SPOM pp. 109-10 why is Derrida so late to Marx? he believes in political virtue of contretemps

p. 204 ghost is there [re: de-limitation of critique] in the opening of the promise, before its first apparition, from the first it will have come second, deux fois à la fois, itérabilité originaire, virtualité irréductible de cet espace et de ce temps

POO p. 132n Poe [Purloined Letter] tells the secret twice, w/out same secret being penetrated, matter of trace, secret can be announced w/out being revealed or secret is manifest but still in need of translation

POOF p. 1 contretemps, 2x, plus d’un, 2 moments at the same time [my friends, no friend]

pp. 14-5 time of surviving (btwn mourning & its possibility) gives itself in withdrawal, self-delivers, self-effaces 2x—constancy & beginning again: indefinite repetition of inaugural moment, keeps memory & anticipates > contre-jour of this contretemps, condition/possibility of friendship

pp. 16-7 hexis, contretemporal habitus: yoke-effect (l’effet de joug), binds 2x in same time: duration & omnitemporality, marks/hides in masking—another name for psukhé > hexis insufficient for friendship, remains a simulacrum

——analogy btwn spirit (nous) & animal body inscribes in living body habitus of this contretemps

p. 24 terrible but so just law of contretemps

pp. 172-73 difference btwn talking to them [o my friends/enemies] & speaking of them [there are no friends/enemies]: world of difference, fort/da, record their absence after having called

——the contretemps [appealing to other presupposes his presence, allows him to come, while distancing/retarding his arrival] dictates, as insane as it is inevitable, the teleiopoetic sentence > expectation of Messiah as unbearable terror: hatred of what is thus awaited?

p. 250 temporal torsion [O my friend, no friend, contretemps], dissymmetry envelops theoretical knowledge in performativity of prayer it could never exhaust, we return to question of the response

BL p. 212 from title to incipit [re: Vor dem Gesetz], 2 moments, repetition, the same > dividing of letter, “it [the repetition itself] splits the boundary by dividing its line”

A p. 65 death, impossible simultaneity (where one and the other arrive together), contretemps

PAS PAS p. (86) intempestive (untimely), that which we are least prepared to follow

p. (106) you want to lose your name, and w/ tout autre calculus, you don’t want to get out of it

PPHS p. 71 when Being is presence, sign can only be a transition, lieu de passage, (provisional) bridge btwn 2 moments of full presence, the bridge can be relevé

DS pp. 191-92 never has anteriority of 1st (simple) over 2nd (double) been displaced by a metaphysical system, double de-presents, il le multiplie par suite, le double vient après le simple, the flesh & blood, l’image survient à la réalité > this is ontology

——priority of art over nature still privileges order 1 then 2, the preference, the precedence (pré-séance) of the imitated

p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text, yet desire for reappropriation, structural site of theological trap, is produced, nourished, in very act of separating from it

——mark (same word as margin or marche): word and blank between words > marked twice

p. 277 difference is the necessary interval, suspense btwn 2 outcomes, “lapse of time” btwn 2 shots, rolls, chances > a game of chance forever new, a play of fire forever young > fire & games (via Nietzsche, Heraclitus), play of luck w/ necessity: a hymen btwn chance & rule

ROP pp. 101-02 for Foucault, psychoanalysis oscillates on both sides of dividing line, in two places, two times, at same time (but he does not think these two times w/ structural possibility of event)

p. 109 untimeliness always disturbs the contemporary who reassures him/herself in a “we” > this “we,” our “we,” is not its own contemporary

ATIA p. 5 contretemps of 2 nudities w/out nudity: 1) animal in non-nudity because nude 2) man in nudity so no longer nude

SW pp. 315-16(n) [re: Exodus 26:31] there are 2 veils/curtains btwn [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle & [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle of tabernacles [of holies/of sanctuaries] > 1st embroidered by artist, 2nd merely the work of a carpenter

pp. 343-44 bookmark the fringes, they served once to accomplish a commandment, may another be accomplished w/ them [Kitsour…] > that’s what I’m doing, à contretemps, et signe et livre et date

DPi pp. 55-6 contretemps of “too soon,” “too late” — essential anachronism of DP

RM p. 59 WM marks itself off from making death or dead metaphor its watchword (mot d’ordre) [Ricouer’s accusation] by saying there’re 2 deaths/self-destructions of metaphor > 2 deaths means problem of death is infinitely complicated

PJP p. 173 d’avoir perjuré en jurant: 2 moments of perjury envelop each other; was the promise not to lie, the swearing, truthful?

——the 2 moments are rigorously distinct & strangely indiscernible: difference of times inscribed under law, contract, this law is the Law itself (annuls the difference, sublates into fidelity of oath)

——ultimate resource/fatality of the anacoluthon: multiplicity of times, instants, interruption time inscribes in “me” > the perjurer can always ask to be excused

D p. 330 two is no more an accident of one than one is a secondary surplus of zero (or vice versa): reconsider notion of accident, secondariness, surplus

ATM pp. 156-60 Levinas’ 2 instances of “en ce moment même,” le même moment: one belongs to the dialectic, the other has an infinite advance on the 1st, differs/defers it, and yet it is the same

p. 162 no tear (déchirure) possible in Levinas’ text w/out a certain notching (échancrure) of the 2nd moment, and certain contamination btwn the 2 > he likes the tear he detests contamination

AD pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (l’entretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech

OG p. 255 (360) impossible to describe continuity, passage, from inarticulate to articulate, pure nature to culture, plenitude to play of supplementarity > Rousseau attempts to reconcile (concilier) the 2 times after describing the birth, the being-born, of supplement

FWT p. 70 “no doubt it will always be necessary to kill animals, and probably humans too, even after the universal abolition of the death penalty”

p. 89 Schmitt’s “partisan war” equivocates, poisons, borders of abolition of DP, which are limited to national penal law

p. 142 abolitionism [of DP’s paradoxical transcendentalism] must attempt history of blood w/in history of concept of exception, and a history of cruelty [not all cruelty is bloody, i.e. grausam]

DPi p. 30 literature (past 3/4 centuries) coincides w/ abolitionist thought > risky hypothesis

p. 48 w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

p. 75 abolitionism: Christian force, or, like Camus says, atheist humansim?

p. 76 only/always by limiting sovereignty of states will DP be put in question

p. 79 U.S. (& China) will come under more pressure to end DP [?]; p. 80 apparent teleology of abolition movement seems to tend toward international criminal court (to which states consent to abandon sovereignty) > long way off

p. 82(n) abolitionism is fragile/deconstructible when it maintains the right to kill in war

p. 100 Hugo (on French Revolution): once there’s peace, no more DP > Hugo: “inviolability of human life” > [Hugo aware of rhetoric of address, of apostrophe]

p. 102 Hugo (conscious of historical responsibility of writer/literature): writers of 18th century destroyed torture; writers of 19th century will destroy DP; p. 104 destroy it w/ divine hammer of pen > profoundly Christian stance, btwn profound flourish & faith, for intérieur

p. 105-06 for Hugo, responsibility, sacred right of writer—cosmopolitical

——writer’s right a right that gives the right to go beyond rights, “civil disobedience”; for Hugo, DP too human, abolition is divine law

p. 120 for Hugo, inviolability of human life—an inalienable property > right of property over one’s own life no less sacred than patrimonial right of family (domicile as right of property)

pp. 121-22 for Huge, abolition of DP as a virile man’s task > a revolutionary Christian theodicy

pp. 128-29 split in Christianity both in fervor for (Kantian human dignity) & against DP [flowers of evil?]

pp. 129-30 abolitionists as eternalists fearing death, full of guilt [suspicion of a Nietzschean/Baudelairean cast], the evil of finitude, fallible finitude > for Baudelaire, these fearful men confess w/symptom of their abolitionism, an infinite protest against mortality

——for Kant, life for life’s sake is unworthy of human dignity, failure to inscribe death in law, return to animal (feminine)

p. 132 Baudelaire: “abolishers of the death penalty—very interested parties no doubt”

p. 133 for Kant, DP inscribed in law (categorical imperative of penal law) in name of absolute, endless disinterestedness (is this a reactive moment of resentment?)

——DP defenders & abolitionists: war of resentment?

p. 133 Derrida disagrees w/ Baudelaire’s take on abolitionists, but feels his suspicion is indefinitely necessary re: hypocrisy & symptomal ruses that agitates/animates defenders of just causes

p. 140 how can abolitionism relate itself to a faith grounded on the example of a death sentence [Christianity]?

p. 141 both abolitionists & Kant speak of price, value, dignity above Marketpries > for Kant, jus talionis is pure equivalence not revenge, impersonal principle of reparative justice

p. 160 following Freud & Nietzsche, since originary sadistic cruelty has no contrary, surpassing cruelty w/ apparent non-cruelty would merely be a surpassing in cruelty > isn’t Beccaria’s proposal more cruel than Kant’s?

p. 184 Hugo: “shoot a woman?”

p. 187 Hugo: “but one sublime hour to erase all the terrible hours” [Derrida’s reading this differently? divine law?]

p. 188 for Hugo, seed of abolition (germe always goes together w/ teleology), abolition will happen, a magnificent advance, advance is credit: make civilization a loan in advance > promise

——spirit of revolution makes an advance to spirit of civilization

pp. 188-9 Hugo: almightiness of logic against DP will end up triumphing

pp. 189 Hugo’s “yes! yes!” of abolition would have to wait until 1981

pp. 190-91 would abolition of DP still be w/in economy of DP?

pp. 191-92 sans sang (U.S., Eucharist—real presence of blood of God): interiorization of blood in noncruel DP > turning point as a return, ce trop ou ce trope of blood

p. 201 DP abolition will be long & interminable (we’re not as naive as Hugo)

p. 201n for Hugo, Christ’s law (blood of Christ, good blood) often confused w/ natural law—Christ’s heart will transform written, positive law > it’ll be spiritualized by gentle law of Christ

p. 202 Hugo’s “inviolability of life” a principle of life that sentences death sentence to death

pp. 207-08 Hugo’s abolitionism: disappearance of social order of past (priest, executioner, king), but order remains, what counts is what remains, the reste, of the turning, of the Christian Aufhebung

——Hugo: “cross will be substituted for the gallows”

pp. 208-09 the logic of Aufhebung’s remainder & fact that Christianity, unlike Judaism/Islam, is also an immanentist humanism (mediation of God made man) > brings Camus’ atheistic abolitionism closest to Hugo’s Christological transcendence

p. 213 gallows erected “on Christendom” was founded on Christendom, betrayed it, put its spirit to death, which must be resurrected

p. 214 Hugo: revolution does not get rid of DP

***p. 249 if killing & suicide are linked to same instinct (banal, equivocal argument), would abolition of DP frustrate society’s promise to kill you when you kill someone else > a diabolical proposition & formidable

pp. 254-55 I [Derrida] am against the DP, I am interested in saving my neck, the life I love: and by “I,” I mean “I,” me, and also whoever says “I” in its place or in mine: ultimate resource of my interest in the end of DP—an interest so originary/primordial, it risks being shared by supporters of DP?

p. 256 go from quasi-tautological opposition of life to death, general preference of life itself, to more specific opposition to DP

——it belongs to life not to be immortal, but also to have a future where instant of death is not calculable

——to be against DP is to be against calculation, calculable decidability of you will die on such and such a day, at such and such an hour > no future w/ anticipation of calculable instant > “my life” must keep a relation to the coming of the other as coming of the to-come (venue de l’à-venir)

pp. 258-59 phantasm of end of finitude, the other side of an infinitization, is constitutive of finitude outside any real scene of verdict/DP [?] > DP thus an acting out or an effect of truth re: our own dreams of infinite survival assured by a calculated, decisive, interruption: in these dreams we play the role of judge, jury, executioner, assistants, the condemned > force of this phantasm so strong will probably guarantee forever the double survival of DP and abolitionist protest > phantasm one w/ belief in God, as long as there’s God, there’ll be those for/against DP

——terrifying solidarity btwn abolitionism & DP: what then is indemnity? what is condemnation?

***p. 262 Derrida is seeking path outside Christian dialectic of DP & abolitionist protest

p. 265 Beccaria’s human justice, utilitarianism (divine justice is inaccessible to men, only God can put to death): equality & common utility are nature of human justice

pp. 282-83 still be eating flesh in vegetarianism (will eat waiting for Christ, assimilate his blood as commanded, how can one love w/out being tempted to take it w/in oneself: Love & Eucharist), still be DP after abolition, other figures will be found for it

p. 283 nursing no illusion should not prevent us from being militant, this is composure (le sang-froid), courage, militate w/ cool heads (de sang-froid) [Derrida occupying position of the condemned and the abolitionist], grace, passion, love, J.C., as copy or abyss of exemplarity > Derrida doesn’t care if he’s imitating Christ, he wants to save what is left of life

DPi p. 121 “right to life (laissez-les-vivre),” in name of Christ, in name of human life > must interrogate why these militants usually for DP

pp. 124-27 for Kant, maternal infanticide (putting to death child born out of wedlock) & death in duel not punishable by death (former, to save honor of feminine sex)

——put to death child born outside marriage because outside law (ignore annihilation of contraband merchandise, i.e. child out of wedlock)

——for Kant, justice finds itself here in double bind, knot: either honor (Ehrbegriff) is vain or DP should simply be set aside > Die Auflösung dieses Knotens: no more DP when law (CI) & nature align

——no more need to not DP women, they’ll never marry out of wedlock (Derrida adds: extraordinary & stupid uselessness, rigor & absurdity of Kant’s logic)

p. 156 God sentenced Jesus to death for being an illegitimate child (a paternal version of Kant’s infanticide)

DST DST pp. 319-20n delay as inevitable, delay re: one’s “own” birth, experience of “abortion” > a subject that cannot identify itself because ineluctably delayed [Lacan’s human born prematurely]

p. 321n abortive: a brith takes place w/out taking place: event of a singular failure, “comes to itself only to lose itself” [re: Lacoue-Labarthe on Reik’s theory of autobiography]

HST pp. 408-09 substitution, cloning, series; where does human begin? abortion: subject hôte-hostage, clone w/out father?

GOD pp. 70-1 Dome of Rock, House of Lord in Jerusalem, place of dispute btwn monotheistic faiths of transcendent God, absolute other; they fight over it w/ fire & blood (now, more than ever)

——interpretations, reading, tradition of Isaac’s sacrifice have become sites of holocaustic sacrifice

——machines of death that wage a war w/ no front

——orders of responsibility in sacrificial war of religions of Book and beyond: ethico-political, theologico-political, secret/public, profane/sacred

p. 125 God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, not the God of philosophers of ontotheology, but one who interrupts & retracts his order

p. 141 Judaic God repents, feels remorse, takes back his commands—i.e. the flood, his gesture resembles a confession, a plea for forgiveness [Christ is constantly taking back?]

FK p. 91 fundamental difference btwn 3 original “great monotheisms”: Islam doesn’t concern itself w/ Levinas’ “God is the future” or Heidegger’s “last god” announcing himself in every absence of future

SPOM pp. 72-3 in the Middle East, war of “appropriation[s] of Jerusalem” [is today the world war] mobilize “the most archaic and most modern spectral forces”

——Middle Eastern violence as unleashing of messianic eschatologies, infinite combinatory of holy alliances

——re: these holy alliances, Marxism remains indispensable and structurally insignificant

HASD pp. 30-1 a negative theology & its ghosts in a tradition neither Christian nor Greek? i.e. what of Jewish, Islamic negative theology? question resonates in internal desert, certain void

p. 53 Jewish, Islamic traditions connect name of God w/ name of place [?]

S p. 111 wouldn’t Jews, Moslem, Christians respond to Heidegger’s retrait, flame and fire-writing in promise? [messianic echoes]

FWT p. 165 Derrida pursues necessity of hyper-atheological discourse, while ceaselessly meditating on Abrahamic culture w/out trying to destroy/disqualify it

ATIA p. 101 beneath its mechanistic indifference, Cartesianism belongs to Judeo-Christian-Islamic sacrificial war against animal

pp. 101-02 anthropocentric sacrificial tradition as Epipromethean-Islamic-Judaic-Christian

HST p. 369 in Massignon’s “The 3 Prayers of Abraham…”, monotheistic religions issued from patriarch who came to earth as “stranger, a hôte, gêr”

pp. 370-71 acc. Massignon, Islam looks to Abraham more than Christianity > Islam is most faithful, exemplary heir, of the hospitality of hôte Abraham > Iqrā: right of hospitality

p. 373 Massignon: Abraham’s hospitality as a sign announcing the gathering of all nations

CF pp. 19-20 St. Paul ‘politicized’ primary injunctions of Abrahamic religions: “no longer foreigners nor metic in a foreign land, but fellow-citizens w/ God’s people, members of God’s household” (Ephesians II. 19-20) > cosmopolitanism

pp. 28-9 theater of forgiveness, the singular Abrahamic language becoming universal idiom of law: agent & symptom of internationalism

——act of memory, appearance (comparution) before juridical instant, Nation-State tribunal

BSi p. 313 Abrahamic commencements: 1) Bereshit, Genesis—animals before man 2) en arkhē en o logos, sovereign all-powerful creator of everything, Head, fiat of a logos producing zōē, light, phōs

p. 320 acc. Heidegger, logos becomes Jesus by way of Philo, who attributed to logos function of mediator (mesitēs) > distancing logos from its Greek originarity (what holds contraries together)

pp. 320-21 ten commandments (oi deka logoi), logos as kērux, kērigma, holy proclamation, also logos as angelos, herald, gospel, logos of redemption, logos of eternal life, logos of zōē, i.e. Christ

p. 343 logocentrism: forced hegemony of logos as speech, a “European” operation, logocentrism of Abrahamic languages > everything organized based on forced translations

SPEC pp. 260-61(n) Indra–Varuna (Abraham–Isaac-like) interlace their names w/out revenir sur eux-mêmes (not a ring) > cannot close, so enclose each other > always a [double signature]

OOG p. 149 for Husserl, absolute is passage (historicity as passage of Speech, primordial Logos toward polar Telos)

——every return to the origin, an audacious move toward the origin (circulation, anticipation)

——Husserl’s method: bring [passage] to consciousness, Selbstbesinnung, Verantwortung, avoid risk of inauthenticity, loss of Speech, light

GSP p. 322n Husserl: transcendental ‘Absolute’ is not ultimate, it constitutes itself and has the ultimately, truly absolute as its primeval source (Urquelle)

***GT p. 7 oikonomia would always follow the path of Ulysses, return home to part chosen, destiny commanded (moira), the being-next-to-self of the Idea in absolute knowledge as odyssean, nostalgia of reappropriation

LOBL p. ~128 in one’s most mournful glory: “turn oneself into a mouthful,” swallow oneself so as to be close to oneself, absolute knowledge [this is from GLAS]

SPOM p. 44 ends of philosophy, Blanchot: accomplishment of absolute knowledge, its theoretical suppression linked to its practical realization, the nihilist movement in which all values are engulfed, culmination of metaphysics as precursor sign of something else

HERP p. 165 Heidegger’s carry the friend bei sich (with oneself) same expression used by Hegel for the concept remaining (bleibende) bei sich in absolute knowledge

EM p. 121 (144) nous: assures proximity to itself of central being for which circular reappropriation is produced; nous: unity of absolute knowledge and anthropology, God & man, of onto-theo-teleology and humanism

——“l’être” et la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et l’humanisme

VM p. 316n “alterity, difference, and time are not suppressed but retained by absolute knowledge in the form of the Aufhebung”

PP pp. 107-08 (122-23) on eve of Platonism, morning after Hegelianism, we cannot “overturn (renversées)” or “reject” philosophia, epistēmē in name of writing, we can displace, we can “mime absolute knowledge” > what philosophy would call simulacrum

***VP p. 87 w/in the metaphysics of presence, we believe in absolute knowledge as closure or the end of history, it has taken place, consciousness of self in infinity of parousia, this history’s closed

p. 88 what “begins” “beyond” absolute knowledge: unheard-of thoughts, sought across the memory of old signs [Derrida writes sa clôture, cf. GLAS]

T p. xxv how to put one’s hands on tympanum so it can escape from hands of philosopher, so he can no longer recognize his phallogocentrism [play w/ mains, maintenant, maintain], no longer rediscover himself, no longer able to say: I will have anticipated it w/ absolute knowledge

DS p. 219n Hegel: curtain hanging before inner-world is drawn away, go behind it ourselves to see [curtain-raising of philosophical we, subject of absolute knowing]

ATIA pp. 146-47 Heidegger: Descartes’ desire to make philosophy an absolute science is in the spirit of absolute knowledge [but Heidegger remains Cartesian]

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

——point of ontotheological fusion reduces precipitation & after-affect (dehiscence btwn vouloir-dire & writing, anticipation & recapitulation) to sublatables [mouvement de tête]

p. 54 if one is captive to formulas and absolute knowledge, can’t think anything outside the whole, not even its mimetic double

——if we can question and think about formula of absolute knowledge, the “part” then is bigger than the whole, strange subtraction of a remark, dissemination would then constitute the whole as a totality-effect

WAP p. 64-5 working w/ Bourdieu’s idea of objectification, Derrida sees an infinite task: “objectifiable” is not objectifiable: always exceeds scene of visibility

——achievement of “complete objectification” would ensure sociology’s absolute hegemony, i.e. absolute knowledge

SW p. 317 absolute knowledge will not accept that there will be nothing behind the curtain (in the veiled place of le tout autre: nothing that is in the present)

pp. 353-54 absolute knowledge not man’s thing but that of sericulture [?] > silkworm comes back to itself in its odyssey, wraps itself in its own shroud, kind of absolute knowledge: beyond any coupling, any sexual difference or rather duality of the sexes > [Derrida’s bestiary starting up]

DPi p. 226 in absolute knowledge time is Tilgen not Aufheben (not merely sublated but suppressed)

RGE p. 275 Aufhebung: produced entirely w/in system/work of signification, from one infinite determination to the next, each one conserved in the other, transitions produced by anxiety of infinity—included w/in circle of absolute knowledge, never suspends totality of discourse (work, meaning, law), never exceeds its closure > restricted economy, circulation of prohibitions: history as truth of prohibitions

pp. 275-76 [vis-à-vis Bataille’s paradigmatic displacement, never done before: Derrida’s simili-transcendental] “we” of absolute knowledge, vulgar & natural, naive consciousness: encloses itself in circle in order to know sense, where it comes from and where it is going to

HLP p. 41 absolute lie [Arendt] still supposes absolute knowledge

+R p. 179 ça (quoi?) aura/marché

LI p. 110n ça, sa, Id, savoir absolu, sign of Saussurean signifier, s.a. (speech act), sa (feminine pronoun)

TN p. 145 Merleau-Ponty: “absolute knowledge is not detachment, it is inherence,” “intuition is definitely not simply coincidence or fusion any more, it is extended to ‘limits’”; p. 343n M-P, acc. Derrida, still coincides—even w/ a “non-coincidence”

BSi p. 148 if bêtise not an error (bad judgment) but hebetated (dulled) judgment, aptitude for wrong judgment, it could be there in absolute knowledge [stupidity of encyclopedic knowledge]

p. 159 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] bêtise of hunting bêtise, seeing only bêtise; absolute knowledge as very element of becoming-bête, as sovereignly bête

pp. 173-74 Ronell: philosophy & stupidity, nothing more stupid than Hegel’s absolute knowledge

p. 278 don’t we need to know what knowledge is absolutely before we know absolute knowledge?

p. 288 as soon as there is absolute knowledge, everything prescribed for Sun King as a program [the king, the historian, the reader—who isn’t manipulated by history like a marionette?]

OG p. 26 (41) absolute knowledge effaces writing in logos, it is the retrieval (résumption) of trace in parousia, the metaphysics of the proper, reappropriation of difference

——though [eschatological] Hegel reappropriates trace in absolute knowledge, he is also the thinker of irreducible difference, last writer of book, first of writing > reintroduced necessity of written trace in philosophy, rehabilitated thought as the memory productive of signs

p. 286 (405) Hegel’s (folly) formula must be taken à la lettre: history is nothing but the history of philosophy, absolute knowledge is fulfilled (accompli) > what exceeds this closure is nothing, neither presence of being, nor meaning, history, philosophy—but [this nothing, writing] announces itself w/in thought of this closure, a place in the text which philosophy does not command

ATAP p. 91 [quoted from GLAS p. 198 (222)] absolute knowledge as phantasm of absolute self-having (s’avoir absolu), to be(come) (être-devenir), in a word, bander (bind, bandage, hard-on), son propre mors [Nietzsche’s “become hard”] [cf. CIN pp. 56-8 swallow another to speak his/her commands]

KH p. 116 [re: a logic of living memory in Timaeus] effacement (of secondary impressions) would be the figure for the middle (mil-lieu), both for space and time, would not affect originary impression (that of child), ineffaceable once engraved in virgin wax

***——what about a virgin wax that is always virgin, always older, preceding any possible impression, and thus younger, achronic, anachronistic [cf. SW pp. 322-23]

MONL p. 61 translate memory of what was forbidden, did not take place, left a trace, mark, scar

p. 62 political decision in writing & reading: inscribe undecidable (chance, terror) in ipseity of host, avoid temptation to make prior-to-the-first-language a language of the master (new master)

p. 64 prosthesis of origin: prior-to-the-first time of pre-originary language must be invented

p. 65 entirely other prior-to-the-first language, zone outside law, degree zero-minus-one of writing, leaves a phantomatical map

R p. 84 eventfulness of the to-come exceeds the performative, my ipseity, unforseeable coming of the other (greater & older than I am), heteronomy, responsibility and decision of the other (greater and older than I am)

SPOM p. 25 is a day infinitely foreign to vengeance [w/out it], heterogeneous at its source, to come or more ancient than memory itself? impossible to decide, today: “the time is out of joint”

pp. 30-33 [via Heidegger on dikē, on gift w/out debt] heterogeneity of pre—, absolute precedence rendered to singularity of other, irreducible possibility of Un-Fug, anachronic disjointure, what comes before me, as in, comes from the future: the very coming of the event

POOF pp. 37-8 the to-come disjoins itself, disjoins the self that would yet join itself in this disjunction > to-come more ‘ancient,’ ‘older,’ than the present

p. 65 future is not just the new, but the work of the arch-ancient, repetition

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

p. 287 Nietzsche’s Superman: awaited because he is origin/cause of man, Ursache, this friend promised via messianico-teleiopeotic perhaps, immemorially past > this friendship to come would still be too human, still deserves name ‘friendship’ [anthropological, humanist character of friendship is situated/delimited here, friendship of proximity/presence]

***MPM p. 19 de Man’s affirmation of memory, an alliance or ring more ancient, secret, resistant than familial or strategic alliances it makes possible, but is never reduced to

p. 37 allegorical metonymy—where part stand for whole and for more than whole it exceeds

——parts of memory [traces] that seem greater & older than us, pregnant w/ other: manifests in open but nocturnal space of agora, plus de lumière [Nietzsche’s not bright but open horizon]

——no choice but to let other speak, cannot make other speak w/out other having already spoken > in trace, part greater/less than whole

p. 58 for de Man, memory of traces of a past never present, which always remain to come—from the future, this promise of resurrection of anterior past, is a formal element, place where fictions & figures are elaborated

***pp. 61-2 de Man: memory of present is “a forgetting or a suppression of anteriority,” “memory effaces remembrance”

p. 66 promise of the other (for the future, trace of the future) made to the other as an absolute past, the other’s sur-vival exceeds the “we” of a common present: brings together two friends, “incredible scene of memory,” written in absolute past; dictates madness of amnesic fidelity, forgetful hypermnesia, gravest and lightest

p. 85 “even if this memory of prefiguration were possible, we know that it would offer no ‘anteriority’ that was not fictive or figural; it could only ‘suppress’ or ‘forget’ it”

p. 95 singular aporia that divides the act, can’t be mastered, commits us before any active commitment on our part, impossibility of promise, uncontrollable > faktum, “older”

——no act before speech, no speech before act > there is this not natural “fact,” faktum, to which we’re recalled: already there, past never present, historicity itself, “ancientness” w/out history

p. 137 there is no beyond-the-undecidable, remains to be thought, incalculable order of tout autre, there is no inside-the-undecidable, but an other (singular) memory calls us w/out leading us back to any anteriority > there never existed an older, more original “third term”

p. 140 memory w/out anteriority, w/out origin, cannot become a Heideggerian theme

A p. 34 absolute arrivant, no more commands than commanded by memory of originary event where archaic is bound to final extremity (telos, eskhaton)

VM p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

p. 82 can the other of the Greek be named non-Greek? pensée pour laquelle le tout du logos grec est déjà survenu (erupted), humus apaisé non pas sur un sol, mais autour d’un volcan plus anicen

VP pp. 88-9 could differance (supplement, sign, writing, trace) be more ancient than the originary?

PAS PAS p. (28) “Viens” upsurges (surgit) from a groundless ground (fond sans fond) of an indefinite past

pp. (67-8) “terrifyingly ancient” time, absolute crypt, requires the récit (reciting, it can be a matter of nothing but that), ce récit [of viens], neither relation to the event nor event itself > pas d’événement, pas de concept

p. (79) “from an earlier time (autrefois)” not a date, not past of an event, it’s the structure of a relation to it, the word, the moment

S p. 83 what is later, the latest, can be close to the origin, or return to origin earlier than beginning

pp. 91-2 Derrida uses revenant to describe a Heideggerian passage on Trakl in spite of the metaphysical negativity Heidegger might reject in it: re-venir as the idea of an end before a beginning, originary essence of time kept under veil, guarded in its archi-origin > we are still prisoners of Aristotelian representation of time

p. 130n before the word is the wordless word “yes,” a pre-originary pledge that precedes any engagement in language and action > no erasure is possible for such a pledge (memory before any souvenir), where faith defeats any narrative, la gage engage dans la langue

FWT pp. 4-5 contradictory/uncomfortable double injunction: mad for absolute past, past whose (im)measure that of bottomless memory, while dreading nostalgia, fixation, cult of remembrance: nothing seems desirable save in this injunction > leave life in life & make it live again [this “heir]

DS p. 200 mimodrama is described as anamnesis by Mallarmé, but in reference to a past never present

P p. 113 acc. Kant, pleasure of knowing (which once existed in a time immemorial [absolute past in a Critique?]), a pleasure of the same—mastery of dissimilar, reduction of heterogenous

OS p. 67 differance as a difference older than Being itself, a still more unthought difference than difference of Being/beings > leads to a writing that exceeds all dialectics, w/out history, cause, absence, presence, archia, telos

ATIA p. 24 we’ll have to move continuously along the coming & going btwn the oldest & what is coming > the “again (de nouveau)” and “anew (à nouveau)” of repetition

PS p. 174 approaching archaic, tumultuous ground through a “negative” route, historical in a sense never given thematic value > can’t be tolerated by metaphysical concept of history

FS p. 14 [for deconstruction] history of the work is not only its past, it is the impossibility of the text ever being present > legitimating intention keeps to internal truth, avoids thinking a subjective origin that is not simply psychological/mental

DIF DIF p. 21 Levinas’ trace, enigma of absolute alterity (a past never present), solicits domination of beings (w/in these limits, differance implies Levinas’ entire critique of classical ontology)

p. 22 differance (is) older than ontological difference: outside epochality of Being (outside epoch): no depth to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put to play

SW p. 319 was it even to Christ my poor old incorrigible Augustine finally addressed: “you were w/ me, I was not w/ you, beauty so ancient and new” > or because it is already late?

pp. 322-23 I am so fatigued from knowing truth, that history of the veil—that truth: too old for me, too old like me (however young I remain) > you don’t know the “fatigue” I’m talking about (dreaming of writing in Spanish, forgotten ancestral language)

——infinite weariness of tropes, what do you expect, I want to end it all (protest, attestation, testament, manifesto against the shroud) > no longer write around/in/under folds of truth

p. 324(n) Derrida knows too well how to do the history of veils > there’s the fault: “commencer…à bien faire” (TN. “begin to do too well” or “it’s getting to be too much”); tiresome, tireless, tired out history I’m leaving behind me, running after me

——epuisement recalls the water & the well (le puits) of truth, back to the pit, the hole (puteus)

——has Derrida left no one the right to say the veil has something to hide? that it will suffice to have done w/ veil to access Thing itself (Cause safe & intact)?

pp. 327-28 Derrida’s completely white then yellow tallith; Derrida ought to have pretended to dictate this decision (to have been chosen for choice of white tallith), but verdict is aways of the other: “it is forbidden to be old” [only your fringes are old?]

p. 329 “I’d like to be done w/ mourning [for the veil]…perhaps [H.C.] already succeeded in that”

***p. 331 “immobile archaism of the fantasy [Oedipus?] can outplay w/ its infinite anachronism all the lasers in the world”: (the unconscious) resists translation “in an age of technoscience,” never disarms, nor should we ever > more powerful than technical all-powerfulness

p. 349 signature (operation of poetic writing) must not be absolutely invulnerable: an “I” signs in the place of the wound (the other operates on us w/out knowing)—so virtual that it remains > bears bereaved memory of an unrefusable lesion > seems older than self: you may have forgotten it, but it carries on dictating all the blows of fate (as if we desired even the worst of them)

pp. 353-54 Celan: “Aschenglorie (…) grub ich mich in dich und in dich” > [I in you—love itself] love made itself make love next to watching dreaming child [too old, forbidden to be old, still young]

***pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

REST pp. 329-30 affect of Van Gogh’s painting: army of ghosts demanding their shoes, bottomless memory of a dispossession

DST DST pp. 204 fidelity to the ineluctable, this terrifying form, the already there before me, that which lends itself to all figures and schemas; could there be fidelity w/out the faith called for in this dissymmetry [Levinas]?

——fidelity to the very thing that you who besiege me (qui m’assiégez si nécessairement) couldn’t, did not, avoid (est-ce que cela revient au même?)

PIO pp. 16-7 de Man: unreachable anteriority of allegory, allegory & irony [?], their inauthenticity, distance from totality > they are linked in temporal predicament, the same temporal void

PF p. xxxii concept w/out concept of resistance, brought in line (after twists/turns) w/ desistance, especially restance (restance in Glas: being “nothing,” w/out substance, upsets ontological question “What is it?”—older than distinction btwn “who” and “what”)

TR p. 146 “I beseech you” not to “annihilate” [re: Confessions]: performative eve, arche-peformative before performative, younger & older, support & archive of confession, its subjectile

EJQB p. 71 language is the rupture w/ totality itself (there is an essential lapse, not the nocturnal memory of all language) [letter is the separation/limit]

PSSS p. 252 pleasure/reality principle—same in differance > cruelty drive more ancient than principles?

p. 270 cruel mutation of cruelty: a technical, scientific, juridical, economic, ethical, political, and terrorist policing mutation of our age

——must think a mutation of cruelty, more pscyhoanlaytico; new historical figures of an ageless cruelty, older than man

——think limit/horizon of psychoanalysis (yet to be thought)

p. 280 cruelty there will have been, cruelty before any personal figure, before “cruelty” is an attribute—no one’s fault

D p. 307 opening of presence, “dead surface,” 4th surface, plunged by its “history” into limitless time that is neither “present” nor a “history”

p. 308 double bottom, “theaters of memory,” deprives square of ground (suspended in air)

p. 309 such future perfect makes one text circulate in another, excludes eschatology > future perfect of innumerable imperfect, indefinite past that will never have been present

p. 311 “we,” nonpersonal, limitless, imperfect: I, you, he cut out of a “we” never presented full face (de face)

p. 314 not enough to make air itself appear (call presence to mind), “air” is not a simple medium: opening carved out of it is a closed opening, false exit: a mirror—not any mirror, the tain of…

——once ether (presence of present) has been called to mind: plupresent not merely presence but deformation irreducible to any form (presence, first matter in the last instance)

pp. 324-25 le discurs d’assistance, pluperfect, deconstructs “illusion” of present, unites presence & auxiliary, supports [Plato’s boetheia] ekgonos (dispossessed son), a seed exposed to all violence of writing: you [baby daddy]

p. 326 “I”: passing passageway for permutation, repercussive percussion, full force of writing > d’un coup, triggers (déclenche) tale & keeps (maintient) it in progress

——simulacrum as a force, le simulacre de l’assistance: chambre obscure: feigns to transform the imperfect into present: impossible > et vous entraîne dans un nouveau vertige

p. 329 imperfect, certain aorist, certain unlimitedness, “unreachable double bottom (double-fond insaisissable)”: past of an anterior future, future of an anterior past

p. 334 cited text, prior past still to come

p. 339 already plunged by imperfect into already opened thickness of another text [chiasmatic invagination of borders?]

p. 346 apeiron (the boundless, the aorist, the imperfect)

p. 365 the unique (that which is not repeated—thus, has no unity), the inummerable, call it the present, is thus apeiron, the unlimited, the crowd, the imperfect

HST p. 407 all poetical declarations of love as sickness of the other? > an other always more ancient and more to come than me, as if I carry w/in me the mourning of me carried by the other

C p. 188 little princeps coffin has no relationship w/ family > and yet, in secret, in an immemorial past that was never present, he engendered this family

p. 195 paradigm most often designates an artificial model that already proceeds from a technē: artifact constructed in the past anterior > fac-simile origin of future anterior of model

TN pp. 96-8 periodization: no cutting, indivisible limit, no simple instant or agency btwn a before and an after (impossible to prove): to find the premises of aftereffects it suffices to sharpen (d’aiguiser) one’s reading [there’s a past from before the markable beginning]

ATM pp. 175-76 the future anteriority of Levinas’ seriasure [each interruption will be knotted w/ another] is an eschatology w/out [beyond/otherwise than] philosophical teleology, appealing to a past anterior to any past; this future anteriority is irreducible to ontology or Hegelian teleology [in spite of irreducible resemblance]

pp. 189-90 WE NEED A NEW BODY, UN AUTRE SANS PLUS DE JALOUSIE, THE MOST ANCIENT STILL (ENCORE) TO COME

E E p. 8 for Kant, science is not art, has no beauty in it, because no pleasure can be taken in it

——yet, in his Introduction, he claims that in an immemorial past, pleasure could not be separated from knowledge, so the Witz (bon mot), the only scientific pleasure, carries this repressed past in it

AD AD p. 69 absolute past: “word of God” —will have taken place before taking place, older than Sinai—truth of messianic exceeds national identity; p. 142n absolute “lateness”: older yes

p. 143n w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God

> à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

p. 103 Levinas: à-Dieu is infinitely older than finite, diachrony of time “being destined” before any act of consciousness, destined as devotion itself, desire refers to à-Dieu, which is more profound, older than cogito

pp. 115-16 ethics enjoins a politics & a law, formal injunction, urgent, does not wait and still interminable (it calculates limitless past & future)

p. 148n Levinas: responsibility w/out concern for reciprocity—commitment from ‘profound past’ of immemorial

OG pp. 66-7 (97) that the “imprint” is irreducible means speech is passive in relation to an absolute past that can never be fully mastered, brought to presence > this passivity of speech is also a relation to the future, but not via anticipation [which would be a mastering of passivity]

p. 70 trace, arche-phenomenon of “memory,” prior to oppositions nature/culture, animal/humanity [Levinas, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud]

EU p. 83 response: initial form & minimal requirement of responsibility > structure of call to responsibility so anterior to any positive response—nonresponse a priori assumes responsibility

SPEC pp. 317-18 death drive, w/out contradicting PP, hollows it out, older, not an other mastery (Herrschaft), but other than master, tout autre (not dialectically opposed to PP as life, living, alive)

p. 350 [re: trauma dreams] exception to law that dream fulfills a wish, exception precedes law, doesn’t contradict it, something older than law w/in law: band over contra-band, or contra-band over a-band, disband, over absolute astricture

CHOR p. 106 questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

KH pp. 103-04 khōra as abyss, mise en abyme, gaping hole, not exactly chaos or fright, but not Gaia, foundation, either > abyss in encyclopedic logic [of Timaeus], regulates all sites (lieux) on its edges (jobs in society, region, territory, country)

p. 148n Heidegger: chaos, khaos, khaine, signifies the yawning, a split in two, close connection to aletheia, abyss which opens

——for Nietzsche, Chaos prevents a humanization (Vermenschung) of existence in its totality

p. 104 mise en abyme of discourse on khōra, site of politics, politics of sites; and other that would not be their other [Hegel’s other]

p. 106 Derrida less concerned w/ art of Plato [re: mises en abyme of khōra and politics] but in a constraint, a programme, the being-programme of the programme, the being-logical of logic: Plato apprehends them as such, though in a dream, put en abyme

p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

——is Socrates someone, something, play of proper names more abyssal than ever, “who are you, Khōra?”

p. 112 en abyme reflected w/out limit, feeling of dizziness, up against inside face of what wall: chaos, chasm, khōra

p. 113 abyss of khōra doesn’t open all at once, fracture of abyss announced in muted, subterranean way, preparing, propagating simulacra & mises en abymes

***p. 119 btwn text & theme, structure w/out an indivisible origin > theater of irony, w/out end, w/out bottom [abyss]; to isolate a theme, “philosophy-of-Plato,” would be to violently misrecognize, deny textual scene, questions of topology in general

GOD p. 6 European history gets lost in details, doesn’t think abyss at heart of history that prevents totalization, misunderstands link btwn historicity & responsibility

p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (l’oeuvre)

GT p. 98 “another border already divided itself in indefinite abyssal supplements”

pp. 170-71 Icarus racing toward sun [via Baudelaire], sinking (sombre) not toward the bottom (fond) but toward abyss; unable to give his name, how could he ever claim he knows how to give? has no sepulture thus no proper name > the whole story? all of history?

