2 TIMES

SPOM pp. 109-10 why is Derrida so late to Marx? he believes in political virtue of contretemps

p. 204 ghost is there [re: de-limitation of critique] in the opening of the promise, before its first apparition, from the first it will have come second, deux fois à la fois, itérabilité originaire, virtualité irréductible de cet espace et de ce temps

POO p. 132n Poe [Purloined Letter] tells the secret twice, w/out same secret being penetrated, matter of trace, secret can be announced w/out being revealed or secret is manifest but still in need of translation

POOF p. 1 contretemps, 2x, plus dun, 2 moments at the same time [my friends, no friend]

pp. 14-5 time of surviving (btwn mourning & its possibility) gives itself in withdrawal, self-delivers, self-effaces 2x—constancy & beginning again: indefinite repetition of inaugural moment, keeps memory & anticipates > contre-jour of this contretemps, condition/possibility of friendship

pp. 16-7 hexis, contretemporal habitus: yoke-effect (leffet de joug), binds 2x in same time: duration & omnitemporality, marks/hides in masking—another name for psukhé > hexis insufficient for friendship, remains a simulacrum

——analogy btwn spirit (nous) & animal body inscribes in living body habitus of this contretemps

p. 24 terrible but so just law of contretemps

pp. 172-73 difference btwn talking to them [o my friends/enemies] & speaking of them [there are no friends/enemies]: world of difference, fort/da, record their absence after having called

the contretemps [appealing to other presupposes his presence, allows him to come, while distancing/retarding his arrival] dictates, as insane as it is inevitable, the teleiopoetic sentence > expectation of Messiah as unbearable terror: hatred of what is thus awaited?

p. 250 temporal torsion [O my friend, no friend, contretemps], dissymmetry envelops theoretical knowledge in performativity of prayer it could never exhaust, we return to question of the response

BL p. 212 from title to incipit [re: Vor dem Gesetz], 2 moments, repetition, the same > dividing of letter, “it [the repetition itself] splits the boundary by dividing its line”

A p. 65 death, impossible simultaneity (where one and the other arrive together), contretemps

PAS PAS p. (86) intempestive (untimely), that which we are least prepared to follow

p. (106) you want to lose your name, and w/ tout autre calculus, you don’t want to get out of it

PPHS p. 71 when Being is presence, sign can only be a transition, lieu de passage, (provisional) bridge btwn 2 moments of full presence, the bridge can be relevé

DS pp. 191-92 never has anteriority of 1st (simple) over 2nd (double) been displaced by a metaphysical system, double de-presents, il le multiplie par suite, le double vient après le simple, the flesh & blood, limage survient à la réalité > this is ontology

——priority of art over nature still privileges order 1 then 2, the preference, the precedence (pré-séance) of the imitated

p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text, yet desire for reappropriation, structural site of theological trap, is produced, nourished, in very act of separating from it

——mark (same word as margin or marche): word and blank between words > marked twice

p. 277 difference is the necessary interval, suspense btwn 2 outcomes, “lapse of time” btwn 2 shots, rolls, chances > a game of chance forever new, a play of fire forever young > fire & games (via Nietzsche, Heraclitus), play of luck w/ necessity: a hymen btwn chance & rule

ROP pp. 101-02 for Foucault, psychoanalysis oscillates on both sides of dividing line, in two places, two times, at same time (but he does not think these two times w/ structural possibility of event)

p. 109 untimeliness always disturbs the contemporary who reassures him/herself in a “we” > this “we,” our “we,” is not its own contemporary

ATIA p. 5 contretemps of 2 nudities w/out nudity: 1) animal in non-nudity because nude 2) man in nudity so no longer nude

SW pp. 315-16(n) [re: Exodus 26:31] there are 2 veils/curtains btwn [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle & [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle of tabernacles [of holies/of sanctuaries] > 1st embroidered by artist, 2nd merely the work of a carpenter

pp. 343-44 bookmark the fringes, they served once to accomplish a commandment, may another be accomplished w/ them [Kitsour…] > that’s what I’m doing, à contretemps, et signe et livre et date

DPi pp. 55-6 contretemps of “too soon,” “too late” — essential anachronism of DP

RM p. 59 WM marks itself off from making death or dead metaphor its watchword (mot dordre) [Ricouer’s accusation] by saying there’re 2 deaths/self-destructions of metaphor > 2 deaths means problem of death is infinitely complicated

PJP p. 173 davoir perjuré en jurant: 2 moments of perjury envelop each other; was the promise not to lie, the swearing, truthful?

——the 2 moments are rigorously distinct & strangely indiscernible: difference of times inscribed under law, contract, this law is the Law itself (annuls the difference, sublates into fidelity of oath)

——ultimate resource/fatality of the anacoluthon: multiplicity of times, instants, interruption time inscribes in “me” > the perjurer can always ask to be excused

D p. 330 two is no more an accident of one than one is a secondary surplus of zero (or vice versa): reconsider notion of accident, secondariness, surplus

ATM pp. 156-60 Levinas’ 2 instances of “en ce moment même,le même moment: one belongs to the dialectic, the other has an infinite advance on the 1st, differs/defers it, and yet it is the same

p. 162 no tear (déchirure) possible in Levinas’ text w/out a certain notching (échancrure) of the 2nd moment, and certain contamination btwn the 2 > he likes the tear he detests contamination

AD pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (lentretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech

OG p. 255 (360) impossible to describe continuity, passage, from inarticulate to articulate, pure nature to culture, plenitude to play of supplementarity > Rousseau attempts to reconcile (concilier) the 2 times after describing the birth, the being-born, of supplement

ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY

FWT p. 70 “no doubt it will always be necessary to kill animals, and probably humans too, even after the universal abolition of the death penalty”

p. 89 Schmitt’s “partisan war” equivocates, poisons, borders of abolition of DP, which are limited to national penal law

p. 142 abolitionism [of DP’s paradoxical transcendentalism] must attempt history of blood w/in history of concept of exception, and a history of cruelty [not all cruelty is bloody, i.e. grausam]

DPi p. 30 literature (past 3/4 centuries) coincides w/ abolitionist thought > risky hypothesis

p. 48 w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

p. 75 abolitionism: Christian force, or, like Camus says, atheist humansim?

p. 76 only/always by limiting sovereignty of states will DP be put in question

p. 79 U.S. (& China) will come under more pressure to end DP [?]; p. 80 apparent teleology of abolition movement seems to tend toward international criminal court (to which states consent to abandon sovereignty) > long way off

p. 82(n) abolitionism is fragile/deconstructible when it maintains the right to kill in war

p. 100 Hugo (on French Revolution): once there’s peace, no more DP > Hugo: “inviolability of human life” > [Hugo aware of rhetoric of address, of apostrophe]

p. 102 Hugo (conscious of historical responsibility of writer/literature): writers of 18th century destroyed torture; writers of 19th century will destroy DP; p. 104 destroy it w/ divine hammer of pen > profoundly Christian stance, btwn profound flourish & faith, for intérieur

p. 105-06 for Hugo, responsibility, sacred right of writer—cosmopolitical

——writer’s right a right that gives the right to go beyond rights, “civil disobedience”; for Hugo, DP too human, abolition is divine law

p. 120 for Hugo, inviolability of human life—an inalienable property > right of property over one’s own life no less sacred than patrimonial right of family (domicile as right of property)

pp. 121-22 for Huge, abolition of DP as a virile man’s task > a revolutionary Christian theodicy

pp. 128-29 split in Christianity both in fervor for (Kantian human dignity) & against DP [flowers of evil?]

pp. 129-30 abolitionists as eternalists fearing death, full of guilt [suspicion of a Nietzschean/Baudelairean cast], the evil of finitude, fallible finitude > for Baudelaire, these fearful men confess w/symptom of their abolitionism, an infinite protest against mortality

——for Kant, life for life’s sake is unworthy of human dignity, failure to inscribe death in law, return to animal (feminine)

p. 132 Baudelaire: “abolishers of the death penalty—very interested parties no doubt”

p. 133 for Kant, DP inscribed in law (categorical imperative of penal law) in name of absolute, endless disinterestedness (is this a reactive moment of resentment?)

——DP defenders & abolitionists: war of resentment?

p. 133 Derrida disagrees w/ Baudelaire’s take on abolitionists, but feels his suspicion is indefinitely necessary re: hypocrisy & symptomal ruses that agitates/animates defenders of just causes

p. 140 how can abolitionism relate itself to a faith grounded on the example of a death sentence [Christianity]?

p. 141 both abolitionists & Kant speak of price, value, dignity above Marketpries > for Kant, jus talionis is pure equivalence not revenge, impersonal principle of reparative justice

p. 160 following Freud & Nietzsche, since originary sadistic cruelty has no contrary, surpassing cruelty w/ apparent non-cruelty would merely be a surpassing in cruelty > isn’t Beccaria’s proposal more cruel than Kant’s?

p. 184 Hugo: “shoot a woman?”

p. 187 Hugo: “but one sublime hour to erase all the terrible hours” [Derrida’s reading this differently? divine law?]

p. 188 for Hugo, seed of abolition (germe always goes together w/ teleology), abolition will happen, a magnificent advance, advance is credit: make civilization a loan in advance > promise

——spirit of revolution makes an advance to spirit of civilization

pp. 188-9 Hugo: almightiness of logic against DP will end up triumphing

pp. 189 Hugo’s “yes! yes!” of abolition would have to wait until 1981

pp. 190-91 would abolition of DP still be w/in economy of DP?

pp. 191-92 sans sang (U.S., Eucharist—real presence of blood of God): interiorization of blood in noncruel DP > turning point as a return, ce trop ou ce trope of blood

p. 201 DP abolition will be long & interminable (we’re not as naive as Hugo)

p. 201n for Hugo, Christ’s law (blood of Christ, good blood) often confused w/ natural law—Christ’s heart will transform written, positive law > it’ll be spiritualized by gentle law of Christ

p. 202 Hugo’s “inviolability of life” a principle of life that sentences death sentence to death

pp. 207-08 Hugo’s abolitionism: disappearance of social order of past (priest, executioner, king), but order remains, what counts is what remains, the reste, of the turning, of the Christian Aufhebung

Hugo: cross will be substituted for the gallows”

pp. 208-09 the logic of Aufhebungs remainder & fact that Christianity, unlike Judaism/Islam, is also an immanentist humanism (mediation of God made man) > brings Camus’ atheistic abolitionism closest to Hugo’s Christological transcendence

p. 213 gallows erected “on Christendom” was founded on Christendom, betrayed it, put its spirit to death, which must be resurrected

p. 214 Hugo: revolution does not get rid of DP

***p. 249 if killing & suicide are linked to same instinct (banal, equivocal argument), would abolition of DP frustrate society’s promise to kill you when you kill someone else > a diabolical proposition & formidable

pp. 254-55 I [Derrida] am against the DP, I am interested in saving my neck, the life I love: and by “I,” I mean “I,” me, and also whoever says “I” in its place or in mine: ultimate resource of my interest in the end of DP—an interest so originary/primordial, it risks being shared by supporters of DP?

p. 256 go from quasi-tautological opposition of life to death, general preference of life itself, to more specific opposition to DP

——it belongs to life not to be immortal, but also to have a future where instant of death is not calculable

——to be against DP is to be against calculation, calculable decidability of you will die on such and such a day, at such and such an hour > no future w/ anticipation of calculable instant > “my life” must keep a relation to the coming of the other as coming of the to-come (venue de là-venir)

pp. 258-59 phantasm of end of finitude, the other side of an infinitization, is constitutive of finitude outside any real scene of verdict/DP [?] > DP thus an acting out or an effect of truth re: our own dreams of infinite survival assured by a calculated, decisive, interruption: in these dreams we play the role of judge, jury, executioner, assistants, the condemned > force of this phantasm so strong will probably guarantee forever the double survival of DP and abolitionist protest > phantasm one w/ belief in God, as long as there’s God, there’ll be those for/against DP

——terrifying solidarity btwn abolitionism & DP: what then is indemnity? what is condemnation?

***p. 262 Derrida is seeking path outside Christian dialectic of DP & abolitionist protest

p. 265 Beccaria’s human justice, utilitarianism (divine justice is inaccessible to men, only God can put to death): equality & common utility are nature of human justice

pp. 282-83 still be eating flesh in vegetarianism (will eat waiting for Christ, assimilate his blood as commanded, how can one love w/out being tempted to take it w/in oneself: Love & Eucharist), still be DP after abolition, other figures will be found for it

p. 283 nursing no illusion should not prevent us from being militant, this is composure (le sang-froid), courage, militate w/ cool heads (de sang-froid) [Derrida occupying position of the condemned and the abolitionist], grace, passion, love, J.C., as copy or abyss of exemplarity > Derrida doesn’t care if he’s imitating Christ, he wants to save what is left of life

ABORTION

DPi p. 121 “right to life (laissez-les-vivre),” in name of Christ, in name of human life > must interrogate why these militants usually for DP

pp. 124-27 for Kant, maternal infanticide (putting to death child born out of wedlock) & death in duel not punishable by death (former, to save honor of feminine sex)

——put to death child born outside marriage because outside law (ignore annihilation of contraband merchandise, i.e. child out of wedlock)

——for Kant, justice finds itself here in double bind, knot: either honor (Ehrbegriff) is vain or DP should simply be set aside > Die Auflösung dieses Knotens: no more DP when law (CI) & nature align

——no more need to not DP women, they’ll never marry out of wedlock (Derrida adds: extraordinary & stupid uselessness, rigor & absurdity of Kant’s logic)

p. 156 God sentenced Jesus to death for being an illegitimate child (a paternal version of Kant’s infanticide)

DST DST pp. 319-20n delay as inevitable, delay re: one’s “own” birth, experience of “abortion” > a subject that cannot identify itself because ineluctably delayed [Lacan’s human born prematurely]

p. 321n abortive: a brith takes place w/out taking place: event of a singular failure, “comes to itself only to lose itself” [re: Lacoue-Labarthe on Reik’s theory of autobiography]

HST pp. 408-09 substitution, cloning, series; where does human begin? abortion: subject hôte-hostage, clone w/out father?

ABRAHAMIC FAITH

GOD pp. 70-1 Dome of Rock, House of Lord in Jerusalem, place of dispute btwn monotheistic faiths of transcendent God, absolute other; they fight over it w/ fire & blood (now, more than ever)

——interpretations, reading, tradition of Isaac’s sacrifice have become sites of holocaustic sacrifice

——machines of death that wage a war w/ no front

——orders of responsibility in sacrificial war of religions of Book and beyond: ethico-political, theologico-political, secret/public, profane/sacred

p. 125 God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, not the God of philosophers of ontotheology, but one who interrupts & retracts his order

p. 141 Judaic God repents, feels remorse, takes back his commands—i.e. the flood, his gesture resembles a confession, a plea for forgiveness [Christ is constantly taking back?]

FK p. 91 fundamental difference btwn 3 original “great monotheisms”: Islam doesn’t concern itself w/ Levinas’ “God is the future” or Heidegger’s “last god” announcing himself in every absence of future

SPOM pp. 72-3 in the Middle East, war of “appropriation[s] of Jerusalem” [is today the world war] mobilize “the most archaic and most modern spectral forces”

——Middle Eastern violence as unleashing of messianic eschatologies, infinite combinatory of holy alliances

——re: these holy alliances, Marxism remains indispensable and structurally insignificant

HASD pp. 30-1 a negative theology & its ghosts in a tradition neither Christian nor Greek? i.e. what of Jewish, Islamic negative theology? question resonates in internal desert, certain void

p. 53 Jewish, Islamic traditions connect name of God w/ name of place [?]

S p. 111 wouldn’t Jews, Moslem, Christians respond to Heidegger’s retrait, flame and fire-writing in promise? [messianic echoes]

FWT p. 165 Derrida pursues necessity of hyper-atheological discourse, while ceaselessly meditating on Abrahamic culture w/out trying to destroy/disqualify it

ATIA p. 101 beneath its mechanistic indifference, Cartesianism belongs to Judeo-Christian-Islamic sacrificial war against animal

pp. 101-02 anthropocentric sacrificial tradition as Epipromethean-Islamic-Judaic-Christian

HST p. 369 in Massignon’s “The 3 Prayers of Abraham…”, monotheistic religions issued from patriarch who came to earth as “stranger, a hôte, gêr

pp. 370-71 acc. Massignon, Islam looks to Abraham more than Christianity > Islam is most faithful, exemplary heir, of the hospitality of hôte Abraham > Iqrā: right of hospitality

p. 373 Massignon: Abraham’s hospitality as a sign announcing the gathering of all nations

CF pp. 19-20 St. Paul ‘politicized’ primary injunctions of Abrahamic religions: “no longer foreigners nor metic in a foreign land, but fellow-citizens w/ God’s people, members of God’s household” (Ephesians II. 19-20) > cosmopolitanism

pp. 28-9 theater of forgiveness, the singular Abrahamic language becoming universal idiom of law: agent & symptom of internationalism

——act of memory, appearance (comparution) before juridical instant, Nation-State tribunal

BSi p. 313 Abrahamic commencements: 1) Bereshit, Genesis—animals before man 2) en arkhē en o logos, sovereign all-powerful creator of everything, Head, fiat of a logos producing zōē, light, phōs

p. 320 acc. Heidegger, logos becomes Jesus by way of Philo, who attributed to logos function of mediator (mesitēs) > distancing logos from its Greek originarity (what holds contraries together)

pp. 320-21 ten commandments (oi deka logoi), logos as kērux, kērigma, holy proclamation, also logos as angelos, herald, gospel, logos of redemption, logos of eternal life, logos of zōē, i.e. Christ

p. 343 logocentrism: forced hegemony of logos as speech, a “European” operation, logocentrism of Abrahamic languages > everything organized based on forced translations

SPEC pp. 260-61(n) Indra–Varuna (Abraham–Isaac-like) interlace their names w/out revenir sur eux-mêmes (not a ring) > cannot close, so enclose each other > always a [double signature]

ABSOLUTE

OOG p. 149 for Husserl, absolute is passage (historicity as passage of Speech, primordial Logos toward polar Telos)

——every return to the origin, an audacious move toward the origin (circulation, anticipation)

——Husserl’s method: bring [passage] to consciousness, Selbstbesinnung, Verantwortung, avoid risk of inauthenticity, loss of Speech, light

GSP p. 322n Husserl: transcendental ‘Absolute’ is not ultimate, it constitutes itself and has the ultimately, truly absolute as its primeval source (Urquelle)

ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE

***GT p. 7 oikonomia would always follow the path of Ulysses, return home to part chosen, destiny commanded (moira), the being-next-to-self of the Idea in absolute knowledge as odyssean, nostalgia of reappropriation

LOBL p. ~128 in one’s most mournful glory: “turn oneself into a mouthful,” swallow oneself so as to be close to oneself, absolute knowledge [this is from GLAS]

SPOM p. 44 ends of philosophy, Blanchot: accomplishment of absolute knowledge, its theoretical suppression linked to its practical realization, the nihilist movement in which all values are engulfed, culmination of metaphysics as precursor sign of something else

HERP p. 165 Heidegger’s carry the friend bei sich (with oneself) same expression used by Hegel for the concept remaining (bleibende) bei sich in absolute knowledge

EM p. 121 (144) nous: assures proximity to itself of central being for which circular reappropriation is produced; nous: unity of absolute knowledge and anthropology, God & man, of onto-theo-teleology and humanism

——“lêtreet la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et lhumanisme

VM p. 316n “alterity, difference, and time are not suppressed but retained by absolute knowledge in the form of the Aufhebung

PP pp. 107-08 (122-23) on eve of Platonism, morning after Hegelianism, we cannot “overturn (renversées)” or “reject” philosophia, epistēmē in name of writing, we can displace, we can “mime absolute knowledge” > what philosophy would call simulacrum

***VP p. 87 w/in the metaphysics of presence, we believe in absolute knowledge as closure or the end of history, it has taken place, consciousness of self in infinity of parousia, this history’s closed

p. 88 what “begins” “beyond” absolute knowledge: unheard-of thoughts, sought across the memory of old signs [Derrida writes sa clôture, cf. GLAS]

T p. xxv how to put one’s hands on tympanum so it can escape from hands of philosopher, so he can no longer recognize his phallogocentrism [play w/ mains, maintenant, maintain], no longer rediscover himself, no longer able to say: I will have anticipated it w/ absolute knowledge

DS p. 219n Hegel: curtain hanging before inner-world is drawn away, go behind it ourselves to see [curtain-raising of philosophical we, subject of absolute knowing]

ATIA pp. 146-47 Heidegger: Descartes’ desire to make philosophy an absolute science is in the spirit of absolute knowledge [but Heidegger remains Cartesian]

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

——point of ontotheological fusion reduces precipitation & after-affect (dehiscence btwn vouloir-dire & writing, anticipation & recapitulation) to sublatables [mouvement de tête]

p. 54 if one is captive to formulas and absolute knowledge, can’t think anything outside the whole, not even its mimetic double

——if we can question and think about formula of absolute knowledge, the “part” then is bigger than the whole, strange subtraction of a remark, dissemination would then constitute the whole as a totality-effect

WAP p. 64-5 working w/ Bourdieu’s idea of objectification, Derrida sees an infinite task: “objectifiable” is not objectifiable: always exceeds scene of visibility

——achievement of “complete objectification” would ensure sociology’s absolute hegemony, i.e. absolute knowledge

SW p. 317 absolute knowledge will not accept that there will be nothing behind the curtain (in the veiled place of le tout autre: nothing that is in the present)

pp. 353-54 absolute knowledge not man’s thing but that of sericulture [?] > silkworm comes back to itself in its odyssey, wraps itself in its own shroud, kind of absolute knowledge: beyond any coupling, any sexual difference or rather duality of the sexes > [Derrida’s bestiary starting up]

DPi p. 226 in absolute knowledge time is Tilgen not Aufheben (not merely sublated but suppressed)

RGE p. 275 Aufhebung: produced entirely w/in system/work of signification, from one infinite determination to the next, each one conserved in the other, transitions produced by anxiety of infinity—included w/in circle of absolute knowledge, never suspends totality of discourse (work, meaning, law), never exceeds its closure > restricted economy, circulation of prohibitions: history as truth of prohibitions

pp. 275-76 [vis-à-vis Bataille’s paradigmatic displacement, never done before: Derrida’s simili-transcendental] “we” of absolute knowledge, vulgar & natural, naive consciousness: encloses itself in circle in order to know sense, where it comes from and where it is going to

HLP p. 41 absolute lie [Arendt] still supposes absolute knowledge

+R p. 179 ça (quoi?) aura/marché

LI p. 110n ça, sa, Id, savoir absolu, sign of Saussurean signifier, s.a. (speech act), sa (feminine pronoun)

TN p. 145 Merleau-Ponty: “absolute knowledge is not detachment, it is inherence,” “intuition is definitely not simply coincidence or fusion any more, it is extended to ‘limits’”; p. 343n M-P, acc. Derrida, still coincides—even w/ a “non-coincidence”

BSi p. 148 if bêtise not an error (bad judgment) but hebetated (dulled) judgment, aptitude for wrong judgment, it could be there in absolute knowledge [stupidity of encyclopedic knowledge]

p. 159 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] bêtise of hunting bêtise, seeing only bêtise; absolute knowledge as very element of becoming-bête, as sovereignly bête

pp. 173-74 Ronell: philosophy & stupidity, nothing more stupid than Hegel’s absolute knowledge

p. 278 don’t we need to know what knowledge is absolutely before we know absolute knowledge?

p. 288 as soon as there is absolute knowledge, everything prescribed for Sun King as a program [the king, the historian, the reader—who isn’t manipulated by history like a marionette?]

OG p. 26 (41) absolute knowledge effaces writing in logos, it is the retrieval (résumption) of trace in parousia, the metaphysics of the proper, reappropriation of difference

——though [eschatological] Hegel reappropriates trace in absolute knowledge, he is also the thinker of irreducible difference, last writer of book, first of writing > reintroduced necessity of written trace in philosophy, rehabilitated thought as the memory productive of signs

p. 286 (405) Hegel’s (folly) formula must be taken à la lettre: history is nothing but the history of philosophy, absolute knowledge is fulfilled (accompli) > what exceeds this closure is nothing, neither presence of being, nor meaning, history, philosophy—but [this nothing, writing] announces itself w/in thought of this closure, a place in the text which philosophy does not command

ATAP p. 91 [quoted from GLAS p. 198 (222)] absolute knowledge as phantasm of absolute self-having (savoir absolu), to be(come) (être-devenir), in a word, bander (bind, bandage, hard-on), son propre mors [Nietzsche’s “become hard”] [cf. CIN pp. 56-8 swallow another to speak his/her commands]

ABSOLUTE PAST

KH p. 116 [re: a logic of living memory in Timaeus] effacement (of secondary impressions) would be the figure for the middle (mil-lieu), both for space and time, would not affect originary impression (that of child), ineffaceable once engraved in virgin wax

***——what about a virgin wax that is always virgin, always older, preceding any possible impression, and thus younger, achronic, anachronistic [cf. SW pp. 322-23]

MONL p. 61 translate memory of what was forbidden, did not take place, left a trace, mark, scar

p. 62 political decision in writing & reading: inscribe undecidable (chance, terror) in ipseity of host, avoid temptation to make prior-to-the-first-language a language of the master (new master)

p. 64 prosthesis of origin: prior-to-the-first time of pre-originary language must be invented

p. 65 entirely other prior-to-the-first language, zone outside law, degree zero-minus-one of writing, leaves a phantomatical map

R p. 84 eventfulness of the to-come exceeds the performative, my ipseity, unforseeable coming of the other (greater & older than I am), heteronomy, responsibility and decision of the other (greater and older than I am)

SPOM p. 25 is a day infinitely foreign to vengeance [w/out it], heterogeneous at its source, to come or more ancient than memory itself? impossible to decide, today: “the time is out of joint”

pp. 30-33 [via Heidegger on dikē, on gift w/out debt] heterogeneity of pre—, absolute precedence rendered to singularity of other, irreducible possibility of Un-Fug, anachronic disjointure, what comes before me, as in, comes from the future: the very coming of the event

POOF pp. 37-8 the to-come disjoins itself, disjoins the self that would yet join itself in this disjunction > to-come more ‘ancient,’ ‘older,’ than the present

p. 65 future is not just the new, but the work of the arch-ancient, repetition

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

p. 287 Nietzsche’s Superman: awaited because he is origin/cause of man, Ursache, this friend promised via messianico-teleiopeotic perhaps, immemorially past > this friendship to come would still be too human, still deserves name ‘friendship’ [anthropological, humanist character of friendship is situated/delimited here, friendship of proximity/presence]

***MPM p. 19 de Man’s affirmation of memory, an alliance or ring more ancient, secret, resistant than familial or strategic alliances it makes possible, but is never reduced to

p. 37 allegorical metonymy—where part stand for whole and for more than whole it exceeds

——parts of memory [traces] that seem greater & older than us, pregnant w/ other: manifests in open but nocturnal space of agora, plus de lumière [Nietzsche’s not bright but open horizon]

——no choice but to let other speak, cannot make other speak w/out other having already spoken > in trace, part greater/less than whole

p. 58 for de Man, memory of traces of a past never present, which always remain to come—from the future, this promise of resurrection of anterior past, is a formal element, place where fictions & figures are elaborated

***pp. 61-2 de Man: memory of present is “a forgetting or a suppression of anteriority,” “memory effaces remembrance”

p. 66 promise of the other (for the future, trace of the future) made to the other as an absolute past, the other’s sur-vival exceeds the “we” of a common present: brings together two friends, “incredible scene of memory,” written in absolute past; dictates madness of amnesic fidelity, forgetful hypermnesia, gravest and lightest

p. 85 “even if this memory of prefiguration were possible, we know that it would offer no ‘anteriority’ that was not fictive or figural; it could only ‘suppress’ or ‘forget’ it”

p. 95 singular aporia that divides the act, can’t be mastered, commits us before any active commitment on our part, impossibility of promise, uncontrollable > faktum, “older”

——no act before speech, no speech before act > there is this not natural “fact,” faktum, to which we’re recalled: already there, past never present, historicity itself, “ancientness” w/out history

p. 137 there is no beyond-the-undecidable, remains to be thought, incalculable order of tout autre, there is no inside-the-undecidable, but an other (singular) memory calls us w/out leading us back to any anteriority > there never existed an older, more original “third term”

p. 140 memory w/out anteriority, w/out origin, cannot become a Heideggerian theme

A p. 34 absolute arrivant, no more commands than commanded by memory of originary event where archaic is bound to final extremity (telos, eskhaton)

VM p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

p. 82 can the other of the Greek be named non-Greek? pensée pour laquelle le tout du logos grec est déjà survenu (erupted), humus apaisé non pas sur un sol, mais autour dun volcan plus anicen

VP pp. 88-9 could differance (supplement, sign, writing, trace) be more ancient than the originary?

PAS PAS p. (28) “Viens” upsurges (surgit) from a groundless ground (fond sans fond) of an indefinite past

pp. (67-8) “terrifyingly ancient” time, absolute crypt, requires the récit (reciting, it can be a matter of nothing but that), ce récit [of viens], neither relation to the event nor event itself > pas dévénement, pas de concept

p. (79) “from an earlier time (autrefois)” not a date, not past of an event, it’s the structure of a relation to it, the word, the moment

S p. 83 what is later, the latest, can be close to the origin, or return to origin earlier than beginning

pp. 91-2 Derrida uses revenant to describe a Heideggerian passage on Trakl in spite of the metaphysical negativity Heidegger might reject in it: re-venir as the idea of an end before a beginning, originary essence of time kept under veil, guarded in its archi-origin > we are still prisoners of Aristotelian representation of time

p. 130n before the word is the wordless word “yes,” a pre-originary pledge that precedes any engagement in language and action > no erasure is possible for such a pledge (memory before any souvenir), where faith defeats any narrative, la gage engage dans la langue

FWT pp. 4-5 contradictory/uncomfortable double injunction: mad for absolute past, past whose (im)measure that of bottomless memory, while dreading nostalgia, fixation, cult of remembrance: nothing seems desirable save in this injunction > leave life in life & make it live again [this “heir]

DS p. 200 mimodrama is described as anamnesis by Mallarmé, but in reference to a past never present

P p. 113 acc. Kant, pleasure of knowing (which once existed in a time immemorial [absolute past in a Critique?]), a pleasure of the same—mastery of dissimilar, reduction of heterogenous

OS p. 67 differance as a difference older than Being itself, a still more unthought difference than difference of Being/beings > leads to a writing that exceeds all dialectics, w/out history, cause, absence, presence, archia, telos

ATIA p. 24 we’ll have to move continuously along the coming & going btwn the oldest & what is coming > the “again (de nouveau)” and “anew (à nouveau)” of repetition

PS p. 174 approaching archaic, tumultuous ground through a “negative” route, historical in a sense never given thematic value > can’t be tolerated by metaphysical concept of history

FS p. 14 [for deconstruction] history of the work is not only its past, it is the impossibility of the text ever being present > legitimating intention keeps to internal truth, avoids thinking a subjective origin that is not simply psychological/mental

DIF DIF p. 21 Levinas’ trace, enigma of absolute alterity (a past never present), solicits domination of beings (w/in these limits, differance implies Levinas’ entire critique of classical ontology)

p. 22 differance (is) older than ontological difference: outside epochality of Being (outside epoch): no depth to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put to play

SW p. 319 was it even to Christ my poor old incorrigible Augustine finally addressed: “you were w/ me, I was not w/ you, beauty so ancient and new” > or because it is already late?

pp. 322-23 I am so fatigued from knowing truth, that history of the veil—that truth: too old for me, too old like me (however young I remain) > you don’t know the “fatigue” I’m talking about (dreaming of writing in Spanish, forgotten ancestral language)

——infinite weariness of tropes, what do you expect, I want to end it all (protest, attestation, testament, manifesto against the shroud) > no longer write around/in/under folds of truth

p. 324(n) Derrida knows too well how to do the history of veils > there’s the fault: “commencerà bien faire” (TN. “begin to do too well” or “it’s getting to be too much”); tiresome, tireless, tired out history I’m leaving behind me, running after me

——epuisement recalls the water & the well (le puits) of truth, back to the pit, the hole (puteus)

——has Derrida left no one the right to say the veil has something to hide? that it will suffice to have done w/ veil to access Thing itself (Cause safe & intact)?

pp. 327-28 Derrida’s completely white then yellow tallith; Derrida ought to have pretended to dictate this decision (to have been chosen for choice of white tallith), but verdict is aways of the other: “it is forbidden to be old” [only your fringes are old?]

p. 329 “I’d like to be done w/ mourning [for the veil]…perhaps [H.C.] already succeeded in that”

***p. 331 “immobile archaism of the fantasy [Oedipus?] can outplay w/ its infinite anachronism all the lasers in the world”: (the unconscious) resists translation “in an age of technoscience,” never disarms, nor should we ever > more powerful than technical all-powerfulness

p. 349 signature (operation of poetic writing) must not be absolutely invulnerable: an “I” signs in the place of the wound (the other operates on us w/out knowing)—so virtual that it remains > bears bereaved memory of an unrefusable lesion > seems older than self: you may have forgotten it, but it carries on dictating all the blows of fate (as if we desired even the worst of them)

pp. 353-54 Celan: “Aschenglorie (…) grub ich mich in dich und in dich > [I in you—love itself] love made itself make love next to watching dreaming child [too old, forbidden to be old, still young]

***pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

REST pp. 329-30 affect of Van Gogh’s painting: army of ghosts demanding their shoes, bottomless memory of a dispossession

DST DST pp. 204 fidelity to the ineluctable, this terrifying form, the already there before me, that which lends itself to all figures and schemas; could there be fidelity w/out the faith called for in this dissymmetry [Levinas]?

——fidelity to the very thing that you who besiege me (qui massiégez si nécessairement) couldn’t, did not, avoid (est-ce que cela revient au même?)

PIO pp. 16-7 de Man: unreachable anteriority of allegory, allegory & irony [?], their inauthenticity, distance from totality > they are linked in temporal predicament, the same temporal void

PF p. xxxii concept w/out concept of resistance, brought in line (after twists/turns) w/ desistance, especially restance (restance in Glas: being “nothing,” w/out substance, upsets ontological question “What is it?”—older than distinction btwn “who” and “what”)

TR p. 146 “I beseech you” not to “annihilate” [re: Confessions]: performative eve, arche-peformative before performative, younger & older, support & archive of confession, its subjectile

EJQB p. 71 language is the rupture w/ totality itself (there is an essential lapse, not the nocturnal memory of all language) [letter is the separation/limit]

PSSS p. 252 pleasure/reality principle—same in differance > cruelty drive more ancient than principles?

p. 270 cruel mutation of cruelty: a technical, scientific, juridical, economic, ethical, political, and terrorist policing mutation of our age

——must think a mutation of cruelty, more pscyhoanlaytico; new historical figures of an ageless cruelty, older than man

——think limit/horizon of psychoanalysis (yet to be thought)

p. 280 cruelty there will have been, cruelty before any personal figure, before “cruelty” is an attribute—no one’s fault

D p. 307 opening of presence, “dead surface,” 4th surface, plunged by its “history” into limitless time that is neither “present” nor a “history”

p. 308 double bottom, “theaters of memory,” deprives square of ground (suspended in air)

p. 309 such future perfect makes one text circulate in another, excludes eschatology > future perfect of innumerable imperfect, indefinite past that will never have been present

p. 311 “we,” nonpersonal, limitless, imperfect: I, you, he cut out of a “we” never presented full face (de face)

p. 314 not enough to make air itself appear (call presence to mind), “air” is not a simple medium: opening carved out of it is a closed opening, false exit: a mirror—not any mirror, the tain of…

——once ether (presence of present) has been called to mind: plupresent not merely presence but deformation irreducible to any form (presence, first matter in the last instance)

pp. 324-25 le discurs dassistance, pluperfect, deconstructs “illusion” of present, unites presence & auxiliary, supports [Plato’s boetheia] ekgonos (dispossessed son), a seed exposed to all violence of writing: you [baby daddy]

p. 326 “I”: passing passageway for permutation, repercussive percussion, full force of writing > dun coup, triggers (déclenche) tale & keeps (maintient) it in progress

——simulacrum as a force, le simulacre de lassistance: chambre obscure: feigns to transform the imperfect into present: impossible > et vous entraîne dans un nouveau vertige

p. 329 imperfect, certain aorist, certain unlimitedness, “unreachable double bottom (double-fond insaisissable)”: past of an anterior future, future of an anterior past

p. 334 cited text, prior past still to come

p. 339 already plunged by imperfect into already opened thickness of another text [chiasmatic invagination of borders?]

p. 346 apeiron (the boundless, the aorist, the imperfect)

p. 365 the unique (that which is not repeated—thus, has no unity), the inummerable, call it the present, is thus apeiron, the unlimited, the crowd, the imperfect

HST p. 407 all poetical declarations of love as sickness of the other? > an other always more ancient and more to come than me, as if I carry w/in me the mourning of me carried by the other

C p. 188 little princeps coffin has no relationship w/ family > and yet, in secret, in an immemorial past that was never present, he engendered this family

p. 195 paradigm most often designates an artificial model that already proceeds from a technē: artifact constructed in the past anterior > fac-simile origin of future anterior of model

TN pp. 96-8 periodization: no cutting, indivisible limit, no simple instant or agency btwn a before and an after (impossible to prove): to find the premises of aftereffects it suffices to sharpen (daiguiser) one’s reading [there’s a past from before the markable beginning]

ATM pp. 175-76 the future anteriority of Levinas’ seriasure [each interruption will be knotted w/ another] is an eschatology w/out [beyond/otherwise than] philosophical teleology, appealing to a past anterior to any past; this future anteriority is irreducible to ontology or Hegelian teleology [in spite of irreducible resemblance]

pp. 189-90 WE NEED A NEW BODY, UN AUTRE SANS PLUS DE JALOUSIE, THE MOST ANCIENT STILL (ENCORE) TO COME

E E p. 8 for Kant, science is not art, has no beauty in it, because no pleasure can be taken in it

——yet, in his Introduction, he claims that in an immemorial past, pleasure could not be separated from knowledge, so the Witz (bon mot), the only scientific pleasure, carries this repressed past in it

AD AD p. 69 absolute past: “word of God” —will have taken place before taking place, older than Sinai—truth of messianic exceeds national identity; p. 142n absolute “lateness”: older yes

p. 143n w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God

> à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

p. 103 Levinas: à-Dieu is infinitely older than finite, diachrony of time “being destined” before any act of consciousness, destined as devotion itself, desire refers to à-Dieu, which is more profound, older than cogito

pp. 115-16 ethics enjoins a politics & a law, formal injunction, urgent, does not wait and still interminable (it calculates limitless past & future)

p. 148n Levinas: responsibility w/out concern for reciprocity—commitment from ‘profound past’ of immemorial

OG pp. 66-7 (97) that the “imprint” is irreducible means speech is passive in relation to an absolute past that can never be fully mastered, brought to presence > this passivity of speech is also a relation to the future, but not via anticipation [which would be a mastering of passivity]

p. 70 trace, arche-phenomenon of “memory,” prior to oppositions nature/culture, animal/humanity [Levinas, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud]

EU p. 83 response: initial form & minimal requirement of responsibility > structure of call to responsibility so anterior to any positive response—nonresponse a priori assumes responsibility

SPEC pp. 317-18 death drive, w/out contradicting PP, hollows it out, older, not an other mastery (Herrschaft), but other than master, tout autre (not dialectically opposed to PP as life, living, alive)

p. 350 [re: trauma dreams] exception to law that dream fulfills a wish, exception precedes law, doesn’t contradict it, something older than law w/in law: band over contra-band, or contra-band over a-band, disband, over absolute astricture

CHOR p. 106 questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

ABYSS

KH pp. 103-04 khōra as abyss, mise en abyme, gaping hole, not exactly chaos or fright, but not Gaia, foundation, either > abyss in encyclopedic logic [of Timaeus], regulates all sites (lieux) on its edges (jobs in society, region, territory, country)

p. 148n Heidegger: chaos, khaos, khaine, signifies the yawning, a split in two, close connection to aletheia, abyss which opens

——for Nietzsche, Chaos prevents a humanization (Vermenschung) of existence in its totality

p. 104 mise en abyme of discourse on khōra, site of politics, politics of sites; and other that would not be their other [Hegel’s other]

p. 106 Derrida less concerned w/ art of Plato [re: mises en abyme of khōra and politics] but in a constraint, a programme, the being-programme of the programme, the being-logical of logic: Plato apprehends them as such, though in a dream, put en abyme

p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

——is Socrates someone, something, play of proper names more abyssal than ever, “who are you, Khōra?

p. 112 en abyme reflected w/out limit, feeling of dizziness, up against inside face of what wall: chaos, chasm, khōra

p. 113 abyss of khōra doesn’t open all at once, fracture of abyss announced in muted, subterranean way, preparing, propagating simulacra & mises en abymes

***p. 119 btwn text & theme, structure w/out an indivisible origin > theater of irony, w/out end, w/out bottom [abyss]; to isolate a theme, “philosophy-of-Plato,” would be to violently misrecognize, deny textual scene, questions of topology in general

GOD p. 6 European history gets lost in details, doesn’t think abyss at heart of history that prevents totalization, misunderstands link btwn historicity & responsibility

p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (loeuvre)

GT p. 98 “another border already divided itself in indefinite abyssal supplements”

pp. 170-71 Icarus racing toward sun [via Baudelaire], sinking (sombre) not toward the bottom (fond) but toward abyss; unable to give his name, how could he ever claim he knows how to give? has no sepulture thus no proper name > the whole story? all of history?

AF p. 70 indetermination en abyme when Yerushalmi in-determines Jewishness & science one by the other

POO p. 7 duplicity in a ceremony, being-double, “hollows itself out in an infinite abyss:” one is neither friendly nor polite if one obeys the rules

p. 8 the duplicity before the rule makes one tremble, an other who will seek to hold you back or push you into void, save you or lose you, supposing there ever a choice?

SPOM p. 33 good conscience loses chance of abyssal desert, “desert in desert,” chaotic desert as open mouth, coming of other (messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy) [see p. 209]

POR p. 9 (137) abyss, hole, Abgrund, empty “gorge”: impossibility for a principle of grounding (reason) to ground itself

p. 17 (150) strategic rhythm of new [professorial?] responsibility: multiple sites (lieux), rhythm of blinking eye (dun battement de paupières), play one risk off other, la clôture contre labîme, labîme contre la clôture [hard eye (of reason) has no rhythm, no heart beat, no arrêt of sur-vie]

MPM pp. 10-1 if memory maneuvers btwn law and Being, can one think the being and law of memory? these questions move through transference & translation, above abyss; require impossible passageways: “the fragile resistance of a span” [hymen?]

POOF pp. 143-44 [Schmitt has just led us to the abyss of the partisan] Derrida feigns restraint, one can only speak of the abyss from the shore, then he screams, swallows all assurance, voiceless talk of politics: Rwanda, Italy, ex-Yugoslavia, Palestine, Cambodia, Ukraine, the ‘Clipper’ chip…

p. 281 Nietzsche’s hermit too attracted to the depths, nostalgic for elevation—dreams of a friend to gain altitude > friend’s nostalgia: wish to believe in other, wishing in vain to believe in ourselves > Derrida links this nostalgia to the Heideggerian nostalgia at origin of philosophical philía: elle nourrit [fires?] donc lenvie à légard de lautre comme de nous-mêmes, we envy each other, love as the attempt to leap beyond this envy

A p. 30 abyssal inquiry re: Heidegger’s delimitation of death, modes of ending, more than one limit, ends of man an indestructable (increvable) subject > death of Dasein not end of man, btwn the 2 there’s a divisible limit, perhaps, of ending, place where ending ends [?]

EM p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (lespace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being), “an alternative always suspended over its ‘own proper’ abysm”: it is the text of dissemination

SEC p. 325 general possibility of “parasite”: 1) trap (piège), failure (échec), abyss outside/in front of language, ditch (fossé), place of external perdition, which language can avoid, sheltered by (à labri de) its essence or telos? 2) or is this risk, internal and positive condition of its possibility, this outside its inside?

——Austin makes us accept as ordinary a teleological and ethical determination > univocality of statement, self presence of total context, transparency of intentions, presence of meaning—absolute singular oneness of speech act

PP p. 169 abyss of trembling w/in the pharmakon

S pp. 95-6 Heidegger on Trakl’s avoidance (vermeiden) of word “geistig”: is contrary opposed to material, names abyss (abîme, Kluft) btwn suprasensible (noeton) & sensible (aistheton) > Heidegger is condemning the degradation of “spiritual” into the “rational,” “intellectual,” “ideological”

PAS PAS p. (86) near depthless abyss in mise en scène of “Viens

***FWT pp. 120-21 logic of exemplarity leads to an abyss (figurality undermines the entire question) [re: those w/ self-hatred resembling Jews]

WM p. 262n TN. Bass gives a good account of mettre en abyme alongside abîmer: the former an endless reflection (heraldic term, escutcheon and on), the latter the ruination or plunging into abyss > “figurative of ruination”: when distinction btwn reflected/reflecting falls apart

DS p. 202 a system that is closed-in on itself would be checked by a safety-catch (un cran darrêt)——wrong to interpret Mallarmé’s Mimique as oriented toward its abysses, its false bottoms, as if they were pretextual referents > a writing that refers back only to itself is some other writing

p. 265 hymen is not a phenomenon—it folds itself back into the antre, which is an abyss

——mark upon mark, text w/in text, margin in mark (endless repeat): an abyss

——writing en abyme, abyss will never have glint (léclat) of phenomenon > becomes white or black, lun et/ou lautre au carré de lécriture

p. 281n opposition btwn metaphor & metonymy is purely semantic—deconstructed by superficial, profound, that is abyssal operation of versification (vers, verssensvers, versus, verre), morcelante et reconstituante (hiver, pervers, envers, travers, vertige, rêve)

P p. 24 the circle & the abyss: circle en abyme

p. 27 is there an abyss in Hegel? (circle in a circle not necessarily abyssal) for there to be an abyss the smallest circle would have to inscribe in itself the figure of the largest [es gibt, il y a]

p. 33 all this talk of circles has drawn us toward the abyss, abyss can come to saturate what it hollows it

p. 34 undecidability of abyss: bottom-less & bottom of bottom, “filling up the abyss” > satire of abyss, comic effect

p. 36 Kant looking for a bridge from sensible to supersensible (an analogy), a symbol—that crosses/closes abyss

——bridge (Brücke) not an analogy, concept/effect of analogy makes the bridge itself

——analogy of abyss & bridge over abyss require 3rd term, that which heals the gap, a symbol, bridge is symbol, symbol bridge > abyss calls for analogy (active resource of Critique), mais lanalogie sabîme sans fin dès lors quil faut bien un certain art pour décrire analogiquement le jeu de lanalogie

p. 37 economize on the abyss: 1) textual art of reprise, sépargner la chute en tissant et repliant à linfini le tissu, multiply patches (pièces) 2) abyssal operation (formalize rules, constrain logic, reappropriate): work toward rèleve & that in it which regularly reproduces collapse

p. 40 Kant: very depths of foundations (Grundlage) of faculty of principles is independent of experience, otherwise it might sink and bring w/ it ruin (Einsturz) > Kant descends to bythos of abyss w/out knowing if it exists

p. 41 desire of reason, desire for the fundamental: desire to go to the bythos

p. 79 Kant: examples are wheelchairs (Gängelwagen) [roulettes] of judgment, those who don’t have enough Mutterwitz, the sick, need these wheelchairs, prostheses that replace nothing

——Hegel: there is play in examples, they play, Beispielen

——Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

p. 89 death’s essential relation to the cut, the hiatus of the abyss, where beauty takes us by surprise

pp. 117-18 in Kant, art of man analogized with art of creator (unity of empirical laws), man has goal before operating, this effaces a priori the sans, the pure cut of free beauty

——connection btwn anthropo-theologism & analogism: course being steered [Spinoza says something quite tangential in Ethics], analogy w/ practical finality is its medium

——analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), lanalogisme recapitule ou recapite

ROP p. 37 going from 3rd to 4th, or from 2 to endless & bottomless divisibility [Mephistophelic word]

***SP pp. 115-19 Heidegger’s abyssal structure of the proper, at once superficial & bottomless (since not fundamental), the proper founders, passes into the other

pp. 119-21 (das Eigentum des Ab-grundes) the proper-ty of the abyss, the abyss of proper-ty, the reorganization of metaphysics around more powerful question of propriation, question of event (Ereignis) uprooted from ontology, where proper is proper to no one, to nothing: is this what Nietzsche’s woman is, style’s form: the no-where, gift as woman’s essential predicate, appears in undecidable oscillation btwn give/take, se donner/se donner-pour > price/value of pharmakon

p. 139 plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

***ATIA pp. 30-1 discussion is interesting [re: animals] once limit is abyssal (rather than limit as discontinuity): once frontier is not a single, indivisible line, but more than one internally divided lines (folds, foliations): “what are the edges of a limit that feed on an abyss?”

p. 66 via Valéry’s snake, the “animal abyss” is not a void, it’s too full of being, vertigo, étincelle au lieu de néant, lieu tenant du néant que je suis

p. 83 the abyss of autos, ipseity, autokinesis: we must surrender (get) to the heart of the abyss btwn law of nature (reaction) & law of freedom (response & responsibility)

p. 84 question of response, question of question, where response to question would remain unprogrammable > abyss of “what is a response?”

p. 131 for Lacan, move from animal to human (to speech, to truth, to symbolic order): abyssal concept of a feined feint or pretended pretense (not merely the figure or simple feint)

SW pp. 350-51 theory (beyond theory) of fetishism at moment of verdict, w/ whole history engaged in it (Freud, Exodus, St. Paul, the en abyme of un ver à soie), thought of the event w/out revealed/unveiled truth, w/out phallogocentrism, w/out greco-judeo-paulino-islamo-freud-heidggeriano-lacanian [no christiano!] veil, w/out (un)veiling of phallus

TB pp. 132-33 rhythm, twists & turns from abyss to abyss, deconstructs the tower > madness on both sides (interior/exterior limit) > impossible task: the infinite guilt absolves you immediately

DPi pp. 236-37 we've asked “what is an exception?” “what is cruelty?” “blood?” “man?” “proper to man?” “to humanitarian?” > neither rhetorical nor answerable, these questions showed “the vertigo or the abyss of their own impossibility” > nor did they simply recreate dizziness of hermeneutic circle (which they also did) which accumulates meaning, supposes pre-comprehension [link to imagining the phone call, imminence of verdict]

Gii p. 41 everything Heidegger says about man takes on meaning and value w/in oppositional limit to animal (it is dogmatic and serious)

——man’s hand infinitely removed from prehensile organs through the abyss of its being “durch einen Abgrund des Wesens

——this abyss: speech & thought

REST p. 290 for Heidegger, metaphorical (?) ground, this is the originary and fundamental experience of the Greeks, more than hypokeimenon > the underneath of the underneath (le dessous du dessous): a thinking of the abyss not mis-en-abyme

——abyss: “un des lieux ou non-lieux prêts à tout porter de ce jeu

p. 291 how that which is under hypokeimenon opens an abyss (change of direction) > a completely different topic: “more” carries away, thing no longer has value/figure of “underneath”

——Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, lhymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

pp. 291-92 gift, abyss, offering, there is abyss > essence of Van Gogh’s painting, via Heidegger’s Origin, opens onto an abyss (not attributive certainty, secure ground of [Cartesian-Hegelian] subjectivity)

——Origin an essay on the gift (Schenkung), one of 3 senses in which truth is said to come to its installation, institution, investiture (Stiftung), there’s also the “founding (Gründen)” > this truth which is also nontruth also opens onto the “abyss”

***p. 305 for Heidegger, in Origin, the abyss (Abgrund) plays itself out like “veiled” destiny (fatum) which transfixes (transit) being

p. 312 Shapiro treats shoes as reproduction of real shoes, misses that, for Heidegger, shoes don’t relate to given subjectum, or given world, he won’t be able to avoid the bridge, doesn’t know shoes’re already prosthetic—précipitée dans labîme, la sphinge, dès linstant où lenflure (turgidity)

——that the shoes can always be someone else’s: “to be in someone’s shoes [in English]”

pp. 329-30 affect of Van Gogh’s painting: army of ghosts demanding their shoes, bottomless memory of a dispossession

p. 342 painting as detachment that loses its footing, says nothing of mise-en-abyme: mise-en-abyme as restituting saturation > “painting in painting”

pp. 344-45 [re: the interlaced correspondence]: interminable overflowing of whole, la surenchère en plus-value de la correspondance débordante (subordante), occurs btwn general element (discourse, writing, painting) & particular determinate element > element worth more than whole, and whole plays the part [metonymy/synechdoche no longer what they are]

——what’s essential for Heidegger is making the overflowing appear by “earth,” “shoes,” “world” > il faudrait les ressaisir à linstant où le hors-dusage détaché (relativement déstricturé) donne lieu, a sort of abyssal surplus value, une surenchère sans fond > we can speak of conditions of fetishization of product/work, surplus value forms a truth-effect, useless gives way to speculative exploitation, more than useful (plus quutile): useful for grasping usefulness of useful [cf. pp. 339-41 double/triple uselessness (work, product, useless for grasping usefulness)]

——when the detached calls for reattachment: a discourse is sketched, maneuver to call for adherence

DST DST p. 318n to lose track of Darstellung is to lose track of abyssal structure that can always divide & fictionalize it [it being Darstellung?] [re: Lacoue-Labarthe on Heidegger’s use of Gestell]

p. 213 fold or abyssal redoubling: désistance is first of all the désistance of truth: truth never resembles itself, so it resembles mimesis

p. 216 désistance: mimesis or its double, cela même quelle double et abîme (what it doubles & engulfs)— alētheia

pp. 218-19 for Heidegger, opposition btwn inadequate/adequate circumscribed by alētheias withdrawal—yet, Lacoue-Labarthe’s mimesis haunts alētheia w/ unstable homoiōsis

abyss of pre-originary mimesis, “precedes” truth, introduces desire for homoiōsis > Derrida explains how, w/ this thinking, Lacoue-Labarthe dislocates Heidegger’s epochal history

PIO p. 413n sponge-towel (serviette-éponge), emblematic story of my name as story of the other, blazon (mise en abyme) of “impossible subject,” fable, another way to make history

RM pp. 75-6 metaphysical unity of opposition determined only “starting from (à partir de)” the re-trait of the trait > the “starting from” sy abîme lui-même

AFR pp. 85-7 Condillac’s failure to go straight to principle of order, a fault of composition: he did not go straight to it > following order = discovering order: sabyme, encircles history w/ nature

p. 108 to introduce: seduce the text (not the reader), surprise it close to its content > a rigorous “abyss”

IW p. 245 Rosenzweig sees Cohen as a philosopher-teacher who reminds us of the abyssal risk of thought or existence

p. 246 Rosenzweig associates abyss w/ volcanic fire (eruption), convulsive tremor marking rhythm of flow of lava—tempo of discontinuous rhetoric

PSSS p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds

——this discontinuity calls for a leap, what Classical humanist philosophers call freedom, this interruption gives a chance

D p. 308 double bottom, “theaters of memory,” deprives square of ground (suspended in air)

p. 323 through mirror-effect (germinates/deforms), each sequence of text comprehends another > each part smaller than themselves & greater than the whole they reflect

——figure of quadrangle complicated by strange mirror [imparfait de double fond], mirror as echo that precedes origin it seems to answer > “echo” is an “incision” (X nétant constitués quen retour)

p. 329 imperfect, certain aorist, certain unlimitedness, “unreachable double bottom (double-fond insaisissable)”: past of an anterior future, future of an anterior past

p. 333 expropriation is operation w/in voice

pp. 333-34 in Soller’s Numbers, you are indefinitely referred to bottomlessness, indefinite regress of beginning, which is forbidden along w/ eschatology, archeology, hermeneutic teleology

p. 341 text occupies place before “me,” announces me to myself—une tour de guet (watchtower) planted inside me > like a “transparent column,” pure outside: driven into that which tries to close in on itself > imagine you swallowed a cylindrical mirror, tower of Babel, bottomless plurality, not negative…also phallic [p. 342 in Zohar: “great, ungraspable columns of air”]

***p. 357 thickness (lépaisseur) of text opens upon beyond of a whole, nothing or absolute outside: its depth (sa profondeur) at once null & infinite—each layer (couche) harbors (en abrite) another

***p. 358 au bord (du vertige), alert to the border itself, infinite depths were also bottomless, perfectly superficial, cube w/out depth

HST p. 381 unsolvable, vertiginous depth of sans-fond, irresistible whirlpool that carries forgiveness, gift, re-giving, re-dealing of forgiveness, to the abyss of the impossible

***p. 400 abyss of non-response to aporetic question: condition of responsibility

***+R p. 155 what happens when a surplus value places itself en abyme?

pp. 157-58 the phrase “what both cuts me off and prompts me (me souffle) w/ all the rest” performs, does what it says it’s doing: framing borders are jumped, margins saturated en abyme

p. 163 into (over) the bargain (the market) (par-dessus le marché), not au-dessus (above) the market (the lure in which you would again let yourself be caught) > puts in play, or en abyme, the destructive simulacra of surplus value

p. 180 en abyme [of representational reproduction] deports referential naiveté [re: Benjamin, comprise btwn painting/photography]

C pp. 187-88 “don’t deliver them from fascination just when they’re falling into the abyss of the infinite—yet nil—distance, the outsize (démesuré) space”

p. 209 Derrida refers to the modesty of stopping at 127, of saying “that’s enough” > satis, sufficient, “satire of the abyss”

p. 224 supplement of consequence contains everything, including abyss

***p. 237 bottomless surplus value: power of capitalization in abyss

TN p. 46 for Nancy, the Thing touches itself when one touches nothing: exact hyperbole (Nancy’s writing) engulfs, exscribes itself (sex-crit), sabîme (sinks)

p. 98 for Berkeley, infinite abyss btwn what we see and what we touch

p. 103 for Nancy, touching the limit > moment of decision

——philosophy, literally, has never touched anything > inversely, all one ever does is touch a limit (destiny of this figurality) [hymen]; to touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a border, an outline

pp. 103-04 touch untouchable-touchable surface/border/limit on exposing edge of an abyss

——philosophy will have “touched” something 2x: limit & unfoundable abyss beneath/beyond it

——there can only be a figure of touch, one only touches by way of figure > the object, the touchable thing, the "thing itself,” is the untouchable (gives itself, opens only in history of figure)

pp. 190-91 Derrida defends Husserl’s stubborn conviction that we can’t know alter-ego, only through analogy, appresentation, that there’s an unbridgeable abyss (abîme infranchissable) > Husserl’s stance prevents risk of an immediate intutionism of the other

p. 299 logic of limit [hymen?]: what lets itself be touched does so on its edge (sur son bord), thus it doesn’t let itself be touched/reached (ne se laisse pas atteindre)—exposing untouchable itself, the other edge of the edge (lautre bord du bord)

pp. 306-07 eyes meet, infinitely, mouths in contact [unsatisfied w/ insipid figures, however interesting/necessary], thought begins, jusquà labîme, plunging Narcissus into abyss: makes day or night possible > day and night themselves promising each other, au point du jour

AD p. 114 silence comes to us from abyss; (Kings 19:12-15) “sheer silence”

pp. 114-15 discern edges of abyss: it’s not necessarily a bad abyss

CF p. 50 must forgiveness saturate the abyss (suture, reconcile)? but who could object to imperative of reconciliation? amnesties, work of mourning—political strategy, psycho-therapeutic economy

pp. 53-54 when not insoluble, when I know what to do (program), no decision or responsibility

——an abyss remains and must remain

BSi p. 137 “who” and “what” sink into indifference, into the abyss of who-becoming-what (death)—becoming what we will have always been

pp. 137-38 talk of the bottom (fond), the profound, believing in depth [of “who” or “what”] will never be free from bêtise (stupidity) > sovereign & beast as bottomless bottom, abyss, vertigo

p. 149 if bêtise is not an error [Deleuze’s stance], no pragamatic use of bêtise does not refer (if obscurely) to abyss of jus (justice, justness, judge) [not faulty judgment but judgment of judge, judgment from which one expects some justness]

p. 269 Celan: “whoever walks on his head has heaven beneath him as an abyss (Abgrund)”

p. 334 abyss not a bottom or bottomless depth of hidden base > if there is abyss, there’s plus dun sol, plus dun seul seuil, plus dun seul seul [(no) more (than one) solid, single threshold, single single]

OG p. 69 (101-02) the horizontality of spacing, hollow of differance, discontinuity and discreteness (does not oppose it(self) like surface to depth), a hinge (brisure) marking impossibility of full speech

p. 133 (193-94) Derrida not denying certain roles of writing, but to attribute them to writing specifically and then to exempt speech: “il y a un abîme quon ne doit pas franchir aussi allègrement

p. 157 (226) Rousseau: no intermediary btwn everything & nothing, must substitute

p. 163 supplement as chain itself, theory of textuality, en abyme, structural necessity of abyss, desire of presence born in abyss

p. 183 (261) the dangerous differance, the master name of this supplementary series: death > metonymic substitution horizon & source, abyss from which each threat announces itself

p. 298 (421) “labîme, cest le creux qui peut rester ouvert entre la défaillance de la nature et le retard du supplément” [abyss as delay, hollow, open]; pure law restores (gives back to people) liberty, gives back to presence its sovereignty [sutures abyss], pure law a supplement of supplement

p. (422n) Vico’s 2nd form of writing: heroic emblem [en abyme]

SPEC p. 304 Derrida never wanted to abuse abyss or mise en abyme,” wary of confidence it inspires fundamentally, too representative to go far enough (pour aller assez loin), or to not avoid the very thing toward which it allegedly rushes (pour ne pas éviter cela même vers quoi elle prétend précipiter)

——still, en abyme of Freud’s writing [re: autobiography in fort/da narrative] has relation of structural mimesis w/ relation btwn PP & “its” death drive—latter hollows out the former en abyme, at origin of origin

p. 321 an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (dun après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

p. 323 autobiographics of Beyond…, of word beyond [common name], imprints a prescription on fort:da, an overlapping (rapporté) by means of which proximity distances itself en abyme (Ent-fernung)

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

——death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

FV p. 419 literature that puts truth on stage, can it be read by psychoanalysis? abyssal structure, this space overflowed by powers of simulacrum

p. 467 in Lacan, abyss effects are seriously controlled; fiction [only] manifests truth

p. 483 certain psychoanalytic interpretations (invisible framing: frame w/in frame) vs. scene of writing w/ ruined (abîmé) limits

p. 488 mise en abyme of narration [re: Poe]

p. 493 mise en abyme of title [The Purloined…]: the text is the object

ABYSS AND VOLCANO

VM p. 82 can the other of the Greek be named non-Greek? pensée pour laquelle le tout du logos grec est déjà survenu (erupted), humus apaisé non pas sur un sol, mais autour dun volcan plus anicen

IW p. 246 Rosenzweig associates abyss w/ volcanic fire (eruption), convulsive tremor marking rhythm of flow of lava—tempo of discontinuous rhetoric

p. 247 coming of an event initiates irruption (volcano), rupture and hence interruption of totalizing synthesis

D p. 301 Sollers: “we are dancing on a volcano”

EL pp. 195-96 imminent, eschatological boiling of a language as volcano: the passion of a sacred language suffering

p. 196 Derrida tempted to collapse abyss & volcano—invisible chasm, catastrophe foments [see D p. 327], one can only interpret (blindly) the fumes that announce what can’t be seen coming

p. 197 does Scholem want shibboleth to get out of abyss (the improbable border, the desert) or to rush into it & be engulfed by it (pour sy engouffrer)?

pp. 197-98 for Scholem, to fall into an abyss is to become lucid, not to live blindly above it

p. 198 blind sorcerers of secularization conceal abyss (in them abyss is sealed), but au fond de ce sans-fond, the abyss cannot be dominated, tamed

p. 199 (internal/external) edge (bord) of this reading, as on edge of “those abysses of abysses”

p. 201 for Scholem, secularized = pulling out language’s apocalyptic thorn; but secularization does not take place, a surface effect, language still sacred in its abyssal interior

pp. 201-02 secular is a epiphenomenon, surface (rhetorical) effect, a façon de parler

——secular is surface effect, produces the surface on which we sleepwalk, we believe in the surface, but there is only abyss > speak sacred language even in denying it (avoid speaking it)

pp. 213-14 magical power of name: revelation and encrypting (crypte), hides abyss w/in it > to open a name is to find an abyss, abyss as thing itself

——[vis-à-vis Scholem] prayer invokes spirits, the name is more powerful and transcendent than we are > but, to secularize sacred language, we play w/ ghosts [from spirit to ghost]

p. 215 the 2 abysses (of life, of death) (each one en abîme in other): 1) loss of names/signification 2) the abyss into which one falls, revenge for not realizing language/names are abyssal

p. 217 experience of the edge (bord) [sacrifice?], abyss btwn 2 places: sacred & non-sacred

p. 222 question of decision & responsibility (that of our generation) returns (revient) to us out of (depuis) undecidable bottom, which is, au fond, undecidable

CIN p. 53 the cinder like burning semen (semence brûlante), lava destined nowhere, when you take word into your mouth, to breathe

CIR p. 80 “a sleeping water [mother, too human inhuman, mortal immortal] in the henceforth appeased depth of the abyss, this volcano I tell myself I’m well out of”

ACCELERATION

SPOM p. 103 it has always been acceleration itself [beyond the norms of speed that have until now informed human culture] that dislocates, dislocation no less arch-originary than archaism it dislodges

MPM p. 62 [see p. 88n at what speed ought one to read?] motif of precipitousness in de Man, acceleration to win time, win time over, non-dialectical—not a particular rhythm—a rhythm w/out rhythm (incommensurable acceleration, infinite and null, touches the sublime)

p. 88n Pascal says don’t read too fast or slow—find a rhythm (accelerate toward rhythm)

MSUB J p. 170 to speak of the subjectile, we must speak by insertion and precipitation, acceleration of rhythmical projection [see MPM p. 62] and inscription of projectile, beyond “words and images”

ACCUSE

SPOM p. 166 to accuse the other always announces or denounces its imminent return

ACTIVE/PASSIVE

POOF p. 7 (23-4) Aristotle privileges to love over being loved, active over passive (potential) > Derrida points to a tense btwn active/passive, the question of aimance (lovence) [see pp. 24-5n]

p. 11 Plotinus’ give what you don’t have > receiving a giving? joy of mother not needing to be known (Aristotle) [loving vs. being loved]

VM pp. 315-16n passivity & activity of Husserl’s “constitution,” > not opposed to the encounter; if one rejects his definition, there must be a time/experience w/out “other” before the encounter

DS p. 224 simple opposition btwn activity & passivity (btwn all -er/-ed concepts) becomes too formally weak to encompass graphics of hymen, its spider web, the play of its eyelids

DIF DIF p. 9 differance, middle voice > -ance remains undecided btwn active & passive (i.e. resonance is not the act of resonating), neutralizes what infinitive denotes as active

AFR p. 59 both Condillac and de Biran take repetition for granted, rule of indecision never comes to conception (au concept), a limit which is the concept not a concept: thus, Condillac finds contradiction in activity/passivity, de Biran duplicity in Condillac’s “hesitation”

OG pp. 290-91 (410-11) from Kant to Husserl: Kantian revolution of pure passivity re: pure sensibility—still a linear, geometric, transcendental aesthetic; Husserl’s transcendental kinesthetic blurs lines btwn passive/active, puts all objective space in parentheses > but still living present

ACT OF FAITH

MPM p. 150 une parole donnée au nom de lautre—act of memory, act of faith > or simply an act, impossible act, only act worthy of the name: promise has meaning only w/ death of other, when friend is no longer there > promise not made, but as trace of future it can be renewed

SH p. 46 to bless no one, only chance for an act of faith > otherwise dogma, certainty, judgment

FWT p. 138 how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same

pp. 159-60 successful mourning is failed mourning, is unfaithful: denies alterity of dead other, of death as other, “narcissizes” the dead other > same goes for integration of immigrant/foreigner

——faithfulness prescribes impossibility of mourning at once [St. Augustine’s “I live on for my friend” in POOF]

EJQB p. 76 does not this anxiety [in the book], this war, rest on silence of nonquestion?

——is not the writing of the question, the first violence re: the question, a first response and repose, lerrance (wandering) as history, first crisis, first forgetting, the dissimulation of lerrance?

——nonquestion, act of faith, unpenetrated certainty that Being is a Grammar, world is in all its parts a cryptogram [this nonquestion not yet a dogma]

PSSS p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds

——this discontinuity calls for a leap, what Classical humanist philosophers call freedom, this interruption gives a chance

HST p. 395 since, for Levinas, the will already has relation to betrayal (“harbors treason in its own essence”), its fidelity coming from the other, the idea of a misunderstood will still reveals a relation to exteriority

***LI p. 122 il la faut, an absolute must: “all or nothing” of conceptual language (“it must” translates the faithfulness of my love for philosophy)

ADDRESS

KH p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

——is Socrates someone, something, play of proper names more abyssal than ever, “who are you, Khōra?

p. 115 oral maze inscribed in place which receives everything, Timaeus, addressed to “the one who, as we do, and before us [see p. 117], receives everything,” in this theory of receptions—Socrates

GOD p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (loeuvre)

FK p. 64 descent of God ex machina, stage a “transcendental addressing machine”

p. 66 one either responds to an address with absolute faith or reacts resentfully, impossible to tell which is the response, due to one contaminating the other

***p. 80 “without the performative experience of this elementary act of faith, there would neither be ‘social bond’ nor address of the other, nor performativity in general”

FL p. 248 justice addresses itself to the singularity of the other, despite or because it pretends toward universality [?]

MC p. 346 I address you w/out knowing you, something arrives [Nietzsche’s future philosophers]

H pp. 103-105 [on Oedipus’ final mourning] he’s deprived of something in secrecy [of light?], an encrypting of encrypting, in the crypt the address is cryptic

p. 107 Theseus, with Oedipus’ burial secret, becomes a retained hostage, a detained addressee

——everyone is hostage to the dead man (Oedipus)

p. 135 absolute, hyperbolical, unconditional hospitality suspends language, a particular determinant one, and even the address to the other

SPOM pp. xvi-xvii the address “I’m going to teach you to live,” from lips of master, father to son > hesitates btwn address as experience, as education, as taming or training (dressage)

p. 13 Marcellus anticipated la venue dun autre scholar, had to wait several centuries [for Derrida], one who can think possibility of specter, specter as possibility, who can address spirits, who knows that such is the condition of address, mad enough to unlock such a possibility

p. 64 I accepted address (invitation) “so as not to flee from a responsibility”

HERP p. 182 acc. Aristotle, there must be presence in act of friendship > can exhaust itself in non-address, immediate non-hailing (non-interpellation) [does Heidegger agree? see p. 176]

HASD p. 39 unique address of khora is not a prayer, a celebration, or an encomium, does not speak to You

PAS PAS p. (92) cette femme, not yours, but the name for you, not a part of you, doesn’t possess you, addresses you > [she responds?] my name is unique, and you hide it, forget it

POOF pp. vii, xi “O my friends, there is no friend”—an address > faire appel, prendre appel

p. 27 limit is also a chance: must receive address of other at particular address, in singular language

p. 32 every instant begins at the end, address carries in its readability the signature of the addressee: it withdraws from space by penetrating it

p. 51 Aristotle’s ‘O my friends, no friends’: a last will & testament, spoken from place of death, does not address enemies (unlike Nietzsche's living fool) > dying person turns toward friendship, living person towards enmity

pp. 51-2 Nietzsche’s address ‘Foes, there are no foes’ requests that we go beyond excuse & pardon, still moves in religious space of benediction or malediction?

p. 61 Nietzsche refers to his friends as brothers (all of Zarathustra read through this figural alignment) > addressees lay down law of genre, so their coming virtues are virile ones

pp. 214-15 that either address [re: omega ω] is addressed to someone will always expose utterance to undecidability because address to ‘someone’ presupposes the impossible: 1) neutral gender 2) ‘only one’ someone > for one person to receive a mark once, the mark must multiply, its iterability affirms plus dun (which allows & limits calculability), the 3rd party is there > there is never one, one is always more than one (w/ or w/out consent)

SEC p. 316 absence—death of addressee (inscribed in mark) > value or effect of transcendentality linked to possibility of writing, to this “death”

——what holds for addressee, holds for sender, holds for scribe, holds for reader (disappearance)

SH p. 6 “caesura is the law”: gathers in the discretion of the discontinuous, in the cutting in of relation to other, interruption of address as address itself

p. 15 partage (imparting, division): remarked at point of departure, address to other

p. 55 “you” may be addressed to the other as well as to myself, to oneself as other [“you” listening Sagi?]

OTO p. 38 mother is the faceless figure of a figurant, an extra, gives rise to all figures by becoming anonymous, everything addresses/destines itself to her, she survives, as long she’s at bottom

ATIA p. 14 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas, Descartes, all men, all belong to quasi-epochal category: never been seen (naked) by an animal, never imagine animal could address them > Derrida believes they all have, must decipher symptom of this disavowal

——only poets/prophets face address of the animal, not juridical, civil men

pp. 17-8 time before time has always made “me” dizzy: God’s exposure to surprise, when God does not know what will become, what will happen when the poet names living things; Derrida feels the same way, depuis le temps, before his cat: will it/God address me?

SW p. 325 letting other live: absolute suicide, no trace, not even the seal of a break

——not even leave them my ashes

——no longer be oneself or have oneself (sêtre ou savoir) > truth w/out truth looking for me at end of world

——blessing of one who leaves w/out leaving an address

DPi p. 100 Hugo (on French Revolution): once there’s peace, no more DP > Hugo: “inviolability of human life” > [Hugo aware of rhetoric of address, of apostrophe]

RGE p. 266 Bataille addresses total renunciation to the least weak [see quote]

TR pp. 110-11 a necessity of solitude, no intuition of alter ego felt by addresser & addressee [on either side of excuse/apology/forgiveness]

EL p. 196 the one who confesses (accuses, announces, cautions, warns) does not exclude himself from the whole (ensemble) of his addressees > to speak to the blind: this is act of confession

HST pp. 409-10 an example is always a substitutable substitute > “you, for example” often violent address of one who has power/authority to take hostage: inscribes possible replaceability in address to other

TN p. 34 se toucher toi, “Je se touche”; “tu” [in philosophical discourse] signs general/plural singularity of possible addressee, also signs possibility/need for “I” to address itself as an other > oneself: first & last other

p. 279 for Chrétian, Christ is one, common body, not a plurality of bodies > Chrétian & Nancy deal w/ a different “yes,” or a different provenance of same “yes,” addressed to “you”

pp. 281-82 dissymmetry of se toucher toi makes “you” the touchable (untouchable) pole of an apostrophizing address

BSi pp. 238-39 “after you”: my first address to other as other

p. 263 Celan: poem needs the other, reaches, searches, addresses the other

UWC p. 237 [the event, the unconditional] matter of the sense of sense [meaning of meaning?] > up to you now, up to others—signatories are also addressees

SPEC p. 341 demon, revenance which repeats its entrance, revient w/out having been called by PP > like Socrates’ demon, which made everyone write, this automaton produces effects of ventriloquism, w/out origin, emission, addressee, tele w/out telos

FV p. 453 for Lacan, [proper] address of letter: law that binds King & Queen

——there are only ostriches, the more one presents one’s rear, the more one is master: can’t avoid being plucked (laisser plumer)

ADIEU

GOD p. 48 adieu: 1) salutation, hello, “I can see you” 2) a goodbye 3) à-dieu, relation to God, every relation to other would be à-dieu

TN p. 260 God’s hand not a figuration, the hand in the proper sense, the hand of salvation, le main de là-dieu (the God-ward goodbye hand)

AD p. 134n Levinas: à-Dieu not a finality, infinity is irreducibility of à-Dieu, fear of God to eschatology

p. 61 “to say yes at the moment of a separation, indeed of a departure that is not the contrary of an arrival—is it not this deference that inspires the breath of an à-Dieu?”

pp. 142-43n experience of à-Dieu: to have welcomed yes of other, infinity in separation, in its holiness > Adieu does not wait, is not, beyond being

——w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God

> à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

p. 102 à-Dieu: infinity, promise, welcome at heart of separation, at moment of death

——à of à-Dieu is turned (tourné): by Infinity toward infinity

p. 103 à of à linfini and à-Dieu: ad-dresses, opens relation, responds to, responsible for > desire says A-Dieu

p. 104 God, one “who loves the stranger” excessively so, excess like the non-reciprocity decided in death, the trait or stroke, the hyphen (trait dunion) of adieu: beyond being, where he might not pardon me, or elect me

pp. 120-22 à-Dieu, so close to silence, also related to death, eipimeleia thanatou, Sein zum Tode

——le-plus-de-sens à linfinià lheure de la mort [the (no) more-sense to infinity…at the hour of death]

——Levinas: the fear à-Dieu instills is not a finality, it is fear à leschatologique, which interrupts within the human both ontology and being-towards-death; one must fear the neighbor

——to say à-Dieu to the face: call the name by name

ADVE RB

HASD pp. 46-7 via Eckhart, like adverb quasi (quasi stella matutina), we are beside the verb that is the truth; Eckhart: “may the Father, the Verbum…help us remain adverbs of this Verbum”

——pedagogical necessity of supplement (sermon) due to our adverbial quality

p. 60 Heidegger w/ and w/out word “être” wrote a theology w/ and w/out God, left a trace no longer his own, mais qui reste quasiment la sienne > 3 adverbs: pas, sans, quasiment

VP p. 80 for Husserl, “subjective” adverbs (here, there, above, below, none, yesterday) function as subjective and occasional expressions just like word “I”; these are different from contingent expressions which have plurivocity, and objective expressions which are absolutely pure of contamination: mathematical expressions

PAS PAS p. (69) nothing presents itself [in approach of “terrifyingly ancient,” terrifyingly becoming “subject” not accessory adverb], fors lobscène (save the obscene), what awaits as forgetting

DS pp. 262-64n [re: Mallarmé’s use of Or] Or (substantive noun/adverb of time), gold turned to nothing; Igitur, adverb-name (also means “therefore”), has affinities w/ Or, or marks the hour (today) > temps dor, “Il Signor,” “qui signore,” “signe or,” in the golden antre of a glottis (glossa, gold ingot, lingot, lingua) > throw of linguistic dice

WAP p. 3 the 3 meanings of du droit à la philosophie, the 4th: can we go right to philosophy, do we need training; adverbial “right” enriches & overdetermines other meanings [?]

NOY pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

ATM p. 152 otherwise (autrement), the adverb in Otherwise than Being which wins out immeasurably over a verb, the beyond of the symplokē [linking nouns & verbs, that of essence], leaving a chain of traces, another symplokē [beyond essence]

LG p. 230 trait (supplementary & distinctive), re-mark of belonging doesn’t belong, this sans > a blink of the eye, w/out which nothing would come to light

***BSi p. 5 [re: its double meaning, pas de loup] pas’ savage, stealthy intrusion, an adverb haunts a noun

AFFECT

HERP p. 175 the voice, acc. Heidegger, is essentially marked, like everything at opening of Dasein, by Stimmung and Befindlichkeit—tonality, modality that is affective (not Heidegger’s words)

S p. 73 Heidegger saves Nietzsche’s text (from accusation of biologism, zoologism, racism [?]) by damning it: still metaphysics of absolute subjectity like Hegel: Nietzsche’s absolute subjectity that of body, impulsions, affects; Hegel’s that of the willing that knows itself

p. 84 furnace (embrasement) of spirit (affects, affects itself, and gets affected by fire)

FWT p. 58 affect: relation of living being to other, incalculable, foreign to all machines

POOF pp. 87-8 Schmitt’s purification of all (personal) affect from friend-enemy distinction (its pure political essence), a war w/out intrinsic xenophobia, war w/out hatred

pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe quà l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

P pp. 37-8 object of 3rd Critique? affect (Gefühl)? pleasure/unpleasure? desire? 1st Critique cuts itself off from interests of desire, excludes desire’s reason, reasons’s desire, desire for reason

p. 47 affect of the pleasing-oneself-in (se-plaire-à) [re: Kant’s disinterested pleasure, critique of judgment] remains subjective through & through, an auto-affection that goes outside its inside

p. 94 envy, jealousy, mortification at work w/in our affect > the beautiful this does w/out everything, w/out you, w/out its class [re: Kant’s free beauty]

ROP p. 26 resistance [to analysis] as double bind, other or outside at heart of internal auto-affective tension > it provokes analysis and dialectic to infinity, in order to resist both absolutely

ATIA p. 5 there is no nudity in “nature,” only the affect, sentiment, experience of existing in nakedness > animal not naked because naked

p. 147-48 for Heidegger, “awakening” [of attunement (Stimmung)] in question of the apophantic, “as such,” not consciousness/unconscious duality: won’t understand affective tonality via cogito

GSP pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

FS p. 4 structuralism will never be able to contribute to a “future history of imagination and affectivity” [Jean-Pierre Richard’s hope]

pp. 12-3 Derrida describes a hypocritical humanistic writing that imagines the will-to-write as an awakening of a freedom beyond affectivity: to write forgetting difference (finitude) in pure speech > could beauty then be distinguished from the letter itself? what about specificity?

DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

REST pp. 329-30 affect of Van Gogh’s painting: army of ghosts demanding their shoes, bottomless memory of a dispossession

DST DST p. 228 rhythm not as some occult region where affect placed before knowledge

TN p. 247 for Aquinas, spiritual touching, pure act, no intervallic medium (transcends value of affect), not temporal but eternal: like pure act or Prime Mover, a touch foreign to sensibility: (ordinary/extraordinary) history of Christian language

p. 269 lexicon of touch risks being ruined by abusive spending (dépense absuive) > an eschatological, postwar inflation (desperate call for new “era,” “provenance”) > apocalyptic symptomatology of “deconstruction of Christianity”: all we speak is “touching”

p. 274 touch as self-touchingle toucher plus tout autre sens (dizzy rhetoric), very form of space & time & will (essence of will) (from Descartes to Kant or even to Nietzsche)

——to will is to will to touch, strange tautology, bends/folds oneself back into fold of passive-active auto-affection > this affect, that inflects/conjugates passive activity of will: desire

AD p. 110 first affection of subject in ipseity: singular as replaceable > substitution announces destiny, subjection (as hôte and hostage), of subjectivity

BSi p. 143 acc. Deleuze, psychoanalytic bêtise privileges depth of fantasy over planar affect, becoming-assemblage

OG p. 314 (443) for Rousseau, affect & passion linked to vocalic

ATAP p. 66 relever of tone, dream of philosophy: make tonal difference inaudible, neutrality of tone, affect works (over) concept as contraband

SPEC p. 407 death drive doesn’t work in silence (like in French translation), but goes unnoticed (unauffällig), has to do w/ time (link to Kant, Aristotle)—thus rhythm: do feelings of tension exist to distinguish btwn bound/unbound energy or do they exist in relation to absolute magnitude?

AFFIRMATION

LOBL p. ~133-34 joy of affirming endlessly

IF pp. 314-15 via Flaubert, perspectivism, somewhat Nietzschean code of affirmation; Derrida “recklessly” hypothesizes that Flaubert may have found all this in Spinoza, who opposed the Cartesian idea > Spinoza’s idea does not give rise to any representation or any idea of an idea

OS p. 54 [Hegelian] dialectics as simply a repetition of the [Aristotle’s] exoteric aporia, time becomes affirmation of the aporetic

EU p. 124 Glas: generalized fetishism, pull of the discourse of castration toward affirmative dissemination [also continues pursuing project of grammatology, etc.]

p. 166 to feel despair, there must be a basic fund of philosophical reaffirmation, necessity of link btwn reaffirmation of philosophy & a kind of deconstructive writing

PAS PAS p. (54) toujours deux pas, selon le retour éternel de la transgression passive et de laffirmation répétée (laffirmation sauvage), double instantaneous interminable preterition, une limite singulière entre la garde et la perte, entre le souvenir aussi et loubli > EROS, simulacre de cercle [ring vs. circle]

DS p. 268n neither castration nor dissemination can become originary, central signified, dissem. represents affirmation of this nonorigin, it entails, relaunches, “inscribes” castration

DIF DIF p. 27 there will be no unique name: must think this w/out nostalgia, hors du myth of pure mom/dad language, must affirm like Nietzsche met laffirmation en jeu, dans un rire et un pas de la danse

***O p. 35 avancer quil ny a pas de hors-texte absolu, ce nest pas postuler une immanence idéale > not an idealist/theological operation, le texte affirme le dehors, deconstructs & reduces predicates of speculative operation (appropriation of outside) to “effects”

RGE p. 274 via Bataille, affirmation of play outside meaning: potlach of signs that burns, consumes, wastes words in gay affirmation of death: a sacrifice & a challenge (un défi)

WAP p. 185 affirmation, if there is any, non-negotiable, uncompromising, unconditional

CHOR pp. 93-4 to say ironically, “there is no one place for woman,” is neither anti-feminist nor feminist, is faithful to affirmative displacement: “dancing” of women

P (P) p. xiv if the question corresponds to a demand from the other, elle se laisse déjà précéder par une étrange affirmation > pour veiller sur elle [to guard this affirmation], peut-être faut-il dabord se rendre à la veille de la question

AGAINST (WORDS OF)

MONL p. 4 puerile weapon, accuse Derrida of being: skeptic, relativist, nihilist

p. 66 most authoritarian cultural clichés = indefatigable generation of the literary superego

LOBL p. 88 literary studies in university don’t adequately explore problematic of judicial framing & jurisdiction of frames

p. 121 vulgarity and foolishness inexcusable to Blanchot

***p. ~124-25 writing is triumph, manic life-after-life insurance, indiscreet, exhibitionistic, even if we read no “that’s me there” in it (this increase in discretion is more surplus-value of triumph), supplement of triumph, enough to make you sick

——Derrida says this against Nietzsche: triumph over oneself is also a pursuit of power (Gewalt)

***pp. ~137-38 no paradigmatic text, only cryptic haunting from mark to mark, no piece, no metonymy, no integral corpus, thus no fetishism

——double invagination, through labor of translation, can be brought to bear on gaine in Glas [cf. GLAS p. 210 “against” Hegel, Marx, and Freud on subject of fetishism]

p. ~176 to speak of writing, triumph, as living on, is to denounce [Freud’s] manic fantasy (not w/out repeating it)

HERP p. 206 against vitalist/organicist discourse

HASD pp. 11-2 against Wittgenstein’s imposed silence > one must not avoid speaking = it is necessary that there be a trace

MPM pp. 17-8 Derrida on how professional philosophers (Searle, Danto) concerned w/ progress of deconstruction indict philosophical naïveté of poor literary scholar

pp. 42-3n “one day accounting will have to take place” of the damage of superficial reading

p. 114 Derrida links Austin’s usage of phrases “in general” & “properly speaking”

p. 121 de Man against periodization—form of dramatizing non-historical arguments [see ROP p. 114 only speak in terms of age through citation]

pp. 152-53n de Man: against Schlegel, Hegel on irony’s mastery, way it rises above finite determinations

A p. 32 when someone suggests a solution to an impasse, that person ceases to understand, if he ever did

POOF p. 40 Nietzsche against the levellers (Nivellirer), those who blame all misery on existing society [they are unfree, no solitude, ludicrously superficial]

pp. 81-2 compulsive droning of political “realism” that would refuse to read all the warnings & pleas of disjunction > what does it mean that, henceforth, ineluctable voice of necessity (its most responsible voice) resounds in this way [in disjunction, what has reality become?]?

OH p. x [Naas quotes from interview] precipitating contacts and articulations: dogmatism, confusion, opportunism

FSW p. 331n against Freud?: a rigorous determination of the anomaly [btwn word-representation & think-representation in dreams] is impossible

FWT p. 7 Derrida doesn’t want deconstruction to be used to denigrate, injure, diminish necessity of force of movement, and if it is necessary to do so in polemics, he regrets it in advance

p. 31 microclimate of terror, plots as perverse as the evil one claims to be attacking [re: new sexual harassment regulations] > sexual harassment exists, no only in the U.S.!

p. 124 Derrida attacks intellectuals who close their eyes, who did not read, know how to read, unable to read, did not want to read [re: Renaud Camus affair, anti-Semitism ]

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

testify to what we can neither forget nor recall, a testimony w/out force of verdict or death sentence, to not write risks worst betrayal

——how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same

p. 159 agrees/disagrees w/ Foucault’s claim death is less visible > spectral logic invades everything: work of mourning, technē of image; visibility is deferred, perhaps, transformation of visible field > never have things been as “visible” in global space as they are today

p. 193 against Sartre’s idea that anti-Semitism produces the Jew

DS p. 245 “literary criticism” —ontological interpretation of mimesis? krinein proceeds precisely from out of that which is being threatened by the re-tempering (retrempe) of literature

P pp. 30-1 wanting to avoid “repetition” at all costs, one can: rush toward false exit, empirical chit-chat (bavardage), spring-green impulsive avant-gardism (lavant-gardism printanier ou primesautier)

——who said it was necessary to avoid risk of “repetition”?

POS p. 70 discourses of reduction and misconstrual: thematism, sociologism, historicism, psychologism (can be avoided by formal/syntactic work)

ROP p. 36 double “one must” is against philosophy of life, against desire for decontamination, where pure life = pure death

p. 48 “antiphilosophy” > the thing least deserving of interest in the world

pp. 49-50 Julia Kristeva’s Les Samouraï, a very bad novel

DPi p. 252 rant against philosophical mediocrity as the culture mafia [only alternative to news of executions]

CHM p. 42 if dissension re: madness dates from Socrates, Foucault’s historical description poses banal/inevitable problems of periodization & of geographical, political, ethnological limitation

DST DST p. 198 “singularity” not novelty, which is too bound up w/ periodization, or, in the best cases, w/ Heideggerian epochal structures

——Derrida’s reservation re: history of Being & its epochs, also re: “configuration”: presupposes too much consistency, too much identifiable collectedness in the figure

p. 210 Derrida wary of every “return of the subject,” even in least dogmatic of returns, like that found in late Foucault (all “returns” omit rigorous reading of Heidegger)

LI p. 119 rant against simplifying or pretending to simplify, those people are dogmatists, obscurantists, purify at all costs

***pp. 157-58 rant against non-reading pedants, dogmatists, full of fear, right to confuse everything in authoritarian manner

WOG p. 33 Derrida doesn’t understand privilege of suspicion re: Marx, Freud, Nietzsche

BSi pp. 92-6 [Derrida savages Agamben’s dogmatism in declaring who was “first,” then dogmatism in accusation of negligence, points out abyss of neglect, “one is always a priori negligent,” asks about the ethical responsibility in Levinas’ anarchy (no first)]

ALIBI

MONL p. 39 “sovereign establishment (mise en demeure souveraine) [sovereign summons]… disguised under alibis of ‘universal’ humanism”

R p. 86 when democracy is just obscene alibi tolerating suffering, malnutrition, the grossly deprived, those dispossessed of rights (equality, freedom)

***p. 91 “to” of “to-come” wavers btwn: imperative injunction (call or performative) and patient perhaps of messiancity (nonperformative exposure)

——the two haunt each other, are each other’s alibis, withdrawing into the secret of irony, of which democracy gives the right: to fiction and literature

SPOM p. 117 hypocritical alibis of world market, of new slavery, until we face “foreign Debt” w/ spirit of Marxist critique

FWT p. 98 how can one be opposed to the humanitarian ideal? it’s not even “political” [Schmitt], but must remain vigilant to humanitarian alibis, suspect policies instrumentalizing “human rights”

OS p. 62n political resistance often highly “moral” alibi [re: Heidegger] for another resistance: for philosophical resistance, denegation of the text, refusal to read

DPi pp. 240-41 Christianity has banalized and relativized DP using an alibi of the beyond to deny irreversible gravity of death [deconstruct death]

CHM p. 57 in deconstructing Foucault, Derrida is not evoking an other world, an alibi, or evasive transcendence—a violence often the accomplice of “totalitarian” “good sense”

PIO p. 10 an alibi as an invention (by fabulation) > no corresponding reality outside narrative

PF p. xvi alibi: alleged elsewhere in space, an allegation can also defer/differ in time

p. 281n provocatio, Imperial Roman Law, to make an appeal to the law (lex, btwn legere and ligare [typo? should be legare?]), link to lecture (reading), legacy, allegation, alibi

p. xvii one trace always refers to another, secretes, cannot not produce alibi: ubiquity of alibi

p. xx reading: legare (distance, delegate) & legere (gather, collecting) [same etymology as law?], as [reading] ties together, it gives rise, out of fidelity, to dispersion, referral & send off, allegation > figures that risk proliferating alibis

p. xxvi aren’t all tropes alibis? aren’t alibis allegories? words from elsewhere, in place of others

——parentheses, italics, quotes: alibis [?]

——alius ibi: “elsewhere, in another place”

——alibi tells the story of a lying, every lie is first of all a perjury

——perjurer can always give alibi: I was elsewhere, I wasn’t thinking (his finitude as alibi)

p. xxvii alibi—plea for defense, has meaning only where there’s accusation, guilt, thus responsibility (judicial or penal, but first of all ethical or political)

——can there be a trace (and thus alibi) elsewhere than scene of culpa-responsi-bility, scene of debt, duty (Schuld, Schuldigsein)? an originary alibi that precedes juridico-ethico-political, but isn’t ontological neutrality?

——is the injunction to answer (answer to, answer for) inscribed right on the trace?

——does law, morality, politics determine through & through the thinking of trace/alibi? no

p. xxviii in MONL, non-belonging to language, structure of alibi

pp. xxviii-xxix every alibi: denegation, disavowal, negative allegation, alledenagation [re: French allegations that Derrida’s reception is only “elsewhere,” only in the U.S.]

pp. xxx-xxxi w/out alibi might look like irresponsibility

——but to go from alibi to alibi, not knowing where one is going, to only have alibis, is to be w/out alibi: not proud, not innocent, a blatant offense, flagrante delicto, of irresponsibility

p. xxxii Kamuf (un)knots alibis of the concept around the major alibi: resistance

WAP pp. 100-02 Derrida does not multiply remarks on structure of reference, article of title, value of contextuality [i.e. minutiae, syntax] to divert from urgency, but to determine it by exposing 2 alibis of philosophy: 1) imperialist self-confidence of philosophy: exists in its self-critique, is the paideia of self-critique, always in crisis, critical instance of judging, self-repetition via krinein 2) [see p. 107 nationalization of “teaching”?]

——these are alibis because philosophy, and via deconstruction, has exceeded this schema, a “crisis of crisis”

PSSS p. 276 one cannot justify pacifism, right to life, setting out from an economy of life, can only be done on basis of a sur-vival that owes nothing to alibi of some mytho-theological beyond

p. 279 one rarely speaks of alibis w/out suspecting crime, nor crime w/out suspicion of cruelty

CF pp. 50-1 strategies ruses can hide abusively behind “rhetoric” or “comedy” of forgiveness

OG p. 197 (282) via Rousseau, exceed nature, then return to it, imitate it, but keep a minimal (almost nil) difference > nature as ailleurs, archeo-teleologic, alibi (elsewhere in space), in illo tempore (elsewhere in time)

p. 247 (350-51) Rousseau looks for a limit “being born (naissante)”: childhood, God, pure language w/out supplement—alibi, in illo tempore

CHOR pp. 94-5 lack of place, madness of dance, can also serve as alibi for deserting organized, patient, laborious “feminist” struggle

ALIENATION

PS p. 325n Artaud sometimes writes like Marx of 1844 Manuscripts: alienation & property

***p. 183 metaphysical determination of madness as disease of alienation had to be contemporary w/ proprius [Latin era] > proper subject, absolutely close to himself

p. 193 madness as reduction of work (loeuvre) and difference, inalienable life; other madness: metaphysics that lives w/in difference (alienation) > madness is the work or the absence of it

pp. 193-94 concepts of alienation/inalienation, madness, belong to an epoch of metaphysics that determines Being as the life of a proper subjectivity > difference laid bare by Artaud, can only be conceived beyond metaphysics, like Heidegger’s difference or Duplicity (opens/conceals truth)

Gii pp. 60-1 via Heidegger, German fremd relates to High German fram, underway toward, toward elsewhere > one could say: stranger does not wander (erre), is not w/out destination; Derrida compares this to Latin extraneus, outside of, extra

OG p. 295 (416-17) for Rousseau, in writing the worst is simultaneously the best: total alienation is total reappropriation of presence to itself > Rousseau: “plus de force pour conserver ce quon a

ALLEGORY

HASD p. 23 “sacred allegories [iera synthemata],” would be conventional rhetoric if not for divine light of God, would be “cheap simulacrums of the figureless”

MPM p. 11 for de Man, allegory possibility to say the other, precludes totalization—the exhaustive narrative or total absorption of a memory

p. 37 allegorical metonymy—where part stand for whole and for more than whole it exceeds

——parts of memory that seem greater & older than us: manifests in open but nocturnal space of agora, plus de lumière [Nietzsche’s not bright but open horizon]

p. 56 inscription of memory effaces interiorizing recollection, not because of external limit or finite limitation of memory, but because of [allegorical] structure of relation to Other

p. 63 irony of using another signature to talk about yourself

——this allegorical story of signature includes theme of “Lazarus, arise!” a “ghost” story, resurrection

p. 70 de Man: Hegel marginalizes sign, allegory for sake of symbol & “synthetic judgments”

p. 72 de Man quotes Hegel: allegory “disarticulation of subject from predicate,” > allegory as defective cornerstone of entire system [p. 76 keystone (counts for whole) vs. cornerstone]

p. 74 via de Man, allegory (as a metonymy) is an allegory? > Hegel’s dialectic a vast allegory not of reconciliation & synthesis but of disjunction, dissociation, and discontinuity

p. 77 de Man’s privileging of allegory [never reduced to metaphor] over symbol must be understood via Anglo-American criticism of Romanticism

p. 78 for Derrida, each one (allegory, metaphor, trope, figure) in turn can be privileged, self reflexivity w/out end

pp. 81-2 for de Man, allegory (narrative) and irony (momentary & pointed, instantanéiste) are both figures of ghostly disjunction, duplication, doubling > together they form the rhetoric of memory, forgetting, recalling anteriority

pp. 82-3 for de Man, allegory (feigns storytelling) is diachronic (ideal time, never here or now) & irony (feigns amnesia) is synchronic (forgetting, no prefigurative duration) > neither has a past anterior

p. 83 allegory engenders continuity it knows to be illusionary

p. 84 allegorical Mnemosyne / ironical Lethe

p. 98 for de Man, “allegory of unreadability”: when performative cannot be distinguished from constative, all the while remaining irreducible

p. 100 de Man: promise is “metafigural”, an allegory of a figure “which relapses into the figure it deconstructs”

p. 143-44 via de Man, word “political” is allegorical > “textual allegories…generate history”

p. 145 promise prohibits the gathering of Being in presence (as its condition), the condition of the possibility and impossibility of eschatology, ironic allegory of messianism

FWT p. 178 Europe is the most beautiful example of auto-immunity, and allegory, because w/ Europe we see auto-immunity as survival, invincibility as auto-immunity: immense tragedy of a beautiful suicide

ATIA p. 115 exclamation marks, acc. Rousseau, marks of irony, allegorical incredulity [for Derrida, reading Levinas, they are marks of disavowal]

PIO p. 3 “is the invention of the other an allegory, a myth, a fable?”

p. 4 Cicero opens his text on invention w/ question of the son as a question de ratione dicendi > scene of traditio, tradition, transfer, an allegory of metaphor

pp. 9-10 allegory as structure of event in “Fable”: brought into sequential order, narrative form, then [?] it reaches out to other [Paul de Man]

p. 12 inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

pp. 12-3 for de Man, irony is structure of instant: “climaxes in…single brief moment of a final pointe” (“a synchronic structure”); allegory (other face of irony) unfolds in diachronic of narrative

pp. 16-7 de Man: unreachable anteriority of allegory, allegory & irony [?], their inauthenticity, distance from totality > they are linked in temporal predicament, the same temporal void

RM p. 77 le trait, il arrive à seffacer dans un autre, reinscribing itself heterologically, allegorically

p. 78 from “Origin of the Work of Art,” Zug zum Werk (attraction toward the work), work as sumballein, allegoreuein, nonwithdrawal of truth as truth, Un-verborgenheit > truth as originary combat (Urstreit) > a combat that’s an attraction of reciprocal belonging, a Grundriss

PF p. xxvi aren’t all tropes alibis? aren’t alibis allegories? words from elsewhere, in place of others

EJQB p. 75 [re: Jabès] Jew reproached by rabbinical Jews for universalism, skeletal (décharnés) allegorism, for neutralizing event in realms of symbolic/imaginary [Jew as suffering allegory]

——Jew is split btwn 2 dimensions of letter: 1) allegory (no history, abstract universalism, cold skin of concept) 2) literality (empirical, actualized history, too warm flesh)

BSi p. 251 [via Celan via Büchner’s Dantons Death] art as species of marionette > marionette: an allegorical personification of technē, technical who and what

OG p. 292 (412) via Rousseau, from pure painting to allegorical painting: on transporte la chose dans son double (dans une idéalité) > representation always other

ALLIANCE

POOF pp. 166-67 via & beyond Schmitt, der geschwisterlichen Klang (the brotherly-sisterly sound), the obscure friendship of rhyme, insane linking (appariement) of a couple, sense is born in a pair > before being philosophical, friendship concerns gift of the poem, isn’t there always a politics of a rhyme? > the rhyme can also become a traffic signal (philautie of linkage) > nothing looks more like the traffic signals of one country than those of another: this is the law > everything begins w/ Echo: rhymes sign, in cadence they seal a belonging, an ‘open gate’ [?]

SH pp. 11-2 tout autre in Celan, ganz Anderen Sache, other does not contradict, enters into alliance w/, in expropriating, “inmost concern”

——several singular events concentrated in same date, this concentration (Konzentration) a terrible word for memory, but also the gathering of soul, Kafka’s attention of prayer

p. 21 carrier-pigeon, in Celan, transports, transfers, but not a metaphor: [alliance?]

——ring, sign of belonging itself, condition of return > cipher of seal, imprint of ring, counts more than content of message, what matters is mark of belonging, manifested alliance

p. 31 insignificance of language, can only take on meaning in relation to a place (border, house, threshold, site) > formation of alliances, codes, contracts

pp. 32-3 tragic inversion of shibboleth, corruption of its differential value, from condition of alliance to discriminating limit, policing, normalization, methodical subjugation

p. 52 no “absolute poem,” but date (beyond calendar/clocks), madness of “when,” unthinkable Einmal (once), terrifying ambiguity of shibboleth > sign of belonging (alliance), threat of discrimination (war)

OTO p. 17 alliance in which Nietzsche seals/forges his signatures, and simulates them: demonic neutrality of midday delivered from the negative and from dialectic

Gii p. 45 for Heidegger, Handschlag (handshake) > “grounds” alliance, accord, engagement (Bund)

RM p. 75 the trait of lentame (breaching-broaching incision) marks Ereignis as propriation, event of propriation (not an originary instance prior/proper to the 2 quil entame et allie)

ALS SICH

HERP p. 173 Dasein—possibility of “as such (als)” and Verstehen (understanding)

A pp. 36-7 Heidegger says animal cannot experience death as such, and that animal cannot speak [Derrida draws out undeveloped relation btwn language and death]

——if death can’t be experienced as such both to language and to what exceeds language, border btwn animal & Dasein would become unassignable

p. 71 als not yet als sich [see ATIA pp. 142-43 for als-structure]

p. 75 Heidegger: “death”—annihilation of “as such”; can one experience “as such” as such?

p. 78 ultimate aporia is impossibility of the aporia as such, incalculable reservoir

PP pp. 156-57 no as such where writing or play are concerned, they cannot be classically affirmed (since they have no essence) w/out being negated, le jeu et la graphie vont sans cesse disparaissant

VM p. 139 for Hegel, empiricism always forgets it uses the words “to be”; empiricism: thinking by metaphor w/out thinking the metaphor as such

PAS PAS p. (22) disproportion of present dislocates unity of as such (identity of region or object)

p. (33) what happens when we treat the essence of proximity as such (like we would the color red)

VP p. 29 the “as such”: totality of body, of mundane, totality of the spatial, the visible > not worked over (ne sont pas travaillés) by Geist, which transforms Körper into Leib

p. 87 Hegel seems more radical than Husserl in that he demands thought of positive infinite, so that “the indefiniteness of differance may appear as such

S pp. 50-1 animal has and does not have world, has access to entities, but not entities als sich

pp. 52-3 Heidegger suggests we draw a line through rock to think animal’s relation to it

——erasure of the name, name of rock, erasure of possibility to name rock, as such, to access being-rock

PPHS p. 76 Aufhebung facilitates spirit’s elevation beyond that within which it was submerged, sublimates nature into itself > presenting itself to itself as such

T pp. x-xi philosophy has always thought its other, that which limits it; does to think the other solely mean relever, to control the other? or does the limit/passage always reserve one more coup; to think the proper of the other, the other as such is to miss it, to miss the missing of the other [on manque (de) le manquer]: examine the relevance of the limit

OS p. 66 trace cannot be illuminated, cannot be named as such, as such evades us forever

ATIA pp. 18-20 in avowing his desire to avoid appropriative projection before animal’s gaze, to avoid tradition [Benjamin, Heidegger] that assigns deep sadness (Traurigkeit) to animal’s Benommenheit (inability to respond to name it’s given, inability to experience being “as such”)

——for Benjamin, animal/nature not sad because mute but mute because sad: not the sadness of passivity, of not being able to name, but of receiving ones name > a foreshadowing of mourning

——every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

p. 142 for Heidegger, animal cannot experience world “as such” [explains this w/ breadth of rigor Derrida finds incomparable]

pp. 142-43 for Heidegger, ‘as’-structure founds logos, animal deprived of logos because w/out “as such” > apophantic logos: becoming language of “as such” [deception belongs to essence of logos]

p. 147-48 for Heidegger, “awakening” [of attunement (Stimmung)] in question of the apophantic, “as such,” not consciousness/unconscious duality: won’t understand affective tonality via cogito

p. 156 the differential of animot, animals, should complicate oppositional structure: either have “as such” or don’t (has or doesn’t have world)

p. 157 Aristotle’s non-apophantic logos (neither enunciative nor declarative): euchē, prayer, entreaty, requesting; for Derrida, these would open breach in whole apparatus [of “as such”?]

p. 159 differences btwn how a human eats and how an animal eats are not those btwn “as such” and “not as such,” the ambition of describing this difference exceeds “me (Derrida)”

——w/out “as such,” animals don’t know how to “let be,” let beings be as such: animal as a utilitarian, always putting-in-perspective [does man really escape this trap?]

***p. 160 to “let” something “be” “as such,” you would have to “let be” in your absence, in your death [thus, for Heidegger, being-toward-death and “as such” constitutive of each other], but is this ever possible? can we let the being be? Nietzsche would say no, that the objective is always caught in the living, in life, in perspective > whatever the difference btwn animals, remains an “animal” relation

——Derrida’s strategy re: border(s) btwn animal/human: there is no pure and simple “as such”

——restructuring (pluralizing/varying) “as such” in relation to animal would upset whole framework of Heideggerian discourse, the ontological difference

GSP p. 163 noema: the “as such” > does not borrow its materiality from consciousness, an object (but not real) > nonappurtenance to any region, anarchy of noema > root of all objectivity

——wouldn’t this nonreality disrupt the inclination toward regionality of phenomenological method?

DIF DIF p. 25 trace & difference cannot appear as such, sheltered (sabrite)/dissimulated in names (received in metaphysical text)

pp. 25-6 differance never be appropriated by “as such,” threatens authority of “as such,” presence of thing itself in its essence

CHM pp. 54, 309n work, reason, discourse starts w/ appeal to “as such,” to meaning of Being [before determination of existence/essence] (thus, madness: silence, nonmeaning, absent in work)

Gii p. 301n Derrida sees Heidegger’s reflections on as such [re: borderline btwn man/animal] as similar to his reflections on the hand, ability to give or take as such [see p. 43]

RM pp. 64-6 quasi-metaphor of Being, since it is nothing, since its as obliterates its as such

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, since “as such” is no longer in control, the exhibited functions of text are not montrée but montée (not displayed but put in play, not staged but engaged…)

pp. 313-14 the opening, as presence, is not noticed as opening—we’re fascinated, glued to what presents itself: we’re unable to see presence as such, visibility of visible > never present themselves

UWC pp. 234-37 [perhaps, “if,” event] not horizon of power, of “I can,” irruption that punctures horizon, interrupts performative organization of “as if,” “as such” > “as” name of true problem/target of deconstruction: authority of “as” founds/justifies every ontology, phenomenology, knowledge, science

SPEC pp. 289-90 Repression upsets logic implicit in all philosophy, pleasure that can’t be felt as such > “cannot be experienced as such”

ALTER-EGO

OOG p. 61 egological content discovers dimension of “we” as moment of the eidosego,” transcendental we not something other than transcendental Ego

p. 114 for Husserl, empathizing (Einfühling) possible due to apriori universal structures of sociality/historicity, external inquiry depends on internal intuition

VM pp. 123-24 Husserl’s alter-ego, nonviolent respect of secret, of separation, we can only know the other through analogical appresentation > translates recognition of radical separation

p. 131 for Husserl, my world is opening in which all experience occurs, including experience par excellence > transcendence toward Other as such

——Husserl called irreducible egoic essence of experience “archi-factuality” (Urtatsache)

VP p. 60 for Husserl, the alter-ego in one’s interior solitude is only ever fiction

POOF pp. 54-5 allied in “joint acquiescence to disjunction,” monadic alterities, the proper of the alter-ego is never accessible [see SPOM p. 35]

ATIA p. 79 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance

TN p. 171 for Husserl, when I touch myself w/ my finger: no haptical mirror-effect, no insinuation of alterity

pp. 190-91 Derrida defends Husserl’s stubborn conviction that we can’t know alter-ego, only through analogy, appresentation, that there’s an unbridgeable abyss (abîme infranchissable) > Husserl’s stance prevents risk of an immediate intutionism of the other

p. 192 pre-originary mourning (re: Husserl’s vigilant stance on alter-ego) tied to motif of exappropriation—interiorization, even introjection, never achieved [Derrida has more in common w/ Husserl than Merleau-Ponty?]

pp. 192-93 the difference Derrida adds to Husserl’s alter-ego: recognize lirréductible écart even in the touchant-touché de ma propre main [there’s alter-ego in my own proper body as human ego]

p. 226 Nancy: phenomenology touches/exceeds its own limit in Cartesian Meditations > pré-donation of the alter-ego”

p. 233 intertwining btwn present/nonpresent ensures presence of alter-ego in heart of ego

EW p. 263 even in the most marked transcendental idealism (Husserl’s), alter-ego leads back to a pre-egological and pre-subjectivist zone (transcendental passive genesis of time and other)

BSi pp. 270-72 Celan’s tout autre [ganz Andere] not alter-ego, not another living present, but inaccessible other

OG p. 190 Rousseau’s pity as distance, not “do onto others…” but “do good to yourself w/ as little evil as possible to others” > don’t interiorize other’s pain too much (it would no longer be the other’s)

ALTERITY

GOD p. 84 is Levinas’ face god or human? unable to differentiate infinite alterity of God from that of human > Levinas & Kierkegaard can’t find limit btwn religious & ethical

SEC p. 315 iter (from itara, other, in Sanskrit) > everything that links otherness to repetition

p. 317 no context, no code can enclose written syntagma > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

VM pp. 126-27 how could there be “play of the Same” if alterity were not already in the same?

p. 129 Hegel recognized negativity, anxiety or war in infinite absolute, as movement of absolute’s own history, whose horizon is a final pacification in which alterity would be absolutely encapsulated (résumée), if not lifted up (levée), in parousia

p. 316n “alterity, difference, and time are not suppressed but retained by absolute knowledge in the form of the Aufhebung

POS p. 81 spacing indicates an irreducible alterity, is indissociable from concept alterity

ATIA p. 102 unthought, unconscious, other of the “I think,” (the animal je suis), a function of machinality > haunts automatically, like an evil genius, the Cartesian animal-machine & Kant’s teleological, providential-machine (where war machines presumed to have civilizing effect)

DIF DIF p. 21 radical alterity of every possible mode of presence marked by irreducibility of aftereffect (daprès-coup), of delay (de retardement) [Nächtriglichkeit]

——Levinas’ trace, enigma of absolute alterity (a past never present), solicits domination of beings (w/in these limits, differance implies Levinas’ entire critique of classical ontology)

HST p. 394 Levinas: “I” does not endow itself w/ this [temporal] alterity: impossibility of dialectical time is impossibility of saving oneself by oneself (alone)

p. 395 Levinas: freedom is not negating oneself but having one’s being pardoned by alterity of the other—dialogue w/ other, not silent dialogue w/ our soul, frees us

LI p. 44 logical force of iter: ties repetition to alterity

TN p. 171 for Husserl, when I touch myself w/ my finger: no haptical mirror-effect, no insinuation of alterity

p. 218 Nancy’s partager: 1) affinity, crossings, “tangency” 2) a partitioning, un autre départ: this alterity of bodies follows the line partly of the technical & partly of a beyond Christianity

AD p. 52 alterity as movement of temporalization

OG p. 315 (443-44) Rousseau describes w/out declaring, en contrebande, the originary exteriority of writing: alterity

SPEC pp. 282-83 when master (PP) submits to the work of the secondary (RP), “submits” to its own lieutenant, addresses to himself simulated engagement via detour of institutional telecommunication—il s’envoie, il s’écrit, PP déchaine en lui lautre absolu > alterity more irreducible than alterity of opposition

ALTHUSSER

SPOM p. 112 Althusser tried to dissociate Marxism from teleology and messianic eschatology

AMERICA

MPM p. 18 “America is deconstruction” > no, we learn from deconstruction to suspend hasty attributions of proper names

p. 129 necessary to think America w/ mad lucidity under the light of lunacy

FWT p. 27 denunciation of “political correctness” in U.S. is organized/manipulated by conservatives

pp. 134-35 censorship enforced by loss of job [capitalism] in America [re: movie Mr Death, Holocaust denier]

R pp. 13-4 de Tocqueville sees America as having a sovereignty that acts circularly by itself with no operator or sovereign divided-off from it, outside of it > “no authorities except w/in itself” [Rousseau’s Social Contract] p. 15 pure actuality of Aristotle’s Prime Mover

p. 36 because of undecidability linked to autoimmune logic, can never “prove” whether it’s more democratic to include/exclude immigrants, vote/not vote directly, both protect democracy through some exclusion, some renvoi

p. 96 rogue state is whoever U.S. says it is [Chomsky]

p. 104 United States, w/out consulting anyone, gives itself the right to protect its “vital interests”

——[Derrida on 9/11]: not as unforeseeable as everyone claimed; the trauma that occurred, not what actually happened, but apprehension of a worse threat still to come

DPi p. 42 in U.S., argument is about a good and tolerable DP

p. 71 however powerless, in U.S. you find most vigilant & best informed forces of protest [re: abolitionism?]

p. 74 in U.S., history of civil rights & slavery part of history of DP (also overarming incomparable to other nations)

p. 79 U.S. (& China) will come under more pressure to end DP [?]; p. 80 apparent teleology of abolition movement seems to tend toward international criminal court (to which states consent to abandon sovereignty) > long way off

p. 175 re: U.S., who can deny DP as political justice is class justice

PF p. xxii feeble prejudice, obscurantist disavowal that claims deconstruction found its only or its best welcome in U.S.

HLP p. 64 Derrida likes U.S. phrase “civil disobedience” (Thoreau), that respectable tradition where raison détat does not dispense last word in ethics

——resist positive laws (not all laws), laws that betray their own foundation

IW p. 265 “deconstruction in America”: fable, allegory, metonymy?

PJP pp. 171-72 U.S. more obsessed w/ perjury than any other Western Country

p. 194 most vulgar forms of media violence—link btwn television, University, & “American law” [Trump]

p. 199 Bill Clinton’s perjury first private (infidelity), then public (“what ‘is’ is”)

PSSS pp. 261-62 American hegemony at once obvious & more critical/vulnerable re: globalization, worldwide-ization underway

p. 262 U.S. in crisis w/ DP [?] (also, U.S. ostracizing Freudian psychoanalysis)

LI p. 38 American professors 2nd to none in knowledge of migrations, wanderings (déplacements)

pp. 115-16 no “completeness” where freeplay is concerned > freeplay an inadequate translation of jeu (& network connected to it): “freeplay” [in deconstruction] greatly overestimated in U.S.

CF p. 47 Derrida on nefarious [my word choice] Bill and Hillary Clinton

BSi p. 19 “rogue (voyou, Schurke) state”—U.S.’s hypocritical rhetorical stratagem (Chomsky)

p. 36 collapsus of World Trade Center

pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

p. 89 from Chomsky, U.S. military tactics purposely out of control to seem blind, seem crazy, like an animal

UWC p. 212 mondialisation has to go through U.S.

EU p. 5 Latin, then American English: privileged media of philosophical or techno-scientific communication

pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

FV pp. 474-75 full speech, contracts only w/ itself, system of truth > Lacan not proposing crude readjustment [i.e. American psychology] but rarity à la Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit

WBH p. 190 guardians of institution are guardians of Law > as women’s studies gains institutional legitimacy, it produces guardians of the Law; U.S. is a pioneer of women’s studies

——U.S. more faithful to 19th century model of University than most European countries

p. 196 resistance opposed to deconstruction same as one opposed to woman’s studies, “something sexual at stake in the resistance to deconstruction,” deconstruction successful in U.S. among homosexuals, feminists

p. 200 receiver as determining factor of gift, one who responds, performativity of text produces receiver w/out pre-existing [him/her/it]

——Declaration of Independence signed by God, signs American people into existence, they didn’t exist before it

——it is by the gift that Law is produced, the signature engenders sender, receiver, signer

ANACOLUTHON/ACOLYTE

VM p. 147 following Levinas, what would a language w/out phrase offer the other? a master who forbids himself the phrase gives nothing, has no disciples, only slaves

TR p. 123 dissemination of textual event called anacoluthon [re: de Man on Rousseau]

PJP pp. 166-67 Derrida considers anacoluthon the most productive figure, a general formalization of Miller’s “polylogology”: multiplicity of voices, more than 1 voice in 1 voice, trace of perjury gets lost, leads us astray > this dispersion threatens concept, identity, identity of “I”

p. 173 davoir perjuré en jurant: 2 moments of perjury envelop each other; was the promise not to lie, the swearing, truthful? (possibility of anacoluthic discontinuity)

——ultimate resource/fatality of the anacoluthon: multiplicity of times, instants, interruption time inscribes in “me” > the perjurer can always ask to be excused

p. 179 the suspension of metonymy, quotation, interruption, quasi anacoluthic change of subject > interruption in the obvious: shadow at heart of light

p. 181 acolyte follows, assists, supplements: akoluthia, suppléant [see Condillac], accomplice?

——non sans fausser quelque peu compagnie (not without giving someone the slip), companion becomes “the one who did not accompany” [Blanchot’s naccompagne pas]

——acolyte, anacolytic, anakolouthia, analytic figure: as much an analyst as a breach, interruption> a rupture in a set (contract), be it that of friendship, community, being-together

p. 183 anacoluthon gives rise to fictions or perhaps undecidable lie, perjury, that never can be excluded on part of narrator, author

p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

p. 187 anacoluthon’s metonymy blurs/complicates all frontiers, instigates all substitutions

——anacoluthic catastrophe finds one of its privileged places in fold where the guilty accuses the witness, makes him bear responsibility for the offense

p. 189 anacoluthic substitution of subject, replacement of acolyte—motor, motivation, dramatic emotion of narrative

——generalized anacoluthon would make narrator an acolyte of his “character” or “friend”

——identificatory substitution would harbor the betrayal, perjury, at heart of every narration, confession, “relation,” rapport

——[identificatory substitution] wreaks havoc w/ veracity while being its condition

——narrator, unconscious subject, smuggles, yes, yes, the contrary into the narrative (denegative form [“I am not Chalier”] > yet another disavowal at heart of avowal)

pp. 190-91 even more impossible than report-confession: countersignature of acolyte (most impossible impossible: narrator himself) > unique impossibility [cf. IW p. 287 particular nothing]

——amnesia, irreducible distraction, disappearance at heart of finite thought: the resource, power of anacoluthon [see p. 194]

pp. 191-92 narrative of a disappearance: signature gets erased moment it enters literature [like question in EJQB]

p. 193 acolyte, narrator-friend-witness-countersignatory, “I am myself the rapport,” relation w/out relation, the impossible report/relation (and translation)

p. 194 rapport (analogies of this rapport)—obscure alchemy that precipitates an “us”—in the shelter of/from (à labri de) some sober & inevitable perjury: we guard ourselves form perjury we inhabit

***p. 196 the us of the anacoluthon, not absolute knowledge, anacoluthon interrupts forever: no one says better, “we are not present to the truth of this us” than the acolyte

——when we are present, truth’s not there; suivre/être [see ATIA]

pp. 196, 300n when narrator claims to be quoting: makes the other say

p. 197 maddening irregularity of anacoluthon: dispersal/disavowal of “you,” “us,” where is the reader, the supposed addressees?

ANALOGY

HASD pp. 32-3 Being must be created by what exceeds the border, the Good, intelligible sun, something that far surpasses (hyperekhontos) [Republic 509b], excess of God, light is in Good’s image

——light produced by sun is son of the Good (neither visible, nor sight or vision), excess itself described by what it exceeds, even negative discourse retains ontology, does not interrupt analogical continuity [btwn perceptible/intelligible sun, the Good and that to which it gives birth, allusion to triton genos, i.e. khora]

p. 34 Plato’s use of “third species” as analogical mediation, concerns Being, epekeina tes ousias, and khora > khora also constitutes a third species (triton genos), isn't intelligible paradigm

p. 42 encomium is “neither true nor false, not even contradictory” [Marion] > though it says something about the thearchy, about the Good and the analogy

MSUB J p. 171 everything is singular each time and each time analogical: a figuration of the other

SEC p. 311-12 analogy a major concept in Condillac

p. 313 idea/sign relation preserved through all forms of writing [in Condillac] (hieroglyph, ideograph, phonetic): economic, mechanical, homogenous reduction, community of analogical participation

VM pp. 123-24 Husserl’s alter-ego, nonviolent respect of secret, of separation, we can only know the other through analogical appresentation > translates recognition of radical separation

pp. 142-43 humanism, separating man from animal, via analogy of God and human face [vis-à-vis Descartes, ambiguity of substance as concerns God and his creatures], is this not the original metaphor? Levinas’ metaphysical humanism

POOF p. 16 analogy btwn spirit (nous) & animal body inscribes in living body habitus of this contretemps

PP p. 82 son as interest on capital investment, as return, revenue, son as physical sun, analogon of intelligible sun (the Good, capital, origin of all onta); father as noooumena, son as horōmena

meaning of patēr sometimes exclusively financial capital

p. 159 Plato uses letter, alphabet, for pedagogical ends > never thematizes law of difference made apparent, the irreducibility of structure & relation, of proportionality, w/in analogy

OH pp. 68-9 ideality in capitalization: that which exceeds borders of sensible, opens onto infinite, gives rise to universal, “maxim of maximization,” nothing other than spirit itself (analogic)

VP p. 12 [re: not substantializing Husserlian “transcendental”] language never escapes analogy, is analogy through & through > classical war of language, casting metaphors against metaphors, takes place in difference > le langage garde la différence qui garde le langage

FSW p. 225 Kant’s 3 modes of times, 3 analogies of experience: permanence, succession, simultaneity

WM p. 216 to signify metaphorical process, coins have often been used, analogy w/in language described by analogy btwn language and something other than itself > but that which seems to figure [i.e. coins] cannot be contained w/in regional science, linguistics philology: opens a discourse on figuration itself

p. 235n Condillac (whose philosophy, more than, or like, every other, can be considered a treatise on analogy): all tropes are metaphors, transport from one meaning to another

pp. 237-38 imitation sets man apart from beasts, man alone takes pleasure in imitating > metaphor, an effect of mimēsis and homoiosis, manifestation of analogy, a subordinate means of knowledge: full truth preferred to metaphor

pp. 241-42 Aristotle’s 4 types of metaphor: 1) genus to species 2) species to genus 3) species to species 4) analogy (he privileges analogy, which has nothing hidden or elliptical about it)

p. 243 if, acc. Aristotle, every metaphor is an elliptical comparison or analogy, then the metaphor comparing sun’s flames to sowing seed is metaphor par excellence, an ellipsis of ellipsis

P p. 36 Kant looking for a bridge from sensible to supersensible (an analogy), a symbol—that crosses/closes abyss

——bridge (Brücke) not an analogy, concept/effect of analogy makes the bridge itself

——analogy of abyss & bridge over abyss require 3rd term, that which heals the gap, a symbol, bridge is symbol, symbol bridge > abyss calls for analogy (active resource of Critique), mais lanalogie sabîme sans fin dès lors quil faut bien un certain art pour décrire analogiquement le jeu de lanalogie

pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

pp. 117-18 in Kant, art of man analogized with art of creator (unity of empirical laws), man has goal before operating, this effaces a priori the sans, the pure cut of free beauty

——connection btwn anthropo-theologism & analogism: course being steered [Spinoza says something quite tangential in Ethics], analogy w/ practical finality is its medium

——analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), lanalogisme recapitule ou recapite

OS p. 49(n) time compared by Aristotle to movement and chance, w/out being either one of them, time can only occur en tēi psukhēi > time’s analogy: what is traced (le tracé) as line, grammē

p. 49n for Kant, inner intuition of time gives us no shape, so we make up for this via analogy: time is a line progressing to infinity > but where parts of line are simultaneous, parts of time are successive

p. 58 analogy, correspondence: enigma of “at the same time” [re: relation of time to space, changes of place, movement]

ATIA p. 79 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance

FS p. 27 “fall” of thought into philosophy, analogical displacement of Being which anchors (retient) and irremediably represses discourse in metaphysics, gets history under way (est entamée)

AFR p. 43 how can Locke carve out a trail while repeating an earlier rupture? he applied a general law to particular domain

——by preceding analogically, he discovered an unknown > invention by analogy (or analysis): new “objects” created by transposing, proportioning, analyzing

pp. 44-7 for Condillac, sensation is unmodifiable, first material, immediate presence, but also a germ for analogic sign > degrees of intensity, combinative energetics, good analogy, “identical proportions”

——sensationalist metaphysics, via analogic, develops into semiotism: sign unfolds (développe) germ

p. 72 passage (continuity and/or rupture) from one operation to an other always amounts to difference, quantity, of force > via analogy, this quantity of force is always that of connection

p. 73 innovation as revelation, analysis as analogical process, energy connecting present to absent > concept of force as force of repetition (retracing, supplying)

——Derrida sees here a silent explosion in text or fission in each concept (Condillac, elsewhere, denounces obscurantist force of “metaphor” [hence analogical value])

pp. 80-1 Condillac: if there is fundamentally only one machine, there is fundamentally only one property > unique property assures possibility of “identical propositions,” this self-evident identity (nontautological) is discovered by way of Reason, is “the only sign of evidence” > all modifications are those of first property modifying itself: sensibility

——Condillac’s non-Cartesian indubitability: first property which knows itself (sensibility)

pp. 81-2 Condillac transposes Newtonian discourse [into the mind (lâme) as general principle of analogy?]: analogy creates language & method

pp. 82-3 Condillac: men of genius, favorite disciples of nature, make language seem less arbitrary—method of invention is only analogy itself (analogy: art of reasoning & speaking)

——that math can be a model for analogy: unlimited generality of principle of analogy

p. 92 Condillac considered theory of signs (analogy) in Essay, its most original advance

p. 94 force, analogy, signification will always be ordered to a theory of need (don’t rush to oppose to theory of desire)

***pp. 100-01 Condillac’s theory of analogy (operation of remarking): supply a language’s defects > remarks anteriority in the fact, an anteriority (of the fact) that becomes lacking in itself > supply what is necessary, is missing (il faut), but [remark] also presents itself as surplus value, a superabundance, frivolous futility > makes all commerce possible (as value & sign)

pp. 101-02 operation of suppléance (supplementation or supplying) produces overabundance & frivolous futility

p. 117 identical proposition as powerful circle, finality of the same, circle of identity, self-evidence [brings whole to part] [but how can this circle close if whole is different from part?]

p. 128 frivolity originates from deviation or gap of signifier, also from its folding back on itself in closed, nonrepresentative identity

——we escape frivolity only at semantic risk of nonidentity; Condillac names nonidentity metaphor, makes it the primordial structure of language to begin its analogical/teleological reappropriation

p. 132 for Condillac, degree, gradual difference, ruins “identical proposition,” dislocates is > yet, degree also makes synthesis of “identical proposition” possible (prohibiting frivolity)

***p. 133 a “stretched sense” always risks being empty, [the analogic of the sign], means we never escape 2 imaginations, 2 identities, 2 metaphysics, 2 barbarisms > always a double or stand-in for idea itself: frivolity’s last/first garment

C p. 196 paradeiknymi: to show to one side, analogy, assign, tribute, distribute

p. 201 analogy, like the putting into series of series: must remain accidental

——analogy belongs to order of contingent > appeals neither to model nor example (i.e. both Sade & Titus-Carmel ration the remainder, stage a work & jouissance re: remainder [excrement]) [Derrida is “randomly” comparing Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins to Sade’s 120 days]

p. 215 copro-necrophagy: for those who found the analogy btwn 120 Days…and Titus-Carmel’s coffins forced > [Titus-Carmel has written: “place it there and eat it in a single mouthful”]

LI p. 118 more “scientific” to accept that a scientific analogy inadequate for a theory of language

ATM pp. 186-87 can one analogize the fault against God’s name w/ fault against any Name? only if analogy functions btwn absolute heterogeneities [?] [theonymic cemetery]

E p. 4 for Kant, nature speaks to us through its beautiful forms, one can read the “ciphered language (Chiffreschrift),” nature’s signature as art productions

——even if this stance is opposed to Hegel [only art is beautiful], analogy btwn art and nature always provides a principle of reconciliation

pp. 4-5 proportional analogy btwn oppositions dissolves them, but first the oppositions must be produced, and there’s [almost?] always a regular hierarchy

p. 13 discursive metaphors (i.e. nature says, dictates, prescribes) that function as analogies of analogy > in such cases, nature is properly logos (toward which one must always return)

——analogy of God and poet proceeds from and returns to logos, source as mouth and outlet (embouchure)

pp. 13-14 when analogy is the rule (nature speaks, God speaks, highest poet speaks): “ça veut dire que ça veut dire et que ça dit que ça veut dire que ça veut et que ça veut ce que ça veut par exemple

——analogy as rule btwn rule of art & moral rule > articulated play of analogy is subject to law of supplementarity: we admire nature [beauty] w/out the [moral] purpose appearing to us

p. 17 Kant analogizes division of Fine-Arts w/ the mode of expression man possess in Sprechen (not w/out slight embarrassment) [this serves a teleological function]

p. 18 poetic speech, beyond finite commerce (out of circulation), yet of infinite value: the universal analogical equivalent, the value of values; through poetry, work of mourning turns hetero-affection into auto-affection, producing maximum of disinterested pleasure

p. 19 for Kant, hearing is closest to freedom and spontaneity, one must use term hearing-oneself-speak (le sentendre-parler) because the structure is auto-affective; the mute thus do not have reason, the mouth (indissociable from ear) is not simply an analogy of expression: it is the ground of analogy, regulates analogy, it is logos itself [necessary]

pp. 23-5 what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of indentification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

BSi p. 14 an analogy [re: beast & sovereign] is always a reason, a logos, a calculus > a relation of production in which identity and difference co-exist

p. 20 analogy [re: beast and sovereign] announces (like a black cloud) the historical (actual & virtual) violences, disasters we won’t (already don’t) have a name for

p. 70 sovereign state as Leviathan, as animal-machine, as prosthstatics > beast et (est) sovereign coupled across a copula: affinity through analogy, proportion, reciprocal fascination—or grafting

p. 80 analogy as mediation, Kant’s schema of imagination: btwn intuition & concept of understanding

OG p. 91 heliocentric concept of speech, analogical system: king, father, sun, logos > [ethnocentrism of this concept: all other languages delayed logocentrism]

p. 103 for Lévi-Strauss, each “comme” and “de même” authorize analogy btwn phonology and sociology: phonology exemplary as the example in a series, not a regulative ideal

pp. 213-14 harmony, chromatics, calculation; analogy btwn painting & music is analogy itself

EU p. 85 [vis-à-vis Kant] university as an “artificial (künstliche) institution” guaranteed by analogy: industry, trustee, collective

ANALYSIS

POO p. 3 “anyone can specialize in the analysis of rituals; it is not therefore a specialty”

——the uncertain boundary btwn actor & analyst

p. 131n Edgar Allen Poe’s def. of analysis: imaginative

PP p. 169 analyst tries to distinguish btwn two repetitions, which is good which is bad

F p. xlvii analyst can only decrypt secret seal of [other, patient’s] name w/ his own name > works on his own name

ROP pp. 9-10 the poleros (politics, polemos, eros, seduction) of analysis, ends in an abyss, where resistance to psychoanalytic Lösung, in the name of truth, can only be a disavowal > to analyze, to say to other: prefer, take, love my solution, you will be in truth if you do not resist my solution

——Derrida proposes an other resistance, that of the remainder, thus a restanalysis

p. 11 what forever exceeds the analysis of the dream: a knot that can’t be untied, un fil, qui, pour être coupé, comme un cordon ombilical, nen reste pas moins à jamais noué [knotted even when cut], à même le corps, a la place du nombril [name?] > la cicatrice est un noeud contre lequel lanalyse ne peut rien

pp. 18-20 history of analysis, from Plato to Freud, has Freud invented a new solution to analytical resistance or has he inherited by way of paleonym?; no choice but to keep 2 motifs analysis, doubling of analuein: 1) archeological/anagogical movement toward originary birth 2) eschatological movement toward last word, toward untying, breaking down (lytic, lytological, philolytic) [analysis in teaching (philosophy), in confession]

——as such, Freud’s discourse answerable to logico-epistemological tribunal of analytic tradition

p. 21 paralysis gives movement w/ regard to its other [this is in reference to impossibility of psychoanalysis’ auto-interpretation] (in PAS, paralysis distinguished from logic of analysis)

pp. 29-30 double bind drives deconstruction in rhythmic compulsion to track desire for origin, and to raise its stakes, la pousse à une surenchère > interminable drama of analysis, il fallait faire droit to the law deconstructed, w/ une affirmation donatrice unknown to yet driving analysis

pp. 31-2 iterability as condition/constitution of identity, ideality, of all concepts, but also (double bind) that which resists hierarchical and binary oppositions, a quasi-concept, inconceivable concept > not confusion, approximation, but “reaffirmed exigency of analysis”

p. 33 what always rejects analysis: nonsimple, origin under erasure, trace, or affirmation of gift as trace [differance as divisibility]

p. 34 analysis is interminable because there is no indivisible/simple element

p. 36 double bind (preferable to double contrainte), is the call to analysis: one can never fully analyze it, one can only unbind one of its knots by making the other tighter: movement I call stricture

DPi p. 153 analysis as internal dissociation, element by element

CHM pp. 32-3 the hermeneut, the analyst, must first know language of patient, the immediate materiality of sign (move from sign to signified, obvious meaning to latent)

AFR p. 43 how can Locke carve out a trail while repeating an earlier rupture? he applied a general law to particular domain

——by preceding analogically, he discovered an unknown > invention by analogy (or analysis): new “objects” created by transposing, proportioning, analyzing

NOY pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

CIR pp. 287-88 pronounce an atrociously tragic sentence, make its quotation marks appear, abandoning it to anonymity, putting forward an analysis > for more drama, who more than the other is vulnerable to analysis?

SPEC p. 316 analysand-locomotive (speculator/analyst the 1st analysand): for whom law of listening substituted for law of looking

FV p. 487n Poe: it is in matters beyond limits of rule that skill of analyst is evinced

ANGLE

H p. 39 read from another angle, not simply a triangle

LOBL p. 109 life being drawn through by sharp dividing line, edge where it is impossible to settle: arrête, angle of instability impossible to settle (sarrêter)

pp. ~171-72 think exteriority from angle of economy of the arrêt: greatest “bound” energy, bandée, tightly gathered around its own limit (Hemmung, Haltung) > immediately disseminated, sand, empty, unloaded, spontaneously: in trance of trans, ghosts, transes, folies du jour (cf. Glas on trépas, trans/partition [Derrida’s referring to Genet crossing national borderlines])

MPM p. 72 via de Man, figure of “defective cornerstone,” “neglected corners” > required by architecture [of system], deconstructs from w/in

SH p. 5 Buchecker (beechmast), book corners, sharp, gaping edges of a text

F p. xv [method] the break-in technique (leffraction) that permits one to penetrate the crypt: locating crack or lock, choosing angle of entry, and proceed by force

p. xix le tiers incorporé est gardé pour être supprimé [held in to be crossed out]: assembly of witnesses around Wolf Man’s crypt (forum): whole strategy of testifying > on sy coupe tout le temps, witnesses testify by interrupting, wounded by angular edges of forum

p. xx [angular] partitions [w/in Self] of crypt: fractures into angular pieces, arranges (aménage) cavities, corridors, zigzag labyrinths, anfractuosities, craggy (escarpées) fortifications > effects of breakages (cassures); requires light in darkness to shine on inner partition of splintered symbol (intrasymbolic not cosymbolic): each fragment conscious to itself, unconscious to ‘non-crypt’

p. xxvi Abraham and Torok translate by setting each language at an angle w/ itself: shattered (brisée) linearity

p. xxxiii-xxxiv anasemia: 1) narrative (superposing of “account (récit)”), story, fable w/in concept 2) angle 3) sepulcher

p. xlii [re: Wolf Man’s cryptonomic translations] phonetic contaminations, nonsemantic associations, neither rhetorical figures nor metonymic displacements > but angular: contact (semantic or formal) w/ surface of its allosemes acc. most economical line/surface; angles make itinerary unreadable, makes cryptonomic the once inflexible logic of castration

pp. xlii-xliii 2 routes (both angular) (double density) the Thing follows at dividing line (the Thing marked by same dividing line as symbol broken by crypt): 1) crosses unconscious directly (tableau, symptom) 2) crosses intrasymbolic crack (alloseme)

***p. xlviii [Derrida’s speech]: feel on tongue angular cut of shattered word, et je sens alors, de ma langue, langle coupant dun mot brisé

DS p. 177 double session finds its corner (coin) BTWN (ENTRE) literature & truth (that by which question “what is?” wants answering): figure of folding back, angle ensured by fold

p. 234 certain mimic inscribes a graft in one corner, holding antre open

p. 251 sum can’t be totalized, nor is this non-totalizing exceeded by infinite richness of content of meaning or intention > define the limit otherwise: fold w/ no possibility of folding text back on itself (angle & intersection of re-mark), no reduction of its spacing > blank, fold: impossibility of (imaginary) theme beyond textual instance > these textual effects rich w/ kind of poverty, singular/regular monotony, disappear: one can’t see this because one thinks one is seeing themes

p. 256n lime, lima, limus—oblique (obliquity/curvature of teeth of a file)

p. 259 secret angle of fold > “miniscule tomb”

p. 277 crisis of literature est marquée au coin de cet excès > figure of corner testifies to this in all its recastings/retemperings (corner, coin, angle, seal, fold, hymen, open recess, etc.)

——Mallarmé’s play (on “plume,” on “winds [brise]”) anathema to thematization, to deciphering meaning > coin-entre

pp. 279-80(n) [quoting Mallarmé] rhythm, literary game par excellence: mimic suspense/laughter—rhythmic cadence, or case, all the falls, the silent fall of pen

POS p. 46 DS re-marks a nerve, fold, angle, doubled fold of undecidable, a mark marks both marked and the mark, re-marked site of mark, can’t be counted on list of themes—hollow is the relief: hymen, fold, square, blank, margin, supernumber, column, air, chandelier

p. 86 dissemination is play of castration w/out metaphysical/romantic pathos of negativity > dissemination “is” angle of play of castration

p. 113n TN. se deliter, “disembed,” klinē, incline, clinique

P pp. 73-4 effects of deconstructed frame would not be an absence of one, labîme [undo the frame] en coin dans ses angles et ses articulations, slyly—see picture from the side of the wood (not teleological, not harmony, internal becomes external); thickness taken into account

p. 81 practice of fiction must guard against being reappropriated w/in metaphysical truth, show up remnants of angle in round frames (spirit as round form for Hegel)

O p. 11 dissemination: generalizes theory/practice of graft w/out proper body, skew w/out straight line [?], bias w/out front [Nietzsche perspectivism?]

p. 25 [nonsynonymous synonyms] > never enclosed in finite taxonomy > no lexicon as such, can’t be pinned to a point, marks of dissemination, undecidable acc. 2 of binary opposition, not sublatable into 3 of speculative dialectics > displaced along angle of certain re-folding

——dissemination displaces 3 of ontotheology along angle of a certain refolding (re-ploiement)

p. 55 Derrida places logic of veil alongside that of corner > prelude, en passant, improbably place of dissemination

p. 59 if you wanna see for yourself, encounter by chance, enmeshed (engrenés) in some corner (coin), ce quil en est de la coupe or/livre

SW p. 326 when one cannot read original language, one is lost in translations (veils, fringes or clothing, panels, wings, corners)

p. 341 tallith: 4 corners of living skin

——fur (wool) & skin (leather): tallith must be something living taken from something living worn by something living > a burying of the dead that once had possibility of auto-affection

——homogeneity of textile, heterogeneity of the sewing of corners: another book

REST p. 278 what if, and Derrida sees it too, they’re 2 left shoes, a double that fudges (brouille) both “pair & identity” à la fois—paralyzes directionality, fait loucher vers le diable

p. 291 Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, lhymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

AFR p. 132 the frivolous: (time of a) difference (of degree), spacing which ontology isn’t capable of, con-, de-struction are breached, line of disintegration (not straight/continuous/regular); philosophy deviates from itself, strikes itself w/ blows from outside > deconstruction is possible

PSSS pp. 271-72 Freud on indirect methods to combat war, ruse of detour (Umweg)

——Freud advocates submitting life of drives to Diktatur der Vernunft, a Utopia > indirect stratagem of Eros/Thanatos: contrary to the cruelty drive, though cruelty knows no end

pp. 273-74 Freud’s indirection, oblique, angular, mediating nonstraightness: not just detour, strategic ruse, continuous transaction—but a leap, interruption, an ethical step

D pp. 289, 358-59 liminary question, Medusa, stone, flange, pierre dangle et dattente (cornerstone, toothing stone) > other enumeration, squarely written, remains in reserve, undecipherable

p. 294 [let’s mark in hollow, mute, invisible angle] statistical accumulation of “quotations,” [like constraints of that angle] accumulation as feigning to present the text > “this” text & all that touches it—still “that” text; generalized simulacrum: intertext of 2 fictions (btwn primary text & commentary) [Derrida will call D “this” text w/ a certain irony]

p. 295 passage toward other, se resserrer (fitting itself) into the angles btwn the surfaces, dans lentre-surface [inter(sur)face] > articulation of one surface sur lautre (dun temps sur lautre)

angle: night, blue passage of all tenses into each other, la torsion (twist)

——Derrida’s text: re-marks passage [in Soller’s], repeats square by closing angle, opens another surface of writing to-come: play w/ cardo, hinge, cardinal points; remarque dangle: all lines broken

p. 299 by a folding-back (reploiement) or internal angle of surface: face (frons scaenae) contemplates itself as unconditioned opening of appearance, but explains itself as surface-effect, as conditioned [by square apparatus]

p. 302 present can only present itself by relating back to itself [folding back on itself], (com)plying with itself (en se pliant à soi) dans langle, along la brisure: a “crack (faille)” created by a joint, hinge

p. 303 possibility (potency) of present is its own limit, inner fold, impossibility—its impotence (btwn presence/castration) > same goes for “history,” “form”: language of metaphysics

***p. 304 each germ is its own term—finds its term w/in itself as its own internal limit, faisant angle avec sa proper mort [tracing, grafting, semen already swarming (essaimée)]

p. 355 to write means to graft (same word), each grafted text radiates toward the site of its removal, sy régénèrent dans la répétition, à la bordure dun surjet (overcast seam)

——discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

p. 364 each angle of square belongs to totality of surface, but multiplies it by folding back on itself, fractures it [the surface]—leaving room for supplementary attending (dassistance) surface

——same w/ supernumerary (surnombre) (column of words): is part of the numeral and belongs (appartient) to very milieu it exceeds

+R p. 158 “the angle is always for me the edge of a tomb (un bord de tombe)”

p. 159 plus dair, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature > each letter, bit or piece of word (mors ou morceau de mot) written w/ 2 hands

p. 160 gl of “angle”: wild, almost unnarratable event, not a morpheme, close to piercing (trouer) a hole in the arthron [articulation, joint], patch of color in graphesis, the trait in color, a rebel to appeased commerce (regulated exchange of 2 elements [lexical, pictural])

p. 164 angle, biting (mordant) into the border

C p. 215 work of the angle (RECTIFIES in all senses) resounds on more than one surface: kills, repairs, restores, recaptures, then once more (inexhaustible debt until the échéance of a dice throw)

E E p. 2 once inserted into another network, the “same” philosopheme is no longer the same > inversely, “unique and original (inédits)” philosophemes, if there are any, once they enter network of inherited philosophemes, they’re affected over their whole surface and under every angle > the very project of rigorous criteria for judging philosophical specificity, which we are nowhere near disposing of, belongs to a set of conditions (un ensemble)—that remains to be thought

BSi BSi p. 269 [method in seminar] experience w/ you, and reconnoiter the corner turned

OG OG p. 269 (379) “fermons langle et pénétrons dans la texte”—to where writing is named

EU EU p. 241 [re: CIPH] translation: transferential, diagonal, transversal, interscientific research

SPEC SPEC p. 280 [re: Freud’s speculation] non-simplicity, indirectness > relation btwn pleasure/unpleasure not simple correlation of decrease/increase of (free) energy: inexhaustible reserve for speculation: not substantial riches, but supplementary angles

FV FV p. 420n basted effect of certain footnotes, animal-machines camouflaged in shadows (prudently left in corners)—threatening security of a space & a logic

ANIMAL

GOD GOD p. 141 God’s covenant is also w/ animals, a promise we forget every time an animal is killed

R R p. 53 extend measure of the immeasurable (w/out calculation) to animals, non-living

p. 86 to think democracy [Paulhan], to think “first to happen by (le premier venue),” at limit of “who” or “what,” living being, cadaver > “first to happen by” = “first to come”?

p. 97 beast: incarnation of evil, satanic, diabolical, demonic, beast of apocalypse

pp. 93-94 rogue unlike voyou [in French] can be animal, a creature incapable of mingling w/ the herd

H H p. 77 unconditional welcome of every other would include animals

POO POO p. 143n to speak of something w/out speaking of something [literature] valid for every trace, dissociation doesn’t need to be marked by words, doesn’t require la parole, can be mute deictic, gesture of animal [trace beyond human]

POR POR p. 4 (131) bees, Aristotle says they can’t learn because they can’t hear

HERP HERP p. 172 for Heidegger, animal has no ear so can’t have a friend

HASD HASD p. 17 some would say animal can’t choose to keep silent, can’t keep a secret

POOF POOF pp. 201-02 men & women can have a virtuous friendship, but it’s unstable, child becomes the indispensable link of the bond: the difference from animal procreation is the testament

A A pp. 36-7 Heidegger says animal cannot experience death as such, and that animal cannot speak [Derrida draws out undeveloped relation btwn language and death]

——if death can’t be experienced as such both to language and to what exceeds language, border btwn animal & Dasein would become unassignable

pp. 43-4 difference of animal/human, biological life/culture is the relation to death as such, true border would be there

pp. 58-59 when being-toward-death is universal, crosses historical, cultural borders—it still privileges human above animal

p. 73 Heidegger: no non-truth for the animal [Aristotle-like]

EM EM p. 129n (155n) Heidegger: metaphysics, thought of subject, treats man on basis of animalitas, essence of man is not heeded

S S p. 117n [citation of themes of animality in Glas and Postcard]

p. 12 acc. Heidegger, animals can’t question (no technē or spirit) > Heidegger always presenting his stance on animals as “theses,” which he avoids, for essential reasons, almost everywhere else

p. 47 acc. Heidegger, animality is not de lesprit

pp. 48-9 the confusion of Heidegger’s “animal is weltarm (poor-in-world)” > since it is not a matter of degrees it avoids anthropocentrism, but reconstitutes anthropocentrism (measure of man) in the designation of lack or privation

pp. 50-1 animal has and does not have world, has access to entities, but not entities als sich

p. 51 for Heidegger, privation (Privation) in Dasein, in structure of “as,” structure of “something as something (die Struktur des Etwas als Etwas),” not same as animal’s privation (Entbehrung)

pp. 52-3 Heidegger suggests we draw a line through rock to think animal’s relation to it

——erasure of the name, name of rock, erasure of possibility to name rock, as such, to access being-rock

pp. 55-6 though Derrida sees a “humanist teleology” in the hierarchization of man to animal (found in the negation imposed on animal w/ weltarm), one which requires not one ontology but the very possibility of the onto-logical, he isn’t criticizing it (it does denounce biologism, racism, and naturalism) > can we escape this program? can we transform it by “reconnoitering it right down to its most tortuous ruses and most subtle resources”?

pp. 56-7 acc. Heidegger, animal not in human world as Vorhandenheit nor Zuhandensein, and not Dasein, animal neither categorical nor existential, the 2 pairs of concepts structuring Sein und Zeit > does the animal threaten the whole order of the existential analytic?

p. 103 Heidegger: animal cannot be evil because has no spirit, man can fall even lower than animal, can disjoin from die Seynsfuge (ontological fit)

FWT FWT p. 42 mustn’t crush dimensions of living being [biology, cultural] into each other, all life (animal & human) survives by knowing how to discern (btwn forms of life, btwn “living” and “dead”)

pp. 62-3 question of animality, limit upon which all great questions are asked

p. 63 writing, trace, gramma exceed opposition: human/nonhuman > extend field of living, or rather life/death relation

——Derrida is suspicious of “Animal” in the singular

——treatment of animal: logocentrism > proffered the discourse of hegemony: of mastery

p. 65 acc. Descartes, animal is reaction w/out response (& Kant, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger)

——great respect for foundation of human rights, via post-Cartesian subjectivity, though must be analyzed, developed, enriched

——modern concept of right depends on Cartesian cogito, his “text” not the cause but “represents” structure in powerful systematicity of symptom

——rights for animals confirms logic of subjectivity responsible for greatest violence against them > human rights for animals a disastrous contradiction

p. 66 Derrida says there are uncrossable borders btwn man/animal, many borders, limits

p. 69 arguments for human sovereignty, and the idealism that goes along w/ it > always contains an insult, a contempt for animals

——major feature of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism: assign inferior status so to exclude him/her from the human, place him/her in world of animality

p. 70 Derrida likes Bentham’s “the question is not: can they [animals] speak? but can they suffer?” [see ATIA p. 27 not the capacity of the animal, the power, but their suffering]

——“no doubt it will always be necessary to kill animals, and probably humans too, even after the universal abolition of the death penalty”

pp. 72-3 there is a radical discontinuity btwn animals & humans, but…

p. 73 Derrida withdraws phrase “genocide of animals” after someone protested to this use of genocide in Jerusalem

WM WM pp. 236-37 for Aristotle, brutes and humans both make sounds, but only humans make sounds that can become intelligible, meaningful, sounds that become letters

——animals can’t imitate [cf. ATIA p. 35 Derrida refers to WM, there he follows tropes, rhetoric, metaphors, concepts through animal language btwn Aristotle/Nietzsche]

ROP ROP [quoting EN] Lacanian scandal re: what he says on the animal: en un mot, that death happens to the immortal who lacks for lacking nothing, not to the mortal being-for-death [?]

SW SW pp. 353-54 absolute knowledge not man’s thing but that of sericulture [?] > silkworm comes back to itself in its odyssey, wraps itself in its own shroud, kind of absolute knowledge: beyond any coupling, any sexual difference or rather duality of the sexes > [his bestiary starting up]

DPi DPi p. 99 for Heidegger, animal perishes (crève), only Dasein (human) dies, has right/possibility to die

pp. 129-30 for Kant, life for life’s sake is unworthy of human dignity, failure to inscribe death in law, return to animal (feminine)

RGE RGE pp. 257-58 Bataille: only way for negativity to reveal what we are is to see ourselves dead, this is comedy! must live w/ impression of truly dying, difficult because necessity of spectacle/representation, nothing less animal than fiction of death > emphasis on simulacrum disrupts Hegel

Gii Gii p. 35 for Heidegger, human hand different than ape’s hand

p. 40 the way scientists or thinkers talks about animality constitutes a decisive symptom of discourse’s essential axiomatics

——Heidegger: apes have organs that can grasp, do not have hands

p. 41 Heidegger’s essential propositions re: ape’s lack of hand, an empirico-dogmatic hapax, supposedly nonmetaphysical humanism > when animality is enclosed in its organico-biological programs: absolute oppositional limit which erases differences, homogenizes

p. 301n Derrida sees Heidegger’s reflections on as such [re: borderline btwn man/animal] as similar to his reflections on the hand, ability to give or take as such [see p. 43]

p. 41 everything Heidegger says about man takes on meaning and value w/in oppositional limit to animal (it is dogmatic and serious)

——man’s hand infinitely removed from prehensile organs through the abyss of its being “durch einen Abgrund des Wesens

——this abyss: speech & thought

HST HST p. 363 Levinas still calls the other—my neighbor, my universal brother in humanity > Derrida: wouldn’t hospitality have to open to an other that isn’t my hôte? perhaps an “animal”?

TN TN p. 47 acc. Aristotle, touch: co-extensive w/ animal life, the genus of senses

——animals die w/ too much touch: an originary prohibition, reserve of touch holds life on the brink (au bord) of exaggeration, touching a question of life & death

pp. 152-53 Maine de Biran’s “humanualism (humainisme)”: only humans have hand, can touch in strongest sense (that elephant trunk “approximates” hand of man maintains hierarchy)

p. 168 handless animals can touch!

EW p. 285 trace, iterability, mark, differance (possibilities or necessities) are themselves not only human

BSi pp. 14-6 clear signs of culture in animals, even incest taboos [political animal]; re: opposition man/animal > don’t rush to analogize, to resemblance: multiply attention to differences

pp. 21-3 Plutarch on non-cowardice of animals, on humans mimicking carnivorous animals, eating weak ones > sovereignty as devouring? [Rousseau referring to Plutarch]

p. 31 Freud speaks of an a-historical stasis of animals due to equilibrium btwn drives/environment [bees have a prehistory?]: mankind an irruption of destructive instinct [as history?]

pp. 55-6 non-response of animal as ultimate difference from man (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan, Descartes, Hobbes)

p. 90n [Derrida disputes Lacan’s “animals cannot cross certain threshold of dissimulation”]

p. 154 animal cannot be bête, not free, can’t come away from relation to ground

p. 322 Heidegger against strict, conventional division of man/animal [for very different reasons than Derrida], doesn’t make man unique enough

OG p. 70 trace, arche-phenomenon of “memory,” prior to oppositions nature/culture, animal/humanity [Levinas, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud]

p. 207 (295) acc. Rousseau, animals experience moral signs

pp. 241-42 (343-44) for Rousseau, animals lack the power to substitute, life w/out differance

ANIMAL in ATIA

ATIA p. 2 Kant’s animal “als ein Maschinen der Vorsehung” (a providential machine) [see p. 102]

p. 3 Derrida playing w/ je suis: I am, I follow, crossing borders btwn man/animal, move from “ends of man” to the animal in me, surrender to the animal, animal at unease w/ itself

p. 163n Montaigne recognizes in animal a capacity to respond [contra Descartes]

p. 8 question of animal: what does it mean to respond? how is a response different from a reaction?

——question of the animal, the letter counts, animal response has as its stakes the letter

p. 9 Derrida’s cat, he’s certain it has an existence that refuses to be conceptualized (rebelle à tout concept) > we know the animal is mortal because it has a name, which must survive itself

pp. 10-1 to follow after the animal, means it comes before, that also means its behind > being-with, but how? not a mode of a pre-established being > être-serré (being-huddled-together), pressu, près, auprès, après: acc. stronger/weaker stricture which always remains pressing

p. 11 philosophy forgets (a calculated forgetting?) that the animal can look at me, animal as absolute alterity, point of view of absolute other

pp. 11-2 nudity as passivity, involuntary exhibition in face-to-face: the passion of the animal, my passion of the animal (other)

p. 12 animal as tout autre, tout autre est tout autre, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal, secret > what happens to brotherhood when animal comes on scene?

——what happens to animals when brothers kill each other? on Mount Moriah?

pp. 14 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas, Descartes, all men, all belong to quasi-epochal category: never been seen (naked) by an animal, never imagine animal could address them > Derrida believes they all have, must decipher symptom of this disavowal

——only poets/prophets face address of the animal, not juridical, civil men

pp. 16-7 God created man, to watch man name the animals, to watch him (Ish w/out Ishah) dominate, domesticate, train them [Genesis] (before the fall)

pp. 18-20 in avowing his desire to avoid appropriative projection before animal’s gaze, to avoid tradition [Benjamin, Heidegger] that assigns deep sadness (Traurigkeit) to animal’s Benommenheit (inability to respond to name it’s given, inability to experience being “as such”)

——for Benjamin, animal/nature not sad because mute but mute because sad: not the sadness of passivity, of not being able to name, but of receiving ones name > a foreshadowing of mourning

——every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

pp. 22-3 for Heidegger, animal & time a problem, animal one example of Nur-Lebenden (living but nothing more), history of animal for man followed by section Die Zeitlichkeit des Verfallens

——has philosophy become a symptom of the history of dominating the animal?

p. 23 animal: a word man has given himself the right to give to the living other

pp. 24-5 relation to animal has been accelerating past 2 centuries (Derrida cautious to call it a turning point) > traditional forms of treating animals (sacrifices, hunting, training, etc.) have been turned upside down: mass farming, genetic mutation (unprecedented subjection of animal)

——developments of zoological, biological, genetic forms of knowledge, inseparable from techniques of intervention into their object (living animal), inseparable from transformation/world of object

p. 26 animal genocide, imagine overproducing Jews to experience that same hell > this “pathos” confronts us w/ a new (experience of) compassion [new ( ) right/appeal, new ( ) philosophy]

pp. 27-8 Bentham’s “can they suffer?” no longer question’s animality in relation to power, dynamis, hexis, habitus re: logos; suffering: “can they not be able?” > a power w/out power, possibility of the impossible, a passivity > mortality resides there, as radical means to contemplate our finitude alongside animals, the finitude of life: sharing this nonpower, vulnerability, anguish

p. 29 to think the war we find ourselves waging [against animals] is not only a duty, no one can escape it: thinking, perhaps, begins when animal looks at us and we are naked before it

p. 30 to say there is no abyss btwn man/animal would contradict everything modest Derrida has written about (his concern for differences, abyssal ruptures, over homogeneity)

p. 31 given the heterogeneity at the edge of “the human,” the multiplicity of organizations of relations btwn life/death, relations so abyssal/intertwined no exteriority of one term to other, to say animal, in the singular, is to utter a bêtise > confirms animality disavowed & complicit in war of the species

p. 32 Derrida tries to speak of wrong or evil in singular name “animal” by stammering chimerical aphorisms: lanimal que donc je suis, does it speak? a naked question, still to-come

p. 33 the question of whether animals can respond also concerns whether they can erase (seffacer), can they lie, pretend, cover their own tracks

——that traces can be erased, does not mean someone (man or animal) can erase them

p. 35 Derrida sometimes sees Nietzsche take the horse’s head in his hands, calls it as a witness to his compassion

——Nietzsche tries to teach us to laugh again [in Ecce Homo], by plotting to let all his animals loose into philosophy, “reanimalizes” genealogy of the concept

pp. 34-6 Derrida’s animals swarm, multiply, mobilize, the more he writes autobiographically, they also are welcomed “on the threshold of sexual difference” [cf. “Fourmis,” SW]

——[informal, because modest, list of all Derrida’s bêtes]

p. 166n if Zusage (language “before,” w/out question) is before the possibility of response, then wouldn’t Zusage be something the animal is not deprived of?

pp. 40-1 the animal in the general singular, neutralization, castration, of the sex of the animal > the philosopheme itself, constitutes philosophy [no philosopher has every protested on principle]

——the right to speak blithely of the animal, one of the most symptomatic asinanities of the human, bêtise (of which animals are exempt by definition)

——Derrida introduces lanimot, a chimerical word

***p. 44-5 comparing Genesis w/ Greek myths [re: fault, nakedness] as two symptomatic translations, whose internal necessities partially overlap re: the proper of man [default in propriety]: technics, sociality, emergence out of nature, knowledge, historicity [?], subjectivity, subjugating superiority over animal

p. 48 mot in lanimot should bring us to the word named noun (nommé nom), the one the animal is deprived of: think the absence of the word or name as something other than privation

——general category of animal for all nonhuman living creatures, not only a sin against vigilance, rigor > a crime; “thou shalt not kill” only humans—crimes only “against humanity”?

pp. 49-51 autobiographical animal, the general singulars “I” and “animal,” before ego cogito both living, both auto-affective, both moving > “I” speaks to “engage nudity w/out shame,” untenable pledge > bring in a mirror (une psyché), is the animal caught there too? or my primary mirror?

p. 52 Lacanian animals, like Socrates’ writing (painting), do not respond

***pp. 59-60 is there a mirror-effect wherever there’s sexual coupling/difference? identifying a partner? hetero-narcissism is erotic: a hunting game of erotic modesty occurs, exhibition, dissimulation, modesty, shame, not only humans would have a right to it, would enter order of the law, inseparable from order of truth (since latter linked to veil of modesty)

p. 62 the animort? pluralizing animal, renouncing unification of concept, so it can’t be opposed to anything identifiable (man, the dead)

pp. 63-4 je rêve, donc, au fond dun terrier introuvable et à venir: the schizis of a contradictory injunction > translate an inhuman language w/out the usual bêtise re: animal

p. 66 via Valéry’s snake, the “animal abyss” is not a void, it’s too full of being, vertigo, étincelle au lieu de néant, lieu tenant du néant que je suis

p. 78 radical evil and double figure of animal: innocent or demonic, apocalyptic

p. 79 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance

pp. 82-3 for Descartes, animal judged as automaton, as spectacle, before specular subject—who doesn’t want to find himself reflected in image of animal

p. 84 for Descartes, animal can respond to a call/order/sign of its name but not a question

p. 89 perspicacious warning lights (des voyants) [re: Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, Lacan], all think animal can’t produce language signs, only responds programmatically [there’s more here]

p. 94 animal is capable of auto-affection, of [quasi] “I,” not capable of pointing toward itself and saying “this is I,” of autodeictic, autoreferential self-distancing, thus not capable of understanding, reason, response, responsibility

p. 96 for Kant [in Anthrop], animality (Thierheit) is prior (früher) to man, man is after the animal, inspires all his good tendencies > reversal occurs when man domesticates animal

pp. 100-02 for Kant [via Adorno], animals have no teleology (so always a means), they have no dignity (Würde), that is, no priceless internal value, so always a price, always belong to sensible world that must be sacrificed; Adorno sees in this a hatred towards animals, a Kant avec Sade

——Derrida not convinced by Adorno who claims that Cartesian indifference towards animals becomes Kant’s act of war against them [indifference already act of war]

——animality of human in problem of capital punishment

p. 104 animal’s problem (mal) is the male, vir, not woman

p. 106 philosophy’s relation to the animal: a secret “architectonics” in the construction, & thus deconstruction, of a discursive apparatus

pp. 110-11 in similar ways, Descartes, Levinas, Heidegger, Kant privilege “Here I am” over existence of life; for Levinas, w/out separation, possibility of responding, animals don’t die, can thus be put to death w/out being killed

p. 112 why did Levinas never imagine the animal occupying place of the 3rd party, thus the 1st appeal to justice? > never an other other than the other human

p. 113 Descartes, Kant, Levinas disavow, foreclose, sacrifice, humiliate lanimot [see p. 89] > disavowal of foreclosure

——Derrida points out that a certain profound humanism [that of the Old Testament?] privileged the question of the animal as that of the infinitely other

——this silent appeal that calls from the outside, whose trace can only be disavowed w/ so many wounds, symptoms

pp. 113-18 [Derrida on limitations of Levinas’ thinking around dog Bobby]

——Levinas’ Bobby dog is a witness for us, an other w/out alterity: recalls the subject to being subject > this is not sufficient deconstruction of Cartesian man/animal borderline

pp. 120-21 for Lacan, human is not a beast of prey, but a beast that is prey to language [this is thought while distinguishing anthropological from zoological]

p. 122 in Promethean & biblical tradition, fixity of animal [re: communication, information] related to animal’s perfection

p. 127 Lacan distinguishes btwn animal sexual pretense (feinte) and the deception (tromperie) of speech

pp. 128-29 for Lacan, animal can inscribe the trace but not erase it, thus animal is prisoner w/in specularity of imaginary [for Derrida, inscription erases itself, mechanically, this is iterability]

p. 129 Lacan closer to Heidegger than ever when saying animal can’t die > thus, ignorant of mourning, tomb, cadaver, which constitutes, for Lacan, a “signifier”

——animal an immortal living thing

p. 130 Lacan designates castration complex as Freud’s scientific (nonmythological) original sin

——being subjected to the signifier, a nonmastery that gives human mastery over animals, only man has power to destroy his trace

p. 132 Nietzsche & Kafka realized better than anyone: Mother, Law, God, Animal > indissociable figures of the same Thing

p. 173n [Derrida’s thesis] not resitute to the animal what we have taken from it, but wonder if its reactivity, its wiring, is also applicable to the human

p. 149 for Aristotle, sleep is a desmos, a peculiar way which aisthēsis is bound, Heidegger’s binding “ring” of the animal, animal more tightly bound than man

p. 156 the differential of animot, animals, should complicate oppositional structure: either have “as such” or don’t (has or doesn’t have world)

——re: animal, Heidegger continues Aristotle’s tradition of steresis (privation)

pp. 158-59 for Heidegger, animal lives don’t exist, must strike out (Durchstreichung) all words when speaking about what appears to the animal, nothing appears “as such” [but, might the animal itself, the animal-machine, put into effect all these necessary ratures?]

p. 159 differences btwn how a human eats and how an animal eats are not those btwn “as such” and “not as such,” the ambition of describing this difference exceeds “me (Derrida)”

——w/out “as such,” animals don’t know how to “let be,” let beings be as such: animal as a utilitarian, always putting-in-perspective [does man really escape this trap?]

***p. 160 to “let” something “be” “as such,” you would have to “let be” in your absence, in your death [thus, for Heidegger, being-toward-death and “as such” constitutive of each other], but is this ever possible? can we let the being be? Nietzsche would say no, that the objective is always caught in the living, in life, in perspective > whatever the difference btwn animals, remains an “animal” relation

——Derrida’s strategy re: border(s) btwn animal/human: there is no pure and simple “as such”

ANIMAL-MACHINE [fixerup]

S p. 134n had Heidegger adhered to all his crossing-outs, this would have be silent voracity of an animal-machine, not simply “without spirit,” but a figure of evil [see ATIA p. 39 this animal-machine resembles the virus that obsesses “everything I write”]

ATIA pp. 38-9 [cf. S p. 134n] animal-machine that invades, obsesses (like a computer virus), Derrida’s texts has a family resemblance to Descartes’: Derrida’s is an animal of reading/rewriting, an animal capable of erasing

p. 74 for Descartes, the specter/ghost “conjured” by judgment is simulacrum of “real man,” spectral man as animal-machine, this animal-machine we’re trying to “flush out”

pp. 81-2 Descartes’ 2 criteria (he calls them “methods”) for differentiating authentic from mimetic simulacrum of automaton (still govern method of Lacan & Heidegger): 1) the inability to respond 2) a lack which is not the lack of man, the lacking of the lack of man

p. 91 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas all make explicit fundamental place of sacrifice; for Descartes, its inexplicit: animal-machine not sacrificed animal > but Descartes’ cogito has its Christian heritage: interest in Eucharist, a relation to Augustine’s cogito (despite denials)

p. 102 unthought, unconscious, other of the “I think,” (the animal je suis), a function of machinality > haunts automatically, like an evil genius, the Cartesian animal-machine & Kant’s teleological, providential-machine (where war machines presumed to have civilizing effect)

pp. 124-25 presupposed absence of response in animal, that it is only capable of reaction: identifies animal w/ machine [Derrida not erasing this distinction, but doubts its purity]

pp. 158-59 for Heidegger, animal lives don’t exist, must strike out (Durchstreichung) all words when speaking about what appears to the animal, nothing appears “as such” [but, might the animal itself, the animal-machine, put into effect all these necessary ratures?]

TR p. 77 which theoretical animal, animal-machine (of 3rd millennium) [cf. ATIA pp. 158-59] could measure up to this inhuman program [Derrida’s referring to the conference title]

EJQB p. 72 signifying absence/separation, letter lives as aphorism, it is solitude, articulates solitude: letter of law can’t be outside difference, can’t end interruption, distance, (non)relation to other

——animality of letter assumes forms of letter’s desire, anxiety, solitude [cf. p. 73 metaphor is this animality?]

BSi p. 70 sovereign state as Leviathan, as animal-machine, as prosthstatics > beast et (est) sovereign coupled across a copula: affinity through analogy, proportion, reciprocal fascination—or grafting

p. 111 animal rights a translation of rights of man, a Cartesian/Kantian logic which reduces animal to machine

p. 191 I kill bêtise first, I kill the marionette in me, the animal-machine (so as not be killed by it)

p. 292 Descartes’ Treatise on Man treats human body as “machine of earth” (compares to clocks, artificial fountains) > animal-machines in Descartes

pp. 336-37 the untranslatability of bêtise (no word in world can translate it), even untranslatable from French into French > those who speak French, those privileged by the idiom, are commanded by complicated programs, contexts, pragmatic situations > privilege to unique event of language, the “poetic,” is contaminated by reactive or reactional animality [animal-machine]

FV p. 420n basted effect of certain footnotes, animal-machines camouflaged in shadows (prudently left in corners)—threatening security of a space & a logic

ANIMAL RIGHTS

FWT p. 65 rights for animals confirms logic of subjectivity responsible for greatest violence against them > human rights for animals a disastrous contradiction

p. 67 re: animals, will there ever be a law differentiating killing from letting die?

p. 74 deconstruction: slow/progressive approach—not attempting to destroy/discredit axiomatics of this (formal/juridical) solution [re: animal rights] > reconsider history of law/concept of right

ATIA pp. 87-9 paradox of animal rights: require the very concept of subjectivity that oppresses animals, reduces them

pp. 92-3 [via Kant] Roman law: rights of humans vs. rights of things (irrational animals); humans can do what they please w/ things (Sachen) because of divine injunction, elevation: “I”

p. 96 for Kant, human politics occur at moment of domestication of animals, becoming-livestock (devenir-bétail) of beast: so animal politics would be paradoxical in this logic

p. 101 ecologism, vegeterianism, though better, still suffer under Judeo-Christiano-Islamic tradition of sacrificial war against animal (constitutive of techno-scientific knowledge, process of humanization, development of ethical/religious forms)

p. 108 since, for Levinas, face (thus ethics) is human (fraternal), only through transference or metaphor that we are sensitive to animal suffering

BSi p. 111 animal rights a translation of rights of man, a Cartesian/Kantian logic which reduces animal to machine

ANNIHILATION OF TRACE

GT p. 112 annihilation of a remainder, as ashes sometimes testify, can play role of memory, of offering, of sacrifice

MONL p. 40 [re: barred access to Arabic, Berber] “the inscription of this limit could not leave traces”: multiply symptoms of a fascination

FK p. 57 desert of desert: where foundation loses very trace of itself in the desert, and religion can only begin again [quasi-automatically, machine-like, spontaneously]

p. 71 modern pragmatism liberates words from origins, archaic meanings.

***LOBL p. ~118 translation leaves behind an untranslated remnant, illegitimately, because it arrests the movement of the everyday possibility of literature and parasitism [see SPOM p. 135 translation causes ghost to drop into oblivion] [re: double syntax of arrêt de mort]

——dream of a translation w/out remnants: a metalanguage, a guarantee

H p. anne 20 acc. Nietzsche, w/out an experience, no ear to listen ~ [annihilation of trace?] “where nothing is heard nothing is there”

AF pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin)

——death drive is anarchivic, archiviolithic

p. 11 annihilation of memory and effacement of supplement

p. 12 death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

p. 57 deformations of text: murder

***p. 60 return of the repressed as triumph of life [re: Lou Andreas-Salomé’s reading in Moses], surviving of an excess of life which resists annihilation

p. 79 if repetition is in the heart of future to-come, so is total annihilation of death drive

SPOM p. 109 principle of selectivity guides & hierarchizes “spirits,” fatally excluding in turn, it will annihilate, by watching over some “en veillant (sur) ses ancetres” [dead bodies] and not others

HASD pp. 11-2 against Wittgenstein’s imposed silence > one must not avoid speaking = it is necessary that there be a trace

p. 50 for Dionysius, theologians who penetrate “secret infinity” leave no trace

MPM p. 21 when we know our friend to be gone forever: terrifying lucidity, in light of incinerating blaze where nothingness appears

——we remain in disbelief itself, we will never believe in death or immortality

EM pp. 135-36 Nietzsche’s übermensch “burns his text and erases the traces of his steps,” a laughter bursting beyond metaphysics

PP p. 63 text “run[s] the risk of being definitively lost, who will ever know of such disappearances?”

p. 99 (112) interpretative translation as violent as it is impotent, destroys pharmakon by forbidding access to it, leaving it untouched in its reserve

——all translations into languages that are heirs to Western metaphysics produce these violent effects of analysis

***VM p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

PAS PAS pp. (104-05) if there was one [name], the signature, the anagrammatic, would lose name in infinite measure of its keeping [absolute guard], so > plus de nom (visible name might hide tout autre name)

p. (106) I call to you to protect you against the nameless

S p. 81 in Der Ister, Hölderlin calls to the fire, Jetzt komme, Feuer!, fire as what comes, call for to-come > acc. Heidegger, Hölderlin, the Beseeler, has been struck by God of light, gift of spirit as incineration, cremation, almost becoming ash [MOP & annihilation of trace]

SH p. 35 date is a witness, but one can bless date w/out knowing to “what” or for “whom” one bears witness, always possible there’ll no longer be a witness for this witness

——affinity btwn date, name, ash

p. 56 in Celan’s “Die Schleuse” “Kaddish” is lost, “a word that was looking for me,” that which opens possibility of mourning what has been lost beyond a trace [loss of mourning]

p. 57 no worse loss than death of name (still, a date remains) > mourning, interiorization of other in Erinnerung, the preserving of other in sepulcher/epitaph, is denied us; words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts > incinerated beyond of date, words lost w/out sepulcher

FWT pp. 135-36 movement toward more and more “humane” death penalties whitewashes act of killing; [E.R.] gas chambers & crematoria, all trace of living was effaced

DS p. 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” > hymen

OS p. 36 Hegel: now [point] has tremendous right (ein ungeheures Recht), it is nothing as individual Now, as I pronounce it, the proudly exclusive now dissolves, flows away, falls into dust

pp. 65-6 difference btwn Being/beings, Heidegger’s discourse of trace > if difference (is) (itself) trace (neither presence nor absence): trace of trace has disappeared in the forgetting of the difference btwn Being/beings [forgetting of Being as annihilation of trace]

P p. 31 leaving (laisser), lacing (lacer), interlacing (Geflecht) can cause a lace to disappear once in a while (effigy & fiction) [re: truth in painting, Van Gogh]

ROP p. 110 Foucault’s wager, the end (fin) of finite man: “man would be effaced, like a face drawn in sand at the edge or limit of the sea” > trait (of face, limit) splits, becomes a limit, erasing and multiplying this limit endlessly > self-relation of limit at once erases/multiplies limit

GSP p. 166 in writing, sign can always “empty” itself, may never be reactivated, risks remaining forever closed & mute

PS p. 175 Artaud’s resistance to clinical/critical exegeses: protest itself against exemplification itself > destroy history of dualist metaphysics, render doctor/critic helpless: art w/out works, language w/out trace

***FS p. 28 not abandon ourselves to structural formalism: must attempt emancipation, but only as a dream, emancipation is impossible unless we forget our history [contra Nietzsche?]

DIF DIF p. 24 forgetting of ontological difference: disappearance of trace of trace > Heidegger: even the early trace (die frühe Spur) is obliterated when presence is in the position of the highest

O p. 29n acc. Feuerbach, Hegel’s exposition was supposed to have presupposed nothing, to leave no residue, empty & drain us completely

SW p. 325 letting other live: absolute suicide, no trace, not even the seal of a break

——not even leave them my ashes

——no longer be oneself or have oneself (sêtre ou savoir) > truth w/out truth looking for me at end of world

——blessing of one who leaves w/out leaving an address

RGE pp. 256-57 that there must be meaning, that nothing must be definitely lost in death, that Hegel refers to death as “abstract negativity” > Bataille finds all this laughable

DST DST p. 321n abortive: a brith takes place w/out taking place: event of a singular failure, “comes to itself only to lose itself” [re: Lacoue-Labarthe on Reik’s theory of autobiography]

TR p. 134 formidable effects of machinelike automaticity: an a priori, programmed “I apologize” > automatic forgiveness self-destructs w/out delay (faster than “Mission Impossible” tapes), loses its meaning, its memory, annihilates its own archive

p. 146 “I beseech you” not to “annihilate” [re: Confessions]: performative eve, arche-peformative before performative, younger & older, support & archive of confession, its subjectile

IW p. 265 history’s harshest reality, its most murderous aspects—displacements of figures?

D p. 364 relation to innumerable, absence of traces—unnameable, relation to my death

ATM pp. 185-86 to bury a text that erased the name of God [dysgraphy] is not to annihilate it (burn the whole thing): by inhuming the fault, one keeps it; a work of mourning which can either 1) be successful through spiritual interiorization, introjection 2) or else be paralyzed in melancholic pathology (incorporation)

CIN p. 42 the totally incinerated envois could not be indicated by any mark

ANNOUNCE

GOD pp. 132-33 “pardon for not meaning (to say),” secretless secret of literature, scene of forgiveness, its being “up in the air” keeps it secret, announces literature

FK p. 46 [re: names of God] untranslatability of proper name, but also iterability, thus technē [see p. 56 announce impossible translation]

H p. 105 Oedipus is twice encrypted, 1st in dying, 2nd in hiding his death > by demanding he be kept dead, he announces a piece of blackmail

SPOM SPOM p. 44 to announce oneself, is that not to already be there in a way?

p. 128 Marx uses performative, not constative, to announce future of communism

p. 158 self-manifestation of the manifesto, the “here I am” in the announcement of communism (Marx, Engels’ Manifesto)

p. 166 to accuse the other always announces or denounces its imminent return

***R ***R p. 75 plus dun, divisibility of God, announces democracy

p. 84 event (im-possible) announces itself in the form of an injunction (comes from on high)

p. 109 annulment of time announced in date, revolution, volt of the ring (anneau), il faut le temps, default, failure, collapse [autos needing other, event, time, heteronomy]

POO POO p. 132n Poe [Purloined Letter] tells the secret twice, w/out same secret being penetrated, matter of trace, secret can be announced w/out being revealed or secret is manifest but still in need of translation

HERP HERP p. 213 Heidegger calls the fact of not hearing (überhören) the poet that announces future being of a people: a sacrifice

knowledge of what founds is intolerable, must be, structurally, repressed, excluded, ostracized from what it founds or institutes, must not belong to it (like Rousseau)

HASD HASD p. 28 call of the other, having always already preceded speech to which it was never present a first time, announces itself in advance as a recall (rappel)

EM EM p. 122n (145-46n) man’s specificity, as rational animal, announces itself to itself, as an infinite end

PP PP p. 81 living-beings, father and son, are announced to us w/in household (domesticité) of logos

VM VM p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

p. 95 acc. Levinas, concepts anticipate a horizon w/in which alterity is amortized as soon as it is announced—because foreseen, horizon always horizon of the same

S S p. 94 promise (Versprechen) announces, salutes, what has already taken place “before” (this is the temporality of the coming of the event, Ereignis or Geschehen), it is the dissymmetry of a yes before opposition of yes and no, before question, language always revient à de la promesse

——acc. Heidegger, there’s a “must” a “we must think” of the promise, thought as fidelity to promise > must hear & obey

PAS PAS p. (92) death as the impossibility of dying, à partir de laquelle sannonce la mort sans mort

POOF p. 50 ‘perhaps,’ announcement of 1st act, 1st scene: only chance granted to the future, chance of chance

p. 70 Derrida assumes responsibility for speaking rightly, justly, up to the point where he is no longer responsible: that is, the point from which all responsibility is announced [the response no longer belongs to me]

POS p. 8 what defers presence (its trace, its sign, its representation) is basis of its announcement or desire

p. 9 differance common root of oppositional concepts, as common root, is also element of the same (distinguished from the identical [Heidegger]) in which oppositions are announced

OS pp. 60-1 metaphysical texts already have resources of their own criticism [re: circle of circles of time] (announces itself in the margin) [doubling of de-limitation]

p. 65 lautre geste, le plus difficile, le plus inouï, le plus questionnant, celui pour lequel nous sommes le moins préparé, can only be sketched (esquisser), announced in calculated fissures of metaphysical text: 2 texts, 2 hands, 2 visions (together simultaneously & separated)

ROP pp. 29-30 deconstruction announces status w/out status of nonfinite # of names/quasi-concepts: the thinking of writing called for this, but it’s better thematized and formalized in theory of double bind, stricture of double band, and especially non-ontological remaining

pp. 87-9 “perpetual threat” (Foucault’s term) as shadow of haunting, threatens logic of historical ages, neither present nor absent, positive nor negative, inside nor outside; “announcing” [in its futural spectrality] poses similar problems for the historian as haunting

ATIA p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

p. 20 every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

DIF DIF p. 23 the annunciating and reserved trace can be disclosed in metaphysical discourse when stating closure of ontology (Levinas, Freud, Nietzsche, and especially Heidegger)

O p. 7 preface announces what will already have been written > Derrida claims preface presages a general practice of deconstruction, strange strategy w/out finality, cette défaillance organisatrice of telos or eschaton, which reinscribes restricted economy in general economy——[is this because the preface is an essential and ludicrous operation attempting to cancel out all displacement?]

p. 9 residue of writing remains anterior/exterior to content it announces

DPi pp. 240-41 angel came announcing deconstruction of death, but deconstruction has more than one angel, the other warned against banalizing, relativizing DP like Christianity has done, using an alibi of beyond to deny irreversible gravity of death [returns to angels on pp. 253-54]

TB p. 131 for Benjamin, languages intend (as Babelian event) toward being-language of language, this is “pure language,” not transcendent to each language, not Leibnizian universal language

——translation, as the accord of tongues, lets the being-language of language resonate, announcing it rather than presenting it

——translation makes nocturnal intimacy of core emerge [jealousy]

p. 132 less revelation than promise: “infinite rebirth (Aufleben) of languages”

——translation, as holy growth of languages, announces messianic end, but sign of end only “present” in “knowledge of that distance,” Entfernung, remoteness

Gii p. 58 Heidegger’s Wechselbezug (relation of reciprocity) btwn Erörterung (discussion, awakened literalness of word, situates proper place of Gedicht) and Erläuterung (clarification, elucidation of poems [Dichtungen] themselves) > (announce unique site (Ort) of Gedicht rather than show)

——is this Wechselbezug what is called the hermeneutic circle?

PIO pp. 10-1 Ponge’s “Fable”: poetic performative, describes/carries out, on same line, its own generation; telling & told are undecidable, its constative is its performative (not content w/ announcing, it’s located ironically in evangelical tradition, reveals/perverts structure of envoi)

p. 44 supplementarity introduces (into structure of psyche) the fabulous repetition, a crossing of chance & necessity, bending performative rules while respecting them: allows other to come, or announce’s its coming, in dehiscence’s opening > deconstruction

EL p. 196 Derrida tempted to collapse abyss & volcano—invisible chasm, catastrophe foments [see D p. 327], one can only interpret (blindly) the fumes that announce what can’t be seen coming

p. 217 Scholem’s nothing (secularization) occurs, not fortuitously analogous to Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik: nothingness, nothingness of language, announces “essence of what it threatens and causes to recoil in totality”

LI p. 129 repeatability of same ensures that full presence of a singularity, in being repeated, references something else, thus rending the full presence it announces

TN p. 53 the haptical, for every finite existence, recalls what is coming [Socrates], marks the limit at which or from which the presentation announces itself

p. 330n touchable-untouchable, untouchable right on/at (reste à même) the touchable, could only be announced if before any religion, cult, prohibition

BSi p. 20 analogy [re: beast and sovereign] announces (like a black cloud) the historical (actual & virtual) violences, disasters we won’t (already don’t) have a name for

OG p. 8 (18) death of book announces death of full speech, announces exhaustion of language’s archon [speech], as if language now seen as a species of writing, as a (short) 3000 year adventure: announces new mutation in history of writing

***pp. 46-8 (68-70) Derrida calls instituted trace “unmotivated” (immotivée), asks that the word “institution” not be so quickly interpreted w/in classical oppositions; “unmotivated” deconstructs Saussure’s arbitrary, thinks its possibility en-deçà de (short of) lopposition dérivée btwn nature/convention, symbol/sign > becoming-unmotivated of trace requires synthesis where le tout autre sannonce comme tel: not more natural than cultural

p. 183 (261) the dangerous differance, the master name of this supplementary series: death > metonymic substitution horizon & source, abyss from which each threat announces itself

p. 184 (261-62) image is death, it cannot represent & add representer to represented, thus presence of re-presented folded back on itself in the world, presence announces its dispossession w/in its own representer/death > subject: merely this movement of expropriation

SPEC p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

ANTHROPOLOGY

GT p. 66 anthropologists returning to the good inheritance of primitive societies—nature

HERP p. 195 for Heidegger, anthropology & psychology depend on metaphysics of subjectivity, interpretation of man as subject; thus, psychology did not exist for Greeks, and Christianity (w/ its new relation to philein) is 1st stage in formation of passions for subject/psychology

A p. 43 cultural partition around treatment of death: purely human, intra-anthropological

EM p. 116 (137) hégéliano-husserliano-heideggerienne anthropology (in France) concerned itself with the concept of history but not the history of a concept, especially concerned w/ we, nous-hommes, totality of human-reality

p. 117 (138) anthropologism common ground of Marxism, social-democracy, democratic-Christianity

——(139) the anthropologistic [apologistic?] reading of Hegel, Husserl & Heidegger was a mistake; Hegel not an anthropologist

pp. 117-18 (140) Husserl not an anthropologist; Husserl worried something like Sein und Zeit would be anthropological

pp. 120-21 (143) Hegel’s Phenomenology as truth of soul, the relevé of anthropology, of man

p. 121n (144n) the relevance accomplished in Hegelian metaphysics persists wherever metaphysics, our language, maintains its authority, even in pre-Hegelian systems (i.e. in Kant, figure of finitude organizes capacity to know from emergence of anthropological limit)

pp. 121-22n (144-45n) Kant’s pure end of moral law—not anthropological

p. 122n (145-46n) in spite of Kant’s critique of anthropology, man is sole example of rational being

p. 123 (147) critique of empirical anthropologism affirmation of transcendental humanism (Husserl, Kant)

——“the end of man (as a factual anthropological limit) is announced to thought from the vantage of the end of man (as a determined opening or the infinity of a telos)” > lhomme est ce qui a rapport à sa fin

POOF p. 270n Heidegger: in accomplishment of metaphysics, metaphysics becomes ‘psychology,’ psychology & anthropology are last word of metaphysics—psychology & technics go hand in hand

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

S pp. 48-9 the confusion of Heidegger’s “animal is weltarm (poor-in-world)” > since it is not a matter of degrees it avoids anthropocentrism, but reconstitutes anthropocentrism (measure of man) in the designation of lack or privation

PPHS p. 90 lexicology as science of the material of language: anthropology, psychophysiology

P p. 106 perfection [teleological end, purpose] often confused w/ beauty, Kant breaks from this tradition > judgment of taste does not bear on perfection of object, its internal possibility of existence—those examples (man, horse, buildings) which only have adherent beauty always have relation to man [Kant’s beauty as anti-anthropological in its anti-perfection] [the subjective finality or finality w/out end (beauty) vs. objective finality]

pp. 107-08 [and yet] for Kant, “happiness & culture presuppose that man puts to work what nature puts at his disposal”; Critique depends on reflexive humanism, pragmatic anthropology: to differentiate errant (w/out objective end) beauty from adherent must be view toward final causes

——man is not only an end of nature, he is the final end, goal, of nature, whole system of ends is oriented towards him

p. 108 the horse is so much a part of man’s telos, it can never achieve errant, free beauty, unable to disregard its objective finality which can only be external

pp. 110-11 [why man and horse are different though both examples of adherent beauty]

pp. 110-12 [the paradox of the Critique] paradigm of beauty rests on idea of reason: there’s idea/ideal, adequation & mimēsis in beauty? ideal beauty would then be adherent, not free beauty, only an ideal of imagination/presentation (Darstellung); man, endowed w/ reason, the only being capable of a sans (of ideal of beauty), of giving himself his own ends; he is not errant, cannot conceive himself w/out goal, but he can put errancy, sans, into perspective; in this way man can never be aestheticized, carries himself away from his own aesthetic, the stakes of the “Copernican Revolution” [?] (sans of pure cut is effaced in him) > Kant never asks whether the beauty of man stems from possibility of morcellement sans négativité

pp. 117-18 in Kant, art of man analogized with art of creator (unity of empirical laws), man has goal before operating, this effaces a priori the sans, the pure cut of free beauty

——connection btwn anthropo-theologism & analogism: course being steered [Spinoza says something quite tangential in Ethics], analogy w/ practical finality is its medium

——analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), lanalogisme recapitule ou recapite

p. 140 small/big (problem of sublime) measured against, w/in, living body of man > starting from it, the erection of the largest is preferred

ATIA p. 31 anthropo-centric subjectivity speaks only from one edge of Man/Animal limit, gives autobiography, history of its life, that it therefore calls History

p. 37 Derrida’s early dream of absolute hospitality to liberate animots, must avoid fables: fables an anthropomorphic taming, always a discourse on man, for and in man

p. 40 [quoting PP] contours of anthropos determined by zoopharmaceutical ambivalence [re: the demonic as bestiary] > Socrates is compared to gadfly, his pharmakon like torpedo fish, but he’s still an “autobiographic animal”

p. 54 Derrida will treat Descartes as father, and Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, Lacan as mes re-pères exemplaires (exemplary references) to normative/dominant discourse of a worldwide anthropology

p. 127 Heidegger and Lacan trying to validate a new fundamental anthropology, answer the question: “What is the human?”

FS p. 23 logos spermatikos: adult in miniature, encasement, anthropomorphic concept, preformationsim, biological idea, totality of hereditary characteristics enveloped in germ

CHM p. 56 (Foucault’s narration imbedded w/in impenetrable point of certainty, as are all projects of thinking totality by escaping it) > can only escape, w/in existence, in direction of infinity or nothingness, this margin of the possible: not human (as in anthropological factuality, but demonic/metaphysical), first awakens to itself in war w/ evil genius, resists him by reducing natural man w/in: nothing less reassuring than Cogito at its proper and inaugural moment

TN p. 207 “example of the hand” confirms anthropology of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception

p. 211 Derrida explains why Merleau-Ponty’s denial of an anthropological interpretation is unconvincing [here, Derrida is really trying to be nice, even says so]

p. 356n Merleau-Ponty’s failure to deanthropologize logos, hand still prevails in “hiatus”

p. 243 anthropocentric privilege fails to consider: 1) ultimate reduction of world 2) anything that’s not “human flesh,” i.e. technical prostheses 3) historicity that produces-human-beings-and-technics 4) that privileging human frees path toward Christian body

p. 291 the “self” is as indispensable as you in se toucher toi, an “I” unable to touch itself couldn't se plier à ce qui le déplie absolument, au tout autre qui, comme tout autre, habite mon coeur en étranger > no anthropological limit here > “divine,” “animal,” & life all derivative of se toucher toi

WOG p. 36 khōra, non-event, a place or a taking place, an-ontological, an-anthropo-theological; epekeina tēs ousias, event > fragile limit btwn certain event & non-event

BSi pp. 44-5 for Schmitt, only political theories worthy of the name: pessimistic anthropology, man is a dangerous animal (i.e. Hobbes)

pp. 45-6 [vis-à-vis Schmitt] 3 assertions of political anthropology: 1) prosthstatic sovereignty proper to man 2) absolute indivisibility of sovereignty 3) excludes beast & God

OG p. 105 (154) for Lévi-Strauss, Rousseau founder/prophet of anthropology; Rousseau identified possibility of totemism in pity & metaphoricity

pp. 114-15 (168) confessions of anthropologist [does an anthropologist write anything else?], 18th century, humility before a goodness European society has lost: a “zero degree,” native soil, an eschatology/teleology of full, immediate closing of history

EU pp. 180-1 for Kant, indicate (zeigen) consequences of metaphysics of morals in anthropological discourse > principles of metaphysics of morals cannot be founded (gegründet) on anthropology, though they must be applicable to anthropology

——practical philosophy includes metaphysics of morals & moral anthropology

ANTICIPATION

GOD pp. 15-7 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

p. 40 approach, apprehending, anticipating death (see coming what one can’t see, give oneself what one can probably never give in pure or simple way) [each approach confers on death a different value]

p. 55 trembling before the unforeseeable, what cannot be apprehended

GT p. 14 temporalization of time (memory, present, anticipation, pro, re-tention, imminence of future, “ecstases”) destroys the gift via keeping (la garde), restitution, comprehending in advance

p. 21 Heidegger: to look ahead (vorblicken) to the It (Es) which gives (gibt) Being (Sein) & time (Zeit), we try to bring the It and its Being into view, capitalize the “It”, become foresighted

p. 22 can one ask these questions (i.e. what is a gift?) w/out anticipating a thought?

p. 26 “semantic horizon of anticipation that authorizes….” him [Marcel Mauss] to gather together phenomena of diverse sorts

pp. 122-3 the foreseeable, programmed, conditioned, expected, counted on, necessary cannot be a gift or event

——event, gift, must be structured by aleatory, remain unforeseeable w/out being kept so

R p.18 anticipate the idea of democracy, a little bit, we would never seek nor call for its advent if we didn’t know its idea, somewhat, but still tortured by the wheel.

p. 104 [Derrida on 9/11]: not as unforeseeable as everyone claimed; the trauma that occurred, not what actually happened, but apprehension of a worse threat still to come

p. 109 autoimmunity, cruelty itself, autoinfection of all autoaffectivity, the self, ipse, autos finds itself infected (once it needs event, time, other) precedes or anticipates oppositions btwn physis & its others (tekhnē, nomos, thesis) > life-death

POOF pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

OOG p. 117 “horizon is always virtually present in every experience; for it is at once the unity and incompletion, the anticipated unity in every incompletion” > keeps infinite openness in tact, converting critical philosophy’s state of possibility into concrete infinite potentiality

——“horizon-certainty,” “horizon-knowledge,” “horizon-consciousness,” horizon as already there of the future

pp. 134-35 for anticipation to leap to the infinite, it must already be ideal, anticipation authorizes and prescribes presence for consciousness of an Idea in the Kantian Sense (not imaginary)

p. 141 phenomenology: starts from a lived anticipation [Idea in Kantian sense would be operative not thematic] as radical responsibility absent in Kant

——phenomenological determination of Idea radically impossible: Logos can’t be given in philosophy of seeing, but (like all Speech) can only be understood in visible > Endstiftung of phenomenology (its ultimate legitimation) never directly measures up to phenomenology

FK p. 82 “the future tolerates neither foresight nor providence”

***MC p. 348 there is no chance for anticipation, it sees the ob-ject [the thrown], Gegenstand, before it

H p. 77 law of hospitality commands host gives arrivant, “new arrival,” an unconditional welcome; no anticipation

p. 109 we are always in some way late; “the consciousness only anticipates, ever, one delay too many”

p. anne 34 Derrida risks a discourse where nothing is planned, risks misunderstanding

***AF p. 74 affirmation of affirmation, yes, yes, “inaugural engagement of a promise or of an anticipation which wagers, a priori, the very future”

——is Jewishness the absolute uniqueness of this trait? to be open toward the future (à-venir), to be Jewish?: exemplary uniqueness of the trait dunion [btwn Jewishness & future]

MPM p. 47 promise: not expectation or anticipation but commitment

A p. 55 for Heidegger, all interest, belief in immortality, man’s irreducible torsion of retrospective anticipation (survival structure) in every instant (introduces untimely moment and posthumous in most alive of present living thing), stems from man’s mortality—is secondary [to being-toward-death] > only a “being-to-death” can think, desire, project, live immortality as such

SEC p. 309 to pose a kind of question—anticipate meaning

***VM p. 118 can a method be borrowed like a tool? method always shelters, anticipates the being which one encounters > this is why, since Plato, decision of philosophy has always seen itself as a science

p. 146 “ontological” anticipation, transcendence toward Being, helps us understand God, even as ether in which dissonance resonates > inhabits & founds language, Mitsein, all Being-together

PAS PAS p. (33) the thing can appear near only to what anticipates what the near and proximity are, right there

OH p. 18 every history, history of a culture, has a telos (promise, memory) toward which it dreams of gathering itself > anticipation & telos; and every history cannot be identified in advance, unanticipatable, non-masterable, that of which one has no memory

T p. xxv how to put one’s hands on tympanum so it can escape from hands of philosopher, so he can no longer recognize his phallogocentrism [play w/ mains, maintenant, maintain], no longer rediscover himself, no longer able to say: I will have anticipated it w/ absolute knowledge

PPHS pp. 72-3 theory of sign on basis of being-present, authority of lêtre-en-vue: telos of reappropriation [see POOF p. 65], coordination of sign & light of parousia, speaking logos as close as possible to itself in concept & consciousness

F p. xxxi Torok and Abraham’s method, goes beyond anticipations of a program: introduced an essential déportment (unruliness) [re: “transphenomenology,” relay, conversion]

P pp. 27-8 lemmatic precipitation, anticipatory conceptualizing, recourse to metaphor of circle, circle of circles, metaphor of organic whole [re: Hegel & philosophy as work of art]

SP p. 139 this death [in text] not that of tragedy nor subject, not “I am mortal, therefore…” > the scene of text’s cryptic nature makes possible anticipation of death: tragedy, parody & birth

GSP p. 167 Telos/Vorhaben > infinite theoretical anticipation & infinite practical task: Kantian Idea as project of phenom.? makes it possible by overflowing its system (as its end?) > doesn’t enclose genesis of Being & meaning—is structurally genesis itself: origin/becoming, birth of history

FS p. 26 structuralist totality promises infidelity to telos, but: structures must permit totality to open, overflow itself, totality thus takes on meaning by anticipating telos > an opening which liberates genesis and time but risks stifling force under futural becoming of teleological form

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

——point of ontotheological fusion reduces precipitation & after-affect (dehiscence btwn vouloir-dire & writing, anticipation & recapitulation) to sublatables [mouvement de tête]

pp. 20-1 teleological anticipation: soothing order of future perfect

SW p. 322 expecting w/out knowing, thus w/out expecting [?]