AF p. 70 indetermination en abyme when Yerushalmi in-determines Jewishness & science one by the other

POO p. 7 duplicity in a ceremony, being-double, “hollows itself out in an infinite abyss:” one is neither friendly nor polite if one obeys the rules

p. 8 the duplicity before the rule makes one tremble, an other who will seek to hold you back or push you into void, save you or lose you, supposing there ever a choice?

SPOM p. 33 good conscience loses chance of abyssal desert, “desert in desert,” chaotic desert as open mouth, coming of other (messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy) [see p. 209]

POR p. 9 (137) abyss, hole, Abgrund, empty “gorge”: impossibility for a principle of grounding (reason) to ground itself

p. 17 (150) strategic rhythm of new [professorial?] responsibility: multiple sites (lieux), rhythm of blinking eye (d’un battement de paupières), play one risk off other, la clôture contre l’abîme, l’abîme contre la clôture [hard eye (of reason) has no rhythm, no heart beat, no arrêt of sur-vie]

MPM pp. 10-1 if memory maneuvers btwn law and Being, can one think the being and law of memory? these questions move through transference & translation, above abyss; require impossible passageways: “the fragile resistance of a span” [hymen?]

POOF pp. 143-44 [Schmitt has just led us to the abyss of the partisan] Derrida feigns restraint, one can only speak of the abyss from the shore, then he screams, swallows all assurance, voiceless talk of politics: Rwanda, Italy, ex-Yugoslavia, Palestine, Cambodia, Ukraine, the ‘Clipper’ chip…

p. 281 Nietzsche’s hermit too attracted to the depths, nostalgic for elevation—dreams of a friend to gain altitude > friend’s nostalgia: wish to believe in other, wishing in vain to believe in ourselves > Derrida links this nostalgia to the Heideggerian nostalgia at origin of philosophical philía: elle nourrit [fires?] donc l’envie à l’égard de l’autre comme de nous-mêmes, we envy each other, love as the attempt to leap beyond this envy

A p. 30 abyssal inquiry re: Heidegger’s delimitation of death, modes of ending, more than one limit, ends of man an indestructable (increvable) subject > death of Dasein not end of man, btwn the 2 there’s a divisible limit, perhaps, of ending, place where ending ends [?]

EM p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (l’espace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being), “an alternative always suspended over its ‘own proper’ abysm”: it is the text of dissemination

SEC p. 325 general possibility of “parasite”: 1) trap (piège), failure (échec), abyss outside/in front of language, ditch (fossé), place of external perdition, which language can avoid, sheltered by (à l’abri de) its essence or telos? 2) or is this risk, internal and positive condition of its possibility, this outside its inside?

——Austin makes us accept as ordinary a teleological and ethical determination > univocality of statement, self presence of total context, transparency of intentions, presence of meaning—absolute singular oneness of speech act

PP p. 169 abyss of trembling w/in the pharmakon

S pp. 95-6 Heidegger on Trakl’s avoidance (vermeiden) of word “geistig”: is contrary opposed to material, names abyss (abîme, Kluft) btwn suprasensible (noeton) & sensible (aistheton) > Heidegger is condemning the degradation of “spiritual” into the “rational,” “intellectual,” “ideological”

PAS PAS p. (86) near depthless abyss in mise en scène of “Viens”

***FWT pp. 120-21 logic of exemplarity leads to an abyss (figurality undermines the entire question) [re: those w/ self-hatred resembling Jews]

WM p. 262n TN. Bass gives a good account of mettre en abyme alongside abîmer: the former an endless reflection (heraldic term, escutcheon and on), the latter the ruination or plunging into abyss > “figurative of ruination”: when distinction btwn reflected/reflecting falls apart

DS p. 202 a system that is closed-in on itself would be checked by a safety-catch (un cran d’arrêt)——wrong to interpret Mallarmé’s Mimique as oriented toward its abysses, its false bottoms, as if they were pretextual referents > a writing that refers back only to itself is some other writing

p. 265 hymen is not a phenomenon—it folds itself back into the antre, which is an abyss

——mark upon mark, text w/in text, margin in mark (endless repeat): an abyss

——writing en abyme, abyss will never have glint (l’éclat) of phenomenon > becomes white or black, l’un et/ou l’autre au carré de l’écriture

p. 281n opposition btwn metaphor & metonymy is purely semantic—deconstructed by superficial, profound, that is abyssal operation of versification (vers, vers—sens—vers, versus, verre), morcelante et reconstituante (hiver, pervers, envers, travers, vertige, rêve)

P p. 24 the circle & the abyss: circle en abyme

p. 27 is there an abyss in Hegel? (circle in a circle not necessarily abyssal) for there to be an abyss the smallest circle would have to inscribe in itself the figure of the largest [es gibt, il y a]

p. 33 all this talk of circles has drawn us toward the abyss, abyss can come to saturate what it hollows it

p. 34 undecidability of abyss: bottom-less & bottom of bottom, “filling up the abyss” > satire of abyss, comic effect

p. 36 Kant looking for a bridge from sensible to supersensible (an analogy), a symbol—that crosses/closes abyss

——bridge (Brücke) not an analogy, concept/effect of analogy makes the bridge itself

——analogy of abyss & bridge over abyss require 3rd term, that which heals the gap, a symbol, bridge is symbol, symbol bridge > abyss calls for analogy (active resource of Critique), mais l’analogie s’abîme sans fin dès lors qu’il faut bien un certain art pour décrire analogiquement le jeu de l’analogie

p. 37 economize on the abyss: 1) textual art of reprise, s’épargner la chute en tissant et repliant à l’infini le tissu, multiply patches (pièces) 2) abyssal operation (formalize rules, constrain logic, reappropriate): work toward rèleve & that in it which regularly reproduces collapse

p. 40 Kant: very depths of foundations (Grundlage) of faculty of principles is independent of experience, otherwise it might sink and bring w/ it ruin (Einsturz) > Kant descends to bythos of abyss w/out knowing if it exists

p. 41 desire of reason, desire for the fundamental: desire to go to the bythos

p. 79 Kant: examples are wheelchairs (Gängelwagen) [roulettes] of judgment, those who don’t have enough Mutterwitz, the sick, need these wheelchairs, prostheses that replace nothing

——Hegel: there is play in examples, they play, Beispielen

——Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

p. 89 death’s essential relation to the cut, the hiatus of the abyss, where beauty takes us by surprise

pp. 117-18 in Kant, art of man analogized with art of creator (unity of empirical laws), man has goal before operating, this effaces a priori the sans, the pure cut of free beauty

——connection btwn anthropo-theologism & analogism: course being steered [Spinoza says something quite tangential in Ethics], analogy w/ practical finality is its medium

——analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), l’analogisme recapitule ou recapite

ROP p. 37 going from 3rd to 4th, or from 2 to endless & bottomless divisibility [Mephistophelic word]

***SP pp. 115-19 Heidegger’s abyssal structure of the proper, at once superficial & bottomless (since not fundamental), the proper founders, passes into the other

pp. 119-21 (das Eigentum des Ab-grundes) the proper-ty of the abyss, the abyss of proper-ty, the reorganization of metaphysics around more powerful question of propriation, question of event (Ereignis) uprooted from ontology, where proper is proper to no one, to nothing: is this what Nietzsche’s woman is, style’s form: the no-where, gift as woman’s essential predicate, appears in undecidable oscillation btwn give/take, se donner/se donner-pour > price/value of pharmakon

p. 139 plus d’un spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans l’écart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est l’échéance

***ATIA pp. 30-1 discussion is interesting [re: animals] once limit is abyssal (rather than limit as discontinuity): once frontier is not a single, indivisible line, but more than one internally divided lines (folds, foliations): “what are the edges of a limit that feed on an abyss?”

p. 66 via Valéry’s snake, the “animal abyss” is not a void, it’s too full of being, vertigo, étincelle au lieu de néant, lieu tenant du néant que je suis

p. 83 the abyss of autos, ipseity, autokinesis: we must surrender (get) to the heart of the abyss btwn law of nature (reaction) & law of freedom (response & responsibility)

p. 84 question of response, question of question, where response to question would remain unprogrammable > abyss of “what is a response?”

p. 131 for Lacan, move from animal to human (to speech, to truth, to symbolic order): abyssal concept of a feined feint or pretended pretense (not merely the figure or simple feint)

SW pp. 350-51 theory (beyond theory) of fetishism at moment of verdict, w/ whole history engaged in it (Freud, Exodus, St. Paul, the en abyme of un ver à soie), thought of the event w/out revealed/unveiled truth, w/out phallogocentrism, w/out greco-judeo-paulino-islamo-freud-heidggeriano-lacanian [no christiano!] veil, w/out (un)veiling of phallus

TB pp. 132-33 rhythm, twists & turns from abyss to abyss, deconstructs the tower > madness on both sides (interior/exterior limit) > impossible task: the infinite guilt absolves you immediately

DPi pp. 236-37 we've asked “what is an exception?” “what is cruelty?” “blood?” “man?” “proper to man?” “to humanitarian?” > neither rhetorical nor answerable, these questions showed “the vertigo or the abyss of their own impossibility” > nor did they simply recreate dizziness of hermeneutic circle (which they also did) which accumulates meaning, supposes pre-comprehension [link to imagining the phone call, imminence of verdict]

Gii p. 41 everything Heidegger says about man takes on meaning and value w/in oppositional limit to animal (it is dogmatic and serious)

——man’s hand infinitely removed from prehensile organs through the abyss of its being “durch einen Abgrund des Wesens”

——this abyss: speech & thought

REST p. 290 for Heidegger, metaphorical (?) ground, this is the originary and fundamental experience of the Greeks, more than hypokeimenon > the underneath of the underneath (le dessous du dessous): a thinking of the abyss not mis-en-abyme

——abyss: “un des lieux ou non-lieux prêts à tout porter de ce jeu”

p. 291 how that which is under hypokeimenon opens an abyss (change of direction) > a completely different topic: “more” carries away, thing no longer has value/figure of “underneath”

——Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, l’hymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

pp. 291-92 gift, abyss, offering, there is abyss > essence of Van Gogh’s painting, via Heidegger’s Origin, opens onto an abyss (not attributive certainty, secure ground of [Cartesian-Hegelian] subjectivity)

——Origin an essay on the gift (Schenkung), one of 3 senses in which truth is said to come to its installation, institution, investiture (Stiftung), there’s also the “founding (Gründen)” > this truth which is also nontruth also opens onto the “abyss”

***p. 305 for Heidegger, in Origin, the abyss (Abgrund) plays itself out like “veiled” destiny (fatum) which transfixes (transit) being

p. 312 Shapiro treats shoes as reproduction of real shoes, misses that, for Heidegger, shoes don’t relate to given subjectum, or given world, he won’t be able to avoid the bridge, doesn’t know shoes’re already prosthetic—précipitée dans l’abîme, la sphinge, dès l’instant où l’enflure (turgidity)

——that the shoes can always be someone else’s: “to be in someone’s shoes [in English]”

pp. 329-30 affect of Van Gogh’s painting: army of ghosts demanding their shoes, bottomless memory of a dispossession

p. 342 painting as detachment that loses its footing, says nothing of mise-en-abyme: mise-en-abyme as restituting saturation > “painting in painting”

pp. 344-45 [re: the interlaced correspondence]: interminable overflowing of whole, la surenchère en plus-value de la correspondance débordante (subordante), occurs btwn general element (discourse, writing, painting) & particular determinate element > element worth more than whole, and whole plays the part [metonymy/synechdoche no longer what they are]

——what’s essential for Heidegger is making the overflowing appear by “earth,” “shoes,” “world” > il faudrait les ressaisir à l’instant où le hors-d’usage détaché (relativement déstricturé) donne lieu, a sort of abyssal surplus value, une surenchère sans fond > we can speak of conditions of fetishization of product/work, surplus value forms a truth-effect, useless gives way to speculative exploitation, more than useful (plus qu’utile): useful for grasping usefulness of useful [cf. pp. 339-41 double/triple uselessness (work, product, useless for grasping usefulness)]

——when the detached calls for reattachment: a discourse is sketched, maneuver to call for adherence

DST DST p. 318n to lose track of Darstellung is to lose track of abyssal structure that can always divide & fictionalize it [it being Darstellung?] [re: Lacoue-Labarthe on Heidegger’s use of Gestell]

p. 213 fold or abyssal redoubling: désistance is first of all the désistance of truth: truth never resembles itself, so it resembles mimesis

p. 216 désistance: mimesis or its double, cela même qu’elle double et abîme (what it doubles & engulfs)— alētheia

pp. 218-19 for Heidegger, opposition btwn inadequate/adequate circumscribed by alētheia’s withdrawal—yet, Lacoue-Labarthe’s mimesis haunts alētheia w/ unstable homoiōsis

——abyss of pre-originary mimesis, “precedes” truth, introduces desire for homoiōsis > Derrida explains how, w/ this thinking, Lacoue-Labarthe dislocates Heidegger’s epochal history

PIO p. 413n sponge-towel (serviette-éponge), emblematic story of my name as story of the other, blazon (mise en abyme) of “impossible subject,” fable, another way to make history

RM pp. 75-6 metaphysical unity of opposition determined only “starting from (à partir de)” the re-trait of the trait > the “starting from” s’y abîme lui-même

AFR pp. 85-7 Condillac’s failure to go straight to principle of order, a fault of composition: he did not go straight to it > following order = discovering order: s’abyme, encircles history w/ nature

p. 108 to introduce: seduce the text (not the reader), surprise it close to its content > a rigorous “abyss”

IW p. 245 Rosenzweig sees Cohen as a philosopher-teacher who reminds us of the abyssal risk of thought or existence

p. 246 Rosenzweig associates abyss w/ volcanic fire (eruption), convulsive tremor marking rhythm of flow of lava—tempo of discontinuous rhetoric

PSSS p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds

——this discontinuity calls for a leap, what Classical humanist philosophers call freedom, this interruption gives a chance

D p. 308 double bottom, “theaters of memory,” deprives square of ground (suspended in air)

p. 323 through mirror-effect (germinates/deforms), each sequence of text comprehends another > each part smaller than themselves & greater than the whole they reflect

——figure of quadrangle complicated by strange mirror [imparfait de double fond], mirror as echo that precedes origin it seems to answer > “echo” is an “incision” (X n’étant constitués qu’en retour)

p. 329 imperfect, certain aorist, certain unlimitedness, “unreachable double bottom (double-fond insaisissable)”: past of an anterior future, future of an anterior past

p. 333 expropriation is operation w/in voice

pp. 333-34 in Soller’s Numbers, you are indefinitely referred to bottomlessness, indefinite regress of beginning, which is forbidden along w/ eschatology, archeology, hermeneutic teleology

p. 341 text occupies place before “me,” announces me to myself—une tour de guet (watchtower) planted inside me > like a “transparent column,” pure outside: driven into that which tries to close in on itself > imagine you swallowed a cylindrical mirror, tower of Babel, bottomless plurality, not negative…also phallic [p. 342 in Zohar: “great, ungraspable columns of air”]

***p. 357 thickness (l’épaisseur) of text opens upon beyond of a whole, nothing or absolute outside: its depth (sa profondeur) at once null & infinite—each layer (couche) harbors (en abrite) another

***p. 358 au bord (du vertige), alert to the border itself, infinite depths were also bottomless, perfectly superficial, cube w/out depth

HST p. 381 unsolvable, vertiginous depth of sans-fond, irresistible whirlpool that carries forgiveness, gift, re-giving, re-dealing of forgiveness, to the abyss of the impossible

***p. 400 abyss of non-response to aporetic question: condition of responsibility

***+R p. 155 what happens when a surplus value places itself en abyme?

pp. 157-58 the phrase “what both cuts me off and prompts me (me souffle) w/ all the rest” performs, does what it says it’s doing: framing borders are jumped, margins saturated en abyme

p. 163 into (over) the bargain (the market) (par-dessus le marché), not au-dessus (above) the market (the lure in which you would again let yourself be caught) > puts in play, or en abyme, the destructive simulacra of surplus value

p. 180 en abyme [of representational reproduction] deports referential naiveté [re: Benjamin, comprise btwn painting/photography]

C pp. 187-88 “don’t deliver them from fascination just when they’re falling into the abyss of the infinite—yet nil—distance, the outsize (démesuré) space”

p. 209 Derrida refers to the modesty of stopping at 127, of saying “that’s enough” > satis, sufficient, “satire of the abyss”

p. 224 supplement of consequence contains everything, including abyss

***p. 237 bottomless surplus value: power of capitalization in abyss

TN p. 46 for Nancy, the Thing touches itself when one touches nothing: exact hyperbole (Nancy’s writing) engulfs, exscribes itself (s’ex-crit), s’abîme (sinks)

p. 98 for Berkeley, infinite abyss btwn what we see and what we touch

p. 103 for Nancy, touching the limit > moment of decision

——philosophy, literally, has never touched anything > inversely, all one ever does is touch a limit (destiny of this figurality) [hymen]; to touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a border, an outline

pp. 103-04 touch untouchable-touchable surface/border/limit on exposing edge of an abyss

——philosophy will have “touched” something 2x: limit & unfoundable abyss beneath/beyond it

——there can only be a figure of touch, one only touches by way of figure > the object, the touchable thing, the "thing itself,” is the untouchable (gives itself, opens only in history of figure)

pp. 190-91 Derrida defends Husserl’s stubborn conviction that we can’t know alter-ego, only through analogy, appresentation, that there’s an unbridgeable abyss (abîme infranchissable) > Husserl’s stance prevents risk of an immediate intutionism of the other

p. 299 logic of limit [hymen?]: what lets itself be touched does so on its edge (sur son bord), thus it doesn’t let itself be touched/reached (ne se laisse pas atteindre)—exposing untouchable itself, the other edge of the edge (l’autre bord du bord)

pp. 306-07 eyes meet, infinitely, mouths in contact [unsatisfied w/ insipid figures, however interesting/necessary], thought begins, jusqu’à l’abîme, plunging Narcissus into abyss: makes day or night possible > day and night themselves promising each other, au point du jour

AD p. 114 silence comes to us from abyss; (Kings 19:12-15) “sheer silence”

pp. 114-15 discern edges of abyss: it’s not necessarily a bad abyss

CF p. 50 must forgiveness saturate the abyss (suture, reconcile)? but who could object to imperative of reconciliation? amnesties, work of mourning—political strategy, psycho-therapeutic economy

pp. 53-54 when not insoluble, when I know what to do (program), no decision or responsibility

——an abyss remains and must remain

BSi p. 137 “who” and “what” sink into indifference, into the abyss of who-becoming-what (death)—becoming what we will have always been

pp. 137-38 talk of the bottom (fond), the profound, believing in depth [of “who” or “what”] will never be free from bêtise (stupidity) > sovereign & beast as bottomless bottom, abyss, vertigo

p. 149 if bêtise is not an error [Deleuze’s stance], no pragamatic use of bêtise does not refer (if obscurely) to abyss of jus (justice, justness, judge) [not faulty judgment but judgment of judge, judgment from which one expects some justness]

p. 269 Celan: “whoever walks on his head has heaven beneath him as an abyss (Abgrund)”

p. 334 abyss not a bottom or bottomless depth of hidden base > if there is abyss, there’s plus d’un sol, plus d’un seul seuil, plus d’un seul seul [(no) more (than one) solid, single threshold, single single]

OG p. 69 (101-02) the horizontality of spacing, hollow of differance, discontinuity and discreteness (does not oppose it(self) like surface to depth), a hinge (brisure) marking impossibility of full speech

p. 133 (193-94) Derrida not denying certain roles of writing, but to attribute them to writing specifically and then to exempt speech: “il y a un abîme qu’on ne doit pas franchir aussi allègrement”

p. 157 (226) Rousseau: no intermediary btwn everything & nothing, must substitute

p. 163 supplement as chain itself, theory of textuality, en abyme, structural necessity of abyss, desire of presence born in abyss

p. 183 (261) the dangerous differance, the master name of this supplementary series: death > metonymic substitution horizon & source, abyss from which each threat announces itself

p. 298 (421) “l’abîme, c’est le creux qui peut rester ouvert entre la défaillance de la nature et le retard du supplément” [abyss as delay, hollow, open]; pure law restores (gives back to people) liberty, gives back to presence its sovereignty [sutures abyss], pure law a supplement of supplement

p. (422n) Vico’s 2nd form of writing: heroic emblem [en abyme]

SPEC p. 304 Derrida never wanted to abuse abyss or mise “en abyme,” wary of confidence it inspires fundamentally, too representative to go far enough (pour aller assez loin), or to not avoid the very thing toward which it allegedly rushes (pour ne pas éviter cela même vers quoi elle prétend précipiter)

——still, en abyme of Freud’s writing [re: autobiography in fort/da narrative] has relation of structural mimesis w/ relation btwn PP & “its” death drive—latter hollows out the former en abyme, at origin of origin

p. 321 an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (d’un après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

p. 323 autobiographics of Beyond…, of word beyond [common name], imprints a prescription on fort:da, an overlapping (rapporté) by means of which proximity distances itself en abyme (Ent-fernung)

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

——death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

FV p. 419 literature that puts truth on stage, can it be read by psychoanalysis? abyssal structure, this space overflowed by powers of simulacrum

p. 467 in Lacan, abyss effects are seriously controlled; fiction [only] manifests truth

p. 483 certain psychoanalytic interpretations (invisible framing: frame w/in frame) vs. scene of writing w/ ruined (abîmé) limits

p. 488 mise en abyme of narration [re: Poe]

p. 493 mise en abyme of title [The Purloined…]: the text is the object

VM p. 82 can the other of the Greek be named non-Greek? pensée pour laquelle le tout du logos grec est déjà survenu (erupted), humus apaisé non pas sur un sol, mais autour d’un volcan plus anicen

IW p. 246 Rosenzweig associates abyss w/ volcanic fire (eruption), convulsive tremor marking rhythm of flow of lava—tempo of discontinuous rhetoric

p. 247 coming of an event initiates irruption (volcano), rupture and hence interruption of totalizing synthesis

D p. 301 Sollers: “we are dancing on a volcano”

EL pp. 195-96 imminent, eschatological boiling of a language as volcano: the passion of a sacred language suffering

p. 196 Derrida tempted to collapse abyss & volcano—invisible chasm, catastrophe foments [see D p. 327], one can only interpret (blindly) the fumes that announce what can’t be seen coming

p. 197 does Scholem want shibboleth to get out of abyss (the improbable border, the desert) or to rush into it & be engulfed by it (pour s’y engouffrer)?

pp. 197-98 for Scholem, to fall into an abyss is to become lucid, not to live blindly above it

p. 198 blind sorcerers of secularization conceal abyss (in them abyss is sealed), but au fond de ce sans-fond, the abyss cannot be dominated, tamed

p. 199 (internal/external) edge (bord) of this reading, as on edge of “those abysses of abysses”

p. 201 for Scholem, secularized = pulling out language’s apocalyptic thorn; but secularization does not take place, a surface effect, language still sacred in its abyssal interior

pp. 201-02 secular is a epiphenomenon, surface (rhetorical) effect, a façon de parler

——secular is surface effect, produces the surface on which we sleepwalk, we believe in the surface, but there is only abyss > speak sacred language even in denying it (avoid speaking it)

pp. 213-14 magical power of name: revelation and encrypting (crypte), hides abyss w/in it > to open a name is to find an abyss, abyss as thing itself

——[vis-à-vis Scholem] prayer invokes spirits, the name is more powerful and transcendent than we are > but, to secularize sacred language, we play w/ ghosts [from spirit to ghost]

p. 215 the 2 abysses (of life, of death) (each one en abîme in other): 1) loss of names/signification 2) the abyss into which one falls, revenge for not realizing language/names are abyssal

p. 217 experience of the edge (bord) [sacrifice?], abyss btwn 2 places: sacred & non-sacred

p. 222 question of decision & responsibility (that of our generation) returns (revient) to us out of (depuis) undecidable bottom, which is, au fond, undecidable

CIN p. 53 the cinder like burning semen (semence brûlante), lava destined nowhere, when you take word into your mouth, to breathe

CIR p. 80 “a sleeping water [mother, too human inhuman, mortal immortal] in the henceforth appeased depth of the abyss, this volcano I tell myself I’m well out of”

SPOM p. 103 it has always been acceleration itself [beyond the norms of speed that have until now informed human culture] that dislocates, dislocation no less arch-originary than archaism it dislodges

MPM p. 62 [see p. 88n at what speed ought one to read?] motif of precipitousness in de Man, acceleration to win time, win time over, non-dialectical—not a particular rhythm—a rhythm w/out rhythm (incommensurable acceleration, infinite and null, touches the sublime)

p. 88n Pascal says don’t read too fast or slow—find a rhythm (accelerate toward rhythm)

MSUB J p. 170 to speak of the subjectile, we must speak by insertion and precipitation, acceleration of rhythmical projection [see MPM p. 62] and inscription of projectile, beyond “words and images”

SPOM p. 166 to accuse the other always announces or denounces its imminent return

POOF p. 7 (23-4) Aristotle privileges to love over being loved, active over passive (potential) > Derrida points to a tense btwn active/passive, the question of aimance (lovence) [see pp. 24-5n]

p. 11 Plotinus’ give what you don’t have > receiving a giving? joy of mother not needing to be known (Aristotle) [loving vs. being loved]

VM pp. 315-16n passivity & activity of Husserl’s “constitution,” > not opposed to the encounter; if one rejects his definition, there must be a time/experience w/out “other” before the encounter

DS p. 224 simple opposition btwn activity & passivity (btwn all -er/-ed concepts) becomes too formally weak to encompass graphics of hymen, its spider web, the play of its eyelids

DIF DIF p. 9 differance, middle voice > -ance remains undecided btwn active & passive (i.e. resonance is not the act of resonating), neutralizes what infinitive denotes as active

AFR p. 59 both Condillac and de Biran take repetition for granted, rule of indecision never comes to conception (au concept), a limit which is the concept not a concept: thus, Condillac finds contradiction in activity/passivity, de Biran duplicity in Condillac’s “hesitation”

OG pp. 290-91 (410-11) from Kant to Husserl: Kantian revolution of pure passivity re: pure sensibility—still a linear, geometric, transcendental aesthetic; Husserl’s transcendental kinesthetic blurs lines btwn passive/active, puts all objective space in parentheses > but still living present

MPM p. 150 une parole donnée au nom de l’autre—act of memory, act of faith > or simply an act, impossible act, only act worthy of the name: promise has meaning only w/ death of other, when friend is no longer there > promise not made, but as trace of future it can be renewed

SH p. 46 to bless no one, only chance for an act of faith > otherwise dogma, certainty, judgment

FWT p. 138 how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same

pp. 159-60 successful mourning is failed mourning, is unfaithful: denies alterity of dead other, of death as other, “narcissizes” the dead other > same goes for integration of immigrant/foreigner

——faithfulness prescribes impossibility of mourning at once [St. Augustine’s “I live on for my friend” in POOF]

EJQB p. 76 does not this anxiety [in the book], this war, rest on silence of nonquestion?

——is not the writing of the question, the first violence re: the question, a first response and repose, l’errance (wandering) as history, first crisis, first forgetting, the dissimulation of l’errance?

——nonquestion, act of faith, unpenetrated certainty that Being is a Grammar, world is in all its parts a cryptogram [this nonquestion not yet a dogma]

PSSS p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds

——this discontinuity calls for a leap, what Classical humanist philosophers call freedom, this interruption gives a chance

HST p. 395 since, for Levinas, the will already has relation to betrayal (“harbors treason in its own essence”), its fidelity coming from the other, the idea of a misunderstood will still reveals a relation to exteriority

***LI p. 122 il la faut, an absolute must: “all or nothing” of conceptual language (“it must” translates the faithfulness of my love for philosophy)

KH p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

——is Socrates someone, something, play of proper names more abyssal than ever, “who are you, Khōra?”

p. 115 oral maze inscribed in place which receives everything, Timaeus, addressed to “the one who, as we do, and before us [see p. 117], receives everything,” in this theory of receptions—Socrates

GOD p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (l’oeuvre)

FK p. 64 descent of God ex machina, stage a “transcendental addressing machine”

p. 66 one either responds to an address with absolute faith or reacts resentfully, impossible to tell which is the response, due to one contaminating the other

***p. 80 “without the performative experience of this elementary act of faith, there would neither be ‘social bond’ nor address of the other, nor performativity in general”

FL p. 248 justice addresses itself to the singularity of the other, despite or because it pretends toward universality [?]

MC p. 346 I address you w/out knowing you, something arrives [Nietzsche’s future philosophers]

H pp. 103-105 [on Oedipus’ final mourning] he’s deprived of something in secrecy [of light?], an encrypting of encrypting, in the crypt the address is cryptic

p. 107 Theseus, with Oedipus’ burial secret, becomes a retained hostage, a detained addressee

——everyone is hostage to the dead man (Oedipus)

p. 135 absolute, hyperbolical, unconditional hospitality suspends language, a particular determinant one, and even the address to the other

SPOM pp. xvi-xvii the address “I’m going to teach you to live,” from lips of master, father to son > hesitates btwn address as experience, as education, as taming or training (dressage)

p. 13 Marcellus anticipated la venue d’un autre scholar, had to wait several centuries [for Derrida], one who can think possibility of specter, specter as possibility, who can address spirits, who knows that such is the condition of address, mad enough to unlock such a possibility

p. 64 I accepted address (invitation) “so as not to flee from a responsibility”

HERP p. 182 acc. Aristotle, there must be presence in act of friendship > can exhaust itself in non-address, immediate non-hailing (non-interpellation) [does Heidegger agree? see p. 176]

HASD p. 39 unique address of khora is not a prayer, a celebration, or an encomium, does not speak to You

PAS PAS p. (92) cette femme, not yours, but the name for you, not a part of you, doesn’t possess you, addresses you > [she responds?] my name is unique, and you hide it, forget it

POOF pp. vii, xi “O my friends, there is no friend”—an address > faire appel, prendre appel

p. 27 limit is also a chance: must receive address of other at particular address, in singular language

p. 32 every instant begins at the end, address carries in its readability the signature of the addressee: it withdraws from space by penetrating it

p. 51 Aristotle’s ‘O my friends, no friends’: a last will & testament, spoken from place of death, does not address enemies (unlike Nietzsche's living fool) > dying person turns toward friendship, living person towards enmity

pp. 51-2 Nietzsche’s address ‘Foes, there are no foes’ requests that we go beyond excuse & pardon, still moves in religious space of benediction or malediction?

p. 61 Nietzsche refers to his friends as brothers (all of Zarathustra read through this figural alignment) > addressees lay down law of genre, so their coming virtues are virile ones

pp. 214-15 that either address [re: omega ω] is addressed to someone will always expose utterance to undecidability because address to ‘someone’ presupposes the impossible: 1) neutral gender 2) ‘only one’ someone > for one person to receive a mark once, the mark must multiply, its iterability affirms plus d’un (which allows & limits calculability), the 3rd party is there > there is never one, one is always more than one (w/ or w/out consent)

SEC p. 316 absence—death of addressee (inscribed in mark) > value or effect of transcendentality linked to possibility of writing, to this “death”

——what holds for addressee, holds for sender, holds for scribe, holds for reader (disappearance)

SH p. 6 “caesura is the law”: gathers in the discretion of the discontinuous, in the cutting in of relation to other, interruption of address as address itself

p. 15 partage (imparting, division): remarked at point of departure, address to other

p. 55 “you” may be addressed to the other as well as to myself, to oneself as other [“you” listening Sagi?]

OTO p. 38 mother is the faceless figure of a figurant, an extra, gives rise to all figures by becoming anonymous, everything addresses/destines itself to her, she survives, as long she’s at bottom

ATIA p. 14 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas, Descartes, all men, all belong to quasi-epochal category: never been seen (naked) by an animal, never imagine animal could address them > Derrida believes they all have, must decipher symptom of this disavowal

——only poets/prophets face address of the animal, not juridical, civil men

pp. 17-8 time before time has always made “me” dizzy: God’s exposure to surprise, when God does not know what will become, what will happen when the poet names living things; Derrida feels the same way, depuis le temps, before his cat: will it/God address me?

SW p. 325 letting other live: absolute suicide, no trace, not even the seal of a break

——not even leave them my ashes

——no longer be oneself or have oneself (s’être ou s’avoir) > truth w/out truth looking for me at end of world

——blessing of one who leaves w/out leaving an address

DPi p. 100 Hugo (on French Revolution): once there’s peace, no more DP > Hugo: “inviolability of human life” > [Hugo aware of rhetoric of address, of apostrophe]

RGE p. 266 Bataille addresses total renunciation to the least weak [see quote]

TR pp. 110-11 a necessity of solitude, no intuition of alter ego felt by addresser & addressee [on either side of excuse/apology/forgiveness]

EL p. 196 the one who confesses (accuses, announces, cautions, warns) does not exclude himself from the whole (ensemble) of his addressees > to speak to the blind: this is act of confession

HST pp. 409-10 an example is always a substitutable substitute > “you, for example” often violent address of one who has power/authority to take hostage: inscribes possible replaceability in address to other

TN p. 34 se toucher toi, “Je se touche”; “tu” [in philosophical discourse] signs general/plural singularity of possible addressee, also signs possibility/need for “I” to address itself as an other > oneself: first & last other

p. 279 for Chrétian, Christ is one, common body, not a plurality of bodies > Chrétian & Nancy deal w/ a different “yes,” or a different provenance of same “yes,” addressed to “you”

pp. 281-82 dissymmetry of se toucher toi makes “you” the touchable (untouchable) pole of an apostrophizing address

BSi pp. 238-39 “after you”: my first address to other as other

p. 263 Celan: poem needs the other, reaches, searches, addresses the other

UWC p. 237 [the event, the unconditional] matter of the sense of sense [meaning of meaning?] > up to you now, up to others—signatories are also addressees

SPEC p. 341 demon, revenance which repeats its entrance, revient w/out having been called by PP > like Socrates’ demon, which made everyone write, this automaton produces effects of ventriloquism, w/out origin, emission, addressee, tele w/out telos

FV p. 453 for Lacan, [proper] address of letter: law that binds King & Queen

——there are only ostriches, the more one presents one’s rear, the more one is master: can’t avoid being plucked (laisser plumer)

GOD p. 48 adieu: 1) salutation, hello, “I can see you” 2) a goodbye 3) à-dieu, relation to God, every relation to other would be à-dieu

TN p. 260 God’s hand not a figuration, the hand in the proper sense, the hand of salvation, le main de l’à-dieu (the God-ward goodbye hand)

AD p. 134n Levinas: à-Dieu not a finality, infinity is irreducibility of à-Dieu, fear of God to eschatology

p. 61 “to say yes at the moment of a separation, indeed of a departure that is not the contrary of an arrival—is it not this deference that inspires the breath of an à-Dieu?”

pp. 142-43n experience of à-Dieu: to have welcomed yes of other, infinity in separation, in its holiness > Adieu does not wait, is not, beyond being

——w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God

> à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

p. 102 à-Dieu: infinity, promise, welcome at heart of separation, at moment of death

——à of à-Dieu is turned (tourné): by Infinity toward infinity

p. 103 à of à l’infini and à-Dieu: ad-dresses, opens relation, responds to, responsible for > desire says A-Dieu

p. 104 God, one “who loves the stranger” excessively so, excess like the non-reciprocity decided in death, the trait or stroke, the hyphen (trait d’union) of adieu: beyond being, where he might not pardon me, or elect me

pp. 120-22 à-Dieu, so close to silence, also related to death, eipimeleia thanatou, Sein zum Tode

——le-plus-de-sens à l’infini…à l’heure de la mort [the (no) more-sense to infinity…at the hour of death]

——Levinas: the fear à-Dieu instills is not a finality, it is fear à l’eschatologique, which interrupts within the human both ontology and being-towards-death; one must fear the neighbor

——to say à-Dieu to the face: call the name by name

ADVE RB

HASD pp. 46-7 via Eckhart, like adverb quasi (quasi stella matutina), we are beside the verb that is the truth; Eckhart: “may the Father, the Verbum…help us remain adverbs of this Verbum”

——pedagogical necessity of supplement (sermon) due to our adverbial quality

p. 60 Heidegger w/ and w/out word “être” wrote a theology w/ and w/out God, left a trace no longer his own, mais qui reste quasiment la sienne > 3 adverbs: pas, sans, quasiment

VP p. 80 for Husserl, “subjective” adverbs (here, there, above, below, none, yesterday) function as subjective and occasional expressions just like word “I”; these are different from contingent expressions which have plurivocity, and objective expressions which are absolutely pure of contamination: mathematical expressions

PAS PAS p. (69) nothing presents itself [in approach of “terrifyingly ancient,” terrifyingly becoming “subject” not accessory adverb], fors l’obscène (save the obscene), what awaits as forgetting

DS pp. 262-64n [re: Mallarmé’s use of Or] Or (substantive noun/adverb of time), gold turned to nothing; Igitur, adverb-name (also means “therefore”), has affinities w/ Or, or marks the hour (today) > temps d’or, “Il Signor,” “qui s’ignore,” “signe or,” in the golden antre of a glottis (glossa, gold ingot, lingot, lingua) > throw of linguistic dice

WAP p. 3 the 3 meanings of du droit à la philosophie, the 4th: can we go right to philosophy, do we need training; adverbial “right” enriches & overdetermines other meanings [?]

NOY pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

ATM p. 152 otherwise (autrement), the adverb in Otherwise than Being which wins out immeasurably over a verb, the beyond of the symplokē [linking nouns & verbs, that of essence], leaving a chain of traces, another symplokē [beyond essence]

LG p. 230 trait (supplementary & distinctive), re-mark of belonging doesn’t belong, this sans > a blink of the eye, w/out which nothing would come to light

***BSi p. 5 [re: its double meaning, pas de loup] pas’ savage, stealthy intrusion, an adverb haunts a noun

HERP p. 175 the voice, acc. Heidegger, is essentially marked, like everything at opening of Dasein, by Stimmung and Befindlichkeit—tonality, modality that is affective (not Heidegger’s words)

S p. 73 Heidegger saves Nietzsche’s text (from accusation of biologism, zoologism, racism [?]) by damning it: still metaphysics of absolute subjectity like Hegel: Nietzsche’s absolute subjectity that of body, impulsions, affects; Hegel’s that of the willing that knows itself

p. 84 furnace (embrasement) of spirit (affects, affects itself, and gets affected by fire)

FWT p. 58 affect: relation of living being to other, incalculable, foreign to all machines

POOF pp. 87-8 Schmitt’s purification of all (personal) affect from friend-enemy distinction (its pure political essence), a war w/out intrinsic xenophobia, war w/out hatred

pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe qu’à l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

P pp. 37-8 object of 3rd Critique? affect (Gefühl)? pleasure/unpleasure? desire? 1st Critique cuts itself off from interests of desire, excludes desire’s reason, reasons’s desire, desire for reason

p. 47 affect of the pleasing-oneself-in (se-plaire-à) [re: Kant’s disinterested pleasure, critique of judgment] remains subjective through & through, an auto-affection that goes outside its inside

p. 94 envy, jealousy, mortification at work w/in our affect > the beautiful this does w/out everything, w/out you, w/out its class [re: Kant’s free beauty]

ROP p. 26 resistance [to analysis] as double bind, other or outside at heart of internal auto-affective tension > it provokes analysis and dialectic to infinity, in order to resist both absolutely

ATIA p. 5 there is no nudity in “nature,” only the affect, sentiment, experience of existing in nakedness > animal not naked because naked

p. 147-48 for Heidegger, “awakening” [of attunement (Stimmung)] in question of the apophantic, “as such,” not consciousness/unconscious duality: won’t understand affective tonality via cogito

GSP pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

FS p. 4 structuralism will never be able to contribute to a “future history of imagination and affectivity” [Jean-Pierre Richard’s hope]

pp. 12-3 Derrida describes a hypocritical humanistic writing that imagines the will-to-write as an awakening of a freedom beyond affectivity: to write forgetting difference (finitude) in pure speech > could beauty then be distinguished from the letter itself? what about specificity?

DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

REST pp. 329-30 affect of Van Gogh’s painting: army of ghosts demanding their shoes, bottomless memory of a dispossession

DST DST p. 228 rhythm not as some occult region where affect placed before knowledge

TN p. 247 for Aquinas, spiritual touching, pure act, no intervallic medium (transcends value of affect), not temporal but eternal: like pure act or Prime Mover, a touch foreign to sensibility: (ordinary/extraordinary) history of Christian language

p. 269 lexicon of touch risks being ruined by abusive spending (dépense absuive) > an eschatological, postwar inflation (desperate call for new “era,” “provenance”) > apocalyptic symptomatology of “deconstruction of Christianity”: all we speak is “touching”

p. 274 touch as self-touching—le toucher plus tout autre sens (dizzy rhetoric), very form of space & time & will (essence of will) (from Descartes to Kant or even to Nietzsche)

——to will is to will to touch, strange tautology, bends/folds oneself back into fold of passive-active auto-affection > this affect, that inflects/conjugates passive activity of will: desire

AD p. 110 first affection of subject in ipseity: singular as replaceable > substitution announces destiny, subjection (as hôte and hostage), of subjectivity

BSi p. 143 acc. Deleuze, psychoanalytic bêtise privileges depth of fantasy over planar affect, becoming-assemblage

OG p. 314 (443) for Rousseau, affect & passion linked to vocalic

ATAP p. 66 relever of tone, dream of philosophy: make tonal difference inaudible, neutrality of tone, affect works (over) concept as contraband

SPEC p. 407 death drive doesn’t work in silence (like in French translation), but goes unnoticed (unauffällig), has to do w/ time (link to Kant, Aristotle)—thus rhythm: do feelings of tension exist to distinguish btwn bound/unbound energy or do they exist in relation to absolute magnitude?

LOBL p. ~133-34 joy of affirming endlessly

IF pp. 314-15 via Flaubert, perspectivism, somewhat Nietzschean code of affirmation; Derrida “recklessly” hypothesizes that Flaubert may have found all this in Spinoza, who opposed the Cartesian idea > Spinoza’s idea does not give rise to any representation or any idea of an idea

OS p. 54 [Hegelian] dialectics as simply a repetition of the [Aristotle’s] exoteric aporia, time becomes affirmation of the aporetic

EU p. 124 Glas: generalized fetishism, pull of the discourse of castration toward affirmative dissemination [also continues pursuing project of grammatology, etc.]

p. 166 to feel despair, there must be a basic fund of philosophical reaffirmation, necessity of link btwn reaffirmation of philosophy & a kind of deconstructive writing

PAS PAS p. (54) toujours deux pas, selon le retour éternel de la transgression passive et de l’affirmation répétée (l’affirmation sauvage), double instantaneous interminable preterition, une limite singulière entre la garde et la perte, entre le souvenir aussi et l’oubli > EROS, simulacre de cercle [ring vs. circle]

DS p. 268n neither castration nor dissemination can become originary, central signified, dissem. represents affirmation of this nonorigin, it entails, relaunches, “inscribes” castration

DIF DIF p. 27 there will be no unique name: must think this w/out nostalgia, hors du myth of pure mom/dad language, must affirm like Nietzsche met l’affirmation en jeu, dans un rire et un pas de la danse

***O p. 35 avancer qu’il n’y a pas de hors-texte absolu, ce n’est pas postuler une immanence idéale > not an idealist/theological operation, le texte affirme le dehors, deconstructs & reduces predicates of speculative operation (appropriation of outside) to “effects”

RGE p. 274 via Bataille, affirmation of play outside meaning: potlach of signs that burns, consumes, wastes words in gay affirmation of death: a sacrifice & a challenge (un défi)

WAP p. 185 affirmation, if there is any, non-negotiable, uncompromising, unconditional

CHOR pp. 93-4 to say ironically, “there is no one place for woman,” is neither anti-feminist nor feminist, is faithful to affirmative displacement: “dancing” of women

P (P) p. xiv if the question corresponds to a demand from the other, elle se laisse déjà précéder par une étrange affirmation > pour veiller sur elle [to guard this affirmation], peut-être faut-il d’abord se rendre à la veille de la question

MONL p. 4 puerile weapon, accuse Derrida of being: skeptic, relativist, nihilist

p. 66 most authoritarian cultural clichés = indefatigable generation of the literary superego

LOBL p. 88 literary studies in university don’t adequately explore problematic of judicial framing & jurisdiction of frames

p. 121 vulgarity and foolishness inexcusable to Blanchot

***p. ~124-25 writing is triumph, manic life-after-life insurance, indiscreet, exhibitionistic, even if we read no “that’s me there” in it (this increase in discretion is more surplus-value of triumph), supplement of triumph, enough to make you sick

——Derrida says this against Nietzsche: triumph over oneself is also a pursuit of power (Gewalt)

***pp. ~137-38 no paradigmatic text, only cryptic haunting from mark to mark, no piece, no metonymy, no integral corpus, thus no fetishism

——double invagination, through labor of translation, can be brought to bear on gaine in Glas [cf. GLAS p. 210 “against” Hegel, Marx, and Freud on subject of fetishism]

p. ~176 to speak of writing, triumph, as living on, is to denounce [Freud’s] manic fantasy (not w/out repeating it)

HERP p. 206 against vitalist/organicist discourse

HASD pp. 11-2 against Wittgenstein’s imposed silence > one must not avoid speaking = it is necessary that there be a trace

MPM pp. 17-8 Derrida on how professional philosophers (Searle, Danto) concerned w/ progress of deconstruction indict philosophical naïveté of poor literary scholar

pp. 42-3n “one day accounting will have to take place” of the damage of superficial reading

p. 114 Derrida links Austin’s usage of phrases “in general” & “properly speaking”

p. 121 de Man against periodization—form of dramatizing non-historical arguments [see ROP p. 114 only speak in terms of age through citation]

pp. 152-53n de Man: against Schlegel, Hegel on irony’s mastery, way it rises above finite determinations

A p. 32 when someone suggests a solution to an impasse, that person ceases to understand, if he ever did

POOF p. 40 Nietzsche against the levellers (Nivellirer), those who blame all misery on existing society [they are unfree, no solitude, ludicrously superficial]

pp. 81-2 compulsive droning of political “realism” that would refuse to read all the warnings & pleas of disjunction > what does it mean that, henceforth, ineluctable voice of necessity (its most responsible voice) resounds in this way [in disjunction, what has reality become?]?

OH p. x [Naas quotes from interview] precipitating contacts and articulations: dogmatism, confusion, opportunism

FSW p. 331n against Freud?: a rigorous determination of the anomaly [btwn word-representation & think-representation in dreams] is impossible

FWT p. 7 Derrida doesn’t want deconstruction to be used to denigrate, injure, diminish necessity of force of movement, and if it is necessary to do so in polemics, he regrets it in advance

p. 31 microclimate of terror, plots as perverse as the evil one claims to be attacking [re: new sexual harassment regulations] > sexual harassment exists, no only in the U.S.!

p. 124 Derrida attacks intellectuals who close their eyes, who did not read, know how to read, unable to read, did not want to read [re: Renaud Camus affair, anti-Semitism ]

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

——testify to what we can neither forget nor recall, a testimony w/out force of verdict or death sentence, to not write risks worst betrayal

——how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same

p. 159 agrees/disagrees w/ Foucault’s claim death is less visible > spectral logic invades everything: work of mourning, technē of image; visibility is deferred, perhaps, transformation of visible field > never have things been as “visible” in global space as they are today

p. 193 against Sartre’s idea that anti-Semitism produces the Jew

DS p. 245 “literary criticism” —ontological interpretation of mimesis? krinein proceeds precisely from out of that which is being threatened by the re-tempering (retrempe) of literature

P pp. 30-1 wanting to avoid “repetition” at all costs, one can: rush toward false exit, empirical chit-chat (bavardage), spring-green impulsive avant-gardism (l’avant-gardism printanier ou primesautier)

——who said it was necessary to avoid risk of “repetition”?

POS p. 70 discourses of reduction and misconstrual: thematism, sociologism, historicism, psychologism (can be avoided by formal/syntactic work)

ROP p. 36 double “one must” is against philosophy of life, against desire for decontamination, where pure life = pure death

p. 48 “antiphilosophy” > the thing least deserving of interest in the world

pp. 49-50 Julia Kristeva’s Les Samouraï, a very bad novel

DPi p. 252 rant against philosophical mediocrity as the culture mafia [only alternative to news of executions]

CHM p. 42 if dissension re: madness dates from Socrates, Foucault’s historical description poses banal/inevitable problems of periodization & of geographical, political, ethnological limitation

DST DST p. 198 “singularity” not novelty, which is too bound up w/ periodization, or, in the best cases, w/ Heideggerian epochal structures

——Derrida’s reservation re: history of Being & its epochs, also re: “configuration”: presupposes too much consistency, too much identifiable collectedness in the figure

p. 210 Derrida wary of every “return of the subject,” even in least dogmatic of returns, like that found in late Foucault (all “returns” omit rigorous reading of Heidegger)

LI p. 119 rant against simplifying or pretending to simplify, those people are dogmatists, obscurantists, purify at all costs

***pp. 157-58 rant against non-reading pedants, dogmatists, full of fear, right to confuse everything in authoritarian manner

WOG p. 33 Derrida doesn’t understand privilege of suspicion re: Marx, Freud, Nietzsche

BSi pp. 92-6 [Derrida savages Agamben’s dogmatism in declaring who was “first,” then dogmatism in accusation of negligence, points out abyss of neglect, “one is always a priori negligent,” asks about the ethical responsibility in Levinas’ anarchy (no first)]

MONL p. 39 “sovereign establishment (mise en demeure souveraine) [sovereign summons]… disguised under alibis of ‘universal’ humanism”

R p. 86 when democracy is just obscene alibi tolerating suffering, malnutrition, the grossly deprived, those dispossessed of rights (equality, freedom)

***p. 91 “to” of “to-come” wavers btwn: imperative injunction (call or performative) and patient perhaps of messiancity (nonperformative exposure)

——the two haunt each other, are each other’s alibis, withdrawing into the secret of irony, of which democracy gives the right: to fiction and literature

SPOM p. 117 hypocritical alibis of world market, of new slavery, until we face “foreign Debt” w/ spirit of Marxist critique

FWT p. 98 how can one be opposed to the humanitarian ideal? it’s not even “political” [Schmitt], but must remain vigilant to humanitarian alibis, suspect policies instrumentalizing “human rights”

OS p. 62n political resistance often highly “moral” alibi [re: Heidegger] for another resistance: for philosophical resistance, denegation of the text, refusal to read

DPi pp. 240-41 Christianity has banalized and relativized DP using an alibi of the beyond to deny irreversible gravity of death [deconstruct death]

CHM p. 57 in deconstructing Foucault, Derrida is not evoking an other world, an alibi, or evasive transcendence—a violence often the accomplice of “totalitarian” “good sense”

PIO p. 10 an alibi as an invention (by fabulation) > no corresponding reality outside narrative

PF p. xvi alibi: alleged elsewhere in space, an allegation can also defer/differ in time

p. 281n provocatio, Imperial Roman Law, to make an appeal to the law (lex, btwn legere and ligare [typo? should be legare?]), link to lecture (reading), legacy, allegation, alibi

p. xvii one trace always refers to another, secretes, cannot not produce alibi: ubiquity of alibi

p. xx reading: legare (distance, delegate) & legere (gather, collecting) [same etymology as law?], as [reading] ties together, it gives rise, out of fidelity, to dispersion, referral & send off, allegation > figures that risk proliferating alibis

p. xxvi aren’t all tropes alibis? aren’t alibis allegories? words from elsewhere, in place of others

——parentheses, italics, quotes: alibis [?]

——alius ibi: “elsewhere, in another place”

——alibi tells the story of a lying, every lie is first of all a perjury

——perjurer can always give alibi: I was elsewhere, I wasn’t thinking (his finitude as alibi)

p. xxvii alibi—plea for defense, has meaning only where there’s accusation, guilt, thus responsibility (judicial or penal, but first of all ethical or political)

——can there be a trace (and thus alibi) elsewhere than scene of culpa-responsi-bility, scene of debt, duty (Schuld, Schuldigsein)? an originary alibi that precedes juridico-ethico-political, but isn’t ontological neutrality?

——is the injunction to answer (answer to, answer for) inscribed right on the trace?

——does law, morality, politics determine through & through the thinking of trace/alibi? no

p. xxviii in MONL, non-belonging to language, structure of alibi

pp. xxviii-xxix every alibi: denegation, disavowal, negative allegation, alledenagation [re: French allegations that Derrida’s reception is only “elsewhere,” only in the U.S.]

pp. xxx-xxxi w/out alibi might look like irresponsibility

——but to go from alibi to alibi, not knowing where one is going, to only have alibis, is to be w/out alibi: not proud, not innocent, a blatant offense, flagrante delicto, of irresponsibility

p. xxxii Kamuf (un)knots alibis of the concept around the major alibi: resistance

WAP pp. 100-02 Derrida does not multiply remarks on structure of reference, article of title, value of contextuality [i.e. minutiae, syntax] to divert from urgency, but to determine it by exposing 2 alibis of philosophy: 1) imperialist self-confidence of philosophy: exists in its self-critique, is the paideia of self-critique, always in crisis, critical instance of judging, self-repetition via krinein 2) [see p. 107 nationalization of “teaching”?]

——these are alibis because philosophy, and via deconstruction, has exceeded this schema, a “crisis of crisis”

PSSS p. 276 one cannot justify pacifism, right to life, setting out from an economy of life, can only be done on basis of a sur-vival that owes nothing to alibi of some mytho-theological beyond

p. 279 one rarely speaks of alibis w/out suspecting crime, nor crime w/out suspicion of cruelty

CF pp. 50-1 strategies ruses can hide abusively behind “rhetoric” or “comedy” of forgiveness

OG p. 197 (282) via Rousseau, exceed nature, then return to it, imitate it, but keep a minimal (almost nil) difference > nature as ailleurs, archeo-teleologic, alibi (elsewhere in space), in illo tempore (elsewhere in time)

p. 247 (350-51) Rousseau looks for a limit “being born (naissante)”: childhood, God, pure language w/out supplement—alibi, in illo tempore

CHOR pp. 94-5 lack of place, madness of dance, can also serve as alibi for deserting organized, patient, laborious “feminist” struggle

PS p. 325n Artaud sometimes writes like Marx of 1844 Manuscripts: alienation & property

***p. 183 metaphysical determination of madness as disease of alienation had to be contemporary w/ proprius [Latin era] > proper subject, absolutely close to himself

p. 193 madness as reduction of work (l’oeuvre) and difference, inalienable life; other madness: metaphysics that lives w/in difference (alienation) > madness is the work or the absence of it

pp. 193-94 concepts of alienation/inalienation, madness, belong to an epoch of metaphysics that determines Being as the life of a proper subjectivity > difference laid bare by Artaud, can only be conceived beyond metaphysics, like Heidegger’s difference or Duplicity (opens/conceals truth)

Gii pp. 60-1 via Heidegger, German fremd relates to High German fram, underway toward, toward elsewhere > one could say: stranger does not wander (erre), is not w/out destination; Derrida compares this to Latin extraneus, outside of, extra

OG p. 295 (416-17) for Rousseau, in writing the worst is simultaneously the best: total alienation is total reappropriation of presence to itself > Rousseau: “plus de force pour conserver ce qu’on a”

HASD p. 23 “sacred allegories [iera synthemata],” would be conventional rhetoric if not for divine light of God, would be “cheap simulacrums of the figureless”

MPM p. 11 for de Man, allegory possibility to say the other, precludes totalization—the exhaustive narrative or total absorption of a memory

p. 37 allegorical metonymy—where part stand for whole and for more than whole it exceeds

——parts of memory that seem greater & older than us: manifests in open but nocturnal space of agora, plus de lumière [Nietzsche’s not bright but open horizon]

p. 56 inscription of memory effaces interiorizing recollection, not because of external limit or finite limitation of memory, but because of [allegorical] structure of relation to Other

p. 63 irony of using another signature to talk about yourself

——this allegorical story of signature includes theme of “Lazarus, arise!” a “ghost” story, resurrection

p. 70 de Man: Hegel marginalizes sign, allegory for sake of symbol & “synthetic judgments”

p. 72 de Man quotes Hegel: allegory “disarticulation of subject from predicate,” > allegory as defective cornerstone of entire system [p. 76 keystone (counts for whole) vs. cornerstone]

p. 74 via de Man, allegory (as a metonymy) is an allegory? > Hegel’s dialectic a vast allegory not of reconciliation & synthesis but of disjunction, dissociation, and discontinuity

p. 77 de Man’s privileging of allegory [never reduced to metaphor] over symbol must be understood via Anglo-American criticism of Romanticism

p. 78 for Derrida, each one (allegory, metaphor, trope, figure) in turn can be privileged, self reflexivity w/out end

pp. 81-2 for de Man, allegory (narrative) and irony (momentary & pointed, instantanéiste) are both figures of ghostly disjunction, duplication, doubling > together they form the rhetoric of memory, forgetting, recalling anteriority

pp. 82-3 for de Man, allegory (feigns storytelling) is diachronic (ideal time, never here or now) & irony (feigns amnesia) is synchronic (forgetting, no prefigurative duration) > neither has a past anterior

p. 83 allegory engenders continuity it knows to be illusionary

p. 84 allegorical Mnemosyne / ironical Lethe

p. 98 for de Man, “allegory of unreadability”: when performative cannot be distinguished from constative, all the while remaining irreducible

p. 100 de Man: promise is “metafigural”, an allegory of a figure “which relapses into the figure it deconstructs”

p. 143-44 via de Man, word “political” is allegorical > “textual allegories…generate history”

p. 145 promise prohibits the gathering of Being in presence (as its condition), the condition of the possibility and impossibility of eschatology, ironic allegory of messianism

FWT p. 178 Europe is the most beautiful example of auto-immunity, and allegory, because w/ Europe we see auto-immunity as survival, invincibility as auto-immunity: immense tragedy of a beautiful suicide

ATIA p. 115 exclamation marks, acc. Rousseau, marks of irony, allegorical incredulity [for Derrida, reading Levinas, they are marks of disavowal]

PIO p. 3 “is the invention of the other an allegory, a myth, a fable?”

p. 4 Cicero opens his text on invention w/ question of the son as a question de ratione dicendi > scene of traditio, tradition, transfer, an allegory of metaphor

pp. 9-10 allegory as structure of event in “Fable”: brought into sequential order, narrative form, then [?] it reaches out to other [Paul de Man]

p. 12 inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

pp. 12-3 for de Man, irony is structure of instant: “climaxes in…single brief moment of a final pointe” (“a synchronic structure”); allegory (other face of irony) unfolds in diachronic of narrative

pp. 16-7 de Man: unreachable anteriority of allegory, allegory & irony [?], their inauthenticity, distance from totality > they are linked in temporal predicament, the same temporal void

RM p. 77 le trait, il arrive à s’effacer dans un autre, reinscribing itself heterologically, allegorically

p. 78 from “Origin of the Work of Art,” Zug zum Werk (attraction toward the work), work as sumballein, allegoreuein, nonwithdrawal of truth as truth, Un-verborgenheit > truth as originary combat (Urstreit) > a combat that’s an attraction of reciprocal belonging, a Grundriss

PF p. xxvi aren’t all tropes alibis? aren’t alibis allegories? words from elsewhere, in place of others

EJQB p. 75 [re: Jabès] Jew reproached by rabbinical Jews for universalism, skeletal (décharnés) allegorism, for neutralizing event in realms of symbolic/imaginary [Jew as suffering allegory]

——Jew is split btwn 2 dimensions of letter: 1) allegory (no history, abstract universalism, cold skin of concept) 2) literality (empirical, actualized history, too warm flesh)

BSi p. 251 [via Celan via Büchner’s Danton’s Death] art as species of marionette > marionette: an allegorical personification of technē, technical who and what

OG p. 292 (412) via Rousseau, from pure painting to allegorical painting: on transporte la chose dans son double (dans une idéalité) > representation always other

POOF pp. 166-67 via & beyond Schmitt, der geschwisterlichen Klang (the brotherly-sisterly sound), the obscure friendship of rhyme, insane linking (appariement) of a couple, sense is born in a pair > before being philosophical, friendship concerns gift of the poem, isn’t there always a politics of a rhyme? > the rhyme can also become a traffic signal (philautie of linkage) > nothing looks more like the traffic signals of one country than those of another: this is the law > everything begins w/ Echo: rhymes sign, in cadence they seal a belonging, an ‘open gate’ [?]

SH pp. 11-2 tout autre in Celan, ganz Anderen Sache, other does not contradict, enters into alliance w/, in expropriating, “inmost concern”

——several singular events concentrated in same date, this concentration (Konzentration) a terrible word for memory, but also the gathering of soul, Kafka’s attention of prayer

p. 21 carrier-pigeon, in Celan, transports, transfers, but not a metaphor: [alliance?]

——ring, sign of belonging itself, condition of return > cipher of seal, imprint of ring, counts more than content of message, what matters is mark of belonging, manifested alliance

p. 31 insignificance of language, can only take on meaning in relation to a place (border, house, threshold, site) > formation of alliances, codes, contracts

pp. 32-3 tragic inversion of shibboleth, corruption of its differential value, from condition of alliance to discriminating limit, policing, normalization, methodical subjugation

p. 52 no “absolute poem,” but date (beyond calendar/clocks), madness of “when,” unthinkable Einmal (once), terrifying ambiguity of shibboleth > sign of belonging (alliance), threat of discrimination (war)

OTO p. 17 alliance in which Nietzsche seals/forges his signatures, and simulates them: demonic neutrality of midday delivered from the negative and from dialectic

Gii p. 45 for Heidegger, Handschlag (handshake) > “grounds” alliance, accord, engagement (Bund)

RM p. 75 the trait of l’entame (breaching-broaching incision) marks Ereignis as propriation, event of propriation (not an originary instance prior/proper to the 2 qu’il entame et allie)

HERP p. 173 Dasein—possibility of “as such (als)” and Verstehen (understanding)

A pp. 36-7 Heidegger says animal cannot experience death as such, and that animal cannot speak [Derrida draws out undeveloped relation btwn language and death]

——if death can’t be experienced as such both to language and to what exceeds language, border btwn animal & Dasein would become unassignable

p. 71 als not yet als sich [see ATIA pp. 142-43 for als-structure]

p. 75 Heidegger: “death”—annihilation of “as such”; can one experience “as such” as such?

p. 78 ultimate aporia is impossibility of the aporia as such, incalculable reservoir

PP pp. 156-57 no as such where writing or play are concerned, they cannot be classically affirmed (since they have no essence) w/out being negated, le jeu et la graphie vont sans cesse disparaissant

VM p. 139 for Hegel, empiricism always forgets it uses the words “to be”; empiricism: thinking by metaphor w/out thinking the metaphor as such

PAS PAS p. (22) disproportion of present dislocates unity of as such (identity of region or object)

p. (33) what happens when we treat the essence of proximity as such (like we would the color red)

VP p. 29 the “as such”: totality of body, of mundane, totality of the spatial, the visible > not worked over (ne sont pas travaillés) by Geist, which transforms Körper into Leib

p. 87 Hegel seems more radical than Husserl in that he demands thought of positive infinite, so that “the indefiniteness of differance may appear as such”

S pp. 50-1 animal has and does not have world, has access to entities, but not entities als sich

pp. 52-3 Heidegger suggests we draw a line through rock to think animal’s relation to it

——erasure of the name, name of rock, erasure of possibility to name rock, as such, to access being-rock

PPHS p. 76 Aufhebung facilitates spirit’s elevation beyond that within which it was submerged, sublimates nature into itself > presenting itself to itself as such

T pp. x-xi philosophy has always thought its other, that which limits it; does to think the other solely mean relever, to control the other? or does the limit/passage always reserve one more coup; to think the proper of the other, the other as such is to miss it, to miss the missing of the other [on manque (de) le manquer]: examine the relevance of the limit

OS p. 66 trace cannot be illuminated, cannot be named as such, as such evades us forever

ATIA pp. 18-20 in avowing his desire to avoid appropriative projection before animal’s gaze, to avoid tradition [Benjamin, Heidegger] that assigns deep sadness (Traurigkeit) to animal’s Benommenheit (inability to respond to name it’s given, inability to experience being “as such”)

——for Benjamin, animal/nature not sad because mute but mute because sad: not the sadness of passivity, of not being able to name, but of receiving one’s name > a foreshadowing of mourning

——every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

p. 142 for Heidegger, animal cannot experience world “as such” [explains this w/ breadth of rigor Derrida finds incomparable]

pp. 142-43 for Heidegger, ‘as’-structure founds logos, animal deprived of logos because w/out “as such” > apophantic logos: becoming language of “as such” [deception belongs to essence of logos]

p. 147-48 for Heidegger, “awakening” [of attunement (Stimmung)] in question of the apophantic, “as such,” not consciousness/unconscious duality: won’t understand affective tonality via cogito

p. 156 the differential of animot, animals, should complicate oppositional structure: either have “as such” or don’t (has or doesn’t have world)

p. 157 Aristotle’s non-apophantic logos (neither enunciative nor declarative): euchē, prayer, entreaty, requesting; for Derrida, these would open breach in whole apparatus [of “as such”?]

p. 159 differences btwn how a human eats and how an animal eats are not those btwn “as such” and “not as such,” the ambition of describing this difference exceeds “me (Derrida)”

——w/out “as such,” animals don’t know how to “let be,” let beings be as such: animal as a utilitarian, always putting-in-perspective [does man really escape this trap?]

***p. 160 to “let” something “be” “as such,” you would have to “let be” in your absence, in your death [thus, for Heidegger, being-toward-death and “as such” constitutive of each other], but is this ever possible? can we let the being be? Nietzsche would say no, that the objective is always caught in the living, in life, in perspective > whatever the difference btwn animals, remains an “animal” relation

——Derrida’s strategy re: border(s) btwn animal/human: there is no pure and simple “as such”

——restructuring (pluralizing/varying) “as such” in relation to animal would upset whole framework of Heideggerian discourse, the ontological difference

GSP p. 163 noema: the “as such” > does not borrow its materiality from consciousness, an object (but not real) > nonappurtenance to any region, anarchy of noema > root of all objectivity

——wouldn’t this nonreality disrupt the inclination toward regionality of phenomenological method?

DIF DIF p. 25 trace & difference cannot appear as such, sheltered (s’abrite)/dissimulated in names (received in metaphysical text)

pp. 25-6 differance never be appropriated by “as such,” threatens authority of “as such,” presence of thing itself in its essence

CHM pp. 54, 309n work, reason, discourse starts w/ appeal to “as such,” to meaning of Being [before determination of existence/essence] (thus, madness: silence, nonmeaning, absent in work)

Gii p. 301n Derrida sees Heidegger’s reflections on as such [re: borderline btwn man/animal] as similar to his reflections on the hand, ability to give or take as such [see p. 43]

RM pp. 64-6 quasi-metaphor of Being, since it is nothing, since its as obliterates its as such

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, since “as such” is no longer in control, the exhibited functions of text are not montrée but montée (not displayed but put in play, not staged but engaged…)

pp. 313-14 the opening, as presence, is not noticed as opening—we’re fascinated, glued to what presents itself: we’re unable to see presence as such, visibility of visible > never present themselves

UWC pp. 234-37 [perhaps, “if,” event] not horizon of power, of “I can,” irruption that punctures horizon, interrupts performative organization of “as if,” “as such” > “as” name of true problem/target of deconstruction: authority of “as” founds/justifies every ontology, phenomenology, knowledge, science

SPEC pp. 289-90 Repression upsets logic implicit in all philosophy, pleasure that can’t be felt as such > “cannot be experienced as such”

OOG p. 61 egological content discovers dimension of “we” as moment of the eidos “ego,” transcendental we not something other than transcendental Ego

p. 114 for Husserl, empathizing (Einfühling) possible due to apriori universal structures of sociality/historicity, external inquiry depends on internal intuition

VM pp. 123-24 Husserl’s alter-ego, nonviolent respect of secret, of separation, we can only know the other through analogical appresentation > translates recognition of radical separation

p. 131 for Husserl, my world is opening in which all experience occurs, including experience par excellence > transcendence toward Other as such

——Husserl called irreducible egoic essence of experience “archi-factuality” (Urtatsache)

VP p. 60 for Husserl, the alter-ego in one’s interior solitude is only ever fiction

POOF pp. 54-5 allied in “joint acquiescence to disjunction,” monadic alterities, the proper of the alter-ego is never accessible [see SPOM p. 35]

ATIA p. 79 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance

TN p. 171 for Husserl, when I touch myself w/ my finger: no haptical mirror-effect, no insinuation of alterity

pp. 190-91 Derrida defends Husserl’s stubborn conviction that we can’t know alter-ego, only through analogy, appresentation, that there’s an unbridgeable abyss (abîme infranchissable) > Husserl’s stance prevents risk of an immediate intutionism of the other

p. 192 pre-originary mourning (re: Husserl’s vigilant stance on alter-ego) tied to motif of exappropriation—interiorization, even introjection, never achieved [Derrida has more in common w/ Husserl than Merleau-Ponty?]

pp. 192-93 the difference Derrida adds to Husserl’s alter-ego: recognize l’irréductible écart even in the touchant-touché de ma “propre” main [there’s alter-ego in my own proper body as human ego]

p. 226 Nancy: phenomenology touches/exceeds its own limit in Cartesian Meditations > “pré-donation of the alter-ego”

p. 233 intertwining btwn present/nonpresent ensures presence of alter-ego in heart of ego

EW p. 263 even in the most marked transcendental idealism (Husserl’s), alter-ego leads back to a pre-egological and pre-subjectivist zone (transcendental passive genesis of time and other)

BSi pp. 270-72 Celan’s tout autre [ganz Andere] not alter-ego, not another living present, but inaccessible other

OG p. 190 Rousseau’s pity as distance, not “do onto others…” but “do good to yourself w/ as little evil as possible to others” > don’t interiorize other’s pain too much (it would no longer be the other’s)

GOD p. 84 is Levinas’ face god or human? unable to differentiate infinite alterity of God from that of human > Levinas & Kierkegaard can’t find limit btwn religious & ethical

SEC p. 315 iter (from itara, other, in Sanskrit) > everything that links otherness to repetition

p. 317 no context, no code can enclose written syntagma > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

VM pp. 126-27 how could there be “play of the Same” if alterity were not already in the same?

p. 129 Hegel recognized negativity, anxiety or war in infinite absolute, as movement of absolute’s own history, whose horizon is a final pacification in which alterity would be absolutely encapsulated (résumée), if not lifted up (levée), in parousia

p. 316n “alterity, difference, and time are not suppressed but retained by absolute knowledge in the form of the Aufhebung”

POS p. 81 spacing indicates an irreducible alterity, is indissociable from concept alterity

ATIA p. 102 unthought, unconscious, other of the “I think,” (the animal je suis), a function of machinality > haunts automatically, like an evil genius, the Cartesian animal-machine & Kant’s teleological, providential-machine (where war machines presumed to have civilizing effect)

DIF DIF p. 21 radical alterity of every possible mode of presence marked by irreducibility of aftereffect (d’après-coup), of delay (de retardement) [Nächtriglichkeit]

——Levinas’ trace, enigma of absolute alterity (a past never present), solicits domination of beings (w/in these limits, differance implies Levinas’ entire critique of classical ontology)

HST p. 394 Levinas: “I” does not endow itself w/ this [temporal] alterity: impossibility of dialectical time is impossibility of saving oneself by oneself (alone)

p. 395 Levinas: freedom is not negating oneself but having one’s being pardoned by alterity of the other—dialogue w/ other, not silent dialogue w/ our soul, frees us

LI p. 44 logical force of iter: ties repetition to alterity

TN p. 171 for Husserl, when I touch myself w/ my finger: no haptical mirror-effect, no insinuation of alterity

p. 218 Nancy’s partager: 1) affinity, crossings, “tangency” 2) a partitioning, un autre départ: this alterity of bodies follows the line partly of the technical & partly of a beyond Christianity

AD p. 52 alterity as movement of temporalization

OG p. 315 (443-44) Rousseau describes w/out declaring, en contrebande, the originary exteriority of writing: alterity

SPEC pp. 282-83 when master (PP) submits to the work of the secondary (RP), “submits” to its own lieutenant, addresses to himself simulated engagement via detour of institutional telecommunication—il s’envoie, il s’écrit, PP déchaine en lui l’autre absolu > alterity more irreducible than alterity of opposition

SPOM p. 112 Althusser tried to dissociate Marxism from teleology and messianic eschatology

MPM p. 18 “America is deconstruction” > no, we learn from deconstruction to suspend hasty attributions of proper names

p. 129 necessary to think America w/ mad lucidity under the light of lunacy

FWT p. 27 denunciation of “political correctness” in U.S. is organized/manipulated by conservatives

pp. 134-35 censorship enforced by loss of job [capitalism] in America [re: movie Mr Death, Holocaust denier]

R pp. 13-4 de Tocqueville sees America as having a sovereignty that acts circularly by itself with no operator or sovereign divided-off from it, outside of it > “no authorities except w/in itself” [Rousseau’s Social Contract] p. 15 pure actuality of Aristotle’s Prime Mover

p. 36 because of undecidability linked to autoimmune logic, can never “prove” whether it’s more democratic to include/exclude immigrants, vote/not vote directly, both protect democracy through some exclusion, some renvoi

p. 96 rogue state is whoever U.S. says it is [Chomsky]

p. 104 United States, w/out consulting anyone, gives itself the right to protect its “vital interests”

——[Derrida on 9/11]: not as unforeseeable as everyone claimed; the trauma that occurred, not what actually happened, but apprehension of a worse threat still to come

DPi p. 42 in U.S., argument is about a good and tolerable DP

p. 71 however powerless, in U.S. you find most vigilant & best informed forces of protest [re: abolitionism?]

p. 74 in U.S., history of civil rights & slavery part of history of DP (also overarming incomparable to other nations)

p. 79 U.S. (& China) will come under more pressure to end DP [?]; p. 80 apparent teleology of abolition movement seems to tend toward international criminal court (to which states consent to abandon sovereignty) > long way off

p. 175 re: U.S., who can deny DP as political justice is class justice

PF p. xxii feeble prejudice, obscurantist disavowal that claims deconstruction found its only or its best welcome in U.S.

HLP p. 64 Derrida likes U.S. phrase “civil disobedience” (Thoreau), that respectable tradition where raison d’état does not dispense last word in ethics

——resist positive laws (not all laws), laws that betray their own foundation

IW p. 265 “deconstruction in America”: fable, allegory, metonymy?

PJP pp. 171-72 U.S. more obsessed w/ perjury than any other Western Country

p. 194 most vulgar forms of media violence—link btwn television, University, & “American law” [Trump]

p. 199 Bill Clinton’s perjury first private (infidelity), then public (“what ‘is’ is”)

PSSS pp. 261-62 American hegemony at once obvious & more critical/vulnerable re: globalization, worldwide-ization underway

p. 262 U.S. in crisis w/ DP [?] (also, U.S. ostracizing Freudian psychoanalysis)

LI p. 38 American professors 2nd to none in knowledge of migrations, wanderings (déplacements)

pp. 115-16 no “completeness” where freeplay is concerned > freeplay an inadequate translation of jeu (& network connected to it): “freeplay” [in deconstruction] greatly overestimated in U.S.

CF p. 47 Derrida on nefarious [my word choice] Bill and Hillary Clinton

BSi p. 19 “rogue (voyou, Schurke) state”—U.S.’s hypocritical rhetorical stratagem (Chomsky)

p. 36 collapsus of World Trade Center

pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

p. 89 from Chomsky, U.S. military tactics purposely out of control to seem blind, seem crazy, like an animal

UWC p. 212 mondialisation has to go through U.S.

EU p. 5 Latin, then American English: privileged media of philosophical or techno-scientific communication

pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

FV pp. 474-75 full speech, contracts only w/ itself, system of truth > Lacan not proposing crude readjustment [i.e. American psychology] but rarity à la Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit

WBH p. 190 guardians of institution are guardians of Law > as women’s studies gains institutional legitimacy, it produces guardians of the Law; U.S. is a pioneer of women’s studies

——U.S. more faithful to 19th century model of University than most European countries

p. 196 resistance opposed to deconstruction same as one opposed to woman’s studies, “something sexual at stake in the resistance to deconstruction,” deconstruction successful in U.S. among homosexuals, feminists

p. 200 receiver as determining factor of gift, one who responds, performativity of text produces receiver w/out pre-existing [him/her/it]

——Declaration of Independence signed by God, signs American people into existence, they didn’t exist before it

——it is by the gift that Law is produced, the signature engenders sender, receiver, signer

VM p. 147 following Levinas, what would a language w/out phrase offer the other? a master who forbids himself the phrase gives nothing, has no disciples, only slaves

TR p. 123 dissemination of textual event called anacoluthon [re: de Man on Rousseau]

PJP pp. 166-67 Derrida considers anacoluthon the most productive figure, a general formalization of Miller’s “polylogology”: multiplicity of voices, more than 1 voice in 1 voice, trace of perjury gets lost, leads us astray > this dispersion threatens concept, identity, identity of “I”

p. 173 d’avoir perjuré en jurant: 2 moments of perjury envelop each other; was the promise not to lie, the swearing, truthful? (possibility of anacoluthic discontinuity)

——ultimate resource/fatality of the anacoluthon: multiplicity of times, instants, interruption time inscribes in “me” > the perjurer can always ask to be excused

p. 179 the suspension of metonymy, quotation, interruption, quasi anacoluthic change of subject > interruption in the obvious: shadow at heart of light

p. 181 acolyte follows, assists, supplements: akoluthia, suppléant [see Condillac], accomplice?

——non sans fausser quelque peu compagnie (not without giving someone the slip), companion becomes “the one who did not accompany” [Blanchot’s n’accompagne pas]

——acolyte, anacolytic, anakolouthia, analytic figure: as much an analyst as a breach, interruption> a rupture in a set (contract), be it that of friendship, community, being-together

p. 183 anacoluthon gives rise to fictions or perhaps undecidable lie, perjury, that never can be excluded on part of narrator, author

p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

p. 187 anacoluthon’s metonymy blurs/complicates all frontiers, instigates all substitutions

——anacoluthic catastrophe finds one of its privileged places in fold where the guilty accuses the witness, makes him bear responsibility for the offense

p. 189 anacoluthic substitution of subject, replacement of acolyte—motor, motivation, dramatic emotion of narrative

——generalized anacoluthon would make narrator an acolyte of his “character” or “friend”

——identificatory substitution would harbor the betrayal, perjury, at heart of every narration, confession, “relation,” rapport

——[identificatory substitution] wreaks havoc w/ veracity while being its condition

——narrator, unconscious subject, smuggles, yes, yes, the contrary into the narrative (denegative form [“I am not Chalier”] > yet another disavowal at heart of avowal)

pp. 190-91 even more impossible than report-confession: countersignature of acolyte (most impossible impossible: narrator himself) > unique impossibility [cf. IW p. 287 particular nothing]

——amnesia, irreducible distraction, disappearance at heart of finite thought: the resource, power of anacoluthon [see p. 194]

pp. 191-92 narrative of a disappearance: signature gets erased moment it enters literature [like question in EJQB]

p. 193 acolyte, narrator-friend-witness-countersignatory, “I am myself the rapport,” relation w/out relation, the impossible report/relation (and translation)

p. 194 rapport (analogies of this rapport)—obscure alchemy that precipitates an “us”—in the shelter of/from (à l’abri de) some sober & inevitable perjury: we guard ourselves form perjury we inhabit

***p. 196 the us of the anacoluthon, not absolute knowledge, anacoluthon interrupts forever: no one says better, “we are not present to the truth of this us” than the acolyte

——when we are present, truth’s not there; suivre/être [see ATIA]

pp. 196, 300n when narrator claims to be quoting: makes the other say

p. 197 maddening irregularity of anacoluthon: dispersal/disavowal of “you,” “us,” where is the reader, the supposed addressees?