RGE p. 252 the other dawn (awake from slumber of reason—which anticipated all figures of its beyond, all forms & resources of its exterior—except, perhaps, laughter)

PIO p. 34 invention’s “first time”: inaugural event and iterability > thus, no invention w/out status, w/out introduction or promise of publicity; iterability marked, remarked, at origin of invention, elle y forme une poche du premier instant: retroverted anticipation

——to invent is to produce iterability & the machine for reproduction/simulation

OG p. 66-7 (97) that the “imprint” is irreducible means speech is passive in relation to an absolute past that can never be fully mastered, brought to presence > this passivity of speech is also a relation to the future, but not via anticipation [which would be a mastering of passivity]

p. 295 (416) should (devrait) is the mode and tense (temps) of the teleological/eschatological anticipation that surveils Rousseau’s discourse

ANXIETY

SPOM p. 135 “anxiety in the face of the ghost is properly revolutionary”

APHORISM

PIO p. 417n Leibniz on aphorism: general or experiential truth w/out entirely convincing reason

TN p. 12 aphorisms interest us because elliptical, testamentary: keep silence sur son lit de mort

AD pp. 54-6 aphoristic energy of déliasion in Levinas’ ethical affirmation: from subordination (no interiorization), to welcome of Most High (host), to unicity of possibility of substitution (hostage)

OG p. 18 (30-1) book as idea of totality, encyclopedia, requires external signified, is against writing and its aphoristic energy

——violence on both sides: logocentrism (book), deconstruction (text)

APPEARANCE

DS p. 211 indefinite fold of word appearance (presence, simulacrum)

APPROACH

GT p. 91 what is a border (bord) or an approach (aborder) once the indivisibility of the trait is no longer secure (assurée)? gift will always be w/out border

H p. 123 entering is crossing the threshold, not only approaching or coming

BL p. 205 law prohibits by interfering, deferring the “férance,” reference, rapport, relation > what cannot be approached is the origin of differance: the law of law (neither natural nor institutional)

MPM p. 29 finitude of memory, formed by trace of other in us > approach or remembrance of future (memory of mourning, mourning of memory)

A p. 76 non-access to death where access is only to the threshold, pas, approach to border

PAS PAS p. (30) “quand il la tient, il touche cette force dapproche qui rassemble la proximité, et, dans cette proximité, tout le lointain et tout le dehors

p. (31) force of approach defined “à-partir-deléloignement du proche, gathering proximity and distance in an inclusion w/out interiority

p. (33) “ainsi: quelque chose (quoi? autre-chose) (s’)approche

p. (89) to land, to approach is what creates a border, to approach a strange slow movement of drawing near, does not attain goal, nor tamper with end, does not touch the border, which only remains one so long as approaching never touches it [border of approach ≈ to-come of event]

——approach is not an originary event

p. (90) ne-pas, not negation brought to bear on a position or a negation, but on “singular undecidability of the approach of the other”—unable to go nearer or father: suffice to disable every dialectical schema

p. (95) approach (unpresentable time of récit) thwarts assurance of negation, negative theology and dialectics

SH p. 52 “an approachable you” : date beyond calendar [re: poem’s cipher of singularity]

ROP p. 72 edges of book: approach as 1st border (1st pages of a book), end as other border

EJQB p. 77 born only by approaching book, die only by failing (échouant) in sight of book > toujours la rive impassible du livre est d’abord

TN p. 3 I could touch your eyes by approaching (mapprochant) you, if I dared

AD p. 52 Levinas: ethical language is the very meaning of approach, contrasts w/ knowledge

pp. 150-51n though Levinas calls substitution of being-host (being-hostage) a sacrificial experience (approach as sacrifice), Derrida wonders if substitution comes “before” sacrifice

EU pp. 61-3 philosophy as an idea of a possible science never given in concreto, one finds oneself on the path (trouver en chemin) toward it

APOCALYPSE

GT p. 148 perversity can always secretly corrupt the “donner raison à lautre”: ratio, logos, is on your side [re: “Counterfeit Money”], what counts, can be counted, you took maximum pleasure

——link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

R p. 97 beast: incarnation of evil, satanic, diabolical, demonic, beast of apocalypse

LOBL p. 94 difference btwn archeaology and eschatology as differance in apocalypse, that will be a while in coming

***pp. ~125-126 Glas, apocalyptic text, revelation through faulty teletype [Apokalupsis Ioannou, the Revelation of St. John the Divine] [p. ~164 translators refer to end of my apocalypse (Glas)]

p. ~127 apocalyptic, in other words capital unveiling [from GLAS]

pp. ~136-37 sur-vient, the event, Nietzsche’s Doppelgänger, ghosts, consists in nothing but coming about, being gone

——apocalypse, eschatology, the “last War,” the “context” of larrêt de mort > “come” is said to event that comes about, apocalyptic superimprinting of texts

SPOM pp. 16-7 apocalypse of history, philosophy, Marxism was daily bread for Derrida in ’50s, so those into Fukuyama seem late for the end of history

ATIA p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

EL p. 201 for Scholem, secularized = pulling out language’s apocalyptic thorn; but secularization does not take place, a surface effect, language still sacred in its abyssal interior

p. 203 Scholem’s equivocal use of word apocalypse, fascination w/ abyss : indecision that he can’t, doesn’t want, to master > apocalypse should be guarded (saved), and we should guard against it

pp. 203-04 secularize (desacralize): remove point, sting (Stachel), apocalyptic thorn of language > sting, this teleological aim (visée), institutes sacredness of language > this sacred language (Hebrew) would be nothing w/out magnetized pointer of apocalypse (cette pointe aimantée dapocalypse)

p. 204 apocalyptô: 1) decrypting what is hidden, revelation/unveiling 2) end time, last judgment 3) catastrophe, cataclysm

pp. 204-05 Scholem: apocalypse, form of acute Messianism > writers of apocalypse (Daniel) distinct from prophets (Hosea, Amos, Isaiah): prophets don’t describe specific events of end; apocalypse speaks whole history (from origin to end), & coming of new aeon (Greek aiôn, Hebrew ‘olam) > aeons of apocalypse follow each other while opposing each other: present/future, darkness/light, Israel/nations, holiness/sin, pure/impure, life/death

——against cosmic/cosmopolitan background of apocalypses that ideas of last judgment, resurrection of dead, & paradise/hell have appeared

——Scholem protests against Christianizing Messianism, interiorizing & spiritualizing, a flight seeking to escape verification of Messianic, apocalyptic claim

——Scholem describes a move from national, exoteric [straightforward] Messianism to cryptographic, esoteric, elitist, apocalypticism accentuated by Jews losing their nation: the cryptic veil becomes “its very phenomenality, its state and its efficacy”

——acc. Scholem, apocalyptic knowledge so “explosive” could only be transmitted by word of mouth

p. 206 will apocalyptic path upon which we’re engaged lose us, save us?

p. 219 Geschlecht and Schlag (stamp, imprint) > “we” that undergoes relation to itself out of (depuis) menacing interpellation of Geschlecht by apocalyptic speech (parole)

——[re: “we” of apocalyptic speech] responsibility is ineluctable, finds sign of its freedom in this fatality > not Kantian practical universality, formalizable obligation: does not replace itself, delegate itself

p. 224 every political revolution: a return to speaking essence of sacred language [?] > this return marks moment of judgment, instance of a court (Gericht, the last judgment [Das jüngste Gericht]) w/ apocalyptic value

TN p. 51 following Nancy’s interpretation of The Death of the Virgin, [Life comme une Morte] a “tôt” announcing an apocalypse (an end not a future) > night of nonknowledge, every desire gathers momentum, Psyche ex-posed to other, surrendered but all too soon denied to the other’s eyes

CF p. 33 in 1964, French law described ‘imprescriptibility’ of crimes against humanity: this phrasing has an apocalyptic horizon of final judgment, law beyond law

BSi p. 254 [“you’re stupid”: Cartesian, apocalyptic verdict, final judgment]

ATAP pp. 63-5 words gala and apokalupsis share numerous accords—still gaps, deviations > Greek apokaluptō, a witticism (bon mot) for, hospitable to Hebrew gala

lever/relever all senses (meanings) pressing around Hebrew gala, in front of columns/colossi of Greece, in front of the galactic, the milky ways that fascinate me

pp. 64-5 apocalypse, revealing of [m/f] genitals, pulling back glans: denuding, affording sight

p. 67 end is near, already taken place, “you are dead./Stay awake!”—the “second death” never comes [Kant derides a tone announcing death of all philosophy]

p. 74 numerology, Plato’s amazement w/ geometric figures, illumination, Pythagorean mysticism, vision—all belong to apocalyptic world, crypto-politics, -poetics, [for Kant] perversion of philosophy > matter of veil & castration [that is, who will unveil? who speaks w/out mastery?]

p. 75 Nietzsche’s I have forgotten my umbrella at once totally open & hermetic, “as secret and superficial as the apocalypse of the postcard it announces and protects against”

——apocalypse as dream of raising (aufheben) veil of Isis

p. 80 West dominated by powerful program of ends: Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx (trying to forget differences btwn Hegel & Marx perhaps another eschatology of Marxism): end of Oedipus, of class struggle, of God, of history, of religions, of Christianity & morals (ça, the most serious naiveté), of subject, of man, of earth, of literature: in blood, fire, earthquake, napalm descending sky by helicopters, like prostitutes—the nuclear thunder & the great whoring

pp. 81-2 if eschatological question always surprises us, response to it is impossible: [eschatology?] an appeal promising & responding before the question

p. 82 every apocalyptic eschatology promised in name of light, we are heirs to these Lumières, cannot & must not forgo the Aufklärung; must keep enough apocalyptic desire (clarity, revelation) to deconstruct apocalyptic discourse

p. 83 still philosophical, onto-eschato-teleological interpretation to say apocalyptic strategy is fundamentally one, to say its diversity is simply masks, appearances or simulacra

p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

p. 85 vigil at moment of end, funeral Wake [re: apocalyptic tone]

p. 87 John Patmos (1: 2–3) “the joys of the reader, of the hearer/of the words of the inspiration/for those who keep what is written/yes, the time approaches”: angelic structure, condition of all marks, time, experience, writing, trace > “apocalyptic” writings: exemplary revelation of this transcendental structure

——do not know to whom apocalyptic envoi returns, perhaps not even man is the terminal of this computer w/out end

p. 89-90 apocalypse on both sides of censorship: 1) nothing less conservative than apocalyptic genre, escapes all postal regulations (where censorship is strong, apocalyptic writings increase) 2) state censors by denouncing as false, mystagogic, obscure, apocalyptic

p. 90 Glas’ columns constantly shaken by apocalyptic agitations, laughs at apocalypse (mixing John of Gospel w/ Genet [GLAS p. 198])

p. 91 destinerrance: bastard apocalyptic filiation

pp. 91-2 in “Envois” of PC, the 2 can’t go beyond 4 [?] [4 horsemen]

pp. 94-5 apocalypse w/out apocalypse, w/out Last Judgment, no eschatology beyond tone of “Come” itself > the apocalypse of apocalypse [our apocalypse now], beyond good & evil: no longer collection of evil & good in legein of alētheia, in Geschick of lenvoi, or of Schicken of co-destination

p. 95 [apocalypse w/out apocalypse] X w/out X, sans marks internal/external catastrophe of apocalypse, catastrophe of sans doesn’t merge w/ announced end, is its pli: a closure w/out end, end w/out end > outside of apocalypse w/in apocalypse

——“do not seal”: i.e. do not close, do not sign

EU p. 109 [re: politico-juridical system of university] Derrida beyond [?] political right/left, on the side of a tireless parasite [passe et repasse la limite] seeking conflict or perpetual peace in a university that has from its birth (dès sa naissance) en mal (been wanting) dapocalypse et deschatologie

APOLLO & DIONYSUS

FS p. 28 Apollonian ecstasy cannot embrace force, movement which displaces lines, nor force as desire for itself, nor writing > fallen Dionysianism, melancholy, nostalgia

——difference btwn Dionysus & Apollo, ardor & structure, cannot be erased in history, because not in history > it’s an original structure, the opening of history, historicity itself

p. 29 Dionysus is worked over by difference, always appears (to himself) by a relationship to his exterior, his death [fire]

APORIA

GOD pp. 26-8 responsibility, aporia btwn choice and heresy (hairesis as choice, election), a type of secrecy that keeps responsibility apart (tient la responsabilité à lécart) and in secret, the very thing responsibility insists on

p. 62 aporia of responsibility: always risks not managing to accede to concept of responsibility in process of forming it; for Kierkegaard, the ethical is a temptation that would make Abraham irresponsible

R p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

p. 49 aporia: condition of possibility and impossibility, of responsibility

LOBL p. 78 it is impossible for living speech to speak on living [sur vivre?], unless it’s impossible only w/ living speech: aporia even more paralyzing

H p. anne 30 is the anguish of aporia enough to prevent the process of growing accustomed?

p. 77-9 aporia as the collision of two laws, antinomy; tragedy of destiny that 2 terms of antinomy are asymmetrical [the law above law & laws proper in plural]

p. 81 “at this very moment”: antinomy of laws in the plural and absolutely singular law

——there are 2 plurals, different at same time: 1) multiplicity, plural laws 2) One + a multiplicity, One + n [plus dun]

——One + n, the antinomic addition, adds conditional laws to unconditional law of hospitality

MPM p. 95 singular aporia that divides the act, can’t be mastered, commits us before any active commitment on our part, impossibility of promise, uncontrollable > faktum, “older”

p. 100 writing, as an event of signature, a signature which can only promise itself in the sense that its destination is barred, impasse of aporia

p. 132 re: de Man,“figures of rationality are profiled and outlined in the madness of the aporetic”

p. 133 impasse (dead end) of aporia—reopening, fait appel [arrêt, arrêt]

p. 136 an aporia which, because it paralyzes, engenders

A pp. 11-2 aporia, experience of what’s fascinating in the nonpassage: “not knowing where to go,” paralyzed by separation

——before a door, threshold, border, approach of the other as such [think Kafka, Blanchot], there is “no longer any problem,” without protection, without prosthesis [?], w/out possible substitution, singularly exposed, naked, delivered over to the other, can’t protect the interiority of the secret; can’t find a border still to cross [anxiety before fantasy?]

p. 14 Derrida retraces his steps through Heidegger in OS: Kant, Hegel inherited exoteric aporia from Aristotle, dialectic repeats exoteric aporia as “brilliant formulation of vulgar paradox”

——Derrida reminds us of his method [in OS] (orient confirmation [of Heidegger] toward another suggestion, even will supporting it): can the experience of the time be anything other than vulgar? what if exoteric aporia was irreducible, called for experience of oppositions from both sides of indivisible line [?] > a nonvulgar concept, to the so-called vulgar concept

pp. 14-5 [Derrida quickly reviews many places in his own work where he studied aporetology, paradoxical limitrophy, double bind]

p. 15 experience means traversal without line, without indivisible line, passage, rite of passage, can it ever concern surpassing an aporia? can there be an experience of the aporia as such?

——deconstruction: aporetic experience of the impossible

p. 16 nonpassive endurance of aporia: condition of responsibility, neither dialectizable contradiction like Hegel, Marx, nor transcendental illusion like Kant

——aporia rather than antinomy, or antinomy as an interminable experience

p. 19 choice of negative form (aporia) to designate a duty announces affirmation by avoiding good conscience at all costs

——the 2 forms of good conscience [1) grimace of indulgent vulgarity 2) subjective certainty] incompatible w/ absolute risk of every promise, engagement, responsibility

——affirmation that announces itself in negative form is experience itself, experience of aporia (passage and nonpassage coupled in aporia itself)

——experience of aporia: passion, endurance, resistance, remainder

p. 20 paradox of aporia: multiple figures of aporia do not oppose figures to each other, “instead installs the haunting of the one in the other”

——2 versions of aporia’s nonpassage: 1) impermeable, only opens via shibboleth, closed borders (i.e. during war) 2) impasse of no limit, limit too porous, no opposition btwn 2 sides

p. 23 aporia: not even the non-pas but the deprivation of pas (a-pas)

p. 28 death one of the names of a threat, an aporia, that risks paralyzing ontological, hierarchical, territorial apparatus to which Heidegger lends credit; death, in this sense, names what Heidegger early on called “ruination” [look up]

pp. 40-1 aporia of death, one of the place-names that forms following braid btwn 3 forms of limits, keeps it from coming undone [see pp. 78-80 border, closure, demarcation] 1) problematic closure (around thematic entity) 2) anthropological border (animals don’t have borders, laws) 3) conceptual demarcation, logical de-finition (decontaminate 2 concepts, oppose them rigorously)

pp. 63-4 two ontological statements [re: Heidegger] of possibility articulate, engender, supplement each other: 2 moments of a single aporetic sentence

p. 68 Heidegger’s possibility of an impossibility, is this an aporia? do we situate it in the possibility of an impossibility or the impossibility? not the same thing

p. 73 unique aporia of “expecting death”: 1) impossibility itself, dying as the aporia, impossibility of being dead, of “existing” one’s death 2) or that this impossibility is possible, appears as such, at whose limits one waits, limits of truth, but also possibility of truth

pp. 78-9 aporia can never be endured as such, ultimate aporia is impossibility of aporia as such > incalculable reservoir

death is figure of the aporia such that “death” and death can replace (metonymy that carries name beyond name, beyond name of name) all that is possible as impossible: love, gift, other, testimony

POOF p. 39 btwn concept/event a double bind occurs, imposes itself to be endured there, law of an aporia, undecidability, crucial disjunction btwn thinking & knowing: gift, invention

p. 67 aporia that all change must endure (that of perhaps) > w/out suspense marking a perhaps, there would neither be event nor decision; w/out suspending perhaps while keeping its living possibility in living memory, nothing would take place, nothing would be decided

PP p. 160 “Plato’s metaphors” [re: khōra]? passage beyond all “Platonic” oppositions, toward aporia of originary inscription

OH p. 41 ethics, politics, responsibility only begin in aporia of double injunction

SH p. 24 aporia: barred passage (no pasarán)

FWT pp. 150-51 Derrida’s aporias are not meant to confound, reverse oppositions, but to suspend, mark, recall necessity of suspending naive confidence, common sense, conscious belief

OS p. 39 Aristotle’s aporia [on time] is an exoteric: opened and closed on this dead end (cette voie sans issue): time is that which “is not” or “barely, and scarcely”

p. 40 1st stage of Aristotle’s aporia [re: time]: think time as divisibility, where none of its parts, no now, is in the present; 2nd stage: now is not a part, time is not composed of nun

p. 54 [Hegelian] dialectics as simply a repetition of the [Aristotle’s] exoteric aporia, time becomes affirmation of the aporetic

ROP p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

p. 79 quasi-transcendental (formal) law of seriality (when condition is part of the series) creates aporias not to be avoided—the very chance to think [hors-série]

p. 113 Foucault pulls back from (admits impasses of) epistēmē > mais seul ceux qui travaillent, seuls ceux qui prennent des risques en travaillant rencontrent des difficultés > responsibility dans lépreuve de laporie

PF p. xvii paralysis arrests: negative symptom of aporia > whereas aporia is possibility of impossible, of “play,” very condition of pas, experience of frayage, marche, via rupta [elsewhere Derrida deconstructs becoming route?], decision, event, coming of other: writing & desire

p. 283n mustn’t a response respond beside the point, mustn’t it surprise? > justement et juste à côté de la question: not by program but by aporia

HST p. 385 for forgiveness to be possible, what there is to forgive must remain unforgivable: otherwise exchange, excuse [see p. 380] > logical aporia (not just formal logic) but tragedy of compassion: intersubjectivity as destiny of hostage, madness of substitution

p. 386 forgiveness merges (se confondre) w/ lépreuve of aporia: possibility of impossible, impossible of the possible

p. 398 last aporia of forgiveness, most artful, provoke laughter to point of madness [Beckett’s risus purus]

pp. 398-99 the scandalous aporia: can’t forgive the living (commerce), can’t forgive the dead (silent procedure, oblivion); can only forgive on forbidden threshold/border btwn life/death

***p. 400 abyss of non-response to aporetic question: condition of responsibility

TN p. 4 Aristotle on the aporia of touch, touch is adēlon: obscure, secret, nocturnal

——aporias, never through with them (those worthy their name), can’t see or touch their end

p. 131 “my impertinence will be my tact”: baroque composition, flaunted taste for delirious profusion > response to aporias of text

***CF p. 32 dry & implacable formality of aporia, w/out mercy: forgiveness forgives only unforgivable

APRIORI [fixerup]

OOG p. 128 for Husserl, aprioriness is not a concern, it is the institutive infinitization

S p. 18 how else but by confirming it a priori and circularly can Heidegger question Daseins privilege (Vorrang) re: the question?

AQUINAS

VP p. xviii [see Aquinas’ 2nd way] repetition comes first and last (no unified origin, no final end)

DPi DPi p. 26 Aquinas: fervent advocate of DP for heretics

(AN)ARCHE

POR p. 18 (153) [re: desiring to remove the university] anarchy risks reproducing hierarchy

p. 19 (153) “thinking” requires both principle of reason and what’s beyond it, both archē and an-archy > decision [of thought] always risks the worst, to claim to erase the risk by institutional program is to create a barricade against a future

R p. 66 voyoucracy, corrupting power of street, not anarchic disorder, but structured disorder, secret society, seducer

pp. 75-6 both Plato & Aristotle maintain political turn toward or salutation of One God, where arkhē has at his disposal tekhnē, for Plato not utopia, prayer, but very difficult

POOF pp. 203-04 in Aristotle, honor saves friendship from calculation, from the market—still, it’s proportioned via hierarchy, a hierarchy as sacralization of the beginning, qua command (arkhé)

WM p. 224 trope and arkhē have their own metaphorical charge, resist every meta-metaphorics, values of concept, foundation, theory > fundamental desire for firm/ultimate ground (to build artifice)

SP pp. 79-81 Heidegger oscillates btwn reading in Nietzsche a simple Umdrehung (inversion) of Plato or something other > neither a direct flipping, nor an an-archical erasure of hierarchy (which consolidates established order), but “a transformation of hierarchical structure itself”

POS pp. 13-4 no end of the book, no beginning of writing, writing puts archie in question

***DIF pp. 6-7 differance must be superseded, not considered arkhē of chain, thus not theological

PIO p. 6 for something to be a first time must also be a last time > archaeology & eschatology

acknowledge each other in irony of one & only instant

AFR pp. 118-19 frivolity (useless) is the congenital breach of sign (its entame, archē), since structure of sign’s deviation ensures frivolity has no origin, frivolity defies archeology, condemns it to frivolity: excessive relief, not even money or merchandise > sign’s disposability never presents itself

AD p. 23 Levinas on cogito: “it is not I, it is the other that can say yes” > infinity welcomed in anarchy

p. 90 no state of nature in Levinas—only pre-original anachrony of an-archy

pp. 94-5 for Levinas, paternal “fecundity” (not feminine alterity anymore) opens infinite discontinuous time: protest against egoist protestation of subjectivity (that of Kierkegaard, Rosenzweig) > true anarchy, paternal: only effective protestation against “tyranny of the State”

BSi pp. 92-6 [Derrida savages Agamben’s dogmatism in declaring who was “first,” then dogmatism in accusation of negligence, points out abyss of neglect, “one is always a priori negligent,” asks about the ethical responsibility in Levinas’ anarchy (no first)]

p. 138 sovereign, the arkhē, capital, chief, king, who can lose his head, go mad

p. 312 threshold as solid, indivisible, threshold as arkhē: commencement and commandment > archon, figure of sovereign himself

OG p. 197 (282) via Rousseau, exceed nature, then return to it, imitate it, but keep a minimal (almost nil) difference > nature as ailleurs, archeo-teleologic, alibi (elsewhere in space), in illo tempore (elsewhere in time)

pp. 256-58 (363-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] teleology as external—passage from state of nature to state of language (from one structure to another) explained by catastrophic archaeology (catastrophe of dangerous supplementarity)

ARCHIVE

KH p. 150n Egyptian priest in Timeaus assigns “places” to race of men for conservation of archives, writing, tradition > temperate zones [Rousseau in OG] which protect against hot/cold

GOD p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

GT p. 44 writing not as the external archive of the gift, but tied to the very act of gift, act in sense of archive & performative operation

MONL p. 52 “incarnate archive of a liturgy whose secret no one will betray,” no one else could appropriate, even I, who is in on the secret

FL p. 277 for Benjamin, text & signature are specters which exhibits & archive their implosion, in ruins, [Derrida now affirms this “stance”] such is status of deconstructive text: cannot escape law it enunciates, ruins & contaminates itself [at once founding/preserving], becomes specter of itself

OOG p. 99 phenomenological Reaktivierung: must be fully responsible and conscious of sedimented sense I take up

——via Husserl, because senses deposited, stratified, also prescribed by an archi-tectonics, there’s a danger of passivity

AF p. 1 arkhē: commencement, commandment > 2 principles in one, having place, taking place of authority, command, nomological principle

p. 2 arkheion, house of commanders, guardians, of archons, whose documents speak the law

——archives take place in a house arrest

p. 3 documents in archive inhabit rare place, place of election, law & singularity intersect in privilege

——shouldn’t be heterogeneity or secret in archive; archontic principle: gathering together of signs

p. 4 the secret menaces the archive

——democracy provides more access to archive [see p. 95 w/ dead father, brothers share archive]

p. 7 archival violence: exergue, capitalize on ellipse, accumulates capital in advance, anticipates so to institute (Gewalt)

——archive at once institutive & conservative [see FL], revolutionary & traditional, an eco-nomic archive: keeps, puts in reserve, saves, but in unnatural fashion (forcing obedience to law)

p. 8 question of the archive: where does the archive commence?

pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin)

——death drive is anarchivic, archiviolithic

p. 11 archive takes place at structural breakdown of memory, anamnesis (alive, internal, spontaneous) > archive is hypomnesic [hypomnēma] [pharmakon]

——no archive w/out outside, w/out technique of repetition

pp. 11-2 archive requires repetition, repetition permits memory but is indissociable from death drive—so archive introduces forgetfulness, archiviolithic, always works against itself [auto-immunity]

——death drive destroys archive, unless it can be made up as idol, represented, painted, erotic simulacrum

——death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

p. 12 is circumcision an exterior mark? is it an archive?

p. 13 Jew (or Devil, radical evil, all which is irreconcilable to God in “Christian science”) can be reinvested as an economistic resource of an archive that capitalizes everything [Sagi]

——devil can justify, such is destination of Jew in Aryan ideal

***pp. 16-7 the prosthetic, hypomnesic techniques of archive not only place for storing, but also determine structure of the archivable content in its very coming into existence, in its relationship to the future

p. 18 archival technique: command that which in past instituted/constituted anticipation of the future

pp. 19-20 no archive drive w/out radical finitude, possibility of forgetfulness, death drive’s threat is infinite, radical evil & political-ethical questions

p. 22 lawmakers w/out which one can’t have archives, conservation (memory) puts into reserve (“store”), accumulates, capitalizes, stocks a quasi-infinity of layers (hypermnesic, hypomnesic epidermises of books & penises)

p. 23 entire economy of archival law found in these 2 words: memorial & reminder

——arca: cupboard, coffin, prison cell

p. 25 the proper of the archive, its instant—certain hypomnesic, prosthetic experience of technical substrate [Derrida had this thought while tinkling on his Macintosh computer]

pp. 26-7 can one imagine an archive w/out foundation, w/out substance, w/out subjectile?

p. 28 minimal archive: copy of an impression

p. 31 to not take account of the Freudian impression [resistance], one confirms, countersigns (archives) his theory of “repression”

p. 34 archivology (interdisciplinary science of archive) risks being paralyzed in preliminary aporia: 1) treat psychoanalysis as general science of the archive 2) place itself under the critical authority of psychoanalysis (disputing it while integrating its logic)

p. 35 w/out transgenerational memory (2 types: ancestral or biological), there would be no question of memory or archive

p. 36 to know what archive means, we will only know in time to come: question of the future itself, of a response, promise, a responsibility for tomorrow (spectral messianicity at work in archive)

p. 45 classically—science, philosophy, intrinsically independent of the singular archive of its history

——via Yerushalmi, but w/ a Jewish science, archive becomes a founding moment for science as such

p. 55 first archivist—God?

p. 58 key as seal of arkheion, “deferred obedience”

p. 59 question of the archive introduced by very stakes of vertiginous difference btwn [Freud’s] “material truth” & “historical truth” [Derrida also mentions Augustine’s “making truth”]

p. 64 if Yerushalmi believes that archivization & repression [re: killing of Moses] are irreducible, Derrida insists we can archive what we repress, that repression is archivization, that we can archive otherwise [animals can sign themselves as hidden]

p. 66 repression dissimulates or encrypts the archives, archive of the virtual > virtuality removed from its oppositional coupling to actuality, effectivity, reality [re: full & effective actuality of an archived event]

p. 67 no meta-archive

p. 68 one cannot objectivize the archive [call on its names, employ it, make it gain in auctoritas] w/out remainder, archive produces more archive, never closed, opens to the future

p. 70 no history or archive of the future to come [respect the future to come of the future to come]

pp. 71-2 “if it is at all knowable,” an epochal suspension as energy of virtuality (energeia of a dynamis) [Agamben, Aristotle?], vertiginous, gives only condition of a future which remains to-come, messianic, an archive w/ no record of presence of what is or will have been “actually present” (distinguished radically from all messianism)

p. 80 question of revelation (Offenbarung) or revealability (Offenbarkeit): does the event make the archivization possible? or vice versa? besides, the after-the-fact, the trace, Nachträglichkeit, disturbs the logic of the these two theses

p. 84 the structure of the archive is spectral [see p. 68]

p. 90 archive always holds a problem for translation, it is repeatable and idiomatic

p. 91 desire for archive: homesickness for the archaic place of absolute commencement > en mal darchive [in need of archive, in archive fever, in death drive]

p. 92 divorce of archive and archaeology, close, yet radically incompatible [against Foucault?]

pp. 92-3 nearly ecstatic instant Freud dreams of [re: Studies on Hysteria]: origin speaking by itself, arkhē appears in the nude, w/out archive, anamnēsis w/out hypomnēsis

p. 94 archive made possible by destruction drive as originary finitude and expropriation, also no archive fever or desire w/out in-finite movement of radical destruction

p. 97 archive as history of every concept, all conception

p. 100 no archive of the secret, by definition, it is the very ash of the archive

p. 101 we’ll always wonder what in this mal darchive did Freud burn, what may have burned of his secret passions, w/out him, w/out name, w/out symptom, w/out knowledge, w/out even an ash

MPM pp. 106-07 to distinguish Gedächtnis (thinking memory) from Erinnerung (interiorizing memory) de Man marks irreducible link btwn memory & technical dimension of memory (art of writing, hypomnesic, exteriority of Mnemon, archivation, data banks, artificial memory) > no deconstruction w/out calling into question dissociation of thought and technology, no longer able to subscribe to Heidegger’s Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht (science does not think)

POOF p. 233 dominant structures silence others, covering over or destroying the archive > but traditions are never homogenous

pp. 208 about to venture on a decision re: omega ω in “O my friends…”, Derrida makes it clear that the guard-rails of a philological coup de théâtre will not efface the archive constructed on an error [p. 225n Agamben helped Derrida w/ all this]

——the improbable omega ω has a canonical authority protected by great names, the wager of this mistake, like a capital w/ bottomless surplus-value

p. 263 jusquici [up until now], for several 1000 years, le temps d'un clin d'œil [the twinkling of an eye], tremors have been registered, archived, by the archons of the same family [phallogocentric fraternization]

VP p. 13 the voice simulates the “keeping watch (la garde)” over presence, and that the history of spoken language as archive of this simulation prevents us from considering [its contradiction], prevents us from describing this simulation, the infinite complexity of its structure as phantasm

FSW p. 211 for Freud, wrong to think simple translation can occur from unconscious to conscious, presupposes immobile master text > unconscious consists of archives always already transcriptions

SH p. 43 ellipsis, discontinuity, caesura, discretion cannot be sublated (aufgehoben) > no dialectic of sense-certainty can reassure the matter of archive’s safekeeping

FWT p. 44 there is no absolute archive, and the trace is not a proof [re: authentic “parent”]

p. 188 [re: murder of the father] Freud’s “historical” vs. “material” truth: one based on facts in real archive, the other discernible in symptoms [Yerushalmi neglects the latter]

ROP pp. 39-40 future anterior and conditional concerns archivization, what remains or does not remain

——[techno-psychoanalytical] new techniques of archive (tape recorder, etc.), together w/ ideas re: inscription, erasure, blank, memory storage, threaten concept of history > the way in which history is written has not systematically come to terms w/ all this

pp. 43-4 what is getting archived, the trace arriving to efface itself, beyond presence & absence, is impossible to know—not the order of knowledge

p. 44 ash, stepping beyond psychoanalysis, radical destruction of archive, destroys capitalizing reserve, the guarding of repression

p. 48 “off the record [in English]” is outside the archive, is there an outside? no, that’s impossible, but that’s deconstruction’s affair

***ATIA p. 47 autobiography, writing of self as living, trace of the living for itself, auto-affection or auto-infection as memory/archive of living, an immunization, making holy, virginal, indemnify; every autos, ipseity, threatened w/ auto-immunity, the poison of the auto-biography

WAP pp. 5-6 institution can forget its own elect (finite memory), its finitude also affects remembrance of what it wants to exclude: the surface of its archive thus inscribed w/ what it refuses, excludes (ex: Walter Benjamin not receiving a degree)

***DPi pp. 148-49 memory/archivization engage suffering body in a machine, technical repetition, Mnemoteknik, must cause suffering, red of fire before red of blood > for N., punishment is not juridical: it’s a movement of life, writing to remember, inscription, imprint past in body

TR pp. 76-7 French à propos allies necessity & chance, accidental (machinelike) relation to organic, obligatory link; esprit dà-propos: the art, the genius, the technique of grabbing a chance, making of Khairos or Chaos a significant, archivable, even ineffaceable event

p. 84 in spite of Rousseau’s avoidance of Augustine, their Confessions come from same tree, same wood, same paper pulp [?] > abyssal problem of conscious/unconscious archivation

p. 100 de Man’s “history” not temporal but deals w/ “event,” “power,” which is like Derrida’s always finite (therefore selective) archive

——destined to virtuality of “sooner or later,” archive produces the event no less than it records, consigns it [archive figures a place & an instance of power]

p. 101 [re: Confessions] loeuvre generates/capitalizes a sort of interest (won’t be so bold as to say surplus value) of guilt: overproduces shame that is archived (not effaced)

p. 113 there is the archived event and the archiving event (as inscription): these can be indissociable, contemporary, but not the same thing (structurally)

——no archive w/out body (Derrida prefers “body” to “matter”)

pp. 130-31 re: mosquito caught mid-bite in amber coffin or 2 midges making love, a jouissance took place whose archive we preserve, archive of a singular event 54 million years ago > archive of man’s confessions a few centuries ago, fractions of second in history of life, earth, & the rest

——no true archive of man in his truth before the Confessions

p. 134 formidable effects of machinelike automaticity: an a priori, programmed “I apologize” > automatic forgiveness self-destructs w/out delay (faster than “Mission Impossible” tapes), loses its meaning, its memory, annihilates its own archive

pp. 145-46 archive is as precarious as it is artificial, it’s threatened in advance > “sooner or later” the worst can happen to it

p. 146 subjectile, very body of event, archival and auto-deictic body [re: Rousseau’s Confessions]

——revelation of truth nothing w/out saving body of inscriptions

C p. 214 leaving an “act” (act of discursive writing)—in the sense of archive or testamentary document

p. 231 [Titus-Carmel’s] coffins deploy synoptic archive

CF p. 33 archivization of unforgivable crimes by ‘universal conscience’ better informed than ever: reactivates/accelerates call to forgiveness

p. 53 France’s 1964 definition of “imprescriptible” crimes signals toward an ahistorical Final Judgment: crime never effaced from judicial archive [Derrida uses this example to evince an appeal to transcendent order of unconditional in concrete history]

CIN p. 37 the chance of returning, when one “incenses” a sentence to infinity, adorned w/ all its dead, is more certain than securing sentence in an archive [fire guards better than archive]

BSi pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

CIR p. 312 “you archive the system, MacWrite Macintosh SE Apple of PaRDeS” [computer]

EU p. 47 “current institutions”: university & para-university, publishing, the press, the media, new systems of archiving, etc.

p. 94 State or trans-State capitalist powers, re: storage of information in data banks > once library no longer ideal type of archive: university no longer “guardian” or “trustee” of knowledge (this centralizing representation once constituted mission of university itself)

pp. 95-6 [vis-à-vis Kant] the “lettered,” die Litteraten (Studirte): businessmen of knowledge, technicians of learning, administrators of archivization, journalists [represent the State, not educated by Faculty of Philosophy]

pp. 97-8 to ensure philosophy’s power-to-think-and-judge, Kant draws linear/indivisible border in language (language: that which opens passage to all parasites/simulacrum): [the professor utters only constative], university has no executive power, professor speaks w/out action, does not speak publicly > Kant makes information technology [that which escapes university] philosophy’s most faithful representative—but only as a reserved, intra-university, quasi-private language [before the law of this apparent paradox ultimate responsibility should be taken today]

p. 99 fields of publishing, archiving, mediatization have expanded as strikingly as have overcoding & hyper-formalization of language > where does publication begin? [via Kant, publication of knowledge, not knowledge itself, is submitted to authority]

SPEC p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

p. 353 demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

ARISTOTLE

KH pp. 101-02 acc. Hegel, Plato uses myth because he’s impotent, a ludico-mythological drift (dérive), Aristotle Hegel’s guarantor of seriousness

p. 102 Aristotle: “those who philosophize w/ recourse to myth are not worth treating seriously”

p. 127 Plato never qualified khōra as matter (hylè) like Aristotle did

GT p. 64 mediating desire, measuring morality, mediocrity: who gives themselves the right of right measure? paradoxical hubris of measure [thoughtless to laugh at this position]

p. 133 Aristotle differentiates tukhē from automaton (chance from human finality), offers example of creditor going to market & getting his debt paid back: pas de don, everything happens en marchant

p. 139 for Aristotle, happy medium, good measure, megaloprepreia (liberality), giving to common good, better character than the cumin cutter, he who would shave an egg

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

R p. 15 Aristotle’s Prime Mover, the first desirable, gives a life that exceeds the life of a human, continuous, unending—for us, impossible

——energeia of this pure activity is “pleasure (hēdonē), circle of taking pleasure in oneself (jouissance de soi); a specular auto-affection that accords w/ thinking of thought

p. 16 for Aristotle, the One [i.e. Prime Mover] is above multiplicity, we should not all be kings, Aristotle’s against polykoirania

pp. 23-24 for Aristotle, democracy: equality according to number, not worth, which makes democracy a freedom founded on equality, as opposed to being governed and govern in turn

MONL p. 11 Aristotle’s model: the “most” this, the “best” that: paradigmatic example

FK p. 46 prayer is neither true nor false

LOBL pp. 115-16 [compare crisis, event, instant, edge (arête) which gives momentum to Prime Mover]

POR p. 4 (130) via Aristotle, sight is privileged sense re: knowledge, knowing for sake of knowing linked to sight as senseless sensation (sight privileged even when no praxis in view)

p. 18 (152) acc. Aristotle, math developed in Egypt due to leisure time enjoyed by priestly caste

HERP p. 172 Heidegger enacts “destruction” on Aristotle’s broken analysis of logos as judgment, and has reservations about man as animal rationale, zōon logon echon

p. 188 mishearing, essential possibility for Heidegger [error in Aristotle]

POOF p. 7 (23-4) Aristotle privileges to love over being loved, active over passive (potential) > Derrida points to a tense btwn active/passive, the question of aimance (lovence) [see pp. 24-5n] ——Aristotle places same & other in figure of the other [the friend], cette étrange configuration donne à penser

——more worthwhile (vaut mieux) “to love,” preeminence of form over matter > Derrida will demonstrate how, for once, w/ Aristotle, death situated on side of form & act: act of friendship bears death in itself

p. 9 for Aristotle, friendship linked to knowledge, science & self-consciousness held (tenue) in pledge, alliance, promise, performative chain [of friendship]

p. 10 if Prime Mover [Lover?] sets himself in motion w/out moving or being moved, isn’t he analogically the beloved, the absolute desirable? on the side of death?

——lover, subject, soul, life, breath, philetikoi [see p.12], necessary; beloved, philótimoi, object, accident, soulless, dead

p. 202 Aristotle’s 2 forms of justice: 1) numerical equality (katarithmón), brothers 2) proportional equality (katanalogían), father-son [cf. Aristotle’s Politics]

p. 205 sober aridity of Aristotle’s discourse

p. 243 hard to follow Heidegger’s epochal scansion of philía, yes, anachronistic to find subject/object in Aristotle, but how can he say there's no anthropological or psychological vantage point?

——acc. Heidegger, Christianity is an education of passions, even a psychology, a psychological subjectivity—all post-Aristotelian friendships are Christian, same goes for ‘politics’

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, Aristotle overtook to ruin the capital letters of Platonism, the eídos of friendship, by calling the witness to the stand, an “actual” friend > Derrida will take sign of this ruin & no longer answer call to witness stand

A p. 14 acc. Derrida in OS via Heidegger, Kant, Hegel inherited exoteric aporia from Aristotle, who acknowledges lack of clarity in saying “aporia is exoteric” w/out then deconstructing it

VM p. 317n Aristotle rigorously demonstrated that Being is neither genre nor principle (Metaphysics B, 3, 998 b 20)

p. 319n doctrine of uniformity of Being (don Scotus, Heidegger) incompatible w/ Aristotelian-Thomist Being in which question of 1st/2nd [re: universal/singular] remains

S p. 50 Aristotle’s dynamis (potentiality) is a virtuality oriented by a telos

PPHS p. 75 in Peri Hermeneias [Aristotle spells out logo-phonocentrism]: spoken words (ta en tēi phōnēi) are symbols of mental experiences, written words are symbols of spoken words, mental experiences are the same for all

WM pp. 237-38(n) Aristotle: just like in philosophy, an acute mind will find resemblances in things far apart

——imitation sets man apart from beasts, man alone takes pleasure in imitating > metaphor, an effect of mimēsis and homoiosis, manifestation of analogy, a subordinate means of knowledge: full truth preferred to metaphor

——Aristotle reproaches Plato for using “poetic metaphors” and hollow language when he said Ideas are the paradigms in which other things participate

——to be learning something, recognizing resemblance (the same), is the greatest pleasure, this pleasure is the second [?] “cause” of mimēsis and metaphor

pp. 239-40(n) mimeme (neither thing itself, nor tout autre) > elliptical syllogism of mimēsis provides as recompense a dividend of pleasure, “everything like & akin to oneself is pleasant”: finishing work, laughter of resemblance (also, we should not spend all our time imitating monstrous things)

p. 243 for Aristotle, proper name is nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, father of all figures > everything turns around it, towards it > metaphor as substitution of proper names w/ fixed meaning & referent

pp. 247-48 via Aristotle, univocity (one meaning per noun) is telos (essence) of language, there is only finite polysemia: a nonmasterable dissemination (an irreducible polysemia) is not even a polysemia, it belongs to what is outside language, and thus outside humanity

OS p. 49(n) time compared by Aristotle to movement and chance, w/out being either one of them, time can only occur en tēi psukhēi > time’s analogy: what is traced (le tracé) as line, grammē

pp. 49-50 if Aristotle conceived time in a way not dominated by presence, did Heidegger arrest this possibility in Sein und Zeit, did Kant just make explicit the evaded question [section title] in Physics IV? such making explicit keeps to (se tient) the system de l’éludé

pp. 50-1 Aristotle repeats aporia of Zeno’s argument re: time, says it clarifies nothing, but does not deconstruct it > time’s nonbeing pre-comprehended as nonpresence in relation to determination of being as present

pp. 52-3 transition from parousia to absolute subjectivity does not disrupt Aristotelianism: prime mover, presence, desire, eros, “desire is desire of presence,” absolute subjectivity, circle, return to self, parousia as self-presence > prime mover, noēsis noēseōs, as subject

p. 54 for Aristotle, potentiality & act are not symmetrical: governed by teleology of presence, act (energeia) as presence (ousia, parousia)

p. 56 for Aristotle, being-together [of nun and stigmē] not a determination of Being but very production of Being > ama as the pivot (cheville) (clavis), the key opening & closing metaphysics > this complicity so self-effacing as to barely be noticed, the common origin of space & time > Aristotle says w/out saying [Rousseau describing w/out declaring]: the dyad as the minimum

ROP p. 4 Giusti: for Aristotle, art of dialectic is the exercise of dialogue w/ tradition [?]

ATIA p. 83 the abyss of autos, ipseity, autokinesis: we must surrender (get) to the heart of the abyss btwn law of nature (reaction) & law of freedom (response & responsibility)

p. 149 Aristotle, a fundamental reference for ATIA [or “this seminar”]

p. 156 re: animal, Heidegger continues Aristotle’s tradition of steresis (privation)

p. 157 Aristotle’s non-apophantic logos (neither enunciative nor declarative): euchē, prayer, entreaty, requesting; for Derrida, these would open breach in whole apparatus [of “as such”?]

FS p. 21 Aristotle’s concept of movement: transition to the act, which is itself repose of the desired form

RM p. 51 Aristotle’s 4 types of metaphor (Poetics): 1) apo genous epi eidos, ex. “here stands my ship” 4) kata to analogon

AFR p. 35 Condillac denounces Aristotle’s philosophy as unconscious empiricism: Aristotle takes derived generalities as premises, products for seeds or origins (germes)

p. 126n Condillac: the science Aristotle called ζητουμéνη (desired, sought after) is the general knowledge of soul on which all sciences depend (what science of happiness is to the arts), this science opens future, providence—so wise man is not stuck in present

TN p. 6 Aristotle (Peri psuchēs): 1) touch is “inward,” internal 2) flesh is the “medium” 3) touch has for its object tangible & intangible (tou haptou kai anaptou) [a touchable un-touchable?]

p. 19 Aristotle’s Peri psuchēs (de Anima) is treatise on the pure life of the living

p. 47 acc. Aristotle, touch: co-extensive w/ animal life, the genus of senses

BSi pp. 20-1 Hobbes’ sovereignty breaks w/ Aristotle’s political animal [?]

pp. 343-47 for Aristotle, kurios (sovereign), structural difference btwn state & family (latter comes first [historically]) > go to the arkhē to develop best view of things

——Aristotle: those who foresee w/ mind naturally master, those who foresee w/ body naturally slave—both same interest [?]

——Aristotle: only under ruler are slaves and women distinguished; ox is poor man’s slave

——Aristotle: autarkeia (self-sufficiency), sovereign, has an end in himself, is best—self-sufficiency the end of everything

——city is natural reality, man destined to live in city (Aristotle links politics & logos)

——phonē (which animals also have) does not suffice to define logos

OG p. 11 Aristotle’s phono-logocentrism: voice, spoken symbols, immediately proximate to the universal language of mental experience (pathēmata tes psychēs), closest to the thing, the signified

p. 149 (214) reason can’t think (and thus constituted by) this double infringement: there’s a lack in Nature and because of that very fact something is added to it, the supplement as image & representation of nature, image neither in nor out [Aristotle’s “neither for nor against”]

ARR

GOD p. 8 [another secret] Christian mysterium tremendum, fear and trembling before sacrificial gift, person being paralyzed, in its singularity, by the gaze of God

GT p. 24 subject and object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of the gift; subject as such never gives or receives a gift

H p. 101 delay and haste, halting and hastening, rhythm of Oedipus’ journey; p. 127 infinite speed contracted into an absolute halt or haste, precipitation because delay, instant of an instant that is canceled out > thus always late & precipitous re: hospitality

p. 111 mourning is not allowed without a fixed (arrêté) place, monument, determinable topos, stopping point (arrêt) > promised w/out taking place, only possible mourning is an impossible one

LOBL p. 78 it is impossible for living speech to speak on living [sur vivre?], unless it’s impossible only w/ living speech: aporia even more paralyzing

p. 107 Blanchot: survivre, not living maintaining oneself, lifeless, in a state of pure supplement, movement of supplementing life, but stopping (arrêter) the dying, a stopping that doesn’t stop > speak on the arrête (ridge, cutting edge, backbone, fish bone, arris)

p. 109 via Hartman, is arrêt de mort “death sentence” or “suspension of death”?

——life being drawn through by sharp dividing line, edge where it is impossible to settle: arrête, angle of instability impossible to settle (sarrêter)

p. 114 arrêt de mort: decision on what can’t be decided—it also arrests death by suspending it: gives

“living on”

pp. 114-115 crisis is the urgency, instant, of impossible decision (krinein, judgment is the impossible to reach), the suspensive arrêt suspends the decisive arrêt and vice versa > arrhythmic pulsation, imparts movement in stopping, never sure, unfortunately, fortunately

p. 115 like death, arrêt remains undecidable, one arrêt marks delay, the other haste [2 syntaxes]

——suspensive arrêt already [déjà] undecided because it suspends, decisive arrêt undecided because what it decides, death, la Chose, the neuter, is undecidability itself

——the suspensive arrêt arrests the decisive arrêt and vice versa, the arrêt de mort arrests the arrêt de mort, arrhythmic pulsation of title [Blanchot’s] before it scatters like sand, in stopping (sarrêtant) (as arrêt), it gives movement, sets in motion [prime mover]

——antagony from arrêt to arrêt, an Aufhebung that never lets up, arrêt arresting arrêt, both senses, both ways

p. ~115 arrêt de mort as verdict

p. 116 arrêt arrests itself, stands, stays unstable, remains on arête of itself, it a-rests (for) itself, no consciousness, perception, no watchfulness can gather this remnance, no “I”, hence ghosts, fantasies, epochal pause

——larrêt de mort, “ingenious” decision, one of those that are made (sarrêtent) only in a language, escape signature by any “I”, untranslatable, decision is unreadable > unreadability does not arrest reading in face of opaque surface, it starts reading, writing, translating again

——unreadable not opposite of readable but the ridge (arête) that sets in motion

p. 118 infinite violence [of what’s strictly called] “double bind,” double invagination, double obligation, double demand > sans arrêt and arrêt de mort, no reconciliation

p. 121 death sentence, instant as elusive as last grain of sand in hourglass, death as result of dissemination of rhythm of life w/ no coup darrêt, unbordered/unbounded arrhythmy on beach that’s continuation of a sea: her pulse “scattered like sand”

p. 127 je marrête > “same interdiction encrypts the resurrection at the moment when he sees the terrible Chose

p. 134 more-than-life (sur-vie) marks a reprieve, excess triumphs over life, worth more than eternity of life but presents itself before the arrêt de mort

p. 147 commitment [wedding proposal] in irresponsibility of speech [Blanchot’s character proposes in Slavic not French], arrêt of commitment, commitment thus arrêté, both in one’s language & the other’s—the hymen > mother tongue does away w/ commitment & seals it

p. 154 [reference to la double séance] hymen sarrête, comes about and is immediately forbidden, double-bind structure of event, its “madness”, every hymen intervenes like a crime, event, coup, its dissemination dissolves or absolves it in crowd by multiplying it incalculably

p. 163 embalm [fetish?], set about the arrêt de mort in its double triumph: effigy, chambers of this desire in a sort of “funeral home” > [Blanchot’s narrator] loves them dead, he loves (by) seeing them dead

——there’s an arrêt btwn 2 deaths [in Larrêt de mort], thus hypertopia [see p. 140]

pp. 164-65 interruption, connectionless connection of arrêt > passes through insides w/out insides of ego of récitant

pp. 165-166 hymen, double bind, double affirmation, yes, yes, come, come [re: Blanchot’s 2 ghostly fiancées in Larrêt de mort] signifies, desires, arrête life death, the life the death of the other, the other lives and dies > “for there is an other of the other and it is not the same” [see POO p. 11 “other of the other” is the very undeniable of ethics]

p. ~166 arrêt w/out Aufhebung

p. 171 arrêt de mort brings about the arrêt of the law

POO pp. 22-3 impossible to respond, impossible not to respond, double bind, 2 hands nailed down [no choice]

——brought to a halt [arrêt?] when faced w/ contradictory orders

POOF pp. 92, 109n via Schmitt, stasis implies state of rest, arrest (status) & also revolt [in this sense stasis could name auto-immunity], stásis as a category of political nosography, misfortune, fatal disorder, bad luck

A pp. 11-2 aporia, experience of what’s fascinating in the nonpassage: “not knowing where to go,” paralyzed by separation

PAS PAS pp. (34-5) double pas never arresting itself in dialectical negativity of its proceeding nor in the march of a method, the trope of standing-upright

p. (35) Blanchot: she comes closer every pas to the instant when she must stop herself

p. (68) ce désir de la paralysie qui narrête jamais

p. (71) Blanchot: lucidity could do nothing but render my paralysis infinite

p. (73) paralysis that does not prohibit anything, that makes movement [see ROP p. 21] > le faux mouvement qui procède selon le faut-pas du désir et franchit la limite

p. (76) isn’t the thought of la paralyse a thought of the obscene Medusa? good for laughter too

F pp. xii-xiii je marrête ici, déjà (tombe en arrêt [vault to a stop]), setting on the “edge of the crypt” a voiceless word, a blank stone of a scruple [see p. xlviii], to engage others to it, of a crypt

p. xxxix cryptophore, à manger le morceau (le mors) sans pouvoir le digérer, must constantly betray cipher that seals and conceals it > Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, truly cryptic story

p. xlviii paelontologist médusé devant larête dun mot-chose, like a tomb burning in the grass, double-edged stare of a 2-faced Medusa (le double tranchant dun biface)

DS p. 202 a system that is closed-in on itself would be checked by a safety-catch (un cran darrêt)——wrong to interpret Mallarmé’s Mimique as oriented toward its abysses, its false bottoms, as if they were pretextual referents > a writing that refers back only to itself is some other writing

p. 231 syntax of hymen’s fold makes it impossible to arrest its play of indecision [i.e. to stop it on “mental,” or “imaginary”]

OS pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

P p. 43 arête/manque [re: theory of frame]

p. 128 re: sublime, arrest of outpouring (épanchement) at floodgate (vanne), pressed on limit, pleasure gushes after arrest, inhibition, suspension (Hemmung), an arresting that makes flow > for a blink of an eye passage is closed, stricture absolute, then barrage, linondation

ROP p. 21 paralysis gives movement w/ regard to its other [this is in reference to impossibility of psychoanalysis’ auto-interpretation] (in PAS, paralysis distinguished from logic of analysis)

p. 33 instead of “failure” of archaeological/anagogical principle [of analysis], this principle is destined to limit of its arrest, finitude of its suspense > there’s chance in falling-due, given of fall

OTO p. 9 [Nietzsche’s] life can only be verified after or during arrêt de mort > when the bearer of the name, whom, in our prejudice, we call living, will have died

O p. 5 “transcendental signified” arrests writing [in structure of double mark this arrest can no longer occur, writing as possibility of living on, arrêt de mort]

p. 26 dissemination blows up (saute) security of point, arrested in name of the law: it is at the risk, to risk this blowup (to make this jump, faire sauter) that dissemination broaches/has been broached

DPi p.1 DP: arrêtée par un arrêt de justice > an end decreed by the Other, a verdict > this is not the archetype of every decision [?], though it reminds us: sovereign decision always the Other’s

REST p. 263 to stop one’s feet at the starting line is a place in language [re: Derrida’s starting point, a place where things no longer slide? from which he’ll set off quickly]

pp. 275-76 everything on trial (tout chose en procès), publicized, the proximate cause is a trap: a double that doesn’t make a pair, makes a trap, can’t put one’s feet in them, Christic shade of bait [sole? proper subject? Van Gogh’s surrender?], Christ’s flesh is bait for the Devil (Muscipula Diaboli); in PAS, another type of trap > la paralyse

p. 376 betting on the pair, plus/pas de pari, trap always works in interlace (la piège marche toujours dans lentrelacs): soit quil fasse marcher, laisse marcher ou quil paralyse [p. 373 only the pair can go]

DST DST p. 225 un autre indécidable, the gap/hiatus in an undecidable derived from dialectical calculation/contraction, arrhythmic caesura as respiration of rhythm (this necessity awaits us) [pas, heartbeat] [Derrida here wonders if double bind is too dialectical, thus the other undecidable]

p. 230 no rhythm w/out caesura > antirhythmic [Hölderlin], arrhythmic

——interrupts alternation, constraint of opposition, even double bind [cf. p. 225]

——Lacoue-Labarthe: caesura is empty moment, intrusion of prophetic word (Tiresias)

——caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

PIO pp. 15-6 specularization paralyzes “Fable” (seems to freeze text)—undecidability of whether fabulous discourse makes it out of itself or is the very misfortune (malheurs) of the [possibility of the] mirror, infelicity of constative/performative (way they parasite each other)

RM pp. 49-50 [cf. Pas] the dérive or dérapage (skidding) as un certain jeu de lancre in surrounding waters (parages): Derrida can only stop engines (machines) of this floating vehicle [my discourse on metaphor], which would still abandon it to its unforeseeable dérive [more metaphorico]

PF p. xvii a trace w/out alibi resists thinking, paralyzes, also only chance to not give in to paralysis

——paralysis arrests: negative symptom of aporia > whereas aporia, possibility of impossible, of “play,” very condition of pas, experience of frayage, marche, via rupta [elsewhere Derrida deconstructs becoming route?], decision, event, coming of other: writing & desire

TR p. 103 not only accusation & judgment in confession, there’s the executioner (carrying out of the sentence): sentence endured in pleasure of writing, ambiguous enjoyment at heart of terrible, severe jubilation of inscription: one steps up to cashier right away to collect interest on a capital that will assume value only “sooner or later,” after my death, in my absence

HST p. 393 Levinas: future (avenir) as a resurrection of the present; “next instant” is an annulment of commitment to existence made in the instant; the “I’s” death in the empty interval: condition of new birth

——at moment where everything is lost, everything is possible

p. 397 infinite compassion: the decision of not being able to stop (as life itself never stops [ne se désarme]) > forgiveness, w/out saying anything

+R p. 160 survival movement, arrêt de mort, final trance, sursaut cambré tenu au mors: says “I” (am dead) or hoc est corpus meum > dominant fish, one that bites best, takes from sea a body of scaly writing, homogenous w/ signatory’s initials

——death dance in fish’s tail (queue) > rhythmos: cadence of writing, undulation of waves

LI pp. 132-33 every police (red light) is not repressive: law not necessarily tied to negativity, prohibition, repression

p. 149 differance as nonidentity w/ oneself in process of determination > differance is itself nothing outside of determination, never comes to a full stop (not negativity, nothingness)

TN p. 11 Nancy stopped short one day (était un jour tombé en arrêt) before Freud’s “psyche is extended, knows nothing about it” > this is a beginning by freezing (par simmobiliser)

pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

p. 139 self-relation, “sefforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force sarrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

p. 175 pause for a moment (pour sarrêter un instant)

E p. 21 Kant: sublime occurs due to a momentary checking (Hemmung, an arrest), and its pleasure (admiration or respect) is a negative pleasure

EW p. 286 unconditional affirmation that motivates deconstruction can always upset an instituted rhythm of every pause (subject is a pause, stabilizing arrest, the thesis we will always need [?])

AD p. 92 neither welcome nor hospitality w/out radical alterity: presupposes separation, social bond, unbinding, gives respiration: le chez-soi (at-home-with-oneself) would no longer be natural, rooted, but a response to a wandering (errance), phénomène de l'errance qu'il arrête

pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (lentretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech

OG p. 25 (40-1) acc. Hegel, writing (an Umweg) betrays life/breath > finitude/paralysis, sterilizes spirit, principle of difference/death in becoming of being (is to speech, what China is to Europe)

p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

——becoming-space of time & becoming-time of space mark dead time w/in presence of living present > dead time is at work, les blancs take on importance > limit of phenomenology

ATAP p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

SPEC p. 283 Freud repeats his arrest, pas de marche: speculative possibility of tout autre (than PP), inscribed in advance w/in it, “louvre dune scription de lautre à meme (overlaps) le principe

p. 285 the thesis would be larrêt de mort of differance, arresting death in 2 senses [vis-à-vis syntax]: condemns to death & interruption suspending death

pp. 336-37 same step (pas) [Freud’s step beyond PP] gives & suspends movement, es gibt, exemplary movement of paralysis [Derrida repeating too, cf. FSW, PAS] [démarche]

p. 338 “la paralyse: le pas au-delà du PP sera resté interdit

ARRIVAL

GOD pp. 55-6 tremble in fear of unpredictable, unforeseeable, the untouchability of the arrival (tremo, tromeō, tromos, tremendus), enigma of trembling and tears, what are they metaphors or figures for?

***R p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature > this undecidability [“I continue to believe”] only radical possibility of letting/thinking what comes about by arriving of whoever arrives [see p. 87]

MONL p. 61 desire is borne by the arrival itself, before ipseity (I-me)

H p. 77 law of hospitality commands host gives arrivant, “new arrival,” an unconditional welcome; no anticipation

MC p. 346 I address you w/out knowing you, something arrives [Nietzsche’s future philosophers]

BL p. 211 text [Kafka’s] jealously guards its inconsistent content, brings reader before the law > endless differance until death

——neither arrives no lets anyone arrive

***SPOM p. 33 Marx’s legacy: the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice, messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy

A pp. 33-5 absolute arrivant: singularity of “who” arrives or neutrality of that which arrives

——arrives w/out expecting it (sy attendre)

——affects (brings to light) experience of threshold before one knows if there’s been a call, nomination or promise (Verheissung, Heissen, etc.)

——annihilates prior identity (p. 34)

——not an invader, invasion presupposes some self-identity, arrivant does not cross a threshold separating two identifiable borders

——no more commands than commanded by memory of originary event

——as disarmed as a newly born child (p. 34) [Nietzsche]

——where archaic is bound to final extremity (telos, eskhaton)

——border most difficult to delineate: that the arrivant makes possible everything it cannot be reduced to

——border of absolute arrivant keeps one from discriminating btwn figures of arrivant > the dead, the revenant (the ghost, he or she that returns)

pp. 64-6 triple transitivity of sattendre: 1) oneself 2) arrivant, the other 3) await each other, which is immediately consonant w/ reference to tout autre [cf. HST p. 360]

***pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (narrivent quà seffacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

PAS PAS p. (58) what arrives would always arrive at edge (au bord), shore (rive), [death], the impossible arrival of viens

p. (88) it’s on the border that everything arrives, just misses arriving, or misses le bord darriver > il ny a pas de bord en soi [there’s no border in itself]

P p. 93 free, vague, wild, pure beauty, indefinite errance: elle ne sarrive pas à sa destination

POOF p. x democracy counts votes & subjects, but doesn’t/shouldn’t count ordinary singularities: no numerus clausus for arrivants

p. 29 perhaps as arrivant, arrivant of perhaps: at last the thought of perhaps (will come)

p. 41 Derrida countersigns Nietzsche [re: arrivant thinkers, new philosophers], extends the duty to countersign again, to us, to me, to you, teleiopoetically: friendship w/out friendship of friends of solitude

ROP pp. 41-2 Lacan speaks of the insuccèsDerrida transforms it: “linsuccès qui échoue à arriver” > playing w/ syntax of to: 1) I do not arrive 2) I fail to arrive because I arrive

RM p. 75 Being’s inscription narrive quà seffacer, cf. differance/trace

p. 77 le trait, il arrive à seffacer dans un autre, reinscribing itself heterologically, allegorically

TR p. 98 the 2 meanings of arriver: 1) event that happens to someone 2) message that arrives—or doesn’t arrive at destination, or at some unforeseeable addressee > this singular instability plays w/ its own automatism, never spontaneously interrupted [?] [privileged access to machine effect]

PSSS p. 254 arrivant, hospitality of visitation not invitation, beyond all instituting utterances, ce qui arrive, event, puts to rout performative act, sometimes cruelly, perhaps beyond the death drive, exceeds rules of hospitality: unpredictable for hosts

p. 260 the who and the what of what arrives, the arrivant, the event, makes outdated in advance the question about it that always comes too late

+R p. 159 polysemia or even dissemination drags Adami’s sentence far from any shore (rive), preventing any event from ever arriving (sarriver)

p. 169 double ladder, erected, riveted, shackled, never arrives > steps: symbolic of sexual act

LI pp. 108-09n [re: neologism texter] signature, événement quon texte: process of iteration, like surnombre [of Dissemination], marks pluralization that fractures the event, the unique, while causing it to occur (arriver)

TN pp. 135-36 shouldn’t sense of touch touch us, for something to come about at last (pour que quelque chose arrive enfin), an event, as some say, fatiguing us a little, a singular event (!!) [: )]?

——as if idea of simultaneity/continuity born in contact w/ contact btwn 2 points of contact

AD p. 61 “to say yes at the moment of a separation, indeed of a departure that is not the contrary of an arrival—is it not this deference that inspires the breath of an à-Dieu?”

CF p. 23 city of refuge giving place for reflection and for new order of law, democracy to come (if a certain idea of cosmopolitanism has arrived, perhaps one hasn’t recognized it yet)

BSi p. 267 [vis-à-vis Celan] poetry as way, step, coming of event, arrival

UWC p. 225 techno-scientific virtualization of work, the putting-into-common, any “community” [Aristotle’s city] > mutation of taking place of event, of oeuvrethat which arrives

SPEC p. 324 postal relay (relais) makes it possible for letter not to arrive, divides structure of letter from outset (dentrée), neither relay nor analysis if letter were indivisible & always arrived

——the a fortiori of the a priori

p. 359 Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

p. 402 “set (ensemble)” of stricture, a unity that’s not subject/consciousness, begins by binding itself (se-lier) in differential relation w/ itself—it destines itself (se destine), which doesn’t mean: il arrive

FV p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

pp. 443-44 for Derrida, letter can always not arrive > Lacan’s symbolic, Lacan’s castration, protects letter from its divisibility/fragmentation

p. 454 for Lacan, letter’s destiny is arrival at destination

***p. 489 even when letter arrives, its capacity not to arrive torments it, affects “subject,” “character,” “position” [w/ divisibility]

ART

***MC p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

SPOM p. 204 if commodity corrupts art [Derrida veering away from Marx], becoming-commodity attested to value it puts in danger > commodity put to work the principle of art

MPM p. 64 art is a thing of the past

p. 67 de Man: “art leaves interiorization of past forever behind” > no dialectical passage from symbol to sign; art (like thought of thinking memory) linked to sign not symbol

MSUB J p. 165 van Gogh did not paint ghosts, he reperspired nature, made it sweat, awful elementary pressures of commas [arrêt], scratches > now we see them too in the world

p. 171 Artaud breaking down barrier in the other “arts,” abolishes border btwn all these “arts”

A p. 32 great works, like Being and Time, neither science, philosophy nor poetics

PP pp. 97-8 (111) acc. to king, sun, Thoth is a flimflam artist

TC p. 234 Artaud & Nietzsche want done w/ imitative concept of art

DS p. 192 priority of art over nature still privileges order 1 then 2, the preference, the precedence (pré-séance) of the imitated

p. 203n Bachelard: we love the graft, graft gives matter to flower, Art is grafted nature

p. 233 Jean-Pierre Richard: beauty of glorious lie is what art tries to render true, to do so, must put it under glass

P pp. 20-1 for Hegel, art has a single meaning, une vérité une et nue, an etymon, that can be unveiled through history > wouldn’t this mean art is outside of history? but philosophers have always been too quick to deem art historical via opposition tekhnē/physis translated as art/nature

p. 22 oppositions structuring traditional concept of art: meaning/form, inside/outside, content/container, signifier/signified, represented/representer

——asking what art means, the vouloir-dire of art, tautology w/out reserve, logocentrism of question “What is art?”—teleology & hierarchy prescribed in envelope of this question

p. 23 both Heidegger & Hegel subordinate all art to speech, poem, the said, nomination

p. 25 for Hegel, telos of beauty is found in art not nature

p. 26 art forms only one of the circles in the great circle of Geist, revenant (circle of art, circle of religion, circle of philosophy)

p. 27 when philosophy views itself as a work of art, it is represented on the model of one of its parts, so is philosophy then just a part of art? [living organism, biological metaphor]

p. 28 if Hegel must begin w/ vulgar representation of art, the circle of circles allows him to start anywhere > “no absolute beginning in science”

p. 32 for Hegel, art as 3rd term gives reciprocity to artist & artwork, art is thus 1st term

pp. 32-3 in Hegel & Heidegger, an “it is necessary (il faut)” re: hermeneutic circle of art > must start w/ work of art, but how can you recognize it as art if you don’t already know what art is?: not a vicious circle, but an engagement of thought, circular feast, experience of limit, closure, resistance, humility > pas de cercle: le désir par cette répétition fidèle du cercle, daccéder à lencore infranchi, le désir dun nouveau pas > lien sans liens, franchir le cercle sans saffranchir de sa loi, pas sans pas

p. 34 third party (ein Drittes) regulates encirclement, art can play this role, a medium, can touch both edges > ambiguity of participation can’t exhaust it [what if this 3rd doesn’t rèleve?]

——art: domesticated in this history of truth, onto-encyclopedic economy, the machinery of the pose (Setzung/Entgegensetzung)

p. 45 all theories of art (Plato, Heidegger, Hegel, Husserl), you have to know what you’re talking about—can’t just say, via Rousseau, “I find the palace capitalistic,” this is extrinsic [Derrida makes a pretty good joke!]

p. 65 Kant’s “conceptual scheme” for any theory of art: rational/formal/logical vs. irrational/matter/illogical > thing as formed matter

p. 102 hierarchy of art constituted on the analogical model of human language

p. 116 Kant’s 3 fine arts: talking (words), figurative (gestures), play of sensations (tones) > a humanism

p. 117 Kant’s hierarchical classification of fine arts, a humanism regulated by language & body of man, language dominated by speech & gaze

PS p. 174 Artaud howls under headings: existence, flesh, life, theater, cruelty > promising an art prior to madness & work

FS p. 7 for Kant, [productive] imagination was already art itself > originally, did not distinguish btwn beauty & truth

SW pp. 315-16(n) [re: Exodus 26:31] there are 2 veils/curtains btwn [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle & [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle of tabernacles [of holies/of sanctuaries] > 1st embroidered by artist, 2nd merely the work of a carpenter

DPi p. 144 for Schopenhauer, aesthetics not a disinterest but an anesthetic

REST p. 262 Derrida insists on strong necessity of Heidegger’s questions on art in spite of traditionality & symptomatic qualities

p. 283 Van Gogh’s shoes are out of work in the (art) work, in the invisible ether of being painted

p. 298 in Heidegger’s Origin both product and work of art produced (hervorgebracht) by hand of man, art resembles thing in its self-sufficient presence, product is more than half thing, less than half work of art

——work like shoe-picture exhibits what something lacks in order to be a work, exhibits—in shoes—its lack of itself

p. 318 Heidegger’s step backward from truth of adequation to truth of unveiling can leave one disarmed in face of precritical, dogmatic, in face of “preinvestment” (fantasmatic, ideological)

p. 372 Origin is not about the metaphysical power of art, that’s what’s put in question

IW p. 286 music as highest, most ideal art, its structure is pure breath, spiritus and psyche

PIO pp. 417-18n Kant: imagination, site of genius, it’s creative (schöpferisch)—still, academic rules must be followed if Kunstler wants work to fit Idea underlying it

+R p. 175 Benjamin’s deconstruction of the aura (authenticity) of work of art

p. 177 Benjamin: secularization causes indeterminacy of “once only (Einmaligkeit),” once-only of phenomena replaced by once-only of artistic operation (never w/out remainder)

pp. 178-79 Benjamin theorizes that portrait of face is last “ritual religious art” before “technical reproducibility” > disappearance of the subject as art of the cenotaph [?]

C p. 238 contingent can do w/out discourse, a masterpiece can’t do w/out a cartouche (on the market & in itself: if you insist on this distinction) > even when the cartouche remains, is defunct: pas de cartouche, plus de cartouche > what will have been able to do w/out it? never touched, aussi impassible et invulnérable quaux harcèlements du trait: cest peut-être quil était déjà dans la tombe, le cartouche

pp. 238-39 why Derrida won’t waste his time describing Titus-Carmel’s artwork

pp. 244-45 how can we delimit all the features (traits) [of artwork] when the absent one haunts, obsesses, besieges (assiège) [plus quun autre] > avec égale sans (trait dunion: with-out [in English])

E p. 4 for Kant, nature speaks to us through its beautiful forms, one can read the “ciphered language (Chiffreschrift),” nature’s signature as art productions

——even if this stance is opposed to Hegel [only art is beautiful], analogy btwn art and nature always provides a principle of reconciliation

p. 5 for Kant, art is production of freedom by means of freedom

——for Kant, art is a power, aptitude, property, destiny of man (Geschicklichkeit des Menschen), and is distinguished from science (where to know is to know how to do, to be able to)

——for Kant, difference btwn free, liberal art and mercenary art is the difference btwn play/work

pp. 5-6 [acc. Kant] free, liberal art: 1) play, not salaried work, free man (artist) is not homo oeconomicus, is more human 2) free, liberal art can utilize mercenary art w/out being contaminated by it 3) a productive, spontaneous, not reproductive (mimetic) imagination

——genius of poetry, the highest of Fine-Arts: full expression of productive imagination receives its rules from Nature, thus breaking from mimesis > free unfolding-refolding of physis

p. 7 liberal, free art relates to mercenary art as mind to body; free art enjoys itself but still incurs the unenjoyable incursions, lexical rules etc., of mercenary art; art still requires pedagogy

——why call them Fine-Arts (Beaux-Arts)? why not just call the product beautiful: because the product must still be implicated by its signature, beauty is ascribed to the passage btwn production/product; Fine-Arts: always of the frame & signature

p. 8 Kant distinguishes agreeable arts from Fine-Arts, the former aims at enjoyment (jouissance, Genuss), the latter dispenses w/ concept (ohne Zweck) and enjoyment, but seeks pleasure (Lust)

p. 13 Hegel critiques Kant’s 3rd Critique for staying at the level of “you must” > he very well evinces the moral order that sustains the aesthetic one

pp. 21-2 though sublimity works against our senses, the sacrifice (Aufopferung) of the sublime keeps a power in view, sublime can dawn in art: attains a power greater than what was sacrificed

——economic calculation allows sublime to be swallowed

LG p. 229 can one identify a work of art if it doesn’t bear the mark of a genre?

BSi p. 186 Celan: the artist turns nature to stone, “be a Medusa’s head” (monkey, automata, art)

p. 227 poetic signature: not essence but where poem is coming/going: frees itself, by art, from art

p. 251 [via Celan via Büchner’s Dantons Death] art as species of marionette > marionette: an allegorical personification of technē, technical who and what

pp. 260-61 via Celan, art as unheimlich, containing the inhuman: Medusa, monkey, automata, marionette

OG p. 196 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] transgressing space, mastering exteriority (the inanimate), arts of space carry death w/in themselves—painting, often dead, carries you to depth of desert; voice, song, more alive [?]

p. 203 w/ song, the living arts, outside imitates the inside, “paints” passions, is expressive; w/ inanimate arts, reproduction of the outside on the outside [painting?] > both externalize

pp. 203-04 for Rousseau, art and mimesis are disastrous (supplement) & emergence from inanimate, expression of passion

p. 206 (294) for Rousseau, aesthetics passes through sign (semiology) not sensation, art is moral & ethnological [nonresponse to Western music can’t mean West Indians have different nerves!]

p. 207 (295) for Rousseau, taste (cooking) has no moral element, no good aesthetics can come from it

p. 208 [if art is moralism prior to sensation, by way of sign], attention to signifier degrades art by separating signifier’s effectiveness from the signified it signifies; supplement signifies nothing

p. 209 (297-98) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

——trait is spacing itself, marks figures, works on surface of painting & time of music

pp. 259-60 (367) for Rousseau, what never should have arrived, did [i.e. the supplement]; for Plato, for all onto-theology, meaning put out of play (le sens est mis hors jeu) in condemnation of art > Rousseau does not affirm (play/game of) writing but resigns himself to it

——society born by accident to repair the accidental catastrophe (Fall) [birth of supplement] of nature

IF pp. 312-13 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] as paradoxical as it sounds, Hegel frees passage for literature or writing called Art > having reached its end, one can discredit philosophy by treating it as art

pp. 314-15 [Flaubert will not “divert the least thing” from Art] still philosophical to seek truth (idea) of idea as a primal scene of negativity/resentment in art, scene of guilt-ridden indebtedness to idea

UWC pp. 210-13 “as if”: 1) imagination, utopia 2) Kant’s “as if (als ob)” from Critique of Judgment, points to finality of nature, is neither order of nature nor order of freedom [agent of deconstructive ferment] 3) oeuvres dart, discursive idealities that define disciplines called Humanities, a subtle displacement of Kant’s idea: art is art not nature, it is free from all constraint/rules as if it were a product of nature

EU p. 63 [vis-à-vis Kant] metaphysics as the teacher’s mistress (maîtresse du maître), as censor > for a teacher, a finite being, no lifting of censorship, only strategic calculation: censorship against censorship, debate of the best censorship [the idea of philosopher’s legislation found everywhere in man’s reason], censorship of reason: [Derrida asks vis-à-vis Schelling] is this strategy an art?

p. 70 acc. Schelling, every “new” philosophy makes a new “step (pas)” in form, poetic originality, a provocation/challenge to translation

——Schelling’s originality: philosophy must possess formal originality (it’s a work of art)

p. 73 Schelling: philosophy becomes truly objective only in art > an art of generalized translation

——Schelling: both poetry/philosophy require self-produced original image (Bild) of world

pp. 73-4 [vis-à-vis Schelling] art can never be limited/programmed by State, there is no State culture > philosophy, which demands unconditional freedom, should reside in Faculty of Arts

p. 74 bureaucratic organization doesn’t provide for philosophy, has ceased being a free association in view of the arts (poetic translation)

SPEC p. 332 classically [?]: art preserves proper name, science forgets proper name > what then is psychoanalysis?

ARTAUD

MSUB J pp. 154-57 treason (can a subjectile betray?): not come when called [Artaud levels accusation of treason at God]

p. 162n Artaud: soul is a fiend (suppôt), the else which is going to come back

p. 166 Artaud’s neologism innée, where nature collides w/ its contrary, “suffering of the pre-natal,” appears as monstrosity [Lacan’s extimacy?]

——“nature” conceals even the source of its interdiction > Artaud wants to tear apart veil of birth and reveal “naked nature”

TC pp. 236-37 Artaud: Plato must have experienced the streaming naked realization

p. 242 Artaud rejects psychoanalytic theater for its secret interiority > theater of cruelty a theater of dreams, of calculated dreams, cruelty as consciousness, exposed lucidity

pp. 243 Artaud: to consider dreams as substitute function, theater as second hand, is to diminish dreams & theater

p. 247 Artaud wants to destroy all writing after reading it once; Artaud vs. Plato > both against writing: Artaud because it’s the erasure of body, Plato because it is body

p. 249 Artaud kept himself as close as possible to the limit, possibility & impossibility of pure theater

PS p. 171 for Blanchot, Artaud’s “unpower” is “essential to thought” > [Blanchot risks neutralization by making Artaud exemplary]

——[using Blanchot’s pathetic error, Derrida shows how Artaud's unique example, his history, will be erased on the way to truth, given to the doctors: a pre-Hegelian treatment]

p. 174 Artaud howls under headings: existence, flesh, life, theater, cruelty > promising an art prior to madness & work

p. 175 Artaud’s resistance to clinical/critical exegeses: protest itself against exemplification itself > destroy history of dualist metaphysics, render doctor/critic helpless: art w/out works, language w/out trace

pp. 179-80 Artaud’s metaphysics of flesh [MOP?] determines Being as life, its integrity must be restored > a thought governed by anguish of dispossession, my body stolen by the other, by death (as theft): my death is represented

p. 183 Artaud wants absolute restoration of proper to eve prior to all dissociation

p. 184 Artaud wanted to destroy metaphor, the standing upright as metaphorical erection in written work

p. 325n Artaud uses Bergsonian-like formulations/metaphors of energy

p. 187 Artaud: “words entered like knives in lasting carnation”

p. 188 Artaud: give words the importance they have in dreams

——reclaim onomatopoeia (gesture dormant in classical speech), “no more masterpieces”

——Artaud: “I am writing for illiterates” > not to erase letter but to subordinate it to incidence of illegibility

p. 189 Artaud seeks a depth of illegibility

p. 191 Artaud wants to renounce: superstition of the text, dictatorship of the writer

***p. 194 Artaud affirms cruel law of difference while also fulfilling “most profound and permanent ambition of Western metaphysics”

REST pp. 379-81 Artaud (protests against ghosts): no ghosts in Van Gogh, no visions, the torrid truth, hieroglyphics > Derrida cautions: “you can only give them [the ghosts] back (rendre) if you think you have them, and you can only think you’re giving them if you haven’t got them”]

BSi p. 144 Deleuze accuses psychoanalysis (Freud) of dispossessing (brutalizing w/ machines of war) the Wolf Man (much like Artaud’s complaint about theft of his proper name)

OG pp. 247-49 (351-53) [Artaud-like fantasy in Rousseau?] breath (of God), neume, superhumanity, not on the way to humanity (like child), body w/out organs, w/out spacing, pure presence w/ jouissance, inarticulate enough for jouissance de soi to remain uncorrupted by alterity

pp. 249-50 (354) via Rousseau, heart as organ of pure presence is not an organ, not inscribed w/in system of differences

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

ATIA pp. 124-25 presupposed absence of response in animal, that it is only capable of reaction: identifies animal w/ machine [Derrida not erasing this distinction, but doubts its purity]

AS IF/AS

GT pp. 121-22 one usually believes narrative does not recount itself but an object outside of it; [Derrida considers that]what happens happens to the narrator, as if the narrative condition were the cause of the recounted thing, as if the narrative produced the event it was supposed to report

R p. 85 Kant’s as-if essential to regulative idea, imaginary approach tending towards universality; re: mondialisation, Kant’s word remains a regulative idea [Derrida on why he can’t take regulative idea seriously]

BL p. 190 Kant: typology, symbolic presentation of moral good (beauty, a symbol of morality), respect for law which only appears in law > “as if” in maxim: reconciles practical reason w/ historical teleology (narrative), w/ possibility of unlimited progress

POO pp. 10-1 responsibility not in ones own name but arises in structure of supplementarity: in my name as the name of the other > singularity quakes in exemplary equivocality of this “as”

HASD pp. 46-7 via Eckhart, like adverb quasi (quasi stella matutina), we are beside the verb that is the truth; Eckhart: “may the Father, the Verbum…help us remain adverbs of this Verbum”

——quasi > “as (als)”

A p. 71 als not yet als sich [see ATIA pp. 142-43 for als-structure]

S p. 51 for Heidegger, privation (Privation) in Dasein, in structure of “as,” structure of “something as something (die Struktur des Etwas als Etwas),” not same as animal’s privation (Entbehrung)

FWT p. 127 by inventing/violating modality of as if, revealing its infinity, literature endlessly opens up to historicity of political, w/ certain concept of democracy-to-come

as if an increased responsibility in absolute freedom of literature

P p. 117 acc. Kant, though we cannot determine empirical laws of nature, we must act as if an understanding (not our own) gave them unity [regulative idea?]

SW pp. 313-14 diminish the infinite, diminish ad infinitum: that’s the temptation/dream since ever: but you’re doing it w/out being sure of textile to come, as if caught in sails (voiles) & pushed toward unknown, at the point of this extremity, as if someone were awaiting new Messiah, i.e. a “happy event”—nicknamed the verdict > yes, but a verdict w/out truth, w/ a due date no longer caught up in revealing a truth, the fold or unfolding of a veil—writing from distant place of as if

***TR p. 134 re: oeuvre as trace of its ambiguity, as if quasi-machine were already operating even before being produced in the world, in the vivid experience of living present

p. 135 what is terrifying: what cuts me off from my own initiative [?] > automaticity discuplates & threatens “me”—quasi-excuses, ghosts of excuses, quasi-faults, spectral silhouettes of pardons: “as if” of this quasi, limitless risk of becoming simulacrum, virtuality

PF p. xix to think divisibility of trait of sovereignty deconstructs a certain fable, certain “as if,” of the political onto-theology of sovereignty

TN p. 81 this equivocation [re: Levinas’ caress] of negation w/out negativity marked by recurrence of “as if” and “without” (x w/out x, “essence of this non-essence”)

p. 87 the 2 meanings of “as”: 1) risky comparison, rhetorical 2) appropriate description, phenomenological

p. 169 for Husserl, rigorous philosopher avoids everyday language w/ its as and as ifs (gleichsam) > he should recall us to evidence itself

p. 288 Derrida’s “if there is any (sil y en a)” vs. Nancy’s “there is no ‘the’” > two irreducibly different deconstructions (one turns to a conditional, the other to a negative modality)

E p. 17 for Kant, the “as if” of the poet (“as if” of nature) is better, sincerer, more loyal than the “as if” of the orator, who wears a mask, deceives, his “as if” is “machine-like”

BSi p. 35 “storytelling,” convention of some historical as if, fabular > a moral lesson, a political strategy, pedagogical artifice to credit a fable: to make known (political logic, rhetoric)

p. 171 Derrida stresses “quasi” because it relates to a feint or an “as if”

UWC p. 208 Derrida links new concept of humanities [a deconstructive one] w/ democratic institution called literature, to a certain simulacrum, a certain “as if”

p. 209 “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”: begin at once at end & at beginning > begin w/ end as if it were the beginning [event or telos?]

pp. 209-10 “as,” “as if,” politics of the virtual (not a virtual politics) in cyberworld or cyberspace of worldwide-ization > delocalizing, virtualization of communication, publication, archivization

——where there’s trace there’s some virtualization (i.e. virtualization not absolutely novel)

pp. 210-13 “as if”: 1) imagination, utopia 2) Kant’s “as if (als ob)” from Critique of Judgment, points to finality of nature, is neither order of nature nor order of freedom [agent of deconstructive ferment] 3) oeuvres dart, discursive idealities that define disciplines called Humanities, a subtle displacement of Kant’s idea: art is art not nature, it is free from all constraint/rules as if it were a product of nature

p. 213 impossible attempt to link “as if” to thinking of event: what happens when “taking place” of le travail, when the place itself, becomes virtual, becomes subject to mode “as if”?

pp. 217-18 not every travail an event in itself, doesn’t always produce an oeuvre, not every performative (always authorized by an institutional “as if”) produces oeuvre

p. 223 “as if” mondialisation du monde had as its horizon/origin the disappearance of work (travail) [its virtualization] > work, labor, travail have always implied the real, effective (wirklich) [not virtual]

——“as if” [the end of work]: neither sci-fi utopia of Augustine’s “at the end w/out end,” in fine sine fine (Sabbath w/out evening), nor memory of immemorial (nostalgia for earthly paradise)

pp. 224-25 [re: “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”] logical skeleton of this “as if” proposition: world & work can’t co-exist, one would have to choose one or the other > the becoming-world of world, mondialisation, often speaks of “end of work”

p. 232 “literature,” its link to performative force of “as if,” to the right to say everything (or not to say everything), which founds both democracy & unconditional sovereignty claimed by Humanities

p. 233 end of certain figure of professor gives rise to other strategies of “as if,” singular oeuvres > Derrida believes in certain necessity of professoriat

——mise en oeuvre (the putting to work), at least to the performative putting to work of “as if”

pp. 234-37 [perhaps, “if,” event] not horizon of power, of “I can,” irruption that punctures horizon, interrupts performative organization of “as if,” “as such” > “as” name of true problem/target of deconstruction: authority of “as” founds/justifies every ontology, phenomenology, knowledge, science

EU p. 165 a (philosophical) letter dates the “as if” of the mood, a fabled mood, “a once upon a time, one day, I had the feeling…”

pp. 223-24 “as if” structure—characterizes every philosophical, scientific institution worthy of the name

ASKESIS

***SPOM p. 211 “ascesis strips the messianic hope of all biblical forms…all determinable figures…denudes itself in view of responding to that which must be absolute hospitality, the ‘yes’ to the arrivant(e), the “come” to the future (lavenir) that cannot be anticipated”

——“we must practice recognizing (sexercer à reconnaître)” those too familiar ghosts

——open, waiting for event as justice, this hospitality is absolute only if it “keeps watch (veille)” over its own universality (messianic is always revolutionary, has to be)

HASD p. 44 [re: negative theology] a politics of initiation or teaching, multiplication of voices, veil dissimulates & renders attractive at same time [Augustine: God is powerful w/out power]

p. 61 agogic path [askesis] of a text [Dionysus to Timothy]: repetition or repeatability

POOF pp. 53-4 via Nietzsche, keep silent about “truth” of friendship to protect, guarantee, the truth of friendship, resisting the abyss, the vertigo of friendship’s bottomless ground, the friendship that can’t resist the truth of its illusion, an asceticism, kenosis, speech would ruin friendship, speak in an elliptical way to avow > as though silence could not be spoken about elsewhere than in friendship

DPi p. 146 vis-à-vis Nietzsche, sovereignty of music: Sprache des Willens—telephone exchanged w/ God: priest as musician

——if ascesis rejects body, telephonic language rises above, bringing the distant close to itself, the mediate immediate > the priest, mouthpiece for the in-itself of things speaks in language of metaphysics (er redete Metaphysik)

——still there is enjoyment on the “metaphysical line,” aesthetic renunciation renounces nothing

——telephony is metaphysics: religious, sacrificial, asceticism itself, priesthood itself

EJQB pp. 67-8 writing (originally) as secondary, hermetic: displaced on broken line btwn lost & poisoned speech [re: God’s silence, repentance, broken Tables]

——separation of life & thought: infinite anchoritism (writing as moment of Desert, Judaic experience as reflection)

ASH

GT pp. 16-17 absolute forgetting (oubli absolu) which unbinds (délie) absolutely or infinitely more than excuse, forgiveness, acquittal: certain experience of trace, cinder, ashes

——forgetting and gift condition each other (unconditional)

p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

p. 112 annihilation of a remainder, as ashes sometimes testify, can play role of memory, of offering, of sacrifice

FK p. 100 [bottom w/out bottom of always virgin impassibility] khōra of tomorrow in languages we no longer, don’t yet, speak: makes way w/out generosity, neither divine, nor human > dispersion of ashes not promised there, nor death given

AF pp. 97-9 the archaic impression Freud seeks almost no longer an archive, confuses itself w/ a footstep that leaves its still living mark on surface [see POR p. 19 (154) seize inaudible in a sort of poetic telephony, see what makes sight see], place of origin, when step still one w/ subjectile

——instant when imprint yet to be abandoned by pressure of impression, pure auto-affection, indistinction btwn touching/touched, active/passive, an archive that would confuse itself w/ arkhē

Freud dreams irreplaceable place, the very ash, condition of singularity, idiom, secret, testimony, trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate > absolutely safe location

——holds, right on the ash, pressure of Gradiva’s so singular step

p. 100 no archive of the secret, by definition, it is the very ash of the archive

p. 101 we’ll always wonder what in this mal darchive did Freud burn, what may have burned of his secret passions, w/out him, w/out name, w/out symptom, w/out knowledge, w/out even an ash

SPOM p. 57 Marx: “useless metal” of treasure, horde, becomes like burnt-out ashes (ausgebrannte Asche) of circulation, its caput mortuum; miser, speculator: a martyr to exchange value > dreams of pure exchange value

***p. 220 ghosts and mortals can put the dead to rest, the dead cannot, it is impossible “and they must not do so,” this impossibility, the dead putting dead to rest [p. 31 “do not reduce testimony to knowledge”?], can take place, it is the ruin or the absolute ashes, it is total presence, absolute evil, Derrida exorcises, not to chase away but to grant ghosts the right to return (faire droit), revenant

HASD pp. 28-29 [letter always arrives?] always possible to call on God, to call assumed origin of all speech by name of God, God always names trace of singular event rendering speech possible, all apophatic discourse opens w/ prayer

——always presupposed event, déjà-là, trace of phrase indispensable, irreducible, trace has taken place, even if contaminated by repetition which confers on it code & intelligibility, even if it occurs only to efface itself, effacement will have taken place, even if its place is only in ashes, il y a là cendre

——trace as possibility of finitude, finite & infinite cause of trace appears secondary, an effect of trace or differance (which is finite insofar as it is infinite)

A p. 43 always culture of death (sometimes just to incinerate ashes)

PP p. 171 first use of il y a là cendre, in reference to not losing Plato’s 2nd letter, which speaks of what he [Plato?] could never have written

S S p. 122n Valéry: ashes, ghosts

p. 124n Valéry: knowledge devours everything, turns all to ash

p. 81 in Der Ister, Hölderlin calls to the fire, Jetzt komme, Feuer!, fire as what comes, call for to-come > acc. Heidegger, Hölderlin, the Beseeler, has been struck by God of light, gift of spirit as incineration, cremation, almost becoming ash [MOP & annihilation of trace]

p. 97 duplicity of Geist, as its evil ghost, brings forth question: is ash good or evil? whiteness of ash which belongs to destiny consumed and consuming (conflagration of flame)

p. 98 Heidegger: spirit flames devour, consume, everything, including the white of ash

——Trakl: “flame is the brother of the palest”

p. 102 white of ash as des Zerstörerischen (the destruction) spirit deploys, as radical evil

SH SH p. 22 readability effaces the date, the very thing which it offers for reading, date must conceal w/in itself stigma of singularity if it is to last longer (lasting is the poem), only chance of spectral return, commemoration of date’s annihilation, kind of nothing or ash > ash awaits us

——annulment in the annulation of return belongs to movement of dating

p. 34 signature not only recalls the vanished as vanished, the singular event, its ash > it gathers together a conjunction of singularities, a partaking in future of same date

pp. 38-9 date may always become no one’s, nothing’s date, the essence w/out essence of ash

——name partakes in this destiny of ash along w/ date, not empirical, is part of its readability ——mourning: reading itself > readability: tribute of lost singularity (“beauty” pays)

p. 40 religion before religion: blessing of dates, names, ashes

——date is mad, always more or less than what it says it is, we are mad for dates, those ashes which dates are, remains w/out being > music, Sichelschrift

p. 43 unreadable is readable as unreadable, shibboleth transmitted to a few during finite time of incineration, heart to heart, mouth to ear, hand to hand, still universal by right (legible, coded, troped) > madness of fire: consumes a date from w/in > renders ash from 1st moment

——trace or ash: these names stand for other names, a date’s destiny is that of every proper name: is there any other desire than dating, commemorating?

——a date, to become what it is, must give itself to be read in ash, in the nonbeing of its being

p. 44 shibboleth: “I am ash”

——poem’s desire or gift, the date is born, in movement of blessing, toward ash

p. 45 desert: where no one would be left to bless the ashes

p. 47 [MOP] Celan: Aschenkelle (ash-ladle) draws from tub [better than manger/trough] of being, launders > soapy; ash uses up being, is not a being-that-remains, there is ash, but ash is not

——via Celan, so much ash to be blessed

p. 51 ash calls to night, night calls to ash

p. 67 Jewish language, poetic language, this essence promises itself only in dis-identification (in the expropriation of the nothing, non-essence—[ashes?])

——how can German language receiver circumcision of poem’s date following the holocaust, the solution, the ash of all? how can you bless these ashes in German? [re: Celan]

p. 68 because one can make use of shibboleth, it can be turned against oneself, the circumcised are proscribed, held at border, excluded, reduced to ashes, in the mere name

DS DS p. 263n Mallarmé: “ashes-total-gold- (cendres-or-total-),” “dispersal goldenly consumed,” or devalued, mined out, plus de nom

ROP ROP p. 44 ash, stepping beyond psychoanalysis, radical destruction of archive, destroys capitalizing reserve, the guarding of repression

SP SP p. 123 “steps of the dove (colombe),” which is the manner of the Übermensch, leads Derrida to “pun”: we could begin a discourse on Nietzsche’s columbarium (colombaire)

OTO OTO pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

SW SW p. 325 letting other live: absolute suicide, no trace, not even the seal of a break

——not even leave them my ashes

——no longer be oneself or have oneself (sêtre ou savoir) > truth w/out truth looking for me at end of world

——blessing of one who leaves w/out leaving an address

pp. 353-54 Celan: “Aschenglorie (…) grub ich mich in dich und in dich > [I in you—love itself] love made itself make love next to watching dreaming child [too old, forbidden to be old, still young]

HST HST p. 370 Abraham (Gen 18: 22-32): “I who am but dust & ashes” [re: asking Lord to forgive the Sodomites]

C C p. 230 remainder is neither produced nor reproduced/represented [in Titus-Carmel’s coffins], classical thought re: remainder reduced to ashes > yet we retain at least more than one monumental proof (at least 127) of this historical operation

——hearth (foyer) as crematorium

p. 235 ashes, the fledglings (oisillons) are Phoenician [?]

TN TN p. 52 Nancy: philosophy as work of mourning, work of representation, incorporation, profits from death (jouir de la mort), philosophy doesn’t know true mourning (w/out limits: ashes & tears)

ATM ATM p. 170 there is no Hegelian Phoenix after Levinas’ consummation of me [i.e. not Me] for the other [passivity more passive…], no being reborn from out the ashes

pp. 188-89 PLUS ASSEZ DE DIFFÉRENCE LÀ ENTRE ELLES ENTRE LINHUMÉE OU LES CENDRES DUN BRÛLE-TOUT

CIN pp. 56-8 [quoting from PC] Derrida telling “you” [his love?] to eat all his ashes, to approach him by slowly advancing toward death, an absolute reconciliation

CIR pp. 272-73 never been able to contradict myself, still so young [cf. SW pp. 322-23], unforgettable power of my discourse—they grind even the mute ash, name of God in the ash > so I write, convenient for forgetting

SPEC p. 330 cremation: a form of Fortgehen, quite singular effects on work of mourning

AT THE SAME TIME

MONL p. 31 surging wave [déferlment déchainé] of anamnesia that the double interdict unleashed > invent one’s language and “I” at the same time

***p. 57 both at same time: 2 hyperboles, everything can and cannot be translated, “it is easy for me to hold firm between these two hyperboles”

H p. 81 “at this very moment”: antinomy of laws in the plural and absolutely singular law

——there are 2 plurals, different at same time: 1) multiplicity, plural laws 2) One + a multiplicity, One + n [plus dun]

——One + n, the antinomic addition, adds conditional laws to unconditional law of hospitality

p. 125 “impossibility of that ‘at the same time’ is at the same time what happens, once and every time, it is what is going to happen, what always happens”

LOBL p. 148 I am “irresponsible” and absolutely committed in the establishment of the language of the other, which I do as if the first moment, the “at once” is the occasion of the hymen, its chance and its law

SPOM p. 42 “multiple” and “at once,” the sign of contradiction w/out contradiction, of non-dialectical or “almost” non-dialectical difference running through every injunction

p. 204 ghost is there [re: de-limitation of critique] in the opening of the promise, before its first apparition, from the first it will have come second, deux fois à la fois, itérabilité originaire, virtualité irréductible de cet espace et de ce temps

POOF p. 1 contretemps, 2x, plus dun, 2 moments at the same time [my friends, no friend]

BL p. 199 origin of literature at same time as origin of law; story of prohibition (law) is a prohibited story

MPM p. 145 for de Man, text defined by considering a statement at the same time performative & constative > this same time never is, will never have been, will never be present

A p. 65 death, impossible simultaneity (where one and the other arrive together), contretemps

S pp. 107-08 origin as hétérogène à lorigine: 1) originarily heterogenous 2) heterogenous to what is called the origin, other than the origin 3) heterogenous and or insofar as at the origin: because and although (bien que) at the same time—is logical form of tension that makes this thought vibrate

SH pp. 3-4 circumcision only once, at the same time “first & last,” ring, seal of alliance, anniversary of archeology/eschatology > ring traces, carves the “unwiederholbar (unrepeatable)”

CHM p. 46 praeclare sane, toutefois [beginning of paragraph where Descartes wonders if he’s dreaming]

***PP pp. 92-3 Thoth supplants and supplements (en le suppléant) its other (father, sun, life, speech, origin or orient); at same time Thoth takes shape from very thing it resists and substitutes for

——Thoth opposes itself, passes into its other > messenger-god is truly god of absolute passage btwn opposites: god of non-identity (if he had identity: coincidentia oppositorum)

p. 168 “at once (à la fois):” identity is doubled as its simulacrum, phantasm, at once (identity of presence, presence of its identity, doubled as soon as it appears)

DS p. 202 relation of one text to another, open & closed, at the same time > necessary that each organism only refer to itself as determinate

p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

OS p. 56 for Aristotle, being-together [of nun and stigmē] not a determination of Being but very production of Being > ama as the pivot (cheville) (clavis), the key opening & closing metaphysics > this complicity so self-effacing as to barely be noticed, the common origin of space & time > Aristotle says w/out saying [Rousseau describing w/out declaring]: the dyad as the minimum

pp. 56-7 Aristotle’s 1st aporia, nun not part of ousia, because made of now’s (time’s parts), several nows can’t : 1) follow each other by immediately destroying each other 2) not destroy each other immediately 3) or remain in the same now > need temporal intemporal hama to conceive this aporia

p. 58 analogy, correspondence: enigma of “at the same time” [re: relation of time to space, changes of place, movement]

P pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

ROP p. 27 deconstruction is archaeological & philolytic, while simultaneously resisting this double motif, radicalizes axiomatics of à la fois

pp. 101-02 for Foucault, psychoanalysis oscillates on both sides of dividing line, in two places, two times, at same time (but he does not think these two times w/ structural possibility of event)

ATIA p. 55 re: following the animal, following the other > hunter/hunted, seducer/seduced, persecutor/fugitive constituted in the same animal in the same instant

DIF DIF p. 24 trace: à la fois, monument & mirage, traced & erased, living & dead, living in its simulation of life’s preserved inscription: a pyramid, to be deciphered otherwise, text w/out voice

DST DST p. 205 à la fois (double bind) > point out & not point out (relever et ne pas relever)

TR p. 141 Rousseau’s appeal to others, appeal to future, belongs to same time, same moment, as “myself alone”

LI p. 62 vices [turns] that interest me: time & place of the other time, the other time in (stead of) the first time, at once

p. 119 repeatability of both (identificatory) iterability & (altering) iterability > necessity of thinking rule & event, concept & singularity, at once

——iterability thus a concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, & hence the concept, hence all distinction > marks the limit of idealization/conceptualization: “concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to nonconcept

NOY pp. 231-32 when thought and the word (la parole) given in writing merge (se confond) at the heart of the same time (au coeur du même temps); chance encounter in singularity of “graph,” coincidence of the cut (la coupure) and the opening (louverture)

ATM p. 148 gift of other, debt w/out contract, demands: at the same time, indefinitely equivalent substitution (anonymity) and singularity (rather, absolute uniqueness of proper name)

pp. 156-60 Levinas’ 2 instances of “en ce moment même,le même moment: one belongs to the dialectic, the other has an infinite advance on the 1st, differs/defers it, and yet it is the same

OG pp. 154-55 supplement not only procures an absent presence, it distances, masters, protects: supplement transgresses and à la fois respects interdict (acc. to play/difference of forces)

EU pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

——provocation to think brings together in same instant desire for memory & exposure to future

AUFHEBUNG

KH pp. 100-01 mytheme, acc. Hegel, will have been a prephilosopheme promised to a dialectical Aufhebung

GOD pp. 10-11 [economy of the sacrifice] in turn toward new mystery, toward new structure of responsibility, prior one never eliminated, kept w/in oneself, mourned as crypt of a more ancient secret > is this repression, is this a kind of sacrificial Aufhebung?

LOBL p. 115 antagony from arrêt to arrêt, an Aufhebung that never lets up, arrêt arresting arrêt, both senses, both ways

p. ~166 arrêt w/out Aufhebung

EM p. 121 (143) Aufheben is relever: at the same time > déplacer, élever, remplacer et promouvoir

VM p. 316n “alterity, difference, and time are not suppressed but retained by absolute knowledge in the form of the Aufhebung

pp. 113-14 [do for all words what Hegel did for Aufhebung? no, see DS p. 200]

PPHS p. 76 Aufhebung facilitates spirit’s elevation beyond that within which it was submerged, sublimates nature into itself > presenting itself to itself as such

p. 88 authority of voice: coordinated w/ entire Hegelian system: its archeology, teleology, eschatology, its will to parousia > process of sign is an Aufhebung, negativity

——Hegel: negativity of intelligence, Aufhebung of sign relieves/promotes beyond natural, sensual, spatial

T p. xi Marges concerns relevance of limit, a reading of the Hegelian Aufhebung, a reading beyond Hegel’s own intention, beyond that which is inscribed on the internal vestibule of his ear, where Hegel’s text would be a writing machine of “conscious intention,” thus a mechanical reader

F p. xxii otherness before opposition btwn introj./incorp. not the contradiction of telos of Aufhebung, but undecidable irresolution: paradoxically incorp. doesn’t preserve other [garde une topique, mantient sauve], introj. more open [to other] > makes it impossible for the 2 to close over their proper, their death, their corpse

DS p. 248n Aufhebung—most “relevant” way of (re)covering (up) graphics of supplementarity or hymen, le recouvrement le plus séduisant, because most similar > thus, must critique Aufhebung as decisive target, that which obfuscates specificity of “writing operation”

OS pp. 41-2 space becomes concrete by retaining/restoring negative w/in itself, by negating itself

——1st negative determination of space is the POINT (the place that does not take place), it then negates itself in relation the LINE > als sich aufhebend, point is the line, the Being-spatial of point > then comes the PLANE (surface) > each next stage only made of the negated prior stage, i.e. line made of negated points

——“always too late to ask the question of time” re: spatialization

——each stage of Aufhebung is time

p. 43 point & time thought in circularity together (Aufhebung, speculative negativity, only possible by means of infinite correlation or reflection) > time is spacing, space is time > thus for Aristotle, stigmē, punctuality, determines nowness (nun, jetzt)

p. 43n TN. re- vs auf- in relève/aufhebt

p. 45n Hegel: Notion is in and for itself absolute (total) negativity and freedom

p. 53n for Hegel, time erases time, Tilgen (to erase) is also an Aufhebung: given that time is pure exterior self, parousia is end of time

POS POS pp. 40-1 if there’s a definition of differance, it’s the limit, interruption, destruction of Hegel’s relève, wherever it is

pp. 43-4 differance not Hegel’s difference of contradiction, which uses a third term to resolve, synthesize, aufheben

***p. 94 Houdebine says “no Aufhebung here,” Derrida responds: there is always Aufhebung, just as there is always repression, sublimation, idealization

p. 95 Derrida does not apply spacing to negate that which is ‘present,’ this would remain logic of Hegelian Aufhebung, Derrida’s nonpresence not found in opposition presence/absence

ROP ROP p. 32 repetition compulsion (advocatus diaboli of death drive) as resource & limit (à la fois) of psychoanalysis > analytic position set going endlessly, w/out Aufhebung, in paradox of Bindung and Erlöschung (solution, extinction): no analytic position when resistance is unidentifiable

DIF DIF p. 19 Aufhebung constrained into writing itself otherwise, or simply into writing itself, or taking into account its consumption of writing (sa consommation décriture) [re: general/restricted economy]

O pp. 6-7n differance inscribes contradictions, is the critical limit of idealizing powers of la relève (Aufgehoben), which reduces contradictions to homogeneity of single model

DPi pp. 207-08 Hugo’s abolitionism: disappearance of social order of past (priest, executioner, king), but order remains, what counts is what remains, the reste, of the turning, of the Christian Aufhebung

Hugo: cross will be substituted for the gallows”

pp. 208-09 the logic of Aufhebungs remainder & fact that Christianity, unlike Judaism/Islam, is also an immanentist humanism (mediation of God made man) > brings Camus’ atheistic abolitionism closest to Hugo’s Christological transcendence

RGE pp. 255-56 conservation of Aufhebung: circulation & self-reproduction as reproduction of meaning

p. 257 Aufhebung amortizes absolute expenditure (la dépense absolue), works the “putting at stake” into an investment (à élaborer la mise en jeu en investissement) > it’s laughable

——acc. Bataille, to be indifferent to comedy of Aufhebung (like Hegel was)—to blind oneself to experience of sacred, to heedless sacrifice of presence & meaning

p. 259 Aufhebung collaborates w/ Errinerung (interiorizing memory of meaning)

***p. 275 Aufhebung: produced entirely w/in system/work of signification, from one infinite determination to the next, each one conserved in the other, transitions produced by anxiety of infinity—included w/in circle of absolute knowledge, never suspends totality of discourse (work, meaning, law), never exceeds its closure > restricted economy, circulation of prohibitions: history as truth of prohibitions

p. 335n laughter’s burst does not maintain itself (not negative), laughs at Aufhebung

REST p. 348 to “put aside (mettre de côté)” once bizarre, but here interesting translation of Aufheben [re: Heidegger putting Van Gogh picture aside]

OG p. 25 (40) Aufhebung is the concept of history & teleology

ATAP p. 75 via Kant, apocalypse as dream of raising (aufheben) veil of Isis

SPEC p. 395 Bindung inaugurates, assures, overflows PP (mastery), as seat of its condition

——no relève of PP—not Hegelian [since PP always master?] > in fact, function of PP, (postal) binding, determines interpretation of Aufhebung

FV p. 479 systemic & historical link btwn idealization, relève (Aufhebung), and the voice > Lacan’s elevation of signifier

p. 480 Lacan: “the phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance”

——Lacan reversed Hegel: not ideal signified but ideal signifier

AUGUSTINE

POOF pp. 186-88 [1st] Augustine’s abyssal calculation, after death of his friend [Confessions IV], his close reading of Aristotle’s friends are ‘one soul in bodies twain’: survivre, ou non, au nom de lautre?

survive for yourself or person you’re mourning? question of gift, donner au nom de lautre, a narcissism that only occurs in name of other

——[2nd topology in Augustine] arithmetical challenge of arithmetic (indivisibility induces a desire for infinite multiplication of subject), economy w/out reserve, in originary guilt of friendship

——[3rd] infinitization qua conversion in God, on model of fraternal friendship? i.e. God demands we love the enemy

SW p. 312 grand masters of discourse about resurrection: Saint Paul, Saint Augustine

p. 319 was it even to Christ my poor old incorrigible Augustine finally addressed: “you were w/ me, I was not w/ you, beauty so ancient and new” > or because it is already late?

CHM p. 62 philosophy as this giant confession: attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole (to define it as such is to confess) > I philosophize only in terror, but in confessed terror of going mad

——confession is simultaneously: oblivion/unveiling, protection/exposure > economy

DST DST p. 229 “too late and too early”

HLP p. 31 se tromper > being-mistaken? or lie to oneself? > can one lie to oneself [Augustine seems to exclude this possibility]?

p. 51 performative can produce a truth, makes the truth, as Augustine says, whose power sometimes imposes itself forever

CIR p. 277-78 Saint Augustine, whom elsewhere I venerate and envy

pp. 284-85 writing w/out believing in one’s survival, in the inheritance of the last will, writing for the present, a made present, like SA wants to make truth: I don’t take my life, je me donne ici la mort

EU p. 37 Descartes jealously insists on “true philosophy” [of his thought], re: Augustinian filiation of “I think therefore I am”

AUTHENTICITY

OOG p. 74 authenticity, truth almost equals clarity (Klarheit) for Husserl

IW p. 267 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] Protestantism makes faith come alive to its authenticity, new relation of religion to truth, no longer as correspondence (like science, objective knowledge) but as truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit), authenticity, most intimate Gewissen: [the Church?] internalizes what contests it

AUTHOR

KH p. 124 one telling to the next, author gets farther & farther away: mythic saying resembles a discourse w/out a legitimate father, orphan, bastard, distinguished from philosophy, in Phaedrus, which must have a father to answer for it

BL p. 184 Derrida concedes presuppositions, conventions [on authorship of text], while exposing them

pp. 214-15 different periods of history of positive law give substance to literature, value of signatures [“authors”]

LOBL p. 142 legal bindings, framings, of Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort into single book by single author

pp. 169-72 Derrida’s mad hypothesis, nothing to do w/ intention of “author” that the hymen btwn the 2 women in Larrêt de mort (separated by uncrossable glass partition of 2 stories) is the absolute terror, that they love and approach each other w/out the narrator

SPOM p. 116 one cannot establish the state of a debt, do the balance sheet of an “exhaustive record,” one selects, performs, inheritance is kept secret, secret of a crime of its very author

POOF p. 59 sage & fool: l'un est lautre, l'un garde et se garde de lautre, l'un se fait violence, encore la surenchère infinie > this raising of the stakes doesn’t need an author’s intention

PP p. 95 systematic chain of pharmakon not simply intentions of an author going by name Plato

FSW p. 226 if there were only perception, pure permeability of breaching, there would be no breaches (frayages), no legible writing, but pure perception does not exist: nous ne sommes écrits quen écrivants > subject of writing does not exist as sovereign solitude of author

p. 227 we would search public in vain for first reader, i.e. first author of a work

DS pp. 225-26 [on conscious intention of author] does not matter to us here, reader should not know why, burst of laughter deep inside antre answers these questions

POS p. 42 double, interval, biphase, biface, bifurcated writing can only be marked in a grouped textual field, not in a punctual position, not w/ a single author

ROP p. 57 to identify someone w/ what they get paid for is not to read

OTO pp. 5-6 borderline btwn “work” & “life”: dynamis, virtual & mobile potency, neither active nor passive, outside nor inside, not a thin line, traverses 2 bodies (corpus & body) > not an indivisible trait lying btwn enclosure of philosophemes & life of author identifiable behind name

PS p. 191 Artaud wants to renounce: superstition of the text, dictatorship of the writer

FS p. 14 [for deconstruction] history of the work is not only its past, it is the impossibility of the text ever being present > legitimating intention keeps to internal truth, avoids thinking a subjective origin that is not simply psychological/mental

O p. 6 first effect of dissemination: individuality & responsibility no longer predominate

p. 56 literature is beyond of everything: author would have to disappear along w/ literature

DPi p. 209 exemplarity of Hugolian economy considerably exceeds the singular genius who represents it so well

TB p. 117 vis-à-vis Benjamin, if structure of work is “sur-vival,” a strange debt that doesn’t bind anyone to anyone: debt not engaged w/ subject-author but to formal law in immanence of original text

***PIO p. 36 universality (ideal objectivity, unlimited recurrence) in invention blurs signature of invention: name of individual (singular empirical entity) is associated w/ invention in inessential, extrinsic, accidental, aleatory way > this gives rise to enormous problem of property rights

TR p. 155 de Man: deconstruction of figural dimension threatens autobiographical subject

D p. 332 authorless voice, phonic tracing no ideal signified could stamp [sa frappe sensible] sans reste, all representative outcroppings (affleurements) subjected to rhythm of a numerous pounding

——Verlaine was told: text speaking of itself, w/out an author

ATM p. 171 what to make of a signature [Levinas’] when “il aura obligé,” when Il signs in his place?

——how does one hear “one must” in Derrida’s polysemic “loeuvre dE.L. aura obligé

p. 172 how to cite when Levinas places the whole language (French & Western) btwn quotation marks? at same time “he” is in quotation marks: the nameless signatory w/out authorial signature, “he” who undersigns every work, met en oeuvre tout ouvrage

——infinite law of quotation marks suspends all reference, work enclosed in a borderless context it gives to itself (se donne à elle-même), while making absolute reference to command of tout autre

pp. 177-78 Levinas: the other can always dispossess me of my work

CIN pp. 16-7 Derrida gives Cinder a proper name, is she the signatory of this text?

pp. 23-5 why the phrase “il y a là cendre” doesn’t belong to him [Derrida] > cinder lent, given, to so many others, cinder remains virginal (the only thing he loves), in tact (intacte), the sentence doesn’t even say the cinder

BSi p. 189 Valéry & Monsieur Teste doubles of marionettes—who makes who speak?

OG p. 68 (100) writing can never be thought under the category of the subject

p. 329n Derrida is not concerned w/ Sausurre’s intentions, nor the very thought itself, instead interested in a text which has influenced readings, borrowings, etc.

p. 99 (148) “Hegel,” “Rousseau,” “Leibniz,” “Descartes” neither identities nor causes > name of problems > so long as closure limits our discourse: we will not have other concepts

SPEC p. 322 inscription of a subject in his [Freud’s] text is also condition of the performance/pertinence of a text, beyond empirical subjectivity, supposing that could exist as soon as one writes, substitutes, supplements: notion of truth incapable of accounting for this performance

——autobiography as departure/return of a fort/da

p. 344 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] speculating, “author” already no longer there, no longer responsible, leaves document in your hands > “literary”: make of it what you will, it’s up to you—you’re more than ever on board

p. 348 PP as author or as authority, it/he only increased by dissidents speaking against it

——PP loses mastery w/ flooding (Überschwemmung), psychic apparatus no longer seeks pleasure, occupied only w/ binding (binden) excitations, w/ “mastering (bewältigen)” them

p. 365 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] malignant tumors also “narcissistic,” unleash themselves w/out concern for other cells, for the rights of authors or of succession

p. 376 is Freud’s discourse’s restance statutory?

FV p. 422(n) Lacan translates Wiederholungszwang as “repetition automatism,” the pre-eminence of signifier over signified > consequence: “literary” text does w/out reference to author [Derrida implies that Lacan takes, at times, his distrust of psychobiography too far in other direction: formalist neutralization of effects of signature]

p. 431 inscriber/inscribing function not to be confused w/ author > Lacan excludes textual fiction, indicates a general narrative w/in neutralized or naturalized frame, thus overlooks the frame

p. 432 structure of fiction reduced when related to its condition of truth, poor formalism which guarantees semantic content, doesn’t account for 1) “scription-fiction” and “scription-fictor” 2) narrating narration & narrator > complicity btwn formalist withdrawal (repli) and hermeneutic semanticism (or psychoanalysis applied to literature) [neglect of the subject-author, which, in some situations, might constitute progress or a legitimate demand]

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

GOD p. 62 ethical must sometimes be refused in name of responsibility that doesn’t calculate, that keeps its secret, that tyrannically [Nietzsche], jealously refuses violence of accounts and justifications, declining autobiography that is auto-justification: egodicée

GT p. 100 the supposedly most personal, direct writing, in contact w/ “thing-itself,” is “on credit”

MONL p. 31 surging wave [déferlment déchainé] of anamnesia that the double interdict unleashed > invent one’s language and “I” at the same time [see p. 70 on autobiography]

POO p. 143n use of “I” as an example, am I writing an autobiography? or writing about “I” in general, where I become exemplary

HASD p. 66n most “autobiographical” [attach as many quotation marks around this word as possible] to leave out Jew & Arab, which Derrida has never been able to speak about [see p. 58]

MPM p. 23 de Man: autobiography is “a figure of reading…that occurs in all texts.”

p. 25 tropology of memory in autobiographical discourse > discourse as epitaph, signature of its own epitaph (prosopopeia)

p. 27 de Man: prosopon poiein, to confer a mask or face, “prosopopoeia is the trope of autobiography…by which one’s name…is made memorable as a face” > (dis)figuration

pp. 55-56 Paul de Man translates Hegel’s “Ich kann nicht sagen was ich (nur) meine” as ‘I cannot say I’ > effacing of I, a priori functional forgetting > “Autobiography as De-facement”

A p. 2 whenever someone speaks of someone else, cites or praises him or her, one must hear: this is the story of my life [re: Diderot accusing Seneca, pardoning Seneca, asking for pardon himself]

WM pp. 254-55 [re: Idea in Plato, Hegel] Derrida critiques model of systematic structures perfectly closed over their technical/synchronic manipulation (bodies of work identified acc. “proper name" of signature)

OTO pp. 4-5 discourse on life/death occurs btwn logos and gramme, analogy & program, program & reproduction (since life is on the line, the trait [splitting of line] relating graphical to logical, also working btwn biological & biographical, thanatological & thanatographical)

p. 5 biographical novels of a philosopher don’t analyze signature & proper name (the demands of a text), the dynamis of the borderline btwn “work” & “life”

p. 6 painfully difficult for life to become object of science, would require a philosophy of life, a whole politics, which inscribes the bio-graphical w/in the bio-logical

pp. 8-9 F.N. already a pseudonym, be immeasurably wary when we think we’re reading Nietzsche’s signature or “autograph”

——Nietzsche never knows if anyone will honor the inordinate credit he grants himself in his name, & in the name of the other; autobiography as secret contract (annulus), encrypted credit account: for Nietzsche, his life, the “I-live,” is perhaps mere prejudice (Vorurteil)

——autobiography: life he lives and tells to himself

pp. 12-3 autobiographical récit, tells himself his life, affirms EROS, gratitude for gift (gift: establishment of my own credit w/ this name): EROS signs or seals > before such signature, my life may be mere prejudice

p. 19 autobiography’s signature written in step not beyond, Nietzsche’s one foot beyond life: differance, allo-, thanatography of autobiography

ATIA p. 6 Sarah Kofman’s Autobiogriffures sits vigil over conference

p. 21 autobiography (before the fall), confession (after the fall); autobiography becomes confession when it cannot separate itself from a fault, ill, evil (a debt that needs to be paid off); to pay off truth [but we name animals before the fall, is that possible?]

——why would we owe truth anything? the debt of autobiography: confession > after the fall, must already conceive lying as evil, as hiding truth

p. 24 history, historicity, historicality, all part of auto-biography, auto-definition, auto-situation of man [re: Derrida’s hesitation to claim there’s been a historical turning point in relation btwn man and animal, figure of turning pout too genetic, biological, zoological]

p. 31 anthropo-centric subjectivity speaks only from one edge of Man/Animal limit, gives autobiography, history of its life, that it therefore calls History

p. 34 Derrida introduces what will be his zootobiography, zoo-auto-bio-bibilio-graphy, not the otobiography you can find in Nietzsche [will indulge before discussing history of “I am”]

p. 40 [quoting PP] contours of anthropos determined by zoopharmaceutical ambivalence [re: the demonic as bestiary] > Socrates is compared to gadfly, his pharmakon like torpedo fish, but he’s still an “autobiographic animal”

pp. 47-8 Bellerophon’s modesty, shame before the immodest women saves the city, this immunizing drive, Heidegger’s Verhaltenheit, restraint, is the origin of the religious, of the immune, sacred (heilig), holy, separate (kadosh) [it also can be perverted: auto-immunity; virtual, analogical relation btwn auto-biography & auto-immunity]

***——autobiography, writing of self as living, trace of the living for itself, auto-affection or auto-infection as memory/archive of living, an immunization, making holy, virginal, indemnify; every autos, ipseity, threatened w/ auto-immunity, the poison of the auto-biography

p. 49 “autobiographical animals”: Proust, Gide, Woolf, Stein, Celan, Bataille, Genet, Duras, Cixous, Augustine

p. 50 autobiograparaphing: affect w/ traces of a living self [both man and animals?]

pp. 50-1 “I” speaks to “engage nudity w/out shame,” untenable pledge > bring in a mirror (une psyché), is the animal caught there too? or my primary mirror?

p. 52 every response to “who am I?” is only something I can answer, auto-biography, but it’s also quotation, an aping, miming [idiom & inheritance]

p. 56 “I,” the autos, ipseity, as a promise, guarantee (gage) or undertaking (engagement), of discourse on auto-biographical method, sign/manifestation of life in presence, even if from an animal, machine, living or dead > “I am dead” in some way implied in every cogito ergo sum

pp. 56-7 institutional sanction of “autobiography,” sense of pure autobiography, discharges onus of proof, artificial authority of genre, provides scene of witnessing to “naked and raw” “I”

p. 58 autobiography begins when there is a (female) witness, an animal, a mirror [?]

p. 65 “I,” ipseity, auto-affection, automotion, autokinesis, autonomy, sui-referential egoity (recognized in every animal): genesis of zootobiography [“I” w/out “I am”]

pp. 67-8 Valéry’s snake utters the first word (of Verb): “ME,” this “I am that I am,” first impurity, contamination of being, ontological creation, autobiographogenesis, becomes words of seducer > promise to breach purity of nothingness w/ performative

——I am HE,” auto-zoo-theo-morphic > snake as God, divinity diminished by fires of Seducer

pp. 75, 77 Descartes writes in French (autobiographilosophical narrative, for which he paved the way) to make accessible to “natural reason” and to “women”

p. 77 all autobiography presents itself as testimony, every testimony presents itself as autobiographical truth

***pp. 91-2 single embrace of Kant, Descartes, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger, like chasing, hunting, trying to take hold of cuttlefish, touch the animal in a way where it will expel its ink (encre), its anchor, in this case, w/ these folks, the ink as the ability to do the “I,” before autoreference; (in the name of autobiography) Derrida confides the animalist “vision” he has of what he does, what he writes > his “sole concern” is to not sacrifice to it any difference, fold, opening to-come

p. 100 for Kant, “dignity” of man, his autonomy, his autotely, his capacity for moral autodestination (Selbstbestimmung), for moral autobiography > this is his privilege, assures Herrschaft

pp. 110-11 in similar ways, Descartes, Levinas, Heidegger, Kant privilege “Here I am” over existence of life; for Levinas, w/out separation, possibility of responding, animals don’t die, can thus be put to death w/out being killed

p. 111 responsibility of one who says “here I am” is Levinas’ first inspiration for his “first philosophy”; it is autodeictic, autobiographical: 1) exposing oneself before the law 2) ability to respond to an appeal or command of the other

——secondariness of “I am living” to “I think,” unthought side of a thinking of life, a “living present”: thus began deconstruction, w/ Husserl & everything that followed, questioning autobiography of ego in its living present

p. 122 for Lacan, animal cannot accede to symbolic, unconscious, language (to autobiographical auto-deixis)

pp. 135-36 [can man attribute to himself indivisible concept of being able to feign a feint? “subject of the signifier”] do we have to remind a psychoanalysis that erasure of a trace can ensure its return? sense the virtual consequences on our subject: autobiography

SW p. 354 philosophy of nature, for the child I still am, was naivety itself, but also time of infinite apprenticeship, culture made up acc. fiction, the autobiography of lure (Dichtung und Wahrheit), beginning to write a novel of sericulture

DST DST p. 229 for Lacoue-Labarthe [?], anyone linked to edge of madness (au bord de la folie), the autobiographical (allobiographical) adventure, and its doubles, and the other, and death, is concerned w/ rhythm (the musical obsession) (Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Rousseau, Reik, Mallarmé)

PIO p. 417n Leibniz’s call for a genre that could be called: “an inventor’s autobiographical memoirs”

TR p. 155 de Man: deconstruction of figural dimension threatens autobiographical subject

EL p. 219 “we” of covenant, not secularized “communal subject,” countersigns by responding to commitment already taken: autobiographicity of “we” assigned by call resonating from sacred language > in sacrificial instant, one hears imminence of God’s voice’s return

C p. 219 cartouche: puts itself to work, forms part of the work by inscribing (itself) (as) the title, signature, autobiographical performative of the signatory

TN pp. 51-2 for Psyche, for a psyche altogether exposed to outside & other, there’s no autobiography: mourning autobiography (not just any mourning)

p. 52 being unimaginable gives rise to phantasms, allegories, figures, metonymies: technics > no overcoming (surmonté) this mourning w/out mourning [of autobiography] by any "work of mourning”

p. 58 when Nancy gives thought to birth of body, it’s sarcastic [having it out w/ flesh], mordant, une transsubstantiation acharnée qui inlassablement mord, remord et met à mort la chair > impossible auto-biography, transubstantiation of Eucharist itself: Corpus bursts out laughing

CIR pp. 86-7 literary confessions, form of theology as autobiography

pp. 212-13 ci, scie, ciseaux, si, ceci (enormous narcissistic monument), on the ci of circumcision is gathered the interrupted autobiothanatoheterographical opus; never known how to love save in the place of a figure unknown to me

p. 311 recount the “present,” throw G. off course, the present you are making him: Everybodys Autobiography

EU p. 125 [re: Derrida’s texts] autobiographical elements were undermining very notion of autobiography > undecidable, baffling (déroutant)

SPEC p. 393 PP as quasi-proper, figure of mastery, exappropriation structures PP, proper produced as autothanatography

AUTO S

WAP pp. 20-1 could there ever be self-foundation? could there still be autonomy w/out self-foundation?

p. 22 autos of self foundation, never present, but not nothing, it is not the future but structure of promise to come

AUTO-AFFECTION [fixerup]

GOD pp. 145,148 secret secret of forgiveness: to remain secret, and to become self-forgiveness (via specular identification), and in the ambiguity of se pardonner, to be deprived of sense in this narcissistic reflexivity

——to ask forgiveness is to identify with the other, auto-affect, hetero-affect

GT p. 109 [via psychoanalysis] circulation of auto-affective fantasmatics [imaginative incorporation] can disregard overflow of luxury or recognize in it an essential economic function

R p. 15 Aristotle’s Prime Mover, the first desirable, gives a life that exceeds the life of a human, continuous, unending—for us, impossible

——energeia of this pure activity is “pleasure (hēdonē), circle of taking pleasure in oneself (jouissance de soi); a specular auto-affection that accords w/ thinking of thought

p. 109 autoimmunity, cruelty itself, autoinfection of all autoaffectivity, the self, ipse, autos finds itself infected (once it needs event, time, other) precedes or anticipates oppositions btwn physis & its others (tekhnē, nomos, thesis) > life-death

H p. 137 technological prostheses, whose refinements are unlimited in principle > still give fantasy of auto-nomy, auto-affection: is there hospitality w/out this, w/out auto-affection, the privileged figure of hearing oneself speak?

AF pp. 97-9 the archaic impression Freud seeks almost no longer an archive, confuses itself w/ a footstep that leaves its still living mark on surface, place of origin, when step still one w/ subjectile

——instant when imprint yet to be abandoned by pressure of impression, pure auto-affection, indistinction btwn touching/touched, active/passive, an archive that would confuse itself w/ arkhē

Freud dreams irreplaceable place, the very ash, condition of singularity, idiom, secret, testimony, trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate > absolutely safe location

SPOM pp. 161-62 Stirner advocates auto-affection of “I-Me,” where no ghosts can haunt, no spacing > thinks this epokhē reduces, exorcises the ghost, Marx thinks it reduces to the ghost

EM p. 133 (160) for Heidegger, “le proche, cest le propre; le propre, cest le plus proche (prope, proprius), lhomme est le proper de lêtre, qui de tout près lui parle à loreille

PP p. 105 memory and truth cannot be separated, movement of alētheia, a deployment of mnēmē as psychic life in its self-presentation to itself > powers of lēthē (writing, pharmakon) increase domains of death, nontruth, nonknowledge: fascinate, hypnotize, medusa [verb]

VP p. 59 differance in auto-affection = identity of identity and non-identity in the same of the instant

p. 68 pure auto-affection as universality, absolute reduction of space, unity of sound and voice, unites or escapes distinction btwn intramundanity and transcendentality

——voice is consciousness, hearing-oneself-speak

***pp. 70-1 [commentary > interpretation] auto-affection as voice assumes a pure difference dividing self-presence, makes reduction of world, space, impossible; yet, must pass through reduction “in order to recapture difference in closest proximity to itself”: in closest proximity to movement of differance

——movement of differance produces transcendental subject

——“source-point,” “originary impression” which produces temporalization, is auto-affection

p. 73 acc. Husserl, as soon as we insert a determinate being into description of auto-affection [in time] we are speaking in metaphor,

——time itself is a metaphor that indicates and dissimulates auto-affection, at same time

PAS PAS p. (86) sans is infinitely passive to tout autre that approaches it, sans auto-affects itself by tout autre

S p. 98 Heidegger: what is proper to spirit is its auto-affective [voice in VP] spontaneity; Geist from gheis, to be thrown (aufgebracht), to transport, transpose, deport (entsetzt)

FSW p. 230 for Freud, erasure of trace, as movement of pure auto-affection, temporalization, makes repression “itself” possible, escapes binarism and makes binarism possible on basis of nothing > useful to deconstruct logocentrism and to exercise at different levels of writing in general

F p. xxxvii mouth’s empty cavity: 1) place for shouts, sobs, “deferred filling,” 2) place to call mother 3) then, via introj. or auto-affection, “phonic self-filling”

P p. 47 “grosse Schwierigkeit” of critical judgment of beauty [un plaisir désintéressé], auto-affection must cathect w/ pure objectivity, universality w/out concept, pure pleasure w/out enjoyment > Wohlgefallen (I-please-myself-in), Je-me-plais-à-me-plaire-à > auto-affection immediately goes outside: is pure hetero-affection, tout autre cathects me, w/out which, there’d be no universality

SP p. 137 were the key to the secret of a text “btwn me and myself,” I will still die > relation to event of text as structurally posthumous necessity > text remains open, offered, undecipherable

***ATIA p. 47 autobiography, writing of self as living, trace of the living for itself, auto-affection or auto-infection as memory/archive of living, an immunization, making holy, virginal, indemnify; every autos, ipseity, threatened w/ auto-immunity, the poison of the auto-biography

pp. 49-51 autobiographical animal, the general singulars “I” and “animal,” before ego cogito both living, both auto-affective, both moving > “I” speaks to “engage nudity w/out shame,” untenable pledge > bring in a mirror (une psyché), is the animal caught there too? or my primary mirror?

p. 65 “I,” ipseity, auto-affection, automotion, autokinesis, autonomy, sui-referential egoity (recognized in every animal): genesis of zootobiography [“I” w/out “I am”]

p. 72 for thought to be present to itself, to be present, must exclude/suspend all life, the living body (becomes machine, corpse), animal life, auto-affection

p. 94 animal is capable of auto-affection, of [quasi] “I,” not capable of pointing toward itself and saying “this is I,” of autodeictic, autoreferential self-distancing, thus not capable of understanding, reason, response, responsibility

GSP p. 323n TN. auto-affection is concerned w/ time, self-generating series of present moments, leads to Derrida’s analysis of speech [Heidegger’s analysis of Kant in Kant and…]

SW p. 341 fur (wool) & skin (leather): tallith must be something living taken from something living worn by something living > a burying of the dead that once had possibility of auto-affection

Gi p. 20 Erstreckung: Daseins spatiality before extensio, se tend (tends, extends itself) btwn birth & death (Dasein affects itself w/ this movement, auto-affection belongs to ontological structure of Daseins historicality) > birth/death receive meaning from this intervallic movement > only one of determinate possibilities of essential dispersion (Zerstreuung)

Gii p. 42 Heidegger: w/ man, 2 hands fold into 1, auto-affect each other: prayer (man is a sign)

AFR p. 110 Condillac’s move from perception to imagination (and from one sign to another): on the march toward freedom, spontaneity of auto-affection > teleology: the complete sign, the true sign, is the instituted sign [after rupture, process magnetized toward greatest mastery possible]

HST pp. 419-20 simple, homogenous, calculation of cloning—but every unit is irreplaceable in its factual existence (Kant)—so to be ethical, must be conscious, must be auto-affected by this uniqueness? > for Derrida, displaced certainty btwn opposition arithmetic/ethical substitution

TN p. 6 acc. Aristotle, sense (only potential not actual): does not auto-affect itself w/out motion of an exterior object

pp. 28-9 Nancy’s answer to how double extension self-touches remains elliptical, virtual, prethematic in Ego Sum: auto-affected & hetero-affected at once, uniting both affections like 2 lips

p. 31 feeling oneself feel is not corporeal but spiritual for Husserl & Descartes

p. 32 “I touches itself, I self touches (Je se touche)”: tactile figure of pure auto-affection

pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

p. 34 se toucher toi, “Je se touche”; “tu” [in philosophical discourse] signs general/plural singularity of possible addressee, also signs possibility/need for “I” to address itself as an other > oneself: first & last other

p. 35 for Nancy, excès de la façon (fashioning) sur lessence, et que lune supplée lautre, at origin of feeling oneself touch oneself; spectral revenant, prosthesis at heart of (self-)feeling > revenant, btwn life/death, dictates impossible mourning, sans fin—life itself [re: spacing irreducible to extensio]; p. 321n shouldn’t this spacing (what I call differance/trace) be linked to Heidegger’s tension of distancing (Gespanntheit) rather than Descartes’ extensio or even Freud’s Ausdehnung

p. 46 for Nancy, the Thing touches itself when one touches nothing: exact hyperbole (Nancy’s writing) engulfs, exscribes itself (sex-crit), sabîme (sinks)

——for Kant, time is a priori formal condition of all appearances > question of pure auto-affection in movement of temporalization

p. 53 for Nancy, our world is in touch: auto-affects, hetero-affects itself

pp. 105-06 cela se touche: “it itself touches itself,” “one touches it, it lets itself be touched” > imagination: possibility auto-affecting its essence of a nonessence: it is touched, in a movement de retrait ou de re-pli, becomes at moment it touches untouchable [re: imagination “touching” sublime]

pp. 113-14 interruption of auto-affection of mouth imparts speech [?]

p. 139 self-relation, “sefforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force sarrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

pp. 162-63 auto-deictic function of finger turns back on itself: le se-sentir-toucher du doigt est aussitôt un se-sentir-touché du doigt [Doppelempfindungen]

pp. 164, 347-48n [footnoting Irigaray] finger/hand not only “auto-affecting” body part

pp. 168-69 for Husserl, the incomparable unity of touch: its reflexive double sensation (touching, touched)

pp. 170-71 for Husserl, where sight requires the technical [to see itself] (in sense of mediation and in sense of “intruder”), touch’s self-relation is immediate, spontaneous, direct, intuitive and acts w/out empathy or analogical appresentation

——for Husserl, when I touch myself w/ my finger: no haptical mirror-effect, no insinuation of alterity

pp. 173-75 for Husserl, duplicity of sensible impression/apprehension occurs via a certain necessary exteriority, an outside as “real quality of a thing” (it partakes even in illusions)

——if foreign outside, space of material thing, slips btwn touching/touched, i.e. the heterogeneity of spacing > won’t a hand touching itself experience this detour?

p. 180 there would be auto-affection “effects,” but their analysis can’t escape hetero-affection that makes them possible, keeps haunting them

——constitution of body proper would thus assume passage outside through “technē of bodies,” spacing, death, nonliving, other, mourning > everything the “solipsistic” tries to keep out (maintenir au-dehors)

***pp. 181-82 how the hand led us to the other surface, the other of sense, while trying to demonstrate auto-affection

p. 350n how could [Husserl’s] identical coincidence open up to anything else?

p. 185 connection btwn “self-touching” of “human body” [flesh] and body of Christian ontotheology, its eucharistic ecstasy par excellence [Nancy too?]

p. 357n for Franck, no localization in general w/out auto-affect, self-contact

p. 249 start from fire to think the touching of self-touching > not only fire but flames, since light means what is more than a figure: haptical light of self-consuming flames eludes worship, burns effigies spontaneously, “more than a figure,” the transfiguration of figurality

p. 274 touch as self-touchingle toucher plus tout autre sens (dizzy rhetoric), very form of space & time & will (essence of will) (from Descartes to Kant or even to Nietzsche)

——to will is to will to touch, strange tautology, bends/folds oneself back into fold of passive-active auto-affection > this affect, that inflects/conjugates passive activity of will: desire

p. 291 the “self” is as indispensable as you in se toucher toi, an “I” unable to touch itself couldn't se plier à ce qui le déplie absolument, au tout autre qui, comme tout autre, habite mon coeur en étranger > no anthropological limit here > “divine,” “animal,” & life all derivative of se toucher toi

——w/out lépreuve of impossibility of auto-affection—no love

——il faut saimer [French grammar: puts transitivity in reflexivity] says every “I love you” > this (impossible) auto-affection of love makes love possible

p. 292 auto-hetero-affection inaugurates all experience: speech, declaration of love

E p. 18 poetic speech, beyond finite commerce (out of circulation), yet of infinite value: the universal analogical equivalent, the value of values; through poetry, work of mourning turns hetero-affection into auto-affection, producing maximum of disinterested pleasure

p. 19 for Kant, hearing is closest to freedom and spontaneity, one must use term hearing-oneself-speak (le sentendre-parler) because the structure is auto-affective; the mute thus do not have reason, the mouth (indissociable from ear) is not simply an analogy of expression: it is the ground of analogy, regulates analogy, it is logos itself [necessary]

p. 20 for Kant, hearing (w/ its allergy to prosthesis) distinguished from sight by its auto-affective structure, an internal sense, its “form” is time > not an anthropological but a psychological space

OG p. 12 Hegel privileges sound (speech, voice), because it is a hearing of an interior vibration

——voice, phonè, sentendre-parler, saffecte lui-même (hearing-oneself-speak, affecting oneself), ideality

——phonocentrism se confond (merges) w/ onto-theology, produces these subdeterminations of presence: sight as eidos, substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as point (stigmè) of now (nun), consciousness, cogito, subjectivity, co-presence of other & self…

p. 20 (33-34) transcendental signified: resource of sign, makes difference btwn signans/signatum absolute & irreducible > it is la voix sentend: conscience, auto-affection (spontaneity, ideality, universality, non-mondain of substance)

p. 89 parousia of voice, presence to self of logos w/in voice, absolute hearing-oneself-speak, is a function responding to an indestructible but relative necessity w/in system that encompasses it

p. 97 (145) Rousseau: voice answers hearing

pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

——(from Descartes to Hegel) God is name & element that makes possible absolutely pure self-presence & knowledge > God’s infinite-understanding is the other name for logos as self-presence, produced as auto-affection through voice—excluding sensible, exterior, spatial writing

pp. 153-54 (221) restitution of presence by language: symbolic/immediate, se passe de passer par le monde: touching is touched, jouissance not deferred: auto-affection se donne pour autarcie pure, it does not wait (nattend pas) > but, auto-affection pure speculation, present delivered is chimera, the no longer deferred is absolutely deferred: acc. Rousseau, sign/image/representation sont des illusions qui donnent le change (sidetrack us) [differance w/out delay]

pp. 165-66 (235-36) w/ 2 supplements (writing, onanism), auto-affection manifests by leaving a trace of itself in the world, exteriority of space, touchant-touché admits the world as 3rd party, here jouissance and se-donner-une-présence welcome the other in small difference separating lagir du pâtir (doing from suffering)

——exposed surface of body signifies, marks forever, the division working auto-affection

——auto-affection, universal structure of experience, being capable of being affected by other, capable of symbolizing, another name for “life,” the as-for-itself or for-itself: subjectivity—gains in its mastery of the other to the extent that its power of repetition idealizes itself (s’idéalise) > the external, the signifier, becomes my spontaneity, and escapes me less and less

pp. 166-67 (237) auto-affection constitutes the same (auto) as it divides the same

——masturbation (“sexual” auto-affection) & writing totally indistinguishable inasmuch as each puts into play (met en jeu) the presence of the present, the life of the living [still, this totality is severely articulated and differentiated]

——logocentric longing par excellence is to distinguish the two

p. 186 (265) imagination alone has power of giving birth to itself, creates nothing: but receives nothing alien or interior to itself [khōra?] > other name of differance as pure auto-affection

p. 250 (354-55) jouissance—pure presence to self-auto-affection accorded to God; interior, homogenous, no relation w/ object, welcomes no mortal difference

p. 286 (405) phonic auto-affection permits the epoch of man, epoch not of history but as history: greatest possible mastery, liberty, self-presence of life

——[in spite of Hegel’s follies, Derrida here affirms that concept of history is a concept of philosophy, that history is the history of philosophy]

ATAP pp. 72-3 acc. Kant, mystagogues confuse Geheimnis of practical reason w/ mystery of vision/contact > nothing more auto-affective than voice of moral law, not contaminated by feeling/illumination (touch/sight)

SPEC pp. 285-86 reality principle’s end (autonomy): cut off from all pleasure, from all auto-affective relation, in service of a pleasure too jealous of itself, that would asphyxiate itself

p. 359 analytic of Da-sein (analytic of distance, proximity)—not so foreign to analysis of fort/da > economy of death, law of proper, auto-affection of fort:da, “eigenen Todesweg des Organismus

——Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

AUTOIMMUNITY

R p. 33 [re: Algeria] immunize against suicide of democracy by committing the suicide (value of this strategy can neither be confirmed nor refuted)

p. 34 perverse autoimmunity of democracy due to double couple: “freedom and equality” and “equality acc. #, equality acc. worth” > in the name of one couple, both couples destroyed

p. 35 autoimmunity: a murder that becomes suicide, a suicide that becomes murder

p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

p. 36 because of undecidability linked to autoimmune logic, can never “prove” whether it’s more democratic to include/exclude immigrants, vote/not vote directly, both protect democracy through some exclusion, some renvoi

p. 41 Christian democracy would be hyperbolically autoimmune (let antidemocrats vote)

p. 45 autoimmunity is suicidal while robbing suicide itself of its meaning and supposed integrity

pp. 47-48 antinomy, impossibility, source of every autoimmune process

p. 52 equality is not equal to itself (paradoxes of autoimmune)

***p. 55 the unconscious remains the most vital reserve of the self-destructive conservation of the “subject” or of egological ipseity; without autoimmunity, no sadism, masochism, consciousness, death drive

p. 109 autoimmunity, cruelty itself, autoinfection of all autoaffectivity, the self, ipse, autos finds itself infected (once it needs event, time, other) precedes or anticipates oppositions btwn physis & its others (tekhnē, nomos, thesis) > life-death

pp. 109-10 autoimmunity takes account of what psychoanalysis once called the unconscious

FK p. 78 quasi-spontaneous automaticity: confused identity, auto-immunity, auto-indemnify > detaches & reattaches (to family, proper) at same time, mystical or secret mechanicity: unheimlich

p. 81 reactivity of resentment opposes that which it hates in itself by excising it [auto-immunity]

p. 82 auto-immunity haunts community: hyperbole of community’s own possibility

p. 86 auto-immunity of religion: btwn sacrifice and respect for life

p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

——these dimensions of self-sacrificial supplementarity, the auto-co-immunity, com-mon auto-immunity, keep community alive, open to something other, more than itself (a spectralizing messiancity beyond all messianism)

——Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

p. 88 religion as ellipsis of sacrifice, Heidegger sees ontotheology as free from sacrifice & prayer, but Derrida sees double bind, religion excluding & requiring sacrifice, indemnification of unscathed, auto-immunization & sacrifice of sacrifice

pp. 88-9 in our “war of religion” 2 violences: 1) hypersophistication of military tele-technology 2) “new archaic violence,” counters the first & everything it represents, revenge

——in name of Islam, in name of “religion,” desperate (auto-immune) gesture, attacks blood of its own body

p. 91 the 2 types of auto-immune supplementarity imposed by religious reactivity to technology: 1) violent sundering (Entwürzelung) from all roots, all sacred: identity, proper name, culture, memory 2) counter-fetishism, animism of technology as evil [See H p. 53 & SPOM p. 64]

H p. 51 inviolable immunity (the home) remains the condition of hospitality

p. 53 become virtually xenophobic to protect one’s hospitality

SPOM p. 143 spirit of past [not ghost?] convoked to anesthetize itself (sich betäuben), protects against its “own content,” protects against itself, makes you forget why and that you’re violent

p. 145 reflexive return of conjuration: those who inspire fear conjure themselves, conjure very specter they represent (conjuration in mourning for itself, turns against itself)

p. 177 both Marx & Max wage war on whatever represents the body (prosthesis, difference, etc.) > “le moi vivant est auto-immune, ils [Ma(r)x] ne veulent pas le savoir,” to protect life

MPM p. 101 the sich, “se,” “itself,” deconstructs itself in the very act of the promise, aporetic event [spirit: ghost > auto-immunity: auto-deconstruction]

——the sich is “promised to the effacement it promises itself” [auto-deconstruction]

EM p. 113 (133) interest in universality of anthropos a sign of West’s attempt to interiorize, master what’s different from it, leffet de cette différence dun tout autre ordre, where philosophical colloquium has no meaning, this other space neither barren, nor desert-like

PP pp. 101-02 (115) [Plato’s puritanical auto-immunity] illness as allergy to alien element, “normal” disease defends itself; God cannot have an allergic reaction > perfection and immortality: no relation to outside; but how can we exclude the parasitic supplement, pharmakon?

FWT p. 178 Europe exports: 1) norms, advancements, language [re: consolidation of rights, laws, to sovereignty of subject] 2) its auto-hetero-deconstructive capacity or auto-immunity

——Europe is the most beautiful example of auto-immunity, and allegory, because w/ Europe we see auto-immunity as survival, invincibility as auto-immunity: immense tragedy of a beautiful suicide

POOF pp. 92, 109n via Schmitt, stasis implies state of rest, arrest (status) & also revolt [in this sense stasis could name auto-immunity], stásis as a category of political nosography, misfortune, fatal disorder, bad luck

ATIA pp. 47-8 Bellerophon’s modesty, shame before the immodest women saves the city, this immunizing drive, Heidegger’s Verhaltenheit, restraint, is the origin of the religious, of the immune, sacred (heilig), holy, separate (kadosh) [it also can be perverted: auto-immunity; virtual, analogical relation btwn auto-biography & auto-immunity]

PSSS p. 243 “it’s not going well,” a redemptive concern—necessity to save: salutary, sanitary, immunitary concern > also, a gesture of war: militant saves by routing a resistance: French Revolution’s terror, Comité de Salut Public

pp. 245-46 psychoanalysis has failed to say anything original about mondialisation, tele-technic virtuality—has resisted, in autoimmune fashion, changing, thinking through, fundamental axioms of ethics, law, politics > must be a revolution re: concepts cruelty, sovereignty, resistance

p. 260 condemning/saving inscribe in concepts sovereignty & cruelty an ambiguity as unrelievable as autoimmunity itself: in any paregicide, any Oedipus, any totem + taboo, any republican or democratic installation of brothers, no way to know whether paregicide took place or not, took place w/out taking place, before any question about it [see HYMEN]

TN pp. 60-3 Nancy’s 4 metaphorical displacements of touch: 1) not to “touch” 2) finishing “touch” of pure Idea 3) anesthesia/euthanasia “as soon as it is touched…” 4) longing for touch

——Nancy’s thought of touch as flailing, weighing, scales or scourge of God (all senses of French fléau), exapropriation of most proper, autoimmune desire of proper, expulsion: eating one’s heart out > “saisie dessaisie ou dessaisissante (a seizing put-upon or at grips with one’s grasp)”

p. 326n Nancy’s festering immundity, what is expulsed, the abjected/ejected of (auto-)immune—isn’t law of autoimmunity what commands all Christian thinking of “flesh”?

——risk finding that a deconstructed heart is a Christian one

SPEC p. 365 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] malignant tumors also “narcissistic,” unleash themselves w/out concern for other cells, for the rights of authors or of succession

AUTOPSY (see MARIONETTE)

BSi p. 277 an autopsy [the seminar too?], the becoming-what of the who?

response to questions “so what, so who?” meant to enrich my science, knowledge, conscience through onto-logy, theatrical theorein (optical gaze) > sovereign autopsy

p. 279 knowledge no stranger to power, power no stranger to seeing, having, willing > autopsic/autoptic knowledge: take power over object of knowledge

p. 281 narcissism of autopsy occurs after narcissistic hunt, capture > this setup mediated by institutions

p. 282 elephenomenelephant [Sun King inspecting dead elephant to assert sovereignty]

p. 284 representation/performance of autopsy

p. 287 layers of light in spectacle of autopsy [includes the historiography of Louis XIV’s autopsy]

p. 288 as soon as there is absolute knowledge, everything prescribed for Sun King as a program [the king, the historian, the reader—who isn’t manipulated by history like a marionette?]

p. 289 narrative/representation structural to sovereignty, its force, its dynamis and its energeia (virtual & actual power) > sovereignty draws all its power from simulacrum-, fiction-, representation-effect > mystification of representation constituted by the simulacrum of a true transfer of sovereignty

p. 291 scene, theater, visibility of autopsy [sovereign]: violence of light > enargeia of seeing, knowing; enargeia: fulguration of sun, can’t look at directly

p. 293 visor-effect: king sees w/out [his gaze, origin of his seeing, his eyes] being seen

——[during spectacle of autopsy/sovereignty] an éclat > fragment of light touches everything

pp. 293-94 [vis-à-vis Marin] autopsia: seeing w/ one’s own eyes, bear witness to authentic past event, narrator a “witness,” “martyr”

p. 294 autopsy should be called necropsy [used to mean intimate commerce w/ gods?]

p. 296 globalization of autopsic model, knowledge that de-vitalizes by looking at life (simple objectification) > the 2 senses of autopsia: cadaver & divine power

pp. 296-98 curiosus: avid knowledge and care (cura), Heidegger’s unwholesome curiosity (Neugier, Neugierde) > curious in the beast, in the madman (zoo, asylum): caring and locking up, installing limits, an art and technique, perhaps tekhnē itself

p. 299 treatment, curiosity, autopsy: expropriating the other

p. 300 culture of curiosity, treating, curing: violence of enclosing/objectifying

AWAITING

MONL p. 71 in the waiting without horizon for a language that only knows how to keep people waiting

HASD p. 27 nous sommes encore sur le seuil

p. 49 Jerusalem as place that takes place since event of promise, place thus revealed as place awaiting realization of the promise > then it will take place fully, fully be a place

p. 52 where does order to remain silent take place? the place is Being, Being reduced to a threshold, outer sanctuary (parvis) of temple, sacred place

p. 59 [re: Eckhart] place that gives place w/out being essence of foundation: step, passage, threshold, parvis (vorbürge)—avoidance denies its place there

A pp. 64-6 triple transitivity of sattendre: 1) oneself 2) arrivant, the other 3) await each other, which is immediately consonant w/ reference to tout autre [cf. HST p. 360]

for Heidegger, only w/ death does one await oneself, expect oneself > Dasein stretches (se tend), bends toward (se tend vers), offers to itself (se tend), offers it to itself (se le tend)

p. 66 for Heidegger, death—stand before (steht bevor) oneself, await, precede oneself as before a mirror, as before the future, “in its ownmost potentiality for being” [see p. 78]

p. 74 death always the name of a secret, signs irreplaceable singularity, puts forth common name of the proper name w/out name, always a shibboleth > language about death long history of a secret society, hidden religion of the awaiting, a universal Marrano

——for Heidegger, announcement of impossibility of “death,” the awaiting death, can only occur for Dasein

p. 76 if death is possibility of impossible for Heidegger, Dasein never has relation to death as such, only to perishing, to death of the other (who is not the other), death of other in “me” only death named in syntagm “my death” > thus sattendre, sattendre lun lautre, sattendre soi-même à la mort

p. 81 Marranos that we are, whether we know it or not, incessantly older & younger, untimely histories, still waiting for the other in a last word infinitely finished

VM p. 103 affinity btwn Blanchot & Levinas re: hollow space (creux) of finitude in which messianic eschatology resonates, w/in expectation (attente), response, cette réponse sappelle encore attente, bien sûr, mais cette attente ne se fait plus attendre pour Levinas

VP p. 84 “pure logical grammar” > le sens nattend pas la vérité insofar as it expects it (en tant quil lattend)

T p. xxix after every perforation, one [philosophy] is dying to replace w/ a glorious cadaver, ce temps timbré entre lécriture et la parole (s) appellent un coup de donc [Glas]: it suffices, barely, to wait!

SH p. 22 readability effaces the date, the very thing which it offers for reading, date must conceal w/in itself stigma of singularity if it is to last longer (lasting is the poem), only chance of spectral return, commemoration of date’s annihilation, kind of nothing or ash > ash awaits us

P p. 93 free, vague, wild, pure beauty, indefinite errance: elle ne sarrive pas à sa destination

O pp. 57-8 le plaisir serait toujours formel et de limen

SW p. 317 wait w/out horizon & someone else one knows too well, “even me why not,” an other yet to be born, who strikes dumb order of knowledge > too well-known, stranger head to foot

REST p. 281 shoes are there, made for waiting > “irony of their patience is infinite, it can be taken as nil”

HST p. 359 hospitality: question of time, time of waiting, waiting beyond time

p. 360 [re: hospitality] se tendre, sattendre à, tenue/retenue (holding/withholding) [cf. A pp. 64-6]

——radical hospitality must consists in receiving w/out (extending) invitation

——the unlivable contradiction of extending (du tendre) and waiting (de lattendre); hantise (figure of visitation w/out invitation), au bord de la mort: it is to death that hospitality destines itself

LI p. 39 Derrida likes excessively prolonging the pleasure of the threshold (limen) [?]

TN p. 212 what counts most in imminence? what it expects, or that it is doomed to wait?

AD p. 122 Levinas: patient awaiting of God, patience of excess, a waiting where nothing is awaited

UWC p. 237 [the event, the unconditional] matter of the sense of sense [meaning of meaning?] > up to you now, up to others—signatories are also addressees

——take your time, but be quick: don’t know what awaits you

BAD FAITH

FL p. 231 those who don’t trust that deconstruction is political: bad faith, unjust

HLP p. 57 to lie to oneself is not “bad faith” > must account for mediatic techno-performativity and logic of phantasma (spectral), or symptomatology of unconscious

BARTLEBY

ROP p. 24 Bartleby as figure of death, as secret of literature, makes narrator (man of law) talk

ATIA p. 61 Derrida would prefer not to appear naked before an animal, and then for their eyes to meet

BATAILLE

OS p. 52 for Bataille, process of preserving meaning is “vulgar”; Heidegger would agree [?]: meaning linked to metaphysical closure

RGE p. 252 Bataille: no one knows anything of himself if he has not grasped Hegel’s master/slave dialectic

p. 333-34n Bataille: Hegel’s failure not an error, an authentic movement, pregnant w/ meaning

p. 334n Bataille: Hegel’s memory takes him back to perceived abyss in order to annihilate it, the system is annihilation (Hegel touched the extreme, he knew supplication)

p. 253 Bataille took Hegel seriously: understood internal rigor of system—couldn’t pull one part out

——rigorous effect of trembling to which Bataille submits Hegel’s concepts

——[Derrida includes number of different faces Bataille ascribes to Hegel]

p. 335n Bataille quotes Hegel’s “life of mind…endures death and in death maintains its being” [Blanchot quotes this too, see DPi pp. 111-12]

pp. 257-58 Bataille: only way for negativity to reveal what we are is to see ourselves dead, this is comedy! must live w/ impression of truly dying, difficult because necessity of spectacle/representation, nothing less animal than fiction of death > emphasis on simulacrum disrupts Hegel

p. 259 Bataille must mark his text (must mark the point of no-return of destruction, linstance dune dépense sans réservenot negativity), and he does, so as not to return to positive, pre-Kantian MOP [MOFP] [Žižek thinks otherwise, calls Bataille pre-Kantian]

p. 261 torment of Bataille’s writing (in his own words): “commentary on the absence of meaning”

p. 262 Bataille: “keep in one hand what the other gives” (to possess ruins is not to possess nothing)

——Derrida: that’s still Hegelian

——Bataille wanted to denounce servility/labor of meaning by engaging in major play, not minor (which would still give meaning to the absence of meaning)

pp. 262-63 does Bataille’s sliding (glissement), in silence, lose its sovereignty in meaning?

pp. 262, 265 servility/work as desire for meaning, techne as unfolding of truth > how writing of lordship (which seeks to maintain trace) becomes writing of servility (for Bataille)

——Bataille against servile writing (not irresponsible techne of Plato) that serves life, phantom of life, in presence, advocates a trace w/ possibility of effacement absolu > unerasable trace not a trace

p. 263 difference btwn Bataille/Hegel (btwn 2 differences): Bataille evokes absolute difference that’s not in service of presence > continuum, communication, instant (concepts of Batailles’ sovereign operation) not identical [MOP] but mark/sharpen incision of difference

——Bataille’s communication, only btwn beings who have put the being w/in themselves at stake (mis en jeu) > “placé à la limite de la mort, du néant

——Bataille’s instant (nest pas un point de présence pleine et inentamée): furtive [cf. PS] (il ne se donne pas, il se vole), il se glisse et se dérobe entre deux présences

p. 266 Bataille addresses total renunciation to the least weak [see quote]

p. 266-67 opposition of continuous & discontinuous constantly displaced from Hegel to Bataille > for Bataille, continuum of sovereign communication in night of secret difference; for Hegel, conciliate desire for recognition (breaking of secrecy) w/ discontinuity, negativity

——displacement does not transform nucleus of predicates (all the attributes of sovereignty are those of lordship)

p. 272 Bataille’s not a new mystic: no presence, no interiority > the impossible

pp. 272-73 reading of Bataille: 1) must not isolate notions (“experience,” “interior”) as if they were their own context: error to remain blind [?] to a traditional culture wishing to be taken as natural element of discourse 2) must not submit contextual attentiveness to system of meaning promising absolute formal mastery (this would erase excess of nonmeaning)

p. 275 Bataille against Bataille: he’s even less Hegelian than he thinks

——Bataille designates (as never before) the transgressive relationship that links world of meaning to world of nonmeaning

***p. 277 a text [Bataille’s] that traces, in silence, structure of the eye [illumination] > in contriving/weaving (tramer) “labsolu déchirement,” absolutely rends (déchire) its own tissue—once more “solid” and servile de se donner encore à lire

REST p. 270 [slight difference from Bataille, not sliding?] nous piétinons, nous ne patinons même pas, nous pataugeons (floundering) w/ slightly indecent complacency

TN p. 220 [more on (im)possibility of deconstructing Christianity] salvation from Christianity is a Christian value: Bataille’s hyperbolic mask, what he sometimes called his “hyper-Christianity”

BEAST

ATIA pp. 120-21 for Lacan, human is not a beast of prey, but a beast that is prey to language [this is thought while distinguishing anthropological from zoological]

BSi p. 86 sexual desire—beastly

p. 88 sworn enemy always a wolf

p. 98 bêtise, bestiality, proper to man

p. 99 for Rousseau, the Christian and the philosopher cease to be beast or wolf

p. 167 accusation of bête deprives the accused, like animal, of all that is proper to man (language, reason, logos, sense of death, technique, history, convention, culture, laughter, tears, work)

p. 176 nonknowledge of bête, spirit of seminar; the living in life itself outplays opposition btwn bêtise and its supposed contrary > Nietzsche one of most eloquent witnesses of this theme: both man & animal, both idiotic & cunning—no decidable limit

p. 254 enriching our bestiary (wolf, dolphin, monkey—queen bee)

BEAST AND SOVEREIGN

R pp. 93-94 rogue unlike voyou [in French] can be animal, a creature incapable of mingling w/ the herd

BSi pp. 2-4 à pas de loup (wolf), à pas de colombe (dove) (silent commands order world); wolf, war (hunting), dove, order, peace > both silent

pp. 5-6 the wolf looms, fabulous animal, a fantasma in sense of revenant, wolf more terrifying when not there, a metonymic substitute come to announce/conceal, to manifest/mask

——a loup [party mask], feminine visor-effect: see w/out being seen

pp. 9-10 brothers as wolves, even enemy brothers [my kind]

pp. 10-1 [Akela from Jungle Book, Fenrir] Plautus’ homo homini lupus: man as stranger is wolf [sovereign inflection of stranger] > Plato’s wolf-tyrant (lukos) in Republic Book 8 [lycology of politics]

pp. 11-3 acc. Rousseau, chief secures something w/ a view to devouring it (doesn’t actually devour it), annihilates it by keeping for himself: enslavement or food

——acc. Rousseau via Caligula, kings are gods, people are beasts > reason of sovereign (man himself disappears btwn beast & sovereign)

p. 13 man, a hyphen (mediation) in the theo-anthropo-zoological

p. 14 an analogy [re: beast & sovereign] is always a reason, a logos, a calculus > a relation of production in which identity and difference co-exist

p. 16 minimal sovereignty: power to give, suspend, make law

pp. 17-8 sovereign/beast outside law > beast: violation of law, also Benjamin’s grand criminal, reveals state doesn’t monopolize violence; sovereign: guarantor of law, heterogenous to law > haunting, uncanny fascination: beast/sovereign face

——ontological coupling: la bête et (est) le soveraine

p. 20 analogy [re: beast and sovereign] announces (like a black cloud) the historical (actual & virtual) violences, disasters we won’t (already don’t) have a name for

pp. 21-3 Plutarch on non-cowardice of animals, on humans mimicking carnivorous animals, eating weak ones > sovereignty as devouring? [Rousseau referring to Plutarch]

p. 23 sovereignty, devoro, voraz, vorator, devour w/ teeth, rush to bite > kill or mourn the other?

——devouring and vociferation (voice exteriorizes what is eaten, what is interiorized) > listening, obeying the sovereign voice through donkey’s ears [sovereign devours, like beast, to speak as sovereign to stupid beast]

pp. 24-5 [bibliography of sovereign animals in Bible]

pp. 25-6 sovereign depicted as artificial monstrosity of the animal [i.e. Leviathan] > figuration: always beginning of a fabulation or affabulation

——acc. Aristotle, man is btwn divine/animal as political animal—life outside politics either much worse or much better [outlaw either a beast or a god]

——[how can politics rise above the natural while also being a monstrous, bestial fable?]

p. 26 political sovereignty as the fable of a monstrous animal is prosthetic, prostatic, prosthstatic: supplement that supplements nature by adding an artificial organ, here the state

pp. 26-7 for Hobbes, man as artist mimics art of God [cf. E Kant-like?]; Leviathan is artificial, thus sovereignty a human artifact, monster prosthetic made in lab, and not indivisible, absolute, as Hobbes argues (commentary > interpretation: consequences beyond explicit intention)

p. 28 Hobbes: “Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul” > soul as principle of life, vitality, vivacity

——state, a robot, an animal monster, giant prosthesis designed to amplify

——animal-machine, living-machine, machine of death: serving the living > prosthstate, and yet vitalist in that it mimics the body > civil war [like Schmitt?] death of the State

p. 29 prosthstatic sovereignty presupposes right of man over beasts

p. 30 Freud: all ravenous animals are fathers in disguise

——Hobbes: natural right, war of all against all, applies to animals and men

p. 31 for Freud, thanks to technology, mastery over nature, man has become a “prosthetic God”

pp. 32-3 hallucinatory hymn of beast & sovereign > he who plays sovereign plays the beast

p. 33 by its essence, every decision sovereign & exceptional, escapes order of the possible, the programmable, makes distinction btwn a deciding decision and an undecided one undecidable > supposed decision looks like indecision, nonintention, unconscious, irrational > sovereign looks like the beast

p. 33n Pascal: whoever acts the angel, acts the beast

pp. 45-6 [vis-à-vis Schmitt] 3 assertions of political anthropology: 1) prosthstatic sovereignty proper to man 2) absolute indivisibility of sovereignty 3) excludes beast & God

***p. 57 sovereign as God does not (need to) respond [Levinas’ death] > sovereignty expropriates ecstasy of irresponsibility: bestiality, divinity, death (each dogmatically designated as unresponsive)

p. 65 the zooanthropological rather than biopolitical > horizon of BS

——double carry (portée) of mouth (human) & maw (animal): voci-ferates (carry the voice) & devours (voracious carry)

p. 66 sovereign: he, himself, ipse; beast: she, tamed (mastered) > suspension of pendulum is double

——potsedere (possess), potest, possum (power, “I can”) > ipse (self & power) > Benveniste thinks etymological shift from power (despotēs) to himself (ipse) enfeebles, not Derrida

p. 67 master-self, sovereignty (positionality of self: thesis), ipsissimus (the absolutely himself)

——sovereignty, in minimal, strict sense, always a moment of dictatorship: a performative verdict, a Diktat, has no account to render other than to itself (ipse)

p. 68 Benveniste: dem-pot(i)-[skr.], “master of house,” power of oneself [ipse as sovereignty]

p. 70 sovereign state as Leviathan, as animal-machine, as prosthstatics > beast et (est) sovereign coupled across a copula: affinity through analogy, proportion, reciprocal fascination—or grafting

***p. 81 inventive, passionate, compulsive hallucination of fantastical beasts (zoopoetic fictions): essential structure of political sovereignty, codified rhetoric, law of genre [?]

p. 82 chase chimeras, centaurs: to forget them, domesticate them, repress them, cause them to flee

pp. 84-5 to lie: one is not addressing the other as man > Machiavelli offers this Kantian argument but concedes that when faith in law doesn’t work a prince should become a beast

p. 89 from Chomsky, U.S. military tactics purposely out of control to seem blind, seem crazy, like an animal

——for Machiavelli, fox is closest to truth of man and man’s fidelity: knows who to lie, commit perjury, has sense/culture of snare [for Machiavelli, lion is too bête]

pp. 137-38 talk of the bottom (fond), the profound, believing in depth [of “who” or “what”] will never be free from bêtise (stupidity) > sovereign & beast as bottomless bottom, abyss, vertigo

pp. 140-41 anthropocentered, humanistic logic: sovereignty of Law, freedom, responsibility (response) opposed to animal fixity, program, imaginary, hard-wired, coded reaction

p. 159 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] bêtise of hunting bêtise, seeing only bêtise; absolute knowledge as very element of becoming-bête, as sovereignly bête

pp. 178-79 if very meaning of lexicon of bêtise, being-bête, is not absolutely translatable (abyss of translation), one cannot reserve bêtise for man as sovereign & free > if meaning is linked to relation of forces, distinction btwn reaction/response loses its rigor and decidability [must revise everything]

p. 183 force-differential (unconscious mechanisms) btwn which tension/contradiction bound to localize > bêtise on both sides: side of sovereign (who), side of beast, the stupid, the other (what)

——pitiless lucidity of cogito, triumph of conscious self-positing self, the thesis of self always reflects itself as bêtise, bêtise always triumphs > Triumph of Life in bêtise

bêtise always on side of victor > bêtise must not find itself bête: that would be suicidal

p. 194 free sovereignty over social body & one’s own body (like the king’s 2 bodies) > duel w/ marionette transforms winner into a machine (in playing angel, one plays the beast [Pascal])

pp. 201-03 hardness of capital erection [CAP] turns woman into beast

p. 209 [vis-à-vis Fontaine] that the sovereign’s [wolf’s] power (rage) is always an act of revenge, thus the beast [lamb] has originary guilt (ursprüngliche Schuldigsein): “si ce nest toi, cest donc ton frère

p. 214 [vis-à-vis Fontaine] the lion’s sovereignty: 1) his name, Sire 2) common right—like others 3) courage, right to take 4) fear he inspires

——sovereign is the only one to name himself: ipse, to himself, to his title, to his name, to his might > majestas (from magnus, major), highness, grandeur, dignity, Kant’s Würde

p. 244 [re: “Snake”] sovereign as guest (hôte) commands, the first comer, comes before me

***pp. 244-45 reconstitute sovereignty by 1) transferring it to the other, i.e. no longer my sovereignty 2) or should the idea itself be contested?

p. 245 snake, beast, low; albatross, sovereign, high

p. 277 response to questions “so what, so who?” meant to enrich my science, knowledge, conscience through onto-logy, theatrical theorein (optical gaze) > sovereign autopsy

p. 278 “beast & sovereign” as an incitement to think limits of knowledge (horizon that will constantly border but also un-border)

p. 279 sovereign majesty & bestiality as more than [see pp. 256-59], as upping the ante, going outside the law to make the law; the “perhaps” that does justice to the possibility of pas and event, “liberated, cleared, disengaged by wagering (dégageaient, désengageaient en la gageant)

“perhaps,” “who knows,” as link, separating hyphen btwn beast/sovereign, inviting us, w/out ordering us, to go over the limit of knowledge

p. 290 trap of sovereignty, trap of transfer of sovereignty > in all these fictions and simulacra blood flows, no less cruelly, irreversibly: beast & sovereign bleed, so do marionettes

pp. 308-09 question of responsibility is a question of threshold, from which one passes from reaction to response, same threshold as liberty, indivisible limen btwn beast & sovereign [these humanistic figurations of the threshold are being deconstructed]

p. 313 Abrahamic commencements: 1) Bereshit, Genesis—animals before man 2) en arkhē en o logos, sovereign all-powerful creator of everything, Head, fiat of a logos producing zōē, light, phōs

p. 318 Heidegger ask how logos became Herrschaft (sovereign, master) over Being

pp. 329-30 Derrida believes there are new things happening w/ bio-power but not that it’s new—it’s arch-ancient, bound w/ very idea of sovereignty

***pp. 338-39 the (mis)translation of logos brings w/ it the whole of culture; whole force of history at work to produce this translation [logos as Christ] > whole of history at play in motif of beast & sovereign and their relation to zoōn: “there are no limits, no frontiers that can contain these issues of translation”

BEAUTY

AF pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin): origin of beautiful > memories of death

SH p. 39 name partakes in this destiny of ash along w/ date, not empirical, is part of its readability; mourning: reading itself > readability: tribute of lost singularity (“beauty” pays)

P p. 25 for Hegel, telos of beauty is found in art not nature; for Hegel, there’s almost no natural beauty, and it is inferior to beauty produced by mind

p. 28 for Hegel, only philosophy can pose question “What is the beautiful?” and answer it: it’s a production of art, i.e. the mind

pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

p. 77 for Kant, pure sound & pure color as vibration of ether > purely formal, “universally compatible w/ certainty”—beautiful [what about color gold on frame?]

p. 79 Kant: examples are wheelchairs (Gängelwagen) [roulettes] of judgment, those who don’t have enough Mutterwitz, the sick, need these wheelchairs, prostheses that replace nothing

——Hegel: there is play in examples, they play, Beispielen

——Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

pp. 86-9 Kant’s beauty [wild tulip] requires absolute interruption: straining toward end w/out goal, not pure if cut can be bandaged (pansable), no pure cut (if it could be prolonged, completed, supplemented), no beauty > everything in it straining toward the bout (end, blow)

——this fascination w/out desire, in view of an end never in view, a but en blanc [“point blank”] > interrupted finality must show itself as finality & interrupture, as edging

——it is the sans that counts for beauty, la bordure [edging] en sans de la coupure pure

pp. 89-91 nonknowledge is point of view whose irreducibility gives rise to the beautiful (purity of the trace of the sans) > Kant: no science of the beautiful, only critique

p. 90 beautiful object, tulip, not lacking in anything, tel point de vue, de but en blanc, plie la totalité à se manquer elle-même > le sans de la coupure pure est sans manque—but for me to experience its totality, my knowledge lacks something—its end (bout); not the absence of end but the trace of the without [end] is origin of beauty; ça donne-le-beau: beauty gives nothing to be seen, sans is not visible, et pourtant il y en a et cest beau

p. 91 Kant’s 2 beauties: 1) freie Schönheit (pulchritudo vaga [indefinite, vague]), w/out end, limit, pure 2) bloss anhängende Schönheit (pulchritudo adhaerens [adherent beauty]), “de-pendent on”

p. 93 free, vague, wild, pure beauty, indefinite errance: elle ne sarrive pas à sa destination

paradox of 3rd Critique: singularities must give rise to universalizable judgments > Kant’s free beauty: self-subsisting, always beautiful once

p. 94 concepts stitch up (recoudre), furnish supplement of adherence [re: completes incomplete gadget]; still, there’s a chiasma, w/ free beauty, la coupure ny laisse aucune peau, aucun tissu dadhérence: law w/out concept, w/out debt, complete because incomplete

——une fleur belle est toujours en ce sens une fleur absolument coupable absolument absoute [sic], innocente

envy, jealousy, mortification at work w/in our affect > the beautiful this does w/out everything, w/out you, w/out its class > quasi-narcissistic independence of beautiful

p. 95 what is beautiful is dissemination, pure cut w/out negativity; negativity is significant; adherence always connotes division, lack, negativity; beauty is not a signifier; the signifier: accounts for everything except beauty > a non-sterilized cut from fecundation: la semence serre

p. 96 beauty w/out enunciated rules, judgment w/out concept, mute, open mouth (parole soufflée)

——[Kant on the exemplary, exemplary w/out concept, natural/artificial free beauties]

pp. 97-100 [Derrida makes his move] Kant assigns free beauty to framing-foliation, signifying nothing > having to be interrupted, sans-theme & sans-text relate to end as nonrelation, finality w/out end, but this sans must be marked, the trace [?] > parergon: place/structure of free beauty?

p. 98 isn’t the frame exactly what Kant means by free-wandering beauty? but, unlike frame, that which is beautiful tends towards meaning, a tension, vection, rection that must be absolutely interrupted [from concept, end] to liberate beauty [not stopgap of sublime, though]

pp. 100-01 adherent/vague beauty cannot relate—is there a frame btwn them? suspending relation, puts them in relation > which is the example of which?

——pure telos of beauty (as non-telos), telos of 2 beauties would be sans, nonpresentation of telos

p. 104 conceptual determination of end limits free play (of imagination): sans opens play w/in beauty

——one must choose btwn not seeing beauty & seeing the end

p. 105 the strange fact that the median propositions (those on free beauty) in Kant’s Critique remain suspended, lack immediate justification—though magnetized by their end

p. 106 perfection [teleological end, purpose] often confused w/ beauty, Kant breaks from this tradition > judgment of taste does not bear on perfection of object, its internal possibility of existence—those examples (man, horse, buildings) which only have adherent beauty always have relation to man [Kant’s beauty as anti-anthropological in its anti-perfection] [the subjective finality or finality w/out end (beauty) vs. objective finality]

p. 108 the horse is so much a part of man’s telos, it can never achieve errant, free beauty, unable to disregard its objective finality which can only be external

p. 110 in Kant, sans of free beauty compressed/oriented by regulatory idea of maximal consensus among men [universal?]

pp. 127-28 beauty & sublime: please by themselves, independent of judgment of senses & determinate judgments, pretension to universal validity on side of pleasure (not knowledge), both reflexive judgments > beautiful (finite) requires parergon, presence of limit gives form to beautiful, this bordered edging not only externally limited but called in by hollowing of lacunary quality w/in the work (ergon) > colossal/sublime excludes parergon, not ergon, usually nature, “w/out limit”

p. 130 beauty: w/out interest; sublime: counter-interest

FS p. 7 for Kant, [productive] imagination was already art itself > originally, did not distinguish btwn beauty & truth

p. 18 beauty: value & force

p. 20 medieval theology (Considérans): all forms, even monsters, beautiful, Formosus means beautiful > form is transcendentally beautifully: it is [Being] and makes things be [creating]

C p. 202 one cannot get to it in one go (dun coup): multiplication shows that that which touches on the series is outside the series in the series > the remainder remains cut off, a mors, a turd, really beautiful

p. 203 a turd one would like to make one’s own (sapproprier)—until the end > until is interminable

TN p. 49 Psyche as Mary, beautiful for being neither dead nor alive: surviving

E p. 4 for Kant, nature speaks to us through its beautiful forms, one can read the “ciphered language (Chiffreschrift),” nature’s signature as art productions

——even if this stance is opposed to Hegel [only art is beautiful], analogy btwn art and nature always provides a principle of reconciliation

p. 7 why call them Fine-Arts (Beaux-Arts)? why not just call the product beautiful: because the product must still be implicated by its signature, beauty is ascribed to the passage btwn production/product; Fine-Arts: always of the frame & signature

p. 14 [how the purposelessness of beauty becomes the teleology of humanity]

p. 15 for Kant, “meditation on a disinterested pleasure…provokes a moral interest in the beautiful” > interest taken in disinterestedness

p. 22 for Kant, that which is disgusting more unassimilable than evil, the ugly, the horrible (all of which can be made beautiful)

IF p. 310 for Flaubert, women always mix something useful or pleasant w/ beauty (thus don’t experience it)

——Flaubert desires male sentences, taut, muscular

BEDE BEDEUTUNG

VP pp. 15-6 Husserl’s Ausdruck (expression) vs. Anzeichen (indication), unlike Ausdruck, Anzeichen is deprived of Sinn or Bedeutung

Bedeutung translated into French or English as signification does not allow this thought, for we can never say a sign does not have signification, so Derrida translates Bedeutung as “vouloir-dire

p. 16 Ausdruck as spoken

——Bedeutung reserved for ideal sense content of verbal expression; Sinn covers whole noematic sphere, including non-expressive stratum [in Logical Inv, Husserl yet to make this distinction]

p. 17 one and same sign can be indicative or expressive depending on intentional lived-experience that animates it

pp. 17-8 Husserl says that all expression is in an entanglement (Verflechtung) with indication in communicative discourse > allzeit verflochten ist (always contaminated), but/so Husserl separates expression from communication

p. 18 rigorous distinction btwn indication and expression (which are intimately associated) is only possible through juridical and phenomenological means: the analysis occurs in hiatus btwn fact & right, essence & existence, reality and intentional function

p. 19 for Husserl, Bedeutung can be expressed w/out communication, can occur outside entanglement w/ indication, in the “solitary life of the soul,” when the outside is suspended, an interiority, self-proximity, an ownness (Eigenheit) > this paradox is phenomenology

pp. 20-1 Hinzulenken, Hinzeigen (expressive referral) vs. Anzeigen (indicative referral)

——Husserl does not pose question about Zeigen in general

p. 23n [under Husserl’s definitions, would (phonetic) writing lose all its expressive capacity (non-phonetic)?]

p. 23 phenomenology belongs to metaphysics > because of exteriority of indication in relation to expression

——indicative allusion (Hinweis), apodictic demonstration (Beweis) > in latter case, the “because” links evident/ideal necessities beyond the empirical

pp. 25-6 by making indication exterior, extrinsic, it will fall prey to all empiricity that is reduced in the reduction: factuality, non-evidence, mundane existence, essential non-necessity, etc.

p. 26 Husserl keeps signification outside self-presence of transcendental life

——Husserl develops parallelism of Ausdruck and Anzeichen in the hiatus btwn them

——[moving from commentary to interpretation] if hiatus is responsible for problematic of reduction, then reduction can’t be prior, must be merged w/ speech, power of expression

——Derrida: although there is no discourse w/out expressive kernel, we could almost say la totalité du discours est prise dans une trame indicative

pp. 27-8 for Husserl, ex-pression moves outside (an absolutely original outside, neither nature, world, nor exterior to consciousness), toward an ideal ob-ject, but remains w/in “solitary life,” w/in noetico-noematic sphere of consciousness, remains in the “phenomenological” voice

p. 28 intentionality in every expression explains Derrida’s choice of vouloir-dire for Bedeutung

pp. 28-9 everything indicative, empirical, everything that physically incarnates expression, is foreign to expressivity, to pure intention

——for Husserl, facial expressions are death of self-presence, have no Bedeutung

p. 30 Bedeutung as essence of language, as its telos > indication as failure of this telos

non-expressive signs want to say (veulent dire) (bedeuten) only insofar as one can make them say (on peut leur faire dire) what was murmuring in them

——“they [facial expressions] do not want to say (vouloir-dire) anything because they do not want (vouloir-dire) to say anything.”

p. 31 if, for Husserl, interpretation of someone’s “expression” can only be indicative, is there something in the relation to others that makes indication irreducible?

——what separates expression from indication is “what we could call the immediate non-self-presence of the living present”

pp. 31-2 difference btwn indication and expression is functional or intentional not substantial

p. 32 manifestation function (kundgebende Funktion), indication, physicality, whenever living spirituality is not fully present

p. 34 pure expressivity is pure active intention (spirit, psyche, life, will); all indication takes place in nature, space, world

p. 35 physicality of language seems absent in interior monologue, presence not driven off course by “existence” of word; word is perfectly same inside

p. 36 [now] expression escapes even the logic of the sign, which is always indicative

pp. 36-7 Hinzeigen (“monstration"), Anzeigen (referral); for Husserl, to keep self-presence from being absolutely nothing, there must be a Hinzeigen w/out Anzeigen

p. 43 [Derrida’s interpretation] if all discourse belongs to order of representation, then “actual” language as imaginary as imaginary discourse, imaginary discourse as actual as actual discourse

p. 50 for Husserl, “if representation in indicative discourse is false, in monologue it is useless,” subject has no need to indicate to himself > w/out reason, w/out purpose, “zwecklos,” this purposelessness is the non-alterity in identity of presence

pp. 59-60 [now] phenomenological [absolute] “silence” of self-relation must exclude not only the other (indication) but also expressive language itself > agency of voice btwn these 2 exclusions

pp. 61-2 [w/ difficult logic] Derrida shows that somewhere in Husserl, Zeigen (relation to other as indicative monstration) includes both indication and expression > and wouldn’t Zeigen be indication then? [see pp. 36-7]

pp. 62-3n wouldn’t [contra Husserl] universal element of expressivity forbid fulfillment of Bedeutung when we say “I” in solitude, dispossessing the subject of full intuition of “I”?

p. 63 expression is always “expressing itself about something”

p. 63n Husserlian distinction btwn the manifested (subjective) and the expressed as named: “I” is always an indicative monstration; “glass of water, please” names the thing and manifests the desire

p. 66 if Husserl bracketed what glossematicians call “substance of expression” he would threaten his entire project

p. 69 Husserl manages to reduce medium of language at the moment he asserts his phonocentrism, absolute proximity of signifier/signified, signifier’s erasure in presence

pp. 77-8 Derrida notes uniqueness of Husserl’s division between intuition and intentionality, that the “fulfilling” intuition is not essential to the expression, to the intention of meaning: this allows for a pure logical grammar: absence of object is not absence of meaning

——non-coincidence of ideal expression, ideal Bedeutung and the object

pure logical grammar depends on distinction btwn Widersinnigkeit and Sinnlosigkeit, expression can be widersinnig w/out becoming non-sense (Unsinn)

pp. 78-9 [now] in presence (of object), intentionality and intuition fuse [?], and its structure disappears, can they ever be fused in intentional meaning can function w/out intuition [?]

pp. 79-80 that pure grammar can work w/out object, w/out intuition, leads Derrida to the privilege of writing as the common name for all signification, must work after death

p. 81 for Husserl, the Bedeutung of “I,” for the one who speaks, is realized > immediate representation of our personality; but, isn’t every expression only possible in relation to absence of object, absence of intuition, meaning, in this example, the absence of “I”?

p. 81n Husserl: “I” is “a universally operative indexical of the fact”

pp. 82-3 Husserl’s contradiction: “I” must always be new but doesn’t ideal nature of Bedeutung exclude the “always new” > Derrida uses Husserl’s logic against him, explaining that we understand “I,” even when “I am dead,” because intention does not require intuition

p. 86 Husserl: “we are infinitely distant from this ideal” that of “truths in themselves” [w/out contamination of occasional expressions] > this is the teleological structure of phenomenology

PPHS p. 82(n) Derrida’s translation of Bedeutung as vouloir-dire [re: Husserl’s Logi…] is also valid for Hegel > Hegel accords to Bedeutung name & rank of soul (Seele)

——signifying intention (bedeuten) over body (signifier, from Cratylus, sēma/sōma (tomb/body), sign as tomb, prison) > Husserl, Saussure, Hegel

p. 84 acc. Hegel, symbols (triangle, lion, fox) possess the Bedeutung they’re expressing

p. 88 for Derrida, contents of semiology cannot be exhausted by the metaphysical theory which regulates bedeuten (meaning) by the telos of speech

POS p. 30 Husserl’s progression from no difference then difference btwn Sinn and Bedeutung (meaning isolated from enunciation [intention of enunciation] of signification) [Frege]

pp. 30-32 phenomenology’s concept of “meaning” appears wider (i.e. all experiences) than Sausurre’s, but it also claims that signifier is exteriorization (Äusserung) or expression (Ausdruck) of signified

——Husserl’s Bedeutung becomes pure signified, wouldn’t be in differential tissue of gram, trace, spacing

BEING

GT p. 19 for Heidegger, importance of rethinking time, privileged horizon for reelaboration of Being

p. 23 Blanchot says, more or less, forgetting is another name for Being

OOG p. 152 “access to Being and Being’s arrival must always already be contracted [stricture] or drawn together when phenomenology begins by claiming the right to speak (droit à parole)” > prescribing historicity for Being avoids simple misfortune of delay: phenomenology alone can open absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History, as auto-temporalization of Living Present

——delay is thus philosophical absolute, and absolute origin in general

HERP p. 184 Being is gathering (versammelt) [of the same]—logos > transitivity of “ist”: that it gathers

BL p. 206 guardian of law resembles shepherd of Being [?] (still hidden/guarded abyss of difference)

HASD p. 20 plus dêtre: beyond and more than being [hyper, beyond]

p. 52 where does order to remain silent take place? the place is Being, Being reduced to a threshold, outer sanctuary (parvis) of temple, sacred place

MPM pp. 7-8 Heidegger links law & Being in Hölderlin, de Man contests

——Derrida adds: impossible to reduce a thinking of the law to a thinking of Being

p. 145 promise prohibits the gathering of Being in presence (as its condition), the condition of the possibility and impossibility of eschatology, ironic allegory of messianism

EM p. 116 (137) [re: Sartre’s Being and Nothing…] unity of Being means totality of beings

p. 121 (144)“lêtreet la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et lhumanisme

p. 124 if we give up we-men (nous-hommes) in relation to metaphysical determinations (i.e. zōon logon ekhon, etc.), the proper of man remains inseparable from the question or truth of Being (this makes Heidegger’s Kehre even less pertinent)

pp. 124-26 Being acknowledged as fact (Faktum) by way of phenomenological determination [principle of principles, presence] of exemplary being, Dasein

p. 125 (149) for Heidegger, exemplary interrogated (Befragte) being [man] constitutes privileged text for a reading of meaning of Being

p. 130 (156-57) Heidegger: Being is nearest to man—but at beginning it’s farthest: man clings to beings

p. 131 Being is nothing, not a being, cannot be said, cannot say itself, except in ontic metaphor

p. 131n (157n) Heidegger: Being is the transcendens pure and simple, léclaircie (Lichtung) elle-même

p. 133 (160) for Heidegger, “le proche, cest le propre; le propre, cest le plus proche (prope, proprius), lhomme est le proper de lêtre, qui de tout près lui parle à loreille

——(161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

***SEC pp. 316-17 take classical notion of writing, make it generalizable to all order of signs, and extend it even to experience of Being

VM p. 82 Heidegger says our thought has been desiccated, its return to Greek source, thought of Being, is a knowledge, security not in the world, possibility of our language & nexus of our world

pp. 84-5 imperialism of theoria bothers Levinas: especially phenomenology’s infusion w/ light, way it predetermined Being as object

p. 97 for Levinas, neutral thought of Being neutralizes Other as a being

p. 112 philosophy “think[s] the metaphor in the silent horizon of the non-metaphor: Being”

pp. 135-36 acc. Levinas, Being has impoverished logic of “truism,” [?] valid for every existent except “the Other,” subordinates ethics to ontology,

——if “truism” = analytic affirmation (poverty of tautology) > wouldn’t Being escape form of (banal) truism, where subject is repeated in predicate?; acc. Derrida, because Being is nothing outside existent, not an archia, it can’t precede (as Levinas wants to argue) the existent in time or dignity, can’t subordinate ethical relation to ontological one

——every concept presupposes Being by dissimulating it, common root of essence & existence

——lêtre nest que lêtre-de cet étant et nexiste pas hors de lui comme une puissance étrangère

p. 137 Being is beyond hierarchies [beyond Nietzsche’s height?]

——Being is not even ontology or first philosophy in the sense of rank or excellence

——nothing can enclose thought of Being (no ethics could be opened w/out it)

——if Being is radically foreign to ethics it is not as a counterethics, nor, as Levinas argues, is it a subordination of ethics to neutral violent power

p. 138 Being conditions respect for the other, as what it is: other > w/out Being’s “laisser-être” (of ethical commandment, freedom) violence to such a degree it couldn’t appear or be named

——Being is alone in resistance to every metaphor, neither above nor besides [no rank]

pp. 138-39 acc. Derrida, Heidegger would not have accepted Levinas’s phrase “relation to the Being of existent,” nor his idea that “relation of Being of existent” [not a “relation of knowledge,” not a relation] would “dominate” “relation with an existent”

p. 139 Nietzsche and Renan reduce Heidegger’s Being to a metaphor by referring to its etymological association w/ respiration

p. 140 Being is transcategorical, Heidegger would say of it what Levinas says of Other: “refractory to the category”

p. 141 Being makes search for an archia tremble, its priority is not an archia

pp. 144-45 Heidegger calls original dissimulation of Being beneath the existent, prior to any error in judgment, erring (Irren), every epoch is in an epoch of erring

p. 319n Being “with” and “also” as existentiales, not categories

p. 144 is it risky of Levinas to think of Being as dominated by theme of unveiling when Heidegger continually affirms concealment?

——w/ “epochs,” being-history, Heidegger permits reemergence of thought of eschatology: “Being itself…is in itself eschatological”; eschatology different from messianic eschatology in that w/ former war is not an accident that overcomes Being, war not even negative, war is Being itself

p. 146 Levinas seeks to oppose God to sacred divine, for God to be indicated in Space of Sacred, in light of deity > limit and wellspring (ressource) of finite-being as history: limit because God’s not there and wellspring because anticipation of thought of Being toujours voit venir Dieu

——“ontological” anticipation, transcendence toward Being, helps us understand God, even as ether in which dissonance resonates > inhabits & founds language, Mitsein, all Being-together

p. 147 Being is never identical, it is history, it dissimulates itself in its occurrence

pp. 149-50 God other name of Being? opens difference not simply indicated in it? ontic content of infinity would destroy ontic closure > would this not permit thought of Being, wouldn’t thought of Being be presupposed in thought of God?

p. 150 Malebranche says Being is infinitely slight because infinite; Heidegger says Being is nothing (determined), produced in difference (as difference), that it is produced “in simultaneity with” Nothingness, it is “finite in its essence” [VP p. 87 the infinite differance is finite]

——Heidegger: “strange simplicity” of thought of Being

——question about Being not only introduces question about existent-God, it supposes God as possibility of its question, answer w/in its question > God implied in every question about God, precedes every “method” > content of thought of God is that of a being about which no question could be asked (except by being asked by it)

p. 317n Aristotle rigorously demonstrated that Being is neither genre nor principle (Metaphysics B, 3, 998 b 20)

p. 319n doctrine of uniformity of Being (don Scotus, Heidegger) incompatible w/ Aristotelian-Thomist Being in which question of 1st/2nd [re: universal/singular] remains

PAS PAS p. (92) if being is another name for forgetting, places forgetting in a crypt, forgets forgetting, in naming forgetting one makes it disappear under its name [(un)names], vs. pas sous le nom doubli > le reste sans reste de cet effacement qui ne sefface plus, voilà ce quil y a peut-être, par chance, mais qui nest pas ou qui est pas

VP p. 63 Heidegger tells us that “to be” is enigmatically determined by philosophy via 3rd person of present indicative

p. 64 “Being” is the first or last word to resist deconstruction of a language of words

S S p. 2 avoidance, denegation, categories of psychoanalysis, inadequate when it comes to questions of Being

pp. 16-7 acc. Heidegger, Descartes, Husserl, both dogmatic, their concepts not ontologically clarified via Being

p. 69 for Heidegger, signature of thought never individual, commits via community, people, in his or her own language; there are only some languages open to Being: German, Greek

TC TC p. 246 for Artaud, like Nietzsche, life beyond being, “the beyond of being,” Being as eternal repetition, ideal referral, victory of God/Death over life [cf. PS pp. 192-95]

T T pp. xvi Being, understood as [philosophy’s] proper, assures w/out let up (sans relâche) the relevant of reappropriation, the law of its proper weave (tissu), the economy of its representation

——Being [one reading of it] assures permeable/transparent continuity, logos posits/negates itself en laissant sourdre sa propre voix

p. xix resistance to deconstruction: infinite mastery > assurance of Being & interiorization of every limit as being, as its own proper

PPHS p. 71 when Being is presence, sign can only be a transition, lieu de passage, (provisional) bridge btwn 2 moments of full presence, the bridge can be relevé

pp. 72-3 theory of sign on basis of being-present, authority of lêtre-en-vue: telos of reappropriation [see POOF p. 65], coordination of sign & light of parousia, speaking logos as close as possible to itself in concept & consciousness

DS p. 215 at the edge of being (au bord de lêtre): the entre of the hymen, masked gap, veil of virginity (where nothing’s taken place) & consummation, penetration of antre, release [one in the other] > mirror never passed through, ice never broke, at the edge of being

p. 216 casting aside (mise à lécart) of being defines/imprints itself in dissemination, as dissemination

OS pp. 31-2(n) Heidegger’s question of Being seeks to destroy vulgar concept of time by repeating and interrogating it > that Being is ousia, parousia, Anwesenheit w/ regard to idea of time as Gegenwart (the present)

——vulgar time as gegenwärtigen Besitze (always present possession), the having (Habe) of Being, its permanent presence

p. 40 [via Heidegger] Beings are what is (must not be affected by time): privilege of 3rd person indicative (is, estin), as present participle becomes noun > same for consciousness

pp. 50-1 Aristotle repeats aporia of Zeno’s argument re: time, says it clarifies nothing, but does not deconstruct it > time’s nonbeing pre-comprehended as nonpresence in relation to determination of being as present

p. 56 for Aristotle, being-together [of nun and stigmē] not a determination of Being but very production of Being > ama as the pivot (cheville) (clavis), the key opening & closing metaphysics > this complicity so self-effacing as to barely be noticed, the common origin of space & time

POS pp. 6-7 to “deconstruct” faithful/violent to philosophy, a certain textual work that produces great pleasure, a writing interested in itself that enables us to read philosophemes as symptoms (a word Derrida suspects), the symptom of thinking Being as presence [via Heidegger]

ATIA p. 11 fundamental question of Being through response to/with, before/after the animal

p. 66 via Valéry’s snake, the “animal abyss” is not a void, it’s too full of being, vertigo, étincelle au lieu de néant, lieu tenant du néant que je suis

Gii p. 35 Heidegger’s es gibt goes beyond question of meaning of Being, w/out overturning it

***REST p. 281 praise for Heidegger’s Es gibt, Sein starting from (returning to) Es gibt Sein

p. 305 for Heidegger, in Origin, the abyss (Abgrund) plays itself out like “veiled” destiny (fatum) which transfixes (transit) being

pp. 378-39 certain thinking/experience of nothingness (nonexistent) is required to question being of existent, and the difference of being and existent

——for Heidegger, cette pensée du néant alien to science, which deals only w/ existents: belongs to philosophy/poetry > nonexistent, there w/out being there as being present, a kind of haunting: Unhemlichekeit is condition of question of being, pivot (cheville) of the essence (see OS)

RM pp. 69-70 when Heidegger says “House of Being,” it’s less so the house can determine Being, more so we can rethink the house

——this is an unheimlich maneuver, not pure inversion, outside the familial transport of colloquial metaphor (rethinks economic value & the proper, not a judicative statement: “S is P”)

——Being, which is nothing: makes possible metaphoricity & its withdrawal

EJQB p. 74 the encounter (rencontre) is separation (breaks unity of Being by welcoming [accueillant] other into source of meaning) > contredit lalogique,dans le fragile chaînon du est

——only possible to say this by conceptualizing meaning, which is exile from Being, Being never is, never shows itself, never present, is never now

p. 76 nonquestion, act of faith, unpenetrated certainty that Being is a Grammar, world is in all its parts a cryptogram [this nonquestion not yet a dogma]

p. 77 born only by approaching book, die only by failing (échouant) in sight of book > toujours la rive impassible du livre est d’abord

——the Book as epoch of Being (epoch coming to an end, the glow of Being in agony, a multiplication of the end, “garrulous and tenacious hypermnesia of certain moribunds,” books about the dead book)

——Being radically outside book, its letter? > Being reveals itself only in illegibility (illisibilité)?

IW pp. 259-60 for Cohen, Plato overprivileged vision, intuition, in determination of eidos > Cohen links German idealism to Plato’s neglected concept hypotheton: idea as hypothesis, that’s truly German, infinite task, rigorous science > idea (not as Being but as hypothesis)

pp. 268-69 Cohen translates “I am that I am” as God is Being (One), Jewish Yahweh merges w/ agathon, anhypotheton, escapes all image, perception: God is Love, Greco-Platonic Eros (at source of knowledge & aesthetic feeling) [Jew, Greek, Protestant]

D pp. 353-55 Heidegger’s Geviert, “est” tried to say what is beyond narcissism, se prend (captured) in the mirror: Being confines itself to its rature (crossing-out) comme quadrature (criss-crossing)

TN p. 201 Heidegger: from Parmenides to Husserl, sight privileged as unique access to beings & Being

NOY p. 236 for Heidegger, the metaphysics of will: interpretation of Being as unconditional will of subjectivity—this hegemony marks all modernity (from Descartes to Hegel, to Nietzsche?)

OG p. 20 (34) effacement of signifier in voice is the condition of the idea of truth: ce leurre est lhistoire de la vérité, & the constituent closure: the word is lived (vécu) as elementary, indecomposable > transparent experience/expression of “être,” of word “être

pp. 20-2 (34-6) the word “being” as Urwort (mot originaire) ensures “lêtre-mot” to all other words [Lacan’s name-of-the-father]

——does Heidegger transgress logocentrism of phonè by questioning being? or does the question precomprehend the word being? deconstructive breakthrough (percée) no longer circumscribed in ontic/ontological [?]

pp. 22-3 (36-8) Heidegger transgresses and contained (y est comprise) at same time in presence of logocentrism > his crossing-out (rature, kreuzweise Durchstreichung) of Being effaces presence of transcendental signified while keeping it legible: this last writing is a first writing (of an epoch), inasmuch as it de-limits onto-theology, metaphysics of presence, logocentrism > Heidegger must restore (provisionally) “transcendence” to Being to renounce project/word ontology [given risk of transgression becoming regression here, Derrida insists we go by way of Heidegger’s rigor alone]

——Heidegger questions privilege of “infinitive” and “3rd person singular of the present indicative” [to be, is]

p. 186 (264-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] cet être-dans-la-nature a donc le mode dêtre étrange du supplément: lêtre-dans makes classical logic tremble

EU p. 88 Heidegger’s move beyond responsibility for a determinate knowledge or power: must first answer to being, for the call of being—must think this coresponsibility

BEING AND TIME

HERP p. 193 Being and Time (book of the friend?): before & after the philosophical Eros of the question: the question of the question [see p. 201] (most & least erotic book)

A p. 56 in Being and Time, Heidegger leaves questions re: undecidable (i.e. death) unanswered in order to decide on the undecidable [decides on use of phenomenological method]

p. 74 double sense of de-termination [re: determined closure]: logic of termination (terma, peras, finis) and resolute decision or resolution [Being in Time great discourse on Entschlossenheit]

pp. 76-7 “turn what is thus at the very heart of the possibility of the existential analysis against the whole apparatus of Being and Time” > death as most ex-propriating, most inauthenticating

p. 80 Being and Time repeats all motifs of onto-theology it denies

EM pp. 117-18 (140) Husserl not an anthropologist; Husserl worried something like Sein und Zeit would be anthropological

VM p. 134 present as absolute form of experience: pre-comprehending anticipation of Being as time, the ens of praes-ens > if Being has always been determined by philosophy as presence, the question of Being posed on basis of transcendental horizon of time > first tremor of philosophical security, of self-confident presence

S p. 121n Heidegger’s mediocre and hideous crossing-out (rature) of Husserl (erasing dedication of Sein und Zeit)

pp. 56-7 acc. Heidegger, animal not in human world as Vorhandenheit nor Zuhandensein, and not Dasein, animal neither categorical nor existential, the 2 pairs of concepts structuring Sein und Zeit > does the animal threaten the whole order of the existential analytic?

POOF pp. 57-8 Heidegger’s Stimmung changes everything, beyond the concept, suspends/terrifies oppositions, where truth & untruth are together equiprimordially (gleichursprunglich) > Unheimlichkeit, lodges enemy in heart of every friend

OS p. 63 “the extraordinary trembling to which classical ontology is subjected in Sein und Zeit still remains w/in the grammar & lexicon of metaphysics”

ATIA p. 144 barely a mention of animal in Sein und Zeit

p. 147 the 3 modalities of being: Zuhanden (present-at-hand, thing), Vorhanden (equipment, ready-to-hand, tool), Dasein

Gi p. 23 Heidegger’s method [?] in Sein und Zeit: subject positive cognitions to regional ontologies, and these to a fundamental ontology (1st opened by existential analytic of Dasein)

BEGINNING (INTRODUCTION)

KH p. 110 acc. Hegel, nothing serious, only mythology in introductions

LOBL p. 80 beginning as an attack [?] [Heidegger, philopolemology]

P p. 25 acc. Hegel, natural/mathematical sciences [unlike aesthetics] need no introduction: their object is determined/given in advance, and the method it requires

O p. 18(n) why introduction, for Hegel, is necessary, whereas preface is not: opens a particular philosophical science > Hegel touches on paleonymy

DPi p. 1 begin pretending to begin before the beginning

REST p. 263 to stop one’s feet at the starting line is a place in language [re: Derrida’s starting point, a place where things no longer slide? from which he’ll set off quickly]

p. 270 [slight difference from Bataille, not sliding?] nous piétinons, nous ne patinons même pas, nous pataugeons (floundering) w/ slightly indecent complacency

DST DST p. 321 introduction is a garrulous index, when not an irremediable betrayal

PIO p. 1 “what else am I going to invent?”—inventive incipit for a lecture > w/out patience for a preface invents a new preface

AFR pp. 108-09 to introduce (not saturate, not intrude [sintroduire]): seduce the text (not the reader), surprise it close to its content > a rigorous “abyss”

——follow lines, grafts, borders, ribs: analyze its machine of oppositions, its program, and what breaches the program, defeats its teleology, undecides its circle: suspend text on one of its nervures après-coupées (cut-after-the-fact-ribs)

D p. 292 event that begins by repeating itself: such event takes the form of a récit

pp. 300-01 violent, arbitrary cut, scission (la coupure) necessary because beginning se plie et se multiplie; coupe-papier (letter-opener), la lame (sharp blade) de la décision, tranchant (cutting edge); la répétition hasardeuse et nécessaire du déjà-là dun (autre) texte

p. 316 tout commence donc par la citation, dans les faux plis (creases) dun certain voile, of a certain mirror-like screen

pp. 333-34 in Soller’s Numbers, you are indefinitely referred to bottomlessness, indefinite regress of beginning, which is forbidden along w/ eschatology, archeology, hermeneutic teleology

PPT p. 2 even if Derrida explained, narrated, what he wrote in The Truth In Painting, the indecision (the divided Prime Mover) he was trying to reduce would remain in the formalizing economy—each time overloaded (surchargée) w/ some supplement

LI p. 29 “faux départ” —pretend to begin w/ a false beginning

p. 34 this other hand, marked by Derrida’s false-start, dictated Reply to 3 + n authors [?]

TN p. 11 Nancy stopped short one day (était un jour tombé en arrêt) before Freud’s “psyche is extended, knows nothing about it” > this is a beginning by freezing (par simmobiliser)

OG pp. 161-62 ex-orbitant [method]: certain point of exteriority to totality of age of logocentrism, broach the orbitary (orbita) orb (orbis) > decons. has no methodological or logical intra-orbitary assurances, can never justify un point de départ absolutely: surely before Rousseau was chosen the exit and the critique of the repression of writing had been prepared (amorcé) [?]: [deconstruction designated as errant or empirical—only means something w/in closure]

——departure (la sortie) is radically empiricist, affected by nonknowledge as it ventures out deliberately > very concept of empiricism destroys itself, avowal of empiricism sustains itself only on basis of strength of question

UWC p. 209 “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”: begin at once at end & at beginning > begin w/ end as if it were the beginning [event or telos?]

SPEC p. 259 begin at moment of 3rd ring, seminar “la vie la mort

p. 384 w/out borrowing, nothing begins, il ny a pas de fonds propre, there’s no transference of fund, lemprunt rapporte, produces surplus value, is the prime mover of every investment > on commence ainsi par spéculer, en pariant sur une valeur à produire comme à partir de rien: all these “metaphors” confirm, as metaphors, the necessity of what they state

FV p. 484 “in” a library, in books, everything begins, thus nothing begins, only dérive, disorientation—from which one does not emerge [nothing outside text]

WBH p. 203 to receive a gift, in Nietzschean sense, is to say, “I want to begin again,” not a reproduction: “yes” of gift must be repeatable from the start

BENJAMIN

TB p. 111 Derrida calls attention to Walter Benjamin’s sometimes enigmatic writing, its wealth and its overdeterminations [re: “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man”]

+R p. 151 resonances leading you astray, what if I like words in order to be-tray (pour trahir) > (pour traiter, triturer, traîner, tramer, tracer, traquer)

FL p. 259 [re: Zur Kritik der Gewalt] nomination as originary destination of name (for Benjamin), the gift or the call of presence in the name, but how is the thought of the name articulated with haunting and the logic of the specter?

p. 260 Benjamin grafted language of Marxist revolution onto messianism [see p. 263]: both announcing new historical epoch & beginning of a true history void of myth

p. 275 Marxist-Hegelian critique of violence in name of liberty, in name of what Benjamin calls formless freedom (gestaltlose Freiheit), are impotent, remain alien to juridical essence of violence, to “order of the law”

p. 286 for Benjamin, original sin is when language serves only as means, becomes idle chatter (Geschwätz) [before “bourgeois,” language pure manifestation?]

p. 288 for Benjamin, mythological violence of law sacrifices the living, whereas divine violence sacrifices life to save the living (destructive)

p. 289 for Benjamin, what is sacred is the justice of life not mere life

p. 298 Benjamin’s divine, bloodless violence cannot avoid making us shudder w/ its eery affinity to the final solution (resembles too closely to point of specular fascination) > Benjamin still too Heideggerian, too messianico-Marxist or archeo-eschatological [for Derrida]

p. 291 [re: Benjamin’s 2 violences] undecidable on each side: 1) divine: decision w/out decidable certainty 2) mythic: certainty of the undecidable w/out decision

p. 292 Derrida sets up play btwn Walten and Walter

BETR AYAL

GOD p. 60 by keeping the secret, Abraham betrays [generalized] ethics

p. 67 a betrayal that is not simply a breach of trust, Abraham must hate what he loves, must offer gift of death to whom he loves

p. 69 by preferring what he’s doing here [writing], Derrida betrays all those who are starving [fulfill one’s duty at the expense of the other others]; “Abraham is faithful to God only in his treachery”

p. 156 singularity is sealed & betrayed by inheritance that confirms, reads, translates the covenant

——literature inherits from Abraham, betrays him

p. 157 properly phenomenological virtue of literature: puts thesis or arrest in quotations (parentheses) > literature’s relation to non-literary, religious remainder (Abrahamic moment), betrays in double sense of word: unfaithful to its history at moment it uncovers that history’s secret, reveals its “truth” (i.e. its [literature’s] own filiation) > literature must ask forgiveness for this double betrayal

MONL p. 52 “incarnate archive of a liturgy whose secret no one will betray,” no one else could appropriate, even I, who is in on the secret

FWT p. 160 “one must forget well” (basically same transubstantiation as) “one must eat well”: il faut bien oublier la mort, il faut bien manger

love object is perpetuated in being betrayed/forgotten, the one who died must be forgotten

p. 19 infinite task of deconstruction to challenge limits of our heritage while drawing from it (pass, go beyond, w/out necessarily betraying) [re: human rights, ceaselessly transformed]

SPOM p. 35 “all these words are treacherous” > [spirit, specter, philosophical, ontological?]

POO p. 18 can we extricate ourselves from becoming apostles, traitors (Judas), Jesus

POOF p. 273 from w/in fraternization, greatest crime is betrayal of humanity (fall short of virtue of fraternity), the supreme perjury: fratricide as radical evil, only the brother can be betrayed

MSUB J pp. 154-57 treason (can a subjectile betray?): not come when called [Artaud levels accusation of treason at God] > “subjective,” the treason close up of “subjectile”

p. 160 betrayal takes place in the instant of the subjectile, Being and god are implicated: perversion and malfeasance, subterfuge or swindle

MPM p. 85 “must one at each instant reinvent filiation?” is this a signature of faithful memory or betrayal, figure of simulacrum?

FSW p. 211 to speak of writing, to betray Freud more than ever

F p. xxxix cryptophore, à manger le morceau (le mors) sans pouvoir le digérer, must constantly betray cipher that seals and conceals it > Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, truly cryptic story

ATIA p. 105 deconstruction works to open “betrayals of repressed human possibilities,” in the name of another history

GSP p. 154 to impose a debate, from w/in a philosophy [that of “genesis & structure”], begins w/ aggression, infidelity, even if it can set free meaning of latent process

SW pp. 349-50 [to read the corpus that has known, from operation of other, how to undo itself from veiling/unveiling] you have to write, sign in turn, countersign in writing, something else, in another language, w/out betraying injection/call of first seal

——can’t prove it happened, only swear that it did: perjury must remain possible (a duty that must be respected)

DPi p. 52 acc. to certain logic found in Badinter, a comrade does not leave you alone: “solitude is treason”

CHM p. 36 “no Trojan horse unconquerable by reason,” the best spokesman of the mad are those who betray them best

DST DST p. 321 introduction is a garrulous index, when not an irremediable betrayal

HLP p. 35 lying as making him believe [dimension of credit/faith irreducible], bad faith of liar, betrayal of implicit sworn faith, surprising the good faith of his addressee

TR p. 115 [re: Poe, Lacan] purloined letter not a free/undetermined signifier, at the very least signifies perjury, betrayal of a sworn faith

PJP p. 174 to ask forgiveness: must confirm sincerity of the first commitment [contract of Law, oath, promise to be true], thus attenuating betrayal (by calling it secondary): could not foresee the other “who,” 3rd party, other self > drama of diachrony, bifid structure

p. 189 anacoluthic substitution of subject, replacement of acolyte—motor, motivation, dramatic emotion of narrative

p. 194 Derrida is unable to reconstitute whole weave in which he cuts/selects—do not judge richness of Le Parjure from shreds extracted from it, in supplemental betrayal, for needs of current demonstration

EL p. 205 apocalyptic knowledge, to the side of gnostic knowledge [Merkabah (throne-word of God)] betrayed by being written—Scholem accused of such betrayal by living cabbalists

***HST p. 388 the 3rd intrudes when 2 absolutes exchange place; the 3rd, question of justice, immediately betrays other’s finite-infinite singularity > thus: congenital perjury of justice

p. 395 since, for Levinas, the will already has relation to betrayal (“harbors treason in its own essence”), its fidelity coming from the other, the idea of a misunderstood will still reveals a relation to exteriority

p. 396 mad laughter, le rire dément, at forgiveness in betrayal, betrayal in forgiveness

C p. 246 intraitable: lombilic de ce coffin > I think of the supper and the 13th at the table [Judas?]

TN p. 183 any inheritance or filiation worthy of such names: transform, re-begin, re-invent, divert, sometimes also betrayal (trahison)

p. 298 pudeur: elle déploie ses voiles à linfini > must must not, because can can’t (confess/betray)

——la loi marque ainsi le sans dan le sens ou dans lexistence

a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

ATM p. 158 when Levinas says responsibility is “probably” the essence of language: must allow language freedom to betray its own essence [ethical] so that it can surrender (se rendre) to it

AD pp. 137-38n for Levinas, will (its power) moves btwn betrayal/fidelity

p. 34 state, politics, ontology all betray/exceed ethics in opening it [?]: quasi-transcendental, originary, pre-originary perjury > possibility of radical perversion, haunting of its possibility, also condition of Good, Justice, Love, Faith, perfectibility

CIN p. 8 a voice does not betray a text: if it did, it would in the sense that betrayal is a revelation

BSi p. 89 for Machiavelli, fox is closest to truth of man and man’s fidelity: knows who to lie, commit perjury, has sense/culture of snare [for Machiavelli, lion is too bête]

SPEC pp. 259-60(n) instead of “logic”—issue is to rebind (relier), by means of analysis, notions of lien, stricture, desmos, question of life death to that of position (Setzung, thesis, theme) [this functions as a supplementary “judas” from Glas, re: an incision tattooed btwn pages 270/272]

p. 341 [via Freud] program of all jealousies, model of betrayal: birth of the other child

FV pp. 490-91n meaning of letter not important for Lacan? false! no one would worry about it if it didn’t have a determined meaning > meaning of letter for Lacan: betrayal of a pact

BETWEEN

HERP p. 202 via Heidegger, opening of 2 maintains the entre-deux, no community gathering (pas de rassemblement communautaire) if there are not 2, but no 2 w/out opposition (Gegensatz)

MSUB J p. 164 subjectile: consistency of the btwn itself

p. 168 subjectile, btwn 2 places, the subject become a gisant, spread out, stretched out, inert, neutral (ci-gît) [cf. C p. 234 ci-gît, “here lies”]

T p. xxv question of machine one more time, btwn pit & pyramid, in the margins (of Hegelian text)

p. xxix after every perforation, one [philosophy] is dying to replace w/ a glorious cadaver, ce temps timbré entre lécriture et la parole (s) appellent un coup de donc [Glas]: it suffices, barely, to wait!

WM p. 256n in response to Fontanier’s new “proper sense,” a violent catachresis, btwn figurative and primitive sense, Derrida says: when the middle is not a passageway of mediation btwn oppositions, the opposition is not pertinent > consequences are boundless

DS pp. 172-286 [see HYMEN in “Double Session” for more]

p. 177 double session finds its corner (coin) BTWN (ENTRE) literature & truth (that by which question “what is?” wants answering): figure of folding back, angle ensured by fold

p. 181 Hymen: INTER Platonem et Mallarmatum [p. 219n btwn Mallarmé & Hegel]

p. 212 antre, grotto, cave, interval, vallus, inter, antara, cleft, intervallum

p. 219 perpetual allusion, which plays, performed in groundless entre—undecidable

p. 220 through “hymen” one marks what entre already marks, could replace w/ “identity,” “marriage,” “crime,” “difference”

pp. 221-22(n) Plato would’ve considered undecidability of play, double scene (w/out any dialectical Aufhebung, entrouvert), doxa not epistēmē > i.e. eunuch (not man) hitting a bat (not bird) in Republic

p. 222(n) “btwn” re-marks its semantic void, becomes quasi-categorem, marks opening btwn syntax/semantics > its meaning: possibility of syntax, spacing [Spinoza, “btwns” in Hebrew]

p. 226 surprise in writing, supplement, baffling economy of seduction: entre un silence

p. 231 in “Mimique” excess of syntax over meaning is doubled by excess of “entre” over opposition syntactic/semantic

p. 234 certain mimic inscribes a graft in one corner, holding antre open

p. 261 hymen is the structure of and/or, btwn and and or

p. 277 Mallarmé’s play (on “plume,” on “winds [brise]”) anathema to thematization, to deciphering meaning > coin-entre

POS POS p. 42 double, interval, biphase, biface, bifurcated writing can only be marked in a grouped textual field, not in a punctual position, not w/ a single author

——interval as écart, carré, carrure, carte, charte, quatre

p. 59 re: concept “history,” must use double gesture: can’t strike name from vocabulary, must overturn traditional concept & mark interval, so that interval is not simply reappropriated

P P p. 39 for Kant, system of pure philosophy (metaphysics) is not yet possible; only critique is possible, produces krinein, in-between > metaphysics sews everything up, includes critique w/in

——critique detaches, only a moment, related to desire, pleasure/unpleasure, Spur

OS OS p. 45 can’t extract thematic of Verfallen (re: time in Hegel & Heidegger) from ethicotheological orb, unless léchéance de lorbe redirected, in the void, toward un point de chute plus écarté (see DS)

ROP ROP p. 30 double bind at work on examples of all undecidable figures (hymen, pharmakon…), carry predicates incompatible btwn themselves, in their very btwn, interlacing, sumplukē, chiasmatic invagination > but each one, in its sumplukē, makes up a single trace [?]

SP SP p. 83 pratique stylet, pratique stylée, de quel genre? can’t be written w/out conjoined fabulation of woman/truth, entre la femme, in spite of the profundity that is modesty

p. 139 plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

DIF DIF p. 5 differance is btwn speech/writing, beyond the link that reassures us of the illusion that they (speech/writing) are 2

p. 13 differance constitutes present in interval, constitutes present by dividing it > everything thus thought on basis of the present, in our metaphysical language, would also be divided (subject, substance, being, etc.)

Gi Gi p. 20 Erstreckung: Daseins spatiality before extensio, se tend (tends, extends itself) btwn birth & death (Dasein affects itself w/ this movement, auto-affection belongs to ontological structure of Daseins historicality) > birth/death receive meaning from this intervallic movement > only one of determinate possibilities of essential dispersion (Zerstreuung)

REST REST p. 297 Heidegger uses example of shoes to guide his analysis [mentioned before Van Gogh’s picture], a paradigm of thing as “product” > paradigm, a very noble philosophical tradition dating back to Plato, shoes’re the exemplary example of the intermediate place

——Heidegger’s schema (in barely displaced Kantian sense): hybrid, mediation, double-belonging, double articulation > product (Zeug) situated btwn thing & work of art (Werk always that of art in this context), intermediary place (Zwischenstellung), inter-posture (Lacoue-Labarthe), inter-stela

EJQB p. 73 via Jabès, Jew’s destiny: summoned btwn voice/cipher (acc. Levinas, btwn Socratic/Hebraic, btwn poverty/wealth of letter, btwn pneumatic/grammatical)

p. 75 “entre la chair trop vive de lévénement littéral et la peau froide du concept court le sens

EL p. 218 responsibility on edge of double possibility, undecidability of das Geschlecht des Übergangs (generation of transition), entre-deux, “mi-lieu,” edge of abyss is same as above abyss [Derrida links to Heidegger’s anxiety, abyss, responsibility, Entschlossenheit (resoluteness)]

TN p. 2 do eyes touch like lips? what is contact if it intervenes? a sealed interruption, or the continual, negating upheaval (relevante) of the interval—the death of btwn?

pp. 136-37 to be able to touch: birth of simul btwn us

OG p. 223 Rousseau introduces a btwn (entre), a median btwn north & south to think difference? or to access nondifference? [North/South: 2 poles of language: North: aidez-moi; South aimez-moi]

SPEC p. 335 condition of filiation, mid-mourning (demi-deuil) [see “Ja ou le faux-bond”]: introjection and/or incorporation: la barre entre et et/ou ou > structurally as necessary as it is necessarily impure

BEYOND ECONOMY/SURPLUS VALUE/GENERAL ECONOMY

GOD p. 23 genealogy’s axiom: history never effaces what it buries (enfouit), keeps (garde) secret of what it encrypts, the secret of the secret, cest une histoire secrète du secret gardé; genealogy is also an economy

p. 95 in the instant when Abraham raises the knife, when he decides, instant of absolute sacrifice of economy, law of oikonomia, sacrifice of home, proper, one’s own kin

——but God, who didn’t know what Abraham would do [here Kierkegaard Christianizes the story] reinscribes absolute sacrifice in an economy of reward w/ absolute gift (gives back Isaac)

p. 106 the 2 economies: 1) calculation, Judaic 2) dissymetric economy of sacrifice, “beyond the totality of the calculable as a finite totality of the same,” renunciation of merchandise, still relies on giving back (rendre), on yield, profit, but only father who sees in secret [can calculate]

pp. 108-09 secret market of secrecy, “Christianity’s stroke of genius,” says Nietzsche, merchandise, give credit to the infinite [denounce all calculation & still yield surplus-value]

——no “exterior” critique to Christianity, to its worldwide event > demystifying it justifies proto-Christianity to come

p. 114 Nietzsche’s diagnosis of cruelty is also aimed at economy, speculation, commercial trafficking in institution of morality & justice, & that which exceeds economy as exchange, le commerce du re-merciement [wage, profit of infinite]

——and Christianity’s self-destruction of justice by means of grace

GT p. 106 “Purloined Letter” & “Counterfeit Money” proceed from surplus-value of remnant or a superfluity of revenue (income or inheritance)

FK p. 87 Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

***H p. 81 categorical imperative (under erasure) of hospitality, unconditional; p. 83 unconditional w/out imperative, w/out duty, beyond economy and debt

***LOBL p. ~124-25 writing is triumph, manic life-after-life insurance, indiscreet, exhibitionistic, even if we read no “that’s me there” in it (this increase in discretion is more surplus-value of triumph), supplement of triumph, enough to make you sick

——Derrida says this against Nietzsche: triumph over oneself is also a pursuit of power (Gewalt)

AF p. 9 in Civilization & its Discontents, Freud does a captatio benevolentiae [re: diabolical death drive]: in the end I have nothing new to say, why archive this? would be pure loss (useless expenditure) [Derrida repeats gesture?] > radical perversion in this gesture: archive death drive as pure loss

pp. 11-2 death drive destroys archive, unless it can be made up as idol, represented, painted, erotic simulacrum

——death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

SPOM p. xviii to learn-to-live w/ ghosts, in commerce w/out commerce of ghosts

p. xx Kant placed his unconditional dignity (Würdigkeit) higher than any economy

p. 26 a justice beyond the economy of repression, not distributive, not calculable equality, outside of the economy of vengeance, incalculability of the gift and singularity, infinite asymmetry, the an-economic ex-position to others

p. 31 Heidegger’s supplement of accord, giving what you don’t have, according presence to the other, beyond economy

p. 49 the word conjuration produces a forever errant surplus value, by “capitalizing two orders of semantic value” [?]

POOF pp. 208 about to venture on a decision re: omega ω in “O my friends…”, Derrida makes it clear that the guard-rails of a philological coup de théâtre will not efface the archive constructed on an error [p. 225n Agamben helped Derrida w/ all this]

——the improbable omega ω has a canonical authority protected by great names, the wager of this mistake, like a capital w/ bottomless surplus-value

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

pp. 285-86 quoting Matthew, Derrida asks whether there isn't still profit of a sublime economy, economy beyond economy, in Nietzsche? or does the absolute gift (advising against love of one’s neighbor) break the ruse of this sublime economy? like Kant, isn’t there still best exchange rate for virtue?

OH p. 70 via Valéry, people who read are responsible for, respond before, turn memory into “solid value,” create an absolute surplus value, increase of universal capital, “world’s wealth” increases

DS pp. 207-08(n), the last instance of the mime, no referent (signified, process of truth) in this last instance, but still inseparable from metaphysical search for arkhē, telos, eskhaton; to erase metaphysical concept of last instance would defuse necessary critique it permits in certain contexts > the “general economy” of double science (a bifid, dissymmetrical writing that takes double inscription of concepts into account) constitutes, in a displaced sense, the last instance

p. 234 to write that such a movement [practice of spacing, antre ouvert, insertion] plays along a structure of supplementarity, surplus, vicariousness, is, literally, to quote

POS p. 41 general strategy of deconstruction, its “general economy,” must avoid simply neutralizing binary oppositions & simply residing in closed field of oppositions

p. 64 Derrida is “materialist” to the extent that matter in Bataille’s general economy designates radical alterity

p. 66 insistence that matter, via Bataille’s general economy, is absolute exterior of opposition, is necessary, is related to essential strategy of “materialism,” yet “materialism” must avoid becoming a new “idealism,” adopting naive relation to referent or signified

DIF DIF p. 4 the capital “a” of differance, a pyramid [A]; Hegel: body of sign is Egyptian pyramid > Derrida moves from pyramid to tomb, oikēsis > tomb of proper, familial residence, economy of death (this stone announces death of tyrant [cf. TN.]) [this tomb can’t even be made to resonate]

***p. 7 play: unity of chance & necessity in calculations w/out end (beyond opposition philosophical-logical/empirical-logical) (on eve of philosophy and beyond it)

p. 19 Derrida well aware of evidential calculations that will dismiss illogicality of differance, their necessity, function, is part of differance > rigorous, “scientific” relating of restricted economy (takes no part in expenditure w/out reserve) & general economy (keeps nonreserve in reserve)

——this “scientific” relating: a relationship btwn a differance that makes a profit on its investment, and a differance that misses its profit, la mise de la présence pure et sans perte se confondant avec celle de la perte absolue, de la mort [pure presence and pure loss merge w/ each other]

——Aufhebung constrained into writing itself otherwise, or simply into writing itself, or taking into account its consumption of writing (sa consommation décriture) [re: general/restricted economy]

p. 27 to know there’s nothing kerygmatic [not a master-name] about differance, we must perceive its decapita(liza)tion > must put into question the name of the name

O p. 5 no speculative dialectic of same and other can master “difference” (economy of mark-erasure, trace) because such dialectic always remains an operation of mastery

p. 7 preface announces what will already have been written > Derrida claims preface presages a general practice of deconstruction, strange strategy w/out finality, cette défaillance organisatrice of telos or eschaton, which reinscribes restricted economy in general economy——[is this because the preface is an essential and ludicrous operation attempting to cancel out all displacement?]

p. 53n [general economy of hymen]: cette consumation [consumption, consummation], comme celle de lhymen, ne commence ni ne finit jamais, en quoi son identité se dé-pense

SW p. 350 tallith not incommensurable w/ fetish, but a generalized not restricted fetishism (Glas); theory of fetish no longer merely a theory at moment of verdict

DPi pp. 127-28 for Kant, CI, eye for an eye, talionic law, surpasses value of life and all price: no law will ever be founded on unconditional love of life (life for life’s sake)—on the absolute refusal of any sacrifice of life

p. 261 damnum, via Benveniste, money given w/out return, given for nothing > excess of compelled expenditure pays more than is due, marks double law of homogeneity/proportionality btwn damage/punishment & their incalculable heterogeneity: the condemned/damned pays what he owes and does something tout autre, infinitely more than acquit himself of calculable debt: there is economy/aneconomy > “unless it is a matter of reimbursement (indemnification) and interest as the incalculable surplus value of capital”

p. 270 “cost of life,” what’s worth more than life? surplus value of life—“sur-viving” that would be ultra-life (more than life in life) [re: DP as theater of life, theater of sur-vival]

RGE p. 259 Bataille must mark his text (must mark the point of no-return of destruction, linstance dune dépense sans réservenot negativity), and he does, so as not to return to positive, pre-Kantian MOP [MOFP] [Žižek thinks otherwise, calls Bataille pre-Kantian]

p. 270 writing of sovereignty and general economy are similar: 1) both sciences 2) both relate objects to destruction, w/out reserve, of meaning > neither are sovereignty itself, “this loss,” but the “relation to the loss of meaning”

p. 337n via Bataille, consumption of [general economy’s?] excess of energy by a determined class is not the destructive consuming of meaning, it’s the significative reappropriation of surplus value w/in restricted economy > if sovereignty is absolutely revolutionary, revolution w/in restricted economy (reorganization of world of work, redistribution of values w/in space of meaning) is still a necessary phase w/in strategy of general economy

p. 271 general economy does not overturn but comprehends (not by way of knowledge-gathering but by inscribing w/in its opening) absolute knowledge, folds its figures into nonbasis of expenditure, relates them to destruction of value > atheology, a-teleology, aneschatology

REST p. 260 the pair (of shoes) might not come back to anyone: disappoint desire to reattribute surplus value > might have been made to “remain” there, defying the tribute

——desire for attribution is a desire for appropriation (in matters of art, & everywhere else)

pp. 267-68 from Van Gogh’s shoes to Freud’s show fetish to Bataille’s “Big Toe” > from market de la pointure (of sizes), rising/falling stocks, to speculation on Bataille [general economy]

RM p. 56 usure as “wear and tear” and usure as usury, the production of a surplus value acc. to laws other than a continuous & linearly accumulative capitalization (must deconstruct what’s accredited in psychoanalytic, Nietzschean genealogical, and economico-political regions)

p. 67 withdrawal of Being donne lieu to metaphysics, ontotheology, producing concept of metaphor, producing/calling itself in a quasi-metaphorical manner

——not opposed to metaphor but will limitlessly extend/load (chargera) any metaphoric trait w/ supplementary surplus value; re-trait (at once +/–), double movement of being

PF pp. xxvii-xxviii “it is necessary” of w/out alibi: 1) not sovereign exception 2) not untouched pure presence of trace as referral 3) not invincible transcendental/ontological structure

——“it is necessary” of w/out alibi must proceed from an alterity exceeding circle of same/self, doesn’t take on duty to reclose economic circle of exchange [remains to be thought]

AFR pp. 118-19 frivolity (useless) is the congenital breach of sign (its entame, archē), since structure of sign’s deviation ensures frivolity has no origin, frivolity defies archeology, condemns it to frivolity: excessive relief, not even money or merchandise > sign’s disposability never presents itself

IW pp. 263-64 [vis-à-vis Cohen] Judeo-Protestant Platonism or world logocentrism made spiritual families possible, genealogy w/out limit, general economy (oikonomia, oikos as the law itself) > spiritual mondialisation: logos, spirit, idealism as moral conscience of philosophy & science

PSSS pp. 275-76 [AT IT AGAIN] what I name, what I call for: w/out alibi, w/ or w/out bliss, beyond possible, beyond horizon, beyond the beyond, beyond economy, appropriable, possiblebeyond death drive wherever Freud reintegrated it in economy of possible, economic conditionality

D D p. 330 two is no more an accident of one than one is a secondary surplus of zero (or vice versa): reconsider notion of accident, secondariness, surplus

HST HST p. 416 “in/at the place of (à la place de, au lieu de, en lieu et place de),” “for (pour)” indicating substitution & gift: entering economy of gift/sacrifice to exceed it > [lieu-tenants]

PPT PPT p. 5 the “interest,” the revenue of the surplus value, remains untranslatable in idiom’s economic performance, in ellipses of its trait, the word by word or trait for trait in which it contracts

pp. 7-8 trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

+R +R p. 151 Derrida capitalizes ellipsis [?]

***p p. 155 what happens when a surplus value places itself en abyme?

p. 160 gl of “angle”: wild, almost unnarratable event, not a morpheme, close to piercing (trouer) a hole in the arthron [articulation, joint], patch of color in graphesis, the trait in color, a rebel to appeased commerce (regulated exchange of 2 elements [lexical, pictural])

p. 163 into (over) the bargain (the market) (par-dessus le marché), not au-dessus (above) the market (the lure in which you would again let yourself be caught) > puts in play, or en abyme, the destructive simulacra of surplus value

***C ***C p. 237 bottomless surplus value: power of capitalization in abyss

LI LI p. 76 economics that accounts for iterability, which questions traditional philosophy of oikos, of proprecan’t be separate from economy of Unconscious, of graphematics of undecidables

TN TN p. 271 Nancy, spending like a madman: ontologizes everything that comes down to “touching,” jusquà la ruine, les ressources, le crédit, le capital et les intérêts du transcendental-ontologique > reduces them [all resources/capital figures of touch] to monetary simulacrum

p. 333n [re: Nancy’s distinction btwn gift & offering] how can you eschew economics w/ the value of “keeping (garde)”? [Nancy describes how the surprise of the gift is kept]

E E p. 4 economy [in economimesis] not yet defined as general or restricted, their relation must be neither of identity nor contradiction, must be other

p. 11 poetic gift is an add-on (un en-plus), given as a power to give by God so that, via the poet, this supplementary surplus value can return to the infinite source, the poet breaks from the circular economy, that is the passage to the infinite: passage of infinity btwn gift/debt

——[re: economimesis unfolding to infinity] “Kantism” passes into “Hegelianism”

p. 12 God furnishes the poet w/ his capital, gives him surplus value & means of giving surplus-value, God is a poet

——structure of economimesis has its analogon in the city: when poet isn’t writing, he’s just a man, must eat, receives subsidies from sun-king (sustaining labor force)

LG LG p. 227 law of law of genre: principle of contamination, parasitical economy, participation w/out belonging

CIN CIN pp. 57-59 Derrida’s not accumulating surplus value, speculating on some cinder capital, but making a withdrawal (retrait), to try his luck on a gift w/out the least memory of itself, un retrait (retreat, retracing) w/ no relation to what he just did, what he’s about to tell you

BSi BSi pp. 256-59 Nietzsche’s superman, and the sovereign too, a hyperbolic, sublime, “higher than height,” more about excess than height, it’s the more than that counts, the surplus, absolutely more: could as well be a maximum of smallness, God as small (sovereign use of nanotechnology)

p. 279 sovereign majesty & bestiality as more than [see pp. 256-59], as upping the ante, going outside the law to make the law; the “perhaps” that does justice to the possibility of pas and event, “liberated, cleared, disengaged by wagering (dégageaient, désengageaient en la gageant)

OG OG pp. 130-31 (190-91) Lévi-Strauss hypothesizes that primary function of writing is the enslavement of other humans, Derrida says yes, then describes how structure of society (castes, class, organs of capitalization, stocks), the origin of life in general, appears wherever it’s possible to defer (différer) presence, cest-à-dire la dépense ou la consommation, et dorganiser la production, cest-à-dire la réserve en général; he then adds [strangely] that the increase in differance [as proven by its extraordinary increase past few millenniums w/out change in organism] modifies life less & less as it spreads out (sétend): should differance grow infinite, a possibility excluded by its essence, would be God or death

p. 307 (434) Derrida describes method where Rousseau’s fête is near to Artaud’s theater of cruelty or Bataille’s sovereignty > though Rousseau transforms dépense into presence

SPEC SPEC pp. 283-84 Derrida corrupts (détourne) “properly Freudian” usage of speculation [i.e. a mode proper mode of research]: as production of surplus value, overflows, the given of the gift, oblique object of Freud’s discourse > Freud’s bias of procedure interests Derrida, the scene of what makes Freud write: faire faire, laisser faire, faire écrire, laisser écrire: the syntax of these operations not given [in Freud]

——detour, Umweg, breaks open the path (frayage) > Freud does not interrogate the graphics of the différant detour for itself (can it ever be for itself?)

p. 286 if “sexual drives” are beyond reality principle [et RP =PP], are they beyond pleasure principle too? does the sexual resist binding? stricture? the proper? economy?

p. 384 w/out borrowing, nothing begins, il ny a pas de fonds propre, there’s no transference of fund, lemprunt rapporte, produces surplus value, is the prime mover of every investment > on commence ainsi par spéculer, en pariant sur une valeur à produire comme à partir de rien: all these “metaphors” confirm, as metaphors, the necessity of what they state

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

——death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

p. 399 pleasure—ungraspable limit btwn 2 limits, un en-deçà et un au-delà qui réduisent un pas à rien

producing itself, regenerating: only pleasure, pleasure as counter-pleasure, band contra band, tout se passe alors dans des différences de bandage—not general economy (absolute expenditure) but strictural economy (to the point of its inevitable collapse)

BEYOND

PAS PAS p. (30) “quand il la tient, il touche cette force dapproche qui rassemble la proximité, et, dans cette proximité, tout le lointain et tout le dehors

DS p. 235n Mallarmé: beyond is literature’s [?] agent, dismantle literary mechanism to display nothing

DPi pp. 138-39 “one must” come as close, in body, to those on death row, to thinking “absolute imminence of execution,” or interminable, infinitely brief, suspension of imminence, instant of execution, no more beyond, or beyond where beyond remains beyond, or beyond where salvation might come (grace, pardon) > telephone line [appeal of love]

PSSS p. 241 Derrida evokes a beyond the death drive, beyond pleasure/reality principle, beyond drive for sovereign mastery, beyond cruelty—beyond the “mythology of drives” > the undecidable in psychoanalysis, the impossible other

pp. 275-76 [AT IT AGAIN] what I name, what I call for: w/out alibi, w/ or w/out bliss, beyond possible, beyond horizon, beyond the beyond, beyond economy, appropriable, possiblebeyond death drive wherever Freud reintegrated it in economy of possible, economic conditionality

OG OG p. 74 (109) grammatology’s condition of possibility, the solicitation of logocentrism, is condition of impossibility, risks destroying concept of science, exorbitant aim (visée) beyond savoir

SPEC p. 260 logic of au-delà, pas au-delà: overflows logic of position, not a substitute/replacement/opposition to/for position, opening another relation, rapport sans rapport, frees itself at a stroke (coup), neither pas nor coup is indivisible

BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE

ROP pp. 24-5 pourquoi mon explication avec lanalyse [psychoanalysis] a toujours eu ce goût de mort en poste restante qui ma poussé à rôder sans fin dans les parages de Beyond the Pleasure Principle [?]

p. 32 repetition compulsion (advocatus diaboli of death drive) as resource & limit (à la fois) of psychoanalysis > analytic position set going endlessly, w/out Aufhebung, in paradox of Bindung and Erlöschung (solution, extinction): no analytic position when resistance is unidentifiable

pp. 117-18 was not Freud looking for, in “death drive,” in “repetition compulsion,” the principle before the principle (of pleasure/reality), l’esprit de cette spirale, voilà qui tient en haleine [holds one in suspense], ou si vous aimez mieux: en vie

SPEC pp. 261-62 Beyond… is a-thetic, no (final) judgment (instance), indefinite suspension re: life death > death drive appears/disappears while telling stories, making scenes: myths, fables (literary)

——Derrida will distinguish restance from instance (judgment)

——to account/read the athetic, Derrida unsatisfied w/ dérive (drifting), too continuous/homogenous movement, travels away w/out saccade > prefers double bind, des effondrements de bord, la rive se partage en son trait même

p. 270 Beyond and Das Unheimliche: devil comes back neither as imaginary representation, nor as an apparition in person: devil comes back “in person” to double his double…a doubling doubling his double, devil overflows his double at moment he’s nothing but his double

——dialectics acquits itself [allays uneasiness] of double, opposes mask to original “in person”

——visitation of devil, apparition of “thing in itself,” over & above representative that’s supposed to supplement him, supplement of its “own supplement”: expands double-effects, upsets appeasing order of representation, duplicity w/out original > for Rousseau, diabolical brings fright to a climax

p. 271 which is Freud’s devil? the one that he counterfeits, or the one that he de(for)fends (défendre) [forbids, defends]

pp. 275-78 neither proof nor disproof of PP, belief in PP suspends belief in PP > the theory is mute about pleasure, only quantitative analysis > unpleasure as translation of pleasure

——Freud’s speculation aims neither for originality nor priority, the other’s other (philosophy) > aporia of translation imposed in question life death, pleasure–unpleasure, repetition

——strategy whose finality’s not clear, no known genre, it overflows, thus the hypothesis, the athesis of athesis > asking questions in the dark: Freud’s phosphorescent antennae

pp. 278-79 reality principle just a modification/representation of PP

p. 279 [vis-à-vis Freud] must try most open, loosest (lockerste, plus lâche) hypothesis to describe pleasure–unpleasure, an inevitable sensation/question which nobody has said anything about: a quantitative economics [energetics] w/out knowledge of essence

pp. 279-80 free vs. bound energy > Freud freely interprets free energy as “freely mobile” instead of “freely utilizable” [re: Helmholtz on principles of Carnot-Clausius]

p. 280 non-simplicity, indirectness > relation btwn pleasure/unpleasure not simple correlation of decrease/increase of (free) energy: inexhaustible reserve for speculation: not substantial riches, but supplementary angles

——time, in Freud, must be thought in differential of pleasure–unpleasure, must be of the party (partie)

p. 281 Fechner’s “aesthetic indifference” btwn pleasure/unpleasure dropped by Freud > is this not like a free zone, agency of the “duty free” [in English], free exchange for speculation, a means to pass, as authorized contraband, an always ideal border (in both directions)?

——is sovereign domination (Herrschaft) of PP feigned or seriously accepted by Freud?

pp. 282-83 reality principle as courier, lieutenant, of PP, disciplining disciple, defers enjoyment, the waystation (relais) of a differance (Aufschub), auf dem langen Umwege zur Lust, as if RP produces a socius, institution, contract of discipline

——when master (PP) submits to the work of the secondary (RP), “submits” to its own lieutenant, addresses to himself simulated engagement via detour of institutional telecommunication—il s’envoie, il s’écrit, PP déchaine en lui lautre absolu > alterity more irreducible than alterity of opposition

p. 283 Freud repeats his arrest, pas de marche: speculative possibility of tout autre (than PP), inscribed in advance w/in it, “louvre dune scription de lautre à meme (overlaps) le principe

——la surface même du à même (overlap)” does not belong to itself—writing affects the very surface of its support > non-belonging unleashes speculation

pp. 284-85 PP, RP, differance, the same divided, actuality only in the differance, detour, btwn PP & RP > pure pleasure & pure reality are ideal limits, fictions, one as destructive and mortal as the other

p. 285 from whichever end (bout) [i.e. pleasure or reality], it is death, inscribed but non-inscribable in structure, in process of structure—stricture: death already (déjà) life death

——death’s scandalous [scandalous to dialectical logic] belonging w/out interiority to pleasure, structure of alteration w/out opposition: there’s no thesis of differance

——the thesis would be larrêt de mort of differance, arresting death in 2 senses [vis-à-vis syntax]: condemns to death & interruption suspending death

pp. 285-86 each time one of [3] “terms” [2 principles +/– differance] goes to the end (va au-bout) of itself, of its other, w/out 3rd party, it is death (lentorse mortelle qui met fin au retors du calcul)

——reality principle’s end (autonomy): cut off from all pleasure, from all auto-affective relation, in service of a pleasure too jealous of itself, that would asphyxiate itself

p. 287tn PP (pleasure principle) as pépé (grandfather, that is, Freud), PR (reality principle) as poste restante

pp. 286-87 if “sexual drives” are beyond reality principle [et RP =PP], are they beyond pleasure principle too? does the sexual resist binding? stricture? the proper? economy?

——the principle of the functioning of principles, which can only differentiate itself: this structure w/ one term or three-in-one-terms can be exposed w/out calling upon Repression

pp. 287-88 is Repression necessary? objective science can’t think qualitative or “subjective” affect, philosophy as phenomenological only thinks presence, psychoanalysis’ concept of Repression permits pleasure to be lived & perceived as unpleasure > but still, is Repression necessary?

pp. 289-90 Repression upsets logic implicit in all philosophy, pleasure that can’t be felt as such > “cannot be experienced as such”

***p. 290 [for Freud?] no mélange of pleasure–unpleasure is possible, mélange is madness > though topical distribution [in Beyond…] is effect of differance, it retains differance in reassuring medium & in oppositional logic > principle of identity is respected by topology, division of sites

pp. 290-91 death drive: être à loeuvre déjà (in PP), ça se sera écrit en silence—in speculative overflow

p. 293 PP always revient to itself, haunted by tout autre, retour never “acquits” speculation of PP

——PP cannot be contradicted (contredit); Freud confirms PP in its absolute sovereignty

pp. 293-94 [re: Freud’s “speculative” writing] démarche of this writing, advancing w/out advancing, time of a detour, pas de thèse repeats itself: PP will not let anything be done w/out it, except repetition itself

——Wiederholungszwang (repetition compulsion) put in communication w/ death drive

p. 294 fort/da: story of the PP (grandfather & pleasure principle)

p. 295 Freud his own grandson? put PP in question—Freud makes hypothesis of beyond [the PP] come back (revenir) only to dismiss (congédier) it again, that which comes back (revient) hasn’t truly come back (revenu) > only passed by in specter of its presence

——Freud: Herrschaft of pleasure principle

p. 296 repetition, reproductivity, works w/out saying anything, like death drive, not even “form,” w/out thesis, de-monstration makes its proof (preuve) sans montrer > de-monstration folds into everything it makes explicit, pas de démonstration remains (reste) in this restance

p. 297 for Freud, not Angst, not Furcht (fear), only Schreck (terror) causes trauma

p. 298 Freud’s haste, urgency, to solve the problem of beyond the PP is something other, of another order: not the demonstrative declaration or manifest argument [like Rousseau in OG]

p. 301 [re: fort/da]: selbstgeschaffene (self-invented) game, spontaneity, auto-production, self-engendering of repetition itself, hetero-tautology (definition of Hegelian speculative): gives time, there is time

p. 302 “[PP, the spool, ça, SA, Ernst, Freud] fait semblant deloigner le PP pour le ramener sans cesse, pour constater quil se ramène lui-même” [hetero-tautology? bringing it all back home]

——fort/da and Freud’s speculative game: same application

p. 304 en abyme of Freud’s writing [re: autobiography in fort/da narrative] has relation of structural mimesis w/ relation btwn PP & “its” death drive—latter hollows out the former en abyme, at origin of origin

pp. 313-14 for Freud, in game of fort/da, the greatest pleasure is the re-turn (re-venir), Wiederkommen: yet, again becoming revenant, [spool] must be thrown away again > [Freud, the game] speculates on the return (retour): au départ de ce qui se doit de revenir

pp. 317-18 what binds (lie) game to itself is re- of return, the returned or the returning (le revenu ou le revenant), revenance orders entire teleology, can be handed over to PP

——mastery of PP [grand (-père) spéculateur] as mastery in general, Herrschaft distanced from PP only to reappropriate itself: tauto-teleology makes other return in its domestic specter

——death drive, w/out contradicting PP, hollows it out, older, not an other mastery (Herrschaft), but other than master, tout autre (not dialectically opposed to PP as life, living, alive)

p. 318 reappearance as a moment of the couple disappearance/reappearance, return to itself of return: greatest pleasure

p. 319 force of disappearance, of “fort” > capitalized pleasure (plaisir) (idealization) does w/out what it needs: one provides oneself w/ head of what one needs by doing w/out it (to have it)

——greatest pleasure, play w/ the dummy (le mort), [Ernst, Freud] speaks to himself telephonically, make himself re-, acc. law of PP: signing, contracting w/ himself

p. 325 drive for mastery (Bemächtigungstrieb), beyond PP [?], plays a strangely erased role (what’s the difference btwn a drive and a principle?)

p. 328 no question Sophie’s death affected Beyond… > but Derrida seeks an other passage, labyrinth, crypt [re: empirico-biographical import]

p. 330 work of mourning comes later [Sophie’s death], Beyond…wasn’t interrupted for a single day

pp. 336-37 same step (pas) [Freud’s step beyond PP] gives & suspends movement, es gibt, exemplary movement of paralysis [Derrida repeating too, cf. FSW, PAS] [démarche]

p. 338 “la paralyse: le pas au-delà du PP sera resté interdit

——Freud’s [Derrida’s] 3rd chapter: engages itself in the movement and responds to an unpayable (insolvable) debt

——Freud assumes a curiosity w/out excuse

***p. 340 repetition as reproduction, reproduction of life-death, wiedererleben, poses no problem [to Freud] as long as satisfaction is found elsewhere [i.e. nothing beyond PP]

p. 341 demon, revenance which repeats its entrance, revient w/out having been called by PP > like Socrates’ demon, which made everyone write, this automaton produces effects of ventriloquism, w/out origin, emission, addressee, tele w/out telos

p. 342 demon doesn’t obey master PP, visitation not confined to neurosis, Freud insists on apparent passivity of persons visited

p. 343 “literary fiction” in fort:da, fait-oeuvre in abyss of these repetitions, fairies, demons, unheimlich repetitions, what is most gripping (saisissant) and ungraspable (insaisissable) about Beyond…, for Freud too, who believed he could affix the seal of the Freuds to it [Beyond…] while hearing voices

pp. 343-44 déclencheur (trigger-effect) of the déchaînement, unbinding, destricturation > repetition compulsion & death drive unbind from all contracture

p. 344 bind always serves PP, to understand one must hear several voices, speak several languages, & count w/ several generations of computers [baby daddy]

——speculating, “author” already no longer there, no longer responsible, leaves document in your hands > “literary”: make of it what you will, it’s up to you—you’re more than ever on board

p. 345 you carry (vous portez) his name, until the end of time you will formulate theory carrying his name > ruse infinie (more tricky than itself)

——no theses in science or literature (athetic), every thesis is philosophical

——capital front [bobine (Ernst’s spool) as face, cap as head], where PP might be placed out of action > to rout a mastery, so one doesn’t just end up w/ one’s couriers, offspring, lieutenants

p. 348 PP as author or as authority, it/he only increased by dissidents speaking against it

——PP loses mastery w/ flooding (Überschwemmung), psychic apparatus no longer seeks pleasure, occupied only w/ binding (binden) excitations, w/ “mastering (bewältigen)” them

p. 349 Vorbilder (models), necessity of metaphoric detour whenever Freud doesn’t know what he’s talking about re: interminable band, contra-band, quantity of binding—so he uses rhetoric of code, message, envoi, postal network

p. 350 [re: trauma dreams] exception to law that dream fulfills a wish, exception precedes law, doesn’t contradict it, something older than law w/in law: band over contra-band, or contra-band over a-band, disband, over absolute astricture

p. 351 tendency to stricturing (binding, mastering) foreshadows PP w/out being it, everything en différance de stricture > repetition itself > but there never is repetition itself > allure of this more or less tightened lace

p. 352 Ab-bauen [sometimes translated as “to deconstruct,” cf. p. 267]: repetition haunts the PP

——Plato’s pharmacy [also PP]: “one repetition repeats the other” > there is no “sometimes…sometimes”

——2 repetitions (2 logics) as constitutive duplicity, double bind

——if there’s any chance of reading illegible text as illegible: must take incalculable double bind (bande) of PP into account

——normal repetition: idealizing interiorization, mastery (Hegel, Husserl)

p. 353 for Freud, adults should tend toward novelty > compulsively repetitive demand is beyond the PP, adult acts like child

——demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

——thus far in Beyond… [chapter 3?], differential stricture of repetition has not demanded a word about death

p. 354 death drive: Freud’s “inertia inherent in organic life”

——living is differential of force organized by force of inscription [how did Derrida get here?]

——detour expanding immeasurably: Umweg of 1st Chapter secondary to absolute/unconditional Umweg > pas de détour always leads back to death, not a question of going (aller) but of coming back (revenir)—this is the passage

pp. 354-55 (the) Weg (is) Umweg, weg as adverb signifies “far away,” fort!, go away!

——race to death, exhausts couriers, witnesses, relays, from post to post

p. 355 pas de plus > deux temps of drive: 1) conserves 2) insures path to death, pas de mort, organism arrives by its own (internal) step at death (eigenen Todesweg): senvoyer the message of one’s own death

p. 356 partial drive: assists in death, return closest to oneself as if to one’s origin, senvoyer > in the pas de détour, organism guards against the other stealing death from it: to be the facteur of its death

——[Freud’s death drive] autoteleguiding, suicide deferred, wishes to sound its own glas, wishes the impossible > most driven drive is drive of the proper, drive to reappropriate oneself, stronger than life & death

pp. 356-57 but S is never P, since heterology is involved, there’s force & thus legacy, sending, envoi: the proper is not the proper

p. 357 in both Freud & Heidegger, life death no longer opposed in the proper [both interpret death as proper? unlike Levinas & Derrida]

——all these silences by which a trace works on a text, not indivisible simplicity of limes or marginal trait (S is P, “this has [not] been thought”)—rather: the non-thematized, implicit, mode of foreclosure, disavowal

p. 358 why would Dasein, “our own,” have to constitute itself as démarcheur [stockbroker, bad step]?

——let me die properly: where death is my inheritance

p. 359 analytic of Da-sein (analytic of distance, proximity)—not so foreign to analysis of fort/da > economy of death, law of proper, auto-affection of fort:da, “eigenen Todesweg des Organismus

——Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

pp. 360-61 notion of guarding (garde) is gathered, guarded (particularly in its strategico-military code), at moment Freud defines conservative drives: they are the guardians/sentinels of life (Lebenswachter), veillent sur la vie, la surveillent, gardent et regardent, montent la garde auprès delle > but they are also the satellites (Trabanten) or sentinels of death > Myrmidons, bodyguards, satelles, agents (generally armed), couriers, obeying revolution of a greater body (absolute power): le mort

p. 361 to guard one’s fashion, one’s rhythm, what counts is less telos than rhythm of differance, speed of the step: Zauderrythmus (differential rhythm)

p. 362 exappropriating—no circle (family, economy)

——everything in Freud’s Beyond…: rehetoric of “zurück

pp. 362-63 pas de satisfaction; ego drive—death logic; sex drive: 2 germs seek immortality

p. 363 Freud wonders if calling death immanent & proper to life functions as a great narrative poem, a poetics of proper as reconciliation? consolation? (make it more bearable as Anankē)

——index of original normality [at this point of Beyond…] is the “primitive,” not child: primitives don’t face death [?], anxiety about death has no proper content

——death is the analogon of castration > castration not incompatible w/ thesis of death drive if one refers to syntaxic articulation of athesis: Derrida’s pointing to “it” at this moment

p. 364 [Derrida’s associative talent, hears:] whispering—correspondence—Mother/PP

——will steps forward (pas de plus) permit themselves to be counted?

p. 365 State, multicellular society, socius, guarding life beyond death of any given subject, serves to reproduce & rejuvenate other cells

——[re: Freud’s Beyond…] malignant tumors also “narcissistic,” unleash themselves w/out concern for other cells, for the rights of authors or of succession

p. 366 monistic risk: in duel w/ Jung, Freud preferred dualism > whatever one says about Jung, Freudian dogmatism has been adopted blindly, inherited in this dark affair

——alternative of dualism/monism belongs to much more simplistic framework than that of differential stricture in athetic reading of Beyond

p. 367 for Freud, the “cause,” must be one w/ cause of science—best chance of survival, rings, alliance

pp. 367-68 turning sadistic drive into death drive, sadism reappropriated into our service, turned toward us (implied: against Jung) > masochism as primary—operates otherwise than supplementary/derivative turn [from sadism?]

p. 369 Nirvana—death drive, teleology organizes return of old, oldest, furthest away

——whatever becomes too familiar can be suspected of jealously guarding a secret [re: Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium]

p. 370 Symposium comes to us filtered, deserves minute analysis of tissue of lacunae [re: active selection], would compose another fable

——[fort:da is a narrative] no thesis, only hypothesis, origin is speculative because the object cannot be the object of a thesis

p. 371 [Freud oscillates re: the profit he takes from Aristophanes’ speech] 1) drive restores to previous state 2) variations of drive in relation to object, play of the supplement? > “theory,” “myth,” “hypothesis”

p. 372 variation-of-the-trait-in-relation-to-the-object, not only the theme of Symposium but its performance, its condition

pp. 378-79 Freud’s “to let develop” [re: Aristophanes’ speech] mortgages irresponsibility, no engagement, epokhē of judgment, speaks from no-place [Lacan takes Beyond… too seriously?]

p. 379 speculation as advocatus diaboli, devil revient

p. 380 no one demands to know what devil thinks dans son for intérieur, Freud can think the devil w/out putting himself on the devil’s side (no written promise/contract w/ devil)

——speculation not intuitive (intellectual impartiality) but idiomatic, referential

p. 385 desire & throw of the dice beyond PP is Freud’s pleasure

p. 386 Freud’s signature in form of “if I wish to,” a seal, “auto-critique” w/out pity > what more to say after that? [cf. SW after Derrida, nobody can discover something behind veil]

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

——death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

——this double tonality of Freud’s writing: grave, affirmative, cavalier

p. 389 bindinal economy, economy of tie (lien) or bond (liason) (bind, band, double bind, contra-band); PP as principle of binding, can’t be finished

p. 390 if Freud uses ungelöst (unresolved) colloquially is it abusive to reawaken allegedly sleeping metaphors? Certainly! [in any case, Derrida’s not tracking down hidden metaphors or secret intention of Freud’s writing]

pp. 390-91 resolution, solution [of Freud’s argument?]: band closer, mount tension until released [these are Freud’s schemas] > relating what Freud says to what he does (writing’s démarche, its performance), interlacings can no longer be undone, can’t be closed or opened—trait divided [see p. 391n double chiasmatic invagination of borders]: there can be no accounting, reckoning

——the démarche (procedure) of Beyond… is one of its objects, effects trans- and speculation

pp. 392-93 PP, mastery w/ no regional limit, all other mastery (politics, etc.) derived form it

p. 393 PP as quasi-proper, figure of mastery, exappropriation structures PP, proper produced as autothanatography

pp. 393-95 function of binding (not machinelike regularity [?]), function of stricture as original as the X about which we can only know once banded, once represented by representatives

——to bind is to supplement/substitute, thus represent, Ersatz in place of what stricture inhibits/forbids, to bind is also to detach, detaches a representative, sends it on a mission, a missive liberated to fulfill destiny of what it represents: a post effect, de facteur préposé à lacheminement

the secondary (supplementary stricture) transforms freely mobile into immobile cathectic energy: posits, posts—here’s a thesis: immobilized cathexis is more tonic, tonicity related to effects of binding (elasticity & tension), thus binden as bander (erection): “bander: poster, liason: postale

p. 395 Bindung inaugurates, assures, overflows PP (mastery), as seat of its condition

——no relève of PP—not Hegelian [since PP always master?] > in fact, function of PP, (postal) binding, determines interpretation of Aufhebung

p. 396 the 2 modes of pre- PP (laps, sas): 1) interested in PP, prefigures PP: teleological, function of binding in service of PP 2) indifferent to PP, a tendency in service (Dienst) of more general function > tendance toward combing back (revenir), every preliminary binding se tende toward pleasure of discharge, final relaxation

p. 396tn tendance, bander as tendre, erection, double bande (both noun & verb)

pp. 396-97 PP as tendency in service of general function, but binding (another function) would then be in its [PP’s] service

——pas de PP btwn 2 functions (Binden, general return to Nirvana)

p. 397 irresolution of scene of writing—a Bindung, tends itself (se tend), ceaseless posting, no final orgasm, beyond of pleasure remaining the end of pleasure > pleasure at its proper moment? still don’t know what it is: secousses orgasmiques, joussiance, deferred as soon as obtained

pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

pp. 398-99 skepsis, maieutics [in Freud]—division btwn differance & opposition marked in Philebus (12E) > Beyond… in turn becoming supplementary chapter of Philebus, Philebus deciphers it from afar like a teleguided reading device, Philebus reads Beyond…, is lodged in it > this setting adrift is programmed by discourse on apeiron: Socrates’ last word of Philebus: “let go” [baby daddy]

p. 399 pleasure—ungraspable limit btwn 2 limits, un en-deçà et un au-delà qui réduisent un pas à rien

producing itself, regenerating: only pleasure, pleasure as counter-pleasure, band contra band, tout se passe alors dans des différences de bandage—not general economy (absolute expenditure) but strictural economy (to the point of its inevitable collapse)

p. 400 the démesure shared by pleasure & unpleasure must be interrupted by PP > PP must weaken both to achieve mastery, takes its profits in moderation

pp. 400-01 [fire-like] unleashed intensity of PP would destroy itself if it didn’t submit to moderating stricture, if it didn’t measure itself

——reality nothing outside law of differance > stricture produces pleasure by binding it, plays btwn 2 infinities, betting/speculating on surplus value restriction will bring it

——PP (the master) is not master > pleasure, the great speculator, calculates w/ effects of aphrodisiac stricture (Socrates wanted nothing to do with proper name of Aphrodite)

——quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

p. 401 irresolution—impossible logic btwn solution (non-liaison, absolute untightening: absolution itself) & non-solution (absolute tightening, paralyzing bandage)

——where Causa is lAutre Choseno more opposition btwn pleasure & unpleasure, w/in & beyond, life & death: graphics of strictural supplement not oppositional, knowns no negation, no lack > in this graphics, desire is sanssans,” is of a “sans sans sans”

p. 402 “set (ensemble)” of stricture, a unity that’s not subject/consciousness, begins by binding itself (se-lier) in differential relation w/ itself—it destines itself (se destine), which doesn’t mean: il arrive

[thinking the w/in & the beyond] PP’s mastery [re: Freud’s Beyond…] is no more sexual than metasexual (“proper”)

pp. 402-03 s’il faut se rendre à ce quil faut echaîner strictement [if it’s necessary to submit to what must follow strictly] re: le mot de maîtrise, going beyond oppositional logic—is there mastery?

p. 403 Bemächtigungstrieb, drive not reduced to other drives, takes place in others, quasi-transcendental privilege, donner, prendre, envoyer, destiner, transcendental tautology

——drive to dominate: drivenness of drive

p. 404 Laplanche & Pontalis compare Bemächtigung (power, possession, domination) to Bewältigung (violent exercise of power) > the “posts” are always posts of power (i.e. dynamics of sadism are dynamics of power)

——Freud asks how sadism can be deduced from Eros if it tends to destroy the object

pp. 404-05 auto-heterology of drive for postal power, more originary than, independent of, PP > the only one to permit definition of death drive, an original sadism

——beyond the pleasure principle—power: that is, les postes [erection, position & delay]

p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

pp. 405-06 fort:da, pleasure is a kind of rhythm [Nietzsche], SPEC will have played fort:da of Nietzsche, the limping (boitement) of unterwegs, a step forward for nothing, only rhythm

p. 407 poem of limping consoles for too slow step of science

——death drive doesn’t work in silence (like in French translation), but goes unnoticed (unauffällig), has to do w/ time (link to Kant, Aristotle)—thus rhythm: do feelings of tension exist to distinguish btwn bound/unbound energy or do they exist in relation to absolute magnitude?

p. 408 beyond opposition, differance & rhythm

pp. 408-09 for Nietzsche, pain is not in opposition to pleasure, will to suffer constitutes very aspiration of will to power [?] > would beyond the PP, for Nietzsche, be affirmation of life rather than return to inorganic [?]

——Nietzsche [Will To Power (699)]: one does not react to pain, it causes one to take a step p

BIND (BANDAGE)

MC p. 364 binding: symptom of scholar

AF p. 21 bind anew: an act of love (paternal) (sous peau neuve)

p. 38 scholar repeats the father’s circumcision [Yerushalmi calling Freud back to his father’s faith], even if only by figure

MPM p. 20 ”yes” commits w/ no content must repeat itself: yes yes, must bind itself to memory for memory, if anything’s to come from future [alliance btwn memory and seal of yes, yes]

ROP p. 32 repetition compulsion (advocatus diaboli of death drive) as resource & limit (à la fois) of psychoanalysis > analytic position set going endlessly, w/out Aufhebung, in paradox of Bindung and Erlöschung (solution, extinction): no analytic position when resistance is unidentifiable

ATIA p. 149 for Aristotle, sleep is a desmos, a peculiar way which aisthēsis is bound, Heidegger’s binding “ring” of the animal, animal more tightly bound than man

SH p. 14 meridian binds (“das Verbindende,” both binds and connects), provokes, at noon, the encounter [shortest shadow], example of law > “a date would be the gnomon [nom, shadow, not mine] of these meridians”

P p. 80 reserve, savings, stock: self-protection of the work (ergon), binding (Verbindung) of energy, condition for “mastery” of pleasure-principle

OTO p. 33 Nietzsche exposes “academic freedom,” autonomous university, as ruse of State, a constraint more ferocious for disguising itself as laisser-faire [Hegel is accused here, too]

DPi pp. 33-4 bandalettes (bandages) on body signify death, condemnation of death, and when untied they signal that dead has risen, resuscitated, insurrectioned, insuressuscité

pp. 34-5 time of bandages: when body not found—when Jesus is not dead but not yet elevated, resuscitated > the lodging made ready for literature: ascension w/out ascension, elevation w/out elevation, immanence w/out immanence, imminent yet unaccomplished resurrection

——moment before noli me tangere [p. 35n unique moment, since Jesus is generally a touching Jesus], moment where mourning can’t set to work, there’s no corpse > when Mary and Antigone weep over absence of burial

p. 37 instant of bandages, Christ’s being-there w/out being-there: this Dasein that is not a Da-sein, this Fort/Da-sein of Christ who’s dead but not dead, mort vivant

p. 58 theater of cruelty, scopic drive, fascinatio, enchantment that chains spectator to spectacle (fascio, to tense, tie, attach, fasciola is a bandage wrapping [bandelette]) > what links voyeur-spectator to fascinum, charm, enchantment, virile sex

——to executioner: “so, you got a hard-on! (tu bandes!)” (link to erection at moment of decapitation)

C p. 186 theory of coffins, series w/out model, w/out example (procession in double band fascinates, can’t see there’s no example) > obsequence of this cortege in singular lineage

SPEC pp. 317-18 what binds (lie) game to itself is re- of return, the returned or the returning (le revenu ou le revenant), revenance orders entire teleology, can be handed over to PP

p. 340 exemplary narcissistic wound [for Freud]: jealousy over birth of new baby, proof of infidelity of object of child's affection, undoes (défait) the bind (lien) (Bindung) to parent of opposite sex

——demi-deuil: irreducible category, no gradations

p. 344 bind always serves PP, to understand one must hear several voices, speak several languages, & count w/ several generations of computers

p. 346-47 neither permanent traces nor resistance in [Freud’s] Perception-Consciousness (free circulation of energy w/out obstacle or binding), permanent trace supposes frayage (Bahnung) and an overcome resistance

FV p. 453 [proper] address of letter: law that binds King & Queen

——there are only ostriches, the more one presents one’s rear, the more one is master: can’t avoid being plucked (laisser plumer)

(re)BIRTH

***KH p. 126 because philosophy can’t speak truly of that which looks like the mother, it speaks only of father/son, as if father engendered son all its own

R p. 61 Derrida, alongside Nancy in The Experience of Freedom, rethinks naissance > before genesis, creation, nation, nature [deconstruct fraternity]

OOG p. 131 doesn’t geometry have an infinite number of births which conceal it?

p. 146 Teleological Reason precedes philosophical sense-investigation which awakened Reason to itself > every self-awakening (naissance à soi) of a latent intention is a rebirth (radical, creative)

MSUB J p. 166 Artaud’s neologism innée, where nature collides w/ its contrary, “suffering of the pre-natal,” appears as monstrosity

——“nature” conceals even the source of its interdiction > Artaud wants to tear apart veil of birth and reveal “naked nature”

p. 167 to meet back up with innate nature (in-né), must force the subjectile, rendering it mad from birth, desiring birth

VM p. 112 space as wound and finitude of birth

TC pp. 232-33 a necessary affirmation can be born only by being reborn to itself [theater of cruelty still to be born]

——for Artaud, rebirth occurs through reeducation of organs > access to life before birth and after death [affirmation of cruelty], not to death before birth and after life [romantic negativity]

p. 233 theater of cruelty born by separating death from birth and erasing the name of man

p. 249 not think death as a horizon, nor birth as a past opening [re: repetition at origin of theater]

FWT pp. 39-40 [Derrida prefers not to get trapped btwn naturalism/constructivism] differance btwn psyché & genetico-biological laws > always something of a familial bond around birth, impossible to erase “birth,” a certain geneticism, perhaps birth is question of future, of arrival

p. 42 birth always familial but will come to seem less “natural” [re: “rented belly” (utero in affitto)]

POOF p. 94 in Menexenus, must summon dead to be responsible before them, the dead are made to be born again: oath of this co-engagement thus resembles a fraternal conjuration

ROP p. 11 Freud sutures the unfathomable navel, omphalos, mit dem Unerkannten (unknown, “unknowable”), navel not a provisional limit, but a night, ab-solute unknown, attaché au lieu dont il part et dont il garde la marque de naissance > not only the gap (la béance), as Lacan reads this navel

SP p. 139 this death [in text] not that of tragedy nor subject, not “I am mortal, therefore…” > the scene of text’s cryptic nature makes possible anticipation of death: tragedy, parody & birth

OTO pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

PS pp. 181-82 for Artaud, God is false value of initial worth of what is born: this false value becomes Value, for it doubled what never existed > the work (excrement) repeats this theft, steals another part of me [dispossessing my nonexistent ur-value prior to exiting the Orifice]

——God is proper name of what deprives us of our own nature, our own birth

SW p. 317 wait w/out horizon & someone else one knows too well, “even me why not,” an other yet to be born, who strikes dumb order of knowledge > too well-known, stranger head to foot

TB p. 132 less revelation than promise: “infinite rebirth (Aufleben) of languages”

——translation, as holy growth of languages, announces messianic end, but sign of end only “present” in “knowledge of that distance,” Entfernung, remoteness

TR p. 123 Marion [who Rousseau falsely accused of stealing a ribbon] was fertilized w/ ink through ribbon of a terrible & tireless writing machine [Apple printer—forbidden fruit joke]

EJQB p. 77 born only by approaching book, die only by failing (échouant) in sight of book > toujours la rive impassible du livre est d’abord

IW pp. 279-80 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] “unheard-of” singularity of Jewish nation: its birth belongs to (God’s) Law, not to nature > inscribed in a history that began before it was born (though it was already its own)—history of this nation: supernatural, transhistorical, prehistoric

C p. 197 coffin giving birth (a generator, genetrix): incalculable descendance [Phaedo]

TN p. 58 when Nancy gives thought to birth of body, it’s sarcastic [having it out w/ flesh], mordant, une transsubstantiation acharnée qui inlassablement mord, remord et met à mort la chair > impossible auto-biography, transubstantiation of Eucharist itself: Corpus bursts out laughing

ATM p. 170 there is no Hegelian Phoenix after Levinas’ consummation of me [i.e. not Me] for the other [passivity more passive…], no being reborn from out the ashes

CIN p. 40 [“Ah no, above all not”] Phoenix, the mark, in my fundamental language

OG p. 120 Lévi-Strauss appeals to an “epigenetist” leap from speech to writing: born suddenly

p. 337n structuralism needs the logic of “born by chance” to maintain structure

p. 341n Rousseau: writing (of sounds) born all at once, like light

p. 247 (350-51) Rousseau looks for a limit “being born (naissante)”: childhood, God, pure language w/out supplement—alibi, in illo tempore

p. 253 (358) Rousseau of Essay describes the presque society, subtle passage from origin to genesis; in Discourse he lays out a radical virgin origin > these 2 “origins” complement each other

p. 255 (360) impossible to describe continuity, passage, from inarticulate to articulate, pure nature to culture, plenitude to play of supplementarity > Rousseau attempts to reconcile (concilier) the 2 times after describing the birth, the being-born, of supplement

p. 255 (361) Rousseau’s “catastrophic” birth of supplement prescribed by chain of concepts

p. 267 for Rousseau, birth of society not a passage but a pure, fictive, unstable point > post-originary degradation analogous to pre-originary repetition

——if culture is broached w/in its point of origin—no linear order > morrow = eve of festival

pp. 309-12 (436-39) MOP in Rousseau appears wherever fatality of supplement seems to limit it, he is more interested in presence of the present, essence as presence, as life, as self-presence, energeai, as re-birth (permits all repetitions/returns of origin)—no memory, no anticipation, no souvenir, no distinction, point deau, an unimaginable pleasure, the sleeping imagination [Rousseau’s beautiful depiction in Reveries]

——for Derrida, there’s an interior doubling of presence, a constitution/frustration of jouissance, a call & trace that Rousseau tries to elude

SPEC p. 365 State, multicellular society, socius, guarding life beyond death of any given subject, serves to reproduce & rejuvenate other cells

BLACKMAIL

H p. 53 state techniques, like private spying & blackmail, threaten interiority of home, ipseity, integrity, cause purifying reactions, feeling of resentment [but???]

p. 105 Oedipus is twice encrypted, 1st in dying, 2nd in hiding his death > by demanding he be kept dead, he announces a piece of blackmail

F F p. xxxix double desire of crypt, pocket [cf. GLAS Genet’s “matchbox”], pour garder la vie et mettre le mort dans sa poche [near the pudenda], où se tient le plus précieux (money, title, share of stock market): “prise aussi pour le chantage (blackmail) de lautre”: your wallet or your life

FWT FWT p. 113 almost impossible to insist on complex judgments in face of “blackmail,” pressure to take sides, based on belonging to a particular community [re: Shoah, Israel, Palestine]

C C p. 215 tracking an exhumed body, in the wake’s wake (sillage), exultation of a funeral vigil, blackmail (faire chanter) the dead, Finnegans Wake > faire vibrer le sarcophage: sous le charme

CIR CIR p. 65 I know, dead jealous, I am not the contemporary of those I mentioned yesterday: I belong to the blind man blackmailing me

FV FV p. 445 [blackmail in Poe]

BLANCHOT

P (I) p. (13) each of Blanchot’s works of fiction remain incommensurable to each other

PAS PAS p. (29) Blanchot: “il avait longtemps cru que le secret comptait moins que son approche

——for Blanchot, every word has the same privilege, each one plays an irreplaceable role

p. (31) what does one know of force of de-distancing? and if the custody (garde) of knowledge is distanced? word knowledge would be refolded, re-employed > Blanchot’s reploiement formidable

p. (34) usually, pour faire droit à un autre texte, Derrida exposes avoidances in a text > Blanchot’s texts one of the few (lun des très rares) where Derrida is willing, joyfully, to simply withdraw (retrait)

p. (45) Blanchot’s text unchains law of absolute discretion, w/ intractable rigor, which it violates on its own scene w/ measureless obscenity; the only impossible discretion that would surprise his indiscretion > to remain in friendship under the law of the other: the sole sign of friendship, erased in advance

pp. (45-6) a debt that annuls itself in being infinite > Derrida's debt to Blanchot’s machination sans machine, which is what interests him, what fascinates him, as does fascination

p. (45) Derrida wants to be violent to Blanchot, won’t just call him tu, must be more violent, more discreet than him, but in a different way

p. (49) Derrida wonders why Blanchot doesn’t insist [on syntax of pas?], insists for him

pp. (50-1) Blanchot unleashes what Witz contains or denies, a transparent, neutral, impassive surface of language of writing, beyond/before les lignes de rupture ou de front (psychoanalysis, literature, philosophy, political practice/thought)

——Derrida would praise him for this if that were not another kind of mastery

p. (54) Blanchot’s Le Pas au-delà neither critique nor dialectic

p. (57) from where the right to interrupt? unjustifiable violence of interruption, nothing more servile, indiscreet, unspeakable than generalizing, appropriating the unique, breaking the seal of an absolute singularity [re: citing from Friendship, on single friendship btwn Bataille & Blanchot]

p. (59) from Blanchot, Derrida learns rigor of word gently (doucement)

p. (60) mastery, getting by too well, je men tirais trop bien, does not allow chance of event, must be disabled, wrecked, for something other to happen finally: the best & worst > la dérive [Blanchot’s] guards against security, anchorage, property and against, perhaps, ce qui arrive, le pire ou le meilleur, venant den face ou de labîme [?]

p. (87) wanting (le vouloir) to break fascination always effect of fascination? why break it? I love and desire fascination, any desire w/out it? [tu me fascine, je taime]; viens, word of fascination, defers in difference what it cannot break with—dare that another dissimulation not come

p. (80) is Blanchot’s diabolical démarche: 1) a mastery, which presumes to escape its own trap, believes the maze, the labyrinth, the staircase are a space w/ traps 2) or, very spacing of its pas?

p. (96) Derrida always interrupts Blanchot’s citations very arbitrarily, he is interested, like Blanchot, in logic of parts and partage

p. (100) acc. Derrida, all [?] Blanchot’s books concern fascinating ellipsis (lellipse fascinante) of what leaves the sea

p. (104) ces mots le blanchâtre près de l'eau (j'y entends le déplacement silencieux, dissimulé d'un cachalot, sperm-whale)

F p. xxxix cryptophore, à manger le morceau (le mors) sans pouvoir le digérer, must constantly betray cipher that seals and conceals it > Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, truly cryptic story

DPi p. 114 Blanchot’s “literature as right to death” is not against DP, literature as last act, last judgment, theater of cruelty, both eschatological & apocalyptic

p. 117 Blanchot’s right to death: right to give it, giving it to oneself (en se la donnant), inflicting DP; right to accede to death (not natural) by exceeding natural life > both the right that gives birth to literature and the law that gives birth to the law itself: literature thinks this right of/to right

pp. 117-19 Derrida believes in correctness of interpreting Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to Death” as a terrorist, terrorizing thinking of literature > but: 1) literary language is contradictory 2) death is a principle of salvation/resurrection 3) dying becomes an impossibility

p. 119 Blanchot: a moment ago words were an obstacle, now they’re my only chance

BLANK PAGE

DS p. 177 writing in white, Derrida has written quotes w/ chalk on blackboard [Mallarmé’s page-phantom]

p. 178 what ruins the “pious capital letter,” the aplomb of the heading: the blanks, ordered return of white spaces, measure & order of dissemination, law of spacing, rhythmos, invisible fleuron

pp. 179-80 suspended lustre of title: title provides a first fold, highlights womb-like matrix of page, a germinal or seminal blank, “the perpetual suspense of a tear that can never be entirely formed nor fall (still the lustre) scintillates in a thousand glances

p. 195 the 2 faces of double session: 1) mime inaugurates: breaks into white page 2) “candid virginity” of white page

p. 198 mime: writes himself on white page he is

p. 223 mime mimes a kind of writing, is himself written in a kind of writing, nothing of what is can lie beyond medium/speculum reading-writing > there is 1) writing w/out book, marking tip (la pointe du trait) proceeds w/out past upon virgin sheet 2) infinite number of booklets in other booklets > Mallarmé reads, writes while reading, while reading text written by Mime, who himself reads in order to write

p. 232 Richard: more perfect phantom, the mime, white as unwritten page [Philebus]

p. 252 blank as polysemic totality of whiteness plus the fanlike form of text (spaced-out splitting of whole), plus the writing site (hymen), no longer determinate signifier or signifier at all

p. 253 “blank” marks everything white (snow, virginity, frigidity, sails, swan’s wings, foam) plus the blankness that allows for the mark in the first place

——paper & hymen: blankness that allows for fold > forever re-marks itself as disappearance, erasure, non-sense

——polysemia is infinite not because a finite reading/writing can’t exhaust super abundant meaning, no, displace finitude acc. to law/structure of text: blank, like hymen, forever erasing itself > finitude becomes infinitude in suspension of equation btwn mark & meaning (non-Hegelian finitude/infinitude)

——linkages & rifts created by fold & blank, propagated in text, make it so that nothing can simply have the value of a theme > one can always subtract a blank from the series, ou lajouter en surnombre au nombre [add it as an extra to the #], even if the # is infinite

pp. 253-54 supplementary “blank,” in marking itself, intervenes btwn all series, prevents semantic seriality from closing itself, cest encore lui qui libère des effets de série > makes us take agglomerates for substances

p. 257n virginity (newness, wholeness) always overlaid w/ opposite—virginity submits to operation of hymen of its own accord

pp. 257-58 each “full” white thing in Mallarmé (snow, swan, paper, virginity) is trope of “empty” white space, constellation of “blanks,” there everywhere, reproduced in spacings > la disséminaton des blancs (nous ne dirons pas de la blancheur)

p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text, yet desire for reappropriation, structural site of theological trap, is produced, nourished, in very act of separating from it

——mark (same word as margin or marche): word and blank between words > marked twice

p. 260 blank, counting on and discounting itself at once > blank figures: page, infinite background, behind

p. 265 hymen is not a phenomenon—it folds itself back into the antre, which is an abyss

——mark upon mark, text w/in text, margin in mark (endless repeat): an abyss

——writing en abyme, abyss will never have glint (léclat) of phenomenon > becomes white or black, lun et/ou lautre au carré de lécriture

p. 285 désertant toute profondeur, chacune de ses faces est aussi, après coup, tout le dé

in a hymen depending on verse, blank once more, composed of chance & necessity, writing prepares to receive the seminal spurt of a throw of dice

P pp. 85-7 but en blanc [cf. C p. 229 can(n)on] (gun as finality w/out end in sight) [goal as white page] Kant’s finality w/out end: free beauty, wild tulip

POS p. 3 displacement forms a system, undecidable resource sets system in motion: necessity of “blank spaces”

p. 40 gram, reserve, incision, trace, spacing, blank, supplement, margin, pharmakon—a list w/ no taxonomical closure, not a lexicon: not atoms but focal points (foyers), crucibles of economic condensation, sites of passage: spread out through text, each in a different way

——sens blanc, sang blanc, sans blanc, cent blancs, semblant

O p. 8(n) protocol of preface destroys future anterior > a gluing (kollon), praefatio, prae-fari, protokollon as formula, pharmacopoeia, begins (law of dissemination) doubled by a “facing,” divides/undoes inaugural pretention of first page: neither depth, nor surface, in or for itself, un bloc magique

p. 29n Kierkegaard: blank spaces, voids btwn books, empty expanse btwn Teutons > write what you will

CHM p. 55 if language is the break w/ madness, the closer and closer language gets to it, it’ll be separated only by “transparent sheet” (of which Joyce speaks) > this diaphaneity: “language, meaning, possibility, and elementary discretion of a nothing that neutralizes everything”

——thus, Foucault’s book a gesture of protection & internment

EJQB pp. 69-70 Jabès: at noon, facing infinity, the white page

D p. 302 pure present: la plénitude inentamée, la continuité vierge de la non-coupure (not yet having been written, à la veille du jeu)

p. 344 atheism in Kabbalah, belief only in # [?] > Numbers a cabal/cabala where blanks only provisionally filled in

p. 345 whiteness of virgin paper, blankness of transparent column, air > more than neutrality of some medium, uncovers space of play, play of space

CIN p. 35 entrust words to a page: better to inflame you, eat yourself up immediately, not a tomb that offers patience of mourning, but a tomb of a tomb, deprived of patience of mourning

OG p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

——becoming-space of time & becoming-time of space mark dead time w/in presence of living present > dead time is at work, les blancs take on importance > limit of phenomenology

BLIND

***OG pp. 148-49 (212-14) society as a furnace, man rummages the entrails (fouille les entrailles) of the earth, blindness to plants, nature, mother, moving from blindness to the supplement is the law, we can’t make supplement emerge from its shadow > we speak its reserve (nous en disons la réserve)

BLOOD

GOD pp. 70-71 Dome of Rock, House of Lord in Jerusalem, place of dispute btwn monotheistic faiths of transcendent God, absolute other; they fight over it w/ fire & blood (now, more than ever)

FK p. 81 religion appropriates indemnification of all “proper,” all property: the letter, blood and soil, family, nation

pp. 88-9 in our “war of religion” 2 violences: 1) hypersophistication of military tele-technology 2) “new archaic violence,” counters the first & everything it represents, revenge

——in name of Islam, in name of “religion,” desperate (auto-immune) gesture, attacks blood of its own body

S p. 37 [re: Heidegger’s Rectorship Address] le profond et laltier ally themselves in most high: highest of what guides the spiritual guides of die hohe Schule and depths of forces of earth and blood

SH p. 66 circumcision inscribes Nothing in the heart (flesh, living word), to the point of bleeding

TC p. 243 Artaud: consciousness gives to every act of life it’s blood-red color, its cruel nuance, life is always someone else’s death

FWT p. 136 anonymous [death] machines, purifying neutralization of DP, ensure nothing is visible, no blood > what is called for: history/economy of blood, of sacrificial theatricality it channels [Nietzsche]

p. 142 abolitionism [of DP’s paradoxical transcendentalism] must attempt history of blood w/in history of concept of exception, and a history of cruelty [not all cruelty is bloody, i.e. grausam]

DPi p. 69 cruelty: 1) red blood 2) radical malice [cruelty and exception]

p. 137 great ambiguity of Christianity: confluence of human blood [re: guillotine] and blood of Christ’s Passion

pp. 148-49 memory/archivization engage suffering body in a machine, technical repetition, Mnemoteknik, must cause suffering, red of fire before red of blood > for N., punishment is not juridical: it’s a movement of life, writing to remember, inscription, imprint past in body

p. 158-59 for Nietzsche, Kant stinks of Christian [?] cruelty, he smells blood, though in German grausam makes no reference to blood (cruor, crudelis, crudelitas reference blood)

pp. 191-92 sans sang (U.S., Eucharist—real presence of blood of God): interiorization of blood in noncruel DP > turning point as a return, ce trop ou ce trope of blood

p. 193 guillotine: [doesn’t erase or dry up blood but keeps it] withdraws hands of man

p. 199 red (on flag) as specter of the dead

p. 200 guillotine: gets rid of bloody hands of executioner (bourreau)

p. 201n for Hugo, Christ’s law (blood of Christ, good blood) often confused w/ natural law—Christ’s heart will transform written, positive law > it’ll be spiritualized by gentle law of Christ

p. 206 guillotine’s wooden uprights, buveuse de sang (blood swiller), flowing red > drinks the blood, makes it disappear

***p. 216 [Hugo’s bloody bloody description of guillotine]

p. 236 [Camus’ bloody description > eyewitness: decapitated, looked like a madman]

p. 243n blood flows, blood disappears (lethal injection), blood that flows is both spilt blood & blood of genealogy, filiation, father & son

pp. 282-83 still be eating flesh in vegetarianism (will eat waiting for Christ, assimilate his blood as commanded, how can one love w/out being tempted to take it w/in oneself: Love & Eucharist), still be DP after abolition, other figures will be found for it

PSSS p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds [cruor]

——this discontinuity calls for a leap, what Classical humanist philosophers call freedom, this interruption gives a chance

TN p. 55 flesh (sarx), Nancy’s Corpus is sarcastic, having it out w/ flesh, flesh of Christ

——Christianity a religion of blood > beyond point where any religion begins w/ experience of blood

——as if “touch in itself” were touching blood [Nancy’s self-expulsion] > rapport entre le sang et le sens, entre lecoup de senset lecoup de sang’ [sens, sang, cent, sans]

BSi p. 22 Rousseau on brutishness of blood eaters, teach children to be vegetarians (Émile)

p. 290 trap of sovereignty, trap of transfer of sovereignty > in all these fictions and simulacra blood flows, no less cruelly, irreversibly: beast & sovereign bleed, so do marionettes

OG pp. 117-18 (172) fantômes exsangues of philosophers of consciousness/intuition [Husserl, Descartes], Lévi-Strauss merely incriminating the specters that haunt school manuals

CIR pp. 248-50 on each date, a drop of blood, one date enough to leave geologic program behind

(first) BLOW (ATTACK)

LOBL p. 80 beginning as an attack [?] [Heidegger, philopolemology]

HERP p. 197 why striking (marquant)? because prägen (mark, strike, leave imprint) is found so frequently in Heidegger > philosophy forged, stamped (geprägt) by Heraclitus in name of gathering, gathered originarily in one striking force, one trait > Kampf

PP p. 170 pharmakon means coup, stroke of fate (un coup du sort), dice-throw (le coup de théâtre), le coup double, un coup pour rien, un coup tiré, un coup de force, un coup monté

PAS PAS p. (55) an infinite patience that crosses the limit in one stroke, a forgetting that overflows all philosophical and psychoanalytic determinations w/out omitting their pertinence

S p. 89 acc. Heidegger, first blow is simple duality if difference (Zweifache), second blow is agonistic dissension (Zweitracht) [see p. 106]

p. 106 double mark, doubly remarkable trait [engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, affinity w/ Schlag]: it is the spirit in which it inscribes itself, traces itself, belongs to flame it divides

pp. 110-11 Heidegger’s resurrection to come of Menschenschlag [a third blow?], blow which saves (rettet), hymn to archi-originary, yet-to-come event, what poet sings

T pp. x-xi philosophy has always thought its other, that which limits it; does to think the other solely mean relever, to control the other? or does the limit/passage always reserve one more coup; to think the proper of the other, the other as such is to miss it, to miss the missing of the other [on manque (de) le manquer]: examine the relevance of the limit

p. xxix after every perforation, one [philosophy] is dying to replace w/ a glorious cadaver, ce temps timbré entre lécriture et la parole (s) appellent un coup de donc [GLAS]: it suffices, barely, to wait!

DS p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

SP p. 39 fine point (of spur) cannot be honed (effiler) in single stroke (coup)

p. 53 “the exchange of stylistic blows (coup) or the thrust (coup) of a dagger confuses sexual identity”

O pp. 57-9 “la dissémination (se) produit (dans) cela : coupe de plaisir” > il rythme et le plaisir et la répétition selon une coupe multiple > il [text, literature, the beyond of the whole] imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

coupe claire, coupe définitive, coupe à tire et à aire [different ways to clear out trees]

——preface—external seal, final kick (coup final), kick-off (coup denvoi)

p. 59 mise en jeu sans prélude, de ce qui reste à préparer dun coup [no prelude for all the coups]

——if you wanna see for yourself, encounter by chance, enmeshed (engrenés) in some corner (coin), ce quil en est de la coupe or/livre

DPi p. 243 vertigos, head spinning, head falling (one blow of guillotine), turn around neck of decollation [cf. GLAS, O], everything turns around what turns (not merely rhetorical turns), turns of phrase given to expression “condemned to death” or “condemned to die”: revolution, conversion, faith and DP, DP and belief > highs & lows we climb up/down to point of vertigo

Gi p. 25 Geschlecht as inscription, stroke, imprint [Schlag]

Gii p. 45 for Heidegger, Handschlag (handshake) > “grounds” alliance, accord, engagement (Bund)

pp. 53-4 Schlag (blow, also race/species in figurative sense) & Geschlecht > Heidegger: our language calls the humanity that has received imprint of striking, or cast in this striking (Schlag), Geschlecht

das Zwiefache, double, dual duplicitous fold of sexual difference

——die Zwietracht der Geschlechter, duality of sexes as dissension, war, disagreement

p. 55 what happens when same word, Schlag, is translated 2 different ways: coup, frappe? erases what authorizes Heidegger to find affinity btwn Schlag and Geschlecht

pp. 59-60 [meanings of Geschlecht and Schlag (i.e. imprint of a coin)]

pp. 61-2 savage second blow of sexual difference, its Verwesung, vs. originary, tender sexual difference > Heidegger claims this schema is not Christian/Platonic, but it has no other content and even no other language than Platonism/Christianity > its archi-matinal origin, ultra-Western horizon, constituted by hollow of a repetition, same for Verfall, Ruf, Sorge in structure of Dasein

PIO p. 15 double blow of “Fable” is its invention > gives itself, by itself, a patent of invention

p. 19 double blow, the same blow: fabulous invention becomes invention of truth

AFR p. 40 philosophy is historical for Condillac: it always comes after cognition, after a scientific discovery; his philosophical method can only be established après coupor stroke (coup) of genius

pp. 108-09 to introduce (not saturate, not intrude [sintroduire]): seduce the text (not the reader), surprise it close to its content > a rigorous “abyss”

——follow lines, grafts, borders, ribs: analyze its machine of oppositions, its program, and what breaches the program, defeats its teleology, undecides its circle: suspend text on one of its nervures après-coupées (cut-after-the-fact-ribs)

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, cette fois enfin, “cette fois enfin” not an accomplishment w/ single blow of the pen or the die (décriture ou de dés): nothing could be more foreign to eschatology (of or by way of literature) than Soller’s finite-infinite seriation (enchaînement) of numbers

p. 304 “primitive” mythical unity always reconstituted retrospectively dans laprès-coupure > the decision, le coup (shot, throw, blow) parts the seed as it projects it (partage la semence en la projetant)

EL p. 219 Geschlecht and Schlag (stamp, imprint) > “we” that undergoes relation to itself out of (depuis) menacing interpellation of Geschlecht by apocalyptic speech (parole)

C p. 189 get down to it (sy mettre), commit oneself, donner du gage (give proof, evidence, wager) > get in the coffin, spread out: à chaque coup for the first and last time, always the first and last

SPEC p. 321 an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (dun après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

BODY/EXTENSION

KH p. 127 organicist motif, well-composed logos must look like a living body, found in Phaedrus, Timaeus

GOD pp. 55-6 tremble in fear of unpredictable, unforeseeable, the untouchability of the arrival (tremo, tromeō, tromos, tremendus), enigma of trembling and tears, what are they metaphors or figures for?

——we would need to make inroads into the thinking of the body w/out dissociating registers of discourse

GT p. 97 a “true” corpus is still, perhaps, counterfeit money, may be ghost or spirit, spirit of body & of capital (title, heading, is capital), no problem of canon if this institution were natural

MONL p. 27 body of the martyr, body of language and writing

p. 54 insidious Christian contamination: the respectful belief in inwardness, the preference for intention, the heart, the mind, mistrust of action given to the mechanicity of the body, against Pharisaism

OOG pp. 88-9 the de jure purity of intentional animation, for Husserl, as linguistic or graphic body is a flesh, proper body (Leib) or a spiritual corporeality (geistige Leiblichkeit)

——writing no longer only mnemotechnical aid, possibility of being incarnated in a graphic sign is condition of Objectivity’s internal completion

pp. 97-8 Husserl’s distinction btwn Körper (sensible body) and Leib (constituting body) [nothing can come to latter through former] > how would writing preserve its Leiblichkeit from corporeal disaster

p. 122 language as prescientific: language and intersubjectivity precede geometry, along w/ [fuzzy] corporeality of pregeometrical shapes, pure bodies w/ color, weight, hardness

SPOM p. 146 via Marx, players in history as inverted Schleimihls, shadows w/out body, the specter, the red specter is disincarnated > this impossibility [disincarnation of specter] isn’t it possibility itself: virtuality? mustn’t one reckon w/ this to understand history, the event-ness of the event?

p. 157 acc. Marx, the ghost effect not only spiritualization, autonomization of spirit, idea, or thought (Hegelian idealism), but also supplementary moment after autonomization, one more simulacrum is added: a body, flesh (Leib)

pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

***——that’s not all: specificity of process can still capitalize spectralization > the first ghost effect (autonomized spirit) can be incorporated, negated, integrated as one’s own human body

p. 159 Marx loves word “Eskamotage,” the theft of merchandise which makes the perceptible body disappear, “the escamoteur knows how to make inapparent,” height of his trick is to make disappear while producing “apparitions” [re: Stirner’s incorporation]

pp. 160-61 spectral effect, for Marx, a dialectical position (Setzung) of the ghostly body as body proper > where Stirner sees 1st moment as spectral and 2nd as successful, interiorization, subjectivation (plus de vie) Marx sees a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality (plus de mort)

p. 161 the egological body, Marx cries: ghost of all ghosts! > forum, agora [cf. F], gathering place toward which specters run

pp. 163-64 for Marx, once you’ve chased away the ghostly body (of emperor, of pope), actual body remains > Stirner lost his body out of love of his body

p. 174 larcharnement (ferocity, w/ chair, flesh) dun chasseur > set out the living lifeless body of a ghost (le corps vivant sans vie dun fantôme) to trick prey (pour tromper sa proie)

POOF p. 16 hexis binds 2x in same time, such contretemporality another name for psukhé, accounts for, registers, lépreuve du temps, withholds (en garder) its trace in the body [by way of inscription] > the yoke effect

p. 285 via Nietzsche, friendship is a thing of distance, a thing of the future: friends ready to hear will be ready when they have heard the teleiopetic word

——Nietzsche’s teleipoetic word accomplishes Gospel word in perverting it: promises spiritual fraternity, beyond milk & blood (owing to another blood, another eucharistic body [?])

pp. 289-90 returning ghost [of Zarathustra?] who promises is a testament, a ‘this is my body’ offered again to brothers > no mourning but mourning of brother?

MSUB J p. 170 motion of motif, w/out totalization, subjectilian wall: “of this dissociation in the body of which there will always be marked the singularity of the event made work”

VM p. 115 in classical infinitism (Descartes) neutralization of space to liberate positive infinity, body: exteriority, zero point, origin of space, an origin which has no meaning w/out of, origin inseparable from genitivity, from space it engenders/orients, an inscribed origin, written, traced

——Derrida exposes impossibility of saving theme of positive infinity & face [which would have to have body, space, be finite, if positive infinity remains a theme] > face’s nonmetaphorical unity of body, glance, speech, thought can only be thought w/in horizon of infinite (indefinite) alterity as irreducibly common horizon of Death and Other > horizon of finitude

——infinite alterity as death cannot be reconciled w/ positive, present God

pp. 115-16 to exclude the equation God = Death would be to exclude every particular determination, but this has not been excluded by entirety of classical philosophy > God is named w/in difference btwn All and Nothing, w/in difference as difference itself > difference called history, God is inscribed in it

VP p. 29 the opposition of the soul and the body always depends on an interpretation of language

——the “as such”: totality of body, of mundane, totality of the spatial, the visible > not worked over (ne sont pas travaillés) by Geist, which transforms Körper into Leib

p. 48 for Husserl, actuality put on like an empirical piece of clothing, like a body on a soul

S p. 24 acc. Heidegger, one must not say that the body alone has spatiality, this would be naive opinion (naïve Meinung) where spiritual being is transposed after the fact (nachträglich) into space

pp. 59-60 [Heidegger appeals to depth (Tiefe) positively, sees destitution (Entmachtung) of spirit/world as a flattening, where dimension has become extension & number]

OH p. 66 Valéry: “our body”—best known capital, gives capital its most literal/proper meaning

TC p. 232 for Artaud, whatever can be said of body can be said of theater > must restore “existence” and “flesh”

p. 247 Artaud wants to destroy all writing after reading it once; Artaud vs. Plato > both against writing: Artaud because it’s the erasure of body, Plato because it is body

PPHS p. 82(n) signifying intention (bedeuten) over body (signifier, from Cratylus, sēma/sōma (tomb/body), sign as tomb, prison) > Husserl, Saussure, Hegel

T p. xxv like w/ Mystic Pad, question of writing machine should upset (devrait fair basculer) space of proper body dans lentraînement sans limite des machines de machines et donc de machines à main coupée

SH p. 59 circumcision recalls the body, by wounding it, to its condition as word, carnal mark > wound, very experience of reading, is also universal

——can one ever circumcise a name w/out doing something to the body?

p. 64 the proper of the body, a place of circumcision

——circumcision of the word: an event of the body (from shibboleth to sibboleth)

p. 67 circumcision is a determination, defines & decides, but to ask for circumcision is not to ask for meaning or object > circumcision always binds body to language

F pp. xxviii-xxix [Abraham & Torok’s method] body a hieroglyphic text, but object-text not a substance, this isn’t a “scripturalistic” interpretation, not “dead symbol” > Magic Word explores vibrant, vigilant effectiveness of symbol’s operative genesis

——writing not essentially verbal or phonetic, body signs even before any “proper” name > in principle no difference btwn verbal behavior of patient & paramecium faced w/ obstacle

p. xxix ultimate object still remains, even as “proper” name or body—a text to be deciphered

POS p. 99n a of differance, pyramid (A), tacit monument > for Hegel, body of sign compared to pyramid

ATIA p. 72 for Descartes, for thought to be present to itself, to be present, must exclude/suspend all life, the living body (becomes machine, corpse), animal life, auto-affection

p. 73 for Descartes, human is different from animal because he can think extension, the intelligible body (of wax), the naked wax that can’t be touched, animal only senses the sensible nonnaked wax > man can undress the wax [have you ever tried to do that?]

PS p. 182 Artaud: we shit the glue of minds, pure body doesn’t shit

p. 183 like excrement, like turd, a metaphor of the penis, the work should stand up

pp. 184-85 man as the scato-theological being (this is the essence of guilt), capable of being soiled by the work and thieving God > God is a sin agains the unnameable Divine

p. 183 for Artaud, soteriology will be the eschatology of one’s proper body: “state…of my body…will make the Last Judgment” [when body is upright w/out detritus, w/out the work]

p. 186 acc. Artaud, membering is dismembering; structure always structure of expropriation; “every organ is a parasite” of the body, the body has no need of organs; Heart: “dirtiest means that any being could have invented to pump life inside me” > Artaud as fearful of articulated body as articulated language

——organ is place of loss: its center always an orifice, always functions as embouchure

DPi pp. 100-01 in logic where king has 2 bodies (carnal, immortal), beheading king, splitting king in 2, reduces king to 1 single body: either a noncitizen (public enemy) or citizen traitor

Gi p. 18 Dasein must have body, bodiliness, prior to sexuality? Leiblichkeit draws Dasein into dispersion, thus into sexual difference? [see Gii pp. 38-9 Dasein as Leib]

p. 20 Erstreckung: Daseins spatiality before extensio, se tend (tends, extends itself) btwn birth & death (Dasein affects itself w/ this movement, auto-affection belongs to ontological structure of Daseins historicality) > birth/death receive meaning from this intervallic movement > only one of determinate possibilities of essential dispersion (Zerstreuung)

REST pp. 263-64 [re: les question de la démarche embarrassée (boîteuse ou louche?)] i.e. “Who is walking?” “On whose feet?” > idiomatic figures of questions seem necessary; “necessary: it’s an attribute,” still vague > better to say question-idioms the form of which is very fitting, clinging (collant) (tightly/flexibly) to figure or body of what you here wish to turn into an object (feet)

p. 369 for Shapiro, parousia of Van Gogh: the shoes are him > hoc est corpus meum, sacrificial offering of his flesh

TR p. 113 no archive w/out body (Derrida prefers “body” to “matter”)

p. 146 subjectile, very body of event, archival and auto-deictic body [re: Rousseau’s Confessions]

——revelation of truth nothing w/out saving body of inscriptions

p. 156 de Man: text as body (always retraceable to metaphor) displaced [deconstructed] by text as machine, in this process suffers loss of illusion of meaning [dis-figuration, de-metaphorization]

WAP p. 91 my body > cadaverization of my body, capturing by erasure, fascinating neutralization > my body only fascinates while playing dead, when erected in rigidity of cadaver (delegation of life)

+R p. 160 survival movement, arrêt de mort, final trance, sursaut cambré tenu au mors: says “I” (am dead) or hoc est corpus meum > dominant fish, one that bites best, takes from sea a body of scaly writing, homogenous w/ signatory’s initials

LI p. 82 la hantise of the graft, herein no different from the parasite > never simply alien to and separable from the body it already haunts

TN p. 6 limit, deprived of body, does not touch itself, does not let itself be touched

p. 11 Freud: “Psyche ist ausgedehnt, weiss nichts davon (Psyche is extended, knows nothing about it)”

p. 16 can one figure an untouchable extension? difficult except for intelligible extension w/out body (Descartes, Kant) or insensible sensible (Hegel, Marx)

p. 24 the move from body extension to extension of psyche/thinking is incommensurable > a place (lieu) neither of objective space nor extension: place (lieu) as spacing before space

p. 25 Nancy: “the incommensurable extension of thinking is the opening of the mouth” > mouth as union of soul/body; Nancy accords decisive authority to “quasi” in Descartes’ “quasi permixtio

p. 43 for Freud, the spatiality of space, exteriority, is a projection of an internal, psychical extension

p. 58 when Nancy gives thought to birth of body, it’s sarcastic [having it out w/ flesh], mordant, une transsubstantiation acharnée qui inlassablement mord, remord et met à mort la chair > impossible auto-biography, transubstantiation of Eucharist itself: Corpus bursts out laughing

p. 63 Nancy: writing touches the body

pp. 63-4 for Nancy, history of world/body is Christian? or is it a universal “history”? or the history of the production of every “universalism,” “mondialisation”—through the obligatory passage of a surreptitious, autoimmune, globalatinizing Christianization? couldn’t every culture have produced this idealizing anesthesia, this neutralization, this euthanasia of the body?

p. 64 corps-corpse > when Freud lays Psyche on couch is he referring to the Christian body? to say Psyche is “extended,” is to say she remains tangible (against Kant, Descartes)

p. 325n spasm & distension: passage that confirms gap btwn extension and spacing

p. 71 Nancy moves from Psyche is extended to body weighs (i.e. thinks) [penser, peser]

pp. 93-4 let’s not play w/ words ever: le tendre ne séprouve quà tendre (the proof of the tender is only in the tending, extending)

p. 95 touch gives nearness/proximity more than sight/hearing > proximity, proper, present

——one thinks first of all, and too much, of hands: take the gift (“Tiens!”), comprehension, prehension, captation, a plea (prière) > “tender extending” becomes violence itself: “Take that!”

p. 137 question of touch belongs to history of body, to “my body” (hoc est emin corpus meum), to history of Europe having it out w/ its “Christianity”

p. 338n Plotinus’ pan to sōma: organ of touch the whole body

pp. 339-40n proper, ipseity, proche, “same” are all deconstructible [but try to speak w/out them!], beyond their pedagogical and rhetorical necessity, what do they ever mean? the law that hatches irresistible desire of appropriation (“my body,” “here”) destines it to expropriation > this desire handed over to promise of expropriation [Derrida is deconstructing Nancy’s “properly”]

p. 173 phenomenology finds greatest resistance where extension, place, localization are at issue > nous abordons ainsi une zone de spatialité, extension of the psyche

p. 180 there would be auto-affection “effects,” but their analysis can’t escape hetero-affection that makes them possible, keeps haunting them

——constitution of body proper would thus assume passage outside through “technē of bodies,” spacing, death, nonliving, other, mourning > everything the “solipsistic” tries to keep out (maintenir au-dehors)

p. 347n Derrida translates Husserl’s Leib as corps propre, body proper—not chair [pp. 349-50n]

p. 185 connection btwn “self-touching” of “human body” [flesh] and body of Christian ontotheology, its eucharistic ecstasy par excellence [Nancy too?]

p. 224 Nancy links a dissemination of haptics w/ body’s technical character

p. 226 Nancy: space of bodies not acquainted w/ Death (space abolished) (being-toward-death) but knows each body as a dead one, sharing out for us the extension of his/her “ci-gît (here lies)”

pp. 234-37 leibhaftig as incarnate? does Leib have flesh? > what about machine-bodies, technical supplements, which are both Körper and Leib [p. 361n Derrida points to his early work on Husserl]

p. 247 Chrétian’s carnal figure of a spiritual touch, conversion of body (becoming-flesh) marked by historical event of revelation (Christian body): Incarnation, the Eucharist, by the giving, announcing, promising, and memory of Hoc est meum corpus

——no denial in Chrétian of body’s historicity: no abstract historicity w/out a history of touch, no essential archefacticity [Franck’s flesh?]; no thinking (Heidegger’s) of Offenbarkeit more originary than Offenbarung

p. 248 Christian body as post-sin, post-Incarnation historical body

p. 274 touch as self-touchingle toucher plus tout autre sens (dizzy rhetoric), very form of space & time & will (essence of will) (from Descartes to Kant or even to Nietzsche)

p. 279 for Chrétian, Christ is one, common body, not a plurality of bodies > Chrétian & Nancy deal w/ a different “yes,” or a different provenance of same “yes,” addressed to “you”

pp. 284-85 Nancy’s corpus as dissemination and body

p. 308 Nancy: “muscle-bound thinking,” “sacred-heart thinking,” vitalo-spiritualist fascism believes one can touch the sense of “touch,” ideologies of the “body”—w/ secret horror of bodies

ATM p. 154 for Levinas, logos is not secondary/instrumental, it remains indispensable as fold (pli) that bends (se plie) to the gift, as the tongue (langue) of my mouth when I tear bread from it to give it to the other > it is also my body

pp. 189-90 WE NEED A NEW BODY, UN AUTRE SANS PLUS DE JALOUSIE, THE MOST ANCIENT STILL (ENCORE) TO COME

BSi BSi p. 41 acc. Hobbes, fear exceeds corporeal presence, thus it is the passion/origin of law, the origin of crime too [terror] > no contrary to fear [like Nietzsche’s, Freud’s cruelty]: coextensive w/ all political passion; fear is primarily fear for one’s own proper body, fear is passion of life

pp. 177-78 Husserl’s free ideality (i.e. the number “two” repeated identically) vs. bound (gebundene) idealities (ideal only in body)

p. 194 free sovereignty over social body & one’s own body (like the king’s 2 bodies) > duel w/ marionette transforms winner into a machine (in playing angel, one plays the beast [Pascal])

pp. 285-86 [bibliography re: king’s 2 bodies] king’s living (mortal) body has at its disposal an eternal, celestial, sublime body

——after death, “dignity” of king’s body during lifetime separated from “sovereignty” (majesty) that survives him, is inherited from one king to next

p. 292 Descartes’ Treatise on Man treats human body as “machine of earth” (compares to clocks, artificial fountains) > animal-machines in Descartes

p. 295 Marin adds 3rd body to king: 1) historical–mortal 2) politico-juridical 3) sacramental > acc. Derrida, #2 allies itself w/ #3

OG OG p. 17 (30) acc. Rousseau, perverse, artful writing exiled in exteriority of body

p. 18 (30) Rousseau: conscience is voice of soul, passions voice of body [Platonic]

pp. 33-5 (51-2) moralism, preaching, in Saussure/Plato—casting writing, figuration, to the exterior > maléfique, sin (péché) (traitorous contamination)

——dehors dans le dedans, archetypal violence, sin, interrupts natural rapport of soul w/ itself, writing, exterior, as body, as clothing

——writing (mask, perversion, disguise, debauchery) must be exorcised (that is, conjurer) by the good word (bonne parole)

p. 165 (235) exposed surface of body signifies, marks forever, the division working auto-affection

p. 234 (333) for Rousseau, the wand (la baguette) that traces w/ so much pleasure does not fall outside the body (ne tombe pas hors du corps)

FV p. 461 Bonaparte falls back onto dogmatic imprudence (appeal to author’s unconscious), Lacan falls back, w/ incomparable philosophical vigilance, onto Truth > [both Bonaparte & Lacan] castration of mother as ultimate meaning & proper site of letter: “real intersubjectivity,” “solution in broad daylight”—proper as relation to lack itself, in proper place/body

BOOK

AF p. 22 lawmakers w/out which one can’t have archives, conservation (memory) puts into reserve (“store”), accumulates, capitalizes, stocks a quasi-infinity of layers (hypermnesic, hypomnesic epidermises of books & penises)

HASD p. 46 Eckhart: “every creature is full of God and is a book”

POOF pp. 227-28 Quinet & Michelet: realize Christianity’s dogma (grace) in the Political world, brotherly equality, Fraternity, promise of Christianity: book of the People is yourself, myself (not women though)

DS pp. 184-90 true history, history of meaning, as told in Philebus:

1. book is a dialogue or dialectic, our soul resembles a book when we talk to ourselves, a false dialogue, w/out voice, deficient logos [compare to Husserl’s Bedeutung]

2. truth of the book is decidable, the book w/in the soul can be true, psychic writing must appear before tribunal of ontology & dialectics

3. value of the book (true/false) is not intrinsic to it, a span of writing (lespace écrit) worth nothing in itself, neutral, neither/nor, book as copy, reproduction, of inner speech

4. book as icon, phantasm, soul can be compared to book because each is the image or likeness of the other, logos shaped like eidos, book reproduces logos, specular process > at this point painting plays 2 roles: 1) zōgraphos comes after grammateus, makes portrait of innermost man’s discourse, only worth as much as logos that interprets it 2) painter restores naked image of thing, the image as it presents itself to simple intuition, its intelligible eidos > writer/painter supplement each other w/in tissue of following complicities: 1) both measured against truth 2) they are substitutable images of each other 3) they both partake of mnēmē by dint of participating in mimēsis

p. 223 mime mimes a kind of writing, is himself written in a kind of writing, nothing of what is can lie beyond medium/speculum reading-writing > there is 1) writing w/out book, marking tip (la pointe du trait) proceeds w/out past upon virgin sheet 2) infinite number of booklets in other booklets > Mallarmé reads, writes while reading, while reading text written by Mime, who himself reads in order to write

p. 234 Mallarmé’s book is a block composed of sheets of paper—its “cubic perfection” is open, impossibility of closure, dehiscence as “internal” theater, practice of spacing put in play

p. 259n lèvreslivre

p. 261 hymen, one of those “beneficent figures” engendered by “the opposition btwn the closed and the open”: i.e. the fan, the book, the dancer

p. 281 glassed-in library, open tombs [Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Z…]

POS pp. 3-4 Derrida’s “books" are entirely consumed by reading of other texts, while also referring only to its own writing: we must conceive these contradictory ideas together [deconstruction of book]

pp. 13-4 no end of the book, no beginning of writing, writing puts archie in question

PP pp. 72-3 pharmakon linked to book (biblia), empirical practices, not necessary, writing is open to chance

——problem of writing linked to problem of “knowing by heart” [speech] > need pharmakon, biblia, if one has not learned speech by heart

——pharmakon is but a formula learned by heart, dead, rigid knowledge shut up (enfermé) in biblia, foreign to living knowledge and dialectic

ROP p. 72 edges of book: approach as 1st border (1st pages of a book), end as other border

FS p. 302n translation of Hegel not finished (thank the Lord!): thus explaining Proust, Joyce, Faulkner > Flaubert feared Hegel, rightfully so; Mallarmé, uniquely, approached Hegel: [why he (alone) knew he couldn’t complete the book?]

p. 8 “pure book turns toward Eastern edge of this absence [Blanchot’s pure absence]…is its first and proper content”

——pure book must be about nothing (Flaubert, Artaud)

pp. 9-10, 303-04n God of Leibniz does not know the anguish of choice, only one book distributed through all books, God’s Will always chooses the “best”

——for Leibniz, no tragedy of the book, only one Book, this same Book is distributed throughout all books [cf. Theodicy pp. 375-78]

——writing, not a determined pathos, an empirical state of writer, but responsibility of angustia: [Derrida is privileging a power of equivocality over creativity of classical God, anguish connoting a narrowing, a loss of breath, a restriction, constraint, and thus the anguish of choice]

——to write: 1) not only to conceive Leibnizian book as an impossible possibility (as Mallarmé names the limit) 2) ce n'est pas seulement savoir que le Livre n'existe pas et qu'à jamais il y a des livres où (se) brise, avant même d'avoir été un, le sens d'un monde impensé par un sujet absolu [the English translation of this sentence fails to capture the sense of the books themselves shattering] 3) nor is it to have lost the certainty of pages binding themselves into a “book of reason” 4) not only to know that the non-written can’t be relegated to having no basis by the obliging negativity of some dialectic 5) not only to know that through writing the best may not transpire 6) it is the impossibility of making meaning precede writing: it is to lower meaning while elevating inscription

——absence & haunting of divine sign (Jewish God) [cf. GOD], anguish of Hebraic ruah (pneuma), regulates modern books/criticism/aesthetics

p. 24 structuralist reading > presupposes/appeals to theological simultaneity of the book

p. 25 Mallarmé unrealized unity of Book by making conceptual categories securing it tremble

O p. 13 time as time of preface, space as space of preface > preface: entire location & duration of book

p. 29n Kierkegaard: blank spaces, voids btwn books, empty expanse btwn Teutons > write what you will

p. 36 the 2 fictions: 1) when fiction is in service of meaning, truth is (truth of) fiction, it is low on a hierarchy, accessory to concept 2) fiction outside mimetologism affirms itself as simulacrum, disorganizes all oppositions to which teleology of book sought to violently subordinate it

p. 44 book as Logos, Model, nature, book of life, absolute adequation of presence

——preface’s (double inscription’s) semantic envelopment in Book (representative of ontotheology, absolute knowledge) > restance (left-overness) of its textual exteriority should not be confused w/ Book’s physical thickness

p. 45 MOP as effacement or sublimation of seminal differance, restance of outwork gets internalized, domesticated into ontotheology of great book

p. 46 acc. Claudel, all finite books opuscules of great divine opus

pp. 52-3 if nature is the book, how could there be both, don’t we have to decide btwn is and and, or find a mute conjunction to think book/nature together (cum) as set?

——sense of fulfillment by way of copula (is) means nature is incomplete, needs a book to complete itself: closure of library articulates itself and turns on this hinge (gond): logic, rather graphics, of supplement

p. 54 adventurous excess of writing not improv., throw of dice doesn’t contradict rigorous necessity of its “formal assemblage”: unity of chance & rule, program and its leftovers or extra (son reste ou de son surplus) [literature or book: atheistic face of this play, conflagration achieved, final clause located sur la tranche du livre fermé]

p. 55 Mallarmé: lift a corner of the veil, fragment of total book—scintillate (the whole that’ll never be)

p. 56 beneath form of its protocolic block, preface is everywhere, it’s bigger than the book

p. 59 if you wanna see for yourself, encounter by chance, enmeshed (engrenés) in some corner (coin), ce quil en est de la coupe or/livre

RGE p. 276 absurd for transgression of Book by writing to be legible only in a determined sense

EJQB p. 67 autochthons of the Book (poet, Jew)

***p. 75 book is never finite, tout devra habiter le livre (everything enters into, passes through, transpires in the book) [nothing outside the text], remains suffering and vigilant (veilleuse)

p. 76 to be is to-be-in-the-book (être-dans-le-livre), book only threatened by nothing, if it came to be, the threat, it would be of the house and of the book

——question w/in unity of book welcomes all contradictions, affirmations, questions > a logic like no other

——Jabès knows the book is possessed & threatened

p. 77 born only by approaching book, die only by failing (échouant) in sight of book > toujours la rive impassible du livre est d’abord

——the Book as epoch of Being (epoch coming to an end, the glow of Being in agony, a multiplication of the end, “garrulous and tenacious hypermnesia of certain moribunds,” books about the dead book)

——Being radically outside book, its letter? > Being reveals itself only in illegibility (illisibilité)?

——radical illisibilité belongs to the book, very possibility of it > such illegibility not an accomplice of lost (sought after) legibility, of a page not yet cut from divine encyclopedia

p. 78 books are always books of life, or of afterlife > written questions addressed to literature are forgotten, drained, by literature (mortifications, ruses of life, life negating itself in literature to survive): writing would die of pure vigilance to question (and also simple erasure of question)

——absolute interrogation (of God) will never belong to the book

CIN pp. 7-8 [on structure of CIN] graphic space opened to multiple readings—in traditional, protected form of book

——each time it gives a different reading, another gift, dealing out a new hand all over again

OG p. 8 (18) death of book announces death of full speech, announces exhaustion of language’s archon [speech], as if language now seen as a species of writing, as a (short) 3000 year adventure: announces new mutation in history of writing

pp. 14-5 (26-7) signified–immediate; signifier–mediate (exterior)

——writing as metaphoricity itself: a simulated immediacy; w/in logocentrism: bad writing is finite, artificial, sensible; good writing is infinite, soul-writing, Book of God (natural)

p. 16 (28) [quotes re: book of Nature]

p. 17 (29) Rousseau: to “judge genius” from books is like “painting a man’s portrait from his corpse”; Derrida: writing in the common sense is the dead letter, exhausts life, carrier of death

p. 18 (30-1) book as idea of totality, encyclopedia, requires external signified, is against writing and its aphoristic energy

——violence on both sides: logocentrism (book), deconstruction (text)

p. 26 (41) though [eschatological] Hegel reappropriates trace in absolute knowledge, he is also the thinker of irreducible difference, last writer of book, first of writing > reintroduced necessity of written trace in philosophy, rehabilitated thought as the memory productive of signs

pp. 332-33n André Leroi-Gourhan’s vision of a vast ‘tape-library’ w/ an electronic selection system, beyond the book, beyond the linear [:)] [baby daddy]

pp. 86-7 end of linear writing (epic model) is end of the book: “because we are beginning to write, to write differently, we must reread differently”

pp. 133-34 Rousseau & Lévi-Strauss on books piling, filled w/ lies; book of nature: look, don’t read

EU p. 77 [re: use of word “translation” to refer to “transposition, transfer, transport” in a sense not strictly linguistic] for Schelling, language is a living phenomenon; Novalis, Goethe: nature an author to be translated w/ skill of a philologist

——Schelling: “nature is like some very ancient author whose message is written in hieroglyphics on colossal pages” [geologic?]

FV p. 484 “in” a library, in books, everything begins, thus nothing begins, only dérive, disorientation—from which one does not emerge [nothing outside text]

BORDER (

GT pp. 36-37 is madness the movement of the circle or its excess? besieges reason at its 2 borders (inside & outside)

——linked to double bind (stricture, ligature, obligation) > absolve, forget absolutely & forgive by giving (lier et délier absolument)

p. 81 question of the “come” of the “come back” will invaginate, efface, all borders, will redouble endlessly ambivalence of gift as good or bad, gift or poison (Gift-gift)

p. 91 what is a border (bord) or an approach (aborder) once the indivisibility of the trait is no longer secure (assurée)? gift will always be w/out border

——gift overruns border & suspends its relation to border, is beyond transgression

p. 98 “another border already divided itself in indefinite abyssal supplements”

LOBL p. 77 over the border: into the language of the other

pp. ~82-3 pose question of bord, bord de mer, question of borderline preceding the determination of all dividing lines I just mentioned [i.e. the general bord before the contextual one?]

p. 99 impossible to tell which border forms the other, each comprehends the other by not comprehending the other > which one quotes the other?

H p. 61 “what constitutes a space of controlled and circumscribed property is just what opens it to intrusion,” monad of a home has to have windows, has to let in

pp. anne 54-6 step beyond border, threshold, because inability to mark a stable territory provokes thought

MSUB J p. 164 the subjectile’s strange borders, already crossed the border, or does it “institute itself the border itself is”—the border of “cross the border”

p. 171 Artaud breaking down barrier in the other “arts,” abolishes border btwn all these “arts”

MPM p. 71 thinking, not bereaved interiorization, thinks at boundaries, thinks the boundary, the limit of interiority

A pp. 1-2 as soon as truth is confined (determined to be finished) a border crossing does not seem impossible; there’s something else than truth, something better, truth is finite, cest fini

p. 3 [re: Diderot, Seneca, De la brièveté de la vie] borders w/ respect to death, borders of truth, borders of property

p. 9 shibboleth effect, untranslatability (essential incompleteness of translation), borders of untranslatability w/in original language itself

pp. 11-12 every border is problematic in sense of problēma (projection, dissimulation, shield, prosthesis put forth to represent, replace, shelter, hide something unavowable)

——border becomes a problem as soon as edge-line is threatened, a step crossing an indivisible line (customs, police, visa—all established upon institution of indivisible)

p. 15 border as limit (oros, Grenze, re: nun or Jetzt [now-point] Heidegger underlines) or border as tracing (grammē, Linie)

pp. 17-8 two types of border: 1) border that passes among contents (things, objects, referents: countries, states, nations, cultures, etc.) 2) border that passes btwn a concept (singularly that of duty) and its other, acc. to bar of oppositional logic

p. 18 decision concerns choice btwn relation w/ a wholly non-opposable other (an other that’s not its other) and an other who is its other (can be opposed in a couple) > the former relation is that of aporia, not a crossing of border but a double concept of the border

p. 20 the 2 versions of aporia’s nonpassage: 1) impermeable, only opens via shibboleth, closed borders (i.e. during war) 2) impasse of no limit, limit too porous, no opposition btwn 2 sides

p. 23 mobile slash btwn and/or, and/and, or/and, or/or: a singular border, simultaneously disjunctive, conjunctive, undecidable

pp. 23-4 “my death,” a flashing light at every border, it’s awake, can always see a nightwatchman (du veilleur) or a nightlight (de la veilleuse)

——in crossing a border, one changes/exchanges death (on change le mort, on change de mort), one passes from figure of death as trespass (passage of line, transgression of border, pas au-delà) to another figure of border btwn life and death

——every culture characterized by way of its dealing w/, its “living” death as trespass

pp. 26-7 Heidegger distinguishes death of Dasein from its end (Ende), from its maturation or ripeness (Reife), Dasein don’t need to mature when death occurs, not a final maturity, not an limit end, a telos, terma, a border > Dasein is very transgression of this borderline

——for Heidegger, death cannot be enclosed w/in sexual borders (which crisscross cultural, linguistic, national, religious borders)

p. 29 Heidegger’s hierarchy, desire to think death properly, division btwn ontic & ontological, imposes pure, rigorous, indivisible borders, borders that are crossed but shouldn't be

pp. 33-5 absolute arrivant: singularity of “who” arrives or neutrality of that which arrives

——not an invader, invasion presupposes some self-identity, arrivant does not cross a threshold separating two identifiable borders

——border most difficult to delineate: that the arrivant makes possible everything it cannot be reduced to

——border of absolute arrivant keeps one from discriminating btwn figures of arrivant > the dead, the revenant (the ghost, he or she that returns)

pp. 43-4 difference of animal/human, biological life/culture is the relation to death as such, true border would be there

pp. 52-3 [via Heidegger’s performative incision, decision, “here”] figure of border, line between here & beyond (len-deça et lau-delà) re: death, survival, immortality, beyond

p. 55 for Heidegger, belief in immortality is secondary to being-toward-death, an affirmation of an originary finitude Hegel thought he reversed in Kant

——Heidegger’s on Kant’s side, on this side of finitude > didn’t Hegel want to show unilaterality of border, and that one is already on the other side of the here? [hymen]

***pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (narrivent quà seffacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

p. 76 non-access to death where access is only to the threshold, pas, approach to border

PP p. 102 how can supplementary parasite be excluded by maintaining boundary or triangle?

pp. 123-24 acc. Plato in Laws, Socrates never left the city, never crossed borders, kept his word in the city, under surveillance of mother tongue, didn’t leave it open to errancy, to writing

p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

P (I) p. 14 beyond the divide between performative and constative, dans ces parages where border line trembles

PAS PAS pp. (52-3) (transgressive, completely passive) pas enacts a crossing of border that leaves border unscathed (indemne): bord sans bord, w/out any dialectical reappropriation

p. (88) all paradoxes de la marge, de la marche, de la limite multiply when they are determined as borders (en bords)

——it’s on the border that everything arrives, just misses arriving, or misses le bord darriver > il ny a pas de bord en soi [there’s no border in itself]

p. (89) border of approach dissimulates itself w/out presenting itself elsewhere

——le désir de toucher au bord a eu lieu (has taken place), the touching has not, not arrived at its term, sa rive, sa marge ou son bord, sa berge (bank) (ce qui garde et met à labri, contre une chute ou une noyade)

p. (99) border edge, hidden vicinity (un voisinage caché) [not depth]

VP p. 30 Husserl draws a border btwn language itself, btwn express and non-express in language, not btwn language and non-language

PPHS p. 81 “why this relation between sign and truth?” a question which brings us to external border of the closure of metaphysics [from “what does?” to “why?”]

SH p. 32 a border is never natural

FWT p. 151 quaking of borders, their permeability, their undecidability [re: DP/suicide]

***WM p. 226n Heidegger: once distinction of sensible/non-sensible (the distinction by which metaphor is defined) is deemed inadequate, metaphysics loses its rank as authoritative thought: “metaphorical exists only w/in the borders of metaphysics”

ROP p. 72 edges of book: approach as 1st border (1st pages of a book), end as other border

p. 77 where else but on border do questions of topology get asked, and why else than that the border is not indivisible? risky for historian to assign taking place of event to a borderline

TR p. 93 it [re: Rousseau’s Confessions] precedes acc. substitution of one border for another: in this parergonal composition, in game of interlocking frames, we find mark of 2 limits: 1) crossing from Protestantism to Catholicism 2) [2x last word] last word of the other, last word of self

***WAP p. 138 to neglect Hegel’s functional letter (“Report”) [as parergonal] a failure to move beyond prestatist problematics of education > a refusal to identify borders, exterior, a refusal to transform and transgress

REST p. 331 comes down to a decision about the frame, a border (bordure) which is double in its trait: joins together what it splits (partage): “at stake are (il y va) all the interests caught up in the trial (procès) of this split (partage),” what separates external from internal

p. 339 for Heidegger, the picture is doubly useless, depicts, “shows,” being-products that’re out-of-service, w/out use-value > multiple edge(s) (bordures) detach being-product from subjective scope (portée subjective), simultaneously baiting (inducing/luring) reattachment of subjective scope

——edge (bordure) less simple when turned inside out [invaginated?], not simple at all w/ the lace & the hemmed holes (trous bordés), the eyelets comme lieu de passage [figure of decapitation here too]

PJP p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

p. 187 anacoluthon’s metonymy blurs/complicates all frontiers, instigates all substitutions

PSSS pp. 245-46 psychoanalysis has failed to say anything original about mondialisation, tele-technic virtuality—has resisted, in autoimmune fashion, changing, thinking through, fundamental axioms of ethics, law, politics > must be a revolution re: concepts cruelty, sovereignty, resistance

D p. 355 to write means to graft (same word), each grafted text radiates toward the site of its removal, sy régénèrent dans la répétition, à la bordure dun surjet (overcast seam)

——discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

+R p. 164 angle, biting (mordant) into the border

LI pp. 152-53 though nothing exists outside context, limit of frame/border of context always entails nonclosure: outside penetrates, thus determines, inside

TN p. 289 limit, border (bord), which are nothing, make any gift possible

ATM p. 144 no utterance ever cut from all context, context never annulled w/out remainder: one negotiates w/ les effets de bord, incl. nonnegotiable, that which overflows (déborde) all context

E pp. 20-1 [re: internal, exemplorality of mouth’s auto-affection] what is not regulated by exemplorality, what is its bord ou le débord absolu? > the border which traces limit/frame of its parergon? the border that doesn’t enter into this framed, hierarchized, regulated theory? what is excluded & what gives form to exemplorality proceeding from this exclusion? [can’t be named]

EW p. 270 ex-appropriation does not form a boundary (a closure or a negativity), never totalizes itself, irreducibility of relation to other

WOG p. 35 undecidability found a certain privilege in ‘Greek’ words, in philosophy, on [sur?] its borders, that is, beyond its confines [pharmakon, hymen, parergon]

UWS p. 236 sovereign mastery of interior > [indivisible] border of inside/outside vs. divisible limit, because divisible, it has a history > the divisible limit is the limit of the impossible, the perhaps

EU pp. 97-8 to ensure philosophy’s power-to-think-and-judge, Kant draws linear/indivisible border in language (language: that which opens passage to all parasites/simulacrum): [the professor utters only constative], university has no executive power, professor speaks w/out action, does not speak publicly > Kant makes information technology [that which escapes university] philosophy’s most faithful representative—but only as a reserved, intra-university, quasi-private language [before the law of this apparent paradox ultimate responsibility should be taken today]

p. 105 Kant’s “heroic” effort to mark off juridical borders btwn 2 classes of [university] faculties > freedom of judgment, philosophy, the unconditioned condition w/out which there is no university

p. 106 Kant’s strict separation of knowledge (truth) & power (action) distinguishes sets in excess of themselves, covering the whole of which they’re supposed to be only a part > whole forms poche invaginée in every part or subset (sous-ensemble): intestine division, folding partition inside space

pp. 212-13 ontological-encyclopedic hegemony/structure, univerticality, tends to immobilize all recognized borders > all-powerful & powerless (destiny of philosophy subjected to State power)

——CIPH will outline different topology: horizontal, transversal, heterogenous > experiment

FV p. 484 border negligible for hermeneut interested in the center

p. 485n coincidence in Poe; point is to show that due to structure of effects of framing—no totalization of bordering can occur: frame always enframed, parts w/out a whole

BREACHING (FRAYAGE, ENTAMER)

PP pp. 135-36 writing stripped of its path-breaking force, pure repetition, dead repetition, tautological, hollow, repetition of death > writing is not living repetition of the living

p. 154 seed must submit to logos, do violence to itself, since sperm is opposed to law of logos > when Plato turns live speech into psychic graphē he does so w/ a problematic of truth: lécriture en tè psuchè nest pas une écriture de frayage, mais seulement denseignement, de transmission, écriture daletheia

S p. 104 fire-writing, flame writes, writes itself, right in the flame (à même la flamme) > a Riss, frayage of this trait, a mark that leads spirit on the way to soul, pursues soul in way opened by its fire, trait de conflagration, lesprit en-flammetrace la route, il fraye la voie

FSW p. 200 breaching, Bahnung, frayage (tracing of a trail, also pathbreaking)

——Derrida describes Freud’s development from Project to “Note on Mystic Writing-Pad” > Wunderblock, a solution to problematic of breaching (metaphorics of written trace)

p. 201 for both Freud & Nietzsche, psychē requires difference in exertion of forces, no breaching w/out difference

p. 202 for Freud, deferral, detour (Aufschub), death at origin of life [already death drive] defending itself against death via economy of death, the attempt to douse the pain of an original breach

p. 204 breaching concerns forces & locations, Freud has to reinvent the concept of spacing

pp. 204-05 Freud invents ω neurones btwn ϕ and Ψ to account for that which understands quality, temporality in spacing, that which perceives the period, the break

p. 205 when Freud renounces neurology & anatomical localizations, trace becomes gramme, and region of breaching, a ciphered spacing

——Freud persists in accounting for psyche in terms of spacing, topography of traces, map of breaches

p. 214 supplementary delay, pathbreaking, subterranean toil, mole-like

——when breaching, breaking of path, becomes route (via rupta) opened in nature, in wood (hyle) [see p. 229] > violent inscription of form opposed to writing, route acquires reversibility in time & space

p. 226 if there were only perception, pure permeability of breaching, there would be no breaches (frayages), no legible writing, but pure perception does not exist: nous ne sommes écrits quen écrivants

F p. xx [angular] partitions [w/in Self] of crypt: fractures into angular pieces, arranges (aménage) cavities, corridors, zigzag labyrinths, anfractuosities, craggy (escarpées) fortifications > effects of breakages (cassures); requires light in darkness to shine on inner partition of splintered symbol (intrasymbolic not cosymbolic): each fragment conscious to itself, unconscious to ‘non-crypt’

DS p. 270 si le texte à la lettre nexiste pas, there is (il y a), perhaps, a text, en marche, avec lequel il faut frayer

P p. 146 glas et galactique du colossos, the bridge [tree?] over the abyss which threatens to swallow everything, interval btwn dynamic/mathematical sublime, on edge of which analytic of sublime is broached (sentame): whirlpool heaves/tears tree into la dissemence laiteuse (the question is the cipher writing on the surface of nature)

ROP p. 72 Foucault’s pathbreaking (frayage) History of Madness, like all frayage, does so at a price, bolting shut (verrouillant) other passages, ligaturing, suturing, comprimant, réprimant dautres veines

ATIA p. 157 Aristotle’s non-apophantic logos (neither enunciative nor declarative): euchē, prayer, entreaty, requesting; for Derrida, these would open breach in whole apparatus [of “as such”?]

FS p. 27 “fall” of thought into philosophy, analogical displacement of Being which anchors (retient) and irremediably represses discourse in metaphysics, gets history under way (est entamée)

DIF DIF p. 18 Spur and Bahnung in Freud: inseparable from differance, no breach w/out difference, no difference w/out trace: movement of trace, in Freud, a protection, deferring danger by constituting a reserve (Vorrat) > each of Freud’s concepts a detour in economy of differance

p. 21 it’s domination of beings (Being as presence or beingness) that differance solicits, questions, makes tremble in entirety: question emerges where ontological difference is broached (souvre)

O p. 25 “broach/breach (entamer),” “differance,” “gramme,” “trace,” “hymen,” “de-limitation,” “pharmakon,” “supplement,” “mark-march-margin”

p. 26 dissemination blows up (saute) security of point, arrested in name of the law: it is at the risk, to risk this blowup (to make this jump, faire sauter) that dissemination broaches/has been broached

Gi p. 12 Heidegger pursues irreplaceable pathways (frayages)—inaccessible to common translation

Gii p. 56 for Heidegger, philosophy & science never attain the parallelism, the cutting/breaching (into one another), of thinking/philosophy (Denken) & poetry (Dichten)

RM p. 74 entame (breach/broach incision) best approaches translation of Aufriss (rift-design), le trait (Riss) dune entame, dune ouverture traçante, frayante, a non-voluntary decision > other French translations of Aufriss: gravure (engraving), tracé-ouvrant (opening sketch)

——entamées, les deux parallèles se coupent à linfini, se recoupent, sentaillent: each one [Denken and Dichten] signs in some way in the body of the other, the one in the place (au lieu) of the other: sign there the contract w/out contract of their neighborhood

p. 75 the trait of lentame (breaching-broaching incision) marks Ereignis as propriation, event of propriation (not an originary instance prior/proper to the 2 quil entame et allie)

PF p. xvii paralysis arrests: negative symptom of aporia > whereas aporia is possibility of impossible, of “play,” very condition of pas, experience of frayage, marche, via rupta [elsewhere Derrida deconstructs becoming route?], decision, event, coming of other: writing & desire

EJQB p. 64 acc. Jabès, poetic discourse est entamé dans une blessure (takes root in a wound)

AFR pp. 61-2 genius as trailblazing (frayage); Condillac: “we do not properly create any ideas; we only combine, by composing & decomposing” > Condillac still distinguishes genius (gives birth to new science, new branch, new art) from talent

——combinative concept of generation indispensable for Condillac’s critique of innatism: innatists choose btwn classifying innate ideas (calculus) & empiricism of genesis (engendering)

pp. 108-09 to introduce (not saturate, not intrude [sintroduire]): seduce the text (not the reader), surprise it close to its content > a rigorous “abyss”

——follow lines, grafts, borders, ribs: analyze its machine of oppositions, its program, and what breaches the program, defeats its teleology, undecides its circle: suspend text on one of its nervures après-coupées (cut-after-the-fact-ribs)

pp. 118-19 frivolity (useless) is the congenital breach of sign (its entame, archē), since structure of sign’s deviation ensures frivolity has no origin, frivolity defies archeology, condemns it to frivolity: excessive relief, not even money or merchandise > sign’s disposability never presents itself

p. 132 the frivolous: (time of a) difference (of degree), spacing which ontology isn’t capable of, con-, de-struction are breached, line of disintegration (not straight/continuous/regular); philosophy deviates from itself, strikes itself w/ blows from outside > deconstruction is possible

PJP p. 181 acolyte, anacolytic, anakolouthia, analytic figure: as much an analyst as a breach, interruption> a rupture in a set (contract), be it that of friendship, community, being-together

PSSS p. 271 it is necessary to cultivate (it is necessary for an “it is necessary” to take shape: ethical/juridical/political obligation) an economy of detour & difference: strategy, path, pathbreaking, road, even a method > “indirect” way of combatting cruelty drive

D p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

p. 302 pure present: la plénitude inentamée, la continuité vierge de la non-coupure (not yet having been written, à la veille du jeu)

p. 304 “primitive” mythical unity always reconstituted retrospectively dans laprès-coupure > the decision, le coup (shot, throw, blow) parts the seed as it projects it (partage la semence en la projetant)

——numerical multiplicity not death threat sneaking up on unified germ, it pathbreaks (fraye la voie) for “the” seed (semence), which advances/produces (itself) in plural: singular plural

PPT p. 11 trait never appears, never itself—contracts in its retreat? marks the difference of form/content of the appearing

——lentame of the origin: opens, w/ trace, w/out initiating anything

+R pp. 173-74 this [chromatic] tr, which works inside & outside language, is not logocentrism, not a consecration of analogy, not a hypercratylean theory of language: what’s at stake is violence & the arbitrary > it breaches (fraye) an entirely different body

LI pp. 61-2 idealization (identity in repetition) is made possible by iterability, while broaching/breaching (entame) the idealization at once > iterability alters, contaminates, what it identifies

p. 71 iterability can be supplemented by differance, grapheme, trace > cannot be idealized, makes idealization possible but never pure, simple: iterability has an internal impure limit, prevents it from being identified, synthesized, reappropriated by that whose iteration it entame

p. 78 “from the inception on (dès l’entame) as broached and breached (entamée) in its “origin” by iterability” [re: “-bility”]

p. 100 or, or rather, even parentheses, i.e. “citation (iterability)” > not genus/species, not identity, classical logic fractured in its code, parasitic contamination entame all these relations, which is why words have to be qualified, supplemented by others

p. 107 iterability at once condition/limit of mastery: entame it

OG p. 46 (67-8) science, asleep, uncritical re: tradition it inherits, this sleep the assured means of breaching (dentamer) the deconstruction of la plus grande totalité: epistémè, metaphysical logocentrism

——deconstruction clarifies dream rather than allowing itself to be clarified by it [?]

p. 92 (139) theory, what unites science & philosophy in epistémè, tends toward filling in the breach rather than toward forcing the closure (plutôt à colmater les brèches quà forcer la clôture)

p. 143 (206) differance, breathing space, finitude, death makes presence/absence possible: makes possible very thing it makes impossible, produces what it forbids: non-satisfaction (inassouvissement)

——begins par entamer alienation, ends by leaving reappropriation entamée

p. 154 (222) supplement is maddening, it breaches/broaches (entame) our pleasure and our virginity [hymen]

p. 306 (432) Rousseau’s bonne fête > theater w/out representation, nothing to see since visibility entame la voix vivante; bonne fête: general will, sovereignty of social contract [signifier, la mort de la fête]

EU p. 8 method: following the road; odos, becoming-road of a path; “clearing (frayage)” as the presumed “metaphor” of method as figure for the path or road (via rupta) as language

p. 23 violence comes from both sides, each term of opposition marked by other side (not simply passage btwn 2 poles): law/nonlaw, writing/speech, death/life, paternal/maternal language): always 2 forces of frayage and resistance: each bearing life/death at once

p. 119 Derrida has untiringly striven to contest idea that deconstruction is an abusive deformation or metaphorical usage of current notions of writing, text, trace > frayage always requires transforming/deforming authorized relationship btwn word/concept, btwn trope & supposed proper meaning

p. 220 [CIPH] style of university: pathbreaking, trailblazing (frayage, fléchage)

SPEC p. 84 detour, Umweg, breaks open the path (frayage) > Freud does not interrogate the graphics of the différant detour for itself (can it ever be for itself?)

p. 346-47 neither permanent traces nor resistance in [Freud’s] Perception-Consciousness (free circulation of energy w/out obstacle or binding), permanent trace supposes frayage (Bahnung) and an overcome resistance

FV p. 444 dissemination threatens law of signifier & castration as contract of truth, dissemination entame unity of signifier, i.e. the phallus

CAESURA

GT p. 29 gap (écart) btwn thought, language and desire & philosophy, knowledge and science does not exist, gap btwn gift & economy: resembles an empty word or transcendental illusion

——perhaps analogy to Kant’s noumenal & phenomenal will help us

SH p. 6 “caesura is the law”: gathers in the discretion of the discontinuous, in the cutting in of relation to other, interruption of address as address itself

p. 29 ellipsis & caesura of discretion [Blanchot] inhabit the shibboleth (Joyce), it fascinates, seduces ——shibboleth as the cipher of the cipher: ciphered manifestation of the cipher, emerges from nonmeaning, and keeps itself in reserve

——cipher can conceal secret, which it shelters in its readability, w/out the slightest hidden attention > there’s nothing it can do about it [why/who interpret(s) secret as a taunting gesture?]

p. 43 ellipsis, discontinuity, caesura, discretion cannot be sublated (aufgehoben) > no dialectic of sense-certainty can reassure the matter of archive’s safekeeping

p. 49 poet is provoked, constituted, by the hour, its caesuras > poetic rhythm or spacing at heart of origin of meaning, meaning of language

DST DST p. 202 imprint and caesura, sharp-edged signature (empreinte et césure, la signature aiguë), interrupts most powerful filiations > ineluctably: when tradition can’t secure what it repeats as its own traditionality (exemplarity, repetition, identification, imitation)

p. 230 no rhythm w/out caesura > antirhythmic [Hölderlin], arrhythmic

——interrupts alternation, constraint of opposition, even double bind [cf. p. 225]

——Lacoue-Labarthe: caesura is empty moment, intrusion of prophetic word (Tiresias)

——caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

PIO p. 24 invention only by recourse to lexicon, syntactical rules, prevailing code—a certain submission to conventions (a given configuration)

——the double, indivisible movement of invention: gives place (donne lieu) to an event and produces a machine by introducing a gap (écart) in habit; the “coming,” the venire, the event of novelty must surprise: no status ready/waiting to reduce it to the same

C p. 224 écart, tracé

p. 240 hiatus of series scores out (rature), in serial interlacing, reference to the other (I have called this seriature [cf. ATM]), to the other’s other > simulacrum of reference, supplementary folds

AD p. 118 Levinas’ ContraDiction, intimate caesura but also respiration of saying > non-dialectizable justice

CARL SCHMITT [fixerup]

GOD p. 203 Schmitt separates private and public too quickly

R p. 101 Schmitt is right, a pure sovereignty (decisionist exceptionality) is indivisible or not at all, it’s ahistorical, withdraws from language, does not exist > incompatible w/ universality & internationality that always calls for it

HERP p. 199 for Schmitt, being-toward-death occurs in the political, which requires an enemy

p. 204 difference btwn Schmitt & Heidegger: polemos is everything for both but it’s not a “human war” for Heidegger [see also pp. 211-12 can Heideggerian hearing of Kampf be distinguished from [Nazi] regime? if strategy re: decision is not formalizable—is this still not a war economy?]

POOF p. 68 Schmittian decisionism implies the instance of the subject > a classic, free, willful subject to whom nothing can happen, not even an exceptional event [?]

pp. 84, 107n Schmitt’s Nazism as part of his lucidity, the courage of his fear, his attunement to all border-crossings he needed to repress > some surprising filiations btwn Marxist & Schmittian thought

FWT p. 91 Schmitt always good for problematizing “juridical,” “political”

CARL SCHMITT

R p. 10 a sovereign event always ends the indefinite deliberation of democracy

p. 17 by killing father Cronos (infinite order of time), Zeus wills out over time, touches the finitude of time, sovereignty as the instant of a decision, end to time and language

POOF p. 127 would the decision be free or not? active or passive? conscious or unconscious? is the decision always linked to oblivion itself?

pp. 127-28 for Schmitt, exception is the rule linked to thought of ‘real possibility’: a case, situation, an eventuality arises only exceptionally > an event is always exceptional

——the less there’s war/killing, the more it becomes exceptional: real possibility of killing tends to be infinite > war remains the decisive ordeal (épreuve), krinein of crisis, the ‘Ernstfall,’ the discrimen, the decision discriminates

pp. 128-29 Derrida links logic of Schmitt’s decisionism to Nietzsche’s teleiopoetic, quasi-messianic perhaps: its actual/effective unveiling need only be possible for it to occur > thus, decisionism is haunted by law of spectrality

***FL p. 274 revolutionary instant vs. or as the exceptional decision

pp. 274-75 figure of revolutionary instant, exceptional decision, which metaphorizes an anterior law, is also a contamination > effaces, blurs distinction btwn foundation/preservation

DPi pp. 83-4 Schmitt: “Sovereign is he who decides on (über) the exception” > ambiguity of über: does sovereign decide in an exceptional situation or on what must be considered an exceptional situation? given the context, Derrida thinks the sovereign decides on what is an exceptional situation > affirming/ proving he is sovereign

——for Schmitt, only by limit concept of exception can we think purity of decision, the exception “thinks the general w/ intense passion”

p. 84 Schmitt’s sovereign—structurally theological

p. 85 no general sovereignty (profound and consistent nominalism of Schmitt) > there is only a sovereign, an individual singularity that is itself exceptional

p. 86 since sovereign has right to suspend law, he authorizes absolute maintenance of DP: this performative power cannot be juridical: to create law (droit) don’t need the law (droit) > a-legal

p. 87 in POOF, I attempted, let’s say, to “deconstruct” Schmitt—the sovereign—this a-legal position > inaugural, founding act of constitution (suspended from & at the constitution [à la constitution]) > on the date

——Schmitt, significantly, says his theory is not a theory of state but a theory of the political, the founding of the constitution (Verfassungslehre) (theory of state presupposes theory of the political)

pp. 88-9n one must be a theologian to understand Schmitt’s sovereign exception > decision = miracle (a decision outside norms that invents its own law is a miracle)

p. 90 the exception of “political crime” is not always easy to determine

***pp. 258-59 phantasm of infinitization at heart of finitude [dream of a verdict, the putting an end to finitude], theologico-political, an infinitization of survival assured by calculation itself, by cutting decision of DP, phantasm is one w/ God, belief in God

p. 275 Kant: Der Gesetzgeber ist heilig

AD pp. 23, 135-36n that decision & responsibility are always of the other, the making unconscious of the Schmittian sovereign decision (cf. POOF 68-9), not how Levinas would put it

p. 73 question of borders, question of Israel

CF pp. 45-6 right of grace, order of law above law (right beyond right): monarch’s divine right to pardon transcends/neutralizes the law > this [sovereign exception] has been reappropriated into republican heritage

——transcendental principle of system doesn’t belong to it > as foreign to it as an exception

BSi p. 33 by its essence, every decision sovereign & exceptional, escapes order of the possible, the programmable, makes distinction btwn a deciding decision and an undecided one undecidable > supposed decision looks like indecision, nonintention, unconscious, irrational > sovereign looks like the beast

p. 43 Schmitt sees Hobbes as decisionist theorist of sovereignty

p. 49 theory of exception impossible as philosophical theory, but thought of exception is necessary

p. 173 sovereign decision, mad and bête

CALCULATION

GOD p. 62 ethical must sometimes be refused in name of responsibility that doesn’t calculate, that keeps its secret, that tyrannically [Nietzsche], jealously refuses violence of accounts and justifications, declining autobiography that is auto-justification: egodicée

p. 106 the 2 economies: 1) calculation, Judaic 2) dissymetric economy of sacrifice, “beyond the totality of the calculable as a finite totality of the same,” renunciation of merchandise, still relies on giving back (rendre), on yield, profit, but only father who sees in secret [can calculate]

pp. 108-09 secret market of secrecy, “Christianity’s stroke of genius,” says Nietzsche, merchandise, give credit to the infinite [denounce all calculation & still yield surplus-value]

pp. 155-56 several meanings of vous avez raison: 1) animal rationale (logon ekhon) 2) know how to count, account, principle of reason, we are men of knowledge, good narrators 3) our calculation has prevailed, we have controlled (arraisonné) (the other) by reasoning

GT pp. 15-16 be careful, ethically vigilant re: gift w/out debt, there’s calculation & ruse (economy) even in the unconscious

——forgetting of gift must be far more radical than repression, which always consists of keeping by exchanging places, its operation is systematic or topological

p. 148 perversity can always secretly corrupt the “donner raison à lautre”: ratio, logos, is on your side [re: “Counterfeit Money”], what counts, can be counted, you took maximum pleasure

——link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

p. 171 a gift is not signed, does not calculate w/ a time that would do it justice

R pp. 48-9 democracy’s antinomy: equality introduces measure and calculation, freedom is unconditional, heterogeneous to calculation and measure > incalculable, incommensurable, unconditional equality [?]

pp. 84-85 no justice, neither political nor ethical, when following calculated law like automatic machine

FK p. 90 knowledge & faith, technoscience & religion, alliance of calculable and incalculable

FL p. 244 law is the element of calculation

p. 257 incalculable justice commands calculation

p. 252 judge—calculating machine, decision to calculate is not of the order of the calculable

p. 253 can we ever know if a decision has not been calculated?

p. 257 madness of justice: the incalculable and giving idea of justice is close to the bad, the worst, can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation > assurance against the worst will only suture the opening

p. 264 deconstruction is impossible possibility, [possible would make it calculable]; never applies itself to anything from the outside, auto-heterodeconstruction, open wound of such a signature

MC p. 347 calculating capacity of language: numerous indices, schematic idea of how to reach each other

POO pp. 28-9 literature’s authorization to say everything acknowledges right to absolute nonresponse

——this nonresponse is hyperbolic condition of democracy (democracy to-come) contradicts historically limited democracy where calculable subject has to tell truth, has to reveal secret before the law (doctors, confession, psychoanalyst, lawyer, national defense)

SPOM p. 32 beyond morality, beyond juridicism, beyond right, w/out calculable insurance against evil > only way to do justice to other as other

****p. 82 w/out experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on justice and the event > this is more honest, giving up on good conscience, conceding to economic calculations installed at border of event

POR p. 14 (146) “information ensures the insurance of calculation and the calculation of assurance,” [apparently, according to Heidegger, Leibniz was the inventor of life insurance]

——in-formation does not just offer content, it gives form: “in-formiert

S p. 64 for Heidegger, there’s a resignation of spirit into intelligence (Intelligenz), understanding (Verständigkeit), calculation (Berechnung), mass distribution (massenhafte Verteilung); however, Heidegger, says Derrida, would not agree w/ Derrida’s structure of haunting—would be a resignation to calculating authority: Derrida does not agree w/ imaginary Heidegger

p. 66 silent play of quotation marks [re: spirit], Anführungsstriche, Anführungszeichen, “the hand calculates very fast,” Anführen, to conduct, dupe, brainwash, silent contrivances, fort/da, what shows or hides changes everything, and when one puts away after exhibiting, this is mise au pas (bringing to heel)

PPHS p. 105 Hegel critiques mute writing, released from voice, thus he critiques mathematical symbolism, operations of formal understanding

——acc. Hegel, silence of writing, space of calculation, interrupts movement of Aufhebung, interiorization of past (Erinnerung), history of spirit

pp. 107-08 [Hegel on calculation and machine] a “living,” “thinking,” “speaking” protest against repetition

SH p. 19 conventional forms of dating (charts, coded signs, spatiotemporal plottings, clocks, calendar) assign, consign, absolute singularity, must mark themselves off from themselves, a fatally equivocal power that enunciates the possibility of recurrence > not absolute recurrence (i.e. of the one time of circumcision/birth) but spectral recurrence of that which never will return

p. 52 a date “may give rise to calculations,” but it ceases to be calculable

F pp. xxxvi-xxxvii machinery of words, calculating shrewdness, mêkhanê, theater of words, autonomization of language > in The Magic Word who holds the dictionaries?

FWT p. 58 where calculation reaches its limit: play, possibility of play w/in calculating machines > arrival of other produces effects in machine, but can’t be calculated by them > we shouldn’t close our eyes to extraordinary progress of calculation, to the machine, while still giving over to exposure to, play of, the other > invent discourse capable of taking this into account

p. 151 given that DP revolves around equivalence of an eye for an eye, question of DP is not only about political onto-theology of sovereignty, but principle of reason as calculability

——DP as impossible evaluation of debt (Nietzsche says some strong things on subject)

POOF p. 16 act of faith (reliability of oath) must belong to what is incalcuable in decision [a passivity beyond enérgeia, stability (bébaios) of act in Aristotle’s lover over beloved]: break w/ calculable is ordained by structure of confidence or of credence as faith

——bébaios, stable & reliable, marks, covers over in marking, passage btwn 2 heterogenous orders: 1) assured calculable reliability 2) act of faith

pp. 19-21 via Aristotle, one must choose & prefer friends (election & selection), it takes time > for Aristotle, those who don’t have friends count friends among things (prágmata), possessions, the malevolent place friends in field of calculable hypothesis > yet, the choice of friends, that their # must be small, reintroduces #, calculation, into multiplicity of incalculable singularities: a certain aristocracy in arithmetic of the choice

p. 102 relation btwn friendship/democracy, approbation of greatest #? deployment of countable unity, of ‘one more’ subject > the 2 presumed calculable #s of democracy (from perspective of conventional/nominalist hesitation): 1) form of decision, greatest # of people 2) possibility of this decision: birth—the equivocal double equality (isonomy founded on isogony)

pp. 203-04 in Aristotle, honor saves friendship from calculation, from the market—still, it’s proportioned via hierarchy, a hierarchy as sacralization of the beginning, qua command (arkhé)

pp. 204, 206 via Aristotle, the just wage (gage), a fee, salary, 3rd party & common measure—war ensues wherever common measure & straight and narrow path recoils (se dérobe) [translator also translates the Chapter Title, Replis,” as recoils] > in these grievances, where calculation becomes incalculable, where I can’t count on you, there is no friend

pp. 214-15 that either address [re: omega ω] is addressed to someone will always expose utterance to undecidability because address to ‘someone’ presupposes the impossible: 1) neutral gender 2) ‘only one’ someone > for one person to receive a mark once, the mark must multiply, its iterability affirms plus dun (which allows & limits calculability), the 3rd party is there > there is never one, one is always more than one (w/ or w/out consent)

pp. 215-16 desire for one single friendship exposes possibility & impossibility of indivisible calculation: one time for all time(s) will never cease, immediately infinite in its finiteness, appears as such only in unceasing desire for repetition/multiplication [cf. Augustine in Confessions] > the subject, the ‘one’ friend is indivisible in its calculable identity, indivisible in its incalculable singularity, the one divides the other: it is here that the enemy is w/in the friend

P pp. 130-31 “pleasing-oneself-in” of sublime suspends play, elevates to seriousness, nur negativ, relates to moral law, both presuppose violence done to senses, w/ sublime violence done by imagination, not reason > imagination mutilates itself, conceals itself, binds, robs itself: sacrificial violence gains by losing > organizes expropriation w/in calculation > imagination organizes theft of its own freedom, feels sacrifice/theft at same time as the Ursache to which it submits [see GOD]

PS p. 176 we will follow Artaud’s intention (restore Danger by reawakening theater of cruelty, un monde où la structure du dérobement noffrît plus aucun abri) > with exception dun glissement calculé

***DIF p. 7 play: unity of chance & necessity in calculations w/out end (beyond opposition philosophical-logical/empirical-logical) (on eve of philosophy and beyond it)

***WAP p. 13 institution & philosophy: “here less than ever is thinking opposed to science, technique, calculation, and strategy”

DPi p. 125 CI: immanent & pure calculation free of extrinsic calculation

p. 151 Nietzsche’s arche-genealogical question is the question of origin of law, of penal law as origin of calculation, rule of calculation > whence comes equivalence btwn injury/pain

p. 166 penalty (poena, peine): ransom, repurchase, punishment meant to pay for damage, buying back, redemption in the market > no penal law w/out this project of calculation, be it the calculation of the incalculable, w/ or w/out interest, w/ or w/out surplus value

pp. 166-67 impossible to know if what we blithely call unconscious can calculate incalculable

***p. 248n scandal of DP, dares to calculate/measure beyond measure (démesuré), incorporate the infinite/incalculable into its calculation > excessiveness, penalty w/out proportion

p. 256 it belongs to life not to be immortal, but also to have a future where instant of death is not calculable

——to be against DP is to be against calculation, calculable decidability of you will die on such and such a day, at such and such an hour > no future w/ anticipation of calculable instant > “my life” must keep a relation to the coming of the other as coming of the to-come (venue de là-venir)

pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

***pp. 258-59 phantasm of infinitization at heart of finitude [dream of a verdict, the putting an end to finitude], theologico-political, an infinitization of survival assured by calculation itself, by cutting decision of DP, phantasm is one w/ God, belief in God

p. 261 damnum, via Benveniste, money given w/out return, given for nothing > excess of compelled expenditure pays more than is due, marks double law of homogeneity/proportionality btwn damage/punishment & their incalculable heterogeneity: the condemned/damned pays what he owes and does something tout autre, infinitely more than acquit himself of calculable debt: there is economy/aneconomy > “unless it is a matter of reimbursement (indemnification) and interest as the incalculable surplus value of capital”

***p. 262 zone btwn capital of capital punishment (de-cap-itation) & capital of capitalism (capitalization) causes vertigo, relations murky, when calculating drive, interest of capital, is no longer calculable and becomes virtually infinite, when death w/out return is part of market there where it can’t be, where it ought to remain incalculable > theologico-political: phantasm of infinitization in heart of finitude

***PIO p. 15 deconstruction is impossible, possibility is danger of rule-governed procedures

——experience of the other as invention of the impossible (only possible invention)

pp. 34-6 both Descartes & Leibniz demonstrate 2 meanings of word “invention” in phrase “invention of truth”—when pursuing a universal language: both speak of a universal characteristic, both think about a new machinery to be forged and found

——Leibniz, however, believes the invention of this language does not depend on human perfection of “true philosophy,” the language itself can lead us towards such perfection, the invention thus preceding knowledge/science, until, at last: to reason = to calculate

p. 36 Leibniz’s version of universal language confers productive facilitation, even if inaugural adventure is kept under teleological surveillance by a fundamental analyticism

p. 39 the government’s aleatory margin (for invention) remains homogenous w/ calculation (programmed invention) > w/in order of the calculable: no absolute surprise, order of the same

——but Derrida will not oppose deconstruction (not passivity), the invention of the other, to government’s program: because opposition belongs to regimen of the same

pp. 40-1 Leibniz, early theorist of “new species of logic” that integrates calculation of probabilities

HST pp. 419-20 simple, homogenous, calculation of cloning—but every unit is irreplaceable in its factual existence (Kant)—so to be ethical, must be conscious, must be auto-affected by this uniqueness? > for Derrida, displaced certainty btwn opposition arithmetic/ethical substitution

ATM p. 166 how does EL calculate [so vigilantly], how does the other calculate in him, to leave room for the incalculable?

E pp. 21-2 though sublimity works against our senses, the sacrifice (Aufopferung) of the sublime keeps a power in view, sublime can dawn in art: attains a power greater than what was sacrificed

——economic calculation allows sublime to be swallowed

——Derrida compares the work of mourning to the sublime, both allow negative pleasures to be reappropriated by economic calculation

EW p. 272 subject is also a principle of calculability, for the political, for the current concept of democracy

pp. 272-73 since there has to be some calculation, Derrida “never held against calculation that condescending reticence of ‘Heideggerian’ haughtiness”

BSi p. 260 Celan’s time of the other, beyond calculable speaking time or vote counting that elects sovereign

OG pp. 77-8 (113-16) Leibniz & Descartes on universal language: must we discover true philosophy before developing the language? for Descartes, we would have to wait, & such language would only arise in paradise; Leibniz disagrees, envisions calculation and Reason merging, raisonner et calculer sera la même chose > a teleology in progress

pp. 92-3 phoneticization of writing: science, religion, politics, economy, monetary calculation

p. 209 (297) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

EU p. 49 every critique of censorship is a critique of judgment, censorship is a judgment, proposes laws, tribunal, code > censere, to evaluate (réputer), compute, count—ratio, “census,” “cens,” is enumeration of citizens

SPEC p. 285 each time one of [3] “terms” [2 principles +/– differance] goes to the end (va au-bout) of itself, of its other, w/out 3rd party, it is death (lentorse mortelle qui met fin au retors du calcul)

p. 322 speculator describes what he’s doing w/out doing so explicitly [Rousseau from OG], does w/out auto-analytic calculation, w/out calculation itself analyzing itself > thus the interest and necessity of the thing [for Freud? for Derrida?]

p. 384 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] passage btwn transference & speculation > speculative transference orients, destines, calculates most original & most passive “first step” on very threshold of perception: desire for concept of perception belongs to destiny of this calculation

pp. 400-01 PP (the master) is not master > pleasure, the great speculator, calculates w/ effects of aphrodisiac stricture (Socrates wanted nothing to do with proper name of Aphrodite)

FV p. 487 [profiting from remnant] by means of a remnant of paternal inheritance, one the debtors left out of account, Dupin draws revenue, surplus-value of a capital that works by itself, calculating (rigorous economy) > Dupin can pay for a sole luxury [Dupin’s desire to read]: cuts across restricted economy like gift w/out return [baby daddy]

CALL (

KH p. 91 as if a name should only be given to whom (or what) deserves it, calls for it

GOD p. 46 for Heidegger, it is in being-toward-death, in promise of death, that one is given sameness of self, Jemeinigkeit, that one hears the call (Ruf), and responsibility comes into play

p. 108 God as the name of the possibility of keeping a secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior, a witness others cannot see, other than me, more intimate with me than myself, structure of invisible interiority; God calls me & I call myself God [indissociable]

p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (loeuvre)

GT p. 137 beggars (in their exteriority) can represent absolute demand of the Other, inextuingishable appeal, unquenchable thirst for the gift

MONL pp. 67-8 appeal to come (appel à venir) gathers language together in advance, not in unity, identity, but in singularity of its difference to itself: in difference avec soi not davec soi

LOBL p. 126 call (demand, order, desire); btwn the call & the resurrection, there’s no time > absolute event, not effect of a cause, the cause, causa, la Chose, first name itself

pp. 136-37 survivre delays at once life & death, line of least sure sur-, no clear-cut opposition, living on like differance, beyond identity & difference > tele-phone, tele-gram only 2 modes of this teleography in which trace, grapheme, does come secondarily but marks telic structure a priori

——narrator is always away (at a distance, tele-)

SPOM p. 6 spectrality interrupts all specularity, de-synchronizes, calls us to anachrony

HERP p. 171 the part of the friend Dasein carries “evokes,” can permit evocation > the voice, Ruf (call), Stimme (voice, call)

p. 180 deconstruction, or rather Heidegger’s Destruktion: appropriation of the tradition (while “destructing”), calls itself (heisst): “open our ear (unser Ohr öffnen)” [to a friend?]

HASD p. 28 call of the other, having always already preceded speech to which it was never present a first time, announces itself in advance as a recall (rappel)

MPM p. 133 impasse (dead end) of aporia—reopening, fait appel [arrêt, arrêt]

p. 137 there is no beyond-the-undecidable, remains to be thought, incalculable order of tout autre, there is no inside-the-undecidable, but an other (singular) memory calls us w/out leading us back to any anteriority > there never existed an older, more original “third term”

pp. 146-7 [re: de Man closer to Heidegger than he thinks] for Heidegger, memory too, like promise, gathers near what can come, toward the “future” > es gibt never gives anything in present, it calls as a promise; Heissen (“to call, ” “to command” > entrust, keep safely)

POOF pp. vii, xi “O my friends, there is no friend”—an address > faire appel, prendre appel

p. xi faire appel, prendre appel [to appeal, take one’s mark] > the impetus for declaring “O my friends…”, rassemblerait un corps fléchi (stooping), d'abord plié sur lui-même dans une réflexion préparatoire: before leap, w/out horizon, beyond any form of trial [gathering & event?]

p. 172 suitability (covenance) of the enemy, lodged w/in oikeiéotēs, my own projection, an exemplarity more real/resistant than my own shadow, my truth in painting > proof in the fact that I can address him, call to him, he becomes origin/destination of call [to the point of madness]

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

p. 235 “O my friends…” a call, a promise, a prayer (eukhé) [neither true nor false, Aristotle] > can’t give friendship, were friendship not still to come [Heideggerian ek-stasis] > in the name of friendship, “no friend” respectfully declares the perfect sovereign friendship impossible

——vous-mes-amis-soyez-mes-amis-et-bien-que-vous-ne-le-soyez-pas-encore-vous-lêtes-déjà-puisque-je-vous-appelle-ainsi: “O my friends…” has structure & temporality of messianic teleiopoesis

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

pp. 241-42 [offering quasi-summary of HERP] moment that originary [Heraclitean] phileîn (accord, favour, solicitude Gunst) becomes jealous, nostalgic tension ‘determined by Eros [órexis]’: the step to philosophy, prepared by sophistry [Plato, Socrates] > is the strange voice of the friend, an ontological call [prior to subject, consciousness, even to Mitsein? see p. 243], interior & w/out, the “what is…?” of philosophy [?]

——as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

p. 297 Blanchot no longer has affinity w/ one Nietzsche (there is always plus dun): friendship is not a gift or promise, it’s the outside drawing near in its separateness/inaccessibility—pure desire is the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance, to die in common through separation

——the common becomes the pole end of a call > question regarding the ‘common’ should bring on a vertigo that asks ‘what is to be done?’ what’s to be done, politically, w/ this vertigo & its necessity?

A p. 19 to protect decision or responsibility by knowledge, theoretical assurance, is to transform this experience into deployment of program

——but, should not abandon programs, they are the guardrail of a responsibility to whose calling they remain radically heterogenous

PAS PAS p. (21) yes, yes: force of affirmative repetition, unique call of the to-come as the will to repeat itself, affirmation that cites itself, joyous EROS, immeasurable unhappiness, irreducible contamination, affirmation risks citation, le oui qui fait dans la langue un trou aussi étrange que viens, il approuve, affirme, contresigne tout cequi est arrivé

p. (61) Blanchot: circle of law is this: must be a crossing for there to be a limit, uncrossable that in its desire, its call, has already crossed the line [appele à franchir]

p. (74) the call of death precedes me, it is death and the word (mort/mot) that’re called in the viens > I call myself dead, marcher in my name > w/out name before viens

p. (94) must be able to reject the gift, vomir ce qui tappelle à dire viens, forget in order to reject the poison, to not guard the gift

p. (106) I call to you to protect you against the nameless

T p. xxix after every perforation, one [philosophy] is dying to replace w/ a glorious cadaver, ce temps timbré entre lécriture et la parole (s) appellent un coup de donc [Glas]: it suffices, barely, to wait!

S p. 9 is the guarding, the call, of the question still the question? the question remains protected from that which is not a question, the un-thought, non-negative, un-gedacht

p. 26 acc. Heidegger, Hegelian spirit ruled by epoch of Cartesian cogito, thus calls for deconstruction; Hegel called Descartes the Christopher Columbus of philosophical modernity

SH p. 48 privilege of code (clock, calendar) [in Celan], that which allows one to call off the hours, to class (calare) > calendar, clock, name return of tout autre in the same > hour writes, speaks

p. 68 circumcision of word is not dated in history, has no age, but calls forth date, opens word to other, of all that calls itself (the name, blessing of name, yes & no) > it sets turning the ring

FWT p. 52 what comes?: what calls upon & overwhelms my responsibility, responsibility before my freedom, freedom w/out autonomy

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

ATIA p. 75 donc” of lanimal que donc je suis, a summons [call] issued to Descartes

REST pp. 321-22 I meant “escape (évasion)” by overflowing pictorial limit, framed representation, visible immediacy (if any such thing exists, in the picture) w/ collar flared (au col évasé), half-inside out > isn’t this overflowing the discursive operation, from its very first word? or is its internal reason in pictorial structure? > question of structure of this limit, of being-in or being-out, question of supplement of parergon—once “escape” takes off (prendre son appel sur) from impoverished descriptive trait: no longer concerns a painting

PIO p. 13 event (also loeuvre) calls for new statutes/conventions that could record, account for, such events (neither speech act theory nor literary theory [formalist or hermeneutic variety] can account for such event)

p. 47 “the call of the other is a call to come, and that happens only in multiple voices”

RM p. 76 performative of Heidegger’s writing of Aufriss (entame) > decree to name what’s still unknown under its name > Aufriss calls to us

TR p. 78 plea—an excuse, allegation, argument in form of appeal

——Austin’s “A Plea for Excuses” is such a plea [performs the “theme”]—in exemplary fashion

p. 141 Rousseau’s appeal to others, appeal to future, belongs to same time, same moment, as “myself alone”

WAP p. 56 philosophy, via critique of pure reason [Kant], becomes guardian of tribunal of reason: this new institution (w/ element of Romanism, Latinity) is a response to an old invitation (“self-knowledge”) > tribunal of reason whose power/violence (Gewalt) guaranteed by no other law than its own (Kafka, Benjamin), absolute autonomy, independent even of state

EJQB p. 65 the exchange btwn Jew & writing, exchange w/out prerogative, where original appeal is a convocation (Jabès’ persistent affirmation)

EL p. 219 “we” of covenant, not secularized “communal subject,” countersigns by responding to commitment already taken: autobiographicity of “we” assigned by call resonating from sacred language > in sacrificial instant, one hears imminence of God’s voice’s return

——Geschlecht and Schlag (stamp, imprint) > “we” that undergoes relation to itself out of (depuis) menacing interpellation of Geschlecht by apocalyptic speech (parole)

HST p. 388 congenital perjury of justice: tragedy that calls for forgiveness > this “tragedy” qui désaccorde le coeur dans laccord même, at the heart of the heart—prayer of mercy (miséricorde) rises

TN pp. 193-94 [Derrida’s universality]: convey to “every man’s” ear that world of each person is untranslatable, that there’s never the “same world” > not incompatible premises, condition/call for one another [deconstruction Merleau-Ponty]

EW p. 276 origin of call comes from nowhere, an origin that’s not yet a divine or human “subject” institutes responsibility at root of ulterior ones (moral, juridical, political)

***AD p. 113 engaged by promise while hearing silence it bears at heart of call—figure of hiatus, mouth open to speak/eat

CF p. 33 archivization of unforgivable crimes by ‘universal conscience’ better informed than ever: reactivates/accelerates call to forgiveness

OG pp. 294-95 (416) [necessity of writing] to think writing as accidental, as chance, is to ignore lappel de suppléance and to think evil as exterior, therefore effaceable addition

p. 312 for Derrida, there’s an interior doubling of presence, a constitution/frustration of jouissance, a call & trace that Rousseau tries to elude

ATAP pp. 81-2 if eschatological question always surprises us, response to it is impossible: [eschatology?] an appeal promising & responding before the question

EU p. 88 Heidegger’s move beyond responsibility for a determinate knowledge or power: must first answer to being, for the call of being—must think this coresponsibility

CALL AND RESPONSE (WELCOME OF THE OTHER, ETHICAL OPENING)

DST DST p. 221 no matter how “free” or deconstructed the response, one cannot reduce the delay (retard): an event, a law, a call are already there (others are there, for/before whom one must answer); “response inaugurates nothing if it does not come after

AD pp. 15-6 violence of host, to dare to say bienvenue: appropriate a home one has to give

pp. 22-3 hospitality, welcome of face, attention: this series of metonymies are all the same only where they withdraw, like the other, from theme—each welcomes (says “yes” to) the other

p. 23 yes, yes: the welcoming of the other (laccueil de lautre) (objective/subjective genitive)

p. 24 refer to “first” yes in quotes because there’s no first, call is only called from response, we are thrown, begin by responding > tragedy of unanswered call: as necessary as death, finitude

——call can only be heard in the promise of response

p. 25 appeal to a call (appeler à un appel)

——no welcome w/out face, no face w/out welcome: quasi-primitive, quasi-transcendental language of face > laccueil determines le recevoir”: the receptivity of receiving as the ethical relation

pp. 28-9 Levinas’ welcome contests Heidegger’s motifs of gathering & collecting (colligere)

——welcome to come makes possible recollection at home w/in oneself, but chronology & logic are defied

——welcome is not a secondary modification of col-ligere, which is “linked” to origin of religion, the “relation w/out relation” > what Levinas refers to as “religion,” the “ultimate structure”

p. 29 Levinas: to welcome the Other—put in question my freedom

p. 36 Levinas: woman, other whose presence is discretely an absence, hospitable welcome par excellence, condition for home, recollection, inhabitation

——Levinas: welcoming, “understanding w/out words,” “expression in secret,” “feminine alterity”

pp. 44-5 is Levinas’ feminine an androcentric hyperbole or a feminist manifesto? can one decide?

——feminine not empirical for Levinas, thought of welcome opens ethics, it’s marked by sexual difference (it will thus never again be neutralized) [v. different take from ATM?], this hospitality that precedes property can’t be appropriated

pp. 45-6 “welcome” is a quasi-synonym of “hospitality”: copula that brings them together binds phenomena of unbinding (déliasion) (infinite separation of any hospitality worth its name)

——separation as “metaphysics,” an experience of hospitality, irruption of finite in infinite, the passage meta ta physika passes through hospitality of finite threshold that opens to infinity

p. 50 [like cruelty for Freud & Nietzsche] hospitality not circumscribed, has no contrary: allergy, rejection, xenophobia, even torture “welcomes”

p. 58 Levinas: no nominative form of self in Latin, the irreducibility of sacrifice, law of accusative in welcome

p. 85 Levinas gives teaching magisterial height: teaching what “to welcome,” “to receive”

p. 92 neither welcome nor hospitality w/out radical alterity: presupposes separation, social bond, unbinding, gives respiration: le chez-soi (at-home-with-oneself) would no longer be natural, rooted, but a response to a wandering (errance), phénomène de l'errance qu'il arrête

pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (lentretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech

——w/out silence, w/out non-response: simply unfold (dérouler) knowledge in a program > nothing would make us more irresponsible, nothing more totalitarian

CAP(ITAL)

GOD pp. 96-98 Matthew’s “to be learned by heart,” what is the heart, should it return to its correct place?: lemplacement juste du coeur, cest le lieu du meilleur placement

heart’s where you save real treasure, a capital beyond the terrestrial, the visible, an incorruptible capital, most secure, infinite profit

GT p. 21 Heidegger: to look ahead (vorblicken) to the It (Es) which gives (gibt) Being (Sein) & time (Zeit), we try to bring the It and its Being into view, capitalize the “It”, become foresighted

p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

p. 95 this is perhaps counterfeit money: this perhaps is the intentional dimension[?], the credit, the act of faith that structures all money

p. 97 Baudelaire’s “Counterfeit Money,” its play w/ title, links literature to belief, credit, thus capital, economy, politics

——a “true” corpus is still, perhaps, counterfeit money, may be ghost or spirit, spirit of body & of capital (title, heading, is capital), no problem of canon if this institution were natural

pp. 116-7 Mallarmé links aesthetics w/ political economy via alchemy: alchemy as precursor to political economy, “null stone, dreaming of gold, once called philosophical…foreshadows, in finance, the future credit, preceding capital or reducing it to the humility of money!”

pp. 101-02 writing subject does not have to be giving subject; subject as such: bordered, posed, identified, always calculates, reappropriates surplus-value, circular return, a certain capitalization

——despite labor of subject, production of surplus-value, gift takes place where there’s trace, dissemination, in excessive forgetting, forgetful excess of the gift

p. 110 literature & its relation to capital, city, polis, transformation of monetary forms [late capitalism] (dematerializaiton of money & all the scenes that depend on it)

p. 124 isn’t counterfeit money the truth of capital? everything that depends on faith & credit?

p. 132 Baudelaire’s future: a good sense that will condemn everything except money

pp. 135(n)-36 capitalize, profit on poverty and beggar index, poverty becomes capitalizable credit [Nietzsche’s slave morality]

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

p. 161(n) the Good, in Republic, takes on features of father and of Capital, [Derrida’s fn references Dissemination, on bad faith of fraudulent merchandise, tampering w/ money, & on political economy] whereas Baudelaire is interested in copy of copy, phantasm

MONL p. 30 people must yield to the homo-hegemony of dominant languages, the languages of masters, capital, machine

LOBL p. ~127 apocalyptic, in other words capital unveiling [from GLAS]

AF p. 7 archival violence: exergue, capitalize on ellipse, accumulates capital in advance, anticipates so to institute (Gewalt)

——archive at once institutive & conservative [see FL], revolutionary & traditional, an eco-nomic archive: keeps, puts in reserve, saves, but in unnatural fashion (forcing obedience to law)

p. 12 death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

p. 13 Jew (or Devil, radical evil, all which is irreconcilable to God in “Christian science”) can be reinvested as an economistic resource of an archive that capitalizes everything [Sagi]

——devil can justify, such is destination of Jew in Aryan ideal

p. 22 lawmakers w/out which one can’t have archives, conservation (memory) puts into reserve (“store”), accumulates, capitalizes, stocks a quasi-infinity of layers (hypermnesic, hypomnesic epidermises of books & penises)

POO p. 10 capitale (head on), problema (ob-subject, promontory cap, armor; excuse given to excuse oneself of blame), p. 137n cap as “front,” problem as diverted responsibility

SPOM p. 112 exappropriation is the radical contradiction of all “capital,” property and appropriation, as well as ideas that depend on it: i.e. free subjectivity: “servitude binds (itself) to appropriation” > lexappropriation ne justifie aucune chaîne

p. 139 once revolutionary task sets in, amnesia occurs, nothing but forgetting, “anachrony practices and promises forgetting”

——question of head, cap-, spirit > amnesiac order of capitalist bourgeoisie, the muzzle (gueule) replaces head at summit

p. 141 Marx aims for head, for chief, for mask, for visor

pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

***——that’s not all: specificity of process can still capitalize spectralization > the first ghost effect (autonomized spirit) can be incorporated, negated, integrated as one’s own human body

p. 172 at the head, the capital representation: man, capital ghost (das Hauptgespenst) > if men exist in logic of abstract spirit, they are present in ghostly fashion, as specters

——who’s head of the head (larchi-specter, le fantôme capital) when ghosts are disseminated everywhere? qui mettre en tête parmi tous ceux quon se met en tête?

p. 173 Marx feigns to count ghosts, they are innumberable, and there is but one ghost (already too many, i.e. supplements), it is # itself, the arch-specter as father as capital or Plato’s good [see Plato’s Republic 555e]

p. 189 commodity haunts the thing, its specter travaille la valeur dusage (at work in use-value), cette hantise se déplace comme la silhouette anonyme ou la figure dun figurante qui pourrait être le personnage capital

p. 192 for Marx, capital contradiction, contradiction of automatic autonomy: 1) inert thing [table] appears inspired, has pneuma or psychē 2) remains caught in heavy thingness of hulē

——autonomy the mask of automatism, visor hides absence of living gaze, automaton mimes the living, Thing neither dead nor alive, it survives, war machine, theatrical machine, mekhanē

POOF p. 293 the whole text has thought of Blanchot & Bataille, the “community w/ community,” w/out wanting to capitalize around them all their original thoughts

p. 294 who is the friend? beyond ego, presence, subject, etc.? distancing itself from all determinations? beyond the brother who capitalizes everything? > this a political question—will there be loud protests (by militants of a dogmatic humanism) if to think & live gentle rigor of friendship would be the law of friendship qua an experience of ahumanity?

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, Aristotle overtook to ruin the capital letters of Platonism, the eídos of friendship, by calling the witness to the stand, an “actual” friend > Derrida will take sign of this ruin & no longer answer call to witness stand

VM p. 79 community of questions: unrelentingly ask questions, despite diaspora of institutes, despite publications & techniques that follow, accumulating themselves like capital or poverty

p. 97 [for Levinas, against ontology, primacy > archia > chief > neutral]

PP p. 82 Plato’s Republic (555e): “one of the drawbacks of democracy” is way it lets capital foster drone and pauper element in state, harvesting interest from any remainder

——son as interest on capital investment, as return, revenue, son as physical sun, analogon of intelligible sun (the Good, capital, origin of all onta); father as noooumena, son as horōmena

meaning of patēr sometimes exclusively financial capital

p. 123 dialectical inversion of pharmakon or dangerous supplement makes death à la fois acceptable and null > immortality of soul, acts like antibody, dissipates its terrifying fantasy, le pharmarkon inverti, qui met en fuite tous les épouvantails: origin of epistēmē, opening to truth as possibility of repetition, submission of “greed for life (epithumein zēn)” to law (king, father, chief, capital)

p. 125 temperance, the best pharmakon, the capital cure, when a pharmakon is remedy not drug

OH pp. 13-4 “cap” (caput, capitis), the head, extremity of the extreme, last legs, final moment (eschaton > telos); captain (not a woman); eschatology and teleology—that is man

p. 15 heading of the other: first condition of an identity that is not an egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other, not even anti-heading or decapitation

p. 18 keep the heading (garder le cap) > because absolutely new might bring ghost of the worst

p. 19 must be suspicious of repetitive memory and tout autre of absolutely new [cf. POOF p. 65], of anamnestic capitalization & amnesic exposure to what would no longer be identifiable

pp. 24-5 Europe: representation or figure of a universal idea; has confused its face, figure, w/ a point, a phallus; the idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, eidos, archē, telos, the idea of beginning, commanding, cap, captain, towards an accomplished end

——advanced point is at once beginning and end, divided as beginning and end (Heidegger on Ort as point of spear, and fromm, Frömmigkeit, from promos, what leads, lavant-garde)

p. 27 identification is always cultural never natural, always has a capital form, advanced point, capitalizing reserve

p. 28 we did not choose this responsibility of our heritage [it is from the other, the language of our language], nor the capitalizing memory we have of it

p. 112n for Valéry, capital belongs to series of Europe’s phenomenal manifestations

p. 114n vis-à-vis Valéry, what has not yet happened in history: the capital event of a concept, which would be to think the event as such > the capital event is also the event of capital, the head

p. 31 call to betray a certain order of capital is taking place now, in an act of memory faithful to the other heading

——crisis is not appropriate word any more for event of other heading: crisis [krinein, moment of decision] has always inspired a Selbstbesinnung (self-contemplation), a regaining of “direction (sens)” > protestant, capital discourse

***p. 33 capital as cutting edge of progress (à la pointe du progrès), universalizing model, everyone joins at the head

p. 37 “capillarities” (new media, techno-scientific powers): centralizing pulsions don’t always go through states anymore

p. 38 question of capital, question of hegemonic centrality

p. 40 new topology re: capital, no longer linked to polis, “quasi-political”

p. 44 double bind of European cultural identity: 1) necessary not to reconstitute centralizing hegemony (the capital) 2) necessary not to cultivate minority differences for their sake, untranslatable idiolects (not to multiply borders, marges, marches)

——alliance of capital and a-capital (the other of capital): this seems impossible, it is, such is the nature of all responsibility

pp. 48-9 Europe advances itself as heading for universal essence of man > to advance oneself: to name oneself, rush out ahead, in front, anticipate, launch, stick one’s neck out, to love or to violate, to love to violate, to colonize, colonize itself

pp. 57-8 word “capital,” like “cap,” like “culture,” like “colo,” in “colony” and “colonization,” like “civilization,” is Latin word

p. 122n Valéry: capital would consume Frenchmen w/ “concentration camp” of jealousy

***pp. 56-8 have courage for a new critique of capital that avoids Marxist intimidation

p. 65 via Valéry, most interesting moment of rhetorical capitalization of “capital” (its hierarchization): regional capital always calls for always threatened universal capital

p. 66 Valéry: “our body”—best known capital, gives capital its most literal/proper meaning

pp. 68-9 [threatened] ideality in capitalization: that which exceeds borders of sensible, opens onto infinite, gives rise to universal, “maxim of maximization,” nothing other than spirit itself

p. 70 via Valéry, people who read are responsible for, respond before, turn memory into “solid value,” create an absolute surplus value, increase of universal capital, “world’s wealth” increases

p. 72 value of universality capitalizes all antinomies, linked to value of exemplarity which inscribes universality in proper body of singularity (idiom or culture)

p. 124n Valéry makes analogy btwn spirit, value & capital [refers to Nietzsche]

pp. 125-26n Valéry: the word “spirit” > first commerce of the world [logocentrism]

VP p. 76 the more the signifier is ideal, more it augments potency of repetition of presence, the more it protects, preserves, reserves and capitalizes on sense

WM p. 210 metaphor of (the) usure (of metaphor): the ruining of figure; usure as erasure, rubbing out, and usure as increasing return in the form of revenue, surplus value, supplementary capital

——la figure sensible qui sabrite et qui suse, jusquà paraître inaperçue, dans chaque concept métaphysique

DS pp. 177-78 title—capital: carries its head too high, raises its voice, drowns out ensuing text

p. 178 what ruins the “pious capital letter,” the aplomb of the heading: the blanks, ordered return of white spaces, measure & order of dissemination, law of spacing, rhythmos, invisible fleuron

p. 284n [Derrida comes back to i] reads little point as a decapitation right next to castrated pike > capital I (disseminates unity of meaning), ego, ice, échoplus-je > (I + Dé)irisation

POS p. 45 [Derrida lists texts where to find] false departures, beginnings, titles, epigraphs, fictive pretexts: decapitations

P pp. 117-18 analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), lanalogisme recapitule ou recapite

ROP p. 44 ash, stepping beyond psychoanalysis, radical destruction of archive, destroys capitalizing reserve, the guarding of repression

pp. 92-5 via Foucault, doctor capitalizes/speculates on secret, capital of secret, the secrecy effect, technique of the secret, secret of secret: make one suppose knowledge and believe in the secret, attributes of Evil Genius attributed to doctor, he uses unreason, uses fiction/simulacrum

SP pp. 59-61 [re: truth-castration as man’s affair, and woman’s suspension of it] [English translation seems horrible] Derrida is asking that we take off the head (décapitonner) of Lacan’s discourse, w/ its truth speaking, castration & phallocentrism > by deploying metaphorics of veil

pp. 161-63n la signature et le texte tombent lun hors de lautre, se sécrètent, se séparent, et sexcrètent, se forment de la coupure même qui les décapite, les échafaude en tronc sans tête, dès linstant de leur itérabilité > expropriative commencement marks everything erected w/ structure of etron [fecal matter]

DIF DIF p. 4 the capital “a” of differance, a pyramid [A]; Hegel: body of sign is Egyptian pyramid > Derrida moves from pyramid to tomb, oikēsis > tomb of proper, familial residence, economy of death (this stone announces death of tyrant [cf. TN.]) [this tomb can’t even be made to resonate]

p. 22 differance not announced by capital letter, it subverts all kingdoms > everything w/in us that wants a kingdom (le royaume) (that wants to capitalize) fears differance

p. 27 to know there’s nothing kerygmatic [not a master-name] about differance, we must perceive its decapita(liza)tion > must put into question the name of the name

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

——point of ontotheological fusion reduces precipitation & after-affect (dehiscence btwn vouloir-dire & writing, anticipation & recapitulation) to sublatables [mouvement de tête]

——effect of dissemination: lose one’s head, not know where it is

p. 48 return of theological seed to itself, dispersion working for profit of Idea, exclusion as inclusion [not Hegel’s Jew?] > la vérité qui se parle dans le cercle logocentrique, cest le discours de ce qui revient au père

WAP pp. 128-29 [re: Hegel] are children insured against death of their father (capital, revenue) still children? or, haven't they always been? [same for widow who can count on revenues]

DPi pp. 40-1 w/out title, head (chef), capital: a text is an outlaw, decapitated (w/ neither head nor tail [PP p. 79])

p. 76 capital punishment along w/ debate on capital, period, one of best entry points to think mondialisation (not globalisation) (refers to monde of Christian thought)

p. 140 the Latin interest: 1) finding oneself being btwn space larger than oneself 2) fiduciary calculation, surplus value, search for profit/capitalization, monetary or psychological economy

p. 261 damnum, via Benveniste, money given w/out return, given for nothing > excess of compelled expenditure pays more than is due, marks double law of homogeneity/proportionality btwn damage/punishment & their incalculable heterogeneity: the condemned/damned pays what he owes and does something tout autre, infinitely more than acquit himself of calculable debt: there is economy/aneconomy > “unless it is a matter of reimbursement (indemnification) and interest as the incalculable surplus value of capital”

***p. 262 zone btwn capital of capital punishment (de-cap-itation) & capital of capitalism (capitalization) causes vertigo, relations murky, when calculating drive, interest of capital, is no longer calculable and becomes virtually infinite, when death w/out return is part of market there where it can’t be, where it ought to remain incalculable > theologico-political: phantasm of infinitization in heart of finitude

CHM p. 308n no history except of rationality/meaning: reappropriation of negativity—or forgets it (same thing) > history of truth, history of economy of negative: negativity not positive truth is the nonhistorical capital of history

Gii pp. 37-8 [re: Handwerk] w/out attunement to essence of wood, itself attuned to man’s dwelling: empty activity, commerce, taste for profit > (this is Heidegger’s hierarchy & evaluation)

REST p. 283 whose shoes (whose feet) (the subject of reattachment): the capital subject of this contract [btwn Shapiro & Heidegger], they each have one piece of symbolon, share common interest

p. 313 when Shapiro says, “they are clearly pictures of the artist’s own shoes,” the copula (they are) couples the painted shoes to the painter’s feet, laces drawn out of picture, presupposes hole in canvas

——2 capitalized attributes: adequate model (real shoes) & adequate subject (Van Gogh)

——dogmatic, precritical language: “real,” “proper,” “this is that,” evidently, clearly, his own > talk so loudly, price to pay to have the shoes, believe he is no stranger to the other

p. 346 for Heidegger, putting to work of truth, appears in the hors-dusage, unlacing, destricturation, uselesness overloaded w/ value, augments it w/ surplus value in attaching it symbolically to its belonging > a capital difference, concerns head of subject (not proprietor subject but: the earth and the world, trait and attraction, [ontological difference?])

p. 365 real wearer-holder-proprietor-signatory [subject] of shoes > so much augmented capital: these meanings are added onto, not confused w/, one another

TR p. 103 not only accusation & judgment in confession, there’s the executioner (carrying out of the sentence): sentence endured in pleasure of writing, ambiguous enjoyment at heart of terrible, severe jubilation of inscription: one steps up to cashier right away to collect interest on a capital that will assume value only “sooner or later,” after my death, in my absence

pp. 121-22 band, ribbon, silk, double bind en soie, ringhband, phantasmatic body on which limited ink (finite reserve) is made to flow; ink remains modest but capitalizes, virtually lets flow

pp. 140-41 Rousseau’s scene of virtual “sooner or later” remains fundamentally Christian

PJP p. 172 faux témoignage, contrefaçon; perhaps I have already lied by promising veracity (veracity not truth) > Western social contract capitalizes this perhaps in the act of perjury

C pp. 196-97 Derrida tries to preserve what he invests in word paradigm, a word that’s too much used, worn down (usé), on all sides—thus irreplaceable > what he invests in the word is assaulted by investments of other, from capital (interest & usury): its measure accumulates in surplus value

p. 223 T.-C. outplayed the eidos of the model, played a trick, exemplarily, on paradigm in general, finished it off, reduces it to shrunken head of a little chief (tête réduite dun petit chef)

p. 237 I am myself cartouche and cartouches(s) in the plural: “I” sign myself to death as soon as there’s the title, reduce myself to first heading, capital, shrunken head

TN p. 269 lexicon of touch risks being ruined by abusive spending (dépense absuive) > an eschatological, postwar inflation (desperate call for new “era,” “provenance”) > apocalyptic symptomatology of “deconstruction of Christianity”: all we speak is “touching”

p. 271 Nancy, spending like a madman: ontologizes everything that comes down to “touching,” jusquà la ruine, les ressources, le crédit, le capital et les intérêts du transcendental-ontologique > reduces them [all resources/capital figures of touch] to monetary simulacrum

p. 285 Nancy: “touch” as limit of sense, and the limit of senses is to be taken in all senses, each of which breaks into (fait effraction) the other

——Nancy knows better than to capitalize “the” sense of touch w/ any semantic capital > none of the senses are assured, even if it can be quoted in the stock market

p. 308 Nancy: epopteia, sight accomplished, consummation of Mystery of Sense Certainty, phallic & cephalic

E p. 12 God furnishes the poet w/ his capital, gives him surplus value & means of giving surplus-value, God is a poet

——structure of economimesis has its analogon in the city: when poet isn’t writing, he’s just a man, must eat, receives subsidies from sun-king (sustaining labor force)

BSi p. 138 sovereign, the arkhē, capital, chief, king, who can lose his head, go mad

pp. 191-92 [têtu, entêté] essence itself as headstrong stubbornness in being, bêtise, pigheadedness (entêtement)? the marionette (other) in me I wish to condemn to death? > bêtise hits you over the head (tête), acephalic manner > bêtise not proper to man, but to all those capital beings w/ heads?

p. 193 [Monsieur] Testes, tête, test, terstis (third), témoin, testicles

pp. 200-01 Valéry wagers on CAP: le cap Pensée; the high point (comble) of internal politics, a multipli-city of selves, when the excess that exceeds un-counts the other & outside > jealousy is always the hight point that completes me, supplements me because receives, welcomes, no longer chases out other in me: one only ever jealous of oneself, the selfsame > explains all the loves and wars (which take place btwn the same, the others as the same): as soon as there’s a double capitalized phallic erection (CAP, standing, being on a cape) here called Thought

pp. 201-02 the World Trade Center as image of Valéry’s double capitalized phallic erection (jealous of themselves) > double turn makes one think of double tower (tour)

pp. 201-03 hardness of capital erection [CAP] turns woman into beast

p. 207 sovereign, highest, most eminent capital or capitalization, monopolizes force/violence—Gewalt—gives reason in advance to force through right

p. 237 does a snake have a head? [CAP vs. Face]

p. 250 exergue (ex-ergon)—like parergon, out of work that puts to work > but like capital too: makes work happen, comes at head (inscribe date)

p. 251 Medusa as capital head—erection, castration

p. 313 Abrahamic commencements: 1) Bereshit, Genesis—animals before man 2) en arkhē en o logos, sovereign all-powerful creator of everything, Head, fiat of a logos producing zōē, light, phōs

SPEC p. 319 force of disappearance, of fort > capitalized pleasure (plaisir) (idealization) does w/out what it needs: one provides oneself w/ head of what one needs by doing w/out it (to have it)

p. 345 capital front [bobine (Ernst’s spool) as face, cap as head], where PP might be placed out of action > to rout a mastery, so one doesn’t just end up w/ one’s couriers, offspring, lieutenants

pp. 384-85 to describe structural necessity of borrowing as provisional/external fatality is classical logic [Freud often does this]: suspense is provisional, notes/coins must be guaranteed in final judgment

FV p. 488 [re: Poe’s Purloined…] no neutralization possible when public corporation (société anonyme) of capital & desire inaugurates narration

CAPITALISM

GT p. 110 literature & its relation to capital, city, polis, transformation of monetary forms [late capitalism] (dematerializaiton of money & all the scenes that depend on it)

R pp. 21-22 democracy acc. to Plato [in Republic (Book 8)] looks to Derrida like a bazaar, a carnival, pre-capitalist marketplace, complete lack of authority, soft like Orpheus

***FK pp. 51-52 mondialatinization (strange alliance btwn Christianity, as experience of death of God, & tele-technoscientific capitalism) is at same time hegemonic & finite, “ultra-powerful” and in process of exhausting itself

p. 81 no incompatibility btwn “return of religious” and rationality, which is to say, the tele-techno-capitalistic-scientific fiduciarity in all its mediatic/globalizing [mondial?] dimensions

SPOM p. 57 Marx: “useless metal” of treasure, horde, becomes like burnt-out ashes (ausgebrannte Asche) of circulation, its caput mortuum; miser, speculator: a martyr to exchange value > dreams of pure exchange value

——exchange-value a properly spectral apparition if this figure did not prevent the proper

——speculation (the hoarder) is always fascinated, bewitched by the specter, devoted in his alchemy to haunting or return of revenants

p. 64 [re: dominant discourse on Marxism] the triumphal stage of work of mourning, maniac, jubilatory, animistic magic, rhythm of cadenced march [“Marx is dead,” long live capitalism]

p. 73 “there was never just capital, nor capitalism in the singular, but capitalisms plural”

p. 85 triumph of liberal capitalism & its predestined alliance w/ democracy has never been so critical, fragile, threatened

p. 184 the table, wood table, armed head to toe: origin of exchange-value, birth of capital, of mysticism and the secret [?]

p. 185 Marx uses religious model to understand ideology of capitalism [Žižek]

pp. 191 animism of wood, already matter becoming-immaterial, what would enlightenment be w/out the market? will there ever be progress w/out exchange-value?

***p. 191-92 capital contradiction, at origin of capital: induces the “pragmatic” double constraint of all injunctions [see POO p. 143n difference btwn “use” & “mention”]

——table dances spontaneously, autonomously, but it moves others too

——not just contradiction of sensuous non-sensuous in same Thing, but contradiction of automatic autonomy (spontaneity) > on stage of market, table (commodity) is a prosthesis of itself

pp. 200-01 use-value before exchange value, hulē of wood, ordinary sensuous thing, table before dance > but it must have promised itself to iterability, no use-value w/out possibility of exchange & culture, of an hors-dusage

——“a culture began before culture—and humanity, capitalization also,” a culture destined to survive them: exchange-value is exceeded by the gift, market equivalence arrests the dance (of the commodity) it seemed to initiate

p. 204 “if capitalization has no rigorous limit, it is also because it comes itself to be exceeded”

p. 205 does Marx’s exorcism sign and seal the whole logic of Capital? however virtual, preparatory > is this conjuration ceremony, vital surviving oath, injunction, what puts Capital in motion, and part of the revolutionary promise?

——is the ghost just the effect of the market economy? as Marx says, a finite delirium, a madness that will come to an end? same for spectrality in general?

FWT p. 83 SPOM indicates Derrida’s respect for communist “idea,” necessity for untiring deconstructive critique of capitalistic logic

DPi p. 70 “worldwide market dominated by laws & a philosophy of international law that are European & Romano-Christian”

***p. 262 zone btwn capital of capital punishment (de-cap-itation) & capital of capitalism (capitalization) causes vertigo, relations murky, when calculating drive, interest of capital, is no longer calculable and becomes virtually infinite, when death w/out return is part of market there where it can’t be, where it ought to remain incalculable > theologico-political: phantasm of infinitization in heart of finitude

LI p. 84 Limited Inc as internal regulation by which capitalist system seeks to limit concentration and decision-making power: to protect itself from its own crisis (psychoanalysis’ incorporation)

BSi pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

OG p. 332n writing’s instrumentalization, the suspension of being-upright (cf. FS, PS) > writing’s structural solidarity w/ capitalization [Rousseau, Engels, Court de Gebelin]

pp. 168-70 (239-42) acc. Rousseau & Duclos [via Lévi-Strauss’ tribe w/out writing], degradation of politics/community caused by degradation of language—bad pronunciation, shortened words, caused by capital, aristocracy: speech of the assembly dispossessed from the people by written law (from Rome & Greece to empires of great distance)

pp. 299-300 (423) age of labor, civil society, lhomme policé, money & phonetic writing—elle gagne en universalité: signifiers that are nonsignifying, circulation of arbitrary signs in phonetic writing, alphabet is commercial, a trader > anonymous supplement substituted for a thing

p. 302 (427) for Rousseau, capital contrary to sovereignty of people [degradation of writing]

ATAP p. 77 acc. Kant, philosopher and shopkeeper write in prose

UWC p. 210 new technical “stage” of virtualization > the accelerated rhythm/extent/power of capitalization of such virtuality: digitalization, computerization, virtually immediate mondialisation of readability destabilize university habitat, topology of event no longer “campus”

p. 227 worldwide market violently inegalitarian > capitalistic situation more tragic in absolute figures than ever

EU p. 24 booksellers prefer Descartes in French

p. 94 State or trans-State capitalist powers, re: storage of information in data banks > once library no longer ideal type of archive: university no longer “guardian” or “trustee” of knowledge (this centralizing representation once constituted mission of university itself)

SPEC p. 260 [re: Freud’s speculation, a logic beyond that of position] the “position’s” fall (chute) would cause bankruptcy, ruin, discredit: today I’ll speak of speculation, I’m betting I will

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

ATIA p. 101 animality of human in problem of capital punishment

DPi p. xv capital punishment > question of unforgivable

p. 41 capital punishment: what costs the condemned his head (literally or figuratively)

——German doesn’t speak of capital punishment (rather of Todesstrafe), though there is a capital crime (Kapitalverbrechen)

p. 60 logic of fascination best argument against punishment as exemplarity: bad example risks becoming fascinating martyr, hero, the good example [Genet] (perversion of the imitation of Christ)

p. 76 capital punishment along w/ debate on capital, period, one of best entry points to think mondialisation (not globalisation) (refers to monde of Christian thought)

p. 80 as Kant rightly says, there’s no justice in strict legal sense if not bound by punishment

***pp. 148-49 memory/archivization engage suffering body in a machine, technical repetition, Mnemoteknik, must cause suffering, red of fire before red of blood > for N., punishment is not juridical: it’s a movement of life, writing to remember, inscription, imprint past in body

p. 151 Nietzsche’s arche-genealogical question is the question of origin of law, of penal law as origin of calculation, rule of calculation > whence comes equivalence btwn injury/pain

***p. 152 Nietzsche’s very legitimate question re: equivalence btwn injury/pain, unbelievable jus talionis > it is because we believe, it is because we grant it credit, that we can believe in this equivalence > thus origin of penal law is commercial law: what has us believe in equivalence btwn crime/punishment is belief itself > fiduciary phenomenon of credit or faith

——Nietzsche’s astonishment at equivalence: healthy, trivial, vital

——we believe (always in a credulous fashion, dogmatic fashion)

pp. 238-39 alleged mastery over limit btwn life/death organizes every calculation btwn dead & living, presupposes ability of giving death, mastering instant of death; calculable credit we grant to “death” indexed to set of presuppositions in which “capital punishment” finds a place of inscription where it’s indissociable from murder & suicide; if we can’t master instant of death, one could neither talk of murder, suicide, DP…

——pre-comprehending indubitable separation of state of life from state of death calculated by other, by 3rd party, common sense: the point, blade of knife, instant of passing, stigmē of a point; how could we know this clear-cut, sharp limit?

pp. 260-61 dapnaō, to spend, dapanē, expenditure, dapanēria, prodigality, daptō, devour, consume, damnum (w/out p), injury sustained through forcible seizure, curtailment of resources

——curtailment of capital, head > capital punishment

——for Benveniste, damnare is “to compel to spend,” expense considered as “sacrifice of money” > give money for nothing

p. 261 damnum, via Benveniste, money given w/out return, given for nothing > excess of compelled expenditure pays more than is due, marks double law of homogeneity/proportionality btwn damage/punishment & their incalculable heterogeneity: the condemned/damned pays what he owes and does something tout autre, infinitely more than acquit himself of calculable debt: there is economy/aneconomy > “unless it is a matter of reimbursement (indemnification) and interest as the incalculable surplus value of capital”

***p. 262 zone btwn capital of capital punishment (de-cap-itation) & capital of capitalism (capitalization) causes vertigo, relations murky, when calculating drive, interest of capital, is no longer calculable and becomes virtually infinite, when death w/out return is part of market there where it can’t be, where it ought to remain incalculable > theologico-political: phantasm of infinitization in heart of finitude

p. 271 CI (and thus DP) is priceless, w/out interest, so Beccaria’s utilitarianism is not the law, is pathological; for Kant, justice can’t be evaluated, transcendent to calculation, to price of life, priceless > transcendence (maybe) of the “sur,” surviving beyond life (drive)

p. 272 Kant: law of punishment is a categorical imperative

p. 273 Derrida extrapolates that Kant is de jure for DP, de facto against it (for how can one prevent calculation of interest when condemning to death?) > Kant would be a de facto abolitionist

CARTOUCHE

C p. 190 cartouche is defined: seal, alliance, imperium, family, lines (traits) around an official document

pp. 218-19 paradox of paradigm: deposed from its privilege moment it’s built, inscribed in a series, an out-of-series cartouche > remains heterogenous by virtue of its relief

p. 219 cartouche: puts itself to work, forms part of the work by inscribing (itself) (as) the title, signature, autobiographical performative of the signatory

p. 220 primordial place of “father” (presumed paradigm) depends on cartouche-performance—takes w/ one hand what it gives w/ the other (torturous surgery)

pp. 220-21 production of paradigm via cartouche introduces necessary (fatal) perversion that cartouche alone performs > paradigm must have been preceded by its following: phantasmatics of a contingent remaining (beyond hierarchy, beyond phantasy)

p. 221 the topology of the cartouche: parergon (the hors-doeuvres supplement in the work)

p. 222 [vis-à-vis Freud] father inferred from a sentence, declaration, judgment: “this is the father,” says the cartouche, paternity never touched, unnatural (different matter for maternity)

——as soon as cartouche doesn’t lay down law, pretending to recite the truth > cartouche as simulacrum transforms paradigm into paradigm effect (w/out destroying it, always something of it)

p. 225 Derrida quotes himself from Glas: modesty is no longer in season (de mise) for a cartouche, at the point of death

pp. 230-31 [la cartouche is a cartridge] dissemination of cartouches/cartridges (en tous sens, en tout genre) never exhausts a total > no total of meaning and genres (masculine/feminine)

p. 231 coffin’s mutism: always a box in a box, some supplementary cartridge, a parergon > hors la boîte, fors la boîte: necessity to steal coffin (each time, differently) inscribed right on the “thing,” right on the cartouche [congenital perjury of justice]

pp. 231-32 who signs the theft? Cartouche as great robber: this is my cartouche, I stole it, I am it, this is the body of my name > Cartouche left an institution: commonizing of proper name

p. 236 that which is entitled Cartouches is itself a series of cartouches, the title describes place, structure, form of text: voici des cartouches, ceux que je suis [follow/am] [cf. “Counterfeit Money”]

***——Cartouches: performance w/out presence

p. 237 I am myself cartouche and cartouches(s) in the plural: “I” sign myself to death as soon as there’s the title, reduce myself to first heading, capital, shrunken head

——Cartouches, its singular performance (hapax, only once) simultaneously entitles & signs: I sign, therefore we sign cartouche(s) [m/f]

p. 238 contingent can do w/out discourse, a masterpiece can’t do w/out a cartouche (on the market & in itself: if you insist on this distinction) > even when the cartouche remains, is defunct: pas de cartouche, plus de cartouche > what will have been able to do w/out it? never touched, aussi impassible et invulnérable quaux harcèlements du trait: cest peut-être quil était déjà dans la tombe, le cartouche

p. 245 order of narrative, whose trap has been situated by logic of cartouche

——unity of a period (of a detour) is indeterminable: each article presents perforated cards that transform the other > tombe, in the snare (dans le lacs)

CASTRATION (LACK)

AF p. 42n [re: 2 def. of circumcision] 1) symbolic substitute of castration of the son by primitive father (structural) 2) “conducting fossil” for investigating memory of heritage (historical)

T p. xxviii tympanum punctures itself (se crève), grafts itself > resists concepts of machine or nature, de coupure ou de corps, resists metaphysics of castration

F p. xlii cryptonomy follows contacts, straight lines or surfaces in most economical way, this makes cryptonomic the once inflexible logic of castration

DS p. 268n neither castration nor dissemination can become originary, central signified, dissem. represents affirmation of this nonorigin, it entails, relaunches, “inscribes” castration

p. 284n [Derrida comes back to i] reads little point as a decapitation right next to castrated pike > capital I (disseminates unity of meaning), ego, ice, échoplus-je > (I + Dé)irisation

P pp. 32-3 Derrida’s pas in Hegel/Heidegger’s circle of art, get across (franchir) circle w/out getting free (saffranchir) of its law, pas sans pas: circular closure as one that remains open (suffers neither lack nor negativity)

p. 43 arête/manque [re: theory of frame]

p. 71 no deconstruction of labor w/out theory of frame, any market presupposes a process of framing to liberate surplus value > in classical language, lack as product/production of frame

***pp. 80-1 le se-protéger-de-oeuvre (ergon), énergie captée, bordée, condition for mastery of PP, self-protection of energeia > energeia not as pure, total presence (prime mover), but as (par)ergon against what’s lacking in it, lack not as a substantial emptiness, but as impossibility of arresting differance in its contour, in a pose, of localizing lack, like metaphysics does, in its proper place: castration as truth (circular) > whether parergon borders (works against) free energy or essential lack, the 2 determinations sont le même (métaphysique)

p. 90 beautiful object, tulip, not lacking in anything, tel point de vue, de but en blanc, plie la totalité à se manquer elle-même > le sans de la coupure pure est sans manque—but for me to experience its totality, my knowledge lacks something—its end (bout); not the absence of end but the trace of the without [end] is origin of beauty; ça donne-le-beau: beauty gives nothing to be seen, sans is not visible, et pourtant il y en a et cest beau

p. 95 free beauty, tulip, cut off from fecundation but not sterile: sterility is determined from the end (as end of end)

p. 121 kolossos as stationary, impassive stone, link to Freud’s Medusa (castration/erection/apotropaic) [which Derrida attempted to displace in O]

POS p. 84 castration & mimesis: general title of all works in Dissemination and “White Mythology” [Derrida includes other “themes” on this page as well]

p. 86 dissemination is play of castration w/out metaphysical/romantic pathos of negativity > dissemination “is” angle of play of castration

——dissemination puts at stake (play) castration’s position as transcendental signifier/signified (phallus, transcendental signifier, as correlate to primary signified, mother’s desire)

ROP p. 67 [quoting EN] difference “w/” Lacan: the lack does not have its place in dissemination

SP pp. 59-61 if truth is only on the surface, why the fear, la pudeur? woman as suspension of truth & castration > truth-castration as l’affaire de lhomme, his credulity, man is never sufficiently old (assez vieux), dissimulating, or skeptical

——[re: truth-castration as man’s affair, and woman’s suspension of it] [English translation seems horrible] Derrida is asking that we take off the head (décapitonner) of Lacan’s discourse, w/ its truth speaking, castration & phallocentrism > by deploying metaphorics of veil

p. 61 woman plays w/ castration, does not believe in it, nor its opposite (much too clever for that), but she can’t seduce w/out it, needs castration’s effects, but as she plays w/ it, she anticipates her laughter (at man)

——were woman to believe in anti-castration, she would return plus sûrement to the same old machine, phallogocentrism’s attendant, disciple discipliné du maître > “we?” should learn from her

——castration describes a margin whose consequences are incalculable

p. 89 the becoming-female, Christian, an epoch in parenthesis, a woman castrates and plays at her castration, feigns castration (at once suffered & inflicted) [see HYMEN]

p. 93 castratism of the Church, excision (Ausschneidung), hostile to life (lebensfeindlich): so, if woman is life (femina vita), Christianity hostile to woman > la castration est une opération de la femme contre la femme, non moins que de chaque sexe contre soi et contre lautre

pp. 95-7, p. 101 Nietzsche’s 3 “positions” on woman:

1. woman is figure of falsehood, man as phallus is truth ; man fears castrated woman

2. woman is the figure of truth, plays w/ truth as a fetish ; man fears castrating woman

3. woman as artist, Dionysiac, dissimulatrice, castration doesn’t take place; love affirming woman

p. 99 hymen’s graphic, that of the pharmakon, inscribes castration’s effects w/in itself, w/out being reduced to it

ATIA pp. 81-2 Descartes’ 2 criteria (he calls them “methods”) for differentiating authentic from mimetic simulacrum of automaton (still govern method of Lacan & Heidegger): 1) the inability to respond 2) a lack which is not the lack of man, the lacking of the lack of man

p. 87 from Descartes to Heidegger, nonresponse: mechanicity of programming, deficiency, lack

p. 130 Lacan designates castration complex as Freud’s scientific (nonmythological) original sin (being subjected to the signifier, a nonmastery that gives human mastery over animals)

PS p. 186 for Artaud, swollen ego of cock > separate from me: “a true man has no sex” [swelling of sex as castration]

DIF DIF p. 6 if differance is [Heidegger’s Durchstreichung of Being], it reserves itself, never offered to the present: exceeds order of truth, not a hole in topology of castration [p. 21 differance is not]

O pp. 25-6 [nonsynonymous synonyms] add a supplementary 4th term, the more or the less, opening of square (not a cross, not closed square) > often associated w/ castration, this 4 of dissemination: an outside of castration (fall w/ no return, no restricted economy), a triangle open on its 4th side, splayed square (carré écarté) loosens up circle/triangle, de-limits them, re-cites them

——castration has always been metaphysically interpreted/arrested by full speech, logocentrism, intersubjective triad

p. 40n if “assumption” of castration is same as denial of it: “apotropaics would always have one more surprise up its sleeve (plus dune suprise)”

p. 41n dissemination “threatens signification” [not “threatens castration”] [Medusa stone-phallus]

REST p. 334 philosophico-psychoanalytic concept of fetishism, opposition between fetish & thing, castration as truth of truth, sexual decidability

p. 340 logic of detachment as cut (opposition, leads to suturing-sublation, maintains problematic of castration truth) vs. logic of detachment as stricture (is tout autre, interlacing of differance of [or as] stricture, no suture, haunting, neither empty nor full, largument-de-la-gaine, can’t accommodate the couple, ces coupes oppositionelles, the ghost leases, le, la, les double(s) band-)

TR p. 159 de Man: dispossession in writing due to arbitrary power of signifier, from point of view of subject, this can only be experienced as beheading, dismemberment, castration

AFR pp. 100-01 Condillac’s theory of analogy (operation of remarking): supply a language’s defects > remarks anteriority in the fact, an anteriority (of the fact) that becomes lacking in itself > supply what is necessary, is missing (il faut), but [remark] also presents itself as surplus value, a superabundance, frivolous futility > makes all commerce possible (as value & sign)

BSi pp. 224-25 priapism is infinite ithyphallism, foreign to finitude of erection (finitude makes erection possible) > thus, is detumescence castration?

p. 251 Medusa as capital head—erection, castration

pp. 303-04 Lacan: Oedipus story, a less cretinizing (abêtissant) version of Original Sin > Derrida wonders [coyly] whether everything in BS deals w/ castration

ATAP pp. 76-7 from Kant to Freud, no sexual difference (pas de différence) in castration or emasculation (Entmannung) [either one has male genital or one is castrated], only the masculine!