HASD pp. 32-3 Being must be created by what exceeds the border, the Good, intelligible sun, something that far surpasses (hyperekhontos) [Republic 509b], excess of God, light is in Good’s image

——light produced by sun is son of the Good (neither visible, nor sight or vision), excess itself described by what it exceeds, even negative discourse retains ontology, does not interrupt analogical continuity [btwn perceptible/intelligible sun, the Good and that to which it gives birth, allusion to triton genos, i.e. khora]

p. 34 Plato’s use of “third species” as analogical mediation, concerns Being, epekeina tes ousias, and khora > khora also constitutes a third species (triton genos), isn't intelligible paradigm

p. 42 encomium is “neither true nor false, not even contradictory” [Marion] > though it says something about the thearchy, about the Good and the analogy

MSUB J p. 171 everything is singular each time and each time analogical: a figuration of the other

SEC p. 311-12 analogy a major concept in Condillac

p. 313 idea/sign relation preserved through all forms of writing [in Condillac] (hieroglyph, ideograph, phonetic): economic, mechanical, homogenous reduction, community of analogical participation

VM pp. 123-24 Husserl’s alter-ego, nonviolent respect of secret, of separation, we can only know the other through analogical appresentation > translates recognition of radical separation

pp. 142-43 humanism, separating man from animal, via analogy of God and human face [vis-à-vis Descartes, ambiguity of substance as concerns God and his creatures], is this not the original metaphor? Levinas’ metaphysical humanism

POOF p. 16 analogy btwn spirit (nous) & animal body inscribes in living body habitus of this contretemps

PP p. 82 son as interest on capital investment, as return, revenue, son as physical sun, analogon of intelligible sun (the Good, capital, origin of all onta); father as noooumena, son as horōmena

——meaning of patēr sometimes exclusively financial capital

p. 159 Plato uses letter, alphabet, for pedagogical ends > never thematizes law of difference made apparent, the irreducibility of structure & relation, of proportionality, w/in analogy

OH pp. 68-9 ideality in capitalization: that which exceeds borders of sensible, opens onto infinite, gives rise to universal, “maxim of maximization,” nothing other than spirit itself (analogic)

VP p. 12 [re: not substantializing Husserlian “transcendental”] language never escapes analogy, is analogy through & through > classical war of language, casting metaphors against metaphors, takes place in difference > le langage garde la différence qui garde le langage

FSW p. 225 Kant’s 3 modes of times, 3 analogies of experience: permanence, succession, simultaneity

WM p. 216 to signify metaphorical process, coins have often been used, analogy w/in language described by analogy btwn language and something other than itself > but that which seems to figure [i.e. coins] cannot be contained w/in regional science, linguistics philology: opens a discourse on figuration itself

p. 235n Condillac (whose philosophy, more than, or like, every other, can be considered a treatise on analogy): all tropes are metaphors, transport from one meaning to another

pp. 237-38 imitation sets man apart from beasts, man alone takes pleasure in imitating > metaphor, an effect of mimēsis and homoiosis, manifestation of analogy, a subordinate means of knowledge: full truth preferred to metaphor

pp. 241-42 Aristotle’s 4 types of metaphor: 1) genus to species 2) species to genus 3) species to species 4) analogy (he privileges analogy, which has nothing hidden or elliptical about it)

p. 243 if, acc. Aristotle, every metaphor is an elliptical comparison or analogy, then the metaphor comparing sun’s flames to sowing seed is metaphor par excellence, an ellipsis of ellipsis

P p. 36 Kant looking for a bridge from sensible to supersensible (an analogy), a symbol—that crosses/closes abyss

——bridge (Brücke) not an analogy, concept/effect of analogy makes the bridge itself

——analogy of abyss & bridge over abyss require 3rd term, that which heals the gap, a symbol, bridge is symbol, symbol bridge > abyss calls for analogy (active resource of Critique), mais l’analogie s’abîme sans fin dès lors qu’il faut bien un certain art pour décrire analogiquement le jeu de l’analogie

pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

pp. 117-18 in Kant, art of man analogized with art of creator (unity of empirical laws), man has goal before operating, this effaces a priori the sans, the pure cut of free beauty

——connection btwn anthropo-theologism & analogism: course being steered [Spinoza says something quite tangential in Ethics], analogy w/ practical finality is its medium

——analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), l’analogisme recapitule ou recapite

OS p. 49(n) time compared by Aristotle to movement and chance, w/out being either one of them, time can only occur en tēi psukhēi > time’s analogy: what is traced (le tracé) as line, grammē

p. 49n for Kant, inner intuition of time gives us no shape, so we make up for this via analogy: time is a line progressing to infinity > but where parts of line are simultaneous, parts of time are successive

p. 58 analogy, correspondence: enigma of “at the same time” [re: relation of time to space, changes of place, movement]

ATIA p. 79 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance

FS p. 27 “fall” of thought into philosophy, analogical displacement of Being which anchors (retient) and irremediably represses discourse in metaphysics, gets history under way (est entamée)

AFR p. 43 how can Locke carve out a trail while repeating an earlier rupture? he applied a general law to particular domain

——by preceding analogically, he discovered an unknown > invention by analogy (or analysis): new “objects” created by transposing, proportioning, analyzing

pp. 44-7 for Condillac, sensation is unmodifiable, first material, immediate presence, but also a germ for analogic sign > degrees of intensity, combinative energetics, good analogy, “identical proportions”

——sensationalist metaphysics, via analogic, develops into semiotism: sign unfolds (développe) germ

p. 72 passage (continuity and/or rupture) from one operation to an other always amounts to difference, quantity, of force > via analogy, this quantity of force is always that of connection

p. 73 innovation as revelation, analysis as analogical process, energy connecting present to absent > concept of force as force of repetition (retracing, supplying)

——Derrida sees here a silent explosion in text or fission in each concept (Condillac, elsewhere, denounces obscurantist force of “metaphor” [hence analogical value])

pp. 80-1 Condillac: if there is fundamentally only one machine, there is fundamentally only one property > unique property assures possibility of “identical propositions,” this self-evident identity (nontautological) is discovered by way of Reason, is “the only sign of evidence” > all modifications are those of first property modifying itself: sensibility

——Condillac’s non-Cartesian indubitability: first property which knows itself (sensibility)

pp. 81-2 Condillac transposes Newtonian discourse [into the mind (l’âme) as general principle of analogy?]: analogy creates language & method

pp. 82-3 Condillac: men of genius, favorite disciples of nature, make language seem less arbitrary—method of invention is only analogy itself (analogy: art of reasoning & speaking)

——that math can be a model for analogy: unlimited generality of principle of analogy

p. 92 Condillac considered theory of signs (analogy) in Essay, its most original advance

p. 94 force, analogy, signification will always be ordered to a theory of need (don’t rush to oppose to theory of desire)

***pp. 100-01 Condillac’s theory of analogy (operation of remarking): supply a language’s defects > remarks anteriority in the fact, an anteriority (of the fact) that becomes lacking in itself > supply what is necessary, is missing (il faut), but [remark] also presents itself as surplus value, a superabundance, frivolous futility > makes all commerce possible (as value & sign)

pp. 101-02 operation of suppléance (supplementation or supplying) produces overabundance & frivolous futility

p. 117 identical proposition as powerful circle, finality of the same, circle of identity, self-evidence [brings whole to part] [but how can this circle close if whole is different from part?]

p. 128 frivolity originates from deviation or gap of signifier, also from its folding back on itself in closed, nonrepresentative identity

——we escape frivolity only at semantic risk of nonidentity; Condillac names nonidentity metaphor, makes it the primordial structure of language to begin its analogical/teleological reappropriation

p. 132 for Condillac, degree, gradual difference, ruins “identical proposition,” dislocates is > yet, degree also makes synthesis of “identical proposition” possible (prohibiting frivolity)

***p. 133 a “stretched sense” always risks being empty, [the analogic of the sign], means we never escape 2 imaginations, 2 identities, 2 metaphysics, 2 barbarisms > always a double or stand-in for idea itself: frivolity’s last/first garment

C p. 196 paradeiknymi: to show to one side, analogy, assign, tribute, distribute

p. 201 analogy, like the putting into series of series: must remain accidental

——analogy belongs to order of contingent > appeals neither to model nor example (i.e. both Sade & Titus-Carmel ration the remainder, stage a work & jouissance re: remainder [excrement]) [Derrida is “randomly” comparing Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins to Sade’s 120 days]

p. 215 copro-necrophagy: for those who found the analogy btwn 120 Days…and Titus-Carmel’s coffins forced > [Titus-Carmel has written: “place it there and eat it in a single mouthful”]

LI p. 118 more “scientific” to accept that a scientific analogy inadequate for a theory of language

ATM pp. 186-87 can one analogize the fault against God’s name w/ fault against any Name? only if analogy functions btwn absolute heterogeneities [?] [theonymic cemetery]

E p. 4 for Kant, nature speaks to us through its beautiful forms, one can read the “ciphered language (Chiffreschrift),” nature’s signature as art productions

——even if this stance is opposed to Hegel [only art is beautiful], analogy btwn art and nature always provides a principle of reconciliation

pp. 4-5 proportional analogy btwn oppositions dissolves them, but first the oppositions must be produced, and there’s [almost?] always a regular hierarchy

p. 13 discursive metaphors (i.e. nature says, dictates, prescribes) that function as analogies of analogy > in such cases, nature is properly logos (toward which one must always return)

——analogy of God and poet proceeds from and returns to logos, source as mouth and outlet (embouchure)

pp. 13-14 when analogy is the rule (nature speaks, God speaks, highest poet speaks): “ça veut dire que ça veut dire et que ça dit que ça veut dire que ça veut et que ça veut ce que ça veut par exemple”

——analogy as rule btwn rule of art & moral rule > articulated play of analogy is subject to law of supplementarity: we admire nature [beauty] w/out the [moral] purpose appearing to us

p. 17 Kant analogizes division of Fine-Arts w/ the mode of expression man possess in Sprechen (not w/out slight embarrassment) [this serves a teleological function]

p. 18 poetic speech, beyond finite commerce (out of circulation), yet of infinite value: the universal analogical equivalent, the value of values; through poetry, work of mourning turns hetero-affection into auto-affection, producing maximum of disinterested pleasure

p. 19 for Kant, hearing is closest to freedom and spontaneity, one must use term hearing-oneself-speak (le s’entendre-parler) because the structure is auto-affective; the mute thus do not have reason, the mouth (indissociable from ear) is not simply an analogy of expression: it is the ground of analogy, regulates analogy, it is logos itself [necessary]

pp. 23-5 what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of indentification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

BSi p. 14 an analogy [re: beast & sovereign] is always a reason, a logos, a calculus > a relation of production in which identity and difference co-exist

p. 20 analogy [re: beast and sovereign] announces (like a black cloud) the historical (actual & virtual) violences, disasters we won’t (already don’t) have a name for

p. 70 sovereign state as Leviathan, as animal-machine, as prosthstatics > beast et (est) sovereign coupled across a copula: affinity through analogy, proportion, reciprocal fascination—or grafting

p. 80 analogy as mediation, Kant’s schema of imagination: btwn intuition & concept of understanding

OG p. 91 heliocentric concept of speech, analogical system: king, father, sun, logos > [ethnocentrism of this concept: all other languages delayed logocentrism]

p. 103 for Lévi-Strauss, each “comme” and “de même” authorize analogy btwn phonology and sociology: phonology exemplary as the example in a series, not a regulative ideal

pp. 213-14 harmony, chromatics, calculation; analogy btwn painting & music is analogy itself

EU p. 85 [vis-à-vis Kant] university as an “artificial (künstliche) institution” guaranteed by analogy: industry, trustee, collective

POO p. 3 “anyone can specialize in the analysis of rituals; it is not therefore a specialty”

——the uncertain boundary btwn actor & analyst

p. 131n Edgar Allen Poe’s def. of analysis: imaginative

PP p. 169 analyst tries to distinguish btwn two repetitions, which is good which is bad

F p. xlvii analyst can only decrypt secret seal of [other, patient’s] name w/ his own name > works on his own name

ROP pp. 9-10 the poleros (politics, polemos, eros, seduction) of analysis, ends in an abyss, where resistance to psychoanalytic Lösung, in the name of truth, can only be a disavowal > to analyze, to say to other: prefer, take, love my solution, you will be in truth if you do not resist my solution

——Derrida proposes an other resistance, that of the remainder, thus a restanalysis

p. 11 what forever exceeds the analysis of the dream: a knot that can’t be untied, un fil, qui, pour être coupé, comme un cordon ombilical, n’en reste pas moins à jamais noué [knotted even when cut], à même le corps, a la place du nombril [name?] > la cicatrice est un noeud contre lequel l’analyse ne peut rien

pp. 18-20 history of analysis, from Plato to Freud, has Freud invented a new solution to analytical resistance or has he inherited by way of paleonym?; no choice but to keep 2 motifs analysis, doubling of analuein: 1) archeological/anagogical movement toward originary birth 2) eschatological movement toward last word, toward untying, breaking down (lytic, lytological, philolytic) [analysis in teaching (philosophy), in confession]

——as such, Freud’s discourse answerable to logico-epistemological tribunal of analytic tradition

p. 21 paralysis gives movement w/ regard to its other [this is in reference to impossibility of psychoanalysis’ auto-interpretation] (in PAS, paralysis distinguished from logic of analysis)

pp. 29-30 double bind drives deconstruction in rhythmic compulsion to track desire for origin, and to raise its stakes, la pousse à une surenchère > interminable drama of analysis, il fallait faire droit to the law deconstructed, w/ une affirmation donatrice unknown to yet driving analysis

pp. 31-2 iterability as condition/constitution of identity, ideality, of all concepts, but also (double bind) that which resists hierarchical and binary oppositions, a quasi-concept, inconceivable concept > not confusion, approximation, but “reaffirmed exigency of analysis”

p. 33 what always rejects analysis: nonsimple, origin under erasure, trace, or affirmation of gift as trace [differance as divisibility]

p. 34 analysis is interminable because there is no indivisible/simple element

p. 36 double bind (preferable to double contrainte), is the call to analysis: one can never fully analyze it, one can only unbind one of its knots by making the other tighter: movement I call stricture

DPi p. 153 analysis as internal dissociation, element by element

CHM pp. 32-3 the hermeneut, the analyst, must first know language of patient, the immediate materiality of sign (move from sign to signified, obvious meaning to latent)

AFR p. 43 how can Locke carve out a trail while repeating an earlier rupture? he applied a general law to particular domain

——by preceding analogically, he discovered an unknown > invention by analogy (or analysis): new “objects” created by transposing, proportioning, analyzing

NOY pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

CIR pp. 287-88 pronounce an atrociously tragic sentence, make its quotation marks appear, abandoning it to anonymity, putting forward an analysis > for more drama, who more than the other is vulnerable to analysis?

SPEC p. 316 analysand-locomotive (speculator/analyst the 1st analysand): for whom law of listening substituted for law of looking

FV p. 487n Poe: it is in matters beyond limits of rule that skill of analyst is evinced

H p. 39 read from another angle, not simply a triangle

LOBL p. 109 life being drawn through by sharp dividing line, edge where it is impossible to settle: arrête, angle of instability impossible to settle (s’arrêter)

pp. ~171-72 think exteriority from angle of economy of the arrêt: greatest “bound” energy, bandée, tightly gathered around its own limit (Hemmung, Haltung) > immediately disseminated, sand, empty, unloaded, spontaneously: in trance of trans, ghosts, transes, folies du jour (cf. Glas on trépas, trans/partition [Derrida’s referring to Genet crossing national borderlines])

MPM p. 72 via de Man, figure of “defective cornerstone,” “neglected corners” > required by architecture [of system], deconstructs from w/in

SH p. 5 Buchecker (beechmast), book corners, sharp, gaping edges of a text

F p. xv [method] the break-in technique (l’effraction) that permits one to penetrate the crypt: locating crack or lock, choosing angle of entry, and proceed by force

p. xix le tiers incorporé est gardé pour être supprimé [held in to be crossed out]: assembly of witnesses around Wolf Man’s crypt (forum): whole strategy of testifying > on s’y coupe tout le temps, witnesses testify by interrupting, wounded by angular edges of forum

p. xx [angular] partitions [w/in Self] of crypt: fractures into angular pieces, arranges (aménage) cavities, corridors, zigzag labyrinths, anfractuosities, craggy (escarpées) fortifications > effects of breakages (cassures); requires light in darkness to shine on inner partition of splintered symbol (intrasymbolic not cosymbolic): each fragment conscious to itself, unconscious to ‘non-crypt’

p. xxvi Abraham and Torok translate by setting each language at an angle w/ itself: shattered (brisée) linearity

p. xxxiii-xxxiv anasemia: 1) narrative (superposing of “account (récit)”), story, fable w/in concept 2) angle 3) sepulcher

p. xlii [re: Wolf Man’s cryptonomic translations] phonetic contaminations, nonsemantic associations, neither rhetorical figures nor metonymic displacements > but angular: contact (semantic or formal) w/ surface of its allosemes acc. most economical line/surface; angles make itinerary unreadable, makes cryptonomic the once inflexible logic of castration

pp. xlii-xliii 2 routes (both angular) (double density) the Thing follows at dividing line (the Thing marked by same dividing line as symbol broken by crypt): 1) crosses unconscious directly (tableau, symptom) 2) crosses intrasymbolic crack (alloseme)

***p. xlviii [Derrida’s speech]: feel on tongue angular cut of shattered word, et je sens alors, de ma langue, l’angle coupant d’un mot brisé

DS p. 177 double session finds its corner (coin) BTWN (ENTRE) literature & truth (that by which question “what is?” wants answering): figure of folding back, angle ensured by fold

p. 234 certain mimic inscribes a graft in one corner, holding antre open

p. 251 sum can’t be totalized, nor is this non-totalizing exceeded by infinite richness of content of meaning or intention > define the limit otherwise: fold w/ no possibility of folding text back on itself (angle & intersection of re-mark), no reduction of its spacing > blank, fold: impossibility of (imaginary) theme beyond textual instance > these textual effects rich w/ kind of poverty, singular/regular monotony, disappear: one can’t see this because one thinks one is seeing themes

p. 256n lime, lima, limus—oblique (obliquity/curvature of teeth of a file)

p. 259 secret angle of fold > “miniscule tomb”

p. 277 crisis of literature est marquée au coin de cet excès > figure of corner testifies to this in all its recastings/retemperings (corner, coin, angle, seal, fold, hymen, open recess, etc.)

——Mallarmé’s play (on “plume,” on “winds [brise]”) anathema to thematization, to deciphering meaning > coin-entre

pp. 279-80(n) [quoting Mallarmé] rhythm, literary game par excellence: mimic suspense/laughter—rhythmic cadence, or case, all the falls, the silent fall of pen

POS p. 46 DS re-marks a nerve, fold, angle, doubled fold of undecidable, a mark marks both marked and the mark, re-marked site of mark, can’t be counted on list of themes—hollow is the relief: hymen, fold, square, blank, margin, supernumber, column, air, chandelier

p. 86 dissemination is play of castration w/out metaphysical/romantic pathos of negativity > dissemination “is” angle of play of castration

p. 113n TN. se deliter, “disembed,” klinē, incline, clinique

P pp. 73-4 effects of deconstructed frame would not be an absence of one, l’abîme [undo the frame] en coin dans ses angles et ses articulations, slyly—see picture from the side of the wood (not teleological, not harmony, internal becomes external); thickness taken into account

p. 81 practice of fiction must guard against being reappropriated w/in metaphysical truth, show up remnants of angle in round frames (spirit as round form for Hegel)

O p. 11 dissemination: generalizes theory/practice of graft w/out proper body, skew w/out straight line [?], bias w/out front [Nietzsche perspectivism?]

p. 25 [nonsynonymous synonyms] > never enclosed in finite taxonomy > no lexicon as such, can’t be pinned to a point, marks of dissemination, undecidable acc. 2 of binary opposition, not sublatable into 3 of speculative dialectics > displaced along angle of certain re-folding

——dissemination displaces 3 of ontotheology along angle of a certain refolding (re-ploiement)

p. 55 Derrida places logic of veil alongside that of corner > prelude, en passant, improbably place of dissemination

p. 59 if you wanna see for yourself, encounter by chance, enmeshed (engrenés) in some corner (coin), ce qui’l en est de la coupe or/livre

SW p. 326 when one cannot read original language, one is lost in translations (veils, fringes or clothing, panels, wings, corners)

p. 341 tallith: 4 corners of living skin

——fur (wool) & skin (leather): tallith must be something living taken from something living worn by something living > a burying of the dead that once had possibility of auto-affection

——homogeneity of textile, heterogeneity of the sewing of corners: another book

REST p. 278 what if, and Derrida sees it too, they’re 2 left shoes, a double that fudges (brouille) both “pair & identity” à la fois—paralyzes directionality, fait loucher vers le diable

p. 291 Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, l’hymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

AFR p. 132 the frivolous: (time of a) difference (of degree), spacing which ontology isn’t capable of, con-, de-struction are breached, line of disintegration (not straight/continuous/regular); philosophy deviates from itself, strikes itself w/ blows from outside > deconstruction is possible

PSSS pp. 271-72 Freud on indirect methods to combat war, ruse of detour (Umweg)

——Freud advocates submitting life of drives to Diktatur der Vernunft, a Utopia > indirect stratagem of Eros/Thanatos: contrary to the cruelty drive, though cruelty knows no end

pp. 273-74 Freud’s indirection, oblique, angular, mediating nonstraightness: not just detour, strategic ruse, continuous transaction—but a leap, interruption, an ethical step

D pp. 289, 358-59 liminary question, Medusa, stone, flange, pierre d’angle et d’attente (cornerstone, toothing stone) > other enumeration, squarely written, remains in reserve, undecipherable

p. 294 [let’s mark in hollow, mute, invisible angle] statistical accumulation of “quotations,” [like constraints of that angle] accumulation as feigning to present the text > “this” text & all that touches it—still “that” text; generalized simulacrum: intertext of 2 fictions (btwn primary text & commentary) [Derrida will call D “this” text w/ a certain irony]

p. 295 passage toward other, se resserrer (fitting itself) into the angles btwn the surfaces, dans l’entre-surface [inter(sur)face] > articulation of one surface sur l’autre (d’un temps sur l’autre)

——angle: night, blue passage of all tenses into each other, la torsion (twist)

——Derrida’s text: re-marks passage [in Soller’s], repeats square by closing angle, opens another surface of writing to-come: play w/ cardo, hinge, cardinal points; remarque d’angle: all lines broken

p. 299 by a folding-back (reploiement) or internal angle of surface: face (frons scaenae) contemplates itself as unconditioned opening of appearance, but explains itself as surface-effect, as conditioned [by square apparatus]

p. 302 present can only present itself by relating back to itself [folding back on itself], (com)plying with itself (en se pliant à soi) dans l’angle, along la brisure: a “crack (faille)” created by a joint, hinge

p. 303 possibility (potency) of present is its own limit, inner fold, impossibility—its impotence (btwn presence/castration) > same goes for “history,” “form”: language of metaphysics

***p. 304 each germ is its own term—finds its term w/in itself as its own internal limit, faisant angle avec sa proper mort [tracing, grafting, semen already swarming (essaimée)]

p. 355 to write means to graft (same word), each grafted text radiates toward the site of its removal, s’y régénèrent dans la répétition, à la bordure d’un surjet (overcast seam)

——discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

p. 364 each angle of square belongs to totality of surface, but multiplies it by folding back on itself, fractures it [the surface]—leaving room for supplementary attending (d’assistance) surface

——same w/ supernumerary (surnombre) (column of words): is part of the numeral and belongs (appartient) to very milieu it exceeds

+R p. 158 “the angle is always for me the edge of a tomb (un bord de tombe)”

p. 159 plus d’air, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature > each letter, bit or piece of word (mors ou morceau de mot) written w/ 2 hands

p. 160 gl of “angle”: wild, almost unnarratable event, not a morpheme, close to piercing (trouer) a hole in the arthron [articulation, joint], patch of color in graphesis, the trait in color, a rebel to appeased commerce (regulated exchange of 2 elements [lexical, pictural])

p. 164 angle, biting (mordant) into the border

C p. 215 work of the angle (RECTIFIES in all senses) resounds on more than one surface: kills, repairs, restores, recaptures, then once more (inexhaustible debt until the échéance of a dice throw)

E E p. 2 once inserted into another network, the “same” philosopheme is no longer the same > inversely, “unique and original (inédits)” philosophemes, if there are any, once they enter network of inherited philosophemes, they’re affected over their whole surface and under every angle > the very project of rigorous criteria for judging philosophical specificity, which we are nowhere near disposing of, belongs to a set of conditions (un ensemble)—that remains to be thought

BSi BSi p. 269 [method in seminar] experience w/ you, and reconnoiter the corner turned

OG OG p. 269 (379) “fermons l’angle et pénétrons dans la texte”—to where writing is named

EU EU p. 241 [re: CIPH] translation: transferential, diagonal, transversal, interscientific research

SPEC SPEC p. 280 [re: Freud’s speculation] non-simplicity, indirectness > relation btwn pleasure/unpleasure not simple correlation of decrease/increase of (free) energy: inexhaustible reserve for speculation: not substantial riches, but supplementary angles

FV FV p. 420n basted effect of certain footnotes, animal-machines camouflaged in shadows (prudently left in corners)—threatening security of a space & a logic

GOD GOD p. 141 God’s covenant is also w/ animals, a promise we forget every time an animal is killed

R R p. 53 extend measure of the immeasurable (w/out calculation) to animals, non-living

p. 86 to think democracy [Paulhan], to think “first to happen by (le premier venue),” at limit of “who” or “what,” living being, cadaver > “first to happen by” = “first to come”?

p. 97 beast: incarnation of evil, satanic, diabolical, demonic, beast of apocalypse

pp. 93-94 rogue unlike voyou [in French] can be animal, a creature incapable of mingling w/ the herd

H H p. 77 unconditional welcome of every other would include animals

POO POO p. 143n to speak of something w/out speaking of something [literature] valid for every trace, dissociation doesn’t need to be marked by words, doesn’t require la parole, can be mute deictic, gesture of animal [trace beyond human]

POR POR p. 4 (131) bees, Aristotle says they can’t learn because they can’t hear

HERP HERP p. 172 for Heidegger, animal has no ear so can’t have a friend

HASD HASD p. 17 some would say animal can’t choose to keep silent, can’t keep a secret

POOF POOF pp. 201-02 men & women can have a virtuous friendship, but it’s unstable, child becomes the indispensable link of the bond: the difference from animal procreation is the testament

A A pp. 36-7 Heidegger says animal cannot experience death as such, and that animal cannot speak [Derrida draws out undeveloped relation btwn language and death]

——if death can’t be experienced as such both to language and to what exceeds language, border btwn animal & Dasein would become unassignable

pp. 43-4 difference of animal/human, biological life/culture is the relation to death as such, true border would be there

pp. 58-59 when being-toward-death is universal, crosses historical, cultural borders—it still privileges human above animal

p. 73 Heidegger: no non-truth for the animal [Aristotle-like]

EM EM p. 129n (155n) Heidegger: metaphysics, thought of subject, treats man on basis of animalitas, essence of man is not heeded

S S p. 117n [citation of themes of animality in Glas and Postcard]

p. 12 acc. Heidegger, animals can’t question (no technē or spirit) > Heidegger always presenting his stance on animals as “theses,” which he avoids, for essential reasons, almost everywhere else

p. 47 acc. Heidegger, animality is not de l’esprit

pp. 48-9 the confusion of Heidegger’s “animal is weltarm (poor-in-world)” > since it is not a matter of degrees it avoids anthropocentrism, but reconstitutes anthropocentrism (measure of man) in the designation of lack or privation

pp. 50-1 animal has and does not have world, has access to entities, but not entities als sich

p. 51 for Heidegger, privation (Privation) in Dasein, in structure of “as,” structure of “something as something (die Struktur des Etwas als Etwas),” not same as animal’s privation (Entbehrung)

pp. 52-3 Heidegger suggests we draw a line through rock to think animal’s relation to it

——erasure of the name, name of rock, erasure of possibility to name rock, as such, to access being-rock

pp. 55-6 though Derrida sees a “humanist teleology” in the hierarchization of man to animal (found in the negation imposed on animal w/ weltarm), one which requires not one ontology but the very possibility of the onto-logical, he isn’t criticizing it (it does denounce biologism, racism, and naturalism) > can we escape this program? can we transform it by “reconnoitering it right down to its most tortuous ruses and most subtle resources”?

pp. 56-7 acc. Heidegger, animal not in human world as Vorhandenheit nor Zuhandensein, and not Dasein, animal neither categorical nor existential, the 2 pairs of concepts structuring Sein und Zeit > does the animal threaten the whole order of the existential analytic?

p. 103 Heidegger: animal cannot be evil because has no spirit, man can fall even lower than animal, can disjoin from die Seynsfuge (ontological fit)

FWT FWT p. 42 mustn’t crush dimensions of living being [biology, cultural] into each other, all life (animal & human) survives by knowing how to discern (btwn forms of life, btwn “living” and “dead”)

pp. 62-3 question of animality, limit upon which all great questions are asked

p. 63 writing, trace, gramma exceed opposition: human/nonhuman > extend field of living, or rather life/death relation

——Derrida is suspicious of “Animal” in the singular

——treatment of animal: logocentrism > proffered the discourse of hegemony: of mastery

p. 65 acc. Descartes, animal is reaction w/out response (& Kant, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger)

——great respect for foundation of human rights, via post-Cartesian subjectivity, though must be analyzed, developed, enriched

——modern concept of right depends on Cartesian cogito, his “text” not the cause but “represents” structure in powerful systematicity of symptom

——rights for animals confirms logic of subjectivity responsible for greatest violence against them > human rights for animals a disastrous contradiction

p. 66 Derrida says there are uncrossable borders btwn man/animal, many borders, limits

p. 69 arguments for human sovereignty, and the idealism that goes along w/ it > always contains an insult, a contempt for animals

——major feature of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism: assign inferior status so to exclude him/her from the human, place him/her in world of animality

p. 70 Derrida likes Bentham’s “the question is not: can they [animals] speak? but can they suffer?” [see ATIA p. 27 not the capacity of the animal, the power, but their suffering]

——“no doubt it will always be necessary to kill animals, and probably humans too, even after the universal abolition of the death penalty”

pp. 72-3 there is a radical discontinuity btwn animals & humans, but…

p. 73 Derrida withdraws phrase “genocide of animals” after someone protested to this use of genocide in Jerusalem

WM WM pp. 236-37 for Aristotle, brutes and humans both make sounds, but only humans make sounds that can become intelligible, meaningful, sounds that become letters

——animals can’t imitate [cf. ATIA p. 35 Derrida refers to WM, there he follows tropes, rhetoric, metaphors, concepts through animal language btwn Aristotle/Nietzsche]

ROP ROP [quoting EN] Lacanian scandal re: what he says on the animal: en un mot, that death happens to the immortal who lacks for lacking nothing, not to the mortal being-for-death [?]

SW SW pp. 353-54 absolute knowledge not man’s thing but that of sericulture [?] > silkworm comes back to itself in its odyssey, wraps itself in its own shroud, kind of absolute knowledge: beyond any coupling, any sexual difference or rather duality of the sexes > [his bestiary starting up]

DPi DPi p. 99 for Heidegger, animal perishes (crève), only Dasein (human) dies, has right/possibility to die

pp. 129-30 for Kant, life for life’s sake is unworthy of human dignity, failure to inscribe death in law, return to animal (feminine)

RGE RGE pp. 257-58 Bataille: only way for negativity to reveal what we are is to see ourselves dead, this is comedy! must live w/ impression of truly dying, difficult because necessity of spectacle/representation, nothing less animal than fiction of death > emphasis on simulacrum disrupts Hegel

Gii Gii p. 35 for Heidegger, human hand different than ape’s hand

p. 40 the way scientists or thinkers talks about animality constitutes a decisive symptom of discourse’s essential axiomatics

——Heidegger: apes have organs that can grasp, do not have hands

p. 41 Heidegger’s essential propositions re: ape’s lack of hand, an empirico-dogmatic hapax, supposedly nonmetaphysical humanism > when animality is enclosed in its organico-biological programs: absolute oppositional limit which erases differences, homogenizes

p. 301n Derrida sees Heidegger’s reflections on as such [re: borderline btwn man/animal] as similar to his reflections on the hand, ability to give or take as such [see p. 43]

p. 41 everything Heidegger says about man takes on meaning and value w/in oppositional limit to animal (it is dogmatic and serious)

——man’s hand infinitely removed from prehensile organs through the abyss of its being “durch einen Abgrund des Wesens”

——this abyss: speech & thought

HST HST p. 363 Levinas still calls the other—my neighbor, my universal brother in humanity > Derrida: wouldn’t hospitality have to open to an other that isn’t my hôte? perhaps an “animal”?

TN TN p. 47 acc. Aristotle, touch: co-extensive w/ animal life, the genus of senses

——animals die w/ too much touch: an originary prohibition, reserve of touch holds life on the brink (au bord) of exaggeration, touching a question of life & death

pp. 152-53 Maine de Biran’s “humanualism (humainisme)”: only humans have hand, can touch in strongest sense (that elephant trunk “approximates” hand of man maintains hierarchy)

p. 168 handless animals can touch!

EW p. 285 trace, iterability, mark, differance (possibilities or necessities) are themselves not only human

BSi pp. 14-6 clear signs of culture in animals, even incest taboos [political animal]; re: opposition man/animal > don’t rush to analogize, to resemblance: multiply attention to differences

pp. 21-3 Plutarch on non-cowardice of animals, on humans mimicking carnivorous animals, eating weak ones > sovereignty as devouring? [Rousseau referring to Plutarch]

p. 31 Freud speaks of an a-historical stasis of animals due to equilibrium btwn drives/environment [bees have a prehistory?]: mankind an irruption of destructive instinct [as history?]

pp. 55-6 non-response of animal as ultimate difference from man (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan, Descartes, Hobbes)

p. 90n [Derrida disputes Lacan’s “animals cannot cross certain threshold of dissimulation”]

p. 154 animal cannot be bête, not free, can’t come away from relation to ground

p. 322 Heidegger against strict, conventional division of man/animal [for very different reasons than Derrida], doesn’t make man unique enough

OG p. 70 trace, arche-phenomenon of “memory,” prior to oppositions nature/culture, animal/humanity [Levinas, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud]

p. 207 (295) acc. Rousseau, animals experience moral signs

pp. 241-42 (343-44) for Rousseau, animals lack the power to substitute, life w/out differance

ATIA p. 2 Kant’s animal “als ein Maschinen der Vorsehung” (a providential machine) [see p. 102]

p. 3 Derrida playing w/ je suis: I am, I follow, crossing borders btwn man/animal, move from “ends of man” to the animal in me, surrender to the animal, animal at unease w/ itself

p. 163n Montaigne recognizes in animal a capacity to respond [contra Descartes]

p. 8 question of animal: what does it mean to respond? how is a response different from a reaction?

——question of the animal, the letter counts, animal response has as its stakes the letter

p. 9 Derrida’s cat, he’s certain it has an existence that refuses to be conceptualized (rebelle à tout concept) > we know the animal is mortal because it has a name, which must survive itself

pp. 10-1 to follow after the animal, means it comes before, that also means its behind > being-with, but how? not a mode of a pre-established being > être-serré (being-huddled-together), pressu, près, auprès, après: acc. stronger/weaker stricture which always remains pressing

p. 11 philosophy forgets (a calculated forgetting?) that the animal can look at me, animal as absolute alterity, point of view of absolute other

pp. 11-2 nudity as passivity, involuntary exhibition in face-to-face: the passion of the animal, my passion of the animal (other)

p. 12 animal as tout autre, tout autre est tout autre, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal, secret > what happens to brotherhood when animal comes on scene?