——castration [of reason], a metaphor/simulacrum, concerns phallus (not penis/clitoris); Bemächtigungstrieb

CIR p. 313 see yourself overrunning discourse on castration and its supposed substitute

EU p. 124 Glas: generalized fetishism, pull of the discourse of castration toward affirmative dissemination [also continues pursuing project of grammatology, etc.]

SPEC p. 363 index of original normality [at this point of Beyond…] is the “primitive,” not child: primitives don’t face death [?], anxiety about death has no proper content

——death is the analogon of castration > castration not incompatible w/ thesis of death drive if one refers to syntaxic articulation of athesis: Derrida’s pointing to “it” at this moment

p. 401 w/ Causa, lAutre Choseno opposition btwn pleasure & unpleasure, w/in & beyond, life & death: graphics of strictural supplement not oppositional, knowns no negation, no lack; in graphics, desire is sanssans,” is of a “sans sans sans”

FV pp. 415-16 for Freud, dreams of nakedness don’t exhibit penis or absence of penis but absence of phallus, absence of attribute supplementing a possible fault, absence of colossal double > following chain is indicated: truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame [Schreber]

p. 425 [Derrida’s syntactical deconstruction of Lacan] re: letter, manque à sa place [missing from its place] becomes manque a sa place [lack has its place]

pp. 436-37, 39 “Seminar” insists on topos, single proper itinerary of letter, if meaning [in the general sense] is indifferent to letter, meaning of the letter is not, meaning of letter as truth itself

——not naive topology but still a topos, Heideggerian-like veiled/unveiled castration placed at the hole (trou) of the woman, letter comes back to Being, to the nothing that is the opening btwn woman’s legs (Queen)

pp. 437-38 Derrida on Lacan: circulation, acquitting of a debt, a proper place [not naive, empirical topology], detour from [woman’s] hole to itself permits signified to return to its origin—indivisible locality, signifier must never be lost, divided, fragmented

pp. 440-42 circular itinerary, Dupin & analyst find letter where they expect it: Queen wants letter-fetish brought back to her, exchanges one fetish for another w/out spending—because there’s equivalence here (assurance of return): circle of restricted economy, stricture of the ring

——castration-truth is that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring): brings signifier, fetish, phallus, letter back into their oikos, familiar dwelling, proper place

——the lack never lacks a place: indivisible circulation of proper

——lack does not have its place in dissemination

p. 442 for Lacan, Femininity is the Truth (of) castration, best figure of castration, because in logic of signifier it (elle) has always already been castrated > Femininity “leaves” something in circulation (here the letter), detaches something she never had, brought back to itself

——this 1st castration (pre-castration) affects w/ castration/femininity whoever holds the letter

pp. 443-44 for Derrida, letter can always not arrive > Lacan’s symbolic, Lacan’s castration, protects letter from its divisibility/fragmentation

p. 461 Bonaparte falls back onto dogmatic imprudence (appeal to author’s unconscious), Lacan falls back, w/ incomparable philosophical vigilance, onto Truth > [both Bonaparte & Lacan] castration of mother as ultimate meaning & proper site of letter: “real intersubjectivity,” “solution in broad daylight”—proper as relation to lack itself, in proper place/body

pp. 463-64 the 2 truths lean on, support each other (sétaient): 1) adequation, circular return, garde et regarde, circuit of pact, control, guardianship (la garde) of the phallus as guardianship of the lack 2) veiling-unveiling as structure of lack, a proper place: les contours étant-la place du manque à être

pp. 465-66 [in Purloined Letter] Queen wishes to play on 2 contracts [must be read elsewhere?]: Queen’s desire to retain (garder) or refind the letter doubles her pact w/ the King

p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

pp. 468-69 the 2 truths: adequation (original contract: acquitting of debt), unveiling (lack on basis of which contract contracts in order to reappropriate what’s been detached)

——w/out return, divisibility rebels against lack

p. 472 Lacan’s authentic: “appel propre du vide

——for Lacan, ideal process of analysis: “realization” of full speech as assumption of desire (of castration)

***p. 481n [re: psychoanalysis] institution built on male child’s experience > at stage of genital organization, there’s only maleness (antithesis isn’t femaleness but being castrated): phallogocentrism is no accident/error, its old, enormous root must be accounted for [described] > but, its description is a “participant” when it induces a practice, ethics, institution, a politics that insures truth of a tradition

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [fixerup]

GOD p. 93 a look, God’s look, God’s gaze, that cannot be exchanged, situates original sin, is the essence of responsibility [p. 91 not Kantian autonomy, freedom]

GT p. 165n “freedom” in Kant’s speculative philosophy [?] can’t be demonstrated, it’s a “letter of credit for the moral law,” an assumption; also that (diabolical) evil can never be a motive

——faith/belief (act of faith/credit) given w/ monetary language, practical reason cannot be separated from chremastics as we interpreted it above

FK pp. 50-51 via Kant’s moral law, Christianity can only answer its moral calling in death of God far beyond figures of the Passion

p. 51 via Kant’s “formal rigor,” a law that programs an infinite spiral of outbidding; today both “fundamentalisms” & “integrisms” hyperbolize this outbidding

p. 88 w/ Kant, self-sacrifice sacrifices most proper in service of most proper

FL p. 245 apply rule w/out justice, Kant would say, I acted in conformity with duty but not through duty or out of respect for the law (loi)

p. 275 Kant’s categorical imperative—uncontestable but “allows for no critique of violence”

BL p. 190 Kant: typology, symbolic presentation of moral good (beauty, a symbol of morality), respect for law which only appears in law > “as if” in maxim: reconciles practical reason w/ historical teleology (narrative), w/ possibility of unlimited progress

——for Kant, pure morality excludes historicity, empirical narrativity > shelters these parasites

p. 196 problem of exemplarity [knowing how to enter into the law] w/ re: to Kant’s respect for the law > the example would be the effect of the law, only summoned before the law

p. 210 Kant like Kafka knows the law is an idiom for you—never general

***H p. 81 categorical imperative (under erasure) of hospitality, unconditional; p. 83 unconditional w/out imperative, w/out duty, beyond economy and debt

POO p. 16 sacrifice and sacrificial at heart of Kant’s morality

p. 140n Kant’s pure law whose concept conforms to no example (no mimesis); p. 141n the idea of moral perfection, which reason formulates apriori and connects, inseparably, to free will > the “true original which lies in reason

POOF pp. 252-56 via Kant, responsibility (response, speaking, time) of friendship linked to respect (distance, gaze, space) > Kant links highest friendship to ‘moral law,’ to distance, repulsion, links love to attraction—if it’s a duty to intend toward dignity of ‘sympathy’ & ‘communication (Mitteilung),’ ‘ardour’, excess, of love can break equality while maintaining reciprocity > there must be outward signs, (external) testaments of friendship [?]

——for Kant, friendship doesn’t produce happiness, the 2 feelings [in each person?] render mankind worthy of being happy

p. 271 fraternal friendship & ascension, height: Kant’s stellar sublimity of moral law, Nietzsche’s star friendship

EM pp. 121-22n (144-45n) Kant’s pure end of moral law—not anthropological

VM pp. 96, 314n Kant and Levinas both have immediate respect for other, but Levinas does not pass through neutral element of universal, nor through respect for law

PP p. 123 dialectical inversion of pharmakon or dangerous supplement makes death à la fois acceptable and null > immortality of soul, acts like antibody, dissipates its terrifying fantasy, le pharmarkon inverti, qui met en fuite tous les épouvantails: origin of epistēmē, opening to truth as possibility of repetition, submission of “greed for life (epithumein zēn)” to law (king, father, capital)

OH p. 45 following program—application of know-how > ethics & politics become a technology, no longer order of practical reason or decision, begins to be irresponsible

pp. 68-9 [threatened] ideality in capitalization: that which exceeds borders of sensible, opens onto infinite, gives rise to universal, “maxim of maximization,” nothing other than spirit itself

pp. 76-9 the duty to respond to call of European memory, all other duties presuppose this one in silence [?]

——duty to act in accord w/ a double contradiction that is not simply a Kantian illusionary antimony but an effective one (w/ experience, through experiment), interminable

FWT p. 74 Kant: (finite) subject of law—subject of duty > save God, who has no duty, and slave, who has duties but no rights [see ATIA pp. 99-100]

p. 142 DP conceived of as heart of all criminal law, all moral law (Kant) > its condition or transcendental

pp. 150-51 deconstruction of DP makes untenable from w/in distinction btwn internal punishment (poena naturalis) & external (poena forensis): [Kant does Derrida’s work for him] since guilty should sign off on punishment, all executed punishment would be like a suicide > no law immune from interest, revenge, the sacrificial (for Kant, moral/judicial reason is sacrificial)

——Kant’s interpretation of lex talionis, more Roman/Jewish than evangelical, applied to categorical imperative: “if you kill him, you kill yourself”

DPi p. 125 CI: immanent & pure calculation free of extrinsic calculation

pp. 126-27 for Kant, justice finds itself here in double bind, knot: either honor (Ehrbegriff) is vain or DP should simply be set aside > Die Auflösung dieses Knotens: no more DP when law (CI) & nature align

——no more need to not DP women, they’ll never marry out of wedlock (Derrida adds: extraordinary & stupid uselessness, rigor & absurdity of Kant’s logic)

pp. 127-28 for Kant, CI, eye for an eye, talionic law, surpasses value of life and all price: no law will ever be founded on unconditional love of life (life for life’s sake)—on the absolute refusal of any sacrifice of life

p. 141 both abolitionists & Kant speak of price, value, dignity above Marketpries > for Kant, jus talionis is pure equivalence not revenge, impersonal principle of reparative justice

pp. 141-42 jus talionis: “categorical imperative” of penal justice, pure juridical rationality

p. 145 CI of DP, following Nietzsche & Baudelaire, is not pure disinterest, DP proponents afraid for themselves, interest in gaining release from torture (von ein Tortur loskommen), threat of verdict

p. 148 Nietzsche accuses Kant’s categorical imperative of a hypocritical cruelty, gives itself airs of keeping its hands clean (de ny pas toucher)

p. 271 CI (and thus DP) is priceless, w/out interest, so Beccaria’s utilitarianism is not the law, is pathological; for Kant, justice can’t be evaluated, transcendent to calculation, to price of life, priceless > transcendence (maybe) of the “sur,” surviving beyond life (drive)

p. 272 Kant: “the law of punishment is a categorical imperative”

HLP p. 42 for Kant, in Augustinian tradition, sacred duty, unconditional imperative not to lie; Schürmann: sacred, in Heidegger, keeps historical connotation, while awe and piety direct toward event, presencing (which is not at all historical)

p. 44 Kant: veracity a formal duty (formale Pflicht)

——for Kant, veracity as a formal condition of right, social contract, not ethical but meta-juridical, not historical: “[a lie] necessarily does harm to humanity in general”

p. 45 Kant might say: “all language is structured by this promise of veracity,” “[when you lie] you cease speaking”; Derrida: difficult to refute unless one thinks specter of possible lie that haunts veracity

——rational law of sacred veracity: condition of history, human sociality

p. 290n Kant: permit lying, destroy very possibility of promises

WAP p. 35 Kant’s maxim is not the law, it is the subjective relation to the law, rule of action in conformity w/ law > teaching/training thus administered at level of maxim

pp. 45-6 for Kant, right is only strict, not curved (krumm), oblique (schief), attains its proper stricture, in “contrainte réciproque universelle,” a link btwn universal and “freedom,” right has no internal depths (all internal can be exposed completely), its objects must be shown in actions, domain of visibility, theatricality w/out fold

——for Kant, foundation of right is not juridical but moral [Heideggerian gesture]

——[tautological] consciousness of stricture [?]: being-right of right is its right to be right

pp. 46-8 strict, narrow, rectilinear right must be perfectly external, can’t be motivated by consciousness of being before the law: right and external constraint are the same

——w/ rectilinearity & pedagogy what is at stake is the presentation (Darstellung) of a concept in a pure & a priori intuition, but following an analogy [w/ math] > only a perfectly external right deserves name of strict (narrow) right

——we assert our rights to the extent that we can, in a manner compatible w/ freedom of everyone > Kant: “right and the faculty of constraining are one and the same thing”

pp. 55-6 invitation (Aufforderung) to tribunal of reason would be a repetition of old task; Nancy on Critique: philosophy pronounces law on law

EL p. 219 [re: “we” of apocalyptic speech] responsibility is ineluctable, finds sign of its freedom in this fatality > not Kantian practical universality, formalizable obligation: does not replace itself, delegate itself

LI p. 97 speech act theory seeks the founding categories of all ethical-political statements: relation of intentionality to conventionality or to rules (in the best Kantian tradition)

p. 152 unconditionality (Derrida intentionally recalling Kant’s CI) is independent of every determinate context, announces itself only in the opening of context

pp. 152-53 unconditionality defines injunction that prescribes deconstruction: let another language, other thoughts, make their way

——Derrida hesitates to characterize all this in Kantian terms (though unconditionality intentionally recalls Kant’s CI) because those philosophemes call for deconstructive questions: he experiences a new responsibility, which he respects enough never to compromise

OG p. 20 (33-34) transcendental signified: resource of sign, makes difference btwn signans/signatum absolute & irreducible > it is la voix sentend: conscience, auto-affection (spontaneity, ideality, universality, non-mondain of substance)

ATAP pp. 72-3 acc. Kant, mystagogues confuse Geheimnis of practical reason w/ mystery of vision/contact > nothing more auto-affective than voice of moral law, not contaminated by feeling/illumination (touch/sight)

p. 79 don’t personify moral law, even as voice, that’s “pathological”: exclude any body, especially body of veiled Isis (aesthetic), universal principle of femininity

EU p. 45 moral law, object of the greatest respect (der grössten Achtung), adoration addressed to Supreme Cause (Ursache) > thus Kant explains legitimacy/necessity of censorship

p. 48 highest form of pure reason—pure practical reason, pure laws of practical reason should constrain in a respect given freely

——since finitude of man degrades moral law’s sublimity, respect for it (form of censorship) must be posed from outside, by “coercive laws” > thus, there would be no university w/out principle of evil in man [Derrida remarks that this statement isn’t false, but is formulated too quickly]

pp. 48-9 Kant’s politics always re: State reason as a censoring reason > for Kant, censorship: a critique that has force (Gewalt) at its disposal—pure force does not censor [?]

p. 90 Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties: a dictionary or grammar, powerful effort to formalize Western university (which is finished, marked by finitude)

——formal law: pure legitimation, reason as court of final appeal > pure ethico-juridical instance, tautology, pure practical reason, decision of pure egological subject

p. 105 Kant’s “heroic” effort to mark off juridical borders btwn 2 classes of [university] faculties > freedom of judgment, philosophy, the unconditioned condition w/out which there is no university

p. 180 metaphysics of morals deals w/ freedom not nature, rights & duty, to possess metaphysics is a duty > everyone has this metaphysics and thus this duty—a Faktum

for Kant, metaphysics: a priori system of knowledge by simple concepts

CATEGORY

PAS PAS p. (29) Blanchot disquiets, suspends, infringes on categorical, the self-identity of the category (accusation, judgment) > [infringes] law of identity of “is” in predication

T p. xii is there any ruse not belonging to reason which will prevent philosophy from borrowing its categories from logos of other, affecting itself w/out delay [see POOF p. 1]?

WM p. 249(n) dividing essence from proper permits the play of metaphor, doesn’t involve thing itself in play of substitutions, metaphor is mediate, abstract, medium of quasi-synonymy

——antikatēgoreisthai: reciprocal substitution of two predicates related to identical concrete subject

——first example of antikatēgoreisthai is grammar, i.e. what is proper to man is grammar, ability to read & write > belongs to chain of what’s proper to man: logos, phōnē sēmantikē, mimēsis, metaphora

***DPi pp. 4-5 Socrates’ death: katēgoria (accusation), a theological one: he introduced new demons (hetera de daimonia kaina), daimonia sometimes gods but also lesser ones, revenants

BSi p. 150 katēgoria (accusation, blame)

p. 151 transcategorial—“qui transcendit omne genus”: does not belong to series or table > is bêtise a transcategorial category, a quasi-transcendental?

pp. 151-52 katēgoreuō (decry, accuse in legal proceedings) also means to attribute, to say something about something: “S is P”

p. 158 bêtise can always be mine, turns around like “category of accusation,” betraying my fault > contagion, being-with of bêtise

p. 161 bêtise as madness of definition, “S is P,” definite articles le or la, bêtise is defining as much as defined > the category is a signature of bêtise

pp. 166-67 Kant’s distinction btwn conflict (Streit) & war (Krieg): an institution (3rd party) must know exactly what the accusation means [re: bêtise] for it to achieve rational status of conflict

p. 167 accusation of bête deprives the accused, like animal, of all that is proper to man (language, reason, logos, sense of death, technique, history, convention, culture, laughter, tears, work)

p. 169 bêtise as ambiguous hetero- or self-accusation: I’m too good, too bête

CAUSALITY

HASD p. 28 [in Christian apophatics of Dionysus] cause, gift of gift, order and promise are the same

F pp. xliii-xliv “Cause” is designified in the crypt of anasemia, a trace w/ no present in its wake > Thing does not speak, is not a thing, its testamentary structure organizes funeral pomp of crypt

DIF DIF p. 12 trace as way out of closure of classical cause & effect (but not sufficient outside its text)

CHM p. 44 legitimate renunciation of certain style of causality must still ask etiological questions [re: “act of force”] > can a strict structuralism even write a history?

——what is Descartes’ affinity w/ his historicized period?

BSi p. 271 Celan: poem speaks in the cause of the strange, “vielleicht in eines ganz Anderen Sache

OG p. 290 (410) imposition of form via spacing, beyond classical model of causality, a new transcendental aesthetic guided by inscription: writing, as Rousseau intuited, linked to to nature of social space > inscription as habitation in general

CELAN [fixerup]

SH pp. 6-7 how could we differentiate what Celan says [theorizes? is it theory in a poem?] about the date and how he dates? to differentiate would be to longer read him

p. 29 Joyce and shibboleth; Derrida doesn’t believe Joyce’s first & true desire was to keep professors busy—and nothing could be more foreign to Celan

p. 48 privilege of code (clock, calendar) [in Celan], that which allows one to call off the hours, to class (calare) > calendar, clock, name return of tout autre in the same > hour writes, speaks

p. 67 how can German language receiver circumcision of poem’s date following the holocaust, the solution, the ash of all? how can you bless these ashes in German? [re: Celan]

DST DST p. 201 one never reads Celan (incomparable poet-translator) w/out taking into account genealogy of other poets

BSi p. 234 for Celan, letting the other speak what in the other is most other: let time speak

CENS ORSHIP

H p. 49 literature is self-censoring, requires “competence”

FSW p. 226 writing unthinkable w/out repression > Freud uses metaphor of censorship, writing as vigilance [neither permanent contact] & failure [nor permanent break] of censorship

FWT p. 129 literature has always been subject to censorship, the modalities of censorship keep evolving, indeterminably > should never censor something under name “literary fiction”

pp. 134-35 censorship enforced by loss of job [capitalism] in America [re: movie Mr Death, Holocaust denier]

WAP p. 40-1 how dominant philosophical culture tends to censor other philosophical discourses or other discourses that exceed philosophico-juridico-political machinery

ATAP p. 89-90 apocalypse on both sides of censorship: 1) nothing less conservative than apocalyptic genre, escapes all postal regulations (where censorship is strong, apocalyptic writings increase) 2) state censors by denouncing as false, mystagogic, obscure, apocalyptic

EU p. 44 question of censorship btwn Reason & university: censorship as institution, censorship outside the institution

pp. 44-5 Derrida will situate like an emblem Kant’s division of theologian in single person (first image des lignes de partage, des dissociations intérieures qui sillonnent the territory sur lequel nous nous engageons): theologian as scholar or theologian as censor (ecclesiastic)

——moral law, object of the greatest respect (der grössten Achtung), adoration addressed to Supreme Cause (Ursache) > thus Kant explains legitimacy/necessity of censorship

p. 46 acc. Kant, censorship: “a critique that has power,” doesn’t simply reduce to absolute silence but limits range of addressees—if there’s not unlimited public discourse, there’s censorship

——university always censured & censoring: place & machinery of its application may have changed

pp. 47-8 self-censoring of institution: what is “legitimacy” of concept of legitimacy?

p. 48 highest form of pure reason—pure practical reason, pure laws of practical reason should constrain in a respect given freely

pp. 48-9 acc Kant, censorship: a critique that has force (Gewalt) at its disposal > since 17th century, censorship was always matter of church, theological-political power: grant/refuse imprimatur, decide on professional qualifications, seize/prohibit books

p. 49 every critique of censorship is a critique of judgment, censorship is a judgment, proposes laws, tribunal, code > censere, to evaluate (réputer), compute, count—ratio, “census,” “cens,” is enumeration of citizens

p. 50 acc. Kant, philosophy says, does not do > pure reason thus exempt from censorship, speaks w/in university not outside

——no censorship w/out raison donnée, censorship never presents itself as brutal, mute repression; acc. Kant, censorship always enacts itself in the name of another discourse, never against private discourses, thus restricting instances of translation, contraband, substitution, disguise [?]

p. 51 Freud hasty to call repression psychological “censorship”

***pp. 51-2 [Foucault-like?] even if State censorship is reduced today [compared to Kant’s age], there’s a giant network of delegitimation, marginalization, that functions w/out censorship (stricto sensu): laws of capital, system of language, media politics, publishing structures, “physical & psychological” health, over-determined complexity of bio-psychic function > to point to forbidden shows censors know what they’re censoring, shows a lapse in organigram of prohibition: a principle of disturbance, a deconstructive counterforce

p. 52 Kant rationalizes necessity of censorship, constructs a schema of pure a priori rationality to justify a state of fact (fact of the State [like Hegel?])

pp. 52-3 acc. Kant, censorship justified by evil > who or what faculty can speak meaning & truth of censorship? of evil? the philosopher!

p. 63 [vis-à-vis Kant] metaphysics as the teacher’s mistress (maîtresse du maître), as censor > for a teacher, a finite being, no lifting of censorship, only strategic calculation: censorship against censorship, debate of the best censorship [the idea of philosopher’s legislation found everywhere in man’s reason], censorship of reason: [Derrida asks vis-à-vis Schelling] is this strategy an art?

p. 97 Kant’s total censorship [of philosopher] avoids most odious tyranny: respectful, responsible service to truth, stripped of all coercive power? or does it safeguard totalitarian social forms?

CHANCE

GT pp. 122-23 condition common to gift & event: unconditionality > chance, tukhē, in an instant, disorder, surprise, irruptive, unmotivated, freedom of dice throw, coup de don, obey nothing but disorder, principles w/out principles, not necessary, gratuitous, déchirer la trame

——event, gift, must be structured by aleatory, remain unforeseeable w/out being kept so

——one must intend to give a gift, and yet all intentionality threatens the gift w/ self-keeping > intentional freedom & chance must miraculously agree w/ each other

p. 126 in “Counterfeit Money,” wealth, fortune, is natural, as if nature had decided this belonging to social class

p. 128 Derrida links pheuin, phusis to donation, thus bringing nature & production together [sometimes opposed]; fortune (fate, chance, fors, luck, fortuity) and necessity are allied

p. 133 Aristotle differentiates tukhē from automaton (chance from human finality), offers example of creditor going to market & getting his debt paid back: pas de don, everything happens en marchant

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

R p. 53 technique, “technical measure of equality” is not a mishap, chance for incommensurable, technique before calculating technique [?] [POOF]

FK p. 83 technical, automatic, machine-like [the possibility of faith, its very chance], a chance that entails risk of radical evil, otherwise it would simply be pure know-how, pure knowledge, annulment of future, programme, proof, predictability, providence

LOBL p. 76 contamination is not caused by contingency, contiguity, contagion but by chance

p. 148 I am “irresponsible” and absolutely committed in the establishment of the language of the other, which I do as if the first moment, the “at once” is the occasion of the hymen, its chance and its law

MC p. 345 prepare an encounter vs. “fall upon” by accident (chance)

——count on luck, fishing & hunting [Plato’s Sophist]

——to speak: multiply, enumerate my chances, theme of #s in dim light of indetermination

p. 347 both destiner au hasard and croire au hasard can mean giving up to random chance or not giving at all: not by chance chance, believing, not believing

p. 348 descent, chance, fall (undoes anticipation), lightning-moment

p. 349 [Nietzsche’s etymologizing in On Genealogy] méchance (mean, bad, low): bad luck; malchance: Austin’s “infelicity,” parasite (breach of contract) [the clinic, those who fell (ill)]

p. 350 we are dealing with the logic of (dispatch) envoi

p. 353 turn accidents into meaning

p. 357 no time to display all my chance [see SUBJ]

p. 360 “my clinamen has to do w/ the divisibility of the mark”

p. 367 to believe in chance means all chance means something, so no chance

p. 366 bad luck could also be when truth can reveal itself

p. 373 last chance: moment when 2 dice come to a standstill & one counts up the results > incalcuable/innumerable

p. 376 Derrida ends Mes Chances by telling us to read section in Phaedrus about the divinity of madness recognizing all chances

SPOM p. 46 [see MC] Derrida titles text Specters of Marx before he finds specter of communism

POOF p. 218 one must resist the temptation to keep (garder) its chance, never let it become program, never a grounding on virtue of perhaps [chance as rarity throughout POOF]

POR p. 20 (154) chance of an instant, Augenblick, a wink, blink [rather, “in the twilight of the eye”]: desire for memory & exposure to future brought together in same instant > guardian faithful enough to keep chance of a future

——(155) can one keep chance? can one keep both memory & chance? je suis plutôt tenté de penser que lune ne se garde pas sans lautre, sans garder lautre et sans garder de lautre [double guard of university]

HASD p. 5 the prayer can be mimicked, risk of mimicry (also a piece of luck) inscribed in structure of the mark

MPM pp. 58-9 if a past does not exist, no more does death—only mourning, figures of death, we inscribe in every trace (otherwise called “survivals”)—because they outlast us, trying their luck, in advance, “in memory of” [see p. 87n inexistence of past/death not futility/illusion]

p. 148 to lose one’s language in a foreign place is the terrible chance of the promise

PP pp. 72-3 pharmakon linked to book (biblia), empirical practices, not necessary, writing is open to chance, governed by ways of magic

p. 170 pharmakon means coup, stroke of fate (un coup du sort), dice-throw (le coup de théâtre), le coup double, un coup pour rien, un coup tiré, un coup de force, un coup monté

OH p. 35 responsibility: making a chance of the memory of a name, of the idiomatic limit > an opening of identity to its future

——all names designate a negative limit & a chance

PAS PAS p. (52) to say “Viens” in quotation marks, leViens,” that which we cannot avoid is missed, mais on court la chance de répéter lalliance

p. (60) échouer, échec, échéance, chance; the chance (échec ou écheance) of the event

p. (68) chance and necessity de la langue, la nécessité, la chance, marque encore la chance, the risk: que lautre de la langue se passe dans le pas au-delà de la langue, not its other but the other sans elle (language)

S p. 125n to be sensitive to humor despite seriousness [in Heidegger’s presumptions German, Greek re: Geist] could become an obligation (ethical, political), a chance, chance de lesprit

***POOF p. 27 limit is also a chance: must receive address of other at particular address, in singular language

p. 30 English perhaps linked more directly to chance (hap, perchance), to what may happen

p. 50 ‘perhaps,’ announcement of 1st act, 1st scene: only chance granted to the future, chance of chance

SH p. 11 Derrida plays w/ rencontre (chance, encounter)

F p. xlv et cest dans la mesure où la crypte fermait mal quune chance restait encore: le preuve > but the proof came for Wolf Man too late

DS p. 238 idée: i’s & dé (dice) [phallus-mark & chance]

pp. 262-64n [re: Mallarmé’s use of Or] Or (substantive noun/adverb of time), gold turned to nothing; Igitur, adverb-name (also means “therefore”), has affinities w/ Or, or marks the hour (today) > temps dor, “Il Signor,” “qui signore,” “signe or,” in the golden antre of a glottis (glossa, gold ingot, lingot, lingua) > throw of linguistic dice

p. 285 désertant toute profondeur, chacune de ses faces est aussi, après coup, tout le dé

in a hymen depending on verse, blank once more, composed of chance & necessity, writing prepares to receive the seminal spurt of a throw of dice

P p. 79 Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

ROP p. 64 in EN, in interminable conversation w/ Lacan, Derrida thinks contingency, singularity, event, tukhē, which is also a thinking of death, whose signifier would be the phallus

p. 79 quasi-transcendental (formal) law of seriality (when condition is part of the series) creates aporias not to be avoided—the very chance to think [hors-série]

SP p. 139 plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

WAP p. 25 philosopher, disturbing thinker, always accused of impiety because takes uncertainty, chance, tukhē seriously; Cicero claims Theophrastus said: “fortune is queen of the world”

p. 200n coincidence: singularity of a chance and a justification, another kind of privilege

DPi p. 119 Blanchot: a moment ago words were an obstacle, now they’re my only chance

RGE p. 268 Bataille places discursive knowledge in relation to an unknowledge: avec un non-savoir absolu sur le sans-fond duquel senlèvent la chance ou le pari de sens, de lhistoire et des horizons de savoir absolu

p. 273 sovereign writing: transgresses dialectic of mediacy/immediacy simultaneously > a chance, not technique, assures of nothing (no result, no profit)

REST pp. 301-02 that all of a sudden the motifs of Heidegger’s Überfall in REST link up w/ Kant’s parergon in P [cf. P pp. 66-7] is prescribed in all rigor by flexibility of chance, wager, which could have left the place [the link?] empty [edge of frame, place of signature]

DST DST p. 230 no rhythm w/out caesura > antirhythmic [Hölderlin], arrhythmic

——caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning, caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

PIO pp. 27-8 status of invention via politics of patent, programming of patented inventions (even integrating margin of chance)—are programmed inventions still inventions? still open to future?

p. 34 invention’s “first time”: inaugural event and iterability > thus, no invention w/out status, w/out introduction or promise of publicity; iterability marked, remarked, at origin of invention, elle y forme une poche du premier instant: retroverted anticipation

——to invent is to produce iterability & the machine for reproduction/simulation

pp. 38-9 for Leibniz, inventor shouldn’t fall upon truth by chance, he must know chance, anticipate it, grasp it: this preserves/nullifies chance (cf. governmental policies)

——logic distinguishing chance from method and method of invention from method of pedagogical expositions—calls for deconstruction > it’s in this way that deconstruction is no longer subject to this logic

TR p. 134 cut: wounding, opening, chance of a respiration

p. 144 offered chance [for you the reader to preserve Rousseau’s destiny] is also a wager, logic/economy of wager: by wagering on future [by appealing to survival], you will win at every throw > bearing witness to your goodness/justice [if you watch over Rousseau’s manuscript]

PPT p. 4 event makes a contract w/ itself at instant when singularity of trait divides, in order to link itself to play, chance & economy of language > set economy going by exposing it to chance

+R p. 162 [quoting Glas] Genet’s text is not exhausted by the pocket Derrida cuts, sews, and binds: it was the text [Genet’s] which pierced a hole in the pocket first

C p. 205 what does it mean [re: # 127 of Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins] beyond meaningless anankē of a chance, a term (échéance), a decline (déchéance)?

p. 215 work of the angle (RECTIFIES in all senses) resounds on more than one surface: kills, repairs, restores, recaptures, then once more (inexhaustible debt until the échéance of a dice throw)

LI LI p. 120 that all interpretation and all language are problematic: a stroke of luck?

TN TN p. 195 Nancy, partage—parting, sharing, spacing, syncope, irreducible partition, gives “it” a chance menacée, heartbeat’s the other’s beat (le même battementde lautre, du coeur de lautre)

——syncope is this partage of spacing

p. 309 singularity [never assured] doit être couru comme une chance ou un risque: Nancy’s a bettor, thinker of the bet (pari), a desperate bettor, never stops staking, committing (dengager), calculating w/ exactitude hyperbolic odds (gages): not counting on gains (bénéfice) of an “argument du pari” [Pascal] or any salut

ATM ATM p. 160 there must be a series of Levinas’ même moment if writing of dislocation of the Same toward the Relation [to the Other] is to have a chance, a hold (prise)

——“chance” because: even if obligated, one is not constrained to read what's given to be read

p. 162 [re: Levinas’ sériature] cette reprise (this mending resumption) is the condition by which beyond essence keeps (garde) its chance [see p. 160] against the enveloping seam (couture enveloppante) of the dialectic or thematic

——no tear (déchirure) possible in Levinas’ text w/out a certain notching (échancrure) of the 2nd moment, and certain contamination btwn the 2 > he likes the tear he detests contamination

AD AD p. 35 idiom, ambiguous chance, shibboleth of the threshold, preliminary chance of hospitality (i.e. French language)

——these chances accumulate places appropriate to the crypt (i.e. translating accueil and recueillement)

CIN CIN p. 37 the chance of returning, when one “incenses” a sentence to infinity, adorned w/ all its dead, is more certain than securing sentence in an archive [fire guards better than archive]

p. 42 nothing out of reach of the tongue of fire (langue de feu), not even cinders if there are cinders there, save a chance (fors une chance)

BSi BSi p. 272 tout autre can’t resemble or be introjected, assimilated into mine: chance of encounter, event, takes one’s breath sway—turns it [is tout autre sovereign or sovereignty of no sovereignty?]

***OG ***OG pp. 258-59 for Rousseau, only philosophy can think catastrophic factum, which history (historians) can’t; passage can’t be explained structurally; chance, the “surprising,” not part of system, a free & mythic invention

EU pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

——provocation to think brings together in same instant desire for memory & exposure to future

SPEC p. 353 demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

p. 385 desire & throw of the dice beyond PP is Freud’s pleasure

CHOR p. 95 poker-like gamble w/ no insurance: “each man and each woman must commit his or her own singularity, the untranslatable factor of his or her life and death”

CHANCE AND NECESSITY

GT p. 128 Derrida links pheuin, phusis to donation, thus bringing nature & production together [sometimes opposed]; fortune (fate, chance, fors, luck, fortuity) and necessity are allied

MC p. 350 Derrida links chance & necessity via Anankē, Tukhē, and Automatia

POOF pp. 29-30 the unstable (inconstant), at the crossroads of chance & necessity, as necessary as the stable (bébaios), and already indispensable to Plato or Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship

PAS PAS p. (68) chance and necessity de la langue, la nécessité, la chance, marque encore la chance, the risk: que lautre de la langue se passe dans le pas au-delà de la langue, not its other but the other sans elle (language)

SH p. 23 w/in stricture of cipher # 13 [re: Celan’s February 13th] chance & necessity are bound together, fatality & chance

DS p. 277 difference is the necessary interval, suspense btwn 2 outcomes, “lapse of time” btwn 2 shots, rolls, chances > a game of chance forever new, a play of fire forever young > fire & games (via Nietzsche, Heraclitus), play of luck w/ necessity: a hymen btwn chance & rule

p. 285 désertant toute profondeur, chacune de ses faces est aussi, après coup, tout le dé

in a hymen depending on verse, blank once more, composed of chance & necessity, writing prepares to receive the seminal spurt of a throw of dice

——roll die in hymen, write, seminal spurt: hasard selon le programme génétique > limited to 6 surfaces [each guarding chance]

ROP p. 21 inability to identify w/ oneself, unify oneself, gather oneself > alliance of destiny, namely tragedy, and chance as the possible or aleatory [no pertinence to dramatization]

O p. 54 adventurous excess of writing not improv., throw of dice doesn’t contradict rigorous necessity of its “formal assemblage”: unity of chance & rule, program and its leftovers or extra (son reste ou de son surplus) [literature or book: atheistic face of this play, conflagration achieved, final clause located sur la tranche du livre fermé]

PIO p. 38 logic distinguishing chance from method and method of invention from method of pedagogical expositions—calls for deconstruction > it’s in this way that deconstruction is no longer subject to this logic

p. 44 supplementarity introduces (into structure of psyche) the fabulous repetition, a crossing of chance & necessity, bending performative rules while respecting them: allows other to come, or announce’s its coming, in dehiscence’s opening > deconstruction

TR pp. 76-7 French à propos allies necessity & chance, accidental (machinelike) relation to organic, obligatory link; esprit dà-propos: the art, the genius, the technique of grabbing a chance, making of Khairos or Chaos a significant, archivable, even ineffaceable event

p. 90 Catholicism: literalist & mechanistic religion of the à propos

p. 96 logic of à propos—logic of substitution [cf. p. 149]

p. 144 offered chance [for you the reader to preserve Rousseau’s destiny] is also a wager, logic/economy of wager: by wagering on future [by appealing to survival], you will win at every throw > bearing witness to your goodness/justice [if you watch over Rousseau’s manuscript]

D pp. 300-01 violent, arbitrary cut, scission (la coupure) necessary because beginning se plie et se multiplie; coupe-papier (letter-opener), la lame (sharp blade) de la décision, tranchant (cutting edge); la répétition hasardeuse et nécessaire du déjà-là dun (autre) texte

C p. 239 lot: chance & necessity nicely shared (bien partagée) > contingent says the same, less well, & doesn’t share

(la) CHOSE

GT p. 40 demand of gift/countergift, circulatory differance, requirement of restitution “at term,” delayed “due date,” thing itself demands gift & restitution

SPOM p. 23 “[Hamlet] curses his mission: to do justice to a de-mission of time, he swears against a destiny that leads him to do justice for a fault, a fault of time and the times, by rectifying an address, a movement of correction, reparation, restitution, vengeance, revenge, punishment”

PP p. 112 (128) Plato imitates the imitator to restore the truth of what they imitate: that is, the truth itself [i.e. both Plato and sophists advise exercise of memory]

pp. 130-34 expulsion, sacrifice, exorcism of pharmakos played out on boundary line btwn inside/outside, expulsion of evil or madness to restore sōphrosunē

ROP p. 5 [here] analytic concern merges w/ hermeneutic drive, w/ principle of reason (reddere rationem): render sense at all cost (à tout prix), il faut rendre: fidelity, debt, duty, to restitute sense of sense > even if hidden, verborgene Sinn

p. 35 reappropriate, restitute, reconstitute: to cling to thematic of simple, indivisible origin (both in Lacan and Heidegger)

p. 90 Foucault: madness, evil genius, as a way to restitute lost truths in expression

PS p. 183 Artaud wants absolute restoration of proper to eve prior to all dissociation

TB p. 112 [re: Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”] translation as Aufgabe (task)—translator must acquit himself, is at fault, fallen, in error, perhaps a crime: task to render [think reddere rationem, Leibniz], and possible “reconciliation”: Wiedergabe, Sinnwiedergabe (restitution of meaning)

DPi pp. 259-60 vis-à-vis Benveniste, fraternal filiation as debt, as being condemned > fraternal duty to pay ransom: to acquit oneself of a debt

——fra-gildan, to render, restitute, ghildes, fraternities linked by common interest > require gold (Geld) for reconciliation, restitution

REST p. 258 why always say painting renders, restitutes?

p. 261 restitution: reestablishes in rights or property by placing subject upright again, “the erect body”

p. 266 restitution: who’s the proper subject?

p. 273 restitution, remise des chaussures, snares (ret) of these shoes formed by re- prefixes, revenir

temptation to stand shoes upright again, to return them to authentic subject: la structure de la chose et du procès oblige, alors, toujours, à en rajouter (to keep adding to it) > to put back becomes a supplementary retortion, delirious dramaturgy > these shoes are hallucinogenic

p. 274 by owing the truth, one restitutes it, identifying as assigning points or proper size (pointure)

p. 281 rendering homage [restitution?] is difficult, because of the “interminable outbidding of an analysis which is never finished tying together,” > and yet, il y a hommage, ça donne

p. 283 restitution as reattachment, lacing up, putting to work

——whose shoes (whose feet) (the subject of reattachment): the capital subject of this contract [btwn Shapiro & Heidegger], they each have one piece of symbolon, share common interest

p. 301 Derrida asks himself, “are you rendering justice to, restituting, Heidegger’s truth?” he responds, “question is too early, I’m just starting” [not exact quotes]

p. 302 Heidegger’s subtraction of the product-work to get to the naked thing will not restitute the “remainder” to us as a “naked” thing: must “think” remainder otherwise

p. 303 a certain type of strict commentary on Heidegger, a restitution of him, becomes obscene, his language is no longer recognizable > thinking otherwise means thinking otherwise than he who attempts to think the remainder “properly”—that is, otherwise than properly

pp. 342-43 painting as detachment that loses its footing, says nothing of mise-en-abyme: mise-en-abyme as restituting saturation > “painting in painting”

——there’s a reattachment always, already, in process of retightening the unstrictured > les souliers font marquer (font marcher, font marché-de), shoes make move, make a market, are bigger than the frame

the detached must also be understood as “representative mission to be reattached to its origin of emission” [father-son]

p. 360 Shapiro’s restitution brings a ghost back alive to a dead man, mais revenant, revenant vivant au mort: dès lors vivant, lui-même revenant, who is himself then a ghost returning, “personal object” coming back to the ghost (revenant au revenant)

——sacrifice in memory of another dead man, who [Goldstein] remains stony, like his name, mais revient aussi, comme un revenant, grâce au don de ce revenant

p. 361 putting shoes on acc. to its own size (sa pointure)? unconscious of Shapiro/Heidegger puts something of his own (sien) in them? > no, à la pointure du fantôme (the ghost’s size), of the unconscious of the other, in the final account (tout compte fait)

p. 363 kettle logic: restituting a kettle

——police, Shapiro, Dupin, restitution

p. 364 “clearly” & “evidently” do not implicate clarity but necessity to deny intrinsic obscurity of the thing—deny its essential crypt

p. 369 for Shapiro, parousia of Van Gogh: the shoes are him > hoc est corpus meum, sacrificial offering of his flesh

pp. 370-71 lowly shoes levitate, il élève jusquà la figure, transfigured shoes (haloes of themselves) look up toward most high: the Face [by way of restitution]

PPT p. 5 restitution vs. representation: 1) restitution: truth itself restored, in person, w/out mask or veil > truth of truth 2) representation: adequation (not unveiling)—relief of original’s effigy

ATM p. 147 the trap of obeying Levinas in restituting nothing, one becomes deaf to his obligation, but it only feels like a trap when inclined toward mastery, when one pretends to escape from absolute dissymmetry

OG p. 109 (160-61) nonprohibition of proper name as consciousness which restitutes or discovers irremediable impropriety of proper names

pp. 153-54 (221) restitution of presence by language: symbolic/immediate, se passe de passer par le monde: touching is touched, jouissance not deferred: auto-affection se donne pour autarcie pure, it does not wait (nattend pas) > but, auto-affection pure speculation, present delivered is chimera, the no longer deferred is absolutely deferred: acc. Rousseau, sign/image/representation sont des illusions qui donnent le change (sidetrack us) [differance w/out delay]

p. 227 (323) Rousseau fascinated by the copyist, produces sign of signs, always tempted to add supplementary signs to improve restitution of original—the good copyist must resist [baby daddy]

pp. 298-99 (421-22) though Rousseau doesn’t make “travail de la mort,” play of difference, & operation of negativity serve in dialectical accomplishment of Hegel’s truth w/in horizon of parousia > still, a horizon of infinite restitution of presence [in Rousseau]

EU pp. 22-3 re: translating Descartes “back” into Latin: restitution, reconduire to original language, restoration to writing & law (droit)

——if original (French) already possesses translating structure, already refers to translation of original, it is because Latin is the ordering, lawful language

FV p. 450 Lacan (as Dupin) knows how to return to letter of Freud, knows how to find it where it is found (se trouve) for purposes of restitution

p. 457 dead king, Freud, only one to contract w/ himself, awaits restitution > restoration: carrying off last plume w/ his 1st hand [in dying, mobilizes many]: theory of the facteurs

CHRISTIANITY

GOD p. 8 Platonism > Christianity (exteriority, accessible – interiority, inaccessible)

p. 30 time of the promise of Christianity defines both experience of mysterium tremendum, and the double repression that institutes it

——for Potaçka, radically, [contra Heidegger] Christian promise will only be fulfilled when Europe is freed from Greek & Roman memory

p. 31 acc. Potaçka, orgiastic disciplined in Christianity

p. 32 via/quoting Potaçka, Christianity secretizes Plato’s Good (“incorporated” orgiastic mystery), creates self-denying love

***

FK p. 55 “responsibility of repetition in the wager (gage) of decision or of affirmation (re-legere) which links up with itself to link with the other” [desert, messianic, khōra]

MC pp. 357-8 chance encounters that follow implacable program of contextual necessity, juggler: relance (revive, raise the stakes)

AF p. 74 affirmation of affirmation, yes, yes, “inaugural engagement of a promise or of an anticipation which wagers, a priori, the very future”

SPOM p. 207 wagering that thinking never done with conjuring impulse

POOF p. 40 at each instant discourse [Nietzsche’s] carried to its limit, on the edge of silence: transports itself beyond itself, hyperbolic, infinite build-up (surenchère), swept away by perhaps that undecides meaning in each decisive moment

p. 59 sage & fool: l'un est lautre, l'un garde et se garde de lautre, l'un se fait violence, encore la surenchère infinie > this raising of the stakes doesn’t need an author’s intention

pp. 208 about to venture on a decision re: omega ω in “O my friends…”, Derrida makes it clear that the guard-rails of a philological coup de théâtre will not efface the archive constructed on an error [p. 225n Agamben helped Derrida w/ all this]

——the improbable omega ω has a canonical authority protected by great names, the wager of this mistake, like a capital w/ bottomless surplus-value

p. 278 [sometimes friendship linked to political], sometimes in name of morality that friendship is removed from criteria of politics > doù la surenchère sans fin dont nous avons tenté de formaliser la loi

EM p. 134-35 (162) [re: deconstructive method] strategic bet (le pari stratégique), radical trembling coming from outside, trembling played out in violent relationship of West to its other [its other?], whether that other is “linguistic,” economic, ethnological, political, military > military/economic violence have structural solidarity w/ “linguistic” violence

ROP pp. 29-30 double bind drives deconstruction in rhythmic compulsion to track desire for origin, and to raise its stakes, la pousse à une surenchère > interminable drama of analysis, il fallait faire droit to the law deconstructed, w/ une affirmation donatrice unknown to yet driving analysis

p. 110 Foucault’s wager, the end (fin) of finite man: “man would be effaced, like a face drawn in sand at the edge or limit of the sea” > trait (of face, limit) splits, becomes a limit, erasing and multiplying this limit endlessly > self-relation of limit at once erases/multiplies limit

WAP p. 18 indestructible responsibility (because always revived in anxious raising of stakes [relancée dans une surenchère inquiète]) makes good conscience impossible

Gi p. 9 wager that nothing is at standstill around a silence, the traces of that silence do not come from just anywhere

REST pp. 301-02 that all of a sudden the motifs of Heidegger’s Überfall in REST link up w/ Kant’s parergon in P [cf. P pp. 66-7] is prescribed in all rigor by flexibility of chance, wager, which could have left the place [the link?] empty [edge of frame, place of signature]

p. 368 identification, like attribution, has supplementary/parergonal structure > because demand for reattachment is insatiable, unsatisfied, always making a higher bid, always starts out again

pp. 375-76 bet comes back to a comparing (un pari revient toujours à comparer)

——has to be a difference to permit it: but a pair is a fixed difference, fixed bet not a bet?, bet so as not to bet, plus de pari, pas de pari > bet on pair: limit absolute wager (pari)

——this fixed orientation toward difference presupposes difference, sublates it, concerns Kant’s whole transcendental aesthetic

——betting on the pair, plus/pas de pari, trap always works in interlace (la piège marche toujours dans lentrelacs): soit quil fasse marcher, laisse marcher ou quil paralyse [p. 373 only the pair can go]

——avoir fait marcher la destin, provoked someone to make an impossible bet: Van Gogh’s coup, genius of his unevenness (son impair)

——bet on pair to limit absolute wager [cf. pp. 301-02 Derrida doesn’t limit absolute wager?], which limits & tightens itself (se resserre) to point of self-strangulation, tying itself so as not to absolve itself > the cunning twist (le retors) of le pari absolu: must never exclude disparate or absolute unneveness (limpair)

p. 381 trap is the inevitability of betting, logic of the disparate

p. 382 don’t have to render anything: just bet on the trap like others swear (jurent) on a Bible > il y aura eu à parier, ça donne à rendre, a remmettre [there will be something to bet, it gives…]

if faudrait rendreencore, donc, en se séparant, et même en laissant tomber [even in letting the matter drop, we’d render (something?)]

TR p. 92 Rousseau’s wager (from The Creed) to remain in religion of one’s birth, a quasi-Pascalian sense of machine: best calculation to obtain forgiveness from God

p. 141 Rousseau’s wager, incalculability of absolute perhaps in which contradiction btwn exemplarity & “without example” can survive

p. 144 offered chance [for you the reader to preserve Rousseau’s destiny] is also a wager, logic/economy of wager: by wagering on future [by appealing to survival], you will win at every throw > bearing witness to your goodness/justice [if you watch over Rousseau’s manuscript]

C p. 189 get down to it (sy mettre), commit oneself, donner du gage (give proof, evidence, wager) > get in the coffin, spread out: à chaque coup for the first and last time, always the first and last

TN p. 307 ‘hyper,’ surenchère of Nancy

p. 309 singularity [never assured] doit être couru comme une chance ou un risque: Nancy’s a bettor, thinker of the bet (pari), a desperate bettor, never stops staking, committing (dengager), calculating w/ exactitude hyperbolic odds (gages): not counting on gains (bénéfice) of an “argument du pari” [Pascal] or any salut

CIN pp. 7-8 [on structure of CIN] graphic space opened to multiple readings—in traditional, protected form of book

——each time it gives a different reading, another gift, dealing out a new hand (nouvelle donne) all over again

BSi p. 279 sovereign majesty & bestiality as more than [see pp. 256-59], as upping the ante, going outside the law to make the law; the “perhaps” that does justice to the possibility of pas and event, “liberated, cleared, disengaged by wagering (dégageaient, désengageaient en la gageant)

CIR p. 3 expression “raise the stakes [surènchere?]” belongs only to my mother

SPEC p. 260 [re: Freud’s speculation, a logic beyond that of position] the “position’s” fall (chute) would cause bankruptcy, ruin, discredit: today I’ll speak of speculation, I’m betting I will

p. 303 autobiography of Freud as living description of his own writing, as if grandson were dictating to Freud what he had to set down on paper > not just tautological mirror, autobiography of the writing posits/deposits simultaneously—the psychoanalytic movement, elle performe et parie sur ce qui donna la chance [to psychoanalysis] > now Derrida: “je parie" that this double fort/da cooperates in initiating psychoanalysis

p. 304 the unanalyzed remainder of an unconscious remains [re: Freud’s autobiographical, writing], Derrida: “je parie” that it will be transmitted blindly by all who “return to Freud”: remainder that works the scene is illegible—i.e., restance, yet the only urgency of what reste à faire

p. 384 w/out borrowing, nothing begins, il ny a pas de fonds propre, there’s no transference of fund, lemprunt rapporte, produces surplus value, is the prime mover of every investment > on commence ainsi par spéculer, en pariant sur une valeur à produire comme à partir de rien: all these “metaphors” confirm, as metaphors, the necessity of what they state

CINDERS

SPOM p. 34 despite so many precautions, Heidegger runs risk of reducing justice to juridical-moral rules when he prioritizes gathering to the same over disjunction w/ its cinders

TINO N pp. 208-09 “cinder” [ashes] renders better what Derrida meant by trace, remaining w/out remaining, cinder is not!, testifies w/out testifying, destruction of memory itself, absolute radical forgetting: absolute non-memory communicates w/ gift—not seeking to be recognized or saved; incineration as elementary form of experience

CIN pp. 4-5 [on the structure of the text CIN, a polylogue reading, tension btwn writing and speech] “vibration of grammar in the voice” destined for the eye, or the interior voice, absolutely low voice

p. 13 “il y la (là) cendres” [cf. POO p. 24 il y a là du secret], “there are cinders there, cinders there are” > losing equilibrium btwn eye & ear

——every cinder destined to decompose from w/in, a metaphor or metonymy of itself

——the cinder is no longer here, was (fut) it ever? [note relation btwn fire (feu) and cinders]

pp. 16-7 Derrida gives Cinder a proper name, is she the signatory of this text?

p. 17 cinders: ce qui garde pour ne plus même garder, dooming (vouant) remnant (le reste) to dissolution

——verb “incinerate” has none of the tenderness, patience of cinder, Derrida doesn’t like it

——cinder: doesn’t say what it is, but what it was (fut), remains in memory of departed (feu), all our lost etymologies, fatum, fuit, functus, defunctus

p. 19 no cinder w/out fire, that is what is owed (se doit) to fire, [yet, if possible] w/out shadow of sacrifice, at noon, w/out debt, w/out Phoenix, au lieu daucun placement, place solely of incineration

——“lincinéré nest plus rien fors la cendre [innermost cinder furnace], un reste qui se doit de ne plus rester, ce lieu de rien qui soit, un lieu pur se chiffrât-il [marked out]” > there are cinders, what takes place in letting a place occur

p. 21 dissemination expresses in “il y a là cendre” what is destined by the fire to dispersion w/out return, pyrificiation of what doesn’t remain, and returns to no one

——cinder remains, cinder there is, nonbeing, nonpresence

p. 23 there are cinders only if there is a hearth, some fire or place, cinder as the house of being

pp. 23-5 why the phrase “il y a là cendre” doesn’t belong to him [Derrida] > cinder lent, given, to so many others, cinder remains virginal (the only thing he loves), in tact (intacte), the sentence doesn’t even say the cinder

p. 25 best paradigm for trace not the trail of the hunt, le frayage, wake in sea, nor love of step (pas) for its imprint, but the cinder (what remains w/out remaining from holocaust, from the all-burning [du brûle-tout]) > no longer makes a trace, or traces only by losing trace quelle reste à peine

cinder gets lost down to cinder of its cinder, he burns one more time, he burns what he still adores although he already burned it, he’s intent on it (il sy acharne)

p. 31 btwn black & white, color of writing resembles only “literality” of cinder that still inheres in a language

——name “cinder” a cinder of the cinder itself

pp. 31-2 perhaps he [Derrida] (or she [la cinder]) knew what he set on fire, what he praised in the secret of the sentence “il y a là cendre,” but he may discover more in its unconscious, and he will die > then the phrase w/ its chance of surviving him will be more cinder than ever, and less—w/out anyone to say “I”

p. 35 entrust words to a page: better to inflame you, eat yourself up immediately, not a tomb that offers patience of mourning, but a tomb of a tomb, deprived of patience of mourning

p. 37 incineration celebrates perhaps the nothing of the all, destruction w/out return, mad w/ its desire, desperate disseminal affirmation but also its opposite: “no” to the work mourning, “no” of fire > how to accept working for his Highness (monseigneur) mourning?

——the chance of returning, when one “incenses” a sentence to infinity, adorned w/ all its dead, is more certain than securing sentence in an archive [fire guards better than archive]

p. 39 if you no longer recall it, it’s because the incineration/consummation of cinder proceeds from cinder itself > trace destined like everything to disappear so as to lose its way or rekindle a memory

p. 41 you only have mass or volume when covered w/ cinders, like covering one’s head w/ ashes in sign of mourning

——rebellion against Phoenix, affirmation of fire w/out place or mourning

——plurality of cinders, innumerable lurks (couvait) beneath the cinder

p. 43 essence of cinder (its cinder itself): the insistent pharmakon of a plural body (doesn’t belong to itself) in which the retreat of fire disguises itself > if there is cinder, fire remains in retreat

——no Phoenix, no monument, aucune érection qui tienneou tombe, the cinder w/out ascension, the cinders love me [cf. “proximity loves me” from PC], “they change sex, they re-cinder themselves, they androgynocide themselves”

p. 51 cinder comes in place of the gift

p. 53 cinder obviously a figure, but because word “cinder,” via the name, is supposed to name the thing (not the word), it names one thing in place of another, metonymy when cinder is separated, names one thing while figuring another from which il ne rest rien de figurable en elle

——the cinder like burning semen (semence brûlante), lava destined nowhere, when you take word into your mouth, to breathe

p. 55 cinder & smoke (fumée): smoke gets lost w/out perceptible remainder, spirited away, sublimates; cinder falls (tombe), lets go, heavy, more material because it fritters away its word: it is very divisible

——cendre, cenere, ashes, cinis, Asche, cendrier (a whole sentence), Aschenbecher, ashtray, cineres, ceniza

cinder, nothing that can be in the world, remains beyond everything that is (konis epekeina tēs ousias), giving itself (es gibt ashes)—it’s nothing

BSi p. 240 “smoke”: extraordinary word in French and English

CIR pp. 199-200 impossible to follow my trace, like that of Aids, I only write destinerrancy of desire, you try to calculate itinerary of texts which don’t explode immediately, nothing but fuse

CIPH ER

FSW p. 205 when Freud renounces neurology & anatomical localizations, trace becomes gramme, and region of breaching, a ciphered spacing

SH p. 29 ellipsis & caesura of discretion [Blanchot] inhabit the shibboleth (Joyce), it fascinates, seduces ——shibboleth as the cipher of the cipher: ciphered manifestation of the cipher, emerges from nonmeaning, and keeps itself in reserve

——cipher can conceal secret, which it shelters in its readability, w/out the slightest hidden attention > there’s nothing it can do about it [why/who interpret(s) secret as a taunting gesture?]

DS p. 240 Mallarmé’s “cipher of pirouettes prolonged toward another motif” is, like the whole text: ciphered to 2nd degree > cipher of pirouettes is also pirouette as cipher (sign, hieroglyph)

POS p. 5 up to 1962, everything Derrida had written was a commentary on sentence re: “labyrinth of ciphers” in epigraph to Speech and Phenomena [“In Dresden…”]

P p. 146 glas et galactique du colossos, the bridge [tree?] over the abyss which threatens to swallow everything, interval btwn dynamic/mathematical sublime, on edge of which analytic of sublime is broached (sentame): whirlpool heaves/tears tree into la dissemence laiteuse (the question is the cipher writing on the surface of nature)

DIF DIF p. 24 trace: à la fois, monument & mirage, traced & erased, living & dead, living in its simulation of life’s preserved inscription: a pyramid, to be deciphered otherwise, text w/out voice

D p. 362 X not an unknown but chiasmus, a text that is unreadable because only readable > Numbers undecipherable because you imposed encryption on them by trying to decipher them

pp. 362-63 Numbers undecipherable because numerable and innumerable: 1) something in the # surpasses mere # or cipher 2) everything in them is not ciphered (they’re innumerable), something that’s not anything > circle of the squaring

CIRCLE

GT p. 6 soon as there is law, law of partition (partage), law as partition (moira), soon as there is nomy—there’s economy (oikonomia) > exchange, circulation, return (retour); figure of circle, amortization

pp. 6-7 figure of circle essential to economics, gift must remain aneconomic

pp. 7-9 obsessing over circle encircling us, Heidegger [see OS] on circle, point, as vulgar time; time as circle: one of most powerful, ineluctable representations in history of metaphysics ——can’t exactly escape circle, it’s a feast for thinking, but gift as instant of effraction of circle

——why desire to interrupt circulation of circle, why desire the gift?

pp. 9-10 relation of gift to “present,” essential knot in interlace of this discourse [GT], in knot of Geflecht of which Heidegger says the circle is perhaps only one figure/particular case

pp. 36-37 is madness the movement of the circle or its excess? besieges reason at its 2 borders (inside & outside)

R p. 7 turning of the question, double question, question of question, like being locked in a circular machine that does not work or turn just right [Olivia]

p. 13 democracy as the turning, the wheel, the sovereignty that gives the force of law, circularity, sphericity > either identity btwn origin/conclusion or by turns, in turn, each in turn

p. 15 Aristotle’s Prime Mover, the first desirable, gives a life that exceeds the life of a human, continuous, unending—for us, impossible

——energeia of this pure activity is “pleasure (hēdonē), circle of taking pleasure in oneself (jouissance de soi); a specular auto-affection that accords w/ thinking of thought

H p. 135 always threatened by this dilemma: 1) when unconditional hospitality is circumscribed by economy of circle (law, duty) [vs. ring?] 2) when unconditional hospitality dispenses w/ law

OOG pp. 5-6 [quoted from “Form and Meaning”] no choice [undecidable] btwn 2 lines of thought but to reflect on circularity that makes one pass into the other, by repeating the circle, an elliptical change of site, producing a non-negative deficiency as ellipsis of form and meaning

HERP p. 181 caught in ring of circle once questioning philosophy, engaged by Greek tongue > acc. Heidegger, obscurely, authoritatively, Greek tongue alone is logos

EM p. 126 reading of text Dasein is a hermeneutics > if one looks closely, phenomenological opposition “implicit/explicit” permits Heidegger to avoid vicious circle (posing question of Being on basis of ontological predetermination)

PAS PAS p. (61) Blanchot: circle of law is this: must be a crossing for there to be a limit, uncrossable that in its desire, its call, has already crossed the line [appele à franchir]

S p. 80 via Heidegger’s course on Schelling, spirit is only proper if it is close to itself, desire for gathering, a nostalgia, a Sehnsucht, where Sucht, etymologically, isn’t research but evil, evil inscribed in desire > evil as the desire to go out of oneself in order to return to oneself (motif, movement, trajectory of fire, not circle, of return)

——Heidegger: “in spirit there reigns the nostalgia for its own essence”

p. 108 [re: Gespräch btwn Heidegger & Trakl] the circle via death, via decline, via West that returns to most originary not analogous to circles/revolutions in Marx and Hegel, so “circle, decline, West,” in Heidegger, are paleonyms, receive quotation marks to lead us elsewhere

WM p. 266 dominant metaphor, major signified of ontotheleogy: circle of the heliotrope

***DS p. 271 Mallarmé: all method is a fiction” > point de méthode—still a marching order (marche à suivre) > la dissémination dans le repli de lhymen, pas de méthode pour elle > [no circle-path to first step]

POS pp. 56-7 “closure of metaphysics” can’t have form of line, form in which philosophy recognizes itself, not a circle surrounding homogenous field, limit as various faults, fissures, marks, scars

——metaphysical concept of history: meaning developing itself in straight, circular line

OS p. 37 via Heidegger, Hegel’s jetzt as boundary (Grenze), ‘absolute this (das absolute Dieses’); Aristotle’s nun as stigmē, oros, tode ti > both stress circularity (Kreislauf, sphaira)

p. 43 point & time thought in circularity together (Aufhebung, speculative negativity, only possible by means of infinite correlation or reflection) > time is spacing, space is time > thus for Aristotle, stigmē, punctuality, determines nowness (nun, jetzt)

pp. 52-3 transition from parousia to absolute subjectivity does not disrupt Aristotelianism: prime mover, presence, desire, eros, “desire is desire of presence,” absolute subjectivity, circle, return to self, parousia as self-presence > prime mover, noēsis noēseōs, as subject

p. 53n for Aristotle, circle is model of movement for time and grammē

pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

——this would be a gramme that erases its tracing in a circle, removes limit of point

——we go around in circles trying to erase this circle > [time, still, introduces the thought of trace, if even to excise it]

P p. 24 the circle & the abyss: circle en abyme

p. 26 Hegel’s ternary rhythm—what he calls a “ring”—encircles, links to other rings: in science of beautiful, mind presupposes, anticipates itself > philosophy of art: circle in circle of circles

p. 26 art forms only one of the circles in the great circle of Geist, revenant (circle of art, circle of religion, circle of philosophy)

p. 27 is there an abyss in Hegel? (circle in a circle not necessarily abyssal) for there to be an abyss the smallest circle would have to inscribe in itself the figure of the largest

——metaphor of circle of circles, of training (Bildung) as philosophical encyclopedia

pp. 27-8 lemmatic precipitation, anticipatory conceptualizing, recourse to metaphor of circle, circle of circles, metaphor of organic whole [re: Hegel & philosophy as work of art]

——if Hegel must begin w/ vulgar art, the circle of circles allows him to start anywhere > art already there

p. 28 if Hegel must begin w/ vulgar representation of art, the circle of circles allows him to start anywhere > “no absolute beginning in science”

——Hegel’s circles, each part of whole, a “circle returning to itself,” keeps tie of solidarity w/ others, through fecund backward and forward movement (Rückwärts, Vorwärts) [idea of beauty in philosophical encyclopedia]

pp. 32-3 in Hegel & Heidegger, an “it is necessary (il faut)” re: hermeneutic circle of art > must start w/ work of art, but how can you recognize it as art if you don’t already know what art is?: not a vicious circle, but an engagement of thought, circular feast, experience of limit, closure, resistance, humility > pas de cercle: le désir par cette répétition fidèle du cercle, daccéder à lencore infranchi, le désir dun nouveau pas > lien sans liens, franchir le cercle sans saffranchir de sa loi, pas sans pas

p. 33 all this talk of circles has drawn us toward the abyss

p. 34 third party (ein Drittes) regulates encirclement, art can play this role, a medium, can touch both edges > ambiguity of participation can’t exhaust it [what if this 3rd doesn’t rèleve?]

——art: domesticated in this history of truth, onto-encyclopedic economy, the machinery of the pose (Setzung/Entgegensetzung)

ROP p. 34 divisibility of letter, truth w/out truth of deconstruction, distinguished both from das geistige Band [Hegel], & Heideggerian Versammlung > divisibility of letter undoes link of debt, symbolic, name of father (motifs qui lien et se lient au triangle ou au cercle de la réappropriation)

FS p. 11 God imprints secondarity on every navigation of the human: 1) passage of deferred reciprocity btwn reading & writing? 2) absolute witness who’s already read what you will write: third party as transparency of meaning? [circular logos]

TB p. 119 classic circle always begins to turn once one asks about origin of languages/society

PIO p. 414n racism is an invention of the other, one that excludes it, tightening circle of same

RM p. 60 Geflecht, interlacing, in Der Weg zur Sprache, interlaces Sprache and Weg: a binding-unbinding interlacing (entrelacement liant-déliant) (entbindende Binde)

——a circle that is not a vicious circle, yet still interlaced in advance > Sprache and Weg are “already in advance of us (uns stets schon voraus)”

AFR p. 117 Condillac’s identical proposition as powerful circle, finality of the same, circle of identity, self-evidence [brings whole to part] [but how can this circle close if whole is different from part?]

p. 117(n) reference to Rousseau’s objection to Condillac in 2nd Discourse: Rousseau denounces [turns of Condillac’s] circle only to step into it more quickly

IW p. 249 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig, Cohen] system cannot be given, forbids or reappropriates the gift in advance (in a circular manner) > most generous gift: give to think beyond system

D p. 352 splayed square, triangle open on 4th side, loosens obsidionality of triangle and circle, whose ternary rhythm (Trinity, Oedipus, Dialectics) governs metaphysics

SPEC p. 362 exappropriating—no circle (family, economy)

FV p. 462n circulation, always circulation of truth: toward truth, cause & effect of circle, causa sui, proper course (trajet) and destiny of letter > truth as cause (Ursache)

CIRCULATION

GT p. 8 why desire to interrupt circulation of circle, why desire the gift?

p. 40 demand of gift/countergift, circulatory differance, requirement of restitution “at term,” delayed “due date,” thing itself demands gift & restitution

CIRCUMCISION

AF p. 12 is circumcision an exterior mark? is it an archive?

p. 20 circumcision carries literal singularity into figurality

——a document of an archive, leaves trace of incision right on skin [superficial, like literature] lips of a wound, pellicular superimposition [invagination & circumcision?]

p. 21 bind anew: an act of love (paternal) (sous peau neuve)

p. 22 lawmakers w/out which one can’t have archives, conservation (memory) puts into reserve (“store”), accumulates, capitalizes, stocks a quasi-infinity of layers (hypermnesic, hypomnesic epidermises of books & penises)

p. 22n [iterability of circumcision] at once inaugural & recurrent

p. 38 scholar repeats the father’s circumcision [Yerushalmi calling Freud back to his father’s faith], even if only by figure

p. 41 “I shall say we” to a ghost or newborn > indestructible covenant, extraordinary performative (like a circumcision)

p. 42n [re: 2 def. of circumcision] 1) symbolic substitute of castration of the son by primitive father (structural) 2) “conducting fossil” for investigating memory of heritage (historical)

p. 46 [re: Freud/psychoanalysis] can a science depend on something like a circumcision?

SH pp. 3-4 circumcision only once, at the same time “first & last,” ring, seal of alliance, anniversary of archeology/eschatology > ring traces, carves the “unwiederholbar (unrepeatable)”

——“one time” in English, but “one turn,” “una vez,” “una volta,” in vicissitudes of latinity

p. 19 conventional forms of dating (charts, coded signs, spatiotemporal plottings, clocks, calendar) assign, consign, absolute singularity, must mark themselves off from themselves, a fatally equivocal power that enunciates the possibility of recurrence > not absolute recurrence (i.e. of the one time of circumcision/birth) but spectral recurrence of that which never will return

p. 40 Sichelschrift > cuts in coming around > another turning (not rounding), another trope, inscribes letters in cutting all around > circumcises words in silence

pp. 58-9 “Sie setzt / Wundgelesens über (it carries across / the wound-read)”: [circumcision in the reading] “reader-gatherer” > wound offers itself to be read—not readable, but a part of reading

p. 59 circumcision recalls the body, by wounding it, to its condition as word, carnal mark >

——can one ever circumcise a name w/out doing something to the body?

——tropic of circumcision: cuts, caesuras, ciphered alliances, wounded rings

——wound, very experience of reading, universal

——circumcising the heart even before St. Paul

p. 60 anyone who experiences circumcision (body cut, shibboleth, blessing, purification) is a Jew

——displace literality of belonging if, w/ Judaism, nothing properly belongs, anyone or no one may be a Jew, Jew: no one’s name, the only one, no one's circumcision

p. 61 command (appeal, desire, supplication, prayer) [re: imperative beschneide das Wort]

——figure of absolute future: monstrosity—Elijah, guest, other [re: word to be circumcised opened like a door to “who” would come]

pp. 62-3 Celan’s poem about the poem, the becoming-poetic of the word, its becoming-Jewish, “TO ONE, WHO STOOD BEFORE THE DOOR [Kafkas Vor dem Gesetz]: a narrative of circumcision

p. 64 the proper of the body, a place of circumcision

——circumcision of the word: an event of the body (from shibboleth to sibboleth)

pp. 64-5 the one who awaits his name, awaits its bestowal by circumcision, draws whole poem toward him in absolute dissymmetry

pp. 65-6 circumcision: decision of the word—inscribed in the body—just in the heart (precisely)

p. 66 circumcision inscribes Nothing in the heart (flesh, living word), to the point of bleeding

p. 67 circumcision is a determination, defines & decides, but to ask for circumcision is not to ask for meaning or object > circumcision always binds body to language

p. 68 because one can make use of shibboleth, it can be turned against oneself, the circumcised are proscribed, held at border, excluded, reduced to ashes, in the mere name

——how to guard against double edge of shibboleth? w/ “living Nothing in the heart,” perhaps

——circumcision of word is not dated in history, has no age, but calls forth date, opens word to other, of all that calls itself (the name, blessing of name, yes & no) > it sets turning the ring

FWT FWT p. 193 heritage of circumcision precedes speech, oath, contract

***——there is a universal “structure” of heteronomic election: I am the only one called to do this or that, irreplaceable in the place of decision, in obligation to respond “I am here,” this election of each gives to all responsibility worthy of the name, if there is any, its chance/condition > also, Derrida is very suspicious of “doctrine” of election, & binding this universal to Judaism

——circumcision: someone marked my destiny before I had a word to say > (true for women too, something preceded your Catholicism, Derrida tells E.R.)

SP SP pp. 67-9 the double role of woman as truth’s recession, and as the nonbeliever in truth, she is like the Jew in her “delight in dissimulation,” affirmative power

——does Nietzsche refer to Jew because of the way circumcision marks simulation & castration?

SW SW p. 338 tallith recalls me to the “only once” of mortal wound [circumcision?] (it could speak but it never does, we both know that)

——unlike the veil, the tallith depends on One of the unique, singular event whose repetition repeats only, and that’s history, the “only once” of the Law given

p. 343 tallith hangs on body like a memory of circumcision

p. 344 St. Paul thought he knew the literality of the letter, thought he was distinguishing for the first time, & he prided himself on it, wrongly, the circumcision of the heart (breath, spirit) from that of the flesh (body, “acc. the letter”)

***p. 346 “not in a hurry”: I am against those who prescribe the veil, against those who forbid it (same w/ circumcision) > people don’t realize any longer that the scholarly, secular, democratic

belong to cultures of tallith & veil: contamination is everywhere

p. 350 tallith is proper to man (not woman), like circumcision

HLP HLP p. 291n St. Paul: “I have been all things to all men…” “…everything in order to win them all over” > “Did Paul lie?” on the subject of circumcision

CIR CIR pp. 14-6 circumfession never circumpletes itself, unsealing abandoning the circle open, as long as blood continues its venue in my veins > vein can’t be closed by textual machine or program

——unforgettable circumcision has carried me to the place I had to go

p. 28 [on Bennington’s lack of quotations]: if sentences are proper names, G. is circumcising me, doing w/out my body, producing “logic” or “grammar”

p. 59 Derrida’s “sublime” encyclopedia on circumcision, which he’ll never do anything w/

pp. 68-9 the cruelty of circumcision, the mother’s cruelty: she had to eat the still bloody foreskin [sublime gate of fellatio, mohels]

——avowal is always a denouncing of self (still weaving cloth of affabulation dating from SP)

pp. 70-3 circumcision: all I ever wrote about

p. 78 desire for literature is circumcision, text read does not suffice, has to be eaten, sucked

p. 89 “I shall wonder what, from my birth or thereabouts, to turn around has meant”

pp. 92-3 I love words too much because I have no language of my own, only false escarres, blackish, purulent crusts which form around my mother’s body, escharosis, English scar, cut, eschatology of my circumcision

pp. 113-14 man who accuses himself so much of lying must be madly in love w/ truth, to the point of weeping for it

——those who are queuing up [for circumcision], too late, authorizing themselves to speak for the “Jews,” don’t know what truth they’re talking about

p. 115 only philosopher to describe his penis

***pp. 120-21 circumcision, 1st event to write itself on my body, exemplary counterscar we have to read w/out seeing > outside of language, time of a proper name, the rest is literature

p. 135 foreskin & truth (detour/delay): question of knowing by whom by what the violence of circumcision was imposed

pp. 142-43 my absolute knowledge: writing promised unto death, writing that must come to an end > any reader (addressee) becoming the uncircumcised [son] to be confessed—line thrown to girl-martyrs [wondering why they’re reading Derrida]

pp. 144-45 operation of circumcision retains essential relation to production of screen

p. 148 [re: SA] fault of mother, remain as mythical as my circumcision

***p. 153 blood mixed w/ saliva, w/ sperm, fellatio, make all the readers drool; p. 158 autofellocircumcision; p. 218 ejaculating into bloody mouth of circumcising mother > exultant alliance, her legs open, breasts btwn my legs, both laughing, passing skin from mouth to mouth like a ring

p. 154 the circumcised is the proper

p. 188 if you knew, G., my experience of prayers, you would know everything, my “without-interest” in the depths of me, “I” is only misdirection—presumed crime I’m calling circumcision

p. 196 G.’s countersigning attestation, daring to kill the quotation marks, w/out quoting me, calling me back to a moment when I didn’t yet know what circumcision means [?]

pp. 197-98 intolerable foreclosure when I write: the already known, loved, that can’t be quoted; gather myself in circle of cum, circus of circum, before the constituting witness I’m always fleeing

pp. 202-03 circumcision (what covers the real, all that is left of a language, culture), threat that makes me write, losing life at this moment, my life is that other that ‘I lose’

pp. 212-13 ci, scie, ciseaux, si, ceci (enormous narcissistic monument), on the ci of circumcision is gathered the interrupted autobiothanatoheterographical opus; never known how to love save in the place of a figure unknown to me

p. 222 invent circumcision, like I am doing here, refounding all religions, playfully

——my uncircumcised sons, only people whose judgment I fear

***p. 224 am someOne who the One God never stops de-circumcising, hounds [s’acharner?] herself to make bleed in dispersion: salus in sanguine

p. 236 itching the effect of circumcision to share it w/ others

p. 242 I am erect in my circumcision for centuries (petrified memory, ammonite [fossil index])

pp. 252-53 sign of circumcision will ensure Jewish nation an eternal existence > this sign of circumcision & election is foreign to understanding and true virtue

p. 255 in search of Saint Foreskin, gram of “lost part of self,” has the form of a Ring [objet a?]

p. 256 day of circumcision: a de-cision was taken in me w/out me > Jealousy & virginity, my two nipples

p. 288 before speech, among Jews alone, there’s circumcision

CIRCUMFESSION

CIR p. 3 expression “raise the stakes [surènchere?]” belongs only to my mother

——have never loved anything but the impossible

p. 8 [Saint Augustine] SA: why do we confess to God, when he knows (everything about us)

pp. 10-12 I always dream of a pen that would be a syringe, a suction point instead of a hard weapon to inscribe, choose, calculate > no risk of bad taste or violence, glorious appeasement

pp. 14-6 circumfession never circumpletes itself, unsealing abandoning the circle open, as long as blood continues its venue in my veins > vein can’t be closed by textual machine or program

——say and do something of an avowal w/out truth turning, avowal w/out “hymn,” w/out “virtue”

p. 18 [Bennington like Augustine’s God, G.]

p. 20 Derrida spent his life teaching so as to return to what mixes prayer & tears w/ blood

p. 23 Derrida’s mom: “I have a pain in my mother”

p. 26 “I posthume as I breathe” > G. will have written for me, in my favor

p. 28 [on Bennington’s lack of quotations]: if sentences are proper names, G. is circumcising me, doing w/out my body, producing “logic” or “grammar”

pp. 30-34 beyond G.’s program, G.’s generative grammar: surprise salvation of a backfire, something in the past withdrawn (if not content at least in the sap of the idiom) from effusion of the signature > obliging G., the other, “forgetting me on pretext of understanding me”

——nonsuturable, nonsaturable singularity of event: a perjury in G.’s machine

pp. 38-9 do those reading me (from up there) see my tears (prayers)? incessant return of “I want to kill myself” (less desire to kill myself than compulsion to overtake each second)

p. 40 “I see myself live” translates “I see myself die”

p. 41 “if I did not begin and end by loving you in my private language deprived of you”

p. 44 horrible expression I win, I like neither the word nor the thing, thus my indefinite referral (so-called negative theology, play w/ names of God)

***p. 46 act of writing as perverse overbidding of crime to exhaust evil, evil I committed in truth, the worst

p. 47 “writing is only interesting in proportion and in the experience of evil”

p. 48 essential truth of avowal having nothing to do w/ truth

p. 52 “this writing that resembles the poor chance of a provisional resurrection”

p. 54 I write btwn 2 resurrections, the one given, the one promised > becomes a calcinated root, a photographed wound: bedsore cauterized by light of writing—to fire, to blood, to ash

p. 59 for years [praying], I’ve tried to take [God, my mother] as a witness not to see myself being seen but to re-member myself around a single event

——Derrida’s “sublime” encyclopedia on circumcision, which he’ll never do anything w/

***pp. 62-3 pri, prendre, pris, prier, Proust; anger/irony at Proust’s Franco-Brittanic decorum (Joyce, Heidegger, Wittgenstein): work in which there are theories leaves its price tag > grimace of a good taste naive enough to think it can efface labor of theory: I write w/ price on display

***——“I am for an aristocracy w/out distinction, therefore w/out vulgarity, for a democracy of the compulsion to the highest price, you have to pay the price to read the price displayed”

p. 65 I know, dead jealous, I am not the contemporary of those I mentioned yesterday: I belong to the blind man blackmailing me

pp. 68-9 the cruelty of circumcision, the mother’s cruelty: she had to eat the still bloody foreskin [sublime gate of fellatio, mohels]

——avowal is always a denouncing of self (still weaving cloth of affabulation dating from SP)

pp. 70-3 circumcision: all I ever wrote about

***p. 75 “I am the last of the eschatologists,” like no one else, I made the eschaton into my coat of arms, lips’ edge of my truth

p. 76 secret I’m jealously seeking as last word of my jealousy, continually turning around it w/out knowing secret of my suffering

p. 77 if this book doesn’t help me love life even more, give me a divine smile in face of death, it will have failed: I want to succeed where I’m the only one to know it

***p. 78 desire for literature is circumcision, text read does not suffice, has to be eaten, sucked; Derrida is talking about conscious secrets: no one has yet said anything about the secret as known

p. 80 “a sleeping water [mother, too human inhuman, mortal immortal] in the henceforth appeased depth of the abyss, this volcano I tell myself I’m well out of”

p. 84 the hidden name [Elie] is the given name, a certain nobility, a sign of election

pp. 86-7 literary confessions, form of theology as autobiography

pp. 91-2 escarre [mother’s bedsore], oh my jealousy, as long as I have not sutured you, I have not understood you, escarre closes on blood of new skin > as long as I have not written Of the indubitable foundation or the cogito of my jealousy, or again The Confessions of a Mother, I will have failed my life & written nothing: unfathomable perjury, incurable facial paralysis, mask, etc.

pp. 92-3 I love words too much because I have no language of my own, only false escarres, blackish, purulent crusts which form around my mother’s body, escharosis, English scar, cut, eschatology of my circumcision

p. 94 “they have never forgiven me for being the most advanced eschatologist, the last avant-garde to count”

p. 98 like SA, I love only tears

***p. 99 tears, think credulous humanists, are impossible for machines > what stupidity

p. 101 I perjure like I breathe, whose multitude runs in the tears

***p. 102 I return to dust through love (multiplicity of loves w/out division); I only know how to deceive, deceive myself, deceive you

pp. 103-04 I’m a dying counterfeiter, lie permanently to everyone, will never reveal full grain of transgressions we’re dying to know, archive [SA on temptation of curiosity, knowledge]; skizzolatry in notebook, colonize and cultivate hell, escarre as sponge; SA accuses/praises God for being monster mother, infinite sea containing finite sponge [this is prior to SA’s conversion]

p. 105 SA: sought the source of my evil, way of searching was evil, did not see the evil

p. 110 the 4 PaRDeS “in my blood”: 1) literality denuded 2) crypt, secret, word 3) morality, pulpit eloquence 4) profound, cabbalistic [p. 232 there are at least 4 rabbis]

pp. 113-14 man who accuses himself so much of lying must be madly in love w/ truth, to the point of weeping for it

——those who are queuing up [for circumcision], too late, authorizing themselves to speak for the “Jews,” don’t know what truth they’re talking about

p. 115 only philosopher to describe his penis

p. 118 when young, only liked reading writers quick to tears: Rousseau, Nietzsche, Ponge, SA

***p. 119 nongrammatical syntax that remains to be invented to speak name of God

***pp. 120-21 circumcision, 1st event to write itself on my body, exemplary counterscar we have to read w/out seeing > outside of language, time of a proper name, the rest is literature

p. 122 “I am the end of Judaism”

p. 123 disfiguration w/out respite of Augenblick reminds you that you don’t inhabit your face, you take place in more places than you should

pp. 124-25 a “conversion” outside the writing we’re reading, “in my body,” not decipherable but not illegible: I must teach you to teach me to read myself from the compulsions [baby daddy]

p. 126 “I do not know if what I am saying to you does good or harm”

***p. 128 “I promised to God never to write anything more except on the most irrepressible of drives, the double condition” [double bind]

p. 133 word Sony reminds me of the dream in Turin, btwn Rousseau/Nietzsche > my two positive heroes

***p. 134 to those idiots who think computers are harmful to writing, I’ve nicknamed mine subjectile

p. 135 my writing: cosmonautical, floating in weightlessness, marine, high-tech

pp. 135-36 fixed figures of Freud (Bettelheim too) no longer satisfy me, would sew up chain of all my texts [?]

pp. 138-39 universal fantasy/desire of divided subject (to understand oneself): Envy & Gratitude

***p. 140 future perfect: last ruse of presentations, confessions, conversions, and other peripheral contortions

***pp. 141-42 I’m having a great time, I will have had such a great time, but it costs such a crazy price, that’s what they would like to tell themselves about me

——nonknowledge [like smokers who carries their ashtray on them], best condition for having crazy time like a lunatic, opposed to G.’s absolute theologic program > not nonknowledge of martyrdom but of scholar, drawn from the future found in the confession of my memory

pp. 142-43 my absolute knowledge: writing promised unto death, writing that must come to an end > any reader (addressee) becoming the uncircumcised [son] to be confessed—line thrown to girl-martyrs [wondering why they’re reading Derrida]

pp. 144-45 operation of circumcision retains essential relation to production of screen

p. 147 I confess (myself) means I confess my mother means I own up to making my mother own up

p. 148 [re: SA] fault of mother, remain as mythical as my circumcision

***p. 153 blood mixed w/ saliva, w/ sperm, fellatio, make all the readers drool; p. 158 autofellocircumcision; p. 218 ejaculating into bloody mouth of circumcising mother > exultant alliance, her legs open, breasts btwn my legs, both laughing, passing skin from mouth to mouth like a ring

p. 154 the circumcised is the proper

p. 155 quite rightly I pass for an atheist, what I call God: a voice talking to me w/out saying anything, feminine figure of Yahweh so strange, so familiar to me

p. 155-56 held to secrecy by those who know your secret, share w/ you the open secret, just as useless to make it known, blank sacrifices, like a son not bearing his name [Pierre]

p. 157 too much love in my life, will have gotten the better of me: faithful to my euthanasias

p. 159 my impossible homosexuality, always associated w/ name Claude

p. 164 mourning capitalizes, saving loves me [proximity loves Derrida too]

***p. 166 where you hear me no longer, where you hear yourself no longer, I am content to turn around you: you do not even know that you are wearing mourning for me

p. 169 the satyr galatea that I am, half-mourning satyr > the splitting of the ego, in me, is no transcendental claptrap

pp. 170-71 “they are going to try to reconstitute all that, but if they knew they would be scared and wouldn’t even try”

——I am one of those marranes who no longer say they are Jews even in the secret of their own hearts (and not for authenticity’s sake)

p. 172 it’s to death I already owe everything I earn, I’ve succeeded in making it, as I have w/ God, it’s the same thing, my most difficult ally > costs a great deal of love, impossible but unfailingly faithful, forgive yourself the hurt you do yourself [death same as God]

p. 176 I knew how to “zap” even before Television gave me that pleasure, always zapped in writing, Wescheln der Töne [switch tones] (leaves other rooted to the spot)

p. 177 I lied to my mother all the time, as I do to all of you

p. 182 Elie, élit, et lit, et lI, elle y

p. 188 if you knew, G., my experience of prayers, you would know everything, my “without-interest” in the depths of me, “I” is only misdirection—presumed crime I’m calling circumcision

p. 190 trying to disinterest myself from myself, destroying “I” before death comes to meet it

p. 191 intense relation to survival that writing is (no desire that something remain after me), to enjoy this light I’m producing through experimentation of my possible survival, i.e. of absolute death (truth of the world w/out me) [?]

pp. 194-96 gave into the counterexemplary: only write the impossible > if G. contests me, it’s as a witness who, through countersigning attestation, confirms the counterexample

pp. 197-98 intolerable foreclosure when I write: the already known, loved, that can’t be quoted; gather myself in circle of cum, circus of circum, before the constituting witness I’m always fleeing

pp. 199-200 impossible to follow my trace, like that of Aids, I only write destinerrancy of desire, you try to calculate itinerary of texts which don’t explode immediately, nothing but fuse

——trance, anguish, desire of [Derrida’s] reader: intermittent flame, don’t know when the explosion will come

p. 201 Latin uum mimes fluid I desire to keep, desire as what is kept, keeping not object but continuum of desire; narcissistic self-involvement: libido returns upon itself at moment of loss (approximative, false jargon)

pp. 202-03 circumcision (what covers the real, all that is left of a language, culture), threat that makes me write, losing life at this moment, my life is that other that ‘I lose’

p. 205 puerile, naked faith: whose tribute God is supposed to pay in coin of sensory pleasure

p. 207 mother’ death: contingent cut of CIR

pp. 207-08 no one will know from what secret I’m writing, that I say so changes nothing

***pp. 208-09 when I’m not dreaming of making love, or being a resistance fighter (blowing up trains), dream of being in an orchestra w/ my sons—produce w/ them the world’s ecstasy

p. 212 narcissistic monument of my last child, third one, daughter I’ll never have had

pp. 212-13 ci, scie, ciseaux, si, ceci (enormous narcissistic monument), on the ci of circumcision is gathered the interrupted autobiothanatoheterographical opus; never known how to love save in the place of a figure unknown to me

***pp. 215-16 those who don’t admit their violence, lack of respect for evil, demand Derrida to “own up!” > to Derrida, this is the shameless forgetting of the fault: economy of the worst

——who do they take themselves for, they don’t know the conversion in me

——as if anyone could be more severe and pitiless toward me than myself

p. 216 the other in me, atheist God, infinitely smaller and bigger than I

p. 218 fear that kills me in face of death, not fear of dying (how simple that would be), but fear of replacing one more dead one before being able to die myself [so dead don’t bury the dead]

p. 222 invent circumcision, like I am doing here, refounding all religions, playfully

——my uncircumcised sons, only people whose judgment I fear

***p. 224 am someOne who the One God never stops de-circumcising, hounds [s’acharner?] herself to make bleed in dispersion: salus in sanguine

***p. 228 since the computer, have my memory like a sky in front of me

pp. 228-29 ‘my life,’ a partition btwn 2 absolute subjectivities, I write by reconstituting partitioned & transcendent structure of several religions

——other holds, pulls, separates the skin davec my sex in her mouth, makes me sperm

pp. 232-33 Derrida’s mother never read, never wanted to read, a single word he wrote

p. 233 G. and I are whispering, confess w/out anyone knowing, like a gift confession from the unconscious (know of no other definition of unconscious)

p. 234 I don’t have a fantasy of eradication/expropriation but a virtual, mimicked trance, painful pleasure of obsessive ideo-motor drive

p. 235 [vegetable superepidermis extraterrestrial hedgehog bleed to point of orgasm description]

p. 236 itching the effect of circumcision to share it w/ others

***p. 240 tearing off my skin like I always do, unmask, de-skin myself, while sagely reading others like an angel, dig down in myself to the blood, in them, so as not to scare you, so as to indebt you toward them, not me

p. 242 I am erect in my circumcision for centuries (petrified memory, ammonite [fossil index])

p. 243 just enough breath to ask for pardon, in languages of the PaRDeS, for all the evil that my writing is drawn, withdrawn, drawn out of [animal machine]

p. 244 intolerable envy, the enjoyment that I am, myself and nothing else

pp. 248-50 on each date, a drop of blood, one date enough to leave geologic program behind

p. 250 Spinoza, SA, too marranes, too Catholic

pp. 252-53 sign of circumcision will ensure Jewish nation an eternal existence > this sign of circumcision & election is foreign to understanding and true virtue

p. 255 in search of Saint Foreskin, gram of “lost part of self,” has the form of a Ring [objet a?]

p. 256 day of circumcision: a de-cision was taken in me w/out me > Jealousy & virginity, my two nipples

p. 257 phantom or prophet charged w/ mission, heavily charged w/ secret unknown to him

pp. 257-58 chosen race (genus electum) waiting for the envelope to open, seals to break like skins, so that finally, ceasing to eye your pocket, they enter terrible/sweet truth you bear

pp. 263-64 talking to you, you this god hidden in more than one, a mortal god, I write you my god, to save you from your own mortality

pp. 265-66 from disaster to sinister, no more height, not sublime, alone w/ everything, crawling, like I wanted?

pp. 266-67 a word, “cascade” this morning, happens so often, birth of a love affair, origin of the earth

***p. 268-70 in all the history of humanity, have never known anyone happier, luckier, more euphoric than I (isn’t this a priori true?) > and yet [double bind] remained counterexample of myself: sad, deprived, neurotic, jealous, disappointed

——can’t write w/out these two certainties > interest as passionate as it is disillusioned w/ language, literature, philosophy > impossibility to say: “I sign”

p. 272 caught up by school; they can’t stand that I say nothing refutable (nor tenable, nor valid), my capacity for silence & amnesia, not a strategy but “violence of the void through which God goes to earth to death in me”

pp. 272-73 never been able to contradict myself, still so young [cf. SW pp. 322-23], unforgettable power of my discourse—they grind even the mute ash, name of God in the ash > so I write, convenient for forgetting

***p. 274 I write to alienate, drive mad those I will have alienated by not saying anything

——I’ve been scared, me, in the evening, of the fear I inspire, fear of deathly silence that resounds at my every word

——the 4 breaths relaying each other

p. 276 not interested in principle of selection but this idiom that makes or lets me write

p. 277-78 Saint Augustine, whom elsewhere I venerate and envy

p. 279 Derrida as favorite son: excluded & favorite, at two juxtaposed moments [double bind]

p. 282 wait for the moment which is looking for me, decision deciding my life w/out me

pp. 284-85 writing w/out believing in one’s survival, in the inheritance of the last will, writing for the present, a made present, like SA wants to make truth: I don’t take my life, je me donne ici la mort

pp. 287-88 pronounce an atrociously tragic sentence, make its quotation marks appear, abandoning it to anonymity, putting forward an analysis > for more drama, who more than the other is vulnerable to analysis?

p. 288 before speech, among Jews alone, there’s circumcision

p. 291 “I” even w/in same sentence not the same

p. 293 prison/school: caught up in one, freed from the other [where I write]

p. 294 where they’ll never get me, they masculine or feminine [Zarathustra], up to the other to invent me

p. 295 SA: those pages don’t show countenance of this piety, the tears of confession

pp. 296-97 avowal, even for crime not committed, secretes meaning, order, an intelligibility that arrests > subject constituted by category of this accepted accusation (confines asubjective & endless culpability of chaos)

pp. 297-98 all my tears (of love), prayers, bleeding like overflow of murders I carry w/in myself, knowing not whether I committed them or not, against the other or against me

——spare the sister, she, the password, our lifelong secret, inside of the ring

p. 300 write to see your sacrificer face on, not to accuse him in turn, but to make truth

pp. 301-02 dying of a shame in which I persevere all the more in that I have nothing to do w/ it

p. 302 who am I, if I am not what I inhabit and where I take place: Ich bleibe also Jude

p. 305 happens only to me (the whole of this circumfession): hubris of the prophet, whose undecipherable letter arrives only at himself, who understands it no better than anyone else

pp. 306-08 nervous, worried, hunted, literature (beast playing dead, melding w/ foliage), delivering to world impregnable inedible simulacrum, the theory of the parasite virus, terrorizing others w/ instability he carries everywhere, one book open in the other

p. 310 hear them hear me tremble

p. 311 recount the “present,” throw G. off course, the present you are making him: Everybodys Autobiography

p. 312 “you archive the system, MacWrite Macintosh SE Apple of PaRDeS” [computer]

pp. 312-13 imbecile asks Derrida what he did to help save Jews [didn’t know Derrida was Jewish?] > maybe he was right, perhaps you didn’t do enough to save Jews, always think the other is right, at the beginning or end of the book

——see yourself overrunning discourse on castration and its supposed substitute

pp. 314-15 hoping, sighing, demanding, invoking, promising that the witness will attest that you will never have had any witness, you alone, whose life will have been so short, you the crossing btwn 2 phantoms of witnesses who will never come down to the same

CITATION

POOF p. 5 apostrophic pledge (gage apostrophique et sa citation): could apostrophe (uttered on edge of life, i.e. death) ever offer a pledge w/out substitution?

A p. 2 whenever someone speaks of someone else, cites or praises him or her, one must hear: this is the story of my life [re: Diderot accusing Seneca, pardoning Seneca, asking for pardon himself]

SEC p. 320 Husserl’s “green is or” still example of agrammaticality: a mark can be cited [is legible?], written, function cut off from “original” meaning > can engender infinitely new contexts

——cela ne suppose pas que la marque vaut hors contexte, mais au contraire quil ny a que des contextes sans aucun centre dancrage absolu

p. 324 insufficiency of speech act theory > parasitism and citationality not considered ordinary: “non-serious,” “non-ordinary,” sea change, etiolation

pp. 325-26 Austin excludes determined modification of a general citationality, general iterability [cf. GLAS, general fetishism] w/out which no “successful” performative?

p. 326 citational doubling splits (scinder), dissocier davec elle-même the pure singularity of the event, as positive possibility (not failure)

PAS PAS p. (21) yes, yes: force of affirmative repetition, unique call of the to-come as the will to repeat itself, affirmation that cites itself, joyous EROS, immeasurable unhappiness, irreducible contamination, affirmation risks citation, le oui qui fait dans la langue un trou aussi étrange que viens, il approuve, affirme, contresigne tout cequi est arrivé

p. (22) Blanchot’s récit as new thought of citation acc. EROS, repetition of yes that begins by doubling itself, récit unscathed, unique force of a viens that never reproduces itself: vienssauf

p. (40) unjustifiable and impossible the cutting out (le découpage) to which Derrida is submitting Blanchot’s texts > he does it to slowly approach his unheard of signature, plunge back dans son eau

p. (48) risk of interruption is run, programmed in the night, by the récit

p. (57) from where the right to interrupt? unjustifiable violence of interruption, nothing more servile, indiscreet, unspeakable than generalizing, appropriating the unique, breaking the seal of an absolute singularity [re: citing from Friendship, on single friendship btwn Bataille & Blanchot]

p. (59) the first sentence, no matter how inaugural it may seem, always recites itself in advance

p. (65) [récit] btwn 2 affirmations, legendary suspense, in which the undecided lets itself be lured (se laisse attirer)

p. (66) Viens, at the same time unique and copy (exemplaire), Blanchot’s récits as exemplary citations, their unique power is that the unscathed possibility of unique (le sauf) remains in reserve from which “I would emerge” to say, to one of them,“Viens

pp. (67-8) “terrifyingly ancient” time, absolute crypt, requires the récit (reciting, it can be a matter of nothing but that), ce récit [of viens], neither relation to the event nor event itself > pas dévénement, pas de concept

p. (72) citation of récit sets in moment (mot-ment)

p. (87) [on not citing his sources] the worst méconaissance of Blanchot’s text, hand over incommensurable in it to the market, the hierarchy, the dominant effects tied to name & law, but [other voice] there’s always benefits of mastery for sovereign renunciation, it’s gonna happen, il faut en rendre compte, the gift itself never forgets itself, nor the forgetting

p. (96) Derrida always interrupts Blanchot’s citations very arbitrarily, he is interested, like Blanchot, in logic of parts and partage

p. (101) even if we could cite everything (read everything), the whole would still be lacking

OTO p. 14 btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

D p. 316 tout commence donc par la citation, dans les faux plis (creases) dun certain voile, of a certain mirror-like screen

p. 334 cited text, prior past still to come

LI p. 32 can a signature be cited? what are the consequences?

——signature is on the edge of the text (neither inside nor outside)

p. 40 Derrida will cite Sarl at length to enrich iterative corpus which is the object of discussion

——is it still a citation if you underline parts of the quote?

p. 58 [quoted from SEC] doesn’t a performative have to be identifiable as a “citation?”

pp. 98-9 not conflating parasitism & citationality but identifying possibility they have in common [i.e. iterability] (use of or that signifies neither equivalence, dissociation, nor opposition)

——parasitism susceptible to parasitism of citation; citation can always be parasited by parasite

——citationality not confused w/ iterability but traced back to it

ATM p. 172 how to cite when Levinas places the whole language (French & Western) btwn quotation marks? at same time “he” is in quotation marks: the nameless signatory w/out authorial signature, “he” who undersigns every work, met en oeuvre tout ouvrage

——[Levinas’ work] a fabrication of quotation marks crocheting a text w/out edge (bordure): seriality irreducibly knots a text to a language

——infinite law of quotation marks suspends all reference, work enclosed in a borderless context it gives to itself (se donne à elle-même), while making absolute reference to command of tout autre

LG p. 226 no cause for concern [contamination of law w/ counter law] if one could rigorously distinguish citation from non-citation

p. 240 [re: Blanchot’s La folie du jour] récit in récit > non-inclusive, so remote from dialectic that this structure inscribes dialectic in ellipsis of récit

CITY OF REFUGE

AD p. 81 Levinas: city never this side of the Religious

pp. 108-09 God defends those who commit involuntary murder from avengers of blood

p. 113 Levinas’ city of refuge vs. Pirque Aboth’s “men ready to swallow each other alive”

CF p. 4 audacious call for genuine innovation in history of right and duty of hospitality: city of refuge

——city reinvent its relation to sovereignty of State

p. 6 when State is neither author of nor guarantor against violence forcing refugees to flee—it is powerless to ensure protection/liberty of its own citizens before terrorist threat

pp. 6-7 right to asylum for stateless peoples (lapatrides): was ‘the only right that had ever figured as a symbol of Human Rights in the domain of international relations’ [Arendt]

pp. 8-9 politics of city, a free city, une ville franche, Utopic?

pp. 11-2 juridical tradition remains ‘mean-minded,’ restrictive, because under control of demographico-economic interests (Nation-State regulating asylum)

pp. 12-3 to say a country does not offer economic benefit to a refugee (only asylum) [perverse, hypocritical distinction], discourse on asylum risks becoming nothing but pure rhetorical alibis

pp. 17-8 [bibliography on city of refuge; Numbers]

p. 23 city of refuge giving place for reflection and for new order of law, democracy to come (if a certain idea of cosmopolitanism has arrived, perhaps one hasn’t recognized it yet)

WOG p. 32 the excluded of the city, place of the Stranger in philosopher [?]

CLASS

GT p. 28 most serious stake of political economy: certain social classes have more time than others; but time cannot be given, it is certainly not time that they possess

p. 126 in “Counterfeit Money,” wealth, fortune, is natural, as if nature had decided this belonging to social class

pp. 134-35 social function of beggar, madman: “the pocket of an indispensable internal exclusion,” like structure of pharmakos, incorporation w/out introjection (assimilation), an identity by exclusion, keeps outside w/in, lexception faite (fors) dune clôture ou dun clivage intérieur

p.136 beggar as profound index of socius, at foundation of social contract

p. 137 beggars (in their exteriority) can represent absolute demand of the Other, inextuingishable appeal, unquenchable thirst for the gift

H p. 133 stranger/foreigner by way of “social class”

SPOM pp. 68-9 for Marx, ultimate support for dominant discourse: identity, self-identity of social class [Derrida believes he can suspend this idea while still inheriting from Marx]

POOF pp. 139-41 Schmitt’s Hegelian heritage, oppositional negativity is teleologically political (impossible to distinguish subject/object in speculative idealism); for Schmitt, Hegel fundamentally a political thinker, begins w/ Man as ‘evil,’ ‘dangerous’; for Schmitt, Marxism bears torch of Hegel in concrete-enemy of international class [Lukács]

WAP p. 30 “classes”—goes too fast [instead, Derrida says: certain groups or social circles w/ their dialects and subcodes]

***DPi p. 175 re: U.S., who can deny DP as political justice is class justice

pp. 178-79 Marx, as he does so often, by reducing juridical/judicial phenomena so quickly/brutally to ideological & superstructural effects of class struggle, doesn’t take into account relative autonomy, duration, efficacy of the juridical

RGE p. 337n via Bataille, consumption of [general economy’s?] excess of energy by a determined class is not the destructive consuming of meaning, it’s the significative reappropriation of surplus value w/in restricted economy > if sovereignty is absolutely revolutionary, revolution w/in restricted economy (reorganization of world of work, redistribution of values w/in space of meaning) is still a necessary phase w/in strategy of general economy

C p. 243 all genealogies come down to classifying [a last dwelling place?], and you know Derrida’s taste for taxonomy

pp. 246-47 class is not lacking, it’s at work (series, lineage, rank, hierarchy, etc.) > but what doesn’t come under (nen relève plus) class is perhaps fate (le sort) > no classification table for fate

BSi p. 165 one is never bête all on one’s own: class-structure in accusation of stupidity [re: Flaubert, Valéry]

CLASSICAL (OUR LANGUAGE)

GT p. 20 “it gives (ça donne),” not an utterance in propositional structure of Greek-Latin grammar

HERP p. 181 caught in ring of circle once questioning philosophy, engaged by Greek tongue > acc. Heidegger, obscurely, authoritatively, Greek tongue alone is logos

***H p. 139 urgent contemporary matters [new technologies] not only bring classical structures into present, they seem to deconstruct these inheritances of themselves

EM p. 121n (144n) the relevance accomplished in Hegelian metaphysics persists wherever metaphysics, our language, maintains its authority, even in pre-Hegelian systems (i.e. in Kant, figure of finitude organizes capacity to know from emergence of anthropological limit)

VM p. 94 for Levinas, classical dissymmetry of same and other feigns overturning while remaining the same, impassive beneath an algebraic substitution

p. 95 to think the opposite is still complicit w/ classical alternatives [Levinas’ limprévisiblement-autre beyond classical opposition, hopeless?]

p. 97 Levinas drags all classical concepts into agora, they’re summoned to justify themselves in ethico-political language they didn’t always seek, must confess their violent aims

p. 112 deportation from its [logos’] own site toward the Site, toward spatial locality, is the metaphor congenital to philosophical logos > metaphor (before being rhetorical procedure) would be emergence of language itself

p. 114 all philosophies that don’t distinguish btwn thought/language are philosophies of original “finitude,” but they should be able to abandon this word “finitude,” which is forever prisoner to classical framework

——positive plenitude of classical infinity betrays itself in language w/ negative word “in-finite”

p. 115 classical infinitism of Cartesian type, thought goes much further much faster than language [thought vs. body (language)?], would handle questions re: Levinas’ other by neutralizing space to liberate positive infinity

p. 119 in this language, our only language, how can we not repeat Hegelianism > this language coming into absolute possession of itself?

VP p. 12 [re: not substantializing Husserlian “transcendental”] language never escapes analogy, is analogy through & through > classical war of language, casting metaphors against metaphors, takes place in difference > le langage garde la différence qui garde le langage

p. 21 classical subordination: sign to truth, language to being, speech to thought, writing to speech

p. 72n for Husserl, that which is unnammeable is “absolute subjectivity,” a being of presence as substance, ousia, hypokeimenon > can name its attribute not its “absolute properties,” i.e. its substance [classical metaphysical scheme]

POOF p. 87 “we, speakers of Latin that we are”

WM pp. 221-22(n) [classical idea of metaphor] “economist” theory, metaphor as general figure of speech

POS p. 19 “everyday language” neither innocent nor neutral, language of Western metaphysics, carries w/ it considerable presuppositions

OTO pp. 3-4 strict adherence to classical pedagogy (whose imperatives one can never break from once and for all) would reduce you to silence, tedium, tautology

DIF DIF p. 12 trace as way out of closure of classical cause & effect (but not sufficient outside its text)

TB p. 119 classic circle always begins to turn once one asks about origin of languages/society

p. 127 still classical oppositional logic: expression before content (for Benjamin, expression is form and opposed to composition, which is usually on the side of form)

CHM p. 36 unsurpassable, unique, imperial grandeur of order of reason (Hegelian law) leaves us only recourse to strategies and strategies

p. 41 classical reason a doctrine of tradition, the tradition of logos (is there another tradition?)

RGE p. 252 slumber of reason, ruse of reason, slumber in the form of reason, vigilance of Hegelian logos (engenders monsters then puts them to sleep) > la raison veille sur un sommeil profond auquel elle est intéressée

p. 253 can one inscribe in lexicon/syntax of a language, our language (of philosophy), that which exceeds opposition of concepts governed by this communal logic?

p. 261 there’s only one discourse, it is significative, no getting around Hegel here

EJQB p. 68 that which was impossible for classical rationalists: to proceed w/in duplicity of God’s questionability > God is not truthful: accede to virtue of lie

p. 71 God of classical philosophers had no need to write (never interrogated/interrupted himself)

D p. 297 structural transcendental illusion, one surface of Soller’s square opens to “classical representative scene” > this is a necessity, no nonplace left out, so no pure origin can stand guard over stage as if derived from intactness of absolute opening: any attempt to return to lintimité indemne et propre played out in illusion > nothing takes place but place

p. 310 to describe a continuity of ruptures that doesn’t flatten along homogenous surface (present), necessary to turn to what's outside our language

p. 315 don’t dispel the uncertainty: whether mirror is classical stage or generalized space in which old theater is inscribed?

——all oppositions sont détraquées (thrown out of whack) by “avoir-lieu” of mirror: each term takes over (capte) the other & excludes itself from itself

p. 316 to try to resist removal of textual member from context—maintain boundary line btwn inside/outside of context > classical limits: remain protected against writing poison

HST p. 394 classical thesis of time (monad, event of negation) lacked thought of forgiveness (until Bergson & Heidegger)

PPT p. 9 parergon of this book are ringed together by a circle [parergon are the classic ideas of art, those of Kant, Hegel, & in another respect, those of Heidegger]

C p. 230 remainder is neither produced nor reproduced/represented [in Titus-Carmel’s coffins], classical thought re: remainder reduced to ashes > yet we retain at least more than one monumental proof (at least 127) of this historical operation

LI p. 55 “classical concept” as target: a tortuous, complex strategy > exploit target against itself by discovering it to be “basis” of an operation directed against itself, or discovering “in it” the cryptic reserve of something utterly different

p. 69 classically, fact has been opposed to essence (or principle) > le procès juridico-théorique that leads to an essential definition

——Derrida does not ignore the profound/classical necessity of theoretical-methodological idealizations that isolates “serious literal speech” [Donald Trump]

p. 117 differance, iterability—not entirely words or concepts, must take classical discourse into account, accept logic of “all or nothing” > when one no longer does (via differance, mark, supplement…), must rigorously, pedagogically, explain why one changes the rules

——where the rigorous no longer depends on a binary logic: a more powerful discourse reinscribes “illusory” of “ideal purity” into a thought of its possibility

p. 120 structural idealism, not illusion: constitutes condition of a certain classical value called scientific truth > iterability that makes such truth possible renders it inaccessible (not illusory)

p. 125 Derrida, as a classical philosopher (which, it is true, he remains as well), doesn’t see a big difference btwn “just a little serious” and “not serious at all”

TN p. 223 to proclaim “essential originarity” of technical [as Nancy does] translates this “law” into a classical language that meets its limit here

ATM p. 150 how can Levinas inscribe le tout autre in language of being, of the present, w/in its syntax, lexicon, under its law? > or: cette langue nest pas d’elle-même déliée, opens to tout autre?

——doing so in a way, where the fault (la faute) [see p. 149 Derrida’s fault, failing], which consists in inscribing tout autre in empire of same, alters the same enough to absolve it of itself

p. 154 passage beyond language requires language, or requires text as a place for the trace of a step (pas) that passes beyond language, not (present) elsewhere [not classical]

OG p. lxxxix (7) reading should free itself from classical categories of history: history of literature, history of philosophy, history of ideas

p. 186 (264-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] cet être-dans-la-nature a donc le mode dêtre étrange du supplément: lêtre-dans makes classical logic tremble

EU p. 5 Latin, then American English: privileged media of philosophical or techno-scientific communication

pp. 6-7 “nationalist” dimension of Protestantism, Calvin translating Institution of the Christian Religion into French, royal decree that laws must be pronounced in French—encouraged end of Latin’s hegemony > Latin: language of the law, of father/science/school, nondomestic

p. 64 natural languages fixed, rooted, re-rooted in event of Bible translation > Luther suffices as emblem

SPEC pp. 384-85 to describe structural necessity of borrowing as provisional/external fatality is classical logic [Freud often does this]: suspense is provisional, notes/coins must be guaranteed in final judgment

FV p. 426 when literary writing occupies illustrative position: text in service of truth, to read general law in example, the most classical practice > Lacan: truth makes fiction possible

pp. 467-68 Lacan’s highly classical interpretation of mimesis: Dichtung as detour toward truth, more truth in fiction, fiction manifests the truth [i.e. for Lacan, truth is not a fiction]

WBH p. 194 classical ruse of neutralization/neuterization (of sexual marks): “I think” is neither man nor woman, but we can verify that it’s already man

CLEAVAGE COLUMN

F p. xlviii cryptonomy: crack (la ligne de brisure) of a symbol, upright column of name (colonne érigée dun nom), blank voice of a scruple [see p. xiii], always extends beyond the self

PS p. 195 Artaud: this hole of the hollow btwn 2 bellows of force/which were not (ce trou de creux entre deux soufflets de force/qui nétaient pas)

FS p. 15 Delacroix: two lines give meaning; Freud: valley a common female dream symbol [column, hollowed margin]

p. 29 writing: “excavation (creusement) w/in the other toward the other in which the same seeks its (sa) vein and the true gold of its phenomenon”

p. 30 writing, moment of depth as decay > original valley of the other w/in Being; incidence & insistence of inscription

DIF DIF p. 24 text of metaphysics is comprehended (compris) > encore lisible, and to be read: not surrounded but traversed by limit, marked in its interior by multiple furrow (sillon) of its margin

O p. 29n Kierkegaard: blank spaces, voids btwn books, empty expanse btwn Teutons > write what you will

p. 57 text (lau-delà du tout) resists ontology > not primum movens > il imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

DPi p. 120 Blanchot: literature divided btwn 2 slopes, interminable “resifting (ressassement) of words”

CLONING

FWT p. 38 wherever there is repetition/duplication, that is “nature” and “culture,” there is cloning

p. 55 training as a form of cloning, all techniques, prostheses, all the grafting > one cannot speak out for or against cloning in general

CLOTURE

GT p. 81 language as a phenomenon of gift-countergift, of giving-taking, of exchange, all difficulties of nomination/writing are difficulties of self-naming, self writing (se nommer, sécrire)

——donner reviendrait à prendre et prendre à donner; this would fold itself over on language/writing beyond logocentric closure

pp. 134-35 social function of beggar, madman: “the pocket of an indispensable internal exclusion,” like structure of pharmakos, incorporation w/out introjection (assimilation), an identity by exclusion, keeps outside w/in, lexception faite (fors) dune clôture ou dun clivage intérieur

AF p. 36 can one presuppose closure, identity of psychoanalytic corpus?

LOBL pp. 100-01 double invagination constitutes story of stories, narrative of deconstruction in deconstruction: apparently outer edge of a clôture, makes no sign beyond itself, toward tout autre, w/out becoming dual, being “represented,” refolded, re-marked w/in the clôture > what the structure produces as an effect of interiority, this structure-effect is being deconstructed

SPOM p. 156 [closure: play btwn ghost & spirit?]

p. 235n the supplement of an internal-external fold, in abyssal fashion, marks the closure or principle of ruin of a philosophy of life, and of subjectivity: si on intégrait à la vie de cette subjectivité vivante le travail de la négativité ou de lobjectivité, les phénomènes ou plutôt les non-phénomènes de la mort, etc., pourquoi sobstiner encore à appeler cela vie?

A pp. 40-1 aporia of death, one of the place-names that forms following braid btwn 3 forms of limits, keeps it from coming undone [see pp. 78-80 border, closure, demarcation] 1) problematic closure (around thematic entity) 2) anthropological border (animals don’t have borders, laws) 3) conceptual demarcation, logical de-finition (decontaminate 2 concepts, oppose them rigorously)

pp. 62-3 Heidegger suggests diagnosis of problematic closures, they forget essence of Dasein, lock Dasein into ontological determination that is not its own, that of Vorhandensein

p. 74 double sense of de-termination [re: determined closure]: logic of termination (terma, peras, finis) and resolute decision or resolution [Being in Time great discourse on Entschlossenheit]

POR p. 17 (150) strategic rhythm of new [professorial?] responsibility: multiple sites (lieux), rhythm of blinking eye (dun battement de paupières), play one risk off other, la clôture contre labîme, labîme contre la clôture [hard eye (of reason) has no rhythm, no heart beat, no arrêt of sur-vie]

EM p. 123 (147) let’s not imprison Heidegger’s text in a closure he delimited better than anyone

p. 135 two strategies of deconstruction interwoven: 1) exit from within terrain 2) change terrain, discontinue > 1) risks sinking into autism of closure 2) risks inhabiting more naively the inside one claims to have deserted

p. 136 (164) btwn 2 eves (veilles), 2 ends, of man: 1) the guard mounted around the house (la garde montée auprès de la maison) 2) awakening to the day that is coming (léveil au jour qui vient)

PP pp. 95-6 to put word “voluntarily” in quotation marks designates, content to remain within the closure of oppositions, “submission” to the necessities of a given “language”

p. 122 what species of protection (amuntērion) is the dialectic? counter-poison that’s not antidote [?] > acc. Plato’s Stranger, 2 forms of artificial (poiein, protection), of the 2nd form: 1) antidote either human or divine 2) problēmata (shield, fence), either armaments or fences, fences (clôtures, phragmata) can be screens (alexētēria) or protections, finally garments, art of weaving: problematic space of protection

VM p. 80 every answer to the question, every law, dissimulates the question, encloses, the question is always enclosed, purity of question only found through difference of hermeneutical effort

pp. 110-11 Levinas must pose question of closure, “question of the relations between belonging and the opening,” to break w/ phenomenology and ontology

——Levinas must pose a kind of unheard of graphics, w/in which philosophical conceptuality would be no more than a function

pp. 111-12 why does Levinas return to categories he rejected? Derrida’s not denouncing incoherence [w/ this question], he’s wondering about meaning of necessity, necessity of lodging oneself w/in traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it—does this imposed necessity cache-t-elle quelque ressource indestructible et imprévisible du logos grec? quelque puissance illimitée denveloppement dans laquelle celui qui voudrait le repousser serait toujours déjà surpris?

pp. 149-50 ontic content of infinity would destroy ontic closure > would this not permit thought of Being, wouldn’t thought of Being be presupposed in thought of God?

PAS PAS p. (65) it is not the meaning of viens but the pas de sens that thwarts the closure of language

VP p. 44 what happens in this inside (language of metaphysics) when the closure of metaphysics is named? [what happens is deconstruction]

p. 49n originary representation can only be designated w/in closure “we” are attempting to transgress, tentant dy produire sûrement linsécurité, opening closure to its outside, from w/in

*** p. 87 w/in the metaphysics of presence, we believe in absolute knowledge as closure or the end of history, it has taken place, consciousness of self in infinity of parousia, this history’s closed

***p. 88 once presence in absolute infinity (unity of concept, logos, and consciousness in a voice w/out differance) appears to itself as its own death, this history is closed

——differance thought prior to or from presence tells us to interrogate presence w/in closure of knowledge > it must also be thought otherwise: dans louverture dune question inouïe nouvrant ni sur un savoir ni sur un non-savoir comme savoir à venir, approaching that on basis of which sa clôture announces/decides itself: openness of this question doesn’t belong to system of vouloir-dire

S p. 138n Heidegger, in reference to Schelling, talks about the difficulty of returning to Greek thought (w/ a single leap) and abolishing Christianity [in philosophical thought, by decree]

pp. 111-13 performing as Heidegger, Derrida affirms [?] Heidegger’s rigorous repetition [not hollow], which crosses path of tout autre [re: attempt to move beyond Christianity]

——wouldn’t Jews, Moslem, Christians respond to Heidegger’s retrait, flame and fire-writing in promise? [messianic echoes]

OH p. 19 must be suspicious of repetitive memory and tout autre of absolutely new [cf. POOF p. 65], of anamnestic capitalization & amnesic exposure to what would no longer be identifiable

POOF p. 62 closure & deconstruction (divine microscope) in Nietzsche as he walks down, through, the gauntlet of Christian virtue > must not hesitate to take path of Christian virtue

.

FSW p. 228 Freud augured a beyond and beneath of “Platonic” closure > by opening to theme of writing, writing as technē, as relation btwn life & death, btwn psychical and nonpsychical

——this opening never made explicit, but became urgent in relation to the [failure] of rhetorical device of metaphor [re: Mystic Pad]

TC p. 238 theater of cruelty would be the closure of classical representation, but still would produce closed space of original representation (produced from w/in itself w/out master-speech) w/out alibi or invisible utopia > autopresentation of pure visibility/sensibility

p. 250 “to think the closure of representation is thus to think the cruel powers of death and play which permit presence to be born to itself, and pleasurably to consume [see NIETZSCHE & HEGEL] itself through the representation in which it eludes itself in its deferral”

——“to think the closure of representation is to think the tragic: not as representation of fate, but as the fate of representation, its gratuitous and baseless necessity” > fatal, that, in its closure: representation continues

PPHS p. 81 “why this relation between sign and truth?” a question which brings us to external border of the closure of metaphysics [from “what does?” to “why?”]

T pp. xxiv-xxv delimit the space of a closure that’s not represented by philosophy’s name, acc. to straight circular line enclosed in homogenous space, prevent philosophy from calculating its margin, a limitrophic violence imprinted by new types > 1) overflows and cracks (déborde et fait craquer), count in margins more or less than what’s said/read, déferlement qui tient à la structure de la marque [same word as limit, marche, marge] 2) luxate the pretensions to univocal rigidity [vanne ouverte à une double entente ne formant plus un seul système]

DS p. 193 closure of metaphysics: not as a border enclosing homogenous space but acc. noncircular, tout autre, figure (invariable reference to primary truth, reference itself)

pp. 193-94 double mark, mark erases mark, undecidable stroke > this syntax escapes pertinence of truth, inscribes truth w/in its play [“Mallarmé exemplifies this”—suspect such a claim]

p. 234 Mallarmé’s book is a block composed of sheets of paper—its “cubic perfection” is open, impossibility of closure, dehiscence as “internal” theater, practice of spacing put in play

OS p. 39 “there is no chance that within the thematic of metaphysics anything might have budged” w/ respect to concept of time, from Aristotle to Hegel > founding concepts, entire system, substance, cause, etc. sufficed > one cannot interrupt, transgress, exceed “metaphysics” w/out acknowledging this powerful systematic truth

p. 51 question of meaning (sens) always posed w/in closure of metaphysics: sens (meaning, essence) governed by ousia as presence, as act, as end of movement, energeia (the sens of time thought on basis of present as nontime, as Being)

p. 56 for Aristotle, being-together [of nun and stigmē] not a determination of Being but very production of Being > ama as the pivot (cheville) (clavis), the key opening & closing metaphysics > this complicity so self-effacing as to barely be noticed, the common origin of space & time

pp. 60-1 metaphysical texts already have resources of their own criticism [re: circle of circles of time] (announces itself in the margin) [doubling of de-limitation]

P pp. 32-3 Derrida’s pas in Hegel/Heidegger’s circle of art, get across (franchir) circle w/out getting free (saffranchir) of its law, pas sans pas: circular closure as one that remains open (suffers neither lack nor negativity)

POS p. 6 double play [double hands] rigorously respects philosophemes to the point of their nonpertinence, exhaustion, closure

p. 12 deconstruction not a transgression, that would re-enclose us, give us a hold on closure of metaphysics > “one is never installed w/in transgression, one never lives elsewhere, transgression implies that the limit is always at work”

pp. 13-4 difference btwn closure & end: what is held w/in closure can continue indefinitely

p. 17 not possible to one day simply escape metaphysics

pp. 56-7 “closure of metaphysics” can’t have form of line, form in which philosophy recognizes itself, not a circle surrounding homogenous field, limit as various faults, fissures, marks, scars

pp. 83-4 Derrida fractures hermetic closure that shelters question of writing from psychoanalysis, blinding psychoanalytic discourse from the textual scene

GSP p. 162 exactitude of math vs. rigor of eidetic descriptive science (inexact or “anexact”) > phenomenology cannot be closed: infinite idea (in the Kantian sense) keeps open > this idea is the production of exactitude [essences of phenomena possibility of closure?]

PS p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

——not critiquing Artaud from standpoint of metaphysics, Derrida reveals complicity: Artaud must enclose himself in closure of presence to denounce naive implications w/in difference

DIF DIF p. 16 to delimit closure of metaphysics (absolute privilege that is consciousness as meaning in self-presence) one must solicit the value of presence (this ontotheological determination)

p. 23 the annunciating and reserved trace can be disclosed in metaphysical discourse when stating closure of ontology (Levinas, Freud, Nietzsche, and especially Heidegger)

p. 24 text of metaphysics is comprehended (compris) > encore lisible, and to be read: not surrounded but traversed by limit, marked in its interior by multiple furrow (sillon) of its margin

O pp. 3-6 [summary] must face risk of “old name,” not simply declare freedom of signifier (autonomy of meaning) or go outside (which affirms homogeny of closure, which doesn’t exist) > double mark (1 mark in/1 mark out deconstructed system), double reading, double science: no concept, no name, no signifier can escape this structure

p. 25 two/four & the “closure of metaphysics” no longer take, never could take, the form of circular line enclosing a field, finite culture of binary oppositions

p. 53 sense of fulfillment by way of copula (is) means nature is incomplete, needs a book to complete itself: closure of library articulates itself and turns on this hinge (gond): logic, rather graphics, of supplement

CHM p. 36 archaeology against reason can’t be written: concept of “history” has always been a rational one > writing that exceeds, by questioning them, values of “origin,” “reason,” “history” couldn’t be contained w/in metaphysical closure of an archaeology

p. 60 Derrida’s deconstruction of Foucault not a philosophia perrenis: historicity of philosophy located btwn hyperbole & finite structure, btwn closed totality and what exceeds it, in difference btwn history & historicity, in moment btwn hyperbole/madness/Cogito & forgetting > another statement of excess that’ll become another decline/crisis

RGE p. 268 inscription of relation btwn discourse & sovereign operation: “scientific” > a science made to tremble in absolute nonknowledge, “science” only in a transgressed closure—avec un non-savoir absolu sur le sans-fond duquel senlèvent la chance ou le pari de sens, de lhistoire et des horizons de savoir absolu

PIO p. 46 power of closure ensured by economy of the same, not to be rejected, criticized, combatted > economic circle of invention reappropriates what it sets in motion, the differance of the other (which can’t be reduced to meaning, truth, existence)

***RM p. 57 closure is not a circular limit (bordering homogenous field), but a more twisted (plus retorse) structure, another figure: “invaginated”

——representation of a linear & circular closure surrounding a homogenous space is a self-representation of philosophy in its onto-encyclopedic logic

p. 58 metaphysics [quotes from DIF] is not “surrounded but traversed by its limits,” “marked on its inside by the multiple track (sillon) of its margin”

WAP p. 72 deconstruction had to recognize internal destructuration of phallogocentric onto-theology, otherwise would have reproduced classical logic

p. 171 GREPH hopes to take philosophy out of its narrow pedagogical bounds (clôture)

D p. 336 opening paradoxically wrought as a thing that closes (squares of cubes)

TN pp. 92-3 is it possible to change climates? I believe not > I don’t really believe this, not in an instant, w/ a loss of memory

p. 137 how to say anything that doesn’t get invested in these historical figures [of touch], their rhetorical circle, and their logical, hermeneutical twirling (tourbillon)?

p. 261 spacing & “distance” are thought by Chrétian [by Christian theology of flesh], reduced to phenomenology of finitude, que le toucher spirituel (infini, immédiat, etc.) aura commencé par élever et relever [differance serving to close closure]

WOG p. 28 deconstruction at work in the ‘origin,’ already from the ‘origin’ itself—upon deconstruction of the origin

p. 37 closure is not end of metaphysics, which doesn’t have a self-identity

LG p. 231 genre-clause (clause de genre): clin doeil, écluse (floodgate), clôture qui sexclut de ce quelle inclut, déclasse ce quelle permet de classer > unfigurable figure of clusion, forme sans forme, neither sees day nor brings itself to light

OG pp. 4-5 (14) we can merely glimpse the closure, not the end, of a historico-metaphysical epoch (3000 years) whose ouverture de champ produces its own dislocation, denounces its own limits

——rigorous investigation beyond closure of knowledge, take positivity of science to its limits—monstrous, breaks absolutely w/ normality > faithful to lavenir (for which there is yet no exergue [chapter title: exergue])

p. 12 signs of onto-theology/logocentrism in Heidegger perhaps means that we can’t even leave the closure we can outline (dessiner), movements of belonging/not belonging too subtle to decide

pp. 13-4 (25) that a signified must be able to “take place” in its pure intelligibility (absolute logos): the theology of the sign (perhaps this epoch, whose closure we’ve outlined, will never end)

p. 14 (25-6) rigor of deconstruction (demanded by constant risk of falling back w/in closure): mark conditions, limits, of every critical concept and designate their intimate relation w/ machine (whose deconstruction they permit), & simultaneously designate the crevice (faille) through which one glimpses the unnameable lueur de loutre-clôture (glimmer beyond the closure)

p. 20 (34) effacement of signifier in voice is the condition of the idea of truth: ce leurre est lhistoire de la vérité, & the constituent closure: the word is lived (vécu) as elementary, indecomposable > transparent experience/expression of “être,” of word “être

p. 50 (73) to think play radically must follow Husserl and Heidegger to the end, conserve legibility of their thought, must know le jeu du monde before attempting to understand all forms of play in the world > play, as absence of transcendental signified, not a play in the world

p. 52 (75) closure of this epoch & civilization in process of disappearing dans sa mondialisation elle-même [?]

p. 92 (139) theory, what unites science & philosophy in epistémè, tends toward filling in the breach rather than toward forcing the closure (plutôt à colmater les brèches quà forcer la clôture)

p. 93 (142) unnameable movement of différence-même, I’ve strategically nicknamed (surnommé) trace, reserve, differance > could be called writing only w/in historical closure, w/in limits of science & philosophy

p. 99 (148) “Hegel,” “Rousseau,” “Leibniz,” “Descartes” neither identities nor causes > name of problems > so long as closure limits our discourse: we will not have other concepts

p. 143 perhaps Heidegger couldn’t read in Nietzsche the attempt to think differance prior to being (aka presence) > being speaks nothing other than metaphysics: even if thinking its closure

***pp. 244-45 (347-48) approach to limits (madness, divinity, childhood, animality, etc.) feared as threat of death & desired as life w/out differance: truth-value of these limit concepts only has meaning w/in closure of game (clôture du jeu), they belong to an epoch of supplementarity

p. 283 model of Fall (Platonic or Judeo-Christian) can only be stated w/in common closure

p. 286 (405) Hegel’s (folly) formula must be taken à la lettre: history is nothing but the history of philosophy, absolute knowledge is fulfilled (accompli) > what exceeds this closure is nothing, neither presence of being, nor meaning, history, philosophy—but [this nothing, writing] announces itself w/in thought of this closure, a place in the text which philosophy does not command

ATAP p. 81 Derrida implicated [in Western eschatological program]: to tell le fin du fin (distinguish closure from end) > eschatology is a tone, the voice itself, isn’t the voice always that of the last man?

p. 90 distinguishing deconstruction from simple progressive demystification [à la style of Lumières]? or why has deconstruction taken on an apocalyptic tone, multiplied distinctions btwn closure & end? I intended to analyze a genre rather than practice it, an ironic non-belonging

p. 95 [apocalypse w/out apocalypse] X w/out X, sans marks internal/external catastrophe of apocalypse, catastrophe of sans doesn’t merge w/ announced end, is its pli: a closure w/out end, end w/out end > outside of apocalypse w/in apocalypse

——“do not seal”: i.e. do not close, do not sign

COFFIN

TR pp. 130-31 only once of instant caught in amber coffin (mosquito feeding)

C p. 186 theory of coffins, series w/out model, w/out example (procession in double band fascinates, can’t see there’s no example) > obsequence of this cortege in singular lineage

p. 187 casket engenders? father’s coffin w/ maternal belly? [il faudra que je renonce à ce type danalyse interminable]

p. 188 little princeps coffin has no relationship w/ family > and yet, in secret, in an immemorial past that was never present, he engendered this family

p. 191 it’s difficult to resist obsidional invasion (investissement) > 2 desires of coffin deal (traitent) w/ each other for the dead man:

1. to lie in it, to make it yours, to steal it, give birth in it, calm one’s terror of alterity

2. to let it be the other’s

pp. 191-92 [re: 127 coffin drawings in drawers] glossary tire, tirer, tiroir, tirage [draw, to draw, drawer, drawing (attracting)] (also à la tire of the pickpocket), leads to that of idiomatic trait, to duction or even “ductus” > one recognizes a draftsman even before he signs his name

——seduction/attraction of a drawer, seduce the haunting of a cenotaph

p. 193 revenant—127 times, what of the remains is being put into figures (chiffré) in this way?

pp. 195-96 excess zeal, the little one (paradigm) built like a crypt [Lacan’s objet a?], jealously keeps its secret at moment of greatest exhibition

——hermetically closed (portable temples called hermes): mute beneath its altuglassed transparency, seduces, attracts the dead man, makes him come back and more: fors in that casket

p. 196 paradeigmatizō: to propose as a model, to blame, hound someone so to dishonor him; paradeigmatismos: an infamous punishment to make an example > (hi)story of coffin, the condemned example: an (exemplary) sentencing of the example: damned paradigm—to death!

p. 197 coffin giving birth (a generator, genetrix): incalculable descendance [Phaedo]

***p. 198 paradigm does not show a coffin, it shows itself in its coffin, Titus-Carmel does the paradigm down, to death > works at mourning w/out example: learns to go w/out (se passer)

p. 208 coffin, as the odd, as the remainder, remains entire, divisible only by itself [prime: 127], as long as you deduct one—the paradigm coffin: belongs w/out belonging to series it makes possible > inscribes itself in series, leaves on it mark of its own subtraction

——transcendental mors, fors, exceptional piece; (fait) band à part (has a hard-on, keeps aloof)

p. 215 retrace one’s steps, narrative (récit), series, funeral procession/palindrome, revenir: le revenu de lusure, le revenant, lhôte, ghost, guest [both in English] > le coffin comme hôtel de passe (whore-hotel)

p. 218 stricture of coffins, holds dead man rigid, knotted w/in & w/out, pulls dans tous les sens (in all directions), seira, cord, chain, knotted cord

p. 221 [re: out-of-series] dynamic instability or even double bind (holds coffin btwn its laces): both colossal/radiating/magnificent & diminished/abandoned (délaissé), delacée

p. 224 coffins simultaneously keep & destroy the keeping & destruction of what they keep & destroy [re: Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins]

p. 225 [re: 127 coffins] box is not, it remains, (a) mise en boîte (put in a box, make fun of itself)

p. 226 matchbox, a parallelepiped like coffins: 2 openings, no hinge

p. 231 coffin’s mutism: always a box in a box, some supplementary cartridge, a parergon > hors la boîte, fors la boîte: necessity to steal coffin (each time, differently) inscribed right on the “thing,” right on the cartouche [congenital perjury of justice]

p. 231 [Titus-Carmel’s] coffins deploy synoptic archive

p. 235 Titus-Carmel spends a year caressing the name in his pocket (Derrida imagines), it’s the name of the other, murder & reparation > carnivorous/sarcophagous name, proper name in other’s language (nomination one can neither choose nor appropriate)

p. 246 intraitable (uncompromising) umbilicus of coffin, its tongs leave (laissent) a mark; so many leashes (laisses) > laisse: let see, let do, let fall, and to leave a legacy, lais [old form of legs, legacy]

——I think of the supper and the 13th at the table [Judas?]

COGITO

GOD p. 92 Unheimlichkeit of Geheimnis, both Freud & Heidegger: beyond an axiomatic of the self or the chez soi as ego cogito

R p. 102 the rogue that therefore I am: (ab)using time

SPOM p. 166 acc. Marx, Stirner borrows disguises (Verkleidungen) of Hegelian idea, opposes himself to non-self, reappropriates himself as living, incarnate being

——“I am” = “I am haunted,” Ego = ghost; Es Spukt (translation misses impersonal, quasi-anonymity of German), “it spooks,” “it ghosts,” it specters,” ego inhabited by its own specter

——“es spukt” in Freud’s “Das Unheimliche,” production of figure the revenant (der Spuk)

p. 167 Cartesian cogito, Kantian “I think,” phenomenological ego cogito: “a real presence is promised here to a Eucharistic Narcissus” > living being visited by its own apparition

VM p. 104 dissociation of thought and language, subordination of latter to former, is proper to philosophy of finitude [Cartesian Cogito of 3rd Meditation]

p. 119 for Levinas, if Husserlian Cogito opened to infinite, it would be an object-infinity w/out alterity, a “false infinity” [Levinas never uses this Hegelian term, but idea of indefinite, negative form of infinity haunts his gestures]; Levinas makes true alterity nonnegativity, and the same (complicit w/ negativity) the false-infinity > would have seemed absolutely mad to Hegel

VP p. 10 in phenomenology, transcendental consciousness, the archi-region, is absolutely singular, transcendental “I” distinguished from human, empirical, natural “I”

pp. 46-7(n) “falseness” of phrase “I am immortal” is the truth of truth itself > movement from “I am” (confession of mortal) to res cogitans (immortality) secures itself beyond that which makes it possible—death

S pp. 15-6 Descartes’ cogito not exemplary precedent of existential analytic because sum is not questioned [leap rather than genealogy]; Descartes commits the thingification of the subject, positing (Ansatz) of subjectum or hypokeimenon, a substance or substratum

p. 26 acc. Heidegger, Hegelian spirit ruled by epoch of Cartesian cogito, thus calls for deconstruction; Hegel called Descartes the Christopher Columbus of philosophical modernity

pp. 62-3 for Heidegger, that which causes destitution of spirit is of spirit, is its double, its spectral duplicity; yet, this is not Descartes’ Evil Genius (böse Geist), the destitution, the demonic, comes from cogitos substantializaton, accepts lies, destruction, doesn’t question (Schellingian)

FWT p. 65 modern concept of right depends on Cartesian cogito, his “text” not the cause but “represents” this structure in powerful systematicity of symptom

POOF pp. 175-76 w/out enemy, Nietzsche’s fool, Schmitt in his prison cell, one can no longer utter cogito ergo sum, there’s no evil genius, no absolute hostility > “I” loses reference, objectivity

——is reason the friend of the enemy? philosophy at stake in Nietzsche’s address [‘O my ene…’]

pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe quà l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

——beyond the certainty of cogito, the friend only has to become evil to become Evil Genius

OS pp. 44-5 Heidegger, like Hegel, equates I = I w/ time, in the form “I think” is time

ROP p. 86 Evil Genius as haunting backdrop (le fond de hantise) (perpetual threat) of what lets Cogito appear > how can what comes after (Cogito) be the absolute beginning?

ATIA p. 3 Derrida turns “je suis” into “I follow (je suis)” > I hunt, chase after the animal

p. 56 “I am dead” implied in every cogito ergo sum (cf. SP)

pp. 67-8 Valéry’s snake utters the first word (of Verb): “ME,” this “I am that I am,” first impurity, contamination of being, ontological creation, autobiographogenesis, becomes words of seducer > promise to breach purity of nothingness w/ performative

——I am HE,” auto-zoo-theo-morphic > snake as God, divinity diminished by fires of Seducer

p. 69 to confess the narcissism of confession is to admit that guilt, the lie, perjury are lodged in heart of promise, in veracity itself, in naked/intransitive simplicity of “I am”

p. 72 for thought to be present to itself, to be present, must exclude/suspend all life, the living body (becomes machine, corpse), animal life, auto-affection

p. 75 for Mallarmé, in Igitur, the account of cogito, specular “perception,” comes w/ a zoomorphic clan, a haunting by chimera, “monsters,” “spiders”

pp. 75-6 Descartes never doubted the animal, this indubitability a condition for doubting, for ego, ego dubito, ego cogito, ego sum

pp. 86-7 properly phenomenological logic of “I am” means there is only “I think” > breath, life are secondary: “I breathe, therefore I am” concludes nothing > indubitability of existence depends on thought (not being-in-life)

p. 90 required singularity of animal in cogito, re: Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas; what each maintains of Descartes (despite nuance) > each reaffirms necessity of sacrifice

——Dasein, a deconstruction of Cartesian subjectivity, but still anchored [inked] in “I am,” in Jemeinigkeit

p. 91 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas all make explicit fundamental place of sacrifice; for Descartes, its inexplicit: animal-machine not sacrificed animal > but Descartes’ cogito has its Christian heritage: interest in Eucharist, a relation to Augustine’s cogito (despite denials)

p. 96 finitude of “I think” (anthropologism) is denied the animal by Heidegger & Kant

p. 101 beneath its mechanistic indifference, Cartesianism belongs to Judeo-Christian-Islamic sacrificial war against animal

p. 137 for Lacan, what is great about Descartes’ cogito is that the sum is transcendental, it’s beyond imaginary capture (the animal’s cogito, w/out sum, w/out “I”), the specular > [it is symbolic]

p. 147 for Heidegger, Descartes’ ego sum is dogmatic, doesn’t pose ontological question

CHM p. 32 madness seems [emphasis on seems] to be dismissed, denied entry to philosopher’s city (this last tribunal of Cogito: could not possibly be mad)

p. 33 Cogitos (Descartes’ is neither first nor last Cogito)

pp. 48-9 [very Husserlian side of Descartes] that even if sensory is illusion/dream—there’s always the intelligible (noncounterfeit simplicity)

p. 53 what is de facto and what de jure in relation to Cogito & madness?

p. 55 Descartes installs possible menace (of madness) in very heart of intelligible > as long as doubt is unresolved no knowledge can master madness

***——Cogito: valid even if I am mad, not sheltered from an emprisoned madness but ascertained/attained w/in madness itself

p. 56 hyperbolical (mad) audacity of Cartesian Cogito (critical experience of which we may be too self-assured to experience): return to original point, zero point, where determined meaning & nonmeaning come together in their common origin

——(Foucault’s narration imbedded w/in impenetrable point of certainty, as are all projects of thinking totality by escaping it) > can only escape, w/in existence, in direction of infinity or nothingness, this margin of the possible: not human (as in anthropological factuality, but demonic/metaphysical), first awakens to itself in war w/ evil genius, resists him by reducing natural man w/in: nothing less reassuring than Cogito at its proper and inaugural moment

pp. 56-7 Cogito, exceeding totality of world like epekeina tes ousias (Glaucon: “Lord what demonic hyperbole (daimonias hyperboles)?” [banally translated as “marvelous transcendence”]

——this demonic hyperbole more excessive than hybris, passion > opens, founds, makes possible

pp. 57-8 doubt & Cartesian Cogito punctuated by “unprecedented” excess, overflows totality (beings, factual history, determined meanings)

——to place w/in determined historical structure risks dulling point itself (doing violence)

——everything in Descartes can be objectified as event in determined history except the hyperbolic project

pp. 58-60 Descartes interns his own hyperbole by temporalizing Cogito, certifying it through God (temporalizes the sharpest point, the instant), a hurried repatriation > God protects Descartes against madness of Cogito

p. 60 Cogito as fugitive [cf. furtive in PS], ungraspable, escapes linear order, determinations of natural light > repeats itself in Husserlian Cogito [though Husserl had to reduce it to affirm madness of his reduction]

——Cogito symbolizes madness, derangement, hyperbole

IW p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——truth of nationality is German idealism; the German spirit is the spirit of humanity

——Cohen suspects a narcissistic infatuation in Fichte’s national ego, mirror of a certain psyché, but also room for any other self in this national self, cosmopolitan logic, national self as “We”

EL pp. 207-08 the vengeance of language (language as name of God) > a debt that leaves its signature in the language will be incurred by innocents, archiguilty, generations to come

——this is a logic that the cogito, practico-transcendental egology, cannot comprehend [i.e. cogito can’t comprehend language?]

HST pp. 391-92 for Levinas, threshold of solitude constitutes request for forgiveness, constitutes being-myself—a kind of ego cogito as an asking forgiveness from the other (a leap), as the very temporalizing of “I” [morality/psychology as ontology: the being in “being forgiven”]

——surviving, resurrection, as miracle of each instant (having to be forgiven—as survivor)

TN p. 16 can one figure an untouchable extension? difficult except for intelligible extension w/out body (Descartes, Kant) or insensible sensible (Hegel, Marx)

pp. 36-7 for Nancy, cogito neither point nor space, Nancy’s altercation w/ Descartes occurs btwn improbable pineal gland & a mouth from before speech > an opening anoral & already touching

AD p. 23 Levinas on cogito: “it is not I, it is the other that can say yes” > infinity welcomed in anarchy

p. 103 Levinas: à-Dieu is infinitely older than finite, diachrony of time “being destined” before any act of consciousness, destined as devotion itself, desire refers to à-Dieu, which is more profound, older than cogito

BSi p. 44 Schmitt: protego ergo obligo is cogito ergo sum of State

p. 183 pitiless lucidity of cogito, triumph of conscious self-positing self, the thesis of self always reflects itself as bêtise, bêtise always triumphs > Triumph of Life in bêtise

bêtise always on side of victor > bêtise must not find itself bête: that would be suicidal

OG p. 17 Rousseau’s sensible cogito as another model of presence (self-presence), carries in itself inscription of divine law

pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

——(from Descartes to Hegel) God is name & element that makes possible absolutely pure self-presence & knowledge > God’s infinite-understanding is the other name for logos as self-presence, produced as auto-affection through voice—excluding sensible, exterior, spatial writing

EU p. 17 cogito as je pense gives speech & law to French legal subject [invites tourism?]

p. 25 cogito as the easiest: distinct, clear, natural light of “pure reason” [will writing in French, in the vulgar tongue, make it more difficult to describe the easiest?]

p. 37 Descartes jealously insists on “true philosophy” [of his thought], re: Augustinian filiation of “I think therefore I am”

WBH p. 194 classical ruse of neutralization/neuterization (of sexual marks): “I think” is neither man nor woman, but we can verify that it’s already man

COLONIALISM

MONL p. 23 master does not have exclusive possession of anything, only possesses, usurps unnaturally, rapes, colonizes through “unnatural process of politico-phantasmatic constructions”

p. 39 all culture is originally colonial: unilateral imposition of “politics” of language

pp. 61-62 language of the other, promised language [which doesn’t exist], entirely other [tout autre] than language of the other as language of colonist > there are unsettling resemblances

COLOR (ASSONANCE, CHROMATICS)

MONL pp. 59-60 break with tradition, uprooting, amnesia w/out recourse: all of these unleash the genealogical drive, the desire of the idiom, impulse to anamnesis, destructive love of the interdict, tattooing of all colors on the body [see AF p. 10 erogenous color draws mask]

——madness of a hypermnesia, a supplement of loyalty, commit to traces of writing: toward an anamnesis of the entirely other > this is the most difficult thing [Aristotle says same about virtue]

MSUB J pp. 162-63 grammar & etymology of forcener > lose one’s sense, beyond sense, without sense, hors sens (fors and sen) > can’t forcener un subjectile in French w/out forcing the grammar: corresponds w/ German Wahnsinnige (without sense) not Geisteskrank (mental illness) [Sinnan originally means to travel, stretch towards; Indo-European sent and set mean path]

——forcené: for, fort, force, for, and né, letting or, hors, sort incubate in it

PP p. 129 pharmakon also means paint, an artificial tint, a chemical dye that imitates chromatic scale given in nature

R p. 26 Plato’s multi-colored democratic bazaar

PAS PAS pp. (99-100) in a moment of extreme, precipitous virtuosity, where o (mort, fors, faux, faut, zéro, mot) resonates everywhere and nom turns to mon, Derrida asks himself if his policing overzealousness [to unmask the absence of the name, le pas-de-nom] deciphers identities [maur/chot, m’: o], wants to catch everything in a dragnet (filet)

F pp. xl-xli wolf, Wolkenkratzer (skyscraper), Grateloup (scrapewolf), sounds gr, kr, skr: quasi-synonyms, quasi-homonyms w/out privileging either signifier or signified (linguistic “motivations”?)

DS p. 281n opposition btwn metaphor & metonymy is purely semantic—deconstructed by superficial, profound, that is abyssal operation of versification (vers, verssensvers, versus, verre), morcelante et reconstituante (hiver, pervers, envers, travers, vertige, rêve)

P p. 77 for Kant, pure sound & pure color as vibration of ether > purely formal, “universally compatible w/ certainty”—beautiful [what about color gold on frame?]

+R p. 151 resonances leading you astray, what if I like words in order to be-tray (pour trahir) > (pour traiter, triturer, traîner, tramer, tracer, traquer)

p. 160 gl of “angle”: wild, almost unnarratable event, not a morpheme, close to piercing (trouer) a hole in the arthron [articulation, joint], patch of color in graphesis, the trait in color, a rebel to appeased commerce (regulated exchange of 2 elements [lexical, pictural])

pp. 169-71 [on a tr spree]: not a formal program, not a material matrix, neither metaphor nor metonymy: a system of traits, this truncated matrix lacks nothing for affecting déjà [Derrida], for inciting to all transferences

——trance or tragedy of Ich, trembler [tréma, treachery, trunks, transpierce, trepannings]

pp. 169-74 tr as chromatic, color transforms program by leaving law of trait in tact

pp. 173-74 this [chromatic] tr, which works inside & outside language, is not logocentrism, not a consecration of analogy, not a hypercratylean theory of language: what’s at stake is violence & the arbitrary > it breaches (fraye) an entirely different body

C p. 215 series of words in “or”: mort, fors, or, mors

p. 229 feu (sur) le paradigme [TN. fire on the paradigm, late paradigm], fuit, il-fût > suicide paradigm, retrac(t)ing by blowing itself up

E p. 15 for Kant, colors, which are generally adornments, are affiliated w/ moral qualities (i.e. red–sublimity, violet–tenderness)

LG p. 231 genre-clause (clause de genre): clin doeil, écluse (floodgate), clôture qui sexclut de ce quelle inclut, déclasse ce quelle permet de classer > unfigurable figure of clusion, forme sans forme, neither sees day nor brings itself to light

CIN p. 31 btwn black & white, color of writing resembles only “literality” of cinder that still inheres in a language

OG pp. 213-14 harmony, chromatics, calculation; analogy btwn painting & music is analogy itself

COLOSSAL/COLUMN

FK p. 83 machine-like & faith as one and the same possibility, machine-like & sacrosancity (heilig, holy, safe, unscathed, free, “swollen”) of the phallic effect: phallus as phainesthai, phenomenon (day of phallus) & also phantasm, fetish, specter, its double: colossal automaticity [phallic in bold 2x]

PPHS pp. 97n, 98 acc. Hegel, movement from symbolic hieroglyphic naturalism to colossi: spirit beginning to liberate itself, but colossi still require external light

P p. 120 column & colossal (indissociable, nothing to do together): together see nothing, let nothing be seen, show nothing, display none of what one thinks

——taille: size and cut (the cutting edge) [see TN. decision to use “cise”]

——kolossos originally had no size, what brings cise (taille) to colossus, not a measured cise but disproportionate (démesurante) cise

p. 121 via effigy, in fictional space of representation, erection of kol- as movement from cise (always measured, small) to la démesure, w/out cise, immense > detail, détaille

——in Glas “and of the blink (—) btwn the two col (—)”, problem of col, link to Heideggerian trait (Riss, Zug) and broaching (lentame, Aufriss)

——kolossos as stationary, impassive stone, link to Freud’s Medusa (castration/erection/apotropaic) [which Derrida attempted to displace in O]

colossal is not only encountered, it’s a theme in Kant’s Critique

[about to discuss the column & the colossal]: “I will take my stand (me tiendrai) in this passage”

p. 125 an object is “prodigious,” monstrous (not colossal), when, by size, it annihilates & reduces to nothing the end which constitutes its concept, exceeds the final limit, overflows end & concept

——colossal is almost too (presque trop) large for presentation: singular originality w/out edging (bordure) or simple overspill (débordement) > how can we think of this “almost too,” this incised in excess

p. 126 Kant’s colossal: intuition of object almost too great for our Auffassungsvermögen

——almost too large for apprehension, decidedly too for comprehension (Zusammenfassung)

if we’re in a hurry, we’ll conclude the colossal is the phallus, which doubles the corpse; Derrida jokes: don’t hurry when it’s a matter of erection, let the thing happen

pp. 127-28 beauty & sublime: please by themselves, independent of judgment of senses & determinate judgments, pretension to universal validity on side of pleasure (not knowledge), both reflexive judgments > beautiful (finite) requires parergon, presence of limit gives form to beautiful, this bordered edging not only externally limited but called in by hollowing of lacunary quality w/in the work (ergon) > colossal/sublime excludes parergon, not ergon, usually nature, “w/out limit”

pp. 131-32 no object of sublime, presentation of inadequation of unpresentable, principle of sublime must be in ourselves, in Reason (moral seriousness w/out play), reason of the colossal

p. 132 feeling of colossal, experience of inadequation of presentation to itself, the colossal is the figure of the incommensurable, it is inadequately incommensurable, sa propre béance > elle se détermine en son contour, se taille et sentaille comme incommensurable au sans-taille, voilà une première approche du colossal en érection

pp. 132-33 Hegel reproaches Kant for starting from cise and not from w/out cise: i.e. the sublime, for Hegel, goes beyond symbol, expresses itself only by marking annihilation of expression, in sublime, content (infinity itself, the one, substance) sublates form > Kant is wrong to think subjectivity, finitude, could signify it, but Kant would respond in principle: one can only think w/out cise, the colossal, by way of figure [signified infinity vs. signifying finitude]

pp. 135-36 acc. Kant, sublime is absolutely large, w/out dimension, an unequal equal only to itself > why is there still reference to a cise in space? if absolutely large why not absolutely small? Kant’s preference of largeness is tautological: more is more (preference itself thinks more

p. 138 w/ sublime, everything that is compared to it is small > here, Kant throws a bridge, the bridge like the symbol throws itself [by way of reason?], btwn unpresentable and presentation > the whole world can be made small in relation to sublime magnitude

p. 139 colossal: that which (or presentation of that which) can be taken in hand [Fassen] or eye w/out possibility of being taken, thus crushes you not w/out pleasure, elevates you

p. 140 imagination (btwn sensibility & understanding) has 2 operations, is the cise because it has 2 cises: 1) has the cise of what it delimits 2) and cise of what it de-limits, i.e. that which is liberated in it of its limits [apprehension lets go in comprehension what it gains in apprehension]

p. 141 distance from colossal, to be colossal (not too far, not too close), aesthetic maximum w/out losing itself in mathematical infiinite > relation of body to stone

p. 142 distance required by the sublime opens up perception to space of narrative? divergence btwn apprehension/comprehension? doesn’t it call itself, w/ narrative voice: the colossal?

p. 143 monstrous (prodigious, ungeheuer) defeats end that forms concept, colossal presents limit of conceptualization: borders on monstrous, neither culture nor nature

——colossal: irreducible passage btwn presentable & unpresentable > taille, bordure, bords de coupure, ce qui passe et se passe, sans passer, de lune à lautre

p. 144 double trait of cise, limits and unlimits at the same time, divided line upon which colossus comes to cise itself—and incises itself w/out cise > the sublime

——Kant calls this “subjective,” this psychic ideality, “not in nature,” the psyche as kolossos, superelevated, beyond height

p. 145 Fort: Da colossal: ce qui vient-là-devant-sériger, erected in its own erasure, obscenity of its abyss

——même s’il y en a, la taille de cette entame nexiste pas > trace of each trait what's presented sans taille

——have to have been double, superelevates itself on both sides of its own cise, il est des deux côtés sa propre taille, il est de sa propre taille des deux côtés : double column/colossus, hence its resonance

p. 146 glas et galactique du colossos, the bridge [tree?] over the abyss which threatens to swallow everything, interval btwn dynamic/mathematical sublime, on edge of which analytic of sublime is broached (sentame): whirlpool heaves/tears tree into la dissemence laiteuse (the question is the cipher writing on the surface of nature)

O p. 56 beneath form of its protocolic block, preface is everywhere, it’s bigger than the book

WAP p. 15 CIPH wants its unicity to come from the exorbitant? the exorbitant is immediately contaminated or compromised (selects using the most reassuring norms)

REST p. 309 col de luterus (neck, collar of shoe, turned inside out)

DST DST p. 215 Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger draws stehen and stellen together by identifying stal of stellein (to equip, to send word for) w/ sta of stele (column), he also links thesis via dhe to Setzung, Stellung, Lage—more philological Witz than true etymologism

HLP p. 52 tele-techno-mediatic modernity: colossal amplification

p. 60 Mein Kampf refers to “the colossal lie”

D p. 340 Sollers: column of penis, faeces, baby—solid, each stimulate a membranous passage

p. 341 text occupies place before “me,” announces me to myself—une tour de guet (watchtower) planted inside me > like a “transparent column,” pure outside: driven into that which tries to close in on itself > imagine you swallowed a cylindrical mirror, tower of Babel, bottomless plurality, not negative…also phallic [p. 342 in Zohar: “great, ungraspable columns of air”]

p. 342 column is nothing, no meaning in itself, a hollow phallus > guarantees innumerable passage of dissemination and playful displacement of margins

——marching column, column of #s, mirror-column, column of air, column of mercury, column of gold

p. 345 whiteness of virgin paper, blankness of transparent column, air > more than neutrality of some medium, uncovers space of play, play of space

p. 351 transformations of meaning hinge on certain squaring of text, obligatory passage through open surface, detour through empty square, around the column of fire

pp. 351-52 column is not, passage of dissemination, “phallic” significance of column is a semic effect, reflection on 4th surface (described center, represented mastery of dissemination); “is”—procures calm, consciousness of ideal mastery > operation of 4th surface

——column has no being, belongs to no one

p. 364 each angle of square belongs to totality of surface, but multiplies it by folding back on itself, fractures it [the surface]—leaving room for supplementary attending (dassistance) surface

——same w/ supernumerary (surnombre) (column of words): is part of the numeral and belongs (appartient) to very milieu it exceeds

p. 365 invisible column—undecidable, unmasterable in its height, uncontrollable in extension > unique & innumerable like what is called (the) present

+R pp. 166-68 double échelle (scale, ladder [double column]) hauled par-dessus le cadre, le marche, to dominate the overview

——force of trait (disjointed forms a work): systasis of powerful ligatures holds, binds, disjecta membra, ladder is a scaffold, a synonym of POTENCE, garroted, bound (pillars, columns, frames, capitals)

p. 169 double ladder, erected, riveted, shackled, never arrives > steps: symbolic of sexual act

C C p. 213 colossal raising (surélévation): essential 1st manipulation > allows T.-C. to raise himself above object, it starts by being bigger than him since he approaches it w/ intention to get into it [coffin], until it is diminished enough so he can handle it

p. 221 [re: out-of-series] dynamic instability or even double bind (holds coffin btwn its laces): both colossal/radiating/magnificent & diminished/abandoned (délaissé), delacée

TN p. 184 “too large for dimensions of present essay” [chapter title has exorbitant in it]

E p. 22 the ultimately disgusting is unrepresentable, lexclu absolu, if one could name or represent it, it could enter auto-affective circle of master/reappropriation > must be insensible too (unnameable, un-intelligible), the absolute other of the system [Derrida compares this structure to that of the colossal]

OG pp. 161-62 ex-orbitant [method]: certain point of exteriority to totality of age of logocentrism, broach the orbitary (orbita) orb (orbis) > decons. has no methodological or logical intra-orbitary assurances, can never justify un point de départ absolutely: surely before Rousseau was chosen the exit and the critique of the repression of writing had been prepared (amorcé) [?]: [deconstruction designated as errant or empirical—only means something w/in closure]

p. 163 supplement itself is exorbitant, in every sense of the word

ATAP p. 65 lever/relever all senses (meanings) pressing around Hebrew gala, in front of columns/colossi of Greece, in front of the galactic, the milky ways that fascinate me

p. 90 Glas’ columns constantly shaken by apocalyptic agitations, laughs at apocalypse (mixing John of Gospel w/ Genet [GLAS p. 198])

EU p. 77 Schelling: nature’s message written in hieroglyphic on colossal pages [geologic?]

FV pp. 415-16 for Freud, dreams of nakedness don’t exhibit penis or absence of penis but absence of phallus, absence of attribute supplementing a possible fault, absence of colossal double > following chain is indicated: truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame [Schreber]

COMMAND/OBEY

GOD p. 125 God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, not the God of philosophers of ontotheology, but one who interrupts & retracts his order

p. 128 Abraham’s silence, secrecy of unforgivable, decision, would have “to be forgiven by the one he obeyed”

p. 141 Judaic God repents, feels remorse, takes back his commands—i.e. the flood, his gesture resembles a confession, a plea for forgiveness [Christ is constantly taking back?]

LOBL p. 127 je marrête > “same interdiction encrypts the resurrection at the moment when he sees the terrible Chose

pp. 133-34 terribleness of la chose, not only ineffable, unnarratable: it’s interdictory, it forbids telling/seeing

——interdiction violated by itself, sets in motion a single pas, overflows impossible récit, that which forbids happens [French? arriver?]

HASD p. 28 [in Christian apophatics of Dionysus] cause, gift of gift, order and promise are the same

p. 30 order or promise, injunction commits (me) to sign, in a rigorously asymmetrical manner, to reappropriate for myself and restore the symmetry

——to deny, elude responsibility, it’s still necessary that I countersign it

MPM pp. 146-7 [re: de Man closer to Heidegger than he thinks] for Heidegger, memory too, like promise, gathers near what can come, toward the “future” > es gibt never gives anything in present, it calls as a promise; Heissen (“to call, ” “to command” > entrust, keep safely)

POOF pp. 203-04 in Aristotle, honor saves friendship from calculation, from the market—still, it’s proportioned via hierarchy, a hierarchy as sacralization of the beginning, qua command (arkhé)

A p. 34 absolute arrivant, no more commands than commanded by memory of originary event where archaic is bound to final extremity (telos, eskhaton)

p. 45 request for foundation or for condition of possibility speaks language of methodic order: 1) an order as in a whole 2) an order as in a sequence 3) an order as in a command

VM p. 97 Levinas’ critique of state’s alienation neither Marxist, nor Hegelian, nor anarchist, since his is a philosophy of “principle as commandment”

PP p. 69 an inscription, Delphikon gramma [Phaedrus (229d)], anything but oracle, prescribes silent cipher, signifies, orders autoscopy, autognosis [re: Socrates’ send-off of myths]

p. 147 certain voice, command of logos that Socrates obeys > forbids more than it bids (qui interdit plutôt quelle ne dicte)

OH pp. 24-5 Europe: representation or figure of a universal idea; has confused its face, figure, w/ a point, a phallus; the idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, eidos, archē, telos, the idea of beginning, commanding, cap, captain, towards an accomplished end

——advanced point is at once beginning and end, divided as beginning and end (Heidegger on Ort as point of spear, and fromm, Frömmigkeit, from promos, what leads, lavant-garde)

SW p. 316 veil given by God, and giving here is ordering (donner cest ici ordonner)

p. 340 cest un don quils ordonnent [re: regulations of tallith]

CHM pp. 38-9 Foucault’s Decision (re: point where madness & reason were split): both a fiat/decree/order & schism/dissension/caesura > this dissension is internal (cleavage, torment, w/in act of sentire), fission that divides it along lines of Hegelian Entzweiung [rupture, diremption]

TB p. 133 sacred text is transferability making its translation untranslatable

——sacred text (absolute text): pas de sens (not poverty of meaning, but no meaning that would be itself) > sacred text surrenders itself to translation; commands right away the translation it refuses

TR pp. 124-25 concept of “machine” indissociable from deconstruction: “a text whose grammaticality is a logical code obeys a machine” > no text w/out grammar, w/out machine, w/out “suspension of referential meaning”

PSSS p. 251 Kant (said this better than anyone): no right w/out coercion

——juridical decision approaches ideal of justice to extent that the community has at its disposal force of constraint to command respect for its ideal

p. 257 imperative will always be the question of principle, the principle, of sovereign prince, princedom

TN pp. 67-8 il y a la (là) du tact > given as given as much as ordered (do touch but avoid contact)

p. 121 philosophy under thumb of finger and eye

p. 122 order of presences via haptical (if it was a finger point, command)

ATM pp. 143-45, 150 “he will have obligated (il aura obligé),” a phrase knotted up (se noue) in a certain way of tying (lier), a serial structure of a singular type > edges of the sentence in fog, belong to the night

p. 171 what to make of a signature [Levinas’] when “il aura obligé,” when Il signs in his place?

——how does one hear “one must” in Derrida’s polysemic “loeuvre dE.L. aura obligé

CIN p. 10 a desire, order, prayer or promise: “another voice, may it come soon now, again, another voice…”

BSi pp. 2-4 à pas de loup (wolf), à pas de colombe (dove) (silent commands order world); wolf, war (hunting), dove, order, peace > both silent

pp. 42-3 obey what protects (double meaning of obliger) > when state says, “I protect you,” it institutes a fear that obliges you, subjects you [Donald Trump]

p. 244 [re: “Snake”] sovereign as guest (hôte) commands, the first comer, comes before me

p. 312 threshold as solid, indivisible, threshold as arkhē: commencement and commandment > archon, figure of sovereign himself

OG pp. 17-8 (29-30) natural writing (breath) pneumatological not grammatological

——interior holy voice of faith; natural law, native unity of voice & writing is prescriptive, commandment > good writing comprehended as that which had to be comprehended

pp. 30-1 (46) factum of phonetic writing commands our entire culture/science, not one fact among others > still, does not respond to a necessity of an absolute/universal essence

EU p. 104 via Kant, government must arrest its own power in face of freedom (Montesquieu) > philosophy as absolute freedom but can’t give orders (who could be trained to inspect this?)

COMMITMENT

MONL p. 60 madness of a hypermnesia, a supplement of loyalty, commit to traces of writing: toward an anamnesis of the entirely other > this is the most difficult thing [Aristotle says same about virtue]

LOBL p. 77 hymen or alliance in the language of the other, strange vow by which we are committed in a language not our mother tongue > Derrida’s committed, are you? translators?

p. 147 commitment [wedding proposal] in irresponsibility of speech [Blanchot’s character proposes in Slavic not French], arrêt of commitment, commitment thus arrêté, both in one’s language & the other’s—the hymen > mother tongue does away w/ commitment & seals it

p. 148 I am “irresponsible” and absolutely committed in the establishment of the language of the other, which I do as if the first moment, the “at once” is the occasion of the hymen, its chance and its law

p. 149 commitment only in the language of the other [see pp. 153-54], there is “language of the other” whenever there is a speech-event, this is what I mean by a “trace”

——[trace as commitment to the other, the forgotten remnant in translation]

p. 152 the violence of leaving a text alone, “one should refrain from” as law of text, qui se donne à lire, matched by another violence, exerted against first law in an attempt to commit to it, to draw close > violent truth of “reading” [don’t touch, shred to pieces]

MPM pp. 19-20 affirmation (yes, yes) that seals alliance, via de Man > alliance not secret because occult but because it commits before and beyond anything else

p. 95 singular aporia that divides the act, can’t be mastered, commits us before any active commitment on our part, impossibility of promise, uncontrollable > faktum, “older”

S pp. 129-30n before the question, the question mark, language is already there, we have already said yes to it, given a pledge, acquiesced (Zusage,which also means promise, is for Heidegger a commitment of language toward language)

WAP p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

——double bind of philosophical commitment or pledge (droit, if a philosopheme, also submitted to law of double bind: unstable, deconstructible, it precedes itself, calls for indestructible responsibility)

TB p. 117 every translator is committed, committed by the other before having committed himself?

p. 123 promise of reconciliation (even if unfulfillable) is a rare & notable event: kingdom is never reached, is untouchable > but the commitment takes place, bequeaths its record

REST pp. 282-83 whose shoes (whose feet) (the subject of reattachment): the capital subject of this contract [btwn Shapiro & Heidegger], they each have one piece of symbolon, share common interest, coded commitment

pp. 350-56 Heidegger’s Verlässlichkeit (reliability, solidity), [what Heidegger restitutes from Van Gogh’s painting?], anterior to opposition useful/sacred, comes from earth/world, from trait, the Ring required for a hymen per fidem, makes commitment possible, fidelity that predates everything

C p. 189 get down to it (sy mettre), commit oneself, donner du gage (give proof, evidence, wager) > get in the coffin, spread out: à chaque coup for the first and last time, always the first and last

UWC p. 220 absolute immunity of academic type must be protected even if it risks dangerous auto-immunity, even if we must address ourselves to university’s outside > we must commit ourselves in act, in work, in what we make happen w/ events

CHOR p. 95 poker-like gamble w/ no insurance: “each man and each woman must commit his or her own singularity, the untranslatable factor of his or her life and death”

COMMUNICATION

POS p. 23 communication: transmission of identity of signified object from one subject (presupposes subject) to another: A communicates B to C

RGE p. 263 Bataille’s communication, only btwn beings who have put the being w/in themselves at stake (mis en jeu) > “placé à la limite de la mort, du néant

COMMUNISM [fixerup]

SPOM p 123 communism is untimely, so will always remain spectral, like democracy, no “plenitude of presence-to-itself,” but ghosts never die

p. 130 totalitarianism in Marxism/Communism can be explained as a fear of the ghost, Lenin and Stalin hardened themselves w/ “cadaverous rigor”

p. 131 not “revisionist” to see genesis of totalitarianism in European politics as reciprocal reactions to fear of ghost communism inspired

——communism as monstrous realization, animist incorporation of emancipatory eschatology > couldn’t have been an ideological phantasm because it was inspired by the critique of ideology

p. 139 once revolutionary task sets in, amnesia occurs, nothing but forgetting, “anachrony practices and promises forgetting”

——question of head, cap-, spirit > amnesiac order of capitalist bourgeoisie, the muzzle (gueule) replaces head at summit

p. 158 self-manifestation of the manifesto, the “here I am” in the announcement of communism (Marx, Engels’ Manifesto)

COMMUNITY (UNAVOWABLE, INOPERATIVE)[fixerup] SOCIUS ? see SOCIAL

R p. 88 justice w/ disjointure: out of joint, interruption of relation, unbinding > infinite secret of the other, threatens a communitarian idea of justice [See SPOM p. 30 joining is a thinking of injunction] [hetergeneous inseparability of law & justice developed in FL, then SPOM in discussion w Heidegger's dikē (gathering, harmony, adjoining)]

FK p. 55 the fiduciary “link”, respect, responsibility of repetition in the wager (gage), would precede all determinate community linking all singularities prior to all intersubjectivity

p. 82 auto-immunity haunts community: hyperbole of community’s own possibility

p. 87 dimensions of self-sacrificial supplementarity, the auto-co-immunity, com-mon auto-immunity, keep community alive, open to something other, more than itself (a spectralizing messiancity beyond all messianism)

p. 99 socius as the secret of testimonial experience, a certain faith, address/relation to tout autre, that is, socius as non-relationship of absolute interruption: Levinas, Blanchot

POO p. 21 [2nd type of nonresponse] silence, protection, “insolent weapon and most deadly irony,” absolutely elliptical, shelters one, makes safe from objection, undermines responsibility, very essence of socius

p. 31 even if the secret makes social bonds possible it does not answer to them

POR p. 16 (148) new responsibility of community of thought w/out secured frontier btwn basic & end-oriented research (entre recherche fondamentale et recherche finalisée) > rethink community, institution, and all ruses, tâche infinie, de la raison finalisante > paths by which apparently disinterested research can by reinvested by all sorts of programs

HERP p. 202 via Heidegger, opening of 2 maintains the entre-deux, no community gathering (pas de rassemblement communautaire) if there are not 2, but no 2 w/out opposition (Gegensatz)

pp. 202-03 Heidegger [on Bildung]: community of struggle (Kampfgemeinschaft) a struggle that holds opposition open, permits resolute self-examination [only the “few”] [see p. 190]

POOF p. 37 Nietzsche’s teleiopoesis, a messianic structure, we establish ourselves as heralds & precursors [of ‘community of those w/out community’?], Nietzsche sometimes says “I” and sometimes “we”: singular responsibility is always double [contretemps], doubled, disseminated: double as infinitely divided responsibility

p. 54 the 2 ways to say to oneself (keeping silent) that solitude is irremediable & friendship impossible, 2 ways to (se) partager the impossible: 1) compassionate [see p. 57], negative, keep silent in secret 2) affirmative, attune/join 2 disjointed jouissances at heart of dissociation itself, an ecstasy w/out plenitude [Nietzsche: open horizon w/out light]: a communion darrachement infini [see p. 57 Nietzsche: “finer still to join in laughing”]

p. 55 Nietzsche dares to recommend distancing (in code excluding it), separation, in a language of friendship, family, politics, state: affinity through distance

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

p. 293 the whole text has thought of Blanchot & Bataille, the “community w/ community,” w/out wanting to capitalize around them all their original thoughts

p. 294 Blanchot [re: friendship]: “the fundamental separation from out of which that which separates becomes relation”

p. 295 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

pp. 296-97 what does ‘common’ mean once friendship goes beyond all living community? when it comes to friends only in dying? > common becomes valueless for thinking friendship

p. 297 Blanchot no longer has affinity w/ one Nietzsche (there is always plus dun): friendship is not a gift or promise, it’s the outside drawing near in its separateness/inaccessibility—pure desire is the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance, to die in common through separation

——the common becomes the pole end of a call > question regarding the ‘common’ should bring on a vertigo that asks ‘what is to be done?’ what’s to be done, politically, w/ this vertigo & its necessity?

p. 298 this friendship announced would have nothing to do w/ community: so that each X without X, unceasing neutralization of one predicate by another (relation w/out relation, community w/out community, partage sans partage), would call on significations altogether different from part shared or held in common

pp. 298-99 desire in lovence (friendship or love) engages me w/ a particular him or her, a singular ‘who,’ desire of the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance (nécessairement infranchissable), where a politics of lovence would no longer imply motifs of community, which always risks bringing a brother back > risk must still be assumed to keep question of ‘who’ from being politically enframed (arraisonner) by schema of l'être-commun

VM p. 79 community of questions: unrelentingly ask questions, despite diaspora of institutes, despite publications & techniques that follow, accumulating themselves like capital or poverty

p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

OTO p. 7 masks return a constant yield of protection, a surplus value as the ruse of life, ruse incurs losses once surplus value “does not return again to the living, but to and in the name of names, the community of masks” ——[cf. above]: “nothing ever comes back to the living”

WAP p. 25 “unavowable,” “inoperative” community—not secret but heterogenous to public law, civil society

DPi p. 21 DP at origin of social contract, state, any community

Gii p. 29 Geschlecht as idiom, a “we” that can hear Fichte’s address (not necessarily the Germans)

——organic community in nonnatural, spiritual sense

——“we” announces itself to itself from infinity of a telos of freedom/spirituality > engages, allies, promises itself acc. to circle of this infinite will

p. 30 Geschlecht, in Fichte, is/inhabits living language of inspirited breath vs. dead language torn from its root

——acc. Fichte, children learn language as if signs for sensible things were arbitrary (willkürlich) > must reconstitute past development of national language

PJP p. 181 acolyte, anacolytic, anakolouthia, analytic figure: as much an analyst as a breach, interruption> a rupture in a set (contract), be it that of friendship, community, being-together

p. 193 acolyte, narrator-friend-witness-countersignatory, “I am myself the rapport,” relation w/out relation, the impossible report/relation (and translation)

TN p. 115 for Nancy, touching is very experience of “origin” as “plural singularity” > being w/ (cum or co-), community as co-tact > se toucher soi-même, se toucher l’un l’autre ou les uns les autres [French grammar tolerates reflexive in singular & plural]

pp. 198-99 Merleau-Ponty’s “it is a non-coincidence I coincide w/ here” can only be upset by thinking cum otherwise, w/ Nancy: “the other turns out to be the other of the w/

——law of parting/sharing at heart of con-tact: “inoperative community”

p. 241 “politic” pertains to essence of every community? doubt it

OG pp. 136-38 (197-201) in MOP, the ideal community speaks w/in earshot (à portée dallocution) [Rousseau, Lévi-Strauss, Anarchists, Fourier, Libertarians]

pp. 168-70 (239-42) acc. Rousseau & Duclos [via Lévi-Strauss’ tribe w/out writing], degradation of politics/community caused by degradation of language—bad pronunciation, shortened words, caused by capital, aristocracy: speech of the assembly dispossessed from the people by written law (from Rome & Greece to empires of great distance)

UWC p. 225 techno-scientific virtualization of work, the putting-into-common, any “community” [Aristotle’s city] > mutation of taking place of event, of oeuvrethat which arrives

EU p. 80 for Schelling, those whose thought isn’t regulated by living and buzzing communion w/ divine [w/ community] are like sexless bees (geschlechtslose Bienen) > depositing inorganic excrement outside hive—proof of their platitudes

pp. 100-01 interpretation of poem, philosopheme, theologeme always proposes an institutional model, consolidating an existing one or constituting a new one: calls for politics of community of interpreters > every text/element of corpus bequeathes/reproduces several injunctions

——every text opens/closes, double bind, undecidability, an overdetermination that can’t be mastered

p. 102 minimal responsibility today (of someone belonging to research/teaching institution): make political implications of system and its aporias as clear and thematic as possible

——every operation we (students, teachers, research community) pursue together: always institution at play, contract signed, image of ideal seminar constructed, a socius implied

***p. 173 only livable community (for Derrida, this is a faith in spirit of philosophy w/out dogma, murder, idiotic polemic, hateful distortion) wouldn’t shun/deny double law [i.e. a teacher must initiate/train a student while effacing him/herself in name of autodidactic tradition]

COMPASSION [fixerup]

TN p. 299 compassion, if there is any: lépreuve of impossible compatibility

COMPLAINT (GRIEVANCE)

POOF p. ix grief—grievance (complaint), “O my friends”—orphaned quotation

p. x [friend will countersign complaint?]

pp. 204, 206 via Aristotle, the just wage (gage), a fee, salary, 3rd party & common measure—war ensues wherever common measure & straight and narrow path recoils (se dérobe) [translator also translates the Chapter Title, Replis,” as recoils] > in these grievances, where calculation becomes incalculable, where I can’t count on you, there is no friend

pp. 204-05 Aristotle continually analyses the ruses that allow one friendship to be smuggled into another: use into pleasure, wearing virtue’s mask > though ethical friendship is more beautiful, is bound by faith, beyond contract, legal friendship (political) is more necessary, more natural [?] [more grievances abound in the ethical?]

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

SW pp. 318-19 verdict: end of the end of history, everything is going to start again—is there a heritage looming at this instant/point of verdict? > I am no longer in question re: this unknown verdict, one that, if it came, would be so tortuous, so against the rhythm, that it would mime quasi-resurrection of new year by sealing forever the “so late, too late, sero” > “late” (always tautology) means “so late,” “too late, absolutely”

pp. 322-23 I am so fatigued from knowing truth, that history of the veil—that truth: too old for me, too old like me (however young I remain) > you don’t know the “fatigue” I’m talking about (dreaming of writing in Spanish, forgotten ancestral language)

——infinite weariness of tropes, what do you expect, I want to end it all (protest, attestation, testament, manifesto against the shroud) > no longer write around/in/under folds of truth

pp. 323-24n complaint (of exhaustion) & accusation lodged against matrix of discourse of veil

——complain about myself to myself: immodesty, impudence > but veil makes modest

——complaint: give up all modesty, most elementary politeness

PSSS pp. 248-49 grievances (complaints, demands) of psychoanalysis: internal (problem of its institutionalization & dispersion) and external (relations to state, society, mondialisation) > what is proper not proper to psychoanalysis re: these borders, who addresses the grievance to whom?

p. 249 “mad”: invent destination, address, addressee of grievance

——“mad” as a movement w/ no target, no telos, where movement of (counter-)transference has not yet taking place, is seeking its place, its subjects [is this an analytic site?]

——threat of death, whose mourning/grievance would be born in advance, invades place left vacant for transferential destination

TN p. 137 how to say anything that doesn’t get invested in these historical figures [of touch], their rhetorical circle, and their logical, hermeneutical twirling (tourbillon)?

CONCEALMENT

VM p. 144 ontic before ontological, natural attitude before transcendental reduction: preexistence of relation to the existent > formula of concealment

——is it risky of Levinas to think of Being as dominated by theme of unveiling when Heidegger continually affirms concealment?

CONCEPT

AF p. 33 to have a concept: a closed heritage (seal of guarantee [see POO p. 20 “one and the same seal” “total and intact memory”])

p. 97 archive as history of every concept, all conception

SPOM p. 173 nominalism, conceptualism, realism—routed (mis en déroute) by (A)Thing called ghost

***p. 202 introduce haunting into every construction of a concept, beginning w/ being and time; ontology opposes hauntology in a movement of exorcism, ontology is a conjuration

POOF p. 72 every time a concept bears the ghost of the other, the enemy the friend, the friend the enemy

SEC p. 313 for convenience [re: Condillac], Derrida opposes operative concept to thematic one

***PP p. 104 (118) excess, displacement of series, nest pas une simple sortie hors de la série (ce geste tombe sous une catégorie de la série), a folding back (repli), a re-mark, cannot name it with a single concept w/out being off the mark (sans le manquer): it is a real and necessary challenge that writes itself, and we must begin by reading it

VM p. 88 fantasy [Levinas’?] of a philosophy where contradiction of concepts subsides in displacement of concepts, a philosophy enveloped in its fundamental concepts

p. 95 acc. Levinas, concepts anticipate a horizon w/in which alterity is amortized as soon as it is announced—because foreseen, horizon always horizon of the same

pp. 110-11 Levinas must pose a kind of unheard of graphics, w/in which philosophical conceptuality would be no more than a function

p. 113 langage, fils de la terre et du soleil: écriture > one could never come across a language w/out rupture of space, no aerial or aquatic language, in which alterity would be more lost than ever > structure of inside-outside/day-night has no meaning in pure space [proscribed words], inhabits conceptuality itself

p. 136 every concept presupposes Being by dissimulating it

p. 148 for Levinas, origin of concept must be the gift of the world to the other as tout autre, not the thought of Being

p. 149 for Heidegger, concept is on the plane of ontic determination; for Levinas, it is on the plane of Being

——isn’t thought of Being thought of the other before homogenous identity of concept, asphyxiation of the same?

——God another name of Being (name because nonconcept)? > opening of the horizon not in the horizon

VP p. 21 does absence of question re: starting point and pre-understanding of an operative concept translate into dogmatism? [re: Husserl]

***p. 88 once presence in absolute infinity (unity of concept, logos, and consciousness in a voice w/out differance) appears to itself as its own death, this history is closed

PPHS pp. 76-7 Vorstellung, remembered-interiorized intuition; Erinnerung, interiorized memory, places images in reserve, like water in unconscious pit, like vein at bottom of mine > passage to conceptuality

p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

SH p. 52 poem, in offering itself, risks losing its time and place to the holocaustic generality of recurrence and readability of concept

FWT p. 5 deconstruction is hyperconceptual: large-scale consumption of concepts that it produces as much as it inherits > deconstruction endures experience of limit of concept, endures this excess, loves, an ecstasy of concept—jouissance—overflowing

WM p. 224 concept of concept cannot not retain gesture of mastery

p. 224n Kant: Grund flows from, depends on, substance (Locke: support for accidents), not schematic but symbolic hypotyposes, expresses concept w/out direct intuitionism

p. 261 in life sciences, which demand critique of teleological judgment, we take the metaphor for the concept, use of animistic or (technical, social, cultural) analogy [pp. 258-63 via Bachelard, use of metaphor in science]

pp. 262-63(n) by placing metaphor en abyme, Nietzsche is responsible for the need to find a new distinction than that btwn metaphor and concept

——Nietzsche takes risk of continuity btwn metaphor & concept, describes metaphorical tissue of man as spider’s web, Derrida follows web, tissu, tisser, to weave, honey bees, Marx

OS p. 39 “there is no chance that within the thematic of metaphysics anything might have budged” w/ respect to concept of time, from Aristotle to Hegel > founding concepts, entire system, substance, cause, etc. sufficed > one cannot interrupt, transgress, exceed “metaphysics” w/out acknowledging this powerful systematic truth

P p. 65 Kant’s “conceptual scheme” for any theory of art: rational/formal/logical vs. irrational/matter/illogical > thing as formed matter

pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

p. 76 for Kant, no transition to pleasure/displeasure from concepts (save pure practical laws where there is interest, but not attached to judgment of taste)

p. 94 concepts stitch up (recoudre), furnish supplement of adherence [re: completes incomplete gadget]; still, there’s a chiasma, w/ free beauty, la coupure ny laisse aucune peau, aucun tissu dadhérence: law w/out concept, w/out debt, complete because incomplete

——une fleur belle est toujours en ce sens une fleur absolument coupable absolument absoute [sic], innocente

p. 95 concept: a saturating generality—drinks up or effaces sans of pure cut

POS pp. 66-7 we need to determine otherwise, the effects of ideality, meaning, reference > a “new” concept (first constituting itself) possesses “localizable effervescence in the work of nomination,” effect borrows its characteristics from opposition cause/effect & essence/appearance, w/out being reduced to them > this “fringe of irreducibility” should be analyzed

p. 71 name does not name punctual simplicity of a concept, but a system of predicates defining a concept, conceptual structure centered around given predicate [re: paleonomy]

p. 106-07n spacing as not only the space, but an operation, production, genetic (generative): spacing ensures no overlap of any two concepts, no privileging of a concept

ROP p. 18 qui, fors Dieu, a jamais créé, ce qui sappelle créé, un concept?

pp. 31-2 iterability as condition/constitution of identity, ideality, of all concepts, but also (double bind) that which resists hierarchical and binary oppositions, a quasi-concept, inconceivable concept > not confusion, approximation, but “reaffirmed exigency of analysis”

ATIA pp. 135-36 [can man attribute to himself indivisible concept of being able to feign a feint? “subject of the signifier”] do we have to remind a psychoanalysis that erasure of a trace can ensure its return? sense the virtual consequences on our subject: autobiography

O p. 15 in Hegelian concept of method, self-presentation of concept (lêtre auprès de soi du logos absolu) is true pre-face, essential pre-dicate of all writing

pp. 11-2 for Hegel, necessity of preface belongs to Bildung, external necessity of concept’s self-presentation, must take time into account as the existence (Dasein) of concept [legibility]

p. 19 acc. Hegel, logic has as its object the very concept of science

p. 31 tautology & heterology coupled together in speculative proposition > analytic/synthetic procedure mutually envelop each other: no more anteriority, belatedness of form, exteriority of content > concept enriches itself

p. 48 concept > engenderer & consumer (jouissant) of itself, relève its preface, plunges (senfonce) into itself > conception of concept an autoinsemination

——return of theological seed to itself, dispersion working for profit of Idea, exclusion as inclusion [not Hegel’s Jew?] > la vérité qui se parle dans le cercle logocentrique, cest le discours de ce qui revient au père

p. 48n for Hegel, life is essential philosophical determination of concept & spirit (vegetal, biological traits), organicity of encyclopedic logic [inborn germ of death]

p. 49(n) re: writing, Hegel does not think exteriority, repetitive autonomy of remainder > writing becomes pro-gramme, pre-scription, pre-text, the simple empirical husk (déchet) of concept

——for Derrida, this husk is coextensive w/ whole life of discourse

SW pp. 350-51 culpable edging of phallus, edges of the cut, support the veil, hold it like a roof, canvas—this theoretical toilet of the phallus is the concept > phallus is the concept: can’t oppose it, nor a “sexual theory”: unless you do something different, the way you set the sail (Benjamin)

WAP pp. 133-34 always something of a “mot dordre (slogan)” in every concept, and vice versa > GREPH won’t shrink from (ne recule-t-il pas devant) le mot dordre

Gii p. 40 since, for Heidegger, essence of hand is not in its prehension, it’s also not in Hegelian grasping of Begriff, taking hold by mastery/manipulation > what is hand’s essence?: the gift, give w/out taking anything

PF p. xxxii Kamuf (un)knots alibis of the concept around the major alibi: resistance

EJQB p. 75 “entre la chair trop vive de lévénement littéral et la peau froide du concept court le sens

IW p. 261 Cohen: eidoslogos, concept (logos) is verified through idea & its rendering of accounts

***HST pp. 362-63 “the entire contradiction” more than a dialectical one: each concept hospitable to an other that never was “its other” (dialectical contradiction): autodeconstruction in every concept undoes the grip, the violence of taking, Begriff, capture, comprendre, cum-capio

the difference btwn extending hospitality to one’s chosen other (integratable immigrants), and a tout autre (absolute surprise, madness of the concept of hospitality, atopos)

p. 364 if every concept shelters or lets itself be haunted by another concept (one that’s no longer its other), no concept remains in place

——experience, exercise of impossible hospitality: “the exemplary experience of deconstruction” > deconstruction of the concept, concept of concept, of the at-home

p. 385 impossibility of forgiveness must be thought onto la racine la plus radicale of its paradox—it does not resist the impossibility of what wants to be conceived in it > concept of concept undergoes lépreuve of its essential precariousness, its finitude, its deconstructability

LI p. 53 “concept” of remainder not a sure thing (de tout repos), concept in quotes because remainder deconstructs the logic upon which the concept of the “concept” depends

p. 55 “classical concept” as target: a tortuous, complex strategy > exploit target against itself by discovering it to be “basis” of an operation directed against itself, or discovering “in it” the cryptic reserve of something utterly different

pp. 116-17 every concept, every philosophical concept, that lays claim to any rigor, always implies alternative “all or nothing” —even concept “difference of degree” (simple empiricism), concept of relativity, determined acc. “all or nothing”: difference of degree or nondifference of degree

——it is impossible/illegitimate to form philosophical concept outside logic “all or nothing”

pp. 117-18 all concepts appeal to idealization, even “concept” of iterability > but it has a strange status: marks possibility/limit of idealization, thus conceptualization too

p. 119 alogical logic of iterability: it’s an ideal concept, but also the one that marks essential & ideal limit of all pure idealization > not the concept of nonideality

——repeatability of both (identificatory) iterability & (altering) iterability > necessity of thinking rule & event, concept & singularity, at once

——iterability thus a concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, & hence the concept, hence all distinction > marks the limit of idealization/conceptualization: “concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to nonconcept

p. 128 “ideal concept” (i.e. rigorous concept) vs. pragmatic concept (empirically useful, provisionally convenient, constructed w/out rigor)

E p. 20 for Kant, sight is most noble sense, but hearing is least replaceable, most allergic to prosthesis, tolerates substitution badly, almost succeeds in resisting vicariousness: this is why the mute will never know concepts, they cannot access the universal signs

OG p. 13 totality of metaphysics creates hierarchy of signifier/signified [signified is higher, not exterior like signifier] (Christian creationism, infinitism, both appropriating Greek conceptualism)

——signans (sensible), signatum (intelligible) [?]

pp. 13-4 (25) that a signified must be able to “take place” in its pure intelligibility (absolute logos): the theology of the sign (perhaps this epoch, whose closure we’ve outlined, will never end)

p. 63 (92-3) for Saussure, signifier: sound-image, not real sound but psychic impression (what Husserl would call hylè/morphé structure, distinct from all mundane reality); for Saussure, signified: not thing but “concept” or, better yet, lidéalité du sens

p. 90 what I call erasure of concepts

p. 99 (148) “Hegel,” “Rousseau,” “Leibniz,” “Descartes” neither identities nor causes > name of problems > so long as closure limits our discourse: we will not have other concepts

p. 191 imagination as memory as time as pity > opens reign of law & concept: concept is Dasein [Hegel], exists as time

CHOR p. 100 new “concept” of woman? was there ever an old one? [deconstruct concept of concept]

CONDILLAC

WM p. 235n Condillac (whose philosophy, more than, or like, every other, can be considered a treatise on analogy): all tropes are metaphors, transport from one meaning to another

AFR p. 33 Condillac replaces a metaphysics of essences/causes (the hidden) w/ metaphysics of phenomena & relation (the open)

p. 34 for Condillac, retracing origin of proffered phenomenon can’t be first philosophy, his new philosophy is irreducibly second (in later texts, he feels uncomfortable using word metaphysics)

p. 35 Condillac: metaphysics treats everything in general before observing anything in particular > Condillac’s new metaphysics will resemble empiricism, be called metaphysics only by analogy

——Condillac denounces Aristotle’s philosophy as unconscious empiricism: Aristotle takes derived generalities as premises, products for seeds or origins (germes)

p. 36 for Condillac, “bad” metaphysics must be corrected by new theory of signs and words, by using another language

pp. 37-8 good metaphysics, extreme formalization, language of calculus, must reconstitute “metaphysics's prelinguistic and natural base,” it will have been natural & mute > thus, 2 good metaphysics (form, nature): good metaphysics = physics

p. 39 in Condillac, primacy of practical instinct invariable trait of new critical metaphysics: not philosophy of praxis but metaphysics of fact > general theory, de facto & de jure, presupposes scientific fact

p. 40 for Condillac, metaphysics, psychology, outside of usage, good use; Condillac: “I would call it psychology, if I knew any good work under this title”

——philosophy is historical for Condillac: it always comes after cognition, after a scientific discovery; his philosophical method can only be established après coupor stroke (coup) of genius

p. 42 Locke inaugurates—but after Bacon & Newton (philosophy records pre-existence of good minds), philosophers are the first to recognize genius (Locke recognized Bacon)

p. 43 how can Locke carve out a trail while repeating an earlier rupture? he applied a general law to particular domain

——by preceding analogically, he discovered an unknown > invention by analogy (or analysis): new “objects” created by transposing, proportioning, analyzing

pp. 44-7 for Condillac, sensation is unmodifiable, first material, immediate presence, but also a germ for analogic sign > degrees of intensity, good analogy, “identical proportions”

——sensationalist metaphysics, via analogic, develops into semiotism: sign unfolds (développe) germ

pp. 47-8(n) Derrida defends Condillac against Foucault’s assessment of a “deficiency,” “epistemological myths” > perhaps Condillac’s maintenance of calculus & genesis resists a classical opposition; Derrida then notes [re: relevance to scientific modernity]: imaginary upsurging of one epistēmē, its finitude, table, sets terrain for theory of general epistēmē, which makes table its determining norm [see Bennington’s Scatter p. 11]

pp. 49, 58, 60 the simplifying criticism of Condillac works on a lever of disorganization, works at ruining alternative btwn genesis & calculus—w/ disconcerting regularity in determined situation [implying Condillac’s theory of delay, these criticisms can only be read after the fact]

p. 53 Condillac’s corpus vulnerable, open, to violent self-serving operations [e.g. de Biran], innocently called lapses in reading: dissolving alternative opposition [btwn genesis/calculus] because unable to find literal rule of its [system’s working] statement

p. 56 for de Biran, no progress possible for Condillac’s system: its central deficiency will make it stall btwn 2 lapses

pp. 57-8(n) de Biran's criticism of Condillac’s arbitrary also a criticism of rationalism, of alchemism (reduction to the gold of abstract, simple, fundamental element [ego]), of idealism

p. 58 to point to a “hesitation” in a text “marks a reading’s empiricist limit” [re: de Biran’s critique of Condillac]

——both Condillac and de Biran take repetition for granted, rule of indecision never comes to conception (au concept), a limit which is the concept not a concept: thus, Condillac finds contradiction in activity/passivity, de Biran duplicity in Condillac’s “hesitation”

p. 60 simplifying criticism of Condillac, history of reading Condillac, linked to formation of University & its models of philosophical teaching

——for undergrads, Condillac’s thought limited to statue’s petrified hardheadedness, evanescence of rose’s scent

p. 62 for Condillac, philosopher forms new combination of ideas re: combination of ideas

pp. 62-3 Condillac resists opposition btwn continuist/discontinuist, evolutionist/epigeneticist histories (deconstructs them almost by itself) > double gesture: generates a new science & theory of general conditions for upsurge of a theory [new science]

p. 64 for Condillac, [the fact of facts] sensibility/experience due to original sin [historicity?]

p. 71 if there were only (natural, national) genius and progress of language—no history? > if genius is pure rupture, discontinuity, can’t be reduced to its own conditions—no history

——Condillac’s theory [where there is history]: imagination retraces: produces as reproduction the lost object of perception, brings to light what will have been there

pp. 73-5 for Condillac, primitive sense of force, attraction (a force that draws), proceeds from feeling of effort (sensible, physical), is transferred “figuratively” to metaphor [Derrida exposes how de Biran overplays notion of force in Condillac, which Condillac denounces elsewhere]

pp. 80-1 Condillac: if there is fundamentally only one machine, there is fundamentally only one property > unique property assures possibility of “identical propositions,” this self-evident identity (nontautological) is discovered by way of Reason, is “the only sign of evidence” > all modifications are those of first property modifying itself: sensibility

——Condillac’s non-Cartesian indubitability: first property which knows itself (sensibility)

pp. 81-2 Condillac transposes Newtonian discourse [into the mind (lâme) as general principle of analogy?]: analogy creates language & method

p. 84 Locke, acc. Condillac, missed the sign as principle of unfolding [sensible] germ, did not radically analyze germ/seed

pp. 85-7 Condillac’s failure to go straight to principle of order, a fault of composition: he did not go straight to it > following order = discovering order: sabyme, encircles history w/ nature [Husserl?]

pp. 91-2 after Condillac admits he had to take great detours, Derrida explains that the sign is the name of this detour, experience itself as detour, generation of suppléance to be retraced

——Condillac considered theory of signs (analogy) in Essay, its most original advance

pp. 96-8n for Condillac, theoretical knowledge can be remarked, noted, signed, thus he is critical of all unconscious perception (practical knowledge) > remarking remarked against unconsciousness in general [Condillac’s critique of Leibniz, who Condillac knew insufficiently]

p. 98 for Condillac, btwn reason/instinct only a difference in degree: reason is instinct

p. 107 was Condillac ever idealist? only idealist?

p. 110 Condillac’s move from perception to imagination (and from one sign to another): on the march toward freedom, spontaneity of auto-affection > teleology: the complete sign, the true sign, is the instituted sign [after rupture, process magnetized toward greatest mastery possible]

p. 120n did Condillac write in margins of a book he never read? is his discourse the frivolous repetition or identification of Leibniz’s statements? both attempted to save metaphysics from a frivolity that gnaws at it from inside > did Condillac plagiarize Leibniz, w/out knowing it?

p. 131 for Condillac, there is no difference in general, only of degrees > this proposition comes to unfold (déplier) all concepts of rupture/repetition, this unfolding is time’s

CONFESSION

GOD p. 141 Judaic God repents, feels remorse, takes back his commands—i.e. the flood, his gesture resembles a confession, a plea for forgiveness [Christ is constantly taking back?]

POO p. 13 can a confession or auto-critique (this whole seminar is about me) ever occur? who is the reader of whom?

SPOM p. 24 when one arrives after the crime [essence of the tragic] one still bears responsibility if only in a self-confession that confesses the other (se confesser en confessant lautre)

pp. 232-33n the 2 experiences of the secret: I tell you that I cannot tell you > my 1st crime and 1st confession, a confession w/out confession

POOF p. 54 “what is the truth of a confession? not the veracity of what it says, but its confessional truth?”

ROP p. 18 Freud’s link to all disciplines that question analysis: teaching, teaching philosophy, and (w/ its concern for truth & avowal) confession

ATIA p. 21 autobiography (before the fall), confession (after the fall); autobiography becomes confession when it cannot separate itself from a fault, ill, evil (a debt that needs to be paid off); to pay off truth [but we name animals before the fall, is that possible?]

——why would we owe truth anything? the debt of autobiography: confession > after the fall, must already conceive lying as evil, as hiding truth

p. 69 “as for me, the guilty innocent one, the accused presumed innocent and guilty at the same time, I who confesses even to the sin of confession” > qui/que suis-je?

——in confession, I hunt and chase myself at the same time

——to confess the narcissism of confession is to admit that guilt, the lie, perjury are lodged in heart of promise, in veracity itself, in naked/intransitive simplicity of “I am”

p. 91 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas all make explicit fundamental place of sacrifice; for Descartes, its inexplicit: animal-machine not sacrificed animal > but Descartes’ cogito has its Christian heritage: interest in Eucharist, a relation to Augustine’s cogito (despite denials)

CHM p. 62 philosophy as this giant confession: attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole (to define it as such is to confess) > I philosophize only in terror, but in confessed terror of going mad

——confession is simultaneously: oblivion/unveiling, protection/exposure > economy

HLP p. 47 can a state stop lying about crimes it committed against humanity? can it confess? [p. 50 new performative, tribunal], state dissociated from what characterized it: good conscience

TR p. 71 Augustine/Rousseau signatories of first great works called Confessions (both 16 year old boys who would later confess theft)

Rousseau: thanks to active/passive, mechanical theft, I was able, finally, to sign “I”

p. 80 there’s a memory, history, archive of confessions, of the word “confession”

——Rousseau/Augustine speak language of excuse/inexcusable (inexcusabilis) more often than that of pardon/forgiveness

pp. 80-1 Augustine/Rousseau: both stole at age 16, both stress insignificant use-value of what they stole, both confess in Book 2 of their Confessions, both claim lifelong psychic repercussions

pp. 82-3 Rousseau wraps a ribbon around Augustinian pear (forbidden fruit)

——possible fiction, mēkhanē of a dramaturgy, supplement of fiction, inscribe in the archive of a new, quasi-literary genre (confessions) > palimpsestuous [insect/incest], encrypted lineage

——confession (a veracity of testimony) never makes concessions to lies of literature

——Rousseau spent his life protesting his innocence, thus excusing himself, rather than asking forgiveness

p. 84 Rousseau’s stolen ribbon less serious as a theft than as a dissimulating lie

——in spite of Rousseau’s avoidance of Augustine, their Confessions come from same tree, same wood, same paper pulp [?] > abyssal problem of conscious/unconscious archivation

p. 86 Rousseau confesses to proclaim his radical innocence (which God knows), unlike Augustine begging for pardon

p. 88 [re: “to swear”] délire names extraordinary coincidence of irrationality of machine (beyond my control) & absolute sincerity (authentic innocence of my intentions)

——coincidence of infinite guilt & certainty in absolute, virgin, intact innocence> btwn infinite guilt & absence of guilty conscience

——protest of accusatory innocence: forgive me this my virtue [ask forgiveness for feeling innocent]

pp. 89-90 Rousseau abjures Protestantism (freer, more intentionalist, more spiritual), he converts mechanically to more mechanical, ritualistic Catholicism

p. 90 confession: 1) confession of sin 2) profession of faith (oath)

p. 97 Jean-Jacques puts himself on the cross even as he seems to de-Christianize Augustine

——Augustine: my impiety divided me against myself, excusing & accusing myself

p. 103 not only accusation & judgment in confession, there’s the executioner (carrying out of the sentence): sentence endured in pleasure of writing, ambiguous enjoyment at heart of terrible, severe jubilation of inscription: one steps up to cashier right away to collect interest on a capital that will assume value only “sooner or later,” after my death, in my absence

p. 104 police, prosecutors, torturers know jubilatory pleasure of handling confession machines

——confession is always more and/or less guilty (for addressor & addressee) in act of its inscription than the fault being confessed: that confession is never innocent is a first machine, undeniable program

pp. 108-09 confession not of order of knowledge, of making known; Augustine wonders why he must confess to God, who knows everything > answer: to convert fault into love [Nietzsche]

——confession not a truth to be revealed but a truth to be “made,” to be “verified”

pp. 110-11 Derrida doesn’t believe, like de Man, that there are 2 dissociable modes: every confessional text is already both revealing (asserting a truth) and performing an excuse (apologizing) > undecidable, impossible distinction

——this undecidability makes for all the interest, obscurity, non-decomposable specificity of what is called confession, avowal, excuse, or an asked-for forgiveness

——touching on equivocation btwn constative (revealed truth) & performative (the excuse): originary or preoriginary synthesis w/out which there’d be no trace, inscription, body, materiality > it’s why we’re always asking for forgiveness in ambiguous, perjuring mode

——one can always bear false witness in equivocation of const./perform., no one will be able to theoretically prove someone has lied > lie remains improbable [in mode of confession], even where, in another mode, one is certain of it

——beg to be believed where perjury always possible, precisely unverifiable

——a necessity of solitude, no intuition of alter ego felt by addresser & addressee [on either side of excuse/apology/forgiveness]

p. 112 de Man’s “twilight zone btwn knowing & not-knowing” consubstantial w/ confession

p. 131 no true archive of man in his truth before the Confessions

pp. 140-41 Rousseau’s scene of virtual “sooner or later” remains fundamentally Christian

EJQB pp. 75-6 if writing isn’t a tearing of self toward other w/in a confession of infinite separation, if it takes pleasure for its own sake, it destroys itself—in plenitude, Identity, roundness of egg [cf. p. 66 Jabès renouncing verve, capriciousness]

PJP pp. 190-91 even more impossible than report-confession: countersignature of acolyte (most impossible impossible: narrator himself) > unique impossibility [cf. IW p. 287 particular nothing]

p. 191 lexicon of “past,” dépassé, brings together an argument on impossibility of confession

PSSS p. 240 confession of a “w/out alibi”—if that were possible

EL p. 196 the one who confesses (accuses, announces, cautions, warns) does not exclude himself from the whole (ensemble) of his addressees > to speak to the blind: this is act of confession

HST p. 383 [re: unforgivable “survival”] he confesses, even when he does not confess, denies confessing

TN p. 291 all-powerful logic of narcissism: not as experience of gaze but as painfully ironic discourse of confession that mimics appropriable of unappropriable

p. 296 tact (touch w/out contact) > avowal of impossible confession: confession is perjurious, confession is inexpiable, is the fault > le vertige of comedy that absorbs (aspire) every confession, tragedy of lies in good faith, lies w/ hand on heart

CF pp. 30-1 ‘globalization’ [mondialisation?] of forgiveness as virtually Christian convulsion-conversion-confession before divine, sacred “man-made-God-by-God”

BSi p. 275 Derrida remains enamored by Jardin des Plantes [in spite of its sovereign institutionalism, zoo-like]

OG p. 113 re: Lévi-Strauss, confession of travelogue sets up relation btwn nature & society, ideal society & real society, other society & our society

pp. 114-15 (168) confessions of anthropologist [does an anthropologist write anything else?], 18th century, humility before a goodness European society has lost: a “zero degree,” native soil, an eschatology/teleology of full, immediate closing of history

p. 117 anthropological confession vs. theoretical discussion: difference btwn empirical/essential must assert its rights

CONTAMINATION

***GOD p. 32 contamination btwn: 1) renouncing oneself, denying the gift, as the generosity of the gift that must withdraw itself (se retirer), se cacher, sacrifice itself in order to give 2) repression that transforms gift into economy of sacrifice

——a heterogenous trembling that apprehends, gives oneself death in a new way

FL p. 277 for Benjamin, text & signature are specters which exhibits & archive their implosion, in ruins, [Derrida now affirms this “stance”] such is status of deconstructive text: cannot escape law it enunciates, ruins & contaminates itself [at once founding/preserving], becomes specter of itself

LOBL p. 76 contamination is not caused by contingency, contiguity, contagion but by chance

A p. 7 totalities are overdetermined, rather, contaminated by events of language

p. 79 contaminating contraband remains irreducible [insinuates itself in idiom of existential analysis]

PP p. 149 soul-inscription, inscription of truth in soul, uses a metaphor [Plato admits it] that philosophy will never be able to do w/out, must borrow from simulacrum; metaphoricity is logic of contamination, contamination of logic

——good writing can only be described through metaphor of the bad

VM p. 129 “other” is the name, the unthinkable unity of light and night > “phenomenon supposes original contamination by the sign”

PAS PAS p. (21) yes, yes: force of affirmative repetition, unique call of the to-come as the will to repeat itself, affirmation that cites itself, joyous EROS, immeasurable unhappiness, irreducible contamination, affirmation risks citation, le oui qui fait dans la langue un trou aussi étrange que viens, il approuve, affirme, contresigne tout cequi est arrivé

p. (93) forgetting must guard itself (se guarder) to preserve the gift, so the gift can give, the bank (berge) and contamination poison the gift

VP pp. 17-8 Husserl says that all expression is in an entanglement (Verflechtung) with indication in communicative discourse > allzeit verflochten ist (always contaminated), but/so Husserl separates expression from communication

p. 80 for Husserl, “subjective” adverbs (here, there, above, below, none, yesterday) function as subjective and occasional expressions just like word “I”; these are different from contingent expressions which have plurivocity, and objective expressions which are absolutely pure of contamination: mathematical expressions

S p. 10 acc. Heidegger, essence of technology is not technological; Derrida: what if it is? what is this desire for rigorous non-contamination? > envisage fatal necessity of a contamination

——“contamination by technology of the thinkable essence of technology”

***pp. 39-40 price of the strategy of “spirit,” always turns back on “subject,” even when used to displace subject from racism, biologism, naturalism, the opposition requires a “unilaterality of subjectity,” an oppositional determination > whether “human rights” or democracy, freedom of spirit demarcates a metaphysics of subjectity that is blind to the irreducibility of complicity, contamination (even if, and there are, degrees)

——only choice is btwn the terrifying contaminations it assigns [re: subjectity of spirit]

F p. xlii [re: Wolf Man’s cryptonomic translations] phonetic contaminations, nonsemantic associations, neither rhetorical figures nor metonymic displacements > but angular: contact (semantic or formal) w/ surface of its allosemes acc. most economical line/surface

ROP p. 36 double “one must” is against philosophy of life, against desire for decontamination, where pure life = pure death

***SW p. 346 “not in a hurry”: I am against those who prescribe the veil, against those who forbid it (same w/ circumcision) > people don’t realize any longer that the scholarly, secular, democratic belong to cultures of tallith & veil: contamination is everywhere

DST DST p. 213 how is it possible to resemble mimesis w/out already being contaminated by it?

D p. 316 each part of mirror larger than whole (mirror smaller than itself): 4th surface paradigm of this relation

——the inside of text will always have been outside it; reciprocal contamination of body proper, violent expatriation, poison affirmed—mercury in its tain is a poison

LI p. 59 dehiscence, botanical, divided opening, makes plant grow > law of undecidable contamination (like iterability)

p. 100 or, or rather, even parentheses, i.e. “citation (iterability)” > not genus/species, not identity, classical logic fractured in its code, parasitic contamination entame all these relations, which is why words have to be qualified, supplemented by others

TN p. 75 contamination becomes what it is not: disidentifies/disappropriates everything before it disidentifies itself > attains the ex-propriety of the proper

p. 109 would figure of limit have to be tangible? isn’t the tangible the very contamination of the proper, of contamination itself, of contact/contagion/impurification?

p. 304 quotation marks (guillemets): touching word as if w/ tweezers (pincettes), as if it were contaminated in advance > “touch”

ATM p. 162 no tear (déchirure) possible in Levinas’ text w/out a certain notching (échancrure) of the 2nd moment, and certain contamination btwn the 2 > he likes the tear, he detests contamination

p. 167 for Levinas, in search of God uncontaminated by Being, contact is a priori contamination > graver yet: risk of contamination that surfaces before contact, in necessity of tying interruptions together (insistence of ruptures)

——contamination is no longer a risk but a fate that must be assumed

p. 187 Levinas contaminates when he thematizes the nonthematizable, Derrida contaminates this irrepressible thematization in his turn (not structurally, but w/ a fault of his own)

WOG p. 26 the remainder (of all ontology) and the contamination btwn tout autre and its regular reappropriation (economic redialectization) haunts all Derrida’s essays on the Greeks

LG pp. 225-26 law of impurity, contamination in heart of law, condition for possibility of law, the a priori of a counter-law: a line or trait, internal division, impurity, corruption, etc.

p. 227 law of law of genre: principle of contamination, parasitical economy, participation w/out belonging

OG pp. 33-4 (51-2) moralism, preaching, in Saussure/Plato—casting writing, figuration, to the exterior > maléfique, sin (péché) (traitorous contamination)

CONTEXT

LOBL p. 81 starting point: “no meaning can be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation” > structure of remnant/iteration (I have said this many other ways)

p. ~135 fragment as insaturable context

MC p. 346 activity of translation mobilizes the context & what exceeds it

pp. 359-60 starting w/ the stoikheia (letter, trait, number, proper name) & its marking insignificance (re-markable insignificance), Derrida explains how a mark’s supposed identity, solidity of its stereotypy, its indestructbility/indivisibility requires difference/division

——ideal iterability allows every mark to withdraw from a context, in whole or in part, its insignificance allows it to continue to divide, proliferate identities, destinerring

***p. 370 ever since Plato [repression of Democritus, a large symptom?], an organization of the throw: subject/object > repress chance, repress the mark, protect “normality,” isolate a solid context (stereotomy)

p. 372 each explanatory context gives a performative of convention and a contract that guarantees new performatives

p. 373 not that all fiction, all inscription of proper names has literary dimension, but they arise in a place where limits are never real, never immobile, never solidonly the effects of contextual isolation > pragrammatological (intersection of pragmatics & grammatology)

***p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

EM pp. 111-12 possibility of international philosophical colloquium must take place in a medium > universality of philosophical discourse, linked to group of languages & “cultures”

SEC p. 310 structural nonsaturation of context: 1) insufficiency of usual concept of meaning 2) displacement of writing

p. 317 a written sign can break with its context (set of presences which organize moment of inscription), still be legible, can always be lifted from interlocking chain, grafted into other chains ——no context, no code can enclose it > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

p. 320 Husserl’s “green is or” still example of agrammaticality: a mark can be cited [is legible?], written, function cut off from “original” meaning > can engender infinitely new contexts

——cela ne suppose pas que la marque vaut hors contexte, mais au contraire quil ny a que des contextes sans aucun centre dancrage absolu [nothing outside text]

p. 327 always uncertainty about context

F p. xxxii via Abraham and Torok, no meaning can come into being w/out topography

FWT p. 24 for some one in a hurry, it may look like I’m siding w/ relativism, communitarianism > necessary to take context into account in most refined way possible w/out yielding to relativism

pp. 98-9 there is one principle, but put into effect w/in singularity of context/moment, it will produce different decisions > nothing relativistic or opportunistic in this

POOF pp. 216-17 Derrida now stresses that the sentence could never be independent of all determinable contexts, but that it’s ability to be contextualized demands that it can give way to another context > thus, everyone who uttered Aristotle’s rumored sentence affirmed its displacement/detachment from a unique context, willing or reluctantly, they said the plus dun of the addressee (for example, a feminine ‘one’): the sentence can’t be signed w/out marking this destinerrancy

——in such a way, Aristotle’s sentence was never neutral, always a project of friendship/enmity, & always a project of the corresponding political community (this is irrepressible)

RGE pp. 272-73 reading of Bataille: 1) must not isolate notions (“experience,” “interior”) as if they were their own context: error to remain blind [?] to a traditional culture wishing to be taken as natural element of discourse 2) must not submit contextual attentiveness to system of meaning promising absolute formal mastery (this would erase excess of nonmeaning)

PIO p. 25 the invention must create the statutory conditions not only to be recognized, legitimized, institutionalized, but also to occur, to come about (survenir)

——how can we sort out the conditions that made an invention possible if the invention modifies structure of context itself?

RM p. 63 Derrida’s use of retrait [re: withdrawal of Being] captures greatest quantity of energy/information in Heidegger’s text from w/in the context that is “here our own”

D p. 316 to try to resist removal of textual member from context—maintain boundary line btwn inside/outside of context > classical limits: remain protected against writing poison

EL pp. 198-99 try as best one can to do an internal reading (stay as close to letter as possible) > but simple event of name breaches supposed interiority of text (pure internal reading impossible)

p. 204 beyond internal reading: read other texts by Scholem

PPT p. 2 even if Derrida explained, narrated, what he wrote in The Truth In Painting, the indecision (the divided Prime Mover) he was trying to reduce would remain in the formalizing economy—each time overloaded (surchargée) w/ some supplement

LI p. 52 [re: restance translated as remainder] whether or not it’s an adequate translation, no single word out of context can by itself translate a word perfectly

p. 59 [from SEC] structural unconsciousness, absence of intending actual utterance, prohibits any saturation of context (total presence)

pp. 64-5 [re: conforming to code, grammaticality] a minimum making-sense is incommensurate w/ adequate understanding of intended meaning > this incommensurability is irreducible, “inheres” in intention itself, riven (creusé) w/ iterability

——[re: Sarl and I] our common and minimal code has been the existence & effects of the code > [from SEC] context as protocol of code, mark doesn’t have meaning outside context—there’s only contexts w/out any center, absolute anchoring (ancrage)

——[Derrida briefly wonders if entire equivocation w/ Sarl might be situated in fact that in English “meaningful” can imply minimal-making sense (conformity to code, grammaticality)]

p. 79 [Derrida admits to lack of rigor] “engendering” an infinity of new contexts [from SEC] should be replaced by “engendering & inscribing itself,” or being inscribed in > for a context never creates itself ex nihilo, can’t create context on its own, can’t dominate a context either > this limit, finitude, is the condition by which contextual transformations remain possible

p. 85 Glas, Fors—inseparable, indispensable, for a minimal reading of Limited Inc > “and hence, of all the rest: et cetera”

p. 131 reconstitution of context can never be perfect but is a regulative ideal of an ethics of reading: recalling of a context never neutral, innocent, transparent, disinterested

p. 132 reconstitution of a context always performative, political—even if overdetermined classifications (right/left) don’t apply

p. 136 speaking is never neutral, must determine a context > thus always political: political as nonnatural relation to others (a definition which would apply to animals as well, i.e. man is not the only political animal)

——science, objectivity (in which I firmly believe, in given situations) requires context (no matter how powerful, stabilized, or rooted in network of conventions)

——context, if you like: entire “real-history-of-the-world” in which value of truth and objectivity have taken on meaning and imposed themselves

pp. 136-37 nothing outside text = nothing outside context [less shocking, more to think about?]; deconstruction doesn’t denounce (neither can nor ought to do so) the “values” dominant in its socio-institutional situation, its language, historical inscription of its gestures (i.e. truth)

——I’ve said 1000 times, still not heard: text is not the book confined to the library > does not suspend reference to history, reality, being, (and especially) the other

pp. 137-38 that trace de-limits what it limits is why the finiteness of a context has an indefinite opening—never secure, simple > in this openness of erasure: political responsibility (where irreducible violence communicates w/ an essential nonviolence) > only the irresponsible (to be polemical) will object, those for whom things are always calculable, clear, programmable, decipherable

pp. 144-47 very strong probability of intelligibility of a text is result of stabilized solidity of numerous contracts; minimal consensus > community requires this (discusses this)

p. 149 differance as nonidentity w/ oneself in process of determination > differance is itself nothing outside of determination, never comes to a full stop (not negativity, nothingness)

p. 150 always repression in stabilizing determination of a context, repression at origin of meaning, an irreducible violence > can’t say it’s “bad”

p. 151 Derrida’s pragrammatology also entails deontological rules of discussion [he accounts for contextual stability, contractual possibilities, while aware context is not absolutely solid]

p. 152 deconstruction will always accept w/in certain limits (i.e. never entirely accepting) the givenness of a context, sa fermeture et sa fermeté > w/out this tension, would anything be done?

unconditionality (Derrida intentionally recalling Kant’s CI) is independent of every determinate context, even determination of context in general > announces itself only in the opening of context

——unconditionality intervenes at very inception of determination

——unconditionality must be articulated w/ the determinate (Kant would say hypothetical) > rhetoric, strategy, ethics, politics

pp. 152-53 though nothing exists outside context, limit of frame/border of context always entails nonclosure: outside penetrates, thus determines, inside

ATM p. 144 no utterance ever cut from all context, context never annulled w/out remainder: one negotiates w/ les effets de bord, incl. nonnegotiable, that which overflows (déborde) all context

——what is said inside (dedans) can infinitely overflow all context, at a stroke (dun coup)

LG p. 230 effect of code: in marking itself generically, text unmarks itself (se démarque) > because of trait, text participates in one or several genres

BSi pp. 168-70 bêtise not exactly stupidity, foolishness, imbecility, idiotic, Dummheit, Kleinigkeit, etc. [example of nonsynonymous synonym]

——still, difference btwn these words can only be marked in context, which doesn’t imply an absolute relativity of context: bêtise can’t mean anything at all, not an idealized, objective, “free” ideality > translation problems occur in same language, same cultural code

OG pp. 70-1 (102-03) one can only justify the choice of word trace w/in une topique, it’s an historical calculation & strategy: a # of givens belonging to our discourse have imposed this choice on Derrida > Levinas—trace as absolute past, Heidegger—undermining ontology as presence/full speech, Nietzsche & Freud—Spur, and use of [trace?] in biology > all make enigmatic: propre, proche, presence

CONTINGENCY (NECESSARY)

GOD pp.132-33 the phrase [“pardon for not meaning (to say)…”] is “up in the air”: an appearance that comes from who knows where, contingency (touch, tact, contact), & pertinent (touching, tact, contact) > dwells suspended in air, even when it touches, meteoric [both sexes], suspended like Abraham’s knife over Isaac’s head [re: scene of literature, secrecy, forgiveness]

MC p. 355 turn contingency into symptom

LOBL p. 76 contamination is not caused by contingency, contiguity, contagion but by chance

SH p. 48 philosophy finds itself in vicinity of poetic, of literature, the blurred border (no place, utopia) btwn empirical (contingency of the outer) and necessary (necessity of inner) > indecision of this limit most provokes thought [Derrida attacks the idea that philosophy loses itself there]

PSSS p. 260 psychoanalysis is ineradicable, its revolution is irreversible—yet, like civilization, it’s mortal

C pp. 198-200 I’ll never get to the end—I’ll have to stop at a contingent moment

p. 200 contingent: an attribute, a ration of a series; contingent touches on touch as false-contact; effects of chance, the epithet of uncalculable term (échéance), use of nonnecessary become fatal

——aleatory and inevitable: fatality of a new idiom [re: quite a few more words that’ll form a parallel series]

p. 201 analogy, like the putting into series of series: can/must remain accidental

——analogy belongs to order of contingent > appeals neither to model nor example (i.e. both Sade & Titus-Carmel ration the remainder, stage a work & jouissance re: remainder [excrement]) [Derrida is “randomly” comparing Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins to Sade’s 120 days]

p. 204 “things won’t stop computing in me,” Derrida wants to touch the necessity of the contingency of Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins [compare to Lacan’s: can’t stop being-written]

p. 205 what does it mean [re: # 127 of Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins] beyond meaningless anankē of a chance, a term (échéance), a decline (déchéance)?

p. 211 le Mhors-serie (I’m-out-of-series), Fors-series, the excluded necessary that marks the border of the Necessary itself: the necessary, the excepted, the contingent, sauf, fors

p. 218 bananas [re: Titus-Carmel’s The Great Cultu] would be copies of copies w/out example, phantasmata, if force of ductus did not carry the remainder beyond any phantasy, beyond the signature, proper name, nameable

——ductus’ contingency accounts for ideality of model, which always rises, fermentation of spirt (Geist), above an organic decomposition

pp. 220-21 production of paradigm via cartouche introduces necessary (fatal) perversion that cartouche alone performs > paradigm must have been preceded by its following: phantasmatics of a contingent remaining (beyond hierarchy, beyond phantasy)

pp. 237-38 seal of crypt: contingent, “that’s enough” > Derrida left the seal in tact, truly, didn’t touch it

p. 238 contingent can do w/out discourse, a masterpiece can’t do w/out a cartouche (on the market & in itself: if you insist on this distinction) > even when the cartouche remains, is defunct: pas de cartouche, plus de cartouche > what will have been able to do w/out it? never touched, aussi impassible et invulnérable quaux harcèlements du trait: cest peut-être quil était déjà dans la tombe, le cartouche

p. 239 lot: chance & necessity nicely shared (bien partagée) > contingent says the same, less well, & doesn’t share

LI p. 45 Derrida intentionally including in his debate w/ Sarl the contingent, artificial, external (18 letters, blows)—even the amount of ink in typewriter ribbon: why not? (fringes, frames, parasites)

——surface of the paper, part of our calculation?

p. 62 [vis-à-vis iterability altering, contaminating] no choice but to mean to say something other than what we mean to say: accident is never an accident

TN p. 72 Nancy thinks necessity of undecidables re: thought/weight > there will be identical/analogous necessity re: subject of touching

pp. 230-31 Franck’s forced interpretation of Husserl places hyletic sensuality of flesh (contact, self-contact) before time: Franck overruns intentional analytic toward existential one, then overruns existential analytic > flesh opens time: archefacticity as con-tingency

pp. 238-39 Franck’s happy, lucky condensation of word con-tingency [used as alibi?]: contingere: touching, attaining, also happening (arriver), befalling (échoir), falling to one’s lot or part (tomber en partage): essential facticity of this evenementialité aléatoire resists eidetic variation

p. 248 Chrétian’s contingency: experience of created humanity, historical contingency of creature that “comes after it [divine spirit],” lets itself be touched by the self-enflamed

pp. 302-03 Derrida’s offering [the text] will touch Nancy in a way this is both necessary/contingent: pertinere [as necessary] doesn’t fail to touch, is cocky, arrogant, impertinent; contingency: finite being [Derrida] would like to touch a singularity [Nancy], hic et nunc, in its [his] body

——strange couple of 2 tactilities: appropriate necessity (pertinent), singulier aléatoire (contingent)

CONSCIOUSNESS

H p. 109 we are always in some way late; “the consciousness only anticipates, ever, one delay too many”

OOG pp. 57-8 sedimentary retention [as habitus, occurs because living consciousness is finite] is general form of protention conceived as unique, universal form of Living Present

p. 64 for phenomenology, senses of sense is determined as object, available for regard or gaze, final category of everything can appear, that can be for pure consciousness

——objects join all regions to consciousness, the Ur-region

p. 143 for Husserl, the nondialectical, the Living Present, universal form of all consciousness

HASD pp. 17-8 [blurring lines btwn conscious/unconscious, man/animal] if animals can’t keep secrets, because they can’t represent as such, secret linked to Vorstellung, linked to lying, not presenting in speech that which one has an articulated representation, keep to oneself

VP p. 8 last court of appeal for phenomenology is “consciousness,” possibility of the self-presence of the present in the living present

p. 10 in phenomenology, transcendental consciousness, the archi-region, is absolutely singular, transcendental “I” distinguished from human, empirical, natural “I”

p. 53 philosophical privilege of present-now, evidentness, conscious thought itself

——via Husserl, Greek metaphysics of presence becomes “modern” metaphysics of presence as self-consciousness, metaphysics of idea as representation (Vorstellung)

——to enucleate consciousness from elsewhere than presence: eliminate all security and foundation

p. 68 voice is consciousness

FSW p. 198 acc. Heidegger, Hegel and Descartes conceive self-presence w/in opposition of consciousness to unconsciousness

p. 212 for Freud, consciousness—surface exposed to external world

TC pp. 242-43 Artaud rejects psychoanalytic theater for its secret interiority > theater of cruelty a theater of dreams, of calculated dreams, cruelty as consciousness, exposed lucidity

——Artaud: consciousness gives to every act of life it’s blood-red color, its cruel nuance, life is always someone else’s death

POS p. 22 voice is consciousness itself when phonē is signifying substance > signifier and signified unite, signifier erases itself, exteriority of signifier reduced by spontaneous proximity

OS p. 40 [via Heidegger] Beings are what is (must not be affected by time): privilege of 3rd person indicative (is, estin), as present participle becomes noun > same for consciousness

ROP pp. 18-9 royal weaver (le tisserand royal) of Platonic dialectic (then Aristotle, Hegel, Kant), belongs to order of ideational consciousness, cannot intervene to remove resistance of any sort

FS pp. 5-6 structural consciousness a catastrophic one, simultaneously destroyed & destructive (destructuring) > decadence, period proper to all movement of consciousness [Nietzsche]

pp. 8-9, 303n consciousness takes on meaning by way of consciousness of nothing, thus is speech brought forth > car la pensée de la chose comme ce qu'elle est se confond déjà avec l'expérience de la pure parole; et celle-ci avec l'expérience elle-même

DIF DIF p. 16 consciousness, self-presence—subject cannot be thought w/out reference to presence as hupokeimenon or ousia > subject of consciousness has always manifested itself as self-presence

O p. 14n Hegel: proof of science/logic solely in necessity of emergency (Hervorbringung), a räsonierende (ratiocinative, discursive) manner produces historical knowledge

OG p. 109 (161) nonprohibition of proper name, consciousness, when name is called proper > attempt to restitute the irremediable impropriety of proper names

p. 166 immediacy as myth of consciousness, self-presence, suppression of differance [a signifier that never falls into world/space]

SPEC p. 346 [summary of Freud’s Perception-Consciousness, Consciousness]

p. 346-47 neither permanent traces nor resistance in [Freud’s] Perception-Consciousness (free circulation of energy w/out obstacle or binding), permanent trace supposes frayage (Bahnung) and an overcome resistance

CONTRABAND (COUNTERBAND)

A p. 79 contaminating contraband remains irreducible [insinuates itself in idiom of existential analysis]

PAS PAS p. (33) bivalence of contraband or double bind (of near and far), affects everything that “is,” that is present, that arrives, comes to pass, the essence of the event and event of essence

OH p. 97 speak seriously of the press in the press? only in contraband

FWT p. 108 Derrida’s wares are more perverse, contraband, than his father’s (sees his father as exemplary figure of the victim, of “sacrifice,” voûté); perhaps Derrida is avenging his father by introducing disorder into “commerce,” whose trial he would be organizing

DPi pp. 124-25 put to death child born outside marriage because outside law (ignore annihilation of contraband merchandise, i.e. child out of wedlock) [re: Kant’s view of maternal infanticide]

PJP p. 189 narrator, unconscious subject, smuggles, yes, yes, the contrary into the narrative (denegative form [“I am not Chalier”] > yet another disavowal at heart of avowal)

PPT pp. 7-8 trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

OG pp. 213-14 corruptive principle linked to spacing [writing]; Rousseau includes originarity of lack that necessitates supplement (i.e. harmony supplements melody, color supplements design) w/out making it explicit > “work of contraband”

p. 239 (340) Rousseau cannot declare unity of the advantage of writing (l’intérêt d’écrire), can only describe it in contraband: writing–need, speech–passion

p. 315 (443-44) Rousseau describes w/out declaring, en contrebande, the originary exteriority of writing: alterity

ATAP p. 66 relever of tone, dream of philosophy: make tonal difference inaudible, neutrality of tone, affect works (over) concept as contraband

EU p. 50 no censorship w/out raison donnée, censorship never presents itself as brutal, mute repression; acc. Kant, censorship always enacts itself in the name of another discourse, never against private discourses, thus restricting instances of translation, contraband, substitution, disguise [?]

SPEC p. 281 Fechner’s “aesthetic indifference” btwn pleasure/unpleasure dropped by Freud > is this not like a free zone, agency of the “duty free” [in English], free exchange for speculation, a means to pass, as authorized contraband, an always ideal border (in both directions)?

p. 349 Vorbilder (models), necessity of metaphoric detour whenever Freud doesn’t know what he’s talking about re: interminable band, contra-band, quantity of binding—so he uses rhetoric of code, message, envoi, postal network

p. 350 [re: trauma dreams] exception to law that dream fulfills a wish, exception precedes law, doesn’t contradict it, something older than law w/in law: band over contra-band, or contra-band over a-band, disband, over absolute astricture

p. 399 pleasure—ungraspable limit btwn 2 limits, un en-deçà et un au-delà qui réduisent un pas à rien

producing itself, regenerating: only pleasure, pleasure as counter-pleasure, band contra band, tout se passe alors dans des différences de bandage—not general economy (absolute expenditure) but strictural economy (to the point of its inevitable collapse)

CONTRACT

KH p. 149n in On the Social Contract, a form of fiction, war serves to throw light on limits of social contract [and Rousseau's’ fabulous text as well]

GOD p.147 plea for forgiveness in inheritance of God’s retraction; God’s retraction, a double coming-back, covenant only sealed through repetition [Noah is twice forgiven], God goes back on himself; dissymmetrical contract of Covenant supposes double trait of this retreat (re-trait) (Entzug)

GT p. 136 beggar as profound index of socius, at foundation of social contract

MC p. 372 each explanatory context gives a performative of convention and a contract that guarantees new performatives

FL p. 254 justice is infinite because irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other before any contract, parce quelle est venue (because it has come, because it is a coming)

FWT p. 193 heritage of circumcision precedes speech, oath, contract

TB pp. 118-19 at edge of the language, from this edge to the other of proper name: debt contracts the trait (to-be-translated from one language to the other) of relation of living subject to his name

——to be able to translate as contract > transcendental possibility of all contracts (absolute contract): origin of languages before language

pp. 123-24 for Derrida, “translation contract” is hymen or marriage contract (a seminar) > w/ promise to produce a child whose seed will give rise to history/growth

——Benjamin says as much, that in translation the original will enlarge itself > Derrida adds: this child can speak on its own, something other than a product subjected to law of reproduction > sacred and being-to-be-translated produce each other at edge of same limit

***——promise of reconciliation (even if unfulfillable) is a rare & notable event: kingdom is never reached, is untouchable > but the commitment takes place, bequeaths its record

DPi p. 21 DP as origin of social contract, state, any community

p. 135 re: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, writing down laws that have no juridical force behind them, not a binding obligation [contract]

p. 151 Nietzsche’s arche-genealogical question is the question of origin of law, of penal law as origin of calculation, rule of calculation > whence comes equivalence btwn injury/pain

***p. 152 Nietzsche’s very legitimate question re: equivalence btwn injury/pain, unbelievable jus talionis > it is because we believe, it is because we grant it credit, that we can believe in this equivalence > thus origin of penal law is commercial law: what has us believe in equivalence btwn crime/punishment is belief itself > fiduciary phenomenon of credit or faith

REST pp. 281-82 [re: Shapiro/Heidegger correspondence] reciprocal legitimation, effects of a common code, mutual desire for truth: the 2 parts of the pair (identity & difference, total identity in concept or formal semantics, difference and non-overlap in directionality of traits)

——if there is a pair > a contract is possible, can look for subject, can hope (symbol of the symbolon)

pp. 282-83 whose shoes (whose feet) (the subject of reattachment): the capital subject of this contract [btwn Shapiro & Heidegger], they each have one piece of symbolon, share common interest, coded commitment

——no symbolic contract in case of double that does not form a pair > not 1 (même) chose in 2, but a 2 in identity

p. 287 a contract of “impulsive or precritical naïveté” [all contracts?]

pp. 332-33 Heidegger & Shapiro bound themselves together to law of normal usage, the pair, ligatured worrying dismemberment in order to limit it: pair inhibits “fetishizing” movement, represses diabolical (i.e. a double, duplicity, w/out a pair)—pair rivets (rive) things to “normal” use

p. 354 Heidgger’s precontractual/precontracted marriage [messiancity w/out messianism?]

PIO p. 1 invention (new, original, unique) breaks w/ rhetoric of modesty (convention, etiquette, contract) > w/ all conditions of social interaction

——invention always presupposes some illegality, a breaking of the contract

RM p. 77 Heidegger’s nontautological fashion (like Sprache, Ereignis): trait treats or treats itself, traces the trait, retraces or re-treats the withdrawal > a strange contract that doesn’t precede, for once, its own signature (sa propre signature), and therefore carries it off (et donc l’emporte)

p. 78 from “Origin of the Work of Art,” Zug zum Werk (attraction toward the work), work as sumballein, allegoreuein, nonwithdrawal of truth as truth, Un-verborgenheit > truth as originary combat (Urstreit) > a combat that’s an attraction of reciprocal belonging, a Grundriss

HLP p. 44 Kant: veracity a formal duty (formale Pflicht)

——for Kant, veracity as a formal condition of right, social contract, not ethical but meta-juridical, not historical: “[a lie] necessarily does harm to humanity in general”

PJP p. 172 faux témoignage, contrefaçon; perhaps I have already lied by promising veracity (veracity not truth) > Western social contract capitalizes this perhaps in the act of perjury

p. 181 acolyte, anacolytic, anakolouthia, analytic figure: as much an analyst as a breach, interruption> a rupture in a set (contract), be it that of friendship, community, being-together

PPT p. 4 event makes a contract w/ itself at instant when singularity of trait divides, in order to link itself to play, chance & economy of language > set economy going by exposing it to chance

p. 5 the “interest,” the revenue of the surplus value, remains untranslatable in idiom’s economic performance, in ellipses of its trait, the word by word or trait for trait in which it contracts

C pp. 234-35 breakable, limping hyphen: not only an emblem, a coat of arms, but the symbol > acc. symballein, brings together pieces of a body divided in contract, pact, alliance [symballistic]

LI pp. 144-47 very strong probability of intelligibility of a text is result of stabilized solidity of numerous contracts; minimal consensus > community requires this (discusses this)

TN pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

BSi p. 42 political contract, a prosthesis, nomos as thesis (opposed to physis), convention, positing

——thus provisional, historical, always deconstructible > declared immortal because not

OG pp. 296-97 (418-20) acc. Rousseau, return to inalienable immediacy of self-possession (jouissance de soi), unrepresentable sovereignty—the end of written law > there is a social contract before writing, but always threatened by letter

——for Rousseau, writing is origin of inequality

p. 306 (432) Rousseau’s bonne fête > theater w/out representation, nothing to see since visibility entame la voix vivante; bonne fête: general will, sovereignty of social contract [signifier, la mort de la fête]

SPEC p. 319 greatest pleasure, play w/ the dummy (le mort), [Ernst, Freud] speaks to himself telephonically, make himself re-, acc. law of PP: signing, contracting w/ himself

FV pp. 465-66 [in Purloined Letter] Queen wishes to play on 2 contracts [must be read elsewhere?]: Queen’s desire to retain (garder) or refind the letter doubles her pact w/ the King

p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

pp. 468-69 the 2 truths: adequation (original contract: acquitting of debt), unveiling (lack on basis of which contract contracts in order to reappropriate what’s been detached)

p. 469 for Lacan, analyst links truth to power of speech: power of communication as a contract btwn 2 present things

CONVOCATION

PSSS p. 264 to think institution of auto-nomy (egalitarian, democratic) as autoconvoked and not hetero-convoked is an abdication, political failing

——an auto-nomy institutes itself on basis of a hetero-nomy that survives what survives it, on basis of the law of other, coming of the sur-viving other

——Derrida would like to ask “What is to be done?”—beyond all possible cruelty & sovereignty, w/out alibi, this question is not foreign to paregicide

COPULA

FK p. 96 that which acquiesces prior to all questioning of spirit: trust/faith, Faktum, comprehension of “is” or “be” > [Heidegger’s last god?] this faith does not constitute a religion but is it untouched by religiosity? [see p. 67]

HERP p. 184 Being is gathering (versammelt) [of the same]—logos > transitivity of “ist”: that it gathers

p. 185 Heidegger’s 3 experiences of hearing: 1) immortal, Erhören (hear, answer a prayer) 2) deaf ear (Überhören) of mortals 3) poet hears the ist, before or at origin of philosophy

HASD p. 44 veil (predicate) dissimulates & renders attractive at same time

VM p. 139 for Hegel, empiricism always forgets it uses the words “to be”; empiricism: thinking by metaphor w/out thinking the metaphor as such

p. 147 acc. Levinas, nonviolent language would not use “to be,” would not predicate, predication as 1st violence > only proper nouns: pure invocation, adoration [Derrida can’t see possibility of giving in Levinas’ vision, sees only slavery]

PP p. 64 reading is writing, a single gesture, but doubled, le est qui accouple la lecture à lécriture doit en découdre

S p. 135n re: “Das Wesen der Sprache: Die Sprache des Wesens”—colon erases copula, allows question to be exceeded by pledge (consent to the address, en-gage), “is” would relaunch the question

PAS PAS p. (29) Blanchot disquiets, suspends, infringes on categorical, the self-identity of the category (accusation, judgment) > [infringes] law of identity of “is” in predication

P p. 39 question of Urteil, of function of copula

OS p. 40 [via Heidegger] Beings are what is (must not be affected by time): privilege of 3rd person indicative (is, estin), as present participle becomes noun > same for consciousness

SP pp. 149-51n “moment sexual difference is determined as an opposition, the image of each term is inverted into the other” > the 2 X’s à la fois subject/predicate, their copula a mirror: man wants ideal man in woman, woman ideal woman in man > homosexual effacement à linfini

ATIA p. 64 suis of Qui/Que suis-je? (both être and suivre) the little third party as copula, comes btwn subject and itself, worries it (sacharne), hounds it, to hunt itself in the mirror

O pp. 52-3 if nature is the book, how could there be both, don’t we have to decide btwn is and and, or find a mute conjunction to think book/nature together (cum) as set?

——sense of fulfillment by way of copula (is) means nature is incomplete, needs a book to complete itself: closure of library articulates itself and turns on this hinge (gond): logic, rather graphics, of supplement

DPi pp. 221-22 DP speaks in 3rd person present (can’t say: “I am no more”), copula signifies instantaneous passage from being to nothingness (“he is no more”): stigmē, Most High, Last Judgment, God’s verdict (always instant of death of a 3rd party, never me, you, us)

REST p. 313 when Shapiro says, “they are clearly pictures of the artist’s own shoes,” the copula (they are) couples the painted shoes to the painter’s feet, laces drawn out of picture, presupposes hole in canvas

——2 capitalized attributes: adequate model (real shoes) & adequate subject (Van Gogh)

RM p. 77 can’t say trait is, it conditions the ontological copula—like es gibt

EJQB p. 74 the encounter (rencontre) is separation (breaks unity of Being by welcoming [accueillant] other into source of meaning) > contredit lalogique,dans le fragile chaînon du est

——only possible to say this by conceptualizing meaning, which is exile from Being, Being never is, never shows itself, never present, is never now

AFR p. 132 for Condillac, degree, gradual difference, ruins “identical proposition,” dislocates is > yet, degree also makes synthesis of “identical proposition” possible (prohibiting frivolity)

D pp. 351-52 column is not, passage of dissemination, “phallic” significance of column is a semic effect, reflection on 4th surface (described center, represented mastery of dissemination); “is”—procures calm, consciousness of ideal mastery > operation of 4th surface

——column has no being, belongs to no one

p. 352 present indicative of “to be” is the tense of the great parenthesis and of the 4th surface > which means its predominance is properly quartered (écartelée)

p. 353 can’t rest on copula, coupling is a mirror

TN p. 275 copula in Nancy’s “le sens est le toucher” is suspended, cautiously, and also insistent, also it has a transitive, active movement: touch touching on touch itself: le sens (est), touches touch

AD pp. 45-6 welcome is a quasi-synonym of hospitality: copula that brings them together binds phenomena of unbinding (déliasion) (infinite separation of any hospitality worth its name)

BSi p. 70 sovereign state as Leviathan, as animal-machine, as prosthstatics > beast et (est) sovereign coupled across a copula: affinity through analogy, proportion, reciprocal fascination—or grafting

OG p. 23 (37) Heidegger questions privilege of “infinitive” and “3rd person singular of the present indicative” [to be, is]

COSMOPOLITANISM (PEACE)

R p. 81 in Kant’s Perpetual Peace, Weltrepublik not governed by democratic paradigm

OH pp. 47-8 nationalism always a philosopheme, justifies itself in name of a privilege in the memory of the universal, of the transcendental, of the ontological > no one is more universal than the one that is we; cosmopolitanism & nationalism have always gotten on together

A pp. 84-6n Kant assigns place of secret in practice of politics to philosophers in his vision of perpetual peace

FWT p. 97 Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal, for which Derrida has the greatest respect, conditioned universal hospitality w/ reference to nation-state & citizenship

POOF pp. 260-62 Kant’s friend of man (not simply “one who loves man”), announces promise of cosmopolitanism, universal democracy, perpetual peace: inscribed in sensibility, but only in relation to purely rational Idea of equality (not only calculable measure, but also an obligation)

——Kant gives place to, configures, represents the friend of man: “all men are here represented as brothers under one universal father who wills the happiness of all” > father is not a man, not included in friendship he makes possible [via race, genealogy], can’t receive equal reciprocity

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

DPi p. 105-06 for Hugo, responsibility, sacred right of writer—cosmopolitical

——writer’s right a right that gives the right to go beyond rights, “civil disobedience”; for Hugo, DP too human, abolition is divine law

Gii p. 29 paradoxical/regular association of nationalism w/ cosmopolitanism, w/ humanism

IW p. 252 acc. Cohen, exile of Judaism to Alexandria, its Hellinization (Jewgreek), made it cosmopolitan, universalized it: Greek the 3rd term which brings German and Jew together

p. 277 Cohen: humanity of one’s home can become native soil (Mutterboden) of internationality, foundation of a spirit of peace

p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——truth of nationality is German idealism; the German spirit is the spirit of humanity

——Cohen suspects a narcissistic infatuation in Fichte’s national ego, mirror of a certain psyché, but also room for any other self in this national self, cosmopolitan logic, national self as “We”

PSSS p. 276 one cannot justify pacifism, right to life, setting out from an economy of life, can only be done on basis of a sur-vival that owes nothing to alibi of some mytho-theological beyond

TN p. 93 for Levinas, peace is the ethical itself

p. 323n for Kant, no need to travel to understand cosmopolitanism when one lives in a bustling city (exemplary Königsberg)

AD pp. 19-20 Kant’s “w/ a view to perpetual peace”: universal hospitality in cosmopolitical law

pp. 48-50 Levinas’ unconditional, pre-originary, an-archic declaration of peace not Kant’s “perpetual peace” (which only arrives via politics) > Levinas’ peace is eschatological but not in horizon of history or its end

p. 68 Levinas’ transnational, universal hospitality, asylum (asile), inn (auberge) (“place offered to stranger”) not Kant’s cosmopolitical

p. 79 Levinas’ peace not purely political

p. 82 how does the “and already non- (et déjà non-)” [already non-political] of Levinas’ peace eat (mordre), get eaten by, the “political”?

p. 85 one is never at peace w/ the same

pp. 86-7 for Kant, war is nature, peace is unnatural, and for peace to be eternal [perpetual], it can never be tempted by war

——thus Kant closer to Levinas [peace prior to war], in that politics would never be adequate to its concept > though Kant’s universal hospitality remains only juridical & political

p. 88 for Kant, peace would have trace of war; for Levinas, the opposite (war would have trace of peace)

——anti-Semitism & cosmopolitanism: Stoicism, Pauline Christianity, Enlightenment (Kant)

p. 90 unlike Kant, no state of nature in Levinas—only pre-original anachrony of an-archy

p. 91 Levinas’ attempt to break w/ peace of juridico-cosmpolitanism, which would be, in vein of Hegel (and Schmitt), war by other means [see p. 95] > for Levinas, peace not a process of negative

pp. 100-01 Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden (toward perpetual peace): wants neither cemetery w/ which rulers of State, hawks of every epoch, threaten us nor “sweet dream” of the pacifist philosopher

CF pp. 6-7 right to asylum for stateless peoples (lapatrides): was ‘the only right that had ever figured as a symbol of Human Rights in the domain of international relations’ [Arendt]

p. 19 Cicero bequeathed a Stoic cosmopolitanism

pp. 19-20 St. Paul ‘politicized’ primary injunctions of Abrahamic religions: “no longer foreigners nor metic in a foreign land, but fellow-citizens w/ God’s people, members of God’s household” (Ephesians II. 19-20) > cosmopolitanism

pp. 20-2 Kant’s universal hospitality w/out limit (perpetual peace), a natural law, theological heritage: all endowed w/ reason have received “common possession of the surface of the earth”

——Kant describes globalization occurring on every surface of the earth, leaving no coordinate out, also, Derrida notes, expelling what has been erected above the soil (State, institutions, etc.)

——hospitality: right of visitation (Besuchsrecht) not right of residence (Gastrecht)

——but perpetual peace depends on State sovereignty and the always public nature, for Kant, of the juridical

p. 23 city of refuge giving place for reflection and for new order of law, democracy to come (if a certain idea of cosmopolitanism has arrived, perhaps one hasn’t recognized it yet)

p. 58 international law still depends too much on sovereign & powerful Nation-States

BSi p. 282 French Revolution inaugurates new form (sovereignty of people, international model) of same fundamental structure of sovereignty (knowing-power, knowing-how-to-see): walls destroyed, but architectural model not deconstructed

OG p. 189 (268) Rousseau’s inflection of Hobbes: during barbaric times state of war reigned, but men rarely met, earth at peace [neutral origin of ethico-political conceptuality]

COUNT

H p. 81 “at this very moment”: antinomy of laws in the plural and absolutely singular law

——there are 2 plurals, different at same time: 1) multiplicity, plural laws 2) One + a multiplicity, One + n [plus dun]

——One + n, the antinomic addition, adds conditional laws to unconditional law of hospitality

GT p. 31 even if gift is a simulacrum, il faut (one must) rendre compte (render an account) of the possibility of this simulacrum, and render account of desire to render account > can’t be done w/out principle of reason (principium reddendae rationis)

p. 148 perversity can always secretly corrupt the “donner raison à lautre”: ratio, logos, is on your side [re: “Counterfeit Money”], what counts, can be counted, you took maximum pleasure

——link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

pp. 155-56 several meanings of vous avez raison: 1) animal rationale (logon ekhon) 2) know how to count, account, principle of reason, we are men of knowledge, good narrators 3) our calculation has prevailed, we have controlled (arraisonné) (the other) by reasoning

R p. 53 technique, “technical measure of equality” is not a mishap, chance for incommensurable, technique before calculating technique [?] [POOF]

p. 54 [re: democratic count] how many voices, how many votes for the unconscious?

SPOM p. xx commitment of justice, to whom? to life (natural life, life of spirit) of living being > that this is irrefutable carries justice beyond present life, non pas vers la mort mais vers une sur-vie, where life & death are traces of traces

——alors il y a de l’esprit, des esprits, et il faut compter avec eux > le plus d’un

p. 173 one cannot count ghosts because ghost is # itself, numerous, innumerable as number, cannot count supplements or surplus values of arch-specter (as father as capital or Plato’s good)

p. 178 one will never be done counting, that’s why one counts

p. 183 speculation as count is always theoretical and theological, it believes in what it sees, in representations, ordinary theology believes in ghosts of sensuous imagination, speculative theology, ghosts of non-sensuous abstraction (Feuerbach)

p. 193 there is always more than one commodity, more than one spirit, # belongs to the movement of the commodity

POOF pp. ix-xi the 3 meanings of political crime: 1) assassinations that litter History 2) crime in which political being of politics is constituted [Schmitt, force of law] 3) crime that reduces politics to something else, crime against man qua political animal > w/in these crimes, infinite abysses of imputability, edges of juridical, techno-biological, are we sure we can distinguish btwn death & killing? btwn homicide & genocide? why should a question of # persist in these questions?

p. x count, number, calculate: acc. Aristotle, friends must be small in #, what’s small?

——democracy counts votes & subjects, but doesn’t/shouldn’t count ordinary singularities: no numerus clausus for arrivants

***p. 3 (19) small in # doesn’t characterize friends, it counts those we are speaking of, cites the exemplary, naming the rare illuminates, projects name’s renown beyond death

p. 11 for Aristotle, a friend chooses knowing rather than being known, counts, refers, prefers, chooses to love > irreducible difference btwn active/passive, cest elle qui compte et permet de compter

pp. 19-21 via Aristotle, one must choose & prefer friends (election & selection), it takes time > for Aristotle, those who don’t have friends count friends among things (prágmata), possessions, the malevolent place friends in field of calculable hypothesis > yet, the choice of friends, that their # must be small, reintroduces #, calculation, into multiplicity of incalculable singularities: a certain aristocracy in arithmetic of the choice

***p. 21 (39) via Aristotle, in economy of time, even in the instant, plenitude of enérgeia linked to #: friendship must count but resists enumeration, quantification (# isn’t forbidden but the numerous, the crowd, is) > for a finite being, test of friendship is an endurance of arithmetic

p. 22 wound opens w/ necessity to count one’s friends, democracy’s 2 irreducible laws: 1) respect for irreducible singularity or alterity 2) calculation of majorities, representable subjects, all equal

——mais là où tout autre est également tout autre > political desire borne by this disjunction, bears chance of future of democracy, divided virtue, inadequate to itself, chaos opening in silence

——no virtue, w/out the tragedy of # w/out #, perhaps more unthinkable than tragedy

pp. 32-3 that there can only be friends w/ enemies, that when one desires enemies, we can only count friends—madness looms (in every teleiopoetic event), plus de sens, empty resembles overflow

——teleiopoiós: that which renders absolute, perfect, complete, brings to an end; tele: distance, far-removed, spanning of space > rendering, making, transforming, producing, creating—this is what counts! > occurs in auto-tele-affection of sentence, always auto-teleipoetics, but auto is the splitting effect not simple origin [see auto-affection in VP]

pp. 100-01 tension btwn democracy & aristocracy to do w/ #, with the counting of friends

pp. 178-79 Montaigne’s audacious/uncontestable description of friend, via Aristotle, qua one soul (singularity) in 2 bodies (duplicity): philía most devoted to other becomes friendship of self, philautia (narcissism), a correspondence (convenance, oikeiótēs), all division is driven out, neither friend can give to each other > this is the communal/communist consequence: communism dreaming in secret of the secret, communism which doesn’t count, no further than to ‘one,’ so not even to ‘one’

——to maintain indivisibility of friendship, must harbor the taste of death, division only affects bodies

p. 181 Montaigne’s indivisible (singular) friendship permits & interdicts counting: only “common friendships can be shared”

pp. 196-97 [quasi-thesis of POOF] a justice that cares for the humanity in the human (a principle of infinity) would destroy finite proportionality that ordains calculation of worth, in this way it resembles Montaigne’s friendship > it doesn’t, however, in the sense that Montaigne’s disproportion is extremely rare, inegalitarian heteronomy remains in tact: what if a certain equality could be saved in respect of dissymmetrical/heteronomic singularities > this equality would be at once calculable/incalculable, it would count on the calculable

pp. 204, 206 via Aristotle, the just wage (gage), a fee, salary, 3rd party & common measure—war ensues wherever common measure & straight and narrow path recoils (se dérobe) [translator also translates the Chapter Title, Replis,” as recoils] > in these grievances, where calculation becomes incalculable, where I can’t count on you, there is no friend

p. 209 the dative version of omega ω would produce the meaning: ‘too many friends means no friend’ > this is the recoil (repli) version, more modest, it does reopen the question of “how many?”

pp. 211-12 the hyperbole of an extreme middle in Aristotle, moderation, proper measure: this applies to # of friends & ‘threshold of tolerance’ re: border btwn pólis and ethnos [immigration]

PAS PAS p. (87) [on not citing his sources] the worst méconaissance of Blanchot’s text, hand over incommensurable in it to the market, the hierarchy, the dominant effects tied to name & law, but [other voice] there’s always benefits of mastery for sovereign renunciation, it’s gonna happen, il faut en rendre compte, the gift itself never forgets itself, nor the forgetting

SH p. 21 ring, sign of belonging itself, condition of return > cipher of seal, imprint of ring, counts more than content of message, what matters is mark of belonging, manifested alliance

p. 50 there is a holocaust (all-consuming) for every date: “every hour counts its holocaust”

DS p. 260 blank, counting on and discounting itself at once

POS p. 68 writing structurally carries w/in itself (counts-discounts) its own erasure, while marking what remains of this erasure

P p. 89 the sans counts for beauty

O p. 24 Hegel: spirit is a trinity, but cannot be counted (counting is a bad procedure)

***pp. 24-5 dissemination sets up a pharmacy, can’t count by 1’s, 2’s, 3’s — everything starts w/ dyad (not conflictual, hierarchical, dual oppositions)

pp. 26-7 le détour dune écriture dont one ne revient pas, dissemination: this question calls for restaging of arithmos, “counting” as “bad procedure,” and rereading the rhythmos of Democritus, which philosophy has never been able to reckon w/ (naura pu compter) > philosophy accounts for itself by rising out of, and then circulating w/in its speculative necessity, the [envelope of writing]

SW p. 320 veil as “sa laisse (lead, leash, let)” > tears skin, touches, punctures, pulls, doesn’t just veil gaze; voilà, every word counts

PSSS pp. 276-77 a task w/out horizon for a new psychoanalytic Enlightenment: will calculate w/ the inflexible unconditionality of the unconditional [think POOF, counting event of friendship]

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, only 1/ 4 surfaces donnant lieu to moment of visibility, de la présence en vis-à-vis (face-to-face), counting out the phenomenon > surface is mounted (montée)

p. 305 proliferation, substitution of the unit that adds & effaces itself, counts itself out (se décomptant) at moment of déclenchement; Sollers: “participating in the calculation that effaced us and replaced us”

p. 316 lélément enveloppe et se décompte (deducts itself) de ce quil enveloppe

p. 322 fertility of mother-site (androgynous), M (male, mère), m/f, milk, milky way, mère, énumère

C p. 201 arithmetic compulsion and la narration comptable in Sade’s 120 Days, part of the fun > its regular cadence, rhythmic operation: to excrete excrement, swallow it, en escompter la jouissance

p. 204 “things won’t stop computing in me,” Derrida wants to touch contingency of Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins

NOY p. 238 thought of history of Being affected by internal epochē, divides, suspends the yes: will is not identical to itself (along w/ many other things) > yes as the incalculable, the promise: [quasi-, fable of] “giving reason,” “giving an account,” the countability of the innumerable yesses

p. 240 yes, (already but always) faithful countersignature, can’t be counted: it always sends itself off in number (il senvoie toujours en nombre)

AD pp. 112-13 for Levinas, Torah–Jerusalem [inscribe promise in earthly Jerusalem], co-presence of justice, system, State > negotiation w/ non-negotiable must find “better” or less bad (moins mauvaise): nothing counts more, nothing weighs more heavily (rien ne compte plus gravement) than quotations around word better (meilleur)—it’s not good, it’s a stopgap (pis-aller)

BSi pp. 198-99 in Monsieur Teste, a Nietzschean kind of superman, infinitely cunning and infinitely bête solitary types: incalculable/hyperbolic arithmetic turns “who” into “what”

——quoi as coite from quietus (silence) [who > what: silencing]

pp. 200-01 Valéry wagers on CAP: le cap Pensée; the high point (comble) of internal politics, a multipli-city of selves, when the excess that exceeds un-counts the other & outside > jealousy is always the hight point that completes me, supplements me because receives, welcomes, no longer chases out other in me: one only ever jealous of oneself, the selfsame > explains all the loves and wars (which take place btwn the same, the others as the same): as soon as there’s a double capitalized phallic erection (CAP, standing, being on a cape) here called Thought

pp. 256-59 Nietzsche’s superman, and the sovereign too, a hyperbolic, sublime, “higher than height,” more about excess than height, it’s the more than that counts, the surplus, absolutely more: could as well be a maximum of smallness, God as small (sovereign use of nanotechnology)

p. 337 logos: language, discourse, reason, calculation, counting (ratio)

EU p. 49 every critique of censorship is a critique of judgment, censorship is a judgment, proposes laws, tribunal, code > censere, to evaluate (réputer), compute, count—ratio, “census,” “cens,” is enumeration of citizens

SPEC p. 364 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] will steps forward (pas de plus) permit themselves to be counted?

COUNTERSIGNATURE

LOBL pp. 168-69 [re: Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort] 2 women, like doctor, sign his death warrant, but always as countersignature, because death “given” is requested, demanded, received it with/from/in the hand of the other > another hymen

AF p. 31 to not take account of the Freudian impression [resistance], one confirms, countersigns (archives) his theory of “repression”

HASD p. 30 order or promise, injunction commits (me) to sign, in a rigorously asymmetrical manner, to reappropriate for myself and restore the symmetry

——to deny, elude responsibility, it’s still necessary that I countersign it

POOF p. 41 Derrida countersigns Nietzsche [re: arrivant thinkers, new philosophers], extends the duty to countersign again, to us, to me, to you, teleiopoetically: friendship w/out friendship of friends of solitude

p. 49 responsibility to countersign ‘Friends, there are no friends’: its destiny rides on the event of a response that has come from its addressees

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

PAS PAS p. (21) yes, yes: force of affirmative repetition, unique call of the to-come as the will to repeat itself, affirmation that cites itself, joyous EROS, immeasurable unhappiness, irreducible contamination, affirmation risks citation, le oui qui fait dans la langue un trou aussi étrange que viens, il approuve, affirme, contresigne tout cequi est arrivé

FWT p. 111 specular countersignature, re: communitarianism of oppressed, reactive self-defense, too symmetrical of a response [Derrida couldn’t tolerate being “integrated” into Jewish school]

SW pp. 349-50 [to read the corpus that has known, from operation of other, how to undo itself from veiling/unveiling] you have to write, sign in turn, countersign in writing, something else, in another language, w/out betraying injection/call of first seal

——can’t prove it happened, only swear that it did: perjury must remain possible (a duty that must be respected)

PIO p. 5 to reinvent invention: required countersignature must be that of an other, a son no longer father’s invention, son must recognize invention as such, as if the heir were the sole judge, the legitimating authority > invention can never be private (can’t be countersigned by family)

PF p. xxi countersignature: confirmation of an agreement & a wholly other signature: counterforce [re: Peggy Kamuf’s collection, Derrida’s texts have returned to him transformed]

***p. 283n a work worthy of the name always opens a virtual university, appeals to a new universal knowledge capable of “reading” it, countersigning it, assuring its tradition

TR p. 79 reader as judge, the addressee who decides on reception/address of post card, signature left to the responsibility of the other, reader signs at moment of arrival at destination, rather than at the origin, at moment of reading rather than of writing

p. 297n Rousseau’s interest in justice of inheritance/reading: responsible countersignature

PJP pp. 190-91 even more impossible than report-confession: countersignature of acolyte (most impossible impossible: narrator himself) > unique impossibility [cf. IW p. 287 particular nothing]

p. 193 acolyte, narrator-friend-witness-countersignatory, “I am myself the rapport,” relation w/out relation, the impossible report/relation (and translation)

EL p. 219 “we” of covenant, not secularized “communal subject,” countersigns by responding to commitment already taken: autobiographicity of “we” assigned by call resonating from sacred language > in sacrificial instant, one hears imminence of God’s voice’s return

HST p. 381 to acquit oneself of forgiveness, to call it quits: repeats, countersigns evil

NOY p. 240 the “second” yes, doit arriver comme un renouvellement absolu, the structural “forgetting” of fidelity

——“grâce à la menace de cet oubli [the cutting off, the becoming unique, the divisibility contre laquelle une signature se tend] la mémoire de la promesse, la promesse même peut franchir son premier pas, à savoir le second

yes, (already but always) faithful countersignature, can’t be counted: it always sends itself off in number (il senvoie toujours en nombre)

ATM pp. 183-84 [re: Levinas] by making sexual difference secondary, by excluding the feminine, does She figure “the wholly other of this Saying of the wholly other,” thus under-signing the undersigned of the work [He?], that is, countersigning, not as a redoubling of the signature—but autrement que signer

EU p. 12 king: someone who makes you learn his language, in learning it, you countersign his force: power demonstrated through fact of translation > this is a paradigmatic event, not structural necessity of master-slave dialectic

——can only say “I want to speak my mother tongue” in language of the king

COUPLE/MARRIAGE

GT p. 156 infinite secret btwn the 2 [re: “Counterfeit Money”], opening space of absolute heterogeneity, beyond everything they have said to each other, the reason they’ve given each other

R p. 34 perverse autoimmunity of democracy due to double couple: “freedom and equality” and “equality acc. #, equality acc. worth” > in the name of one couple, both couples destroyed

FK p. 100 no alliance of 2 [faith & religion], plus dun at once more than 2: iterability, division at source > supplement introduces incalculable in heart of calculable; pure faith = pure madness

HERP pp. 194-95 “philia ist das Gönne der Gunst,” philia is the other’s proper, gift to the other of what is to the other its own proper

——Heidegger, translating justice (dikē) as Fuge (joint, accord, coupling), wonders how adikia can give justice > the gift of what we don’t have as only gift possible

p. 202 via Heidegger, opening of 2 maintains the entre-deux, no community gathering (pas de rassemblement communautaire) if there are not 2, but no 2 w/out opposition (Gegensatz)

A p. 18 decision concerns choice btwn relation w/ a wholly non-opposable other (an other that’s not its other) and an other who is its other (can be opposed in a couple) > the former relation is that of aporia, not a crossing of border but a double concept of the border

FWT p. 34 couple not transgressed by homosexual couple

POOF pp. 54-5 allied in “joint acquiescence to disjunction,” monadic alterities, the proper of the alter-ego is never accessible [see SPOM p. 35]

pp. 65-6 following Nietzsche beyond Eros? if love is always a lust for new possession, we must acquiesce to principle of ruin at heart of utterly new > would this leave open the chance to accord w/ the “love whose just name would be friendship” [?]—just once, it would happen, friendship as the name for this impossible event [only once btwn 2]

——but how could there be a right name for such an event, for any event? how could you convince the partner of such rightness at the moment of the act?

p. 78 history of friendship, history of men, of the couple, of 2 men

pp. 166-67 via & beyond Schmitt, der geschwisterlichen Klang (the brotherly-sisterly sound), the obscure friendship of rhyme, insane linking (appariement) of a couple, sense is born in a pair > before being philosophical, friendship concerns gift of the poem, isn’t there always a politics of a rhyme? > the rhyme can also become a traffic signal (philautie of linkage) > nothing looks more like the traffic signals of one country than those of another: this is the law > everything begins w/ Echo: rhymes sign, in cadence they seal a belonging, an ‘open gate’ [?]

p. 180 for Montaigne, in ‘holy bond’ of sovereign friendship, the friend is a man: marriage, heterosexual friendship, friendship btwn women—an ‘imaginary resemblance’

pp. 190-91n for Montaigne, marriage is a free market, this is it’s liability, it is contractual thus reversible, it’s a market w/out the immanence or disinterestedness of friendship > friendship has commerce only w/ itself

——Montaigne also seems to blame the woman more than Marriage itself

pp. 201-02 men & women can have a virtuous friendship, but it’s unstable, child becomes the indispensable link of the bond: the difference from animal procreation is the testament

O pp. 57-8 is pleasure literary in essence? if Vorlust, foreplay, prime (bonus) of seduction, formal moment of literature, ne se comble quà la fin du plaisir, then jouissance would be instance of seduction, prime supplémentaire de rien dautre: pleasure a formal, threshold phenomena, nul et sans fins, a repression lifted & maintained > graphics of hymen questions all couples, all oppositions (especially those of Freud)

SW pp. 353-54 absolute knowledge not man’s thing but that of sericulture [?] > silkworm comes back to itself in its odyssey, wraps itself in its own shroud, kind of absolute knowledge: beyond any coupling, any sexual difference or rather duality of the sexes > [his bestiary starting up]

DPi p. 247 can’t share DP, must die one by one, though someone always more than one in dying [can’t be calculated] > 2 people seeking DP together, this would be more sacred than marriage

Gi p. 26 for Heidegger, no properly sexual predicate > none that doesn’t refer back to general structure of Dasein: inside/outside, dispersion & proximity, here & there, birth & death…

——sexual connotations can mark discourse, jusquà lenvahir, to the extent that they are homogenous w/ what every discourse implies

——sexual difference not yet sexual duality? not yet, no longer, sealed by the 2? > “not yet” and “no longer” imply a submission to “the control and inspection of reason (quelque arraisonnement)”

——how did difference get deposited in the 2?

——if one insists in consigning difference to dual opposition, how did multiplication get arrested in difference? in sexual difference?

PJP pp. 198-99 [re: Henri Thomas’ novel] a couple men united as one, “a single idiot,” brothers before impassible, inaccessible woman (the other, only one who decides, only guardian, only survivor, keeps watch at end of night, “w/out saying a word”)

p. 200 forgiveness linked to impossible marriage

——sacrifice of Isaac: sort of rupture w/ marriage, infidelity to Sarah

——madness of marriage, madness of the oath; for Kierkegaard, one cannot suffer/repent together from an unhappy love: “unethical for her & me to sorrow thus in union [sorge]”

——if Christianity demands marriage, it’s a form of madness

p. 201 Christian marriage: (this madness) sworn faith of 2 sinners who unite to ask forgiveness together, repentance for a mortal sin

——marriage, machine of death, madness of alliance in Christian marriage: at center of question of perjury & forgiveness > ***Christianity marries everything

——Christian marriage a machine of death: give oneself death as one pretends to be giving oneself life, to life, life to one’s children

——never get married, it is madness in Christian lands, and has no sacramental sense outside Christianity; is it more mad to lose one’s senses inside or outside Christian lands? > perhaps it’s even more impossible to decide where frontiers of Christian lands are drawn

D p. 353 can’t rest on copula, coupling is a mirror

TN p. 90 Levinas: lovers, dual solitude, excludes the third [triple solitude: each partner is solitary and so is the witness], the contrary of social relation > nothing attained, touched w/ caress

LG p. 243 Derrida includes very elusive, allusive reference to hymen [genre as gender], rapport sans rapport btwn masculine & feminine; genre (Gattung) and marriage in series gattieren, gatten, Gatte/Gattin

p. 244 [Blanchot’s] immense double affirmation both to life & death, forming an alliance or marriage bond w/ itself (“hymen”)

BSi pp. 58-9 Montaigne: good marriage should be like friendship; Socrates: only man decides to marry, take a wife

pp. 59-60 double bind of being inside or outside of marriage (inside/outside cage), double bind of domestication, regret on both sides

OG p. 175 (250) for Rousseau, amorous passion perversion of natural pity—limits our attachment to a single person

p. 308 (435) Rousseau: marriage, holiest of bonds in society

SPEC p. 318 reappearance as a moment of the couple disappearance/reappearance, return to itself of return: greatest pleasure

WBH p. 198 opposition is 2, is man/woman, sexual difference can be an indefinite # of sexes > w/ the 2, the classical sense of sexual difference, gift is impossible, all you can call “gift” (love, jouissance) is forbidden by dual opposition [see WBH in SEXUAL DIFFERENCE]

CHOR p. 108 in dreaming of saving the chance [of deconstructing sexuality], Derrida would like to believe in multiplicity of sexually marked voices, desire for sexuality w/out # can protect us, like a dream, from an implacable destiny that immures us (everything in life) in #2

——if merciless closure [of the 2] would arrest desire at wall of opposition, there would never be but 2 > tragedy would leave this strange sense, a contingent one, that we must affirm & learn to love instead of dreaming of innumerable: but doesn’t dream prove what is dreamt of?

——desire to escape combinatory itself, to invent incalculable choreographies, would remaineven beyond exchange of sexes w/ considerably varied rhythms

CREDIT/FAITH

GOD pp. 108-09 secret market of secrecy, “Christianity’s stroke of genius,” says Nietzsche, merchandise, give credit to the infinite [denounce all calculation & still yield surplus-value]

p. 116 to credit Christianity w/ its “stroke of genius,” like the ruse of a know-how, one would also have to confer on God the irreducible experience of belief; did Nietzsche believe in his story about credit? was he making believe? (see DS p. 220)

GT pp. 11-12 credit, good faith, we lend each other in conversation; credit/faith as precomprehension that condition “tautology” of gift, and make gift impossible: “one” has to give some “thing” to someone other

——gift can’t be content with giving to itself (se donner)?

p. 48 what is the consensus on the basis of which an implicit linguistic contract permits us to understand one another, to credit each other when we speak of gift? what if we renounced this question for a play without postulate/prescription, a certain concept of dissemination?

p. 95 this is perhaps counterfeit money: this perhaps is the intentional dimension[?], the credit, the act of faith that structures all money

p. 97 Baudelaire’s “Counterfeit Money,” its play w/ title, links literature to belief, credit, thus capital, economy, politics

——Montaigne: our soul moves only on credit and faith, bound & constrained, under the authority of their teaching

p. 100 the supposedly most personal, direct writing, in contact w/ “thing-itself,” is “on credit”

pp. 116-7 Mallarmé links aesthetics w/ political economy via alchemy: alchemy as precursor to political economy, “null stone, dreaming of gold, once called philosophical…foreshadows, in finance, the future credit, preceding capital or reducing it to the humility of money!”

p. 124 isn’t counterfeit money the truth of capital? everything that depends on faith & credit?

p. 133 Aristotle differentiates tukhē from automaton (chance from human finality), offers example of creditor going to market & getting his debt paid back: pas de don, everything happens en marchant

pp. 135(n)-36 capitalize, profit on poverty and beggar index, poverty becomes capitalizable credit [Nietzsche’s slave morality]

pp. 150-51 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

——literature as place of non-place of frame, triptych w/ dislocated frame, 3 + or – excluded 4th, all positions exchangeable to infinite, an ex-propriation that forbids a return to self, most powerful or interesting speculation

——readers are at once debtors & creditors, like the narrator, we are the beggar, the 3rd party excluded from the secret of the dual scene

pp. 153-54 as long as money counts, produces effects, as long as it assures finite possibilities of decision & judgment, it is simply not different from money it counterfeits > a more powerful but not infinitely powerful [?] inscription of effects of reference on truth, convention, dispositifs

——opposition of conventional to natural is discredited, or, more rigorously, it is limited in its indispensable credit, in the speculation it will always have to authorize

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

p. 165n “freedom” in Kant’s speculative philosophy [?] can’t be demonstrated, it’s a “letter of credit for the moral law,” an assumption; also that (diabolical) evil can never be a motive

——faith/belief (act of faith/credit) given w/ monetary language, practical reason cannot be separated from chremastics as we interpreted it above

pp. 169-70 no nature, only effects of nature, nature reconstituted after the fact on basis of simulacrum (i.e. literature), nature lends rather than gives, extends credit

***p. 170 secret of literature has no depth, no interiority, spread on the surface of the page, non-psychological structure, not subjective though responsible for most radical effects of subjectivity, a post card, a bank note, a “letter of credit” [see LOBL p. ~101, &

SUBJECTILE

]

MONL p. 9 “take your word for it:” good faith, credit to the Other

p. 20 one can testify only to the unbelievable: that which can only be believed [credited] > even false testimony presupposes this unbelievable testimony

***p. 47 I always surrender myself to language: give credit to that which is to come (as opposed to the given)

R p. 48 no democracy without credit, w/out act of faith

FK p. 43 faith & knowledge: credit, trustworthiness, act of faith

p. 44 minimal trustworthiness of the word, like Heidegger’s Faktum

pp. 55-56 desert, nocturnal light, before “link” of religare (man to man & man to god), condition of link, most anarchivable, the holding back, Verhaltenheit, responsibility of repetition in wager (gage) of decision or affirmation (re-legare)

——a fiduciary “link” before all positive religion, prior to opposition btwn sacred/profane: “messianic,” or “chora”

p. 49 a “reflecting faith” acts; a “dogmatic faith” seeks revelation

p. 57 “mystical foundation of authority” [Montaigne, Pascal], the law of law, event which doesn’t belong to set it founds, decision of other in undecidable > links secret, belief, credit to foundation, knowledge, science

pp. 66-67 hyper-imperialist appropriation (Anglo-American remains Latin), in mondialatinization no semantic cell can remain alien, “heilig,” safe & sound > word “religion” calmly applied to all that which has always been foreign to it, same goes for “cult,” “faith,” “belief,” “sacred,” “saved”

p. 68 temptation of knowledge: to believe not only in what one knows one knows but to know, have faith, in what knowledge is

——the scholar’s (Benveniste’s) scruple, assurance and also hesitation, between the proper meaning and its other > quasi-automatic, machine-like, also religious: restraint of response

***p. 80 “without the performative experience of this elementary act of faith, there would neither be ‘social bond’ nor address of the other, nor performativity in general”

p. 81 no incompatibility btwn “return of religious” and rationality, which is to say, the tele-techno-capitalistic-scientific fiduciarity in all its mediatic/globalizing [mondial?] dimensions

p. 83 technical as possibility of faith, its chance: a chance that maintains the greatest risk, menace of radical evil

p. 96 that which acquiesces prior to all questioning of spirit: trust/faith, Faktum, comprehension of “is” or “be” > [Heidegger’s last god?] this faith does not constitute a religion but is it untouched by religiosity? [see p. 67]

***p. 98 the everydayness of credit/faith: “believe what I say as one believes in a miracle” science, philosophy, religion: pure attestation.

FL p. 240 authority of laws rests on credit granted to them, this justice of law, justice as law, is not justice

p. 248 deconstruction suspends the credit/credibility of an axiom (for a moment)

p. 267 credit/trust in law as part of a tautology, where what founded law structures its survival

AF p. 87 Freud: “something in delusion that really deserves belief,” if it ever makes it into consciousness it is distorted, supplemented

p. 94 belief, radical phenomenon of believing, the only relationship possible to the other as other has no irreducible place in Freudian psychoanalysis: Freud thinks one ought not to believe in ghosts [?] > archeological outbidding of a return to reality

p. 100 no archive of the secret, by definition, it is the very ash of the archive (speculation begins there, belief too)

BL pp. 198-99 quasi-event of the murder of father, event w/out event, resembles fiction, myth, fable > real, effective guilt; question of belief & historical referent—irremediably fissured

——dead father more powerful than living one

POO p. 136n belief/credit have etymological resonance (créance)

SPOM p. 55 via Marx, in Timon of Athens [see pp. 96-7 Marx’s play]: Timon’s trust in money (simulacrum, ghost), an oath, a giving credit, to that which is unworthy of oath; not convention society, or law > cult of money as nature, prostitution, thus constant perjury, simulacrum, greed

p. 136 borrowed figures, borrowing, a question of credit, then faith

p. 167 [re: Marx “deconstructing” Stirner] Derrida notes theme of food, Last Supper, host as conjuring tricks naively accrediting discursive powers: “abuse of etymology that serves as explanation, play on homonyms, privileging of nomination, autonomization of language”

pp. 183-4 via Feuerbach, Marx refers to 2 theologies: 1) ordinary: believes in ghosts of sensuous imagination 2) speculative: believes in ghosts of non-sensuous abstraction

——theology is “belief in ghosts,” belief in general as alliance of 2 theologies

POOF pp. 14-5 faith, credence, credit of engagement: open experience of time

p. 16 act of faith (reliability of oath) must belong to what is incalcuable in decision [a passivity beyond enérgeia, stability (bébaios) of act in Aristotle’s lover over beloved]: break w/ calculable is ordained by structure of confidence or of credence as faith

——Aristotle’s bébaios [re: friendship] (temporal, becoming-intemporal, omnitemporal), stable & reliable, marks, covers over in marking, passage (through time) btwn 2 heterogenous orders: 1) assured calculable reliability 2) act of faith [unyoked there’s difference]

pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe quà l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

***FSW p. 208 Freud: dream-interpreters were versed in symbolic riddling, a ground of interpretation giving the strongest credit to their Art

FWT p. 7 Derrida respects idiom or singularity of signature [re: Foucault, Lacan, Lévi-Strauss] while looking to deconstruct what’s hegemonic, the “dogmatic moment,” the residue of credulity

p. 130 common possibilities of literature & democracy: 1) historicity (literature has acts, birthplaces, legacies; democracy defines itself by promising itself, by and in its historicity, its future-to-come) 2) power, credit of fiction [Montaigne/Pascal understood connection btwn right & fiction]

p. 173 [re: psychoanalysis’ method, teaching?] debt of all theoretical (juridical, ethical & political) positing to a performative power structured by a fiction, by figural invention: “the convention that guarantees every performative inscribes within itself the credit that is conferred upon a fiction”

DS pp. 172, 286 Mallarmé describes a genealogy from philosopher’s elixir to the null stone, the philosopher dreaming of gold, foreshadowing future credit—preceding capital; alchemy as the precursor to political economy (triumphing over aesthetics, the other pathway of our mind)

ROP p. 5 [here] analytic concern merges w/ hermeneutic drive, w/ principle of reason (reddere rationem): render sense at all cost (à tout prix), il faut rendre: fidelity, debt, duty, to restitute sense of sense > even if hidden, verborgene Sinn

p. 70 thought conditioned (exercent) by fidelity, fidelity honed (aiguisent) by thought

pp. 95-6 acc. Foucault, Doctor attains power through credit given to fiction, secrecy effect [Derrida shows how, in this case, Foucault places Evil Genius on the side of reason/order/father]

OTO pp. 8-9 Nietzsche: “I live on my own credit (Ich lebe auf meinen eigenen Kredit hin)”

——Nietzsche never knows if anyone will honor the inordinate credit he grants himself in his name, & in the name of the other; autobiography as secret contract (annulus), encrypted credit account: for Nietzsche, his life, the “I-live,” is perhaps mere prejudice (Vorurteil)

pp. 12-3 autobiographical récit, tells himself his life, affirms EROS, gratitude for gift (gift: establishment of my own credit w/ this name): EROS signs or seals > before such signature, my life may be mere prejudice

WAP pp. 4-5 institution of title/work can be incarnated by people, even single person: but this incarnation guaranteed by some institution > institution guards, guarantees title, thus already holds title; origin of power to entitle/accredit can never be phenomenalized; this not merely circle makes us rethink “repression,” “suppression,” “sacrifice”

***DPi p. 152 Nietzsche’s very legitimate question re: equivalence btwn injury/pain, unbelievable jus talionis > it is because we believe, it is because we grant it credit, that we can believe in this equivalence > thus origin of penal law is commercial law: what has us believe in equivalence btwn crime/punishment is belief itself > fiduciary phenomenon of credit or faith

——Nietzsche’s astonishment at equivalence: healthy, trivial, vital

——we believe (always in a credulous fashion, dogmatic fashion)

pp. 152-53 fiction, invented performance: which in the end we don’t believe, we pretend to believe, we make believe > no one could ever believe that homicide (crime) = DP (punishment)

——no one believes what one pretends to believe/credit [Žižek-like]

***pp. 153-54 unheimlich concept of belief: the believer (Glaübiger) who affects to believe is divided in belief, fiction of this simulacrum belongs to belief: skepsis, ēpokhē as believing itself > all economy traffics in act of faith: believing w/out believing, belief haunted by non-belief > quasi-hypnotic, quasi-hallucinatory, spectral, unconscious

——believing (like cruelty) has no contrary, thus is its own contrary

pp. 156-57 Christianity’s stroke of genius: to believe/credit unbelievable meaning of Incarnation/Passion: creditor has paid your debt, forgiven the unforgivable: i.e. love, the creditor pays the debt, I give you what you don’t have, I forgive you > Nietzsche: “can one credit that?”

***pp. 168-69 impossible, unstable, contagious, endemic question of cruelty reinscribed in hollow (creux) of another question: belief (croyance) > believing and not-believing “resonat[e] spectrally in the shell or the hollow of the other’s ear,” every belief “ventriloquized telephonically” by skepsis or epokhē of an “incredible” that is not belief’s contrary, but always a belief w/out belief, cruelty w/out cruelty [?]; cruelty and belief are hollowed into each other, the credited (cru) and the cruel

p. 188 for Hugo, seed of abolition (germe always goes together w/ teleology), abolition will happen, a magnificent advance, advance is credit: make civilization a loan in advance > promise

——spirit of revolution makes an advance to spirit of civilization

pp. 238-39 alleged mastery over limit btwn life/death organizes every calculation btwn dead & living, presupposes ability of giving death, mastering instant of death; calculable credit we grant to “death” indexed to set of presuppositions in which “capital punishment” finds a place of inscription where it’s indissociable from murder & suicide; if we can’t master instant of death, one could neither talk of murder, suicide, DP…

p. 251 to be happy w/ happiness is to believe in it: like every belief, a belief of the other in oneself [Derrida emphasizes painful equivocality of this expression]

REST p. 273 “give me credit for the moment,” “allow me a slight advance…”

pp. 348-49 Verlässlichkeit > reliability anterior to any nameable subject (commitment), that which is verlässig deserves faith/credit/confidence

pp. 350-51 Heidegger’s Verlässlichkeit (reliability, solidity), [what Heidegger restitutes from Van Gogh’s painting?], anterior to opposition useful/sacred, the Ring required for a hymen per fidem, makes commitment possible, fidelity that predates everything

p. 352 Verlässlichkeit is not natural, comes from the combat btwn earth & world, and its trait, other threads in Heidegger too: Ring, Geviert (fourfold), Gering (circuit)

p. 353 Verlässlichkeit > pre-originary gift (don) or abandon [Derrida scolds his interlocutor (“don’t play utilities”) for hurrying to recognizes schemas: “to/from THE-MOTHER for reliability]

p. 354 Heidgger’s precontractual/precontracted marriage [messiancity w/out messianism?]

pp. 354-55 Verlässlichkeit laces and lets loose at same time, restitutes “profoundest” going-back behind the philosophemes of matter-form, subjectivity, law, etc., but also [restitutes] most naively archaic regression to trust, that which can let itself be had (se laisser prendre), can abandon itself to the primary/crudest trap, trap before all traps, to a lure constituted by mirror play of the world, its Spiegelspiel [Levinas-like critique? or affirmation of Duplicity?]

p. 356 Heidegger’s Geborgenheit associates hidden, crypted secret w/ being-in-safety: what one must hold in reserve, conceal, to live > tightening of originary ring > effect of Verlässlichkeit

HLP HLP p. 35 lying as making him believe [dimension of credit/faith irreducible], bad faith of liar, betrayal of implicit sworn faith, surprising the good faith of his addressee

BSi BSi p. 16 every law (contract, authority, credit) not necessarily political

p. 35 “storytelling,” convention of some historical as if, fabular > a moral lesson, a political strategy, pedagogical artifice to credit a fable: to make known (political logic, rhetoric)

pp. 35-6 fabular dimension of political not just sayings or writings but actions > death & suffering inscribed in affabulatory score (on Television): put living beings on stage to accredit interpretation of narrative, to faire savoir, like Augustine’s making truth, veritatem faciare

pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

CIR CIR p. 205 puerile, naked faith: whose tribute God is supposed to pay in coin of sensory pleasure

SPEC SPEC p. 298 fort/da: argument of spool, not a story, not a myth > to give it a title is to accredit the deposit, the investiture

CRIME/CRIMINALS

GOD pp. 85-86 sacrifice of Isaac is an abomination, it is criminal, unforgivable; today society not only participates in incalculable sacrifices (starving children, wars), it organizes them

FL p. 267 criminal lays bare the violence of the juridical order itself

pp. 269-270 via Benjamin, terrifying moments of suffering, crime, torture: “mystical” epochē, moment of suspense, instance of nonlaw, founding or revolutionary violence, a pure performative act that wouldn’t have to respond to anyone, interrupts

p. 274 criminal & prophet

R p. 68 Benjamin’s great criminal

LOBL p. 155 essential irresponsibility of promise or response: crime of hymen > repeats itself endlessly, takes place w/out taking place [writing/reading]

SPOM p. 24 essence of tragic: preorginary and properly spectral anteriority of the crime; Hamlet cursed to be the man of right, can only come after the crime, originarily late and therefore destined to inherit

——when one arrives after the crime [essence of the tragic] one still bears responsibility if only in a self-confession that confesses the other (se confesser en confessant lautre)

p. 116 one cannot establish the state of a debt, do the balance sheet of an “exhaustive record,” one selects, performs, inheritance is kept secret, secret of a crime—of its very author

pp. 232-33n the 2 experiences of the secret: I tell you that I cannot tell you > my 1st crime and 1st confession, a confession w/out confession

POOF pp. ix-xi the 3 meanings of political crime: 1) assassinations that litter History 2) crime in which political being of politics is constituted [Schmitt, force of law] 3) crime that reduces politics to something else, crime against man qua political animal > w/in these crimes, infinite abysses of imputability, edges of juridical, techno-biological, are we sure we can distinguish btwn death & killing? btwn homicide & genocide? why should a question of # persist in these questions?

——as if nothing can be thought except btwn guilt, responsibility, compassion, testaments and specters (between these imputable crimes)

p. 273 the question “what is a crime against humanity?” is pregnant w/ a future whose monstrosity ne porte pas de nom

FWT p. 142 DP conceived of as heart of all criminal law, all moral law (Kant) > its condition or transcendental

pp. 160-61 heritage of forgiveness at once Jewish, Christian, and Islamic w/ very strong Christian imprint: the criminal asks for forgiveness, recognizes his fault

DS . 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” [Wolf Man] > hymen

ATIA p. 43 Cain’s shame, like a second original sin, he needs to hide his nakedness, his crime, he feels excessively culpable > but, isn’t all wrongdoing excessive, le défaut devant leil faut

p. 48 general category of animal for all nonhuman living creatures, not only a sin against vigilance, rigor > a crime; “thou shalt not kill” only humans—crimes only “against humanity”?

TB p. 112 [re: Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”] translation as Aufgabe (task)—translator must acquit himself, is at fault, fallen, in error, perhaps a crime: task to render [think reddere rationem, Leibniz], and possible “reconciliation”: Wiedergabe, Sinnwiedergabe (restitution of meaning)

DPi pp. 28-9 [via Genet, great witness/man of theater of our time] equal fascination w/ weapon of crime & weapon of capital punishment (another kind of crime) > fascination w/ spectacle, one condemned to death becomes parody, comedy, imitation of Christ

p. 141 acc. Kant, absolute crime = DP, in sense that both are beyond value, thus not driven by interest of vengeance > but impersonal principle of jus talionis

p. 172 how to distinguish enemy from abroad charged w/ political crimes from public enemy charged under common law?

pp. 218-19 condemned to death: know the date, quasi-suicidal mastery of death, criminals who do everything to give themselves this death (se donner cette mort) > phantasm of omnipotence over their own death

p. 248n premeditated crime: criminal is judge, acquits himself; unpremeditated—no crime

TR p. 120 if theft is to be a sin, it must be done for the crime itself, not for use value (to eat) but for exchange, fetish value (certain uselessness)

EJQB p. 67 text as weed (mauvaise herbe) and outlaw (hors la Loi)

PSSS p. 279 one rarely speaks of alibis w/out suspecting crime, nor crime w/out suspicion of cruelty

CF p. 34 for Hegel, all is forgivable except crime against spirit, against reconciling power of forgiveness

p. 37 Arendt: punishment & forgiveness put limits on crimes that would continue indefinitely

pp. 48-9 the impossibility of finding a language where the crime could be understood > forgiveness plunged lucidly into night of unintelligible (non-conscious or unconscious)

BSi pp. 17-8 sovereign/beast outside law > beast: violation of law, also Benjamin’s grand criminal, reveals state doesn’t monopolize violence; sovereign: guarantor of law, heterogenous to law > haunting, uncanny fascination: beast/sovereign face

——ontological coupling: la bête et (est) le soveraine

p. 40 for Hobbes, only crime where there’s sovereign power

p. 41 acc. Hobbes, fear exceeds corporeal presence, thus it is the passion/origin of law, the origin of crime too [terror] > no contrary to fear [like Nietzsche’s, Freud’s cruelty]: coextensive w/ all political passion; fear is primarily fear for one’s own proper body, fear is passion of life

p. 103 to uniquely human “I” of Descartes and Kant, Lacan adds superego (Law/Crime) > i.e. animals don’t have superego

p. 105 Lacan’s psychoanalysis does distance itself from genetic predisposition toward crime [i.e. born to be a serial killer], but…

p. 107 oath of brothers after founding criminality [killing baby daddy], trace of primitive crime remains ineffaceable in egalitarian, compassional, communitarian fraternity

CIR p. 188 if you knew, G., my experience of prayers, you would know everything, my “without-interest” in the depths of me, “I” is only misdirection—presumed crime I’m calling circumcision

pp. 296-97 avowal, even for crime not committed, secretes meaning, order, an intelligibility that arrests > subject constituted by category of this accepted accusation (confines asubjective & endless culpability of chaos)

pp. 297-98 all my tears (of love), prayers, bleeding like overflow of murders I carry w/in myself, knowing not whether I committed them or not, against the other or against me

CRISIS

LOBL pp. 114-115 crisis is the urgency, instant, of impossible decision (krinein, judgment is the impossible to reach), the suspensive arrêt suspends the decisive arrêt and vice versa > arrhythmic pulsation, imparts movement in stopping, never sure, unfortunately, fortunately

OH p. 31 crisis is not appropriate word any more for event of other heading: crisis [krinein, moment of decision] has always inspired a Selbstbesinnung (self-contemplation), a regaining of “direction (sens)” > protestant, capital discourse

pp. 31-2 there is a crisis whenever the capital of infinity and universality finds itself in danger, when the eidos, limits, ends, confines, the finitude of Europe, emerges

p. 33 Husserl’s “crisis of European sciences” sought recovery of transcendental theme in Descartes

S pp. 60-1 Heidegger’s destitution of spirit is not a crisis of spirit: crisis, acc. Derrida, would perhaps be treated by Heidegger as a symptom of Cartesian heritage

DS pp. 236-37 literary criticism, linked to possibility of decidability, to krinein, goes into crisis > Cris de vers

p. 277 crisis of literature est marquée au coin de cet excès > figure of corner testifies to this in all its recastings/retemperings (corner, coin, angle, seal, fold, hymen, open recess, etc.)

FS p. 27 when all value 1st constituted by theoretical subject, diaphanousness is supreme value, univocity > hence, difficulty in thinking genesis & mysterious failures called crises

——Husserl’s solution: forgetting is eidetically dictated, necessary, under rubric of “sedimentation” > for the development of truth

O p. 25 crisis of versus [cris de vers] [re: undecidable nonsynonymous synonyms]

CHM p. 60 Derrida’s deconstruction of Foucault not a philosophia perrenis: historicity of philosophy located btwn hyperbole & finite structure, btwn closed totality and what exceeds it, in difference btwn history & historicity, in moment btwn hyperbole/madness/Cogito & forgetting > another statement of excess that’ll become another decline/crisis

pp. 62-3 crisis: 1) acc. Husserl, menace to reason/meaning by way of objectivism, forgetting of origins 2) krinein, choice & division btwn 2 ways: meaning, non-meaning (Parmenides’ logos and non-way [labyrinth, the palintrope]), division in which logos (in necessary violence of its irruption) separates from itself as madness, forgets its origin [back to 1)]—finitude > possibility as crisis?

——identity btwn consciousness of crisis & forgetting of it > crisis of reason: access to reason and attack of reason > Foucault teaches us to think: crises of reason in strange complicity w/ crises of madness

PF p. xxiv decision supposes passage through undecidable of a crisis/krinein/krisis (choice of election, selection: legere, lecture/reading)

WAP p. 99 the definite article in title “The Crisis in the Teaching of Philosophy” would mean one can identify it, legitimacy of a topos [but crisis is a problem of limits, borders, etc.]

pp. 100-02 Derrida does not multiply remarks on structure of reference, article of title, value of contextuality [i.e. minutiae, syntax] to divert from urgency, but to determine it by exposing 2 alibis of philosophy: 1) imperialist self-confidence of philosophy: exists in its self-critique, is the paideia of self-critique, always in crisis, critical instance of judging, self-repetition via krinein 2) [see p. 107 nationalization of “teaching”?]

——these are alibis because philosophy, and via deconstruction, has exceeded this schema, a “crisis of crisis”

p. 108 crisis of crisis [beyond nationalistic alibi] lies there where we can’t trust unity of “properly European” or “properly African”

LI p. 84 Limited Inc as internal regulation by which capitalist system seeks to limit concentration and decision-making power: to protect itself from its own crisis (psychoanalysis’ incorporation)

OG p. 6 (15) crisis also a symptom: inflation of language, of sign “language,” inflation of sign itself, inflation itself > language’s historico-metaphysical epoch must determine totality of its problematic horizon, exposing its finitude when no longer self-assured, guaranteed (bordé), by infinite signified (which seemed to exceed it)

CRITIQUE

***LOBL p. ~91 from polysemia (economy) to dissemination; p. ~93 from critical to deconstruction

SPOM p. 131 emancipatory eschatology of Communism couldn’t have been an ideological phantasm because it was inspired by the critique of ideology

p. 155 Marx insists on discerning, the price of the krinein of the critique: he’s out to get the specter, not the spirit, believing in a decontaminating purification, as if ghost were not haunting the spirit, as if iterability did not erase critical assurance of distinction btwn these 2 concepts

p. 204 deconstruction of “critical limits, the reassuring limits that guarantee the necessary and legitimate exercise of critical questioning,” deconstruction is not critique of critique

p. 207 critical problematization as apotropaic shielding, battle against ghosts, fears them as it fears itself

POO p. 4 the analyst vs. the critic, participant in ritual vs. one who assumes an “objectifying” position (even if he is “close to passivity, if not passion” )

——critic makes choices, judgments, and noncritique ends up participating in critique

p. 8 we are indebted to Kant, his heirs, to the great philosopher of critique

p. 20 to suppose that deconstruction can be sealed under one register, and recalled, would be to treat deconstruction as the critiques it deconstructs, so many dogmatic naivetés “one will never discourage,” “but all the more reason not to respond” or think one could

OH pp. 76-9 the duty to respond to call of European memory, all other duties presuppose this one in silence [?]

——this same duty dictates welcoming foreigners, cultivating virtue of critical idea, but also submitting critique to deconstructive genealogy that exceeds it w/out compromising it, dictates a democracy to come (not even a regulative Kantian idea), tolerance of faith, minorities

FWT p. 81 Marx’s critique of ideology is a critique of the revenant > reproduces panic fear of spectrality, pursues, distances himself from, chases (away) the ghost

DS p. 245 “literary criticism” —ontological interpretation of mimesis? krinein proceeds precisely from out of that which is being threatened by the re-tempering (retrempe) of literature

P p. 19 deconstruction, not critique because it interferes w/ solid structures, attacks internal edifice (semantic, formal) of philosophemes (not only signifying representations or discourses) > also attacks historical forms of its pedagogy (economic, political structures), which should not be viewed as its “external housing

p. 39 for Kant, system of pure philosophy (metaphysics) is not yet possible; only critique is possible, produces krinein, in-between > pure philosophy sews everything up, includes critique w/in

——critique detaches, only a moment, related to desire, pleasure/unpleasure, Spur

p. 50 Kant’s intro (the foundation) came after he wrote Critique, tries to articulate critique w/ philosophy, Kant’s critique not metaphysics, it’s a crane (une grue) or dragline bucket (une drague) above the pit (la fosse), travaillant à gratter, fouiller, déblayer, looking to open up sure ground [compare to reading machine in Glas]

OTO pp. 33-4 Nietzsche’s critique of journalism always linked to critique of cultural machinery of State and educational apparatus [Derrida reads this as striking re: media today] > Nietzsche’s critique would make “ideology” critique appear as symptomatic, degenerative, as new subjection to Hegelian State (but, there are many Marxist views of State, and one would also…)

GSP p. 159 to point to prior circumscription of natural regions (domains of objectivity) in utilization of notions genesis and structure can only be derived from phenomenological critique > thus it is always rightfully primary

PS p. 170 to protect meaning of thought (value of work) against psychomedical reduction, criticism (aesthetic, literary, philosophical) must create an example, a case [from opposite path, produces same reduction it’s trying to avoid]

——the work, the example, becomes martyr, bearing witness to structure whose essential permanence is prime preoccupation of commentary > criticism reads essence into example

p. 183 for Artaud, evil, pollution, resides in clinical, critical [the work stolen from the body]

O p. 6 to remain content w/ reversal is to operate w/in immanence of system to be destroyed

WAP p. 63 question has no critical status if its answer is undecidable (yes & no)

p. 134 GREPH will critique all existing hierarchies (all implicit/explicit criteriology) and give general reelaboration of entire problematics of hierarchies

——w/out reelaboration [solely critique?] no profound transformation is possible

AFR pp. 49, 58, 60 the simplifying criticism of Condillac works on a lever of disorganization, works at ruining alternative btwn genesis & calculus—w/ disconcerting regularity in determined situation [implying Condillac’s theory of delay, these criticisms can only be read after the fact]

p. 53 Condillac’s corpus vulnerable, open, to violent self-serving operations [e.g. de Biran], innocently called lapses in reading: dissolving alternative opposition [btwn genesis/calculus] because unable to find literal rule of its [system’s working] statement

p. 58 to point to a “hesitation” in a text “marks a reading’s empiricist limit” [re: de Biran’s critique of Condillac]

——both Condillac and de Biran take repetition for granted, rule of indecision never comes to conception (au concept), a limit which is the concept not a concept: thus, Condillac finds contradiction in activity/passivity, de Biran duplicity in Condillac’s “hesitation”

OG pp. 158-60 [doubling commentary] read philosophy, even if you find its project fails, knowing it seeks to efface itself in the face of the signified content that it transports and teaches [this thought is beyond critique?]; all traditional criticism must be adhered to but only as a guardrail (garde-fou) > only protects, never opens a reading

EU pp. 48-9 acc Kant, censorship: a critique that has force (Gewalt) at its disposal > since 17th century, censorship was always matter of church, theological-political power: grant/refuse imprimatur, decide on professional qualifications, seize/prohibit books

pp. 75-6 most post-Kantians (incl. Nietzsche [?]) claim to have already reached the inaccessible: to think finitude, you have already thought the infinite (this becomes definition of thinking)

——post-Kantians accuse Kant of founding “criticism” in denegation, more responsible to found thought in inaccessible

p. 226 most ruthless critique still produced in name of a system of legitimation—one can at most deny this, it’s the most common thing in the world today

SPEC p. 267 when French Heideggerians translate Abbauen as “to deconstruct,” or when Marx’s aufgelöst is translated as deconstructed: pass off the already-there (déjà-là) of a word as the anteriority of a concept > w/ Marx, “deconstruction” would be limited to “intellectual critique” of superstructures

CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

P p. 35 Kant came closest to infinite reconciliation in Critique (reconciling infinite gulf opened in 1st & 2nd critique) > Hegel could reflect & reappropriate the Critique “almost at once,” but still a lack, in form of representative anticipation, reconciliation announced as duty, Sollen to infinity

——Heidegger defends Critique of Judgment’s meditation on art against Nietzsche’s reading

p. 38 difficulty, for Kant, to think judgment: what is the a priori of a middle term? a regulative principles would not allow for a proper domain, judgment as place deprived of place, neither practical nor theoretical

pp. 38-9 judgment (Urteil) as Mittelglied (middle articulation) btwn understanding and reason; is this third faculty [party?] attached to the other two, a part on its own? Kant can’t decide

——Urteil as the function of the copula

p. 41 if one can find a priori principles only in understanding, “great difficulties” in finding a priori of faculty of judgment w/out risking empiricism, but it must give itself its own norms

pp. 42-3 aesthetic judgments not one example but the example of judgment

——the lacunary character (Mangelhaftigkeit) [Hegel] of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, its lack as its frame, lack of theory of frame, or lack in theory of frame [Kant blames nature, old age]

pp. 43-4 Critique of Judgment about pleasure, being-pleasure of pleasure, possibility of pleasure, thus begin w/ taste, w/ affect not object, judgment of taste is subjective—outside of knowledge

p. 47 “grosse Schwierigkeit” of critical judgment of beauty [un plaisir désintéressé], auto-affection must cathect w/ pure objectivity, universality w/out concept, pure pleasure w/out enjoyment > Wohlgefallen (I-please-myself-in), Je-me-plais-à-me-plaire-à > auto-affection immediately goes outside: is pure hetero-affection, tout autre cathects me, w/out which, there’d be no universality

p. 50 Kant’s intro (the foundation) came after he wrote Critique, tries to articulate critique w/ philosophy, Kant’s critique not metaphysics, it’s a crane (une grue) or dragline bucket (une drague) above the pit (la fosse), travaillant à gratter, fouiller, déblayer, looking to open up sure ground [compare to reading machine in Glas]

——in what order do we read the critique: the de facto order, the de jure?

p. 51 divide btwn reflective/determinant judgment watches over internal divisions of Critique: 1) reflective (art): example first, particular allows discovery of law 2) determinant (science, logic): law first, specifies, narrows, tightens around particular

p. 63 where is the heart of the Critique?—[can only latch onto hinges (brisures), to parergons] > is Derrida taking unfair advantage of subchapters, but what is the proper text?

——fundamental presupposition in Critique: aesthetic judgment must bear upon intrinsic beauty, know difference btwn extrinsic/intrinsic

pp. 68-9 Kant’s table of 12 categories [of knowledge/understanding] is repeated for judgment—which is mediate knowledge of object (but it offers no knowledge…)

——Kant imports logical frame into nonlogical structure > the frame fits badly, violence of frame multiplies: theory of aesthetic in theory of beautiful in theory of taste in theory of judgment

pp. 70-1 Derrida reads footnotes, parentheses, hastily imported frames (re: Kant’s discrete admittance that there’s something of understanding in judgment) as invagination (pocket in “main” text) [Kant forced things, not Derrida?]

pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

p. 78 Kant’s pushing along his theory w/ aid of highchair, wheelchair, things aren’t going well

pp. 85-7 but en blanc [cf. C p. 229 can(n)on] (gun as finality w/out end in sight) [goal as white page] Kant’s finality w/out end: free beauty, wild tulip

p. 93 paradox of 3rd Critique: singularities must give rise to universalizable judgments > Kant’s free beauty: self-subsisting, always beautiful once

p. 105 the strange fact that the median propositions (those on free beauty) in Kant’s Critique remain suspended, lack immediate justification—though magnetized by their end

pp. 110-12 [the paradox of the Critique] is there idea/ideal, adequation & mimesis in beauty? ideal beauty is adherent, not free beauty, only ideal of imagination/presentation (Darstellung); man, endowed w/ reason, only being capable of a sans (of ideal of beauty), of giving himself his own ends; he is not errant, cannot conceive himself w/out goal, but he can put errancy, sans, into perspective; in this way man can never be aestheticized, cannot be beautiful, this is the “Copernican Revolution”? (sans of pure cut is effaced in him)

E p. 2 Kant allies pure morality w/ empirical culturalism in critique of pure judgments of taste

——a politics (a political economy) acts upon his discourse

EU p. 49 every critique of censorship is a critique of judgment, censorship is a judgment, proposes laws, tribunal, code > censere, to evaluate (réputer), compute, count—ratio, “census,” “cens,” is enumeration of citizens

pp. 57-8 Kant’s architectonics (of Reason) as internal principle, organic whole or organic purposiveness (finalité), one sets out from a purpose (on part de la fin), as in every organic totality > organic “metaphor” in Critique of Pure Reason presages the 3rd Critique

——if one does not set out from architectonic principle, one only achieves “technical” unity, “know-how”

p. 73 Kant of Critique of Judgment takes himself beyond oppositions, tries to think the living & art

CRUE LTY

GOD p. 114 Nietzsche’s diagnosis of cruelty is also aimed at economy, speculation, commercial trafficking in institution of morality & justice, & that which exceeds economy as exchange, le commerce du re-merciement [wage, profit of infinite]

——and Christianity’s self-destruction of justice by means of grace

R p. 109 autoimmunity, cruelty itself, autoinfection of all autoaffectivity, the self, ipse, autos finds itself infected (once it needs event, time, other) precedes or anticipates oppositions btwn physis & its others (tekhnē, nomos, thesis) > life-death

TC pp. 232-50 [see

THEATER OF CRUELTY

]

p. 250 Artaud: evil is the permanent law, good a cruelty added to another cruelty > fatal limit of cruelty which begins w/ its own representation

FWT p. 64 cruor (blood), Grausamkeit (no blood)

pp. 75-6 ‘sanitized society’ [MOP]—dead, sterilized? > there is and will be cruelty, among living beings, among men

p. 86 for Robespierre, re: DP, cruelty is excess severity > guillotine: more democratic than torture

p. 142 abolitionism [of DP’s paradoxical transcendentalism] must attempt history of blood w/in history of concept of exception, and a history of cruelty [not all cruelty is bloody, i.e. grausam]

p. 143 for Hugo, “social edifice of past” rested on 3 pillars: 1) priest 2) king 3) executioner

ATIA p. 100 Derrida introduces Adorno’s attack on Kant’s cruelty, compares it to Lacan’s Kant Avec Sade, though points out that Lacan not concerned w/ Kant’s cruelty towards animals

——in Kant, sacrificial cruelty more serious, terrible, when it comes to animals, less serious [?] re: sacrificing sensibility to moral reason

DPi p. 69 cruelty: 1) red blood 2) radical malice [cruelty and exception]

p. 137 great ambiguity of Christianity: confluence of human blood [re: guillotine] and blood of Christ’s Passion

p. 148 because cruelty “is” for Nietzsche, DP has no original place, just one of a series of tortures/spectacles > Nietzsche traces genealogies of law back to prehistoric animal-human life always ready to leave symptoms in law itself > cruelty of DP not a matter for law

p. 148 Nietzsche accuses Kant’s categorical imperative of a hypocritical cruelty, gives itself airs of keeping its hands clean (de ny pas toucher)

p. 149 religions: Systeme der Gausamkeit, festivals, theater of cruelty, are serious, there is no laughter, one suffers & causes suffering to take pleasure > cruelty not one part among others: it is the essence of life, life makes itself suffer to keep itself in memory, an interpretation of sacrificiality

——at all solemn festivals, there comes back (nachwirkt) a remainder of fear that presided over all acts of memory, promises, oaths, engagements

pp. 155-56 for Nietzsche, jouissance of causing pain, le jouir > right to cruelty

p. 158 Nietzsche: for too long earth as been a madhouse (Irrenhaus) > the psychical cruelty of God as executioner [of Christ] [suicide?], a will becoming mad, willing itself mad, mad about itself, pure sovereignty, madness of voluntary freedom

——mechanism of cruelty: take (infinite) pleasure in doing evil for evil’s sake > “genealogy of morals”: theater of cruelty, history of cruelty, prehistory of history as cruelty

p. 158-59 for Nietzsche, Kant stinks of Christian [?] cruelty, he smells blood, though in German grausam makes no reference to blood (cruor, crudelis, crudelitas reference blood)

pp. 159-60 sadism/masochism [cf. p. 168] > which is originary in Freud?; (Bemächtigung, Bewältigung—to dominate): cells sent to death, sacrificed, so that it, the state, can survive

p. 160 following Freud & Nietzsche, since originary sadistic cruelty has no contrary, surpassing cruelty w/ apparent non-cruelty would merely be a surpassing in cruelty > isn’t Beccaria’s proposal more cruel than Kant’s?

p. 163 for Nietzsche, Christianity hyperbolically augments infinite disproportion, pleasure of “highest degree” that accompanies the law of cruelty: finite debt exceeds correspondence by responding w/ a pleasure of cruelty that becomes infinite

***p. 167 questioning as cruelty, initiates torture, threatens to causes subject to lose his/her head

p. 168 for Nietzsche, cruelty has no contrary—just different forms, values, intensities, only a differance (logic w/out logic of differance is a paradoxical economy)

——how not to be cruel? is this question contaminated by contagion of cruelty?

***pp. 168-69 impossible, unstable, contagious, endemic question of cruelty reinscribed in hollow (creux) of another question: belief (croyance) > believing and not-believing “resonat[e] spectrally in the shell or the hollow of the other’s ear,” every belief “ventriloquized telephonically” by skepsis or epokhē of an “incredible” that is not belief’s contrary, but always a belief w/out belief, cruelty w/out cruelty [?]; cruelty and belief are hollowed into each other, the credited (cru) and the cruel

pp. 191-92 sans sang (U.S., Eucharist—real presence of blood of God): interiorization of blood in noncruel DP > turning point as a return, ce trop ou ce trope of blood

PSSS p. 238 whether I (you) make myself (yourself) or let myself (yourself) suffer cruelly [laisserfaire]—“cruelly,” a state of suffering, cruelty, remains

——cruor, crudus, crudelitas: necessary history of spilled blood

——Freud’s Grausamkeit (w/out flow of blood): suffer just to suffer, torture/kill oneself, take psychic pleasure in evil for evil’s sake

p. 239 for Nietzsche, cruelty is the cunning essence of life, w/out limit or opposable term, endless and w/out contrary

——for Freud, endless too, but w/ contrary [?] [Eros?]

——acc. Nietzsche & Freud, psychic cruelty always inventing new resources: cruelty of psyche, state of soul, still of the living, but a non-bloody cruelty [Grausamkeit]

——Derrida doesn’t [:)] draw link btwn non-bloody cruelty & the Jewish joke about analyst who chose his profession because he didn’t like sight of blood [doesn’t want to reopen history of Judaism & potential universality of psychoanalysis]

——psychoanalysis allows to think: the suffering for the pleasure of it (just to, just for), the worst cruelty, suffer to suffer, making/letting oneself suffer

p. 240 possibility of a drive of cruelty is reduced/excluded by theological, genetic, physicalist, cognitivist, metaphysical discourses

——“psychoanalysis” turned toward what is most proper to psychical cruelty, w/out alibi

——psychoanalysis as another name for “w/out alibi”: questions radical evil or an even worse evil > only psychoanalytic revolution up to task of taking account of grammatical syntax, reflexivity: [“I you we made I you we suffer”]

pp. 240-41 death drive (Todestrieb), cruel drive of destruction, annihilation, but also cruelty in Bemächtigungstrieb (drive for power, sovereignty, mastery)

p. 241 Derrida evokes a beyond the death drive, beyond pleasure/reality principle, beyond drive for sovereign mastery, beyond cruelty—beyond the “mythology of drives” > the undecidable in psychoanalysis, the impossible other

p. 242 cruelty & sovereignty (very obscure things) pose a resistance to psychoanalysis, just as psychoanalysis resists them > this border (inside/outside) of psychoanalysis bears weight of our questions: historical, ethical, juridical, political

p. 252 pleasure/reality principle—same in differance > cruelty drive more ancient than principles?

p. 256 these revenants must haunt our debates [Joshua Jung, Moses Freud] > cruel destiny of a proper name

pp. 257-58 death drive, origin of all cruelty—from sadism to primary masochism > this death drive sends reality/pleasure principles into crisis

p. 266 all the worst cruelties and terrors coincide w/ invention of human rights: Paris Commune, French Revolution, Shoah…

p. 261 survival, like some cruelty to oneself, always consists in enduring more than one death (and already during one’s lifetime)

pp. 269-70 for Freud, cruelty, aggression > death drive turned outward, toward “objects”

p. 270 cruel mutation of cruelty: a technical, scientific, juridical, economic, ethical, political, and terrorist policing mutation of our age

——must think a mutation of cruelty, more pscyhoanlaytico; new historical figures of an ageless cruelty, older than man

——think limit/horizon of psychoanalysis (yet to be thought)

p. 271 it is necessary to cultivate (it is necessary for an “it is necessary” to take shape: ethical/juridical/political obligation) an economy of detour & difference: strategy, path, pathbreaking, road, even a method > “indirect” way of combatting cruelty drive

——for Nietzsche & Freud, only differences of intensity, modality, quality, w/ in a same cruelty

——Freud: communism is an illusion, get rid of man’s aggressive inclination by guaranteeing satisfaction of all material needs

p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds [cruor]

——unconditional coming of other, its death or death itself, as irruption that routs performative/constative, perhaps beyond any cruelty

——psychoanalysis only possible approach, w/out alibi, to all virtual translations btwn the cruelties of a suffering “for the pleasure of it” [?] [I you we cruel-suffer]

p. 280 cruelty there will have been, cruelty before any personal figure, before “cruelty” is an attribute—no one’s fault

D p. 327 “I” as surface vacant of itself: foments (prepares a poison) cruel dispossession > reaches simulacrum point: où il peut à la fois teindre le tissu (stains the tissue) et feindre to tell you truth about it

——a summons, provocation, face-to-face [w/ what?]

AD p. 50 [like cruelty for Freud & Nietzsche] hospitality not circumscribed, has no contrary: allergy, rejection, xenophobia, even torture “welcomes”

p. 64 many interruptions of self re: Sinai (broken tablets, veiling/unveiling of Moses’ face, etc.) > Sinai still provocation to think passage btwn ethical, messianic, eschatological and the political (today when the foreigner, the displaced, the refugee incur cruelty w/out precedent)

CRYPTology

GOD pp. 10-11 [economy of the sacrifice] in turn toward new mystery, toward new structure of responsibility, prior one never eliminated, kept w/in oneself, mourned as crypt of a more ancient secret > is this repression, is this a kind of sacrificial Aufhebung?

p. 22 repression & incorporation: either 2 economies, or one economy w/ 2 systems in move from mysterium to secretum (possibility of keeping the secret)

——[secretum as history of truth, as cryptology, as a subjectification, separation from community of fusion]

p. 23 genealogy’s axiom: history never effaces what it buries (enfouit), keeps (garde) secret of what it encrypts, the secret of the secret, cest une histoire secrète du secret gardé; genealogy is also an economy

pp. 99-100 heart as light, photology, because it is spiritual, not earthly, it cannot hide, cannot be encrypted, an omnipresence more radical & effective than a spy satellite

p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (loeuvre)

GT pp. 152-3 readability of text structured by unreadability of secret, narrator in situation analogous to reader; crypt gives to be read, eternally unreadable

——[no depth beyond literary phenomenon] inviolability of secret depends on essential superficiality, bare device of being-two-to-speak (lêtre-deux-à-parler), a secret beyond reserve of technique, thing, being, thing thought (same could be said for money)

FK p. 100 crypt: n + 1 incalculably engenders all supplements

LOBL p. 127 je marrête > “same interdiction encrypts the resurrection at the moment when he sees the terrible Chose

***p. ~154 absolute crypt [heart] is unreadability—yet calls for infinite finite analysis, infinite-finite reada-translata-bility

p. 156 for intérieur (“conscience,” “inner tribunal,” “heart of hearts”), crypt

p.159 Blanchot: “in the very heart of which lives the infinite”

p. 162 “come”: single word, yet intertwined in series, inscribes its own effacement in middle of and on invaginated boundaries of récit, of these crypts, death or bridal chambers, hymen brings alliance & separation [after theft of key]

pp. 169-72 in Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, 2 women, 2 voices w/out voice, tele-phone each other: “come” > how do we read this unreadable hymen? it takes place as unreadable, from bottom of crypt in which it remains > it will have taken place where it remains: that’s the proof

H pp. 103-105 [on Oedipus’ final mourning] he’s deprived of something in secrecy [of light?], an encrypting of encrypting, in the crypt the address is cryptic

p. 105 Oedipus is twice encrypted, 1st in dying, 2nd in hiding his death > by demanding he be kept dead, he announces a piece of blackmail

p. anne 114 crypt, vault [voute] has a relation to casting spells [envoutement]; pp. 124-26 having a spell cast is enclosure beneath a vault—dematerialization of Internet end of spell? no, there’s spell, encrypting in techno-communication

AF AF p. 66 repression dissimulates or encrypts the archives, archive of the virtual > virtuality removed from its oppositional coupling to actuality, effectivity, reality [re: full & effective actuality of an archived event]

PP PP p. 105 (119) written traces don’t belong to phusis, not alive, or belong to Heraclitean phusis, in which truth takes shelter in its crypt (à sabriter en sa crypte) > “cryptogram” is a pleonasm

——acc. to king, pharmakon hypnotizes life of memory, taking it out of itself (la faisant sortir de soi) by monumentalizing it: médusée (medusad)

p. 129 in shadows of Plato’s pharmacy [like a crypt, cave], prior to oppositions (conscious/unconscious, freedom/constraint, voluntary/involuntary), where “language” is not pertinent

PAS PAS pp. (67-8) “terrifyingly ancient” time, absolute crypt, requires the récit (reciting, it can be a matter of nothing but that), ce récit [of viens], neither relation to the event nor event itself > pas dévénement, pas de concept

***PPHS pp. 82-3(n) Derrida, through Hegel, describes tomb, family crypt (caveau), oikēsis, as the sign of death that capitalizes (thésaurise) on life by marking that life continues elsewhere, il la tient donc aussi à labri de la mort; at the heart of this monument, this sign of death, soul keeps itself alive, needs this works of death > the sign, “the height conserving in its depths the hegemony of the soul,” is the pyramid [later, Derrida will live through this tomb not, like Hegel, by negating it]

T pp. xv-xvi how to interpret (interpretation as neither a theory nor discursive practice of philosophy) the discourse that organizes economy of its [philosophy’s] representation, its weave, so nothing surprises: reasons from w/in vault (cave) of its autism

——interpretation as luxating philosophical ear, set loxōs in logos to work, une tout autre forme dembuscade, lokhos, block correspondence muffling other hammer [speaks to him w/ third ear]

p. leiris xxi-ii basse taille: gravedigger’s funeral voice: monk

SH p. 52 crypt occurs, is poet’s passion (not action)

——a date fascinates, but is not made to fascinate, crypt occurs wherever singular incision marks language (not the work of hermetic poet anxious to seduce w/ ciphers)

F p. xii the crypt’s rightful place is the other’s, it won’t have taken place

pp. xii-xiii je marrête ici, déjà (tombe en arrêt [vault to a stop]), setting on the “edge of the crypt” a voiceless word, a blank stone of a scruple [see p. xlviii], to engage others to it, of a crypt

p. xiii question of crypt (singular not general) precedes philosophical questions re: Thing, Thinking > false, “artificial” unconscious (new metaphorical terrain): graft in heart of the organ

——crypt’s same: topoi, death, cipher > neither disassociated nor hierarchically ordered

p. xiv crypt: hides as it holds, dissimulates its dissimulation, its grounds not natural; physis tends to encrypt (itself) > cest quelle se déborde pour enfermer, naturellement, son autre, tous ses autres

——an enclosure, history of an enclave, architecture, open square w/in space, secret interior w/in public square, a closure, a safe (for) in a forum (where free circulation of objects & speech occurs)

——hermetically sealed? yes and no [see SH p. 61], “jene sauve un for intérieur quen le mettant enmoi”, à part moi, dehors

p. xv crypt built by (dans) violence, break in w/ lock, force, discovering crack, choose angle

——crypt’s failure to prevent seeping, its angular inscriptions run along a divided line of “fantasmatic double(ness)”: each fantasy “double and opposed”

——le for du dedans (not intérieur) is not le tribunal de la conscience, even though enclosed w/in forum of self > it is the contradiction w/ in desire [?]: father’s penis neither comes [ne jouisse] nor goes [ni ne périsse] > from this contradiction we understand the solidity of crypt, the indefatigable effort to maintain it, & its failures, permeations from w/in & w/out, its seepings

p. xvi crypt is a parasite inclusion/internalization, an inside heterogenous to inside of Self, an outcast in domain of introjection w/in which it violently takes its place, le for cryptique entretiens dans la répétition the mortal conflict it is impotent to resolve

p. xvii crypt, place of silence, where a foreign body is kept as a foreigner, the self mimes introj. while incorp. makes secret; introjection speaks, incorporation silent, or speaks to ward off

——crypt is monument/tomb/commemoration of object’s exclusion

——crypt is vault (le caveau) of a desire [refused introjection: failed/fake incorporation]

pp. xviii-xix crypt must always incorporate more than one, plus dun: cryptophore’s secret must be shared (partagé) w/ a “third,” that’s what makes a secret a secret

——le tiers incorporé est gardé pour être supprimé [held in to be crossed out]: assembly of witnesses around Wolf Man’s crypt (forum): whole strategy of testifying > on sy coupe tout le temps, witnesses testify by interrupting, wounded by angular edges of forum

p. xix crypt, pocket of resistance, le for le plus intérieur (la crypte comme inconscience artificiel, comme artefact du Moi) devient le hormis (excepté, sauf, fors) > dizzying topology of inside/outside

p. xx [angular] partitions [w/in Self] of crypt: fractures into angular pieces, arranges (aménage) cavities, corridors, zigzag labyrinths, anfractuosities, craggy (escarpées) fortifications > effects of breakages (cassures); requires light in darkness to shine on inner partition of splintered symbol (intrasymbolic not cosymbolic): each fragment conscious to itself, unconscious to ‘non-crypt’

p. xxi crypt: no-place of place (other place), a before acquittal (the whole trial should no have ever been); crypt: “pleasure’s death” marks singular pleasure: fors

p. xxii crypt is catastrophe, catastrophe’s monument (forum is that which attempts to prevent catastrophe); but in trying to destroy it [crypt?], it is consolidated: this is the catastrophe

——[re: Wolf Man] choice btwn 2 catastrophes: 1) love his sister to avoid killing her 2) kill his sister to avoid loving her

pp. xxii-xxiii Wolf Man tries to kill all the dead figures w/in him, and thus they are still alive > he silent consolidates the crypt

p. xxiii crypt constructed by its very ruin, held up by what saps it > in its contradiction, coffre-fort [fors] and ceaseless instability

p. xxiv crypt as commemorative monument of what must be kept alive: most precious think of all

p. xxvi the Thing is encrypted by crypt (for du Moi, self’s safe) not w/in (dans) it; crypted structure of ultimate referent [Thing] means double articulation (history, story) coalesces all these genres: myth, poem, novel, drama, translation > the narrated event never appears

p. xxvii Torok: “the discovery of English as a cryptic language was a crucial step”

pp. xxx-xxxi crypt (foreigner in self) & the ghost effect (heterocryptic ghost returning from Unconscious of the other) > radical otherness in self (not unconscious) > law of another generation

pp. 118-19n ghost effect (ghost that comes haunting from someone else’s crypt, heterocryptography) ≠ crypt effect (foreigner incorporated in crypt of Self) > la revenance nest pas un retour du refoulé

“ventroliquist” speaks from topography w/in self or from foreign/parental topography

pp. xxxiv-xxxv tombstone is “illicit,” marks extreme jouissance, attempt to break in [analyze] isn’t illegal, a market is organized around crypt, when introjection is thwarted > evaluates rates (taux) of pleasure (jouissance) & pain (forum or for, la place de marché, fur)

p. xxxvi melancholic crypt: shelters one’s own lost and incorporated object; Wolf Man’s crypt not melancholic, it shelters illegitimate object of another [his sister] [ghost effect?]

p. xxxvi crypt: 1) organization of places designed to lead astray 2) topos to conserve/hide living dead 3) cipher/code

p. xxxv self: a cemetery guard (crypt is enclosed w/in self as excluded), self makes rounds (round & round) of crypt like he’s the proprietor, but he’s not, uses knowledge to keep visitors away

p. xliii machinery would attest to existence of crypt

DS p. 193 mimesis commanded by process of truth 1) mimēsis presents thing itself, the physis that produces itself, it is the movement of phusis (which prefers the crypt), is linked to mnēmē, which unveils, un-forgets

P pp. 46-7 Kant’s disinterested pleasure (uninteressirten Wohlgefallen) a mise en crypte (a pleasing myself by putting to death what exists in as much as it exists)

REST p. 364 “clearly” & “evidently” do not implicate clarity but necessity to deny intrinsic obscurity of the thing—deny its essential crypt

p. 382 “useless hermeticism [Artaud]” of crypted remainder, secret already legible, separation already in the word, the letter, the pair > opening of secret

EJQB p. 76 nonquestion, act of faith, unpenetrated certainty that Being is a Grammar, world is in all its parts a cryptogram [this nonquestion not yet a dogma]

PJP pp. 182-83 tragedy of testimonial narration > encrypt while unveiling

C p. 188 Derrida means not to touch anything, leave the thing alone, alone w/ you, leave the thing to “the nameless crypt of its mutism” > it knows (how) to keep quiet

pp. 239-40 date as place of crypt, stands in for it, only one that remains; why do I date? throw of a die: no one will know what was lived on the date (what was taken away), save (fors) the heart

LI p. 55 “classical concept” as target: a tortuous, complex strategy > exploit target against itself by discovering it to be “basis” of an operation directed against itself, or discovering “in it” the cryptic reserve of something utterly different

ATM p. 189 bottomless crypt gives one to read for a lapse above her body that decomposes on analysis

AD p. 35 idiom, ambiguous chance, shibboleth of the threshold, preliminary chance of hospitality (i.e. French language)

——these chances accumulate places appropriate to the crypt (i.e. translating accueil and recueillement)

CRYPT

PP p. 69 an inscription, Delphikon gramma [Phaedrus (229d)], anything but oracle, prescribes silent cipher, signifies, orders autoscopy, autognosis [re: Socrates’ send-off of myths]

F p. xx topography “twice cleft”; dividing line runs through intrasymbolism of Self and Unconscious (the twice divided, or double division, is what creates an undecipherable symbol)

pp. xxxv-xxxvi language inhabits crypt as “mots enterrés vifs,” words relieved of communicative function, marking, in a way, that le désir a été dune certaine manière satisfait, que la jouissance a eu lieu

p. xxxvi Wolf Man’s crypt not melancholic crypt, doesn’t shelter his own object, but illegitimate object of another [his sister] > if cemetery guard lacks ownership of the tombs, at least he’s entitled to position, Wolf Man is in position of guard as proxy [pp. 199-20n position as guard has been mortgaged, Derrida haunted by this word, this “death pledge”]

p. xxxvi encrypted, coded text written on crypt is not written on a pre-existing partition, the partition is the material of the text > crypter, cest chiffrer

one can never manipulate a secret code alone

——the reason a code is indispensable to a crypt is because the ghosts floating around it exchange signs

p. xxxvii Abraham and Torok decipher a story that was its own ciphering, tell the story of a story, from one word, one safe (for), to another

pp. xxxviii-xxxix crypt of language: contract w/ dead, dead must pledge to occupy place as dead, must engage dying self alive

——pledge as pocket [Genet’s matchbox] > double desire, thanato-poetic pleasure (plaisir) can catch fire

p. xxxix pocket near pudenda, extra flap of cloth, where most precious thing is kept: money, title, share in stock market [crypt as wallet]

——cryptophore, à manger le morceau (le mors) sans pouvoir le digérer, must constantly betray cipher that seals and conceals it > Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, truly cryptic story

——cryptonomy is not purely verbal, but perception, like all mute pictures, falls under laws of cipher

***pp. xliii-xliv “Cause” is designified in the crypt of anasemia, a trace w/ no present in its wake > Thing does not speak, is not a thing, its testamentary structure organizes funeral pomp of crypt

p. xlii [re: Wolf Man’s cryptonomic translations] phonetic contaminations, nonsemantic associations, neither rhetorical figures nor metonymic displacements > but angular: contact (semantic or formal) w/ surface of its allosemes acc. most economical line/surface

——cryptonymic translations, art of chicanery, judicial pettifogging, hidden doors, detours > seduces, discourages, fascinates, fatigues

——cryptonomy follows contacts, straight lines or surfaces in most economical way, this makes cryptonomic the once inflexible logic of castration

——“cryptonyms of repressed pleasure words” [re: Grateloup, tieret, rub, scar, Thing]

p. xlv cryptonomy is said first of [his, Wolf Man’s] proper name (what it kept secret): monument of a catastrophe

***——et cest dans la mesure où la crypte fermait mal quune chance restait encore: le preuve > but the proof came for Wolf Man too late

——could Wolf Man read what is written here on his crypt?

p. xlviii cryptonomy: crack (la ligne de brisure) of a symbol, upright column of name (colonne érigée dun nom), blank voice of a scruple [see p. xiii], always extends beyond the self

SP pp. 135-39 Derrida exposes cryptic structure of writing by “confessing” to it “directly,” re: Nietzsche’s forgetting the umbrella; one could never heed the cryptic warning, what if the “limits of will to mean” are exactly what Nietzsche meant w/ this phrase, an intentional graft

REST p. 271 obviously secret: cipher remains secret because not concealed > encrypted in the ether of obviousness & truth [re: correspondence btwn Heidegger/Shapiro] [cf. p. 283 “invisible ether of this trivial self-evidence”: the shoes in the work are out of work because they are painted]

p. 382 would have to render secret already legible, like a remainder of a useless cipher

EL p. 204 apocalyptô: 1) decrypting what is hidden, revelation/unveiling 2) end time, last judgment 3) catastrophe, cataclysm

pp. 204-05 Scholem describes a move from national, exoteric [straightforward] Messianism to cryptographic, esoteric, elitist, apocalypticism accentuated by Jews losing their nation: the cryptic veil becomes “its very phenomenality, its state and its efficacy”

SPEC pp. 378-79 Freud’s “to let develop” [re: Aristophanes’ speech] mortgages irresponsibility, no engagement, epokhē of judgment, speaks from no-place [Lacan takes Beyond… too seriously?]

CULTURE

A pp. 23-4 “my death,” a flashing light at every border, it’s awake, can always see a nightwatchman (du veilleur) or a nightlight (de la veilleuse)

——in crossing a border, one changes/exchanges death (on change le mort, on change de mort), one passes from figure of death as trespass (passage of line, transgression of border, pas au-delà) to another figure of border btwn life and death

——every culture characterized by way of its dealing w/, its “living” death as trespass

p. 42 there is no culture of death itself or properly dying, dying neither entirely natural nor cultural

p. 43 no culture, no medicine [pharmakon] w/out horizon of death

pp. 43-44 “culture of death”—a tautology? each culture treats death differently, w/ different partitions, culture of death = history of death (cult of ancestors, rituals of mourning/sacrifice)

——difference of animal/human, biological life/culture is the relation to death as such, true border would be there

OH pp. 9-10 what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself, culture of oneself as culture of other, gathered and divided at the heart, home: [violent syntax] différence (d) avec soi

——culture of other: signals culture never has a single origin

pp. 10-1 monogenealogy: mystification in history of culture

p. 18 every history, history of a culture, has a telos (promise, memory) toward which it dreams of gathering itself > anticipation & telos; and every history cannot be identified in advance, unanticipatable, non-masterable, that of which one has no memory

p. 27 identification is always cultural never natural, always has a capital form, advanced point, capitalizing reserve

p. 64 Valéry: Mediterranean has been a veritable machine for making culture

PPHS p. 95 acc. Hegel, phonetic alphabet most open to infinite development of tradition, most historic element of culture

P p. 107 Kant: “happiness & culture presupposes that man puts to work what nature puts at his disposal”; Critique depends on reflexive humanism, pragmatic anthropology

POS p. 102n taking seriously the systematic formation of our “culture” gives deconstruction its systematic character, avoids empiricism, improvisation, false discoveries

OTO pp. 21-2 for Nietzsche, culture (Bildung) begins when we know how to treat the living as living; Derrida discusses a pact, alliance, contract, a hymen w/ living language, w/ mother (tongue), against death (father): even good master of history (science of the father) trains for the sake of mother tongue, must know when to suppress ‘historical interest’ for culture to begin

p 24n [re: signature w/out value, to which is juxtaposed untimely signature] Nietzsche: rights of genius have been democratized, everyone relieved of the labor to form oneself, of personal necessity of culture (Bildungsarbeit, Bildungsnot)

p. 28 Nietzsche: culture (Bildung) begins w/ obedience (Gehorsamkeit), subordination (Unterordnung), discipline (Zucht), not academic freedom

O p. 13n Hegel: “Bildung (culture) must leave room for the earnestness of life in its concrete richness; this leads the way to experience of the thing itself”

***SW p. 346 “not in a hurry”: I am against those who prescribe the veil, against those who forbid it (same w/ circumcision) > people don’t realize any longer that the scholarly, secular, democratic belong to cultures of tallith & veil: contamination is everywhere

RGE pp. 272-73 reading of Bataille: 1) must not isolate notions (“experience,” “interior”) as if they were their own context: error to remain blind [?] to a traditional culture wishing to be taken as natural element of discourse 2) must not submit contextual attentiveness to system of meaning promising absolute formal mastery (this would erase excess of nonmeaning)

REST p. 264 marche almost same word as mark, margins, also Pas > necessity of walking, lowest degree, most subjective or underlying level of culture/institution: pair of shoes

HST pp. 361 hospitality: culture itself > les structure de laccueil, les structures daccueil

——no culture w/out culture of death says same thing as no culture w/out culture of hospitality: of the abode as last resting place (de la demeure comme dernieère demeure), mourning & memory

***+R p. 175 “left-realism” (codified simplification or politicist stereotype) annuls scientific event, squeezing out thickness of culture, ideological efficacity [opposite of formalism?]

CF pp. 16-7 ‘to cultivate an ethic of hospitality’: tautologous expression? hospitality is culture, ethics, residence, relation to ourselves & others

p. 57 all Nation-States founded in violence, all culture a type of colonialism > foundation scripted into State order to hide itself, sublimation/celebration of beginning as amnesia

***BSi pp. 338-39 the (mis)translation of logos brings w/ it the whole of culture; whole force of history at work to produce this translation [logos as Christ] > whole of history at play in motif of beast & sovereign and their relation to zoōn: “there are no limits, no frontiers that can contain these issues of translation”

OG p. 25 Hegel: learn to read and write as a means to infinite culture

p. 121 writing as criterion of historicity or cultural value

p. 207 forget different remedies, is the tarantula bite itself different in different cultures?

CUT

LOBL p. 117 I slice barbarously, illegitimately, as we always do, counting on implicit contract, impossible contract, that you’ve read “everything,” that you know the whole corpus by heart at every moment, w/ living heart that beats unceasingly (sans arrêt), w/out pulsation

pp. ~171-72 economy: stricture not coupure [pre-capitalist machine?], always external constraint that arrests a text in general, i.e. anything, for example life death

MSUB J p. 165 van Gogh did not paint ghosts, he reperspired nature, made it sweat, awful elementary pressures of commas [arrêt], scratches > now we see them too in the world

A p. 29 ontology of Dasein superordinate (vorgeordneten) to ontology of life [hierarchy in Heidegger]

p. 38 Heidegger: “Daisen never perishes (verendet nie), Dasein, however, can demise (ableben) only as long as it is dying (solange, als es stirbt)”

——Heidegger’s distinction btwn sterben and verenden not irreconcilable w/ Freud’s thought re: fact that our mortality via death drive isn’t testified by science, our beliefs or the unconscious

pp. 38-9 does distinction btwn demise and dying avoid Levinas’ objection to Heidegger re: “mineness” of dying > in dying proper and properly speaking, no one can die for the other

pp. 39-40 that Dasein knows no end in sense of verenden, that it can only only perish as animal but not as Dasein, implies Dasein is immortal in its originary being-to-death

p. 44 Heidegger: all thoughts of demise presuppose an anthropological (historical) or biological (natural) concept of death, which existential analytic of Dasein seeks to correct

p. 45 existential analytic precedes, and is presupposed by other discourses of death, and founds (fundiert) them

p. 51 “lived experience” is a ridiculous translation of Erlebnis (the measure of phenomenology) > how does it relate to Bezeugung (testimony)? Dasein never has the Erleben of its own demise (Ableben) but can testify to it, acc. Heidegger

p. 52 universality of existential analysis of death (primitives have access to Dasein)

p. 53 “ontico-ontological priority of Dasein,” “exemplary” point of departure of existential analytic of Dasein, power of question of we, we here, that can listen wait for each other

pp. 53-4 Heidegger places analytic of Dasein re: death here, on this side, before all ontical speculation operating beyond (ultra, meta, trans), by way of an uncontested, irrecusable decision (a performative incision) on the undecidable question of “here”: a testimony w/out proof

p. 57 only way for existential analytic of Dasein to achieve universality, must be only discipline where death knows no borders

pp. 62-3 Heidegger suggests diagnosis of problematic closures, they forget essence of Dasein, lock Dasein into ontological determination that is not its own, that of Vorhandensein

p. 63 “if being-possible is the being proper to Dasein, then the existential analysis of the death of Dasein will have to make of this possibility its theme” > death is possibility par excellence, exemplarily guides existential analysis

p. 66 for Heidegger, only w/ death does one await oneself, expect oneself > Dasein stretches (se tend), bends toward (se tend vers), offers to itself (se tend), offers it to itself (se le tend)

for Heidegger, death—stand before (steht bevor) oneself, await, precede oneself as before a mirror, as before the future, “in its ownmost potentiality for being” [see p. 78]

p. 67 Dasein takes shelter from standing before oneself [in anxiety of death] in gossip (Gerede), far from Unheimlichkeit, structural not accidental modes of Verfallen

Derrida notes that, for Heidegger, the certainty of death is heterogenous to any other form of certainty, that when one speaks of dying it occurs at limits of truth and untruth

p. 68 Derrida introduces the often cited: death is for Dasein the possibility of an impossibility

p. 79 existential analysis as witness, belonging w/out belonging of testimony, and first of all to language

PP p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

PAS PAS p. (76) Blanchot makes a laughing stock (fait rire) of the opposition btwn clarification (explicitation) and cut (coupure) > léclat de rire

P pp. 86-9 Kant’s beauty [wild tulip] requires absolute interruption: straining toward end w/out goal, not pure if cut can be bandaged (pansable), no pure cut (if it could be prolonged, completed, supplemented), no beauty > everything in it straining toward the bout (end, blow)

——this fascination w/out desire, in view of an end never in view, a but en blanc [“point blank”] > interrupted finality must show itself as finality & interrupture, as edging

——it is the sans that counts for beauty, la bordure [edging] en sans de la coupure pure

p. 89 death’s essential relation to the cut, the hiatus of the abyss, where beauty takes us by surprise

p. 94 concepts stitch up (recoudre), furnish supplement of adherence [re: completes incomplete gadget]; still, there’s a chiasma, w/ free beauty, la coupure ny laisse aucune peau, aucun tissu dadhérence: law w/out concept, w/out debt, complete because incomplete

——une fleur belle est toujours en ce sens une fleur absolument coupable absolument absoute [sic], innocente

p. 95 concept: a saturating generality—drinks up or effaces sans of pure cut

POS p. 82 incision of deconstruction (not voluntary decision, not absolute beginning) occurs along lines of force, forces of rupture, that are localizable in discourse to be deconstructed

ROP p. 11 what forever exceeds the analysis of the dream: a knot that can’t be untied, un fil, qui, pour être coupé, comme un cordon ombilical, nen reste pas moins à jamais noué [knotted even when cut], à même le corps, a la place du nombril [name?] > la cicatrice est un noeud contre lequel lanalyse ne peut rien

p. 12 how can the cut be the tie itself? how can the link be the interruption?

SP pp. 161-63n la signature et le texte tombent lun hors de lautre, se sécrètent, se séparent, et sexcrètent, se forment de la coupure même qui les décapite, les échafaude en tronc sans tête, dès linstant de leur itérabilité > expropriative commencement marks everything erected w/ structure of etron [fecal matter]

O pp. 57-9 “la dissémination (se) produit (dans) cela : coupe de plaisir” > il rythme et le plaisir et la répétition selon une coupe multiple > il [text, literature, the beyond of the whole] imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

coupe claire, coupe définitive, coupe à tire et à aire [different ways to clear out trees]

——preface—external seal, final kick (coup final), kick-off (coup denvoi)

p. 59 mise en jeu sans prélude, de ce qui reste à préparer dun coup [no prelude for all the coups]

——if you wanna see for yourself, encounter by chance, enmeshed (engrenés) in some corner (coin), ce quil en est de la coupe or/livre

SW p. 329 [re: laser] this radiance requires two parallel mirrors perpendicular to cutting rays (like in nature, double mirror w/ 2 voices)

p. 332 braid of phonemes (verdict, voix, vouloir, le voir, la venue, etc.) is knotted out of sight, remains, like warp of text, untranslatable > language we inherit is never ours, which is why it can’t be translated: put it outside its self, no longer recognize its children/idiom [baby daddy]

pp. 350-51 culpable edging of phallus, edges of the cut, support the veil, hold it like a roof, canvas—this theoretical toilet of the phallus is the concept > phallus is the concept: can’t oppose it, nor a “sexual theory”: unless you do something different, the way you set the sail (Benjamin)

Gii pp. 61-2 savage second blow of sexual difference, its Verwesung, vs. originary, tender sexual difference > Heidegger claims this schema is not Christian/Platonic, but it has no other content and even no other language than Platonism/Christianity > its archi-matinal origin, ultra-Western horizon, constituted by hollow of a repetition, same for Verfall, Ruf, Sorge in structure of Dasein

REST p. 357 Da of Dasein (its proximity) lets distance of fort play w/in it

DST DST p. 196 perhaps désister marks nothing negative, perhaps dé- does not determine -ister (-ester, ist, est: exist, subsist, consist), but dislodges it radically (this aradical root -ister) [cf. LI p. 159n]

p. 202 signature interrupts, or rather marks w/ incision, the fold along which metaphysical ontomimetology is destined to divide, desist [ontomimetology in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, and more surreptitiously in Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan]

RM p. 73 Derrida attempted to regulate use of word recouper in Glas

TR p. 133 oeuvre as trace implies structure of sur-vival, what cuts the oeuvre off from the operation, cut assures archival independence, quasi-machinelike autonomy: iterability, power of repetition

——machine is cut as well as cutting re: living present of life, living body > machine as much effect as cause of cut

p. 134 cut: wounding, opening, chance of a respiration

PSSS p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds [cruor]

——this discontinuity calls for a leap, what Classical humanist philosophers call freedom, this interruption gives a chance

D p. 300 Soller: toujours cette marge, cette coupure, mince immensité latente

——every term depends on place [in?] machine—entrained into an ordered series of cuts

pp. 300-01 violent, arbitrary cut, scission (la coupure) necessary because beginning se plie et se multiplie; coupe-papier (letter-opener), la lame (sharp blade) de la décision, tranchant (cutting edge); la répétition hasardeuse et nécessaire du déjà-là dun (autre) texte

p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

pp. 301-02 to present oneself, to stand upright (se dresser), always a murder, a castration > an erection that can only display itself in play, laughter, pointed teeth of cut

p. 304 “primitive” mythical unity always reconstituted retrospectively dans laprès-coupure > the decision, le coup (shot, throw, blow) parts the seed as it projects it (partage la semence en la projetant)

p. 307 nothing says present better, it seems, than il y a; but what is present is a scission, il y a cette coupure, what is present & at work is a “recoil (recul),” possibility of its triggering

p. 323 through mirror-effect (germinates/deforms), each sequence of text comprehends another > each part smaller than themselves & greater than the whole they reflect

——figure of quadrangle complicated by strange mirror [imparfait de double fond], mirror as echo that precedes origin it seems to answer > “echo” is an “incision” (X nétant constitués quen retour)

p. 355 discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

+R p. 162 [quoting Glas] Genet’s text is not exhausted by the pocket Derrida cuts, sews, and binds: it was the text [Genet’s] which pierced a hole in the pocket first

p. 181 [re: Adami] detailing of extracts, fragments detachable as signatures (typewriter, pen case, umbrella, spectacles, etc.) > why de-tail [dé-tailler: cut out]?

LI p. 53 coupure intervenes moment there’s a mark, its positive condition of emergence, it is iterability itself, that which is remarkable in mark, re- of repeated, re- of repeating, condition/effect of iterability, merges w/ it, cuts across (recoupe) iterability, cutting the cut/break in remark

TN pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

p. 96 operation that inscribed some touching in all writing, surg-ical, Greek cheirourgia, cheir (hand), ergon (work) > even if machines/technology are indispensable

NOY pp. 231-32 when thought and the word (la parole) given in writing merge (se confond) at the heart of the same time (au coeur du même temps); chance encounter in singularity of “graph,” coincidence of the cut (la coupure) and the opening (louverture)

pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

ATM pp. 163-64 for Levinas, interruption puts an end to the authority of the Said, the thematical, dialectical, the same, the economical

——Levinas describes how the enveloping continuum or tissue of the State, the dialectic, etc., preserves itself by cutting out interruptions and retying/maintaining itself in suppressing them: Levinas reties cut threads (not continuous ones): this is the trace of his diachrony, trace of discontinuity

p. 165 since interruption is not a cut but logic of ab-solute de-stricturation, since it is reappropriable: to insist on the hiatus, the series is necessary > series has no single knot, but knots a multiplicity of retied knots (noeuds re-noués)

——opening of interruption is never pure

DASE IN

SPOM p. 125 there is no Dasein of the specter

HERP p. 173 Dasein—possibility of “as such (als)” and Verstehen (understanding)

p. 175 the voice, acc. Heidegger, is essentially marked, like everything at opening of Dasein, by Stimmung and Befindlichkeit—tonality, modality that is affective (not Heidegger’s words)

p. 177 as Dasein throws itself by anticipation toward death, it inherits & chooses, chooses the very possibility of inheritance (Kampf belongs to very structure of Dasein)

p. 178 Dasein (Daseins ear) is beside what is heard [see What Poets are For?], carries beside itself (bei sich) the voice of the friend > all depends on semantics of bei, beside, auprès de: neither very close nor infinitely distant

EM pp. 115-16 (136-37) Sartre countersigned Corbin’s monstrous translation of Dasein: “réalité-humaine” > w/ Sartre and others of this period, concept of man is never examined

p. 124 (148) though Dasein not simply man of metaphysics, everything in Letter on Humanism and beyond returns to “proper of man,” guided by concept of proximity

pp. 125-26 (150-51) for Heidegger, Dasein entity w/ which to interpret Being, and which questions it; Dasein not consciousness like in transcendental phenomenology

——exemplary being is “phenomenological,” governed by principle of principles, i.e. presence and presence in self-presence, manifested in being we are, such proximity determines factum

p. 126 reading of text Dasein is a hermeneutics > if one looks closely, phenomenological opposition “implicit/explicit” permits Heidegger to avoid vicious circle (posing question of Being on basis of ontological predetermination)

pp. 126-27 (151) Dasein serves as exemplary text to read Being, lhomme reste le lien ou le fil conducteur paléonymique that ties analytic of Dasein to totality of metaphysical tradition

——“on voit donc que le Dasein, sil nest pas lhomme, nest pourtant pas autre chose que lhomme

p. 127 (152) for Heidegger, motif of proximity caught in opposition which unceasingly regulates his discourse: in proximity of ontic, ontological Dasein is that which is farthest

p. 128 Da of Dasein signifies near as much as far

p. 130 (156) for Heidegger, restoration of essence of dignity, of proximity to Being, is done for Being and honor of Dasein, not for civilization or culture

——Derrida explains reason for Heidegger’s “metaphorics of proximity”: “the ontological distance from Dasein to what Dasein is as ek-sistence and to the Da of Sein, the distance that first was given as ontic proximity, must be reduced by the thinking of the truth of Being”

p. 131n (157-58n) predominance of ontological proximity, man dwells in nearness, lighting of the Da, dwells as ek-sisting (ecstatic dwelling in nearness of Being, contrasts existentia, existence)

S p. 17 Dasein is exemplary because of the experience of the question; privileged entity for a reading of Being

p. 18 how else but by confirming it a priori and circularly can Heidegger question Daseins privilege (Vorrang) re: the question?

pp. 18-19 spirit, soul, psyche, consciousness, ego, reason, subject block interrogation of Being of Dasein; the Jemeinigkeit of Dasein is not ego, not Vorhandene, not indifferent to but cares for its Being

pp. 19-20 Daseins indifference (Indifferenz, Gleichgültigkeit) is only possible because Dasein is not in-different, cares about Being, indifference as everydayness (not negative), its Durchschnittlichkeit

pp. 20-21 three forms of indifference: 1) stone, vorhandene entity 2) positive phenomenon of Dasein 3) paralyzing indifference, that of Descartes, substantializes a “who” as existing in form of Vorhandenheit > #2 and #3, however, are of the same capacity

——Heidegger’s Destruktion of “spirit,” vulgar concept of time, Daseins substance is not spirit but existence

p. 35 Entschlossenheit (resolution) gives possible opening to Eigentlichkeit, authentic property of Dasein

p. 51 for Heidegger, privation (Privation) in Dasein, in structure of “as,” structure of “something as something (die Struktur des Etwas als Etwas),” not same as animal’s privation (Entbehrung)

OS pp. 63-4(n) in analytic of Dasein, relation of fall to proper, authenticity, enigmatic proximity (identity w/ itself of the questioning), concept of finitude

ATIA pp. 79-80 for Dasein to be in the world, for there to be world, must Dasein be-with-animal?

p. 90 Dasein, a deconstruction of Cartesian subjectivity, but still anchored [inked] in “I am,” in Jemeinigkeit

DPi p. 37 instant of bandages, Christ’s being-there w/out being-there: this Dasein that is not a Da-sein, this Fort/Da-sein of Christ who’s dead but not dead, mort vivant

p. 99 for Heidegger, animal perishes (crève), only Dasein (human) dies, has right/possibility to die

RGE p. 338n Dasein translated as human-reality in Corbin’s French: monstrosity of unlimited consequences!

Gi p. 8 insofar as it is open to the question of Being, Dasein would not be sexiferous (sexifère) [?]

p. 10 Dasein, the there of Being, bears no sexual mark [?]

***——list of general structures of Dasein: In-der-Welt Sein als Mit- und Selbstsein, Räumlichkeit, Befindlichkeit, Rede, Sprache, Geworfenheit, Sorge, Zeitlichkeit, Sein zum Tode

——Dasein: exemplary entity for the reading of the meaning of Being

pp. 10-1 justification of terminological choice Dasein—a predetermination only it can command > brutal, decisive declaration of name (Heidegger proceeds by decree)

***pp. 11-2 Dasein more neutral than Mensch?; Daseins neutrality as neutralization/subtraction of everything but naked trait of this relation to self, to the Being of its being

——Dasein’s neutrality as a certain sexlessness (Geschlechtsoloigkeit), sexual difference privileged anthropological trait to be neutralized; Heidegger: “Dasein is neither of the two sexes”

pp. 15-6 Daseins neutrality makes possible concrete facticity of human, the analytic precedes “the existent,” not a philosophy of life

p. 16 ipseity of Dasein, its Selbstheit exists only for the sake of itself (but not egoism, consciousness)

p. 17 analytic of Dasein must be protected from risks of anthropology, psychoanalysis, biology

——Isolierung (metaphysical isolation) of Dasein, not a factical, existential solitude of man > and yet it does mean a certain isolation of man

p. 18 Dasein must have body, bodiliness, prior to sexuality? Leiblichkeit draws Dasein into dispersion, thus into sexual difference? [see Gii pp. 38-9 Dasein as Leib]

pp. 19-20 Dasein always interacts w/ multiple objects, not because there are many but because of Daseins originary disseminal structure, its dispersion (Zerstreuung)

p. 20 Erstreckung: Daseins spatiality before extensio, se tend (tends, extends itself) btwn birth & death (Dasein affects itself w/ this movement, auto-affection belongs to ontological structure of Daseins historicality) > birth/death receive meaning from this intervallic movement > only one of determinate possibilities of essential dispersion (Zerstreuung)

p. 21 “transcendental dispersion” belongs to essence of Dasein in its neutrality

——it is the possibility of all dissociation in factical existence > dispersion is itself based on primordial feature Geworfenheit

pp. 21-22 Dasein is geworfen (thrown) before all modes of throwness that determine it

——thrownness can never be mastered (not a project of Dasein > also not passivity, which could reinscribe Dasein in active/passive subject(iv)ity)

——not thrown into space, space depends on thrownness, before the Platonic or Christian image of the fall

p. 22 being-with does not arise from factical connection, a species-like unification (gattungshafte Zusammenstreben) “metaphysically presupposes” dissemination of Dasein, thus Mitsein

p. 23 ontology of life requires a “privative interpretation” [could one speak of a method?]; in Heidegger, life is neither pure Vorhandensein nor Dasein: what is life, then?

pp. 24-5 dispersion marks most general structure of Dasein > yet elsewhere dispersion and distraction characterize inauthentic ipseity of Dasein (Man-selbst)

p. 25 dispersion marked twice (same could be said for neutral): general structure of Dasein & mode of inauthenticity

p. 26 for Heidegger, no properly sexual predicate > none that doesn’t refer back to general structure of Dasein: inside/outside, dispersion & proximity, here & there, birth & death…

HLP p. 69 Dasein: “bears w/in it self the possibilities of deceit & lying”

***EW p. 258 Dasein can’t be reduced to a subjectivity but existential analytic retains formal traits of every transcendental analytic [Heidegger & Kant]

p. 266 Derrida believes in certain irreversibility of replacing subject w/ Dasein, though Dasein is still too marked by vorhanden, thus time—the ontological structure is insufficiently questioned

p. 267 “we” of Dasein, we who are open to the question, to relation to self, to what is lacking in everything that’s not Dasein: this is analogous “logic” to what Heidegger sought to deconstruct

p. 271 Da of Dasein singularizes itself w/out being reducible to any categories of human subjectivity (self, rational being, consciousness, person), because it is presupposed by all of these

SPEC p. 357 in both Freud & Heidegger, life death no longer opposed in the proper [both interpret death as proper? unlike Levinas & Derrida]

p. 358 why would Dasein, “our own,” have to constitute itself as démarcheur [stockbroker, bad step]?

——let me die properly: where death is my inheritance

p. 359 analytic of Da-sein (analytic of distance, proximity)—not so foreign to analysis of fort/da > economy of death, law of proper, auto-affection of fort:da, “eigenen Todesweg des Organismus

——Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

CHOR p. 104 Heidegger insists that Dasein is neuter, it is neutral, neither of the 2 sexes, but not indifferent, not annulling negativity—an originary positivity, Mächtigkeit des Wesens

DATE

R p. 109 annulment of time announced in date, revolution, volt of the ring (anneau), il faut le temps, default, failure, collapse [autos needing other, event, time, heteronomy]

OH pp. 27-8 in the dated nature of dating, of currentness, lies a disquieting wrinkle, stigmata of anachrony marking all our days > traditional discourse of modernity, discourse of anamnesis w/ its goût de fin, if not for death

S p. 89 the becoming-crepuscular (Dämmerung) is not a decline (Untergang), it shields the year, the course of the sun [Jahr, march (ier, ienai, gehen), translates race or course of sun]

SH p. 8 example offers its example only on condition it holds for no other > every poem has its [irreplaceable] “January 20th

pp. 9-10 what happens to the poem: the date > the poem is “dated,” calls itself back to the date, but it speaks! to all the others who haven’t experienced/shared singularity thus dated

p. 10 instead of walling up in singularity > a date gives chance to speak to the other

——writing on a certain date as a writing to (à) the date (past or future) [“to” of “to-come”]

——poem is due its date, owes itself to its date as inmost concern, signature, owes itself to its secret, speaks of this date only insofar as it acquits itself

p. 11 to speak of the date one must also efface it, make it readable, an effacement faced w/ another date—the one to which it speaks > experience of date, experience itself?

——“Geheimnis der Begegnung (the secrecy of encounter)” > otherness & solitude (poem, singularity) conjoined in one & same date: chance, plus dun at once, that which seals event

p. 12 several singular events concentrated in same date, this concentration (Konzentration) a terrible word for memory, but also the gathering of soul, Kafka’s attention of prayer

p. 14 meridian binds (“das Verbindende,” both binds and connects), provokes, at noon, the encounter [shortest shadow], example of law > “a date would be the gnomon [nom, shadow, not mine] of these meridians”

pp. 14-5 dating amounts to signing; signature marks provenance of what is given (sent), destined (whether or not it arrives) > one signs a date from a given place

p. 15 question “what is…[a date]?” is finite, signed, engaged, by a place, time, language(s)

p. 16 date repeats its unrepeatability: divides in repeating, enciphers, encrypts itself, effaces to become readable, unreadable in its readability

p. 17 date always bound up w/ a proper name > gives us to think an idiom, each time, barely translatable [Derrida is also referring to his French phrasing]

——date not there, w/ draws in order to appear, there are dates (just like there are ashes), even if they don’t exist

p. 18 witnessing codes, disguises of poem at once essential & inessential [re: Szondi as intimate witness of one of Celan’s poems, he knew Celan passed through Berlin at this date], poem would speak to us nonetheless, beyond its dated singularity

p. 70n from Heidegger, datum becomes donation, thus date & gift, debt as well

p. 71n Heidegger: pre-calendrical datability

p. 19 date: cut or incision poem bears in its body like a memory

p. 22 readability effaces the date, the very thing which it offers for reading, date must conceal w/in itself stigma of singularity if it is to last longer (lasting is the poem), only chance of spectral return, commemoration of date’s annihilation, kind of nothing or ash > ash awaits us

——annulment in the annulation of return belongs to movement of dating

p. 22 date is always also metonymy (part of event standing for whole)

p. 27 date resembles shibboleth, gives ciphered access to secret configuration of places for memory

——date is a future anterior, the slightest indetermination increases the chances (of a future anterior), gives time one assigns to anniversaries to come

p. 34 signature not only recalls the vanished as vanished, the singular event, its ash > it gathers together a conjunction of singularities, a partaking in future of same date

p. 35 date is a witness, but one can bless date w/out knowing to “what” or for “whom” one bears witness, always possible there’ll no longer be a witness for this witness

——affinity btwn date, name, ash

p. 38 ring’s condition & fate of all archival recording > date marks itself, becomes readable, by freeing itself from singularity it recalls, its body becomes ideal, coded

——ideality carries forgetting in its memory, the memory of forgetting itself, the truth of forgetting > reference to singular event annulled in ring’s annulation, the date’s turning-about, una volta, volte-face, revolt, revolution

——date offers itself up to annihilation, commemorating what may always be forgotten in absence of witness > date is threatened in remaining to be read

pp. 38-9 date may always become no one’s, nothing’s date, the essence w/out essence of ash

——name partakes in this destiny of ash along w/ date, not empirical, is part of its readability ——mourning: reading itself > readability: tribute of lost singularity (“beauty” pays)

p. 40 date is mad, always more or less than what it says it is, we are mad for dates, those ashes which dates are, remains w/out being > music, Sichelschrift

p. 41 date opens into madness, what there is to read, injunction in every reading; madness slumbers in aleatory encounter > chance among heterogeneities which break into making sense [re: Wahnsinn, Wahn/wann]

p. 42 given of date leaves its trace in the poem, the trace of the date is the poem

p. 43 date es gibt, annulment at work when date inscribes its here and now in iterability, consigns itself to self-forgetfulness, succeeds in effacing itself

——a date, to become what it is, must give itself to be read in ash, in the nonbeing of its being

——gift of the poem, and of the date: no dialectic > condition [of poem] made up of distress, hope, shi[f]t of tones, “Weschsel der Töne [Hölderlin]

p. 44 experience of ashes w/in incineration of date > date as incineration

——poem’s desire or gift, the date is born, in movement of blessing, toward ash

p. 45 date consumed from w/in, the expiring that is its production, genesis, inscription: its essence & chance

p. 50 there is a holocaust (all-consuming) for every date: “every hour counts its holocaust”

p. 51 virtually at the same date because the originary date, as coded mark, is already a kind of fiction, singularity spoken of in generalities and fable of conventions (iterable marks)

p. 52 no “absolute poem,” but date (beyond calendar/clocks), madness of “when,” unthinkable Einmal (once), terrifying ambiguity of shibboleth > sign of belonging (alliance), threat of discrimination (war)

——a date “may give rise to calculations,” but it ceases to be calculable

——a date fascinates, but is not made to fascinate, crypt occurs wherever singular incision marks language (not the work of hermetic poet anxious to seduce w/ ciphers)

——wherever signature enters idiom, leaving trace of incision (unique & iterable, cryptic & readable), there’s a date

p. 53 effacement of date or name inside the ring: origin of philosophy, hermeneutics, poetics, their sendoff [envois]

p. 57 no worse loss than death of name (still, a date remains) > mourning, interiorization of other in Erinnerung, the preserving of other in sepulcher/epitaph, is denied us; words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts > incinerated beyond of date, words lost w/out sepulcher

p. 67 how can German language receiver circumcision of poem’s date following the holocaust, the solution, the ash of all? how can you bless these ashes in German? [re: Celan]

p. 68 circumcision of word is not dated in history, has no age, but calls forth date, opens word to other, of all that calls itself (the name, blessing of name, yes & no) > it sets turning the ring

——[Derrida ends his lecture by dating it, circumcising]

DS DS p. 239 Mallarmé: as of this date, a veil

SP SP p. 139 plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

OTO OTO p. 15 TN. data littera, “letter given,” first words of medieval formula for time and place of legal act

SW SW p. 313-14 diminish the infinite, diminish ad infinitum: that’s the temptation/dream since ever: but you’re doing it w/out being sure of textile to come, as if caught in sails (voiles) & pushed toward unknown, at the point of this extremity, as if someone were awaiting new Messiah, i.e. a “happy event”—nicknamed the verdict > yes, but a verdict w/out truth, w/ a due date no longer caught up in revealing a truth, the fold or unfolding of a veil—writing from distant place of as if

——infinite finite trial (implacable suspicion) that you impose on yourself to not want what you know you want (the due date of such a verdict)?

p. 325 faire date (have an impact)

pp. 342-43 tallith as trace of date, event of singularity, not lifting, unfolding of veil—“even if one translates this gift of the Law as Revelation, the figure of the veil,” the taking-place of the event counts more than the “intuition & movement of vision”

pp. 343-44 bookmark the fringes, they served once to accomplish a commandment, may another be accomplished w/ them [Kitsour…] > that’s what I’m doing, à contretemps, et signe et livre et date

DPi DPi p. 87 in POOF, I attempted, let’s say, to “deconstruct” Schmitt—the sovereign—this a-legal position > inaugural, founding act of constitution (suspended from & at the constitution [à la constitution]) > on the date

pp. 218-19 condemned to death: know the date, quasi-suicidal mastery of death, criminals who do everything to give themselves this death (se donner cette mort) > phantasm of omnipotence over their own death

p. 219 modality “when” splits condemned to die (mortal who doesn’t know moment of death) from condemned to death [DP] like a blade

p. 220 w/ DP, the third party, the State, its legal system are presumed to know, calculate, operate “time of death”: alignment of objective time w/ subjective time of subject condemned to death

p. 256 it belongs to life not to be immortal, but also to have a future where instant of death is not calculable

——to be against DP is to be against calculation, calculable decidability of you will die on such and such a day, at such and such an hour > no future w/ anticipation of calculable instant > “my life” must keep a relation to the coming of the other as coming of the to-come (venue de là-venir)

——DP ends finitude of “my life” > w/ calendar

C C pp. 239-40 date as place of crypt, stands in for it, only one that remains; why do I date? throw of a die: no one will know what was lived on the date (what was taken away), save (fors) the heart

TN TN p. x On TouchingJean-Luc Nancy is intentionally dated, get you to read him

BSi BSi p. 226 [vis-à-vis Celan] January 20th [date Hitler drew up plans for ‘final solution’]—anniversary of death > sovereign decision to commit genocide

p. 250 exergue (ex-ergon)—like parergon, out of work that puts to work > but like capital too: makes work happen, comes at head (inscribe date)

p. 271 Celan: are we not all descended from such dates [January 20th]?

CIR CIR pp. 248-50 on each date, a drop of blood, one date enough to leave geologic program behind

EU EU pp. 109-10 question of droit du droit not juridical, event of foundation never comprehended w/in logic it founds > foundation of a university not a university event (only the anniversary of the foundation would be), foundation of reason isn’t legal, isn’t rational: only w/in epoch of law can one distinguish btwn legal/illegal conflicts

p. 165 a (philosophical) letter dates the “as if” of the mood, a fabled mood, “a once upon a time, one day, I had the feeling…”

DAY

OH p. 109 one day the day today (visibility of image, publicity of public) will not be the ratio essendi of the political

(the) DEAD

FK pp. 83-4 phallus, the marionette, virtuality of virtuality, distinct from penis: parade fetish, the healthy, the automatic sur-viving, faith in most living as dead

***p. 86 machine, mechanics, reproduces the dead in the living; the marionette, the dead machine, automation acc. phallic effect

LOBL p. 125 everything that preserves the dead: sculpture, mask, embalm

p. 163 embalm [fetish?], set about the arrêt de mort in its double triumph: effigy, chambers of this desire in a sort of “funeral home” > [Blanchot’s narrator] loves them dead, he loves (by) seeing them dead

H p. anne 102 the dead, the corpse, are the most easily read, manipulated [?]

SPOM p. 59 “exorcism consists in repeating in the mode of an incantation that the dead man is really dead,” nothing more sure than that what is dead is dead

p. 60 “this is dead” means I am killing it, I dream of killing, thus: it is alive

p. 64 [re: dominant discourse on Marxism] the triumphal stage of work of mourning, maniac, jubilatory, animistic magic, rhythm of cadenced march [“Marx is dead,” long live capitalism]

p. 120 conjuration, work of mourning: make sure dead will not come back

——vigilance, therefore: the dead is perhaps not as dead as conjuration deludes us into believing

p. 143 Marx’s revolutionary injunction “let the dead bury the dead”, the imperative of an “active forgetting,” as Nietzsche would put it

——neither the dead nor the living (the “only living,” the immortal living, the gods) have buried anyone (Marx knows this) > il faudra toujours que des mortels encore vivants enterrent des vivants déjà morts

p. 184 Marx & Saint Max, heirs to Platonic tradition, associate image w/ specter, idol w/ phantasm, phantasma, eidola (Phaedo, Timaeus): living-dead, figures of dead souls > survival and return of living-dead as essence of the idol

POOF p. 94 in Menexenus, must summon dead to be responsible before them, the dead are made to be born again: oath of this co-engagement thus resembles a fraternal conjuration

MSUB J pp. 161-62 Latin is stubborn, need to use words in order to express ideas that are clear; for me, ideas that are clear are dead > Descartes’ “clear ideas”

p. 167 subjectile interposes itself as the hymen btwn inside & outside, finally becoming the jetée (the spurt, a spurt like a fallen stone, dead) > objective, subjective, projectile, introjection, objection, dejection, abjection

A p. 35 border of absolute arrivant keeps one from discriminating btwn figures of arrivant > the dead, the revenant (the ghost, he or she that returns)

p. 59 Heidegger’s existential analysis has no competence for dealing w/ political problems of burial, cult of the dead

MPM pp. xv-xvi with the dead, you can only speak “of” not “to” or “with”: la mort dans lâme

p. 21 the dead: receive nothing of what takes place in memory

p. 22 the other is dead and nothing can save him from this death

p. 48 the dead can no longer answer the call of the name, only in memory

PP p. 73 pharmakon is but a formula learned by heart, dead, rigid knowledge shut up (enfermé) in biblia, foreign to living knowledge and dialectic

T p. xxix after every perforation, one [philosophy] is dying to replace w/ a glorious cadaver, ce temps timbré entre lécriture et la parole (s) appellent un coup de donc [Glas]: it suffices, barely, to wait!

F p. xxxviii crypt of language: contract w/ dead, mort-gage, dead must pledge to occupy place as dead, must engage dying self alive

p. xxxv exquisite pleasure (nearing orgasm) disguised by repression as exquisite pain, le lieu where exquisite corpse has folded so much it appears flat > challenges us to exhume: “accuse-moi

POS p. 6 keep at the limit, not the death, of philosophy, and besides, the dead wields a very specific power [Derrida does not believe in the death of whatever: God, book, philosophy]

OTO p. 6 painfully difficult for life to become object of science, would require a philosophy of life, a whole politics, which inscribes the bio-graphical w/in the bio-logical

——not the same for science of nonlife, of the dead, wins its claim to scientificity w/out delay: the co-implication btwn scientific object & the dead concerns desire to know

p. 7 only the name can inherit, so the name is always a dead man’s name

ATIA p. 62 the animort? pluralizing animal, renouncing unification of concept, so it can’t be opposed to anything identifiable (man, the dead)

GSP p. 157-58 Husserl refuses to believe #s/math fall from heaven, pure Platonic idealism, but also refuses, when subjectifying math, to explain #s via “psychologism”: 1) distinguishes # from concept, psychological artifact 2) math irreducible to psychological temporality 3) designates an intentional dimension of objectivity, which no psychological genesis could institute [Frege would call this possibility a bloodless specter (blutloses Gespenst)?]

PS pp. 192-93 for Artaud, furtive differance slipped in btwn 2 forms of writing, placing life outside the work, and making its origin (flesh) the epigraph, the breathless (essoufflé) sarcophagus of my discourse > only through writing made flesh, theatrical hieroglyphic, could double be destroyed

O pp. 21-2n Hegel: math has for its Stoffe dead space & lifeless numerical unit

DPi p. 9 in Plato’s Laws, there’s a worse than DP, the beast who doesn’t have the right to be buried > the nocturnal council (tou nukterinou syllogou) still treats the condemned as subject w/ rights

p. 72 when is someone dead?

p. 199 red (on flag) as specter of the dead

REST p. 271 la nature morte, still life, dead nature

WAP p. 73 people haven’t noticed how often the dead return

EJQB p. 78 to write: to confuse ontology & grammar; grammar: in which are inscribed all dislocations of dead syntax, all aggressions perpetrated by speech against language, every questioning of the letter

——all these tortures are forgotten in literature, as mortifications, as ruses of life

EL pp. 209-10 the turn to everyday sacredness (secular Hebrew): miraculous manna but also profanatory jouissance > sorcerers: sinister masquerade, quasi Esperanto or Valapük, living dead in a shoddy resurrection used for commerce > evacuation & perversion of meaning

——the false cadaver will avenge itself its carnival disguises, its cadaverous instrumentality

p. 211 for Scholem, for language to avenge itself against secularization: 1) it must be someone, bear the name of someone, remain attached to its creator 2) no iterability at source: technology is secondary or evil, can only befall (survenir) it [this exteriorizing of contamination is similar to Christian idealism, a spiritual interiorization separated from body, time, letter, carnal signifier]

p. 212 iconoclasm & idolatry at same time (if that’s possible): turn infinite value into a commercial one (both use & exchange)

——w/in “logic” of fetishism, no one ones who’s doing the fetishizing: Scholem or those he accuses? (via Enlightenment tradition prepared by Spinoza, it would be Scholem)

C p. 191 it’s difficult to resist obsidional invasion (investissement) > 2 desires of coffin deal (traitent) w/ each other for the dead man:

1. to lie in it, to make it yours, to steal it, give birth in it, calm one’s terror of alterity

2. to let it be the other’s

p. 215 tracking an exhumed body, in the wake’s wake (sillage), exultation of a funeral vigil, blackmail (faire chanter) the dead, Finnegans Wake > faire vibrer le sarcophage: sous le charme

p. 217 paradigm as revenge: le mort se venge, “model” is always le revenant rêvé: haunting does not befall it, but takes the first step (la hantise ne lui survient pas, elle donne le premier pas)

p. 218 stricture of coffins, holds dead man rigid, knotted w/in & w/out, pulls dans tous les sens (in all directions), seira, cord, chain, knotted cord

p. 242 la référence morcelée [TN. mort scellé(e)]

TN p. 64 corps-corpse > when Freud lays Psyche on couch is he referring to the Christian body? to say Psyche is “extended,” is to say she remains tangible (against Kant, Descartes)

p. 226 Nancy: space of bodies not acquainted w/ Death (space abolished) (being-toward-death) but knows each body as a dead one, sharing out for us the extension of his/her “ci-gît (here lies)”

AD p. 97 via Levinas, the State left “to itself” only judges the dead or absent, no face present [Aristole’s Politics]

CF p. 44 only dead man can forgive—survivor not ready to substitute him/herself (immense, painful experience of survivor)

BSi p. 280 for Heidegger, the object is Vorhandensein—the dead body of living being (animal or man) is neither Dasein, nor Zu-, nor Vor-handensein [?]

p. 296 globalization of autopsic model, knowledge that de-vitalizes by looking at life (simple objectification) > the 2 senses of autopsia: cadaver & divine power

OG p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

——becoming-space of time & becoming-time of space mark dead time w/in presence of living present > dead time is at work, les blancs take on importance > limit of phenomenology

pp. 226-27 (322) via Rousseau, a written accent, “il ny a là quun fard (makeup) dissimulant le cadavre de laccent,” writing hides language, masks the already decomposed corpse of language

SPEC p. 319 greatest pleasure, play w/ the dummy (le mort), [Ernst, Freud] speaks to himself telephonically, make himself re-, acc. law of PP: signing, contracting w/ himself

FV pp. 490-92 [re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

DEATH

GOD pp. 15-7 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

pp. 56-57 trembling in mysterium tremendum? gift of infinite love, dissymmetry btwn gaze of God, and me not seeing what looks at me (gift and endurance of death in irreplaceable) > disproportion btwn infinite gift & my finitude > responsibility: salvation, sin, culpability, sacrifice

GT p. 102 death: the fact that the gift does not return to the donor; death not a natural accident, can only be thought setting out from (à partir du) the gift > neither death nor immortal life can give anything, only a singular surviving can give

OOG p. 137 for phenomenology, death not a sense but a fact extrinsic to temporalization

***FK p. 86 machine, mechanics, reproduces the dead in the living; the marionette, the dead machine, automation acc. phallic effect

p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis [link btwn fetishization & transcendence]

LOBL p. 95 double affirmation: of death which triumphs over life, & triumph of life at edge of death

p. 110 the Il (who says “I”) donne la mort, he, the narrator (I), kills

p. 114 arrêt de mort: decision on what can’t be decided—it also arrests death: gives “living on”

p. 115 death as undecidable itself

p. 163 there’s an arrêt btwn 2 deaths [in Larrêt de mort], thus hypertopia [see p. 140]

H p. 117 “no fixed address” of death, no phenomenal exteriority, interiority of the heart, nocturnal secret (a suffering both intimate & infinite)

p. anne 148 disseminating logic of death: because it can be manipulated by everyone, easily [?]

p. anne 152 a place of haunting has no ghosts, ghosts come where they are exclude, death haunts us by remaining unthought

BL p. 204 differance till death, for death, without end because ended [here we have an example of differance’s universalism: he’s talking about law’s differance, but it is exemplary?]

SPOM p. 177 death is not beyond, outside of life, unless beyond is inside > essence of living

——figures of death: differance of technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins in language, before language

pp. 160-61 spectral effect, for Marx, a dialectical position (Setzung) of the ghostly body as body proper > where Stirner sees 1st moment as spectral and 2nd as successful, interiorization, subjectivation (plus de vie) Marx sees a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality (plus de mort)

p. 169 phenomenological ego is a specter, phanesthai is the possibility of the specter, brings death, gives death, works at mourning [see pp. 237-38n Husserl’s noeme, irréellité]

p. 212 figure of absolute hospitality: strange, familiar, inhospitable > quasi-transcendental “messianism,” materialism w/out substance, materialism of the khōra for a despairing “messianism,” a curious taste of death, a foretaste (avant-goût), curious of what it conjures

p. 220 the impossible (“to let the dead bury their dead”) is possible, absolute evil (fully present life which doesn’t want to hear/know death), takes place (peut avoir lieu) > on basis of this terrible possibility, justice is desirable (through but also beyond law, right) [cf. HST p. 399]

HERP p. 177 as Dasein throws itself by anticipation toward death, it inherits & chooses, chooses the very possibility of inheritance (Kampf belongs to very structure of Dasein)

p. 217n can we read an “unconscious” affinity btwn impending arrival of friend and imminence of death? [Heidegger would protest—isn’t analytic of Dasein regulated by norms of absolute intentional meaning?]

POOF p. x “infinite abysses of imputability open on to mourning in the shadow of each and every event of death”

p. 7 more worthwhile (vaut mieux) “to love,” preeminence of form over matter > Derrida will demonstrate how, for once, w/ Aristotle, death situated on side of form & act: act of friendship bears death in itself

p. 10 if Prime Mover [Lover?] sets himself in motion w/out moving or being moved, isn’t he analogically the beloved, the absolute desirable? on the side of death?

p. 13 the irreducible dissymmetry btwn hypothesis of shared friendship & idea that love can (must) survive the friend’s death—a doubling fold: friend bears our proper death, expropriates it, he bears my death & inherits it as the last survivor

p. 290 great canonical meditations on friendship (Cicero, Montaigne, Blanchot) all belong to experience of mourning > through the irreplaceable of the named, they always advance in testimonial order to confide/refuse death of unique to a universalizable discourse > simultaneously found/destabilize all oppositions, opens to abyss, se fracture

p. 295 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

pp. 296-97 what does ‘common’ mean once friendship goes beyond all living community? when it comes to friends only in dying? > common becomes valueless for thinking friendship

p. 302 it is thanks to death that friendship can be declared, and never if not recalling > friendship declared during lifetime avows the same thing [so what is significance of actual death?]

MPM p. xix [death, real death: the worst?]

——tu meurs (you are dying, tumor) [see pp. 87-8n tumeur, a memory untranslatable from French)

p. 21 when we know our friend to be gone forever: terrifying lucidity, in light of incinerating blaze where nothingness appears

——we remain in disbelief itself, we will never believe in death or immortality

p. 24 fatality (of tropological dislocation) is the law, non-totalization [impossibility of coming into being], the law of the law, that the law takes turns w/, as if it were, its own supplement

p. 31 if death teaches us anything it leaves no chance for any innocent desire for truth

p. 33 possibility of death of the other in-forms any relation to other & finitude of memory

p. 34 we come to ourselves through memory of possible mourning, knowledge older than ourselves, de Man might say: unreadability of mourning

——inconsolable [infinitely responsible] before finitude of memory: [want memory to be infinite?] possibility of impossible commands whole rhetoric of mourning, describes essence of memory > w/ dark light of this nothing (death of other) we learn other resists closure of our interiorizing memory [Freud’s “normal” “work of mourning” (ideally, quasi-literally devouring body/voice of other)]

——mimetic interiorization not just fictive, is origin of fiction, takes place in a body, makes place for body, soul, “ours” > death constitutes and makes manifests limits of me, us, obliged to harbor something greater than us w/in us

p. 35 il faut: one must follow the trace, remember that which did not exist, the law [Being and law], only there in the aporia of mourning and prosopopoeia: 1) success fails: other becomes part of us, bear him in us, like a future 2) failure succeeds: aborted interorization, respect for other as other, other remains alone, outside us, in his death > schema makes true mourning impossible

p. 49 defect, default of name is its immense power: name already survives him, does not wait for death

p. 50 “in memory of” both proper name and common noun (nom et nom), death reveals a proper name could always lend itself to repetition (in absence of bearer) becoming a common noun

pp. 58-9 if a past does not exist, no more does death—only mourning, figures of death, we inscribe in every trace (otherwise called “survivals”)—because they outlast us, trying their luck, in advance, “in memory of” [see p. 87n inexistence of past/death not futility/illusion]

p. 87n inexistence of past & death not futility/illusion, their literal non-presence is also their fictive or figurative value

——when de Man quotes Mallarmé’s “this shallow calumniated stream called death” from “Tomb of Verlaine” (signatory of epitaph always writes on his own tomb), Derrida tells us genealogy of genitives cannot be broken by cenotaph or cremation: the tomb of Verlaine of Mallarmé of Paul de Man

A p. 4 via Seneca, death (immanence of a disappearance) seals union of possible and impossible

***p. 22 if death names irreplaceability of absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in place of the other) then all examples in world can illustrate this singularity, death of all those who say “my death” is irreplaceable [universal?] > tout autre est tout autre

——that anybody can appropriate expression “my death” > exemplary complication of exemplarity: nothing more nor less substitutable than syntagm “my death,” hapax legomenon

——one does not know meaning or referent of word “death,” can’t predicate it, like “God”

pp. 23-4 “my death,” a flashing light at every border, it’s awake, can always see a nightwatchman (du veilleur) or a nightlight (de la veilleuse)

——in crossing a border, one changes/exchanges death (on change le mort, on change de mort), one passes from figure of death as trespass (passage of line, transgression of border, pas au-delà) to another figure of border btwn life and death

——every culture characterized by way of its dealing w/, its “living” death as trespass

pp. 26-7 Heidegger distinguishes death of Dasein from its end (Ende), from its maturation or ripeness (Reife), Dasein don’t need to mature when death occurs, not a final maturity, not an limit end, a telos, terma, a border > Dasein is very transgression of this borderline

——for Heidegger, death cannot be enclosed w/in sexual borders (which crisscross cultural, linguistic, national, religious borders)

p. 28 death one of the names of a threat, an aporia, that risks paralyzing ontological, hierarchical, territorial apparatus to which Heidegger lends credit; death, in this sense, names what Heidegger early on called “ruination” [look up]

——for Heidegger, precipitous concepts of death not only a speculative failure, they introduce empirical or techno-juridical confusions becoming more serious today

p. 30 abyssal inquiry re: Heidegger’s delimitation of death, modes of ending, more than one limit, ends of man an indestructable subject > death of Dasein not end of man, btwn the 2 there’s a divisible limit, perhaps, of ending, place where ending ends [?]

pp. 30-31 re: Heidegger’s Verenden, the coming to an end that all living things share, Derrida prefers translation “perishing,” “périr” to “arrêt de vie” because retains per of passage to limit, pereo, perire, crosses line, though losing sense of corrupting, ending in ver of verenden

p. 35 Heidegger: only man can experience death as such

pp. 36-7 Heidegger says animal cannot experience death as such, and that animal cannot speak [Derrida draws out undeveloped relation btwn language and death]

——if death can’t be experienced as such both to language and to what exceeds language, border btwn animal & Dasein would become unassignable p. 37 Ableben (demise) vs. Sterben (dying) vs. Verenden (perishing)

p. 38 Heidegger: “Daisen never perishes (verendet nie), Dasein, however, can demise (ableben) only as long as it is dying (solange, als es stirbt)”

——Heidegger’s distinction btwn sterben and verenden not irreconcilable w/ Freud’s thought re: fact that our mortality via death drive isn’t testified by science, our beliefs or the unconscious

pp. 38-9 does distinction btwn demise and dying avoid Levinas’ objection to Heidegger re: “mineness” of dying > in dying proper and properly speaking, no one can die for the other

pp. 39-40 that Dasein knows no end in sense of verenden, that it can only only perish as animal but not as Dasein, implies Dasein is immortal in its originary being-to-death

pp. 40-1 aporia of death, one of the place-names that forms following braid btwn 3 forms of limits, keeps it from coming undone [see pp. 78-80 border, closure, demarcation] 1) problematic closure (around thematic entity) 2) anthropological border (animals don’t have borders, laws) 3) conceptual demarcation, logical de-finition (decontaminate 2 concepts, oppose them rigorously)

p. 42 there is no culture of death itself or properly dying, dying neither entirely natural nor cultural

pp. 43-4 “culture of death”—a tautology? each culture treats death differently, w/ different partitions, culture of death = history of death (cult of ancestors, rituals of mourning/sacrifice)

——difference of animal/human, biological life/culture is the relation to death as such, true border would be there

pp. 52-3 [via Heidegger’s performative incision, decision, “here”] figure of border, line between here & beyond (len-deça et lau-delà) re: death, survival, immortality, beyond

p. 55 originary, underivable character of death, of finitude, forces us to decide [on undecidable]

p. 56 in Being and Time, Heidegger leaves questions re: undecidable (i.e. death) unanswered in order to decide on the undecidable [decides on use of phenomenological method]

p. 57 only way for existential analytic of Dasein to achieve universality, must be only discipline where death knows no borders

p. 58 everyone feels like “death is no longer what it used to be”

pp. 60-1 Heidegger not interested in revenant or mourning—just death itself, not its figures or experiences of demise (Ableben)

p. 65 death, impossible simultaneity (where one and the other arrive together), contretemps

p. 66 for Heidegger, only w/ death does one await oneself, expect oneself > Dasein stretches (se tend), bends toward (se tend vers), offers to itself (se tend), offers it to itself (se le tend)

for Heidegger, death—stand before (steht bevor) oneself, await, precede oneself as before a mirror, as before the future, “in its ownmost potentiality for being” [see p. 78]

pp. 71-2 greater and greater orientation toward death, for Heidegger, the incalculable nonmeasure [of truth], signifies possibility of measureless impossibility of existence

p. 73 unique aporia of “expecting death”: 1) impossibility itself, dying as the aporia, impossibility of being dead, of “existing” one’s death 2) or that this impossibility is possible, appears as such, at whose limits one waits, limits of truth, but also possibility of truth

***pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (narrivent quà seffacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

——principle of ruin nothing other than death, not dying-properly but the end of the properly-dying > threatens and makes possible the [existential] analysis

——double sense of de-termination [re: determined closure]: logic of termination (terma, peras, finis) and resolute decision or resolution [Being in Time great discourse on Entschlossenheit]

p. 74 death always the name of a secret, signs irreplaceable singularity, puts forth common name of the proper name w/out name, always a shibboleth > language about death long history of a secret society, hidden religion of the awaiting, a universal Marrano

——for Heidegger, announcement of impossibility of “death,” the awaiting death, can only occur for Dasein

p. 76 if death is possibility of impossible for Heidegger, Dasein never has relation to death as such, only to perishing, to death of the other (who is not the other), death of other in “me” only death named in syntagm “my death” > thus sattendre, sattendre lun lautre, sattendre soi-même à la mort

non-access to death where access is only to the threshold, pas, approach to border

pp. 76-7 “turn what is thus at the very heart of the possibility of the existential analysis against the whole apparatus of Being and Time” > death as most ex-propriating, most inauthenticating

p. 77 Heidegger dissociates Verfallen from original sin, but still needs distinction btwn authentic/inauthentic > death as “possibility of impossibility” can mean Eigentlichkeit inhabited by Enteignis

pp. 78-9 death is figure of the aporia in which “death” and death can replace (metonymy that carries name beyond name, beyond name of name) all that is possible as impossible: love, gift, other, testimony

EM p. 134 (161) prescription of the end of man, prescribed since always, has done nothing but “modulate equivocality of the end, in the play of telos and death”

——dans la lecture de ce jeu: le fin de lhomme est la pensée de lêtre, lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre, la fin de lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre > lhomme est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-a-dire la fin de son propre > lêtre est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-à-dire la fin de son propre

SEC p. 316 absence—death of addressee (inscribed in mark) > value or effect of transcendentality linked to possibility of writing, to this “death”

PP p. 105 memory and truth cannot be separated, movement of alētheia, a deployment of mnēmē as psychic life in its self-presentation to itself > powers of lēthē (writing, pharmakon) increase domains of death, nontruth, nonknowledge: fascinate, hypnotize, medusa [verb]

p. 120 (137) fear of death [child in us] (la crainte de la mort) gives occult medicine, sorcery (les envoûtements), its hold (donne prise) > le pharmakeus mise sur cette crainte

——Socrates must renounce knowledge as power, passion and pleasure, must consent to die, let his body die, to achieve alētheia, epistēmē, which are also powers

p. 123 dialectical inversion of pharmakon or dangerous supplement makes death à la fois acceptable and null > immortality of soul, acts like antibody, dissipates its terrifying fantasy, le pharmarkon inverti, qui met en fuite tous les épouvantails: origin of epistēmē, opening to truth as possibility of repetition, submission of “greed for life (epithumein zēn)” to law (king, father, chief, capital)

p. 124 eidos, truth, law, epistēmē, dialectics, philosophy: names of the pharmakon that must oppose to pharmakon of Sophists, the bewitching fear of death

——Socrates must listen to the Laws like they’re a phonic spell

pp. 135-36 writing stripped of its path-breaking force, pure repetition, dead repetition, tautological, hollow, repetition of death > writing is not living repetition of the living

p. 166 if truth is presence to eidos, would it not be absolute blindness? death?

VM p. 79 philosophy’s wellspring (ressource) is its death, nonphilosophy, because of its death it has a future, the future has a future

p. 115 Derrida exposes impossibility of saving theme of positive infinity & face [which would have to have body, space, be finite, if positive infinity remains a theme] > face’s nonmetaphorical unity of body, glance, speech, thought can only be thought w/in horizon of infinite (indefinite) alterity as irreducibly common horizon of Death and Other > horizon of finitude

——infinite alterity as death cannot be reconciled w/ positive, present God

pp. 115-16 to exclude the equation God = Death would be to exclude every particular determination, but this has not been excluded by entirety of classical philosophy > God is named w/in difference btwn All and Nothing, w/in difference as difference itself > difference called history, God is inscribed in it

PAS PAS p. (35) Blanchot: to sleep in a passivity exactly like death, madness therefore

p. (36) pas de mort, immeasurable unhappiness is the impossible death

p. (58) viens calls la mort de lautre, venue de lautre, who calls and names itself

p. (61) death: “always the horizon of law” and from which is withdrawn “the benefit of an event

p. (74) the call of death precedes me, it is death and the word (mort/mot) that’re called in the viens > I call myself dead, marcher in my name > w/out name before viens

p. (92) death as the impossibility of dying, à partir de laquelle sannonce la mort sans mort

——faux pas de mort

p. (103) death, the other name of viens (both only reach the other)

——must forget the question of your self, of your uniqueness, and love viens, the unique, not a name, not an impersonal infinitive

OH pp. 27-8 in the dated nature of dating, of currentness, lies a disquieting wrinkle, stigmata of anachrony marking all our days > traditional discourse of modernity, discourse of anamnesis w/ its goût de fin, if not for death

——horizon (ancient Greek) = limit; to see itself (Europe) on the horizon, is to see itself from its end, discourse of anamnesis—taste for finality (goût de fin), for death

VP p. 8 “ideality is the salvation or mastery of presence in repetition” (this is why Husserl claims intuition is not reell), not a presence of anything that exists in the world, in correlation w/ ideal acts of repetition [idealization secured by a certain relation of “existent” to his death]

pp. 28-9 for Husserl, facial expressions are death of self-presence, have no Bedeutung

p. 34 indicative language (another name of the relation to death) is process of death at work in signs > as soon as other appears, it can no longer be erased

***p. 46 presence as universal form of all existence, transgression of all empirical, and first of all mine, but even beyond my death, this present still is, must be to be universal; if the possibility of the sign is this relation to death, erasure of sign in metaphysics is dissimulation of this relation to death; I am only possible through my disappearance, death; I am originarily means I am mortal

pp. 46-7(n) “falseness” of phrase “I am immortal” is the truth of truth itself > movement from “I am” (confession of mortal) to res cogitans (immortality) secures itself beyond that which makes it possible—death

p. 82 “my death is structurally necessary to pronouncing the ‘I,’” it is an active structure, and it must function against all falsehood, meaning “I am dead” must function as Bedeutung outside of intuition (fact of my death)

***p. 88 once presence in absolute infinity (unity of concept, logos, and consciousness in a voice w/out differance) appears to itself as its own death, this history is closed

——une voix sans différance, une voix sans écriture est à la fois absolument vive et absolument morte

S pp. 90-1 Heidegger interprets der Wahnsinnige in Trakl to mean that the stranger is on the way to elsewhere (as madness, de-ceased, toward the unborn, Artaud’s in-nate)—like a revenant, Derrida adds [p. 92 journey, Abgeschiedenheit of stranger]

pp. 106-07 acc. Heidegger, difference or duality inscribed by the trait (Riss) is not division, it is the gathering (Versammlung) of the place (Ort), the de-cease (dé-cès) (Abgeschiedenheit), in the one (Ein), the soul Gemüt, Ein Geschlecht, none other than Geist [path-breaking (frayage) of trait]

FSW p. 227 via Freud’s frustration w/ analogy of Mystic Pad, machine is dead, is death, does not run of itself > representation is dead, death is (only) representation

TC pp. 246-47 [see NIETZSCHE & HEGEL on pure expenditure, death, repetition of affirmation, maintaining presence, consume pure difference w/ pleasure]

p. 248 [Derrida’s interpretation?] “grammar” of theater of cruelty will always remain inaccessible limit of a re-presentation that is not repetition, that is full presence, doesn’t carry it’s double w/in itself as death, a present outside time, a nonpresent > [instead?] present harbors its “intestine difference” in the interior fold of its original repetition, in representation, in dialectics

PPHS pp. 92(n) for Hegel, theory via vision, is death of desire, desire of death > no consummation of light (can’t be eaten); theoretical: “lets objects persist freely & independently”

SH p. 19 conventional forms of dating (charts, coded signs, spatiotemporal plottings, clocks, calendar) assign, consign, absolute singularity, must mark themselves off from themselves, a fatally equivocal power that enunciates the possibility of recurrence > not absolute recurrence (i.e. of the one time of circumcision/birth) but spectral recurrence of that which never will return

p. 23 w/in stricture of cipher # 13 [re: Celan’s February 13th] chance & necessity are bound together, fatality & chance

FWT p. 147 what welds philosophy as ontology (in its hegemonic tradition) to political theology of DP, & to idea of “proper to man”: 1) Plato’s care for death (epimeleia tou thanatou) 2) Kant’s dignity (Würde), man as end in himself, inscribes DP w/in his law 3) Hegel’s struggle for recognition 4) Heidegger’s being-toward-death of Dasein

——DP, like death itself, what’s “proper to man” > DP, at risk of shocking, always answered deeply “humanist” pleas

WM p. 271 metaphor always carries its death w/in itself, this death is always the death of philosophy [but the genitive is double]

DS p. 206 Mallarmé’s mimicry: a double of nothing simple, a double nothing anticipates—or at least a double of another double; for this double, reality is death, it never breaks the glass

POS p. 6 keep at the limit, not the death, of philosophy, and besides, the dead wields a very specific power [Derrida does not believe in the death of whatever: God, book, philosophy]

P pp. 46-7 Kant’s disinterested pleasure (uninteressirten Wohlgefallen) a mise en crypte (a pleasing myself by putting to death what exists in as much as it exists)

p. 89 death’s essential relation to the cut, the hiatus of the abyss, where beauty takes us by surprise

ROP pp. 24-5 pourquoi mon explication avec lanalyse [psychoanalysis] a toujours eu ce goût de mort en poste restante qui ma poussé à rôder sans fin dans les parages de Beyond the Pleasure Principle [?]

p. 64 in EN, in interminable conversation w/ Lacan, Derrida thinks contingency, singularity, event, tukhē, which is also a thinking of death, whose signifier would be the phallus

pp. 65-6 thinking destination indissociable from thinking death [quotes EN, the destination is death]

p. 66 [quoting EN] Derrida will not accept Heidegger’s being-for-death nor Lacan’s, latter linked to phallocentered signifier

——[quoting EN] Lacanian scandal re: what he says on the animal: en un mot, that death happens to the immortal who lacks for lacking nothing, not to the mortal being-for-death [?]

pp. 117-18 Derrida concludes by putting words (modestly) into Foucault’s dead mouth: il aurait renvoyé dos à dos la maîtrise et la mort, cest-à-dire le même, la mort comme le maître

SP pp. 47-9 [re: Nietzsche’s “—Distanz!”] hyphen & exclamation mark invite us, by way of pirouette & play of silhouette, to keep distance from veils [woman] that make us dream of death

p. 139 this death [in text] not that of tragedy nor subject, not “I am mortal, therefore…” > the scene of text’s cryptic nature makes possible anticipation of death: tragedy, parody & birth

ATIA p. 20 every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

p. 111 death, for Levinas, the moment the other no longer responds (different from animal nonresponse)

***p. 160 to “let” something “be” “as such,” you would have to “let be” in your absence, in your death [thus, for Heidegger, being-toward-death and “as such” constitutive of each other], but is this ever possible? can we let the being be? Nietzsche would say no, that the objective is always caught in the living, in life, in perspective > whatever the difference btwn animals, remains an “animal” relation

***PS pp. 179-80 Artaud’s metaphysics of flesh [MOP?] determines Being as life, its integrity must be restored > a thought governed by anguish of dispossession, my body stolen by the other, by death (as theft): my death is represented

death as structure of all theft, we do not die alone, the other strips us of ourselves

p. 326n (with remarkable/ambiguous exception of Hegel) God is Death: infinite life, life w/out difference > w/in life God-Death names finitude, difference w/in life > mais l'autre nom de la même chose ne veut pas dire la même chose que le premier nom, il n'en est pas synonyme et c'est toute l’histoire

FS p. 29 Dionysus is worked over by difference, always appears (to himself) by a relationship to his exterior, his death [fire]

DIF DIF p. 19 la mise de la présence pure et sans perte se confondant avec celle de la perte absolue, de la mort

DPi p. 99 for Heidegger, animal perishes (crève), only Dasein (human) dies, has right/possibility to die

pp. 111-12 Blanchot: literature is Terror in that its being is where “life bears death and maintains itself in death itself” [quotation from Hegel]

p. 117 Blanchot’s right to death: right to give it, giving it to oneself (en se la donnant), inflicting DP; right to accede to death (not natural) by exceeding natural life > both the right that gives birth to literature and the law that gives birth to the law itself: literature thinks this right of/to right

pp. 237-39 unlike Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida asks question of DP before death > pre-comprehending indubitable separation of state of life from state of death calculated by other, by 3rd party, common sense: the point, blade of knife, instant of passing, stigmē of a point; how could we know this clear-cut, sharp limit?