——what happens to animals when brothers kill each other? on Mount Moriah?

pp. 14 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas, Descartes, all men, all belong to quasi-epochal category: never been seen (naked) by an animal, never imagine animal could address them > Derrida believes they all have, must decipher symptom of this disavowal

——only poets/prophets face address of the animal, not juridical, civil men

pp. 16-7 God created man, to watch man name the animals, to watch him (Ish w/out Ishah) dominate, domesticate, train them [Genesis] (before the fall)

pp. 18-20 in avowing his desire to avoid appropriative projection before animal’s gaze, to avoid tradition [Benjamin, Heidegger] that assigns deep sadness (Traurigkeit) to animal’s Benommenheit (inability to respond to name it’s given, inability to experience being “as such”)

——for Benjamin, animal/nature not sad because mute but mute because sad: not the sadness of passivity, of not being able to name, but of receiving one’s name > a foreshadowing of mourning

——every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

pp. 22-3 for Heidegger, animal & time a problem, animal one example of Nur-Lebenden (living but nothing more), history of animal for man followed by section Die Zeitlichkeit des Verfallens

——has philosophy become a symptom of the history of dominating the animal?

p. 23 animal: a word man has given himself the right to give to the living other

pp. 24-5 relation to animal has been accelerating past 2 centuries (Derrida cautious to call it a turning point) > traditional forms of treating animals (sacrifices, hunting, training, etc.) have been turned upside down: mass farming, genetic mutation (unprecedented subjection of animal)

——developments of zoological, biological, genetic forms of knowledge, inseparable from techniques of intervention into their object (living animal), inseparable from transformation/world of object

p. 26 animal genocide, imagine overproducing Jews to experience that same hell > this “pathos” confronts us w/ a new (experience of) compassion [new ( ) right/appeal, new ( ) philosophy]

pp. 27-8 Bentham’s “can they suffer?” no longer question’s animality in relation to power, dynamis, hexis, habitus re: logos; suffering: “can they not be able?” > a power w/out power, possibility of the impossible, a passivity > mortality resides there, as radical means to contemplate our finitude alongside animals, the finitude of life: sharing this nonpower, vulnerability, anguish

p. 29 to think the war we find ourselves waging [against animals] is not only a duty, no one can escape it: thinking, perhaps, begins when animal looks at us and we are naked before it

p. 30 to say there is no abyss btwn man/animal would contradict everything modest Derrida has written about (his concern for differences, abyssal ruptures, over homogeneity)

p. 31 given the heterogeneity at the edge of “the human,” the multiplicity of organizations of relations btwn life/death, relations so abyssal/intertwined no exteriority of one term to other, to say animal, in the singular, is to utter a bêtise > confirms animality disavowed & complicit in war of the species

p. 32 Derrida tries to speak of wrong or evil in singular name “animal” by stammering chimerical aphorisms: l’animal que donc je suis, does it speak? a naked question, still to-come

p. 33 the question of whether animals can respond also concerns whether they can erase (s’effacer), can they lie, pretend, cover their own tracks

——that traces can be erased, does not mean someone (man or animal) can erase them

p. 35 Derrida sometimes sees Nietzsche take the horse’s head in his hands, calls it as a witness to his compassion

——Nietzsche tries to teach us to laugh again [in Ecce Homo], by plotting to let all his animals loose into philosophy, “reanimalizes” genealogy of the concept

pp. 34-6 Derrida’s animals swarm, multiply, mobilize, the more he writes autobiographically, they also are welcomed “on the threshold of sexual difference” [cf. “Fourmis,” SW]

——[informal, because modest, list of all Derrida’s bêtes]

p. 166n if Zusage (language “before,” w/out question) is before the possibility of response, then wouldn’t Zusage be something the animal is not deprived of?

pp. 40-1 the animal in the general singular, neutralization, castration, of the sex of the animal > the philosopheme itself, constitutes philosophy [no philosopher has every protested on principle]

——the right to speak blithely of the animal, one of the most symptomatic asinanities of the human, bêtise (of which animals are exempt by definition)

——Derrida introduces l’animot, a chimerical word

***p. 44-5 comparing Genesis w/ Greek myths [re: fault, nakedness] as two symptomatic translations, whose internal necessities partially overlap re: the proper of man [default in propriety]: technics, sociality, emergence out of nature, knowledge, historicity [?], subjectivity, subjugating superiority over animal

p. 48 mot in l’animot should bring us to the word named noun (nommé nom), the one the animal is deprived of: think the absence of the word or name as something other than privation

——general category of animal for all nonhuman living creatures, not only a sin against vigilance, rigor > a crime; “thou shalt not kill” only humans—crimes only “against humanity”?

pp. 49-51 autobiographical animal, the general singulars “I” and “animal,” before ego cogito both living, both auto-affective, both moving > “I” speaks to “engage nudity w/out shame,” untenable pledge > bring in a mirror (une psyché), is the animal caught there too? or my primary mirror?

p. 52 Lacanian animals, like Socrates’ writing (painting), do not respond

***pp. 59-60 is there a mirror-effect wherever there’s sexual coupling/difference? identifying a partner? hetero-narcissism is erotic: a hunting game of erotic modesty occurs, exhibition, dissimulation, modesty, shame, not only humans would have a right to it, would enter order of the law, inseparable from order of truth (since latter linked to veil of modesty)

p. 62 the animort? pluralizing animal, renouncing unification of concept, so it can’t be opposed to anything identifiable (man, the dead)

pp. 63-4 je rêve, donc, au fond d’un terrier introuvable et à venir: the schizis of a contradictory injunction > translate an inhuman language w/out the usual bêtise re: animal

p. 66 via Valéry’s snake, the “animal abyss” is not a void, it’s too full of being, vertigo, étincelle au lieu de néant, lieu tenant du néant que je suis

p. 78 radical evil and double figure of animal: innocent or demonic, apocalyptic

p. 79 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance

pp. 82-3 for Descartes, animal judged as automaton, as spectacle, before specular subject—who doesn’t want to find himself reflected in image of animal

p. 84 for Descartes, animal can respond to a call/order/sign of its name but not a question

p. 89 perspicacious warning lights (des voyants) [re: Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, Lacan], all think animal can’t produce language signs, only responds programmatically [there’s more here]

p. 94 animal is capable of auto-affection, of [quasi] “I,” not capable of pointing toward itself and saying “this is I,” of autodeictic, autoreferential self-distancing, thus not capable of understanding, reason, response, responsibility

p. 96 for Kant [in Anthrop…], animality (Thierheit) is prior (früher) to man, man is after the animal, inspires all his good tendencies > reversal occurs when man domesticates animal

pp. 100-02 for Kant [via Adorno], animals have no teleology (so always a means), they have no dignity (Würde), that is, no priceless internal value, so always a price, always belong to sensible world that must be sacrificed; Adorno sees in this a hatred towards animals, a Kant avec Sade

——Derrida not convinced by Adorno who claims that Cartesian indifference towards animals becomes Kant’s act of war against them [indifference already act of war]

——animality of human in problem of capital punishment

p. 104 animal’s problem (mal) is the male, vir, not woman

p. 106 philosophy’s relation to the animal: a secret “architectonics” in the construction, & thus deconstruction, of a discursive apparatus

pp. 110-11 in similar ways, Descartes, Levinas, Heidegger, Kant privilege “Here I am” over existence of life; for Levinas, w/out separation, possibility of responding, animals don’t die, can thus be put to death w/out being killed

p. 112 why did Levinas never imagine the animal occupying place of the 3rd party, thus the 1st appeal to justice? > never an other other than the other human

p. 113 Descartes, Kant, Levinas disavow, foreclose, sacrifice, humiliate l’animot [see p. 89] > disavowal of foreclosure

——Derrida points out that a certain profound humanism [that of the Old Testament?] privileged the question of the animal as that of the infinitely other

——this silent appeal that calls from the outside, whose trace can only be disavowed w/ so many wounds, symptoms

pp. 113-18 [Derrida on limitations of Levinas’ thinking around dog Bobby]

——Levinas’ Bobby dog is a witness for us, an other w/out alterity: recalls the subject to being subject > this is not sufficient deconstruction of Cartesian man/animal borderline

pp. 120-21 for Lacan, human is not a beast of prey, but a beast that is prey to language [this is thought while distinguishing anthropological from zoological]

p. 122 in Promethean & biblical tradition, fixity of animal [re: communication, information] related to animal’s perfection

p. 127 Lacan distinguishes btwn animal sexual pretense (feinte) and the deception (tromperie) of speech

pp. 128-29 for Lacan, animal can inscribe the trace but not erase it, thus animal is prisoner w/in specularity of imaginary [for Derrida, inscription erases itself, mechanically, this is iterability]

p. 129 Lacan closer to Heidegger than ever when saying animal can’t die > thus, ignorant of mourning, tomb, cadaver, which constitutes, for Lacan, a “signifier”

——animal an immortal living thing

p. 130 Lacan designates castration complex as Freud’s scientific (nonmythological) original sin

——being subjected to the signifier, a nonmastery that gives human mastery over animals, only man has power to destroy his trace

p. 132 Nietzsche & Kafka realized better than anyone: Mother, Law, God, Animal > indissociable figures of the same Thing

p. 173n [Derrida’s thesis] not resitute to the animal what we have taken from it, but wonder if its reactivity, its wiring, is also applicable to the human

p. 149 for Aristotle, sleep is a desmos, a peculiar way which aisthēsis is bound, Heidegger’s binding “ring” of the animal, animal more tightly bound than man

p. 156 the differential of animot, animals, should complicate oppositional structure: either have “as such” or don’t (has or doesn’t have world)

——re: animal, Heidegger continues Aristotle’s tradition of steresis (privation)

pp. 158-59 for Heidegger, animal lives don’t exist, must strike out (Durchstreichung) all words when speaking about what appears to the animal, nothing appears “as such” [but, might the animal itself, the animal-machine, put into effect all these necessary ratures?]

p. 159 differences btwn how a human eats and how an animal eats are not those btwn “as such” and “not as such,” the ambition of describing this difference exceeds “me (Derrida)”

——w/out “as such,” animals don’t know how to “let be,” let beings be as such: animal as a utilitarian, always putting-in-perspective [does man really escape this trap?]

***p. 160 to “let” something “be” “as such,” you would have to “let be” in your absence, in your death [thus, for Heidegger, being-toward-death and “as such” constitutive of each other], but is this ever possible? can we let the being be? Nietzsche would say no, that the objective is always caught in the living, in life, in perspective > whatever the difference btwn animals, remains an “animal” relation

——Derrida’s strategy re: border(s) btwn animal/human: there is no pure and simple “as such”

S p. 134n had Heidegger adhered to all his crossing-outs, this would have be silent voracity of an animal-machine, not simply “without spirit,” but a figure of evil [see ATIA p. 39 this animal-machine resembles the virus that obsesses “everything I write”]

ATIA pp. 38-9 [cf. S p. 134n] animal-machine that invades, obsesses (like a computer virus), Derrida’s texts has a family resemblance to Descartes’: Derrida’s is an animal of reading/rewriting, an animal capable of erasing

p. 74 for Descartes, the specter/ghost “conjured” by judgment is simulacrum of “real man,” spectral man as animal-machine, this animal-machine we’re trying to “flush out”

pp. 81-2 Descartes’ 2 criteria (he calls them “methods”) for differentiating authentic from mimetic simulacrum of automaton (still govern method of Lacan & Heidegger): 1) the inability to respond 2) a lack which is not the lack of man, the lacking of the lack of man

p. 91 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas all make explicit fundamental place of sacrifice; for Descartes, its inexplicit: animal-machine not sacrificed animal > but Descartes’ cogito has its Christian heritage: interest in Eucharist, a relation to Augustine’s cogito (despite denials)

p. 102 unthought, unconscious, other of the “I think,” (the animal je suis), a function of machinality > haunts automatically, like an evil genius, the Cartesian animal-machine & Kant’s teleological, providential-machine (where war machines presumed to have civilizing effect)

pp. 124-25 presupposed absence of response in animal, that it is only capable of reaction: identifies animal w/ machine [Derrida not erasing this distinction, but doubts its purity]

pp. 158-59 for Heidegger, animal lives don’t exist, must strike out (Durchstreichung) all words when speaking about what appears to the animal, nothing appears “as such” [but, might the animal itself, the animal-machine, put into effect all these necessary ratures?]

TR p. 77 which theoretical animal, animal-machine (of 3rd millennium) [cf. ATIA pp. 158-59] could measure up to this inhuman program [Derrida’s referring to the conference title]

EJQB p. 72 signifying absence/separation, letter lives as aphorism, it is solitude, articulates solitude: letter of law can’t be outside difference, can’t end interruption, distance, (non)relation to other

——animality of letter assumes forms of letter’s desire, anxiety, solitude [cf. p. 73 metaphor is this animality?]

BSi p. 70 sovereign state as Leviathan, as animal-machine, as prosthstatics > beast et (est) sovereign coupled across a copula: affinity through analogy, proportion, reciprocal fascination—or grafting

p. 111 animal rights a translation of rights of man, a Cartesian/Kantian logic which reduces animal to machine

p. 191 I kill bêtise first, I kill the marionette in me, the animal-machine (so as not be killed by it)

p. 292 Descartes’ Treatise on Man treats human body as “machine of earth” (compares to clocks, artificial fountains) > animal-machines in Descartes

pp. 336-37 the untranslatability of bêtise (no word in world can translate it), even untranslatable from French into French > those who speak French, those privileged by the idiom, are commanded by complicated programs, contexts, pragmatic situations > privilege to unique event of language, the “poetic,” is contaminated by reactive or reactional animality [animal-machine]

FV p. 420n basted effect of certain footnotes, animal-machines camouflaged in shadows (prudently left in corners)—threatening security of a space & a logic

FWT p. 65 rights for animals confirms logic of subjectivity responsible for greatest violence against them > human rights for animals a disastrous contradiction

p. 67 re: animals, will there ever be a law differentiating killing from letting die?

p. 74 deconstruction: slow/progressive approach—not attempting to destroy/discredit axiomatics of this (formal/juridical) solution [re: animal rights] > reconsider history of law/concept of right

ATIA pp. 87-9 paradox of animal rights: require the very concept of subjectivity that oppresses animals, reduces them

pp. 92-3 [via Kant] Roman law: rights of humans vs. rights of things (irrational animals); humans can do what they please w/ things (Sachen) because of divine injunction, elevation: “I”

p. 96 for Kant, human politics occur at moment of domestication of animals, becoming-livestock (devenir-bétail) of beast: so animal politics would be paradoxical in this logic

p. 101 ecologism, vegeterianism, though better, still suffer under Judeo-Christiano-Islamic tradition of sacrificial war against animal (constitutive of techno-scientific knowledge, process of humanization, development of ethical/religious forms)

p. 108 since, for Levinas, face (thus ethics) is human (fraternal), only through transference or metaphor that we are sensitive to animal suffering

BSi p. 111 animal rights a translation of rights of man, a Cartesian/Kantian logic which reduces animal to machine

GT p. 112 annihilation of a remainder, as ashes sometimes testify, can play role of memory, of offering, of sacrifice

MONL p. 40 [re: barred access to Arabic, Berber] “the inscription of this limit could not leave traces”: multiply symptoms of a fascination

FK p. 57 desert of desert: where foundation loses very trace of itself in the desert, and religion can only begin again [quasi-automatically, machine-like, spontaneously]

p. 71 modern pragmatism liberates words from origins, archaic meanings.

***LOBL p. ~118 translation leaves behind an untranslated remnant, illegitimately, because it arrests the movement of the everyday possibility of literature and parasitism [see SPOM p. 135 translation causes ghost to drop into oblivion] [re: double syntax of arrêt de mort]

——dream of a translation w/out remnants: a metalanguage, a guarantee

H p. anne 20 acc. Nietzsche, w/out an experience, no ear to listen ~ [annihilation of trace?] “where nothing is heard nothing is there”

AF pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin)

——death drive is anarchivic, archiviolithic

p. 11 annihilation of memory and effacement of supplement

p. 12 death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

p. 57 deformations of text: murder

***p. 60 return of the repressed as triumph of life [re: Lou Andreas-Salomé’s reading in Moses], surviving of an excess of life which resists annihilation

p. 79 if repetition is in the heart of future to-come, so is total annihilation of death drive

SPOM p. 109 principle of selectivity guides & hierarchizes “spirits,” fatally excluding in turn, it will annihilate, by watching over some “en veillant (sur) ses ancetres” [dead bodies] and not others

HASD pp. 11-2 against Wittgenstein’s imposed silence > one must not avoid speaking = it is necessary that there be a trace

p. 50 for Dionysius, theologians who penetrate “secret infinity” leave no trace

MPM p. 21 when we know our friend to be gone forever: terrifying lucidity, in light of incinerating blaze where nothingness appears

——we remain in disbelief itself, we will never believe in death or immortality

EM pp. 135-36 Nietzsche’s übermensch “burns his text and erases the traces of his steps,” a laughter bursting beyond metaphysics

PP p. 63 text “run[s] the risk of being definitively lost, who will ever know of such disappearances?”

p. 99 (112) interpretative translation as violent as it is impotent, destroys pharmakon by forbidding access to it, leaving it untouched in its reserve

——all translations into languages that are heirs to Western metaphysics produce these violent effects of analysis

***VM p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

PAS PAS pp. (104-05) if there was one [name], the signature, the anagrammatic, would lose name in infinite measure of its keeping [absolute guard], so > plus de nom (visible name might hide tout autre name)

p. (106) I call to you to protect you against the nameless

S p. 81 in Der Ister, Hölderlin calls to the fire, Jetzt komme, Feuer!, fire as what comes, call for to-come > acc. Heidegger, Hölderlin, the Beseeler, has been struck by God of light, gift of spirit as incineration, cremation, almost becoming ash [MOP & annihilation of trace]

SH p. 35 date is a witness, but one can bless date w/out knowing to “what” or for “whom” one bears witness, always possible there’ll no longer be a witness for this witness

——affinity btwn date, name, ash

p. 56 in Celan’s “Die Schleuse” “Kaddish” is lost, “a word that was looking for me,” that which opens possibility of mourning what has been lost beyond a trace [loss of mourning]

p. 57 no worse loss than death of name (still, a date remains) > mourning, interiorization of other in Erinnerung, the preserving of other in sepulcher/epitaph, is denied us; words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts > incinerated beyond of date, words lost w/out sepulcher

FWT pp. 135-36 movement toward more and more “humane” death penalties whitewashes act of killing; [E.R.] gas chambers & crematoria, all trace of living was effaced

DS p. 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” > hymen

OS p. 36 Hegel: now [point] has tremendous right (ein ungeheures Recht), it is nothing as individual Now, as I pronounce it, the proudly exclusive now dissolves, flows away, falls into dust

pp. 65-6 difference btwn Being/beings, Heidegger’s discourse of trace > if difference (is) (itself) trace (neither presence nor absence): trace of trace has disappeared in the forgetting of the difference btwn Being/beings [forgetting of Being as annihilation of trace]

P p. 31 leaving (laisser), lacing (lacer), interlacing (Geflecht) can cause a lace to disappear once in a while (effigy & fiction) [re: truth in painting, Van Gogh]

ROP p. 110 Foucault’s wager, the end (fin) of finite man: “man would be effaced, like a face drawn in sand at the edge or limit of the sea” > trait (of face, limit) splits, becomes a limit, erasing and multiplying this limit endlessly > self-relation of limit at once erases/multiplies limit

GSP p. 166 in writing, sign can always “empty” itself, may never be reactivated, risks remaining forever closed & mute

PS p. 175 Artaud’s resistance to clinical/critical exegeses: protest itself against exemplification itself > destroy history of dualist metaphysics, render doctor/critic helpless: art w/out works, language w/out trace

***FS p. 28 not abandon ourselves to structural formalism: must attempt emancipation, but only as a dream, emancipation is impossible unless we forget our history [contra Nietzsche?]

DIF DIF p. 24 forgetting of ontological difference: disappearance of trace of trace > Heidegger: even the early trace (die frühe Spur) is obliterated when presence is in the position of the highest

O p. 29n acc. Feuerbach, Hegel’s exposition was supposed to have presupposed nothing, to leave no residue, empty & drain us completely

SW p. 325 letting other live: absolute suicide, no trace, not even the seal of a break

——not even leave them my ashes

——no longer be oneself or have oneself (s’être ou s’avoir) > truth w/out truth looking for me at end of world

——blessing of one who leaves w/out leaving an address

RGE pp. 256-57 that there must be meaning, that nothing must be definitely lost in death, that Hegel refers to death as “abstract negativity” > Bataille finds all this laughable

DST DST p. 321n abortive: a brith takes place w/out taking place: event of a singular failure, “comes to itself only to lose itself” [re: Lacoue-Labarthe on Reik’s theory of autobiography]

TR p. 134 formidable effects of machinelike automaticity: an a priori, programmed “I apologize” > automatic forgiveness self-destructs w/out delay (faster than “Mission Impossible” tapes), loses its meaning, its memory, annihilates its own archive

p. 146 “I beseech you” not to “annihilate” [re: Confessions]: performative eve, arche-peformative before performative, younger & older, support & archive of confession, its subjectile

IW p. 265 history’s harshest reality, its most murderous aspects—displacements of figures?

D p. 364 relation to innumerable, absence of traces—unnameable, relation to my death

ATM pp. 185-86 to bury a text that erased the name of God [dysgraphy] is not to annihilate it (burn the whole thing): by inhuming the fault, one keeps it; a work of mourning which can either 1) be successful through spiritual interiorization, introjection 2) or else be paralyzed in melancholic pathology (incorporation)

CIN p. 42 the totally incinerated envois could not be indicated by any mark

GOD pp. 132-33 “pardon for not meaning (to say),” secretless secret of literature, scene of forgiveness, its being “up in the air” keeps it secret, announces literature

FK p. 46 [re: names of God] untranslatability of proper name, but also iterability, thus technē [see p. 56 announce impossible translation]

H p. 105 Oedipus is twice encrypted, 1st in dying, 2^nd in hiding his death > by demanding he be kept dead, he announces a piece of blackmail

SPOM SPOM p. 44 to announce oneself, is that not to already be there in a way?

p. 128 Marx uses performative, not constative, to announce future of communism

p. 158 self-manifestation of the manifesto, the “here I am” in the announcement of communism (Marx, Engels’ Manifesto)

p. 166 to accuse the other always announces or denounces its imminent return

***R ***R p. 75 plus d’un, divisibility of God, announces democracy

p. 84 event (im-possible) announces itself in the form of an injunction (comes from on high)

p. 109 annulment of time announced in date, revolution, volt of the ring (anneau), il faut le temps, default, failure, collapse [autos needing other, event, time, heteronomy]

POO POO p. 132n Poe [Purloined Letter] tells the secret twice, w/out same secret being penetrated, matter of trace, secret can be announced w/out being revealed or secret is manifest but still in need of translation

HERP HERP p. 213 Heidegger calls the fact of not hearing (überhören) the poet that announces future being of a people: a sacrifice

——knowledge of what founds is intolerable, must be, structurally, repressed, excluded, ostracized from what it founds or institutes, must not belong to it (like Rousseau)

HASD HASD p. 28 call of the other, having always already preceded speech to which it was never present a first time, announces itself in advance as a recall (rappel)

EM EM p. 122n (145-46n) man’s specificity, as rational animal, announces itself to itself, as an infinite end

PP PP p. 81 living-beings, father and son, are announced to us w/in household (domesticité) of logos

VM VM p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

p. 95 acc. Levinas, concepts anticipate a horizon w/in which alterity is amortized as soon as it is announced—because foreseen, horizon always horizon of the same

S S p. 94 promise (Versprechen) announces, salutes, what has already taken place “before” (this is the temporality of the coming of the event, Ereignis or Geschehen), it is the dissymmetry of a yes before opposition of yes and no, before question, language always revient à de la promesse

——acc. Heidegger, there’s a “must” a “we must think” of the promise, thought as fidelity to promise > must hear & obey

PAS PAS p. (92) death as the impossibility of dying, à partir de laquelle s’annonce la mort sans mort

POOF p. 50 ‘perhaps,’ announcement of 1st act, 1st scene: only chance granted to the future, chance of chance

p. 70 Derrida assumes responsibility for speaking rightly, justly, up to the point where he is no longer responsible: that is, the point from which all responsibility is announced [the response no longer belongs to me]

POS p. 8 what defers presence (its trace, its sign, its representation) is basis of its announcement or desire

p. 9 differance common root of oppositional concepts, as common root, is also element of the same (distinguished from the identical [Heidegger]) in which oppositions are announced

OS pp. 60-1 metaphysical texts already have resources of their own criticism [re: circle of circles of time] (announces itself in the margin) [doubling of de-limitation]

p. 65 l’autre geste, le plus difficile, le plus inouï, le plus questionnant, celui pour lequel nous sommes le moins préparé, can only be sketched (esquisser), announced in calculated fissures of metaphysical text: 2 texts, 2 hands, 2 visions (together simultaneously & separated)

ROP pp. 29-30 deconstruction announces status w/out status of nonfinite # of names/quasi-concepts: the thinking of writing called for this, but it’s better thematized and formalized in theory of double bind, stricture of double band, and especially non-ontological remaining

pp. 87-9 “perpetual threat” (Foucault’s term) as shadow of haunting, threatens logic of historical ages, neither present nor absent, positive nor negative, inside nor outside; “announcing” [in its futural spectrality] poses similar problems for the historian as haunting

ATIA p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

p. 20 every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

DIF DIF p. 23 the annunciating and reserved trace can be disclosed in metaphysical discourse when stating closure of ontology (Levinas, Freud, Nietzsche, and especially Heidegger)

O p. 7 preface announces what will already have been written > Derrida claims preface presages a general practice of deconstruction, strange strategy w/out finality, cette défaillance organisatrice of telos or eschaton, which reinscribes restricted economy in general economy——[is this because the preface is an essential and ludicrous operation attempting to cancel out all displacement?]

p. 9 residue of writing remains anterior/exterior to content it announces

DPi pp. 240-41 angel came announcing deconstruction of death, but deconstruction has more than one angel, the other warned against banalizing, relativizing DP like Christianity has done, using an alibi of beyond to deny irreversible gravity of death [returns to angels on pp. 253-54]

TB p. 131 for Benjamin, languages intend (as Babelian event) toward being-language of language, this is “pure language,” not transcendent to each language, not Leibnizian universal language

——translation, as the accord of tongues, lets the being-language of language resonate, announcing it rather than presenting it

——translation makes nocturnal intimacy of core emerge [jealousy]

p. 132 less revelation than promise: “infinite rebirth (Aufleben) of languages”

——translation, as holy growth of languages, announces messianic end, but sign of end only “present” in “knowledge of that distance,” Entfernung, remoteness

Gii p. 58 Heidegger’s Wechselbezug (relation of reciprocity) btwn Erörterung (discussion, awakened literalness of word, situates proper place of Gedicht) and Erläuterung (clarification, elucidation of poems [Dichtungen] themselves) > (announce unique site (Ort) of Gedicht rather than show)

——is this Wechselbezug what is called the hermeneutic circle?

PIO pp. 10-1 Ponge’s “Fable”: poetic performative, describes/carries out, on same line, its own generation; telling & told are undecidable, its constative is its performative (not content w/ announcing, it’s located ironically in evangelical tradition, reveals/perverts structure of envoi)

p. 44 supplementarity introduces (into structure of psyche) the fabulous repetition, a crossing of chance & necessity, bending performative rules while respecting them: allows other to come, or announce’s its coming, in dehiscence’s opening > deconstruction

EL p. 196 Derrida tempted to collapse abyss & volcano—invisible chasm, catastrophe foments [see D p. 327], one can only interpret (blindly) the fumes that announce what can’t be seen coming

p. 217 Scholem’s nothing (secularization) occurs, not fortuitously analogous to Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik: nothingness, nothingness of language, announces “essence of what it threatens and causes to recoil in totality”

LI p. 129 repeatability of same ensures that full presence of a singularity, in being repeated, references something else, thus rending the full presence it announces

TN p. 53 the haptical, for every finite existence, recalls what is coming [Socrates], marks the limit at which or from which the presentation announces itself

p. 330n touchable-untouchable, untouchable right on/at (reste à même) the touchable, could only be announced if before any religion, cult, prohibition

BSi p. 20 analogy [re: beast and sovereign] announces (like a black cloud) the historical (actual & virtual) violences, disasters we won’t (already don’t) have a name for

OG p. 8 (18) death of book announces death of full speech, announces exhaustion of language’s archon [speech], as if language now seen as a species of writing, as a (short) 3000 year adventure: announces new mutation in history of writing

***pp. 46-8 (68-70) Derrida calls instituted trace “unmotivated” (immotivée), asks that the word “institution” not be so quickly interpreted w/in classical oppositions; “unmotivated” deconstructs Saussure’s arbitrary, thinks its possibility en-deçà de (short of) l’opposition dérivée btwn nature/convention, symbol/sign > becoming-unmotivated of trace requires synthesis where le tout autre s’annonce comme tel: not more natural than cultural

p. 183 (261) the dangerous differance, the master name of this supplementary series: death > metonymic substitution horizon & source, abyss from which each threat announces itself

p. 184 (261-62) image is death, it cannot represent & add representer to represented, thus presence of re-presented folded back on itself in the world, presence announces its dispossession w/in its own representer/death > subject: merely this movement of expropriation

SPEC p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

GT p. 66 anthropologists returning to the good inheritance of primitive societies—nature

HERP p. 195 for Heidegger, anthropology & psychology depend on metaphysics of subjectivity, interpretation of man as subject; thus, psychology did not exist for Greeks, and Christianity (w/ its new relation to philein) is 1st stage in formation of passions for subject/psychology

A p. 43 cultural partition around treatment of death: purely human, intra-anthropological

EM p. 116 (137) hégéliano-husserliano-heideggerienne anthropology (in France) concerned itself with the concept of history but not the history of a concept, especially concerned w/ we, nous-hommes, totality of human-reality

p. 117 (138) anthropologism common ground of Marxism, social-democracy, democratic-Christianity

——(139) the anthropologistic [apologistic?] reading of Hegel, Husserl & Heidegger was a mistake; Hegel not an anthropologist

pp. 117-18 (140) Husserl not an anthropologist; Husserl worried something like Sein und Zeit would be anthropological

pp. 120-21 (143) Hegel’s Phenomenology as truth of soul, the relevé of anthropology, of man

p. 121n (144n) the relevance accomplished in Hegelian metaphysics persists wherever metaphysics, our language, maintains its authority, even in pre-Hegelian systems (i.e. in Kant, figure of finitude organizes capacity to know from emergence of anthropological limit)

pp. 121-22n (144-45n) Kant’s pure end of moral law—not anthropological

p. 122n (145-46n) in spite of Kant’s critique of anthropology, man is sole example of rational being

p. 123 (147) critique of empirical anthropologism affirmation of transcendental humanism (Husserl, Kant)

——“the end of man (as a factual anthropological limit) is announced to thought from the vantage of the end of man (as a determined opening or the infinity of a telos)” > l’homme est ce qui a rapport à sa fin

POOF p. 270n Heidegger: in accomplishment of metaphysics, metaphysics becomes ‘psychology,’ psychology & anthropology are last word of metaphysics—psychology & technics go hand in hand

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

S pp. 48-9 the confusion of Heidegger’s “animal is weltarm (poor-in-world)” > since it is not a matter of degrees it avoids anthropocentrism, but reconstitutes anthropocentrism (measure of man) in the designation of lack or privation

PPHS p. 90 lexicology as science of the material of language: anthropology, psychophysiology

P p. 106 perfection [teleological end, purpose] often confused w/ beauty, Kant breaks from this tradition > judgment of taste does not bear on perfection of object, its internal possibility of existence—those examples (man, horse, buildings) which only have adherent beauty always have relation to man [Kant’s beauty as anti-anthropological in its anti-perfection] [the subjective finality or finality w/out end (beauty) vs. objective finality]

pp. 107-08 [and yet] for Kant, “happiness & culture presuppose that man puts to work what nature puts at his disposal”; Critique depends on reflexive humanism, pragmatic anthropology: to differentiate errant (w/out objective end) beauty from adherent must be view toward final causes

——man is not only an end of nature, he is the final end, goal, of nature, whole system of ends is oriented towards him

p. 108 the horse is so much a part of man’s telos, it can never achieve errant, free beauty, unable to disregard its objective finality which can only be external

pp. 110-11 [why man and horse are different though both examples of adherent beauty]

pp. 110-12 [the paradox of the Critique] paradigm of beauty rests on idea of reason: there’s idea/ideal, adequation & mimēsis in beauty? ideal beauty would then be adherent, not free beauty, only an ideal of imagination/presentation (Darstellung); man, endowed w/ reason, the only being capable of a sans (of ideal of beauty), of giving himself his own ends; he is not errant, cannot conceive himself w/out goal, but he can put errancy, sans, into perspective; in this way man can never be aestheticized, carries himself away from his own aesthetic, the stakes of the “Copernican Revolution” [?] (sans of pure cut is effaced in him) > Kant never asks whether the beauty of man stems from possibility of morcellement sans négativité

pp. 117-18 in Kant, art of man analogized with art of creator (unity of empirical laws), man has goal before operating, this effaces a priori the sans, the pure cut of free beauty

——connection btwn anthropo-theologism & analogism: course being steered [Spinoza says something quite tangential in Ethics], analogy w/ practical finality is its medium

——analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), l’analogisme recapitule ou recapite

p. 140 small/big (problem of sublime) measured against, w/in, living body of man > starting from it, the erection of the largest is preferred

ATIA p. 31 anthropo-centric subjectivity speaks only from one edge of Man/Animal limit, gives autobiography, history of its life, that it therefore calls History

p. 37 Derrida’s early dream of absolute hospitality to liberate animots, must avoid fables: fables an anthropomorphic taming, always a discourse on man, for and in man

p. 40 [quoting PP] contours of anthropos determined by zoopharmaceutical ambivalence [re: the demonic as bestiary] > Socrates is compared to gadfly, his pharmakon like torpedo fish, but he’s still an “autobiographic animal”

p. 54 Derrida will treat Descartes as father, and Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, Lacan as mes re-pères exemplaires (exemplary references) to normative/dominant discourse of a worldwide anthropology

p. 127 Heidegger and Lacan trying to validate a new fundamental anthropology, answer the question: “What is the human?”

FS p. 23 logos spermatikos: adult in miniature, encasement, anthropomorphic concept, preformationsim, biological idea, totality of hereditary characteristics enveloped in germ

CHM p. 56 (Foucault’s narration imbedded w/in impenetrable point of certainty, as are all projects of thinking totality by escaping it) > can only escape, w/in existence, in direction of infinity or nothingness, this margin of the possible: not human (as in anthropological factuality, but demonic/metaphysical), first awakens to itself in war w/ evil genius, resists him by reducing natural man w/in: nothing less reassuring than Cogito at its proper and inaugural moment

TN p. 207 “example of the hand” confirms anthropology of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception

p. 211 Derrida explains why Merleau-Ponty’s denial of an anthropological interpretation is unconvincing [here, Derrida is really trying to be nice, even says so]

p. 356n Merleau-Ponty’s failure to deanthropologize logos, hand still prevails in “hiatus”

p. 243 anthropocentric privilege fails to consider: 1) ultimate reduction of world 2) anything that’s not “human flesh,” i.e. technical prostheses 3) historicity that produces-human-beings-and-technics 4) that privileging human frees path toward Christian body

p. 291 the “self” is as indispensable as you in se toucher toi, an “I” unable to touch itself couldn't se plier à ce qui le déplie absolument, au tout autre qui, comme tout autre, habite mon coeur en étranger > no anthropological limit here > “divine,” “animal,” & life all derivative of se toucher toi

WOG p. 36 khōra, non-event, a place or a taking place, an-ontological, an-anthropo-theological; epekeina tēs ousias, event > fragile limit btwn certain event & non-event

BSi pp. 44-5 for Schmitt, only political theories worthy of the name: pessimistic anthropology, man is a dangerous animal (i.e. Hobbes)

pp. 45-6 [vis-à-vis Schmitt] 3 assertions of political anthropology: 1) prosthstatic sovereignty proper to man 2) absolute indivisibility of sovereignty 3) excludes beast & God

OG p. 105 (154) for Lévi-Strauss, Rousseau founder/prophet of anthropology; Rousseau identified possibility of totemism in pity & metaphoricity

pp. 114-15 (168) confessions of anthropologist [does an anthropologist write anything else?], 18th century, humility before a goodness European society has lost: a “zero degree,” native soil, an eschatology/teleology of full, immediate closing of history

EU pp. 180-1 for Kant, indicate (zeigen) consequences of metaphysics of morals in anthropological discourse > principles of metaphysics of morals cannot be founded (gegründet) on anthropology, though they must be applicable to anthropology

——practical philosophy includes metaphysics of morals & moral anthropology

GOD pp. 15-7 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

p. 40 approach, apprehending, anticipating death (see coming what one can’t see, give oneself what one can probably never give in pure or simple way) [each approach confers on death a different value]

p. 55 trembling before the unforeseeable, what cannot be apprehended

GT p. 14 temporalization of time (memory, present, anticipation, pro, re-tention, imminence of future, “ecstases”) destroys the gift via keeping (la garde), restitution, comprehending in advance

p. 21 Heidegger: to look ahead (vorblicken) to the It (Es) which gives (gibt) Being (Sein) & time (Zeit), we try to bring the It and its Being into view, capitalize the “It”, become foresighted

p. 22 can one ask these questions (i.e. what is a gift?) w/out anticipating a thought?

p. 26 “semantic horizon of anticipation that authorizes….” him [Marcel Mauss] to gather together phenomena of diverse sorts

pp. 122-3 the foreseeable, programmed, conditioned, expected, counted on, necessary cannot be a gift or event

——event, gift, must be structured by aleatory, remain unforeseeable w/out being kept so

R p.18 anticipate the idea of democracy, a little bit, we would never seek nor call for its advent if we didn’t know its idea, somewhat, but still tortured by the wheel.

p. 104 [Derrida on 9/11]: not as unforeseeable as everyone claimed; the trauma that occurred, not what actually happened, but apprehension of a worse threat still to come

p. 109 autoimmunity, cruelty itself, autoinfection of all autoaffectivity, the self, ipse, autos finds itself infected (once it needs event, time, other) precedes or anticipates oppositions btwn physis & its others (tekhnē, nomos, thesis) > life-death

POOF pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

OOG p. 117 “horizon is always virtually present in every experience; for it is at once the unity and incompletion, the anticipated unity in every incompletion” > keeps infinite openness in tact, converting critical philosophy’s state of possibility into concrete infinite potentiality

——“horizon-certainty,” “horizon-knowledge,” “horizon-consciousness,” horizon as already there of the future

pp. 134-35 for anticipation to leap to the infinite, it must already be ideal, anticipation authorizes and prescribes presence for consciousness of an Idea in the Kantian Sense (not imaginary)

p. 141 phenomenology: starts from a lived anticipation [Idea in Kantian sense would be operative not thematic] as radical responsibility absent in Kant

——phenomenological determination of Idea radically impossible: Logos can’t be given in philosophy of seeing, but (like all Speech) can only be understood in visible > Endstiftung of phenomenology (its ultimate legitimation) never directly measures up to phenomenology

FK p. 82 “the future tolerates neither foresight nor providence”

***MC p. 348 there is no chance for anticipation, it sees the ob-ject [the thrown], Gegenstand, before it

H p. 77 law of hospitality commands host gives arrivant, “new arrival,” an unconditional welcome; no anticipation

p. 109 we are always in some way late; “the consciousness only anticipates, ever, one delay too many”

p. anne 34 Derrida risks a discourse where nothing is planned, risks misunderstanding

***AF p. 74 affirmation of affirmation, yes, yes, “inaugural engagement of a promise or of an anticipation which wagers, a priori, the very future”

——is Jewishness the absolute uniqueness of this trait? to be open toward the future (à-venir), to be Jewish?: exemplary uniqueness of the trait d’union [btwn Jewishness & future]

MPM p. 47 promise: not expectation or anticipation but commitment

A p. 55 for Heidegger, all interest, belief in immortality, man’s irreducible torsion of retrospective anticipation (survival structure) in every instant (introduces untimely moment and posthumous in most alive of present living thing), stems from man’s mortality—is secondary [to being-toward-death] > only a “being-to-death” can think, desire, project, live immortality as such

SEC p. 309 to pose a kind of question—anticipate meaning

***VM p. 118 can a method be borrowed like a tool? method always shelters, anticipates the being which one encounters > this is why, since Plato, decision of philosophy has always seen itself as a science

p. 146 “ontological” anticipation, transcendence toward Being, helps us understand God, even as ether in which dissonance resonates > inhabits & founds language, Mitsein, all Being-together

PAS PAS p. (33) the thing can appear near only to what anticipates what the near and proximity are, right there

OH p. 18 every history, history of a culture, has a telos (promise, memory) toward which it dreams of gathering itself > anticipation & telos; and every history cannot be identified in advance, unanticipatable, non-masterable, that of which one has no memory

T p. xxv how to put one’s hands on tympanum so it can escape from hands of philosopher, so he can no longer recognize his phallogocentrism [play w/ mains, maintenant, maintain], no longer rediscover himself, no longer able to say: I will have anticipated it w/ absolute knowledge

PPHS pp. 72-3 theory of sign on basis of being-present, authority of l’être-en-vue: telos of reappropriation [see POOF p. 65], coordination of sign & light of parousia, speaking logos as close as possible to itself in concept & consciousness

F p. xxxi Torok and Abraham’s method, goes beyond anticipations of a program: introduced an essential déportment (unruliness) [re: “transphenomenology,” relay, conversion]

P pp. 27-8 lemmatic precipitation, anticipatory conceptualizing, recourse to metaphor of circle, circle of circles, metaphor of organic whole [re: Hegel & philosophy as work of art]

SP p. 139 this death [in text] not that of tragedy nor subject, not “I am mortal, therefore…” > the scene of text’s cryptic nature makes possible anticipation of death: tragedy, parody & birth

GSP p. 167 Telos/Vorhaben > infinite theoretical anticipation & infinite practical task: Kantian Idea as project of phenom.? makes it possible by overflowing its system (as its end?) > doesn’t enclose genesis of Being & meaning—is structurally genesis itself: origin/becoming, birth of history

FS p. 26 structuralist totality promises infidelity to telos, but: structures must permit totality to open, overflow itself, totality thus takes on meaning by anticipating telos > an opening which liberates genesis and time but risks stifling force under futural becoming of teleological form

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

——point of ontotheological fusion reduces precipitation & after-affect (dehiscence btwn vouloir-dire & writing, anticipation & recapitulation) to sublatables [mouvement de tête]

pp. 20-1 teleological anticipation: soothing order of future perfect

SW p. 322 expecting w/out knowing, thus w/out expecting [?]