——calculable credit granted to word “death” indexed to presuppositions in which “capital punishment” finds its place: where it’s indissociable from murder/suicide

p. 241 depth of desire of deconstruction: deconstruct death, perhaps > but it is not enough to deconstruct death to ensure salvation [Derrida’s multiple angels speaking to him]

p. 247 can’t share death, must die one by one, if it were possible for 2 people to seek DP together this would be more sacred than marriage

p. 274 can one desire, what is really called desire, an anesthetic?—pure intelligibility (sur-viving beyond life), death as absolute anesthetic

SW p. 328 culture of tallith, of shawl (not culture of veil): blessing and death

RGE pp. 256-57 that there must be meaning, that nothing must be definitely lost in death, that Hegel refers to death as “abstract negativity” > Bataille finds all this laughable

pp. 257-58 Bataille: only way for negativity to reveal what we are is to see ourselves dead, this is comedy! must live w/ impression of truly dying, difficult because necessity of spectacle/representation, nothing less animal than fiction of death > emphasis on simulacrum disrupts Hegel

p. 263 Bataille’s communication, only btwn beings who have put the being w/in themselves at stake (mis en jeu) > “placé à la limite de la mort, du néant

PIO p. 9 even if metonymy of other w/in ourselves already constituted our relation to living other, [actual?] death brings relation into a more abundant light (un plus de lumière) > makes the breaking of the mirror more necessary (difficult): at instant of death, limit of narcissistic reappropriation is terribly sharp > must no longer be concerned w/ other in ourselvesyet, that’s all we can be concerned w/ > narcissistic wound enlarges (saccroît) for want of being (ne plus pouvoir être) narcissistic, no longer appeased in that Erinnerung we call work of mourning

RM p. 59 WM marks itself off from making death or dead metaphor its watchword (mot dordre) [Ricouer’s accusation] by saying there’re 2 deaths/self-destructions of metaphor > 2 deaths means problem of death is infinitely complicated

TR pp. 159-60 [re: event, trauma] that which makes possible desire, some outside, some nondesire, some death: becoming possible of the impossible as im-possible (inappropriability of the other)

***PSSS p. 249 death & technics > nonderivable, nonsecondary technics

p. 261 survival, like some cruelty to oneself, always consists in enduring more than one death (and already during one’s lifetime)

D p. 325 “I” as ghost, as germ, term, that disseminates, a germ that carries w/in itself its own term, se faisant fort de sa mort > le sperme: ferme

p. 331 one’s undifferentiated proximity to oneself: another name for death > the space of property: “dead surface”

p. 351 semantic order entangled in seminal, that which was never itself, never comes back to itself; semantic, as a moment of desire, signifies reappropriation of seed w/in presence > the seminal’s dream of death: seed wanting to keep itself

p. 364 relation to innumerable, absence of traces—unnameable, relation to my death

HST p. 384 Levinas: my death as my part in death of other, death of other not only moment of “the mineness of my ontological function” [contra Heidegger]

LI p. 116 “self-presence” as desire/need is not simply a linguistic superstition Derrida keeps alive to win an argument, it is indestructible, “immortal”—also death, mortifère (death bearing) > is not “pure realization of self presence” also death?

p. 129 plenitude is telos, but structure of this telos is such that attainment = death/paralysis > thus, telos divided/split, this non-end not an extraneous vestige but most intimate and irreducible other in intentionality; plenitude orients and endangers intention [“dispossessed of long-for presence…”]

——non-end lasts wherever there’s life, language, intention, mark, finite infinite of differance

TN pp. 3-4 pray that you’ll outlive me, survivor guilt > the only reconciliation w/ death: not to see those I love die

p. 19 death introduces drive of expropriation, but is still more tolerable than prosthesis, metonymic substitute, technical survival [lintrus] (complicates incarnation even more)

p. 49 Nancy: there is never “death itself”

p. 52 Nancy: philosophy as work of mourning, work of representation, incorporation, profits from death (jouir de la mort), philosophy doesn’t know true mourning (w/out limits: ashes & tears)

p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 226 Nancy: space of bodies not acquainted w/ Death (space abolished) (being-toward-death) but knows each body as a dead one, sharing out for us the extension of his/her “ci-gît (here lies)”

p. 289 diastole w/out systole, interruption risks death at every moment, other heart se touche toi only to be exposed to death: toi es (t) aussi ma mort [at heart of a finite thinking]

NOY pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

AD p. 6 for Levinas, death is experience for the survivor of “without-response” > not, first of all, annihilation, non-being, nothingness: survivor’s guilt as guilt w/out fault/debt, as entrusted responsibility

——it is the murderer who identifies death w/ nothingness (Cain)

pp. 7-8 Levinas: [re: relation to death] “neither a seeing of being as in Plato nor an aiming toward nothingness as in Heidegger”

p. 9 if relation to other is an infinite separation, death comes to hollow out (creuser) even more infinitely this separation: interruption déchirante (rending) au coeur de linterruption même?

p. 131n Levinas: death as ex-ception, to seize and put outside the series

p. 83 for Levinas, “substitution,” absolute passivity, “possibility of the impossible” that’s not Heidegger’s death, but the condition of the hostage, responsibility before/beyond death— impossibility of “slipping away (se dérober)”

pp. 120-22 à-Dieu, so close to silence, also related to death, eipimeleia thanatou, Sein zum Tode

——le-plus-de-sens à linfinià lheure de la mort [the (no) more-sense to infinity…at the hour of death]

***BSi p. 57 sovereign as God does not (need to) respond [Levinas’ death] > sovereignty expropriates ecstasy of irresponsibility: bestiality, divinity, death (each dogmatically designated as unresponsive)

OG p. 8 (18) death of book announces death of full speech, announces exhaustion of language’s archon [speech], as if language now seen as a species of writing, as a (short) 3000 year adventure: announces new mutation in history of writing [death announces]

p. 17 (29) Rousseau: to “judge genius” from books is like “painting a man’s portrait from his corpse”; Derrida: writing in the common sense is the dead letter, exhausts life, carrier of death

p. 73 (106-08) writing as death & resource of signatum [sa mort, sa ressource] > immediate signatum [in MOP] is not considered trace but full presence

p. 110 (162) death, violence, impossibility of pure point, “point vocative,” death of absolutely proper naming (the other as pure other) is death of pure idiom

p. 143 (206) differance, breathing space, finitude, death makes presence/absence possible: makes possible very thing it makes impossible, produces what it forbids [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]: non-satisfaction (inassouvissement)

p. 155 (223) for Rousseau, as dangerous as the supplement is, cohabitation w/ women is even more dangerous, “jouir!” another name for death

p. 183 (261) the dangerous differance, the master name of this supplementary series: death > metonymic substitution horizon & source, abyss from which each threat announces itself

p. 184 (261-62) image is death, it cannot represent & add representer to represented, thus presence of re-presented folded back on itself in the world, presence announces its dispossession w/in its own representer/death > subject: merely this movement of expropriation

p. 187 (265) for Rousseau, human pity, imagine suffering of other as such, imagine passage from suffering to death: one & same limit/opening > relation w/ death & other: otherwise mute, solitude, animal

p. 335n Freud: mutism in a dream represents death

p. 216 (309) orientation is a disorientation, the structure of language; Rousseau’s geography of language: oriented toward its origin comme à son orient > occident as la fin, la chute, la cadence, léchéance, la mort, la nuit

p. 245 (348) must be death via grapheme before phoneme: word & thing are referential limits produced/marked by supplementarity

pp. 298-99 (421-22) though Rousseau doesn’t make “travail de la mort,” play of difference, & operation of negativity serve in dialectical accomplishment of Hegel’s truth w/in horizon of parousia > still, a horizon of infinite restitution of presence [in Rousseau]

p. 309 (436) for Rousseau, imagination irritates/ravages desire, representation (North, winter, death) as danger of supplement—whose efficiency is of the imagination

p. 315 (443-44) death (not present) travels w/in speech as trace, reserve, differance, supplement; not the simple exteriority of death to life, evil to good, signifier to signified [that would be MOP]

ATAP p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

CIR p. 172 it’s to death I already owe everything I earn, I’ve succeeded in making it, as I have w/ God, it’s the same thing, my most difficult ally > costs a great deal of love, impossible but unfailingly faithful, forgive yourself the hurt you do yourself [death same as God]

p. 218 fear that kills me in face of death, not fear of dying (how simple that would be), but fear of replacing one more dead one before being able to die myself [so dead don’t bury the dead]

pp. 284-85 writing w/out believing in one’s survival, in the inheritance of the last will, writing for the present, a made present, like SA wants to make truth: I don’t take my life, je me donne ici la mort

SPEC p. 269 death impels (pousse) the pas décriture: but de la vie, but sans but, stratégie sans finalité du vivant > Nietzsche’s no conservation, and life a rare genus of that which is dead

p. 285 from whichever end (bout) [i.e. pleasure or reality], it is death, inscribed but non-inscribable in structure, in process of structure—stricture: death already (déjà) life death

——death’s scandalous [scandalous to dialectical logic] belonging w/out interiority to pleasure, structure of alteration w/out opposition: there’s no thesis of differance

——the thesis would be larrêt de mort of differance, arresting death in 2 senses [vis-à-vis syntax]: condemns to death & interruption suspending death

——each time one of [3] “terms” [2 principles +/– differance] goes to the end (va au-bout) of itself, of its other, w/out 3rd party, it is death (lentorse mortelle qui met fin au retors du calcul)

DEATH DRIVE

AF pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin): origin of beautiful > memories of death

——death drive is anarchivic, archiviolithic

p. 11 death drive incites annihilation of memory and commands the effacement [i.e. effacing nature] of supplement

pp. 11-12 archive requires repetition, repetition permits memory but is indissociable from death drive—so archive introduces forgetfulness, archiviolithic, always works against itself (auto-immunity)

——death drive destroys archive, unless it can be made up as idol, represented, painted, erotic simulacrum

——death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

pp. 19-20 no archive drive w/out radical finitude, possibility of forgetfulness; death drive’s threat is infinite [radical evil], sweeps away logic of finitude, opens political-ethical questions

p. 79 if repetition is in the heart of future to-come, so is total annihilation of death drive

p. 91 desire for archive: homesickness for the archaic place of absolute commencement > en mal darchive [in need of archive, in archive fever, in death drive]

p. 94 archive made possible by destruction drive as originary finitude and expropriation, also no archive fever or desire w/out in-finite movement of radical destruction

POOF p. 113 [re: friend–enemy] is ultimate pessimism the absolute ambivalence of those hospitable to death drive [Freud, Empedocles]? > fool & sage never stop laughing w/ each other

pp. 218-19 we can’t exclude fact that when someone speaks they strive not to be understood, diabolical figure of death drive > so can the accord of hyperbolic lovence be possible, hoping to be understood beyond all dialectics, haunting (failure) must leave an imprint on the body it seems to threaten, merging indissociably, it’s impossible not to aspire to this haunting [a necessity]: instant of decision remains heterogenous, undecidable, crucial experience of perhaps

A p. 38 Heidegger’s distinction btwn sterben and verenden not irreconcilable w/ Freud’s thought re: fact that our mortality via death drive isn’t testified by science, our beliefs or the unconscious

FSW p. 202 for Freud, deferral, detour (Aufschub), death at origin of life [already death drive] defending itself against death via economy of death, the attempt to douse the pain of an original breach

***p. 203 “no doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, differance”—but there’s no life present at first, life is trace so we can say life is death

pp. 213-14 “repetition”—death as power, lack of power—institutes translatability, makes possible “language,” transforms absolute idiom into a limit toujours déjà transgressed (pure idiom is not language, becomes so only through repetition), repetition divides point of departure of first time; however, to only look at effect of repetition, at translation, obvious distinction btwn force & meaning, effaces intensity of death drive

POS p. 87 dissemination via death drive links new concept of repetition to value of mimesis

P p. 79 Kant: examples are wheelchairs (Gängelwagen) [roulettes] of judgment, those who don’t have enough Mutterwitz, the sick, need these wheelchairs, prostheses that replace nothing

——Hegel: there is play in examples, they play, Beispielen

——Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

ROP pp. 22-5 death drive and repetition compulsion (Wiederholungszwang), hyperbolic resistance of nonresistance, “resistance of the unconscious,” thwarts working through, une résistance qui n’a pas de sens (death drive), nest pas une résistance > [does this concept present analysis itself? is it the structure of analysis? does it fold over? upset the meaning of the series?]

pp. 24-5 pourquoi mon explication avec lanalyse [psychoanalysis] a toujours eu ce goût de mort en poste restante qui ma poussé à rôder sans fin dans les parages de Beyond the Pleasure Principle [?]

p. 32 repetition compulsion (advocatus diaboli of death drive) as resource & limit (à la fois) of psychoanalysis > analytic position set going endlessly, w/out Aufhebung, in paradox of Bindung and Erlöschung (solution, extinction): no analytic position when resistance is unidentifiable

pp. 117-8 was not Freud looking for, in “death drive,” in “repetition compulsion,” the principle before the principle (of pleasure/reality), l’esprit de cette spirale, voilà qui tient en haleine [holds one in suspense], ou si vous aimez mieux: en vie

DIF DIF pp. 18-9 in Beyond Pleas…, difference btwn pleasure/reality principle is only differance as detour [if “only,” then not differance as relation to impossible presence?]

DPi p. 15 Rousseau “presumes” nobody premeditates himself getting hanged, oh really? really? > if no one dreamed of getting hanged: no murders or DP [p. 16 death drive and DP]

p. 249 instant/instinct of death gathers together desire to kill & die [via/ Camus] > would suppression of DP frustrate these desires?

p. 250 to run toward DP, to run toward suicide, to want to have done w/ the other > out of excess hatred/love

AFR p. 135 [re: need to desire, desire as end w/out end] moment stone (statue) comes to life, works to reduce gap, (not) become dead again—contrary to frivolous distraction, to headstrong identity of signs: fear of Medusa, legitimacy itself [fear of frivolous = fear of Medusa?]

PSSS pp. 240-41 death drive (Todestrieb), cruel drive of destruction, annihilation, but also cruelty in Bemächtigungstrieb (drive for power, sovereignty, mastery)

p. 241 Derrida evokes a beyond the death drive, beyond pleasure/reality principle, beyond drive for sovereign mastery, beyond cruelty—beyond the “mythology of drives” > the undecidable in psychoanalysis, the impossible other

p. 254 arrivant, hospitality of visitation not invitation, beyond all instituting utterances, ce qui arrive, event, puts to rout performative act, sometimes cruelly, perhaps beyond the death drive, exceeds rules of hospitality: unpredictable for hosts

pp. 257-58 death drive, origin of all cruelty—from sadism to primary masochism > this death drive sends reality/pleasure principles into crisis

pp. 269-70 for Freud, cruelty, aggression > death drive turned outward, toward “objects”

pp. 271-72 Freud on indirect methods to combat war, ruse of detour (Umweg)

——Freud advocates submitting life of drives to Diktatur der Vernunft, a Utopia > indirect stratagem of Eros/Thanatos: contrary to the cruelty drive, though cruelty knows no end

pp. 275-76 [AT IT AGAIN] what I name, what I call for: w/out alibi, w/ or w/out bliss, beyond possible, beyond horizon, beyond the beyond, beyond economy, appropriable, possiblebeyond death drive wherever Freud reintegrated it in economy of possible, economic conditionality

+R +R p. 161 fishing picture, record of a hunt: 2 death drives cross in an X (double diagonal): 1) pushes, attracts, holds down—descending column 2) the other, just as sublime, raises up, asphyxia of the phallus—ascending column

BSi BSi p. 31 Freud speaks of an a-historical stasis of animals due to equilibrium btwn drives/environment [bees have a prehistory?]: mankind an irruption of destructive instinct [as history?] p. 137 “who” and “what” sink into indifference, into the abyss of who-becoming-what (death)—becoming what we will have always been

p. 290 Bemächtigungstrieb: beyond other drives, beyond death drive, think sovereignty through drive, transference, inheritance, transmission, sovereignty itself is nothing, is excess, beyond everything

OG pp. 130-31 (190-91) Lévi-Strauss hypothesizes that primary function of writing is the enslavement of other humans, Derrida says yes, then describes how structure of society (castes, class, organs of capitalization, stocks), the origin of life in general, appears wherever it’s possible to defer (différer) presence, cest-à-dire la dépense ou la consommation, et dorganiser la production, cest-à-dire la réserve en général; he then adds [strangely] that the increase in differance [as proven by its extraordinary increase past few millenniums w/out change in organism] modifies life less & less as it spreads out (sétend): should differance grow infinite, a possibility excluded by its essence, would be God or death

SPEC pp. 290-91 death drive: être à loeuvre déjà (in PP), ça se sera écrit en silence—in speculative overflow

pp. 293-94 [re: Freud’s “speculative” writing] démarche of this writing, advancing w/out advancing, time of a detour, pas de thèse repeats itself: PP will not let anything be done w/out it, except repetition itself

——Wiederholungszwang (repetition compulsion) put in communication w/ death drive

p. 296 repetition, reproductivity, works w/out saying anything, like death drive, not even “form,” w/out thesis, de-monstration makes its proof (preuve) sans montrer > de-monstration folds into everything it makes explicit, pas de démonstration remains (reste) in this restance

pp. 317-18 death drive, w/out contradicting PP, hollows it out, older, not an other mastery (Herrschaft), but other than master, tout autre (not dialectically opposed to PP as life, living, alive)

pp. 343-44 déclencheur (trigger-effect) of the déchaînement, unbinding, destricturation > repetition compulsion & death drive unbind from all contracture

p. 353 thus far in Beyond… differential stricture of repetition has not demanded a word about death

p. 354 death drive: Freud’s “inertia inherent in organic life”

——living is differential of force organized by force of inscription [how did Derrida get here?]

——detour expanding immeasurably: Umweg of 1st Chapter secondary to absolute/unconditional Umweg > pas de détour always leads back to death, not a question of going (aller) but of coming back (revenir)—this is the passage

pp. 354-55 (the) Weg (is) Umweg, weg as adverb signifies “far away,” fort!, go away!

——race to death, exhausts couriers, witnesses, relays, from post to post

p. 355 pas de plus > deux temps of drive: 1) conserves 2) insures path to death, pas de mort, organism arrives by its own (internal) step at death (eigenen Todesweg): senvoyer the message of one’s own death

p. 356 partial drive: assists in death, return closest to oneself as if to one’s origin, senvoyer > in the pas de détour, organism guards against the other stealing death from it: to be the facteur of its death

——[Freud’s death drive] autoteleguiding, suicide deferred, wishes to sound its own glas, wishes the impossible > most driven drive is drive of the proper, drive to reappropriate oneself, stronger than life & death

pp. 356-57 but S is never P, since heterology is involved, there’s force & thus legacy, sending, envoi: the proper is not the proper

p. 357 in both Freud & Heidegger, life death no longer opposed in the proper [both interpret death as proper? unlike Levinas & Derrida]

p. 358 why would Dasein, “our own,” have to constitute itself as démarcheur [stockbroker, bad step]?

——let me die properly: where death is my inheritance

p. 359 analytic of Da-sein (analytic of distance, proximity)—not so foreign to analysis of fort/da > economy of death, law of proper, auto-affection of fort:da, “eigenen Todesweg des Organismus

——Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

pp. 367-68 turning sadistic drive into death drive, sadism reappropriated into our service, turned toward us (implied: against Jung) > masochism as primary—operates otherwise than supplementary/derivative turn [from sadism?]

p. 369 Nirvana—death drive, teleology organizes return of old, oldest, furthest away

p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

p. 407 death drive doesn’t work in silence (like in French translation), but goes unnoticed (unauffällig), has to do w/ time (link to Kant, Aristotle)—thus rhythm: do feelings of tension exist to distinguish btwn bound/unbound energy or do they exist in relation to absolute magnitude?

DEATH PENALTY

FL p. 276 death penalty as right to law, testifies that law is a violence contrary to nature, something “rotten” at the heart of law; police are a more spectral version of death penalty

p. 277 police are the force of law, contamination of founding/preserving

FWT p. 85 Lacan tells us (in an ellipse), Sade opposed DP to refuse a certain Christianity

p. 86 for Robespierre, re: DP, cruelty is excess severity > guillotine: more democratic than torture

pp. 87-8 Kant believes debate over DP should only concern its principle, not its utility

p. 88 “deconstruction” of everything most hegemonic in philosophy should include deconstruction of DP, this includes concept of sovereignty, & its scaffolding via “the animal”

p. 89 Schmitt’s “partisan war” equivocates, poisons, borders of abolition of DP, which are limited to national penal law

——[Rousseau’s “public enemy,” his remorseful justification of DP, see also p. 153]

pp. 89-90 for Kant, nothing more ruinous for foundations of sovereignty than “formal” regicide; ——was king killed or just his body? (“formal” execution, judgement vs. assassination)

——Derrida is for abolition of DP, for reasons of principle [via Kant] / reasons of heart (stripped of sentimentality, allied w/ “reasons of principle”)

pp. 135-36 movement toward more and more “humane” death penalties whitewashes act of killing; [E.R.] gas chambers & crematoria, all trace of living was effaced [see E.R. p. 154]

——anonymous [death] machines, purifying neutralization of DP, ensure nothing is visible, no blood > what is called for: history/economy of blood, of its sacrificial theatricality [Nietzsche]

p. 141 Catholics in favor or DP (Juan Donoso Cortès, Aquinas), DP and history of blood sacrifice?

p. 142 DP conceived of as heart of all criminal law, all moral law (Kant) > its condition or transcendental

DP either internal to criminal law, one punishment among others, or external, non-serial exemplarity, hyperbolic, foundation, condition, more/other than a penalty

p. 143 for Hugo, “social edifice of past” rested on 3 pillars: 1) priest 2) king 3) executioner

p. 144 DP: alliance btwn sovereignty of State & religious message (but is State ever not deeply in alliance w/ the religious?)

——Socrates, Christ, Joan of Arc, Al-Hallaj are paradigmatic cases, but religious authority, via accusation (profanation/violation of sacred), always decides on DP in exemplary way

p. 145 Derrida wants to think the onto-theological-political through DP

p. 147 what welds philosophy as ontology (in its hegemonic tradition) to political theology of DP, & to idea of “proper to man”: 1) Plato’s care for death (epimeleia tou thanatou) 2) Kant’s dignity (Würde), man as end in himself, inscribes DP w/in his law 3) Hegel’s struggle for recognition 4) Heidegger’s being-toward-death of Dasein

——DP, like death itself, what’s “proper to man” > DP, at risk of shocking, always answered deeply “humanist” pleas

p. 148 DP the keystone, prosthetic artifact, weld, cement that keeps onto-theological upright, and all its dualities (physis/tekhnè, physis/nomos, physis/thesis)

pp. 150-51 deconstruction of DP makes untenable from w/in distinction btwn internal punishment (poena naturalis) & external (poena forensis): [Kant does Derrida’s work for him] since guilty should sign off on punishment, all executed punishment would be like a suicide > no law immune from interest, revenge, the sacrificial (for Kant, moral/judicial reason is sacrificial)

——to say execution is suicide for Kant is as stupid as saying capital punishment is murder

——Kant’s interpretation of lex talionis, more Roman/Jewish than evangelical, applied to categorical imperative: “if you kill him, you kill yourself”

p. 151 given that DP revolves around equivalence of an eye for an eye, question of DP is not only about political onto-theology of sovereignty, but principle of reason as calculability

——DP as impossible evaluation of debt (Nietzsche says some very strong things on subject)

p. 153 DP: not a simple question of life & death

pp. 153-54 Shoah, mass killings > not, stricto sensu, DP (never a question, not even simulacrum, of legality, neither judgment, nor guilty parties, nor accusation, nor defense)

——some believe (incorrectly), DP minor next to genocides, war crimes, malnutrition, AIDS

PSSS p. 262 psychoanalysis hasn’t yet treated DP, sovereignty in general, it needs to > otherwise, double resistance both of world to psychoanalysis & that of psychoanalysis to itself as to the world

DEATH PENALTY in DPi

DPi p. xv capital punishment > question of unforgivable

p. 1 DP is what is proper to man? or is it proper to God? (is that the same thing?)

——DP: arrêtée par un arrêt de justice > an end decreed by the Other, a verdict > this is not the archetype of every decision [?], though it reminds us: sovereign decision always the Other’s

p. 2 political-theology of DP, religion always present at DP, DP as religion

——no invisibility of DP: polis must see condemned one die > as a way for sovereign to best see itself > its sovereignty: il se voit

p. 3 stage lighting of DP, light of fire, never is sovereign more visible than when it makes itself voyante et voyeuse of execution > sovereign witnesses crime, witnesses itself, eye witness

***pp. 4-5 Socrates’ death: katēgoria (accusation), a theological one: he introduced new demons (hetera de daimonia kaina), daimonia sometimes gods but also lesser ones, revenants

***pp. 8-9 Kant: DP as proper of man, dignity of his logos or nomos, ultimate justification of jus

——in Plato’s Laws, there’s a worse than DP, the beast who doesn’t have the right to be buried > the nocturnal council (tou nukterinou syllogou) still treats the condemned as subject w/ rights

——Kant, DP as hinge of justice, law; also Locke (p. 14)

pp. 10-11 Derrida’s 2 massively obvious facts: 1) abolition of DP does not include war time killing 2) those countries who practice Abrahamic religion find no contradiction btwn DP and “thou shalt not kill,” and neither does God: put to death those who don’t obey commandments

p. 14 Rousseau: DP affirmed after chapter on sovereignty [this sequence is reversed in Derrida]

p. 15 Rousseau “presumes” nobody premeditates himself getting hanged, oh really? really? > if no one dreamed of getting hanged: no murders or DP

pp. 16-7 Rousseau’s 3 reservations re: DP (this chapter one of most tormented/interesting in The Social Contract): 1) DP not a civil law but law of war 2) not the general but a particular act of sovereign 3) Rousseau rejects exemplarity of punishment, believes guilty party can always be rehabilitated, but affirms DP when danger is too much

pp. 18-20 the transition, the trance btwn when Jews have received commandments but have yet to hear the “judgments” > as if they know God’s about to invent DP after uttering “thou shalt not kill,” terrified by this divine word electing them > Moses says, “Do not tremble”

pp. 20-1 ten commandments: allegorico-narrative or “historical staging of the very structure of the absolute law as founded on DP” > origin of social contract, state, community, people

——DP & the case, both judicial case and case as fall, headlong descent, decapitation

p. 23 to think DP, must think history/horizon of sovereignty as hyphen in theologico-political

***——but will history/horizon resist deconstruction of scaffolding of these scaffolds? scaffolding as construction/architecture to be deconstructed, the speculation, calculation, market (speculative idealism) that provides its supports; deconstruction of carno-phallogocentrism always deconstruction of DP’s historical scaffolding > history as scaffolding of this scaffold

pp. 24-6 Joan of Arc, Hallaj, Socrates, Jesus: all said, in some fashion, “I am the truth” > put to death because people afraid to hear voice of God directly (see Jewish trance pp. 18-20)

——Socrates’ daimon is silent before law, lets Socrates fall: philosophy finds its place in this silence of the daimon at moment of condemnation of Socrates [Derrida resists though strongly tempted to compare this moment to Jewish trance pp. 18-20]

——in theological-political structure of DP in 4 examples above: the sanhedrin, the Greek priests, the church must be only guardian/guarantor of word of God > DP against another political theology: in the name of transcendence against transcendence [p. 28 sovereignty against sovereignty]

——Aquinas eloquent/fervent proponent of DP for heretics, counterfeiters of faith

p. 27 can only think DP outside real theater (place of worship, witness stand, courtroom, print or televised news)—in classroom

pp. 28-9 [via Genet, great witness/man of theater of our time] equal fascination w/ weapon of crime & weapon of capital punishment (another kind of crime) > fascination w/ spectacle, one condemned to death becomes parody, comedy, imitation of Christ

p. 31 Genet reveals/betrays a Christian perversity: sacred, religious element in DP

pp. 45-6 in series of seminars called “Pardon & Perjury,” Derrida insisted that forgiveness/pardon foreign to juridical space, unlike perjury > with DP, we have the sovereign pardon; w/ DP, forgiveness returns to the Lord, remains un-forgivable on Earth

p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

pp. 55-6 contretemps of “too soon,” “too late” — essential anachronism of DP

p. 58 theater of cruelty, scopic drive, fascinatio, enchantment that chains spectator to spectacle (fascio, to tense, tie, attach, fasciola is a bandage wrapping [bandelette]) > what links voyeur-spectator to fascinum, charm, enchantment, virile sex

——to executioner: “so, you got a hard-on! (tu bandes!)” (link to erection at moment of decapitation)

p. 60 logic of fascination best argument against punishment as exemplarity: bad example risks becoming fascinating martyr, hero, the good example [Genet] (perversion of the imitation of Christ)

p. 64 DP as Christian theater of sovereignty, mercy, right of pardon

p. 68 sovereign exception & DP > is state, third party, witness already there in singular, savage, secret crime, when murderer claims to do ones own or to do oneself justice? where does murder begin?

——both abolitionists and proponents of DP allow logic of exception

p. 96 no illegal DP, only DP in (exceptional!) cases where it’s provided by law

pp. 100-01 in logic where king has 2 bodies (carnal, immortal), beheading king, splitting king in 2, reduces king to 1 single body: either a noncitizen (public enemy) or citizen traitor

p. 114 Blanchot’s “literature as right to death” is not against DP, literature as last act, last judgment, theater of cruelty, both eschatological & apocalyptic

***p. 116 Blanchot repeats core argument of right-wing philosopheme found in Kant, Hegel: man’s dignity is to risk life in law > right as right of literature & right of death as right of DP

——human law implies: something worth more than life, life must be liable to be sacrificed (not sacred [?]), sacrifice raises, raises itself above egoism, above anxiety of individual life

p. 124(n) from Kant to Blanchot > no law w/out DP, homo noumenon above homo phaenomenon > one must raise oneself by means of law above life & inscribe from this height DP in law

pp. 124-27 for Kant, maternal infanticide (putting to death child born out of wedlock) & death in duel not punishable by death (former, to save honor of feminine sex)

pp. 138-39 telephone as suspension/link to beyond, moment of grace or verdict from beyond, who calls from theologico-political apparatus of DP?

——[Derrida warns against the good conscience that doesn’t think about this instant of execution, that feels far from theater of DP]

p. 148 because cruelty “is” for Nietzsche, DP has no original place, just one of a series of tortures/spectacles > Nietzsche traces genealogies of law back to prehistoric animal-human life always ready to leave symptoms in law itself > cruelty of DP not a matter for law

p. 166 penalty (poena, peine): ransom, repurchase, punishment meant to pay for damage, buying back, redemption in the market > no penal law w/out this project of calculation, be it the calculation of the incalculable, w/ or w/out interest, w/ or w/out surplus value

p. 175 in U.S., who can deny DP as political justice is class justice

***p. 181 DP: divine weapon granted by sovereign God to sovereign monarch to fulfill providential law

p. 205 DP’s spectacle continues by becoming virtual [still visible?]

pp. 218-19 condemned to death: know the date, quasi-suicidal mastery of death, criminals who do everything to give themselves this death (se donner cette mort) > phantasm of omnipotence over their own death

p. 219 modality “when” splits condemned to die (mortal who doesn’t know moment of death) from condemned to death [DP] like a blade

p. 220 w/ DP, the third party, the State, its legal system are presumed to know, calculate, operate “time of death”: alignment of objective time w/ subjective time of subject condemned to death

p. 238 Derrida explains why he will ask question of DP before question of death

p. 247 can’t share DP, must die one by one, though someone always more than one in dying [can’t be calculated] > 2 people seeking DP together, this would be more sacred than marriage

——can’t speak about DP today w/out film, TV

***p. 248n scandal of DP, dares to calculate/measure beyond measure (démesuré), incorporate the infinite/incalculable into its calculation > excessiveness, penalty w/out proportion

p. 249 instant/instinct of death gathers together desire to kill & die [via/ Camus] > would suppression of DP frustrate these desires?

pp. 252-53 can only condemn a person/subject answerable to his or her name to death > genocide not sensu stricto DP, can’t DP a language (though languages are killed)

pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

p. 269 how long will DP survive Holy Father in Catholic church, how to measure time of the Son’s agony [?] (p. 276 Son’s agony, question of survival, blood in filiation)

p. 270 DP as theater of sur-vival

p. 278 is the Enlightenment the twilight of DP? does it begin to think DP from its end?

pp. 278-79 for Montaigne, there’s always something worth more than life, exceeding life, force of an opining (to say yes), belief, a force of force, a force of act of faith that says yes > this, acc. Montaigne, is the essence of religion: acceptance of sacrificial death & DP in shadow of a sur-viving supposedly worth more than life > religion grants the surviving of survival

DEATH PENALTY (UNCRUEL, ANESTHETIZED)

DPi pp. 48-9 anesthetize DP, uncruel, would have to think through Kant & Husserl on sensibility

pp. 49-50 against cruelty, humanize DP, change mode of DP not principle (hypocrisy of emotion spilt on cruelty of DP: still preserve cruel enjoyment of spectacle)

p. 53 Furman v. Georgia ruling on “cruel & unusual” punishment not against DP in principle

pp. 57-8 anesthetize DP (follows rhythm of nighttime up until dawn) like nocturnal council (dawn, fascination, theater, coldness of machine)

pp. 61-2 coldness, cruelty, heartless machinism of guillotine, hard and cold like a machine (again juxtaposed to woman, who is apolitical, private, warm)

p. 73 moment of anesthesia: heighten suspense (in films)

p. 79 when U.S. reinstated DP, DP was only criticized for being cruel & unusual to sensibility & imagination, in sense of aisthesis, phantasia, phantasma

p. 144 for Schopenhauer, aesthetics not a disinterest but an anesthetic

pp. 191-92 sans sang (U.S., Eucharist—real presence of blood of God): interiorization of blood in noncruel DP > turning point as a return, ce trop ou ce trope of blood

pp. 225-26 Cartesianism of Guillotin/guillotine, not only mechanism of individualism/egalitarian universalism, but also body/mind (Cartesian doxa, ideology), but also Descartes’ instantaneism (separate, indivisible instants) as part of anesthetic logic of moment of guillotine

——would the mind only know it was severed from its head when the crowd cheers? other determines instant of my death

——guillotine as pain killer: instant, no sensibility of duration of time: anesthesia—euthanasia—instantaneity

p. 274 can one desire, what is really called desire, an anesthetic?—pure intelligibility (sur-viving beyond life), death as absolute anesthetic

p. 275 Montaigne: fairest death is the most willed death, pulled like a thread > Derrida imagines [via fil of life, filet of blood] a tireless trapeze artist who is caught by net of belief, his opinion, dies on day net breaks, a willed/beautiful death > he decides to put an end to his belief

p. 276 religion as anesthetic for death & DP

TN p. 61 “this” and “here” of body (its sublimating idealization) makes it inaccessible to touch > an anesthesia of anesthesia, euthanasia contract

p. 64 [is Christianity the only idealizing anesthesia, neutralization, universalism—or one case?]

p. 229 for Derrida, epochē divides contact at its heart, anesthetizing it from the threshold of its possibility, for 2 reasons: 1) suspends reality of contact 2) noematic can’t pertain to touched thing

***pp. 229-30 anesthetic interruption in heart of aesthetic phenomenality, anesthetics very ecstasy at heart of pleasure, pleasure as differance w/out delay > plier, prier and invent substitutes, prostheses, fetishes, cultures, technics (all of “history,” before and beyond “hand of man”)

DEBT

KH p. 111 w/ Socrates still sense of debt, gift & counter-gift: he is ready to receive the discourses of which he becomes welcoming > khōra glimpse beyond debt?

GOD p. 64 for Kierkegaard [contra Hegel], universal duty is a dereliction of absolute duty, a sacrifice or duty that reaches beyond debt & duty > the “gift of death”

p. 93 a look, God’s look, God’s gaze, that cannot be exchanged, situates original sin, is the essence of responsibility

p. 115 via Nietzsche’s “genius of Christianity,” moralizing the mechanisms of debt via moral duty & bad conscience, a hyperbolized repression: sacrificial hubris

GT pp. 12-3 circular ring of “giving back (rendre),” circulation of debt not just that of things but values or symbols that are involved there (qui sy engagent en-gage) [TN footnote on engager & its evocation of pledge]

p. 133 Aristotle differentiates tukhē from automaton (chance from human finality), offers example of creditor going to market & getting his debt paid back: pas de don, everything happens en marchant

p. 169 natural debt, debt w/out debt > infinite debt

FK pp. 73-4 the 2 definitions of religio: piety, shame, patience, respect (bring together) vs. obligation, debt > Christians linked religion via ligare to the link, ligature, obligation, debt

***H p. 81 categorical imperative (under erasure) of hospitality, unconditional; p. 83 unconditional w/out imperative, w/out duty, beyond economy and debt

***SPOM p. 114 no inheritance w/out call to responsibility, a reaffirmation of a debt, but a critical, selective one

pp. 116-17 state of the debt [to Marx]: 1) one cannot establish the state of a debt, do the balance sheet of an “exhaustive record,” one selects, performs, inheritance is kept secret, secret of a crime—of its very author 2) hypocritical alibis of world market, of new slavery, until we face “foreign Debt” w/ spirit of Marxist critique

POO p. 133n where to look for debt and duty: Critique of Practical Reason or Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Being and Time, Genealogy of Morals (2nd essay), Totem & Taboo

that debt always haunts duty, and we seek beyond duty and debt, how can we have a good conscience?

——“pure morality” go beyond duty, beyond duty as debt, duty w/out debt, a silent break w/culture and language

p. 134n Benveniste: debeo (de + habeo) to have something of the others

——to not give back what was literally borrowed

p. 136n Malamoud: in debt are combined duty and fault (faute; also lack)

——Chinese/Japanese do not share etymological link of duty/debt

——belief/credit have etymological resonance (créance)

POR POR p. 8 (136) in French, Leibniz’s reddere rationem is rendre raison de quelque chose, does that mean reason is owed? it gives rise to circulation?

——“must be rendered”: principle of reason as duty, debt, law, command, imperative

A A p. 16 most general/indeterminate form of double single duty: responsible decision must obey an “it is necessary” that owes nothing, owes nothing in order to be a duty, duty w/out debt, thus w/out duty

PAS PAS pp. (45-6) a debt that annuls itself in being infinite > Derrida's debt to Blanchot’s machination sans machine, which is what interests him, what fascinates him, as does fascination

p. (75) vigilance (jalousie) links (enchaînant) affirmation to its repetition, bond (lien) w/out pact, w/out debt

SH p. 10 poem is due its date, owes itself to its date as inmost concern, signature, owes itself to its secret, speaks of this date only insofar as it acquits itself

p. 70n from Heidegger, datum becomes donation, thus date & gift, debt as well

FWT pp. 5-6 [re: responsibility as experience of inheritance] a double before (devant), to come before as in debt and before as in what is to come, always anachronism: devancer in the name of what came before, and devancer the name itself! [la devance, “owingness”]

——to invent one’s name, sign otherwise, in the name of the name passed down, if that’s possible

p. 151 DP as impossible evaluation of debt (Nietzsche says some strong things on subject)

DS p. 231n Derrida’s respect/debt for/to scholarship on Mallarmé [despite his deconstruction of it], rigorous need for it

P p. 94 concepts stitch up (recoudre), furnish supplement of adherence [re: completes incomplete gadget]; still, there’s a chiasma, w/ free beauty, la coupure ny laisse aucune peau, aucun tissu dadhérence: law w/out concept, w/out debt, complete because incomplete

——une fleur belle est toujours en ce sens une fleur absolument coupable absolument absoute [sic], innocente

ROP p. 34 divisibility of letter, truth w/out truth of deconstruction, distinguished both from das geistige Band [Hegel], & Heideggerian Versammlung > divisibility of letter undoes link of debt, symbolic, name of father (motifs qui lien et se lient au triangle ou au cercle de la réappropriation)

POOF p. 79 [re: tension btwn political/historical urgency of what’s befalling us & bibliophilic discretion, esoteric rarity] absolute urgency always law of decision, no knowledge can change this, heartrending instant, interruption of science: answers ‘more naturally’ inscribed in space of political philosophy will always be inadequate > the debt is infinite, for an apriori finite being, as soon as duty presents itself to it: urgent because infinite

SP p. 37 Derrida’s debt to other readings (of Nietzsche) should be presupposed in its totality

OTO p. 14 btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

ATIA p. 21 why would we owe truth anything? the debt of autobiography: confession > after the fall, must already conceive lying as evil, as hiding truth

TB p. 11 translatable-untranslatable name: a universal reason that limits its universality > impossible univocity: translation as law, duty/debt, insolvent debt > all marked in very name of Babel

p. 117 vis-à-vis Benjamin, if structure of work is “sur-vival,” a strange debt that doesn’t bind anyone to anyone: debt not engaged w/ subject-author but to formal law in immanence of original text

p. 118 if original text demands translation, the original is indebted to the translator, original is 1st debtor: God weeps over his untranslatable name > [his Law as law of translation, double bind]

pp. 118-19 at edge of the language, from this edge to the other of proper name: debt contracts the trait (to-be-translated from one language to the other) of relation of living subject to his name

pp. 132-33 rhythm, twists & turns from abyss to abyss, deconstructs the tower > madness on both sides (interior/exterior limit) > impossible task: the infinite guilt absolves you immediately

DPi p. 154 Nietzsche’s debtor pledges himself to inspire trust in his promise > pledges to indemnify the creditor if he doesn’t pay (gives a possession: wife, body, life, freedom)

pp. 156-57 Christianity’s stroke of genius: to believe/credit unbelievable meaning of Incarnation/Passion: creditor has paid your debt, forgiven the unforgivable: i.e. love, the creditor pays the debt, I give you what you don’t have, I forgive you > Nietzsche: “can one credit that?”

p. 163 for Nietzsche, Christianity hyperbolically augments infinite disproportion, pleasure of “highest degree” that accompanies the law of cruelty: finite debt exceeds correspondence by responding w/ a pleasure of cruelty that becomes infinite [infinite debt?]

p. 259 fraternal filiation as debt, as being condemned > fraternal duty to pay ransom: to acquit oneself of a debt [follows Benveniste here: ghilde, Geld, damnum]

p. 269 how long will DP survive Holy Father in Catholic church, how to measure time of the Son’s agony [?] (p. 276 Son’s agony, question of survival, blood in filiation)

REST p. 271 in “I owe you the truth in painting,” emphasis should be placed on the owe (doit), the debt, il doit, “he must/should/owes/ought”: vérité sans vérité de la vérité

***PF pp. xxxiv-xxxv not exonerated by decision of the other in me (passive decision): don’t give in to alibi of the other (ultimate creditor whose debt remains mine to discharge, God)

——impossibility of acquitting oneself, duty not to want to acquit oneself: attest to this w/out “mercy,” w/out alibi

TR p. 115 in every scene of inheritance, there’s laws of substitution (law period): responsibility, debt, duty—thus guilt & forgiveness

PJP p. 198 ultimate signature (last pages of book) says something of debt that remains unpaid > no scene of perjury w/out forgiveness

——forgive me, we say to us

EL pp. 207-08 the vengeance of language (language as name of God) > a debt that leaves its signature in the language will be incurred by innocents, archiguilty, generations to come

——this is a logic that the cogito, practico-transcendental egology, cannot comprehend [i.e. cogito can’t comprehend language?]

HST p. 376 Huysmans: Jesus as first example of mystical substitution, the substitution (suppléance) of him who owes nothing for him who owes everything

pp. 382-83 survival guilt, reproach oneself before everything for which Auschwitz remains proper name/metonymy > asking forgiveness for being-there (être-là); (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas) debt prior to any borrowing: unacquittable fact of being-there, a being there originarily guilty

p. 404 Levinas: memory of servitude in Egypt assembles humanity, ego is a hostage, ego ceaselessly missing itself, debt absorbed only by being increased; such is the pride of nonessence!

PPT p. 4 [re: Cezanne] to promise the truth, render what’s due, un rendu (a due, a sum rendered)

p. 9 one dreams of a painting w/out debt, w/out truth, a painting that would still not give up painting

C p. 215 work of the angle (RECTIFIES in all senses) resounds on more than one surface: kills, repairs, restores, recaptures, then once more (inexhaustible debt until the échéance of a dice throw)

TN TN p. 298 a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

ATM ATM p. 146 to neither pay homage to, nor “rendez-vous” w/ Levinas, a gesture beyond any possible restitution, operating w/out debt: absolute ingratitude, Derrida would pay homage to Levinas’ radical generosity, which requires, “ingratitude de lautre

p. 148 gift of other, debt w/out contract, demands: at the same time, indefinitely equivalent substitution (anonymity) and singularity (rather, absolute uniqueness of proper name)

AD AD p. 6 for Levinas, death is experience for the survivor of “without-response” > not, first of all, annihilation, non-being, nothingness: survivor’s guilt as guilt w/out fault/debt, as entrusted responsibility

——it is the murderer who identifies death w/ nothingness (Cain)

pp. 12-3 Levinas, unlike Heidegger, offers a debt w/out regret > of the order of the unconditional yes [Derrida’s only regret: not having said this to him enough]

p. 99 ex-propriety makes of the subject a hôte and hostage (gentle), someone who is in his own home in the home of the other—“anachronism of a debt preceding the loan”

SPEC SPEC p. 262 what is the child’s debt in a play w/out debt? on what w/out debt does play speculate in secret? what is the place of such a secret? [re: Freud’s debt to Nietzsche]

p. 263 if one’s [intellectual] debt is always another’s, one is acquitted & guilty in advance? comment spéculer sur la dette dun autre à soi revenant (amounting to, coming back to oneself)?

pp. 264-65 Nietzsche dared to link debt to the unconscious, a debt to that which one feels in advance acquitted, the debt of another that comes back to torment you

p. 264n [Derrida will link Nietzsche’s debt to Heidegger’s Schuldigsein elsewhere]

p. 353 demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

FV FV p. 414 what happens when a text that psychoanalysis deciphers inscribes w/in itself a scene of deciphering? when it says more about itself than the deciphering? [Freud often acknowledges this debt]

pp. 468-69 the 2 truths: adequation (original contract: acquitting of debt), unveiling (lack on basis of which contract contracts in order to reappropriate what’s been detached)

DECISION

GOD p. 66 instant of decision is madness; like gift & “gift of death,” instant irreducible to presence, act of giving death, sacrifice, suspends labor of negative, labor itself, perhaps even work of mourning

pp. 78-80 a decision is always secret, always secret in instant of its performance; Abraham’s decision is absolutely responsible: answers for itself before the absolute other

p. 128 Abraham’s silence, secrecy of unforgivable, decision, would have “to be forgiven by the one he obeyed”

GT p. 9 could only be a gift the instant the paradoxical instant tears time apart (what Kierkegaard means when he says decision is madness)

R p. 17 by killing father Cronos (infinite order of time), Zeus wills out over time, touches the finitude of time, sovereignty as the instant of a decision, end to time and language

OOG p. 62 phenomenology’s profound philosophical decision, a methodological necessity (limitation): one’s starting point in the constituted [compare to Derrida’s no choice]

p. 150 phenomenology terminates as philosophical propaedeutic for every philosophical decision [i.e. “ontological” question cannot stem from phenomenology as such] : this propaedeutic is an ideal sense, announced as infinite, phenomenology will always be its jurisdiction in its explicit anticipation of the end of its itinerary

FK p. 55 “responsibility of repetition in the wager (gage) of decision or of affirmation (re-legere) which links up with itself to link with the other” [desert, messianic, khōra]

FL p. 255 the just decision (rend time, defy dialectics) as madness, via Kierkegaard, madness because hyper-active and suffered, retains something passive

p. 291 [re: Benjamin’s 2 violences] undecidable on each side: 1) divine: decision w/out decidable certainty 2) mythic: certainty of the undecidable w/out decision

LOBL pp. 114-15 crisis is the urgency, instant, of impossible decision (krinein, judgment is the impossible to reach), the suspensive arrêt suspends the decisive arrêt and vice versa > arrhythmic pulsation, imparts movement in stopping, never sure, unfortunately, fortunately

POO p. 9 self-justification of a decision is always impossible, full of equivocation, cannot respond for itself

SPOM p. 37 “there is the pledge (il y a le gage),” even before, perhaps, a decision confirms it > responds w/out delay to demand of justice

p. 116 “one makes oneself accountable by an engagement that selects, interprets, and orients, in a practical and performative manner, and by a decision that begins by getting caught up, like a responsibility, in the snares of an injunction that is already multiple, heterogeneous, contradictory, divided—therefore an inheritance that will always keep its secret, and the secret of a crime”

POR p. 19 (153) “thinking” requires both principle of reason and what’s beyond it, both archē and an-archy > decision [of thought] always risks the worst, to claim to erase the risk by institutional program is to create a barricade against a future

HERP p. 177 as Dasein throws itself by anticipation toward death, it inherits & chooses, chooses the very possibility of inheritance (Kampf belongs to very structure of Dasein)

pp. 211-12 when Heidegger places strategy of a decision outside the calculus of the formalizable, is this still a war economy?

A p. 16 most general/indeterminate form of double single duty: responsible decision must obey an “it is necessary” that owes nothing, owes nothing in order to be a duty, duty w/out debt, thus w/out duty

p. 18 decision concerns choice btwn relation w/ a wholly non-opposable other (an other that’s not its other) and an other who is its other (can be opposed in a couple) > the former relation is that of aporia, not a crossing of border but a double concept of the border

pp. 53-4 Heidegger places analytic of Dasein re: death here, on this side, before all ontical speculation operating beyond (ultra, meta, trans), by way of an uncontested, irrecusable decision (a performative incision) on the undecidable question of “here”: a testimony w/out proof

pp. 54-7 the 3 reasons Heidegger’s authoritative decision on what must remain undecided seems so decisive: 1) superordinating of existential analytic 2) the originary, underivable character of death, of finitude, forces us to decide 3) prevalence of phenomenological tradition, pre-ferring, pre-férance [with an “a”], pre-archic originarity of proper, eigentlich

p. 56 decision to decide from “here” not simply methodological decision: decides that a method is pre-ferable to no-method, this absolute decision turns into non-decision since, as unconditional decision re: place/taking-place of decision, it relies on prevalence of what can’t be decided (i.e. death), leaving questions undecided, that would make one hesitate btwn decision/non-decision

——that which would make decision object of thematic knowledge must remain undecidable for there to be a decision

p. 74 double sense of de-termination [re: determined closure]: logic of termination (terma, peras, finis) and resolute decision or resolution [Being in Time great discourse on Entschlossenheit]

PP p. 63 cutting trace (la trace coupante): the decision of each reading, risk getting fingers caught, only chance, must not only look but touch the text

p. 117 (133) in Gorgias’ analogy “logos/soul : pharmakon/body,” the name of the relation is the same as one of its terms, logos: this comprehension an act of domination and decision

PAS PAS pp. (96-7) decision not only suspended but understood (sous-entendue), I say understood, btwn 2 readings

OH p. 45 following program—application of know-how > ethics & politics become a technology, no longer order of practical reason or decision, begins to be irresponsible

p. 72 any decision that does not endure antimony is a dangerous mystification, immorality plus good conscience, good conscience as immorality

FWT pp. 3-4 heir must respond to double injunction: reaffirm what comes “before us,” necessary (il faut) to appropriate a past fundamentally inappropriable, reaffirm, relaunch otherwise, keep alive

——reaffirmation which continues & interrupts: one’s own decision as that of the other: signature against signature

p. 53 must be a leap from knowledge to decision, doesn’t take place w/out other, “passive” decision, decision of other, this doesn’t exonerate me [Derrida can prove this rationally, in the name of reason to come] > still necessary to know as much as possible before deciding

p. 76 risk decision by enduring undecidable: 2 contradictory imperatives

POOF p. 67 aporia that all change must endure (that of perhaps) > w/out suspense marking a perhaps, there would neither be event nor decision; w/out suspending perhaps while keeping its living possibility in living memory, nothing would take place, nothing would be decided

p. 68 no event not followed/preceded by its own perhaps, no event is as unique, singular and irreplaceable as the decision [?] > isn’t the eventness of an event excluded by a decision?

pp. 68-9 a passive decision, responsibility outside of knowledge, outside of subjective decisionism, occurs from the heartbeat of the other (blood arriving), which makes an exception for/of me > opens autonomy on to itself, matches decision to the gift, figure of the heartbeat: [passive decision doesn’t contradict sovereign decision, sovereign becomes guest, other?] [Derrida beyond Levinas] ——in sum, a decision is unconscious

p. 79 [re: tension btwn political/historical urgency of what’s befalling us & bibliophilic discretion, esoteric rarity] absolute urgency always law of decision, no knowledge can change this, heartrending instant, interruption of science: answers ‘more naturally’ inscribed in space of political philosophy will always be inadequate > the debt is infinite, for an apriori finite being, as soon as duty presents itself to it: urgent because infinite

p. 127 would the decision be free or not? active or passive? conscious or unconscious? is the decision always linked to oblivion itself?

ROP p. 33 decision most decisive there where it is impossible to decide

DPi p.1 DP: arrêtée par un arrêt de justice > an end decreed by the Other, a verdict > this is not the archetype of every decision [?], though it reminds us: sovereign decision always the Other’s

pp. 83-4 for Schmitt, only by limit concept of exception can we think purity of decision, the exception “thinks the general w/ intense passion”

CHM pp. 38-9 Foucault’s Decision (re: point where madness & reason were split): both a fiat/decree/order & schism/dissension/caesura > this dissension is internal (cleavage, torment, w/in act of sentire), fission that divides it along lines of Hegelian Entzweiung [rupture, diremption]

p. 39 much less-determined, archaic reason/logos: common root of reason/madness in classical age > not only common ground for all dissension, it’s the atmosphere in which Foucault’s language moves

p. 40 Derrida’s problem w/ writing history of decision: risk construing division as event subsequent to unity of original presence > confirms metaphysics in its fundamental operation

PF p. xxiv decision supposes passage through undecidable of a crisis/krinein/krisis (choice of election, selection: legere, lecture/reading)

D p. 290 Littré: déclenchement, triggering a machine, release of a machine, lever la clenche, open a door, speak

p. 292 technicity as metaphor that transports life into death, a non-accidental extra, which, in its act of falling (en y tombant): la branche (plugs it in) et la déclenche (and triggers it off): “force vivante

p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

p. 305 proliferation, substitution of the unit that adds & effaces itself, counts itself out (se décomptant) at moment of déclenchement; Sollers: “participating in the calculation that effaced us and replaced us”

p. 307 nothing says present better, it seems, than il y a; but what is present is a scission, il y a cette coupure, what is present & at work is a “recoil (recul),” possibility of its triggering

p. 308 presence as product, tombe déjà comme un effet, sous le coup (under the sway) dune structure machinée qui ne se livre (gives itself away) pas au présent

EL p. 222 question of decision & responsibility (that of our generation) returns (revient) to us out of (depuis) undecidable bottom, which is, au fond, undecidable

TN p. 103 for Nancy, touching the limit > moment of decision

AD pp. 23-4 how could an automatic, proper “I” make an immanent “decision” w/out the tearing rupture (rupture déchirante) we associate w/ “free” decision?

p. 52 interruption se produit, se décide—in name of ethics

pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (lentretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech

——w/out silence, w/out non-response: simply unfold (dérouler) knowledge in a program > nothing would make us more irresponsible, nothing more totalitarian

CF pp. 56-7 infinite distress (night) of deciding w/out necessary infinite deliberation, the responsibility of concrete situations, the “contextual,” never sure of the justice of one’s decision——the future will give us no more knowledge, it will be determined by that choice

——but ‘contextual’ differences, difficulties, occur in name of the unconditional, never empiricist, relativist, pragmatist resignation [urgency]

WOG p. 35 undecidability: condition and necessary passage for the decision

BSi p. 33 by its essence, every decision sovereign & exceptional, escapes order of the possible, the programmable, makes distinction btwn a deciding decision and an undecided one undecidable > supposed decision looks like indecision, nonintention, unconscious, irrational > sovereign looks like the beast

p. 173 sovereign decision, mad and bête

OG p. 167 (238) originary differance is supplementarity as structure: irreducible complexity of shifting play of absence/presence: metaphysics produced by it, doesn’t think it: writing is a representation of trace, trace itself does not exist > place of decision now hidden, but still indicated

CIR p. 256 day of circumcision: a de-cision was taken in me w/out me > Jealousy & virginity, my two nipples

p. 282 wait for the moment which is looking for me, decision deciding my life w/out me

SPEC pp. 343-44 déclencheur (trigger-effect) of the déchaînement, unbinding, destricturation > repetition compulsion & death drive unbind from all contracture

DECONSTRUCTION

AF p. 97 archive as history of every concept, all conception

SPOM pp. 16-7 apocalypse of history, philosophy, Marxism was daily bread for Derrida in ’50s, so those into Fukuyama seem late for the end of history

p. 93 deconstruction had to put into question the onto-theo, archeo-teleological concept of history in Hegel, Marx, “or even” in the epochal thinking of Heidegger

——instead of reading Kòjeve’s end of history like Fukuyama, as capitalist paradise, Derrida reads an actor’s ploy, a demand that corresponds to law of law: where history comes to an end, historicity of history beings, finally has chance of promising itself

——where determined concept of man finished > là lhumanité pure de lhomme, de lautre homme et de lhomme comme autre commence ou a enfin la chance de sannoncerde se promettre > in an inhuman or a-human fashion

p. 96 “world is going badly (le monde va mal),” il est usé mais son usure ne compte plus, vieillesse ou jeunesse [cf. SW pp. 322-23]—on ne compte plus avec elle, on ne sen rend plus compte comme dun seau âge dans le progrès dune histoire > ce qui arrive arrive à lâge même > messes w/ “teleological order of history”

***p. 146 via Marx, players in history as inverted Schleimihls, shadows w/out body, the specter, the red specter is disincarnated > this impossibility [disincarnation of specter] isn’t it possibility itself: virtuality? mustn’t one reckon w/ this to understand history, the event-ness of the event?

——impossibility to discern specter from specter of specter > not night where all cows are black, but grey on grey because red on red

pp. 241-42n though each period, “epoch” as its own hauntological media, and one can explain (to a certain point) a text’s [Marx’s, Stirner’s] historical singularity, one must not fail to reinscribe it in a much “larger spectrological sequence” [see p. 233n where “revisionism” is used to accuse anyone who wants to rethink history]

***POOF pp. 219-20 how this madness [undecidable, beyond dialectics] can negotiate w/ what it isn’t, translated & protected in good sense of ‘things,’ proofs, guarantees, symbols, concepts—in a politics: this is the whole of history

p. 263 jusquici [up until now], for several 1000 years, le temps d'un clin d'œil [the twinkling of an eye], tremors have been registered, archived, by the archons of the same family [phallogocentric fraternization]

p. 273 how short life will have been > by precipitation into which an eschatological sentiment of the future throws us, a few 1000 years is only yesterday: world is drawing to a close (va finir)

p. 274 Kant explains that empty gestures, those of politesse, lead to genuine dispositions of soul > Derrida extrapolates: history of becoming-true of an illusion, une histoire qui se fait comme histoire qu'on se raconte: elle se fait alors qu'on la raconte, on se la raconte pour la faire [history made while story being told] > a trial (procès) of verification

——a good philosophical computer could convert Kant’s history of truth qua history of error into Hegelian software, then Nietzschean—il le fait déjà [Derrida], n'est-ce pas [baby daddy]

p. 278 history is neither a continuous evolution nor a simple succession of discontinuous figures

***p. 284 if we find in Nietzsche a play of the Gospels against Aristotelian virtue, while Aristotelian heritage is reimplemented: enough to discourage a reassuring historical scansion, must think up different ways of doing history, that which defies tranquility of historian is a strategy of friendship, a war for friendship: lamitié, voilà lenjeu de ces stratagèmes sans fin

p. 289 Nietzsche’s abyssal altercation w/ Christian fraternity, that we’re tasked to relate ancient & new history (fraternity in Christianity, in Arabo-islamic culture too) > no justification in the shortcoming, the obliged shirking, of this task: nevertheless we believe in the seriousness of the obligation

——Derrida has insisted that the indefinite recoils (replis) in Zarathustra’s strategy must contain one fold or another that places history of brother in Bible & Koran beside Zarathustra (not in confrontation)

p. 305 this book has said nothing against the brother, one can’t protest from inside of history of brothers: the history won’t be thought, recalled, by taking up this side

MPM p. 125 [re: de Man, word “deconstruction” inscribing itself instead of being erased] “always already” erases singularity of event, which is erased in its turn before signature of this word [“deconstruction”] > signature asserts itself as history insofar as origin of its “taking-place” is unlocatable

p. 143-44 via de Man, word “political” is allegorical > “textual allegories…generate history”

PPHS p. 72 [method, compare to Nietzschean interpretation] Derrida will look 1) at the ruptures, breaks, discontinuities of long but finite historical continuum/sequence of metaphysics re: sign as referral to presence 2) and at the sequence itself, ample chains of predicates that aren’t interrupted by fascinating rupturing events

WM p. 230 Derrida not petitioning for homogenous continuum ceaselessly relating tradition back to itself [re: metaphysics & metaphor], but if we don’t attend to durable constraints of long systematic chain, to its general functioning & effective limits, run risk of taking derivative effects for original characteristics of historical subset, a break beneath every step!

POS p. 7 to read this symptom [MOP] is not ingenious discovery of single person, is due to total transformation that can’t be called “historical,” or “worldwide” anymore

p. 24 “I do not believe” in decisive ruptures, unequivocal “epistemological break[s]”, breaks are always reinscribed in old cloth that must be undone interminably

p. 50 Derrida associates linearism [of history] w/ logo-phonocentrism, semantism, idealism; he rejects absolute autonomy of history as history of philosophy [see M pp. 230-31, PPHS 72-3]

p. 51 re: logocentrism, a powerful historical/systematic unity must be determined first, instead of taking dross for gold once rupture, break, emergence is allegedly delineated

pp. 56-60 metaphysical concept of history: meaning developing itself in straight, circular line

——but since Derrida doesn’t believe there are metaphysical concepts in themselves, he uses word “history” to reinscribe its force, produces a monumental, stratified, contradictory history, a history w/ new logic of repetition and trace (how could there be history w/out it?)

——Derrida always subscribed to Althusser’s necessary critique of Hegel’s concept of history, showing there are multiple histories w/ different rhythms, & to Soller’s “monumental” history

——but what about historicity of history [Derrida will not simply enumerate histories like Socrates enumerates sciences, never asking about scientificity of science], but won’t historicity always demand an essence? ineluctable reappropriation of metaphysics, don’t we need to ask what is the “history” of “essence”?

——[Derrida describes the textual work (“practically” inscribes/overflows) that must be done, the overturning cannot simply occur w/in “discourse,” w/ new “conceptualization”]

——“history” in quotes has led to Derrida being attributed w/ “rejection of history”

p. 80 “history…bear[s] w/in it the motif of a final repression of difference”

p. 104n complicity [in MOP] of concepts “history,” “constitution,” “production,” Derrida uses them for strategic purposes

ROP p p. 40 [techno-psychoanalytical] new techniques of archive (tape recorder, etc.), together w/ ideas re: inscription, erasure, blank, memory storage, threaten concept of history > the way in which history is written has not systematically come to terms w/ all this

p. 77 where else but on border do questions of topology get asked, and why else than that the border is not indivisible? risky for historian to assign taking place of event to a borderline

ATIA p. 24 history, historicity, historicality, all part of auto-biography, auto-definition, auto-situation of man [re: Derrida’s hesitation to claim there’s been a historical turning point in relation btwn man and animal, figure of turning pout too genetic, biological, zoological]

p. 31 anthropo-centric subjectivity speaks only from one edge of Man/Animal limit, gives autobiography, history of its life, that it therefore calls History

p. 105 deconstruction works to open “betrayals of repressed human possibilities,” in the name of another history

PS p. 174 approaching archaic, tumultuous ground through a “negative” route, historical in a sense never given thematic value > can’t be tolerated by metaphysical concept of history

p. 326n (with remarkable/ambiguous exception of Hegel) God is Death: infinite life, life w/out difference > w/in life God-Death names finitude, difference w/in life > mais l'autre nom de la même chose ne veut pas dire la même chose que le premier nom, il n'en est pas synonyme et c'est toute l'histoire

FS pp. 3-4 Derrida links structuralist obsession w/ an anxiety (inquiétude) about (sur) language, an anxiety of (du) language and in (dans) language itself

——yet, to dream of reducing this link to a sign of the times is to dream of violence: the sign is more or less, something other than a sign of an epoch

——structuralist attitude, et notre posture aujourdhui devant ou dans le langage, not only moments in history: étonnement, plutôt, par le langage comme origine de lhistoire > par l'historicité elle-même

p. 14 [for deconstruction] history of the work is not only its past, it is the impossibility of the text ever being present > legitimating intention keeps to internal truth, avoids thinking a subjective origin that is not simply psychological/mental

O p. 26 “la dissémination traitesur lit (doctors, reads, on bed)le point où le mouvement de la signification viendrait régulièrement lier le jeu de la trace en produisant ainsi lhistoire

DPi p. 18 “two centuries is an infinity of eternities, and it is a fraction of a second in the history of humanity, all and nothing”

***p. 23 but will history/horizon resist deconstruction of scaffolding of these scaffolds? scaffolding as construction/architecture to be deconstructed, the speculation, calculation, market (speculative idealism) that provides its supports; deconstruction of carno-phallogocentrism always deconstruction of DP’s historical scaffolding > history as scaffolding of this scaffold

p. 136 span of 50 years: eternity for the dead, a fraction of 1/1000 of a second in the history of humanity

CHM p. 33 if understood as a sign, does Descartes’ stated intention have the historical meaning assigned to it (by Foucault)? & is its meaning exhausted by its historicity?

p. 36 archaeology against reason can’t be written: concept of “history” has always been a rational one > writing that exceeds, by questioning them, values of “origin,” “reason,” “history” couldn’t be contained w/in metaphysical closure of an archaeology

p. 41 classical reason a doctrine of tradition, the tradition of logos (is there another tradition?)

pp. 42-3 if great division btwn madness/Cogito is the historicity of history, could we write the history of historicity (the origin of history)? wouldn’t the hysteron proteron be more than a “logical fallacy”?

——if historicity is proper to reason: history of reason is not history of its origin but one of its determined figures

p. 44 before writing a history: must do an autonomous, internal analysis of philosophical content (when totality of meaning is clear, I can rigorously situate in total historical form—which is never)

pp. 307-08n Freud’s latent content as danger to all historians of meaning [cf. p. 44]

***——all history can only be the history of meaning

——no history except of rationality/meaning: reappropriation of negativity—or forgets it (same thing) > history of truth, history of economy of negative: negativity not positive truth is the nonhistorical capital of history

——think an ahistoricality, negativity so negative it wouldn’t be negative > affirm negativity in silence [negative dialectics?]: access nonclassical dissociation btwn thought & language

p. 60 Derrida’s deconstruction of Foucault not a philosophia perrenis: historicity of philosophy located btwn hyperbole & finite structure, btwn closed totality and what exceeds it, in difference btwn history & historicity, in moment btwn hyperbole/madness/Cogito & forgetting > another statement of excess that’ll become another decline/crisis

RGE p. 269 Hegel 1st to have demonstrated onotological unity of method & historicity, so [Bataille’s] sovereignty exceeds not only subject but history, not as ahistorical, but as superhistorical—takes its responsibilities from completion/closure of history

TR p. 118 when it’s a matter of structure of text, concept of historicity not regulated by teleological process but by the event, by singularity of “one time only”

——via de Man, time is not enough to make history, not the essential predicate of concept of history

pp. 130-31 re: mosquito caught mid-bite in amber coffin or 2 midges making love, a jouissance took place whose archive we preserve, archive of a singular event 54 million years ago > archive of man’s confessions a few centuries ago, fractions of second in history of life, earth, & the rest

p. 136 event is always traumatic: singularity interrupts normal fabric of temporality/history

WAP p. 103 to identity historical concatenation of deconstruction & decolonization is to use a conceptual resource of history no longer self-evident

p. 123 if historian of philosophy finds amalgamation unrefined, it’s because refinement of historian is “crude”—blinding “him” to mechanisms that must be analyzed [re: negligible difference btwn Descartes, Fénelon, Bossuet, re: massive effects in teaching]

***REST pp. 325-26 if police there is (and isn’t there always?) > Derrida polices too [?], “close reading,” counterpolices [?] oldest, most dogmatic, sinisterly authoritarian programs, massive meidatizing machines: pre-text of perception, of bare hands (mains nue), of real history, of living speech (vous enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte)

DST DST p. 220 Lacoue-Labarthe (w/ rigor & prudence) follows folds of what can no longer be called scene, period, history, sequence—a deportation whose measurelessness (démesure) seems to defy hope of judgment/justice > and yet, there’s an il faut, there’s philosophy & its law

PIO pp. 24-5 Derrida links tekhnē/fabula and historia/epistemē > man defined by human subject’s aptitude for invention: 1) narrative fiction, historical fabulation 2) technical or technnoepistemic innovation

p. 32 the 2nd notion of invention [dispositif] haunts & thus magnetizes the 1st [unveil what’s there] > this haunting at heart of question re: modern tekhnē

D p. 302 present can only present itself by relating back to itself [folding back on itself], (com)plying with itself (en se pliant à soi) dans langle, along la brisure: a “crack (faille)” created by a joint, hinge

p. 303 possibility (potency) of present is its own limit, inner fold, impossibility—its impotence (btwn presence/castration) > same goes for “history,” “form”: language of metaphysics

***TN pp. 229-30 anesthetic interruption in heart of aesthetic phenomenality, anesthetics very ecstasy at heart of pleasure, pleasure as differance w/out delay > plier, prier and invent substitutes, prostheses, fetishes, cultures, technics (all of “history,” before and beyond “hand of man”)

WOG p. 28 unity of history of metaphysics a domestic representation (economic reappropriation)

BSi p. 332 we are all grateful for Foucault and Agamben’s confusions/contradictions [re: biopolitics and periodization], they compel us to reconsider a way of thinking and doing history

pp. 333-34 call into question periodization not to reduce eventness or singularity, singularity makes it all the more irreducible and confusing

——give up linear history of epistēmēs (which Foucault and Agamben adhere to in spite of themselves), give up alternative of simultaneously synchronic and linear diachronic

——motifs of the passage of what passes and comes to pass (passe et se passe) in history has no solid foundation, no indivisible line > requires a rethinking figure of threshold, requires greater vigilance to our irrepressible desire for single, solid threshold

——perhaps there never is any such threshold, perhaps that’s why we remain on it, why we risk staying on it forever

***pp. 338-39 the (mis)translation of logos brings w/ it the whole of culture; whole force of history at work to produce this translation [logos as Christ] > whole of history at play in motif of beast & sovereign and their relation to zoōn: “there are no limits, no frontiers that can contain these issues of translation”

OG p. 85 linear thought reduces history (perhaps we need another word), linear always the unfolding presence of anthropos > this line becomes originary presence acc. to straight line/circle

p. 86 “line” only a particular model, vulgar, [acc. Heidegger] mundane concept of time in ontology from Aristotle to Hegel > meditation on writing & the deconstruction of the philosophy of history are inseparable

p. 286 (405) phonic auto-affection permits the epoch of man, epoch not of history but as history: greatest possible mastery, liberty, self-presence of life

——[in spite of Hegel’s follies, Derrida here affirms that concept of history is a concept of philosophy, that history is the history of philosophy]

pp. 286-87 (406) the epoch of truth, what Nietzsche calls abbreviation of signs [retreat of signifier?] [Derrida defends Nietzsche against reading that restores truth, fundamental ontology, in Nietzsche’s thought] [Heidegger’s reading?]

CHOR p. 91 once feminism movements reappropriate stifled past, feminism will perhaps have to renounce all too easy progressivism

——“dogmatics” of feminism as telos, sinister mystification, will flounder in same homogenized, sterilized river of history of mankind [w/ its age-old dream of reappropriation]

DEHISCENCE

FWT p. 112 “I” am working around a dehiscence, division (more than 1, 2, 3, beyond all arithmetic, calculability)

***DS p. 215n “event” (historical event, if you wish) has form of a repetition, the mark (readable because doubled) of a quasi-tearing (quasi-déchirure), a dehiscence [etymology of dehiscence follows]

p. 234 Mallarmé’s book is a block composed of sheets of paper—its “cubic perfection” is open, impossibility of closure, dehiscence as “internal” theater, practice of spacing put in play

PIO p. 44 supplementarity introduces (into structure of psyche) the fabulous repetition, a crossing of chance & necessity, bending performative rules while respecting them: allows other to come, or announce’s its coming, in dehiscence’s opening > deconstruction

LI p. 59 dehiscence, botanical, divided opening, makes plant grow > law of undecidable contamination (like iterability)

p. 72 expressionist & representationalist description of language: intention adequate to, realizes, expression (dehiscence is there even before divide btwn intention/expression)

pp. 92-3 the non-simple “two-fold root” divides, guts, (philosophical) radicality: makes possible & limits at same time

DELAY (

OOG pp. 152-53 re: Husserl’s Origin…, delay is the philosophical absolute, all methodic reflection begins in the consciousness of another previous, possible, and absolute origin

——this phenomenological delay, the alterity of absolute origin can only be recognized in my Living Present, reduction is pure thought as delay

——could there be any philosophy if consciousness of delay was not primordial and pure

——primordial consciousness of delay can only have the pure from of anticipation

H p. 109 we are always in some way late; “the consciousness only anticipates, ever, one delay too many”

p. 101 delay and haste, halting and hastening, rhythm of Oedipus’ journey; p. 127 infinite speed contracted into an absolute halt or haste, precipitation because delay, instant of an instant that is canceled out > thus always late & precipitous re: hospitality

BL p. 202 time: resolution of non-resolution—brings story into being and sustains it, only appears after law of delay, advance of law, anachrony of relation

SPOM p. 37 “there is the pledge (il y a le gage),” even before, perhaps, a decision confirms it > responds w/out delay to demand of justice

LOBL p. 115 like death, arrêt remains undecidable, one arrêt marks delay, the other haste [2 syntaxes]

pp. 136-37 survivre delays at once life & death, line of least sure sur-, no clear-cut opposition, living on like differance, beyond identity & difference > tele-phone, tele-gram only 2 modes of this teleography in which trace, grapheme, does come secondarily but marks telic structure a priori

——narrator is always away (at a distance, tele-)

HERP pp. 191-92 for Heidegger, philosophy seeks after, comes later than harmony, this delay eroticizes philosophical search, tension of Eros; Heraclitus & Parmenides not philosophers, no straining, no erotic pas, in accord, Einklang, homology w/ logos

VM p. 107 Man is a God arrived too early, a God who knows himself forever late in relation to the already-there of Being (qui se sait à jamais en retard sur le déjà-là de lÊtre)

FSW p. 203 Freud [of Beyond…] complies w/ dual necessity: differance at origin, crossing-out concept primariness > delay is in the beginning

p. 214 supplementary delay, pathbreaking, subterranean toil, mole-like

T p. xii is there any ruse not belonging to reason which will prevent philosophy from borrowing its categories from logos of other, affecting itself w/out delay [see POOF p. 1]?

DIF DIF p. 21 radical alterity of every possible mode of presence marked by irreducibility of aftereffect (daprès-coup), of delay (de retardement) [Nächtriglichkeit]

WAP p. 168 hegemonic belatedness (retard-hégémonique): [presence, glory, of the empire after its demise?]

SW p. 348 [read Cixous’ Savoir] only in a French to come, only happen in delayed form—inheriting w/out inheriting, reinventing mother & father [baby daddy]

DST DST p. 221 no matter how “free” or deconstructed the response, one cannot reduce the delay (retard): an event, a law, a call are already there (others are there, for/before whom one must answer); “response inaugurates nothing if it does not come after

pp. 319-20n delay as inevitable, delay re: one’s “own” birth, experience of “abortion” > a subject that cannot identify itself because ineluctably delayed [Lacan’s human born prematurely]

***TN pp. 229-30 anesthetic interruption in heart of aesthetic phenomenality, anesthetics very ecstasy at heart of pleasure, pleasure as differance w/out delay > plier, prier and invent substitutes, prostheses, fetishes, cultures, technics (all of “history,” before and beyond “hand of man”)

OG pp. 153-54 (221) restitution of presence by language: symbolic/immediate, se passe de passer par le monde: touching is touched, jouissance not deferred: auto-affection se donne pour autarcie pure, it does not wait (nattend pas) > but, auto-affection pure speculation, present delivered is chimera, the no longer deferred is absolutely deferred: acc. Rousseau, sign/image/representation sont des illusions qui donnent le change (sidetrack us) [differance w/out delay]

p. 298 (421) “labîme, cest le creux qui peut rester ouvert entre la défaillance de la nature et le retard du supplément” [abyss as delay, hollow, open]; pure law restores (gives back to people) liberty, gives back to presence its sovereignty [sutures abyss], pure law a supplement of supplement

CIR p. 135 foreskin & truth (detour/delay): question of knowing by whom by what the violence of circumcision was imposed

SPEC p. 282 reality principle as courier, lieutenant, of PP, disciplining disciple, defers enjoyment, the waystation (relais) of a differance (Aufschub), auf dem langen Umwege zur Lust, as if RP produces a socius, institution, contract of discipline

DEMOCRACY

R pp. 4-5 fidelity to come, to the to-come, to the future, always trembling, risky, is held in friendship, friendship of thought: yes, there is friendship to (be) thought: oui, il y a de lamitié à penser > we are guests to this snaking oath (serment) [D.H. Lawrence], in name of democracy

p. 8 is Derrida’s definition of democracy just apophatic, negative theology? or is it rigorous?

p. 10 a sovereign event always ends the indefinite deliberation of democracy

p. 13 democracy as the turning, the wheel, the sovereignty that gives the force of law, circularity, sphericity > either identity btwn origin/conclusion or by turns, in turn, each in turn

pp. 13-4 de Tocqueville sees America as having a sovereignty that acts circularly by itself with no operator or sovereign divided-off from it, outside of it > “no authorities except w/in itself” [Rousseau’s Social Contract] p. 15 pure actuality of Aristotle’s Prime Mover

pp. 14-15 how can we reconcile the turning unity, autos = ipse, the One, the homogeneity of democracy with its heterogeneity, dissymmetry, disseminating multiplicity

p. 17 democratic sovereignty replaces theogonic politics with something just as phallocentric, phall-paterno-filio-fraterno-ipsocentric (ipsocratic, though tautological, because ipseity already implies force)

pp. 20-21 roué qualifies one who turns a trick, the voyou (rogue) w/ his leading astray (dévoiement), debauchery, worklessness, always a seduction, licentious, libertine [always men, sexual difference]

——democracy always associated w/ this figure, w/ taking too many libertine, liberalism, “everything is allowed,” announces a beheading of monarchical sovereignty

pp. 21-22 democracy acc. to Plato [in Republic (Book 8)] looks to Derrida like a bazaar, a carnival, pre-capitalist marketplace, complete lack of authority, soft like Orpheus

pp. 23-24 for Aristotle, democracy: equality according to number, not worth, which makes democracy a freedom founded on equality, as opposed to being governed and govern in turn

p. 25 undecidability, play, in the interpretation of the democratic

p. 26 Plato’s multi-colored democratic bazaar

p. 29 democracy will never be present but it is urgent

p. 31 the alternative to democracy can always be presented as democratic alternation

p. 33 since concept of democracy has always been suicidal, if there is to be a democracy to come must think life otherwise, life and the force of life [contra to Aristotle’s actuality as life?]

——[re: Algeria] immunize against suicide of democracy by committing the suicide (value of this strategy can neither be confirmed nor refuted)

p. 34 perverse autoimmunity of democracy due to double couple: “freedom and equality” and “equality acc. #, equality acc. worth” > in the name of one couple, both couples destroyed

p. 36 because of undecidability linked to autoimmune logic, can never “prove” whether it’s more democratic to include/exclude immigrants, vote/not vote directly, both protect democracy through some exclusion, some renvoi

——democratic protection creates a deferral, differance (a renvoi—both sending off, putting off) that is limitless, moving toward infinite extension of “what are called human rights.”

p. 37 democracy defined by lack of the proper and the selfsame (affirms and defies the proper)

——democracy to come neither constitutive (Plato’s paradigmatic) nor regulative (Kant’s regulative idea)

p. 39 ultrapolitical (democracy not only political—btwn law and justice)

p. 41 history of philosophy not pro-democratic

——Christian democracy would be hyperbolically autoimmune (let antidemocrats vote)

pp. 48-9 democracy’s antinomy: equality introduces measure and calculation, freedom is unconditional, heterogeneous to calculation and measure > incalculable, incommensurable, unconditional equality [?]

p. 48 no democracy without credit, w/out act of faith

p. 50 no worse threat to democracy than fraternity/brotherhood

***p. 54 how many voices, how many votes for the unconscious?

p. 63 antinomy: democracy has wanted only men and also aspires to offer hospitality to excluded

***p. 65 democracy must be public, phenomenal, something of the Enlightenment, but also it must give rights to the secret, society of the secret (voyoucracy)

***p. 75 plus dun, divisibility of God, announces democracy

pp. 75-7 acc. Statesmen of Plato, Politics of Aristotle, democracy, government of greatest #, is only best when laws are broken, exact reverse of Monarchy

——both Plato & Aristotle maintain political turn toward or salutation of One God, where arkhē has at his disposal tekhnē, for Plato not utopia, prayer, but very difficult

p. 81 in Kant’s Perpetual Peace, Weltrepublik not governed by democratic paradigm

p. 82 khōra or spacing before any reappropriation by a theologico-political history or revelation, even before negative theology (which is fundamentally linked to Christianity)

——democracy-to-come would be like khōra of political

——democracy, inheritance of a promise > threat in the promise itself

p. 84 more impossible and yet necessary: separate autonomy & democracy, sovereignty & unconditionality, law & justice [Derrida reminds audience of UWC]

p. 86 to think democracy [Paulhan], to think “first to happen by (le premier venue),” at limit of “who” or “what,” living being, cadaver > “first to happen by” = “first to come”?

———to-come: democracy does not exist, never present, not because deferred but because aporetic in its structure (force without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality, commensurability and incommensurability, heteronomy and autonomy, indivisible sovereignty and divisible or shared sovereignty, a despairing messianicity)

——when democracy is just obscene alibi tolerating suffering, malnutrition, the grossly deprived, those dispossessed of rights (equality, freedom)

p. 90 no democracy w/out deconstruction (and reverse): democracy is the autos [ipse] of deconstructive self-delimitation

***p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature > this undecidability [“I continue to believe”] only radical possibility of letting/thinking what comes about by arriving of whoever arrives

——messianicity that at once interrupts and accomplishes intrinsic historicity [re: concept of democracy]

p. 114 only a God w/out sovereignty can save us? nothing is less sure, that is why we are talking, and what we are talking about [also re: democracy]; “democracy to come—salut!”

***FK pp. 47-8 [Derrida’s liberalism?] unreserved taste for democratic public space, lights of Enlightenment, emancipation from religious dogmatism, thus the attempt to try to think religion w/in limits of reason alone, an epoché that “gives a chance to a political event” [see “Sauf le nom”], belongs to history of democracy

FL p. 281 via Benjamin, police violence of industrial democracies denies its own principle, democratic power would have no other name than police

AF p. 4 democracy provides more access to archive [see p. 95 w/ dead father, brothers share archive]

POO p. 28 each time literary work is censured, democracy is in danger

pp. 28-9 literature’s authorization to say everything acknowledges right to absolute nonresponse

——this nonresponse is hyperbolic condition of democracy (democracy to-come) contradicts historically limited democracy where calculable subject has to tell truth, has to reveal secret before the law (doctors, confession, psychoanalyst, lawyer, national defense)

SPOM p. 74 messianic w/out messianism distinguished from “an idea of” democracy, from law or right, even human rights

***p. 81 democracy always untenable because it calls for infinite respect of singularity and infinite alterity as much as respect for calculable, subjectal equality btwn anonymous singularities

——la démocratie à venir: son idée comme événement dune injonction gagée qui commande de faire venir cela même qui ne se présentera jamais dans la forme de la présence pleine, cest louverture de cet écart entre une promesse infinie

——undetermined messianic hope, ce rapport eschatologique à lavenir, at heart of democracy and communism, concept[s] or promise[s] that arise in a diastema (“out of joint”), a “to come” in future present, not a Kantian regulating idea that would retain future modality of the living present

HERP p. 183 where Derrida is beyond Heidegger’s aim (propos) [acc. Derrida]: in the non synonymy of dissemblance, heterogeneity, disproportion, incommensurability, nonexchange, excess of every measure/symmetry > democracy to-come

POOF p. viii democracy—fraternization (brothers kill father): inclusion of women as sister, as a case of the brother [this neutralization an example of whole of political education]

p. x democracy counts votes & subjects, but doesn’t/shouldn’t count ordinary singularities: no numerus clausus for arrivants

pp. 3, 101 examples [Cicero, Menexenus] where name ‘democracy’ is used carelessly, indifferently

p. 22 wound opens w/ necessity to count one’s friends, democracy’s 2 irreducible laws: 1) respect for irreducible singularity or alterity 2) calculation of majorities, representable subjects, all equal

——mais là où tout autre est également tout autre > political desire borne by this disjunction, bears chance of future of democracy, divided virtue, inadequate to itself, chaos opening in silence

——no virtue, w/out the tragedy of # w/out #, perhaps more unthinkable than tragedy

(see p. 43 for paradox btwn common and community)

p. 38 Nietzsche condemns “democratic sensibilities” in name of a hyperbolic democracy [?]

p. 75 Loraux: democracy has never found a language for itself

pp. 100-01 tension btwn democracy and aristocracy to do w/ #, with the counting of friends

p. 102 relation btwn friendship/democracy, approbation of greatest #? deployment of countable unity, of ‘one more’ subject > the 2 presumed calculable #s of democracy (from perspective of conventional/nominalist hesitation): 1) form of decision, greatest # of people 2) possibility of this decision: birth—the equivocal double equality (isonomy founded on isogony)

pp. 101-06, 110-11n can one criticize democracy in the name of democracy? radicalizing [uprooting] democracy, which has roots in fraternal rootedness, secure autochthonous foundation

——genealogical deconstruction, deconstruction of the genealogical schema, deconstruct credit, doxa, eudoxia, right opinion, approbation given to filiation > live a politics, friendship, justice that begins where the beginning divides (no democracy w/out deconstruction, no deconstruction w/out democracy) > democracy is the autos of deconstructive self-delimitation, it unconditionally de-limits itself, de-limits where its conditional enclosure nourishes itself in land (sol) & blood [?]

——another thought of calculation & # (beyond autochthonous/homophilic rooting), another way of apprehending universality of singular (w/out dooming political to incalculable), depoliticization, but only of dominant concept of political

p. 159 de-naturalization of fraternal authority (its de-construction), preference given to democratic fraternization > this is all possible, along w/ demand of a democracy to-come, because fraternity was never natural, never a fact [God is dead because God was always dead?]

pp. 197-98 for Aristotle, one can not be friends w/ a tool (órganon), friendship irreducible to technologization: requires philía, puskhé, ánthrōpos, díkaion, nómos, sunthékē (convention, contract), koinōnía (communal sharing) > it is thus, out of a relation of proportion, a tendential law, that friendship finds its destiny in democracy

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, is literature [linked to democracy, which has no unconditional virtue] the very thing which remains intolerable to the geopolitical process of a becoming-worldwide (mondialité)? > absolute theologization qua absolute politicization

pp. 305-06 the question “what is meant when one says ‘brother’?”, and the infinite price of friendship, supposes an affirmation, a pledge of a testimony irreducible to proof or certitude > this pledge retranslated into hypothesis/question: is it possible to think/implement democracy, keeping old name ‘democracy,’ & faithful memory of democratic reason (& reason tout court), while uprooting it from all these figures that prescribe fraternal friendship

——democracy remains to come, this is its essence, indefinitely perfectible, always insufficient & future > even when there is democracy, it never exists

——when will we be ready for an experience of freedom & equality that’s capable of respectfully experiencing the friendship that would at last be just, just beyond law, measured against its measurelessness? > “O my democratic friends…”

PP p. 82 Plato’s Republic (555e): “one of the drawbacks of democracy” is way it lets capital foster drone and pauper element in state, harvesting interest from any remainder

p. 144n creation of phonetic writing inseparable from “democratization”; Plato speaks about writing from position of king? while suspecting non-“democratic” politics of writing

pp. 144-45 (166-67) democracy is like writing, Plato’s trial against democracy similar to that against pharmakon: excess, anarchy, orgy, flea market, fair, bazaar (pantopōlion); errant democratic man has no substance, not perverse in regular way, like signifier freed from logos

OH p. 78 democracy to-come not a Kantian regulative idea, not a certain future, but democracy that has structure of promise > memory of that which carries the to-come here and now

p. 95 doesn’t a democrat have the responsibility to analyze unrelentingly democracy's historical determinations?

FWT p. 97 democracy-to-come extends beyond citizenship, but Derrida’s not against citizenship, and advocates fighting for those deprived of it

p. 127 by inventing/violating modality of as if, revealing its infinity, literature endlessly opens up to historicity of political, w/ certain concept of democracy-to-come

as if an increased responsibility in absolute freedom of literature

p. 130 common possibilities of literature & democracy: 1) historicity (literature has acts, birthplaces, legacies; democracy defines itself by promising itself, by and in its historicity, its future-to-come) 2) power, credit of fiction [Montaigne/Pascal understood connection btwn right & fiction]

OTO p 24n [re: signature w/out value, to which is juxtaposed untimely signature] Nietzsche: rights of genius have been democratized, everyone relieved of the labor to form oneself, of personal necessity of culture (Bildungsarbeit, Bildungsnot)

WAP p. 42 “thinking,” which entitles only this “no” of no pure instance, must, in the name of a democracy to come, “unremittingly interrogate” (that is deconstruct) the de facto democracy, its determinations > event/promise whose singularity doesn’t signify (self-) presence

HLP p. 63 for Koyré, any secret threatens res publica: politeia as absolute phenomenality, thus required transparency/illumination of public space

——germ of totalitarianism w/ democratic face: [everything must be illuminated]

PSSS pp. 259-60 who’s to say our republic is still not monarchical, that instead of a paregicide, the king’s neck was saved, erected by decapitation; never know if States General, at moment of first convocation, condemned or saved king’s head > both gestures indissociable

——condemning/saving inscribe in concepts sovereignty & cruelty an ambiguity as unrelievable as autoimmunity itself: in any paregicide, any Oedipus, any totem + taboo, any republican or democratic installation of brothers, no way to know whether paregicide took place or not, took place w/out taking place, before any question about it [see HYMEN]

——question of event/revolution always comes too late

p. 264 to think institution of auto-nomy (egalitarian, democratic) as autoconvoked and not hetero-convoked is an abdication, political failing

p. 265 political force of psychoanalysis remains at odds w/ res publica, or even democracy of sovereignist concept (nation-statist), and at odds w/ publicity of its own institutionalization

AD p. 115 requisite question marks: democracy “better” than tyranny

UWC pp. 204-05 unconditional university, resistance to indivisible sovereignty, to nation-state, to economic, media, ideological, cultural, religious powers > all that limit democracy to-come

p. 208 Derrida links new concept of humanities [a deconstructive one] w/ democratic institution called literature, to a certain simulacrum, a certain “as if”

p. 232 democracy dissociated from sovereignty of people (from nation-state, from citizenship) [?]

——“literature,” its link to performative force of “as if,” to the right to say everything (or not to say everything), which founds both democracy & unconditional sovereignty claimed by Humanities

DEPTH [fixerup]

GOD p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (loeuvre)

GT p. 94 reader is not deceived [like narrator], experiences a secret w/out depth, a secret w/out secret

p. 152 [no depth beyond literary phenomenon] inviolability of secret depends on essential superficiality, bare device of being-two-to-speak (lêtre-deux-à-parler), a secret beyond reserve of technique, thing, being, thing thought (same could be said for money)

***p. 170 secret of literature has no depth, no interiority, spread on the surface of the page, non-psychological structure, not subjective though responsible for most radical effects of subjectivity, a post card, a bank note, a “letter of credit” [see LOBL p. ~101, &

SUBJECTILE

]

AF p. 27 psychoanalysis is not a depth psychology

MSUB J p. 158 subjectile is everything distinct from form, from sense & representation, skin w/holes for pores [Irigaray] > “its presumed depth can only be seen like surface,” a flat succubi

PP p. 111 (126) opposition btwn mnēmē and hypomnēsis institutes all oppositions of Platonism, the boundary line is major decision of philosophy, maintains, institutes itself, contains its fond advers

p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

PAS PAS p. (28) “Viens” upsurges (surgit) from a groundless ground (fond sans fond) of an indefinite past

p. (78) Blanchot: “more secret and more interior than speech of the innermost heart” > “the secret is w/out depth (sans profondeur)”

p. (86) near depthless abyss in mise en scène of “Viens

p. (99) border edge, hidden vicinity (un voisinage caché) [not depth]

S p. 37 [re: Heidegger’s Rectorship Address] le profond et laltier (haughty) allied in most high: highest of what guides the spiritual guides of die hohe Schule and depths of forces of earth and blood

pp. 59-60 [Heidegger appeals to depth (Tiefe) positively, sees destitution (Entmachtung) of spirit/world as a flattening, where dimension has become extension & number]

POOF p. 50 Nietzsche’s upheaval of ‘O my friends…’ [in Human All…] plays w/ a tradition deeper & wider than we can fathom

***FSW p. 224 Mystic Pad depth w/out bottom, stratification of surfaces, whose interior is a similarly exposed surface, perfectly superficial exteriority open to incision of scratch

pp. 227-28 Freud’s Writing Pad (machine) can’t run of itself (like living memory of Plato), a dead complexity w/out depth, multiplicity of layered surfaces

——“life as depth belongs only to the wax of psychical memory,” Plato’s mnemic writing

PPHS pp. 76-7 Vorstellung, remembered-interiorized intuition; Erinnerung, interiorized memory, places images in reserve, like water in unconscious pit, like vein at bottom of mine > permits passage to conceptuality

——possession of pit > gives forth its property, produces light

p. 77n Hegel reassembles the feminine law (singularity, sepulcher, night, the divine) around the pit and the pyramid (feminine law only effective in the underworld not on earth)

p. 83 the sign, “the height conserving in its depths the hegemony of the soul,” is the pyramid [later, Derrida will live through this tomb not, like Hegel, by negating it]

DS p. 285 désertant toute profondeur, chacune de ses faces est aussi, après coup, tout le dé [each surface, once die is cast, is the whole of it]

ROP p. 34 la restance disséminale, hyperbolythique, destined (vouée) to chance, to ash, à un oubli radical, trace w/out trace: secret w/out depth, lieu, nom, destination, lysis w/out measure/return/anagogy

SP p. 51 woman but one name for untruth of truth, depthless depths that distorts identity, essence, property, brings philosophy to ruin

pp. 51-3 Nietzsche: modesty of life, veils: “Yes, life is a woman!” [see p. 59 truth becomes profound by disguising of pudendum, by modest veil that falls over it]

p. 83 pratique stylet, pratique stylée, de quel genre? can’t be written w/out conjoined fabulation of woman/truth, entre la femme, in spite of the profundity that is modesty

p. 85 Nietzsche: “women are considered profound, why? because one never fathoms their depths, women aren’t even shallow”

***pp. 115-19 Heidegger’s abyssal structure of the proper, at once superficial & bottomless (since not fundamental), the proper founders, passes into the other

PS p. 189 Artaud seeks a depth of illegibility

FS p. 5 panoramagram (image of structuralist instrument): obtain on flat surface, depth of objects on horizon > one can glance at field divested of its forces

p. 28 philosophy as twilight of forces, “sun-splashed (ensoleillé)” morning of images, forms, phenomena > matin des idées et des idoles, où le relief des forces devient repos, aplatit sa profondeur dans la lumière et s'étend dans l'horizontalité

p. 30 writing, moment of depth as decay > original valley of the other w/in Being; incidence & insistence of inscription

DIF DIF p. 22 differance (is) older than ontological difference: outside epochality of Being (outside epoch): no depth to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put to play

O p. 50(n) logos spermatikos, philosophy of the seed, romanticism, myth of semantic depth, genetic pro-gram [quoting from OG]

D p. 312 Soller’s open square: open side, air, mirror, veil

p. 313 Soller: single sheet gives sensation of depth, representation, reflection

***p. 357 thickness (lépaisseur) of text opens upon beyond of a whole, nothing or absolute outside: its depth (sa profondeur) at once null & infinite—each layer (couche) harbors (en abrite) another

***p. 358 au bord (du vertige), alert to the border itself, infinite depths were also bottomless, perfectly superficial, cube w/out depth

TN p. 131 always writing a story, tangent touches line/surface w/out intersection, a tangent touches one point, point is nothing, a limit w/out depth or surface, untouchable even as a figure

BSi pp. 137-38 talk of the bottom (fond), the profound, believing in depth [of “who” or “what”] will never be free from bêtise (stupidity) > sovereign & beast as bottomless bottom, abyss, vertigo

p. 143 acc. Deleuze, psychoanalytic bêtise privileges depth of fantasy over planar affect, becoming-assemblage

OG p. 69 (101-02) the horizontality of spacing, hollow of differance, discontinuity and discreteness (does not oppose it(self) like surface to depth), a hinge (brisure) marking impossibility of full speech

SPEC pp. 381-82 speculation as provisional floating, distances from intuition, impartiality, science, psychology of depths

FV pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

p. 483tn one reason, male libido, altus, at the bottom of things—highest truth

DERRIDA

***MONL pp. 60-62 the monolingual is promised (an eschatological or messianic horizon this promise can’t deny, or can merely deny) one language that’s forever deprived, the monolingual is aphasic, thrown into absolute translation

——political decision in writing & reading: inscribe undecidable (chance, terror) in ipseity of host, avoid temptation to make prior-to-the-first-language a language of the master (new master)

***R p. 39 Derrida does not acknowledge a political turn or ethical turn [in his work]: thinking of differance always political, contour & limits of political, around enigma or autoimmune double bind of the democratic (not certain democracy a political thought through & through)

H p. 149 how could there be a perfectible, concrete politics? [can’t be, but] intervene in condition of hospitality (unprecedented historical situations) in name of unconditional, even if it seems inaccessible like Kantian regulative idea, but also inaccessible for structural reasons, “barred” by internal contradictions

pp. anne 66-8 Derrida’s political gesture: leave space for the essential [?]; [questions of politics arises anew in question of foreigner, of hospitality]

SPOM pp. 62-3 privilege figure of conjuration (Verschwörung, Beschwörung) for another reason [not just fear]: swearing, taking an oath, committing oneself in performative, secret fashion

——frontier btwn public & private constantly being displaced because the spacing of the public (techno-tele-discursvity, -iconcity) is neither living nor dead: it spectralizes > less and less assured identity of political

p. 94 lépreuve de lindécidabilitié & “it is necessary” of emancipatory desire > condition of re-politicization, perhaps another concept of political

p. 105 Derrida admits that the right’s stance on the hypocrisy of what’s called humanitarian should be saluted, while remaining vigilantly on guard for its manipulations

pp. 108-09 w/out some fidelity to Marxist spirit, the worst, worse than bad, might occur: a fatalist idealism [nihilism, accelerationism] or abstract and dogmatic eschatology in face of world’s evils [orthodox Marxism?] [no re-politicization possible w/out this fidelity]

pp. 109-10 why is Derrida so late to Marx? he believes in political virtue of contretemps

MPM p. 68 [re: de Man’s “Reply…”] tells us more about institutions and strategies of reading than “all the pious recitations or bits of revolutionary bravura which only revolve in place”

p. 143 via de Man, word “political” is allegorical, excessive “politicism” in deconstruction

p. 144 de Man: the incompatibility of grammar & meaning becomes explicit when linguistic structures are stated in political terms [on the grammar, historicity of law]

A p. 20 we can never say these are the conditions of inexhaustible singularity of event, must speak in negative form (w/out X no Y) [Derrida against present or presentation of “this is that”]

——as soon as conditions are converted to positive certainty we are being deceived, indeed we are deceiving the other

EM p. 134-35 (162) [re: deconstructive method] strategic bet (le pari stratégique), radical trembling coming from outside, trembling played out in violent relationship of West to its other [its other?], whether that other is “linguistic,” economic, ethnological, political, military > military/economic violence have structural solidarity w/ “linguistic” violence

***SEC pp. 314-15 if all signs suppose absence, writing would no longer be a species of communication, and all other theories would be uncritical, ensuring authority and force of a certain historical discourse

OH p. 19 must be suspicious of repetitive memory and tout autre of absolutely new [cf. POOF p. 65], of anamnestic capitalization & amnesic exposure to what would no longer be identifiable

p. 52 [summary of political responsibility today] denounce divergences btwn principle and the determined limits of their representation > task always urgent, infinite > identity instituted in responsibility as experience/experiment of the response

p. 69 Derrida will subscribe to European analogic (ideality, capitalization) w/ one hand, write outside it w/ the other

pp. 80-1 double constraint, performative contradiction, undecidable (typical, recurring form & inexhaustible singularization) > conditions for duty can only take negative form, once you hear “these are the conditions,” you are being deluded

p. 81 every time Europe, politics, responsibility, decision is reduced to what they must exceed (order of the present, of presentation [knowledge, certainty, judgment in the form “this is that”]), we have the very presentable face of good conscience

p. 95 doesn’t a democrat have the responsibility to analyze unrelentingly democracy's historical determinations?

p. 109 one day the day today (visibility of image, publicity of public) will not be the ratio essendi of the political

S p. 125n to be sensitive to humor despite seriousness [in Heidegger’s presumptions German, Greek re: Geist] could become an obligation (ethical, political), a chance, chance de lesprit

FWT p. 7 Derrida doesn’t want deconstruction to be used to denigrate, injure, diminish necessity of force of movement, and if it is necessary to do so in polemics, he regrets it in advance

p. 11 nothing serious in politics w/out “hairsplitting,” sharpening analyses, w/out being intimidated by impatience of media

pp. 20-22 [Derrida illustrates how “concept” of differance problematizes ethics/politics of communitarianism]

——Derrida distrusts cult of identitarian/communitarian discourse; resists narcissism of minorities developing everywhere—including w/in feminist movements > yet, “I can understand the vital urgency of an identitarian reflex,” I accept a momentary/prudent alliance [see WAP pp. 3-4], but he can soon mistrust, limit to solidarity in figures of communitarianism or nationalism

——I am not this or that, I am this and that, this rather than that, acc. the situation/urgency

p. 65 “I do not believe in the miracle of legislation” [re: animal rights]

p. 79 “melancholy,” interminable/irreducible “half-failure,” structurally defeatist behavior of geopolitical unconscious mourns not only communism but corpse of political itself

pp. 79-80 [Derrida on his unique relation to Marxism, on being reduced to silence, chosen silence, on the significance, for French “logics,” of the strange Rue dUlm]

pp. 81-2 Derrida faithful to one of the “spirits of Marx,” idea of justice beyond failures of communism

p. 83 SPOM indicates Derrida’s respect for communist “idea,” necessity for untiring deconstructive critique of capitalistic logic

pp. 89-90 Derrida is for abolition of DP, for reasons of principle [via Kant] / reasons of heart (stripped of sentimentality, allied w/ “reasons of principle”)

pp. 94-5 for Derrida, though communism can’t be reduced to crimes of Gulag, it must never be separated

——Derrida’s new International to fight 10 wounds of new world order: unemployment, exclusion of exiles, economic wars, arms trade, ethnic conflict (based on soil & blood), power of phantom states in form of mafias and drug cartels

p. 96 there’s necessity for secondary effects of program (programmatic economy & strategy), but in the first/last instance, what is to be done is invented/inaugurated, must come w/out program

——New International must seek unheard of figures [I cannot define this forms], not opposed to existence of parties, but “Party” form is no longer the major form of political struggle

p. 97 technology [telephone, Internet, stock market] dissociates political field from territorial & national field > new concept of political is being forged

——democracy-to-come extends beyond citizenship, but Derrida’s not against citizenship, and advocates fighting for those deprived of it

p. 98 how can one be opposed to the humanitarian ideal? it’s not even “political” [Schmitt], but must remain vigilant to humanitarian alibis, suspect policies instrumentalizing “human rights”

pp. 99-102 [on great Mandela, on his circumcision, on his ability to resist insanity in prison]

p. 113 almost impossible to insist on complex judgments in face of “blackmail,” pressure to take sides, based on belonging to a particular community [re: Shoah, Israel, Palestine]

FL p. 231 those who don’t trust that deconstruction is political: bad faith, unjust

p. 236 deconstruction not just speculation, wants to, responsibly, change the world

***p. 254 the justice of deconstruction is invincible to all skepticism: accepts madness and mysticism, deconstruction existed as justice before it became an academic discourse

pp. 257-58 politicization is interminable but not total, each advance in politics demands we rethink their calculation; this holds true for classical emancipatory ideal which cannot be maintained today w/out producing the worst complicities

p. 269 when left and right look the same (founding violence)

POOF pp. ix-xi the 3 meanings of political crime: 1) assassinations that litter History 2) crime in which political being of politics is constituted [Schmitt, force of law] 3) crime that reduces politics to something else, crime against man qua political animal > w/in these crimes, infinite abysses of imputability, edges of juridical, techno-biological, are we sure we can distinguish btwn death & killing? btwn homicide & genocide? why should a question of # persist in these questions?

***p. 45 [re: friends of solitude] not an abstaining from political, even if anchorite plays scarecrow, such a person overpoliticizes space of city

p. 79 [re: tension btwn political/historical urgency of what’s befalling us & bibliophilic discretion, esoteric rarity] absolute urgency always law of decision, no knowledge can change this, heartrending instant, interruption of science: answers ‘more naturally’ inscribed in space of political philosophy will always be inadequate > the debt is infinite, for an apriori finite being, as soon as duty presents itself to it: urgent because infinite

——[continuing w/ indefensible bibliophilic discretion] Nietzsche marks a mutation in the political, who better than he marked our history as a history of political linked to love, friend, enemy via Jew, Greek, Christian > binding/unbinding of this link; p. 80 who better than he showed friend/enemy passing into each other: still, the individual ‘Nietzsche’ not the only witness

pp. 81-2 compulsive droning of political “realism” that would refuse to read all the warnings & pleas of disjunction > what does it mean that, henceforth, ineluctable voice of necessity (its most responsible voice) resounds in this way [in disjunction, what has reality become?]?

p. 83 would politics of friendship be a crime w/in the political or crime against politics (as we know it)?

p. 144 re: cybercrime, ‘Clipper’ chip, etc., despite the technological mutation which produces structural effects, there’s fundamentally nothing new here > certainly, but novelty of structural effects mustn’t be neglected: the entirety of the ‘concrete’ in politics

p. 297 Blanchot no longer has affinity w/ one Nietzsche (there is always plus dun): friendship is not a gift or promise, it’s the outside drawing near in its separateness/inaccessibility—pure desire is the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance, to die in common through separation

——the common becomes the pole end of a call > question regarding the ‘common’ should bring on a vertigo that asks ‘what is to be done?’ what’s to be done, politically, w/ this vertigo & its necessity?

POS pp. 41-2 double writing, double gesture, double science, a writing in/of itself multiple [Derrida explains that the phase of overturning the hierarchy of an opposition is necessary, politically necessary, there are risks of rushing to neutralization, but to remain w/in this phase isn’t enough]

OS p. 39 w/out rigorous critical/deconstruction of MOP, the very necessary attention to differences, coupures, mutations, leaps becomes ensnarled (sencombre) in slogans, dogmatic stupidities, empiricist precipitation > and discourse “put in question” [takes you from behind]

p. 62n political resistance often highly “moral” alibi [re: Heidegger] for another resistance: for philosophical resistance, denegation of the text, refusal to read

OTO p. 32 we will not decide through hermeneutic, exegetic interpretations, but will offer political interventions which politically rewrite the text and its destination: this is how it’s been since Hegel, the destinational structure of all post-Hegelian texts: Heideggerian left, Heideggerian right, Marxism left, Marxism right > the one can always be the double of the other

***RGE p. 276 reactionary movement & revolutionary movement: too full of meaning (via Aufhebung), these contradictions lack pertinence, at a very determined point [Bataille’s sovereign point?]

——one understands nothing about strategy if one renounces any regulation of ascertaining nonpertinence (if one puts it in the hands of the left or the right)

PF p. xvi those who rush to confuse differance and alibi disavow that they are avoiding “thing itself,” which differance will never be; is differance a political alibi? an allegation destined to delay the deadline? no: w/out alibi is precisely a differance w/out alibi

pp. xix-xx to think divisibility of trait of sovereignty deconstructs a certain fable, certain “as if,” of the political onto-theology of sovereignty:

1. sovereignty can resist international capital

2. deconstruct sovereignty while acknowledging all rights of subject founded on concept

3. sovereignty seems exceptional, indivisible, but ‘trait of sovereignty’ divides like any frontier > frontier limit se partageant: divides by sharing itself, shares itself by dividing

WAP p. 42 “thinking,” which entitles only this “no” of no pure instance, must, in the name of a democracy to come, “unremittingly interrogate” (that is deconstruct) the de facto democracy, its determinations > event/promise whose singularity doesn’t signify (self-) presence

p. 103 philosophy, deconstruction of philosophy, and decolonization are interminable, pushed to its extreme limit, where it is interminable, decolonization cannot import, interiorize, model of another State or even the style of their deconstruction (model/reality of their crisis), for there is no one deconstruction

pp. 113-14 maintain unity of philosophy against seductive tropisms of human sciences w/out accepting reactive obscurantism of slogan “the unity and specificity of the discipline”

——this contradiction, law of double bind, has concrete effects in our practice: independence not from State but from dominating powers in State (repoliticize zones that are depoliticized)

HLP p. 64 Marrano: right to secrecy as right to resistance beyond order of political (or theologico-political in general)

IW pp. 242-43 Derrida begins lecture in Jerusalem by acknowledging necessity of courageous, patient reflection, & demand to immediately respond > states his solidarity w/ those advocating withdrawal of Israel troops, recognition of Palestinians’ right to representation

——call for historical reflection is inscribed in urgency of context

PSSS p. 264 to think institution of auto-nomy (egalitarian, democratic) as autoconvoked and not hetero-convoked is an abdication, political failing

——an auto-nomy institutes itself on basis of a hetero-nomy that survives what survives it, on basis of the law of other, coming of the sur-viving other

——Derrida would like to ask “What is to be done?”—beyond all possible cruelty & sovereignty, w/out alibi, this question is not foreign to paregicide

LI pp. 96-7 pharmakoi, people on welfare, spies, effects of unconscious

p. 98 parasite parasites the limits that guarantee purity of rules/intentions: this has import for law, politics, ethics, economics

p. 112 to believe intellectual field is nonviolent, apolitical, is an artifice of untenable denial, scanty analysis & voracious interest

——[Derrida’s politics] analysis and most refined, ingenious account of conditions of violence: least violent gesture, perhaps nonviolent > contributes to transforming legal-ethical-political rules in university and outside

p. 116 undecidable calls for decision, for ethical-political responsibility beyond program, beyond calculable—even if it takes a second: experience and experiment of the undecidable > passage/trial of the undecidable

p. 132 reconstitution of a context always performative, political—even if overdetermined classifications (right/left) don’t apply

pp. 134-36 theoretician of right (droit), the legislator (inventor or first signatory of a constitution), and executive power can come together in a single person/apparatus (dispositif) > structures of “performativity”: describe law w/out insisting on its application, eliciting respect for the law…

——theoretical duty is thus always “ethical-political duty” > highly political nature of status of parasite: politics of immigration > what’s “foreign” touches all social institutions—everything

——every institution designed to enforce the law is a police (i.e. the Academy), doesn’t have to be physical, can be “spiritual,” can be more noble

p. 137 to no longer oppose writing to erasure (accounting for supplementary paradox) is both terrible and yet nonviolent (perhaps nonviolence itself)

p. 136 speaking is never neutral, must determine a context > thus always political: political as nonnatural relation to others (a definition which would apply to animals as well, i.e. man is not the only political animal)

pp. 137-38 that trace de-limits what it limits is why the finiteness of a context has an indefinite opening—never secure, simple > in this openness of erasure: political responsibility (where irreducible violence communicates w/ an essential nonviolence) > only the irresponsible (to be polemical) will object, those for whom things are always calculable, clear, programmable, decipherable

p. 139 political practice of deconstruction indecipherable by current codes

p. 141 Derrida’s “conservatism”: I am for safeguards, memory, jealous conservation of #s of traditions (in university & in scientific, philosophical, literary theory) > I am actively committed to safeguards: at same time (in same text), I call into question foundation of these traditions

——in deconstructive practice, opposition conservative/revolutionary no longer pertinent > deconstruction is “inherently” nothing at all: only what it does, and what is done w/ it: depends on very minute, flexible analyses

——absence of univocal definitions not “obscurantist” but a new, very new Aufklärung

p. 154 call for maximal development of a press that is freer and more rigorous in exercise of its duties

p. 152 unconditionality (Derrida intentionally recalling Kant’s CI) is independent of every determinate context, announces itself only in the opening of context

——unconditionality intervenes at very inception of determination

——unconditionality must be articulated w/ the determinate (Kant would say hypothetical) > rhetoric, strategy, ethics, politics

EW p. 273 subject and Dasein (still tied to a relation to self, reserved for man alone) constitute identity in name of a particular kinds of rights, a certain juridico-political calculation; deconstruction calls for different rights, more exacting articulation of rights, more responsibility

p. 276 origin of call comes from nowhere, an origin that’s not yet a divine or human “subject” institutes responsibility at root of ulterior ones (moral, juridical, political)

AD pp. 20-1 hiatus btwn ethics of hospitality (Levinas’ 1st philosophy) & ethics of law/politics becomes negative when we want assurance of ontological foundation, want to deduce, derive

——if we think hiatus as opening (mouth, possibility of other speech), outside hierarchy of founding/founded, responsibility would impose itself btwn ethics, politics, law

p. 31 the “without question” at the birth of “first question” (the question is the 3rd): passage (w/out transition) from ethical responsibility to political, juridical, philosophical responsibility (the move out of immediacy)

p. 34 state, politics, ontology all betray/exceed ethics in opening it [?]: quasi-transcendental, originary, pre-originary perjury > possibility of radical perversion, haunting of its possibility, also condition of Good, Justice, Love, Faith, perfectibility

p. 64 many interruptions of self re: Sinai (broken tablets, veiling/unveiling of Moses’ face, etc.) > Sinai still provocation to think passage btwn ethical, messianic, eschatological and the political (today when the foreigner, the displaced, the refugee incur cruelty w/out precedent)

pp. 76, 80 Levinas’ “beyond-in (au-delà-dans)” of State of David [?], a sort of enclave inside and outside of itself, participates in politics while going beyond it > [deconstructive invagination]

——transcendence in immanence, the door as the bearing (porte que porte)

p. 105 [re: a return to Jerusalem] a promise remains, its possibility remains effective, but ethics demands the effectivity be effectuated: an ineffectual promise betrays its promise [?]—is realization of promise already politics? which politics?

pp. 112-13 for Levinas, Torah–Jerusalem [inscribe promise in earthly Jerusalem], co-presence of justice, system, State > negotiation w/ non-negotiable must find “better” or less bad (moins mauvaise): nothing counts more, nothing weighs more heavily (rien ne compte plus gravement) than quotations around word better (meilleur)—it’s not good, it’s a stopgap (pis-aller)

pp. 115-16 ethics enjoins a politics & a law, formal injunction, urgent, does not wait and still interminable (it calculates limitless past & future)

CF p. 4 audacious call for genuine innovation in history of right and duty of hospitality: city of refuge

——theoretical/critical reflection indissociable from practical initiations

pp. 5-6 Derrida abstains from giving an example of recent persecutions—those excluded from his example will be sent back into darkness they can’t escape

p. 14 Derrida not launching unjust, utopic discourse of suspicion against police, especially in their fight against drug-trafficking, terrorism, mafias

pp. 22-3 improve law of hospitality, do so btwn unconditional and conditional: pure unconditional law in danger of piety, irresponsibility, no potency, no form > the unconditional can be perverted at any moment

p. 43 equivocality, heterogeneity, confusion btwn order of forgiveness & order of justice [juridical] > one can mimic scene of “immediacy,” quasi-automatic forgiveness, to escape justice

——forgiveness has nothing to do w/ [State] judgment or public/political sphere

p. 50 must forgiveness saturate the abyss (suture, reconcile)? but who could object to imperative of reconciliation? amnesties, work of mourning—political strategy, psycho-therapeutic economy

p. 51 I remain ‘torn’ btwn ‘hyperbolic’ ethical vision of pure forgiveness & reality of society (pragmatic processes of reconciliation) > w/out power or desire to decide > to change law necessary to refer to hyperbolic ethical vision of forgiveness

p. 53 France’s 1964 definition of “imprescriptible” crimes signals toward an ahistorical Final Judgment: crime never effaced from judicial archive [Derrida uses this example to evince an appeal to transcendent order of unconditional in concrete history]

***p. 55 a politics that would respect the secret (that which exceeds the political or is no longer in juridical domain): democracy to come

pp. 56-7 infinite distress (night) of deciding w/out necessary infinite deliberation, the responsibility of concrete situations, the “contextual,” never sure of the justice of one’s decision——the future will give us no more knowledge, it will be determined by that choice

——but ‘contextual’ differences, difficulties, occur in name of the unconditional, never empiricist, relativist, pragmatist resignation [urgency]

p. 58 international law still depends too much on sovereign & powerful Nation-States

pp. 59-60 Derrida’s mad, not so mad, dream of forgiveness w/out power: unconditional but w/out sovereignty

WOG pp. 30-1 Derrida’s close reading of Greeks do think politeia [i.e. KH, PP, re: accusation that Derrida’s work is apolitical]

***BSi pp. 75-6 repoliticization (another politicization not depoliticization), a slow and differentiated deconstruction occurs in the divisibility of sovereignty already happening

p. 106 Derrida one of the few who smiles at machine of presuppositions to be deconstructed in “law,” “freedom,” “institution,” “culture”

p. 108 Derrida has attempted [throughout the years] to oppose/distinguish justice from right > obligation to le plus dissemblable, the méconnaissable—monstrously other: beginning of ethics, Law, is not human

——so long as there is recognizability & fellow, ethics is dormant

pp. 108-09 obligation to fellow, even if it’s a fact (can a fact ground, justify an ethics?), will never have founded a right, an ethics…

pp. 109-10 is Derrida just widening the parameters of “fellow”? no, the monstrously other binds me to the nonliving & inscribes concept of death in life > do we find a comparable obligation to the dead in murder of primal father [Freud]?

pp. 300-02 liberty & sovereignty (its limitless “I can”) are indissociable, double bind in 2 senses: 1) double injunction 2) duplicity in very concept of binding, obligation, bind, bond: stricture rather than structure, stricture that limits liberty along w/ sovereignty or sovereignty along w/ liberty

——double bind [#1 above]: deconstruct ontotheology of sovereignty w/out questioning liberty in name of which we put this deconstruction to work: think liberty differently, w/in distribution of a divisible sovereignty > think unconditional w/out indivisible sovereignty

pp. 310-11 supervised liberty is most common condition, and therefore supervised sovereignty > who would dare say we want to escape it?

UWC pp. 209-10 “as,” “as if,” politics of the virtual (not a virtual politics) in cyberspace or cyberworld of worldwide-ization > delocalizing, virtualization of communication, publication, archivization

——where there’s trace there’s some virtualization (i.e. virtualization not absolutely novel)

EU pp. 100-01 interpretation of poem, philosopheme, theologeme always proposes an institutional model, consolidating an existing one or constituting a new one: calls for politics of community of interpreters > every text/element of corpus bequeathes/reproduces several injunctions

——every text opens/closes, double bind, undecidability, an overdetermination that can’t be mastered

p. 102 minimal responsibility today (of someone belonging to research/teaching institution): make political implications of system and its aporias as clear and thematic as possible

——every operation we (students, teachers, research community) pursue together: always institution at play, contract signed, image of ideal seminar constructed, a socius implied

——deconstruction is not only concerned w/ meaning, is inseparable from politico-institutional problematic

——too political for some, too demobilizing for those who use prewar signs to recognize political

p. 123 never liked word deconstruction—disagreeably surprised at its fortune

p. 109 [re: politico-juridical system of university] Derrida beyond [?] political right/left, on the side of a tireless parasite [passe et repasse la limite] seeking conflict or perpetual peace in a university that has from its birth (dès sa naissance) en mal (been wanting) dapocalypse et deschatologie

pp. 110-12 opposition right/left a conflict btwn several strategies of political mochlos [a wooden beam, bref ce sur quoi lon sappuie pour forcer et déplacer]: serious discourses have more to do w/ levers than w/ ends > specular walking on 2 feet, Van Gogh’s pair of shoes: a university will have to walk on 2 feet, left & right

p. 121 convinced of necessity for profound transformation, un bouleversement of university institutions

——Derrida believes in indestructibility of ordered procedures of legitimation, titles, diplomas

p. 122 events of 1968 confirmed an anticipation

——the political doesn’t only take conventional left/right axis: revolutionary often gets along w/ reproductive force of authority (institutional symbolism) > what is most unacceptable then is that which upsets these norms, entrenched contracts, in the very form of work, teaching, writing

p. 167 [re: philosophical institutions vis-à-vis GREPH] profound political mutation, a change of government wouldn’t be enough

p. 235 classical eloquence in favor of human rights, though necessary, does not take the place of philosophical thought

WBH p. 202 deconstruction, occupies both places [re: women’s studies], thus it’s conservative and not conservative

DERRIDA BEYOND HEIDEGGER

GT p. 161n Derrida reminds us of his perplexity in D re: Heidegger’s thought on finding vs. retaining the word for Being [on way to language]

R pp. 44-5 in The Experience of Freedom, Nancy puts to use Heidegger’s Jemeinigkeit, as singularity of time, each time, as other time, also “ipseity of singularity”; Derrida has concerns this risks saving the “I can” of voluntary-conscious-intentional-deciding-I-myself, while acknowledging that Nancy divides it, ruins it, w/ interval or trace of a spacing [see p. 51]

FK p. 51 can Heidegger escape Christian motifs of Schuldigsein, Gewissen, or Bezeugung (attestation)?

p. 59 khōra is nothing but not nothing in which anxiety of Dasein would still be open to question of Being > immemoriality of a desert

p. 60n Derrida thinks Justice in relation to a sundering (déliaison), an always-safe, always-to-be-saved possibility of secret of disassociation, rather than bringing-together (Versammlung) re: dikē

p. 85n yes, Gestell and “all technical manipulation of human beings” (Machenschaft) are the same, doesn’t exclude or efface differential folds

——Derrida wondering how Heidegger can separate heilig from religion & technics

H p. anne 32 Derrida forces us to think, finally

FL p. 261 don’t confuse Heidegger’s Destruktion w/ “destruction” at heart of Benjamin’s thought sought, but both sought condition of an authentic tradition & memory

p. 298 Benjamin’s divine, bloodless violence cannot avoid making us shudder w/ its eery affinity to the final solution (resembles too closely to point of specular fascination) > Benjamin still too Heideggerian, too messianico-Marxist or archeo-eschatological [for Derrida]

SPOM p. 34 despite so many precautions, Heidegger runs risk of reducing justice to juridical-moral rules when he prioritizes gathering to the same over disjunction w/ its cinders

p. 93 deconstruction had to put into question the onto-theo, archeo-teleological concept of history in Hegel, Marx, “or even” in the epochal thinking of Heidegger

HERP p. 183 where Derrida is beyond Heidegger’s aim (propos) [acc. Derrida]: in the non synonymy of dissemblance, heterogeneity, disproportion, incommensurability, nonexchange, excess of every measure/symmetry > democracy to-come

POOF pp. 57-8 in its very depth the keeping silent of Sein und Zeit never laughs (hear something here re: colloquy btwn Heidegger & Nietzsche) > little room for laughter in Heidegger

pp. 242 as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

p. 243 acc. Heidegger, Christianity is an education of passions, even a psychology, a psychological subjectivity—all post-Aristotelian friendships are Christian, same goes for ‘politics’

p. 244 is Heidegger’s Zusage (prior to the question) that agency of phileîn which is not yet the eroticized tension of philosophy?

——Derrida proposes to think a perhaps ‘prior’ to Zusage, arche-originary pledge preceding all questioning, a friendship that could never thrive in gathering (Versammlung), that which accords phília to phúsis to lógos

HASD p. 54 Heidegger says Plato’s khora fell short of thinking the place (Ort), preparing the way for Cartesian space [Derrida thinks this statement is problematic & reductive]

——but 17 years later, Heidegger says, “[hē khōra] heisst der Ort,” and refers to Plato’s khōrismos as the difference of place (die verschiedene Ortung) btwn Being and beings

p. 57 for Heidegger, gathering of Geviert takes place in an indivisible topos, simplicity of point [of sword]: “the place (Ort) gathers toward itself at the greatest height and extremity”

p. 58 Derrida remarks on the folds of denial in the conditional mode: if Heidegger were to write a theology

MPM pp. 96-7 de Man “parodies” Die Sprache spricht w/ Die Sprache versprichtlanguage promises (itself), no originary Sprechen modalized into promise [would Heidegger protest?] [see S p. 93-4]

p. 106 no deconstruction w/out calling into question dissociation of thought and technology, no longer able to subscribe to Heidegger’s Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht (science does not think)

pp. 111, 152n for Heidegger, Socrates is “purest thinker,” did nothing else but place himself in the draft, this is why he wrote nothing

p. 139 deconstruction is no longer Heideggerian where he tries to reclaim hierarchy, limit purity by claiming “essence of technology is nothing technology” [or thinking of rhetoricity is not rhetorical]

p. 140 Heidegger protects agains abyssal risk of parasitic contamination, of an an-oppositional differance, thus risk and gravity of saying, “essence of technology is not foreign to technology”

——memory w/out anteriority, w/out origin, cannot become a Heideggerian theme

A p. 14 Heidegger thinks beyond “vulgar concept of time that privileges now,” Derrida asks: “is there anything other than vulgar time & vulgar death” [see OS]

p. 28 death one of the names of a threat, an aporia, that risks paralyzing ontological, hierarchical, territorial apparatus to which Heidegger lends credit; death, in this sense, names what Heidegger early on called “ruination” [look up]

p. 29 Heidegger’s hierarchy, desire to think death properly, division btwn ontic & ontological, imposes pure, rigorous, indivisible borders, borders that are crossed but shouldn't be

pp. 60-1 Heidegger not interested in revenant or mourning—just death itself, not its figures or experiences of demise (Ableben)

p. 68 Derrida’s impossible not the same as Heidegger’s possibility of an impossibility [?]

pp. 76-7 “turn what is thus at the very heart of the possibility of the existential analysis against the whole apparatus of Being and Time” > death as most ex-propriating, most inauthenticating

——Heidegger dissociates Verfallen from original sin, but still needs distinction btwn authentic/inauthentic > death as “possibility of impossibility” can mean Eigentlichkeit inhabited by Enteignis

p. 79 contaminating contraband remains irreducible [insinuates itself in idiom of existential analysis]

p. 80 Being and Time repeats all motifs of onto-theology it denies

EM pp. 134-35 (161-62) Derrida’s attention to system and structure, la réduction du sens, neither restores classical motifs nor erases them > rather, determining possibility du sens on basis of “formal” organization which in itself has no sens: a critique [sic] of phenomenologies (Husserl, Hegel), which aspire for une réduction au sens

this critique would extend to Heidegger who situates his destruction of metaphysical humanism in hermeneutical question on the meaning or truth of Being

OS p. 34 Heidegger does not investigate hidden passageway (le passage dissimulé) that makes problem of presence communicate w/ the problem of the written trace

p. 35n is [Heidegger’s] authentic/inauthentic, proper/improper still Hegelian, still “vulgar” time

p. 46n Derrida doesn’t think Heidegger considers relever in his reading of Hegel’s concept of time

p. 48 at certain point, destruction of metaphysics remains w/in, only makes explicit its principles > must examine this necessity via this example [re: time in Kant, Aristotle], & formalize rules

pp. 49-50 if Aristotle conceived time in a way not dominated by presence, did Heidegger arrest this possibility in Sein und Zeit, did Kant just make explicit the evaded question [section title] in Physics IV? such making explicit keeps to (se tient) the system de l’éludé

p. 64n in analytic of Dasein, Heidegger gives credit to self-presence via proximity, proper

p. 63 still Platonism in Heidegger’s Verfallen (into time, Being)? > move from primordial to derivative (time) always metaphysical

pp. 64-5 almost impossible to distinguish Heidegger’s Anwesenheit from Gegenwärtigkeit: sometimes it is a more original presence, other times it questions Greco-Western philosophical closure; perhaps we need to make thought tremble w/ a Wesen not yet Anwesen

p. 67 differance as a difference older than Being itself, a still more unthought difference than difference of Being/beings > leads to a writing that exceeds all dialectics, w/out history, cause, absence, presence, archia, telos

VP p. 63n Derrida already wondering if irreducible unity Heidegger attributes to words like “being” calls forth same questions as MOP [i.e. Heidegger still caught in MOP]

S p. 8 why not stand firm and interrogate prescription and proscription? [re: phrase axiomatics of Destruktion, which Heidegger would have refused], axiomatics only suspect in epochal schema

——Derrida has problems w/ Heidegger’s interpretation of khōra in Introduction to Metaphysics

p. 10 acc. Heidegger, essence of technology is not technological; Derrida: what if it is? what is this desire for rigorous non-contamination? > envisage fatal necessity of a contamination

——“contamination by technology of the thinkable essence of technology”

p. 29 doubling of “spirit” by use of quotation marks affects it w/ obsessive specter, one Heidegger is not exactly hospitable to, unless (see p. 30) he re-calls the other under the same

p. 64 for Heidegger, there’s a resignation of spirit into intelligence (Intelligenz), understanding (Verständigkeit), calculation (Berechnung), mass distribution (massenhafte Verteilung); however, Heidegger, says Derrida, would not agree w/ Derrida’s structure of haunting—would be a resignation to calculating authority: Derrida does not agree w/ imaginary Heidegger

pp. 85, 94 Heidegger would refuse designation “commentary” for ontological statement, Derrida asks if we do anything other than commentary [at moment he goes beyond commentary]

p. 107 most matutinal in Frühe, of promise, an other birth, other essence, hétérogène à lorigine, foreign to Christianity w/out being opposed to it, even more radically foreign to Platonic metaphysics

FWT pp. 80-1 Derrida likes Heidegger’s positioning justice outside law but not its harmony w/ injustice > thinking justice on basis of logos, gathering, accord, Being as presence; for Derrida, harshness of justice—infinite disjunction demands its right, out of joint

p. 165 Heidegger’s Destruktion has Lutheran origins which Derrida has always been interested in deconstructing, but can one pass through, overstep, this “Christian” landscape?

P pp. 30-1 does Heidegger escape the metaphysics of Hegel’s Aesthetics in “Truth of the Origin…” —or does he repeat it, going no further than “common representation”?

POS pp. 9-10 Derrida is “above all” made possible by Heidegger’s ontological difference (the unthought difference btwn Being and beings), yet Nietzsche is “perhaps” a move beyond the ontotheology of Heidegger, toward a differance no longer in language of West

pp. 54-5 Derrida’s departure from Heideggerian problematic re: concepts origin & fall, departure from proper (Eigen), and the sense that Heidegger defends presence more than anyone

SP p. 115 [re: Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, that he still belongs to history of metaphysics] reading opens internal necessity, a certain dehiscence, but no critical/destructive effect: mais elle en transforme la figure et réinscrit à son tour le geste herméneutique [see pp. 81-3, p. 123]

p. 127 reading/writing perforates hermeneutic sail

***ATIA p. 160 to “let” something “be” “as such,” you would have to “let be” in your absence, in your death, [thus, for Heidegger, being-toward-death and “as such” constitutive of each other] but is this ever possible? can we let the being be? Nietzsche would say no, that the objective is always caught in the living, in life, in perspective > difference btwn animals, thus an “animal” relation

——Derrida’s strategy re: border(s) btwn animal/human: there is no pure and simple “as such”

——restructuring (pluralizing/varying) “as such” in relation to animal would upset whole framework of Heideggerian discourse, the ontological difference

DS p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

——not critiquing Artaud from standpoint of metaphysics, Derrida reveals complicity: Artaud must enclose himself in closure of presence to denounce naive implications w/in difference

FS p. 29 lécriture est l'issue comme descente hors de soi en soi du sens: métaphore-pour-autrui-en-vuc-d'autrui-ici-bas, métaphore comme possibilité d'autrui ici-bas, métaphore comme métaphysique où l'être doit se cacher si l'on veut que l'autre apparaisse

DIF DIF p. 10 [re: differance] Derrida in strict communication w/ Heidegger re: liberating question of Being from domination by present/now—but Heidegger is not exhaustive

p. 17 before Heidegger purposely and radically questioned presence, Freud & Nietzsche did so, and, remarkably, they did so via motif of differance [remarkable :)]

pp. 22-3 differance (is) older than ontological difference: outside epochality of Being (outside epoch): no depth to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put to play

——is this why Heraclitean play of hen diapheron heautōi, the one differing from itself, in difference w/ itself, is lost like a trace when diapherein is determined as ontological difference?

——isn’t the determination of differance as ontico-ontological difference, difference w/in horizon of question of Being, still intrametaphysical effects of differance?

——differance would be play of trace which no longer belongs to horizon of Being

——a trace that can never appear in phenomenon: trace beyond link btwn ontology & phenomenology > trace erases itself, muffles itself in resonating, like the “a” inscribing its pyramid in differance

p. 25 Heidegger: usage (Brauch) has left a trace (Spur) in to khreon (necessity), quickly forgotten in destiny of Being, usage conjoins the dis- (Der Brauch fügt das Un-) > doesn’t dis of differance refer us beyond history of Being, beyond our language, beyond anything that can be named in it?

p. 26n differance not a process of propriation, neither “species” of genus Being nor Ereignis (nor ontological difference): neither appropriation (position), nor expropriation (negation)—it is other

pp. 26-7 [Derrida argues for new relation to unnameable, different from Heidegger’s] “no name” for differance is not ineffable Being which no name could approach (i.e. God), it is play which makes possible nominal effects, the chains of substitutions of names

WAP p. 13 Derrida’s willingness to link thinking to science not form/function Heidegger gives it

p. 122-23 Derrida applies Heidegger’s thought of epochality to the philosophical “age”: from Descartes to Hegel truth is certitude, reassuring foundation of subjectivity > but, Derrida also wonders how this will shed light on regional determinants (political, ideological), and whether this systematic perspective puts to the test or a takes distance from the situation

DPi pp. 237-39 unlike Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida asks question of DP before death > pre-comprehending indubitable separation of state of life from state of death calculated by other, by 3rd party, common sense: the point, blade of knife, instant of passing, stigmē of a point; how could we know this clear-cut, sharp limit?

——calculable credit granted to word “death” indexed to presuppositions in which “capital punishment” finds its place: where it’s indissociable from murder/suicide

Gii p. 46 Derrida proposes “manuscripture" to Heidegger’s handwriting (Handschrift), given that typewriting, which Heidegger will indict, is also a handwriting

——Heidegger: typewriter “tears (entreisst) writing from the essential realm of the hand” [MOP]

——“typed” word only a copy (Abschrift)

——machine “degrades” word into means of commerce, offers the advantage, for those who enjoy degradation, of dissimulation > Heidegger: “typewriter makes everyone look the same”

pp. 48-9 logo-phonocentrism in Heidegger: writing declines thought, escapes draft when it enters literature [Derrida briefly directs us to Heidegger’s meditation on chreōn, Brauch, necessity, logos]

p. 57 [like pitting Bataille against Bataille (see RGE p. 338n)] > Derrida only “critiques” Heidegger by doing so from other places in his own text: he writes w/ 2 hands at least (i.e. his text is not homogenous)

p. 60 Ort as point of spear (die Spitze des Speers), first & foremost has power of gathering

——“everything concurs and conveys toward the point,” site always a site of gathering

——acc. Heidegger, great poet resists forces of dissemination or dislocation, privilege granted to unicity, value of gathering (indivisibility [?])

p. 62 end of text, in French, sometimes chute or envoi [re: whether Heidegger’s gathering has ever taken place]

REST p. 262 Derrida insists on strong necessity of Heidegger’s questions on art in spite of traditionality & symptomatic qualities

pp. 292-93 Derrida goes off, rather fancifully, on Heidegger’s “projection” of the peasant woman, calls the decision many names (i.e. ridiculous), then quasi-admits his story could be a projection

——Heidegger missed the detachability of the step, the possibility of the digressive

p. 303 a certain type of strict commentary on Heidegger, a restitution of him, becomes obscene, his language is no longer recognizable > thinking otherwise means thinking otherwise than he who attempts to think the remainder “properly”—that is, otherwise than properly

DST DST p. 198 “singularity” not novelty, which is too bound up w/ periodization, or, in the best cases, w/ Heideggerian epochal structures

——Derrida’s reservation re: history of Being & its epochs, also re: “configuration”: presupposes too much consistency, too much identifiable collectedness in the figure

pp. 318-19n Derrida wonders if Heidegger’s insistence on Ort, Erörterung, a unique site of gathering, leaves un-thought désistance or dislocation, which might be thought itself [this torments Derrida’s respect for Heidegger, along w/ Derrida’s insufficient concern re: authentic thought]

p. 320n does Lacoue-Labarthe define a subject from which Heidegger protects himself (and seeks relief [assistance])?

pp. 218-19 for Heidegger, opposition btwn inadequate/adequate circumscribed by alētheias withdrawal—yet, Lacoue-Labarthe’s mimesis haunts alētheia w/ unstable homoiōsis

abyss of pre-originary mimesis, “precedes” truth, introduces desire for homoiōsis > Derrida explains how, w/ this thinking, Lacoue-Labarthe dislocates Heidegger’s epochal history

p. 224 though Heidegger recalled that Georgiades translated rhuthmos as Gepräge (imprint, seal, type, character), this didn’t prevent him from bringing typos back to ontotypology & subject back to epoch of subjectity

***PSSS p. 276 originary affirmation, which advances itself in advance, lends [?] rather than gives itself?

PPT pp. 5-6 Riss: opens above gulf, holds together opposite edges [is Derrida’s trait the same?]

LI p. 134 deconstruction of onto-theological humanism (of Heidegger too) > iterability of mark beyond all human speech acts

EW p. 265 Derrida finds Heidegger’s questions about Descartes necessary, but finds the link btwn subjectivity and representation inadequate, as well as the way he links the subject-object couple to Leibniz’s principle reason

——also, Heidegger’s foreclosure of Spinoza, who critiques finalism and (Cartesian) representative determination of the idea, risks problematizing Heidegger’s theory of the epoch

p. 266 Derrida believes in certain irreversibility of replacing subject w/ Dasein, though Dasein is still too marked by vorhanden, thus time—the ontological structure is insufficiently questioned

p. 270 from Heidegger’s being-thrown to another thinking of destination, chance, destinerrance

pp. 272-73 since there has to be some calculation, Derrida “never held against calculation that condescending reticence of ‘Heideggerian’ haughtiness”

AD pp. 28-9 Levinas’ welcome contests Heidegger’s motifs of gathering & collecting (colligere)

WOG p. 19 horizon of Greek thing itself no longer assured in Derrida: neither as place, system of language, spiritual figure (‘Husserl’) or historial figure (‘Heidegger’)

pp. 22-3 unlike Deleuze and Foucault, Derrida constantly thematized vis-à-vis Heidegger, always a deconstructive explication, always folded-onto itself (sur-pliée): Heidegger’s history of philosophy and of being, Heidegger’s Nietzsche, Aristotle, his situating of Greek language, theos and theion, principle of reason, mimêsis, truth, khōra [each theme has a footnote providing texts where discussed]

——never considered Heidegger’s ‘epoch’ legitimate

p. 23n margin btwn polysemy & dissemination, an objection to Heidegger & Aristotle

p. 25 Derrida’s Nietzsche different from Foucault’s & Deleuze's because of an insistent passage through Heidegger

p. 27 [Derrida deconstructs his Greek influence by disagreeing w/ Heidegger’s interpretation of logos (as gathering towards the One and the Same)]

p. 37 hen diapheron heautôi (Heraclitus) is Greek heritage Derrida is most faithful to, tries to think this “one differing from itself” alongside (“improbably”) the khōra > the very event of the même, the soi-même: under this sign, Derrida contrasted differance to ontological difference [cf. D p. 22]

p. 38 “reading of Heidegger has given me to think…in the most abyssal, unforeseeable way” > still, Derrida critiques the following in Heidegger: epochalization of science & technology, animality/hand, sexuality & life, question as originary form or ultimate dignity of thought, reading of Nietzsche, principle of reason, use of khōra, relationship to language (German/Greek), ontological difference, logos as gathering…

CIN p. 23 there are cinders only if there is a hearth, some fire or place, cinder as the house of being

BSi p. 322 Heidegger against strict, conventional division of man/animal [for very different reasons than Derrida], doesn’t make man unique enough

OG pp. 19-20 (31-33) Heidegger’s reading of Nietzschean demolition irrefutable if it remains confined to metaphysical edifice, entirely other if one accepts the deconstruction at hand > is Nietzsche captive or deconstructive?

——Nietzsche contributed great deal to liberating signifier from dependence on logos (in relation to truth, primary signified) > to save Nietzsche from Heidegger’s reading (N. remains simply w/in metaphysics), we need to understand how a step out of metaphysics must still utilize it in a certain way, perhaps we should offer Nietzsche up to Heidegger’s reading entirely

pp. 20-2 (34-6) the word “being” as Urwort (mot originaire) ensures “lêtre-mot” to all other words [Lacan’s name-of-the-father]

——does Heidegger transgress logocentrism of phonè by questioning being? or does the question precomprehend the word being? deconstructive breakthrough (percée) no longer circumscribed in ontic/ontological [?]

pp. 22-3 (36-8) Heidegger transgresses and contained (y est comprise) at same time in presence of logocentrism > his crossing-out (rature, kreuzweise Durchstreichung) of Being effaces presence of transcendental signified while keeping it legible: this last writing is a first writing (of an epoch), inasmuch as it de-limits onto-theology, metaphysics of presence, logocentrism > Heidegger must restore (provisionally) “transcendence” to Being to renounce project/word ontology [given risk of transgression becoming regression here, Derrida insists we go by way of Heidegger’s rigor alone]

pp. 23-4 (38) on (à) but not w/in (en-deçà) Heidegger’s horizon, being no longer transcendental signified but a determined signifying trace, “ontico-ontological” derivative w/ respect to differance

——differance can only be thought by passing through the ontico-ontological difference, a determination that gets erased by differance: this trick of writing (tour décriture) is irreducible

p. 68 (99) “God’s death” & “return to finitude” belong to onto-theology they fight against > differance something other than finitude

p. 143 perhaps Heidegger couldn’t read in Nietzsche the attempt to think differance prior to being (aka presence) > being speaks nothing other than metaphysics: even if thinking its closure

EU p. 19 translating structure begins as soon as a reading of “original” text is instituted, offers up language to be read in its very erasure: erased traces of a path (odos), chemin deffacement, translation passing over/beyond the path of language [beyond Heidegger], passant son chemin

DERRIDA CONFESSES?

***MONL p. 47 I always surrender myself to language: give credit to that which is to come (as opposed to the given)

pp. 50-52 Derrida on his relation to French language; the secret, a tattoo, blood mixed w/ ink, love by setting on fire, graft, mark, let come to itself in itself

POR p. 5 (133) Derrida [in preparation for this Cornell address] felt like a cornered animal, while worrying he would be like Elijah, an eschatological harbinger

POO p. 13 can a confession or auto-critique (this whole seminar is about me) ever occur? who is the reader of whom?

p. 144n “the secret remains intact, my politeness [see S p. 9] unblemished, my reserve unbreached, my modesty more jealous than ever [see TB p. 124]” [respond w/out responding]

SPOM p. 174 larcharnement (ferocity, w/ chair, flesh) dun chasseur > set out the living lifeless body of a ghost (le corps vivant sans vie dun fantôme) to trick prey (pour tromper sa proie)

——Derrida has a feeling about this, and it’s projected into what he’s doing: “it is never possible to avoid this precipitation, since everyone reads, acts, writes with his or her ghosts, even when one goes after the ghosts of others”

POOF p. 13 [Derrida “confesses,” in parentheses, intended method to go beyond Aristotle]

pp. 304-05 when Blanchot claims that Judaism was the foundation of our relationships w/ the other (autri), Derrida believes this is highly problematic while possessing imposing necessity (this is unquestionable when one calls Judaism the thing one defines: a circle Derrida can’t engage here [heterotautology?]) > Derrida wonders why he can’t subscribe, like Blanchot, to words “community” or this statement on Judaism—which response is more hyperbolically Jewish?

p. 305 Derrida confessing: he has more than one ‘brother,’ of more than one sex, and he loves having more than one (uniquely bound, each time, by a conjuration & so many unuttered oaths)

HASD pp. 23-4 in topolitology of secret, figures or places of rhetoric are also political stratagems [Derrida & deconstruction?]

p. 66n most “autobiographical” [attach as many quotation marks around this word as possible] to leave out Jew & Arab, which Derrida has never been able to speak about [see p. 58]

MPM pp. xix-xx Derrida overwhelmed by memories of de Man, everything is painful, so painful

p. 3 Derrida, lover of memory, never knew how to tell a story, never received gift (doron) of Mnemosyne, the wax imprint, an eidolon [Derrida has a relation to memory beyond the imprint?]: keeps the memory loses the narrative

p. 86 I can’t tell stories so I turn to myth > Mnemon: an auxiliary, a technician, artist of memory, hypomnesic servant [Derrida?]

A p. 2 whenever someone speaks of someone else, cites or praises him or her, one must hear: this is the story of my life [re: Diderot accusing Seneca, pardoning Seneca, asking for pardon himself]

p. 74 Marranolike (cryptic awaiting), a universal Marrano

p. 77 that which lives w/ out a name, we’ll give an added name (surnom) [which a name always is]: Marrano (crypto-judaic, crypto-X), believe if you want to the Marranos have come to an end

p. 81 Marranos that we are, whether we know it or not, incessantly older & younger, untimely histories, still waiting for the other in a last word infinitely finished

——Marrano: anyone who remains faithful to a secret he hasn’t chosen

SEC p. 329 pour conclure ce propos très sec

PAS PAS p. (52) what i would like to give you: Viens w/out language overhang (sans aucun langage de surplomb), w/out anything that could name it, designate it from a third place

p. (106) Derrida’s ideal to drown in true sea of Blanchot’s text, to have loved it as the original first name

FWT pp. 112-13 incalculable inner multiplicity is Derrida’s torment, his work, travail, his tripalium, passion, labor, also that which makes him work > I do not believe this division/nonidentity to oneself is exemplarily Jewish, but who would dare say it isn’t?

——nothing matters more to Derrida than his Jewishness, & it matters so little

DS pp. 203-04n “psychic Proteus,” perfect scoundrel [definition of mime, of Derrida?]

ROP p. 2 Derrida loves French word résistance, loaded w/ pathos of his nostalgia, dreams of bombing in the ‘40s > secret of inconsolable nostalgia resists analysis, kinda like navel of dream

p. 40 Derrida frustrated that at colloquia no one ever goes into detail, swept away by voice, do w/out minutiae of letter (the micrological displacements where I incorrigibly persist in hoping things get decided—at a given moment, that’s never given)

ATIA p. 7 if you suspect me of perversion [re: “it really was a little black pussycat”], it’s always a possibility

p. 22 Derrida is going to put off reading of Heidegger until later, then says that later might just mean never

p. 23 the indulgent way one poses in front of a camera

——Derrida on all the memories he has of Cerisy, he hallucinates them, a chimera, a haunted castle, and his talk that year his most chimerical

p. 37 Derrida’s very early dream, obsession, before his bestiary [his texts], of an absolute hospitality (to so many animots), infinite appropriation—constituting everything thought or written w/in a zoosphere

p. 62 Derrida’s exceptionalism, sentiment of election, always exempted himself, in everything he’s written, erased, traced, from the “they” who name the “animal” > “as if I were the secret elect of what they call animals”

——Derrida’s dreams, many dreams, dreams of animals dreaming, loves watching them sleep

p. 69 “as for me, the guilty innocent one, the accused presumed innocent and guilty at the same time, I who confesses even to the sin of confession” > qui/que suis-je?

***pp. 91-2 single embrace of Kant, Descartes, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger, like chasing, hunting, trying to take hold of cuttlefish, touch the animal in a way where it will expel its ink (encre), its anchor, in this case, w/ these folks, the ink as the ability to do the “I,” before autoreference; (in the name of autobiography) Derrida confides the animalist “vision” he has of what he does, what he writes > his “sole concern” is to not sacrifice to it any difference, fold, opening to-come

p. 141 I’m not trying to be the last one speaking, the last Jew, the last of the eschatologists > I would like to write a long text one day

O p. 3 I will not feign, acc. to code, either premeditation or improvisation

p. 49n Derrida not disputing la raison elle-même, the one (masculine) libido—“why not?” > to stand on head [call for feminine libido?] would put back/leave in place truth of phallocentric dialectic

WAP p. 70 re: coming “late” to think critically about teaching philosophy, Derrida explains he is not going to display histrionic guilt, as a matter of taste

SW p. 324(n) Derrida knows too well how to do the history of veils > there’s the fault: “commencerà bien faire” (TN. “begin to do too well” or “it’s getting to be too much”); tiresome, tireless, tired out history I’m leaving behind me, running after me

——has Derrida left no one the right to say the veil has something to hide? that it will suffice to have done w/ veil to access Thing itself (Cause safe & intact)?

p. 325 I am pretending to confess

p. 326 “I like to touch more than to see” [his tallith]

p. 329 “I’d like to be done w/ mourning [for the veil]…perhaps [H.C.] already succeeded in that”

p. 340 “as for swapping one’s tunic w/ a woman, who can be sure of never being ‘in abomination’?” not me, I fear

p. 343 “I continue to murmur, under the protection of hypothesis”

pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

DPi p. 64 [another example of “seschances: was talking dawn then found it capitalized in The Execution]

pp. 254-55 I [Derrida] am against the DP, I am interested in saving my neck, the life I love: and by “I,” I mean “I,” me, and also whoever says “I” in its place or in mine: ultimate resource of my interest in the end of DP—an interest so originary/primordial, it risks being shared by supporters of DP?

p. 275 Montaigne: fairest death is the most willed death, pulled like a thread > Derrida imagines [via fil of life, filet of blood] a tireless trapeze artist who is caught by net of belief, his opinion, dies on day net breaks, a willed/beautiful death > he decides to put an end to his belief

CHM pp. 31-2 re: his relation to Foucault: interminable unhappiness (unhappy consciousness) of disciple > master might be absent

——must break the mirror, the glass, infinite speculation on master: start to speak

p. 62 philosophy as this giant confession: attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole (to define it as such is to confess) > I philosophize only in terror, but in confessed terror of going mad

——confession is simultaneously: oblivion/unveiling, protection/exposure > economy

Gii p. 302n Derrida writes on typewriter w/ 3 hands btwn 3 tongues [re: 3rd ear as ear of other, a supplementary readability of Heidegger]

REST p. 261 interlacing of interruption points, a purely faked multiplicity [Derrida confessing about the multiple voices, the dialogue occurring in essay?], periods remain w/out destination, but they have authority in common [cf. ATM how do interruptions interlace?]

p. 301 Derrida asks himself, “are you rendering justice to, restituting, Heidegger’s truth?” he responds, “question is too early, I’m just starting” [not exact quotes]

p. 320 you’re trying to justify [Heidegger] at any price? his “pathetic tirade”

——if Heidegger is not referring to painted shoes w/in the limits of a frame, which can only be crossed in one direction (from outside to inside), then…

PIO pp. 2-3 friendship w/ de Man, cloudless (sans ombre): rarest, most precious rays of light (traits de lumière)

HLP p. 38 I will not tell you the whole truth about a history of the lie, not even what I think it’s necessary to say, I will not say the whole truth of what I think: a lacunary testimony

TR p. 109 Derrida analyzing de Man on Rousseau admits he doesn’t see things clearly enough [re: a certain point]

EJQB p. 74 [re: his commentary on Jabès] adding pitiful (misérables) graffiti to an immense poem

PSSS p. 256 Derrida, advancing to a new theater of cruelty, wants to avoid alibis, will be very slow: prefers incorrigibly long [therapy] sessions [:)]

pp. 256-57 Derrida’s Socratic-like “I know nothing,” doesn’t know where to put his knowing nothing (who authorizes his questions?)

HST p. 405 Derrida so shy in his incompetence w/ Arabic

pp. 410-11 Derrida tells this story: he was thinking of substitution, he thought of the example of stealing a child, replacing it w/ another, then he went to Littré (as a matter of duty, to verify, to search for an example), and the first definition/example is child substitution [mes chances]

+R p. 151 resonances leading you astray, what if I like words in order to be-tray (pour trahir) > (pour traiter, triturer, traîner, tramer, tracer, traquer)

C p. 191 I shall not speculate: let that be clear forever; the objects don’t belong to me, not mine; still, it’s difficult to resist obsidional invasion (investissement)

p. 227 Derrida, in Glas, incorrectly thought Genet was talking about a trouser pocket

LI p. 42 Derrida feels certain sense of guilt for not having incorporated some of Searle’s texts in SEC, even though they were written later

p. 94 even Derrida’s discourse involves effect of idealism in some way

p. 157n Derrida’s incorrigible naïveté: confidence in ethics of discussion (in morality, if not in moralism)

p. 141 Derrida’s “conservatism”: I am for safeguards, memory, jealous conservation of #s of traditions (in university & in scientific, philosophical, literary theory) > I am actively committed to safeguards: at same time (in same text), I call into question foundation of these traditions

TN p. 7 “soul,” “body,” “being”: I never understood these words, same for everyone?

——I dream one day some statistics [baby daddy] will reveal how often I used them (w/out confessing how unsure I was of their exact meaning)

pp. 70-1 has Derrida singled out frapper, caresser for pedagogical, provisional convenience—tie them to later texts?

p. 116 touch does not come as easily to Derrida as it does to Nancy—isn’t Nancy’s [every] origin “appropriable”?

——Derrida not more idealist, history of touch is idealistic—“cannot bring myself to believe in it very much”

p. 302 dream of kissing Nancy, real friends intimidate me, as do my sons

pp. 336-37n pregnancy, only a woman can feel the heart of another in her; [Derrida to Nancy before surgery] “Don’t worry, I’ll wake up w/ you,” friend who keeps heart of other, this incredible survival > “heart” joins w/ thinking, w/ grace of gratitude, w/ love of friendship

ATM p. 187 Levinas contaminates when he thematizes the nonthematizable, Derrida contaminates this irrepressible thematization in his turn (not structurally, but w/ a fault of his own)

WOG pp. 18-9 my relationship to ‘Greece’ is somewhat naive, limited by philological & historical incompetence

ATAP p. 91 Derrida didn’t know when he wrote Pas that “Viens” came from John Patmos

DERRIDA CONFESSES, SUMMARIZES (in

EU p. 113 so young & so old [cf. SW pp. 322-23], one and the same thing, anachrony in oneself, confusion of identity > this confusion has suddenly gotten much worse—leaving me speechless

——écart alternatif entre la jouissance et la fécondité

p. 114 too early or too late (trop tôt ou trop tard) [Nietzsche-like]—my anachrony

pp. 115-16 Derrida’s 1st thesis title: The Ideality of the Literary Object > Derrida tells Hyppolite: if I saw where I was going, I wouldn’t take another step

——Derrida also knows enough about where he’s going to think, w/ terror, things aren’t going so well there, would be better not to go there at all

——but there’s always Necessity (w/ capital of a proper noun) > Necessity says one must always yield, always go (se rendre) where it calls: even if it means never arriving

p. 117 Husserlian phenomenology, incomparable rigor—not Sartre, not Merleau-Ponty

pp. 117-18 [Derrida’s move] from phenomenology to a language that couldn’t be submitted to the epochē (to the epoch) [list of interests: wills, testaments, archives, etc.]

——not a system, but strategic device opening onto its own abyss, non clôturable, not wholly formalizable rules of reading, interpretation, writing

pp. 118-19 the existence of constraints [re: devaluation of writing] practiced at the price of contradictions, denials, dogmatic decrees > Derrida didn’t study these constraints w/in a limited topos of culture/ontology, he proposed their nonclosed, fissured system: logocentrism (as found in Western philosophy) and phonocentrism (in its widest scope)

——Derrida has untiringly striven to contest idea that deconstruction is an abusive deformation or metaphorical usage of current notions of writing, text, trace > frayage always requires transforming/deforming authorized relationship btwn word/concept, btwn trope & supposed proper meaning

——strategic/rhetorical scope (portée) of these gestures never ceased to engage me in subsequent texts, grouped together under the title: graphics of differance, deconstruction, trace, supplement…

p. 120 Derrida’s solitude considered well-deserved consequence of hermetic & unjustified reclusiveness [he does not think this is so]

——needed to transform rhetoric, staging, particular discursive procedures dominating university discourse

p. 121 convinced of necessity for profound transformation, un bouleversement of university institutions

——Derrida believes in indestructibility of ordered procedures of legitimation, titles, diplomas

——universitas has essential tie w/ logocentric, onto-encyclopedic system

p. 122 events of 1968 confirmed an anticipation

——the political doesn’t only take conventional left/right axis: revolutionary often gets along w/ reproductive force of authority (institutional symbolism) > what is most unacceptable then is that which upsets these norms, entrenched contracts, in the very form of work, teaching, writing

p. 123 never liked word deconstruction—disagreeably surprised at its fortune

——philosophy finds itself inscribed w/in space it can’t order, opens to an other not even its other > in a tympanum as little Hegelian as possible

——knowledge called socio-political often remains blind to its own inscription, stage of its own heritage, to its writing

p. 124 my obstinacy is great, compulsive, forced me to take les voies les plus détournées

——Glas: generalized fetishism, pull of the discourse of castration toward affirmative dissemination [also continues pursuing project of grammatology, etc.]

——phallocentrism & logocentrism (essentially indissociable) wherever I could spot them > everywhere, even where unnoticed

p. 125 [re: Derrida’s texts] autobiographical elements were undermining very notion of autobiography > undecidable, baffling (déroutant)

——GREPH: urgent, ineluctable task in places we occupy, can’t deny we belong, we’re inscribed

p. 126 GREPH’s activities can’t be separated from larger scene

——political involvement w/ GREPH, publications, even the gesture I make today: make possible involvements/responsibilities in the same struggle (même lutte)

——Derrida’s little forum of endless scenography: symbols, phantasies, traps, strategies > a self-image recounts interminable, incredible stories to itself

p. 127 Derrida’s “speechlessness,” the captatio in which he just indulged [thesis defense] not only excessively coded but as impoverished as a punctuation mark, an apostrophe in an unfinished text

p. 128 Derrida admits to abusing word strategy, always stratégie sans finalité, au risque de me couper lherbe sous les pieds > car jy tiens et elle me tient > aleatory strategy: someone who admits he doesn’t know where he’s going > also comme la précipitation sans détour vers la fin, joyous contradiction of self: very old and cunning (rusée), something that’s just been born, delights in being w/out defense

DERRIDA PERFORMING IDEA

GT p. 114 Derrida “apologizes” for long detour, explains that it marks the step of 2 men in “Counterfeit Money,” rhythm of every incalculable scene of the gift

HASD p. 16 Derrida explains how he improvised motifs of HASD on the telephone > “how to avoid speaking” at the moment he wanted to defer responsibility of lecture

pp. 23-4 in topolitology of secret, figures or places of rhetoric are also political stratagems [Derrida & deconstruction?]

p. 31 Derrida introduces 3 paradigms of apophasis, admitting that this architectural model [paradigms] surrounds a resonant space of which nothing, almost nothing, will ever be said

POOF pp. 63, 79-80 [refracting the Aristotlean idea that one must love lovence, that it’s more worthwhile (vaut mieux) to love than to be loved, Derrida continually uses phrase “who better (mieux)” re: Nietzsche, as if extending an ambiguous friendship to him]

A p. 72 seminar is ending, must rush to end, abruptly [death]

VM p. 84 “without reflecting here on the philosophy of this hesitation”

PAS PAS p. (39) we will try to approach later [re: what determines eau (thing, name)]

S p. 107 after discussing Heidegger's most matutinal morning, Derrida says, “I will not keep you here until morning”

pp. 110-13 Derrida performs an imaginary question and response btwn Christian theologians and Heidegger

OH p. 69 Derrida will subscribe to European analogic (ideality, capitalization) w/ one hand, write outside it w/ the other

p. 71 Derrida precipitates conclusion, which is movement of the head (chef)

SH p. 12 after saying multiple singular events can conjoin: Celan quoting Benjamin citing Malebranche on Kafka

p. 51 measureless violence of breaking up rhythm of poem (Derrida says he has to)

p. 68 [Derrida ends his lecture by dating it, circumcising]

WM p. 219 “the exergue effaced” [once section exergue is finished]

P p. 84 “I’m using a reflective route” [moving from example to concept]

p. 121 [about to discuss the column & the colossal]: “I will take my stand (me tiendrai) in this passage”

SP pp. 135-39 Derrida exposes cryptic structure of writing by “confessing” to it “directly,” re: Nietzsche’s forgetting the umbrella; one could never heed the cryptic warning, what if the “limits of will to mean” are exactly what Nietzsche meant w/ this phrase, an intentional graft

OTO pp. 3-4, 25-6 discussing Nietzsche’s vision of the destruction of the University, speaking to the University, Derrida speaks of his own refusal to adhere to a certain pedagogy, while mocking a-ca-dem-ic free-dom [prolongation references taking all the time to finish, not rushing to end]

ATIA p. 22 Derrida will put off until later a reading of Heidegger putting off until later a reading on the animal & time > later, i.e. never

p. 33 Derrida will sniff out, hunt down, like an animal, the reasons for confident usage of word “animal”

pp. 54-5 adding syllogistic “therefore” to The Animal That I Am (Follow): “such procedural steps (démarche) should be followed” [machine of inheritance] > to follow: seek to find, seek to escape?

DST DST p. 203 [while still writing w/in parentheses for 8 pages, Derrida describes the obsessionality of double bind that makes it so one can’t close a parentheses]

PIO p. 1 “que vais-je pouvoir inventer encore?” [beginning of essay on invention]

pp. 10-1 Ponge’s “Fable”: poetic performative, describes/carries out, on same line, its own generation; telling & told are undecidable, its constative is its performative (not content w/ announcing, it’s located ironically in evangelical tradition, reveals/perverts structure of envoi)

p. 12 constative (discovering, unveiling, pointing out [manifester], dire ce qui est); performative (producing, instituting, transforming) > “Fable” is co-implication of these 2 values; “Fable” is exemplary > invents by means of enunciation (performs/describes, operates/states)

HLP p. 38 I will not tell you the whole truth about a history of the lie, not even what I think it’s necessary to say, I will not say the whole truth of what I think: a lacunary testimony

WAP pp. 89-90 [speaking of teaching body] hear I am, the teaching body, in what way is this a glorious body? all light on me > it is also glorious because no longer a body: sublimated, at once part/whole of general teaching body, representative of philosophical/sociopolitical corpus [also, he is contraband]

p. 116 “The Crisis in Teaching” — a rather slow way of “preparing to listen to you”

REST p. 273 “give me credit for the moment,” “allow me a slight advance…”

TR pp. 125-26 Derrida confesses theft so to excuse himself for it [re: de Man’s unjust justice]

C pp. 185-247 [to re-capture the contingency of Titus-Carmel’s 127, Derrida divides the text by “what seems” an arbitrary amount of dated entries]

p. 189 get down to it (sy mettre), commit oneself, donner du gage (give proof, evidence, wager) > get in the coffin [writing about coffins], spread out

pp. 234-35 [Derrida focuses throughout on contingency of Titus-Carmel’s decision to make 127 coffins; here, he indulges in wild speculations: anagrams, palindromes, numerical values]

LI p. 40 Derrida will cite Sarl at length to enrich iterative corpus which is the object of discussion [pushing the issue of parasitic contamination]

TN p. 182 Derrida’s 5 Tangents, chapters (5 fingers, 5 senses)

BSi pp. 78-9 “reason of strongest always best” is violently tautological [Derrida’s “gonna show” this tautology, but never does, thus (as the professor, as the strongest in the room) he does show it (a performative demonstration)]

——Derrida intentionally neglected to introduce a wolf in Machiavelli [?]

SPEC pp. 336-37 same step (pas) [Freud’s step beyond PP] gives & suspends movement, es gibt, exemplary movement of paralysis [Derrida repeating too, cf. FSW, PAS] [démarche]

p. 339 je le suppose relu [re: Freud’s Beyond…]—gagner le temps (or essential form of that which interests the speculation)

p. 363 death is the analogon of castration > castration not incompatible w/ thesis of death drive if one refers to syntaxic articulation of athesis: Derrida’s pointing to “it” at this moment

p. 372 Derrida’s limiting the pleasure he can give himself tonight [re: comparison of fort/da to Symposium]

pp. 402-03 s’il faut se rendre à ce quil faut echaîner strictement [if it’s necessary to submit to what must follow strictly] re: le mot de maîtrise, going beyond oppositional logic—is there mastery?

FV pp. 424-25, 439 throughout an essay that deconstructs arrival of letter, Derrida continually says: “we’re not there yet”

DERRIDA STRETCHING IT

FL p. 249 there is nothing more just than deconstruction

p. 271 new readings = revolutions (though he does remind everyone their on 5th avenue)

LOBL LOBL p. ~89 [The promise he doesn’t keep: anticipate translatable problems, see pp. 175-76]

p. ~167 story of the woman [Miss Blind feminist] who wouldn’t let Derrida have his “mad hypothesis” [2 women approaching via hymen w/out narrator: absolute terror]

pp. ~175-6 Derrida did not keep his promise to consider translatability [see p. ~89], but keeps a secret

MC MC p. 349 I never wrote a “self-centered” text: I wanted to, I fell upon the others [Nietzsche says something quite similar]

p. 376 [conclusion] “perhaps…I [am] under the influence of some drug” referring to pharmakon

H H p. 87 two sources of sighs, two nostalgias, their dead ones and their language > return home, or exiles find home in language

SPOM SPOM p. 13 Marcellus anticipated la venue dun autre scholar, had to wait several centuries [for Derrida], one who can think possibility of specter, specter as possibility, who can address spirits, who knows that such is the condition of address, mad enough to unlock such a possibility

A A p. 27 Derrida policing misuse of Heidegger

PP PP p. 68 Derrida recognizes that the cicada myth in Phaedrus also includes question about writing [before the Theuth myth], he asks: “has anyone ever picked up on it?”

VM VM p. 126 Derrida calls attention to his showing off his Parmenidean-like dialectical virtuosity

PAS PAS p. (45) Derrida wants to be violent to Blanchot, won’t just call him tu, must be more violent, more discreet than him, but in a different way

pp. (99-100) in a moment of extreme, precipitous virtuosity, where o (mort, fors, faux, faut, zéro, mot) resonates everywhere and nom turns to mon, Derrida asks himself if his policing overzealousness [to unmask the absence of the name, le pas-de-nom] deciphers identities [maur/chot, m’: o], wants to catch everything in a dragnet (filet)

SH pp. 52-3 poem is a hermeneutic event, it has philosophical implications which draw out the limits of hermeneutic acuity; limit of philosophy and formal poetics not to be renounced, not a failure: they recall the forgetting of the mark’s annulment by forgetting it (by supposing date)

POOF p. 34 Derrida aligning himself w/ Nietzsche’s future (new) philosophers

OH pp. 35-6 Derrida comes from other heading of Algeria

F p. xxx Derrida’s friendship w/ Abraham and Torok was “authentic” not “hollow” or “alienated” like the words of ideologues, utopians, idolators [uses their words]

FWT p. 37 future has in store things not yet registered by civil state—but already known by unconscious

p. 39 prefer not to get trapped btwn naturalism & constructivism

DS p. 224 “or even that you, dear everyreader, retain the initiative of reading all these texts…nothing could be less certain”

p. 281 referring to Mallarmé [but, sounds like someone else]: burst of lightning, by him who seems to have read it all

ROP p. 5 [everyone has analyzed “Dream of Irma’s Injection,” so, modest Derrida, will add nothing, only differance, the something other than sense itself in the interpretation]

pp. 40-1 “I’ve never much liked” theses, positions, position takings, positionings > for those waiting for my position, so they can decide, “good luck”

p. 113-14 Derrida refers to his modest contribution re: a question for Foucault (doesn’t Foucault’s project belong too much to “the age of psychoanalysis”?)

SP p. 39 déjà, nom de ce qui sefface ou davance se soustrait, laissant néanmoins une marque, une signature soustraite dans cela même don il se retire [Derrida talking about “himself”]

ATIA p. 32 lanimal que donc je suis speaks, and no less asinine (bête) for it

p. 58 Derrida basically has us envision him naked before his cat, with a woman looking on [and he did just talk about a creature being hung like a horse (monter un cheval)]

PS p. 174 “the tumultuous presence…” [Derrida’s only bad sentence?]

WAP pp. 33-4 even among people who read me “effects of interpretation are very unequal,” these differences are irreducible

RM p. 54 RM not in a polemical spirit: it’s often because I subscribe to Ricouer’s propositions (whose text he can’t do justice) that I protest > they’re already there in what I wrote

TR p. 77 which theoretical animal, animal-machine (of 3rd millennium) [cf. ATIA pp. 158-59] could measure up to this inhuman program [Derrida’s referring to the conference title]

p. 127 differance and deconstruction were “ugly,” “new” words

LI p. 45 Derrida swears his good faith (raises his hand above the typewriter)

TN p. 58 unlike Nancy, Derrida endlessly thinks about death w/out having had a change of hearts [socratic irony? also literal reference to Nancy’s surgery]

pp. 93-4 let’s not play w/ words ever: le tendre ne séprouve quà tendre (the proof of the tender is only in the tending, extending)

pp. 94-5 w/out playing on words, never: il faudrait donc entendre et tendre tendrement ces motstender, tend, extend > “Tiens!”: “Take (Prends)!” (tender it, à tendre on sous-entend) is not “I give you (je te donne)” (obscene phrase: assumed certainty, expected recognition)

p. 107 Derrida jokingly scolds himself for scolding Nancy: stop using this incredible vocabulary > abstain from ‘touching,’ ce concept sans répondant assuré: figures w/out figure, therefore w/out credit

p. 131 “my impertinence will be my tact”: baroque composition, flaunted taste for delirious profusion > response to aporias of text

p. 295 Derrida finds a passage in Nancy that confirms all he tried to formulate before he came across it, declares: (how lucky I am!)

ATM pp. 183-84 while discussing Levinas’ and [a certain] psychoanalysis’ secondarization of the woman, Derrida hypothesizes [?] that this complicit gesture gathers around one fundamental design: their relation to me, to the other as woman

p. 185 “I am speaking from my place as woman”

p. 187 as a woman, by reversing dissymmetry [of tout autre in Levinas], Derrida has added rape [alongside other violences: hostage, persecution, etc.]

DESCARTES

R p. 43 never developed a theory of the subject, word is not part of his vocabulary

MSUB J pp. 161-62 Latin is stubborn, need to use words in order to express ideas that are clear; for me, ideas that are clear are dead > Descartes’ “clear ideas”

VM pp. 85-6 for Levinas, sun of epekeina tes ousias (fecundity, generosity) will always illuminate inexhaustible source of thought, Plato places Good beyond Being, beyond light of Being [see p. 312n Descartes’ infinite does this too]; “ex-cendence”

p. 104 Levinas’ reading of Descartes’ 3rd Meditation supports entirety of his thought: absolute irreducibility of other, infinitely Other can only be infinity

p. 106 acc. Levinas, Husserl misunderstands Descartes’ 3rd Meditation, places infinite entirely w/in subjectivity, makes it an object, so phenomenology cannot account for ethics

p. 139 Descartes [in letter]: “I breathe, therefore I am” proves nothing about existence

OH OH p. 33 Husserl’s “crisis of European sciences” sought recovery of transcendental theme in Descartes

S S pp. 16-7 acc. Heidegger, Descartes, Husserl, both dogmatic, their concepts not ontologically clarified via Being

p. 26 acc. Heidegger, Hegelian spirit ruled by epoch of Cartesian cogito, thus calls for deconstruction; Hegel called Descartes the Christopher Columbus of philosophical modernity

FWT FWT p. 65 acc. Descartes, animal is reaction w/out response (& Kant, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger)

——great respect for foundation of human rights, via post-Cartesian subjectivity, though must be analyzed, developed, enriched

——modern concept of right depends on Cartesian cogito, his “text” not the cause but “represents” structure in powerful systematicity of symptom

——rights for animals confirms logic of subjectivity responsible for greatest violence against them > human rights for animals a disastrous contradiction

WM WM p. 259n Bachelard: Descartes’ metaphysics of space, a metaphorics of the sponge

p. 267 it is lumen naturale that allows Descartes to affirm his mind beyond all doubt, natural light constitutes the ether of thought > natural light proceeds from God and returns to God

ROP ROP p. 73 are we closer to Freud or Descartes today?

p. 75 Lacan returns to an unsurpassability of Descartes, brings Descartes close to Freud > [is this part of Foucault’ critique of psychoanalysis? re: subject (of science)]

pp. 86 death drive (repetition compulsion, fort/da), Evil Genius of Freud, the devil’s advocate, limping devil: by way of which psychoanalysis finds its speculative power & its greatest resistance

ATIA ATIA p. 46 when Descartes describes the Chimaera, whose existence must be excluded at moment of cogito ergo sum, he leaves out the serpent, the behind, the evil genius of the animal

p. 53 like most anthropocentrics: Descartes cares more that animals won’t respond than that they don’t have language

pp. 70-1 Descartes not given enough credit [not even by Heidegger] for a suspension that also suspends the man as “rational animal”: I do not have sufficient understanding of who I am

p. 72 Descartes also suspends everything that has life: his body is a corpse/machine

p. 75 donc” of lanimal que donc je suis, a summons [call] issued to Descartes

pp. 75, 77 Descartes writes in French (autobiographilosophical narrative, for which he paved the way) to make accessible to “natural reason” and to “women”

pp. 81-2 Descartes’ 2 criteria (he calls them “methods”) for differentiating authentic from mimetic simulacrum of automaton (still govern method of Lacan & Heidegger): 1) the inability to respond 2) a lack which is not the lack of man, the lacking of the lack of man

p. 90 Descartes never calls “I think there I am” subjectivity, but it lays the foundation of the subject (Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas)

p. 101 beneath its mechanistic indifference, Cartesianism belongs to Judeo-Christian-Islamic sacrificial war against animal

p. 106 Levinas reconfigures Descartes’ infinite will to “I am (following) after the infinite” > subject as host/hostage of the infinite

pp. 146-47 Heidegger: Descartes’ desire to make philosophy an absolute science is in the spirit of absolute knowledge [but Heidegger remains Cartesian]

FS FS p. 16 Leibniz critiqued Descartes for having explained everything in nature w/ figures & movements, of ignoring force by confusing it w/ quantity of movement [Derrida extending this critique to structuralism, Rousset, the best literary formalism]

O O pp. 37-6(n) Derrida makes a sweeping comparison btwn 6th song in Maldoror, Marx’s distinction btwn method of inquiry/method of presentation & Descartes’ theory re: synthetic method (demands assent, Principles of Philosophy) & analytic method (shows way, Meditations)

DPi DPi pp. 225-26 Cartesianism of Guillotin/guillotine, not only mechanism of individualism/egalitarian universalism, but also body/mind (Cartesian doxa, ideology), but also Descartes’ instantaneism (separate, indivisible instants) as part of anesthetic logic of moment of guillotine

——would the mind only know it was severed from its head when the crowd cheers? other determines instant of my death

——guillotine as pain killer: instant, no sensibility of duration of time: anesthesia—euthanasia—instantaneity

CHM CHM pp. 48-9 [very Husserlian side of Descartes] that even if sensory is illusion/dream—there’s always the intelligible (noncounterfeit simplicity)

pp. 308-09n no error in perception for Descartes, only in will of judgment [like Aristotle]

WAP WAP p. 122 Cartesian doubt is provisional, methodical, not skeptical doubt

AFR AFR pp. 83-4 for Condillac, philosophers who were geometers (the least mathematical) think too synthetically (contra analytically) (Leibniz, Descartes, Mallebranche), Locke was not a geometer

p. 85 for Condillac, Descartes’ success: taught us his method of self-reflection so it could be perpetuated [methodological operation as revolutionary operation]

LI LI p. 83 why did Descartes have to prove the existence of God twice? ][3rd and 5th Meditations?]

what does it mean to multiply/cite demonstrations/proofs of that beyond all substitution? God, exemplary case: unique, irreplaceable, both absolutely repeatable and unrepeatable

——[re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

——differance of stricture > the writing of God renders possible/impossible, serious/non-serious, strict/non-strict oppositions like “normal” & parasitic

TN TN p. 12 to say Psyche, essence, is extended [Freud], would raise (se lever) Descartes from his tomb

p. 31 feeling oneself feel is not corporeal but spiritual for Husserl & Descartes

pp. 39-40 acc. Nancy, Kant knows nothing about what links body/soul, points finger at Descartes for pure speculation

p. 140 Descartes’ stick of the blind: 6th sense

AD AD p. 48 Charles Péguy refers to Descartes as the “French knight”

p. 59 Levinas compares his illeity to unimpeachable witness in Descartes’ 3rd Meditation

BSi BSi pp. 148-49 for Descartes, bêtise would occur btwn infinite will & finite understanding; the excess, disproportion of will (freedom) over understanding leaves abyssal/vertiginous possibility of bêtise

OG OG p. 98 (147) Descartes drove out sign, Hegel reappropriates sensible sign to movement of Idea, but only Rousseau dealt directly w/ reduction of writing

p. 351n Rousseau & Descartes [Aristotle too]: our senses never deceive us, only our judgments

EU EU pp. 17-8 the 3 orders (not equally divided, nor can they be discussed apart) that impacted Descartes’ decision to write in French: 1) reinforce establishing of French Law 2) pedagogical facilitation (for women) 3) link btwn philosophical system & some language

p. 18 [vis-à-vis Descartes] link drawn btwn using vulgar language and “facility” for women

p. 19 in 1644, Courcelle’s Latin translation of Discourse of Method doesn’t include Descartes’ “I am speaking French” > when “original” speaks its language by speaking of its language, it prepares a suicide by translation, suicide by fire: almost w/out remainder [tells us about idiomaticity in general]

pp. 25-6 Descartes wrote in vulgar language because he worried the untrained mind would be too tempted by skeptic method of Latin, its schooling, wanted to facilitate a vulgar “facility”

——yet, one must pass through skepticism to escape dogmatism of sensualism, natural “imbecility”

p. 26 [moral image of thought] acc. Descartes, one shouldn’t just read, one must also meditate

pp. 27-9 Descartes and feminism: intelligible order has no sexual marks [cogito is “desexed,” w/out body, sexually neutral or indifferent]

——which is feminist: learn Latin? or be talked down to in vulgar language?

p. 30 for Descartes, universal language could only be proposed in land of romance [cf. OG pp. 77-8 (113-16)], while the reality of his vulgar language should be read like a romance

p. 34 Descartes: almost no more controversy if we could agree on meaning of words

p. 43 Descartes never a teaching philosopher, a professor, never civil servant in State university

FV FV p. 471n Lacan reconstitutes Cartesian certainty, capturing in this chain (Descartes–Hegel–Husserl) Heideggerian motions which are allergic to it—rigorously speaking

DESERT [fixerup]

MONL p. 72 Derrida has the illusion he cultivates his own desert, whereas a hostage’s place was reserved for him, as a summons (mise en demeure)

FK p. 47 the island, the Promised land, the desert [see p. 55 most extreme ecstasy, abstraction], absence of horizon: “emergence of event punctures every horizon of expectation”

p. 48 via negativa prescribes esoteric insularity of desert

p. 55 before “link” or religare (man to god), desert (nocturnal light [see HLP p. 28 specter as penumbral light]) as the most anarchivable, the holding back, Verhaltenheit, responsibility of repetition in wager (gage) of decision or affirmation (re-legare), a fiduciary “link” before all positive religion: “messianic,” or “chora”

p. 57 desert of desert: where foundation loses very trace of itself in the desert, and religion can only begin again [quasi-automatically, machine-like, spontaneously]

——khōra, place of absolute exteriority, and place of bifurcation btwn 2 approaches to the desert > [Derrida links Platonic, Plotinian epekeina tes ousias to Christian act of birth]

——desert of desert can’t be reduced to via negativa of Graeco-Judaeo-Christian tradition

p. 59 khōra, secret, desert of the desert (last desert, before the first), neither a threshold nor a mourning, btwn event and possibility, or virtuality of the event, not the desert of revelation

——a khōra w/out faith or law, an utterly faceless other

H p. 89 “language is also the experience of expropriation, of an irreducible exappropriation” makes us all wandering Jews, mother tongue is the tongue of the other [universalizes election], desert in all of us

SPOM p. 33 good conscience loses chance of abyssal desert, “desert in desert,” chaotic desert as open mouth, coming of other (messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy) [see p. 209]

HASD pp. 30-1 a negative theology & its ghosts in a tradition neither Christian nor Greek? i.e. what of Jewish, Islamic negative theology? question resonates in internal desert, certain void

VM p. 82 Levinas makes us tremble, from the heart of the desert, a thought which makes us dream of dispossession and dismantling

S pp. 109-10 Nazism was not born in a desert but in a black European forest, world of spirit, culture (religions, philosophies, economic structures, religious/academic institutions)

POOF p. 33 that which is empty resembles that which overflows: plus de sens, desert mirage effect

pp. 155-59 from afar, from on high, the political is an inhabited desert w/ not a woman in sight, are sisters just species of genus brother [‘Dear Brother Jacqueline’]? is she the absolute partisan, absolute enemy of the theory of the absolute enemy? > Schmitt’s phallogocentric neutralization of sexual difference, a sealing away (sous scellés), a house arrest, vigilance of the frightened watchman (de guetteur apeuré): the political is genderless

pp. 241-42 [offering quasi-summary of HERP] moment that originary [Heraclitean] phileîn (accord, favour, solicitude Gunst) becomes jealous, nostalgic tension ‘determined by Eros [órexis]’: the step to philosophy, prepared by sophistry [Plato, Socrates] > is the strange voice of the friend, an ontological call [prior to subject, consciousness, even to Mitsein? see p. 243], interior & w/out, the “what is…?” of philosophy [?]

SH p. 45 desert: where no one would be left to bless the ashes

EJQB p. 66 site of freedom whose cult is not necessarily pagan, not an enclosure, ghetto, site of exclusion: when a Jew proclaims the Site, not a declaration of war, site is not empirical/national, it is immemorial, a future too, tradition as adventure > freedom granted to nonpagan Land only if separated from freedom by Desert of the Promise (Land keeping itself beyond proximity)

——poem: promise of the desert [?]

pp. 67-8 writing (originally) as secondary, hermetic: displaced on broken line btwn lost & poisoned speech [re: God’s silence, repentance, broken Tables]

——separation of life & thought: infinite anchoritism (writing as moment of Desert, Judaic experience as reflection)

p. 69 nemein: common root of division, naming, nomadism > nomadic Jew struck by infinity & the letter in the desert

——Nietzsche: the poet “hides deserts w/in him”

***——poet or Jew: protects the desert that protects his speech (can speak only in desert), his writing (traced [sillonner] only in desert) > invents unfindable/unspecifiable pathway (un chemin introuvable et inassigné) > dont aucune résolution cartésienne ne peut nous assurer la droite ligne et lissue

EL p. 197 desert, verge of the abyss, place w/out place (lieu sans lieu), improbable border

——does Scholem want shibboleth to get out of abyss (the improbable border, the desert) or to rush into it & be engulfed by it (pour sy engouffrer)?

OG p. 196 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] transgressing space, mastering exteriority (the inanimate), arts of space carry death w/in themselves—painting, often dead, carries you to depth of desert; voice, song, more alive [?]

DESIRE

GOD p. 14 Plato’s responsibility, or discipline, press one secret to work in service of another, put the demonic secret of Eros to work in this new hierarchy

p. 149 desire engenders fault, it is the failing itself [of God]

p. 150 story of flood, of Noah, hesitate forever btwn justice & perversion: God won’t forgive himself for the fault in man, for man’s desire, regrets his creation

GT p. 4 [re: Madame de Maintenon (Maintenant)] desire as desire to give what one cannot give, pour le pouvoir de donner

p. 8 why desire to interrupt circulation of circle, why desire the gift?

p. 31 even if gift is a simulacrum, il faut (one must) rendre compte (render an account) of the possibility of this simulacrum, and render account of desire to render account > can’t be done w/out principle of reason (principium reddendae rationis)

——which law obligates one to answer for, to account for, a gift that calls one beyond all responsibility?

p. 35 the alogos, madness, of rendering account (logos) of the atopos (the gift), desire to think the impossible, to desire, to desire to give the impossible: madness as given & desired forgetting

pp. 35-6 how could one desire a gift that is non-ambivalent? a gift that would not be pharmakon, poison, that would be good? how does one desire forgetting

p. 40 demand of gift/countergift, circulatory differance, requirement of restitution “at term,” delayed “due date,” thing itself demands gift & restitution

DESISTANCE

DST DST p. 196 perhaps désister marks nothing negative, perhaps dé- does not determine -ister (-ester, ist, est: exist, subsist, consist), but dislodges it radically (this aradical root -ister) [cf. LI p. 159n]

p. 197 désistance (2 typical experiences) is ineluctable: 1) il faut que cela arrive: in this case, the “I,” the free subject, anticipates/precedes, is constituted w/out or before, the ineluctable event that happens to me 2) constitutive desistance of subject: something began before me, I am late, a subject marked in advance by a pre-impression, imprint—deconstitution (“I” am not the supporting basis of this imprint): still, ineluctable not genetic programs or historical determination—those would be supplemental, late determinations of ineluctable

pp. 198-99 is it a law? Derrida’s choosing or compulsion to introduce a translation of an untranslatable [re: désistement]

p. 199 se désister (to renounce a [law]suit, a responsibility)

p. 315n Lacoue-Labarthe: subject in mirror is first of all subject in désistance, figure is never one, destabilizing division of figural (this muddles Lacan’s distinction btwn symbolic/imaginary)

p. 200 désistance—impossibility of consisting, [de]-constitution of subject

p. 201 désistancela juste démesure (precise inordinancy), strange measure (une étrange mesure)

pp. 316-17n Lacoue-Labarthe: désistance as a desertion [Derrida quotes a passage w/out usage of désistance] that is prior to any ‘self-possession’ (not mode of dispossession), (de)constitution of subject, can one think of loss re: what one never had?

p. 317n subject—nothing other than formation of movement of désistance

***pp. 212-13, 318-19n w/ both Lacoue-Labarthe & Heidegger, Derrida wonders about unity of unthought—couldn’t the unthought be désistance, & doesn’t désistance enforce an irreducible dispersion that disidentifies even a concept of a subject that exceeds the metaphysical one?

pp. 318-19n Derrida wonders if Heidegger’s insistence on Ort, Erörterung, a unique site of gathering, leaves un-thought désistance or dislocation, which might be thought itself [this torments Derrida’s respect for Heidegger, along w/ Derrida’s insufficient concern re: authentic thought]

p. 213 fold or abyssal redoubling: désistance is first of all the désistance of truth: truth never resembles itself, so it resembles mimesis

p. 214 truth never resembles itself, withdraws, masks itself, se désister (never ceases)

ester: “to appear, present oneself in court” [p. 319n Kahn’s translation of Heidegger] > désistance, a rupture, heterogeneity w/ respect to Wesen, estance, not Abwesen (absence), Unwesen (disorder), Entwesen (inessentiality): dé, not negative, marks nonbelonging to family of ester

***pp. 215-16 désistance brings to light anoia, not to be confused w/ madness though it can resemble it > double bind btwn 2 madnesses: 1) one of disintalling 2) one of reason, defensive stiffening (crispation) in assistance [Kafka], imitation, identification > madness against madness

p. 216 désistance: mimesis or its double, cela même quelle double et abîme (what it doubles & engulfs)— alētheia

p. 217 mimesis as désistance (w/out being it) is missed when one decides to identify it, one misses what it lacks and that this lack is not proper; Lacoue-Labarthe: mimesis ek-sists, better yet “de-sists,” infinity of substitution & circulation (must think of Nietzsche again)

pp. 220-21 désistance: one of the most demanding thoughts of responsibility > that the traditional categories don’t suffice places irresponsibility rather on the side of these categories: how can one assume responsibility in désistance, the responsibility of désistance itself?

p. 222 we are constituted by this rhythm, (de-)constituted by marks of this “caesuraed” stamp, rhythmotypy as divided idiom in us of désistance > no subject w/out signature of this rhythm

——rhythm: to think désistance as it is written

p. 224 Lacoue-Labarthe: [subject] ‘desists’ because must confront at least 2 figures (or one figure that is at least double) > destabilizing Lacan’s imaginary/symbolic

p. 226 the “loss (perte) of the subject” in Lacan calls for a suturing that obliterates désistance

p. 322n resistance to désistance is desire for assistance, paternal assistance, Oedipal help

unavoidable resistance to désistance as nonpathological inhibition, no rhythm w/out it, can say the same about the double bind (see p. 228 return to father, subject to law as inhibition, defense) [a safeguarding, a filiation, a subjectivity compelled by the caesura?]

p. 323n play of de- might belong to hyperbologic, belongs to and escapes its own series: “gift of mimesis,” “gift of impropriety,” not negative (dialecticizable)

——organizes/disorganizes what it appears to determine

DESTINATION

MC p. 345 “my lecture has not purely and simply missed its destination”

pp. 359-60 starting w/ the stoikheia (letter, trait, number, proper name) & its marking insignificance (re-markable insignificance), Derrida explains how a mark’s supposed identity, solidity of its stereotypy, its indestructbility/indivisibility requires difference/division

——ideal iterability allows every mark to withdraw from a context, in whole or in part, its insignificance allows it to continue to divide, proliferate identities, destinerring

MPM p. 100 writing, as an event of signature, a signature which can only promise itself in the sense that its destination is barred, impasse of aporia

ROP pp. 42-3 to say “we” when all alone, after the death of the other, is a common phenomena of destinerrance, of the letter’s never returning, une dérive interne, to which we have to return

——“we” modality of with, with the other, as guest, host, or parasite, we is always said by a single person, taking advantage, the one signs for the other (at the home of; apud, avuec, avoc, apud hoc)

TR p. 79 reader as judge, the addressee who decides on reception/address of post card, signature left to the responsibility of the other, reader signs at moment of arrival at destination, rather than at the origin, at moment of reading rather than of writing

CHOR p. 98 [cf. WBH p. 198] could femininity, however irreducible it may be, remain derived from or subordinated to question of destination or thought of gift?

DETOUR [fixerup]

GT p. 114 Derrida “apologizes” for long detour, explains that it marks the step of 2 men in “Counterfeit Money,” rhythm of every incalculable scene of the gift

FSW p. 198 difference btwn pleasure/reality principle: original possibility of economy of death, of detour, deferral

p. 202 for Freud, deferral, detour (Aufschub), death at origin of life [death drive?] defending itself against death via economy of death, the attempt to douse the pain of an original breach

PPHS p. 83 Vorstellung, delegate of and reference to the other, representative detour

F p. xlii cryptonymic translations, art of chicanery, judicial pettifogging, hidden doors, detours > seduces, discourages, fascinates, fatigues

WM p. 239 since, for Aristotle, mimēsis is not identity but gives us to see in action what is not to be seen in action, only in its resembling double, its mimēma, Derrida wants to leave open this energetic absence, this enigmatic division, the interval which makes scenes and tells tales

p. 241 for Aristotle, if metaphor, risk and chance of mimēsis, can miss the true, it is because metaphor must count w/ a determined absence [moment of detour]

——as moment of detour in which truth might still be lost, metaphor belongs to mimēsis, fold of physis, veiling, when nature has yet to re-find its proper nudity

p. 256n in response to Fontanier’s new “proper sense,” a violent catachresis, btwn figurative and primitive sense, Derrida says: when the middle is not a passageway of mediation btwn oppositions, the opposition is not pertinent > consequences are boundless

DIF DIF pp. 18-9 in Beyond Pleas…, difference btwn pleasure/reality principle is only differance as detour [if “only,” then not differance as relation to impossible presence?]

O pp. 26-7 le détour dune écriture dont one ne revient pas, dissemination: this question calls for restaging of arithmos, “counting” as “bad procedure,” and rereading the rhythmos of Democritus, which philosophy has never been able to reckon w/ (naura pu compter) > philosophy accounts for itself by rising out of, and then circulating w/in its speculative necessity, the [envelope of writing]

AFR pp. 91-2 after Condillac admits he had to take great detours, Derrida explains that the sign is the name of this detour, experience itself as detour, generation of suppléance to be retraced

PSSS pp. 271-72 Freud on indirect methods to combat war, ruse of detour (Umweg)

——Freud advocates submitting life of drives to Diktatur der Vernunft, a Utopia > indirect stratagem of Eros/Thanatos: contrary to the cruelty drive, though cruelty knows no end

pp. 273-74 Freud’s indirection, oblique, angular, mediating nonstraightness: not just detour, strategic ruse, continuous transaction—but a leap, interruption, an ethical step

p. 270 for Freud, force against force, deferred economy of force: makes right (passage from violence to law)

D p. 351 transformations of meaning hinge on certain squaring of text, obligatory passage through open surface, detour through empty square, around the column of fire

OG p. 10 (20) history and knowledge (istoria and epistémè) > detours for the purpose of (en vue de) reappropriating presence

p. 226 (321-22) for Rousseau, writing in North, cold, reasoning, turned toward death, tour de force, detour of force qui sefforce à garder la vie > history effaces vowel accent, extends power of writing

p. 308 (434) for Rousseau, le plein air—voice, nature, franc parler, absence of detour

CIR p. 135 foreskin & truth (detour/delay): question of knowing by whom by what the violence of circumcision was imposed

SPEC p. 269 Freud’s speculation, interminable detour (Umweg): quil décrit lui-même, écrit et désécrit, pas décriture [like Rousseau, Freud describes but doesn’t declare]

pp. 282-83 when master (PP) submits to the work of the secondary (RP), “submits” to its own lieutenant, addresses to himself simulated engagement via detour of institutional telecommunication—il s’envoie, il s’écrit, PP déchaine en lui lautre absolu > alterity more irreducible than alterity of opposition

p. 284 detour, Umweg, breaks open the path (frayage) > Freud does not interrogate the graphics of the différant detour for itself (can it ever be for itself?)

pp. 293-94 [re: Freud’s “speculative” writing] démarche of this writing, advancing w/out advancing, time of a detour, pas de thèse repeats itself: PP will not let anything be done w/out it, except repetition itself

——Wiederholungszwang (repetition compulsion) put in communication w/ death drive

p. 320 fort/da: scene of writing that Freud’s playing, plays itself, plays him

——detour of the télé, an entire chaine (network) [play w/ Television]

p. 349 Vorbilder (models), necessity of metaphoric detour whenever Freud doesn’t know what he’s talking about re: interminable band, contra-band, quantity of binding—so he uses rhetoric of code, message, envoi, postal network

p. 354 detour expanding immeasurably: Umweg of 1st Chapter [re: Freud’s Beyond…] secondary to absolute/unconditional Umweg > pas de détour always leads back to death, not a question of going (aller) but of coming back (revenir)—this is the passage

pp. 354-55 (the) Weg (is) Umweg, weg as adverb signifies “far away,” fort!, go away!

——race to death, exhausts couriers, witnesses, relays, from post to post

p. 356 partial drive: assists in death, return closest to oneself as if to one’s origin, senvoyer > in the pas de détour, organism guards against the other stealing death from it: to be the facteur of its death

FV pp. 437-38 Derrida on Lacan: circulation, acquitting of a debt, a proper place [not naive, empirical topology], detour from [woman’s] hole to itself permits signified to return to its origin—indivisible locality, signifier must never be lost, divided, fragmented

pp. 467-68 Lacan’s highly classical interpretation of mimesis: Dichtung as detour toward truth, more truth in fiction, fiction manifests the truth [i.e. for Lacan, truth is not a fiction]

DIALECTIC

KH p. 100 speculative dialectics inscribes mythic thought in a teleological perspective

——sublates mythemes into philosophemes: is and is not a logic of noncontradiction

pp. 100-01 mytheme, acc. Hegel, will have been a prephilosopheme promised to a dialectical Aufhebung > teleological future anterior resembles narrative while marking end of narrative fiction

OOG p. 58 what must be called the dialectic of protention and retention despite Husserl’s repugnance for that word

p. 143 movement of primordial temporalization (protention, retention) was, as every dialectic wants, a dialectic in to nondialectical (the Living Present, universal form of all consciousness)

SPOM p. 42 “multiple” and “at once,” the sign of contradiction w/out contradiction, of non-dialectical or “almost” non-dialectical difference running through every injunction

p. 78 logic of ghost, toward a thinking of event, exceeds binary, dialectical logic where effectivity or actuality (present, empirical, or not) is opposed to ideality (regulating or absolute non-presence)

pp. 160-61 spectral effect, for Marx, a dialectical position (Setzung) of the ghostly body as body proper > where Stirner sees 1st moment as spectral and 2nd as successful, interiorization, subjectivation (plus de vie) Marx sees a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality (plus de mort)

HASD p. 25 a dénégation prior to Freudian context, secret of denial, a negativity that de-negates itself, gives no chance to dialectic

MPM 138-39 the undecidable that resists non-dialectizable oppositions will bear name, maintain rhetorical relation w/ opposition, will have figure of opposition, be figurable, will always let itself by parasited by figure of opposition [thus staging of promise as act or position]

A p. 16 nonpassive endurance of aporia: condition of responsibility, neither dialectizable contradiction like Hegel, Marx nor transcendental illusion like Kant

PP p. 73 pharmakon is but a formula learned by heart, dead, rigid knowledge shut up (enfermé) in biblia, foreign to living knowledge and dialectic

p. 93 mimicry of Thoth prevents dialectics, an ironic doubling preventing fulfillment or eschatological reappropriation, he is never present, he invented play, his propriety is impropriety

pp. 120-21 Socratic dialectic as exorcism (training in dialectics), counterspell to free us from fear of death and power of sorcery that banks on such fear

pp. 121-22 (138-39) in Laws judge must introject, internalize the letter, grammata [tou Dephikou grammatos], into his soul; anamnesic dialectics, repetition of eidos, self-knowledge, self-mastery > a forgetting of childhood, exorcism of child, teaches child to speak

p. 122 what species of protection (amuntērion) is the dialectic? counter-poison that’s not antidote [?] > acc. Plato’s Stranger, 2 forms of artificial (poiein, protection), of the 2nd form: 1) antidote either human or divine 2) problēmata (shield, fence), either armaments or fences, fences (clôtures, phragmata) can be screens (alexētēria) or protections, finally garments, art of weaving: problematic space of protection

——[anamnesic] dialectic as antidoteness of antidote, passage btwn human & divine, before their division, also dialectic as science of sumplokē [see p. 67], art of weaving (tissage), if there are 2 sorts of texture

p. 123 dialectical inversion of pharmakon or dangerous supplement makes death à la fois acceptable and null > immortality of soul, acts like antibody, dissipates its terrifying fantasy, le pharmarkon inverti, qui met en fuite tous les épouvantails: origin of epistēmē, opening to truth as possibility of repetition, submission of “greed for life (epithumein zēn)” to law (king, father, chief, capital)

p. 124 eidos, truth, law, epistēmē, dialectics, philosophy: names of the pharmakon that must oppose to pharmakon of Sophists, the bewitching fear of death

——Socrates must listen to the Laws like they’re a phonic spell

p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

pp. 155 (179) Plato moves dividing line btwn presence and trace (ikhnos) to dialectical trace and nondialectical trace: good play and bad play

p. 166 [stranger (from Sophist) as first grammatologist?] grammar and dialectics can only be distinguished when truth is fully present, fills logos > but parricide in Sophist (impossibility of presence) establishes condition of discourse as diacritical principle of sumplokē

necessity of logos as necessity of parricide > absolute pre-condition crossed out by parricide at point of its arche-being—prevents difference btwn grammar and ontology

p. 167 transmission of dialectical mastery of pharmaka from father to son disrupted by family scene that constitutes & undermines passage btwn pharmacy & house

PAS PAS p. (47) no circulation, no dialectic, can close itself (se refermer) on (sur) a determinable quantity of forces

pp. (52-3) (transgressive, completely passive) pas enacts a crossing of border that leaves border unscathed (indemne): bord sans bord, w/out any dialectical reappropriation

p. (90) ne-pas, not negation brought to bear on a position or a negation, but on “singular undecidability of the approach of the other”—unable to go nearer or father: suffice to disable every dialectical schema

VP p. 59 [rare occasion where “dialectic” is compared to differance] “dialectic” opens living to differance, hiatus (of indication and signification) in pure immanence of lived-experience

S pp. 122-23n acc. Valéry, spirit is negative dialectics, “always says no,” and to itself, spirit opposed to life/nature [Nietzsche-like]

POOF p. 30 perhaps as non-dialectical passage from one to other that Aristotle can’t think, unable to endure contamination coming from what is beyond both antithetical values > Nietzsche: “Glaube an die Gegensatze der Werthe (faith in antithetical values)”

***pp. 217-18 via name ‘Aristotle,’ doesn’t dream of an unusable friendship survive? beyond fatal syntheses or reconciliations of dialectics [the worst?] > this inflexible hyperbole of philía is not some indestructible, rigid, resistant solidity, sa vulnérabilité légère ne donnerait prise à aucun retournement [via dialectics]: a politics that would break from the old, tired, tiring, exhausted history: la belle tentation of the book you’re reading

——one must resist the temptation to keep (garder) its chance, never let it become program, never a grounding on virtue of perhaps

TC pp. 246-47 dialectics is that which has finished all of us (nous a perdus), because it takes into account our rejection of it

——dialectics as economy of repetition, economy of truth, movement by which expenditure is reappropriated into presence [Being and dialectics? eternal repetition]

p. 248 following Artaud, Derrida describes a dialectic outside conventional Hegelianism > the indefinite movement of finitude, original repetition, origin of tragedy as absence of simple origin: dialectics as tragedy, only possible affirmation to be made against [Christian] idea of pure origin

PPHS p. 74 Hegel: in the dialectic a thing can have its cessation (Vergehen) by another, in another

p. 80 “is dialectics the resolution of the sign in the horizon of the nonsign, of the presence beyond the sign?”

SH p. 43 ellipsis, discontinuity, caesura, discretion cannot be sublated (aufgehoben) > no dialectic of sense-certainty can reassure the matter of archive’s safekeeping

——gift of the poem, and of the date: no dialectic

DS pp. 184-85 book is a dialogue or dialectic, our soul resembles a book when we talk to ourselves, a false dialogue, w/out voice, deficient logos [compare to Husserl’s Bedeutung]

p. 207 Mallarmé is more patient, subtle, discreet, efficient, does not suppress the double (make it dialectical, bringing us back to presence, to perception of the thing itself)

p. 211 dialectic is beginning and end of philosophy, Mallarmé marks it w/ his syntax at the point of its sterility [MOP] > a point that will be called, analogically, provisionally, undecidable

***p. 249 dialectical structure can’t account for graphics of hymen, is itself comprehended and inscribed w/in latter, separated from it only by itself, a simple veil that constitutes the very thing that tries to reduce it to nothing: desire

OS p. 38 dialectical negativity would just renew Hegel’s vulgar concept of time, retain an “other present,” and isn’t this already what Hegel wished to to > the question is of something tout autre

p. 54 [Hegelian] dialectics as simply a repetition of the [Aristotle’s] exoteric aporia, time becomes affirmation of the aporetic

ROP p. 4 Giusti: for Aristotle, art of dialectic is the exercise of dialogue w/ tradition [?]

pp. 18-9 royal weaver (le tisserand royal) of Platonic dialectic (then Aristotle, Hegel, Kant), belongs to order of ideational consciousness, cannot intervene to remove resistance of any sort

p. 27 a third path that breaks symbolic, dialectical pact (authority of the 3), that would not be a third path: the square as that which most radically resists, un dernier carré

OTO p. 18 Nietzsche: dialectic is a symptom of decadence, especially in Socrates

PS p. 173 for Foucault, “dialectic,” via rapid oscillations, makes this rapid movement [btwn example & essence] seem to disappear

O p. 5 no speculative dialectic of same and other can master “difference” (economy of mark-erasure, trace) because such dialectic always remains an operation of mastery

p. 35 avancer quil ny a pas de hors-texte absolu, ce nest pas postuler une immanence idéale > not an idealist/theological operation, le texte affirme le dehors, deconstructs & reduces predicates of speculative operation (appropriation of outside) to “effects”

p. 49n Derrida not disputing la raison elle-même, the one (masculine) libido—“why not?” > to stand on head [call for feminine libido?] would put back/leave in place truth of phallocentric dialectic

——signifier sublated in process of meaning (the signified) > Hegel’s dialectic

Gi p. 20 to interpret as negative forces [re: Heidegger’s essential properties of Dasein]: precipitate interpretation, dialecticize

DST DST p. 225 Derrida says that no dialectic can overcome (ne saurait venir à bout) double constraint, double law, that of knot & caesura, obligation & cut (i.e. rhythm) > but then wonders if double bind is too dialectical, so he thinks of an arrythmic gap, hiatus, caesura, another undecidable

un autre indécidable, the gap/hiatus in an undecidable derived from dialectical calculation/contraction, arrhythmic caesura as respiration of rhythm (this necessity awaits us) [pas, heartbeat]

***TR p. 118 Derrida not sure if Marx’s thought and his heritage can be reduced to dialectic (from which de Man would distinguish the eventness of the event)

EL p. 200 what if there were no third language, no metalinguistic referee, no language in general, no [originary] neutral language? > what if the dialectico-transcendental hypothesis is already a positivist naturalization/neutralization of the supernatural?

***HST pp. 362-63 “the entire contradiction” more than a dialectical one: each concept hospitable to an other that never was “its other” (dialectical contradiction): autodeconstruction in every concept undoes the grip, the violence of taking, Begriff, capture, comprendre, cum-capio

the difference btwn extending hospitality to one’s chosen other (integratable immigrants), and a tout autre (absolute surprise, madness of the concept of hospitality, atopos)

p. 394 Levinas: “I” does not endow itself w/ this [temporal] alterity: impossibility of dialectical time is impossibility of saving oneself by oneself (alone)

LI p. 53 permanence depends on dialectical opposition of presence/absence > differential structure of iteration escapes this logic

p. 116 antidialectical > too dialectical

TN p. 290 you, metronome of my heteronomy, you resist my dreams of a reappropriating movement of self-presence, self-consciousness, absolute knowledge, which is why I love you, so painfully, at heart of pleasure itself

——you break me from dialectic (which does not exclude it)

ATM p. 162 [re: Levinas’ sériature] cette reprise (this mending resumption) is the condition by which beyond essence keeps (garde) its chance [see p. 160] against the enveloping seam (couture enveloppante) of the dialectic or thematic

AD p. 22 how Levinas upsets (dérange) the dialectical affiliation of subject/predicate

p. 73 Levinas’ anti-Hegelian transcendental dialectic [?]

WOG p. 24 under the sign of difference (Foucault, Deleuze too), ‘We Other Greeks’ displaced/deformed (not reversed) an inherited dialecticism that had a Platonic origin before Hegelian, Marxist dialectic

p. 26 the remainder (of all ontology) and the contamination btwn tout autre and its regular reappropriation (economic redialectization) haunts all Derrida’s essays on the Greeks

p. 27 the non-discursive remainder, the resistance of the pharmakon, exceeds (is not only) the simulacrum or phantasm—whose repetition disorganizes dialectic

LG p. 240 [re: Blanchot’s La folie du jour] récit in récit > non-inclusive, so remote from dialectic that this structure inscribes dialectic in ellipsis of récit

OG p. 40 (59-60) for Saussure & Husserl, teleology of phonetic writing makes the crisis of nonphonetic writing psychological errors, these nonintutionisms exile from sense; for Husserl, unlike Saussure, empty formalism part of his teleology > dialectical use of negativity should force us to rethink crisis (crisis not a mere accident)

p. 246 Rousseau says what he doesn’t wish to say: graphics of supplementarity is not comprised in any dialectic (a concept governed by horizon of presence, eschatological parousia, parole pleine)

pp. 298-99 (421-22) though Rousseau doesn’t make “travail de la mort,” play of difference, & operation of negativity serve in dialectical accomplishment of Hegel’s truth w/in horizon of parousia > still, a horizon of infinite restitution of presence [in Rousseau]

IF p. 311 Flaubert like Mallarmé: inscribed in locus of philosophical exhaustion, simulacrum of dialectic, both expose its limits & impossibility > simulacrum that discredits oppositions (both mimic Platonic-Hegelian Idea while emptying it of its metaphysical/dialectic content)

EU p. 12 king: someone who makes you learn his language, in learning it, you countersign his force: power demonstrated through fact of translation > this is a paradigmatic event, not structural necessity of master-slave dialectic

——can only say “I want to speak my mother tongue” in language of the king

SPEC p. 270 dialectics acquits itself [allays uneasiness] of double, opposes mask to original “in person”

FV p. 475 acc. Lacan, the [full] speech which constitutes/forms the subject is forbidden to him > it speaks everywhere it can be read in his Being [this antinomy is very antinomy of the meaning Freud gave to unconscious]: true speech always operates through mediation of another subject, it is open to chain w/out end re: speeches in which dialectic of recognition is concretely realized in human community [?]