RGE p. 252 the other dawn (awake from slumber of reason—which anticipated all figures of its beyond, all forms & resources of its exterior—except, perhaps, laughter)

PIO p. 34 invention’s “first time”: inaugural event and iterability > thus, no invention w/out status, w/out introduction or promise of publicity; iterability marked, remarked, at origin of invention, elle y forme une poche du premier instant: retroverted anticipation

——to invent is to produce iterability & the machine for reproduction/simulation

OG p. 66-7 (97) that the “imprint” is irreducible means speech is passive in relation to an absolute past that can never be fully mastered, brought to presence > this passivity of speech is also a relation to the future, but not via anticipation [which would be a mastering of passivity]

p. 295 (416) should (devrait) is the mode and tense (temps) of the teleological/eschatological anticipation that surveils Rousseau’s discourse

SPOM p. 135 “anxiety in the face of the ghost is properly revolutionary”

PIO p. 417n Leibniz on aphorism: general or experiential truth w/out entirely convincing reason

TN p. 12 aphorisms interest us because elliptical, testamentary: keep silence sur son lit de mort

AD pp. 54-6 aphoristic energy of déliasion in Levinas’ ethical affirmation: from subordination (no interiorization), to welcome of Most High (host), to unicity of possibility of substitution (hostage)

OG p. 18 (30-1) book as idea of totality, encyclopedia, requires external signified, is against writing and its aphoristic energy

——violence on both sides: logocentrism (book), deconstruction (text)

DS p. 211 indefinite fold of word appearance (presence, simulacrum)

GT p. 91 what is a border (bord) or an approach (aborder) once the indivisibility of the trait is no longer secure (assurée)? gift will always be w/out border

H p. 123 entering is crossing the threshold, not only approaching or coming

BL p. 205 law prohibits by interfering, deferring the “férance,” reference, rapport, relation > what cannot be approached is the origin of differance: the law of law (neither natural nor institutional)

MPM p. 29 finitude of memory, formed by trace of other in us > approach or remembrance of future (memory of mourning, mourning of memory)

A p. 76 non-access to death where access is only to the threshold, pas, approach to border

PAS PAS p. (30) “quand il la tient, il touche cette force d’approche qui rassemble la proximité, et, dans cette proximité, tout le lointain et tout le dehors”

p. (31) force of approach defined “à-partir-de” l’éloignement du proche, gathering proximity and distance in an inclusion w/out interiority

p. (33) “ainsi: quelque chose (quoi? autre-chose) (s’)approche”

p. (89) to land, to approach is what creates a border, to approach a strange slow movement of drawing near, does not attain goal, nor tamper with end, does not touch the border, which only remains one so long as approaching never touches it [border of approach ≈ to-come of event]

——approach is not an originary event

p. (90) ne-pas, not negation brought to bear on a position or a negation, but on “singular undecidability of the approach of the other”—unable to go nearer or father: suffice to disable every dialectical schema

p. (95) approach (unpresentable time of récit) thwarts assurance of negation, negative theology and dialectics

SH p. 52 “an approachable you” : date beyond calendar [re: poem’s cipher of singularity]

ROP p. 72 edges of book: approach as 1st border (1st pages of a book), end as other border

EJQB p. 77 born only by approaching book, die only by failing (échouant) in sight of book > toujours la rive impassible du livre est d’abord

TN p. 3 I could touch your eyes by approaching (m’approchant) you, if I dared

AD p. 52 Levinas: ethical language is the very meaning of approach, contrasts w/ knowledge

pp. 150-51n though Levinas calls substitution of being-host (being-hostage) a sacrificial experience (approach as sacrifice), Derrida wonders if substitution comes “before” sacrifice

EU pp. 61-3 philosophy as an idea of a possible science never given in concreto, one finds oneself on the path (trouver en chemin) toward it

GT p. 148 perversity can always secretly corrupt the “donner raison à l’autre”: ratio, logos, is on your side [re: “Counterfeit Money”], what counts, can be counted, you took maximum pleasure

——link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

R p. 97 beast: incarnation of evil, satanic, diabolical, demonic, beast of apocalypse

LOBL p. 94 difference btwn archeaology and eschatology as differance in apocalypse, that will be a while in coming

***pp. ~125-126 Glas, apocalyptic text, revelation through faulty teletype [Apokalupsis Ioannou, the Revelation of St. John the Divine] [p. ~164 translators refer to end of my apocalypse (Glas)]

p. ~127 apocalyptic, in other words capital unveiling [from GLAS]

pp. ~136-37 sur-vient, the event, Nietzsche’s Doppelgänger, ghosts, consists in nothing but coming about, being gone

——apocalypse, eschatology, the “last War,” the “context” of l’arrêt de mort > “come” is said to event that comes about, apocalyptic superimprinting of texts

SPOM pp. 16-7 apocalypse of history, philosophy, Marxism was daily bread for Derrida in ’50s, so those into Fukuyama seem late for the end of history

ATIA p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

EL p. 201 for Scholem, secularized = pulling out language’s apocalyptic thorn; but secularization does not take place, a surface effect, language still sacred in its abyssal interior

p. 203 Scholem’s equivocal use of word apocalypse, fascination w/ abyss : indecision that he can’t, doesn’t want, to master > apocalypse should be guarded (saved), and we should guard against it

pp. 203-04 secularize (desacralize): remove point, sting (Stachel), apocalyptic thorn of language > sting, this teleological aim (visée), institutes sacredness of language > this sacred language (Hebrew) would be nothing w/out magnetized pointer of apocalypse (cette pointe aimantée d’apocalypse)

p. 204 apocalyptô: 1) decrypting what is hidden, revelation/unveiling 2) end time, last judgment 3) catastrophe, cataclysm

pp. 204-05 Scholem: apocalypse, form of acute Messianism > writers of apocalypse (Daniel) distinct from prophets (Hosea, Amos, Isaiah): prophets don’t describe specific events of end; apocalypse speaks whole history (from origin to end), & coming of new aeon (Greek aiôn, Hebrew ‘olam) > aeons of apocalypse follow each other while opposing each other: present/future, darkness/light, Israel/nations, holiness/sin, pure/impure, life/death

——against cosmic/cosmopolitan background of apocalypses that ideas of last judgment, resurrection of dead, & paradise/hell have appeared

——Scholem protests against Christianizing Messianism, interiorizing & spiritualizing, a flight seeking to escape verification of Messianic, apocalyptic claim

——Scholem describes a move from national, exoteric [straightforward] Messianism to cryptographic, esoteric, elitist, apocalypticism accentuated by Jews losing their nation: the cryptic veil becomes “its very phenomenality, its state and its efficacy”

——acc. Scholem, apocalyptic knowledge so “explosive” could only be transmitted by word of mouth

p. 206 will apocalyptic path upon which we’re engaged lose us, save us?

p. 219 Geschlecht and Schlag (stamp, imprint) > “we” that undergoes relation to itself out of (depuis) menacing interpellation of Geschlecht by apocalyptic speech (parole)

——[re: “we” of apocalyptic speech] responsibility is ineluctable, finds sign of its freedom in this fatality > not Kantian practical universality, formalizable obligation: does not replace itself, delegate itself

p. 224 every political revolution: a return to speaking essence of sacred language [?] > this return marks moment of judgment, instance of a court (Gericht, the last judgment [Das jüngste Gericht]) w/ apocalyptic value

TN p. 51 following Nancy’s interpretation of The Death of the Virgin, [Life comme une Morte] a “tôt” announcing an apocalypse (an end not a future) > night of nonknowledge, every desire gathers momentum, Psyche ex-posed to other, surrendered but all too soon denied to the other’s eyes

CF p. 33 in 1964, French law described ‘imprescriptibility’ of crimes against humanity: this phrasing has an apocalyptic horizon of final judgment, law beyond law

BSi p. 254 [“you’re stupid”: Cartesian, apocalyptic verdict, final judgment]

ATAP pp. 63-5 words gala and apokalupsis share numerous accords—still gaps, deviations > Greek apokaluptō, a witticism (bon mot) for, hospitable to Hebrew gala

——lever/relever all senses (meanings) pressing around Hebrew gala, in front of columns/colossi of Greece, in front of the galactic, the milky ways that fascinate me

pp. 64-5 apocalypse, revealing of [m/f] genitals, pulling back glans: denuding, affording sight

p. 67 end is near, already taken place, “you are dead./Stay awake!”—the “second death” never comes [Kant derides a tone announcing death of all philosophy]

p. 74 numerology, Plato’s amazement w/ geometric figures, illumination, Pythagorean mysticism, vision—all belong to apocalyptic world, crypto-politics, -poetics, [for Kant] perversion of philosophy > matter of veil & castration [that is, who will unveil? who speaks w/out mastery?]

p. 75 Nietzsche’s I have forgotten my umbrella at once totally open & hermetic, “as secret and superficial as the apocalypse of the postcard it announces and protects against”

——apocalypse as dream of raising (aufheben) veil of Isis

p. 80 West dominated by powerful program of ends: Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx (trying to forget differences btwn Hegel & Marx perhaps another eschatology of Marxism): end of Oedipus, of class struggle, of God, of history, of religions, of Christianity & morals (ça, the most serious naiveté), of subject, of man, of earth, of literature: in blood, fire, earthquake, napalm descending sky by helicopters, like prostitutes—the nuclear thunder & the great whoring

pp. 81-2 if eschatological question always surprises us, response to it is impossible: [eschatology?] an appeal promising & responding before the question

p. 82 every apocalyptic eschatology promised in name of light, we are heirs to these Lumières, cannot & must not forgo the Aufklärung; must keep enough apocalyptic desire (clarity, revelation) to deconstruct apocalyptic discourse

p. 83 still philosophical, onto-eschato-teleological interpretation to say apocalyptic strategy is fundamentally one, to say its diversity is simply masks, appearances or simulacra

p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

p. 85 vigil at moment of end, funeral Wake [re: apocalyptic tone]

p. 87 John Patmos (1: 2–3) “the joys of the reader, of the hearer/of the words of the inspiration/for those who keep what is written/yes, the time approaches”: angelic structure, condition of all marks, time, experience, writing, trace > “apocalyptic” writings: exemplary revelation of this transcendental structure

——do not know to whom apocalyptic envoi returns, perhaps not even man is the terminal of this computer w/out end

p. 89-90 apocalypse on both sides of censorship: 1) nothing less conservative than apocalyptic genre, escapes all postal regulations (where censorship is strong, apocalyptic writings increase) 2) state censors by denouncing as false, mystagogic, obscure, apocalyptic

p. 90 Glas’ columns constantly shaken by apocalyptic agitations, laughs at apocalypse (mixing John of Gospel w/ Genet [GLAS p. 198])

p. 91 destinerrance: bastard apocalyptic filiation

pp. 91-2 in “Envois” of PC, the 2 can’t go beyond 4 [?] [4 horsemen]

pp. 94-5 apocalypse w/out apocalypse, w/out Last Judgment, no eschatology beyond tone of “Come” itself > the apocalypse of apocalypse [our apocalypse now], beyond good & evil: no longer collection of evil & good in legein of alētheia, in Geschick of l’envoi, or of Schicken of co-destination

p. 95 [apocalypse w/out apocalypse] X w/out X, sans marks internal/external catastrophe of apocalypse, catastrophe of sans doesn’t merge w/ announced end, is its pli: a closure w/out end, end w/out end > outside of apocalypse w/in apocalypse

——“do not seal”: i.e. do not close, do not sign

EU p. 109 [re: politico-juridical system of university] Derrida beyond [?] political right/left, on the side of a tireless parasite [passe et repasse la limite] seeking conflict or perpetual peace in a university that has from its birth (dès sa naissance) en mal (been wanting) d’apocalypse et d’eschatologie

FS p. 28 Apollonian ecstasy cannot embrace force, movement which displaces lines, nor force as desire for itself, nor writing > fallen Dionysianism, melancholy, nostalgia

——difference btwn Dionysus & Apollo, ardor & structure, cannot be erased in history, because not in history > it’s an original structure, the opening of history, historicity itself

p. 29 Dionysus is worked over by difference, always appears (to himself) by a relationship to his exterior, his death [fire]

GOD pp. 26-8 responsibility, aporia btwn choice and heresy (hairesis as choice, election), a type of secrecy that keeps responsibility apart (tient la responsabilité à l’écart) and in secret, the very thing responsibility insists on

p. 62 aporia of responsibility: always risks not managing to accede to concept of responsibility in process of forming it; for Kierkegaard, the ethical is a temptation that would make Abraham irresponsible

R p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

p. 49 aporia: condition of possibility and impossibility, of responsibility

LOBL p. 78 it is impossible for living speech to speak on living [sur vivre?], unless it’s impossible only w/ living speech: aporia even more paralyzing

H p. anne 30 is the anguish of aporia enough to prevent the process of growing accustomed?

p. 77-9 aporia as the collision of two laws, antinomy; tragedy of destiny that 2 terms of antinomy are asymmetrical [the law above law & laws proper in plural]

p. 81 “at this very moment”: antinomy of laws in the plural and absolutely singular law

——there are 2 plurals, different at same time: 1) multiplicity, plural laws 2) One + a multiplicity, One + n [plus d’un]

——One + n, the antinomic addition, adds conditional laws to unconditional law of hospitality

MPM p. 95 singular aporia that divides the act, can’t be mastered, commits us before any active commitment on our part, impossibility of promise, uncontrollable > faktum, “older”

p. 100 writing, as an event of signature, a signature which can only promise itself in the sense that its destination is barred, impasse of aporia

p. 132 re: de Man,“figures of rationality are profiled and outlined in the madness of the aporetic”

p. 133 impasse (dead end) of aporia—reopening, fait appel [arrêt, arrêt]

p. 136 an aporia which, because it paralyzes, engenders

A pp. 11-2 aporia, experience of what’s fascinating in the nonpassage: “not knowing where to go,” paralyzed by separation

——before a door, threshold, border, approach of the other as such [think Kafka, Blanchot], there is “no longer any problem,” without protection, without prosthesis [?], w/out possible substitution, singularly exposed, naked, delivered over to the other, can’t protect the interiority of the secret; can’t find a border still to cross [anxiety before fantasy?]

p. 14 Derrida retraces his steps through Heidegger in OS: Kant, Hegel inherited exoteric aporia from Aristotle, dialectic repeats exoteric aporia as “brilliant formulation of vulgar paradox”

——Derrida reminds us of his method [in OS] (orient confirmation [of Heidegger] toward another suggestion, even will supporting it): can the experience of the time be anything other than vulgar? what if exoteric aporia was irreducible, called for experience of oppositions from both sides of indivisible line [?] > a nonvulgar concept, to the so-called vulgar concept

pp. 14-5 [Derrida quickly reviews many places in his own work where he studied aporetology, paradoxical limitrophy, double bind]

p. 15 experience means traversal without line, without indivisible line, passage, rite of passage, can it ever concern surpassing an aporia? can there be an experience of the aporia as such?

——deconstruction: aporetic experience of the impossible

p. 16 nonpassive endurance of aporia: condition of responsibility, neither dialectizable contradiction like Hegel, Marx, nor transcendental illusion like Kant

——aporia rather than antinomy, or antinomy as an interminable experience

p. 19 choice of negative form (aporia) to designate a duty announces affirmation by avoiding good conscience at all costs

——the 2 forms of good conscience [1) grimace of indulgent vulgarity 2) subjective certainty] incompatible w/ absolute risk of every promise, engagement, responsibility

——affirmation that announces itself in negative form is experience itself, experience of aporia (passage and nonpassage coupled in aporia itself)

——experience of aporia: passion, endurance, resistance, remainder

p. 20 paradox of aporia: multiple figures of aporia do not oppose figures to each other, “instead installs the haunting of the one in the other”

——2 versions of aporia’s nonpassage: 1) impermeable, only opens via shibboleth, closed borders (i.e. during war) 2) impasse of no limit, limit too porous, no opposition btwn 2 sides

p. 23 aporia: not even the non-pas but the deprivation of pas (a-pas)

p. 28 death one of the names of a threat, an aporia, that risks paralyzing ontological, hierarchical, territorial apparatus to which Heidegger lends credit; death, in this sense, names what Heidegger early on called “ruination” [look up]

pp. 40-1 aporia of death, one of the place-names that forms following braid btwn 3 forms of limits, keeps it from coming undone [see pp. 78-80 border, closure, demarcation] 1) problematic closure (around thematic entity) 2) anthropological border (animals don’t have borders, laws) 3) conceptual demarcation, logical de-finition (decontaminate 2 concepts, oppose them rigorously)

pp. 63-4 two ontological statements [re: Heidegger] of possibility articulate, engender, supplement each other: 2 moments of a single aporetic sentence

p. 68 Heidegger’s possibility of an impossibility, is this an aporia? do we situate it in the possibility of an impossibility or the impossibility? not the same thing

p. 73 unique aporia of “expecting death”: 1) impossibility itself, dying as the aporia, impossibility of being dead, of “existing” one’s death 2) or that this impossibility is possible, appears as such, at whose limits one waits, limits of truth, but also possibility of truth

pp. 78-9 aporia can never be endured as such, ultimate aporia is impossibility of aporia as such > incalculable reservoir

——death is figure of the aporia such that “death” and death can replace (metonymy that carries name beyond name, beyond name of name) all that is possible as impossible: love, gift, other, testimony

POOF p. 39 btwn concept/event a double bind occurs, imposes itself to be endured there, law of an aporia, undecidability, crucial disjunction btwn thinking & knowing: gift, invention

p. 67 aporia that all change must endure (that of perhaps) > w/out suspense marking a perhaps, there would neither be event nor decision; w/out suspending perhaps while keeping its living possibility in living memory, nothing would take place, nothing would be decided

PP p. 160 “Plato’s metaphors” [re: khōra]? passage beyond all “Platonic” oppositions, toward aporia of originary inscription

OH p. 41 ethics, politics, responsibility only begin in aporia of double injunction

SH p. 24 aporia: barred passage (no pasarán)

FWT pp. 150-51 Derrida’s aporias are not meant to confound, reverse oppositions, but to suspend, mark, recall necessity of suspending naive confidence, common sense, conscious belief

OS p. 39 Aristotle’s aporia [on time] is an exoteric: opened and closed on this dead end (cette voie sans issue): time is that which “is not” or “barely, and scarcely”

p. 40 1st stage of Aristotle’s aporia [re: time]: think time as divisibility, where none of its parts, no now, is in the present; 2nd stage: now is not a part, time is not composed of nun

p. 54 [Hegelian] dialectics as simply a repetition of the [Aristotle’s] exoteric aporia, time becomes affirmation of the aporetic

ROP p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

p. 79 quasi-transcendental (formal) law of seriality (when condition is part of the series) creates aporias not to be avoided—the very chance to think [hors-série]

p. 113 Foucault pulls back from (admits impasses of) epistēmē > mais seul ceux qui travaillent, seuls ceux qui prennent des risques en travaillant rencontrent des difficultés > responsibility dans l’épreuve de l’aporie

PF p. xvii paralysis arrests: negative symptom of aporia > whereas aporia is possibility of impossible, of “play,” very condition of pas, experience of frayage, marche, via rupta [elsewhere Derrida deconstructs becoming route?], decision, event, coming of other: writing & desire

p. 283n mustn’t a response respond beside the point, mustn’t it surprise? > justement et juste à côté de la question: not by program but by aporia

HST p. 385 for forgiveness to be possible, what there is to forgive must remain unforgivable: otherwise exchange, excuse [see p. 380] > logical aporia (not just formal logic) but tragedy of compassion: intersubjectivity as destiny of hostage, madness of substitution

p. 386 forgiveness merges (se confondre) w/ l’épreuve of aporia: possibility of impossible, impossible of the possible

p. 398 last aporia of forgiveness, most artful, provoke laughter to point of madness [Beckett’s risus purus]

pp. 398-99 the scandalous aporia: can’t forgive the living (commerce), can’t forgive the dead (silent procedure, oblivion); can only forgive on forbidden threshold/border btwn life/death

***p. 400 abyss of non-response to aporetic question: condition of responsibility

TN p. 4 Aristotle on the aporia of touch, touch is adēlon: obscure, secret, nocturnal

——aporias, never through with them (those worthy their name), can’t see or touch their end

p. 131 “my impertinence will be my tact”: baroque composition, flaunted taste for delirious profusion > response to aporias of text

***CF p. 32 dry & implacable formality of aporia, w/out mercy: forgiveness forgives only unforgivable

OOG p. 128 for Husserl, aprioriness is not a concern, it is the institutive infinitization

S p. 18 how else but by confirming it a priori and circularly can Heidegger question Dasein’s privilege (Vorrang) re: the question?

VP p. xviii [see Aquinas’ 2^nd way] repetition comes first and last (no unified origin, no final end)

DPi DPi p. 26 Aquinas: fervent advocate of DP for heretics

POR p. 18 (153) [re: desiring to remove the university] anarchy risks reproducing hierarchy

p. 19 (153) “thinking” requires both principle of reason and what’s beyond it, both archē and an-archy > decision [of thought] always risks the worst, to claim to erase the risk by institutional program is to create a barricade against a future

R p. 66 voyoucracy, corrupting power of street, not anarchic disorder, but structured disorder, secret society, seducer

pp. 75-6 both Plato & Aristotle maintain political turn toward or salutation of One God, where arkhē has at his disposal tekhnē, for Plato not utopia, prayer, but very difficult

POOF pp. 203-04 in Aristotle, honor saves friendship from calculation, from the market—still, it’s proportioned via hierarchy, a hierarchy as sacralization of the beginning, qua command (arkhé)

WM p. 224 trope and arkhē have their own metaphorical charge, resist every meta-metaphorics, values of concept, foundation, theory > fundamental desire for firm/ultimate ground (to build artifice)

SP pp. 79-81 Heidegger oscillates btwn reading in Nietzsche a simple Umdrehung (inversion) of Plato or something other > neither a direct flipping, nor an an-archical erasure of hierarchy (which consolidates established order), but “a transformation of hierarchical structure itself”

POS pp. 13-4 no end of the book, no beginning of writing, writing puts archie in question

***DIF pp. 6-7 differance must be superseded, not considered arkhē of chain, thus not theological

PIO p. 6 for something to be a first time must also be a last time > archaeology & eschatology

acknowledge each other in irony of one & only instant

AFR pp. 118-19 frivolity (useless) is the congenital breach of sign (its entame, archē), since structure of sign’s deviation ensures frivolity has no origin, frivolity defies archeology, condemns it to frivolity: excessive relief, not even money or merchandise > sign’s disposability never presents itself

AD p. 23 Levinas on cogito: “it is not I, it is the other that can say yes” > infinity welcomed in anarchy

p. 90 no state of nature in Levinas—only pre-original anachrony of an-archy

pp. 94-5 for Levinas, paternal “fecundity” (not feminine alterity anymore) opens infinite discontinuous time: protest against egoist protestation of subjectivity (that of Kierkegaard, Rosenzweig) > true anarchy, paternal: only effective protestation against “tyranny of the State”

BSi pp. 92-6 [Derrida savages Agamben’s dogmatism in declaring who was “first,” then dogmatism in accusation of negligence, points out abyss of neglect, “one is always a priori negligent,” asks about the ethical responsibility in Levinas’ anarchy (no first)]

p. 138 sovereign, the arkhē, capital, chief, king, who can lose his head, go mad

p. 312 threshold as solid, indivisible, threshold as arkhē: commencement and commandment > archon, figure of sovereign himself

OG p. 197 (282) via Rousseau, exceed nature, then return to it, imitate it, but keep a minimal (almost nil) difference > nature as ailleurs, archeo-teleologic, alibi (elsewhere in space), in illo tempore (elsewhere in time)

pp. 256-58 (363-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] teleology as external—passage from state of nature to state of language (from one structure to another) explained by catastrophic archaeology (catastrophe of dangerous supplementarity)

KH p. 150n Egyptian priest in Timeaus assigns “places” to race of men for conservation of archives, writing, tradition > temperate zones [Rousseau in OG] which protect against hot/cold

GOD p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

GT p. 44 writing not as the external archive of the gift, but tied to the very act of gift, act in sense of archive & performative operation

MONL p. 52 “incarnate archive of a liturgy whose secret no one will betray,” no one else could appropriate, even I, who is in on the secret

FL p. 277 for Benjamin, text & signature are specters which exhibits & archive their implosion, in ruins, [Derrida now affirms this “stance”] such is status of deconstructive text: cannot escape law it enunciates, ruins & contaminates itself [at once founding/preserving], becomes specter of itself

OOG p. 99 phenomenological Reaktivierung: must be fully responsible and conscious of sedimented sense I take up

——via Husserl, because senses deposited, stratified, also prescribed by an archi-tectonics, there’s a danger of passivity

AF p. 1 arkhē: commencement, commandment > 2 principles in one, having place, taking place of authority, command, nomological principle

p. 2 arkheion, house of commanders, guardians, of archons, whose documents speak the law

——archives take place in a house arrest

p. 3 documents in archive inhabit rare place, place of election, law & singularity intersect in privilege

——shouldn’t be heterogeneity or secret in archive; archontic principle: gathering together of signs

p. 4 the secret menaces the archive

——democracy provides more access to archive [see p. 95 w/ dead father, brothers share archive]

p. 7 archival violence: exergue, capitalize on ellipse, accumulates capital in advance, anticipates so to institute (Gewalt)

——archive at once institutive & conservative [see FL], revolutionary & traditional, an eco-nomic archive: keeps, puts in reserve, saves, but in unnatural fashion (forcing obedience to law)

p. 8 question of the archive: where does the archive commence?

pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin)

——death drive is anarchivic, archiviolithic

p. 11 archive takes place at structural breakdown of memory, anamnesis (alive, internal, spontaneous) > archive is hypomnesic [hypomnēma] [pharmakon]

——no archive w/out outside, w/out technique of repetition

pp. 11-2 archive requires repetition, repetition permits memory but is indissociable from death drive—so archive introduces forgetfulness, archiviolithic, always works against itself [auto-immunity]

——death drive destroys archive, unless it can be made up as idol, represented, painted, erotic simulacrum

——death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

p. 12 is circumcision an exterior mark? is it an archive?

p. 13 Jew (or Devil, radical evil, all which is irreconcilable to God in “Christian science”) can be reinvested as an economistic resource of an archive that capitalizes everything [Sagi]

——devil can justify, such is destination of Jew in Aryan ideal

***pp. 16-7 the prosthetic, hypomnesic techniques of archive not only place for storing, but also determine structure of the archivable content in its very coming into existence, in its relationship to the future

p. 18 archival technique: command that which in past instituted/constituted anticipation of the future

pp. 19-20 no archive drive w/out radical finitude, possibility of forgetfulness, death drive’s threat is infinite, radical evil & political-ethical questions

p. 22 lawmakers w/out which one can’t have archives, conservation (memory) puts into reserve (“store”), accumulates, capitalizes, stocks a quasi-infinity of layers (hypermnesic, hypomnesic epidermises of books & penises)

p. 23 entire economy of archival law found in these 2 words: memorial & reminder

——arca: cupboard, coffin, prison cell

p. 25 the proper of the archive, its instant—certain hypomnesic, prosthetic experience of technical substrate [Derrida had this thought while tinkling on his Macintosh computer]

pp. 26-7 can one imagine an archive w/out foundation, w/out substance, w/out subjectile?

p. 28 minimal archive: copy of an impression

p. 31 to not take account of the Freudian impression [resistance], one confirms, countersigns (archives) his theory of “repression”

p. 34 archivology (interdisciplinary science of archive) risks being paralyzed in preliminary aporia: 1) treat psychoanalysis as general science of the archive 2) place itself under the critical authority of psychoanalysis (disputing it while integrating its logic)

p. 35 w/out transgenerational memory (2 types: ancestral or biological), there would be no question of memory or archive

p. 36 to know what archive means, we will only know in time to come: question of the future itself, of a response, promise, a responsibility for tomorrow (spectral messianicity at work in archive)

p. 45 classically—science, philosophy, intrinsically independent of the singular archive of its history

——via Yerushalmi, but w/ a Jewish science, archive becomes a founding moment for science as such

p. 55 first archivist—God?

p. 58 key as seal of arkheion, “deferred obedience”

p. 59 question of the archive introduced by very stakes of vertiginous difference btwn [Freud’s] “material truth” & “historical truth” [Derrida also mentions Augustine’s “making truth”]

p. 64 if Yerushalmi believes that archivization & repression [re: killing of Moses] are irreducible, Derrida insists we can archive what we repress, that repression is archivization, that we can archive otherwise [animals can sign themselves as hidden]

p. 66 repression dissimulates or encrypts the archives, archive of the virtual > virtuality removed from its oppositional coupling to actuality, effectivity, reality [re: full & effective actuality of an archived event]

p. 67 no meta-archive

p. 68 one cannot objectivize the archive [call on its names, employ it, make it gain in auctoritas] w/out remainder, archive produces more archive, never closed, opens to the future

p. 70 no history or archive of the future to come [respect the future to come of the future to come]

pp. 71-2 “if it is at all knowable,” an epochal suspension as energy of virtuality (energeia of a dynamis) [Agamben, Aristotle?], vertiginous, gives only condition of a future which remains to-come, messianic, an archive w/ no record of presence of what is or will have been “actually present” (distinguished radically from all messianism)

p. 80 question of revelation (Offenbarung) or revealability (Offenbarkeit): does the event make the archivization possible? or vice versa? besides, the after-the-fact, the trace, Nachträglichkeit, disturbs the logic of the these two theses

p. 84 the structure of the archive is spectral [see p. 68]

p. 90 archive always holds a problem for translation, it is repeatable and idiomatic

p. 91 desire for archive: homesickness for the archaic place of absolute commencement > en mal d’archive [in need of archive, in archive fever, in death drive]

p. 92 divorce of archive and archaeology, close, yet radically incompatible [against Foucault?]

pp. 92-3 nearly ecstatic instant Freud dreams of [re: Studies on Hysteria]: origin speaking by itself, arkhē appears in the nude, w/out archive, anamnēsis w/out hypomnēsis

p. 94 archive made possible by destruction drive as originary finitude and expropriation, also no archive fever or desire w/out in-finite movement of radical destruction

p. 97 archive as history of every concept, all conception

p. 100 no archive of the secret, by definition, it is the very ash of the archive

p. 101 we’ll always wonder what in this mal d’archive did Freud burn, what may have burned of his secret passions, w/out him, w/out name, w/out symptom, w/out knowledge, w/out even an ash

MPM pp. 106-07 to distinguish Gedächtnis (thinking memory) from Erinnerung (interiorizing memory) de Man marks irreducible link btwn memory & technical dimension of memory (art of writing, hypomnesic, exteriority of Mnemon, archivation, data banks, artificial memory) > no deconstruction w/out calling into question dissociation of thought and technology, no longer able to subscribe to Heidegger’s Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht (science does not think)

POOF p. 233 dominant structures silence others, covering over or destroying the archive > but traditions are never homogenous

pp. 208 about to venture on a decision re: omega ω in “O my friends…”, Derrida makes it clear that the guard-rails of a philological coup de théâtre will not efface the archive constructed on an error [p. 225n Agamben helped Derrida w/ all this]

——the improbable omega ω has a canonical authority protected by great names, the wager of this mistake, like a capital w/ bottomless surplus-value

p. 263 jusqu’ici [up until now], for several 1000 years, le temps d'un clin d'œil [the twinkling of an eye], tremors have been registered, archived, by the archons of the same family [phallogocentric fraternization]

VP p. 13 the voice simulates the “keeping watch (la garde)” over presence, and that the history of spoken language as archive of this simulation prevents us from considering [its contradiction], prevents us from describing this simulation, the infinite complexity of its structure as phantasm

FSW p. 211 for Freud, wrong to think simple translation can occur from unconscious to conscious, presupposes immobile master text > unconscious consists of archives always already transcriptions

SH p. 43 ellipsis, discontinuity, caesura, discretion cannot be sublated (aufgehoben) > no dialectic of sense-certainty can reassure the matter of archive’s safekeeping

FWT p. 44 there is no absolute archive, and the trace is not a proof [re: authentic “parent”]

p. 188 [re: murder of the father] Freud’s “historical” vs. “material” truth: one based on facts in real archive, the other discernible in symptoms [Yerushalmi neglects the latter]

ROP pp. 39-40 future anterior and conditional concerns archivization, what remains or does not remain

——[techno-psychoanalytical] new techniques of archive (tape recorder, etc.), together w/ ideas re: inscription, erasure, blank, memory storage, threaten concept of history > the way in which history is written has not systematically come to terms w/ all this

pp. 43-4 what is getting archived, the trace arriving to efface itself, beyond presence & absence, is impossible to know—not the order of knowledge

p. 44 ash, stepping beyond psychoanalysis, radical destruction of archive, destroys capitalizing reserve, the guarding of repression

p. 48 “off the record [in English]” is outside the archive, is there an outside? no, that’s impossible, but that’s deconstruction’s affair

***ATIA p. 47 autobiography, writing of self as living, trace of the living for itself, auto-affection or auto-infection as memory/archive of living, an immunization, making holy, virginal, indemnify; every autos, ipseity, threatened w/ auto-immunity, the poison of the auto-biography

WAP pp. 5-6 institution can forget its own elect (finite memory), its finitude also affects remembrance of what it wants to exclude: the surface of its archive thus inscribed w/ what it refuses, excludes (ex: Walter Benjamin not receiving a degree)

***DPi pp. 148-49 memory/archivization engage suffering body in a machine, technical repetition, Mnemoteknik, must cause suffering, red of fire before red of blood > for N., punishment is not juridical: it’s a movement of life, writing to remember, inscription, imprint past in body

TR pp. 76-7 French à propos allies necessity & chance, accidental (machinelike) relation to organic, obligatory link; esprit d’à-propos: the art, the genius, the technique of grabbing a chance, making of Khairos or Chaos a significant, archivable, even ineffaceable event

p. 84 in spite of Rousseau’s avoidance of Augustine, their Confessions come from same tree, same wood, same paper pulp [?] > abyssal problem of conscious/unconscious archivation

p. 100 de Man’s “history” not temporal but deals w/ “event,” “power,” which is like Derrida’s always finite (therefore selective) archive

——destined to virtuality of “sooner or later,” archive produces the event no less than it records, consigns it [archive figures a place & an instance of power]

p. 101 [re: Confessions] l’oeuvre generates/capitalizes a sort of interest (won’t be so bold as to say surplus value) of guilt: overproduces shame that is archived (not effaced)

p. 113 there is the archived event and the archiving event (as inscription): these can be indissociable, contemporary, but not the same thing (structurally)

——no archive w/out body (Derrida prefers “body” to “matter”)

pp. 130-31 re: mosquito caught mid-bite in amber coffin or 2 midges making love, a jouissance took place whose archive we preserve, archive of a singular event 54 million years ago > archive of man’s confessions a few centuries ago, fractions of second in history of life, earth, & the rest

——no true archive of man in his truth before the Confessions

p. 134 formidable effects of machinelike automaticity: an a priori, programmed “I apologize” > automatic forgiveness self-destructs w/out delay (faster than “Mission Impossible” tapes), loses its meaning, its memory, annihilates its own archive

pp. 145-46 archive is as precarious as it is artificial, it’s threatened in advance > “sooner or later” the worst can happen to it

p. 146 subjectile, very body of event, archival and auto-deictic body [re: Rousseau’s Confessions]

——revelation of truth nothing w/out saving body of inscriptions

C p. 214 leaving an “act” (act of discursive writing)—in the sense of archive or testamentary document

p. 231 [Titus-Carmel’s] coffins deploy synoptic archive

CF p. 33 archivization of unforgivable crimes by ‘universal conscience’ better informed than ever: reactivates/accelerates call to forgiveness

p. 53 France’s 1964 definition of “imprescriptible” crimes signals toward an ahistorical Final Judgment: crime never effaced from judicial archive [Derrida uses this example to evince an appeal to transcendent order of unconditional in concrete history]

CIN p. 37 the chance of returning, when one “incenses” a sentence to infinity, adorned w/ all its dead, is more certain than securing sentence in an archive [fire guards better than archive]

BSi pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

CIR p. 312 “you archive the system, MacWrite Macintosh SE Apple of PaRDeS” [computer]

EU p. 47 “current institutions”: university & para-university, publishing, the press, the media, new systems of archiving, etc.

p. 94 State or trans-State capitalist powers, re: storage of information in data banks > once library no longer ideal type of archive: university no longer “guardian” or “trustee” of knowledge (this centralizing representation once constituted mission of university itself)

pp. 95-6 [vis-à-vis Kant] the “lettered,” die Litteraten (Studirte): businessmen of knowledge, technicians of learning, administrators of archivization, journalists [represent the State, not educated by Faculty of Philosophy]

pp. 97-8 to ensure philosophy’s power-to-think-and-judge, Kant draws linear/indivisible border in language (language: that which opens passage to all parasites/simulacrum): [the professor utters only constative], university has no executive power, professor speaks w/out action, does not speak publicly > Kant makes information technology [that which escapes university] philosophy’s most faithful representative—but only as a reserved, intra-university, quasi-private language [before the law of this apparent paradox ultimate responsibility should be taken today]

p. 99 fields of publishing, archiving, mediatization have expanded as strikingly as have overcoding & hyper-formalization of language > where does publication begin? [via Kant, publication of knowledge, not knowledge itself, is submitted to authority]

SPEC p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

p. 353 demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

KH pp. 101-02 acc. Hegel, Plato uses myth because he’s impotent, a ludico-mythological drift (dérive), Aristotle Hegel’s guarantor of seriousness

p. 102 Aristotle: “those who philosophize w/ recourse to myth are not worth treating seriously”

p. 127 Plato never qualified khōra as matter (hylè) like Aristotle did

GT p. 64 mediating desire, measuring morality, mediocrity: who gives themselves the right of right measure? paradoxical hubris of measure [thoughtless to laugh at this position]

p. 133 Aristotle differentiates tukhē from automaton (chance from human finality), offers example of creditor going to market & getting his debt paid back: pas de don, everything happens en marchant

p. 139 for Aristotle, happy medium, good measure, megaloprepreia (liberality), giving to common good, better character than the cumin cutter, he who would shave an egg

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

R p. 15 Aristotle’s Prime Mover, the first desirable, gives a life that exceeds the life of a human, continuous, unending—for us, impossible

——energeia of this pure activity is “pleasure (hēdonē), circle of taking pleasure in oneself (jouissance de soi); a specular auto-affection that accords w/ thinking of thought

p. 16 for Aristotle, the One [i.e. Prime Mover] is above multiplicity, we should not all be kings, Aristotle’s against polykoirania

pp. 23-24 for Aristotle, democracy: equality according to number, not worth, which makes democracy a freedom founded on equality, as opposed to being governed and govern in turn

MONL p. 11 Aristotle’s model: the “most” this, the “best” that: paradigmatic example

FK p. 46 prayer is neither true nor false

LOBL pp. 115-16 [compare crisis, event, instant, edge (arête) which gives momentum to Prime Mover]

POR p. 4 (130) via Aristotle, sight is privileged sense re: knowledge, knowing for sake of knowing linked to sight as senseless sensation (sight privileged even when no praxis in view)

p. 18 (152) acc. Aristotle, math developed in Egypt due to leisure time enjoyed by priestly caste

HERP p. 172 Heidegger enacts “destruction” on Aristotle’s broken analysis of logos as judgment, and has reservations about man as animal rationale, zōon logon echon

p. 188 mishearing, essential possibility for Heidegger [error in Aristotle]

POOF p. 7 (23-4) Aristotle privileges to love over being loved, active over passive (potential) > Derrida points to a tense btwn active/passive, the question of aimance (lovence) [see pp. 24-5n] ——Aristotle places same & other in figure of the other [the friend], cette étrange configuration donne à penser

——more worthwhile (vaut mieux) “to love,” preeminence of form over matter > Derrida will demonstrate how, for once, w/ Aristotle, death situated on side of form & act: act of friendship bears death in itself

p. 9 for Aristotle, friendship linked to knowledge, science & self-consciousness held (tenue) in pledge, alliance, promise, performative chain [of friendship]

p. 10 if Prime Mover [Lover?] sets himself in motion w/out moving or being moved, isn’t he analogically the beloved, the absolute desirable? on the side of death?

——lover, subject, soul, life, breath, philetikoi [see p.12], necessary; beloved, philótimoi, object, accident, soulless, dead

p. 202 Aristotle’s 2 forms of justice: 1) numerical equality (kat’arithmón), brothers 2) proportional equality (kat’analogían), father-son [cf. Aristotle’s Politics]

p. 205 sober aridity of Aristotle’s discourse

p. 243 hard to follow Heidegger’s epochal scansion of philía, yes, anachronistic to find subject/object in Aristotle, but how can he say there's no anthropological or psychological vantage point?