CHOR pp. 100-01 when sexual difference is determined by opposition, acc. Hegelian dialectics, destines sexual difference for truth—in order to erase/neutralize sexual difference [in masculine sex?]

DISINTEREST

POR p. 16 (148) new responsibility of community of thought w/out secured frontier btwn basic & end-oriented research (entre recherche fondamentale et recherche finalisée) > rethink community, institution, and all ruses, tâche infinie, de la raison finalisante > paths by which apparently disinterested research can by reinvested by all sorts of programs

PP p. 120 (137) [re: Socrates renouncing pleasure for truth] one must be careful, in symptamotological manner of Nietzsche, to diagnose the economy, linvestissement et le bénéfice différé sous le signe du pur renoncement, sous la mise du sacrifice désintéressé

P p. 44 Kant’s “letting-be,” disinterest, is not indifferent like Nietzsche thinks (Heidegger reproaches)

pp. 46-7 Kant’s disinterested pleasure (uninteressirten Wohlgefallen) a mise en crypte (a pleasing myself by putting to death what exists in as much as it exists); Nietzsche/Artaud: disinterest is supererogatory; Heidegger: pleasure is superfluous/insufficient

p. 49 via disinterest, nothing less aesthetic (sensory) than Kant’s aesthetic object

p. 130 beauty: w/out interest; sublime: counter-interest

DPi pp. 129-30, 132 Baudelaire: “abolishers of the death penalty—very interested parties no doubt”

p. 133 for Kant, DP inscribed in law (categorical imperative of penal law) in name of absolute, endless disinterestedness (is this a reactive moment of resentment?)

p. 140 the Latin interest: 1) finding oneself being btwn space larger than oneself 2) fiduciary calculation, surplus value, search for profit/capitalization, monetary or psychological economy

p. 140-41 does one [i.e. Nietzsche, Baudelaire] have right to find interest in a discourse that claims to be beyond it? > [Kant’s disinterest raises itself above the living, sacrifices the living]

——acc. Kant, absolute crime = DP, in sense that both are beyond value, thus not driven by interest of vengeance > but impersonal principle of jus talionis

p. 144 for Schopenhauer, aesthetics not a disinterest but an anesthetic

p. 180 for Kant, government has an interest in treating man as more than a machine, in a manner appropriate to his dignity; that is w/ disinterested interest, interest w/out interest > beyond any market price, any calculable interest, any pathological interest, treat him as an end in-itself

E p. 15 for Kant, “meditation on a disinterested pleasure…provokes a moral interest in the beautiful” > interest taken in disinterestedness

OG pp. 128-29 if Lévi-Strauss believes that writing doesn’t achieve “disinterest” of science, then he is not a scientist, a well-known pattern… [truth as theoretically infinite transmissibility has historical possibility only w/ writing]

CIR p. 188 if you knew, G., my experience of prayers, you would know everything, my “without-interest” in the depths of me, “I” is only misdirection—presumed crime I’m calling circumcision

p. 190 trying to disinterest myself from myself, destroying “I” before death comes to meet it

DISPATCH (ENVOI)/ SEND

KH pp. 122-23 [kind of Plato/Socrates Envois motif] Egypt tells childish Athens that it lacks the writing which it possesses, but whose invention Athens played the role of model

GOD p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

R p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

p. 36 because of undecidability linked to autoimmune logic, can never “prove” whether it’s more democratic to include/exclude immigrants, vote/not vote directly, both protect democracy through some exclusion, some renvoi

ROP p. 64 in EN, in interminable conversation w/ Lacan, Derrida thinks contingency, singularity, event, tukhē, which is also a thinking of death, whose signifier would be the phallus

Gii p. 62 end of text, in French, sometimes chute or envoi [re: whether Heidegger’s gathering has ever taken place]

PIO pp. 10-1 Ponge’s “Fable”: poetic performative, describes/carries out, on same line, its own generation; telling & told are undecidable, its constative is its performative (not content w/ announcing, it’s located ironically in evangelical tradition, reveals/perverts structure of envoi)

***C p. 246 send oneself [TN. senvoyer, “get landed w/,” “make it w/”] the remainder, that’s (the) desire, and its impossibility

LI p. 32 dispatch should have been signed, which I do, and counterfeit, here, where? [Remark at end of SEC, also see GT]

pp. 47-8 absence of receiver from sender is possible not necessary, but this possibility is a must, is a structural necessity > possibility of an absence always inscribed, necessarily inscribed as possibility

pp. 48-9 structural & essential, iterability is at work in all facts, each mark divided or multiplied in advance > a more powerful “logic”—graphics of iterability undercuts classical opposition of fact & principle (le droit), factual & possible (virtual), necessity & possibility

——iterability disrupts presence, unity of ego in sender, du maintenant-écrivain (grasping w/ 1 hand his ballpoint pen) > stigmè of every mark already split

EW p. 260 Derrida’s “subject”: a place or non-place in a text, an instance (w/out stance) for some “who,” a “who” besieged by problematic of trace and differance, of the je[c]t as destinerring of missive

CIN p. 42 the totally incinerated envois could not be indicated by any mark

ATAP p. 86 write and send, voice comes from behind John Patmos: transmits a message already transmitted, testifies to a testimony > so many on telephone line

p. 87 John Patmos (1: 2–3) “the joys of the reader, of the hearer/of the words of the inspiration/for those who keep what is written/yes, the time approaches”: angelic structure, condition of all marks, time, experience, writing, trace > “apocalyptic” writings: exemplary revelation of this transcendental structure

——do not know to whom apocalyptic envoi returns, perhaps not even man is the terminal of this computer w/out end

p. 91 destinerrance: bastard apocalyptic filiation

IF p. 310 messenger, translator, facteur (letter carrier)

CIR pp. 199-200 impossible to follow my trace, like that of Aids, I only write destinerrancy of desire, you try to calculate itinerary of texts which don’t explode immediately, nothing but fuse

EU pp. 221-22 thought of sendoff (envoi), dispensation or gift of being: one of most powerful/singular attempts to think history/structure of onto-theology: Shickung, Schicksal, Gabe, “es gibt Sein,” “es gibt Zeit” do not seem to belong w/in onto-theological philosophemes

SPEC pp. 273-74 performance of psychoanalytic theory: “in the theory of psychoanalysis…” [compare to Rousseau’s Confessions: singular performance] > Freud gave his coup denvoi, his singular certification: Freud seems to contract only w/ himself

p. 274 the contractual institution that permits one to say “je-nous” > Freud’s signature engageant et représentant tous les tenants de la théorie: ça marche et fait marcher comme ça [is Derrida speaking about himself too?]

pp. 282-83 when master (PP) submits to the work of the secondary (RP), “submits” to its own lieutenant, addresses to himself simulated engagement via detour of institutional telecommunication—il s’envoie, il s’écrit, PP déchaine en lui lautre absolu > alterity more irreducible than alterity of opposition

p. 339 “il senvoieet la poste fait suivre, elle ne donne ni ne demande jamais dacquit définitif pour le solde du mandat” [sends himself w/out acquittance to meet the balance]

p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

——document is ciphered, will remain secret if author dies before “his own (les siens),” all “his own” will be those who believe they can decipher the will (testament) of this code

p. 355 [vis-à-vis Freud] pas de plus > deux temps of drive: 1) conserves 2) insures path to death, pas de mort, organism arrives by its own (internal) step at death (eigenen Todesweg): senvoyer the message of one’s own death

p. 356 partial drive: assists in death, return closest to oneself as if to one’s origin, senvoyer > in the pas de détour, organism guards against the other stealing death from it: to be the facteur of its death

pp. 356-57 but S is never P [re: Freud’s death drive], since heterology is involved, there’s force & thus legacy, sending, envoi: the proper is not the proper

DISSEMINATION

GOD p. 96 dissemination as “that which doesn’t come back to the father,” Abrahamic Renunciation (expecting neither response nor return)

GT p. 48 what is the consensus on the basis of which an implicit linguistic contract permits us to understand one another, to credit each other when we speak of gift? what if we renounced this question for a play without postulate/prescription, a certain concept of dissemination?

R pp. 14-15 how can we reconcile the turning unity, autos = ipse, the One, the homogeneity of democracy with its heterogeneity, dissymmetry, disseminating multiplicity

MONL p. 26 dissemination, form of thinking of the unique, not the plural

H p. anne 148 disseminating logic of death: because it can be manipulated by everyone, easily?

AF p. 84 spectral motif of archive stages disseminating fission, from which the archontic principle and concept of archive suffers

LOBL p. 115 the suspensive arrêt arrests the decisive arrêt and vice versa, the arrêt de mort arrests the arrêt de mort, arrhythmic pulsation of title [Blanchot’s] before it scatters like sand, in stopping (sarrêtant) (as arrêt), it gives movement, sets in motion [prime mover]

p. 121 death sentence, instant as elusive as last grain of sand in hourglass, death as result of dissemination of rhythm of life w/ no coup darrêt, unbordered/unbounded arrhythmy on beach that’s continuation of a sea: her pulse “scattered like sand”

pp. ~171-72 think exteriority from angle of economy of the arrêt: greatest “bound” energy, bandée, tightly gathered around its own limit (Hemmung, Haltung) > immediately disseminated, sand, empty, unloaded, spontaneously: in trance of trans, ghosts, transes, folies du jour (cf. Glas on trépas, trans/partition [Derrida’s referring to Genet crossing national borderlines])

SPOM p. 172 who’s head of the head (larchi-specter, le fantôme capital) when ghosts are disseminated everywhere? qui mettre en tête parmi tous ceux quon se met en tête?

BL p. 209 hymen of the law, its entry (Eintritt): ante portes (place of premature ejaculation), place & non-place: the adjournment ’til death of child is either premature ejaculation or non-ejaculation: no ejaculate w/out relation to the law [Lacan] > tabernacle empty, dissemination fatal

SEC p. 310 dissemination ≠ polysemia

p. 320 Husserl’s “green is or” still example of agrammaticality: a mark can be cited [is legible?], written, function cut off from “original” meaning > can engender infinitely new contexts

p. 329 semantic horizon exceeded or punctured (crevé) by dissemination not polysemia

EM p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (lespace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being), “an alternative always suspended over its ‘own proper’ abysm”: it is the text of dissemination

PP p. 149 Plato prefers one writing over the other, a good writing over bad, a fertile trace (endgenders w/in) over a sterile one (une semence dépensée au-dehors en pure perte, risk of dissemination)

p. 161 la khōra est grosse de tout ce qui se dissémine ici, inscription produces the son and at the same time the constitution of structurality

PAS PAS p. (93) dissemination does not play w/ the multiple, plural, dispersion, the apart (épars), but with the unique, the unique and itself

T p. xviii(n) tympanum, Dionysianism, Ariadne’s Thread, labyrinth: the bloodiness of a disseminated writing violates embouchure of philosophy, contact w/ another code, a unique event, unreadable as such, inaudible, btwn earth & sea, w/out signature

p. xxi(n) this ecorchè (destroy the tympanum) (Dissemination too was to “skin the ear”), brain dissection, burnt head > pursues deconstruction of triangulocircular structure (Oedipus, Trinity, Speculative Dialectics)

WM pp. 247-48 via Aristotle, univocity (one meaning per noun) is telos (essence) of language, there is only finite polysemia: a nonmasterable dissemination (an irreducible polysemia) is not even a polysemia, it belongs to what is outside language, and thus outside humanity

DS p. 178 what ruins the “pious capital letter,” the aplomb of the heading: the blanks, ordered return of white spaces, measure & order of dissemination, law of spacing, rhythmos, invisible fleuron

pp. 203-04 out of sight (a perte de vue): hymen & dissemination > une entaille y est marquée, qui ouvre encore sur un autre texte et pratique une autre lecture, lanalyse en serait infinie

p. 216 casting aside (mise à lécart) of being defines/imprints itself in dissemination, as dissemination

pp. 257-58 each “full” white thing in Mallarmé (snow, swan, paper, virginity) is trope of “empty” white space, constellation of “blanks,” there everywhere, reproduced in spacings > la disséminaton des blancs (nous ne dirons pas de la blancheur)

p. 262 if no thematic unity, hermeneutic concept of polysemy must be replaced by dissemination

p. 266 hymen will have always disseminated: SPERM, burning lava, milk, spume, dribble of seminal liquor

p. 267 a bo/lit [TN. abolishing: reading, sleeping]: la dissémination y écume assez le vol dune semence, perte blanche et vaine où le mât, pour qui le lit, sabîme en perdition de voile et denfant

——Mallarmé: poets’ nightly emissions ought to be milky ways, not shameful stains

p. 268 quasi-meaning of dissemination, impossible return to rejoined unity or meaning, dissemination affirms always already divided generation of meaning—le laisse davance tomber

p. 268n neither castration nor dissemination can become originary, central signified, dissem. represents affirmation of this nonorigin, it entails, relaunches, “inscribes” castration

p. 269 dissemination, fold of hymen, somber white of cave or womb, au noir sur blanc du ventre, lieu de son émission éparse et de ses hasards sans retours [scattered emissions, chances, w/out return]

p. 271 dissemination in the folds of the hymen

p. 275 Mallarmé: plus jeplumeplume jeplume jet [jai]

P P p. 95 what is beautiful is dissemination, pure cut w/out negativity; negativity is significant; adherence always connotes division, lack, negativity; beauty is not a signifier; the signifier: accounts for everything except beauty > a non-sterilized cut from fecundation: la semence serre

p. 146 glas et galactique du colossos, the bridge [tree?] over the abyss which threatens to swallow everything, interval btwn dynamic/mathematical sublime, on edge of which analytic of sublime is broached (sentame): whirlpool heaves/tears tree into la dissemence laiteuse (the question is the cipher writing on the surface of nature)

POS POS pp. 45-6 dissemination, seminal differance, explodes semantic horizon, not polysemia (which reassembles w/in totalizing, teleological dialectics), play on seme and semen: simulated common parentage, accident produces semantic mirage, deviance of meaning sets something off

——dissemination marks irreducible, generative multiplicity

p. 70 X as chiasm [btwn philosophy & literature?]: a fork (crossroads, quadrifurcum, grid, trellis, key) > more unequal at one point than other: figure of double gesture, intersection

——can be hastily thought of as thematic drawing of dissemination [cf. +R p. 166]

pp. 84-7 dissemination situates the more or less that resists effect of subjectivity, appropriation > disorganizes, marks writing of Lacan’s “symbolic”: la dissémination figure ce qui ne revient pas au père, affirms endless substitution, does not overlook duplicity, simulacrum [like Lacan’s “symbolic”?]

——possibility for a mark to “disembed” itself, “unsew-it,”that which is no longer integrated in “symbolic” > violence & unconscious effects of simulacrum

——cannot be reclaimed by imaginary, neither veil nor truth, signifier nor signified

——dissemination is play of castration w/out metaphysical/romantic pathos of negativity > dissemination “is” angle of play of castration, the graphic of the hymen

——dissemination via death drive links new concept of repetition to value of mimesis

ROP ROP p. 34 la restance disséminale, hyperbolythique, destined (vouée) to chance, to ash, à un oubli radical, trace w/out trace: secret w/out depth, lieu, nom, destination, lysis w/out measure/return/anagogy

——divisibility of letter, truth w/out truth of deconstruction, distinguished both from das geistige Band [Hegel], & Heideggerian Versammlung > divisibility of letter undoes link of debt, symbolic, name of father (motifs qui lien et se lient au triangle ou au cercle de la réappropriation)

——Lacan uses trinitarian figures to give firm consistency to a resistance supérieurement organisée > letter always arrives; here proceeds division btwn 3 & 4, btwn resistance bound up in repression & disseminal remaining, no longer belonging to economy of repression

p. 67 [quoting EN] difference “w/” Lacan: the lack does not have its place in dissemination

O O p. 6 first effect of dissemination: individuality & responsibility no longer predominate

p. 8(n) protocol of preface destroys future anterior > a gluing (kollon), praefatio, prae-fari, protokollon as formula, pharmacopoeia, begins (law of dissemination) doubled by a “facing,” divides/undoes inaugural pretention of first page: neither depth, nor surface, in or for itself, un bloc magique

p. 11 dissemination: generalizes theory/practice of graft w/out proper body, skew w/out straight line [?], bias w/out front [Nietzsche perspectivism?]

p. 21 effect of dissemination: lose one’s head, not know where it is

——semantic after-effect (après-coup) cannot be turned into teleological anticipation, soothing order of future perfect > dissemination disrupts circulation that turns after-affect of meaning into an origin [Marx’s commodity?]

***pp. 24-5 dissemination sets up a pharmacy, can’t count by 1’s, 2’s, 3’s — everything starts w/ dyad (not conflictual, hierarchical, dual oppositions)

——the 3 is no longer ideality of speculative solution, but the “effect” of a strategic re-mark > referring name of 1 of the 2 terms [in dual opposition] to absolute outside of opposition (marked once again in exposé of differance)

——two/four & the “closure of metaphysics” no longer take, never could take, the form of circular line enclosing a field, finite culture of binary oppositions

p. 25 [nonsynonymous synonyms] > never enclosed in finite taxonomy > no lexicon as such, can’t be pinned to a point, marks of dissemination, undecidable acc. 2 of binary opposition, not sublatable into 3 of speculative dialectics > displaced along angle of certain re-folding

p. 26 “la dissémination traitesur lit (doctors, reads, on bed)le point où le mouvement de la signification viendrait régulièrement lier le jeu de la trace en produisant ainsi lhistoire

——dissemination blows up (saute) security of point, arrested in name of the law: it is at the risk, to risk this blowup (to make this jump, faire sauter) that dissem. broaches/has been broached

pp. 27-8n dissemination illustrates act of appending (from one end to the other), outwork as hystero-colic sketch of appendix

***p. 33 dissemination written on back, tain of mirror, not on its inverted specter

p. 41n dissemination “threatens signification” [not “threatens castration”] [Medusa stone-phallus]

p. 42 [re: Maldorors 6th song, exit into the real] spider w/out web to spin, instant of awakening, instant of death

p. 43 dissemination: doesn’t simply place plural in effervescence > il sagite de la contradiction sans fin, marked by undecidable syntax of plus

p. 44 acc. X (chiasmus) (thematic diagram of dissemination), semen just as likely to get lost as seminal differance as it is to be reappropriated by sublimity of father

p. 45 business (laffaire) of old name, of onymism in general, of false identity of mark, which dissemination must disturb (doit perturber) at the root [re: “Mallarmé,” guise of homonymy]

p. 49n dissemination reads “female sexuality,” if you look closely, as a sort of womb (théorique par-dessus le marché, pour voir)

p. 52 dissemination also explains itself, “the apparatus explains itself,” constitutes itself into a program (heterogeneity, absolute exteriority of seed), but one that is not formalizable, infinity of its code, sa rupture, not saturated w/ self-presence: “it is attached (tient), so to speak, to the incessant falling of a supplement to the code

——[in field of dissemination] formalism no longer fails (néchoue) before empirical richness [like in Hegel?] but before une queue, dont le se-mordre [self-bite] nest ni spéculaire ni symbolique

***p. 53 “dissemination, soliciting physis as mimesis, places philosophy on stage and its book at stake (en jeu)”

p. 54 if we can question and think about formula of absolute knowledge, the “part” then is bigger than the whole, strange subtraction of a remark, dissemination would then constitute the whole as a totality-effect

p. 55 Derrida places logic of veil alongside that of corner > prelude, en passant, improbably place of dissemination

pp. 57-8 “la dissémination (se) produit (dans) cela : coupe de plaisir” > il rythme et le plaisir et la répétition selon une coupe multiple > il [text, literature, the beyond of the whole] imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

coupe claire, coupe définitive, coupe à tire et à aire [different ways to clear out trees]

TB TB p. 107 God’s disseminates the Sem [languages], dissemination is here deconstruction

Gi Gi pp. 17-8 translation problems not accidental or secondary, thinking of Geschlecht same as translation: French dis- translates (by means of transfer/displacement) German zer- (dissociation, distraction, dissemination, division, dispersion, Zerstreuung, Zerstreutheit, Zerstörung, Zersplitterung, Zerspaltung) [lexical swarm (essaim)]

——inner supplementary frontier splits lexicon again: both dis- and zer- have neutral, nonnegative sense

p. 19 Streuung (a dissemination, a multiplication, not a multiplicity), Zerstreuung the intensive determination of the former—how can it not be contaminated by negating fall in zer-?

p. 22 being-with does not arise from factical connection, a species-like unification (gattungshafte Zusammenstreben) “metaphysically presupposes” dissemination of Dasein, thus Mitsein

pp. 24-5 dispersion marks most general structure of Dasein > yet elsewhere dispersion and distraction characterize inauthentic ipseity of Dasein (Man-selbst)

p. 25 dispersion marked twice (same could be said for neutral): general structure of Dasein & mode of inauthenticity

PF PF p. xx reading: legare (distance, delegate) & legere (gather, collecting) [same etymology as law?], as [reading] ties together, it gives rise, out of fidelity, to dispersion, referral & send off, allegation > figures that risk proliferating alibis

D D p. 304 dissemination, germination, no first insemination, “primal” insemination is dissemination: a trace, graft, whose traces have been lost

p. 325 “I” as ghost, as germ, term, that disseminates, a germ that carries w/in itself its own term, se faisant fort de sa mort > le sperme: ferme

p. 342 column is nothing, no meaning in itself, a hollow phallus > guarantees innumerable passage of dissemination and playful displacement of margins

p. 350 polysemy multiplies w/in horizon of final parousia, temporary detours of lived passion, a signifying martyrdom of truth past or truth to come [thus, dissemination not polysemy]

p. 351 polysemy forgets its horizon is framed: difference btwn discursive polysemy and textual dissemination is difference itself

——seminal dissemination w/out having been or coming back to itself, carried out at at loss, unto death

pp. 351-52 column is not, passage of dissemination, “phallic” significance of column is a semic effect, reflection on 4th surface (described center, represented mastery of dissemination); “is”—procures calm, consciousness of ideal mastery > operation of 4th surface

——column has no being, belongs to no one

+R +R p. 159 polysemia or even dissemination drags Adami’s sentence far from any shore (rive), preventing any event from ever arriving (sarriver)

TN TN p. 12 Nancy’s partes extra partes, everything outside another outside; p. 14 fold of becoming-inside of the first outside, nothing but surfaces & outsides w/out insides: superficies of surfaces are limits, exposed to a touch that can only leave them intact, untouchable > irreducible disseminal divisibility

p. 224 Nancy links a dissemination of haptics w/ body’s technical character

p. 284 that which can’t be sublated, the dissemination of essence (of the One) > dissemination pluralizes any singularity that allows one to say “the” touch, “the” body

pp. 284-85 Nancy’s corpus as dissemination and body

WOG WOG p. 23n margin btwn polysemy & dissemination, an objection to Heidegger & Aristotle

CIN CIN p. 21 dissemination expresses in “il y a là cendre” what is destined by the fire to dispersion w/out return, pyrificiation of what doesn’t remain, and returns to no one

p. 37 incineration celebrates perhaps the nothing of the all, destruction w/out return, mad w/ its desire, desperate disseminal affirmation but also its opposite: “no” to the work mourning, “no” of fire > how to accept working for his Highness (monseigneur) mourning?

EU EU p. 124 Glas: generalized fetishism, pull of the discourse of castration toward affirmative dissemination [also continues pursuing project of grammatology, etc.]

SPEC SPEC p. 341 [focusing on Oedipus complex] as if one were pulling this nebulous matrix, w/ disseminations w/out return, by only one of its string (fils), where matricial mother would be only what she is > for what it means to write oedipally, cf. Glas, which concerns itself w/ only strings/sons (fils), with gash (balafre) and demi-deuil in affectations of proper surname

FV FV p. 444 dissemination threatens law of signifier & castration as contract of truth, dissemination entame unity of signifier, i.e. the phallus

pp. 485-86n when letter isn’t allergic to partition, linguistic unit (le sème) “phallus” wanders, begins by disseminating, not even disseminating itself [baby daddy]

DISTANCE

POOF p. 55 Nietzsche dares to recommend distancing (in code excluding it), separation, in a language of friendship, family, politics, state: affinity through distance

pp. 252-56 via Kant, responsibility (response, speaking, time) of friendship linked to respect (distance, gaze, space) > Kant links highest friendship to ‘moral law,’ to distance, repulsion, links love to attraction—if it’s a duty to intend toward dignity of ‘sympathy’ & ‘communication (Mitteilung),’ ‘ardour’, excess, of love can break equality while maintaining reciprocity > there must be outward signs, (external) testaments of friendship [?]

SP pp. 47-9 [re: Nietzsche’s “—Distanz!”] hyphen & exclamation mark invite us, by way of pirouette & play of silhouette, to keep distance from veils [woman] that make us dream of death

p. 49 not only keep your distance from woman, game of seduction, but woman as non-figure, non-identity, distance’s very chasm, interval’s cadence, distance itself [which can’t be said]

pp. 49-51 Heidegger’s Entfernung, de-ferment, distantiation of distance, veiled enigma of proximation, distance itself constituted by destruction (Ent-)

TB p. 132 translation, as holy growth of languages, announces messianic end, but sign of end only “present” in “knowledge of that distance,” Entfernung, remoteness

——can know this remoteness, not overcome it: fort/da (experience is translation)

REST p. 261 what is a pair in this case? a catastrophic question [?], the other is the catastrophe [?], the other is kept at a distance

p. 357 Da of Dasein (its proximity) lets distance of fort play w/in it

DST DST p. 229 Lacoue-Labarthe is at every instant as close & as far as could be from Theodor Reik > tells you everything you need to think law of this paradox (hyperbologic) [re: rhythm]

RM pp. 70-1 to state condition of metaphoricity nonliterally: withdrawal by which what is distanced (entfernt) in the non-near of proximity is withdrawn & sheltered

SPEC p. 325 if, for Freud, distancing is a quasi-complete game unto itself in the great complete game [re: Ernst’s fort/da], we were correct not to take the allegation of completion as coin of the realm (prendre pour argent comptant)

DIFFERANCE

GT p. 40 demand of gift/countergift, circulatory differance, requirement of restitution “at term,” delayed “due date,” thing itself demands gift & restitution

——la différance, qui n’(est) rien, est (dans) la chose même, elle est (donnée) dans la chose même, elle (est) la chose même, elle, la différance, la chose (même), elle, sans rien dautre, elle-même, rien [differance, the nothing in the thing-itself]

pp. 128-9 counterfeit money: heart of questions of reference and difference

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

R p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

p. 38 difference as deferral, as trace as gap (becoming-space of time, becoming-time of space) and experience of the alterity of the other: both in democracy

***p. 39 Derrida does not acknowledge a political turn or ethical turn [in his work]: thinking of differance always political, contour & limits of political, around enigma or autoimmune double bind of the democratic (not certain democracy a political thought through & through)

——every trace is a trace of democracy, of democracy there could only be a trace

***p. 84 im-possible (nonnegative) seizes me here and now, nonvirtualizable, what is most undeniably real and sensible (like the other, differance of the other)

***MONL p. 26 differance in relation to universal necessity (trauma, lesion), reality, scope of any férance

***FL p. 282 from instituting violence to preserving law/contract [modern democracies] > passage from presence to representation, acc to Benjamin a Verfall, forgetting of originary violence in this differance [Derrida doesn’t see this as accidental?]

LOBL p. 94 difference btwn archeaology and eschatology as differance in apocalypse, that will be a while in coming

p. 136 differance: arrêt de mort or triumph of life

pp. 136-37 survivre delays at once life & death, line of least sure sur-, no clear-cut opposition, living on like differance, beyond identity & difference > tele-phone, tele-gram only 2 modes of this teleography in which trace, grapheme, does come secondarily but marks telic structure a priori

****SPOM p. 37 [MOTHERLOAD] differance (irreducibly required by spacing of any promise) not only (as some believe naively) delay, postponement, retard, but also sans retard, sans délai mais sans présence, in which “here-now” unfurls (déferle), precipitation of absolute singularity (singular because differing, justement), pledge (perhaps before decision), uncompromising, unconditional

——differance > se liant nécessairement à la forme de linstant, dans l’imminence et dans l’urgence: même sil se porte vers ce qui reste à venir, il y a le gage

pp. 102-03 archaism, not bad in itself, more outdated than ever in ontopology it supposes, by tele-technic dis-location > this unheard of acceleration no less arch-originary than the archaism it has dislodged (déloge)

——local differance donne place et donne lieu, spacing of a displacement gives movement its start, stability, sedentarization depends on it > all national rootedness is in the memory of displacement

——not only time is “out of joint,” but space in time, spacing

p. 164 Marx opposes work [see pp. 161, 163] to Stirner's work of mourning, his hyper-phantomality, Marx determines differance or deferral as practical and as delay of reappropriation [he doesn’t eliminate death, expropriation, at heart of living—puts it to work?]

p. 170 difference btwn specter & spirit is a differance

p. 177 figures of death: differance of technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins in language, before language

BL p. 204 differance till death, for death, without end because ended [here we have an example of differance’s universalism: he’s talking about law’s differance, but it is exemplary?]

p. 205 law prohibits by interfering, deferring the “férance,” reference, rapport, relation > what cannot be approached is the origin of differance: the law of law (neither natural nor institutional)

HASD p. 9 differance and trace don’t arise from Being, from presence, even less from [negative theology’s] hyperessentiality

p. 29 trace as possibility of finitude, finite & infinite cause of trace appears secondary, an effect of trace or differance (which is finite insofar as it is infinite)

MPM p. 58 what if ontological difference is translated into rhetoric of memory? or vice versa?

p. 140 Heidegger protects agains abyssal risk of parasitic contamination, of an an-oppositional differance, thus risk and gravity of saying, “essence of technology is not foreign to technology”

SEC p. 315 absence of addressee, différance, must be brought to an absolute degree (to make writing possible), not reduced to a presence that is distant

p. 327 differance, “the irreducible absence of intention or assistance [due to iteration] from the performative statement, from the most ‘event-like’ statement possible” authorizes Derrida to posit general graphematic structure of every “communication”

PP p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

p. 167 disappearance, retrait of father’s face (good-sun-capital) is movement of differance, which opens to writing, which writing opens for itself, threatens hierarchical interiority of pharmacy

p. 168 differance at once condition of possibility and impossibility of truth, disappearance of any originary presence

VM p. 129 differance, difference btwn same and other, is not valid in Levinas’ infinitely other (where peace would not even have meaning)

——for Hegel (against Levinas), difference btwn same and other has no meaning in infinite, except to speak of anxiety of infinite which determines & negates itself > violence in horizon of infinite is that where differance is no longer valid, where peace would no longer have meaning

VP p. 58 possibility of re-petition in its most general form, the trace in the most universal sense, inhabits pure actuality of now and constitutes now via differance

p. 59 [rare occasion where “dialectic” is compared to differance] “dialectic” opens living to differance, hiatus (of indication and signification) in pure immanence of lived-experience

***pp. 70-1 [commentary > interpretation] auto-affection as voice assumes a pure difference dividing self-presence, makes reduction of world, space, impossible; yet, must pass through reduction “in order to recapture difference in closest proximity to itself”: in closest proximity to movement of differance

——movement of differance produces transcendental subject

p. 75 supplementarity is really differance, differance must be thought prior to separation btwn deferral (différer) as delay and differing (différer) as active work of difference > differance is unthinkable through consciousness, starting from presence, and is not simply its opposite

p. 85 differance as difference btwn ideality and non-ideality

p. 87 Hegel seems more radical than Husserl in that he demands thought of positive infinite, so that “the indefiniteness of differance may appear as such

——Hegel’s criticism of Kant would hold for Husserl; but since ideal, infinite differance only appears in relation to my-death, appearing of infinite differance is finite, the infinite differance is finite

p. 88 once presence in absolute infinity (unity of concept, logos, and consciousness in a voice w/out differance) appears to itself as its own death, this history is closed

——une voix sans différance, une voix sans écriture est à la fois absolument vive et absolument morte

——differance thought prior to or from presence tells us to interrogate presence w/in closure of knowledge > it must also be thought otherwise: dans louverture dune question inouïe nouvrant ni sur un savoir ni sur un non-savoir comme savoir à venir, approaching that on basis of which sa clôture announces/decides itself: openness of this question doesn’t belong to system of vouloir-dire

pp. 88-9 could differance (supplement, sign, writing, trace) be more ancient than the originary?

——nothing will suspend it w/ security (rien assurément ne la suspendra)

FSW p. 198 differance, pre-opening of ontic-ontological distinction, & of all the differences which furrow (sillonnant) Freudian conceptuality

——differance & identity, differance in economy of the same

——archi-trace, differance, neither Freudian nor Heideggerian concepts

p. 203 “no doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, differance”—but there’s no life present at first, life is trace so we can say life is death

——Freud [of Beyond…] complies w/ dual necessity: differance at origin, crossing-out concept primariness > delay is in the beginning

——differance as non-originary origin, erases myth of origin, determined outside teleological/eschatological horizon [horizon key word here]

TC p. 333n only way to indicate anti-Hegelianism, not pure difference but difference outside Being as presence, difference as original impurity, differance in finite economy of the same

FWT p. 21 what is universalizable about differance: allows one to think differentiation beyond every kind of limit, there is differance wherever there’s living [not just human] trace, a relation of life/death, presence/absence > spacing, not an essence, not a (dialectical) opposition, inscription of same that’s not identical, not frozen/fixed [also a meditation on signifier/signified, Saussure]

p. 40 differance is at once: the same (living being, but deferred, supplemented by technology, prosthesis) and the other (absolutely heterogenous, wholly other, death, irreducible, untranslatable); ——differance can both interrupt laws and introduce economy of new configuration into living being, it can both be reinscribed in economy of the same and opened to excess of tout autre

——differance appears by leaving a trace (it may not appear as such, it never does)

pp. 173-74 Freud’s grand entities (ego, id, etc.) & Lacan’s grand conceptual oppositions (real, imaginary, symbolic) are too solid, substantialized—differance erases/displaces their borders

OS p. 67 differance as a difference older than Being itself, a still more unthought difference than difference of Being/beings > leads to a writing that exceeds all dialectics, w/out history, cause, absence, presence, archia, telos

P pp. 80-1 le se-protéger-de-oeuvre (ergon), énergie captée, bordée, condition for mastery of PP, self-protection of energeia > energeia not as pure, total presence (prime mover), but as (par)ergon against what’s lacking in it, lack not as a substantial emptiness, but as impossibility of arresting differance in its contour, in a pose, of localizing lack, like metaphysics does, in its proper place: castration as truth > whether parergon borders (works against) free energy or essential lack, the 2 determinations sont le même (métaphysique)

POS p. 8 the a of differance perhaps signifies production of sign (signified/signifier): the mute intervention of a written sign found in all discourse

——delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving

——never preceded by originary/indivisible unity of present that could be reserved as an expenditure calculated for reasons of economy

——differance is the general structure of economy, it is the economical concept

——what defers presence (its trace, its representation) is basis of its announcement or desire

pp. 8-10 differance:

1. deferring by means of delay

2. that which produces different things, differentiates, the root of all oppositional concepts

3. the production of these differences: diacriticity (neither structural nor geneticist)

4. the unfolding of difference, in particular (but not only or first) Heidegger’s ontological difference

p. 9 differance common root of oppositional concepts, as common root, is also element of the same (distinguished from the identical [Heidegger]) in which oppositions are announced

pp. 26-7 gram as differance neutralizes phonologistic propensity of “sign,” liberates “graphic substance” > gram not an element, interwoven w/ traces of other elements of chain/system

pp. 27-8 differance incompatible w/ static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in concept of structure because of generativity (via transformation) of a of differance; production of differance not astructural (produces regulated, systematic transformations, even structural science), differance even develops most legitimate exigencies of “structuralism”

pp. 28-9 differance/spacing not preceded by present or in-different being, space/time deferral of present: elements take on meaning or signify only by referring to another past/future element in economy of traces; this economy is inseparable from more narrowly semiotic aspect of differance

——no author, agent, or master of differance

p. 29 all conceptual oppositions subordinate movement of differance to an antecedent presence of meaning, a “transcendental signified”

p. 99n a of differance, pyramid (A), tacit monument > for Hegel, body of sign compared to pyramid

pp. 40-1 if there’s a definition of differance, it’s the limit, interruption, destruction of Hegel’s relève, wherever it is

pp. 43-4 differance not Hegel’s difference of contradiction, which uses a third term to resolve, synthesize

p. 101n differance can’t be subsumed by logical contradiction > differance (process of differentiation) permits heterogenous modes of contradiction

p. 40 gathering Derrida’s work into a “sheaf,” historic/systematic crossroads, is structural impossibility of limiting network of differance, of putting an edge on its weave, not a master-word, always finds itself in others

p. 104n in calling attention to the productive nature of differance, one must also think the deconstruction of “production”

ROP p. 33 what always rejects analysis: nonsimple, origin under erasure, trace, or affirmation of gift as trace [differance as divisibility]

ATIA p. 104 mark, gramma, trace, differance refer differentially to all living things, all relations btwn living and nonliving

GSP p. 161 for Husserl, a confusion of value, and all types of idealities sheltered beneath category “historical”: w/ some precautions [Derrida’s], Husserl considers Weltanschauung a “provisional morality” > system of anticipation that precedes an absolute science

——Derrida calls the interminable delay of this theoretical foundation differance [thus morality, any anticipatory system, would be a response to this delay]

PS pp. 177-78 the “I” who hears becomes the “I” who speaks, stealing speech form the “I” who thinks he speaks and is heard in his own name: sintroduisant dans le nom de celui qui parle, cette différence nest rien, elle est le furtif: la structure du dérobement instantané et originaire sans lequel aucune parole ne trouverait son souffle [w/out Artaud’s valuation, this sentence affirms differance]

pp. 189-90 se laisser ainsi souffler la parole, cest, comme lécrire lui-même, larchi-phénomène de la réserve: abandon de soi au furtif, discrétion, séparation et en même temps accumulation, capitalisation, mise en sécurité aussi dans la décision déléguée ou différée > laisser la parole au furtif, cest se rassurer [tranquilize? give courage? reassure] dans la différance, cest-à-dire dans léconomie

pp. 192-93 for Artaud, furtive differance slipped in btwn 2 forms of writing, placing life outside the work, and making its origin (flesh) the epigraph, the breathless (essoufflé) sarcophagus of my discourse > only through writing made flesh, theatrical hieroglyphic, could double be destroyed

pp. 193-94 to call differance the furtive is to apply a metaphysics that produces this quality

O p. 6 direction or chain of the “metaphysical” can’t be opposed by concept, rather by process of textual labor, the movement of differance, which cannot be relevédisorganizes opposition

——differance not preceded by any identity, unity, origin, etc.

pp. 6-7n differance inscribes contradictions, is the critical limit of idealizing powers of la relève (Aufgehoben), which reduces contradictions to homogeneity of single model

p. 25 the 3 is no longer ideality of speculative solution, but the “effect” of a strategic re-mark > referring name of 1 of the 2 terms [in dual opposition] to absolute outside of opposition (marked once again in exposé of differance)

p. 50n seminal differance: not only the seed, but the egg

DPi p. 168 for Nietzsche, cruelty has no contrary—just different forms, values, intensities, only a differance (logic w/out logic of differance is a paradoxical economy)

CHM p. 62 vouloir-dire-lhyperbole not antagonistic to silence but its condition, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

REST p. 340 logic of detachment as cut (opposition, leads to suturing-sublation, maintains problematic of castration truth) vs. logic of detachment as stricture (is tout autre, interlacing of differance of [or as] stricture, no suture, haunting, neither empty nor full, largument-de-la-gaine, can’t accommodate the couple, ces coupes oppositionelles, the ghost leases, le, la, les double(s) band-)

PF p. xvi those who rush to confuse differance and alibi disavow that they are avoiding “thing itself,” which differance will never be; is differance a political alibi? an allegation destined to delay the deadline? no: w/out alibi is precisely a differance w/out alibi

LI pp. 49-50 differance as positive condition, as possibility > possible absences remark mark in advance, re-mark part of mark itself: supplement, mark, trace of presence-absence

p. 54 blinking, quasi-concept of “remainder” (repetition as differance)

p. 57 differance removes from itself what was written “in its name,” removes the proper name: changes itself into more or less anonymous multiplicity

p. 83 differance of stricture > the writing of God renders possible/impossible, serious/non-serious, strict/non-strict oppositions like “normal” & parasitic

p. 117 differance, iterability—not entirely words or concepts, must take classical discourse into account, accept logic of “all or nothing” > when one no longer does (via differance, mark, supplement…), must rigorously, pedagogically, explain why one changes the rules

——where the rigorous no longer depends on a binary logic: a more powerful discourse reinscribes “illusory” of “ideal purity” into a thought of its possibility

——thought, relation to other, “experience” of differance

p. 147 the play of differance makes “guardrails,” “doubling commentary,” possible & necessary; “doubling commentary”: a reading that is interpretive, inventive, or “productive”

p. 149 differance as nonidentity w/ oneself in process of determination > differance is itself nothing outside of determination, never comes to a full stop (not negativity, nothingness)

***TN pp. 229-30 anesthetic interruption in heart of aesthetic phenomenality, anesthetics very ecstasy at heart of pleasure, pleasure as differance w/out delay > plier, prier and invent substitutes, prostheses, fetishes, cultures, technics (all of “history,” before and beyond “hand of man”)

pp. 229-30 differance btwn 2 surfaces: condition of contact & originarily spaced opening that calls for technical prosthetics (makes it possible w/out delay)

EW p. 269 via “logic” of trace or differance, re-appropriation produces the opposite of what it aims for, thus ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man

p. 285 trace, iterability, mark, differance (possibilities or necessities) are themselves not only human

CIN p. 13 “il y la (là) cendres” [cf. POO p. 24 il y a là du secret], “there are cinders there, cinders there are” > losing equilibrium btwn eye & ear

OG pp. 23-4 (38) on (à) but not w/in (en-deçà) Heidegger’s horizon, being no longer transcendental signified but a determined signifying trace, “ontico-ontological” derivative w/ respect to differance

——differance can only be thought by passing through the ontico-ontological difference, a determination that gets erased by differance: this trick of writing (tour décriture) is irreducible

pp. 62-3 (91-2) unity of arche-trace’s double passage through form and imprint (empreinte) [re: path from Saussure to Hjelmslev, from phonic substance to formalism]

——the (pure) trace is differance, is the condition of sensible plenitude, an originary synthesis not preceded by absolute simplicity > w/out originary trace retaining other in the same, meaning could not appear

——differance is formation of form & being-imprinted of imprint

——differance does not exist, the never being-present outside plenitude > no science of this nonorigin

p. 68 (99) “God’s death” & “return to finitude” belong to onto-theology they fight against > differance something other than finitude

pp. 130-31 (190-91) Lévi-Strauss hypothesizes that primary function of writing is the enslavement of other humans, Derrida says yes, then describes how structure of society (castes, class, organs of capitalization, stocks), the origin of life in general, appears wherever it’s possible to defer (différer) presence, cest-à-dire la dépense ou la consommation, et dorganiser la production, cest-à-dire la réserve en général; he then adds [strangely] that the increase in differance [as proven by its extraordinary increase past few millenniums w/out change in organism] modifies life less & less as it spreads out (sétend): should differance grow infinite, a possibility excluded by its essence, would be God or death

p. 143 (206) differance, breathing space, finitude, death makes presence/absence possible: makes possible very thing it makes impossible, produces what it forbids [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]: non-satisfaction (inassouvissement)

——begins par entamer alienation, ends by leaving reappropriation entamée

perhaps Heidegger couldn’t read in Nietzsche the attempt to think differance prior to being (aka presence) > being speaks nothing other than metaphysics: even if thinking its closure

p. 150 (215) Derrida not looking for a truth signified in Rousseau but an engagement and appurtenance “qui enserrent dans le même tissu, le même texte, lexistence et lécriture”—same [text, tissue] is here called supplement, another name for differance

p. 183 (261) the dangerous differance, the master name of this supplementary series: death > metonymic substitution horizon & source, abyss from which each threat announces itself

p. 186 (264-65) Rousseau: nearer we are to jouissance, further from bonheur

imagination is differance of or w/in presence or jouissance

imagination alone has power of giving birth to itself, creates nothing: but receives nothing alien or interior to itself [khōra?] > other name of differance as pure auto-affection

p. 229 (326) Rousseau declares what he wishes to say: writing/articulation are post-originary malady; he describes what he does not wish to say: articulation (space of writing) at origin of language

——what he describes takes place for better or worse, annuls eschatology & teleology just as differance (originary articulation) annuls archeology

p. 268 local difference: differance btwn desire & pleasure

SPEC pp. 284-85 [vis-à-vis Freud] PP, RP, differance, the same divided, actuality only in the differance, detour, btwn PP & RP > pure pleasure & pure reality are ideal limits, fictions, one as destructive and mortal as the other

***p. 290 [for Freud?] no mélange of pleasure–unpleasure is possible, mélange is madness > though topical distribution [in Beyond…] is effect of differance, it retains differance in reassuring medium & in oppositional logic > principle of identity is respected by topology, division of sites

p. 351 tendency to stricturing (binding, mastering) foreshadows PP w/out being it, everything en différance de stricture > repetition itself > but there never is repetition itself > allure of this more or less tightened lace

p. 359 Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

p. 361 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] to guard one’s fashion, one’s rhythm, what counts is less telos than rhythm of differance, speed of the step: Zauderrythmus (differential rhythm)

p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

p. 408 beyond opposition, differance & rhythm

DIFFERANCE in

DIF DIF p. 3 differance: gross spelling mistake

——differance neither a word nor a concept, à la lettre > impossible (for essential reasons) to gather (rassembler) all usages of differance in a sheaf (en faisceau)

p. 4 the capital “a” of differance, a pyramid [A]; Hegel: body of sign is Egyptian pyramid > Derrida moves from pyramid to tomb, oikēsis > tomb of proper, familial residence, economy of death (this stone announces death of tyrant [cf. TN.]) [this tomb can’t even be made to resonate]

pp. 4-5 [re: differance] that pyramidal silence btwn “e” and “a” can only function in phonetic writing reminds us there’s no pure phonetic writing (functions by admitting nonphonetic “signs”: punctuation, spacing)

p. 5 differance that establishes phonemes, lets them be heard (les donne à entendre), is inaudible

——an order neither of sensibility nor intelligibility, can not be seen nor heard > [to see (theōrein) as understanding, to hear (entendement) as understanding]

——differance is btwn speech/writing, beyond the link that reassures us of the illusion that they (speech/writing) are 2

p. 6 if differance is [Heidegger’s Durchstreichung of Being], it reserves itself, never offered to the present: exceeds order of truth, not a hole in topology of castration [p. 21 differance is not]

——detours, locutions, syntax used to describe differance will resemble negative theology to the point of being indistinguishable > but there’s no superessentiality beyond

——differance is not, neither existence nor essence: inscribes & exceeds ontotheology w/out return

pp. 6-7 differance must be superseded, not considered arkhē of chain, thus not theological

p. 7 delineating differance is strategic & adventurous: 1) strategic: because no transcendent truth outside the field can govern (theologically) the totality of the field 2) adventurous: because this strategy has no goal, no telos, strategy w/out finality, blind tactics

——chain in which differance lends itself to nonsynonymous substitutions: reserve, arch-writing, archi-trace, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, margin-mark-march

***pp. 7-8 Latin differre has 2 meanings: 1) the common one, not identical, interval, spacing, allergic or polemical otherness 2) delay, relay, reserve, that which suspends fulfillment of “will”; Greek diapherein does not imply temporization, detour, delay

——strategically differance seemed most proper one [?] to think/master, though maintained w/in structural limits of mastery

——differance: defers itself more readily than other words

p. 9 differance, middle voice > -ance remains undecided btwn active & passive (i.e. resonance is not the act of resonating), neutralizes what infinitive denotes as active

——classically, sign is treated as deferred presence, as differance of temporization > sign is thus provisional, secondary > but Derrida is questioning this logic: to think originary differance, one would have to recognize origin, archi-, telos, eskhaton have always denoted presence: ousia, parousia

***p. 10 differance not included in concept of a sign, which has always meant representation of a presence

——[re: differance] Derrida in strict communication w/ Heidegger re: liberating question of Being from domination by present/now—but Heidegger is not exhaustive

p. 12 differance no more static than genetic, no more structural than historical

p. 13 [differance’s relation to trace] differance makes signification possible by assuring each “present” element relates to something other than itself, a trace of the future or past element

***——differance constitutes present in interval, constitutes present by dividing it > everything thus thought on basis of the present, in our metaphysical language, would also be divided (subject, substance, being, etc.)

p. 14 differance as radical, infinitesimal displacement of Hegelian discourse (while maintaining profound affinity)

***pp. 14-5 answer to “what is differance?” (w/out turning question back on itself) would reassert MOP

p. 15 if Saussure’s opposition speech/language is rigorous, differance would be play of differences w/in language & relation of speech/language, the detour, the silent promise I must make to speak (but differance forbids this essential dissociation: archi-writing before the letter)

pp. 16-7 system of differance no longer tolerates oppositions passive/active, indeterminate/determinate, cause/effect > consciousness as “effect” or “determination” w/in system of differance: strategically, one continues to operate acc. lexicon one is de-limiting

pp. 17-8 before Heidegger purposely and radically questioned presence, Freud & Nietzsche did so, and, remarkably, they did so via motif of differance [remarkable :)]

——Nietzsche: “difference of quantity is the essence of force, the relation of force to force” > “isn’t all Nietzsche’s thought a critique of philosophy as an active indifference to difference, as the system of adiaphoristic reduction or repression?”: this doesn’t exclude that philosophy lives in/on differance

——if we were to think not the erasure of opposition but why each term must appear as differance of the other [long list of classical oppositions: i.e. physis/mimēsis] > we see announced sameness of differance and repetition in the eternal return

——differance as “active,” as Nietzsche’s incessant interpretation, system of figures not dominated by value of truth

p. 18 “Freud’s diaphoristics”: Spur and Bahnung in Freud: inseparable from differance, no breach w/out difference, no difference w/out trace: movement of trace, in Freud, a protection, deferring danger by constituting a reserve (Vorrat) > each of Freud’s concepts a detour in economy of differance

pp. 18-9 in Beyond Pleas…, difference btwn pleasure/reality principle is only differance as detour [if “only,” then not differance as relation to impossible presence?]

p. 19 Derrida well aware of evidential calculations that will dismiss illogicality of differance, their necessity, function, is part of differance > rigorous, “scientific” relating of restricted economy (takes no part in expenditure w/out reserve) & general economy (keeps nonreserve in reserve)

——this “scientific” relating: a relationship btwn a differance that makes a profit on its investment, and a differance that misses its profit, la mise de la présence pure et sans perte se confondant avec celle de la perte absolue, de la mort [pure presence and pure loss merge w/ each other]

p. 21 Levinas’ trace, enigma of absolute alterity (a past never present), solicits domination of beings (w/in these limits, differance implies Levinas’ entire critique of classical ontology)

——cannot think trace (therefore differance) on basis of presence: refers to a past never present

p. 22 differance not announced by capital letter, it subverts all kingdoms > everything w/in us that wants a kingdom (le royaume) (that wants to capitalize) fears differance

pp. 22-3 differance (is) older than ontological difference: outside epochality of Being (outside epoch): no depth to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put to play

——isn’t the determination of differance as ontico-ontological difference, difference w/in horizon of question of Being, still intrametaphysical effects of differance?

——differance would be play of trace which no longer belongs to horizon of Being

——a trace that can never appear in phenomenon: trace beyond link btwn ontology & phenomenology > trace erases itself, muffles itself in resonating, like the “a” inscribing its pyramid in differance

pp. 25-6 differance never be appropriated by “as such,” threatens authority of “as such,” presence of thing itself in its essence

p. 26n differance not a process of propriation, neither “species” of genus Being nor Ereignis (nor ontological difference): neither appropriation (position), nor expropriation (negation)—it is other

pp. 26-7 [Derrida argues for new relation to unnameable, different from Heidegger’s] “no name” for differance is not ineffable Being which no name could approach (i.e. God), it is play which makes possible nominal effects, the chains of substitutions of names

p. 27 to know there’s nothing kerygmatic [not a master-name] about differance, we must perceive its decapita(liza)tion > must put into question the name of the name

——there will be no unique name: must think this w/out nostalgia, hors du myth of pure mom/dad language, must affirm like Nietzsche met laffirmation en jeu, dans un rire et un pas de la danse

pp. 65-6 (96) writing of difference, fabric (tissu) of trace, permits difference btwn space & time to be articulated in unity of “same” proper body, permits graphic chain to be adapted to a spoken chain > difference is articulation

DIFFERENCE (Heidegger

HERP p. 169 for Heidegger, durchtragende Austrag, “what carries to term,” carries and includes the other in the “intimacy of difference” > the intimacy of dif-ference (Die Innigkeit des Unter-Schiedes) unifies diaphora in rapport: portée [see MSUBJ p. 167], port, porter, ferein, fero > difference carries

p. 170 Dif-ference first discovers (ermittelt), makes world and things accede to their being (Wesen)

——must distinguish primary tragen and Austrag from every “relational distinction,” to preserve ontological unity of becoming > Heidegger takes same precautions w/ Latin word dimension

pp. 214-15 if aus-tragen = dis-fero [settle, carry, differ], difference becomes synonymous w/ accord, conciliation, peace

A pp. 54-7 the 3 reasons Heidegger’s authoritative decision on what must remain undecided seems so decisive: 1) superordinating of existential analytic 2) the originary, underivable character of death, of finitude, forces us to decide 3) prevalence of phenomenological tradition, pre-ferring, pre-férance [with an “a”], pre-archic originarity of proper, eigentlich

DISPOSSESSION

GT pp. 150-51 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

——literature as place of non-place of frame, triptych w/ dislocated frame, 3 + or – excluded 4th, all positions exchangeable to infinite, an ex-propriation that forbids a return to self, most powerful or interesting speculation

——readers are at once debtors & creditors, like the narrator, we are the beggar, the 3rd party excluded from the secret of the dual scene

R p. 86 when democracy is just obscene alibi tolerating suffering, malnutrition, the grossly deprived, those dispossessed of rights (equality, freedom)

AF p. 94 archive made possible by destruction drive as originary finitude and expropriation, also no archive fever or desire w/out in-finite movement of radical destruction

OOG p. 78 common object: an object whose original owner is thus dispossessed

H p. 89 “language is also the experience of expropriation, of an irreducible exappropriation” makes us all wandering Jews, mother tongue is the tongue of the other [universalizes election], desert in all of us

p. anne 110 what doesn’t belong to you, highest risk. what you do not possess is what obsesses you

p. anne 130 what happens when humans are dispossessed of their interiority?

SPOM p. 112 exappropriation is the radical contradiction of all “capital,” property and appropriation, as well as ideas that depend on it: i.e. free subjectivity: “servitude binds (itself) to appropriation” > lexappropriation ne justifie aucune chaîne

POOF pp. 288-89 there are specters on both sides of us (past & future), the phantom friends we lost, the arrival of the Superman > ‘it is necessary to love’ = specters, they are to be loved

——disjunction of spectral distance marks past/future w/ non-reappropriable alterity [p. 307n cf. Düttmann, “What is Called love in…”]

MSUB J p. 166 “the property of a theme is what an expropriation has deprived us, and it is as if we had been deprived of our own memory, distanced from our own birth”

A pp. 76-7 “turn what is thus at the very heart of the possibility of the existential analysis against the whole apparatus of Being and Time” > death as most ex-propriating, most inauthenticating

——Heidegger dissociates Verfallen from original sin, but still needs distinction btwn authentic/inauthentic > death as “possibility of impossibility” can mean Eigentlichkeit inhabited by Enteignis

VM p. 82 Levinas makes us tremble, from the heart of the desert, a thought which makes us dream of dispossession and dismantling

PAS PAS pp. (48-9) event (de-distance of near) (Eriegnis, Entfernung, Enteignis) “before” which philosophy and its pas au déla (thought) are trying to close themselves; event, to come and more than past (à venir et plus que passé) > beyond because the instant I say viens, both pas are crossed in a single pas

p. (85) sans remarks same X w/out annulling it, springless spring (ce ressort sans ressort), this re-trait leaves everything intact (sauf, indemne) in appearance [absolute heterogenous neutrality w/out negation], at the same time it has abducted, erased, absolute rapidity of dispossession (dérapage)

p. (91) faire trembler dabord (trembling, first approach): denial of fear, frightens more, a fascination, la moindre possibilité de sarriver, in trembling one renounces mastery, use, domination, one does not know how to sign its effects > pas dinsistance distances itself on first approach

p. (93) to give must forget all the way up to what is given, one gives without having self (sans savoir) [see p. (23) say “come” w/out knowing, having, seeing]

p. (97) the inner rhythm of sauf (contamination), always altered, always unscathed, “jai tout, sauf” > “sauf que je voudrais en être débarrassé

VP pp. 62-3n wouldn’t [contra Husserl] universal element of expressivity forbid fulfillment of Bedeutung when we say “I” in solitude, dispossessing the subject of full intuition of “I”?

T p. xix logic of event, structures of expropriation: timbre (tympanum), style and signature > same obliterating division of the proper, make every event possible, necessary, unfindable

TC pp. 232-33 Artaud lived the morrow of a dispossession > his body had been stolen (at birth)—he had to reeducate his organs

SH pp. 11-2 tout autre in Celan, ganz Anderen Sache, other does not contradict, enters into alliance w/, in expropriating, “inmost concern”

p. 67 Jewish language, poetic language, this essence promises itself only in dis-identification (in the expropriation of the nothing, non-essence—[ashes?])

SP pp. 161-63n la signature et le texte tombent lun hors de lautre, se sécrètent, se séparent, et sexcrètent, se forment de la coupure même qui les décapite, les échafaude en tronc sans tête, dès linstant de leur itérabilité > expropriative commencement marks everything erected w/ structure of etron [fecal matter]

PS p. 176 for Artaud, interpreter already dispossessed of [text] he receives [differance as dispossession]

p. 177 for Artaud, furtiveness is quality of dispossession > empties speech before “I” have it: furtive, in Latin, is the manner of a thief, who must act quickly

pp. 179-80 Artaud’s metaphysics of flesh [MOP?] determines Being as life, its integrity must be restored > a thought governed by anguish of dispossession, my body stolen by the other, by death (as theft): my death is represented

p. 181 why does Artaud lament dispossession? > “O! bitches of impossibility”

p. 182 for Artaud, God is false value of initial worth of what is born: this false value becomes Value, for it doubled what never existed > the work (excrement) repeats this theft, steals another part of me [dispossessing my nonexistent ur-value prior to exiting the Orifice]

——for Artaud, “the metaphor of myself is my dispossession w/in language” > this by way of the counterfeiter, God–Satan, who isn’t a creator, but the subject of all [dispossessing] oeuvres

p. 186 acc. Artaud, membering is dismembering; structure always structure of expropriation; “every organ is a parasite” of the body, the body has no need of organs; Heart: “dirtiest means that any being could have invented to pump life inside me” > Artaud as fearful of articulated body as articulated language

DIF DIF p. 26n differance not a process of propriation, neither “species” of genus Being nor Ereignis (nor ontological difference): neither appropriation (position), nor expropriation (negation)—it is other

REST pp. 329-30 affect of Van Gogh’s painting: army of ghosts demanding their shoes, bottomless memory of a dispossession

p. 381 can a ghost (fantôme) be attributed as “the ghost-of”? > no distributive justice for this tribute: shoes always open to unconscious of the other, never possessed, still less kept (garder)

DST DST pp. 316-17n Lacoue-Labarthe: désistance as a desertion [Derrida quotes a passage w/out usage of désistance] that is prior to any ‘self-possession’ (not mode of dispossession), (de)constitution of subject, can one think of loss re: what one never had?

TR p. 159 de Man: dispossession in writing due to arbitrary power of signifier, from point of view of subject, this can only be experienced as beheading, dismemberment, castration

pp. 159-60 [re: event, trauma] that which makes possible desire, some outside, some nondesire, some death: becoming possible of the impossible as im-possible (inappropriability of the other)

AFR pp. 76, 77-8(n) another disappropriation, fission, in 2 concepts of imagination, tampers w/ very concept of what disappropriates [re: Condillac]:

1. imagination as purely reproductive: disposition, material used by consciousness, perception

2. imagination as productive: force, free > new forms can be true or untrue (in order to supply, it adds something more)

D pp. 324-25 le discurs dassistance, pluperfect, deconstructs “illusion” of present, unites presence & auxiliary, supports [Plato’s boetheia] ekgonos (dispossessed son), a seed exposed to all violence of writing: you [baby daddy]

p. 329 imperfect, certain aorist, certain unlimitedness, “unreachable double bottom (double-fond insaisissable)”: past of an anterior future, future of an anterior past

p. 327 “I” as surface vacant of itself: foments (prepares a poison) cruel dispossession > reaches simulacrum point: où il peut à la fois teindre le tissu (stains the tissue) et feindre to tell you truth about it

——a summons, provocation, face-to-face [w/ what?]

p. 333 expropriation is operation w/in voice

LI p. 141 deconstructions are movements of “exappropriation” > is a system (i.e. university) that appropriates it (i.e. deconstructive style) modified by this appropriation?

TN p. 75 contamination becomes what it is not: disidentifies/disappropriates everything before it disidentifies itself > attains the ex-propriety of the proper

p. 93 for Levinas, the peace that is ethical found more in the tender caress that renounces possession than in erotic violence acharnée à jouir

p. 287 it’s because there’s some technical (which there is not) that one can infinitely repeat examples that deconstruct very properness/unity itself of all essences, “beings”

ATM pp. 177-78 Levinas: the other can always dispossess me of my work

EW p. 269 via “logic” of trace or differance, re-appropriation produces the opposite of what it aims for, thus ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man

p. 270 ex-appropriation does not form a boundary (a closure or a negativity), never totalizes itself, irreducibility of relation to other

AD pp. 41-2 host is guest in own home, one who receives is received in receiving: Rosenzweig’s originary dispossession of ipseity, home [the Jew]

p. 99 ex-propriety makes of the subject a hôte and hostage (gentle), someone who is in his own home in the home of the other—“anachronism of a debt preceding the loan”

BSi p. 299 treatment, curiosity, autopsy: expropriating the other

***OG pp. 141-42 (203-05) dispossession institutes/deconstitutes me (is a law of language)—dessaisissement spéculaire, power of death at heart of living speech > dispossessed of longed-for presence in attempt to seize it [Rousseau recognized this]

p. 143 (205-06) Rousseau’s sacrifice: never began to live until he looked upon himself as a dead man, until he affirmed writing [death in life, differance] > aiming at a symbolic reappropriation of presence that differance will have breached/broached

p. 166 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] writing: 1) effort to symbolically reappropriate presence 2) consecrates dispossession that had already dislocated parole

p. 168 (238-39) acc. Heidegger’s history of metaphysics, liberty/truth became condition of presence: freedom of speech borrows no signifiers from exterior world—cannot be dispossessed

p. 184 (261-62) image is death, it cannot represent & add representer to represented, thus presence of re-presented folded back on itself in the world, presence announces its dispossession w/in its own representer/death > subject: merely this movement of expropriation

p. 296 (417-18) representation dispossesses, re-presents, wrenches presence from itself

——naiveté of MOP: to see representation as restorative

SPEC p. 362 exappropriating—no circle (family, economy)

p. 393 PP as quasi-proper, figure of mastery, exappropriation structures PP, proper produced as autothanatography

FV pp. 494-95 signer dispossessed [re: The Purloined…], signature in quotations: ce reste est encore de la littérature

DIVIDED SUBJECT

FWT p. 112 “I” am working around a dehiscence, division (more than 1, 2, 3, beyond all arithmetic, calculability)

p. 176 via Freud, divided, differentiated “subject,” not reduced to egological intentionality, experiences against inexhaustible/invincible background of heteronomy

DST DST p. 197 désistance (2 typical experiences) is ineluctable: 1) il faut que cela arrive: in this case, the “I,” the free subject, anticipates/precedes, is constituted w/out or before, the ineluctable event that happens to me 2) constitutive desistance of subject: something began before me, I am late, a subject marked in advance by a pre-impression, imprint—deconstitution (“I” am not the supporting basis of this imprint): still, ineluctable not genetic programs or historical determination—those would be supplemental, late determinations of ineluctable

p. 315n Lacoue-Labarthe: subject in mirror is first of all subject in désistance, figure is never one, destabilizing division of figural (this muddles Lacan’s distinction btwn symbolic/imaginary)

p. 200 désistance—impossibility of consisting, [de]-constitution of subject

pp. 316-17n Lacoue-Labarthe: désistance as a desertion [Derrida quotes a passage w/out usage of désistance] that is prior to any ‘self-possession’ (not mode of dispossession), (de)constitution of subject, can one think of loss re: what one never had?

p. 317n subject—nothing other than formation of movement of désistance

pp. 319-20n delay as inevitable, delay re: one’s “own” birth, experience of “abortion” > a subject that cannot identify itself because ineluctably delayed [Lacan’s human born prematurely]

——condition of possibility of identification is its impossibility (both ineluctable) > subject identifies itself because it can never be identified

——does Lacoue-Labarthe define a subject from which Heidegger protects himself (and seeks relief [assistance])?

p. 221 Lacoue-Labarthe: traversed from the beginning by discourse of others, “subject” does not incur a simple Spaltung (splitting) > the latter, w/ its oppositional logic (absence/position), creates obsession w/ appropriation dominating analysis of mimesis, & also its economic, political bearing

p. 222 we are constituted by this rhythm, (de-)constituted by marks of this “caesuraed” stamp, rhythmotypy as divided idiom in us of désistance > no subject w/out signature of this rhythm

p. 224 Lacoue-Labarthe: [subject] ‘desists’ because must confront at least 2 figures (or one figure that is at least double) > destabilizing Lacan’s imaginary/symbolic

p. 226 the “loss (perte) of the subject” in Lacan calls for a suturing that obliterates désistance

HLP p. 67 classical lying: liar knows the truth, knows he is lying, the self excludes the self-lie (the other is other enough, an enemy to be deceived in his belief)

——unless we think the other w/in oneself, an ipseity more originary than ego, a divisible ipseity, oneself as enemy

D pp. 326-27 what does it mean to stand upright (se dresser) if inconsistent, divided?

OG p. 184 (261-62) image is death, it cannot represent & add representer to represented, thus presence of re-presented folded back on itself in the world, presence announces its dispossession w/in its own representer/death > subject: merely this movement of expropriation

ATAP p. 81 Nietzsche: my beloved voice deludes my solitude, obliges me to speak as if I were 2

CIR pp. 138-39 universal fantasy/desire of divided subject (to understand oneself): Envy & Gratitude

p. 169 the satyr galatea that I am, half-mourning satyr > the splitting of the ego, in me, is no transcendental claptrap

FV p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

p. 470n Lacan’s “True Speech”: “subject is founded in this act as being the other”

p. 471n Lacan reconstitutes Cartesian certainty, capturing in this chain (Descartes–Hegel–Husserl) Heideggerian motions which are allergic to it—rigorously speaking

p. 472 Lacan’s authentic: “appel propre du vide

——for Lacan, ideal process of analysis: “realization” of full speech as assumption of desire (of castration)

DIVIDING LINE (BORDERLINE) [fixerup]

KH p. 148n Heidegger: chaos, khaos, khaine, signifies the yawning, a split in two, close connection to aletheia, abyss which opens

BL p. 212 from title to incipit [re: Vor dem Gesetz], 2 moments, repetition, the same > dividing of letter, “it [the repetition itself] splits the boundary by dividing its line”

LOBL pp. ~82-3 pose question of bord, bord de mer, question of borderline preceding the determination of all dividing lines I just mentioned [i.e. the general bord before the contextual one?]

DS p. 176 Mallarmé: ivory knife — 2 joined pages

pp. 240-41 pirouette at one point—at “philosophical point,” at stigmē, here—already at another point (unties/divides along same line)

P pp. 60-1 two limits of edge: 1) internal, btwn frame & painting 2) external, separating from wall

pp. 73-4 effects of deconstructed frame would not be an absence of one, labîme [undo the frame] en coin dans ses angles et ses articulations, slyly—see picture from the side of the wood (not teleological, not harmony, internal becomes external); thickness taken into account

p. 144 double trait of cise, limits and unlimits at the same time, divided line upon which colossus comes to cise itself—and incises itself w/out cise > the sublime

OTO pp. 5-6 borderline btwn “work” & “life”: dynamis, virtual & mobile potency, neither active nor passive, outside nor inside, not a thin line, traverses 2 bodies (corpus & body) > not an indivisible trait lying btwn enclosure of philosophemes & life of author identifiable behind name

p. 13 problems of borderline occur whenever one seeks determination: dating event, identify beginning of text, the origin of life, first movement of a signature

***ATIA pp. 30-1 discussion is interesting [re: animals] once limit is abyssal (rather than limit as discontinuity): once frontier is not a single, indivisible line, but more than one internally divided lines (folds, foliations): “what are the edges of a limit that feed on an abyss?”

DIF DIF p. 13 differance constitutes present in interval, constitutes present by dividing it > everything thus thought on basis of the present, in our metaphysical language, would also be divided (subject, substance, being, etc.)

***DPi p. 108 [vis-à-vis Hugo] border line of right to literature divides a good & bad Christianity

REST p. 331 comes down to a decision about the frame, a border (bordure) which is double in its trait: joins together what it splits (partage): “at stake are (il y va) all the interests caught up in the trial (procès) of this split (partage),” what separates external from internal

***EJQB p. 69 poet or Jew: protects the desert that protects his speech (can speak only in desert), his writing (traced [sillonner] only in desert) > invents unfindable/unspecifiable pathway (un chemin introuvable et inassigné) > dont aucune résolution cartésienne ne peut nous assurer la droite ligne et lissue

D p. 304 “primitive” mythical unity always reconstituted retrospectively dans laprès-coupure > the decision, le coup (shot, throw, blow) parts the seed as it projects it (partage la semence en la projetant)

——numerical multiplicity not death threat sneaking up on unified germ, it pathbreaks (fraye la voie) for “the” seed (semence), which advances/produces (itself) in plural: singular plural

——dissemination, germination, no first insemination, “primal” insemination is dissemination: a trace, graft, whose traces have been lost

——each germ is its own term—finds its term w/in itself as its own internal limit, faisant angle avec sa proper mort [tracing, grafting, semen already swarming (essaimée)]

PPT p. 11 trait is never common, never even one, w/ & w/out itself, its divisibility founds texts, traces, remains

——in [classical] discourses on painting, trait always determined as opposition-slash > what happens before difference becomes opposition? becoming always been a concept of determinate opposition

+R p. 163 rigor/joyous severity of trait, petrifying (médusante) impassivity of line > disjunction works on any equality, unhinges, interrupts, truncates > “integrity in dispersion”

LI p. 59 dehiscence, botanical, divided opening, makes plant grow > law of undecidable contamination (like iterability)

pp. 70-1 what is re-markable about the mark includes margin w/in mark > mark is remarkable in that it “is” also its margin

——line of margin can never be determined rigorously: divides the dividing-line & its unity at once > iterability allows for “negative” double, lie, also conditions so-called “positive” values

p. 84 where is dividing-line btwn use/mention?

p. 102 iterability displaces dividing-line btwn opposition nature/convention

AD p. 74 very thrust (poussée) of Levinas’ thought: makes borderline (ligne de frontière), semantic identity of all the words he uses, tremble

LG pp. 225-26 law of impurity, contamination in heart of law, condition for possibility of law, the a priori of a counter-law: a line or trait, internal division, impurity, corruption, etc.

pp. 227-28 trait that marks membership (lappartenance) divides > boundary (bordure) of set comes to form by invagination—an internal pocket larger than the whole

——consequences of this division & overflowing (débordement) as singular as they are limitless (quillimitables)

p. 235 edge (bord), borderline (ligne de bordure), overflowing (débordement) do not arise w/out a fold—which figure of folding? [the answer: double chiasmatic invagination]

UWS p. 236 sovereign mastery of interior > [indivisible] border of inside/outside vs. divisible limit, because divisible, it has a history > the divisible limit is the limit of the impossible, the perhaps

DIVISION/DISJUNCTURE

GT p. 85 division or double engenders many other dehiscences > virtually to infinity

MONL p. 8 division, why one writes and how one dreams of writing

MPM p. 60 memory of present divides the instant? inscribes difference in presence of present?

A p. 11 border becomes a problem as soon as edge-line is threatened, a step crossing an indivisible line (customs, police, visa—all established upon institution of indivisibility or identity of line)

S pp. 79-80 following a limit in a way where division is almost impossible because it touches both sides of limit [re: limit btwn philosophemes and the sayings of Dichter]

p. 106 double mark, doubly remarkable trait [engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, affinity w/ Schlag]: it is the spirit in which it inscribes itself, traces itself, belongs to flame it divides

pp. 106-07 acc. Heidegger, difference or duality inscribed by the trait (Riss) is not division, it is the gathering (Versammlung) of the place (Ort), the de-cease (Abgeschiedenheit), in the one (Ein), the soul Gemüt, Ein Geschlecht, none other than Geist [path-breaking (frayage) of trait]

SH p. 16 date repeats its unrepeatability: divides in repeating, enciphers, encrypts itself, effaces to become readable, unreadable in its readability

p. 34 pledge, complementary object divide in 2 to seal alliance > moment of engagement, signature, contract, ring

F p. xv crypt’s impenetrability, crypt’s failure to prevent seeping, its angular inscriptions run along a divided line of “fantasmatic doubleness”: each fantasy “double and opposed”

p. xx topography [of crypt] “twice cleft”; dividing line runs through intrasymbolism of Self and Unconscious (the twice divided, or double division, is what creates an undecipherable symbol)

pp. xlii-xliii 2 routes (both angular) (double density) the Thing follows at dividing line (the Thing marked by same dividing line as symbol broken by crypt): 1) crosses unconscious directly (tableau, symptom) 2) crosses intrasymbolic crack (alloseme)

***pp. xliii-xliv Ichspaltung rethought when it is not Fetish vs. Thing (in-itself) but Fetish-Thing as cipher to be translated interminably

DS p. 227 double session has no middle, divided in 2 through fiction of a crease (du faux pli)

ROP p. 33 the dogma/idealism of Lacan’s “letter always arrives,” one can never assemble anything in its indivisibility

——question of divisibility one of most powerful instruments of formalization for deconstruction, differance as divisibility

CHM p. 40 Derrida’s problem w/ writing history of decision: risk construing division as event subsequent to unity of original presence > confirms metaphysics in its fundamental operation

REST pp. 267-68 for Freud, the shoe always a “form” of prosthesis, but always as a penis (woman’s penis too)? but Ferenczi recognizes in it the vagina

——fetish generation is syntactical, meaning it never designates a detachable whole: a relatively detachable part of an always divisible ensemble

D p. 304 mathematicogenetic theory of groups: [if this were intended to mean anything] nothing prior to group (no originary unity prior to division)

FV pp. 468-69 the 2 truths: adequation (original contract: acquitting of debt), unveiling (lack on basis of which contract contracts in order to reappropriate what’s been detached)

——w/out return, divisibility rebels against lack

DOES NOT EXIST

KH p. 94 w/ no essence, how could khōra be beyond its name? it anachronizes being, and it is like nothing, there beyond its name

p. 96 es gibt always implicated in negative theology (in its Christian history?); what there is, there, is not; p. 97 there is khōra, but the khōra does not exist [importance of article]

GT p. 26 “there is gift,” not the same as “the gift exists” [ontological difference?]

p. 29 gap (écart) btwn thought, language and desire & philosophy, knowledge and science does not exist, gap btwn gift & economy: resembles an empty word or transcendental illusion

——perhaps analogy to Kant’s noumenal & phenomenal will help us

p. 40 la différance, qui n’(est) rien, est (dans) la chose même, elle est (donnée) dans la chose même, elle (est) la chose même, elle, la différance, la chose (même), elle, sans rien dautre, elle-même, rien [differance, the nothing in the thing-itself]

MONL p. 67 fatal precipitation of promise dissociated from will, intention, meaning-to-say [vouloir-dire], heralds uniqueness of language to came, “there is…” implies “it doesn’t exist”

p. 69 Heidegger says [?], “there is language that does not exist,” i.e. there is no metalanguage

R p. 29 democracy will never be present but it is urgent

p. 86 to-come: democracy does not exist, never present, not because deferred but because aporetic in its structure (force without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality, commensurability and incommensurability, a despairing messianicity)

p. 101 Schmitt is right, a pure sovereignty (decisionist exceptionality) is indivisible or not at all, it’s ahistorical, withdraws from language, does not exist

FK p. 59 khōra is nothing but not nothing in which anxiety of Dasein would still be open to question of Being > immemoriality of a desert

BL p. 208-09 law becomes something by being a nothing that constantly defers access to itself [tabernacle]; atopology [khōra] erases event, annuls the event, nullification gives birth to the law

OOG p. 144 the Idea is not, always “beyond being” (epekeina tes ousias), as Telos of infinite determinability of Being, it’s being’s openness to the light > it is the light of light, sun of the visible sun, a hidden sun, no doubt what a Plato muted by Platonism tells us about

SPOM p. 125 there is no Dasein of the specter

POOF p. 306 democracy remains to come, this is its essence, indefinitely perfectible, always insufficient & future > even when there is democracy, it never exists

HASD p. 26 [re: Mystical Theology] difference btwn access to contemplation of God, and access to where God resides > God not even in his most holy places, il nest pas et il na pas lieu, ou plutôt il est et a lieu mais sans être et sans lieu, sans être sons lieu

MPM pp. 58-9 if a past does not exist, no more does death—only mourning, figures of death, we inscribe in every trace (otherwise called “survivals”)—because they outlast us, trying their luck, in advance, “in memory of” [see p. 87n inexistence of past/death not futility/illusion]

p. 145 for de Man, text defined by considering a statement at the same time performative & constative > this same time never is, will never have been, will never be present

EM p. 131 Being is nothing, not a being, cannot be said, cannot say itself, except in ontic metaphor

PP p. 109 (124) supplement is dangerous because it doesn’t exist (not a simple non-being, its sliding slips it out of alternative presence/absence)

p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

pp. 156-57 no as such where writing or play are concerned, they cannot be classically affirmed (since they have no essence) w/out being negated, le jeu et la graphie vont sans cesse disparaissant

VP p. 8 “ideality is the salvation or mastery of presence in repetition” (this is why Husserl claims intuition is not reell), not a presence of anything that exists in the world, in correlation w/ ideal acts of repetition [idealization secured by a certain relation of “existent” to his death]

SH p. 17 date not there, w/ draws in order to appear, there are dates (just like there are ashes), even if they don’t exist

pp. 38-9 date may always become no one’s, nothing’s date, the essence w/out essence of ash

p. 43 a date, to become what it is, must give itself to be read in ash, in the nonbeing of its being

p. 44 shibboleth: “I am ash”

p. 47 [MOP] Celan: Aschenkelle (ash-ladle) draws from tub [better than manger/trough] of being, launders > soapy; ash uses up being, is not a being-that-remains, there is ash, but ash is not

DS p. 229 necessity of folding (page of the hymen) not a secondary procedure, no smooth fold, hymen doesn’t simply adopt some fold > fold, in the lining which, of itself, the hymen was, at once its outside and its inside, no proper name, doesn’t exist: hymen, already torn, in the fold

——le pli (se) multiplie mais (nest) pas (un)

——in the morgue you’ve been able to read the folding (vous aurez pu lire que la pliure)

p. 270 si le texte à la lettre nexiste pas, there is (il y a), perhaps, a text, en marche, avec lequel il faut frayer

OS pp. 39-40 nun, often translated as instant, functions in Greek like “now (maintenant)” > nun is form in which time cannot not be given, yet nun is not, is both no longer (nest plus) & not yet (nest pas encore), a no-thing (ne-ant), doesn’t participate in presence

PS p. 195 Artaud: this hole of the hollow btwn 2 bellows of force/which were not (ce trou de creux entre deux soufflets de force/qui nétaient pas)

FS p. 8 for Blanchot, pure absence, the excess of everything—possibility of writing (absence of everything in which presence is announced) > makes one work

DIF DIF p. 6 if differance is [Heidegger’s Durchstreichung of Being], it reserves itself, never offered to the present: exceeds order of truth, not a hole in topology of castration [p. 21 differance is not] [fixerup X]

RGE p. 270 sovereignty is impossible—therefore it is not, it is “this loss (perte)”

REST pp. 378-39 certain thinking/experience of nothingness (nonexistent) is required to question being of existent, and the difference of being and existent

——for Heidegger, cette pensée du néant alien to science, which deals only w/ existents: belongs to philosophy/poetry > nonexistent, there w/out being there as being present, a kind of haunting: Unhemlichekeit is condition of question of being, pivot (cheville) of the essence (see OS)

DST DST p. 213 for Lacoue-Labarthe, mimesis is an essence w/out essence, is not, does not exist—desists (not negative)

p. 214 ester: “to appear, present oneself in court” [p. 319n Kahn’s translation of Heidegger] > désistance, a rupture, heterogeneity w/ respect to Wesen, estance, not Abwesen (absence), Unwesen (disorder), Entwesen (inessentiality): dé, not negative, marks nonbelonging to family of ester

PIO p. 45 it is another “we” given over to inventiveness when mirror broken & tain crossed [re: “Fable”], a “we” that doesn’t find itself anywhere—not “we” of a community of human subjects

——the other is always another origin of the world, and we are to be invented > beyond being

RM pp. 64-6 quasi-metaphor of Being, since it is nothing, since its as obliterates its as such

p. 70 Being, which is nothing: makes possible metaphoricity & its withdrawal

p. 77 can’t say trait is, it conditions the ontological copula—like es gibt

HLP p. 28 fabulous, phantasma, return of some specter: apparition of specter, vision of phantom, phenomenon of the revenant

——fable & phantasm do not belong to true or false

——irreducible species of simulacrum, penumbral light of a virtuality, neither being nor nothingness (which no ontology/mimetology could account for, subdue w/ reason)

EJQB p. 74 the encounter (rencontre) is separation (breaks unity of Being by welcoming [accueillant] other into source of meaning) > contredit lalogique,dans le fragile chaînon du est

——only possible to say this by conceptualizing meaning, which is exile from Being, Being never is, never shows itself, never present, is never now

p. 75 Jew’s identification w/ himself doesn’t exist

AFR p. 78 [re: Condillac’s ambiguity of 2 imaginations] major strategic operation of mastery is to control ambiguity & risks, the strategy is almost mastery itself

——mastery, if there is any, does not exist: it must possess what is not, never itself

D pp. 313-14 the opening, as presence, is not noticed as opening—we’re fascinated, glued to what presents itself: we’re unable to see presence as such, visibility of visible > never present themselves

p. 342 column is nothing, no meaning in itself, a hollow phallus > guarantees innumerable passage of dissemination and playful displacement of margins

pp. 351-52 column is not, passage of dissemination, “phallic” significance of column is a semic effect, reflection on 4th surface (described center, represented mastery of dissemination); “is”—procures calm, consciousness of ideal mastery > operation of 4th surface

——column has no being, belongs to no one

EL p. 217 Scholem’s nothing (secularization) occurs, not fortuitously analogous to Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik: nothingness, nothingness of language, announces “essence of what it threatens and causes to recoil in totality”

C p. 225 [re: 127 coffins] box is not, it remains, (a) mise en boîte (put in a box, make fun of itself)

pp. 244-45 how can we delimit all the features (traits) [of artwork] when the absent one haunts, obsesses, besieges (assiège) [plus quun autre] > avec égale sans (trait dunion: with-out [in English])

LI p. 83 why did Descartes have to prove the existence of God twice? ][3rd and 5th Meditations?]

what does it mean to multiply/cite demonstrations/proofs of that beyond all substitution? God, exemplary case: unique, irreplaceable, both absolutely repeatable and unrepeatable

——[re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

——the rest of the trace, its remains (restance), neither present nor absent

p. 141 in deconstructive practice, opposition conservative/revolutionary no longer pertinent > deconstruction is “inherently” nothing at all: only what it does, and what is done w/ it: depends on very minute, flexible analyses

p. 149 differance as nonidentity w/ oneself in process of determination > differance is itself nothing outside of determination, never comes to a full stop (not negativity, nothingness)

pp. 152-53 though nothing exists outside context, limit of frame/border of context always entails nonclosure: outside penetrates, thus determines, inside

TN p. 49 Nancy: there is never “death itself”

p. 287 it’s because there’s some technical (which there is not) that one can infinitely repeat examples that deconstruct very properness/unity itself of all essences, “beings”

p. 289 limit, border (bord), which are nothing, make any gift possible

NOY pp. 238-39 yes must be fictive, quasi, opens every event w/out being itself an event, never present

ATM p. 148 the gift is not

AD p. 104 for Levinas, God is not, not “contaminated by being”

pp. 142-43n experience of à-Dieu: to have welcomed yes of other, infinity in separation, in its holiness > Adieu does not wait, is not, beyond being

***WOG p. 35 khōra, utterly resistant to historical narrative, not eternal or ahistorical like intelligible idea > radically foreign to all oppositions & heterogenous to epekeina tēs ousias (the one that doesn’t participate in Being, gives rise to history, narratives, myths, Good and God)

CIN p. 21 cinder remains, cinder there is, nonbeing, nonpresence

pp. 24-30 holocaust as gift before every determinable being [see CIN in FIRE]

p. 55 cinder, nothing that can be in the world, remains beyond everything that is (konis epekeina tēs ousias), giving itself (es gibt ashes)—it’s nothing

BSi p. 219 to think the marionette, difference btwn marionettes, not the living of life but a living w/out being—simulacrum of being, prosthesis, substitute for the being of the thing itself—fetish—life death at same time > marionette [Marion’s Dieu sans lÊtre]

p. 290 Bemächtigungstrieb: beyond other drives, beyond death drive, think sovereignty through drive, transference, inheritance, transmission, sovereignty itself is nothing, is excess, beyond everything

OG p. 35 (53) for Malebranche, original sin is distraction, inattention, is nothing, temptation of ease [MOP in attentiveness]

pp. 46-8 (68-70) in the “unmotivatedness” of the sign, le tout autre sannonce comme tel, the trace: “non-living,” occultation (de soi), prior to theology, dissimulates itself, no identity, no simplicity, resemblance, continuity > mark of relation to other, immotivation of trace has always become

***pp. 56-7 (82-3) arche-writing can never be an object of science, it is that which cannot be reduced to a form of presence

pp. 62-3 (91-2) differance does not exist, the never being-present outside plenitude > no science of this nonorigin

p. 167 (237-38) exclusion of the supplement, of addition, can only function if one deems it pure [i.e. simple exteriority, pure addition] > for logocentric MOP addition is nothing, can’t add to full presence (being, essence, eidos, ousia)

——originary differance is supplementarity as structure: irreducible complexity of shifting play of absence/presence: metaphysics produced by it, doesn’t think it: writing is a representation of trace, trace itself does not exist > place of decision now hidden, but still indicated

***p. 244 (347) supplementarity is nothing, not absence, presence, not essence/substance of man: it’s the opening of play (jeu) btwn presence/absence, dislocation of proper of man, the impossibility and thus the desire for proximity to self (pure presence)

UWC p. 204 university w/out conditions does not, in fact, exist > still, in principle, it remains ultimate place of critical resistance to dogmatism, unjust appropriation

EU p. 100 performativity (where knowledge & power are no longer distinguished) produces/transforms situation in which it speaks [i.e. the founding of a graduate school] > the performative does not exist

CHOR p. 99 hymen: 1) membranous fold 2) marriage > lies btwn inside/outside of woman, btwn desire & its fulfillment: once pierced there is no hymen

p. 106 hymen does not exist, anything constituting value of existence is foreign to “hymen,” so how could one then attribute existence of hymen properly to woman? (same goes for invagination)

DOGMATISM

GOD pp. 49-50 “gift of death,” Christian (Potačka), non-Christian (Heidegger, Levinas)? isn’t Christianity already the nondogmatic doublet of dogma, where revelation of event or event of revelation is unnecessary, the possibility of religion w/out religion

——Christian “gift of death”: infinite love & goodness that infinitely forgets itself

FK p. 49 a “reflecting faith” acts; a “dogmatic faith” seeks revelation

SPOM p. 59 exorcism conjures away evil in ways that are irrational, mystifying, exorcism misleads us w/ respect to its magical, authoritarian dogmatism [unscathed]

POOF p. 44 via Nietzsche, universalization hides cunning of all dogmatisms: being-common or being-in-common, a dogmatic stratagem > la mise en commun ne fait jamais que raisonner pour arraisonner [frame, set]

VM p. 130 infinitist dogmatism in pre-Kantian style does not pose question of responsibility of finite philosopher, overlooks irreducibility of history (infinite passage through violence)

S pp. 16-7 acc. Heidegger, Descartes, Husserl, both dogmatic, their concepts not ontologically clarified via Being

OH p. x [Naas quotes from interview] precipitating contacts and articulations: dogmatism, confusion, opportunism

pp. 54-5 demand for “transparency,” “consensus,” common sense, intelligibility in new university space via publishing enterprises [new order, dogma]

p. 100 “new censorship” combines concentration & fractionalization, accumulation & privatization > de-politicizes every informing of a “fact,” no information escapes

pp. 101-02 the way “cultural press” dogmatizes, culture determined by whoever monopolizes decision to bring to daylight; quasi-private, “difficult,” “obscure” works excluded from the scene

VP p. 21 does absence of question re: starting point and pre-understanding of an operative concept translate into dogmatism? [re: Husserl]

SH p. 46 to bless no one, only chance for an act of faith > otherwise dogma, certainty, judgment

FWT p. 7 Derrida respects idiom or singularity of signature [re: Foucault, Lacan, Lévi-Strauss] while looking to deconstruct what’s hegemonic, the “dogmatic moment,” the residue of credulity

OS p. 39 w/out rigorous critical/deconstruction of MOP, the very necessary attention to differences, coupures, mutations, leaps becomes ensnarled (sencombre) in slogans, dogmatic stupidities, empiricist precipitation > and discourse “put in question” [takes you from behind]

ROP p. 33 the dogma/idealism of Lacan’s “letter always arrives,” one can never assemble anything in its indivisibility

OTO p. 13 problems of borderline occur whenever one seeks determination: dating event, identify beginning of text, the origin of life, first movement of a signature

ATIA p. 133 dogma: to assert w/out appealing to testimony or knowledge (which are different) [re: Lacan’s distinction btwn pretense & pretense of pretense] [Derrida wonders if the dogmatism is here inspired by the difficulty/impossibility of discernment re: pretense]

p. 147 for Heidegger, Descartes’ ego sum is dogmatic, doesn’t pose ontological question

O p. 47 Hegel: to make things plain risks dogmatism (tissue of assumptions, assertions, inferential pros and cons), against which there’d be equal right of counter-dogmatism

WAP pp. 3-4 certains sont toujours impatients d’accéder-directement-aux-choses-mêmes-et-d'atteindre-sans-attendre-tout-droit-le-vrai-contenu-des-problèmes-urgents-et-graves-qui-se-posent-à-tous-etc. > demand not to be slow, self-indulgent, has a history, a hypocritical structure

p. 39 philosophy needn’t be confused w/ a specialized discipline, though some fear if it isn’t, other contents (moral, social, political ideology) will occupy it insidiously and dogmatically

p. 73 metaphysical dogmatics more alive than ever w/ apparent abandonment of philosophy in places of technology, moralism, empiricism, religion (indeed, all at the same time)

p. 96 complicit, complementary forms of dogmatism, confusionism, obscurantism, conservatism: 1) academic clatter (bavardage) 2) antiuniversity verbiage

***DPi p. 152 we believe (always in a credulous fashion, dogmatic fashion)

CHM p. 60 the dogmatic & historically determined grounds—ours

Gii p. 41 Heidegger’s essential propositions re: ape’s lack of hand, an empirico-dogmatic hapax, supposedly nonmetaphysical humanism > when animality is enclosed in its organico-biological programs: absolute oppositional limit which erases differences, homogenizes

REST p. 313 when Shapiro says, “they are clearly pictures of the artist’s own shoes,” the copula (they are) couples the painted shoes to the painter’s feet, laces drawn out of picture, presupposes hole in canvas

——2 capitalized attributes: adequate model (real shoes) & adequate subject (Van Gogh)

——dogmatic, precritical language: “real,” “proper,” “this is that,” evidently, clearly, his own > talk so loudly, price to pay to have the shoes, believe he is no stranger to the other

pp. 313-14 the 3 dogmas of Shapiro: 1) painted shoes belong to real subjects w/ names 2) shoes are shoes, painted or “real” 3) feet belong to a proper body, can’t be severed

——these 3 distinct articulations in the interest of one and the same continuum: reattach detachables according to an absolute stricture

p. 318 Heidegger’s step backward from truth of adequation to truth of unveiling can leave one disarmed in face of precritical, dogmatic, in face of “preinvestment” (fantasmatic, ideological)

DST DST p. 203 [re: Lacoue-Labarthe’s désistance] exemplary, superior probity that, w/out ceding to dogmatic moralism, submits ethical demand to trial (lépreuve) of thought

p. 210 Derrida wary of every “return of the subject,” even in least dogmatic of returns, like that found in late Foucault (all “returns” omit rigorous reading of Heidegger)

LI p. 34 Sarl’s serene dogmatism re: intention/origin of utterance/signature: confidence in distinguishing oppositions, i.e. “parasite” from “nonparasite,” etc.

pp. 91-93 determination of “positive” values, the “standard (propre),” the non-parasitic, the literal is dogmatic: restricted interpretation of common sense never submitted to discussion

——that which is “logically dependent” on the dogma is called pathology or decline (déchéance); for Derrida, this dogmatism is what psychoanalysis would call denial (dénégation)

p. 119 rant against simplifying or pretending to simplify, those people are dogmatists, obscurantists, purify at all costs

***pp. 157-58n rant against non-reading pedants, dogmatists, full of fear, right to confuse everything in authoritarian manner

——jugement dautorité: preferred method/practice of all dogmatism

BSi p. 57 sovereign as God does not (need to) respond [Levinas’ death] > sovereignty expropriates ecstasy of irresponsibility: bestiality, divinity, death (each dogmatically designated as unresponsive)

pp. 92-6 [Derrida savages Agamben’s dogmatism in declaring who was “first,” then dogmatism in accusation of negligence, points out abyss of neglect, “one is always a priori negligent,” asks about the ethical responsibility in Levinas’ anarchy (no first)]

ATAP p. 68 via Kant, mystagogy (pretension): when name philosophy becomes pseudonym, cryptonym, homonym, philosophy w/out Bedeutung, w/out guarantee of its value

EU pp. 218-19 “thinking” proceeds to limits of these unavoidable words of legitimation: art, science, philosophy, technique, practice, law, etc.

——permanent opening: never suture w/ assurance (tranquility) of doctrine or dogma

SPEC p. 366 monistic risk: in duel w/ Jung, Freud preferred dualism > whatever one says about Jung, Freudian dogmatism has been adopted blindly, inherited in this dark affair

——alternative of dualism/monism belongs to much more simplistic framework than that of differential stricture in athetic reading of Beyond

***FV p. 468 Lacan’s insistence on opposition truth/reality as orthodox as can be [p. 468n full speech]

CHOR p. 91 “dogmatics” of feminism as telos, sinister mystification, will flounder in same homogenized, sterilized river of history of mankind

DOUBLE/DYAD

GOD p.147 plea for forgiveness in inheritance of God’s retraction; God’s retraction, a double coming-back, covenant only sealed through repetition [Noah is twice forgiven], God goes back on himself; dissymmetrical contract of Covenant supposes double trait of this retreat (re-trait) (Entzug)

GT p. 85 division or double engenders many other dehiscences > virtually to infinity

LOBL p. 118 double bind, double invagination, double obligation, double demand, w/out end, no reconciliation

H p. 105 Oedipus is twice encrypted, 1st in dying, 2nd in hiding his death > by demanding he be kept dead, he announces a piece of blackmail

SPOM SPOM p. 176 endless chase after double as brother, wants to classify can only chase

POO POO p. 7 duplicity in a ceremony, being-double, “hollows itself out in an infinite abyss:” one is neither friendly nor polite if one obeys the rules

p. 8 the duplicity before the rule makes one tremble, an other who will seek to hold you back or push you into void, save you or lose you, supposing there ever a choice?

PAS PAS p. (54) double pas provokes double instantaneous but interminable preterition, forms a singular limit btwn keeping and loss, remembering and forgetting

S p. 29 Heidegger’s doubling of “spirit” by use of quotation marks affects it w/ obsessive specter, he doesn’t shelter “spirit,” a hospitality w/ reservations, quotations call for another word unless they re-call the other under the same

pp. 40-1 Geist is always haunted by its Geist, a ghost is always the other’s ventriloquist; metaphysics always returns in the sense of a revenant, Geist is the most fatal figure of revenance: the double which can never be separated from the single > spirit is its double

p. 106 double mark, doubly remarkable trait [engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, affinity w/ Schlag]: it is the spirit in which it inscribes itself, traces itself, belongs to the flame it divides

POOF p. 37 Nietzsche’s teleiopoesis, a messianic structure, we establish ourselves as heralds & precursors [of ‘community of those w/out community’?], Nietzsche sometimes says “I” and sometimes “we”: singular responsibility is always double [contretemps], doubled, disseminated: double as infinitely divided responsibility

p. 72 friendship–enemy btwn logic of unconscious & logic of lie: these 2 logics can’t help but haunt each other, et de partager même le concept de cette hantise qui travaille le langage de notres temps

FSW p. 226 traces produce space of their inscription by acceding to period of their erasure, traces constituted by double force of repetition & erasure, of legibility & illegibility

TC p. 248 [Derrida’s interpretation?] “grammar” of theater of cruelty will always remain inaccessible limit of a re-presentation that is not repetition, that is full presence, doesn’t carry it’s double w/in itself as death, a present outside time, a nonpresent > [instead?] present harbors its “intestine difference” in the interior fold of its original repetition, in representation, in dialectics

F p. xv crypt’s impenetrability, crypt’s failure to prevent seeping, its angular inscriptions run along a divided line of “fantasmatic doubleness”: each fantasy “double and opposed”

p. xlviii paelontologist médusé devant larête dun mot-chose, like a tomb burning in the grass, double-edged stare of a 2-faced Medusa (le double tranchant dun biface)

FWT pp. 5-6 [re: responsibility as experience of inheritance] a double before (devant), to come before as in debt and before as in what is to come, always anachronism: devancer in the name of what came before, and devancer the name itself! [la devance, “owingness”]

WM p. 239 since, for Aristotle, mimēsis is not identity but gives us to see in action what is not to be seen in action, only in its resembling double, its mimēma, Derrida wants to leave open this energetic absence, this enigmatic division, the interval which makes scenes and tells tales

DS p. 186n le double parricide [Plato’s]: Homer (for mimetic poetry), Parmenides (for neglecting mimesis > his logos, the “paternal thesis” would prohibit doubling)

p. 188 specularity of eidos > logos—speech < mirroring [repetition ordered by resemblance (homoiōsis), doubling as duplication]

p. 191 internal division w/in mimēsis, double of itself, destined to mime or mask itself, everything played in paradox of supplementary double

pp. 191-92 never has anteriority of 1st (simple) over 2nd (double) been displaced by a metaphysical system, double de-presents, il le multiplie par suite, le double vient après le simple, the flesh & blood, limage survient à la réalité > this is ontology

——priority of art over nature still privileges order 1 then 2, the preference, the precedence (pré-séance) of the imitated

p. 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” > hymen

p. 206 Mallarmé’s mimicry: a double of nothing simple, a double nothing anticipates—or at least a double of another double; for this double, reality is death, it never breaks the glass

p. 207 Mallarmé is more patient, subtle, discreet, efficient, does not suppress the double (make it dialectical, bringing us back to presence, to perception of the thing itself)

***p. 215n “event” (historical event, if you wish) has form of a repetition, the mark (readable because doubled) of a quasi-tearing (quasi-déchirure), a dehiscence [etymology of dehiscence follows]

p. 220n Derrida always returning to Freud’s Das Unheimliche (1919)—double, repetition, blurring of borders btwn “imagination” & “reality,” “symbol” & “thing it symbolizes”

p. 238 supplementary double will always defy & baffle criticism, always one extra rejoinder, one recess or representation too many, and thus too few

——replication of tissue and a re-folding

p. 268n (to be continued) in The Uncanny, Freud is most attentive to undecidable ambivalence, play of double, though he separates fictional uncanny from the feeling itself

p. 284n M (at once male/maternal) an upside-down double V

POS pp. 41-2 double writing, double gesture, double science, a writing in/of itself multiple [Derrida explains that the phase of overturning the hierarchy of an opposition is necessary, politically necessary, there are risks of rushing to neutralization, but to remain w/in this phase isn’t enough]

OS p. 55 the now, presence in the act of the present: limpossibilité de coexister avec soi: avec soi, cest-à-dire, avec un autre soi, un autre maintenant, un autre même, un double

p. 65 lautre geste, le plus difficile, le plus inouï, le plus questionnant, celui pour lequel nous sommes le moins préparé, can only be sketched (esquisser), announced in calculated fissures of metaphysical text: 2 texts, 2 hands, 2 visions (together simultaneously & separated)

OTO p. 11 Dionysus vs. Crucified, name of versus, countername, suffices to pluralize (in a singular fashion) homonymic mask & proper name, to lead all threads of name astray in labyrinth (ear)

pp. 16-7 Nietzsche’s living mother/dead father, identity as double & neutral; “I know both, I am both” [“both” must be read as singular] > la vie la mort: the dead man the living feminine

pp. 18-9 Nietzsche’s “I am a Doppelgänger”: a contradiction of “double” beyond negativity of dialectical opposition, Blanchot’s Pas au-delà, a single pas, beyond opposition life/death

p. 33 the ear is uncanny, can become double, large or small; Freud says the infant can’t close it

ATIA p. 78 radical evil and double figure of animal: innocent or demonic, apocalyptic

PS p. 181 for Artaud, thief > great invisible Other, furtive persecutor doubles me everywhere: God

p. 182 for Artaud, God is false value of initial worth of what is born: this false value becomes Value, for it doubled what never existed > the work (excrement) repeats this theft, steals another part of me [dispossessing my nonexistent ur-value prior to exiting the Orifice]

pp. 192-93 for Artaud, furtive differance slipped in btwn 2 forms of writing, placing life outside the work, and making its origin (flesh) the epigraph, the breathless (essoufflé) sarcophagus of my discourse > only through writing made flesh, theatrical hieroglyphic, could double be destroyed

O p. 4 structure of double mark (caught [pris], both seized [emprunté] & entangled [enfermé], in binary opposition)

——one of the terms retains old name to destroy opposition to which it no longer quite belongs

——repetition w/out identity, one mark inside, the other outside deconstructed system: double reading, double writing, double science: structure itself is worked in turn

p. 13 double topography, double face, overwritten erasure of Hegel’s preface [undeclared double mark?]

***pp. 24-5 dissemination sets up a pharmacy, can’t count by 1’s, 2’s, 3’s — everything starts w/ dyad (not conflictual, hierarchical, dual oppositions)

p. 25 two/four & the “closure of metaphysics” no longer take, never could take, the form of circular line enclosing a field, finite culture of binary oppositions

p. 40 ontospeleology, another name for mimetology, is not mimesis, an enigma of redoubtable power, but an interpretation of mimesis that misapprehends/distorts logic of double [cf. p. 36]

p. 54 if one is captive to formulas and absolute knowledge, can’t think anything outside the whole, not even its mimetic double

Gii p. 45 Heideggerian hand like alētheia (concealment/disclosure [Verbergung/Entbergung]: double movement)

REST p. 275 a double that doesn’t make a pair, makes a trap, can’t put one’s feet in them

p. 278 what if, and Derrida sees it too, they’re 2 left shoes, a double that fudges (brouille) both “pair & identity” à la fois—paralyzes directionality, fait loucher vers le diable

p. 283 no symbolic contract in case of double that does not form a pair > not 1 (même) chose in 2, but a 2 in identity

***pp. 287-88 Heidegger: from hypokeimenon to subjectum, Roman thought takes over (übernimmt) Greek words w/out corresponding co-originary experience, absence-of-ground (Bodenlosigkeit) of Western thought opens w/ this translation > a transfer, über, over and beyond Greek experience

——these words become ghostly (fantômatiques) doubles of themselves, leur simulacre légers, walk above/in the void, bodenlos

pp. 332-33 Heidegger & Shapiro bound themselves together to law of normal usage, the pair, ligatured worrying dismemberment in order to limit it: pair inhibits “fetishizing” movement, represses diabolical (i.e. a double, duplicity, w/out a pair)—pair rivets (rive) things to “normal” use

p. 326 pair: a doubling that is a narrowing (resserrant), plus strict, plus étroit

pp. 336-37 [re: Heidegger’s stance that a picture is useless to apprehend the useful] this reason doubles up (se dédouble): un mouvement dentrelacement du lacet: 1) the interlacing of lace w/ itself 2) incompletely laced (entre-lacé), entrouvert (half-open) 3) figurer of lace interlaced with what is figured

——Heidegger’s argument hangs (tient) on 2 reasons that double each other, remarkable mode of interlacing: one reason marked in the other or in itself

p. 373 once there is ghost (fantôme) or double as revenant, logic of identification is not easily appeased > ghost of Van Gogh: genitive translates the malaise, Unheimlichkeit, all by itself

p. 376 disparate: that which opens up fort: da of shoe size (pointure), possibility of dis-pairing, play of dis/appearing > double, Doppelgänger, not pair (unadaptable to walking [à la marche])

DST DST p. 224 Lacoue-Labarthe: [subject] ‘desists’ because must confront at least 2 figures (or one figure that is at least double) > destabilizing Lacan’s imaginary/symbolic

PIO p. 19 double blow, the same blow: fabulous invention becomes invention of truth

PF p. xxxiii passivity marks all unconditional pure events (gift, forgiveness, hospitality, death), marks and thus doubly limits most active, productive performativity

EJQB p. 68 that which was impossible for classical rationalists: to proceed w/in duplicity of God’s questionability > God is not truthful: accede to virtue of lie

AFR pp. 62-3 Condillac resists opposition btwn continuist/discontinuist, evolutionist/epigeneticist histories (deconstructs them almost by itself) > double gesture: generates a new science & theory of general conditions for upsurge of a theory [new science]

p. 119 for Condillac, bad metaphysics is frivolous, hollow signs, purely verbal; Condillac had to guard his discourse from frivolity as if from its infinitely alike double [doppelgänger]

***p. 133 a “stretched sense” always risks being empty, [the analogic of the sign], means we never escape 2 imaginations, 2 identities, 2 metaphysics, 2 barbarisms > always a double or stand-in for idea itself: frivolity’s last/first garment

LI pp. 70-1 what is re-markable about the mark includes margin w/in mark > mark is remarkable in that it “is” also its margin

——line of margin can never be determined rigorously: divides the dividing-line & its unity at once > iterability allows for “negative” double, lie, also conditions so-called “positive” values

TN pp. 281-82 dissymmetry of se toucher toi makes “you” the touchable (untouchable) pole of an apostrophizing address

OG pp. 36-7 (54-5) to think writing first, a perversion, dangerous promiscuity, origin ungraspable, the violence of forgetting, auxiliary meaning not living (not spontaneous); representation mingles (senlace) w/ what it represents; infinite reference (renvoi): le double dédouble ce quil redouble

p. 312 for Derrida, there’s an interior doubling of presence, a constitution/frustration of jouissance, a call & trace that Rousseau tries to elude

SPEC p. 270 Beyond and Das Unheimliche: devil comes back neither as imaginary representation, nor as an apparition in person: devil comes back “in person” to double his double…a doubling doubling his double, devil overflows his double at moment he’s nothing but his double

——dialectics acquits itself [allays uneasiness] of double, opposes mask to original “in person”

——visitation of devil, apparition of “thing in itself,” over & above representative that’s supposed to supplement him, supplement of its “own supplement”: expands double-effects, upsets appeasing order of representation, duplicity w/out original > for Rousseau, diabolical brings fright to a climax

FV pp. 415-16 for Freud, dreams of nakedness don’t exhibit penis or absence of penis but absence of phallus, absence of attribute supplementing a possible fault, absence of colossal double > following chain is indicated: truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame [Schreber] me

pp. 459-61 Lacan forecloses the double w/out mercy, contains it in the imaginary > imaginary/symbolic duality controls Unheimlichkeit, the anguishing disarray (laffolement angoissant) (w/out hope of closure, reappropriation, or truth) provoked by references (renvois) from simulacrum to simulacrum, double to double

——analysand seeing his/her double: “uncontrollable anxiety” disrupts every verification of identity, obstacle for transference

p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

pp. 490-92 the fancy (fantastique) of an identification btwn 2 doubled doubles, the narrator inside what he narrates, makes [Lacan’s] triangular logic very limited play w/in the play

——[re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

——double, Unheimlichkeit, doesn’t belong to triad, triangle carried into a labyrinth of doubles, w/out original, fac-similes

DOUBLE INJUNCTION (DOUBLE BIND)

GT pp. 36-37 is madness the movement of the circle or its excess? besieges reason at its 2 borders (inside & outside)

——linked to double bind (stricture, ligature, obligation) > absolve, forget absolutely & forgive by giving (lier et délier absolument)

p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

R p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

***p. 39 Derrida does not acknowledge a political turn or ethical turn [in his work]: thinking of differance always political, contour & limits of political, around enigma or autoimmune double bind of the democratic (not certain democracy a political thought through & through)

p. 83 [quoted in KH] democratic double injunction (around edges of khōra): 1) all-inclusive 2) secret entrusted to those worthy of it > paradox of example, good example

p. 84 event (im-possible) announces itself in the form of an injunction (comes from on high)

——never leaves me in peace, can’t put off until later

***p. 91 “to” of “to-come” wavers btwn: imperative injunction (call or performative) and patient perhaps of messiancity (nonperformative exposure)

——the two haunt each other, are each other’s alibis, withdrawing into the secret of irony, of which democracy gives the right: to fiction and literature

FK p. 43 “religion” involved in reacting antagonistically, re-affirmatively outbidding itself > in this place knowledge & faith bound to each other by band of their opposition

p. 88 religion as ellipsis of sacrifice, Heidegger sees ontotheology as free from sacrifice & prayer, but Derrida sees double bind, religion excluding & requiring sacrifice, indemnification of unscathed, auto-immunization & sacrifice of sacrifice

BL p. 203 law is interdit (prohibition, prohibited): terrifying double bind of its own taking place

LOBL p. 118 infinite violence [of what’s strictly called] “double bind,” double invagination, double obligation, double demand > sans arrêt and arrêt de mort, no reconciliation

pp. 165-166 hymen, double bind, double affirmation, yes, yes, come, come [re: Blanchot’s 2 ghostly fiancées in Larrêt de mort] signifies, desires, arrête life death

——hymen is a “double bind” because each of these bonds that bind is [?], in itself, double

p. 167 “and” as arrêt de mort, “and” of double bind, and I say “come,” “and immediately"-writing, annihilates time in ring of eternal return, yokes affirmation to itself in récit, the being-at-the-same-time of the other beyond time

POO pp. 22-3 impossible to respond, impossible not to respond, double bind, 2 hands nailed down [no choice]

——brought to a halt [arrêt?] when faced w/ contradictory orders

***SPOM p. 191-92 capital contradiction, at origin of capital: induces the “pragmatic” double constraint of all injunctions [see POO p. 143n difference btwn “use” & “mention”]

——table dances spontaneously, autonomously, but it moves others too

——not just contradiction of sensuous non-sensuous in same Thing, but contradiction of automatic autonomy (spontaneity) > on stage of market, table (commodity) is a prosthesis of itself

POOF p. 30 perhaps as non-dialectical passage from one to other that Aristotle can’t think, unable to endure contamination coming from what is beyond both antithetical values > Nietzsche: “Glaube an die Gegensatze der Werthe (faith in antithetical values)”

p. 39 btwn concept/event a double bind occurs, imposes itself to be endured there, law of an aporia, undecidability, crucial disjunction btwn thinking & knowing: gift, invention

p. 174 teleiopoesis carries w/in it an irresistible disavowal, fearing all the chance & threat of the perhaps?: the called converted to the repressed, friend into enemy

——to renounce desire, must command the other to be free, to address the other qua other, command him to be capable of not answering, double bind [eg. don’t answer my phone call]

pp. 184-85 via Montaigne, law of secrecy placed above law of city, apolitical drive of friendship divides virtue or reason > double bind: 1) sovereign fraternity of secrecy btwn 2 w/out perjury 2) political secrecy of brotherhood begins w/ the 3rd, opens to perjury

MPM pp. 51-2 fidelity requires that one quote, let other speak, and that one not restrict oneself to quoting > double law of Mnemosyne or common law of double source Mnemosyne/Lethe

MSUB J p. 169 neither/nor of subjectile (neither subservient nor dominating) situates place of a double constraint (both screen & projectile) > becomes unrepresentable

A pp. 14-5 [Derrida quickly reviews many places in his own work where he studied aporetology, paradoxical limitrophy, double bind]

p. 18 decision concerns choice btwn relation w/ a wholly non-opposable other (an other that’s not its other) and an other who is its other (can be opposed in a couple) > the former relation is that of aporia, not a crossing of border but a double concept of the border

SEC p. 329 deconstruction overturns (renversement), displaces, by means of double writing, double science, double gesture; field of oppositions that it criticizes [sic] can also be nondiscursive

——logic of paleonymy, provisional conservation of old name, while liberating, “grafting,” excluded, subordinated predicates (resistances, remainders of dominant force)

OH p. 29 double bind, injunction divides us > guardians of a European idea that cares for what is other than it, the other heading, the heading of the other

pp. 38-40 double injunction of Europe: 1) cannot be dispersed (monopoly) 2) remote control [TV] (dispersion)

p. 41 ethics, politics, responsibility only begin in aporia of double injunction

p. 44 double bind of European cultural identity: 1) necessary not to reconstitute centralizing hegemony (the capital) 2) necessary not to cultivate minority differences for their sake, untranslatable idiolects (not to multiply borders, marges, marches)

——alliance of capital and a-capital (the other of capital): this seems impossible, it is, such is the nature of all responsibility

pp. 76-9 the duty to respond to call of European memory, all other duties presuppose this one in silence [?]

——duty to act in accord w/ a double contradiction that is not simply a Kantian illusionary antimony but an effective one (w/ experience, through experiment), interminable

pp. 80-1 double constraint, performative contradiction, undecidable (typical, recurring form & inexhaustible singularization) > conditions for duty can only take negative form, once you hear “these are the conditions,” you are being deluded

PAS PAS p. (33) bivalence of contraband or double bind (of near and far), affects everything that “is,” that is present, that arrives, comes to pass, the essence of the event and event of essence

p. (77) logic of double band arrests laughter and shamelessness (limpudeur) when they shield themselves (se défendent) against anguish and affirmation > contamination btwn laughs and violations is inevitable

***p. (105) double band is structure of name said to be proper, anonymity is the effect, whether by monumentalization (sauf, the unscathed) or effacement (seeds, dispersion); gift of name is corrupted in advance dans le pas-de-nom [plus-de-nom] > what takes place in and beyond language: leaves the fold of this folding back

T p. xxiv vanne ouverte à une double entente ne formant plus un seul système

FWT pp. 3-4 heir must respond to double injunction: reaffirm what comes “before us,” necessary (il faut) to appropriate a past fundamentally inappropriable, reaffirm, relaunch otherwise, keep alive

——reaffirmation which continues & interrupts: one’s own decision as that of the other: signature against signature

pp. 4-5 contradictory/uncomfortable double injunction: mad for an absolute past, past whose (im)measure that of bottomless memory, while dreading nostalgia, fixation, cult of remembrance: nothing seems desirable save in this injunction > leave life in life & make it live again [this “heir]

p. 8 heritage not only a double injunction or reaffirmation but a choice, filtering, heir not only receives but is one who risks choosing

p. 76 risk decision by enduring undecidable: 2 contradictory imperatives

***p. 132 double bind: must not give ground on either legitimate injunction, no decision, no responsibility worthy of the name that doesn’t endure this double injunction, this terrible law, the law of the law, which gives responsibility a chance, leaving no chance for good conscience [see 223n double bind a word coined to describe schizophrenic]

P p. 129 sublime does violence to our imagination, all the more sublime for that, shock, double bind (attraction, repulsion), violent incommensurability

POS pp. 3-4 Derrida’s “books" are entirely consumed by reading of other texts, while also referring only to its own writing: we must conceive these contradictory ideas together [deconstruction of book]

ROP p. 26 resistance [to analysis] as double bind, other or outside at heart of internal auto-affective tension > it provokes analysis and dialectic to infinity, in order to resist both absolutely

pp. 29-30 deconstruction announces status w/out status of nonfinite # of names/quasi-concepts: the thinking of writing called for this, but it’s better thematized and formalized in theory of double bind, stricture of double band, and especially non-ontological remaining

double bind drives deconstruction in rhythmic compulsion to track desire for origin, and to raise its stakes, la pousse à une surenchère > interminable drama of analysis, il fallait faire droit to the law deconstructed, w/ une affirmation donatrice unknown to yet driving analysis

p. 30 double bind at work on examples of all undecidable figures (hymen, pharmakon…), carry predicates incompatible btwn themselves, in their very btwn, interlacing, sumplukē, chiasmatic invagination > but each one, in its sumplukē, makes up a single trace [?]

pp. 31-2 iterability as condition/constitution of identity, ideality, of all concepts, but also (double bind) that which resists hierarchical and binary oppositions, a quasi-concept, inconceivable concept > not confusion, approximation, but “reaffirmed exigency of analysis”

p. 33 Glas and The Post Card, books on bind (Band), nexum, desmos, stricture, “unsolvable-postal effect”

p. 35 “deconstruction's” double bind: 1) inherit from Enlightenment, affirmed/displaced in Freud, Husserl, & even Heidegger 2) tirelessly analyze resistance that clings to the elementary

p. 36 law of antinomy, can only be endured in its tension (Kant’s antinomies the fated outcome of analysis), paradox of a double “one must”: one can only endure the double bind in passion

—— double bind (preferable to double contrainte), is the call to analysis: one can never fully analyze it, one can only unbind one of its knots by making the other tighter: movement I call stricture

***p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

OTO pp. 16-7 Nietzsche’s living mother/dead father, identity as double & neutral; “I know both, I am both” [“both” must be read as singular] > la vie la mort: the dead man the living feminine

ATIA pp. 63-4 je rêve, donc, au fond dun terrier introuvable et à venir: the schizis of a contradictory injunction > translate an inhuman language w/out the usual bêtise re: animal

O pp. 3-6 [summary] must face risk of “old name,” not simply declare freedom of signifier (autonomy of meaning) or go outside (which affirms homogeny of closure, which doesn’t exist) > double mark (1 mark in/1 mark out deconstructed system), double reading, double science: no concept, no name, no signifier can escape this structure

WAP p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

——double bind of philosophical commitment or pledge (droit, if a philosopheme, also submitted to law of double bind: unstable, deconstructible, it precedes itself, calls for indestructible responsibility)

pp. 105-06 double bind of techno-science (formalization)/philosophy (mother/natural tongue): 1) formalization of techno-science resists monolingual hegemony of philosophy as onto-encylopedia—science of sciences 2) philosophy can still point to dogmatic philosophemes in science

pp. 106-07 ingenuity of human sciences (precritical) offers privileged ground for ideological reinvestments > double bind, the nodosité (knottiness) of the knot structure: precriticalness is often of a philosophical nature—and where is the State in all this?

SW pp. 341-42 the 2 categorical imperatives of tallith/prayer: don’t be late, must be living skin: untenability of these imperatives the very possibility of the promise

TB p. 117 every translator is committed, committed by the other before having committed himself?

p. 118 if original text demands translation, the original is indebted to the translator, original is 1st debtor: God weeps over his untranslatable name > [his Law as law of translation]

——double bind is the law, in name of God: most originary, most sacred, must be translated, deciphered: translation not 2nd (secondary): constructor cannot make universal tongue, deconstructor constrained by appeal to translation

DPi pp. 126-27 for Kant, justice finds itself here in double bind, knot: either honor (Ehrbegriff) is vain or DP should simply be set aside > Die Auflösung dieses Knotens: no more DP when law (CI) & nature align

——no more need to not DP women, they’ll never marry out of wedlock (Derrida adds: extraordinary & stupid uselessness, rigor & absurdity of Kant’s logic)

pp. 240-41 angel came announcing deconstruction of death, but deconstruction has more than one angel, the other warned against banalizing, relativizing DP like Christianity has done, using an alibi of beyond to deny irreversible gravity of death [returns to angels on pp. 253-54]

p. 283 DP will survive (other figures will be invented for it) > still must militate against it

CHM pp. 35-6 there are 2 ways to totally disengage totality of historical language: 1) stay silent about silence 2) follow madman down road of his exile [rabbit hole]

RGE p. 266 sovereignty, the putting at stake, the space of writing, absolute in night of secret: “continuum of sovereign communication has as its milieu this night of secret difference” > one would understand nothing if one thought there’s a contradiction btwn these 2 requisites

***REST p. 340 logic of detachment as cut (opposition, leads to suturing-sublation, maintains problematic of castration truth) vs. logic of detachment as stricture (is tout autre, interlacing of differance of [or as] stricture, no suture, haunting, neither empty nor full, largument-de-la-gaine, can’t accommodate the couple, ces coupes oppositionelles, the ghost leases, le, la, les double(s) band-)

——[Derrida describes this logic of stricture as a double bind suspendu/tendu à la fois, but will not attach it strictly to another discourse on double bind] > any stricture is à la fois stricturation & destricturation

p. 377 the de-paired (le dépareillé), the disparate, helps us better to think the pair’s repair (à sa réparation), à panser (bandage), à bander là où le-la-les double(s) band- [cf. P p. 88]

DST DST p. 199 tie thinking of untranslatable idiom to logic of double constraint: one must avoid avoiding, one cannot avoid avoiding, il faut, il ne faut pas

p. 203 question of obsession, of obsidionality, of exposure on all sides, arises w/ figure of a besieged (assiégée) power

——this figure is impregnable because it has no single site, single figure

——it harasses (harcèle) out of (depuis) sa désistance all the others in turn

traps everywhere, double bind and hyperbologic leave no way out (aucun issue)

——must know all this to begin to think

——double bind (as ending parentheses): can’t close one front w/out opening another on another side

——thus Lacoue-Labarthe’s “style,” ethos, multiplying parentheses, rhythm of warnings, which don’t protect anyone > warning stands watch so no one will fail to expose oneself

p. 205 à la fois (double bind) > point out & not point out (relever et ne pas relever)

***pp. 215-16 désistance brings to light anoia, not to be confused w/ madness though it can resemble it > double bind btwn 2 madnesses: 1) one of disintalling 2) one of reason, defensive stiffening (crispation) in assistance [Kafka], imitation, identification > madness against madness

——[in reference to method found in Lacoue-Labarthe] supplementary loop (boucle), tempted to call it a ring (anneau), voire bague (band), a certain circulation takes on value of prescription: obligation, injunction, alliance > detour & return path > inside and outside path of epochality

***p. 225 Derrida says that no dialectic can overcome (ne saurait venir à bout) double constraint, double law, that of knot & caesura, obligation & cut (i.e. rhythm) > but then wonders if double bind is too dialectical, so he thinks of an arrythmic gap, hiatus, caesura, another undecidable

——un autre indécidable, the gap/hiatus in an undecidable derived from dialectical calculation/contraction, arrhythmic caesura as respiration of rhythm (this necessity awaits us) [pas, heartbeat] [Derrida here wonders if double bind is too dialectical, thus the other undecidable]

p. 230 no rhythm w/out caesura > antirhythmic [Hölderlin], arrhythmic

——interrupts alternation, constraint of opposition, even double bind [cf. p. 225]

——Lacoue-Labarthe: caesura is empty moment, intrusion of prophetic word (Tiresias)

——caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

p. 322n unavoidable resistance to désistance as nonpathological inhibition, no rhythm w/out it, can say the same about the double bind (see p. 228 return to father, subject to law as inhibition, defense) [a safeguarding, a filiation, a subjectivity compelled by the caesura?]

PIO p. 7 singularity of event that produces itself by speaking about itself [Derrida’s essay], invents on subject of invention, bringing it about—while also describing generality of its genre, genealogy of its topos, sustaining tradition de inventione

p. 24 invention only by recourse to lexicon, syntactical rules, prevailing code—a certain submission to conventions (a given configuration)

——the double, indivisible movement of invention: gives place (donne lieu) to an event and produces a machine by introducing a gap (écart) in habit; the “coming,” the venire, the event of

novelty must surprise: no status ready/waiting to reduce it to the same

TR pp. 121-22 band, ribbon, silk, double bind en soie, ringhband, phantasmatic body on which limited ink (finite reserve) is made to flow; ink remains modest but capitalizes, virtually lets flow

——ribbon: subjectile on which one writes & piece of machine thanks to which one will never have done w/ inscribing [all this deconstructs de Man’s claim the “ribbon” is a “free signifier’]

+R p. 162 Ich [the painting, but…] can’t be found in Glas; Ich captures/draws to itself a psicultural machination rhythmed by logic of double band (bind) or so-called sheath argument

C p. 221 [re: out-of-series] dynamic instability or even double bind (holds coffin btwn its laces): both colossal/radiating/magnificent & diminished/abandoned (délaissé), delacée

p. 243 a discourse on stricture: elles sont tendues pour (faire) bander le mors (bind the bit, get a hard-on), set a trap w/key and lock (serrure) > get up the ghost of a double bind, same lacing in other series, w/in, around two bodies skewered in mirror-image

LI p. 148 undecidability (not “indeterminacy”) always a determinate oscillation btwn possibilities highly determined in strictly defined structures: difference of force in decision of writing (a word whose broad sense includes political action & experience in general) > no indecision or double bind w/out determination: occasionally, each side terribly necessary & irreplaceably singular

p. 152 “double writing”: irreducible divisibility, “quasi-transcendental,” must partition itself along 2 sides of a limit and respect the rules (to certain extent) of what it deconstructs

——without this tension, contradiction, could anything be done? change?

TN p. 18 penser le toucher en touchant à lintouchable > injunction of impossible?

AD pp. 33-4 violence of pure face to face (hospitable welcome, narcissistic closing [renfermement]): in double bind [not a term Levinas would use] w/ the 3rd (protects against vertigo of ethical violence while violating its purity)

——justice as law begins w/ perjury > violates; sigh of just man: “Quai-je à faire avec la justice?”

CF p. 35 inherit a heritage w/ a double & contradictory injunction: reinvent memory w/out norm or criteria

BSi pp. 59-60 double bind of being inside or outside of marriage (inside/outside cage), double bind of domestication, regret on both sides

pp. 300-02 liberty & sovereignty (its limitless “I can”) are indissociable, double bind in 2 senses: 1) double injunction 2) duplicity in very concept of binding, obligation, bind, bond: stricture rather than structure, stricture that limits liberty along w/ sovereignty or sovereignty along w/ liberty

——double bind [#1 above]: deconstruct ontotheology of sovereignty w/out questioning liberty in name of which we put this deconstruction to work: think liberty differently, w/in distribution of a divisible sovereignty > think unconditional w/out indivisible sovereignty

——if double bind (implacable contradiction) ever lifted (that’s impossible, how could anyone wish for it?) > paradise; can only dream of paradise (absolute felicity and inescapable catastrophe)

OG pp. 48-50 (70-2) Pierce’s sign w/ no final reference comes close to deconstruction, he complies w/ 2 incompatible exigencies w/out sacrificing one for the other > links symbol & sign, semiotics & logic: to think only in signs, is to ruin the notion of sign > the thing itself is a sign

pp. 237-38 [review of Rousseau] voice immediacy, hieroglyphic immediacy, in and out of nature: [double bind of] need & passion, Rousseau describes une différance supplémentaire [writing/pity]

pp. 245-46 (349) [excluded 3rd defied by supplement] incompatibles brought together [Freud’s dream interpretation] [double bind]: Rousseau affirms both that which constructs via articulation (passion, language, society, man) & that which is canceled by it (accent, life, energy, passion) [passion both prior to supplement & supplemental] > Rousseau dissociates these contradictions while allowing an intact purity (une pureté inentameé) to both negative & positive

——Rousseau says what he doesn’t wish to say: graphics of supplementarity is not comprised in any dialectic (a concept governed by horizon of presence, eschatological parousia, parole pleine)

ATAP p. 64 grace when writing of other absolves you from double bind, gift unbinds itself from double bind > grace can never be proven, improbable: belief itself

p. 92 John Patmos’ double bind: “do not seal the words of the inspiration of this book” > must disobey in order to obey: problem of translation re: quotation marks (“I, Yéshoua”)

***CIR p. 128 “I promised to God never to write anything more except on the most irrepressible of drives, the double condition” [double bind]

p. 133 word Sony reminds me of the dream in Turin, btwn Rousseau/Nietzsche > my two positive heroes

p. 256 day of circumcision: a de-cision was taken in me w/out me > Jealousy & virginity, my two nipples

***p. 268-70 in all the history of humanity, have never known anyone happier, luckier, more euphoric than I (isn’t this a priori true?) > and yet [double bind] remained counterexample of myself: sad, deprived, neurotic, jealous, disappointed

——can’t write w/out these two certainties > interest as passionate as it is disillusioned w/ language, literature, philosophy > impossibility to say: “I sign”

p. 279 Derrida as favorite son: excluded and favorite, at two juxtaposed moments [double bind]

EU p. 23 violence comes from both sides, each term of opposition marked by other side (not simply passage btwn 2 poles): law/nonlaw, writing/speech, death/life, paternal/maternal language): always 2 forces of frayage and resistance: each bearing life/death at once

p. 62 double bind that knots around sublime body of “teacher of philosophizing” [i.e. philosophy eludes teaching, philosophizing requires it]: teacher haunts the scene, doesn’t dominate, or dominates like a ghost > one might say he fascinates/seduces if these connotations weren’t too closely tied to imagination/sensibility: for reason should break the charm [of sensibility?]

pp. 100-01 interpretation of poem, philosopheme, theologeme always proposes an institutional model, consolidating an existing one or constituting a new one: calls for politics of community of interpreters > every text/element of corpus bequeathes/reproduces several injunctions

——every text opens/closes, double bind, undecidability, an overdetermination that can’t be mastered

pp. 168-73 [structure of matrix of philosophical discipline] is a “nondialectizable” contradiction, divided law, double law, double bind, antinomy: the fights/debates we’re talking about always oppose different philosophies

——Husserl’s transcendental community of “we” in face of “crisis” & Heidegger’s call of Being comprises, pre-comprehends, us—so we begin w/ them & otherwise:

*1st commandment: 2 ends: the cheap end, the Kantian end

*2nd commandment: local, ubiquity

*3rd commandment: teach, not teach

*6th commandment: time requirements, and “single blow (tout à coup)”

*7th commandment: place, non-place

***p. 173 only livable community (for Derrida, this is a faith in spirit of philosophy w/out dogma, murder, idiotic polemic, hateful distortion) wouldn’t shun/deny double law [i.e. a teacher must initiate/train a student while effacing him/herself in name of autodidactic tradition]

SPEC pp. 260-61n when Manu is absolved of Varuna’s double bind by Indra, will Manu escape bind of profit (bénéfice) from Indra’s grace, will he only love Indra?

p. 261 to account/read the athetic, Derrida unsatisfied w/ dérive (drifting), too continuous/homogenous movement, travels away w/out saccade > prefers double bind, des effondrements de bord, la rive se partage en son trait même

p. 352 [re: repetition before PP or collaborates w/ PP] the 2 repetitions (2 logics) as constitutive duplicity, double bind

——if there’s any chance of reading illegible text as illegible: must take incalculable double bind (bande) of PP into account

DOUBT

***ATIA p. 126 casting doubt on responsibility, decision, being-ethical > the essence of ethics, decisions, responsibility [no doubt would be a programmable reaction]

EAR [see HEAR(ING)]

HERP p. 172 for Heidegger, animal has no ear so can’t have a friend

p. 178 Dasein (Daseins ear) is beside what is heard [see What Poets are For?], carries beside itself (bei sich) the voice of the friend > all depends on semantics of bei, beside, auprès de: neither very close nor infinitely distant

p. 179 acc. Heidegger, philosophy addresses itself to us as a summons, we respond, in a correspondence (Entsprechen), lend an ear, w/ that toward which philosophy is underway (unterwegs)

p. 180 deconstruction, or rather Heidegger’s Destruktion: appropriation of the tradition (while “destructing”), calls itself (heisst): “open our ear (unser Ohr öffnen)” [to a friend?]

p. 186 for Heidegger, ear is poetic (dichtende), hears in advance what it causes to burst forth, elle donne elle-même à entendre ce quelle entend [a heart?]

p. 188 “we do not hear because we have ears, we have ears because we hear” > for Heidegger, to hear we must forget the ears, to hear (hören) it’s necessary to listen, to hearken (horchen)

——Heidegger, dual hands, dual ears [ontic?], single hands, single ears [ontological: hear, give?] > passage from plural to singular is essential

p. 189 Heidegger our organ of hearing is a necessary condition but not sufficient

***p. 206 Heidegger’s desire to hear better, w/ another ear, beyond consonance w/ narrow political, determined context toward horizon of a more open future

p. 209 [re: Heidegger] what assures homology of to auton, the reversible tautology btwn polemos and philein, what gathers tautology w/ itself, is logos > “philology,” tautology is otology

T p. xi Marges concerns relevance of limit, a reading of the Hegelian Aufhebung, a reading beyond Hegel’s own intention, beyond that which is inscribed on the internal vestibule of his ear, where Hegel’s text would be a writing machine of “conscious intention,” thus a mechanical reader

p. xiii circular complicity of the metaphor of the eye & the ear

——Derrida allows Nietzsche’s hammer back into philosophy because “to hear w/ their eyes too” is a typical metaphysical complicity, and the hammer inside the ear (protects against noise, keeps rhythm) does not disrupt the serenity of metaphysics, it participates in it

pp. leiris xiii-xiv perce-oreille/Persephone, ear-wig

p. xv Derrida’s membrane of tympanum stretched obliquely in ear—not perpendicular—to hear the margins (loxōs of logos, a tout autre ambush, an oblique ambush)

p. xvii ear is the organ that produces effect of proximity, absolute properness, throat to ear > shelter of indifference > no organs

p. xvii(n) ear-vulva, hymen, vesta, vestibule, hearth, familial

p. xviii(n) un autre tympan > tympanum, Dionysianism, labyrinth, the spiral walkways of a shell stretched out to sea, ramps don’t hold [play w/ limaçon and conque]

p. xxiii margin not a secondary virginity (but an other text)—an inexhaustible reserve, stereographic activity of an entirely other ear

SP p. 43 all Nietzsche’s investigations, especially those of woman > coiled in labyrinth of ear

OTO p. 11 Dionysus vs. Crucified, name of versus, countername, suffices to pluralize (in a singular fashion) homonymic mask & proper name, to lead all threads of name astray in labyrinth (ear): proceed, then, by seeking out the edges, inner walls, the passages

p. 20(n) institutions of “yes,” have need of ears: Nietzsche doesn’t expect the ears and hands for his truths today—my small ears no small interest to ladies, makes me a monster, anti-ass, Anti-Christ

p. 33 the ear is uncanny, can become double, large or small; Freud says the infant can’t close it

pp. 34-5 your ears grow into ass-ears (inverted cripple) when you think you are free, autonomous, w/ respect to the State > all ears for the phonograph dog, you’re a high-fidelity receiver

——the ear does not answer

pp. 35-6 the umbilicus has you by the ear, the ear is “taking notes,” the master a mouth (ear, mouth: both invaginated, involuted orifices) > the umbilical cord of State (dead father, cold monster) education, like a leash, commands us to write—that’s uncanny

ATIA p. 78 some animal will cock its ears when someone [Descartes] invokes infinity of experiences that “witness to,” w/out feeling need to “review” [animal Derrida? animal Nietzsche?]

DPi p. 29 case of Weidmann: echoed in everyone’s ears [Genet, Derrida]

***pp. 168-69 impossible, unstable, contagious, endemic question of cruelty reinscribed in hollow (creux) of another question: belief (croyance) > believing and not-believing “resonat[e] spectrally in the shell or the hollow of the other’s ear,” every belief “ventriloquized telephonically” by skepsis or epokhē of an “incredible” that is not belief’s contrary, but always a belief w/out belief, cruelty w/out cruelty [?]; cruelty and belief are hollowed into each other, the credited (cru) and the cruel

Gii p. 302n Derrida writes on typewriter w/ 3 hands btwn 3 tongues [re: 3rd ear as ear of other, a supplementary readability of Heidegger]

REST p. 360 Van Gogh’s detached ear isn’t any organ, but Derrida’s not going to compare one ear to a pair of shoes

E p. 19 for Kant, hearing is closest to freedom and spontaneity, one must use term hearing-oneself-speak (le sentendre-parler) because the structure is auto-affective; the mute thus do not have reason, the mouth (indissociable from ear) is not simply an analogy of expression: it is the ground of analogy, regulates analogy, it is logos itself [necessary]

p. 20 for Kant, hearing (w/ its allergy to prosthesis) distinguished from sight by its auto-affective structure, an internal sense, its “form” is time > not an anthropological but a psychological space

——for Kant, sight is most noble sense, but hearing is least replaceable, most allergic to prosthesis, tolerates substitution badly, almost succeeds in resisting vicariousness: this is why the mute will never know concepts, they cannot access the universal signs

CIN p. 55 and you can also receive semen through the ear

EATING (EUCHARIST)

POO p. 19 no vegetarian can avoid “sublimity of mystical cannibalism, cannibalism in mourning”

SPOM p. 167 Cartesian cogito, Kantian “I think,” phenomenological ego cogito: “a real presence is promised here to a Eucharistic Narcissus” > living being visited by its own apparition

——[re: Marx critiquing Stirner] food, Last Supper, host as conjuring tricks naively accrediting discursive powers: “abuse of etymology that serves as explanation, play on homonyms, privileging of nomination, autonomization of language”

p. 180 “is not the Christic moment, and within it the Eucharistic instant, the hyperbole of acharnement itself?”

MPM p. 34 Freud’s “normal” “work of mourning”: interiorizing idealization—devouring the other—mimetic interiorization is not fictive, it’s the origin of fiction, of apocryphal figuration

PAS PAS p. (81) Blanchot: the work (lensemble) is trying to devour and devour itself endlessly into nothing

p. (82) Blanchot: key word to enigma is this enigma, capable not of devouring me but associating me w/ its devouring avidity

S p. 97 duplicity of Geist, as its evil ghost, brings forth question: is ash good or evil? whiteness of ash which belongs to destiny consumed and consuming (conflagration of flame)

p. 98 Heidegger: spirit flames devour, consume, everything, including the white of ash

——Trakl: “flame is the brother of the palest”

FSW p. 231 eating words, as excrement, as nourishing honey, as inky dust of law [Ezekiel, Numbers]

PPHS pp. 92(n) for Hegel, theory via vision, is death of desire, desire of death > no consummation of light (can’t be eaten); theoretical: “lets objects persist freely & independently”

T p. xxv [deconstruction:] limitrophic violence imprinted acc. new types, eat margin in luxating the tympanum (relation to itself of double membrane)

F p. xxxviii other—atopique > means they can never tell you how they want to be eaten

p. xxxix cryptophore, à manger le morceau (le mors) sans pouvoir le digérer, must constantly betray cipher that seals and conceals it > Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, truly cryptic story

FWT p. 5 deconstruction is hyperconceptual: large-scale consumption of concepts that it produces as much as it inherits

p. 67 re: animals, will there ever be a law differentiating killing from letting die?

——re: absolute “vegetarianism,” a certain form of cannibalism is unsurpassable

p. 68 Derrida gave seminar on “Eating the Other,” studied Kleist’s Penthesilea > love: temptation to eat the other

p. 160 “one must forget well” (basically same transubstantiation as) “one must eat well”: il faut bien oublier la mort, il faut bien manger

love object is perpetuated in being betrayed/forgotten, the one who died must be forgotten

ATIA p. 159 differences btwn how a human eats and how an animal eats are not those btwn “as such” and “not as such,” the ambition of describing this difference exceeds “me (Derrida)”

O p. 52 [in field of dissemination] formalism no longer fails (néchoue) before empirical richness [like in Hegel?] but before une queue, dont le se-mordre [self-bite] nest ni spéculaire ni symbolique

DPi pp. 191-92 sans sang (U.S., Eucharist—real presence of blood of God): interiorization of blood in noncruel DP > turning point as a return, ce trop ou ce trope of blood

p. 206 guillotine’s wooden uprights, buveuse de sang (blood swiller), flowing red > drinks the blood, makes it disappear

pp. 260-61 dapnaō, to spend, dapanē, expenditure, dapanēria, prodigality, daptō, devour, consume, damnum (w/out p), injury sustained through forcible seizure, curtailment of resources

——curtailment of capital, head > capital punishment

——for Benveniste, damnare is “to compel to spend,” expense considered as “sacrifice of money” > give money for nothing

pp. 282-83 still be eating flesh in vegetarianism (will eat waiting for Christ, assimilate his blood as commanded, how can one love w/out being tempted to take it w/in oneself: Love & Eucharist), still be DP after abolition, other figures will be found for it

TN p. 58 when Nancy gives thought to birth of body, it’s sarcastic [having it out w/ flesh], mordant, une transsubstantiation acharnée qui inlassablement mord, remord et met à mort la chair > impossible auto-biography, transubstantiation of Eucharist itself: Corpus bursts out laughing

pp. 60-3 Nancy’s 4 metaphorical displacements of touch: 1) not to “touch” 2) finishing “touch” of pure Idea 3) anesthesia/euthanasia “as soon as it is touched…” 4) longing for touch

——Nancy’s thought of touch as flailing, weighing, scales or scourge of God (all senses of French fléau), exapropriation of most proper, autoimmune desire of proper, expulsion: eating one’s heart out > “saisie dessaisie ou dessaisissante (a seizing put-upon or at grips with one’s grasp)”

——unleavened bread—throbbing, bloody heart

p. 146 M-P: sensation a form of communion, eating bread [Eucharist]

p. 185 connection btwn “self-touching” of “human body” [flesh] and body of Christian ontotheology, its eucharistic ecstasy par excellence [Nancy too?]

E p. 21 logo-phonocentric system doesn’t exclude a negative, negative is its business, it’s work, it excludes what can’t be digested, represented, eaten, irreducible heterogeneity: vomit

p. 25 w/in logocentric system (w/in the name), one simply can’t name what’s outside it, to say it would be to eat it—or, what is no longer absolutely different—to vomit it

EW p. 280 link the question of “who” to the question of “sacrifice,” phallogocentrism as a schema of carnivorous virility

——carno-phallogocentrism: a heterotautology as a priori synthesis, i.e. “speculative idealism,” “becoming-subject of substance,” “absolute knowledge,” “speculative Good Friday” > idealizing interiorization of phallus and its necessity of its passage through the mouth

pp. 282-83 “il faut bien manger” (it’s good to eat, one must eat well), a learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat, a rule offering infinite hospitality

——sublime refinement involved in respect for the other: a way of “Eating well” or “eating the good”

AD p. 82 how does the “and already non- (et déjà non-)” [already non-political] of Levinas’ peace eat (mordre), get eaten by, the “political”?

CIN pp. 56-8 [quoting from PC] Derrida telling “you” [his love?] to eat all his ashes, to approach him by slowly advancing toward death, an absolute reconciliation

BSi p. 23 sovereignty, devoro, voraz, vorator, devour w/ teeth, rush to bite > kill or mourn the other?

——devouring and vociferation (voice exteriorizes what is eaten, what is interiorized) > listening, obeying the sovereign voice through donkey’s ears [sovereign devours, like beast, to speak as sovereign to stupid beast]

pp. 60-1 Socrates: wolf loves lamb like lover adores beloved

p. 65 double carry (portée) of mouth (human) & maw (animal): voci-ferates (carry the voice) & devours (voracious carry)

p. 210 [vis-à-vis Cixous] love of wolf—love of fear, wolf loves by consum(mat)ing > nothing stronger than love, save death

pp. 284-85 Derrida mocks the circus of modern political actors > kissing babies: pâté de campagne

OG p. 340n Rousseau: “I have always had a fancy for eating while reading”

***CIR p. 78 desire for literature is circumcision, text read does not suffice, has to be eaten, sucked

EAU

PAS p. (36) she slips into the water when she is abandoned by ses pas

p. (37) water: a movement w/out pas, beyond all tension (crispation) of pas, degree zero of an infinite metaphor [see p. (84) sans as degree o]

pp. (38-9) eau, element where she no longer can find a foothold, also element of “sovereign time,” illusion du sans-pas, of the absence of space, when ses pas have left her, her movement is always entry, penetration [see HYMEN]

***——water as cruel illusion of “sovereign time,” illusion of sans pas

p. (39) name, thing, element of name or thing, syllable or letter determines eau as sea, tide, with rhythms and edges (bordures), shores or wrecks (rivages ou naufrages)

pp. (58-9) neither word nor syllable eau, o, could signify affection by which what departs from come relates to itself from the other: there was no water

——waters (parages), where every machine is stopped

p. (64) le surgissement, calling someone to his own proper name in water > analyze baptism from this gift of the name

p. (83) Blanchot: looking at them (elles) as if they had risen from their graves, and, I remain in their fascination > cest la scène deau, la noyade et léventualité de viens

pp. (83-4) eau is a rebus, a morsel (morceau) or moment of a word (thing, letter, names, syllable, cry) > like sans, pas, sauf, rat, not a theme, sense, signifier

p. (88) the immense always brings us back to the water

pp. (99-100) in a moment of extreme, precipitous virtuosity, where o (mort, fors, faux, faut, zéro, mot) resonates everywhere and nom turns to mon, Derrida asks himself if his policing overzealousness [to unmask the absence of the name, le pas-de-nom] deciphers identities [maur/chot, m’: o], wants to catch everything in a dragnet (filet)

pp. (101-02) o as degree 0 (of appearance), double 0 as “power of 0 and 2” > the pas de Sans-Nom, EROS, neither gathers, identifies, nor excludes the one or the other

p. (104) name is no more its infinitely divisible elements than it is dispersed in them like foam in anonymous sea [Kant’s simple/composite]

PPHS p. 71 Hegel [Science of Logic]: sign, more precisely Sprache, fulfills spiritual function of middle (like water in nature)

pp. 76-7 Vorstellung, remembered-interiorized intuition; Erinnerung, interiorized memory, places images in reserve, like water in unconscious pit, like vein at bottom of mine > permits passage to conceptuality

RM pp. 49-50 [cf. Pas] the dérive or dérapage (skidding) as un certain jeu de lancre in surrounding waters (parages): Derrida can only stop engines (machines) of this floating vehicle [my discourse on metaphor], which would still abandon it to its unforeseeable dérive [more metaphorico]

BSi p. 241 [re: D.H. Lawerence’s poem “Snake”] scene of hospitality at water source

OG p. 262 (371) Rousseau: cradle of nations, first fires of love born at water wells; p. 267 “well of oath” in Genesis XXI

pp. 279-80 (396-97) neume, epoch of natural languages: fête autour du point deau, temps de lIsle de Saint-Pierre [?]: limage fixant ce qui ne fut quun point de pur passagela limite toujours déjà franchie, rèpere absolu

ECONOMIMESIS (THE BRIDGE, CLOSURE)

P pp. 117-19 economy of mimesis, law of same & proper, always forms itself anew, only to close up again, also leaves an embouchure each time

——analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), lanalogisme recapitule ou recapite

E p. 2 Kant allies pure morality w/ empirical culturalism in critique of pure judgments of taste

——a politics (a political economy) acts upon his discourse

pp. 2-4 economimesis: to show the link between oikonomia and mimesis

economy not yet defined as general or restricted, their relation must be neither of identity nor contradiction, must be other

p. 4 Kant’s remarks on mimesis set forth by remarks on salary?: 1) difference btwn free (freie) art and mercenary art (Lohnkunst) 2) Fine-Arts must occupy the mind w/out end (but), w/out salary

——for Kant, are is originally not nature (mechanical necessity) but freedom; however, when nature assigns its rules to genius, it folds itself into art: so art no longer mimics nature, nature is the secret resource of mimicry

p. 5 the anthropology of art as freedom, as beyond nature, raises man up, but the “ruse and naiveté” of economimesis: in order to save this absolute privilege of human emergence (art, freedom, language), of grounding it in absolute naturalism [?], man’s production (anthropological domesticity) has to be renaturalized > differentiation effaced into opposition (i.e. bees have no art)

——art can’t enter into circle of commerce, must be free, not a craft (Handwerk), thus mercenary art is lower, is like the work of bees, is not the play of imagination, but a fixed program w/out reason

pp. 5-6 [acc. Kant] free, liberal art: 1) play, not salaried work, free man (artist) is not homo oeconomicus, is more human 2) free, liberal art can utilize mercenary art w/out being contaminated by it 3) a productive, spontaneous, not reproductive (mimetic) imagination

——genius of poetry, the highest of Fine-Arts: full expression of productive imagination receives its rules from Nature, thus breaking from mimesis > free unfolding-refolding of physis

***pp. 8-9 essence, proper, oikos of man is to take pleasure in reflection w/out concept, w/out enjoyment, i.e. non-exhangable productivity: non-exchangeable in terms of sensible objects or signs of sensible objects (money), and in terms of enjoyment (neither use nor exchange value)

——and yet, in this pure oikos, man must seem als ob (as if) it were a product of nature, must resemble nature while not depending on it: the artist thus imitates the very act of nature itself; man as artist-god, a commerce between divine artist and man, this commerce is a mimesis, identification, mask on stage, a “true” mimesis btwn subjects not things that critiques servility of imitation > “true” mimesis: that of 2 productions, 2 freedoms [man & God/nature]

——a divine teleology secures the political economy of Fine-Arts

p. 11 “naturalization of political economy subordinates the production and the commerce of art to a transeconomy,” poet supersedes the circular, rises above restricted economy: economimesis unfolds itself to infinity: “Kantism" passes into “Hegelianism”

——poetic gift is an add-on (un en-plus), given as a power to give by God so that, via the poet, this supplementary surplus value can return to the infinite source, the poet breaks from the circular economy, that is the passage to the infinite: passage of infinity btwn gift/debt

p. 12 God furnishes the poet w/ his capital, gives him surplus value & means of giving surplus-value, God is a poet

——structure of economimesis has its analogon in the city: when poet isn’t writing, he’s just a man, must eat, receives subsidies from sun-king (sustaining labor force)

ECONOMY

GOD p. 22 repression & incorporation: either 2 economies, or one economy w/ 2 systems in move from mysterium to secretum (possibility of keeping the secret)

p. 95 in the instant (no-time-lapse) when Abraham raises the knife, when he decides, instant of absolute sacrifice of economy, law of oikonomia, sacrifice of home, proper, one’s own kin

——but God, who didn’t know what Abraham would do [here Kierkegaard Christianizes the story] reinscribes absolute sacrifice in an economy of reward w/ absolute gift (gives back Isaac)

p. 97 Jesus teaches in Matthew, “you can count on the heavenly economy if you sacrifice the earthly one”

p. 106 the 2 economies: 1) calculation, Judaic 2) dissymmetric economy of sacrifice, “beyond the totality of the calculable as a finite totality of the same,” renunciation of merchandise, still relies on giving back (rendre), on yield, profit, but only father who sees in secret [can calculate]

pp. 112-13 via Baudelaire’s “The Pagan School,” any exchange w/ purpose, any remuneration, slightest hint of calculation transforms gift into counterfeit money

GT p. 6 soon as there is law, law of partition (partage), law as partition (moira), soon as there is nomy—there’s economy (oikonomia) > exchange, circulation, return (retour); figure of circle, amortization

***p. 7 oikonomia would always follow the path of Ulysses, return home to part chosen, destiny commanded (moira), the being-next-to-self of the Idea in absolute knowledge as odyssean, nostalgia of reappropriation

——gift interrupts economy, it’s not impossible but the impossible

pp. 15-16 be careful, ethically vigilant re: gift w/out debt, there’s calculation & ruse (economy) even in the unconscious

——forgetting of gift must be far more radical than repression, which always consists of keeping by exchanging places, its operation is systematic or topological

p. 76 one must render account of law that dissolves the gift in an Aufklarung of relational logic, that privileges, like Lévi-Strauss, the logic of exchange

p. 77 the mapped-out signified of structuralism, a complementarity w/out supplement that conditions “exercise of symbolic thinking” > this is the rationality of the principle of reason

p. 138 laws turn gift into exchange, economy, contractual circulation, (distributive) justice

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

***LOBL p. ~91 from polysemia (economy) to dissemination; p. ~93 from critical to deconstruction

pp. ~114-15 is double affirmation same as Freud’s triumph? wouldn’t this risk negativity of mourning, economic resentment, melancholia in “yes, yes”? can this be avoided?

pp. ~169-70 matter of economy (time, space, counting words, signs, marks) arrests translations

pp. ~171-72 economy: stricture not coupure [pre-capitalist machine?], always external constraint that arrests a text in general, i.e. anything, for example life death

——think exteriority from angle of economy of the arrêt: greatest “bound” energy, bandée, tightly gathered around its own limit (Hemmung, Haltung) > immediately disseminated, sand, empty, unloaded, spontaneously: in trance of trans, ghosts, transes, folies du jour (cf. Glas on trépas, trans/partition [Derrida’s referring to Genet crossing national borderlines])

H p. 135 always threatened by this dilemma: 1) when unconditional hospitality is circumscribed by economy of circle (law, duty) [vs. ring?] 2) when unconditional hospitality dispenses w/ law

AF p. 13 Jew (or Devil, radical evil, all which is irreconcilable to God in “Christian science”) can be reinvested as an economistic resource of an archive that capitalizes everything [Sagi]

——devil can justify, such is destination of Jew in Aryan ideal

p. 86 haunting requires a home, a place, ghosts are sensitive to idioms, welcoming this one, allergic to that one > law of oikos, economy

POOF pp. 153-55, 169n in Lysis, existence of friend for sake of enemy (ekthrou éneka) is abandoned for hypothesis of desire (épithumia): friend is friend of what he desires, the oikeiéotēs, home, habitat, familiar, property, hómoion, the present, near, neighbor > friend: everything an economy can reconcile

——so, politics of friendship: w/out presence, w/out affinity, w/out analogy, aneconomic, truth & presence start to tremble

pp. 285-86 quoting Matthew, Derrida asks whether there isn't still profit of a sublime economy, economy beyond economy, in Nietzsche? or does the absolute gift (advising against love of one’s neighbor) break the ruse of this sublime economy? like Kant, isn’t there still best exchange rate for virtue?

p. 286 Nietzsche’s gift must also belong to a finite world > how to think dissymmetry of gift w/out exchange, infinite disproportion, from vantage point of terrestrial finitude? under its horizon w/out horizon [see p. 263] > infinitization itself is suspected of being an economic ruse, perverse seduction, stratagem, of loving one’s neighbor

SEC p. 312 history of writing conform to law of mechanical economy: gain most space & time by means of most convenient abbreviation

***VM p. 95 acc. Levinas, concepts anticipate a horizon w/in which alterity is amortized as soon as it is announced—because foreseen, horizon always horizon of the same

pp. 128-29 preethical (if this can be said), transcendental violence institutes relationship btwn 2 finite ipseities, at the same time it’s nonviolence since it opens up relation to the other (an economy)

PP p. 120 (137) [re: Socrates renouncing pleasure for truth] one must be careful, in symptamotological manner of Nietzsche, to diagnose the economy, linvestissement et le bénéfice différé sous le signe du pur renoncement, sous la mise du sacrifice désintéressé

POS p. 8 differance never preceded by originary/indivisible unity of present that could be reserved as an expenditure calculated for reasons of economy

——differance is the general structure of economy, it is the economical concept

DPi pp. 153-54 unheimlich concept of belief: the believer (Glaübiger) who affects to believe is divided in belief, fiction of this simulacrum belongs to belief: skepsis, ēpokhē as believing itself > all economy traffics in act of faith: believing w/out believing, belief haunted by non-belief > quasi-hypnotic, quasi-hallucinatory, spectral, unconscious

——believing (like cruelty) has no contrary, thus is its own contrary

***p. 254 1) being-unscathed (l’être-indemne): safe, sound, intact, virgin, heilig, unhurt, holy 2) becoming-indemnified (l’être-indeminsé): rendered unscathed again, reimbursed, redemption of debt

——indemnity signals toward interest, economy

REST p. 258 why always say painting renders, restitutes?

p. 281 rendering homage [restitution?] is difficult, because of the “interminable outbidding of an analysis which is never finished tying together,” > and yet, il y a hommage, ça donne

p. 373 pour aller, aller ensemble, ou aller-à > the 2 shoes must make a pair (aller à doesn’t mean se rendre à)

pp. 379-81 Artaud (protests against ghosts): no ghosts in Van Gogh, no visions, the torrid truth, hieroglyphics > Derrida cautions: “you can only give them [the ghosts] back (rendre) if you think you have them, and you can only think you’re giving them if you haven’t got them”]

——annexing narcissism to fetishism, we’d never be finished, 4 forms of rendering: 1) render oneself in painting 2) render something to oneself, se payer 3) to go somewhere (se rendre quelque part) 4) given in to someone (se rendre à quelquun), surrender

p. 382 don’t have to render anything: just bet on the trap like others swear (jurent) on a Bible > il y aura eu à parier, ça donne à rendre, a remmettre [there will be something to bet, it gives…]

if faudrait rendreencore, donc, en se séparant, et même en laissant tomber [even in letting the matter drop, we’d render (something?)]

AFR pp. 100-01 Condillac’s theory of analogy (operation of remarking): supply a language’s defects > remarks anteriority in the fact, an anteriority (of the fact) that becomes lacking in itself > supply what is necessary, is missing (il faut), but [remark] also presents itself as surplus value, a superabundance, frivolous futility > makes all commerce possible (as value & sign)

IW pp. 263-64 [vis-à-vis Cohen] Judeo-Protestant Platonism or world logocentrism made spiritual families possible, genealogy w/out limit, general economy (oikonomia, oikos as the law itself) > spiritual mondialisation: logos, spirit, idealism as moral conscience of philosophy & science

ATM p. 148 every present remains w/in the economic sphere of the same

p. 178 if a work signifies expenditure (dépense) or pure loss (perte) in a game, it would still be determined by economy

BSi p. 283 zoos profitable to knowledge and economy [physiocratic theory of economy]

——nomos of oikos: taming, training, the domus of the dominus > oikonomia also general condition of ipseity as sovereign mastery over beast

p. 310 every economy & ecology presupposes limits, thresholds, and therefore (bunches of) keys

SPEC p. 300 [re: Freud’s fort/da] law of oikos, open secret, family vacance (vacancy, vacation), secret for no one [everyone knows Freud is Ernst’s PP], domestico-familial, domestico-funerary

ECONOMY OF DEATH

GT p. 102 death: the fact that the gift does not return to the donor; death not a natural accident, can only be thought setting out from (à partir du) the gift > neither death nor immortal life can give anything, only a singular surviving can give, “life” in an “economy of death”

FSW p. 198 difference btwn pleasure/reality principle: original possibility of economy of death, of detour, deferral

p. 202 for Freud, deferral, detour (Aufschub), death at origin of life [already death drive] defending itself against death via economy of death, the attempt to douse the pain of an original breach

POS pp. 28-9 differance/spacing not preceded by present or in-different being, space/time deferral of present: elements take on meaning or signify only by referring to another past/future element in economy of traces; this economy is inseparable from more narrowly semiotic aspect of differance

PS pp. 189-90 se laisser ainsi souffler la parole, cest, comme lécrire lui-même, larchi-phénomène de la réserve: abandon de soi au furtif, discrétion, séparation et en même temps accumulation, capitalisation, mise en sécurité aussi dans la décision déléguée ou différée > laisser la parole au furtif, cest se rassurer [tranquilize? give courage? reassure] dans la différance, cest-à-dire dans léconomie

DIF DIF p. 4 the capital “a” of differance, a pyramid [A]; Hegel: body of sign is Egyptian pyramid > Derrida moves from pyramid to tomb, oikēsis > tomb of proper, familial residence, economy of death (this stone announces death of tyrant [cf. TN.]) [this tomb can’t even be made to resonate]

p. 19 Derrida well aware of evidential calculations that will dismiss illogicality of differance, their necessity, function, is part of differance > rigorous, “scientific” relating of restricted economy (takes no part in expenditure w/out reserve) & general economy (keeps nonreserve in reserve)

——this “scientific” relating: a relationship btwn a differance that makes a profit on its investment, and a differance that misses its profit, la mise de la présence pure et sans perte se confondant avec celle de la perte absolue, de la mort [pure presence and pure loss merge w/ each other]

O p. 49(n) re: writing, Hegel does not think exteriority, repetitive autonomy of remainder > writing becomes pro-gramme, pre-scription, pre-text, the simple empirical husk (déchet) of concept

——for Derrida, this husk is coextensive w/ whole life of discourse

CHM pp. 61-2 from heights of “to-attempt-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole”: absolute opening, uneconomic expenditure, thought announces itself, frightens itself, reassures itself against annihilation by madness/death > always re-embraced by economy > relation btwn reason, madness, death is an economy: structure of deferral whose originality must be respected

——vouloir-dire-lhyperbole condition of silence, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

p. 62 philosophy as this giant confession: attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole (to define it as such is to confess) > I philosophize only in terror, but in confessed terror of going mad

——confession is simultaneously: oblivion/unveiling, protection/exposure > economy

RGE p. 255 Hegel’s master/slave an economy of life [vs. economy of death]

——ruse of life, ruse of reason

REST p. 327 as in fetishism trial, everything is a business & economy of detail, of la détaille (de-tailing/unsizing), you can’t do w/out detail

PSSS p. 276 originary affirmation is attached to a life, but an im-possible life, a sur-vival, not symbolizable, but the only one worthy of being lived, w/out alibi, the one from which to depart

——one cannot justify pacifism, right to life, setting out from an economy of life, can only be done on basis of a sur-vival that owes nothing to alibi of some mytho-theological beyond

LI p. 76 economics that accounts for iterability, which questions traditional philosophy of oikos, of propre > can’t be separate from economy of Unconscious, of graphematics of undecidables

OG pp. 130-31 (190-91) Lévi-Strauss hypothesizes that primary function of writing is the enslavement of other humans, Derrida says yes, then describes how structure of society (castes, class, organs of capitalization, stocks), the origin of life in general, appears wherever it’s possible to defer (différer) presence, cest-à-dire la dépense ou la consommation, et dorganiser la production, cest-à-dire la réserve en général; he then adds [strangely] that the increase in differance [as proven by its extraordinary increase past few millenniums w/out change in organism] modifies life less & less as it spreads out (sétend): should differance grow infinite, a possibility excluded by its essence, would be God or death

p. 143 (205-06) Rousseau’s sacrifice: never began to live until he looked upon himself as a dead man, until he affirmed writing [death in life, differance] > aiming at a symbolic reappropriation of presence that differance will have breached/broached

pp. 224-25 for Rousseau, absolute North is death, need usually isolates men—in North it begins society: what was needed was not énergie but clarity, work replaces passion, represses desire

——force of need/work turns song into articulation: Northerner fights against force of death w/ another force of death [economy of death]; liberated passion impossible in North

SPEC p. 359 Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

EDGE (

SH p. 5 Buchecker (beechmast), book corners, sharp, gaping edges of a text

LOBL p. 95 double affirmation: of death which triumphs over life, & triumph of life at edge of death

p. 142 Blanchot’s narrative held together w/ invisible hinge, double inner edge (bord)

PAS PAS p. (88) at the indistinct edge of sea, viens said just once between us

F pp. xii-xiii je marrête ici, déjà (tombe en arrêt [vault to a stop]), setting on the “edge of the crypt” a voiceless word, a blank stone of a scruple [see p. xlviii], to engage others to it, of a crypt

SPOM pp. 212-13 the event we are prowling around (autour duquel nous rôdon) hesitates btwn singular “who” of ghost and general “what” of simulacrum; in dis-locaton, in virtual space of tele-technosciences, le messianique tremble au bord de cet événement même

DS p. 215 at the edge of being (au bord de lêtre): the entre of the hymen, masked gap, veil of virginity (where nothing’s taken place) & consummation, penetration of antre, release [one in the other] > mirror never passed through, ice never broke, at the edge of being

p. 253 “themes” run aground (échoue) at edge lesser & greater than theme, where “there is” a text is made a possibility, a readability w/out signified (fright’s reflex declares: unreadable)

POS gathering Derrida’s work into a “sheaf,” historic/systematic crossroads, is structural impossibility of limiting network of differance, of putting an edge on its weave, not a master-word, always finds itself in others

P p. 43 arête/manque [re: theory of frame]

pp. 53-4 philosophy always against parergon, parerga (Plato’s Laws, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics); Kant on color, ornament

——parergon: il est dabord làbord (on board, the border), bord as plank, hylē, wood, bordel

pp. 60-1 two limits of edge: 1) internal, btwn frame & painting 2) external, separating from wall

pp. 81-2 everything will flower at the edge of a deconstructed tomb [see ATIA p. 29 limitrophy]

pp. 86-9 Kant’s beauty [wild tulip] requires absolute interruption: straining toward end w/out goal, not pure if cut can be bandaged (pansable), no pure cut (if it could be prolonged, completed, supplemented), no beauty > everything in it straining toward the bout (end, blow)

——this fascination w/out desire, in view of an end never in view, a but en blanc [“point blank”] > interrupted finality must show itself as finality & interrupture, as edging

——it is the sans that counts for beauty, la bordure [edging] en sans de la coupure pure

pp. 94, 98 sharpen point(s)/edge (tranchant): [be more rigorous] (il faut bien aiguiser les pointes, les lames ou les fils…)

p. 120 column & colossal (indissociable, nothing to do together): together see nothing, let nothing be seen, show nothing, display none of what one thinks

——taille: size and cut (the cutting edge) [see TN. decision to use “cise”]

——kolossos originally had no size, what brings cise (taille) to colossus, not a measured cise but disproportionate (démesurante) cise

OTO p. 11 Dionysus vs. Crucified, name of versus, countername, suffices to pluralize (in a singular fashion) homonymic mask & proper name, to lead all threads of name astray in labyrinth (ear): proceed, then, by seeking out the edges, inner walls, the passages

***ATIA pp. 30-1 discussion is interesting [re: animals] once limit is abyssal (rather than limit as discontinuity): once frontier is not a single, indivisible line, but more than one internally divided lines (folds, foliations): “what are the edges of a limit that feed on an abyss?”

***SW pp. 348-49 this irreducible reality of an event (outside discourse but not text)—is so unlike you? > but, it’s the signature, a hem, on the edge, forever heterogenous, a tear, overlap, remaining caught in poetic stitches—thus the effects of anticipated iterability

TB pp. 118-19 at edge of the language, from this edge to the other of proper name: debt contracts the trait (to-be-translated from one language to the other) of relation of living subject to his name

REST p. 263 Heidegger & Shapiro, a pairing-together in difference of opinion, lénigme dun ajustement complémentaire des deux côtés, one edge to the other (dun bord à lautre)

p. 339 for Heidegger, the picture is doubly useless, depicts, “shows,” being-products that’re out-of-service, w/out use-value > multiple edge(s) (bordures) detach being-product from subjective scope (portée subjective), simultaneously baiting (inducing/luring) reattachment of subjective scope

——edge (bordure) less simple when turned inside out [invaginated?], not simple at all w/ the lace & the hemmed holes (trous bordés), the eyelets comme lieu de passage [figure of decapitation here too]

EL p. 199 (internal/external) edge (bord) of this reading, as on edge of “those abysses of abysses”

p. 217 experience of the edge (bord) [sacrifice?], abyss btwn 2 places: sacred & non-sacred

HST p. 360 the unlivable contradiction of extending (du tendre) and waiting (de lattendre); hantise (figure of visitation w/out invitation), au bord de la mort: it is to death that hospitality destines itself

PPT pp. 7-8 partition of edge occurs everywhere (se passe partout) (in this book), protocol-frame is multiplied endlessly: lemmata, parerga, exergues, cartouches

essential parasitizing opens every system to its outside, divides unity of the line (trait) purported to mark the system’s edges

——trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

p. 12 [external edge of passe-partout is the one closest to the painting?]

——le trait il sy attire et sy passe, de lui-même: situated, situates, btwn visible edging (la bordure visible) and phantom in center—from which we fascinate

+R p. 158 “the angle is always for me the edge of a tomb (un bord de tombe)”

p. 159 plus dair, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature

LI p. 31 signature is on the edge of the text (neither inside nor outside)

TN p. 299 logic of limit [hymen?]: what lets itself be touched does so on its edge (sur son bord), thus it doesn’t let itself be touched/reached (ne se laisse pas atteindre)—exposing untouchable itself, the other edge of the edge (lautre bord du bord)

——one would also have to integrate the rhetoric, plus quune rhétorique quand elle franchit à chaque figure the limits btwn sensible/intelligible—finding itself on both sides of the limit

ATM pp. 143-45, 150 “he will have obligated (il aura obligé),” a phrase knotted up (se noue) in a certain way of tying (lier), a serial structure of a singular type > edges of the sentence in fog, belong to the night

AD pp. 114-15 discern edges of abyss: it’s not necessarily a bad abyss

LG p. 226 law can’t edge through (inabordable) nor edge away from (indébordable) the counterlaw (contre-loi) that constitutes it: reasons of edges (bords)

p. 235 edge (bord), borderline (ligne de bordure), overflowing (débordement) do not arise w/out a fold—which figure of folding? [the answer: double chiasmatic invagination]

p. 236 in Blanchot’s La folie du jour, one reads (sees w/out seeing) the crumbling (effondrement) of the upper edge, initial edge, the one regulated by common law [as first line] > forms a pocket inside corpus, invagination: trait of first line, borderline, splits while remaining the same—traverses the corpus it bounds

p. 237 there is only content w/out edge, w/out boundary, w/out frame, there is only edge w/out content: interminable inocclusive invagination (inenarrable, unarrestable, insatiable) > terrible for those who require order in the name of the law

——a lower edge of invagination intersects invagination of upper edge: trait splits again into an internal & external edge

p. 240 what happens when edge pronounces a sentence?

SPEC pp. 316-17 curtains, veils, “skirt” of bed, hymen of fort:da, edge of bed (lit) [of reading?], va-et-vient, there would’ve been a hymen even w/out curtains > veil of this “skirt” is interest of bed (lit) and fort:da of all these generations

——[Derrida clearly explains the difference btwn fort/da and fort:da] “skirt” of bed, which hides the bars, forms inner chamber of fort/da, double screen which divides w/in itself—but dividing only by reassembling it w/ itself, sticking (piquant) to itself doubly, fort:da

EGO

GOD p. 62 ethical must sometimes be refused in name of responsibility that doesn’t calculate, that keeps its secret, that tyrannically [Nietzsche], jealously refuses violence of accounts and

justifications, declining autobiography that is auto-justification: egodicée

SPOM p. 161 the egological body, Marx cries: ghost of all ghosts! > forum, agora [cf. F], gathering place toward which specters run

pp. 161-62 Stirner advocates auto-affection of “I-Me,” where no ghosts can haunt, no spacing, no interstice > thinks this epokhē reduces, exorcises the ghost, Marx thinks it reduces to the ghost

p. 166 acc. Marx, Stirner borrows disguises (Verkleidungen) of Hegelian idea, opposes himself to non-self, reappropriates himself as living, incarnate being

——“I am” = “I am haunted,” Ego = ghost; Es Spukt (translation misses impersonal, quasi-anonymity of German), “it spooks,” “it ghosts,” it specters,” ego inhabited by its own specter

——“es spukt” in Freud’s “Das Unheimliche,” production of figure the revenant (der Spuk)

p. 167 Cartesian cogito, Kantian “I think,” phenomenological ego cogito: “a real presence is promised here to a Eucharistic Narcissus” > living being visited by its own apparition

p. 169 phenomenological ego is a specter, phanesthai is the possibility of the specter, brings death, gives death, works at mourning [see pp. 237-38n Husserl’s noeme, irréellité]

p. 177 living ego is auto-immune, welcomes other ghosts

VM p. 109 w/out using these terms, Levinas warns against confusing idem (same) w/ ipse (ego), identity w/ ipseity > this happens immediately w/ Greek and German: autos, selbst

pp. 109-10 for Levinas, homogenization of Same and Ego, homogenized w/ concept, and finite totality, permits him to condemn state, totality, not in the name of but against subjectivity

p. 110 acc. Levinas, Hegel and Kierkegaard: violent & pre-metaphysical egoisms

p. 131 btwn original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, in which violence returned against violence, in which original finitude appears, in which other is respected w/in, by, the same

question of philosophy: why finitude? why must I think transcendental through ego, ipseity?

Husserl called irreducible egoic essence of experience “archi-factuality” (Urtatsache)

——for Levinas, tragedy of ego, riveted to its own being > even in transcendence toward, venturing toward, the Other

OH p. 15 heading of the other: first condition of an identity that is not an egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other, not even anti-heading or decapitation

***F pp. xliii-xliv Ichspaltung rethought when it is not Fetish vs. Thing (in-itself) but Fetish-Thing as cipher to be translated interminably

FWT pp. 178-79 how we proceed as if psychoanalysis never happened, as if we still believed in sovereign authority of ego, speak the language of “autonomy”

DS p. 284n [Derrida comes back to i] reads little point as a decapitation right next to castrated pike > capital I (disseminates unity of meaning), ego, ice, échoplus-je > (I + Dé)irisation

GSP p. 323n Husserl: phenomenology of ego’s self-constitution coincides w/ phenomenology as a whole

PS p. 186 for Artaud, swollen ego of cock > separate from me: “a true man has no sex” [swelling of sex as castration]

DPi pp. 210-11 Hugo: “alloy of egotism alters and destroys finest social schemes, that is the black vein in the white marble” [self-interested noble cause]

AFR pp. 57-8(n) de Biran's criticism of Condillac’s arbitrary also a criticism of rationalism, of alchemism (reduction to the gold of abstract, simple, fundamental element [ego]), of idealism

IW p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——truth of nationality is German idealism; the German spirit is the spirit of humanity

——Cohen suspects a narcissistic infatuation in Fichte’s national ego, mirror of a certain psyché, but also room for any other self in this national self, cosmopolitan logic, national self as “We”

HST p. 404 Levinas: memory of servitude in Egypt assembles humanity, ego is a hostage, ego ceaselessly missing itself, debt absorbed only by being increased; such is the pride of nonessence!

LI pp. 48-9 structural & essential, iterability is at work in all facts, each mark divided or multiplied in advance > a more powerful “logic”—graphics of iterability undercuts classical opposition of fact & principle (le droit), factual & possible (virtual), necessity & possibility

——iterability disrupts presence, unity of ego in sender, du maintenant-écrivain (grasping w/ 1 hand his ballpoint pen) > stigmè of every mark already split

pp. 75-6 “primary masochism” [a wolf of undecidability] poisons, how can one identify the intention, the speaker, the effect once border btwn pleasure/pain is upset?

——thus the limited responsibility of Sarl, vulnerable to parasitisms, the “conscious ego” cannot incorporate and does its best to exclude [despite Derrida’s vehemence, substituting Sarl for Searle demonstrates his uncanny generosity—he will not accuse a subject]

TN pp. 149-50 for de Biran, faculty of movement: “willing subject,” twinning (jumeler) the stem (souche): ego w/out ego before ego—1) touch as motor will 2) touch as pure sensibility

p. 165 Husserl leads us back to purely psychic ego (Descartes) > not necessarily human

pp. 166-67 “principle of principles” gives us no choice [?]: commands us to begin w/ “us,” that is, w/ most proper, proximate Ego; this “man,” this “we” comes before most radical phenomenological reduction, the one that suspends the world

pp. 176-77 for Husserl, introjection is a late, upper layer of experience

——can there be solipsism w/out introjection? “I” requires intersubjectivity?

pp. 192-93 the difference Derrida adds to Husserl’s alter-ego: recognize lirréductible écart even in the touchant-touché de ma propre main [there’s alter-ego in my own proper body as human ego]

p. 233 intertwining btwn present/nonpresent ensures presence of alter-ego in heart of ego

p. 242 when ichfremd [though affirmed] returns to the proper, rebecomes/remains egological

ELECTION

GOD pp. 26-8 responsibility, aporia btwn choice and heresy (hairesis as choice, election), a type of secrecy that keeps responsibility apart (tient la responsabilité à lécart) and in secret, the very thing responsibility insists on

p. 155 covenant remains absolutely singular in its election, if there’s no 3rd party, no hypothetical imperative, no generality of ethical, political, juridical

H p. 55 host must elect, choose, filter, must have power, no hospitality w/out finitude: Gewalt, force of law

AF p. 75 along with openness to future, via Yerushalmi, Jew has historicity, obligation of memory, of the archive

——2 specificities, exclusivities, responsibilities, in absolute privilege of election

***p. 77 Derrida trembles when Yerushalmi declares “only in Israel” [is there future, is there past], logic of election, question of proper name, exemplarity > place of all violences

——if it is just to remember to guard and gather archive, it’s just as just to remember the others, tout autre est tout autre [invaginates]

FWT p. 3 we do not choose our inheritance, it violently elects us

***p. 193 there is a universal “structure” of heteronomic election: I am the only one called to do this or that, irreplaceable in the place of decision, in obligation to respond “I am here,” this election of each gives to all responsibility worthy of the name, if there is any, its chance/condition > also, Derrida is very suspicious of “doctrine” of election, & binding this universal to Judaism

——circumcision: someone marked my destiny before I had a word to say > (true for women too, something preceded your Catholicism, Derrida tells E.R.)

POOF pp. 19-21 via Aristotle, one must choose & prefer friends (election & selection), it takes time > for Aristotle, those who don’t have friends count friends among things (prágmata), possessions, the malevolent place friends in field of calculable hypothesis > yet, the choice of friends, that their # must be small, reintroduces #, calculation, into multiplicity of incalculable singularities: a certain aristocracy in arithmetic of the choice

pp. 210-12 does the autarkic (self-sufficient) man need a friend? [Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, Plato’s Lysis] > rarity is the virtue of friendship [p. 225n rarity also among Christian monks]

——scarcity, rareness, is worth more—sometimes to the extreme > scarcity sets the price of true friendship [hyperbole, incommensurable]

pp. 257-58 for Kant, friendship is rare, the rarity of keeping a secret, a black swan > [Derrida seems to hint that Kant is getting personal here: Kant murmurs a confession]

ATIA p. 62 Derrida’s exceptionalism, sentiment of election, always exempted himself, in everything he’s written, erased, traced, from the “they” who name the “animal” > “as if I were the secret elect of what they call animals”

WAP pp. 5-6 institution can forget its own elect (finite memory), its finitude also affects remembrance of what it wants to exclude: the surface of its archive thus inscribed w/ what it refuses, excludes (ex: Walter Benjamin not receiving a degree)

DPi pp. 18-20 the transition, the trance btwn when Jews have received commandments but have yet to hear the “judgments” > as if they know God’s about to invent DP after uttering “thou shalt not kill,” terrified by this divine word electing them > Moses says, “Do not tremble”

p. 24 daimon for Greeks: divine & inferior to divinity of God (theos), revenant, soul of dead, fate—kind of election, singular destiny; in Christianity, daimon is bad spirit, demonic, evil genius

——daimon (for Socrates) silent before law: philosophy finds its place in this silence of the daimon at moment of condemnation

PF p. xxiv decision supposes passage through undecidable of a crisis/krinein/krisis (choice of election, selection: legere, lecture/reading)

EJQB p. 65 Jew elects writing which elects the Jews > responsible for truth’s suffusion w/ historicity, and history’s assignment of itself (s’assigne) to its empiricity

——Jabes: “what difference is there btwn choosing and being chosen when we can do nothing but submit to the choice?”

HST p. 417 Abrahamic substitution not a homogenous, identical (cloning) replacement but that of exception, election > implicates (engage) each singularity in responsibility to give, to sacrifice themselves as pledge (comme gage) > still, not a free, voluntary act: there’s grace, a certain passivity

AD p. 56 for Levinas, the hôte is a hostage insofar as he’s a subject obsessed (thus besieged), persecuted, put into question in the place where he takes place—in election

pp. 65-6 “Torah before Sinai,” law before event, recognition of Torah by those for whom event of Sinai means nothing? a recognition by some 3rd, that would replace unique w/ unique? > a universal message in election of Israel (humanitarian hospitality uprooted from singularity of event, which becomes empirical, allegorical, “political” in restricted sense) [see p. 72]

p. 69 absolute past: “word of God” —will have taken place before taking place, older than Sinai—truth of messianic exceeds national identity; p. 142n absolute “lateness”: older yes

p. 70 election not restricted to particular place/identity, inseparable from what seems to contest it: substitution

——iterability: replaceability of unique in experience of unicity [see p. 72]

p. 93 for Levinas, allotted (allouée) home is not natural, it’s elected

p. 104 God, one “who loves the stranger” excessively so, excess like the non-reciprocity decided in death, the trait or stroke, the hyphen (trait dunion) of adieu: beyond being, where he might not pardon me, or elect me

pp. 106-07, 149n (Psalms 132:13) desire of Yahweh to reside > no desire w/out elective claim, w/out exclusive request for singular residence

p. 118 Levinas trying to delimit a faith in election safe from (à labri de) all “nationalist” temptation

BSi p. 63 not reading: neglect (neglego, neglegere), not gathering (legere), not electing (élire) [one doesn’t have to neglect the book to neglect to read]

p. 216 deciding actors [political leaders] consecrated by election of their erection to status of marionette in the puppet show [in English]

CIR pp. 252-53 sign of circumcision will ensure Jewish nation an eternal existence > this sign of circumcision & election is foreign to understanding and true virtue

pp. 257-58 chosen race (genus electum) waiting for the envelope to open, seals to break like skins, so that finally, ceasing to eye your pocket, they enter terrible/sweet truth you bear

EMPIRICISM

OOG pp. 48-9 for Husserl of “Philosophy of Rigorous Science,” singularity is “oneness of fact in its pure factuality,” eternally apeiron, excludes only, acc. Ricouer, empirical individuality, only ‘factuality’ > the tode ti of brute existence

SPOM p. 154 empiricism has a vocation for heterology (alterity)

PP pp. 72-3 pharmakon linked to book (biblia), empirical practices, not necessary, writing is open to chance

VM p. 139 for Hegel, empiricism always forgets it uses the words “to be”; empiricism: thinking by metaphor w/out thinking the metaphor as such

p. 145 for Heidegger, the Site, not an empirical Here but always an Illic, for Jew & for Poet

p. 151 empiricism, true name of renunciation of the concept [what Levinas risks], the dream of a purely heterological thought, pure thought of pure difference, metaphysical thought or pretension [thought of God: empiricism?]

——empiricism is a dream because it vanishes when language awakens

pp. 151-52 Levinas renews empiricism, revealing it to itself as metaphysics, he even says, “the radical empiricism confident in the instruction of exteriority”

p. 153 Hegel’s speculative logic: living logic which reconciles formal tautology and empirical heterology [after having thought prophetic discourse in preface to Phenom…]

VP p. 48 for Husserl, actuality put on like an empirical piece of clothing, like a body on a soul

POS pp. 64-5 realism, sensualism, “empiricism” are modifications of logocentrism > and “materialism” is often invested w/ ideas of reality, presence, plenitude, content

GSP p. 159 for [1st phase] phenomenology, all empiricism requires a prior [transcendental] regional circumscription of objectivity, not against all genetism, but certainly against skeptical “worldly genesis,” naturalism, causalism, positivism, science-of-facts (Tatsachenwissenschaft)

O p. 11 lesson of Hegel’s to be maintained even beyond Hegelianism: complicity of empiricism/formalism

p. 33 this new text, cest aussi le débord infini de sa représentation classique, a breakthrough (effraction), lining fringe [?], de-limitation, would be called a posteriority or an empiricism [by Hegel]

p. 52 [in field of dissemination] formalism no longer fails (néchoue) before empirical richness [like in Hegel?] but before une queue, dont le se-mordre [self-bite] nest ni spéculaire ni symbolique

EJQB p. 65 Jew elects writing which elects the Jews > responsible for truth’s suffusion w/ historicity, and history’s assignment of itself (s’assigne) to its empiricity

AFR p. 58 to point to a “hesitation” in a text “marks a reading’s empiricist limit” [re: de Biran’s critique of Condillac]

LI pp. 116-17 every concept, every philosophical concept, that lays claim to any rigor, always implies alternative “all or nothing” —even concept “difference of degree” (simple empiricism), concept of relativity, determined acc. “all or nothing”: difference of degree or nondifference of degree

pp. 127-28 empiricism dominated by a logic I deem necessary to deconstruct

p. 128 “ideal concept” (i.e. rigorous concept) vs. pragmatic concept (empirically useful, provisionally convenient, constructed w/out rigor)

p. 137 relativism, and everything sometimes associated w/ it (skepticism, empiricism, even nihilism), remains a philosophical position in contradiction w/ itself (Husserl showed this better than anyone)

TN p. 287 Nancy’s “there is no ‘the’…” could deprive him of any conceptual determination, or hand over the discourse to irresponsible empiricism > Socrates has been teaching us this for years

OG p. 60 (89) must exhaust concept experience so as not to fall prey to “empiricism” and “naive” critiques of experience [i.e. for thinkers appealing to experience, must look for experience outside their theoretical system]

p. 61 (90) transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased, arche-trace must comply w/ this necessity & erasure (contradictory and not acceptable in logic of identity), it is the disappearance of origin, and also the origin of origin, so to wrench (arracher) trace from classical scheme that would demand it comes after originary nontrace (that would make of it an empirical mark), we must speak of originary trace or arche-trace > but if all begins w/ trace, there’s no originary trace

p. 108 (158-59) graphein as originary effacement of proper name, there is “subject” the moment obliteration of proper is produced (dawn of language) > universal a priori

how one moves from this a priori to empirical facts can’t be answered, no general answer to a question of this form [no explanation of bridge, passage]

p. 117 anthropological confession vs. theoretical discussion: difference btwn empirical/essential must assert its rights

p. 130 (189) [re: Lévi-Strauss’ assessment of when science began] if writing is “necessary condition” of science, argument se trouve frappée dun lourd indice dapproximation empirique

p. 132 [vis-à-vis Lévi-Strauss] how can literacy be violent when reserved for elite minority & when law demands total literacy?: universality always monopolized as empirical force by a determined empirical force

p. 162 deconstruction’s departure (la sortie) is radically empiricist, affected by nonknowledge as it ventures out deliberately > very concept of empiricism destroys itself, avowal of empiricism sustains itself only on basis of strength of question

——[deconstruction designated as errant or empirical—only means something w/in closure]

IF p. 308 nominalism normally doubled by a certain empiricism (coded argument)

EU p. 178 for Kant, thinking of supersensible can never become popular, reason as such places popular on side of sensible, not accessible to the people as such, who require the results [still not empirical?] of the metaphysics of pure rights > the people are “unwitting metaphysicians,” those w/ “healthy reason” can learn to know by way of conclusions w/out the principle

ENCYCLOPEDIA

KH pp. 103-04 khōra as abyss, mise en abyme, gaping hole, not exactly chaos or fright, but not Gaia, foundation, either > abyss in encyclopedic logic [of Timaeus], regulates all sites (lieux) on its edges (jobs in society, region, territory, country)

O pp. 46-7 Hegel’s philosophical encyclopedia, last of its kind in history to deserve the name > encyclopedia is thoroughly theological in essence/origin (despite the so-called atheistic one)

p. 48n for Hegel, life is essential philosophical determination of concept & spirit (vegetal, biological traits), organicity of encyclopedic logic [inborn germ of death]

T pp. xix-xxii two types of mastery (phallocentrism, logocentrism): 1) hierarchy [Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger] 2) envelopment [Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel] (whole in each part), system, encyclopedia, circle, homogeny

P p. 19 Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics: system of training for teaching and cycle of knowledge

p. 27 metaphor of circle of circles, of training (Bildung) as philosophical encyclopedia

p. 28 Hegel’s circles, each part of whole, a “circle returning to itself,” keeps tie of solidarity w/ others, through fecund backward and forward movement (Rückwärts, Vorwärts) [idea of beauty in philosophical encyclopedia]

p. 34 art: domesticated in this history of truth, onto-encyclopedic economy, the machinery of the pose (Setzung/Entgegensetzung)

***RM p. 57 closure is not a circular limit (bordering homogenous field), but a more twisted (plus retorse) structure, another figure: “invaginated”

——representation of a linear & circular closure surrounding a homogenous space is a self-representation of philosophy in its onto-encyclopedic logic

WAP p. 73 onto-theological, phallogocentric principles of metaphysics guided by question “what is?” subordinates all fields to onto-encyclopedic instant: leads to unity of philosophical university

——a university is always the construction of a philosophy

p. 86 paideia as auto-encyclopedia > teacher effaces himself so student can begin again [Condillac]

p. 101 philosophy is ontology, its paideia is an encyclopedia

pp. 105-06 double bind of techno-science (formalization)/philosophy (mother/natural tongue): 1) formalization of techno-science resists monolingual hegemony of philosophy as onto-encylopedia—science of sciences 2) philosophy can still point to dogmatic philosophemes in science

p. 125 onto-encylopedic universitas inseparable from a certain concept of the State; Cousin: “University is the State,” “public power brought to bear on the instruction of the young”

——Cousin: to teach is not a natural right, the professor of philosophy is a functionary of the moral order [for more on influence of Victor Cousin, cf. P p. 19]

***p. 146 Hegel’s presupposition of the Idea is linked to entire onto-encyclopedia, and thereby entire Universitas, which cannot be dissociated from the system

pp. 147-48 Derrida now wonders whether Hegel’s philosophy itself demands that no texts [i.e. his “Report”] be minor [preface? not even a text?] > passage from minor to major is tautological, reproduces heterotautology of speculative proposition

——Hegel’s system an immense school: auto-encylopedia of absolute spirit in absolute knowledge > never leave this school, mandatory instruction

——Universitas: onto-, auto-encyclopedic circle of the State

EJQB p. 77 radical illisibilité belongs to the book, very possibility of it > such illegibility not an accomplice of lost (sought after) legibility, of a page not yet cut from divine encyclopedia

TN p. 275 philosophers, meddlers who can’t keep their hands off anything, insatiable polymorphous perversity, imperious encyclopedism

BSi p. 148 if bêtise not an error (bad judgment) but hebetated (dulled) judgment, aptitude for wrong judgment, it could be there in absolute knowledge [stupidity of encyclopedic knowledge]

OG p. 18 (30-1) book as idea of totality, encyclopedia, requires external signified, is against writing and its aphoristic energy

——violence on both sides: logocentrism (book), deconstruction (text)

IF p. 301 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] philosophy as vast circulation, unending procession of received ideas > insofar as encyclopedia generates/preserves ideas, it carries w/in itself its own necrosis: idea always becoming-matter (from 1st instant) > hence stupidity of philosophy (easy to stereotype), hence impertinence of materialism & spiritualism

EU p. 121 universitas has essential tie w/ logocentric, onto-encyclopedic system

***p. 200 philosophy’s new relation w/ techno-scientific reason: coextensive immediacy w/ encyclopedia

pp. 212-13 ontological-encyclopedic hegemony/structure, univerticality, tends to immobilize all recognized borders > all-powerful & powerless (destiny of philosophy subjected to State power)

——CIPH will outline different topology: horizontal, transversal, heterogenous > experiment

ENDS OF MAN

SPOM pp. 16-7 apocalypse of history, philosophy, Marxism was daily bread for Derrida in ’50s, so those into Fukuyama seem late for the end of history

A p. 30 abyssal inquiry re: Heidegger’s delimitation of death, modes of ending, more than one limit, ends of man an indestructable subject > death of Dasein not end of man, btwn the 2 there’s a divisible limit, perhaps, of ending, place where ending ends [?]

EM p. 121 (144) phenomenology as relève of anthropology, no longer but still a science of man

——in all structures described in Phenomlhomme y reste en son relief, equivocal relation to relief (relevance) marque sans doute la fin de lhomme, man past, but also achievement of man > cest la fin de lhomme fini, end of finitude of man, unity of infinite and finite

p. 121 (144) “la relève ou la relevance de lhomme est son télos ou son eskhaton”

——thinking of end of man prescribed in metaphysics, in thinking truth of man > difficulty today to think an end of man not organized by dialectics of truth & negativity, an end of man that’s not a teleology in first person plural

p. 121n (144n) the relevance accomplished in Hegelian metaphysics persists wherever metaphysics, our language, maintains its authority, even in pre-Hegelian systems (i.e. in Kant, figure of finitude organizes capacity to know from emergence of anthropological limit)

p. 123 (147) “the end of man (as a factual anthropological limit) is announced to thought from the vantage of the end of man (as a determined opening or the infinity of a telos)” > lhomme est ce qui a rapport à sa fin

“man” only has meaning in eschato-teleological situation, inscribed in metaphysics btwn 2 ends: 1) transcendental end 2) mortality, finitude

——finitude as origin of, that which unfolds, ideality

——nous, we, arises (sélève) [like ghost?] [out of the folds of the 2 ends of man: 1) transcendental end 2) finitude]

p. 134 (161) prescription of the end of man, prescribed since always, has done nothing but “modulate equivocality of the end, in the play of telos and death”

——dans la lecture de ce jeu: le fin de lhomme est la pensée de lêtre, lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre, la fin de lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre > lhomme est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-a-dire la fin de son propre > lêtre est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-à-dire la fin de son propre

p. 136 (164) btwn 2 eves (veilles), 2 ends, of man: 1) the guard mounted around the house (la garde montée auprès de la maison) 2) awakening to the day that is coming (léveil au jour qui vient)

OH p. 28 horizon (in ancient Greek) = the limit; to see itself [Europe] on the horizon, is to see itself from its end, discourse of anamnesis—taste for finality (goût de fin), for death

P pp. 107-08 [and yet] for Kant, “happiness & culture presuppose that man puts to work what nature puts at his disposal”; Critique depends on reflexive humanism, pragmatic anthropology: to differentiate errant (w/out objective end) beauty from adherent must be view toward final causes

——man is not only an end of nature, he is the final end, goal, of nature, whole system of ends is oriented towards him

ROP p. 110 Foucault’s wager, the end (fin) of finite man: “man would be effaced, like a face drawn in sand at the edge or limit of the sea” > trait (of face, limit) splits, becomes a limit, erasing and multiplying this limit endlessly > self-relation of limit at once erases/multiplies limit

ATIA p. 3 Derrida turns “je suis” into “I follow (je suis)” > I hunt, chase after the animal: moves from confines (ends) of man to bordercrossing btwn man/animal

p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

pp. 79-80 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance > methodological fiction of men only seeing men, an ends of the animal (not man): 1) phenomenological question: is there world w/out animal? 2) a real hypothesis (if you’ll permit me): after animality, a sort of holocaust

p. 102 Kant’s providential-machine (Maschinenwesen der Vorsehung), which teleologizes in advance all war machines, would prosecute war w/out mercy against animal in form pax humana

DPi p. 180 for Kant, government has an interest in treating man as more than a machine, in a manner appropriate to his dignity; that is w/ disinterested interest, interest w/out interest > beyond any market price, any calculable interest, any pathological interest, treat him as an end in-itself

ATAP p. 81 Derrida implicated [in Western eschatological program]: to tell le fin du fin (distinguish closure from end) > eschatology is a tone, the voice itself, isn’t the voice always that of the last man?

ENLIGHTENMENT

FK p. 46 wherever arché of light commands, possibility more originary than manifestation > light there in discourse of philosophy, revelation, also, via Enlightenment, opposed to religion

***pp. 47-8 [Derrida’s liberalism?] unreserved taste for democratic public space, lights of Enlightenment, emancipation from religious dogmatism, thus the attempt to try to think religion w/in limits of reason alone, an epoché that “gives a chance to a political event” [see “Sauf le nom”], belongs to history of democracy

p. 80 the “lights” and Enlightenment of tele-technoscientific critique and reason suppose trustworthiness

SPOM p. 188 phenomenological good sense “may perhaps be valid” for use-value, or only for use-value, phenomenology of good sense, of perception (at work in Marx), of Enlightenment, has nothing mysterious about it, use-value as the proper of man

pp. 191 animism of wood, already matter becoming-immaterial, what would enlightenment be w/out the market? will there ever be progress w/out exchange-value?

POOF p. 42 language of madness, forced by most rigorous & profound necessity to say the insane, impossible, absurd, undecidable—to the disdain of philosophical good conscience (wants to hold out in shade of the Enlightenment): every “X without X” [i.e. “community w/out community”]

pp. 238 gravest of problems, not our intention to denounce fraternity: via Michelet, fraternity as ‘law beyond law,’ vision of universal/revolutionary fraternity [à la the Enlightenment], a hyperbole whose generosity can’t be opposed

pp. 284-85 the 3 friendships in one, the same, those we must break (il faut en finir): 1) Aristotle’s 2) Christian fraternity 3) Enlightenment fraternity (sublated Christian fraternity)

A p. 59 Heidegger refuses to use word universal even though his existential analysis of death wants to be (universal too humanistic for Heidegger, too dependent on Aufklärung)

S p. 131n Heidegger’s Kehre? from question to Zusage?: remove remnant of Aufklärung which still slumbered in privilege of the question? [Derrida is not having it]

PPHS p. 99 Oedipus solves Sphinx’s riddle, beyond hieroglyph > enlightenment, even history

ROP p. 35 “deconstruction's” double bind: 1) inherit from Enlightenment, affirmed/displaced in Freud, Husserl, & even Heidegger 2) tirelessly analyze resistance that clings to the elementary

——Aufklärung, lépoque des Lumières: render reason by breaking things down to the simple

SP p. 67 Nietzsche: can woman really want enlightenment? is she simply looking for new adornment? nothing has been more alien to woman than truth, her great art is the lie

DPi p. 117 irreconcilable axiomatics (humanism of Enlightenment & its opposite): reign of terror, DP, etc.—divide will continue “for a long time”

p. 195 Enlightenment concepts of guillotine not in contradiction w/ certain Christian humanism: the dignified, humanistic death; it is progressive: 1) egalitarian 2) individualist 3) mechanistic, machinisitic > only the machine can make everyone equal before the law

pp. 250-51(n) acc. Saint-Just, happiness a new idea in 18th century Europe > this century also invented the Terror & the guillotine

p. 278 is the Enlightenment the twilight of DP? does it begin to think DP from its end?

IW p. 258 French Lumières different than Aufklärung: French could only oppose Catholic Church, not affirm Protestantism

pp. 266-67 the anti-, archi-institutional nature of German Protestantism partly why Aufklärung is not opposed to faith like French Lumières (Encyclopédie)

ATAP p. 82 every apocalyptic eschatology promised in name of light, we are heirs to these Lumières, cannot & must not forgo the Aufklärung; must keep enough apocalyptic desire (clarity, revelation) to deconstruct apocalyptic discourse

p. 90 distinguishing deconstruction from simple progressive demystification [à la style of Lumières]? or why has deconstruction taken on an apocalyptic tone, multiplied distinctions btwn closure & end? I intended to analyze a genre rather than practice it, an ironic non-belonging

UWC p. 203 light, truth, Enlightenment—question of man

ENEMY

HERP p. 209 how is Heidegger’s monology, this belonging-to-one-another of Speech [shiz produced by polemos must gather, join up, ally, couple] different from speculative proposition [Hegel]? both synthesize an autoheterology, a heterotautology—too big of a question? [see p. 214 reconciliation in Heidegger btwn friend & enemy]

p. 214 Heidegger almost never names the enemy, nor hatred, why such dissymmetry, a voice of friend in polemos, but not a voice of enemy?