——acc. Heidegger, Christianity is an education of passions, even a psychology, a psychological subjectivity—all post-Aristotelian friendships are Christian, same goes for ‘politics’

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, Aristotle overtook to ruin the capital letters of Platonism, the eídos of friendship, by calling the witness to the stand, an “actual” friend > Derrida will take sign of this ruin & no longer answer call to witness stand

A p. 14 acc. Derrida in OS via Heidegger, Kant, Hegel inherited exoteric aporia from Aristotle, who acknowledges lack of clarity in saying “aporia is exoteric” w/out then deconstructing it

VM p. 317n Aristotle rigorously demonstrated that Being is neither genre nor principle (Metaphysics B, 3, 998 b 20)

p. 319n doctrine of uniformity of Being (don Scotus, Heidegger) incompatible w/ Aristotelian-Thomist Being in which question of 1st/2nd [re: universal/singular] remains

S p. 50 Aristotle’s dynamis (potentiality) is a virtuality oriented by a telos

PPHS p. 75 in Peri Hermeneias [Aristotle spells out logo-phonocentrism]: spoken words (ta en tēi phōnēi) are symbols of mental experiences, written words are symbols of spoken words, mental experiences are the same for all

WM pp. 237-38(n) Aristotle: just like in philosophy, an acute mind will find resemblances in things far apart

——imitation sets man apart from beasts, man alone takes pleasure in imitating > metaphor, an effect of mimēsis and homoiosis, manifestation of analogy, a subordinate means of knowledge: full truth preferred to metaphor

——Aristotle reproaches Plato for using “poetic metaphors” and hollow language when he said Ideas are the paradigms in which other things participate

——to be learning something, recognizing resemblance (the same), is the greatest pleasure, this pleasure is the second [?] “cause” of mimēsis and metaphor

pp. 239-40(n) mimeme (neither thing itself, nor tout autre) > elliptical syllogism of mimēsis provides as recompense a dividend of pleasure, “everything like & akin to oneself is pleasant”: finishing work, laughter of resemblance (also, we should not spend all our time imitating monstrous things)

p. 243 for Aristotle, proper name is nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, father of all figures > everything turns around it, towards it > metaphor as substitution of proper names w/ fixed meaning & referent

pp. 247-48 via Aristotle, univocity (one meaning per noun) is telos (essence) of language, there is only finite polysemia: a nonmasterable dissemination (an irreducible polysemia) is not even a polysemia, it belongs to what is outside language, and thus outside humanity

OS p. 49(n) time compared by Aristotle to movement and chance, w/out being either one of them, time can only occur en tēi psukhēi > time’s analogy: what is traced (le tracé) as line, grammē

pp. 49-50 if Aristotle conceived time in a way not dominated by presence, did Heidegger arrest this possibility in Sein und Zeit, did Kant just make explicit the evaded question [section title] in Physics IV? such making explicit keeps to (se tient) the system de l’éludé

pp. 50-1 Aristotle repeats aporia of Zeno’s argument re: time, says it clarifies nothing, but does not deconstruct it > time’s nonbeing pre-comprehended as nonpresence in relation to determination of being as present

pp. 52-3 transition from parousia to absolute subjectivity does not disrupt Aristotelianism: prime mover, presence, desire, eros, “desire is desire of presence,” absolute subjectivity, circle, return to self, parousia as self-presence > prime mover, noēsis noēseōs, as subject

p. 54 for Aristotle, potentiality & act are not symmetrical: governed by teleology of presence, act (energeia) as presence (ousia, parousia)

p. 56 for Aristotle, being-together [of nun and stigmē] not a determination of Being but very production of Being > ama as the pivot (cheville) (clavis), the key opening & closing metaphysics > this complicity so self-effacing as to barely be noticed, the common origin of space & time > Aristotle says w/out saying [Rousseau describing w/out declaring]: the dyad as the minimum

ROP p. 4 Giusti: for Aristotle, art of dialectic is the exercise of dialogue w/ tradition [?]

ATIA p. 83 the abyss of autos, ipseity, autokinesis: we must surrender (get) to the heart of the abyss btwn law of nature (reaction) & law of freedom (response & responsibility)

p. 149 Aristotle, a fundamental reference for ATIA [or “this seminar”]

p. 156 re: animal, Heidegger continues Aristotle’s tradition of steresis (privation)

p. 157 Aristotle’s non-apophantic logos (neither enunciative nor declarative): euchē, prayer, entreaty, requesting; for Derrida, these would open breach in whole apparatus [of “as such”?]

FS p. 21 Aristotle’s concept of movement: transition to the act, which is itself repose of the desired form

RM p. 51 Aristotle’s 4 types of metaphor (Poetics): 1) apo genous epi eidos, ex. “here stands my ship” 4) kata to analogon

AFR p. 35 Condillac denounces Aristotle’s philosophy as unconscious empiricism: Aristotle takes derived generalities as premises, products for seeds or origins (germes)

p. 126n Condillac: the science Aristotle called ζητουμéνη (desired, sought after) is the general knowledge of soul on which all sciences depend (what science of happiness is to the arts), this science opens future, providence—so wise man is not stuck in present

TN p. 6 Aristotle (Peri psuchēs): 1) touch is “inward,” internal 2) flesh is the “medium” 3) touch has for its object tangible & intangible (tou haptou kai anaptou) [a touchable un-touchable?]

p. 19 Aristotle’s Peri psuchēs (de Anima) is treatise on the pure life of the living

p. 47 acc. Aristotle, touch: co-extensive w/ animal life, the genus of senses

BSi pp. 20-1 Hobbes’ sovereignty breaks w/ Aristotle’s political animal [?]

pp. 343-47 for Aristotle, kurios (sovereign), structural difference btwn state & family (latter comes first [historically]) > go to the arkhē to develop best view of things

——Aristotle: those who foresee w/ mind naturally master, those who foresee w/ body naturally slave—both same interest [?]

——Aristotle: only under ruler are slaves and women distinguished; ox is poor man’s slave

——Aristotle: autarkeia (self-sufficiency), sovereign, has an end in himself, is best—self-sufficiency the end of everything

——city is natural reality, man destined to live in city (Aristotle links politics & logos)

——phonē (which animals also have) does not suffice to define logos

OG p. 11 Aristotle’s phono-logocentrism: voice, spoken symbols, immediately proximate to the universal language of mental experience (pathēmata tes psychēs), closest to the thing, the signified

p. 149 (214) reason can’t think (and thus constituted by) this double infringement: there’s a lack in Nature and because of that very fact something is added to it, the supplement as image & representation of nature, image neither in nor out [Aristotle’s “neither for nor against”]

GOD p. 8 [another secret] Christian mysterium tremendum, fear and trembling before sacrificial gift, person being paralyzed, in its singularity, by the gaze of God

GT p. 24 subject and object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of the gift; subject as such never gives or receives a gift

H p. 101 delay and haste, halting and hastening, rhythm of Oedipus’ journey; p. 127 infinite speed contracted into an absolute halt or haste, precipitation because delay, instant of an instant that is canceled out > thus always late & precipitous re: hospitality

p. 111 mourning is not allowed without a fixed (arrêté) place, monument, determinable topos, stopping point (arrêt) > promised w/out taking place, only possible mourning is an impossible one

LOBL p. 78 it is impossible for living speech to speak on living [sur vivre?], unless it’s impossible only w/ living speech: aporia even more paralyzing

p. 107 Blanchot: survivre, not living maintaining oneself, lifeless, in a state of pure supplement, movement of supplementing life, but stopping (arrêter) the dying, a stopping that doesn’t stop > speak on the arrête (ridge, cutting edge, backbone, fish bone, arris)

p. 109 via Hartman, is arrêt de mort “death sentence” or “suspension of death”?

——life being drawn through by sharp dividing line, edge where it is impossible to settle: arrête, angle of instability impossible to settle (s’arrêter)

p. 114 arrêt de mort: decision on what can’t be decided—it also arrests death by suspending it: gives

“living on”

pp. 114-115 crisis is the urgency, instant, of impossible decision (krinein, judgment is the impossible to reach), the suspensive arrêt suspends the decisive arrêt and vice versa > arrhythmic pulsation, imparts movement in stopping, never sure, unfortunately, fortunately

p. 115 like death, arrêt remains undecidable, one arrêt marks delay, the other haste [2 syntaxes]

——suspensive arrêt already [déjà] undecided because it suspends, decisive arrêt undecided because what it decides, death, la Chose, the neuter, is undecidability itself

——the suspensive arrêt arrests the decisive arrêt and vice versa, the arrêt de mort arrests the arrêt de mort, arrhythmic pulsation of title [Blanchot’s] before it scatters like sand, in stopping (s’arrêtant) (as arrêt), it gives movement, sets in motion [prime mover]

——antagony from arrêt to arrêt, an Aufhebung that never lets up, arrêt arresting arrêt, both senses, both ways

p. ~115 arrêt de mort as verdict

p. 116 arrêt arrests itself, stands, stays unstable, remains on arête of itself, it a-rests (for) itself, no consciousness, perception, no watchfulness can gather this remnance, no “I”, hence ghosts, fantasies, epochal pause

——l’arrêt de mort, “ingenious” decision, one of those that are made (s’arrêtent) only in a language, escape signature by any “I”, untranslatable, decision is unreadable > unreadability does not arrest reading in face of opaque surface, it starts reading, writing, translating again

——unreadable not opposite of readable but the ridge (arête) that sets in motion

p. 118 infinite violence [of what’s strictly called] “double bind,” double invagination, double obligation, double demand > sans arrêt and arrêt de mort, no reconciliation

p. 121 death sentence, instant as elusive as last grain of sand in hourglass, death as result of dissemination of rhythm of life w/ no coup d’arrêt, unbordered/unbounded arrhythmy on beach that’s continuation of a sea: her pulse “scattered like sand”

p. 127 je m’arrête > “same interdiction encrypts the resurrection at the moment when he sees the terrible Chose”

p. 134 more-than-life (sur-vie) marks a reprieve, excess triumphs over life, worth more than eternity of life but presents itself before the arrêt de mort

p. 147 commitment [wedding proposal] in irresponsibility of speech [Blanchot’s character proposes in Slavic not French], arrêt of commitment, commitment thus arrêté, both in one’s language & the other’s—the hymen > mother tongue does away w/ commitment & seals it

p. 154 [reference to la double séance] hymen s’arrête, comes about and is immediately forbidden, double-bind structure of event, its “madness”, every hymen intervenes like a crime, event, coup, its dissemination dissolves or absolves it in crowd by multiplying it incalculably

p. 163 embalm [fetish?], set about the arrêt de mort in its double triumph: effigy, chambers of this desire in a sort of “funeral home” > [Blanchot’s narrator] loves them dead, he loves (by) seeing them dead

——there’s an arrêt btwn 2 deaths [in L’arrêt de mort], thus hypertopia [see p. 140]

pp. 164-65 interruption, connectionless connection of arrêt > passes through insides w/out insides of ego of récitant

pp. 165-166 hymen, double bind, double affirmation, yes, yes, come, come [re: Blanchot’s 2 ghostly fiancées in L’arrêt de mort] signifies, desires, arrête life death, the life the death of the other, the other lives and dies > “for there is an other of the other and it is not the same” [see POO p. 11 “other of the other” is the very undeniable of ethics]

p. ~166 arrêt w/out Aufhebung

p. 171 arrêt de mort brings about the arrêt of the law

POO pp. 22-3 impossible to respond, impossible not to respond, double bind, 2 hands nailed down [no choice]

——brought to a halt [arrêt?] when faced w/ contradictory orders

POOF pp. 92, 109n via Schmitt, stasis implies state of rest, arrest (status) & also revolt [in this sense stasis could name auto-immunity], stásis as a category of political nosography, misfortune, fatal disorder, bad luck

A pp. 11-2 aporia, experience of what’s fascinating in the nonpassage: “not knowing where to go,” paralyzed by separation

PAS PAS pp. (34-5) double pas never arresting itself in dialectical negativity of its proceeding nor in the march of a method, the trope of standing-upright

p. (35) Blanchot: she comes closer every pas to the instant when she must stop herself

p. (68) ce désir de la paralysie qui n’arrête jamais

p. (71) Blanchot: lucidity could do nothing but render my paralysis infinite

p. (73) paralysis that does not prohibit anything, that makes movement [see ROP p. 21] > le faux mouvement qui procède selon le faut-pas du désir et franchit la limite

p. (76) isn’t the thought of la paralyse a thought of the obscene Medusa? good for laughter too

F pp. xii-xiii je m’arrête ici, déjà (tombe en arrêt [vault to a stop]), setting on the “edge of the crypt” a voiceless word, a blank stone of a scruple [see p. xlviii], to engage others to it, of a crypt

p. xxxix cryptophore, à manger le morceau (le mors) sans pouvoir le digérer, must constantly betray cipher that seals and conceals it > Blanchot’s L’arrêt de mort, truly cryptic story

p. xlviii paelontologist médusé devant l’arête d’un mot-chose, like a tomb burning in the grass, double-edged stare of a 2-faced Medusa (le double tranchant d’un biface)

DS p. 202 a system that is closed-in on itself would be checked by a safety-catch (un cran d’arrêt)——wrong to interpret Mallarmé’s Mimique as oriented toward its abysses, its false bottoms, as if they were pretextual referents > a writing that refers back only to itself is some other writing

p. 231 syntax of hymen’s fold makes it impossible to arrest its play of indecision [i.e. to stop it on “mental,” or “imaginary”]

OS pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

P p. 43 arête/manque [re: theory of frame]

p. 128 re: sublime, arrest of outpouring (épanchement) at floodgate (vanne), pressed on limit, pleasure gushes after arrest, inhibition, suspension (Hemmung), an arresting that makes flow > for a blink of an eye passage is closed, stricture absolute, then barrage, l’inondation

ROP p. 21 paralysis gives movement w/ regard to its other [this is in reference to impossibility of psychoanalysis’ auto-interpretation] (in PAS, paralysis distinguished from logic of analysis)

p. 33 instead of “failure” of archaeological/anagogical principle [of analysis], this principle is destined to limit of its arrest, finitude of its suspense > there’s chance in falling-due, given of fall

OTO p. 9 [Nietzsche’s] life can only be verified after or during arrêt de mort > when the bearer of the name, whom, in our prejudice, we call living, will have died

O p. 5 “transcendental signified” arrests writing [in structure of double mark this arrest can no longer occur, writing as possibility of living on, arrêt de mort]

p. 26 dissemination blows up (saute) security of point, arrested in name of the law: it is at the risk, to risk this blowup (to make this jump, faire sauter) that dissemination broaches/has been broached

DPi p.1 DP: arrêtée par un arrêt de justice > an end decreed by the Other, a verdict > this is not the archetype of every decision [?], though it reminds us: sovereign decision always the Other’s

REST p. 263 to stop one’s feet at the starting line is a place in language [re: Derrida’s starting point, a place where things no longer slide? from which he’ll set off quickly]

pp. 275-76 everything on trial (tout chose en procès), publicized, the proximate cause is a trap: a double that doesn’t make a pair, makes a trap, can’t put one’s feet in them, Christic shade of bait [sole? proper subject? Van Gogh’s surrender?], Christ’s flesh is bait for the Devil (Muscipula Diaboli); in PAS, another type of trap > la paralyse

p. 376 betting on the pair, plus/pas de pari, trap always works in interlace (la piège marche toujours dans l’entrelacs): soit qu’il fasse marcher, laisse marcher ou qu’il paralyse [p. 373 only the pair can go]

DST DST p. 225 un autre indécidable, the gap/hiatus in an undecidable derived from dialectical calculation/contraction, arrhythmic caesura as respiration of rhythm (this necessity awaits us) [pas, heartbeat] [Derrida here wonders if double bind is too dialectical, thus the other undecidable]

p. 230 no rhythm w/out caesura > antirhythmic [Hölderlin], arrhythmic

——interrupts alternation, constraint of opposition, even double bind [cf. p. 225]

——Lacoue-Labarthe: caesura is empty moment, intrusion of prophetic word (Tiresias)

——caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

PIO pp. 15-6 specularization paralyzes “Fable” (seems to freeze text)—undecidability of whether fabulous discourse makes it out of itself or is the very misfortune (malheurs) of the [possibility of the] mirror, infelicity of constative/performative (way they parasite each other)

RM pp. 49-50 [cf. Pas] the dérive or dérapage (skidding) as un certain jeu de l’ancre in surrounding waters (parages): Derrida can only stop engines (machines) of this floating vehicle [my discourse on metaphor], which would still abandon it to its unforeseeable dérive [more metaphorico]

PF p. xvii a trace w/out alibi resists thinking, paralyzes, also only chance to not give in to paralysis

——paralysis arrests: negative symptom of aporia > whereas aporia, possibility of impossible, of “play,” very condition of pas, experience of frayage, marche, via rupta [elsewhere Derrida deconstructs becoming route?], decision, event, coming of other: writing & desire

TR p. 103 not only accusation & judgment in confession, there’s the executioner (carrying out of the sentence): sentence endured in pleasure of writing, ambiguous enjoyment at heart of terrible, severe jubilation of inscription: one steps up to cashier right away to collect interest on a capital that will assume value only “sooner or later,” after my death, in my absence

HST p. 393 Levinas: future (avenir) as a resurrection of the present; “next instant” is an annulment of commitment to existence made in the instant; the “I’s” death in the empty interval: condition of new birth

——at moment where everything is lost, everything is possible

p. 397 infinite compassion: the decision of not being able to stop (as life itself never stops [ne se désarme]) > forgiveness, w/out saying anything

+R p. 160 survival movement, arrêt de mort, final trance, sursaut cambré tenu au mors: says “I” (am dead) or hoc est corpus meum > dominant fish, one that bites best, takes from sea a body of scaly writing, homogenous w/ signatory’s initials

——death dance in fish’s tail (queue) > rhythmos: cadence of writing, undulation of waves

LI pp. 132-33 every police (red light) is not repressive: law not necessarily tied to negativity, prohibition, repression

p. 149 differance as nonidentity w/ oneself in process of determination > differance is itself nothing outside of determination, never comes to a full stop (not negativity, nothingness)

TN p. 11 Nancy stopped short one day (était un jour tombé en arrêt) before Freud’s “psyche is extended, knows nothing about it” > this is a beginning by freezing (par s’immobiliser)

pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

p. 139 self-relation, “s’efforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force s’arrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

p. 175 pause for a moment (pour s’arrêter un instant)

E p. 21 Kant: sublime occurs due to a momentary checking (Hemmung, an arrest), and its pleasure (admiration or respect) is a negative pleasure

EW p. 286 unconditional affirmation that motivates deconstruction can always upset an instituted rhythm of every pause (subject is a pause, stabilizing arrest, the thesis we will always need [?])

AD p. 92 neither welcome nor hospitality w/out radical alterity: presupposes separation, social bond, unbinding, gives respiration: le chez-soi (at-home-with-oneself) would no longer be natural, rooted, but a response to a wandering (errance), phénomène de l'errance qu'il arrête

pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (l’entretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech

OG p. 25 (40-1) acc. Hegel, writing (an Umweg) betrays life/breath > finitude/paralysis, sterilizes spirit, principle of difference/death in becoming of being (is to speech, what China is to Europe)

p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

——becoming-space of time & becoming-time of space mark dead time w/in presence of living present > dead time is at work, les blancs take on importance > limit of phenomenology

ATAP p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

SPEC p. 283 Freud repeats his arrest, pas de marche: speculative possibility of tout autre (than PP), inscribed in advance w/in it, “l’ouvre d’une scription de l’autre à meme (overlaps) le principe”

p. 285 the thesis would be l’arrêt de mort of differance, arresting death in 2 senses [vis-à-vis syntax]: condemns to death & interruption suspending death

pp. 336-37 same step (pas) [Freud’s step beyond PP] gives & suspends movement, es gibt, exemplary movement of paralysis [Derrida repeating too, cf. FSW, PAS] [démarche]

p. 338 “la paralyse: le pas au-delà du PP sera resté interdit”

GOD pp. 55-6 tremble in fear of unpredictable, unforeseeable, the untouchability of the arrival (tremo, tromeō, tromos, tremendus), enigma of trembling and tears, what are they metaphors or figures for?

***R p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature > this undecidability [“I continue to believe”] only radical possibility of letting/thinking what comes about by arriving of whoever arrives [see p. 87]

MONL p. 61 desire is borne by the arrival itself, before ipseity (I-me)

H p. 77 law of hospitality commands host gives arrivant, “new arrival,” an unconditional welcome; no anticipation

MC p. 346 I address you w/out knowing you, something arrives [Nietzsche’s future philosophers]

BL p. 211 text [Kafka’s] jealously guards its inconsistent content, brings reader before the law > endless differance until death

——neither arrives no lets anyone arrive

***SPOM p. 33 Marx’s legacy: the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice, messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy

A pp. 33-5 absolute arrivant: singularity of “who” arrives or neutrality of that which arrives

——arrives w/out expecting it (s’y attendre)

——affects (brings to light) experience of threshold before one knows if there’s been a call, nomination or promise (Verheissung, Heissen, etc.)

——annihilates prior identity (p. 34)

——not an invader, invasion presupposes some self-identity, arrivant does not cross a threshold separating two identifiable borders

——no more commands than commanded by memory of originary event

——as disarmed as a newly born child (p. 34) [Nietzsche]

——where archaic is bound to final extremity (telos, eskhaton)

——border most difficult to delineate: that the arrivant makes possible everything it cannot be reduced to

——border of absolute arrivant keeps one from discriminating btwn figures of arrivant > the dead, the revenant (the ghost, he or she that returns)

pp. 64-6 triple transitivity of s’attendre: 1) oneself 2) arrivant, the other 3) await each other, which is immediately consonant w/ reference to tout autre [cf. HST p. 360]

***pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (n’arrivent qu’à s’effacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

PAS PAS p. (58) what arrives would always arrive at edge (au bord), shore (rive), [death], the impossible arrival of viens

p. (88) it’s on the border that everything arrives, just misses arriving, or misses le bord d’arriver > il n’y a pas de bord en soi [there’s no border in itself]

P p. 93 free, vague, wild, pure beauty, indefinite errance: elle ne s’arrive pas à sa destination

POOF p. x democracy counts votes & subjects, but doesn’t/shouldn’t count ordinary singularities: no numerus clausus for arrivants

p. 29 perhaps as arrivant, arrivant of perhaps: at last the thought of perhaps (will come)

p. 41 Derrida countersigns Nietzsche [re: arrivant thinkers, new philosophers], extends the duty to countersign again, to us, to me, to you, teleiopoetically: friendship w/out friendship of friends of solitude

ROP pp. 41-2 Lacan speaks of the insuccès—Derrida transforms it: “l’insuccès qui échoue à arriver” > playing w/ syntax of to: 1) I do not arrive 2) I fail to arrive because I arrive

RM p. 75 Being’s inscription n’arrive qu’à s’effacer, cf. differance/trace

p. 77 le trait, il arrive à s’effacer dans un autre, reinscribing itself heterologically, allegorically

TR p. 98 the 2 meanings of arriver: 1) event that happens to someone 2) message that arrives—or doesn’t arrive at destination, or at some unforeseeable addressee > this singular instability plays w/ its own automatism, never spontaneously interrupted [?] [privileged access to machine effect]

PSSS p. 254 arrivant, hospitality of visitation not invitation, beyond all instituting utterances, ce qui arrive, event, puts to rout performative act, sometimes cruelly, perhaps beyond the death drive, exceeds rules of hospitality: unpredictable for hosts

p. 260 the who and the what of what arrives, the arrivant, the event, makes outdated in advance the question about it that always comes too late

+R p. 159 polysemia or even dissemination drags Adami’s sentence far from any shore (rive), preventing any event from ever arriving (s’arriver)

p. 169 double ladder, erected, riveted, shackled, never arrives > steps: symbolic of sexual act

LI pp. 108-09n [re: neologism texter] signature, événement qu’on texte: process of iteration, like surnombre [of Dissemination], marks pluralization that fractures the event, the unique, while causing it to occur (arriver)

TN pp. 135-36 shouldn’t sense of touch touch us, for something to come about at last (pour que quelque chose arrive enfin), an event, as some say, fatiguing us a little, a singular event (!!) [: )]?

——as if idea of simultaneity/continuity born in contact w/ contact btwn 2 points of contact

AD p. 61 “to say yes at the moment of a separation, indeed of a departure that is not the contrary of an arrival—is it not this deference that inspires the breath of an à-Dieu?”

CF p. 23 city of refuge giving place for reflection and for new order of law, democracy to come (if a certain idea of cosmopolitanism has arrived, perhaps one hasn’t recognized it yet)

BSi p. 267 [vis-à-vis Celan] poetry as way, step, coming of event, arrival

UWC p. 225 techno-scientific virtualization of work, the putting-into-common, any “community” [Aristotle’s city] > mutation of taking place of event, of oeuvre—that which arrives

SPEC p. 324 postal relay (relais) makes it possible for letter not to arrive, divides structure of letter from outset (d’entrée), neither relay nor analysis if letter were indivisible & always arrived

——the a fortiori of the a priori

p. 359 Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

p. 402 “set (ensemble)” of stricture, a unity that’s not subject/consciousness, begins by binding itself (se-lier) in differential relation w/ itself—it destines itself (se destine), which doesn’t mean: il arrive

FV p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

pp. 443-44 for Derrida, letter can always not arrive > Lacan’s symbolic, Lacan’s castration, protects letter from its divisibility/fragmentation

p. 454 for Lacan, letter’s destiny is arrival at destination

***p. 489 even when letter arrives, its capacity not to arrive torments it, affects “subject,” “character,” “position” [w/ divisibility]

***MC p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

SPOM p. 204 if commodity corrupts art [Derrida veering away from Marx], becoming-commodity attested to value it puts in danger > commodity put to work the principle of art

MPM p. 64 art is a thing of the past

p. 67 de Man: “art leaves interiorization of past forever behind” > no dialectical passage from symbol to sign; art (like thought of thinking memory) linked to sign not symbol

MSUB J p. 165 van Gogh did not paint ghosts, he reperspired nature, made it sweat, awful elementary pressures of commas [arrêt], scratches > now we see them too in the world

p. 171 Artaud breaking down barrier in the other “arts,” abolishes border btwn all these “arts”

A p. 32 great works, like Being and Time, neither science, philosophy nor poetics

PP pp. 97-8 (111) acc. to king, sun, Thoth is a flimflam artist

TC p. 234 Artaud & Nietzsche want done w/ imitative concept of art

DS p. 192 priority of art over nature still privileges order 1 then 2, the preference, the precedence (pré-séance) of the imitated

p. 203n Bachelard: we love the graft, graft gives matter to flower, Art is grafted nature

p. 233 Jean-Pierre Richard: beauty of glorious lie is what art tries to render true, to do so, must put it under glass

P pp. 20-1 for Hegel, art has a single meaning, une vérité une et nue, an etymon, that can be unveiled through history > wouldn’t this mean art is outside of history? but philosophers have always been too quick to deem art historical via opposition tekhnē/physis translated as art/nature

p. 22 oppositions structuring traditional concept of art: meaning/form, inside/outside, content/container, signifier/signified, represented/representer

——asking what art means, the vouloir-dire of art, tautology w/out reserve, logocentrism of question “What is art?”—teleology & hierarchy prescribed in envelope of this question

p. 23 both Heidegger & Hegel subordinate all art to speech, poem, the said, nomination

p. 25 for Hegel, telos of beauty is found in art not nature

p. 26 art forms only one of the circles in the great circle of Geist, revenant (circle of art, circle of religion, circle of philosophy)

p. 27 when philosophy views itself as a work of art, it is represented on the model of one of its parts, so is philosophy then just a part of art? [living organism, biological metaphor]

p. 28 if Hegel must begin w/ vulgar representation of art, the circle of circles allows him to start anywhere > “no absolute beginning in science”

p. 32 for Hegel, art as 3rd term gives reciprocity to artist & artwork, art is thus 1st term

pp. 32-3 in Hegel & Heidegger, an “it is necessary (il faut)” re: hermeneutic circle of art > must start w/ work of art, but how can you recognize it as art if you don’t already know what art is?: not a vicious circle, but an engagement of thought, circular feast, experience of limit, closure, resistance, humility > pas de cercle: le désir par cette répétition fidèle du cercle, d’accéder à l’encore infranchi, le désir d’un nouveau pas > lien sans liens, franchir le cercle sans s’affranchir de sa loi, pas sans pas

p. 34 third party (ein Drittes) regulates encirclement, art can play this role, a medium, can touch both edges > ambiguity of participation can’t exhaust it [what if this 3rd doesn’t rèleve?]

——art: domesticated in this history of truth, onto-encyclopedic economy, the machinery of the pose (Setzung/Entgegensetzung)

p. 45 all theories of art (Plato, Heidegger, Hegel, Husserl), you have to know what you’re talking about—can’t just say, via Rousseau, “I find the palace capitalistic,” this is extrinsic [Derrida makes a pretty good joke!]

p. 65 Kant’s “conceptual scheme” for any theory of art: rational/formal/logical vs. irrational/matter/illogical > thing as formed matter

p. 102 hierarchy of art constituted on the analogical model of human language

p. 116 Kant’s 3 fine arts: talking (words), figurative (gestures), play of sensations (tones) > a humanism

p. 117 Kant’s hierarchical classification of fine arts, a humanism regulated by language & body of man, language dominated by speech & gaze

PS p. 174 Artaud howls under headings: existence, flesh, life, theater, cruelty > promising an art prior to madness & work

FS p. 7 for Kant, [productive] imagination was already art itself > originally, did not distinguish btwn beauty & truth

SW pp. 315-16(n) [re: Exodus 26:31] there are 2 veils/curtains btwn [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle & [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle of tabernacles [of holies/of sanctuaries] > 1st embroidered by artist, 2nd merely the work of a carpenter

DPi p. 144 for Schopenhauer, aesthetics not a disinterest but an anesthetic

REST p. 262 Derrida insists on strong necessity of Heidegger’s questions on art in spite of traditionality & symptomatic qualities

p. 283 Van Gogh’s shoes are out of work in the (art) work, in the invisible ether of being painted

p. 298 in Heidegger’s Origin both product and work of art produced (hervorgebracht) by hand of man, art resembles thing in its self-sufficient presence, product is more than half thing, less than half work of art

——work like shoe-picture exhibits what something lacks in order to be a work, exhibits—in shoes—its lack of itself

p. 318 Heidegger’s step backward from truth of adequation to truth of unveiling can leave one disarmed in face of precritical, dogmatic, in face of “preinvestment” (fantasmatic, ideological)

p. 372 Origin is not about the metaphysical power of art, that’s what’s put in question

IW p. 286 music as highest, most ideal art, its structure is pure breath, spiritus and psyche

PIO pp. 417-18n Kant: imagination, site of genius, it’s creative (schöpferisch)—still, academic rules must be followed if Kunstler wants work to fit Idea underlying it

+R p. 175 Benjamin’s deconstruction of the aura (authenticity) of work of art

p. 177 Benjamin: secularization causes indeterminacy of “once only (Einmaligkeit),” once-only of phenomena replaced by once-only of artistic operation (never w/out remainder)

pp. 178-79 Benjamin theorizes that portrait of face is last “ritual religious art” before “technical reproducibility” > disappearance of the subject as art of the cenotaph [?]

C p. 238 contingent can do w/out discourse, a masterpiece can’t do w/out a cartouche (on the market & in itself: if you insist on this distinction) > even when the cartouche remains, is defunct: pas de cartouche, plus de cartouche > what will have been able to do w/out it? never touched, aussi impassible et invulnérable qu’aux harcèlements du trait: c’est peut-être qu’il était déjà dans la tombe, le cartouche

pp. 238-39 why Derrida won’t waste his time describing Titus-Carmel’s artwork

pp. 244-45 how can we delimit all the features (traits) [of artwork] when the absent one haunts, obsesses, besieges (assiège) [plus qu’un autre] > avec égale sans (trait d’union: with-out [in English])

E p. 4 for Kant, nature speaks to us through its beautiful forms, one can read the “ciphered language (Chiffreschrift),” nature’s signature as art productions

——even if this stance is opposed to Hegel [only art is beautiful], analogy btwn art and nature always provides a principle of reconciliation

p. 5 for Kant, art is production of freedom by means of freedom

——for Kant, art is a power, aptitude, property, destiny of man (Geschicklichkeit des Menschen), and is distinguished from science (where to know is to know how to do, to be able to)

——for Kant, difference btwn free, liberal art and mercenary art is the difference btwn play/work

pp. 5-6 [acc. Kant] free, liberal art: 1) play, not salaried work, free man (artist) is not homo oeconomicus, is more human 2) free, liberal art can utilize mercenary art w/out being contaminated by it 3) a productive, spontaneous, not reproductive (mimetic) imagination

——genius of poetry, the highest of Fine-Arts: full expression of productive imagination receives its rules from Nature, thus breaking from mimesis > free unfolding-refolding of physis

p. 7 liberal, free art relates to mercenary art as mind to body; free art enjoys itself but still incurs the unenjoyable incursions, lexical rules etc., of mercenary art; art still requires pedagogy

——why call them Fine-Arts (Beaux-Arts)? why not just call the product beautiful: because the product must still be implicated by its signature, beauty is ascribed to the passage btwn production/product; Fine-Arts: always of the frame & signature

p. 8 Kant distinguishes agreeable arts from Fine-Arts, the former aims at enjoyment (jouissance, Genuss), the latter dispenses w/ concept (ohne Zweck) and enjoyment, but seeks pleasure (Lust)

p. 13 Hegel critiques Kant’s 3rd Critique for staying at the level of “you must” > he very well evinces the moral order that sustains the aesthetic one

pp. 21-2 though sublimity works against our senses, the sacrifice (Aufopferung) of the sublime keeps a power in view, sublime can dawn in art: attains a power greater than what was sacrificed

——economic calculation allows sublime to be swallowed

LG p. 229 can one identify a work of art if it doesn’t bear the mark of a genre?

BSi p. 186 Celan: the artist turns nature to stone, “be a Medusa’s head” (monkey, automata, art)

p. 227 poetic signature: not essence but where poem is coming/going: frees itself, by art, from art

p. 251 [via Celan via Büchner’s Danton’s Death] art as species of marionette > marionette: an allegorical personification of technē, technical who and what

pp. 260-61 via Celan, art as unheimlich, containing the inhuman: Medusa, monkey, automata, marionette

OG p. 196 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] transgressing space, mastering exteriority (the inanimate), arts of space carry death w/in themselves—painting, often dead, carries you to depth of desert; voice, song, more alive [?]

p. 203 w/ song, the living arts, outside imitates the inside, “paints” passions, is expressive; w/ inanimate arts, reproduction of the outside on the outside [painting?] > both externalize

pp. 203-04 for Rousseau, art and mimesis are disastrous (supplement) & emergence from inanimate, expression of passion

p. 206 (294) for Rousseau, aesthetics passes through sign (semiology) not sensation, art is moral & ethnological [nonresponse to Western music can’t mean West Indians have different nerves!]

p. 207 (295) for Rousseau, taste (cooking) has no moral element, no good aesthetics can come from it

p. 208 [if art is moralism prior to sensation, by way of sign], attention to signifier degrades art by separating signifier’s effectiveness from the signified it signifies; supplement signifies nothing

p. 209 (297-98) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

——trait is spacing itself, marks figures, works on surface of painting & time of music

pp. 259-60 (367) for Rousseau, what never should have arrived, did [i.e. the supplement]; for Plato, for all onto-theology, meaning put out of play (le sens est mis hors jeu) in condemnation of art > Rousseau does not affirm (play/game of) writing but resigns himself to it

——society born by accident to repair the accidental catastrophe (Fall) [birth of supplement] of nature

IF pp. 312-13 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] as paradoxical as it sounds, Hegel frees passage for literature or writing called Art > having reached its end, one can discredit philosophy by treating it as art

pp. 314-15 [Flaubert will not “divert the least thing” from Art] still philosophical to seek truth (idea) of idea as a primal scene of negativity/resentment in art, scene of guilt-ridden indebtedness to idea

UWC pp. 210-13 “as if”: 1) imagination, utopia 2) Kant’s “as if (als ob)” from Critique of Judgment, points to finality of nature, is neither order of nature nor order of freedom [agent of deconstructive ferment] 3) oeuvres d’art, discursive idealities that define disciplines called Humanities, a subtle displacement of Kant’s idea: art is art not nature, it is free from all constraint/rules as if it were a product of nature

EU p. 63 [vis-à-vis Kant] metaphysics as the teacher’s mistress (maîtresse du maître), as censor > for a teacher, a finite being, no lifting of censorship, only strategic calculation: censorship against censorship, debate of the best censorship [the idea of philosopher’s legislation found everywhere in man’s reason], censorship of reason: [Derrida asks vis-à-vis Schelling] is this strategy an art?

p. 70 acc. Schelling, every “new” philosophy makes a new “step (pas)” in form, poetic originality, a provocation/challenge to translation

——Schelling’s originality: philosophy must possess formal originality (it’s a work of art)

p. 73 Schelling: philosophy becomes truly objective only in art > an art of generalized translation

——Schelling: both poetry/philosophy require self-produced original image (Bild) of world

pp. 73-4 [vis-à-vis Schelling] art can never be limited/programmed by State, there is no State culture > philosophy, which demands unconditional freedom, should reside in Faculty of Arts

p. 74 bureaucratic organization doesn’t provide for philosophy, has ceased being a free association in view of the arts (poetic translation)

SPEC p. 332 classically [?]: art preserves proper name, science forgets proper name > what then is psychoanalysis?

MSUB J pp. 154-57 treason (can a subjectile betray?): not come when called [Artaud levels accusation of treason at God]

p. 162n Artaud: soul is a fiend (suppôt), the else which is going to come back

p. 166 Artaud’s neologism innée, where nature collides w/ its contrary, “suffering of the pre-natal,” appears as monstrosity [Lacan’s extimacy?]

——“nature” conceals even the source of its interdiction > Artaud wants to tear apart veil of birth and reveal “naked nature”

TC pp. 236-37 Artaud: Plato must have experienced the streaming naked realization

p. 242 Artaud rejects psychoanalytic theater for its secret interiority > theater of cruelty a theater of dreams, of calculated dreams, cruelty as consciousness, exposed lucidity

pp. 243 Artaud: to consider dreams as substitute function, theater as second hand, is to diminish dreams & theater

p. 247 Artaud wants to destroy all writing after reading it once; Artaud vs. Plato > both against writing: Artaud because it’s the erasure of body, Plato because it is body

p. 249 Artaud kept himself as close as possible to the limit, possibility & impossibility of pure theater

PS p. 171 for Blanchot, Artaud’s “unpower” is “essential to thought” > [Blanchot risks neutralization by making Artaud exemplary]

——[using Blanchot’s pathetic error, Derrida shows how Artaud's unique example, his history, will be erased on the way to truth, given to the doctors: a pre-Hegelian treatment]

p. 174 Artaud howls under headings: existence, flesh, life, theater, cruelty > promising an art prior to madness & work

p. 175 Artaud’s resistance to clinical/critical exegeses: protest itself against exemplification itself > destroy history of dualist metaphysics, render doctor/critic helpless: art w/out works, language w/out trace

pp. 179-80 Artaud’s metaphysics of flesh [MOP?] determines Being as life, its integrity must be restored > a thought governed by anguish of dispossession, my body stolen by the other, by death (as theft): my death is represented

p. 183 Artaud wants absolute restoration of proper to eve prior to all dissociation

p. 184 Artaud wanted to destroy metaphor, the standing upright as metaphorical erection in written work

p. 325n Artaud uses Bergsonian-like formulations/metaphors of energy

p. 187 Artaud: “words entered like knives in lasting carnation”

p. 188 Artaud: give words the importance they have in dreams

——reclaim onomatopoeia (gesture dormant in classical speech), “no more masterpieces”

——Artaud: “I am writing for illiterates” > not to erase letter but to subordinate it to incidence of illegibility

p. 189 Artaud seeks a depth of illegibility

p. 191 Artaud wants to renounce: superstition of the text, dictatorship of the writer

***p. 194 Artaud affirms cruel law of difference while also fulfilling “most profound and permanent ambition of Western metaphysics”

REST pp. 379-81 Artaud (protests against ghosts): no ghosts in Van Gogh, no visions, the torrid truth, hieroglyphics > Derrida cautions: “you can only give them [the ghosts] back (rendre) if you think you have them, and you can only think you’re giving them if you haven’t got them”]

BSi p. 144 Deleuze accuses psychoanalysis (Freud) of dispossessing (brutalizing w/ machines of war) the Wolf Man (much like Artaud’s complaint about theft of his proper name)

OG pp. 247-49 (351-53) [Artaud-like fantasy in Rousseau?] breath (of God), neume, superhumanity, not on the way to humanity (like child), body w/out organs, w/out spacing, pure presence w/ jouissance, inarticulate enough for jouissance de soi to remain uncorrupted by alterity

pp. 249-50 (354) via Rousseau, heart as organ of pure presence is not an organ, not inscribed w/in system of differences

ATIA pp. 124-25 presupposed absence of response in animal, that it is only capable of reaction: identifies animal w/ machine [Derrida not erasing this distinction, but doubts its purity]

GT pp. 121-22 one usually believes narrative does not recount itself but an object outside of it; [Derrida considers that]what happens happens to the narrator, as if the narrative condition were the cause of the recounted thing, as if the narrative produced the event it was supposed to report

R p. 85 Kant’s as-if essential to regulative idea, imaginary approach tending towards universality; re: mondialisation, Kant’s word remains a regulative idea [Derrida on why he can’t take regulative idea seriously]

BL p. 190 Kant: typology, symbolic presentation of moral good (beauty, a symbol of morality), respect for law which only appears in law > “as if” in maxim: reconciles practical reason w/ historical teleology (narrative), w/ possibility of unlimited progress

POO pp. 10-1 responsibility not in one’s own name but arises in structure of supplementarity: in my name as the name of the other > singularity quakes in exemplary equivocality of this “as”

HASD pp. 46-7 via Eckhart, like adverb quasi (quasi stella matutina), we are beside the verb that is the truth; Eckhart: “may the Father, the Verbum…help us remain adverbs of this Verbum”

——quasi > “as (als)”

A p. 71 als not yet als sich [see ATIA pp. 142-43 for als-structure]

S p. 51 for Heidegger, privation (Privation) in Dasein, in structure of “as,” structure of “something as something (die Struktur des Etwas als Etwas),” not same as animal’s privation (Entbehrung)

FWT p. 127 by inventing/violating modality of as if, revealing its infinity, literature endlessly opens up to historicity of political, w/ certain concept of democracy-to-come

——as if an increased responsibility in absolute freedom of literature

P p. 117 acc. Kant, though we cannot determine empirical laws of nature, we must act as if an understanding (not our own) gave them unity [regulative idea?]

SW pp. 313-14 diminish the infinite, diminish ad infinitum: that’s the temptation/dream since ever: but you’re doing it w/out being sure of textile to come, as if caught in sails (voiles) & pushed toward unknown, at the point of this extremity, as if someone were awaiting new Messiah, i.e. a “happy event”—nicknamed the verdict > yes, but a verdict w/out truth, w/ a due date no longer caught up in revealing a truth, the fold or unfolding of a veil—writing from distant place of as if

***TR p. 134 re: oeuvre as trace of its ambiguity, as if quasi-machine were already operating even before being produced in the world, in the vivid experience of living present

p. 135 what is terrifying: what cuts me off from my own initiative [?] > automaticity discuplates & threatens “me”—quasi-excuses, ghosts of excuses, quasi-faults, spectral silhouettes of pardons: “as if” of this quasi, limitless risk of becoming simulacrum, virtuality

PF p. xix to think divisibility of trait of sovereignty deconstructs a certain fable, certain “as if,” of the political onto-theology of sovereignty

TN p. 81 this equivocation [re: Levinas’ caress] of negation w/out negativity marked by recurrence of “as if” and “without” (x w/out x, “essence of this non-essence”)

p. 87 the 2 meanings of “as”: 1) risky comparison, rhetorical 2) appropriate description, phenomenological

p. 169 for Husserl, rigorous philosopher avoids everyday language w/ its as and as ifs (gleichsam) > he should recall us to evidence itself

p. 288 Derrida’s “if there is any (s’il y en a)” vs. Nancy’s “there is no ‘the’” > two irreducibly different deconstructions (one turns to a conditional, the other to a negative modality)

E p. 17 for Kant, the “as if” of the poet (“as if” of nature) is better, sincerer, more loyal than the “as if” of the orator, who wears a mask, deceives, his “as if” is “machine-like”

BSi p. 35 “storytelling,” convention of some historical as if, fabular > a moral lesson, a political strategy, pedagogical artifice to credit a fable: to make known (political logic, rhetoric)

p. 171 Derrida stresses “quasi” because it relates to a feint or an “as if”

UWC p. 208 Derrida links new concept of humanities [a deconstructive one] w/ democratic institution called literature, to a certain simulacrum, a certain “as if”

p. 209 “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”: begin at once at end & at beginning > begin w/ end as if it were the beginning [event or telos?]

pp. 209-10 “as,” “as if,” politics of the virtual (not a virtual politics) in cyberworld or cyberspace of worldwide-ization > delocalizing, virtualization of communication, publication, archivization

——where there’s trace there’s some virtualization (i.e. virtualization not absolutely novel)

pp. 210-13 “as if”: 1) imagination, utopia 2) Kant’s “as if (als ob)” from Critique of Judgment, points to finality of nature, is neither order of nature nor order of freedom [agent of deconstructive ferment] 3) oeuvres d’art, discursive idealities that define disciplines called Humanities, a subtle displacement of Kant’s idea: art is art not nature, it is free from all constraint/rules as if it were a product of nature

p. 213 impossible attempt to link “as if” to thinking of event: what happens when “taking place” of le travail, when the place itself, becomes virtual, becomes subject to mode “as if”?

pp. 217-18 not every travail an event in itself, doesn’t always produce an oeuvre, not every performative (always authorized by an institutional “as if”) produces oeuvre

p. 223 “as if” mondialisation du monde had as its horizon/origin the disappearance of work (travail) [its virtualization] > work, labor, travail have always implied the real, effective (wirklich) [not virtual]

——“as if” [the end of work]: neither sci-fi utopia of Augustine’s “at the end w/out end,” in fine sine fine (Sabbath w/out evening), nor memory of immemorial (nostalgia for earthly paradise)

pp. 224-25 [re: “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”] logical skeleton of this “as if” proposition: world & work can’t co-exist, one would have to choose one or the other > the becoming-world of world, mondialisation, often speaks of “end of work”

p. 232 “literature,” its link to performative force of “as if,” to the right to say everything (or not to say everything), which founds both democracy & unconditional sovereignty claimed by Humanities

p. 233 end of certain figure of professor gives rise to other strategies of “as if,” singular oeuvres > Derrida believes in certain necessity of professoriat

——mise en oeuvre (the putting to work), at least to the performative putting to work of “as if”

pp. 234-37 [perhaps, “if,” event] not horizon of power, of “I can,” irruption that punctures horizon, interrupts performative organization of “as if,” “as such” > “as” name of true problem/target of deconstruction: authority of “as” founds/justifies every ontology, phenomenology, knowledge, science

EU p. 165 a (philosophical) letter dates the “as if” of the mood, a fabled mood, “a once upon a time, one day, I had the feeling…”

pp. 223-24 “as if” structure—characterizes every philosophical, scientific institution worthy of the name

***SPOM p. 211 “ascesis strips the messianic hope of all biblical forms…all determinable figures…denudes itself in view of responding to that which must be absolute hospitality, the ‘yes’ to the arrivant(e), the “come” to the future (l’avenir) that cannot be anticipated”

——“we must practice recognizing (s’exercer à reconnaître)” those too familiar ghosts

——open, waiting for event as justice, this hospitality is absolute only if it “keeps watch (veille)” over its own universality (messianic is always revolutionary, has to be)

HASD p. 44 [re: negative theology] a politics of initiation or teaching, multiplication of voices, veil dissimulates & renders attractive at same time [Augustine: God is powerful w/out power]

p. 61 agogic path [askesis] of a text [Dionysus to Timothy]: repetition or repeatability

POOF pp. 53-4 via Nietzsche, keep silent about “truth” of friendship to protect, guarantee, the truth of friendship, resisting the abyss, the vertigo of friendship’s bottomless ground, the friendship that can’t resist the truth of its illusion, an asceticism, kenosis, speech would ruin friendship, speak in an elliptical way to avow > as though silence could not be spoken about elsewhere than in friendship

DPi p. 146 vis-à-vis Nietzsche, sovereignty of music: Sprache des Willens—telephone exchanged w/ God: priest as musician

——if ascesis rejects body, telephonic language rises above, bringing the distant close to itself, the mediate immediate > the priest, mouthpiece for the in-itself of things speaks in language of metaphysics (er redete Metaphysik)

——still there is enjoyment on the “metaphysical line,” aesthetic renunciation renounces nothing

——telephony is metaphysics: religious, sacrificial, asceticism itself, priesthood itself

EJQB pp. 67-8 writing (originally) as secondary, hermetic: displaced on broken line btwn lost & poisoned speech [re: God’s silence, repentance, broken Tables]

——separation of life & thought: infinite anchoritism (writing as moment of Desert, Judaic experience as reflection)

GT pp. 16-17 absolute forgetting (oubli absolu) which unbinds (délie) absolutely or infinitely more than excuse, forgiveness, acquittal: certain experience of trace, cinder, ashes

——forgetting and gift condition each other (unconditional)

p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

p. 112 annihilation of a remainder, as ashes sometimes testify, can play role of memory, of offering, of sacrifice

FK p. 100 [bottom w/out bottom of always virgin impassibility] khōra of tomorrow in languages we no longer, don’t yet, speak: makes way w/out generosity, neither divine, nor human > dispersion of ashes not promised there, nor death given

AF pp. 97-9 the archaic impression Freud seeks almost no longer an archive, confuses itself w/ a footstep that leaves its still living mark on surface [see POR p. 19 (154) seize inaudible in a sort of poetic telephony, see what makes sight see], place of origin, when step still one w/ subjectile

——instant when imprint yet to be abandoned by pressure of impression, pure auto-affection, indistinction btwn touching/touched, active/passive, an archive that would confuse itself w/ arkhē

——Freud dreams irreplaceable place, the very ash, condition of singularity, idiom, secret, testimony, trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate > absolutely safe location

——holds, right on the ash, pressure of Gradiva’s so singular step

p. 100 no archive of the secret, by definition, it is the very ash of the archive

p. 101 we’ll always wonder what in this mal d’archive did Freud burn, what may have burned of his secret passions, w/out him, w/out name, w/out symptom, w/out knowledge, w/out even an ash

SPOM p. 57 Marx: “useless metal” of treasure, horde, becomes like burnt-out ashes (ausgebrannte Asche) of circulation, its caput mortuum; miser, speculator: a martyr to exchange value > dreams of pure exchange value

***p. 220 ghosts and mortals can put the dead to rest, the dead cannot, it is impossible “and they must not do so,” this impossibility, the dead putting dead to rest [p. 31 “do not reduce testimony to knowledge”?], can take place, it is the ruin or the absolute ashes, it is total presence, absolute evil, Derrida exorcises, not to chase away but to grant ghosts the right to return (faire droit), revenant

HASD pp. 28-29 [letter always arrives?] always possible to call on God, to call assumed origin of all speech by name of God, God always names trace of singular event rendering speech possible, all apophatic discourse opens w/ prayer

——always presupposed event, déjà-là, trace of phrase indispensable, irreducible, trace has taken place, even if contaminated by repetition which confers on it code & intelligibility, even if it occurs only to efface itself, effacement will have taken place, even if its place is only in ashes, il y a là cendre

——trace as possibility of finitude, finite & infinite cause of trace appears secondary, an effect of trace or differance (which is finite insofar as it is infinite)

A p. 43 always culture of death (sometimes just to incinerate ashes)

PP p. 171 first use of il y a là cendre, in reference to not losing Plato’s 2^nd letter, which speaks of what he [Plato?] could never have written

S S p. 122n Valéry: ashes, ghosts

p. 124n Valéry: knowledge devours everything, turns all to ash

p. 81 in Der Ister, Hölderlin calls to the fire, Jetzt komme, Feuer!, fire as what comes, call for to-come > acc. Heidegger, Hölderlin, the Beseeler, has been struck by God of light, gift of spirit as incineration, cremation, almost becoming ash [MOP & annihilation of trace]

p. 97 duplicity of Geist, as its evil ghost, brings forth question: is ash good or evil? whiteness of ash which belongs to destiny consumed and consuming (conflagration of flame)

p. 98 Heidegger: spirit flames devour, consume, everything, including the white of ash

——Trakl: “flame is the brother of the palest”

p. 102 white of ash as des Zerstörerischen (the destruction) spirit deploys, as radical evil

SH SH p. 22 readability effaces the date, the very thing which it offers for reading, date must conceal w/in itself stigma of singularity if it is to last longer (lasting is the poem), only chance of spectral return, commemoration of date’s annihilation, kind of nothing or ash > ash awaits us

——annulment in the annulation of return belongs to movement of dating

p. 34 signature not only recalls the vanished as vanished, the singular event, its ash > it gathers together a conjunction of singularities, a partaking in future of same date

pp. 38-9 date may always become no one’s, nothing’s date, the essence w/out essence of ash

——name partakes in this destiny of ash along w/ date, not empirical, is part of its readability ——mourning: reading itself > readability: tribute of lost singularity (“beauty” pays)

p. 40 religion before religion: blessing of dates, names, ashes

——date is mad, always more or less than what it says it is, we are mad for dates, those ashes which dates are, remains w/out being > music, Sichelschrift

p. 43 unreadable is readable as unreadable, shibboleth transmitted to a few during finite time of incineration, heart to heart, mouth to ear, hand to hand, still universal by right (legible, coded, troped) > madness of fire: consumes a date from w/in > renders ash from 1^st moment

——trace or ash: these names stand for other names, a date’s destiny is that of every proper name: is there any other desire than dating, commemorating?

——a date, to become what it is, must give itself to be read in ash, in the nonbeing of its being

p. 44 shibboleth: “I am ash”

——poem’s desire or gift, the date is born, in movement of blessing, toward ash

p. 45 desert: where no one would be left to bless the ashes

p. 47 [MOP] Celan: Aschenkelle (ash-ladle) draws from tub [better than manger/trough] of being, launders > soapy; ash uses up being, is not a being-that-remains, there is ash, but ash is not

——via Celan, so much ash to be blessed

p. 51 ash calls to night, night calls to ash

p. 67 Jewish language, poetic language, this essence promises itself only in dis-identification (in the expropriation of the nothing, non-essence—[ashes?])

——how can German language receiver circumcision of poem’s date following the holocaust, the solution, the ash of all? how can you bless these ashes in German? [re: Celan]

p. 68 because one can make use of shibboleth, it can be turned against oneself, the circumcised are proscribed, held at border, excluded, reduced to ashes, in the mere name

DS DS p. 263n Mallarmé: “ashes-total-gold- (cendres-or-total-),” “dispersal goldenly consumed,” or devalued, mined out, plus de nom

ROP ROP p. 44 ash, stepping beyond psychoanalysis, radical destruction of archive, destroys capitalizing reserve, the guarding of repression

SP SP p. 123 “steps of the dove (colombe),” which is the manner of the Übermensch, leads Derrida to “pun”: we could begin a discourse on Nietzsche’s columbarium (colombaire)

OTO OTO pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

SW SW p. 325 letting other live: absolute suicide, no trace, not even the seal of a break

——not even leave them my ashes

——no longer be oneself or have oneself (s’être ou s’avoir) > truth w/out truth looking for me at end of world

——blessing of one who leaves w/out leaving an address

pp. 353-54 Celan: “Aschenglorie (…) grub ich mich in dich und in dich” > [I in you—love itself] love made itself make love next to watching dreaming child [too old, forbidden to be old, still young]

HST HST p. 370 Abraham (Gen 18: 22-32): “I who am but dust & ashes” [re: asking Lord to forgive the Sodomites]

C C p. 230 remainder is neither produced nor reproduced/represented [in Titus-Carmel’s coffins], classical thought re: remainder reduced to ashes > yet we retain at least more than one monumental proof (at least 127) of this historical operation

——hearth (foyer) as crematorium

p. 235 ashes, the fledglings (oisillons) are Phoenician [?]

TN TN p. 52 Nancy: philosophy as work of mourning, work of representation, incorporation, profits from death (jouir de la mort), philosophy doesn’t know true mourning (w/out limits: ashes & tears)

ATM ATM p. 170 there is no Hegelian Phoenix after Levinas’ consummation of me [i.e. not Me] for the other [passivity more passive…], no being reborn from out the ashes

pp. 188-89 PLUS ASSEZ DE DIFFÉRENCE LÀ ENTRE ELLES ENTRE L’INHUMÉE OU LES CENDRES D’UN BRÛLE-TOUT

CIN pp. 56-8 [quoting from PC] Derrida telling “you” [his love?] to eat all his ashes, to approach him by slowly advancing toward death, an absolute reconciliation

CIR pp. 272-73 never been able to contradict myself, still so young [cf. SW pp. 322-23], unforgettable power of my discourse—they grind even the mute ash, name of God in the ash > so I write, convenient for forgetting

SPEC p. 330 cremation: a form of Fortgehen, quite singular effects on work of mourning

MONL p. 31 surging wave [déferlment déchainé] of anamnesia that the double interdict unleashed > invent one’s language and “I” at the same time

***p. 57 both at same time: 2 hyperboles, everything can and cannot be translated, “it is easy for me to hold firm between these two hyperboles”

H p. 81 “at this very moment”: antinomy of laws in the plural and absolutely singular law

——there are 2 plurals, different at same time: 1) multiplicity, plural laws 2) One + a multiplicity, One + n [plus d’un]

——One + n, the antinomic addition, adds conditional laws to unconditional law of hospitality

p. 125 “impossibility of that ‘at the same time’ is at the same time what happens, once and every time, it is what is going to happen, what always happens”

LOBL p. 148 I am “irresponsible” and absolutely committed in the establishment of the language of the other, which I do as if the first moment, the “at once” is the occasion of the hymen, its chance and its law

SPOM p. 42 “multiple” and “at once,” the sign of contradiction w/out contradiction, of non-dialectical or “almost” non-dialectical difference running through every injunction

p. 204 ghost is there [re: de-limitation of critique] in the opening of the promise, before its first apparition, from the first it will have come second, deux fois à la fois, itérabilité originaire, virtualité irréductible de cet espace et de ce temps

POOF p. 1 contretemps, 2x, plus d’un, 2 moments at the same time [my friends, no friend]

BL p. 199 origin of literature at same time as origin of law; story of prohibition (law) is a prohibited story

MPM p. 145 for de Man, text defined by considering a statement at the same time performative & constative > this same time never is, will never have been, will never be present

A p. 65 death, impossible simultaneity (where one and the other arrive together), contretemps

S pp. 107-08 origin as hétérogène à l’origine: 1) originarily heterogenous 2) heterogenous to what is called the origin, other than the origin 3) heterogenous and or insofar as at the origin: because and although (bien que) at the same time—is logical form of tension that makes this thought vibrate

SH pp. 3-4 circumcision only once, at the same time “first & last,” ring, seal of alliance, anniversary of archeology/eschatology > ring traces, carves the “unwiederholbar (unrepeatable)”

CHM p. 46 praeclare sane, toutefois [beginning of paragraph where Descartes wonders if he’s dreaming]

***PP pp. 92-3 Thoth supplants and supplements (en le suppléant) its other (father, sun, life, speech, origin or orient); at same time Thoth takes shape from very thing it resists and substitutes for

——Thoth opposes itself, passes into its other > messenger-god is truly god of absolute passage btwn opposites: god of non-identity (if he had identity: coincidentia oppositorum)

p. 168 “at once (à la fois):” identity is doubled as its simulacrum, phantasm, at once (identity of presence, presence of its identity, doubled as soon as it appears)

DS p. 202 relation of one text to another, open & closed, at the same time > necessary that each organism only refer to itself as determinate

p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

OS p. 56 for Aristotle, being-together [of nun and stigmē] not a determination of Being but very production of Being > ama as the pivot (cheville) (clavis), the key opening & closing metaphysics > this complicity so self-effacing as to barely be noticed, the common origin of space & time > Aristotle says w/out saying [Rousseau describing w/out declaring]: the dyad as the minimum

pp. 56-7 Aristotle’s 1st aporia, nun not part of ousia, because made of now’s (time’s parts), several nows can’t : 1) follow each other by immediately destroying each other 2) not destroy each other immediately 3) or remain in the same now > need temporal intemporal hama to conceive this aporia

p. 58 analogy, correspondence: enigma of “at the same time” [re: relation of time to space, changes of place, movement]

P pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

ROP p. 27 deconstruction is archaeological & philolytic, while simultaneously resisting this double motif, radicalizes axiomatics of à la fois

pp. 101-02 for Foucault, psychoanalysis oscillates on both sides of dividing line, in two places, two times, at same time (but he does not think these two times w/ structural possibility of event)

ATIA p. 55 re: following the animal, following the other > hunter/hunted, seducer/seduced, persecutor/fugitive constituted in the same animal in the same instant

DIF DIF p. 24 trace: à la fois, monument & mirage, traced & erased, living & dead, living in its simulation of life’s preserved inscription: a pyramid, to be deciphered otherwise, text w/out voice

DST DST p. 205 à la fois (double bind) > point out & not point out (relever et ne pas relever)

TR p. 141 Rousseau’s appeal to others, appeal to future, belongs to same time, same moment, as “myself alone”

LI p. 62 vices [turns] that interest me: time & place of the other time, the other time in (stead of) the first time, at once

p. 119 repeatability of both (identificatory) iterability & (altering) iterability > necessity of thinking rule & event, concept & singularity, at once

——iterability thus a concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, & hence the concept, hence all distinction > marks the limit of idealization/conceptualization: “concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to nonconcept

NOY pp. 231-32 when thought and the word (la parole) given in writing merge (se confond) at the heart of the same time (au coeur du même temps); chance encounter in singularity of “graph,” coincidence of the cut (la coupure) and the opening (l’ouverture)

ATM p. 148 gift of other, debt w/out contract, demands: at the same time, indefinitely equivalent substitution (anonymity) and singularity (rather, absolute uniqueness of proper name)

pp. 156-60 Levinas’ 2 instances of “en ce moment même,” le même moment: one belongs to the dialectic, the other has an infinite advance on the 1st, differs/defers it, and yet it is the same

OG pp. 154-55 supplement not only procures an absent presence, it distances, masters, protects: supplement transgresses and à la fois respects interdict (acc. to play/difference of forces)

EU pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

——provocation to think brings together in same instant desire for memory & exposure to future

KH pp. 100-01 mytheme, acc. Hegel, will have been a prephilosopheme promised to a dialectical Aufhebung

GOD pp. 10-11 [economy of the sacrifice] in turn toward new mystery, toward new structure of responsibility, prior one never eliminated, kept w/in oneself, mourned as crypt of a more ancient secret > is this repression, is this a kind of sacrificial Aufhebung?

LOBL p. 115 antagony from arrêt to arrêt, an Aufhebung that never lets up, arrêt arresting arrêt, both senses, both ways

p. ~166 arrêt w/out Aufhebung

EM p. 121 (143) Aufheben is relever: at the same time > déplacer, élever, remplacer et promouvoir

VM p. 316n “alterity, difference, and time are not suppressed but retained by absolute knowledge in the form of the Aufhebung”

pp. 113-14 [do for all words what Hegel did for Aufhebung? no, see DS p. 200]

PPHS p. 76 Aufhebung facilitates spirit’s elevation beyond that within which it was submerged, sublimates nature into itself > presenting itself to itself as such

p. 88 authority of voice: coordinated w/ entire Hegelian system: its archeology, teleology, eschatology, its will to parousia > process of sign is an Aufhebung, negativity

——Hegel: negativity of intelligence, Aufhebung of sign relieves/promotes beyond natural, sensual, spatial

T p. xi Marges concerns relevance of limit, a reading of the Hegelian Aufhebung, a reading beyond Hegel’s own intention, beyond that which is inscribed on the internal vestibule of his ear, where Hegel’s text would be a writing machine of “conscious intention,” thus a mechanical reader

F p. xxii otherness before opposition btwn introj./incorp. not the contradiction of telos of Aufhebung, but undecidable irresolution: paradoxically incorp. doesn’t preserve other [garde une topique, mantient sauve], introj. more open [to other] > makes it impossible for the 2 to close over their proper, their death, their corpse

DS p. 248n Aufhebung—most “relevant” way of (re)covering (up) graphics of supplementarity or hymen, le recouvrement le plus séduisant, because most similar > thus, must critique Aufhebung as decisive target, that which obfuscates specificity of “writing operation”

OS pp. 41-2 space becomes concrete by retaining/restoring negative w/in itself, by negating itself

——1st negative determination of space is the POINT (the place that does not take place), it then negates itself in relation the LINE > als sich aufhebend, point is the line, the Being-spatial of point > then comes the PLANE (surface) > each next stage only made of the negated prior stage, i.e. line made of negated points

——“always too late to ask the question of time” re: spatialization

——each stage of Aufhebung is time

p. 43 point & time thought in circularity together (Aufhebung, speculative negativity, only possible by means of infinite correlation or reflection) > time is spacing, space is time > thus for Aristotle, stigmē, punctuality, determines nowness (nun, jetzt)

p. 43n TN. re- vs auf- in relève/aufhebt

p. 45n Hegel: Notion is in and for itself absolute (total) negativity and freedom

p. 53n for Hegel, time erases time, Tilgen (to erase) is also an Aufhebung: given that time is pure exterior self, parousia is end of time

POS POS pp. 40-1 if there’s a definition of differance, it’s the limit, interruption, destruction of Hegel’s relève, wherever it is

pp. 43-4 differance not Hegel’s difference of contradiction, which uses a third term to resolve, synthesize, aufheben

***p. 94 Houdebine says “no Aufhebung here,” Derrida responds: there is always Aufhebung, just as there is always repression, sublimation, idealization

p. 95 Derrida does not apply spacing to negate that which is ‘present,’ this would remain logic of Hegelian Aufhebung, Derrida’s nonpresence not found in opposition presence/absence

ROP ROP p. 32 repetition compulsion (advocatus diaboli of death drive) as resource & limit (à la fois) of psychoanalysis > analytic position set going endlessly, w/out Aufhebung, in paradox of Bindung and Erlöschung (solution, extinction): no analytic position when resistance is unidentifiable

DIF DIF p. 19 Aufhebung constrained into writing itself otherwise, or simply into writing itself, or taking into account its consumption of writing (sa consommation d’écriture) [re: general/restricted economy]

O pp. 6-7n differance inscribes contradictions, is the critical limit of idealizing powers of la relève (Aufgehoben), which reduces contradictions to homogeneity of single model

DPi pp. 207-08 Hugo’s abolitionism: disappearance of social order of past (priest, executioner, king), but order remains, what counts is what remains, the reste, of the turning, of the Christian Aufhebung

——Hugo: “cross will be substituted for the gallows”

pp. 208-09 the logic of Aufhebung’s remainder & fact that Christianity, unlike Judaism/Islam, is also an immanentist humanism (mediation of God made man) > brings Camus’ atheistic abolitionism closest to Hugo’s Christological transcendence

RGE pp. 255-56 conservation of Aufhebung: circulation & self-reproduction as reproduction of meaning

p. 257 Aufhebung amortizes absolute expenditure (la dépense absolue), works the “putting at stake” into an investment (à élaborer la mise en jeu en investissement) > it’s laughable

——acc. Bataille, to be indifferent to comedy of Aufhebung (like Hegel was)—to blind oneself to experience of sacred, to heedless sacrifice of presence & meaning

p. 259 Aufhebung collaborates w/ Errinerung (interiorizing memory of meaning)

***p. 275 Aufhebung: produced entirely w/in system/work of signification, from one infinite determination to the next, each one conserved in the other, transitions produced by anxiety of infinity—included w/in circle of absolute knowledge, never suspends totality of discourse (work, meaning, law), never exceeds its closure > restricted economy, circulation of prohibitions: history as truth of prohibitions

p. 335n laughter’s burst does not maintain itself (not negative), laughs at Aufhebung

REST p. 348 to “put aside (mettre de côté)” once bizarre, but here interesting translation of Aufheben [re: Heidegger putting Van Gogh picture aside]

OG p. 25 (40) Aufhebung is the concept of history & teleology

ATAP p. 75 via Kant, apocalypse as dream of raising (aufheben) veil of Isis

SPEC p. 395 Bindung inaugurates, assures, overflows PP (mastery), as seat of its condition

——no relève of PP—not Hegelian [since PP always master?] > in fact, function of PP, (postal) binding, determines interpretation of Aufhebung

FV p. 479 systemic & historical link btwn idealization, relève (Aufhebung), and the voice > Lacan’s elevation of signifier

p. 480 Lacan: “the phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance”

——Lacan reversed Hegel: not ideal signified but ideal signifier

POOF pp. 186-88 [1st] Augustine’s abyssal calculation, after death of his friend [Confessions IV], his close reading of Aristotle’s friends are ‘one soul in bodies twain’: survivre, ou non, au nom de l’autre?

survive for yourself or person you’re mourning? question of gift, donner au nom de l’autre, a narcissism that only occurs in name of other

——[2nd topology in Augustine] arithmetical challenge of arithmetic (indivisibility induces a desire for infinite multiplication of subject), economy w/out reserve, in originary guilt of friendship

——[3rd] infinitization qua conversion in God, on model of fraternal friendship? i.e. God demands we love the enemy

SW p. 312 grand masters of discourse about resurrection: Saint Paul, Saint Augustine

p. 319 was it even to Christ my poor old incorrigible Augustine finally addressed: “you were w/ me, I was not w/ you, beauty so ancient and new” > or because it is already late?

CHM p. 62 philosophy as this giant confession: attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole (to define it as such is to confess) > I philosophize only in terror, but in confessed terror of going mad

——confession is simultaneously: oblivion/unveiling, protection/exposure > economy

DST DST p. 229 “too late and too early”

HLP p. 31 se tromper > being-mistaken? or lie to oneself? > can one lie to oneself [Augustine seems to exclude this possibility]?

p. 51 performative can produce a truth, makes the truth, as Augustine says, whose power sometimes imposes itself forever

CIR p. 277-78 Saint Augustine, whom elsewhere I venerate and envy

pp. 284-85 writing w/out believing in one’s survival, in the inheritance of the last will, writing for the present, a made present, like SA wants to make truth: I don’t take my life, je me donne ici la mort

EU p. 37 Descartes jealously insists on “true philosophy” [of his thought], re: Augustinian filiation of “I think therefore I am”

OOG p. 74 authenticity, truth almost equals clarity (Klarheit) for Husserl

IW p. 267 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] Protestantism makes faith come alive to its authenticity, new relation of religion to truth, no longer as correspondence (like science, objective knowledge) but as truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit), authenticity, most intimate Gewissen: [the Church?] internalizes what contests it

KH p. 124 one telling to the next, author gets farther & farther away: mythic saying resembles a discourse w/out a legitimate father, orphan, bastard, distinguished from philosophy, in Phaedrus, which must have a father to answer for it

BL p. 184 Derrida concedes presuppositions, conventions [on authorship of text], while exposing them

pp. 214-15 different periods of history of positive law give substance to literature, value of signatures [“authors”]

LOBL p. 142 legal bindings, framings, of Blanchot’s L’arrêt de mort into single book by single author

pp. 169-72 Derrida’s mad hypothesis, nothing to do w/ intention of “author” that the hymen btwn the 2 women in L’arrêt de mort (separated by uncrossable glass partition of 2 stories) is the absolute terror, that they love and approach each other w/out the narrator

SPOM p. 116 one cannot establish the state of a debt, do the balance sheet of an “exhaustive record,” one selects, performs, inheritance is kept secret, secret of a crime of its very author

POOF p. 59 sage & fool: l'un est l’autre, l'un garde et se garde de l’autre, l'un se fait violence, encore la surenchère infinie > this raising of the stakes doesn’t need an author’s intention

PP p. 95 systematic chain of pharmakon not simply intentions of an author going by name Plato

FSW p. 226 if there were only perception, pure permeability of breaching, there would be no breaches (frayages), no legible writing, but pure perception does not exist: nous ne sommes écrits qu’en écrivants > subject of writing does not exist as sovereign solitude of author

p. 227 we would search public in vain for first reader, i.e. first author of a work

DS pp. 225-26 [on conscious intention of author] does not matter to us here, reader should not know why, burst of laughter deep inside antre answers these questions

POS p. 42 double, interval, biphase, biface, bifurcated writing can only be marked in a grouped textual field, not in a punctual position, not w/ a single author

ROP p. 57 to identify someone w/ what they get paid for is not to read

OTO pp. 5-6 borderline btwn “work” & “life”: dynamis, virtual & mobile potency, neither active nor passive, outside nor inside, not a thin line, traverses 2 bodies (corpus & body) > not an indivisible trait lying btwn enclosure of philosophemes & life of author identifiable behind name

PS p. 191 Artaud wants to renounce: superstition of the text, dictatorship of the writer

FS p. 14 [for deconstruction] history of the work is not only its past, it is the impossibility of the text ever being present > legitimating intention keeps to internal truth, avoids thinking a subjective origin that is not simply psychological/mental

O p. 6 first effect of dissemination: individuality & responsibility no longer predominate

p. 56 literature is beyond of everything: author would have to disappear along w/ literature

DPi p. 209 exemplarity of Hugolian economy considerably exceeds the singular genius who represents it so well

TB p. 117 vis-à-vis Benjamin, if structure of work is “sur-vival,” a strange debt that doesn’t bind anyone to anyone: debt not engaged w/ subject-author but to formal law in immanence of original text

***PIO p. 36 universality (ideal objectivity, unlimited recurrence) in invention blurs signature of invention: name of individual (singular empirical entity) is associated w/ invention in inessential, extrinsic, accidental, aleatory way > this gives rise to enormous problem of property rights

TR p. 155 de Man: deconstruction of figural dimension threatens autobiographical subject

D p. 332 authorless voice, phonic tracing no ideal signified could stamp [sa frappe sensible] sans reste, all representative outcroppings (affleurements) subjected to rhythm of a numerous pounding

——Verlaine was told: text speaking of itself, w/out an author

ATM p. 171 what to make of a signature [Levinas’] when “il aura obligé,” when Il signs in his place?

——how does one hear “one must” in Derrida’s polysemic “l’oeuvre d’E.L. aura obligé”

p. 172 how to cite when Levinas places the whole language (French & Western) btwn quotation marks? at same time “he” is in quotation marks: the nameless signatory w/out authorial signature, “he” who undersigns every work, met en oeuvre tout ouvrage

——infinite law of quotation marks suspends all reference, work enclosed in a borderless context it gives to itself (se donne à elle-même), while making absolute reference to command of tout autre

pp. 177-78 Levinas: the other can always dispossess me of my work

CIN pp. 16-7 Derrida gives Cinder a proper name, is she the signatory of this text?

pp. 23-5 why the phrase “il y a là cendre” doesn’t belong to him [Derrida] > cinder lent, given, to so many others, cinder remains virginal (the only thing he loves), in tact (intacte), the sentence doesn’t even say the cinder

BSi p. 189 Valéry & Monsieur Teste doubles of marionettes—who makes who speak?

OG p. 68 (100) writing can never be thought under the category of the subject

p. 329n Derrida is not concerned w/ Sausurre’s intentions, nor the very thought itself, instead interested in a text which has influenced readings, borrowings, etc.

p. 99 (148) “Hegel,” “Rousseau,” “Leibniz,” “Descartes” neither identities nor causes > name of problems > so long as closure limits our discourse: we will not have other concepts

SPEC p. 322 inscription of a subject in his [Freud’s] text is also condition of the performance/pertinence of a text, beyond empirical subjectivity, supposing that could exist as soon as one writes, substitutes, supplements: notion of truth incapable of accounting for this performance

——autobiography as departure/return of a fort/da

p. 344 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] speculating, “author” already no longer there, no longer responsible, leaves document in your hands > “literary”: make of it what you will, it’s up to you—you’re more than ever on board

p. 348 PP as author or as authority, it/he only increased by dissidents speaking against it

——PP loses mastery w/ flooding (Überschwemmung), psychic apparatus no longer seeks pleasure, occupied only w/ binding (binden) excitations, w/ “mastering (bewältigen)” them

p. 365 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] malignant tumors also “narcissistic,” unleash themselves w/out concern for other cells, for the rights of authors or of succession

p. 376 is Freud’s discourse’s restance statutory?

FV p. 422(n) Lacan translates Wiederholungszwang as “repetition automatism,” the pre-eminence of signifier over signified > consequence: “literary” text does w/out reference to author [Derrida implies that Lacan takes, at times, his distrust of psychobiography too far in other direction: formalist neutralization of effects of signature]

p. 431 inscriber/inscribing function not to be confused w/ author > Lacan excludes textual fiction, indicates a general narrative w/in neutralized or naturalized frame, thus overlooks the frame

p. 432 structure of fiction reduced when related to its condition of truth, poor formalism which guarantees semantic content, doesn’t account for 1) “scription-fiction” and “scription-fictor” 2) narrating narration & narrator > complicity btwn formalist withdrawal (repli) and hermeneutic semanticism (or psychoanalysis applied to literature) [neglect of the subject-author, which, in some situations, might constitute progress or a legitimate demand]

GOD p. 62 ethical must sometimes be refused in name of responsibility that doesn’t calculate, that keeps its secret, that tyrannically [Nietzsche], jealously refuses violence of accounts and justifications, declining autobiography that is auto-justification: egodicée

GT p. 100 the supposedly most personal, direct writing, in contact w/ “thing-itself,” is “on credit”

MONL p. 31 surging wave [déferlment déchainé] of anamnesia that the double interdict unleashed > invent one’s language and “I” at the same time [see p. 70 on autobiography]

POO p. 143n use of “I” as an example, am I writing an autobiography? or writing about “I” in general, where I become exemplary

HASD p. 66n most “autobiographical” [attach as many quotation marks around this word as possible] to leave out Jew & Arab, which Derrida has never been able to speak about [see p. 58]

MPM p. 23 de Man: autobiography is “a figure of reading…that occurs in all texts.”

p. 25 tropology of memory in autobiographical discourse > discourse as epitaph, signature of its own epitaph (prosopopeia)

p. 27 de Man: prosopon poiein, to confer a mask or face, “prosopopoeia is the trope of autobiography…by which one’s name…is made memorable as a face” > (dis)figuration

pp. 55-56 Paul de Man translates Hegel’s “Ich kann nicht sagen was ich (nur) meine” as ‘I cannot say I’ > effacing of I, a priori functional forgetting > “Autobiography as De-facement”

A p. 2 whenever someone speaks of someone else, cites or praises him or her, one must hear: this is the story of my life [re: Diderot accusing Seneca, pardoning Seneca, asking for pardon himself]

WM pp. 254-55 [re: Idea in Plato, Hegel] Derrida critiques model of systematic structures perfectly closed over their technical/synchronic manipulation (bodies of work identified acc. “proper name" of signature)

OTO pp. 4-5 discourse on life/death occurs btwn logos and gramme, analogy & program, program & reproduction (since life is on the line, the trait [splitting of line] relating graphical to logical, also working btwn biological & biographical, thanatological & thanatographical)

p. 5 biographical novels of a philosopher don’t analyze signature & proper name (the demands of a text), the dynamis of the borderline btwn “work” & “life”

p. 6 painfully difficult for life to become object of science, would require a philosophy of life, a whole politics, which inscribes the bio-graphical w/in the bio-logical

pp. 8-9 F.N. already a pseudonym, be immeasurably wary when we think we’re reading Nietzsche’s signature or “autograph”

——Nietzsche never knows if anyone will honor the inordinate credit he grants himself in his name, & in the name of the other; autobiography as secret contract (annulus), encrypted credit account: for Nietzsche, his life, the “I-live,” is perhaps mere prejudice (Vorurteil)

——autobiography: life he lives and tells to himself

pp. 12-3 autobiographical récit, tells himself his life, affirms EROS, gratitude for gift (gift: establishment of my own credit w/ this name): EROS signs or seals > before such signature, my life may be mere prejudice

p. 19 autobiography’s signature written in step not beyond, Nietzsche’s one foot beyond life: differance, allo-, thanatography of autobiography

ATIA p. 6 Sarah Kofman’s Autobiogriffures sits vigil over conference

p. 21 autobiography (before the fall), confession (after the fall); autobiography becomes confession when it cannot separate itself from a fault, ill, evil (a debt that needs to be paid off); to pay off truth [but we name animals before the fall, is that possible?]

——why would we owe truth anything? the debt of autobiography: confession > after the fall, must already conceive lying as evil, as hiding truth

p. 24 history, historicity, historicality, all part of auto-biography, auto-definition, auto-situation of man [re: Derrida’s hesitation to claim there’s been a historical turning point in relation btwn man and animal, figure of turning pout too genetic, biological, zoological]

p. 31 anthropo-centric subjectivity speaks only from one edge of Man/Animal limit, gives autobiography, history of its life, that it therefore calls History

p. 34 Derrida introduces what will be his zootobiography, zoo-auto-bio-bibilio-graphy, not the otobiography you can find in Nietzsche [will indulge before discussing history of “I am”]

p. 40 [quoting PP] contours of anthropos determined by zoopharmaceutical ambivalence [re: the demonic as bestiary] > Socrates is compared to gadfly, his pharmakon like torpedo fish, but he’s still an “autobiographic animal”

pp. 47-8 Bellerophon’s modesty, shame before the immodest women saves the city, this immunizing drive, Heidegger’s Verhaltenheit, restraint, is the origin of the religious, of the immune, sacred (heilig), holy, separate (kadosh) [it also can be perverted: auto-immunity; virtual, analogical relation btwn auto-biography & auto-immunity]

***——autobiography, writing of self as living, trace of the living for itself, auto-affection or auto-infection as memory/archive of living, an immunization, making holy, virginal, indemnify; every autos, ipseity, threatened w/ auto-immunity, the poison of the auto-biography