POOF pp. 50-1 Nietzsche’s hospitality for mad arrivants, fool already on premises, a guest who would have preceded his host, sheer madness of inverting friend/enemy > requests only that they open the doors of their hearts to him

p. 51 Aristotle’s ‘O my friends, no friends’: a last will & testament, spoken from place of death, does not address enemies (unlike Nietzsche's living fool) > dying person turns toward friendship, living person towards enmity

p. 58 unheimlich enters into the most familiar, lodges enemy into heart of friend, a form of welcome that recalls the haunt as much as the home (lhabitat), hearth, oikeiótēs

pp. 59-60 conversion of enemy to friend, friend to enemy, a structural condition that we can never be done with, raises the stakes (surenchère) > turns sage’s apostrophe & fool’s apostrophe into each other, especially when Nietzsche confesses to performing the fool as a sage, masking himself as the fool (who calls to his enemies) out of friendship for mankind

p. 72 Blake’s “Do be my Enemy for Friendships sake,” hatred as last fidelity to specter of lost friendship? if declaring (referencing/respecting) a name means war, love, friendship, friend/enemy haunts every naming

——friendship–enemy btwn logic of unconscious & logic of lie: these 2 logics can’t help but haunt each other, et de partager même le concept de cette hantise qui travaille le langage de notres temps

——every time a concept bears the ghost of the other, the enemy the friend, the friend the enemy

p. 79 [continuing w/ indefensible bibliophilic discretion] Nietzsche marks a mutation in the political, who better than he marked our history as a history of political linked to love, friend, enemy via Jew, Greek, Christian > binding/unbinding of this link; p. 80 who better than he showed friend/enemy passing into each other: still, the individual ‘Nietzsche’ not the only witness

p. 83 when Nietzsche spectralizes the enemy, no longer reassurance of an identifiable enemy (of a figure at least): not a new ear of peace, human fraternity, but unprecedented violence > thus Schmitt’s desire, in tradition of modernity (Hegel), to re-configure the enemy

p. 84 Christian sage or fool might say, at moment when political has begun to expire [eschatological edge], “there is no enemy!” > would he address the political enemies (Schmitt’s enemies), or the enemies worse than enemies, the enemies of the political

p. 85 Schmitt’s political difference assumes opposition, a determined opposition: friend/enemy > should it erase itself: no politics

pp. 87-8 Schmitt’s purification of all (personal) affect from friend-enemy distinction (its pure political essence), a war w/out intrinsic xenophobia, war w/out hatred

p. 88 Schmitt’s concept of political would collapse under threats to border of friend–enemy, and it is exactly that these threats exist that makes Schmitt’s concept so prophetic and pathetic

——“love your enemies” is ekhthrous not polémios [which agrees with Schmitt’s idea: polémios is the public enemy]

p. 113 [re: friend–enemy] is ultimate pessimism the absolute ambivalence of those hospitable to death drive [Freud, Empedocles]? > fool & sage never stop laughing w/ each other

pp. 122-23 must endure undecidable triviality of crossroads btwn 3 hypotheses: 1) no friend w/out possibility of killing, establishing non-natural community 2) to love in friendship would precisely be the opposite of killing 3) love as step beyond the political, another politics of loving

p. 135n Freud loves to tell Schopenhauerian fable of porcupines who, hoping to stay warm, stop cuddling because their quills hurt them: find mean distance btwn attraction/repulsion

pp. 129-30 politicization thus increases in relation to depoliticization, creates hyperpoliticization, the less enemies there are, the more: this is the vertigo, mirror reflection, of ‘dying sage’ & ‘living fool,’ same # and calculation > ruin, spectrality, madness at heart of concept of political

——this double hyperbole is indirectly affirmed by Schmitt in The Theory of the Partisan

pp. 138-39 when the concrete starts to resemble the ghost, inversion of signs, effect of haunting > is the ‘partisan’ Schmitt’s specter?

pp. 149-50 via Schmitt, if enemy must be my brother & [Däubler's] Der Feind ist unser eigne Frage als Gestalt, the brother enemy is the questioning form of the question, which resembles the friend > a complaint, a crime, aggression, traumatism, war: when called into question by the question

p. 150 friendship of the perhaps: perhaps ‘prior’ to the question, prior even to affirmation that opens it up, before question takes form (friend–enemy as figure of brother), an exclamation mark before a question mark

p. 151 “Enemies, there is no enemy!”—a catapostrophe: is this a complaint against modernity? you’re losing the enemy, deserting grand politics

——deadliest tragedy of fratricide: absolute enemy resembles absolute friend

pp. 159-60 Schmitt, in prison, reading Stirner’s The Ego and its Own, evokes Echo & Narcissus w/ deep anxiety, protective

pp. 161-62 who can be my enemy? who is the non-I? who questions me? who can I recognize as my enemy? I am not theologian, I’m a jurist [who more than Schmitt could smile at this distinction], the jurist must recognize the enemy [?], redialecticzes the conditions of the question [via Hegelian exercise]: “the brother reveals himself as my enemy,” “fraternal kiss (den Bruderkuss)”

pp. 162-63 question itself is an act of war, like recognition in Hegel, a calling into question, on se la pose depuis leffraction ou linfraction de lautre > another step in the night: an enemy can only call into question he who calls himself into question > if I am my own enemy, doesn’t this call into question everything Schmitt has said?

p. 165 Schmitt seems to echo Nietzsche & Aristotle (fool & sage), but as a man awaiting judgment: “woe to him who has no friend…woe to him how has no enemy…”

p. 172 suitability (covenance) of the enemy, lodged w/in oikeiéotēs, my own projection, an exemplarity more real/resistant than my own shadow, my truth in painting > proof in the fact that I can address him, call to him, he becomes origin/destination of call [to the point of madness]

pp. 172-73 difference btwn talking to them [o my friends/enemies] & speaking of them [there are no friends/enemies]: world of difference, fort/da, record their absence after having called

the contretemps [appealing to other presupposes his presence, allows him to come, while distancing/retarding his arrival] dictates, as insane as it is inevitable, the teleiopoetic sentence > expectation of Messiah as unbearable terror: hatred of what is thus awaited?

p. 174 teleiopoesis carries w/in it an irresistible disavowal, fearing all the chance & threat of the perhaps?: the called converted to the repressed, friend into enemy

——to renounce desire, must command the other to be free, to address the other qua other, command him to be capable of not answering, double bind [eg. don’t answer my phone call]

——Nietzsche’s ‘enemies, there’s no enemy’ prepared by the avowal of enmity in intimacy of friendship

p. 175 Schmitt tells us what Aristotle reports: all institutions & destruction originate in war/friendship

pp. 175-76 w/out enemy, Nietzsche’s fool, Schmitt in his prison cell, one can no longer utter cogito ergo sum, there’s no evil genius, no absolute hostility > “I” loses reference, objectivity

——is reason the friend of the enemy? philosophy at stake in Nietzsche’s address [‘O my ene…’]

pp. 187-88 Augustine’s infinitization qua conversion in God, on model of fraternal friendship? i.e. God demands we love the enemy

pp. 189-90 on difference btwn omega ω [w/out iota & spirit] in “O my friends…” and ᾠ [w/ both] [which, inconceivably, English translation failed to mark], vocative interjection or pronomial dative? > philological haunting, ω [w/out] as crypt w/ twin ghosts, the added spirit (aspiration) in memory or omission > do the friends remain motionless/indifferent in either case?

pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe quà l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

——beyond the certainty of cogito, the friend only has to become evil to become Evil Genius

pp. 215-16 desire for one single friendship exposes possibility & impossibility of indivisible calculation: one time for all time(s) will never cease, immediately infinite in its finiteness, appears as such only in unceasing desire for repetition/multiplication [cf. Augustine in Confessions] > the subject, the ‘one’ friend is indivisible in its calculable identity, indivisible in its incalculable singularity, the one divides the other: it is here that the enemy is w/in the friend

pp. 218-19 we can’t exclude fact that when someone speaks they strive not to be understood, diabolical figure of death drive > so can the accord of hyperbolic lovence be possible, hoping to be understood beyond all dialectics, haunting (failure) must leave an imprint on the body it seems to threaten, merging indissociably, it’s impossible not to aspire to this haunting [a necessity]: instant of decision remains heterogenous, undecidable, crucial experience of perhaps

p. 244 is the voice of the friend in Heidegger, that which rings out withdrawn from metaphysical subjectivity, a minimal ‘community,’ friendship prior to friendship & enmity?

pp. 256-57 via Kant's suspicion of tenderness/gentleness in friendship, a catastrophic complication in natural law of attraction/repulsion, a rupture, love will tend toward the evil of reciprocal possession (fusion), love harbors hate w/in itself > friendship as sign/symptom of this possible perversion, and that which protects us from it: attraction must be against attraction, repulsion against repulsion

p. 276 is there a worse jealousy than jealousy of self? is there any other? jealous of one’s very own brother: qui est le plus d’un, le supplément de l’un en trop? [the friend, says Nietzsche’s hermit]

pp. 281-82 in face of our envy, the aggression whereby nous nous faisons un ennemi, make ourselves our own enemy: hides/reveals our vulnerability > true fear/respect [?]: “At least be my enemy!”

p. 282 Derrida deduces the political register of friendship in Nietzsche: to be able to honor enemy in friend, a sign of freedom, neither slaves nor tyrants know this freedom > woman is either slave or tyrant, knows only how to love, can’t respect enemy (honor what she doesn’t love); the political translation of Nietzsche’s axiom: friendship is freedom plus equality [the double bind]

HST pp. 401-02 dakhīl (intimate, interior, stranger due protection, protected by divine blessing) linked to hôte, hostis gār, stranger, enemy > hostipitality

ENVELOPE

OOG p. 137 for Husserl, Living Present: indefinite Maintenance of double enveloping (protention, retention)

T p. xviii(n) tympanum, Dionysianism, Ariadne’s Thread, labyrinth: by means of the breach (fellure) of philosophical identity, which amounts to addressing the truth to itself in an envelope, to hearing it speak inside without opening its mouth or showing its teeth, the bloodiness of a disseminated writing separates the lips, violates the embouchure of philosophy, contact w/ another code, a unique event, unreadable as such, inaudible, btwn earth & sea, w/out signature

DS p. 189 painting [in one of its avatars] strips all superadded language, the envelope around the kernel, restores naked image, direct to eidos

p. 215 hymen, comme tissu, envelops, outwits (déjoue) philosphemes, ontologies, dialectics, les retourne et les inscrit, suspense in the antre of perpenetration

FS pp. 12-3 attempt-to-write, moment of overflow (can’t be understand via voluntarism): when play of meaning overflows signification, which is always enveloped by limits of nature, life, soul

p. 23 logos spermatikos: adult in miniature, encasement, anthropomorphic concept, preformationsim, biological idea, totality of hereditary characteristics enveloped in germ

O pp. 26-7 le détour dune écriture dont one ne revient pas, dissemination: this question calls for restaging of arithmos, “counting” as “bad procedure,” and rereading the rhythmos of Democritus, which philosophy has never been able to reckon w/ (naura pu compter) > philosophy accounts for itself by rising out of, and then circulating w/in its speculative necessity, the [envelope of writing]

RGE p. 251 misconstrued, treated lightly, Hegelianism expands its historical domination w/ its immense enveloping resources

REST pp. 265-66 when shoes no longer have strict relation avec un sujet porteur ou porté—they’re the lightened, anonymous, voided support (but so much the heavier abandoned à son inertie opaque) “of an absent subject whose name haunts the open form”

——never completely open, the shoe maintains a form, that of the foot > describes external surface or envelope of what is called a “form” [Derrida quotes from Littré, where “form” is wood in shape (figure) of foot, then he links figure to face—Shapiro sees Van Gogh’s in “his” shoes]

***AFR pp. 112-13 though, acc. Condillac, articulated language as system of arbitrary signs is only 1 of 3 kinds of signs, once it proves the best example, exemplary, it draws, envelops in advance, everything which precedes it: upsets the symmetry to its own benefit

D p. 293 Soller: beating envelope, I was on its border

p. 316 lélément enveloppe et se décompte (deducts itself) de ce quil enveloppe

ATM p. 162 [re: Levinas’ sériature] cette reprise (this mending resumption) is the condition by which beyond essence keeps (garde) its chance [see p. 160] against the enveloping seam (couture enveloppante) of the dialectic or thematic

FV pp. 464-65 [phonematic limitation of letter, phonē spared divisibility] voice: spontaneous self-presence one can retain (garder) w/out paper, w/out envelope, always available (disponible) > Lacan’s not attentive to writing w/in the voice, before the letter

——sheltered (à labri) from disseminating threat/power in OG, agency of Lacan’s letter is the relève of writing in system of speech

EPEKEINA TES OUSIAS (

GT p. 147 violence of gift: takes by surprise in such a way as to trap, indebt the receiver, place, hold in a process of circulation, but this violence irreducible whether it repeats or interrupts the circle

——or: a surprise surprising enough to be forgotten w/out delay, beyond Being, epekeina tes ousia: secret about which one cannot speak, but can no longer remain silent

MONL p. 49 hyperbole is Plato’s word: excess beyond excess > impregnable, epekeina tes ousias

p. 71 [Derrida’s quilting point?] passage points = places of transcendence, absolute elsewhere in eyes of Greco-Latino-Christian philosophy & yet inside it > epekeina tes ousias, khōra, negative theology, Freud, Artaud, Blanchot, Levinas, Eckhart

OOG p. 144 the Idea is not, always “beyond being” (epekeina tes ousias), as Telos of infinite determinability of Being, it’s being’s openness to the light > it is the light of light, sun of the visible sun, a hidden sun, no doubt what a Plato muted by Platonism tells us about

FK p. 57 khōra, place of absolute exteriority, and place of bifurcation btwn 2 approaches to the desert > [Derrida links Platonic, Plotinian epekeina tes ousias to Christian act of birth]

p. 59 utterly faceless other

SPOM p. 125 specter, frequency of the visibility of the invisible, visibility is not seen > epekeina tes ousias

p. 189 transcendence, super-, step beyond (über, epekeina) is made sensuous in its exceeding (excess) the sensuous body, non-sensuous becomes sensuous, one feels what is not felt, suffers where suffering does not take place, phantom limbs (the X marking any phenomenology of perception) [see Descartes’ Meditations on phantom limbs]

POOF p. 112 a hyperbolic build-up (surènchere) perhaps the origin of good & evil, both beyond being (Plato’s Good in Republic), a hyperbole common to both, makes them pass one into the other

p. 183 friendship beyond the law, justice, the political: is that the good (beyond being)? if so, should one judge/condemn one’s friend’s political faults?

HASD p. 31 the 2 paradigms of Greek “negative theology”: epekeina tes ousias of Republic, khora of Timaeus

——epekeina tes ousias as excess beyond Being, inauguration of Good > has more affinity with Christian apophases [Dionysus] than khora

p. 32 epekeina tes ousias, beyond beingness of Being, hyperbolism—sur, hyper > negativity serves the hyper movement that produces, attracts, guides it

pp. 32-3 Being must be created by what exceeds the border, the Good, intelligible sun, something that far surpasses (hyperekhontos) [Republic 509b], excess of God, light is in Good’s image

——light produced by sun is son of the Good (neither visible, nor sight or vision), excess itself described by what it exceeds, even negative discourse retains ontology, does not interrupt analogical continuity [btwn perceptible/intelligible sun, the Good and that to which it gives birth, allusion to triton genos, i.e. khora]

pp. 33-34 the laughter and breath [what divine hyperbole!] of theatrical rhetoric in Republic [re: epekeina tes ousias] becomes serious prayer in Christianity

p. 34 Plato’s use of “third species” as analogical mediation, concerns Being, epekeina tes ousias, and khora > khora also constitutes a third species (triton genos), isn't intelligible paradigm

pp. 53-4 strangeness of what is as le tout autre (das schlechthin Andere)—transcendence, which, acc. Heidegger, Plato properly expresses w/ epekeina tes ousias

PP p. 167 absolute invisibility of origin of visibility, father (good-sun-capital), epekeina tēs ousias, a structure where all presences are supplements substituted for absolute origin

p. 168 if disappearance of good-father-capital-sun is precondition of discourse, writing (is) epekeina tēs ousias

VM pp. 85-6 for Levinas, sun of epekeina tes ousias (fecundity, generosity) will always illuminate inexhaustible source of thought, Plato places Good beyond Being, beyond light of Being [see p. 312n Descartes’ infinite does this too]; “ex-cendence”

***p. 153 Greek logos not accidental for any thought; Greek miracle is impossibility for any thought to treat its sages as “sages of the outside” > by proferring epekeina tes ousias, by welcoming alterity into heart of logos, it has protected itself against every surprising convocation

——but isn’t Good still light of light? necessarily nocturnal source of light? heart of light is black

TC p. 246 for Artaud, like Nietzsche, life beyond being, “the beyond of being,” Being as eternal repetition, ideal referral, victory of God/Death over life [cf. PS pp. 192-95]

DS p. 208 for Mallarmé, ideality of idea, metaphysical name, is necessary to mark non-being, nonpresent, marks w/out breaking glass, alludes to epekeina tēs ousias: a hymen (closeness & veil) btwn Plato’s sun & Mallarmé’s lustre

p. 242 forms of writing subject to law of hymen (literature, theater, drama, ballet, dance, fable, mimicry), the rule of the cast-aside-reference, the being aside (référence écartée, être à l’écart)

CHM pp. 56-7 Cogito, exceeding totality of world like epekeina tes ousias (Glaucon: “Lord what demonic hyperbole (daimonias hyperboles)?” [banally translated as “marvelous transcendence”]

——this demonic hyperbole more excessive than hybris, passion > opens, founds, makes possible

WAP p. 60 hyperbole (in pre-Kantian form: epekeina tes ousias): an excess beyond all disciplines, beyond circle of knowledge, encyclopedia; yet, as a symbol (symbolic order) it masters, overhangs (surplombe) entirety of what is > brings together & constitutes what it exceeds, makes appear by authorizing itself

TN pp. 83-89 Levinas’ feminine, profanation, the uncovering of the hidden still hidden, young animal, irresponsible animality, a not Good epekeina tēs ousias, uncovered virginity, mortuary mask

p. 121 epekeina tēs ousias (hyphen btwn Plato/Plotinus): Plotinus’ hyperbolic touching of the One as the Good, beyond being

p. 282 heart: condition of desire, the effraction of the other, of what can’t return to self

——diastole, absolute generosity, generosity more generous than generosity itself, orients us toward epekeina tēs ousisas, Plotinus’ One

AD p. 147n in the passage beyond totality (epekeina tēs ousias), we find Levinas’ strained and precarious filiation w/ Heidegger > unlike Levinas, Heidegger does not give in to “politism” of, nor fascination w/, a (supposedly Hegelian) totality

WOG p. 26 Derrida took from Greeks: other of language, simulacrum, infinite alterity, while privileging epekeina tēs ousias, that which uproots ontology and metaphysics

***p. 35 khōra, utterly resistant to historical narrative, not eternal or ahistorical like intelligible idea > radically foreign to all oppositions & heterogenous to epekeina tēs ousias (the one that doesn’t participate in Being, gives rise to history, narratives, myths, Good and God)

p. 36 beyond of being: Jewish/Christian revelations, apophatic theologies/mysticisms, Levinas’ beyond ontology, Heidegger’s proposed theology w/ no Being or his kreuzweise Durchstreichung

khōra, non-event, a place or a taking place, an-ontological, an-anthropo-theological; epekeina tēs ousias, event > fragile limit btwn certain event & non-event

CIN p. 55 cinder, nothing that can be in the world, remains beyond everything that is (konis epekeina tēs ousias), giving itself (es gibt ashes)—it’s nothing

EPOKHE

FL pp. 248-249 the moment of suspense that makes deconstruction possible: the moment the credit of an axiom is suspended.

pp. 269-270 via Benjamin, terrifying moments of suffering, crime, torture: “mystical” epochē, moment of suspense, instance of nonlaw, founding or revolutionary violence, a pure performative act that wouldn’t have to respond to anyone, interrupts

***FK pp. 47-8 [Derrida’s liberalism?] unreserved taste for democratic public space, lights of Enlightenment, emancipation from religious dogmatism, thus the attempt to try to think religion w/in limits of reason alone, an epoché that “gives a chance to a political event” [see “Sauf le nom”], belongs to history of democracy

LOBL p. 116 suspension that retains [Blanchot’s] title, compulsive pulsation of larrêt de mort, a decision that escapes the signature of any “I”

p. 117 suspension that is a resurrection

H p. 83 place Kant’s categorical imperative under erasure, under epochē

AF pp. 71-2 “if it is at all knowable,” an epochal suspension as energy of virtuality (energeia of a dynamis) [Agamben, Aristotle?], vertiginous, gives only condition of a future which remains to-come, messianic, an archive w/ no record of presence of what is or will have been “actually present” (distinguished radically from all messianism)

OOG p. 119 new reduction (epochē) developed in Crisis cannot be a forgetting or negating, a subtraction or devaluation of what it de-sediments or neutralizes

SPOM p. 74 eschatology of Marxist critique and that of religions cannot accept the epochē of the content, whereas, for deconstruction, it is essential to the messianic

pp. 161-62 Stirner advocates auto-affection of “I-Me,” where no ghosts can haunt, no spacing > thinks this epokhē reduces, exorcises the ghost, Marx thinks it reduces to the ghost

VP p. 11 Husserl neutralizes totality of world to phenomenon through transcendental reduction, thus arises the nothing that distinguishes parallels [trans. psychology from trans. phenom.]

SH pp. 24-5 in shibboleth (river), there’s suspension of meaning, almost opposite of phenomenological “epokhe,” which preserves meaning > those who couldn’t pronounce “shi” marked themselves as unable to remark a mark thus coded

SP pp. 59-61 woman as suspension of truth & castration

CHM p. 60 phenomenological reduction as neutralizing, normalizing, straitjacketing (thematic of living present, profound reassurance of certainty of meaning)

RGE p. 268 Bataille carried away in his calculable sliding > concepts become nonconcepts, unthinkable, untenable

——phenomenological epochē a reduction carried out au nom et en vue du sens> Bataille proposes epochē of epoch of meaning

***DPi pp. 168-69 impossible, unstable, contagious, endemic question of cruelty reinscribed in hollow (creux) of another question: belief (croyance) > believing and not-believing “resonat[e] spectrally in the shell or the hollow of the other’s ear,” every belief “ventriloquized telephonically” by skepsis or epokhē of an “incredible” that is not belief’s contrary, but always a belief w/out belief, cruelty w/out cruelty [?]; cruelty and belief are hollowed into each other, the credited (cru) and the cruel

DST DST p. 203 epochē sets, suspends, in parentheses > what do epochs of “What is…?” have to do, or not to do, w/ madness?

RM p. 52 epoch of metaphor: suspensive retrait and return supported by line (trait) delimiting a contour

pp. 64-5 metaphysics as series of guises, turns, modes, figures—vast structural process of epochē of Being withholding itself, holding itself in withdrawal > metaphysics as tropics, a singular metaphoric detour

PF p. xxiii quotations, suspend word [“United States”] in epokhē of epoch, a fabulous act of nomination, fabula (like provocation) recounts/deciphers a history, the phantasm of an accredited myth, myth by force of law, “enforced” myth

+R p. 179 picture, film, hieroglyph: projection speeded up to limit of instantaneity: gestus of interruption, suspense of breaching force, holding metonymic fragments, seized by death

TN pp. 166-67 “principle of principles” gives us no choice [?]: commands us to begin w/ “us,” that is, w/ most proper, proximate Ego; this “man,” this “we” comes before most radical phenomenological reduction, the one that suspends the world

p. 349n for Husserl, hallucination is like a spontaneous reduction

p. 229 for Derrida, epochē divides contact at its heart, anesthetizing it from the threshold of its possibility, for 2 reasons: 1) suspends reality of contact 2) noematic can’t pertain to touched thing

NOY p. 238 thought of history of Being affected by internal epochē, divides, suspends the yes: will is not identical to itself (along w/ many other things) > yes as the incalculable, the promise: [quasi-, fable of] “giving reason,” “giving an account,” the countability of the innumerable yesses

AD p. 51 hospitality, the epochē of epochē, interruption of self, of phenomenology’s “principle of principles,” of presentation in person, “in the flesh”

OG pp. 61-2 (91) transcendental reduction—refers to lebendige Gegenwart (The Living Present), reduces trace > commanded by theme of presence

EU pp. 117-18 [Derrida’s move] from phenomenology to a language that couldn’t be submitted to the epochē (to the epoch) [list of interests: wills, testaments, archives, etc.]

——not a system, but strategic device opening onto its own abyss, non clôturable, not wholly formalizable rules of reading, interpretation, writing

SPEC pp. 378-79 Freud’s “to let develop” [re: Aristophanes’ speech] mortgages irresponsibility, no engagement, epokhē of judgment, speaks from no-place [Lacan takes Beyond… too seriously?]

EQUALITY [fixerup]

R p. 52 equality is not equal to itself (paradoxes of autoimmune)

p. 53 technique, “technical measure of equality” is not a mishap, chance for incommensurable, technique before calculating technique [?] [POOF]

AD p. 144n for Kant & Levinas, brothers, irruption of equality, thus of the 3rd

POOF p. 22 wound opens w/ necessity to count one’s friends, democracy’s 2 irreducible laws: 1) respect for irreducible singularity or alterity 2) calculation of majorities, representable subjects, all equal

——mais là où tout autre est également tout autre > political desire borne by this disjunction, bears chance of future of democracy, divided virtue, inadequate to itself, chaos opening in silence

——no virtue, w/out the tragedy of # w/out #, perhaps more unthinkable than tragedy

p. 64 temptation to match Nietzsche’s gesture, call he seems to be making for another justice, one that breaks w/ equivalence of right & vengeance: what’re political consequences for democracy?

——what would an equality be that no longer calculates? exceeding all reappropriation of the proper

p. 102 relation btwn friendship/democracy, approbation of greatest #? deployment of countable unity, of ‘one more’ subject > the 2 presumed calculable #s of democracy (from perspective of conventional/nominalist hesitation): 1) form of decision, greatest # of people 2) possibility of this decision: birth—the equivocal double equality (isonomy founded on isogony)

p. 196 if Montaigne’s disproportion of sovereign friendship is translated into the political, wouldn’t that endanger Aristotle’s principle of autarky, equality, mutuality [?] > but our question is always about political translation: is the political a universal translating machine?

p. 202 Aristotle’s 2 forms of justice: 1) numerical equality (katarithmón), brothers 2) proportional equality (katanalogían), father-son [cf. Aristotle’s Politics]

pp. 227-28 Quinet & Michelet: realize Christianity’s dogma (grace) in the Political world, brotherly equality, Fraternity, promise of Christianity: book of the People is yourself, myself (not women though)

p. 268n via Leroux, fraternity links freedom & equality OR fraternity appears first as origin/principle > Christianity as an ‘infinite enlargement’ of [gentle] fraternity, still deploys a Greek memory: these 2 memories efficiently coupled in ideal instant of French Revolution

pp. 260-62 Kant’s friend of man (not simply “one who loves man”), announces promise of cosmopolitanism, universal democracy, perpetual peace: inscribed in sensibility, but only in relation to purely rational Idea of equality (not only calculable measure, but also an obligation)

——Kant gives place to, configures, represents the friend of man: “all men are here represented as brothers under one universal father who wills the happiness of all” > father is not a man, not included in friendship he makes possible [via race, genealogy], can’t receive equal reciprocity

pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

——modesty would get woman to participate in universal fraternity (i.e. humanity), equalizes sexes by moralizing them: modest woman is a brother for man

p. 282 Derrida deduces the political register of friendship in Nietzsche: to be able to honor enemy in friend, a sign of freedom, neither slaves nor tyrants know this freedom > woman is either slave or tyrant, knows only how to love, can’t respect enemy (honor what she doesn’t love); the political translation of Nietzsche’s axiom: friendship is freedom plus equality [the double bind]

p. 284 the gift is that which gives friendship in Nietzsche > and yet, friendship still means freedom, equality, fraternity in Nietzsche

pp. 295-96 the hyperbole of this friendship seems to engage w/ greatest risk (re: inherited concept of friendship) when Nietzsche speaks of ‘w/out sharing,’ ‘w/out reciprocity’ > can one, then, still speak of equality & fraternity?

p. 306 when will we be ready for an experience of freedom & equality that’s capable of respectfully experiencing the friendship that would at last be just, just beyond law, measured against its measurelessness? > “O my democratic friends…”

ERASURE

MPM p. 22 de Man’s “Autobiography as Defacement”

p. 123 we can only write what can be erased—otherwise no promise, no memory

p. 125 [re: de Man, word “deconstruction” inscribing itself instead of being erased] “always already” erases singularity of event, which is erased in its turn before signature of this word [“deconstruction”] > signature asserts itself as history insofar as origin of its “taking-place” is unlocatable

***A pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (narrivent quà seffacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

S p. 2 a modality of “avoiding” like using quotation marks or a non-negative crossed-shape crossing out (kreuzweise Durchstreichung); p. 52 the crossing out here symbolizes the fourfold

p. 135n re: “Das Wesen der Sprache: Die Sprache des Wesens”—colon erases copula, allows question to be exceeded by pledge (consent to the address, en-gage), “is” would relaunch the question

FSW p. 226 traces produce space of their inscription by acceding to period of their erasure, traces constituted by double force of repetition & erasure, of legibility & illegibility

p. 230 unerasable trace, not a trace, full-presence, son of God, sign of parousia, not a seed, not a mortal germ

——erasure [of trace] is death itself

KH p. 116 [re: a logic of living memory in Timaeus] effacement (of secondary impressions) would be the figure for the middle (mil-lieu), both for space and time, would not affect originary impression (that of child), ineffaceable once engraved in virgin wax

BL p. 208-09 law becomes something by being a nothing that constantly defers access to itself [tabernacle]; atopology [khōra] erases event, annuls the event, nullification gives birth to the law

PAS PAS p. (85) sans remarks same X w/out annulling it, springless spring (ce ressort sans ressort), this re-trait leaves everything intact (sauf, indemne) in appearance [absolute heterogenous neutrality w/out negation], at the same time it has abducted, erased, absolute rapidity of dispossession (dérapage)

PPHS p. 89 sign erases itself for Hegel, but, unlike for Derrida, preserves signified ideality, through passageway of time

SH p. 43 date es gibt, annulment at work when date inscribes its here and now in iterability, consigns itself to self-forgetfulness, succeeds in effacing itself

WM p. 213 white mythology [vis-à-vis Anatole France]: metaphysics, culture of West, erased w/in itself fabulous scene that produced it, this scene remains active—inscribed in white ink; white man takes his own mythology, his own logos, the mythos of his idiom, for universal Reason

p. 268 because metaphoric is plural from the start, it cannot escape syntax, it organizes its division w/in syntax, cannot be what it is except in erasing itself, indefinitely constructing its destruction

DS pp. 193-94 double mark, mark erases mark, undecidable stroke > this syntax escapes pertinence of truth, inscribes truth w/in its play [“Mallarmé exemplifies this”—suspect such a claim]

p. 253 paper & hymen: blankness that allows for fold > forever re-marks itself as disappearance, erasure, non-sense

OS pp. 52-3n all anticipation of the meaning of time: onto-theo-teleology; time suppressed the moment one asks the question of its meaning, when one relates it to presence, truth, essence; Hegel: “time is that which erases time” > time, existence of circle, hides from itself its own totality

p. 53n for Hegel, time erases time, Tilgen (to erase) is also an Aufhebung: given that time is pure exterior self, parousia is end of time

p. 65 trace is its own erasure, belongs to trace to erase itself, eludes what would maintain it in presence, neither perceptible nor imperceptible

P p. 61 parergon stands out (se détache), not like work, which also stands out > parergon stands out against 2 grounds (fonds) [work, background], as that which merges (se fond), effaces itself; frame’s thickness as margin not figure—or figure that comes away of its own accord (senlève delle même)

***POS p. 68 writing structurally carries w/in itself (counts-discounts) its own erasure, while marking what remains of this erasure

ATIA p. 33 the question of whether animals can respond also concerns whether they can erase (seffacer), can they lie, pretend, cover their own tracks

——that traces can be erased, does not mean someone (man or animal) can erase them

p. 128 for Lacan, animals are capable of dansité, sexual lure, hunt, but still just pretense, not a lie [a trace, but not an ability to erase the trace, to pretend to pretend]

p. 135 Derrida substituted trace for signifier to ensure that erasure and inscription could be included in the same structure

***p. 136 no human, no animal, no God has mastery over erasure of trace, nor power to “judge” its erasure

DIF DIF p. 24 because trace is a simulacrum of presence, erasure belongs to structure of the trace, it has no site > erasures on both sides of trace

***——inversion of metaphysical concepts: the present becomes trace of trace, sign of sign, mark of erasure > present is a trace & a trace of erasure of trace

O p. 5 no speculative dialectic of same and other can master “difference” (economy of mark-erasure, trace) because such dialectic always remains an operation of mastery

RGE p. 265 Bataille against servile writing (not irresponsible techne of Plato) that serves life, phantom of life, in presence, advocates a trace w/ possibility of effacement absolu > unerasable trace not a trace

RM p. 75 Being’s inscription narrive quà seffacer, cf. differance/trace

p. 77 le trait, il arrive à seffacer dans un autre, reinscribing itself heterologically, allegorically

TR p. 101 plus de faute [no more fault, more fault] > vicious circle of excusing & being guilty

——guilt as inscription that is ineffaceable, inexorable, inexonerable

——[re: Confessions] loeuvre generates/capitalizes a sort of interest (won’t be so bold as to say surplus value) of guilt: overproduces shame that is archived (not effaced)

D p. 305 proliferation, substitution of the unit that adds & effaces itself, counts itself out (se décomptant) at moment of déclenchement; Sollers: “participating in the calculation that effaced us and replaced us”

***p. 331 trace can only imprint itself by referring to another trace (the other), letting itself be upstaged (outrepasser)/forgotten: its force of production stands in relation to energy of its erasure

p. 364 tracing not simply mere other or outside of erasing: can only trace itself out in in the erasure of its own “presence”

LI p. 137 to no longer oppose writing to erasure (accounting for supplementary paradox) is both terrible and yet nonviolent (perhaps nonviolence itself)

pp. 137-38 that trace de-limits what it limits is why the finiteness of a context has an indefinite opening—never secure, simple > in this openness of erasure: political responsibility (where irreducible violence communicates w/ an essential nonviolence) > only the irresponsible (to be polemical) will object, those for whom things are always calculable, clear, programmable, decipherable

ATM pp. 174-75 for Levinas, to make passage to other, there can’t be an absolute erasure, withdrawal must appear, “He,” only there in seriasure, a series of hiatuses (mouth agape), enlaced erasures

OG p. 7 (16) writing as “signifier of the signifier” no longer means accidental doubling, fallen (déchue) secondarity, but overflows, goes beyond extension of language > comprehends language

——signified always already (toujours déjà) functions as signifier: effacing = overflowing

——advent of writing, advent of a play which effaces all those abris du hors-jeu (out-of-bounds shelters [transcendental signifieds]) that surveil field of language > destroying the concept sign

***p. 23 ontotheology, the system functioning as effacing of difference

p. 60 (88) concept of experience belongs to metaphysics, can only use it [deconstructively] sous rature, “experience” always a relationship w/ presence [cf. Nietzsche’s On the Genea… Preface 1]

p. 61 (90) transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased, arche-trace must comply w/ this necessity & erasure (contradictory and not acceptable in logic of identity), it is the disappearance of origin, and also the origin of origin, so to wrench (arracher) trace from classical scheme that would demand it comes after originary nontrace (that would make of it an empirical mark), we must speak of originary trace or arche-trace > but if all begins w/ trace, there’s no originary trace

——erasure of concepts

pp. 109 (159-61) a prohibition of proper names is derivative to arche-writing > prohibition only possible because of proper names’ originary erasure, because they belong to a system of differences that condition play of interdict and its transgression [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]

——proper name has always been original myth of transparent legibility present under obliteration

p. 167 (238) origin/nature as myth of addition, supplementarity annulled by being purely additive > myth of the effacement of the trace

pp. 199-200 for Rousseau, origin as beginning of end, inaugural decadence, separation btwn song & speech: growth of music parallels writing as “dangerous supplement” > gradual forgetting (of voice of nature) usurps, separates, deprives: re-placement as effacement by forgetting

p. 215 Rousseau links effacement w/ substitution

EU p. 19 translating structure begins as soon as a reading of “original” text is instituted, offers up language to be read in its very erasure: erased traces of a path (odos), chemin deffacement, translation passing over/beyond the path of language [beyond Heidegger], passant son chemin

SPEC p. 360 proper name arrives only to erase itself

p. 374 complex scene of signature in which inscription arrives only to erase itself

——Plato remains behind (derrière) Socrates’ signature

pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

ERECTION

FK p. 84 matrix of unlimited, general fetishization of Thing itself > read the unscathed as spontaneity of erection or pregnancy

SPOM pp. 210, 243-44n for Marx, there’s a phantomatic objectivity before commodity value [?] product of labor petrifies, erects, hardens (feminine character of commodity-chimera?)

F p. xlviii cryptonomy: crack (la ligne de brisure) of a symbol, upright column of name (colonne érigée dun nom), blank voice of a scruple [see p. xiii], always extends beyond the self

P p. 126 if we’re in a hurry, we’ll conclude the colossal is the phallus, which doubles the corpse; Derrida jokes: don’t hurry when it’s a matter of erection, let the thing happen

p. 140 small/big (problem of sublime) measured against, w/in, living body of man > starting from it, the erection of the largest is preferred

ATIA p. 55 the animal sniffing out traces (which are always traces of an other), seeking to escape/find: the inevitable animot > what happens when man stands up/represses smell?

p. 61 distinctive trait of human coupling: man can’t dissimulate rhythm of erection & detumescence

——difference btwn erection and “being-standing”

——modesty, for humans, concentrated on genitals, on phallus, Derrida hypothesizes that criterion here is of uprightness (droiture) as erection in process of hominization

——is all “hiding of oneself” modesty? is there modesty not directed toward genitalia? the metonymy has been arrested/concentrated on phallic region

p. 92 for Kant, the power to have the “I” is the erection of man, infinitely above: the subject

p. 99 erection, standing up, allows face-to-face copulation

PS p. 183 like excrement, like turd, a metaphor of the penis, the work should stand up

p. 184 Derrida shows in Nietzsche & Hölderlin an equation btwn dancing, standing upright, and the work itself

——but, unlike Artaud, they treat erection metaphorically, it doesn’t exile itself into the work, expatriate itself to sovereignty of speech/writing, uprightness of letter, the tip of the pen

——does Nietzsche question relation of grammatical security & uprightness of letter?

——Heidegger foretells this relationship: Greeks interpret language visually, as grammata, in writing language comes to stand (paradoxically, this confirms disdain of writing in Phaedrus)

——Artaud wanted to destroy [this] metaphor: the standing upright as metaphorical erection in written work

p. 326n Derrida juxtaposes Nietzsche’s boner pen w/ Genet’s jimmy

p. 186 for Artaud, swollen ego of cock > separate from me: “a true man has no sex” [swelling of sex as castration]

O p. 21 Hegel allows for insistence [TN. (in + sistere) “standing firm in”] of a gap btwn form/content, btwn what he calls certainty and truth

WAP p. 10 the erection of institution betrays fragility of foundation: institution instituted against deconstructibility (reveals/deceives ground like a symptom would)

p. 91 my body > cadaverization of my body, capturing by erasure, fascinating neutralization > my body only fascinates while playing dead, when erected in rigidity of cadaver (delegation of life)

DPi p. 48 w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

p. 58 theater of cruelty, scopic drive, fascinatio, enchantment that chains spectator to spectacle (fascio, to tense, tie, attach, fasciola is a bandage wrapping [bandelette]) > what links voyeur-spectator to fascinum, charm, enchantment, virile sex

——to executioner: “so, you got a hard-on! (tu bandes!)” (link to erection at moment of decapitation)

REST p. 261 restitution: reestablishes in rights or property by placing subject upright again, “the erect body”

p. 312 Shapiro treats shoes as reproduction of real shoes, misses that, for Heidegger, shoes don’t relate to given subjectum, or given world, he won’t be able to avoid the bridge, doesn’t know shoes’re already prosthetic—précipitée dans labîme, la sphinge, dès linstant où lenflure (turgidity)

p. 377 the de-paired (le dépareillé), the disparate, helps us better to think the pair’s repair (à sa réparation), à panser (bandage), à bander là où le-la-les double(s) band- [cf. P p. 88]

PIO p. 26 “statute”: stance, stays erect, it’s essentially institutional, defines while prescribing, stable, order, supposes a group (like invention, it’s only human, not animal/theological)

PF p. xxxiv how to think durable hardness, invincibility, of an onto-theologico-political phantasm: i.e. sovereignty?

PSSS pp. 259-60 who’s to say our republic is still not monarchical, that instead of a paregicide, the king’s neck was saved, erected by decapitation; never know if States General, at moment of first convocation, condemned or saved king’s head > both gestures indissociable

D p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

pp. 301-02 to present oneself, to stand upright (se dresser), always a murder, a castration > an erection that can only display itself in play, laughter, pointed teeth of cut

pp. 326-27 what does it mean to stand upright (se dresser) if inconsistent, divided?

+R p. 168 force of trait (disjointed forms a work): systasis of powerful ligatures holds, binds, disjecta membra, ladder is a scaffold, a synonym of POTENCE, garroted, bound (pillars, columns, frames, capitals)

p. 169 double ladder, erected, riveted, shackled, never arrives > steps: symbolic of sexual act

C C p. 208 coffin, as the odd, as the remainder, remains entire, divisible only by itself [prime: 127], as long as you deduct one—the paradigm coffin: belongs w/out belonging to series it makes possible > inscribes itself in series, leaves on it mark of its own subtraction

——transcendental mors, fors, exceptional piece; (fait) band à part (has a hard-on, keeps aloof)

p. 243 a discourse on stricture: elles sont tendues pour (faire) bander le mors (bind the bit, get a hard-on), set a trap w/key and lock (serrure) > get up the ghost of a double bind, same lacing in other series, w/in, around two bodies skewered in mirror-image

AD AD p. 152n for Levinas, paternity, at instant of eroticism, not virility of war, state, heroism

CIN CIN p. 43 no Phoenix, no monument, aucune érection qui tienneou tombe, the cinder w/out ascension, the cinders love me [cf. “proximity loves me” from PC], “they change sex, they re-cinder themselves, they androgynocide themselves”

BSi pp. 201-03 hardness of capital erection [CAP] turns woman into beast

p. 212 “excellently eminent and excellently phallic erection of sovereign highness”

p. 216 deciding actors [political leaders] consecrated by election of their erection to status of marionette in the puppet show [in English]

pp. 224-25 for Derrida, hypothesis that bêtise always threatens imperturbable ithyphallus is the essential ithyphallic bêtise > ithyphallus’ hyperbolical desire is nil/empty of thought, this void pushes, pulses, compulses, makes one think of a drive that is absolutely bête, never gives up anything, absolute stranger to all thought

——priapism is infinite ithyphallism, foreign to finitude of erection (finitude makes erection possible) > thus, is detumescence castration?

p. 251 Medusa as capital head—erection, castration

ATAP p. 91 [quoted from GLAS p. 198 (222)] absolute knowledge as phantasm of absolute self-having (savoir absolu), to be(come) (être-devenir), in a word, bander (bind, bandage, hard-on), son propre mors [Nietzsche’s “become hard”] [cf. CIN pp. 56-8 swallow another to speak his/her commands]

IF p. 309 Flaubert desires male sentences, taut, muscular

SPEC p. 394 the secondary (supplementary stricture) transforms freely mobile into immobile cathectic energy: posits, posts—here’s a thesis: immobilized cathexis is more tonic, tonicity related to effects of binding (elasticity & tension), thus binden as bander (erection): “bander: poster, liason: postale

p. 396tn tendance, bander as tendre, erection, double bande (both noun & verb)

p. 404 Laplanche & Pontalis compare Bemächtigung (power, possession, domination) to Bewältigung (violent exercise of power) > the “posts” are always posts of power (i.e. dynamics of sadism are dynamics of power)

——Freud asks how sadism can be deduced from Eros if it tends to destroy the object

pp. 404-05 auto-heterology of drive for postal power, more originary than, independent of, PP > the only one to permit definition of death drive, an original sadism

——beyond the pleasure principle—power: that is, les postes [erection, position & delay]

EREIGNIS

PAS PAS p. (33) Derrida proposes we hear Blanchot’s viens, a coming back w/out memory (le sous-venir sans mémoire), in Heidegger’s Ereignis

SP pp. 109-13 Nietzsche’s analysis of sexual difference, “eternal war btwn sexes,” based on propriation, where woman takes shape acc. formalized law > woman is woman because she gives herself to a man who takes possession, or la femme en se donnant se donne-pour, simule et sassure ainsi la mâtrise possessive: if opposition give/take, possess/possessed, is a “transcendental snare” produced by hymen’s graphics, process of propriation would escape dialectics and ontological decidability

——can no long ask “what is property?” > because propriation, a sexual operation, before which we didn’t know sexuality [?], is undecidable, more powerful than ti esti, than veil of truth, meaning of being, it organized all ontological statements > lhistoire (de la) vérité (est) un procès de propriation

a singular limit, limit of being itself, not derivative of question of being, but also not available to investigation > onto-hermeneutic limitation shows chaque fois que surgit la question du propre in restricted fields (economy, linguistics, rhetoric, psychoanalysis, politics)

pp. 119-21 (das Eigentum des Ab-grundes) the proper-ty of the abyss, the abyss of proper-ty, the reorganization of metaphysics around more powerful question of propriation, question of event (Ereignis) uprooted from ontology, where proper is proper to no one, to nothing: is this what Nietzsche’s woman is, style’s form: the no-where, gift as woman’s essential predicate, appears in undecidable oscillation btwn give/take, se donner/se donner-pour > price/value of pharmakon

p. 123 Heidegger warns against transforming Being into species/case of genus proprier, a mere incident in Ereignis > futility of such conceptual reversal btwn species/genus

DIF DIF p. 26n differance not a process of propriation, neither “species” of genus Being nor Ereignis (nor ontological difference): neither appropriation (position), nor expropriation (negation)—it is other

RM p. 61 Er-aügnis (light, clearing, eye) in Ereignis

p. 75 the trait of lentame (breaching-broaching incision) marks Ereignis as propriation, event of propriation (not an originary instance prior/proper to the 2 quil entame et allie)

——via Ereignis, re- of retrait no accident, no accident occurring to trait, does not appear, no proper, structurally in withdrawal: gap, trace, border, traction, effraction, differentiality

p. 76 repetition of incision stated violently in Riss, Ent-Ziehung, Ent-fernung, and in the Enteignen (rectraction of propriety) that hollows out every Ereignis

p. 77 Heidegger’s nontautological fashion (like Sprache, Ereignis): trait treats or treats itself, traces the trait, retraces or re-treats the withdrawal > a strange contract that doesn’t precede, for once, its own signature (sa propre signature), and therefore carries it off (et donc l’emporte)

ATAP pp. 93-4 “Come” precedes & calls event, opens scene, no theme, supports no metalinguistic citation, not an order, not a prayer, not obscurantism—just beyond “What is?” > perhaps where Ereignis and Enteignis unfold movement of propriation

EROS (ETERNAL RETURN OF THE SAME)

GOD pp. 80-81 can a secret be transmitted? (yes & no); we do not understand, w/ Kierkegaard, Abraham’s decision; we share w/ Abraham what can’t be shared [highest passion, faith], a secret we know nothing about, neither him nor us > an incessant repetition of the absolute beginning

***LOBL p. 104 [extensive description] yes of event, yes of iteration, quotes, cites, in accordance w/ strange ring outside of presence, sur-vives

——ring is sealed by arrêt de mort (syntax, almost untranslatable, is sealed in this French expression)

p. 167 “and” as arrêt de mort, “and” of double bind, and I say “come,” “and immediately"-writing, annihilates time in ring of eternal return, yokes affirmation to itself in récit, the being-at-the-same-time of the other beyond time

MPM p. 78 Derrida: each one (allegory, metaphor, trope, figure) in turn can be privileged, self reflexivity w/out end

PAS PAS p. (21) yes, yes: force of affirmative repetition, unique call of the to-come as the will to repeat itself, affirmation that cites itself, joyous EROS, immeasurable unhappiness, irreducible contamination, affirmation risks citation, le oui qui fait dans la langue un trou aussi étrange que viens, il approuve, affirme, contresigne tout cequi est arrivé

——eternal ring, passivity of nonpower, strength in reception, restarts alliance w/out debt, gift w/out credit

p. (22) Blanchot’s récit as new thought of citation acc. EROS, repetition of yes that begins by doubling itself, récit unscathed, unique force of a viens that never reproduces itself: vienssauf

p. (54) toujours deux pas, selon le retour éternel de la transgression passive et de laffirmation répétée (laffirmation sauvage), double instantaneous interminable preterition, une limite singulière entre la garde et la perte, entre le souvenir aussi et loubli > EROS, simulacre de cercle [ring vs. circle]

p. (60) affirm viens w/out possible return or as eternal return of the other

pp. (101-02) o as degree 0 (of appearance), double 0 as “power of 0 and 2” > the pas de Sans-Nom, EROS, neither gathers, identifies, nor excludes the one or the other

S p. 83 what is later, the latest, can be close to the origin, or return to origin earlier than beginning

POOF pp. 31-2 Nietzsche: “Alas! if only you knew how soon, how very soon, things will be –different! –” > “what a sentence! is it a sentence?” the sentence precipitates/precedes itself, a knowledge of a non-knowledge, an instantaneous teaching, a circle that is future-producing, instantaneous teledromatics, race finished in advance: “vibration of a shaft of writing” that promises/calls for a reading: withdraws from space by penetrating it [hymen], arrow whose flight returns to bow, as what happens in every instant—the end begins > elle se gagne de vitesse

——for economic purposes, let’s call the event of such sentences: teleiopoetic

p. 37 [ethics of EROS?] double infinite responsibility: “an intertwining of temporal ekstases; a friendship to come of time w/ itself where we meet again the interlacing of the same and the tout autre (‘Grundlich-Anderes’)”

p. 42 the risk of the perhaps and its already, we’ve undergone it, we have it in memory: ce déjà [Derrida]du peut-être

pp. 185-86 does Montaigne (via túkhē [see 192n re: Cicero], exceptionality of friendship) add rupture of infinite to Greek philía? a reassuring principle would periodize, overdetermine, oppose Christian fraternity to Greek fraternity > Derrida won’t have it: the discrepancies of culture aren’t negligible but they are that of a generative graft, cultural body (so old & new) begins w/ prosthesis > no proper body w/out graft: endless politically consequences of this law—now more than ever, endlessly

OTO pp. 12-3 autobiographical récit, tells himself his life, affirms EROS, gratitude for gift (gift: establishment of my own credit w/ this name): EROS signs or seals > before such signature, my life may be mere prejudice

——cannot think nor hear Nietzsche’s name w/out reaffirmation of the hymen, alliance or wedding ring, eternal return, “yes, yes” to shadowless gift of high noon

p. 14 it is life, as the living feminine, that must return eternally, selectively > life allied to herself by nuptial annulus, wedding ring

——btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

***pp. 19-20 good news of EROS is message, is a teaching, address/destination of doctrine, is untimely, differant, since news repeats an affirmation (yes, yes), must give rise to magisterial institution, institutions of the “yes,” which have need of ears

pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

DIF DIF p. 18 if we were to think not the erasure of opposition but why each term must appear as differance of the other [long list of classical oppositions: i.e. physis/mimēsis] > we see announced sameness of differance and repetition in the eternal return

SW pp. 313-14 diminish the infinite, diminish ad infinitum: that’s the temptation/dream since ever: but you’re doing it w/out being sure of textile to come, as if caught in sails (voiles) & pushed toward unknown, at the point of this extremity, as if someone were awaiting new Messiah, i.e. a “happy event”—nicknamed the verdict > yes, but a verdict w/out truth, w/ a due date no longer caught up in revealing a truth, the fold or unfolding of a veil—writing from distant place of as if

DPi p. 18 “two centuries is an infinity of eternities, and it is a fraction of a second in the history of humanity, all and nothing”

DST DST p. 217 mimesis as désistance (w/out being it) is missed when one decides to identify it, one misses what it lacks and that this lack is not proper; Lacoue-Labarthe: mimesis ek-sists, better yet “de-sists,” infinity of substitution & circulation (must think of Nietzsche again)

PIO p. 19 tain prohibits transparency & authorizes invention of mirror, is a trace of language

——tain (btwn 2 lines) is language itself [“word”] (associates/dissociates forever: Eros/Psyche) [tain like hymen?]: an unbearable violence, a perversion that obeys law of language

***D pp. 336-37 obsessive desire to escape due to structure of the text, obsession always textual

——textuality is obsidional: undecidable process of opening/closing—no letup (sans cesse)

p. 366 limits of square/cube—indefinitely specular unfolding/refolding: not limits at all > opening of its own inscription—tout autre, la même, another geometry to come [EROS]

C p. 202 one cannot get to it in one go (dun coup): multiplication shows that that which touches on the series is outside the series in the series > the remainder remains cut off, a mors, a turd, really beautiful

p. 203 a turd one would like to make one’s own (sapproprier)—until the end > until is interminable

LG p. 237 there is only content w/out edge, w/out boundary, w/out frame, there is only edge w/out content: interminable inocclusive invagination (inenarrable, unarrestable, insatiable) > terrible for those who require order in the name of the law

SPEC p. 269 Freud’s “perpetual recurrence of the same thing”: phantom of demonic, conjured up cadentially, limping (boiteux) devil

WBH p. 203 to receive a gift, in Nietzschean sense, is to say, “I want to begin again,” not a reproduction: “yes” of gift must be repeatable from the start

ESCHATOLOGY

***MONL pp. 60-62 the monolingual is promised [an eschatological or messianic horizon this promise can’t deny, or can merely deny] one language that’s forever deprived, the monolingual is aphasic, thrown into absolute translation

p. 68 promise [of which I speak], promises the impossible, possibility of all speech, yields no messianic, eschatological content [saves nothing]; yet resembles messianism, soteriology [addressed to totally other, finite mortal, w/out hope], structural opening: messianism w/out messianicity

FK p. 48 [historicity itself was an event] figure of Promised Land, essential bond btwn promise of place & historicity

——messianic or eschatological horizon delimits this historicity by having inaugurated it

LOBL p. 94 difference btwn archeaology and eschatology as differance in apocalypse, that will be a while in coming

BL p. 204 differance till death, for death, without end because ended [here we have an example of differance’s universalism: he’s talking about law’s differance, but it is exemplary?]

SPOM p. 10 question of the event as question of the ghost: first time (but also last time) & repetition, tout autre > hauntology, logic of haunting: more powerful than ontology, harbors eschatology/teleology as effects, mise en scène pour une fin de lhistoire

——after the end of history, a spirit comes by coming back (revenant)

p. 45 messianic extremity, eskhaton, exceeds, at each moment, final term of a phusis, such as work, production, and telos of any history

p. 73 Middle Eastern violence as unleashing of messianic eschatologies, infinite combinatory of holy alliances

p. 74 eschatology of Marxist critique and that of religions cannot accept the epochē of the content, whereas, for deconstruction, it is essential to the messianic

***pp. 81-2 undetermined messianic hope at heart of democratic & communist promise, eschatological relation to to-come of event, singularity, alterity

MPM p. 145 promise prohibits the gathering of Being in presence (as its condition), the condition of the possibility and impossibility of eschatology, ironic allegory of messianism

POOF p. 273 how short life will have been > by precipitation into which an eschatological sentiment of the future throws us, a few 1000 years is only yesterday: world is drawing to a close (va finir)

MSUB J p. 164 a mime would say we have to be done w/ subjectile, and he wouldn’t be wrong, it’s a judgment of God, we are spectators of it, “having done with it, interminably”

A p. 34 absolute arrivant, no more commands than commanded by memory of originary event where archaic is bound to final extremity (telos, eskhaton)

p. 66 for Heidegger, death—stand before (steht bevor) oneself, await, precede oneself as before a mirror, as before the future, “in its ownmost potentiality for being” [see p. 78]

p. 81 Marranos that we are, whether we know it or not, incessantly older & younger, untimely histories, still waiting for the other in a last word infinitely finished

——Marrano: anyone who is faithful to a secret they haven’t chosen

EM p. 121 (144) “la relève ou la relevance de lhomme est son télos ou son eskhaton”

p. 123 (147) “man” only has meaning in eschato-teleological situation, inscribed in metaphysics btwn 2 ends: 1) transcendental end 2) mortality, finitude

——finitude as origin of, that which unfolds, ideality

***VM p. 83 Levinas’ messianic eschatology never directly mentioned, an opening of opening, beyond all category, concepts, resists philosophemes, space or hollow in naked experience

pp. 87-8 for Levinas, eschatology “as the beyond of history withdraws beings from history’s jurisdiction” [?] [re: Levinas’ praise of Heidegger’s historicity (absent in Husserl) and then his move beyond Heidegger]

p. 95 Levinas’ eschatology as encounter (rencontre) w/ unforeseeably other seems infinitely hopeless, awaiting nothing; Levinas even calls it renunciation [madness?]

***——“doubtless, this encounter of the unforeseeable itself is the only possible opening of time, the only pure future, the only pure expenditure beyond history as economy, but this future, this beyond, is not another time, a day after history > it is present at the heart of experience, present not as a total presence but as a trace: therefore, before all dogmas, all conversions, all articles of faith or philosophy, experience itself is eschatological at its origin and in each of its aspects”

p. 103 affinity btwn Blanchot & Levinas re: hollow space (creux) of finitude in which messianic eschatology resonates, w/in expectation (attente), response, cette réponse sappelle encore attente, bien sûr, mais cette attente ne se fait plus attendre pour Levinas

——their difference occurs re: eschatological positivity, when neutral’s determined > can there be a “w/out theological context” as Blanchot thinks it? Levinas would most likely say no

p. 117 against Levinas, Derrida sees history as transcendence, as excess over totality, history not totality transcended by eschatology, metaphysics, speech > but these movements themselves

p. 123 history would be meaningless, impossible w/out eschatology and transcendence, impossible as either finite totality or positive infinity

p. 130 [Nietzschean logic] Levinas’ eschatology would’ve had to have kept its promise already, even if no longer being able to occur w/in a discourse of eschatology

p. 132 for Husserl (transcendental phenomenology), “subjective a priori” only way to check totalitarianism of the neutral, impersonal “absolute Logic”: eschatology w/out dialogue [re: why finitude?] [revelation through faulty teletype]

p. 133 origin of question why finitude? why why? transcendental archi-factuality as violence? > naked, silent opening of question escapes phenomenology, permits appearance of history as such: it is the call (to) (of) an eschatology that dissimulates its own opening

——opening of question, inversion of transcendental dissymmetry, put to philosophy as logos, finitude, history, violence: interpellation of Greek by non-Greek, strange community of silent question > la phénoménologie et leschatologie peuvent interminablement entamer le dialogue, s’entamer en lui, sappeler lune lautre au silence

question can be stated only by being forgotten in language of Greeks

p. 144 w/ “epochs,” being-history, Heidegger permits reemergence of thought of eschatology: “Being itself…is in itself eschatological”; eschatology different from messianic eschatology in that w/ former war is not an accident that overcomes Being, war not even negative, war is Being itself

p. 148 for Levinas, despite critique of Husserl’s “anhistoricism,” origin of meaning is nonhistory, “beyond history,” a Hebraic transhistoricity? can this nonhistory be uprooted from history, can eschatology be invoked separated from every reference to history?

p. 153 Hegel’s speculative logic: living logic which reconciles formal tautology and empirical heterology [after having thought prophetic discourse in preface to Phenom…]

——Greek logos provides understanding to those who understand eschatological prophecy and to those who don’t

OH pp. 13-4 “cap” (caput, capitis), the head, extremity of the extreme, last legs, final moment (eschaton > telos); captain (not a woman); eschatology and teleology—that is man

PP p. 93 mimicry of Thoth prevents dialectics, an ironic doubling preventing fulfillment or eschatological reappropriation, he is never present, he invented play, his propriety is impropriety

FSW p. 203 differance as non-originary origin, erases myth of origin, determined outside teleological/eschatological horizon [horizon key word here]

PPHS p. 81 [see FSW p. 203] “why” no longer marks question of “en-vue-de-quoi,” re: telos/eskhaton of signification, nor is it a question of origin

FWT p. 131 literature a recent invention, threatened by death, repeats its birth beginning from its end, from a finitude that is its resource & essential specter

***DS pp. 207-08(n), the last instance of the mime, no referent (signified, process of truth) in this last instance, but still inseparable from metaphysical search for arkhē, telos, eskhaton; to erase metaphysical concept of last instance would defuse necessary critique it permits in certain contexts > the “general economy” of double science (a bifid, dissymmetrical writing that takes double inscription of concepts into account) constitutes, in a displaced sense, the last instance

OS pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

——this would be a gramme that erases its tracing in a circle, removes limit of point

——we go around in circles trying to erase this circle > [time, still, introduces the thought of trace, if even to excise it]

ROP pp. 18-20 history of analysis, from Plato to Freud, has Freud invented a new solution to analytical resistance or has he inherited by way of paleonym?; no choice but to keep 2 motifs analysis, doubling of analuein: 1) archeological/anagogical movement toward originary birth 2) eschatological movement toward last word, toward untying, breaking down (lytic, lytological, philolytic) [analysis in teaching (philosophy), in confession]

pp. 127-08n tone of Foucault’s eschatological promise [re: psychoanalysis fulfilling Christianity’s stratagems of sex] resonates w/ Christianity, Christian humanism

ATIA p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

p. 141 I’m not trying to be the last one speaking, the last Jew, the last of the eschatologists > I would like to write a long text one day

PS p. 183 for Artaud, soteriology will be the eschatology of one’s proper body: “state…of my body…will make the Last Judgment” [when body is upright w/out detritus, w/out the work]

FS p. 5 like melancholy for Gide, structural criticism only possible after defeat of force: a reflection of the constituted, constructed: historical, eschatological, crepuscular

DIF DIF p. 9 classically, sign is treated as deferred presence, as differance of temporization > sign is thus provisional, secondary > Derrida questioning this logic: to think originary differance, one would have to recognize origin, archi-, telos, eskhaton have always denoted presence: ousia, parousia

p. 24 erasures on both sides of trace

SW p. 313-14 diminish the infinite, diminish ad infinitum: that’s the temptation/dream since ever: but you’re doing it w/out being sure of textile to come, as if caught in sails (voiles) & pushed toward unknown, at the point of this extremity, as if someone were awaiting new Messiah, i.e. a “happy event”—nicknamed the verdict > yes, but a verdict w/out truth, w/ a due date no longer caught up in revealing a truth, the fold or unfolding of a veil—writing from distant place of as if

——infinite finite trial (implacable suspicion) that you impose on yourself to not want what you know you want (the due date of such a verdict)?

p. 314 waiting for a quasi-resurrection, in view of a first/last time, that has nothing to do w/ unveiling (w/ truth)

——no chance of savoir (belonging to oneself) > you’ll end up in imminence > un-veiling still movement of veil: a disappearing, drawing aside, to let something be seen, let be, to let

p. 325 no longer be oneself or have oneself (sêtre ou savoir) > truth w/out truth looking for me at end of world

p. 343 when prayer replaces bloody sacrifice, tallith commemorates both privileged animal of sacrifice & (leaping w/ wing-beat to eschatological term of story) the sacrifice of sacrifice

pp. 351-52 Derrida dreams of interruption of dream, a resurrection, at the ends of the verdict, that’s not a miracle but reality of the real, ordinary reality rendered beyond fantasy, hallucination > a verdict that never stopped suspending its moratorium, stretching out its imminence

DPi p. 114 Blanchot’s “literature as right to death” is not against DP, literature as last act, last judgment, theater of cruelty, both eschatological & apocalyptic

p. 138 one must never stop thinking about this instant of execution (no good conscience)

p. 256 it is because my life is finite, “ended,” that I keep this relation to incalculability and undecidability as to the instant of my death

p. 258 an end will never put an end to finitude because: finality of this end will produce phantasm of this end of finitude, the other side of an infinitization (experience constitutive of finitude)

RGE p. 271 general economy does not overturn but comprehends (not by way of knowledge-gathering but by inscribing w/in its opening) absolute knowledge, folds its figures into nonbasis of expenditure, relates them to destruction of value > atheology, a-teleology, aneschatology

PIO p. 6 for something to be a first time must also be a last time > archaeology & eschatology

acknowledge each other in irony of one & only instant

TR p. 98 machine-like operation of excuse: divides/multiplies, drags guilty into repetition of “last word” > eschatology becomes a genre, inexhaustible eschatology of final words

p. 99 [bibliography of last word] Blanchot: “ordinary language not last word but first

p. 100 de Man analyzes the mechanism that turns last word into the penultimate one

——paradoxical instance of “last word”: forgiveness, pardon, excuse, remission of sin, absolute absolution always proposed in figure of “last word”

——a pardon must be granted w/ assurance, promise of end of history

——disturbing proximity btwn pardon & last judgment (which pardon is not, pardon does not judge, foreign to courtroom), as close as possible to verdict

——“I forgive you” has structure of last word, hence its apocalyptic & millenarian aura

pp. 118-19 event of forgiveness: 1) always supposes irreversible interruption, revolutionary caesura, end of history, at least of history as teleological process 2) inscription, material trace

WAP p. 103 pushed to the extreme limit, where it is interminable [re: decolonization]

EJQB p. 77 born only by approaching book, die only by failing (échouant) in sight of book > toujours la rive impassible du livre est d’abord

——the Book as epoch of Being (epoch coming to an end, the glow of Being in agony, a multiplication of the end, “garrulous and tenacious hypermnesia of certain moribunds,” books about the dead book)

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, cette fois enfin, “cette fois enfin” not an accomplishment w/ single blow of the pen or the die (décriture ou de dés): nothing could be more foreign to eschatology (of or by way of literature) than Soller’s finite-infinite seriation (enchaînement) of numbers

p. 309 such future perfect makes one text circulate in another, excludes eschatology > future perfect of innumerable imperfect, indefinite past that will never have been present

pp. 333-34 in Soller’s Numbers, you are indefinitely referred to bottomlessness, indefinite regress of beginning, which is forbidden along w/ eschatology, archeology, hermeneutic teleology

EL pp. 195-96 imminent, eschatological boiling of a language as volcano: the passion of a sacred language suffering

pp. 204-05 Scholem: apocalypse, form of acute Messianism > writers of apocalypse (Daniel) distinct from prophets (Hosea, Amos, Isaiah): prophets don’t describe specific events of end; apocalypse speaks whole history (from origin to end), & coming of new aeon (Greek aiôn, Hebrew ‘olam) > aeons of apocalypse follow each other while opposing each other: present/future, darkness/light, Israel/nations, holiness/sin, pure/impure, life/death

——Scholem describes a move from national, exoteric [straightforward] Messianism to cryptographic, esoteric, elitist, apocalypticism accentuated by Jews losing their nation: the cryptic veil becomes “its very phenomenality, its state and its efficacy”

pp. 225-26 Stéphane Mosès: virtual explosion of nondeterminate meaning, fulfilled eschatology, day when ‘ancient names & seals’ emerge anew into light of day, ‘return of the repressed’

C p. 189 get down to it (sy mettre), commit oneself, donner du gage (give proof, evidence, wager) > get in the coffin, spread out: à chaque coup for the first and last time, always the first and last

TN p. 60 Plato, Hegel, Marx, Luther’s destructio (Heidegger’s Destruktion is close): certain Christianity will always take charge of most exact, eschatological hyperbole—if deconstruction is possible must untie itself from destructio [p. 326n]

p. 269 lexicon of touch risks being ruined by abusive spending (dépense absuive) > an eschatological, postwar inflation (desperate call for new “era,” “provenance”) > apocalyptic symptomatology of “deconstruction of Christianity”: all we speak is “touching”

ATM pp. 175-76 the future anteriority of Levinas’ seriasure [each interruption will be knotted w/ another] is an eschatology w/out [beyond/otherwise than] philosophical teleology, appealing to a past anterior to any past; this future anteriority is irreducible to ontology or Hegelian teleology [in spite of irreducible resemblance]

AD p. 134n Levinas: à-Dieu not a finality, infinity is irreducibility of à-Dieu, fear of God to eschatology

p. 106 questions of eschatological hospitality not posed (posent) in repose of place, they put one to the test (mettent à lépreuve) of an interrogation that endures sans repos

p. 118-19 structural messianicity, an irrecusable and threatening promise, eschatology w/out teleology, from every determinate messianism

p. 121 Levinas: the fear à-Dieu instills is not a finality, it is fear à leschatologique, which interrupts within the human both ontology and being-towards-death; one must fear the neighbor

OG p. 24 (39) Hegel already caught up in passage beyond himself, in deconstruction, by summing up philosophy of logos, assigning to presence the eschatology of parousia, describing self-proximity of infinite subjectivity

p. 107 (156-57) Rousseau: figurative language initiates and proper meaning is discovered last > eschatology of proper (self-presence, self-proximity, own-ness)

pp. 114-15 (168) confessions of anthropologist [does an anthropologist write anything else?], 18th century, humility before a goodness European society has lost: a “zero degree,” native soil, an eschatology/teleology of full, immediate closing of history

p. 198 (283) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] in an archeoteleological concept of nature [eg. identification of word & song, avant et afin]: modification becomes one w/ substance it modifies: (nature & its other, archeology & eschatology, substance & mode, origin & genesis) > this logic wreaks havoc on juridical/methodological point of view, annuls difference btwn structural/genetic point of view

p. 229 (326) Rousseau declares what he wishes to say: writing/articulation are post-originary malady; he describes what he does not wish to say: articulation (space of writing) at origin of language

——what he describes takes place for better or worse, annuls eschatology & teleology just as differance (originary articulation) annuls archeology

ATAP p. 68 calculated benefit of eschatological mystagogy

——eschatology tells the eskhaton, end, extreme, limit, last of history, of genealogy, of a countable series

p. 80 West dominated by powerful program of ends: Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx (trying to forget differences btwn Hegel & Marx perhaps another eschatology of Marxism): end of Oedipus, of class struggle, of God, of history, of religions, of Christianity & morals (ça, the most serious naiveté), of subject, of man, of earth, of literature: in blood, fire, earthquake, napalm descending sky by helicopters, like prostitutes—the nuclear thunder & the great whoring

p. 81 Derrida implicated [in Western eschatological program]: to tell le fin du fin (distinguish closure from end) > eschatology is a tone, the voice itself, isn’t the voice always that of the last man?

——for Heidegger, thought (not philosophy) essentially eschatological

pp. 81-2 if eschatological question always surprises us, response to it is impossible: [eschatology?] an appeal promising & responding before the question

p. 82 every apocalyptic eschatology promised in name of light, we are heirs to these Lumières, cannot & must not forgo the Aufklärung; must keep enough apocalyptic desire (clarity, revelation) to deconstruct apocalyptic discourse

p. 83 still philosophical, onto-eschato-teleological interpretation to say apocalyptic strategy is fundamentally one, to say its diversity is simply masks, appearances or simulacra

pp. 94-5 apocalypse w/out apocalypse, w/out Last Judgment, no eschatology beyond tone of “Come” itself > the apocalypse of apocalypse [our apocalypse now], beyond good & evil: no longer collection of evil & good in legein of alētheia, in Geschick of lenvoi, or of Schicken of co-destination

p. 95 [apocalypse w/out apocalypse] X w/out X, sans marks internal/external catastrophe of apocalypse, catastrophe of sans doesn’t merge w/ announced end, is its pli: a closure w/out end, end w/out end > outside of apocalypse w/in apocalypse

——“do not seal”: i.e. do not close, do not sign

***CIR p. 75 “I am the last of the eschatologists,” like no one else, I made the eschaton into my coat of arms, lips’ edge of my truth

p. 94 “they have never forgiven me for being the most advanced eschatologist, the last avant-garde to count”

EU p. 109 [re: politico-juridical system of university] Derrida beyond [?] political right/left, on the side of a tireless parasite [passe et repasse la limite] seeking conflict or perpetual peace in a university that has from its birth (dès sa naissance) en mal (been wanting) dapocalypse et deschatologie

SPEC p. 376 to speculate: not only going beyond a given oppositional limit but the very notion of limit as front btwn two opposed terms—eg. the identifiable terms where every term terminates: life/death [Derrida’s eschatology?]

ETHICS

GOD p. 48 dying of or for the other, the most ancient, institutes responsibility as giving oneself death, se-donner-le-mort ou offrir sa mort, cest-à-dire sa vie > ethical dimension of sacrifice

p. 60 by keeping the secret, Abraham betrays [generalized] ethics, what binds us to our own or our fellows

p. 62 aporia of responsibility: always risks not managing to accede to concept of responsibility in process of forming it; for Kierkegaard, the ethical is a temptation that would make Abraham irresponsible

——ethical must sometimes be refused in name of responsibility that doesn’t calculate, that keeps its secret, that tyrannically [Nietzsche], jealously refuses violence of accounts and justifications, declining autobiography that is auto-justification: egodicée

p. 63 for Hegel, manifestation, unveiling, phenomenalization is given priority over secret: no final secret for philosophy, politics, ethics

p. 64 for Kierkegaard [contra Hegel], universal duty is a dereliction of absolute duty, a sacrifice or duty that reaches beyond debt & duty > the “gift of death”

***p. 79 [we are all Abraham in every instant] responsibility and relation of gift of death of each instant

——via tout autre est tout autre & Kierkegaard, supplementary complication upon ethical generality: everyone else asks at every moment to behave as knights of faith

p. 84 is Levinas’ face god or human? unable to differentiate infinite alterity of God from that of human > Levinas & Kierkegaard can’t find limit btwn religious & ethical

p. 124n via Kierkegaard, generality of ethics is bloodless specter of faith; teleological suspension of ethics determined by Abraham’s silence; aesthetics cultivates secret, ethics punishes it

p. 155 covenant remains absolutely singular in its election, if there’s no 3rd party, no hypothetical imperative, no generality of ethical, political, juridical

GT p. 74n hard to draw line btwn moral duty and moralizing discourse on subject of moral duty [teaching ethics], as well as btwn a scientific task, ethos of science, and morality in general

R p. 58 Christian & Islamic privileging figure of brother in ethics, law, politics [calls for a deconstruction of Christianity]

p. 60 pure ethics, if there is any, begins w/ respectable dignity of the other, absolutely unlike (neighbor, resemblance, ruins such an ethics)

H p. 133 speaking the same language a matter of ethos, not just linguistic operation

POO p. 16 “What is?” what is responsibility, ethicity of ethics, morality of morality? urgent, unanswerable questions

SPOM p. xvii wisdom “learn-to-live” is ethics itself; learn to live—alone, from oneself, by oneself

POOF pp. 204-05 Aristotle continually analyses the ruses that allow one friendship to be smuggled into another: use into pleasure, wearing virtue’s mask > though ethical friendship is more beautiful, is bound by faith, beyond contract, legal friendship (political) is more necessary, more natural [?] [more grievances abound in the ethical?]

VM p. 81 untraditional appeal to tradition found in Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s “ontology”: ethical dissociated from metaphysics, associated w/ something other than itself, when ethical is part of archia, of law, or resolution, loses ethical specificity

p. 91 acc. Levinas, renounce the other is to enclose oneself in bad solitude of self-identity, to repress ethical transcendence

p. 111 Levinas concerned w/ essence of ethical, not laws or moral rules; wouldn’t ethics beyond law be the Law of Laws—infinite concept, hidden in protest against concept [see FWT p. 132]?

pp. 120-21 if infinity of Husserlian horizon has form of indefinite opening, doesn’t this keep it from totalization, from immediate present? is not intentionality respect itself? eternal irreducibility of other to same > w/out phenomenon of other as other no respect, respect supposes phenomenality, and ethics, phenomenology

p. 125 would return to intentional phenomenon acquiesce to violence of fact, is there thus an irreducible zone of factuality, an original, transcendental, preethical violence? > would it be tied to phenomenality itself & possibility of language? embedded in root of meaning & logos

pp. 137-38 nothing can enclose thought of Being (no ethics could be opened w/out it); need something outside me for ethics to be possible

——Being conditions respect for the other, as what it is: other > w/out Being’s “laisser-être” (of ethical commandment, freedom) violence to such a degree it couldn’t appear or be named

p. 147 Levinas proposes an ethics w/out law and a language w/out phrase

OH p. 41 ethics, politics, responsibility only begin in aporia of double injunction

***ATIA p. 126 casting doubt on responsibility, decision, being-ethical > the essence of ethics, decisions, responsibility [no doubt would be a programmable reaction]

SW p. 316 “for they shall make a sanctuary, I shall dwell in their bosom” > veil, curtain, drape is dwelling of God, his ethos, this Who (that dwells) is also a What, a 3rd party, the Law, text of law

HLP p. 29 phenomenon of lie, its irreducibly ethical dimension

p. 33 ethics of veracity always a sacral ethics of sacrifice [cf. p. 289n]

p. 58 sacred veracity, the Heiligkeit of the safe, sound, healthy, saintly, lindemnealways links religious to ethical

PJP p. 163 one cannot expect a finite subject to think/remember, at every instant, all ethical obligations he should answer > inhuman, indecent [Mount Moriah of GOD]

p. 169 de Man: ethics is a discursive mode, a category, linguistic not subjective

HST p. 364 border btwn ethical/political no longer insured: the 3rd (le tiers) gives birth to justice & finally state, 3rd announces himself in duel of the face-to-face, & the face: the beyond the state (condition of ethics) had to produce itself in the state

——this is a topological invagination: “outside produce[s] an enclave in the inside of the inside”

p. 396 laughter that says the truth of lying: logic of symptom always stronger than an ethics of truthfulness (véracité)

p. 411 grave substitution (one worthy of name), life for another, or life for something (contaminate logic of who w/ what, ethics w/ arithmetic, arithméthique) > (fetishism is only a figure of this)

***p. 414 thoughts of hospitality at once ethics of substitution & ethics of holy/sacred hospitality

pp. 419-20 simple, homogenous, calculation of cloning—but every unit is irreplaceable in its factual existence (Kant)—so to be ethical, must be conscious, must be auto-affected by this uniqueness? > for Derrida, displaced certainty btwn opposition arithmetic/ethical substitution

TN p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 93 for Levinas, peace is the ethical itself

ATM p. 178 Levinas plays a game that’s not a game, the gratuity of his work, what he still calls liturgy > “it is ethics itself”

AD pp. 4-5 Levinas’ meditation on ethics, on the transcendence of the holy over the sacred (paganism of roots, idolatry of place)

p. 25 no welcome w/out face, no face w/out welcome: quasi-primitive, quasi-transcendental language of face > laccueil determines le recevoir”: the receptivity of receiving as the ethical relation

p. 34 state, politics, ontology all betray/exceed ethics in opening it [?]: quasi-transcendental, originary, pre-originary perjury > possibility of radical perversion, haunting of its possibility, also condition of Good, Justice, Love, Faith, perfectibility

p. 39 woman as welcoming before ethics (avant lethique), before illeity of face, before teaching, before height [?]

p. 52 Levinas: ethical language is the very meaning of approach, contrasts w/ knowledge

pp. 54-6 aphoristic energy of déliasion in Levinas’ ethical affirmation: from subordination (no interiorization), to welcome of Most High (host), to unicity of possibility of substitution (hostage)

p. 61 “ethics beyond the political”: interruption of self (in phenomenology, by phenomenology itself), phenomenology surprises, suspends itself > paradoxical reverting to “ethics beyond the political”

p. 90 acc. Levinas, “Thou shall not kill” is origin of ethics: can only declare war against a face

p. 99 Levinas’ border btwn ethical/political loses for good indivisible simplicity of a limit

p. 105 a promise’s possibility remains, remains effective, while ethics demands the effectivity be effectuated, an ineffectual promise betrays its promise [?] is realization already politics?

pp. 115-16 ethics enjoins a politics & a law, formal injunction, urgent, does not wait and still interminable (it calculates limitless past & future)

CF pp. 16-7 ‘to cultivate an ethic of hospitality’: tautologous expression? hospitality is culture, ethics, residence, relation to ourselves & others

pp. 35-6 in Le Pardon, Jankélévitch delimits a “hyperbolic ethics,” beyond laws, ethics beyond ethics, undiscoverable place of forgiveness—but does not admit an unconditional forgiveness

BSi p. 108 fraternalism frees us from all ethical obligation toward our non-fellow; worst human violence committed against humans considered non-fellows

——Derrida has attempted [throughout the years] to oppose/distinguish justice from right > obligation to le plus dissemblable, the méconnaissable—monstrously other: beginning of ethics, Law, is not human

——so long as there is recognizability & fellow, ethics is dormant

pp. 108-09 obligation to fellow, even if it’s a fact (can a fact ground, justify an ethics?), will never have founded a right, an ethics…

p. 150 for Deleuze, bêtise [ethical, quasi-juridical fault] at heart of philosophy > makes modest

OG p. 139 (201-02) lure of ethics of speech resembles a hunter’s stratagem, term of falconry > to recognize writing in speech is to begin to think the lure (leurre)

p. 140 (202) arche-writing: nonethical (violent) opening of ethics, origin of morality & immorality; no ethics w/out other, detour, simulation, differance, absence, writing

pp. 185-86 (263-64) nature as limit concept—impossible equilibrium btwn reserve & desire, imagination breaks equilibrium, desire must leave its reserve; acc. Rousseau, ethics: to come closest to this limit

p. 188 (267) Rousseau’s neutral origin of ethico-political conceptuality [is this so different than Hobbes? i.e. no injustice w/out law]

EU pp. 75-6 for Schelling, ethics (raised to a point beyond determination) makes us similar to God, onto-theological translation w/out rupture > a risk of totalizing absolutization of State (which Kant would deem dangerous)

SPEC p. 265 Freud: “super-ego is the heir of the Oedipus complex and represents the ethical standards of mankind”

***FV p. 481n [re: psychoanalysis] institution built on male child’s experience > at stage of genital organization, there’s only maleness (antithesis isn’t femaleness but being castrated): phallogocentrism is no accident/error, its old, enormous root must be accounted for [described] > but, its description is a “participant” when it induces a practice, ethics, institution, a politics that insures truth of a tradition

ETYMOLOGY

FK p. 71 etymology never provides a law, only material for thinking

SPOM p. 167 [re: Marx “deconstructing” Stirner] Derrida notes theme of food, Last Supper, host as conjuring tricks naively accrediting discursive powers: “abuse of etymology that serves as explanation, play on homonyms, privileging of nomination, autonomization of language”

OOG p. 69n Heidegger’s etymologies determine rather than follow (Husserl) orientation of investigation

S p. 99 war of etymology [re: Geist], the ghosts flapping in what Artaud would call this “alchemical theater”

WM pp. 210-11 classical motif, etymon of a primitive sense always determinable, interprets degradation as passage from physical to metaphysical > [valuing sensory image as “original figure,” against the concept, is its own conceptualization]

p. 216-17n Marx against etymologism (like Rousseau, Leibniz, Plato), rails against Stirner, who refutes communist abolition of property via etymology: essential “having” in Eigentum (property)

DS p. 182n etymology used to maintain, conserve > i.e. the surgeon who asked Freud, “how can a man be hysterical if Hysteron signifies ‘uterus’?”

p. 256n not turning to Littré for etymology

POS p. 55 WM systematizes critique of etymologism in philosophy and rhetoric

P pp. 20-1 for Hegel, art has a single meaning, une vérité une et nue, an etymon, that can be unveiled through history > wouldn’t this mean art is outside of history? but philosophers have always been too quick to deem art historical via opposition tekhnē/physis translated as art/nature

POOF p. 98 after quoting Benveniste, who says it is time to “begin to see what it [phílos] signifies,” Derrida says: “indeed (voire)” [i.e. would etymology be that beginning?]

ROP p. 115 history of uses of a word [re: Foucault] is neither essentialist nor nominalist, it is a history of problematizations, to analyze all problematic intersections also calls for problematization of its own problematization > avec sa vigilance réflexive et le souci de se penser dans sa rigoureuse spécificité > which must itself question itself w/ same care that it methodically prescribes

SP p. 163n Derrida quotes an accusation that he uses Littré for the sanctity of definition, as a bourgeois fixation

DST DST p. 215 Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger draws stehen and stellen together by identifying stal of stellein (to equip, to send word for) w/ sta of stele (column), he also links thesis via dhe to Setzung, Stellung, Lage—more philological Witz than true etymologism

HST pp. 410-11 Derrida tells this story: he was thinking of substitution, he thought of the example of stealing a child, replacing it w/ another, then he went to Littré (as a matter of duty, to verify, to search for an example), and the first definition/example is child substitution [mes chances]

LI p. 62 etymology has no value as proof: if Sanskrit itara does not mean alterity, etymology’s mistake confirms law of iterability

EUROPE

GOD p. 51 has Christianity alone made possible an authentic responsibility, responsibility as history, and as history of Europe? there’s no choice here btwn a logical deduction & reference to the revelatory event [not simply affirmed as believer]

OOG p. 115 Europe is the good example of historicity, incarnating in its purity the Telos of all historicity: universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditonality

FL p. 246 we adult white male Europeans, carnivorous and capable of sacrifice

SPOM p. 3 haunting marks the very existence of Europe

POOF p. 233 once again referring to the ‘infinite’ Christianization of Greek fraternity, while reminding us that Greek phília carries w/in it the injunction of its infinitization, Derrida will privilege Christianiziation for the role it played in the theological-political graft that constructed political discourse of modern Europe

OH p. 11 is Europe an example or exemplary?

p. 13 we must not forget programs that do not forget us [re: Eurocentrism, anti-Eurocentrism]

p. 17 responsibility for the other heading—European?

pp. 24-5 Europe: representation or figure of a universal idea; has confused its face, figure, w/ a point, a phallus; the idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, eidos, archē, telos, the idea of beginning, commanding, cap, captain, towards an accomplished end

——advanced point is at once beginning and end, divided as beginning and end (Heidegger on Ort as point of spear, and fromm, Frömmigkeit, from promos, what leads, lavant-garde)

pp. 25-6 Europe gathers difference into itself, is difference w/ itself

p. 28 horizon (ancient Greek) = limit; to see itself (Europe) on the horizon, is to see itself from its end, discourse of anamnesis—taste for finality (goût de fin), for death

p. 29 double bind, injunction divides us > guardians of a European idea that cares for what is other than it, the other heading, the heading of the other

p. 122n from Valéry, Europe name of that which leads subject to desiring maximum (capital, power)

pp. 30-1 Europe: paleonymic appellation

pp. 31-2 there is a crisis whenever the capital of infinity and universality finds itself in danger, when the eidos, limits, ends, confines, the finitude of Europe, emerges

p. 34 Heidegger’s Entmachtung of spirit > destitution of Europe

pp. 38-40 double injunction of Europe: 1) cannot be dispersed (monopoly) 2) remote control [TV] (dispersion)

p. 44 double bind of European cultural identity: 1) necessary not to reconstitute centralizing hegemony (the capital) 2) necessary not to cultivate minority differences for their sake, untranslatable idiolects (not to multiply borders, marges, marches)

pp. 48-9 Europe advances itself as heading for universal essence of man > to advance oneself: to name oneself, rush out ahead, in front, anticipate, launch, stick one’s neck out, to love or to violate, to love to violate, to colonize, colonize itself

——advance oneself (name & also extend), risk, Europe as avant-garde of geography & history

p. 64 Valéry: Mediterranean has been a veritable machine for making culture

p. 75 for Husserl, the European philosopher committed to universal reason is functionary of mankind

pp. 76-9 the duty to respond to call of European memory, all other duties presuppose this one in silence [?]

——this same duty dictates welcoming foreigners, cultivating virtue of critical idea, but also submitting critique to deconstructive genealogy that exceeds it w/out compromising it, dictates a democracy to come (not even a regulative Kantian idea), tolerance of faith, minorities

——duty to act in accord w/ a double contradiction that is not simply a Kantian illusionary antimony but an effective one (w/ experience, through experiment), interminable

p. 112n for Valéry, capital belongs to series of Europe’s phenomenal manifestations

FWT p. 18 Europe arms itself and those against it w/ weapons against it—auto-immunization

——the universal of philosophy (neither relativism nor nationalism) not a given, an essence, but an infinite process of universalization > in the name of European filiation we are liberating ourselves from Eurocentrism/ethnocentrism

p. 178 Europe exports: 1) norms, advancements, language [re: consolidation of rights, laws, to sovereignty of subject] 2) its auto-hetero-deconstructive capacity or auto-immunity

——globalization is Europeanization

——Europe is the most beautiful example of auto-immunity, and allegory, because w/ Europe we see auto-immunity as survival, invincibility as auto-immunity: immense tragedy of a beautiful suicide

Gii p. 34 profound link btwn Europocentric universalism, humanism & nationalism

TN p. 137 question of touch belongs to history of body, to “my body” (hoc est emin corpus meum), to history of Europe having it out w/ its “Christianity”

OG p. 223 for Rousseau, only Europe can be itself & everything else at same time [re: language/society], pedagogical success & ethnological humanism have good fortune to appear in Europe

——Derrida says Rousseau simply wrong for not using this universal opening en fait

EVENT

GOD pp. 49-50 “gift of death,” Christian (Potačka), non-Christian (Heidegger, Levinas)? isn’t Christianity already the nondogmatic doublet of dogma, where revelation of event or event of revelation is unn

ecessary, the possibility of religion w/out religion

——Christian “gift of death”: infinite love & goodness that infinitely forgets itself

p. 51 has Christianity alone made possible an authentic responsibility, responsibility as history, and as history of Europe? there’s no choice here btwn a logical deduction & reference to the revelatory event [not simply affirmed as believer]

p. 66 instant of decision is madness; like gift & “gift of death,” instant irreducible to presence, act of giving death, sacrifice, suspends labor of negative, labor itself, perhaps even work of mourning

p. 128 there’s always a Letter to the Father before the event (avant la lettre), signed by a son who publishes posthumously [Kafka, Johannes de Silentio]

p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (loeuvre)

GT pp. 73-4n event as “first time,” classical question, but event, gift, can’t give evidence of itself, only promise itself

p. 96 text [“Counterfeit Money”]: a machine for provoking events

p. 119 no gift w/out advent of an event, no event w/out surprise of the gift

p. 120 can one create an event, make a story, w/ a simulacrum, w/ counterfeit money? [Badiou]

pp. 122-23 condition common to gift & event: unconditionality > chance, tukhē, in an instant, disorder, surprise, irruptive, unmotivated, freedom of dice throw, coup de don, obey nothing but disorder, principles w/out principles, not necessary, gratuitous, déchirer la trame

——event, gift, must be structured by aleatory, remain unforeseeable w/out being kept so

——gift is no longer effect even if there are gift effects (des effets de don)

——one must intend to give a gift, and yet all intentionality threatens the gift w/ self-keeping > intentional freedom & chance must miraculously agree w/ each other [double bind]

***p. 156 conditions of gift/event: outside law, unforseeable, surprise, excess, beyond reason

p. 157 is there a desire to create an event? to give more to live? (the counterfeiter)

R p. 84 eventfulness of the to-come exceeds the performative, my ipseity, unforseeable coming of the other (greater & older than I am), heteronomy, responsibility and decision of the other (greater and older than I am)

——event (im-possible) announces itself in the form of an injunction

p. 109 self finds itself infected as soon as soon as it (ipse) needs event, heteronomy

OOG p. 49 for phenomenology, irreducible historicity is only recognized after the event [re: phrasing of “in which it must have appeared,” necessity of Quod and Quomodo]

FK p. 47 the island, the Promised land, the desert [see p. 55 most extreme ecstasy, abstraction], absence of horizon: “emergence of event punctures every horizon of expectation”

p. 57 “mystical foundation of authority” [Montaigne, Pascal], the law of law, event which doesn’t belong to set it founds, decision of other in undecidable > links secret, belief, credit to foundation, knowledge, science

p. 59 khōra, secret, desert of the desert (last desert, before the first), neither a threshold nor a mourning, btwn event and possibility, or virtuality of the event, not the desert of revelation

——a khōra w/out faith or law, an utterly faceless other

MC p. 349 unforeseeability conditions the structure of the event

FL p. 269 when people talk about “our time,” “our present” in the future anterior, they don’t know what they are saying > it’s precisely in this nonknowledge that the eventness of the event consists, what’s naively called its presence

BL p. 208-09 law becomes something by being a nothing that constantly defers access to itself [tabernacle]; atopology [khōra] erases event, annuls the event, nullification gives birth to the law

LOBL p. 126 sur-vive: absolute event

p. 122 reaffirmation, triumph over (sur, hyper), living-on, a supplement of life that is better than life and better than death, better than truth > la Chose par excellence: sur-vérité [see pp. 137-38 la sur-vérité du survivre][Blanchot calls la Chose the event]

p. 149 commitment only in the language of the other [see pp. 153-54], there is “language of the other” whenever there is a speech-event, this is what I mean by a “trace”

***AF p. 62 archival technē overflows singularity of event, i.e. the answering machine that outlives its moment of recording, the ghost speaks

SPOM p. 10 question of the event as question of the ghost: first time (but also last time) & repetition, tout autre > hauntology, logic of haunting: more powerful than ontology, harbors eschatology/teleology as effects, mise en scène pour une fin de lhistoire

pp. 30-33 [via Heidegger on dikē, on gift w/out debt] heterogeneity of pre—, absolute precedence rendered to singularity of other, irreducible possibility of Un-Fug, anachronic disjointure, what comes before me, as in, comes from the future: the very coming of the event

p. 78 logic of ghost, toward a thinking of event, exceeds binary, dialectical logic where effectivity or actuality (present, empirical, or not) is opposed to ideality (regulating or absolute non-presence)

***pp. 81-2 undetermined messianic hope at heart of “democratic promise,” eschatological relation to to-come of event, singularity, alterity

p. 82 hospitality w/out reserve is the condition of the event

——w/out experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on justice and the event > this is more honest, giving up on good conscience, conceding to economic calculations installed at border of event

p. 87 those who oppose simulacrum to presence can’t think event

p. 92 “necessary” promise “il faut lavenir” marks any opening to the event and conditions interest (not indifference) to anything whatsoever, to all content, no desire w/out it

***p. 146 via Marx, players in history as inverted Schleimihls, shadows w/out body, the specter, the red specter is disincarnated > this impossibility [disincarnation of specter] isn’t it possibility itself: virtuality? mustn’t one reckon w/ this to understand history, the event-ness of the event?

pp. 212-13 the event we are prowling around (autour duquel nous rôdon) hesitates btwn singular “who” of ghost and general “what” of simulacrum; in dis-locaton, in virtual space of tele-technosciences, le messianique tremble au bord de cet événement même

“it is this hesitation, it has no other vibration…it would no longer be messianic if it stopped hesitating.”

POOF pp. 19-21 via Aristotle, one must choose & prefer friends (election & selection), it takes time > for Aristotle, those who don’t have friends count friends among things (prágmata), possessions, the malevolent place friends in field of calculable hypothesis > yet, the choice of friends, that their # must be small, reintroduces #, calculation, into multiplicity of incalculable singularities: a certain aristocracy in arithmetic of the choice

p. 39 btwn concept/event a double bind occurs, imposes itself to be endured there, law of an aporia, undecidability, crucial disjunction btwn thinking & knowing: gift, invention

p. 68 no event not followed/preceded by its own perhaps, no event is as unique, singular and irreplaceable as the decision [?] > isn’t the eventness of an event excluded by a decision?

pp. 78-9 one might insist the world can’t wait for bibliophilic decision, “esoteric rarity,” and yet event is always absolutely urgent, cutting, conclusive, heartrending (déchirante)

pp. 127-28 for Schmitt, exception is the rule linked to thought of ‘real possibility’: a case, situation, an eventuality arises only exceptionally > an event is always exceptional

HASD p. 39 khora, neither an event nor a giving, neither an order nor a promise, the wholly other (tout autre), neither transcendent, absolutely distanced, nor immanent and close

pp. 39-40 historicity, événemantialité > significations foreign to khora

pp. 48-9 contrary to khora, Christian apophasis is initiated by event of revelation which is also a promise, Jerusalem as place of event, place is event

——this event prescribes a good & accurate apophasis: comment ne pas dire

prayer, quotation of prayer, & apostrophe weave same text > there is a text because of this repetition, this place is the event, future of what is promised, initiated, not motionless like khora

p. 53 Christianity did not cease to be Greek [both are apophatic, only Christianity is evental?]

MPM p. 125 [re: de Man, word “deconstruction” inscribing itself instead of being erased] “always already” erases singularity of event, which is erased in its turn before signature of this word [“deconstruction”] > signature asserts itself as history insofar as origin of its “taking-place” is unlocatable

MSUB J p. 170 motion of motif, w/out totalization, subjectilian wall: “of this dissociation in the body of which there will always be marked the singularity of the event made work”

A p. 8 “coming to pass” of event doesn’t have the movement of passing, traversing, or transiting, a coming without pas, impossible passage, prohibited passage, indeed nonpassage

p. 20 we can never say these are the conditions of inexhaustible singularity of event, must speak in negative form (w/out X no Y) [Derrida against present or presentation of “this is that”]

——as soon as conditions are converted to positive certainty we are being deceived, indeed we are deceiving the other

SEC p. 326 citational doubling splits (scinder), dissocier davec elle-même the pure singularity of the event, as positive possibility (not failure)

p. 327 differance, “the irreducible absence of intention or assistance [due to iteration] from the performative statement, from the most ‘event-like’ statement possible” authorizes Derrida to posit general graphematic structure of every “communication”

pp. 328-29 for Austin, signature is equal to verbal utterance coming from “I”, for signature to maintain itself: pure reproducibility of pure event

——for Derrida, for a signature to function, to be legible, it must detach itself from present and singular intention of its production; its sameness alters its identity and singularity, divides the seal

VM p. 81 difference btwn philosophy as power/adventure of question itself & philosophy as determined event/turning point (tournant) w/in this adventure [difference btwn Nietzsche & Heidegger?]

OH p. 31 crisis is not appropriate word any more for event of other heading: crisis [krinein, moment of decision] has always inspired a Selbstbesinnung (self-contemplation), a regaining of “direction (sens)” > protestant, capital discourse

p. 114n vis-à-vis Valéry, what has not yet happened in history: the capital event of a concept, which would be to think the event as such > the capital event is also the event of capital, the head

P (I) p. 14 event (rencontre, décision, appel, nomination, initial incision dune marque): another cause than causality? undecidable, outside calculation, “tout ne serait-il pas livré au programme (wouldn’t this all be booked in the program)?”

PAS PAS pp. (48-9) event (de-distance of near) (Eriegnis, Entfernung, Enteignis) “before” which philosophy and its pas au déla (thought) are trying to close themselves; event, to come and more than past (à venir et plus que passé) > beyond because the instant I say viens, both pas are crossed in a single pas

event, going-to-come rather than a coming-and-going (aller-venir plutôt que va-et-vient)

p. (51) Blanchot on event: he’s always outside it, lightning, can only perpetuate its approach, take its indecision by surprise

p. (60) échouer, échec, échéance, chance; the chance (échec ou écheance) of the event

——mastery, getting by too well, je men tirais trop bien, does not allow chance of event, must be disabled, wrecked, for something (other) to happen finally: the best & worst > la dérive guards against security, anchorage, property and against, perhaps, ce qui arrive, le pire ou le meilleur, venant den face ou de labîme [?]

pp. (67-8) “terrifyingly ancient” time, absolute crypt, requires the récit (reciting, it can be a matter of nothing but that), ce récit [of viens], neither relation to the event nor event itself > pas dévénement, pas de concept

pp. (95-6) the event adrift (en dérive) abducts (enlève) its simple past from an indefinite background of habitus or repetition, fond sans fond [quasi-now of récit]

VP p. 42 for Husserl, a sign is never an event if event means an “empirical singularity” that happens only “once,” is irreplaceable and irreversible > purely idiomatic sign would not be a sign

S p. 94 promise (Versprechen) announces, salutes, what has already taken place “before” (this is the temporality of the coming of the event, Ereignis or Geschehen), it is the dissymmetry of a yes before opposition of yes and no, before question, language always revient à de la promesse

T p. xix logic of event, structures of expropriation: timbre (tympanum), style and signature > same obliterating division of the proper, make every event possible, necessary, unfindable

SH p. 11 “Geheimnis der Begegnung (the secrecy of encounter)” > otherness & solitude (poem, singularity) conjoined in one & same date: chance, plus dun at once, that which seals event

p. 20 [Derrida comes very close here to a dialectic of program/event?]

***FWT p. 52 event falls upon me vertically from so high (not most high)—does not come upon me horizontally, also event surprises from behind, or I never see it, I feel or hear it/him (barely)

pp. 52-3 no “free subject,” but certain space of freedom opened by event, spacing liberated, dis-engaged, before & for the pledge (le gage); “with the determinism you spoke of”—no future

——event worthy of the name absolutely surprises me, so I can’t not respond, exposed beyond all mastery, dare I say, happily vulnerable

p. 83 revolution, interruption, radical caesura in ordinary course of History > revolution only event worthy of the name (all responsibility: revolutionary)

***pp. 159, 230-31n revenant different from specter/ghost (latter have horizons, are visible, come into light); revenant—think event & haunting together; revenant “almost” merges w/ trace itself

***p. 184-85 [Socrates] necessary to know, there’s no event w/out some kind of non-knowledge ——event beyond all performative sovereignty, all foreseeability, beyond every horizon (one believes one sees coming) [re: psychoanalytic revolution beyond sovereignty of “subject”]

DS p. 208 space of writing: “event” in which nothing happens—hymen, crime, suicide, spasm (laughter/pleasure): everything describes structure of text & effectuates its possibility > a lustre which is nothing beyond its own fragmented light

***p. 215n “event” (historical event, if you wish) has form of a repetition, the mark (readable because doubled) of a quasi-tearing (quasi-déchirure), a dehiscence [etymology of dehiscence follows]

pp. 261-62 hymen not even a signifier or sign [an event?], thus everything that comes from propagation-structure of hymen, i.e. text, is never truly made up of “signs” or “signifiers”

ROP p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

p. 64 in EN, in interminable conversation w/ Lacan, Derrida thinks contingency, singularity, event, tukhē, which is also a thinking of death, whose signifier would be the phallus

p. 77 where else but on border do questions of topology get asked, and why else than that the border is not indivisible? risky for historian to assign taking place of event to a borderline

pp. 101-02 for Foucault, psychoanalysis oscillates on both sides of dividing line, in two places, two times, at same time (but he does not think these two times w/ structural possibility of event)

SP p. 137 were the key to the secret of a text “btwn me and myself,” I will still die > relation to event of text as structurally posthumous necessity > text remains open, offered, undecipherable

***SW pp. 348-49 this irreducible reality of an event (outside discourse but not text)—is so unlike you? > but, it’s the signature, a hem, on the edge, forever heterogenous, a tear, overlap, remaining caught in poetic stitches—thus the effects of anticipated iterability

CHM p. 40 Derrida’s problem w/ writing history of decision: risk construing division as event subsequent to unity of original presence > confirms metaphysics in its fundamental operation

***PIO pp. 5-6 no invention w/out advent, singular structure of event, makes come about what is new in a “first time ever,” [cf. première fois] inauguration of a possibility/power at disposal of everyone, thus conventions, belonging to a culture (heritage, pedagogical institution, discipline)

——invention begins by being susceptible to repetition, exploitation, reinscription

p. 6 enigmatic collusion of invenire, inventio, event, advent, lavenir, adventure, convention

p. 46 sole concern of invention of the other (the coming of invention): allow adventure or event of tout autre to come > future-to-come

PF p. xxxiii injunction “it is necessary” of future-to-come can receive indifferently names “event” and “other” > irreducible to calculation, program, project, subject, object, anticipation

TR p. 80 textual event: calls to question internal/external border

p. 118 discontinuity will help us go beyond the excuse come closer to event of forgiveness

p. 136 event is always traumatic: singularity interrupts normal fabric of temporality/history

p. 158 eventness of event requires the arbitrary (for de Man, this is an experience of threat, suffering, dismemberment, castration, cruelty)

p. 159 de Man: deconstruction/dissemination independent of any desire (mechanical/arbitrary like a grammar) [Derrida quickly claims this argument is both defensible & indefensible]

——event supposes surprise/contingency, thus exteriority or irreducibility to desire, exappropriation as work of inappropriable in desire > unless nondesire haunts every desire, abyssal attraction btwn the 2 (not simply exclusion, exteriority, opposition)

——due to unforeseeable, inappropriable exteriority, event is traumatic (a fearsome generality of “trauma”—there’s trauma of “happy” experience) > makes precarious distinction btwn point of view of subject & that which is produced independently of desire: event injures desire

——event is radically inappropriable, radically resistant to logic of proper

EJQB p. 75 [re: Jabès] Jew reproached by rabbinical Jews for universalism, skeletal (décharnés) allegorism, for neutralizing event in realms of symbolic/imaginary [Jew as suffering allegory]

——Jew is split btwn 2 dimensions of letter: 1) allegory (no history, abstract universalism, cold skin of concept) 2) literality (empirical, actualized history, too warm flesh)

p. 75 “entre le chair trop vive de lévénement littéral et la peau froide du concept court le sens

PSSS p. 254 arrivant, hospitality of visitation not invitation, beyond all instituting utterances, ce qui arrive, event, puts to rout performative act, sometimes cruelly, perhaps beyond the death drive, exceeds rules of hospitality: unpredictable for hosts

p. 260 the who and what comes, the arrivant, makes outdated the question who or what has come? ——question of event/revolution always comes too late

p. 276 numerous figures of the impossible: hospitality, forgiveness, gift—above all [?] the “perhaps,” the “what if,” the unpredictability of event

+R p. 159 polysemia or even dissemination drags Adami’s sentence far from any shore (rive), preventing any event from ever arriving (sarriver)

LI p. 109n system of presence, origin, archeology, production must be deconstructed for event to occur: event is what deconstructs

p. 90 parasite can never be excluded from body “proper” > “an owner” calls it parasite (jealously defending his oikos) > whatever violently “takes place” always something of a parasite, offered hospitality, a place, by host: never quite taking place is part of parasite’s success as an event

TN pp. 56-7 madness: [Nancy] “world is its own rejection,” condition of thinking the event > just madness, call for different thinking of the just

pp. 77-9 Levinas’ language is hostage to rhetoric as he describes what Derrida risks calling quasi-messianic: “not yet, from a future never future enough” where “caress aims at the tender”

——Derrida compares Levinas’ caress to the event, but wonders it if it’s simply valid for any event worth the name

p. 332n Levinas, by way of Husserl, proposes the word sentance to describe an immediate iteration “whose sensation is the event itself”

pp. 135-36 shouldn’t sense of touch touch us, for something to come about at last (pour que quelque chose arrive enfin), an event, as some say, fatiguing us a little, a singular event (!!) [: )]?

——as if idea of simultaneity/continuity born in contact w/ contact btwn 2 points of contact

p. 221 singularity takes place and takes place of (a lieu et tient lieu), inscribing technical prosthetics onto singularity of event itself, because of this spacing: takes place, lévénement dune venue

p. 224 event, la venue de larrivant, routs (met en déroute) and exceeds any performative power

NOY pp. 238-39 yes must be fictive, quasi, opens every event w/out being itself an event, never present

WOG p. 23n simulacra do have power to produce events (do not always do so)

p. 36 khōra, non-event, a place or a taking place, an-ontological, an-anthropo-theological; epekeina tēs ousias, event > fragile limit btwn certain event & non-event

p. 37 hen diapheron heautôi (Heraclitus) is Greek heritage Derrida is most faithful to, tries to think this “one differing from itself” alongside (“improbably”) the khōra > the very event of the même, the soi-même: under this sign, Derrida contrasted differance to ontological difference [cf. D p. 22]

BSi p. 279 sovereign majesty & bestiality as more than [see pp. 256-59], as upping the ante, going outside the law to make the law; the “perhaps” that does justice to the possibility of pas and event, “liberated, cleared, disengaged by wagering (dégageaient, désengageaient en la gageant)

ATAP pp. 93-4 “Come” precedes & calls event, opens scene, no theme, supports no metalinguistic citation, not an order, not a prayer, not obscurantism—just beyond “What is?” > perhaps where Ereignis and Enteignis unfold movement of propriation

UWC pp. 234-37 [perhaps, “if,” event] not horizon of power, of “I can,” irruption that punctures horizon, interrupts performative organization of “as if,” “as such” > “as” name of true problem/target of deconstruction: authority of “as” founds/justifies every ontology, phenomenology, knowledge, science

——this thinking of impossible possible is not a thinking of necessity but a thinking of the dangerous “perhaps” > force of event always stronger than performative

EVENT & MACHINE

FK p. 57 machine-like spontaneity (sponta sua, what flows from the source) [event has machine-like properties], “religion” begins again, quasi-automatically

T pp. leiris xxiv-xxv [song as margin—ineffable and machinery]

FWT pp. 49-50 machine: a system (dispositif) of calculation & repetition [Freud’s reality/pleasure principle]; the event: that which exceeds the machine, a noncalculable that doesn’t belong to order of calculation: extremely difficult, yet necessary, to think the event w/ the machine > if everywhere there’s a machine, & there’s some machine everywhere, there’s its excess, we must track calculation/machinery everywhere, to know where we are affected by the other

——taking account of event (that which defies accounting), knowing how not to ignore/deny it, is knowledge too, scientific responsibility

p. 58 where calculation reaches its limit: play, possibility of play w/in calculating machines > arrival of other produces effects in machine, but can’t be calculated by them > we shouldn’t close our eyes to extraordinary progress of calculation, to the machine, while still giving over to exposure to, play of, the other > invent discourse capable of taking this into account

PIO p. 7 recent discourse on invention seeks both recognition for general truth value on subject, and, du même coup, for the “operative value of a technical apparatus henceforth available to all”

pp. 7, 411-12n Bach’s Inventions not merely didactic techniques

p. 10 since 17th century in Europe, 2 authorized examples of invention: stories (fictional or fabulous) or machines

p. 12 inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

p. 13 [re: “Fable”] no metalanguage: essential instability, rapid oscillation btwn performative/constative (fiction/nonfiction), constitutes event > disturbs norms, rules, statues

——event (also loeuvre) calls for new statutes/conventions that could record, account for, such events (neither speech act theory nor literary theory [formalist or hermeneutic variety] can account for such event)

pp. 13-4 fabulous economy in “Fable,” of a very simple sentence [par le mot par commence donc ce texte], spontaneously deconstructs opposition constative/performative w/out disabling this logic totally, since it needs it in order to detonate speech event (pour provoquer ce singulier événement [?])

pp. 20-1 “Fable” has status of invention, from double position of author/reader, signatory/countersignatory, insofar as it proposes a machine, tekhnē, a self-quoting invention, a printing matrix > process w/out beginning or end, an exergue as impossible as it is necessary

pp. 21-2 shouldn’t an inaugural invention deny/overflow environment of reception (which shouldn’t be able to welcome an authentic invention)? thus producing a disordering mechanism for every status assignable to it? isn’t an invention spontaneously deconstructive?

p. 24 invention only by recourse to lexicon, syntactical rules, prevailing code—a certain submission to conventions (a given configuration)

——the double, indivisible movement of invention: gives place (donne lieu) to an event and produces a machine by introducing a gap (écart) in habit; the “coming,” the venire, the event of novelty must surprise: no status ready/waiting to reduce it to the same

p. 25 the invention must create the statutory conditions not only to be recognized, legitimized, institutionalized, but also to occur, to come about (survenir)

——how can we sort out the conditions that made an invention possible if the invention modifies structure of context itself?

p. 34 invention’s “first time”: inaugural event and iterability > thus, no invention w/out status, w/out introduction or promise of publicity; iterability marked, remarked, at origin of invention, elle y forme une poche du premier instant: retroverted anticipation

——to invent is to produce iterability, & the machine for reproduction/simulation

TR p. 72 event & calculable program (machine) together > no future w/out this thought, which appears antinomic because:

1. event: unprogrammable, incalculable singularity, experience of what happens to the living, organicity, aesthetic affect of event’s inscription

2. machine: impassive, indifferent, state of anesthesia, no affect or auto-affection, inorganic, obey command or calculable program, automaticity not spontaneity of life

p. 73 machine/event resembles a monster: there is no resemblance to a monster, so new figure of event-machine is no longer a figure

——the impossibility of machine-event becomes the only event, the first event, since event is impossible

——“event does not come about unless irruption interrupts course of possible, and, as the impossible itself, surprises any foreseeability”

——event-machine: change very name of what we call “thought” (now a homonym, paleonym)

p. 74 for Austin, a machine could never achieve a performative, intervenes in performative event as a parasite, as extrinsic, accidental

——“us”: those of us who find ourselves inhabiting this uninhabitable machine-event monster, who refuse to subordinate one to the other

pp. 76-7 French à propos allies necessity & chance, accidental (machinelike) relation to organic, obligatory link; esprit dà-propos: the art, the genius, the technique of grabbing a chance, making of Khairos or Chaos a significant, archivable, even ineffaceable event

p. 87 the work that operates by itself, in quasi-machine like fashion: secret affinity btwn grace & machine, heart & automatism of marionette; re: Rousseau, excusing machine, writing machine

——machine kills time & redeems fault > grace will operate “sooner or later” by the work of the work at work (in machinelike fashion)

p. 88 [re: “to swear”] délire names extraordinary coincidence of irrationality of machine (beyond my control) & absolute sincerity (authentic innocence of my intentions)

——coincidence of infinite guilt & certainty in absolute, virgin, intact innocence> btwn infinite guilt & absence of guilty conscience

p. 98 machine-like operation of excuse: divides/multiplies, drags guilty into repetition of “last word” > eschatology becomes a genre, inexhaustible eschatology of final words

——2 meanings of arriver: 1) event that happens to someone 2) message that arrives, or doesn’t, at destination, or unforeseeable addressee > this singular instability plays w/ its own automatism

——Rousseau’s text graciously offers us privileged access to machine effect

p. 100 de Man analyzes the mechanism that turns the last word into the penultimate one

——paradoxical instance of “last word”: forgiveness, pardon, excuse, remission of sin, absolute absolution always proposed in figure of “last word”

——a pardon must be granted w/ assurance, promise of end of history

——destined to virtuality of “sooner or later,” archive produces the event no less than it records, consigns it [archive figures a place & an instance of power]

p. 101 [re: Confessions] loeuvre generates/capitalizes a sort of interest (won’t be so bold as to say surplus value) of guilt: overproduces shame that is archived (not effaced)

p. 102 de Man: never enough guilt to match text-machine’s infinite power to excuse

p. 104 confession is always more and/or less guilty (for addressor & addressee) in act of its inscription than the fault being confessed: that confession is never innocent is a first machine, undeniable program

p. 105 machine & event: btwn the “who” & “what”

p. 113 there is the archived event and the archiving event (as inscription): these can be indissociable, contemporary, but not the same thing (structurally)

pp. 121-22 band, ribbon, silk, double bind en soie, ringhband, phantasmatic body on which limited ink (finite reserve) is made to flow; ink remains modest but capitalizes, virtually lets flow

——ribbon: subjectile on which one writes & piece of machine thanks to which one will never have done w/ inscribing [all this deconstructs de Man’s claim the “ribbon” is a “free signifier’]

p. 123 Marion [who Rousseau falsely accused of stealing a ribbon] was fertilized w/ ink through ribbon of a terrible & tireless writing machine [Apple printer—forbidden fruit joke]

pp. 124-25 no text conceivable w/out grammar (machine), no machine w/out “suspension of referential meaning”

p. 133 oeuvre as trace implies structure of sur-vival, what cuts the oeuvre off from the operation, cut assures archival independence, quasi-machinelike autonomy: iterability, power of repetition

——machine is cut as well as cutting re: living present of life, living body > machine as much effect as cause of cut

——machine structurally resembles causa sui, figure of God, question of technical as question of theological: Bergson’s “machine for making gods”

——forgiveness & excuse only possible where there’s quasi-machinelike survival of oeuvre

p. 134 oeuvre: (name of) trace of event or institution of this event itself?

——cut: wounding, opening, chance of a respiration

***——re: oeuvre as trace of its ambiguity, as if quasi-machine were already operating even before being produced in the world, in the vivid experience of living present

p. 135 necessary/possible to account [?] for suffering, wound, trauma (of desire, living movement, proper body) via machine: machine’s possibility produces such desire, the “as if,” the quasi, the simulacrum, expropriation > giving an account is impossible because: condition of possibility is the condition of impossibility

——[re: impossible conditions of possible] place of thought that ought to be devoted to virtualization of the event by the machine: exceeds classical determinations of possibility (dynamis, power, Möglichkeit), exceeds classical opposition possible/impossible

p. 136 concept of machine & event an event that is undeniable but w/out pure presence

p. 160 that “sooner or later” de Man’s text will answer for him: spectral machine

LI p. 119 repeatability of both (identificatory) iterability & (altering) iterability > necessity of thinking rule & event, concept & singularity, at once

——iterability thus a concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, & hence the concept, hence all distinction > marks the limit of idealization/conceptualization: “concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to nonconcept

OG pp. 84-5 how to think possibility of techné, of machine, w/out becoming technicist, teleological? it’s impossible [?] > recapture unity of body & language, tool & thought, w/out thinking they’re unity in a system where they’re opposed, w/out succumbing to confusionism; Leroi-Gourhan’s pluri-dimensional “mythogram”—beyond linearity & simultaneity (simultaneity still linear because it brings two absolute points of presence together)

UWC p. 210 new technical “stage” of virtualization > the accelerated rhythm/extent/power of capitalization of such virtuality: digitalization, computerization, virtually immediate mondialisation of readability destabilize university habitat, topology of event no longer “campus”

EVIL

GT p. 165n “freedom” in Kant’s speculative philosophy [?] can’t be demonstrated, it’s a “letter of credit for the moral law,” an assumption; also that (diabolical) evil can never be a motive

——faith/belief (act of faith/credit) given w/ monetary language, practical reason cannot be separated from chremastics as we interpreted it above

p. 166n Baudelaire affirms the diabolical evil or “bêtise”, satanic cruelty, Kant refuses to acknowledge (excess zeal of a bottomless perversity); Baudelaire: one must always return to de Sade, to natural man, to explain evil

——for Baudelaire, the worst evil is the one that doesn’t know it’s evil

R p. 97 beast: incarnation of evil, satanic, diabolical, demonic, beast of apocalypse

FK p. 43 evil as the deracination of the abstract > lead to machine, tele-technology, cyberspace

pp. 48-9 figures of radical evil not simply figures; the whole evil: always inventing a new evil

——Kant: “radical perversion of human heart”

p. 83 technical as possibility of faith, its chance: a chance that maintains the greatest risk, menace of radical evil

p. 90 the reaction to radical evil at the heart of Freudian thought, interminable Jewish question [?]

p. 100 possibility of radical evil (perjury, lies, remote-control murder) destroys and institutes the religious

AF p. 13 Jew (or Devil, radical evil, all which is irreconcilable to God in “Christian science”) can be reinvested as an economistic resource of an archive that capitalizes everything [Sagi]

——devil can justify, such is destination of Jew in Aryan ideal

pp. 19-20 radical evil & political-ethical questions (infinite threat of annihilation)

SPOM p. 32 beyond morality, beyond juridicism, beyond right, w/out calculable insurance against evil > only way to do justice to other as other

p. 34 everything Derrida affirms, the “out of joint,” is the possibility of evil, no doubt

——mais sans louverture de cette possibilité, il ne reste, peut-être, au-delà du bien et du mal, que la nécessité du pire, une nécessité qui ne serait (même) pas une fatalité

p. 220 the impossible (“to let the dead bury their dead”) is possible, absolute evil (fully present life which doesn’t want to hear/know death), takes place (peut avoir lieu) > on basis of this terrible possibility, justice is desirable (through but also beyond law, right) [cf. HST p. 399]

HASD p. 41 evil is even more negatively theologized than good in Pseudo-Dionysus

MSUB J p. 157 btwn sub and tile [the “-ject”]: persecuting evils, haunting the supports, substrata, substances > Artaud never stopped exorcising, conjuring the fiends (suppôts), succubi, sorcerers

PP pp. 130-34 expulsion, sacrifice, exorcism of pharmakos played out on boundary line btwn inside/outside, expulsion of evil or madness to restore sōphrosunē

S p. 40 Heidegger’s Rectorship Address is diabolical because it capitalizes on the worst, both evils at once: sanctions nazism and a metaphysical gesture [spirit w/out quotations]

pp. 62-3 for Heidegger, that which causes destitution of spirit is of spirit, is its double, its spectral duplicity; yet, this is not Descartes’ Evil Genius (böse Geist), the destitution, the demonic, comes from cogitos substantializaton, accepts lies, destruction, doesn’t question (Schellingian)

p. 80 via Heidegger’s course on Schelling, spirit is only proper if it is close to itself, desire for gathering, a nostalgia, a Sehnsucht, where Sucht, etymologically, isn’t research but evil, evil inscribed in desire > evil as the desire to go out of oneself in order to return to oneself (motif, movement, trajectory of fire, not circle, of return)

——Heidegger: “in spirit there reigns the nostalgia for its own essence”

p. 134n had Heidegger adhered to all his crossing-outs, this would have be silent voracity of an animal-machine, not simply “without spirit,” but a figure of evil [see ATIA p. 39 this animal-machine resembles the virus that obsesses “everything I write”]

p. 97 acc. Heidegger, spirit in-flames has evil in it already, thus an evil that is not Platonico-Christian, not of the body, evil is spiritual

——duplicity of Geist, as its evil ghost, brings forth question: is ash good or evil? whiteness of ash which belongs to destiny consumed and consuming (conflagration of flame)

pp. 101-02 from “holy spirit” (ruah haqqodech, ruah qodech) to “evil spirit” (ruah raa)

——white of ash as des Zerstörerischen (the destruction) spirit deploys, as radical evil

——does Heidegger remain w/in a Schellingian metaphysics of evil? in spite of his attempt to go beyond Christianity

p. 103 Heidegger: animal cannot be evil because has no spirit, man can fall even lower than animal, can disjoin from die Seynsfuge (ontological fit)

PAS PAS p. (80) is Blanchot’s diabolical démarche: 1) a mastery, which presumes to escape its own trap, believes the maze, the labyrinth, the staircase are a space w/ traps 2) or, very spacing of its pas?

p. (81) diabolism, double of sovereignty, its trap must take on all forms of sovereignty: méconnaissance and forgetting w/out remains; sovereign traps the devil, lui donnant ainsi raison, risks leaving him the last word

POOF pp. 55-6 Nietzsche’s silence (among friends), imperative/enigma of sense of decency (pudeur) [Why I am a Destiny]: an erasure w/out erasure, everything is possible in this silence > silence as interruption that substitutes testimony for know-how, faith for the test, the perhaps for certainty, other for same, friendship for calculation: different way of thinking among

——no silence among friends w/out laughter, which bares its teeth like death, doing evil & laughing at evil (not laughing it away) among friends

pp. 59-60 Nietzsche’s dissimulation (sage acts the fool), for friendship’s sake be an enemy, knowing how to lie to divert wicked lucidity, dissimulate in order to preserve: feigning to be precisely what he is, he loves them enough not to want to do them all the evil he wants for them

p. 273 from w/in fraternization, greatest crime is betrayal of humanity (fall short of virtue of fraternity), the supreme perjury: fratricide as radical evil, only the brother can be betrayed

TC p. 250 Artaud: evil is the permanent law, good a cruelty added to another cruelty > fatal limit of cruelty which begins w/ its own representation

ROP p. 29 deconstruction as hyperbolicism of analysis: hyperdiabolicism (in certain people’s eyes)

p. 32 repetition compulsion (advocatus diaboli of death drive) as resource & limit (à la fois) of psychoanalysis > analytic position set going endlessly, w/out Aufhebung, in paradox of Bindung and Erlöschung (solution, extinction): no analytic position when resistance is unidentifiable

p. 85 [Derrida discussing debate w/ Foucault over the methodical neutralization of Descartes’ Evil Genius]

p. 86 Evil Genius as haunting backdrop (le fond de hantise) (perpetual threat) of what lets Cogito appear > how can what comes after (Cogito) be the absolute beginning?

——86 death drive (repetition compulsion, fort/da), Evil Genius of Freud, the devil’s advocate, limping devil: by way of which psychoanalysis finds its speculative power & its greatest resistance

pp. 95-6 acc. Foucault, Doctor attains power through credit given to fiction, secrecy effect [Derrida shows how, in this case, Foucault places Evil Genius on the side of reason/order/father]

pp. 99-100 how to think Foucault’s contradictions? Freud on one side then the other of the maddening dividing line? isn’t being right (avoir raison) & wrong part of the history of madness?

——Evil Genius on side of madness, & on side of exclusion-reappropriation (confinement)

ATIA p. 21 why would we owe truth anything? the debt of autobiography: confession > after the fall, must already conceive lying as evil, as hiding truth

p. 32 Derrida refers to the wrong or the evil in the human use of singular name “animal”

p. 46 the serpent, of the Chimaera, is its most cunning part, its Evil Genius

p. 78 radical evil and double figure of animal: innocent or demonic, apocalyptic

p. 130 for Lacan, animal’s inability to be subject to “signifier,” inability to be evil (deceit)

PS p. 183 for Artaud, evil, pollution, resides in clinical, critical [the work stolen from the body]

***SW pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

DPi p. 24 daimon for Greeks: divine & inferior to divinity of God (theos), revenant, soul of dead, fate—kind of election, singular destiny; in Christianity, daimon is bad spirit, demonic, evil genius

——daimon (for Socrates) silent before law: philosophy finds its place in this silence of the daimon at moment of condemnation

REST pp. 275-76 everything on trial (tout chose en procès), publicized [re: Shapiro], the proximate cause is a trap: a double that doesn’t make a pair, makes a trap, can’t put one’s feet in them, Christic shade of bait [sole? proper subject? Van Gogh’s surrender?], Christ’s flesh is bait for the Devil (Muscipula Diaboli); in PAS, another type of trap > la paralyse

p. 278 what if, and Derrida sees it too, they’re 2 left shoes, a double that fudges (brouille) both “pair & identity” à la fois—paralyzes directionality, fait loucher vers le diable

TR pp. 85-6 for Rousseau, work of evil, “wickedness of men,” must be trade secret of God, can’t accuse mēkhanē (strategy, machine) of men (but can’t accuse God—so must put blind trust in him)

PSSS p. 238 Freud’s Grausamkeit (w/out flow of blood): suffer just to suffer, torture/kill oneself, take psychic pleasure in evil for evil’s sake

p. 240 psychoanalysis as another name for “w/out alibi”: questions radical evil or an even worse evil > only psychoanalytic revolution up to task of taking account of grammatical syntax, reflexivity: [“I you we made I you we suffer”]

***p. 279 stranger [Derrida] speaks badly (mal) of evil, doesn’t believe in sovereign good or sovereign evil > he only suffers from it, but hopes to make it known

p. 280 is Derrida or the French language to blame for the untranslatable: avoir mal, faire mal, vouloir du mal, en vouloir à quelquun?

EL pp. 194-95 for Rosenzweig, Zionism is a linguistic evil: turns a language of names into one of political information

HST p. 381 to acquit oneself of forgiveness, to call it quits: repeats, countersigns evil

LI p. 81 Sarl’s anger at confusion btwn use/mention, his appeal to good & evil, due to fact that use/mention are always susceptible to confusion

TN p. 283 for there to be a good heart: possibility of bad heart must remain forever open, i.e. tout autre > good heart must be ready for the other, for treachery, for perjury (inevitable-impossible vow of abstinence, tactile’s fate); is this how we can translate Kant’s “evil heart”?

CF p. 39 the excessive, mad, hyperbolic forgiveness, surprises like a revolution: to forgive not only the guilty one but the fault itself, where both are evil, irreversibly, repeatably

——this mad forgiveness heterogenous to politics, ordinary juridical practice > otherwise, calculated transaction, negotiations, hypothetical imperatives

p. 49 ‘radical evil,’ or perhaps even worse, unforgivable evil, that which makes question of forgiveness emerge

OG p. 152 (217) Rousseau: all evil caused because mothers shirk their duty as mothers [supplement, writing, as cause of evil]

p. 153 (221) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] masturbation, contingent evil, model of perversion: summon absent beauties, one corrupts oneself by oneself (on s’altère soi-même)

p. 179 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] history also protects/resists abyss of evil > “moral love” (which is immoral, acc. Rousseau) becomes modesty (true morality of women)

p. 201-02 all Rousseau’s figures of evil occur in move from Greece to Rome (articulation over accentuation, no small city, consonant over vowel, northern over southern, capital over province)

p. 207 (295) for Rousseau, taste (cooking) has no moral element, no good aesthetics can come from it

p. 292 (413) writing as painting is evil and remedy, pharmakon, zoographeme betrays being & speech, freezes (fige) them > writing as representation (painting) of la bête chassée: capture et meurtre magiques

——that writing carries death, Rousseau would agree w/out reservation

pp. 294-95 (416) [necessity of writing] to think writing as accidental, as chance, is to ignore lappel de suppléance and to think evil as exterior, therefore effaceable addition

pp. 303-04 (428-29) acc. Rousseau, Leibniz’s pure algebra, universal writing of science, total break from langue parlée, would be absolute evil, alienation > Rousseau: “la lettre tue

p. 304 (430) for Rousseau, theater worked by profound evil of representation (Darstellung—put there before), luxury, fine clothes, adornment (parure), dissipation

ATAP pp. 94-5 apocalypse w/out apocalypse, w/out Last Judgment, no eschatology beyond tone of “Come” itself > the apocalypse of apocalypse [our apocalypse now], beyond good & evil: no longer collection of evil & good in legein of alētheia, in Geschick of lenvoi, or of Schicken of co-destination

IF p. 304 via Flaubert, the devil is no more an atheist than Spinoza > no one is less atheist than devil

***CIR p. 46 act of writing as perverse overbidding of crime to exhaust evil, evil I committed in truth, the worst

p. 47 “writing is only interesting in proportion and in the experience of evil”

p. 105 SA: sought the source of my evil, way of searching was evil, did not see the evil

***pp. 215-16 those who don’t admit their violence, lack of respect for evil, demand Derrida to “own up!” > to Derrida, this is the shameless forgetting of the fault: economy of the worst

EU p. 48 since finitude of man degrades moral law’s sublimity, respect for it (form of censorship) must be posed from outside, by “coercive laws” > thus, there would be no university w/out principle of evil in man [Derrida remarks that this statement isn’t false, but is formulated too quickly]

pp. 52-3 acc. Kant, censorship justified by evil > who or what faculty can speak meaning & truth of censorship? of evil? the philosopher!

SPEC p. 269 Freud’s “perpetual recurrence of the same thing”: phantom of demonic, conjured up cadentially, limping (boiteux) devil

p. 380 no one demands to know what devil thinks dans son for intérieur, Freud can think the devil w/out putting himself on the devil’s side (no written promise/contract w/ devil)

EXAMPLE

KH p. 98 difference btwn calling it/her (elle) in the same manner & calling it/her by the same name [khōra], difference btwn appellation (discourse) & name? is Timaeus an example of this difference or exemplary?

GT p. 67 equivalence of taken & given is posed, thematized; the exemplarity of God (Maru) giving as much as he takes; tribe restores, restitutes equilibrium by following example

——not through w/ this logic, one is never through w/ it

MONL p. 11 Aristotle model: the “most” this, the “best” that: paradigmatic example

pp. 19-20 alone in a genre [particular] that becomes a universal example, exemplarity of host as hostage: “universal hostage”

p. 27 body of the martyr, body of language and writing, marks as scars, Derrida a Franco-Maghrebian martyr

——mark, re-mark, experience of language, what gives rise to articulation btwn ontological universality & testimonial singularity of martyred existence > universal destiny assigns us to a single language which cannot be appropriated

R p. 83 [quoted in KH] democratic double injunction (around edges of khōra): 1) all-inclusive 2) secret entrusted to those worthy of it > paradox of example, good example

FK p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

OOG p. 79 for Husserl, factuality of fellow men never anything but a variable example

p. 113 Husserl retains from fact only its exemplarity and its essential structure, its “possibility” and not its factuality

FL p. 263 not exemplary but a singular example [re: Benjamin]

AF p. 74 is Jewishness the absolute uniqueness of this trait? to be open toward the future (à-venir), to be Jewish?: exemplary uniqueness of the trait dunion [btwn Jewishness & future]

***p. 77 Derrida trembles when Yerushalmi declares “only in Israel” [is there future, is there past], logic of election, question of proper name, exemplarity > place of all violences

——if it is just to remember to guard and gather archive, it’s just as just to remember the others, tout autre est tout autre [invaginates]

SPOM p. 41 example [Marx] always carries (porte) beyond itself, opens a testamentary dimension, example is for others, beyond the self

pp. 186-87 the secret (Geheimnis) of the fetishism of the commodity, the “germ” of the money-form, une table tournante, example of an apparition

p. 210 messianic as universal structure, historical opening of future, experience itself and its language (Abrahamic messianism an exemplary prefiguration?)

pp. 217-18 if “es spukt” is strongest example of Unheimlichkeit, as Freud admits, can it be reduced to an example, is it not the Thing, cause of history or epistemē, exemplary force?

POO p. 17 exemplarity: “example itself, as such, overflows its singularity as much as its identity”

——the exemplarity of the example is not the example

——the example is always a performative fiction

p. 140n Kant’s pure law whose concept conforms to no example (no mimesis)

p. 141n for Kant, Christ is exemplary of the inadequacy of the example

——passion is always a matter of example

p. 143n literary is only exemplary of what happens everywhere

——use of “I” as an example, am I writing an autobiography? or writing about “I” in general, where I become exemplary

p. 144n identifiable institutions stabilize, arrest turbulence, master, order, to be able to make decisions, to be able > literature is exemplary in the face of this, it always does something other, something other than itself: for example: philosophy (literature & philosophy)

HERP p. 215 for Heidegger, Hölderlin’s sacrifice, which Germans have not heard, is an exemplary sacrifice, but how to respond to someone who says “You do not hear the sacrificed poet”?

POOF p. 3 via Cicero, the friend as exemplary, illuminates, brings hope beyond death, elle la promet à la revenance testamentaire d'un plus-dé vie, d'un survivre qui restera ici l'un de nos thèmes

***p. 4 Cicero combines the meanings of exemplum (copy, reproduction, duplicate) and exemplar (portrait, single original) to describe the hope friendship provides beyond death: Cicero stresses sameness, ideal double, as condition of survival

p. 165 ‘all men are brothers’: a responsibility, that is always, of course, exemplary (claim to universalism) > reconciles double imperative: brother (face & mirror, original & copy, one & other) is always exemplary & that is why there’s war

p. 172 suitability (covenance) of the enemy, lodged w/in oikeiéotēs, my own projection, an exemplarity more real/resistant than my own shadow, my truth in painting > proof in the fact that I can address him, call to him, he becomes origin/destination of call [to the point of madness]

pp. 237-38 what will be put into question re: fraternity is the exemplarist strategy (ethnocentrism, patriotism, nationalism), alleged universalism of nation, homeland: our homeland gives passage to homeland of all mankind

pp. 238-39 for Michelet, fraternity is another name for friendship, national singularity gives example of universal friendship, the boundless generosity (exemplary universalism) of Michelet’s andro-gallo-fraternocentrism

pp. 272-73 Derrida explains how he does not want to exploit spectacular ‘news,’ that which screens out (fait écran) reflection [makes a screen of reflection], by projecting itself w/ pathetic, sensational, images of violence that are too easily mediatizable > yet, all these examples (immigration, globalization, new warfare) are in our mind & heart as Derrida strives to deconstruct fraternal link to friendship: how does humanitarian participate in fraternizing humanization?

BL p. 196 problem of exemplarity [knowing how to enter into the law] w/ re: to Kant’s respect for the law > the example would be the effect of the law, only summoned before the law

***A p. 22 if death names irreplaceability of absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in place of the other) then all examples in world can illustrate this singularity, death of all those who say “my death” is irreplaceable [universal?] > tout autre est tout autre

——that anybody can appropriate expression “my death” > exemplary complication of exemplarity: nothing more nor less substitutable than syntagm “my death,” hapax legomenon

p. 35 Heidegger & Kant: man only example of not-man man (Dasein, finite reasonable being)

***p. 53 methodological urgency in being-toward-death: we can only start from here (len-deça), “ontico-ontological priority of Dasein,” “exemplary” point of departure of existential analytic of Dasein, power of question of we, we here, that can listen/wait for each other

p. 63 “if being-possible is the being proper to Dasein, then the existential analysis of the death of Dasein will have to make of this possibility its theme” > death is possibility par excellence, exemplarily guides existential analysis

EM p. 122n (145-46n) in spite of Kant’s critique of anthropology, man is sole example of rational being

p. 125 (149) for Heidegger, exemplary interrogated (Befragte) being [man] constitutes privileged text for a reading of meaning of Being

pp. 126-27 (151) Dasein serves as exemplary text to read Being, lhomme reste le lien ou le fil conducteur paléonymique that ties analytic of Dasein to totality of metaphysical tradition

SEC p. 311 Condillac an example w/out counterexample of properly philosophical interpretation of writing

p. 320 Husserl’s interest is in purely logical grammar not pure grammar > “the green is or,” unacceptable in context determined by a will to know, still signifies an example of agrammaticality

VM p. 86 example of perception of extending things only provisional for Husserl

p. 92 Borges: “perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors,” light, for example, but what an example! which language can escape metaphor of light? [not night]

p. 316n connaturality of violence & discourse as very essence of history, ethnosociological (Lévi-Strauss) information would only confirm as factual example eidetic-transcendental evidence

VP p. 4 for Husserl, starting point in “Fatkum” of language not a presupposition so long as we’re attentive to contingency of example

PAS PAS p. (66) Viens, at the same time unique and copy (exemplaire), Blanchot’s récits as exemplary citations, their unique power is that the unscathed possibility of unique (le sauf) remains in reserve from which “I would emerge” to say, to one of them,“Viens

p. (91) Blanchot’s example of how speaking negates the existent of which it speaks: ‘This woman!’ > Hölderlin, Mallarmé, all poets, felt act of naming is marvelous/disquieting

OH p. 11 is Europe an example or exemplary?

pp. 24-5 Europe: representation or figure of a universal idea; has confused its face, figure, w/ a point, a phallus; the idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, eidos, archē, telos, the idea of beginning, commanding, cap, captain, towards an accomplished end

p. 72 value of universality capitalizes all antinomies, linked to value of exemplarity which inscribes universality in proper body of singularity (idiom or culture)

p. 73 whether hospitable or xenophobic, self-affirmation of identity always claims to be responding to call of universality, an inscription of universal in singular, unique testimony to human essence and to what’s proper to man

p. 123n spirit as exemplary example, example par excellence, of value (source of value)

S pp. 15-6 Descartes’ cogito not exemplary precedent of existential analytic because sum is not questioned [leap rather than genealogy]; Descartes commits the thingification of the subject, positing (Ansatz) of subjectum or hypokeimenon, a substance or substratum

p. 17 Dasein is exemplary because of the experience of the question; privileged entity for a reading of Being

——the exemplarity of we, our we, is our Mitsein, discourse w/ ourselves and others

***SH p. 8 example offers its example only on condition it holds for no other > every poem has its [irreplaceable] “January 20th

p. 14 meridian binds (“das Verbindende,” both binds and connects), provokes, at noon, the encounter [shortest shadow], example of law > “a date would be the gnomon [nom, shadow, not mine] of these meridians”

***FWT ***FWT pp. 120-21 logic of exemplarity leads to an abyss (figurality undermines the entire question) [re: those w/ self-hatred resembling Jews]

p. 142 DP either internal to criminal law, one punishment among others, or external, non-serial exemplarity, hyperbolic, foundation, condition, more/other than a penalty

p. 144 Socrates, Christ, Joan of Arc, Al-Hallaj are paradigmatic cases, but religious authority, via accusation (profanation/violation of sacred), always decides on DP in exemplary way

p. 178 Europe is the most beautiful example of auto-immunity, and allegory, because w/ Europe we see auto-immunity as survival, invincibility as auto-immunity: immense tragedy of a beautiful suicide

WM WM p. 251 wouldn’t a bad metaphor be the best example of the metaphor?

pp. 251, 253 [exemplary nature of sun in relation to metaphor] if sun is always metaphorical, it has lustre [Mallarmé], is an artificial construction, always other than itself, emerging from itself (father, eye, seed, fire, egg) > via Du Marsais, the philosophical metaphor light of the spirit is a detour w/in (in sight of) reappropriation, presence, etc. (from Platonic eidos to Hegelian Idea), a trope, a borrowed dwelling (house) > here, light is one metaphor among metaphors, and borrowed dwelling, expropriation, becomes metaphor of metaphor

DS DS pp. 193-94 double mark, mark erases mark, undecidable stroke > this syntax escapes pertinence of truth, inscribes truth w/in its play [“Mallarmé exemplifies this”—suspect, displace, such a claim]

p. 243 Mallarmé on example of the dancer: “through a kind of commerce whose secret her smile seems to pour forth, w/out delay she imparts to you, through the last veil that remains forever, the nudity of your own concepts, and silently proceeds to write your vision in the manner of a Sign, which she is”

——re: “double game,” each pair referred to another pair, each proposing itself as an example w/ respect to the others

P P pp. 42-3 aesthetic judgments not one example but the example of judgment

p. 51 divide btwn reflective/determinant judgment watches over internal divisions of Critique: 1) reflective (art): example first, particular allows discovery of law 2) determinant (science, logic): law first, specifies, narrows, tightens around particular

p. 79 Kant: examples are wheelchairs (Gängelwagen) [roulettes] of judgment, those who don’t have enough Mutterwitz, the sick, need these wheelchairs, prostheses that replace nothing

——Hegel: there is play in examples, they play, Beispielen

——Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

p. 84 “I’m using a reflective route” [moving from example to concept]

p. 89 tulip is exemplary of the sans of the pure cut (sans of finality-sans-end)

***——“on this sans, that is not a lack, science has nothing to say”

p. 96 [Kant on the exemplary, exemplary w/out concept, natural/artificial free beauties]

p. 97 Derrida exploits Kant’s example of frame to ask whether parergon constitutes place/structure of free-wandering beauty (nothing prohibits the right to exploit the example)

pp. 100-01 adherent/vague beauty cannot relate—is there a frame btwn them? suspending relation, puts them in relation > which is the example of which?

***p. 109 exemplary is a singular product, cannot be imitated, an example immediately valid for all (an historical event which points to an ahistorical, the concept can only come after the blow)

PS p. 170 to protect meaning of thought (value of work) against psychomedical reduction, criticism (aesthetic, literary, philosophical) must create an example, a case [from opposite path, produces same reduction it’s trying to avoid]

——the work, the example, becomes martyr, bearing witness to structure whose essential permanence is prime preoccupation of commentary > criticism reads essence into example

p. 171 for Blanchot, Artaud’s “unpower” is “essential to thought” > [Blanchot risks neutralization by making Artaud exemplary]

——[using Blanchot’s pathetic error, Derrida shows how Artaud's unique example, his history, will be erased on the way to truth, given to the doctors: a pre-Hegelian treatment]

p. 324n TN. Blanchot does to Artaud what Hegel does to Novalis (Beautiful Soul) [?] > extract the life from the thought

p. 172 Blanchot’s very Hegelian reading of Hölderlin > fate not his but poetry’s fate: dissolution of unique (say “poet” instead of Hölderlin) authorized by conception of unity, unicity, of unique

pp. 173-74 Laplanche finds in Hölderlin exemplary access to schizophrenia, very structure that opens truth of man > so the unique becomes a universal figure: exemplarity only apparently contradicts unicity > equivocality of example is resource of complicity btwn clinical/critical discourse

——no commentary can escape these defeats [silences before the unique] unless it destroys itself as commentary: exhuming unity in which are embedded the differences (madness/work, psyche/text, example/essence) supporting both criticism & clinic

p. 175 Artaud’s resistance to clinical/critical exegeses: protest itself against exemplification itself > destroy history of dualist metaphysics, render doctor/critic helpless: art w/out works, language w/out trace

——Artaud establishes link btwn essence of theft & origin of discourse: theft of speech as possibility of theft, theft would constitute structure of the example as such

p. 328n we could not avoid the violence of the example the moment we proscribed it, but perhaps we can better understand the necessity of this incoherence

DPi pp. 16-7 Rousseau’s 3 reservations re: DP (this chapter one of most tormented/interesting in The Social Contract): 1) DP not a civil law but law of war 2) not the general but a particular act of sovereign 3) Rousseau rejects exemplarity of punishment, believes guilty party can always be rehabilitated, but affirms DP when danger is too much

p. 60 logic of fascination best argument against punishment as exemplarity: bad example risks becoming fascinating martyr, hero, the good example [Genet] (perversion of the imitation of Christ)

p. 209 exemplarity of Hugolian economy considerably exceeds the singular genius who represents it so well

***p. 283 nursing no illusion should not prevent us from being militant, this is composure (le sang-froid), courage, militate w/ cool heads (de sang-froid) [Derrida occupying position of the condemned and the abolitionist], grace, passion, love, J.C., as copy or abyss of exemplarity > Derrida doesn’t care if he’s imitating Christ, he wants to save what is left of life

TB p. 104 Babel, exemplary: myth of myth, translation of translation > tells need for figures, tropes, for translation inadequate to compensate for what multiplicity denies us

——metaphor of metaphor, narrative of narrative: not only structure hollowing itself out like that, but does so in its own way > its idiom would have to be saved

CHM p. 42 if exclusion of madness is fundamental structure of historicity, the origin of history, then Foucault’s example [re: “classical” moment] is a sample (échantillon) not a model

——or could he show it to be a unique exclusion, exemplary, an example revelatory by privilege?

Gi p. 10 Dasein: exemplary entity for the reading of the meaning of Being

REST p. 297 Heidegger uses example of shoes to guide his analysis [mentioned before Van Gogh’s picture], a paradigm of thing as “product” > paradigm, a very noble philosophical tradition dating back to Plato, shoes’re the exemplary example of the intermediate place (Zwischenstellung), btwn the mere thing & the work [Lacoue-Labarthe’s inter-posture]

p. 307 Derrida imagines a gallery filled w/ all the female examples (figures) Heidegger uses

p. 325 for Heidegger, truth of the being-product is not that of the example (the particular shoes)

PIO p. 12 constative (discovering, unveiling, pointing out [manifester], dire ce qui est); performative (producing, instituting, transforming) > “Fable” is co-implication of these 2 values; “Fable” is exemplary > invents by means of enunciation (performs/describes, operates/states)

p. 415n Kant: talent for inventing things is called genius, unlike mere imitators, the inventor’s work is exemplary, it serves as a model (Beispeil) (exemplar) to be imitated

TR p. 141 Rousseau’s wager, incalculability of absolute perhaps in which contradiction btwn exemplarity & “without example” can survive

WAP p. 131 childhood as pure memory, not yet speculation; young Hegel, very gifted, an example (pour example), the essence of a possibility, not exemplary (en example): all children should be able like young Hegel to play role, figure, of moment in pedagogy of the mind

EJQB p. 65 [vis-à-vis Jabès] situation of Jew exemplary for situation of poet

AFR p. 61 invention of a new science: “new combinations” exist (new science at once example and discovery of this) > generative or combinative model (separately) insufficient

***pp. 112-13 though, acc. Condillac, articulated language as system of arbitrary signs is only 1 of 3 kinds of signs, once it proves the best example, exemplary, it draws, envelops in advance, everything which precedes it: upsets the symmetry to its own benefit [great example of exemplary]

IW pp. 324-25n exemplarity (rather than paradigm): when “nation” declares itself, by virtue of its singularity, to be charged w/ exemplary testimony, universal message [e.g. Germans, Jews]

p. 292 exemplarism (center of our reflection on nationality): our Beispiel (example) must be followed as a model (Vorbild) to recognize our Vormacht (hegemony, preeminence): if Beispiel is exemplary, not indifferent case in series, then this statement is a tautology

——exemplary as a pre-model, a pre-formative model, an ideal

D p. 290 Soller’s Numbers is exemplary re: the reader, cette fois enfin, the text shows (montrée) that a reader cannot choose his/her place in a text > does so by composing surfaces retournées & par une mise en scène matérielle exacte

pp. 303-04 life & presence as privileged examples [of folding back onto their own limit, folding back in their very triggering] > inscribes difference in heart of life

HST p. 364 experience, exercise of impossible hospitality: “the exemplary experience of deconstruction” > deconstruction of the concept, concept of concept, of the at-home

pp. 370-71 acc. Massignon, Islam looks to Abraham more than Christianity > Islam is most faithful, exemplary heir, of the hospitality of hôte Abraham > Iqrā: right of hospitality

***pp. 409-10 an example is always a substitutable substitute > “you, for example” often violent address of one who has power/authority to take hostage: inscribes possible replaceability in address to other

***p. 410 exemplary substitution, child substitution (steal a child & replace w/ another), irreplaceable substitution > if so: every substitution recalls child substitution (the child is the first substitute)

C p. 186 theory of coffins, series w/out model, w/out example (procession in double band fascinates, can’t see there’s no example) > obsequence of this cortege in singular lineage

p. 194 little princeps coffin is not given, not a prior given that would be natural, autochthonous: “models,” examples, referents (usually are)

p. 196 paradeigmatizō: to propose as a model, to blame, hound someone so to dishonor him; paradeigmatismos: an infamous punishment to make an example > (hi)story of coffin, the condemned example: an (exemplary) sentencing of the example: damned paradigm—to death!

TN p. 64 [is Christianity the only idealizing anesthesia, neutralization, universalism—or one case?]

pp. 146-49 acc. de Biran, touch as transcendental, “faculty of movement,” withdraws from order of sensibility: exemplary sense (comparing other “senses” to touch: more or less sense on both sides of analogy)

p. 154 for de Biran, the hand is irreplaceable/dominant (teleological) and it’s pregnant w/ every kind of metonymy (pedagogical): best ontoteleological figure, best rhetorical figure

——“transcendentalism” always guided by such surreptitious exemplarism

p. 159 the 3 values of exemplarism [re: hand/touch]: 1) léchantillon quelconque (random sample), indifferent 2) teleological value—best example 3) et surtout, un simulacre déchantillon dont le symptôme trahirait une autre téléologie cachée: symptom of a metonymy, because touch always has been figural, some figural substitute courant sans fin to its “proper” abyss

p. 280 se toucher toi—unforgettable event, sans example, deprives us of all “for example,” an event from which one should re-partir, to prepare for another departure (autre départ)

p. 287 via Nancy, there is no “the” technical is an exemplary example, plus quun exemple, gives privileged access to all “there is no ‘the’…”’s > le vertige quasi transcendantal

——it’s because there’s some technical (which there is not) that one can infinitely repeat examples that deconstruct very properness/unity itself of all essences, “beings”

E p. 16 Kant’s exemplorality, exemplary orality, the mouth—os as absolute of every analogon: mouth is the measure of taste, of good art, it’s also the measure of bad taste (consumptive taste): one expressive (emissive) the other vomitive (emitic) > 2 means of entering/leaving the mouth

——if pure taste demands non-consumption, wouldn’t disgust (rejection) be origin of pure taste?

AD p. 117 not just Israel: all nationalisms think their exemplary

CF pp. 5-6 Derrida abstains from giving an example of recent persecutions—those excluded from his example will be sent back into darkness they can’t escape

LG p. 227 “avant den venir à lépreuve dun certain exemple, je tenterai de formuler [formulate before the ordeal, test, proof of an example, i.e. Blanchot]

p. 252 “a récit?” will not have been exemplary, w/ regard to the whole > contre-exemplaire de tout

OG p. lxxxix (7) the notion of example not acceptable w/in argument of OG

p. 29 (44) Saussure serves as a particular (privileged) example that doesn’t interfere (nentame pas) w/ generality of Derrida’s argument (must take this into account)

pp. 48, 51 (70, 74) substitute grammatology for semiology, le devenir-immotivé du symbole [via Pierce]: no more pertinence of synchronic/diachronic, and semiology no longer mastered by exemplary linguistic sign (master-sign)

p. 97 (145) Derrida’s distrust of the “example” [re: “age of Rousseau”]

p. 103 for Lévi-Strauss, each “comme” and “de même” authorize analogy btwn phonology and sociology: phonology exemplary as the example in a series, not a regulative ideal

pp. 204, 344n (291-92, 292n) teach by example or explanation? but will the child do it by heart or memory? is there virtue in imitating virtue? [Kant, Rousseau]

SPEC p. 340 exemplary narcissistic wound [for Freud]: jealousy over birth of new baby, proof of infidelity of object of child's affection, undoes (défait) the bind (lien) (Bindung) to parent of opposite sex

——demi-deuil: irreducible category, no gradations

p. 341 [via Freud] program of all jealousies, model of betrayal: birth of the other child

FV p. 416 [re: Benveniste on Aristotle’s categories (see p. 416n), Freud referring to The Emperors New Clothes] example of illustrative jubilation, treats element of its “scientific” discourse as marvelous paradigm there to be found, happily available (disponible) for instructing discourse

EXCEPTIONALITY

R p. 96 rogue state is whoever U.S. says it is

p. 100 “reason of the strongest is always best”

FWT p. 142 abolitionism [of DP’s paradoxical transcendentalism] must attempt history of blood w/in history of concept of exception, and a history of cruelty [not all cruelty is bloody, i.e. grausam]

EXCREMENT

FSW p. 197 why Derrida hesitates to utilize Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts: belong to history of metaphysics, logocentric repression which excludes written trace, calls it servile, excrement

p. 231 eating words, as excrement, as nourishing honey, as inky dust of law [Ezekiel, Numbers]

SP pp. 161-63n la signature et le texte tombent lun hors de lautre, se sécrètent, se séparent, et sexcrètent, se forment de la coupure même qui les décapite, les échafaude en tronc sans tête, dès linstant de leur itérabilité > expropriative commencement marks everything erected w/ structure of etron [fecal matter]

PS p. 182 for Artaud, history of God is the history of the work as excrement

——Artaud: we shit the glue of minds, pure body doesn’t shit

p. 183 like excrement, like turd, a metaphor of the penis, the work should stand up

pp. 184-85 man as the scato-theological being (this is the essence of guilt), capable of being soiled by the work and thieving God > God is a sin agains the unnameable Divine

O p. 7 preface announces what will already have been written > Derrida claims preface presages a general practice of deconstruction, strange strategy w/out finality, cette défaillance organisatrice of telos or eschaton, which reinscribes restricted economy in general economy——[is this because the preface is an essential and ludicrous operation attempting to cancel out all displacement?]

p. 11 preface as excrement of philosophical essentiality? that which falls away (la tombée) > can we account for preface differently?

——graft w/out body, bias w/out front, skew w/out line

p. 29n Kierkegaard: digressions shouldn’t be treated as inessential in Appendix, as stagnant refuse

C p. 201 arithmetic compulsion and la narration comptable in Sade’s 120 Days, part of the fun > its regular cadence, rhythmic operation: to excrete excrement, swallow it, en escompter la jouissance

introjection of mors, morceau [Lacan’s objet a?] always lets drop a heterogenous remainder of incorporation > infinite analysis of mourning btwn introj./incorp.

p. 202 one cannot get to it in one go (dun coup): multiplication shows that that which touches on the series is outside the series in the series > the remainder remains cut off, a mors, a turd, really beautiful

p. 203 a turd one would like to make one’s own (sapproprier)—until the end > until is interminable

pp. 203-04 disseminal spurt (projet) of semen [120 Days] does not emerge (débouche) into the other’s mouth (bouche) before the turd has been incorporated by the mouth, his own: embouchure of the remainder, vomit in economimesis

p. 215 copro-necrophagy: for those who found the analogy btwn 120 Days…and Titus-Carmel’s coffins forced > [Titus-Carmel has written: “place it there and eat it in a single mouthful”]

EU p. 80 for Schelling, those whose thought isn’t regulated by living and buzzing communion w/ divine [w/ community] are like sexless bees (geschlechtslose Bienen) > depositing inorganic excrement outside hive—proof of their platitudes

EXCUSE

POOF pp. 51-2 Nietzsche’s address ‘Foes, there are no foes’ requests that we go beyond excuse & pardon, still moves in religious space of benediction or malediction?

TR p. 78 plea—an excuse, allegation, argument in form of appeal

——Austin’s “A Plea for Excuses” is such a plea [performs the “theme”]—in exemplary fashion

p. 83 Rousseau spent his life protesting his innocence, thus excusing himself, rather than asking forgiveness

p. 95 undecidability btwn excuse & accusation

p. 97 Augustine: my impiety divided me against myself, excusing & accusing myself

p. 98 machine-like operation of excuse: divides/multiplies, drags guilty into repetition of “last word” > eschatology becomes a genre, inexhaustible eschatology of final words

——2 meanings of arriver: 1) event that happens to someone 2) message that arrives, or doesn’t, at destination, or unforeseeable addressee > this singular instability plays w/ its own automatism

——Rousseau’s text graciously offers us privileged access to machine effect

p. 101 plus de faute [no more fault, more fault] > vicious circle of excusing & being guilty

——guilt as inscription that is ineffaceable, inexorable, inexonerable

p. 102 de Man: never enough guilt to match text-machine’s infinite power to excuse

——guilt in the act of writing, excuse doesn’t merely accuses: carries out the verdict

pp. 105-06 de Man assumes excuse & forgiveness are the same [?], and that it is easy to say “I forgive you,” he only analyses the one excusing him/herself (not the victim who forgives)

p. 118 discontinuity will help us go beyond the excuse come closer to event of forgiveness

p. 137 sexcuser: sometimes deemed improper because it implies excusing oneself in advance, quasi-excuse

——via Rousseau, as if one always had to excuse oneself for failing to do so: and once one does, one is excused in advance or condemned forever > madness of this machine (interests us)

PJP p. 173 ultimate resource/fatality of the anacoluthon: multiplicity of times, instants, interruption time inscribes in “me” > the perjurer can always ask to be excused

WOG p. 20n to be polite and not speak about yourself could be excuse for haughty detachment

EXERGUE

AF p. 7 archival violence: exergue, capitalize on ellipse, accumulates capital in advance, anticipates so to institute (Gewalt)

WM p. 209n TN. exergue as place on coin for inscription, ex-ergon, “outside the work,” epigraph

p. 219 “the exergue effaced” [once section exergue is finished]

OTO p. 14 btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

Gii pp. 59-60 [meanings of Geschlecht and Schlag (i.e. imprint of a coin)]

PIO pp. 20-1 “Fable” has status of invention, from double position of author/reader, signatory/countersignatory, insofar as it proposes a machine, tekhnē, a self-quoting invention, a printing matrix > process w/out beginning or end, an exergue as impossible as it is necessary

BSi p. 250 exergue (ex-ergon)—like parergon, out of work that puts to work > but like capital too: makes work happen, comes at head (inscribe date)

OG pp. 4-5 (14) rigorous investigation beyond closure of knowledge, take positivity of science to its limits—monstrous, breaks absolutely w/ normality > faithful to lavenir (for which there is yet no exergue [chapter title: exergue])

EXHAUSTIVE

GT p. 34 “exhausting faculty” of “nature” given to narrator of “Counterfeit Money” as a “gift”: to look for what cannot be found where & when one is looking for it

——to look for (chercher) the impossible is that form of madness

MONL p. 2 this inexhaustible solipsism is myself before me, lastingly (A demeure)

pp. 17-18 disorder of identity: does it favor or inhibit anamnesia? heighten desire for memory? both! exhausts us, point of losing our breath, our minds

OOG pp. 54-5 for Husserl, ideal of exhaustive deductivity re: evolution of [geometrical] axiomatization toward a total formalization (limits to which are found in Gödel’s theorem) must be secondary to primordial sense-fashioning

pp. 150-52(n) to pass from question “how” to question “why” (“why is there any historical factuality?”) we must exhaust question of historicity’s sense and historicity as sense > the “why,” the ontological question, owes its seriousness to a phenomenological certainty, arises only out of a teleological affirmation, i.e. out of freedom

——only phenomenology stripped Fact of its materiality [sense can always not be incarnated?]

LOBL p. 121 the temptation of an exhaustive reading

HERP p. 174 [re: Heidegger on hearing] “before leaving this inexhaustible paragraph”

SW pp. 322-23 I am so fatigued from knowing truth, that history of the veil—that truth: too old for me, too old like me (however young I remain) > you don’t know the “fatigue” I’m talking about (dreaming of writing in Spanish, forgotten ancestral language)

——infinite weariness of tropes, what do you expect, I want to end it all (protest, attestation, testament, manifesto against the shroud) > no longer write around/in/under folds of truth

pp. 323-24n complaint (of exhaustion) & accusation lodged against matrix of discourse of veil

——complain about myself to myself: immodesty, impudence > but veil makes modest

——complaint: give up all modesty, most elementary politeness

p. 324(n) Derrida knows too well how to do the history of veils > there’s the fault: “commencerà bien faire” (TN. “begin to do too well” or “it’s getting to be too much”); tiresome, tireless, tired out history I’m leaving behind me, running after me

——epuisement recalls the water & the well (le puits) of truth, back to the pit, the hole (puteus)

——has Derrida left no one the right to say the veil has something to hide? that it will suffice to have done w/ veil to access Thing itself (Cause safe & intact)?

PIO pp. 22-3 why this new desire for “invention” (not creation, institution, etc.)? that worn-out (usé), classical word? desire for invention dreams of inventing a new desire, still contemporary w/ a certain weariness, exhaustion, but also accompanies a desire for deconstruction (lifting [lever] contradiction that might exist btwn invention/deconstruction)

RM p. 58 Derrida has regularly questioned (w/ insistence that might be judged tiresome) the “privilege of the name,” opposing its primacy w/ attention to syntactic motif

TN p. 276 Nancy: writing is violent exhaustion of the discourse in which “all sense” is altered in exscribed body

OG p. 8 (18) death of book announces death of full speech, announces exhaustion of language’s archon [speech], as if language now seen as a species of writing, as a (short) 3000 year adventure: announces new mutation in history of writing

IF p. 311 Flaubert like Mallarmé: inscribed in locus of philosophical exhaustion, simulacrum of dialectic, both expose its limits & impossibility > simulacrum that discredits oppositions (both mimic Platonic-Hegelian Idea while emptying it of its metaphysical/dialectic content)

EXPERIENCE

KH p. 93 leave khōra untranslated, thinking & translation here traverse the same experience/experiment (expérience): “place,” “location,” “region,” “country” & its figures, “mother,” “nurse,” “receptacle,” “imprint-bearer” [see p. 126, these figures not even true figures]

SPOM pp. xvi-xvii is not learning to live experience itself?

A pp. 14-15 can the experience of the aporia be anything other than vulgar, dialectical, across an indivisible line?

p. 15 experience means traversal without line, without indivisible line, passage, rite of passage, can it ever concern surpassing an aporia? can there be an experience of the aporia as such?

——deconstruction: aporetic experience of the impossible

p. 19 affirmation that announces itself in negative form is experience itself, experience of aporia (passage and nonpassage coupled in aporia itself)

——experience of aporia: passion, endurance, resistance, remainder

p. 51 “lived experience” is a ridiculous translation of Erlebnis, the measure of phenomenology—how does it relate to Bezeugung (testimony)? (Dasein never has the Erleben of its own demise)

VM p. 131 for Husserl, my world is opening in which all experience occurs, including experience par excellence > transcendence toward Other as such

——Husserl called irreducible egoic essence of experience “archi-factuality” (Urtatsache)

p. 134 present as absolute form of experience: pre-comprehending anticipation of Being as time, the ens of praes-ens > if Being has always been determined by philosophy as presence, the question of Being posed on basis of transcendental horizon of time > first tremor of philosophical security, of self-confident presence

p. 152 can there be an experience of the Other or difference, or has experience always been determined by a metaphysics of presence?

pp. 315-16n passivity & activity of Husserl’s “constitution,” > not opposed to the encounter; if one rejects his definition, there must be a time/experience w/out “other” before the encounter

OH pp. 76-9 the duty to respond to call of European memory, all other duties presuppose this one in silence [?]

——duty to act in accord w/ a double contradiction that is not simply a Kantian illusionary antimony but an effective one (w/ experience, through experiment), interminable

VP p. 10 in phenomenology, lived-experience (Erlebnis) arises from immanent domain of purely psychical [is this the transcendental epochē itself?]

GSP p. 156 Husserl’s “transcendental experience,” designates field of reflection > for Kant, this project would have derived from teratology [study of monsters/abnormalities]

FS pp. 8-9, 303n consciousness takes on meaning by way of consciousness of nothing, thus is speech brought forth > car la pensée de la chose comme ce qu'elle est se confond déjà avec l'expérience de la pure parole; et celle-ci avec l'expérience elle-même

DPi p. 258 an end will never put an end to finitude because: finality of this end will produce phantasm of this end of finitude, the other side of an infinitization (experience constitutive of finitude)

TB p. 132 translation, as holy growth of languages, announces messianic end, but sign of end only “present” in “knowledge of that distance,” Entfernung, remoteness

——can know this remoteness, not overcome it: fort/da (experience is translation)

RGE p. 253 for Bataille, laughter is extreme point of “experience,” makes Hegelian discourse dislocate itself > must know what one’s laughing at, a complicity w/out reserve

REST pp. 378-39 certain thinking/experience of nothingness (nonexistent) is required to question being of existent, and the difference of being and existent

——for Heidegger, cette pensée du néant alien to science, which deals only w/ existents: belongs to philosophy/poetry > nonexistent, there w/out being there as being present, a kind of haunting: Unhemlichekeit is condition of question of being, pivot (cheville) of the essence (see OS)

***PIO p. 15 deconstruction is impossible, possibility is danger of rule-governed procedures

——experience of the other as invention of the impossible (only possible invention)

AFR p. 64 for Condillac, [the fact of facts] sensibility/experience due to original sin [historicity?]

pp. 91-2 after Condillac admits he had to take great detours, Derrida explains that the sign is the name of this detour, experience itself as detour, generation of suppléance to be retraced

EL p. 217 secularization as a sacrifice of language, destruction of sacred language as experience of sacred language (perhaps most unheimlich experience), but also sacrifice of sacrifice: self-destruction of sacrificial function/operation (which presupposes sacredness)

——experience of the edge (bord) [sacrifice?], abyss btwn 2 places: sacred & non-sacred

HST p. 364 experience, exercise of impossible hospitality: “the exemplary experience of deconstruction” > deconstruction of the concept, concept of concept, of the at-home

p. 386 must welcome the infinite (for Levinas, that’s 1st hospitality), forgive beyond me, what is not mine to forgive: must think substitution from limit-experiences (decision, gift, forgiveness), from possible-impossible, the impossible of the possible

LI p. 116 undecidable calls for decision, for ethical-political responsibility beyond program, beyond calculable—even if it takes a second: experience and experiment of the undecidable > passage/trial of the undecidable

p. 117 thought, relation to other, “experience” of differance

p. 148 undecidability (not “indeterminacy”) always a determinate oscillation btwn possibilities highly determined in strictly defined structures: difference of force in decision of writing (a word whose broad sense includes political action & experience in general) > no indecision or double bind w/out determination: occasionally, each side terribly necessary & irreplaceably singular

——every referent, all reality, has structure of a differential trace, can only refer to “real” in an interpretive experience

TN p. 115 for Nancy, touching is very experience of “origin” as “plural singularity” > being w/ (cum or co-), community as co-tact > se toucher soi-même, se toucher l’un l’autre ou les uns les autres [French grammar tolerates reflexive in singular & plural]

p. 221 cet espacement fait lépreuve du non-contact comme la condition ou lexpérience même du contact, lexpérience même du même à jamais ouverte (forever open)et par lautre espacée” [hiatus of noncontact at heart of contact]

OG p. 60 (88) concept of experience belongs to metaphysics, can only use it sous rature, “experience” always a relationship w/ presence [cf. Nietzsche’s On the Genea… Preface 1]

——still, must exhaust concept experience so as not to fall prey to “empiricism” and “naive” critiques of experience [i.e. for thinkers appealing to experience, must look for experience outside their theoretical system]

***p. 150 (215) Rousseau: “suppléer en gagnant de vitesse sur lexperience,” dangerous habit of supplementing by out-distancing experience

p. 166 (237) privation of presence is condition of experience, that is, of presence

EXPOSURE

DST DST pp. 203-04 Lacoue-Labarthe’s warning (la mise en garde) of désistance, of traps everywhere, not protective, stands watch (veille) so you don’t forget you’re exposed on this and that side > exposure does not miss you (ne vous manquera pas) or me

——presupposes a contract, alliance, fidelity to the ineluctable, this terrifying form, the already there before me, that which lends itself to all figures and schemas; could there be fidelity w/out the faith called for in this dissymmetry [Levinas]?

——fidelity to the very thing that you who besiege me (qui massiégez si nécessairement) couldn’t, did not, avoid (est-ce que cela revient au même?)

EXORCISM [fixerup]

AF pp. 85-87 Freud both accounted for ghosts, and tried to conjure them like Marx: [re: Gradiva’s ghost] Freud speaks of “real ghost,” and of a part of truth, the truth of delusion, haunted by specter of truth, truth is spectral as part of truth irreducible by explanation

SPOM pp. 49-50 the word conjuration produces a forever errant surplus value, by “capitalizing two orders of semantic value” [?]: 1) secret oath meant to silence 2) magical incantation used to evoke

——Marx would have played w/ this word if he wrote his Manifesto in French

pp. 57-8 Marx does not like ghosts, he believes in dividing line btwn ghost and actual reality, living effectivity > he believes enough to want to chase away, exorcise specters > but how to distinguish analysis that denounces magic from a counter-magic?

p. 59 exorcism conjures away evil in ways that are irrational, mystifying, exorcism misleads us w/ respect to its magical, authoritarian dogmatism [unscathed]

pp. 62-3 privilege figure of conjuration (Verschwörung, Beschwörung) for another reason [not just fear]: swearing, taking an oath, committing oneself in performative, secret fashion

——frontier btwn public & private constantly being displaced because the spacing of the public (techno-tele-discursvity, -iconcity) is neither living nor dead: it spectralizes > less and less assured identity of political

p. 120 conjuration, work of mourning: make sure dead will not come back

——vigilance, therefore: the dead is perhaps not as dead as conjuration deludes us into believing

p. 124 via Marx, politicians are seers, visionaries, they form alliances to conjure away “specter of communism”; alliance signifies: death to the specter

pp. 135-36 [re: Eighteenth Brumaire: “conjure up spirits of past”] convoking (beschwören) spirits as specters, le geste dune conjuration positive, celle qui jure pour appeler et non pour refouler

welcoming, hospitable conjuration still full of anxiety: la conjurationappelle la mort pour inventer le vif et faire vivre le nouveau, make come what’s not there, revolutionary

——specter weighs (pèse), thinks (pense), nothing more juste than this phantasmagoria, répondre du mort, répondre au mort > obsessive haunting, the more life, the graver the specter

p. 140 the great specter of classical tradition (Rome) is convoked (positive conjuration) to allow one to rise to height of historic tragedy

p. 143 Marx’s revolutionary injunction “let the dead bury the dead”, the imperative of an “active forgetting,” as Nietzsche would put it

——neither the dead nor the living (the “only living,” the immortal living, the gods) have buried anyone (Marx knows this) > il faudra toujours que des mortels encore vivants enterrent des vivants déjà morts

spirit of past [not ghost?] convoked to anesthetize itself (sich betäuben), protects against its “own content,” protects against itself, makes you forget why and that you’re violent

p. 145 reflexive return of conjuration: those who inspire fear conjure themselves, conjure very specter they represent (conjuration in mourning for itself, turns against itself)

p. 147 via Marx, btwn revolution & counter-revolution, not only specters and conjurations, but simulacra of simulacra: specular reflection endlessly sends simulacrum away (defers to abyss encounter w/ living body, w/ revolution itself)

p. 159 in denouncing Stirner’s “conjuring tricks” Marx risks “giv[ing] into the vertigo to which such tropics necessarily lead” [Eskamotage]

pp. 161-62 Stirner advocates auto-affection of “I-Me,” where no ghosts can haunt, no spacing, no interstice > thinks this epokhē reduces, exorcises the ghost, Marx thinks it reduces to the ghost

pp. 176-77 Marx wants not to want same “thing” as Stirner: a ghost; occupied w/ exorcism of ghosts, ghost hunt > Marx’s endless chase, his deconstructive critiques boomerang, lacharnement s'acharne

***p. 202 introduce haunting into every construction of a concept, beginning w/ being and time; ontology opposes hauntology in a movement of exorcism, ontology is a conjuration

——“mystical character” of commodity is inscribed before being inscribed, traced before being written letter for letter, everything begins before it begins > but Marx wants to know the instant the ghost comes on stage—this is a manner of exorcism

p. 205 does Marx’s exorcism sign and seal the whole logic of Capital? however virtual, preparatory > is this conjuration ceremony, vital surviving oath, injunction, what puts Capital in motion, and part of the revolutionary promise?

p. 207 jurer ou conjurer: the chance of thinking and its limit? the gift of its finitude? [nous gageons ici que la pensée ne vient jamais à bout de la pulsion conjuratoire]

p. 209 as soon as there’s production there’s fetishism (idealization, autonomization, dematerialization, spectral incorporation, mourning work thus work)

——for Marx, all this co-extensive w/ commodity production; in our view, this is his gesture of exorcism

p. 212 figure of absolute hospitality: strange, familiar, inhospitable > quasi-transcendental “messianism,” materialism w/out substance, materialism of the khōra for a despairing “messianism,” a curious taste of death, a foretaste (avant-goût), curious of what it conjures

p. 213 “good Marxism” must adjust the value of Marx’s ‘helpful’ theory of autonomization and automatization of ideality, but he still exorcises “the spectral simulacrum in an ontology”

p. 218 Freud’s conjuring mechanism: even though “es spukt” strongest example of Unheimlichkeit, one can’t begin there because on se fait trop peur, heimliche-unheimliche becomes undecidable

***p. 220 the impossible (“to let the dead bury their dead”) is possible, absolute evil, absolute ashes, (fully present life which doesn’t want to hear/know death), takes place (peut avoir lieu) > on basis of this terrible possibility, justice is desirable (through but beyond law) [cf. HST p. 399] > Derrida exorcises, not to chase away but to grant ghosts the right to return (faire droit), revenant

MSUB J p. 157 btwn sub and tile [the “-ject”]: persecuting evils, haunting the supports, substrata, substances > Artaud never stopped exorcising, conjuring the fiends (suppôts), succubi, sorcerers

PP pp. 120-21 Socratic dialectic as exorcism (training in dialectics), counterspell to free us from fear of death and power of sorcery that banks on such fear

pp. 121-22 (138-39) in Laws judge must introject, internalize the letter, grammata [tou Dephikou grammatos], into his soul; anamnesic dialectics, repetition of eidos, self-knowledge, self-mastery > a forgetting of childhood, exorcism of child, teaches child to speak

p. 128 cure by logos, exorcism, must call on very thing it’s expelling (chasse), et au surplus quelle met dehors, “pharmaceutical operation must exclude itself from itself”

pp. 130-34 expulsion, sacrifice, exorcism of pharmakos played out on boundary line btwn inside/outside, expulsion of evil or madness to restore sōphrosunē

p. 140 (160) knowledge, epistēmē, antidote: remaining measured against hubris, cet entraînment démesuré qui emporte lêtre dans le simulacre, le masque et la fête

p. 158 dictum pronounces itself against itself as soon as it finds its way into writing, “contradiction” as relation-to-self of diction chasing itself away by hunting its trap (scription); not a contingent contradiction [confirmed by Platonism in Rousseau, Saussure]

PAS PAS p. (50) certitude, mastery, puts limits on madness, uses Witz, this slavish, economic vulgarity (of our epoch), masters what occurs in blank spaces [btwn 2 pas], condenses davance (in advance)

——psychoanalysis already warned us, Witz always denies relation to other, always apotropaic

p. (77) [Blanchot displaces logic of disavowal & denial] pas-de-dénégation doesn’t mean apotropaic can ever be suspended, it is a “double chute,il garde la chute contre elle-même > perverts up to the limit perversion and its other

——those who think denial is a simple gesture are more sheltered (plus abrités) than others

p. (97) the inner rhythm of sauf (contamination), always altered, always unscathed, “jai tout, sauf” > “sauf que je voudrais en être débarrassé

S p. 41 Heidegger wards off bad double of spirit, ghost of subjectity, by means of Destruktion

p. 122n Valéry: says farewell to ghosts, world doesn’t need you [this exorcism equates spirit w/ death] [if you exorcise a ghost, you exorcise the spirit which produces the ghost]

POOF pp. 41-2 Nietzsche: today we even need to be scarecrows [p. 36 scarecrow, disquieting simulacrum, opposite of a decoy], insofar as we are jealous friends of our most midday/midnight solitude > “friends of solitude” even called to be conjurers

***p. 35-6 Nietzsche’s new philosophers are friends of solitude (singularity), love cutting ties, uncompromising, w/out proximity, w/out presence, w/out resemblance: not a secret society—it’s exactly the classical concept of the secret they rebel against

p. 94 in Menexenus, must summon dead to be responsible before them, the dead are made to be born again: oath of this co-engagement thus resembles a fraternal conjuration

pp. 266-67 Hugo [re: humanist vision], like Marx, would like to swear (jurer) & abjure á la fois, on le voit à la fois accueillir et chasser, convoquer et conjurer le spectre, he would like to ‘let the dead bury the dead’ > Hugo: extinguishing of a people evaporating into fraternity

pp. 289-90 returning ghost [of Zarathustra?] who promises is a testament, a ‘this is my body’ offered again to brothers > no mourning but mourning of brother?

——deferred mourning as friendship, no possible introj./incorp. > no successful death w/out remainder, that would be the return of the father (what brothers don’t want!) > this is what brothers are conjuring: love of the father (a scene framed thus: w/out a woman)

F p. xvii crypt, place of silence, where a foreign body is kept as a foreigner, the self mimes introj. while incorp. makes secret; introjection speaks, incorporation silent, or speaks to ward off

p. xxxv self: a cemetery guard (crypt is enclosed w/in self as excluded), self makes rounds (round & round) of crypt like he’s the proprietor, but he’s not, uses knowledge to keep visitors away

FWT p. 81 Marx’s critique of ideology is a critique of the revenant > reproduces panic fear of spectrality, pursues, distances himself from, chases (away) the ghost

p. 138 how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same [Derrida’s exorcism, exorcise the same in same?]

SP p. 41 style-spur (le style éperonnant) as oblong object w/ its tissues, webs, sails, veils, thus its apotropaic power > also an umbrella

p. 129 umbrella’s symbolic figure: hermaphroditic spur of a phallus (modestly folded dans ses voiles) > aggressive/apotropaic à la fois threatening/threatened

ATIA p. 103 [via Adorno] the idealist conjuration, the making totem/taboo, insulting materialism, hatred for the animal [the animal that therefore I am as self-hatred]: the Jew, the woman

O p. 40n if “assumption” of castration is same as denial of it: “apotropaics would always have one more surprise up its sleeve (plus dune suprise)”

WAP p. 78 ideological or political constraint is the real program of power, all under its sway, in essence, reproduce said program, and ward off (repoussant) everything that would remove it

——somewhat Foucault-like vision of network of programs as profound machine, though the additional idea that this machine reinvests, reemploys, itself in each determined configuration

***p. 121 use natural to “inculcate” precisely what one wishes to exempt from criticism

DPi p. 240 deconstructing death a task for every kind of vigilance, a task of vigilance for the vigilant > when one loves keeping watch (la veille) and vigilance, when one loves period, one may sleep—but one dreams

CHM pp. 58-60 Descartes interns his own hyperbole by temporalizing Cogito, certifying it through God (temporalizes the sharpest point, the instant), a hurried repatriation > God protects Descartes against madness of Cogito

——philosophy as reassurance against anguish of madness at point of greatest proximity to it

D p. 292 no one can enter Soller’s Numbers who thinks literature/thought ought to exorcise the machine (that the 2 have nothing to do w/ each other)

OG pp. 33-5 (51-2) moralism, preaching, in Saussure/Plato—casting writing, figuration, to the exterior > maléfique, sin (péché) (traitorous contamination)

——dehors dans le dedans, archetypal violence, sin, interrupts natural rapport of soul w/ itself, writing, exterior, as body, as clothing

——writing (mask, perversion, disguise, debauchery) must be exorcised (that is, conjurer) by the good word (bonne parole)

p. 45 (66) Saussure chasse lécriture dans les ténèbres extérieures du langage [contesting his theory re: arbitrariness of sign]

EXCEPTION

DPi p. 47 law of pardon: it must be lawless, absolute exception, beyond calculation

——paradox of knowing, wanting to know the exception (which must be unforeseeable); problematic of exception will articulate connection btwn pardon, perjury & DP

p. 68 sovereign exception & DP > is state, third party, witness already there in singular, savage, secret crime, when murderer claims to do ones own or to do oneself justice? where does murder begin?

——both abolitionists and proponents of DP allow logic of exception

p. 69 cruelty: 1) red blood 2) radical malice [cruelty and exception]

pp. 83-4 Schmitt: “Sovereign is he who decides on (über) the exception” > ambiguity of über: does sovereign decide in an exceptional situation or on what must be considered an exceptional situation? given the context, Derrida thinks the sovereign decides on what is an exceptional situation > affirming/ proving he is sovereign

——for Schmitt, only by limit concept of exception can we think purity of decision, the exception “thinks the general w/ intense passion”

p. 96 no illegal DP, only DP in (exceptional!) cases where it’s provided by law

C p. 211 le Mhors-serie (I’m-out-of-series), Fors-series, the excluded necessary that marks the border of the Necessary itself: the necessary, the excepted, the contingent, sauf, fors

EXCESS [fixerup]

KH p. 99 excess of khōra not ontological

GT pp. 101-02 subject as such: bordered, posed, identified, always calculates, reappropriates surplus-value, circular return, a certain capitalization

——despite labor of subject, production of surplus-value, gift takes place where there’s trace, dissemination, in excessive forgetting, forgetful excess of the gift

p. 109 [via psychoanalysis] circulation of auto-affective fantasmatics [imaginative incorporation] can either disregard overflowing of pure luxury or recognize in it an essential economic function

R p. 4 Derrida speaking from the bottom of his heart: the excessive gift goes straight to his heart, to what he holds dear, to what holds him to life > any words of welcome (hospitality) too modest

LOBL p. 134 more-than-life (sur-vie) marks a reprieve, excess triumphs over life, worth more than eternity of life but presents itself before the arrêt de mort

SPOM p. 204 “if capitalization has no rigorous limit, it is also because it comes itself to be exceeded”

POO p. 16 affirmation of excess always spurs a counter-moralism

p. 31 if simulacrum bears witness to a possibility that exceeds it, exceeding remains, il (est) le reste, il le rest

HERP p. 183 where Derrida is beyond Heidegger’s aim (propos) [acc. Derrida]: in the non synonymy of dissemblance, heterogeneity, disproportion, incommensurability, nonexchange, excess of every measure/symmetry > democracy to-come

HASD pp. 32-3 Being must be created by what exceeds the border, the Good, intelligible sun, something that far surpasses (hyperekhontos) [Republic 509b], excess of God, light is in Good’s image

——light produced by sun is son of the Good (neither visible, nor sight or vision), excess itself described by what it exceeds, even negative discourse retains ontology, does not interrupt analogical continuity [btwn perceptible/intelligible sun, the Good and that to which it gives birth, allusion to triton genos, i.e. khora]

MSUB J p. 159 subjectile embodies the paradox of excess (does it or does it not belong to language?)

MPM p. 93 promise is always excessive—promise too much

SEC p. 329 semantic horizon exceeded or punctured (crevé) by dissemination not polysemia

VM p. 112 why must Levinas obliterate notion of spatiality re: the other, w/out erasing it, w/out making it illegible? > must he state infinity’s excess in language of the Same [inside-outside]?

***PP p. 104 (118) excess, displacement of series, nest pas une simple sortie hors de la série (ce geste tombe sous une catégorie de la série), a folding back (repli), a re-mark, cannot name it with a single concept w/out being off the mark (sans le manquer): it is a real and necessary challenge that writes itself, and we must begin by reading it

POOF p. 28 the all too of Human All Too Human, a rolling wave, a trembling, enveloped violence of a welling up wave falling back on itself, “when the excess of the beyond itself folds back into immanence,” turning around, coming to perhaps

DS p. 231 in “Mimique” excess of syntax over meaning is doubled by excess of “entre” over opposition syntactic/semantic

pp. 234-35 supplement in Mallarmé (not unilateral movement, like in Rousseau, which loses warmth of spoken word): cest lexcès dun signifiant qui, en son dedans, supplée lespace et répète louverture

OS p. 62 Heideggerian breakthrough: thought the excess of metaphysics

ATIA p. 43 Cain’s shame, like a second original sin, he needs to hide his nakedness, his crime, he feels excessively culpable > but, isn’t all wrongdoing excessive, le défaut devant leil faut

FS p. 8 for Blanchot, pure absence, the excess of everything—possibility of writing (absence of everything in which presence is announced) > makes one work

O p. 54 excess of writing not improv., throw of dice does not contradict rigorous necessity of “formal assemblage”: unity of chance & rule, program and its leftovers or extra (son reste ou de son surplus)

CHM p. 57 doubt & Cartesian Cogito punctuated by “unprecedented” excess, overflows totality (beings, factual history, determined meanings)

——to place w/in determined historical structure risks dulling point itself (doing violence)

p. 62 vouloir-dire-lhyperbole not antagonistic to silence but its condition, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

RGE p. 255 Bataille: the excess is outside reason

D pp. 363-64 because innumerable beyond/short of what can be read by machine: excess & lack (defect)

TN p. 105 untouchable, the excess of inaccessible beyond, the origin of figural fiction: le toucher

p. 290 “heart”: ultimate place of mourning, sanctuary of what one keeps when one can’t keep anything, name of what infinitely exceeds the inside

AD p. 122 Levinas: patient awaiting of God, patience of excess, a waiting where nothing is awaited

BSi pp. 256-59 Nietzsche’s superman, and the sovereign too, a hyperbolic, sublime, “higher than height,” more about excess than height, it’s the more than that counts, the surplus, absolutely more: could as well be a maximum of smallness, God as small (sovereign use of nanotechnology)

OG p. 180 supplement (a lack = an excess)

CHOR pp. 107-08 certain dissymmetry is law of sexual difference & relation to other (Derrida says this in opposition to violence of “democratic” platitudes), dissymmetry as inordinate, excessive, goes beyond coded marks, beyond grammar & spelling of sexuality

EXTERIORITY

SEC p. 325 general possibility of “parasite”: 1) trap (piège), failure (échec), abyss outside/in front of language, ditch (fossé), place of external perdition, which language can avoid, sheltered by (à labri de) its essence or telos? 2) or is this risk, internal and positive condition of its possibility, this outside its inside?

VM p. 112 for Levinas, exteriority of other is nonspatial > true exteriority is non-exteriority

PAS PAS p. (79) what does sauf mean? save them from an outside not even proper to them? sauf: secret (dérobé), powerful word, language fascinates starting form it > like sans, pas: crumbles, precludes the set from understanding itself: “rien sauf le dehors” > sauvetage project part of writing project

——assimilating interiority of mastery can also be terrible thus compulsion toward outside could be defense > sauf le dehors, tout sauf le dehors

T pp. xiii-xiv exteriority & alterity (by themselves) do not surprise philosophy > the overflow is [philosophy’s] object

p. xxvii khōra—as tympanum, watches over its margins as virgin, homogenous, negative space, leaving its outside outside, w/out mark, w/out opposition > ready to receive and repercuss type

FS p. 29 Dionysus is worked over by difference, always appears (to himself) by a relationship to his exterior, his death [fire]

O p. 12 for Hegel, exteriority of negative still belongs to process of truth—must leave its trace upon it

***p. 35 avancer quil ny a pas de hors-texte absolu, ce nest pas postuler une immanence idéale > not an idealist/theological operation, le texte affirme le dehors, deconstructs & reduces predicates of speculative operation (appropriation of outside) to “effects”

pp. 36-7 if nothing outside text, text not snug airtight (calfeutré) inside of an interiority or an identity-to-itself (dune identité à soi) > though “dehors à tout prix” can play a reassuring role, un certain dedans peut être terrible

TR p. 159 de Man: deconstruction/dissemination independent of any desire (mechanical/arbitrary like a grammar) [Derrida quickly claims this argument is both defensible & indefensible]

——event supposes the arbitrary & exteriority to desire

AFR p. 106 Condillac: we learn externality from touch alone

p. 107n Condillac: “sensation becomes idea only by force of touch,” every touch representative of objects the hand holds; sensation of solidity: both idea and feeling, idea as feeling in soul that relates to something outside

D p. 346 outside “illusion” of originary presence, never anything but overdetermination

HST p. 395 since, for Levinas, the will already has relation to betrayal (“harbors treason in its own essence”), its fidelity coming from the other, the idea of a misunderstood will still reveals a relation to exteriority

TN p. 43 for Freud, the spatiality of space, exteriority, is a projection of an internal, psychical extension

pp. 51-2 for Psyche, for a psyche altogether exposed to outside & other, there’s no autobiography: mourning autobiography (not just any mourning)

AD p. 26 Levinas’ open door calls for the opening of an exteriority or of a transcendence of the idea of infinity > idea comes through the door: the door passed through is reason in teaching

OG p. 14 (26) w/out exteriority of signifier, there is no sign, together they keep an indestructible solidity, can’t just “move on to something else”

p. 17 (30) acc. Rousseau, perverse, artful writing exiled in exteriority of body

pp. 33-5 (51-2) moralism, preaching, in Saussure/Plato—casting writing, figuration, to the exterior > maléfique, sin (péché) (traitorous contamination)

——dehors dans le dedans, archetypal violence, sin, interrupts natural rapport of soul w/ itself, writing, exterior, as body, as clothing

——writing (mask, perversion, disguise, debauchery) must be exorcised (that is, conjurer) by the good word (bonne parole)

p. 196 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] transgressing space, mastering exteriority (the inanimate), arts of space carry death w/in themselves—painting, often dead, carries you to depth of desert; voice, song, more alive [?]

p. 315 (443-44) Rousseau describes w/out declaring, en contrebande, the originary exteriority of writing: alterity

——death (not present) travels w/in speech as trace, reserve, differance, supplement; not the simple exteriority of death to life, evil to good, signifier to signified [that would be MOP]

FABLE

SH p. 51 virtually at the same date because the originary date, as coded mark, is already a kind of fiction, singularity spoken of in generalities and fable of conventions (iterable marks)

SP p. 83 pratique stylet, pratique stylée, de quel genre? can’t be written w/out conjoined fabulation of woman/truth, entre la femme, in spite of the profundity that is modesty

ATIA p. 37 Derrida’s early dream of absolute hospitality to liberate animots, must avoid fables: fables an anthropomorphic taming, always a discourse on man, for and in man

PIO p. 8 fable/fabulous — fari/phanai (to speak)

p. 413n sponge-towel (serviette-éponge), emblematic story of my name as story of the other, blazon (mise en abyme) of “impossible subject,” fable, another way to make history

p. 9 death as moment of mourning when breaking the mirror is most necessary & most difficult > “Fable” tells story of this crossing over to the other, other side of mirror

pp. 10-1 fable, logos, performative demonstration of thing it’s saying, says the saying: [in the beginning was the word] incipit, dispatch (envoi), evangelical message

——Ponge’s “Fable”: poetic performative, describes/carries out, on same line, its own generation; telling & told are undecidable, its constative is its performative (not content w/ announcing, it’s located ironically in evangelical tradition, reveals/perverts structure of envoi)

pp. 11-2 Derrida explains how Ponge’s single line is divided into “use” and “mention”

——inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

p. 12 constative (discovering, unveiling, pointing out [manifester], dire ce qui est); performative (producing, instituting, transforming) > “Fable” is co-implication of these 2 values; “Fable” is exemplary > invents by means of enunciation (performs/describes, operates/states)

p. 15 double blow of “Fable” is its invention > gives itself, by itself, a patent of invention

pp. 15-6 specularization paralyzes “Fable” (seems to freeze text)—undecidability of whether fabulous discourse makes it out of itself or is the very misfortune (malheurs) of the [possibility of the] mirror, infelicity of constative/performative (way they parasite each other)

p. 19 double blow, the same blow: fabulous invention becomes invention of truth

pp. 24-5 Derrida links tekhnē/fabula and historia/epistemē > man defined by human subject’s aptitude for invention: 1) narrative fiction, historical fabulation 2) technical or technnoepistemic innovation

pp. 29-30 if one draws a [historical] dividing line btwn use of word “invention,” must do so w/in great/fundamental reference to human tekhnē, this mythopoetic power that associates fable w/ historical, epistemic narrative [Foucault +/–]

PF p. xxiii quotations, suspend word [“United States”] in epokhē of epoch, a fabulous act of nomination, fabula (like provocation) recounts/deciphers a history, the phantasm of an accredited myth, myth by force of law, “enforced” myth

HLP pp. 28-9 Nietzsche’s “History of an Error,” a fabulation about the fabulation of truth (Nietzsche proceeds as if a true story could be told about fabrication [?]) > coup de théâtre

AFR pp. 78-9 via Condillac, the history/narrative we produce re: “progress of language,” via the imaginations [productive, reproductive], always risks resembling a fable

NOY pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

BSi p. 24 a seminar as a fable?

pp. 25-6 sovereign depicted as artificial monstrosity of the animal [i.e. Leviathan] > figuration: always beginning of a fabulation or affabulation

——[how can politics rise above the natural while also being a monstrous, bestial fable?]

p. 34 a seminar that teaches knowledge must be w/out fable

pp. 34-5 fable, for, fari, to speak, to say, fabula, something said > make so as to know: 1) bring knowledge to the other 2) give impression, effect, of knowledge, of knowing, simulacrum of knowing: a savoir-faire to “faire savoir where there is no knowing worthy of the name

——“storytelling,” convention of some historical as if, fabular > a moral lesson, a political strategy, pedagogical artifice to credit a fable: to make known (political logic, rhetoric)

pp. 35-6 fabular dimension of political not just sayings or writings but actions > death & suffering inscribed in affabulatory score (on Television): put living beings on stage to accredit interpretation of narrative, to faire savoir, like Augustine’s making truth, veritatem faciare

p. 190 Valéry: “IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE FABLE [speech], it will always be

p. 217 power that makes the law, legitimation of arbitrary violence, passes via fable

EU EU pp. 30-1 romance can’t be reduced to fable [Nancy’s Ego sum]: both avoid tedium, but fable can have exemplary signification of truth

p. 165 a (philosophical) letter dates the “as if” of the mood, a fabled mood, “a once upon a time, one day, I had the feeling…”

SPEC SPEC p. 370 Symposium comes to us filtered, deserves minute analysis of tissue of lacunae [re: active selection], would compose another fable

FACE

GOD p. 84 is Levinas’ face god or human? unable to differentiate infinite alterity of God from that of human > Levinas & Kierkegaard can’t find limit btwn religious & ethical

FK p. 59 khōra, secret, desert of the desert (last desert, before the first), neither a threshold nor a mourning, btwn event and possibility, or virtuality of the event, not the desert of revelation

——a khōra w/out faith or law, an utterly faceless other

BL p. 200 he who asserts the law, turns his back on it

——he who awaits the law, faces it [or see p. 201 before the law w/out facing it]

HERP p. 165 friend has no face, no figure, no sex, at a distance neither absolutely infinite, nor absolute proximity (null) of an ownness (propriété) [see p. 70]

VM p. 98 for Levinas, ethics, morality, is first philosophy; though Plato and Descartes thought the overflowing of infinity, only Levinas thought infinity as the face

p. 100 face-to-face cannot be categorized; face is original unity of glance and speech, thought is speech > immediately face

——other not signaled by his face, he is the face, “absolutely present, in his face, the Other—w/out any metaphor—faces me”; face > does not incarnate anything other than subjectivity (self)

p. 101 face is most high because it is origin of space, kathauto, “substance,” presence, ousia [Feuerbach on height, substance, face] [engenders set outside of set]

——Aristotle compares transcendental principle of good to chief of armies, overlooked that it is the Face

p. 103 forever discreet, interrupting all historical totalities through its freedom of speech, face not “of this world”

——être derrière le signe qui est dans le monde, cest ensuite demeurer invisible au monde dans lépiphanie

p. 107 war played out btwn face and finite world w/out a face, isn’t this the difference in which absence-presence of God plays? wouldn’t this play precede God, permit us to think his essence?

p. 104 dissociation of thought and language, subordination of latter to former, is proper to

pp. 108-09 God’s face commands while hiding, more and less a face than all faces, face neither face of God nor figure of man but their resemblance, a resemblance thought w/out the Same

p. 115 Derrida exposes impossibility of saving theme of positive infinity & face [which would have to have body, space, be finite, if positive infinity remains a theme] > face’s nonmetaphorical unity of body, glance, speech, thought can only be thought w/in horizon of infinite (indefinite) alterity as irreducibly common horizon of Death and Other > horizon of finitude

——infinite alterity as death cannot be reconciled w/ positive, present God

p. 122 to have regard for face is to respect nontheoretical (ethics, metaphysical) w/ theoretical knowledge

pp. 142-43 humanism, separating man from animal, via analogy of God and human face [vis-à-vis Descartes, ambiguity of substance as concerns God and his creatures], is this not the original metaphor? Levinas’ metaphysical humanism

p. 144 metaphysics of the face encloses thought of Being, stifles it

PP p. 140 (161) bewitchment (lenvoûtement) > always effect of representation, capturing, captivating, the form of the other, par excellence his face, the vultus

OTO p. 38 mother is the faceless figure of a figurant, an extra, gives rise to all figures by becoming anonymous, everything addresses/destines itself to her, she survives, as long she’s at bottom

ATIA p. 99 erection, standing up, allows face-to-face copulation

p. 109 if Levinas doesn’t know if the animal has a face, doesn’t this call into question the whole discourse/ethics of the face?

p. 110 for Levinas, “thou shalt not kill” is the 1st commandment to come from face of the other > refers only to the face, don’t murder the face, my neighbor, my brother, another human

FS p. 26 [Levinas’] face as structuralist repose [?], peacefulness of a spectacle, horizon

DPi p. 11 for Levinas, “Thou shall not kill” [cf. AD p. 6] is the first commandment, first meaning of face, does not contradict DP

REST p. 348 [joke] Shapiro takes a step backwards to see things face on

pp. 370-71 lowly shoes levitate, il élève jusquà la figure, transfigured shoes (haloes of themselves) look up toward most high: the Face [by way of restitution]

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, only 1/ 4 surfaces donnant lieu to moment of visibility, de la présence en vis-à-vis (face-to-face), counting out the phenomenon > surface is mounted (montée)

p. 295 passage toward other, se resserrer (fitting itself) into the angles btwn the surfaces, dans lentre-surface [inter(sur)face] > articulation of one surface sur lautre (dun temps sur lautre)

pp. 298-99 illusion of truth facing me, sans cesse par soi régénérée de mon visage, will have only been scene-effect of “dispositif”; cet appareil differentiated enough to include autarchic illusion of sovereign subject in its structure

p. 311 “we,” nonpersonal, limitless, imperfect: I, you, he cut out of a “we” never presented full face (de face)

p. 327 “I” as surface vacant of itself: foments (prepares a poison) cruel dispossession > reaches simulacrum point: où il peut à la fois teindre le tissu (stains the tissue) et feindre to tell you truth about it

——a summons, provocation, face-to-face [w/ what?]

HST p. 364 border btwn ethical/political no longer insured: the 3rd (le tiers) gives birth to justice & finally state, 3rd announces himself in duel of the face-to-face, & the face: the beyond the state (condition of ethics) had to produce itself in the state

——this is a topological invagination: “outside produce[s] an enclave in the inside of the inside”

+R pp. 178-79 Benjamin theorizes that portrait of face is last “ritual religious art” before “technical reproducibility” > disappearance of the subject as art of the cenotaph [?]

TN p. 30 Nancy’s 4 figures: 1) form of extension 2) fashioned 3) as trope 4) as visage (face)

p. 90 Derrida asks: where is borderline (la ligne) btwn beyond possible exceeding [Levinas’] caress, making it possible, and beyond possible that opens the ethical [face?], making it possible?

p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 308 Nancy: epopteia, sight accomplished, consummation of Mystery of Sense Certainty, phallic & cephalic

——Nancy: epopteias only face—Medusa

p. 330n for Levinas, flesh not reduced to the face

AD p. 21 neither face nor hospitality can be thematized (what they have in common)

pp. 29-30 the 3rd, illeity of 3rd (not the 3rd man), begins justice, comes w/out waiting [w/out delay of differance?], affects face to face, but doesn’t interrupt the “welcome of the face”

pp. 33-4 violence of pure face to face (hospitable welcome, narcissistic closing [renfermement]): in double bind w/ the 3rd (protects against vertigo of ethical violence while violating its purity)

——pure face to face as oath (serment) before the letter, debt before every contract or loan (emprunt), must perjure itself in bind w/ 3rd: in operation of justice can no longer distinguish btwn fidelity of oath & perjury of false witness

——justice as law begins w/ perjury > violates; sigh of just man: “Quai-je à faire avec la justice?”

p. 36 discretion: manifestation & withdrawal in the face [the woman?]

pp. 37-8 even if feminine alterity is “hospitable welcome par excellence,” even if she’s not a man, she remains human: woman w/out “height” of face, not most high: her familiarity accomplishes “the en-ergy of separation” [?]

p. 139n first Levinas believed that femininity was a modality of alterity [?], but in Otherwise than… he goes back further, nakedness before face presupposes feminine alterity: idea of skin is a “responsibility before eros”

pp. 52-4 discretion of face, not unveiling/revelation but an opening before the opening, not an opening to phenomenality, not Heidegger’s Erschliessung, Erschlossenheit, Offenheit

p. 60 “illeity,” sometimes designates interruption of face to face, sometimes very transcendence of the face in the face-to-face (a certain experience of “feminine alterity”): He (Il) in the depth of you

p. 62 trace of withdrawal, of face, visitation, unforeseeable, messianic visit, the “passing (passée)” of guest > dislocates temporal presence and representation, exceeds anamnestic representation

p. 90 acc. Levinas, “Thou shall not kill” is origin of ethics: can only declare war against a face

***p. 97 via Levinas, the State left “to itself” only judges the dead or absent, no face present [Aristole’s Politics]

p. 98 the 2 ways State dissimulates the face: 1) bringing to light makes face’s invisibility invisible 2) effaces its unicity in generality > both of these are the same

p. 110 unicity (absolute, irrecusable singularity) of face is plural a priori via substitution

——exceeding and obsessing the political/juridical: beyond law in the law > everything face exceeds marks demand for justice as law (law of justice must bend to itself)

pp. 111-12 spectral aura of face, figure of Geist, ghost, urgent before “real” qualities > recognize other w/out waiting: exceeds, deconstructs ontological positions

——no hospitality w/out chance of spectrality; God uncontaminated by Being: rigorous definition of the Face, le tout autre > as spectral as it is spiritual? gives orders, gives pardon

***pp. 119-20 “face” as untranslatable proper name—by virtue of an event of translation

——[re: visages] an other translation, more than a very old name, a poem composing a new accord, an other thought of translation, language unheard of by other man, other of man, other than man [übermensch?]

——to say à-Dieu to the face: call the name by name

p. 149n [Levinas on the 3rd and the face]

BSi p. 237 does a snake have a head? [CAP vs. Face]

CIR p. 123 disfiguration w/out respite of Augenblick reminds you that you don’t inhabit your face, you take place in more places than you should

FACTUALITY/FACTICITY

FK p. 44 minimal trustworthiness of the word, like Heidegger’s Faktum

p. 96 that which acquiesces prior to all questioning of spirit: trust/faith, Faktum, comprehension of “is” or “be” > [Heidegger’s last god?] this faith does not constitute a religion but is it untouched by religiosity? [see p. 67]

——each time Heidegger uses Faktum (not empirical fact) led back to place where acquiescence is de rigueur

OOG pp. 48-9 for Husserl of “Philosophy of Rigorous Science,” singularity is “oneness of fact in its pure factuality,” eternally apeiron, excludes only, acc. Ricouer, empirical individuality, only ‘factuality’ > the tode ti of brute existence

p. 148 [like Hegel like Husserl] Logos is the pure movement of its own historicity, goes beyond “Fact” as the “ready-made” of history

SPOM p. 98 techno-tele-media apparatuses don’t affect only the facts but concept of “facts”

MPM p. 95 singular aporia that divides the act, can’t be mastered, commits us before any active commitment on our part, impossibility of promise, uncontrollable > faktum, “older”

——no act before speech, no speech before act > there is this not natural “fact,” faktum, to which we’re recalled: already there, past never present, historicity itself, “ancientness” w/out history

EM pp. 124-26 (148-49) Being acknowledged as fact (Faktum) by way of phenomenological determination [principle of principles, presence] of exemplary being, Dasein

pp. 125-26 (150-51) for Heidegger, exemplary being is “phenomenological,” governed by principle of principles, i.e. presence and presence in self-presence, manifested in being we are, such proximity determines factum

VM p. 125 would return to intentional phenomenon acquiesce to violence of fact, is there thus an irreducible zone of factuality, an original, transcendental, preethical violence? > would it be tied to phenomenality itself & possibility of language? embedded in root of meaning & logos

p. 131 Husserl called irreducible egoic essence of experience “archi-factuality” (Urtatsache); p. 132 egological life has “living present” as irreducible absolutely universal form

p. 144 ontological/transcendental “priority” no more contradicts than confirms ontic/factual precedence

VP p. 4 for Husserl, starting point in “Fatkum” of language not a presupposition so long as we’re attentive to contingency of example

p. 82 “my death is structurally necessary to pronouncing the ‘I,’” it is an active structure, and it must function against all falsehood, meaning “I am dead” must function as Bedeutung outside of intuition (fact of my death)

S p. 28 Heidegger: factitious existence “falls (fällt)” from originary temporality, from which it has its possibility

OH p. 100 “new censorship” combines concentration & fractionalization, accumulation & privatization > de-politicizes every informing of a “fact,” no information escapes

SH p. 70n from Heidegger, datum becomes donation, thus date & gift, debt as well

FWT p. 188 [re: murder of the father] Freud’s “historical” vs. “material” truth: one based on facts in real archive, the other discernible in symptoms [Yerushalmi neglects the latter]

SP pp. 141-43 for Heidegger, forgetting of a being incommensurable w/ forgetting of Being: [Derrida quotes Heidegger: can’t understand forgetting as a human fact, as omission, Being not umbrella of distracted philosopher, forgetting attacks essence of Being, is the Destiny of the essence of Being]

GSP p. 159 for [1st phase] phenomenology, all empiricism requires a prior [transcendental] regional circumscription of objectivity, not against all genetism, but certainly against skeptical “worldly genesis,” naturalism, causalism, positivism, science-of-facts (Tatsachenwissenschaft)

p. 160 acc. Husserl, Dilthey’s Weltanschauungsphilosophie is a structural historicism, doesn’t avoid relativism or skepticism: confuses truth of facts w/ truths of reason [Leibniz’s terms]

FAITH

GOD p. 8 gift of death, marriage of responsibility & faith, history depends on this excessive beginning > new experience of death

***pp. 80-81 can a secret be transmitted? (yes & no); we do not understand, w/ Kierkegaard, Abraham’s decision; we share w/ Abraham what can’t be shared [highest passion, faith], a secret we know nothing about, neither him nor us > an incessant repetition of the absolute beginning

p. 124n via Kierkegaard, generality of ethics is bloodless specter of faith; teleological suspension of ethics determined by Abraham’s silence; aesthetics cultivates secret, ethics punishes it

R pp. 4-5 fidelity to come, to the to-come, to the future, always trembling, risky, is held in friendship, friendship of thought: yes, there is friendship to (be) thought: oui, il y a de lamitié à penser > we are guests to this snaking oath (serment) [D.H. Lawrence], in name of democracy

FK p. 83 machine-like & faith as one and the same possibility, machine-like & sacrosancity (heilig, holy, safe, unscathed, free, “swollen”) of the phallic effect: phallus as phainesthai, phenomenon (day of phallus) & also phantasm, fetish, specter, its double: colossal automaticity [phallic in bold 2x]

p. 100 no alliance of 2 [faith & religion], plus dun at once more than 2: iterability, division at source > supplement introduces incalculable in heart of calculable; pure faith = pure madness

POOF p. 16 act of faith (reliability of oath) must belong to what is incalcuable in decision [a passivity beyond enérgeia, stability (bébaios) of act in Aristotle’s lover over beloved]: break w/ calculable is ordained by structure of confidence or of credence as faith

——Aristotle’s bébaios [re: friendship] (temporal, becoming-intemporal, omnitemporal), stable & reliable, marks, covers over in marking, passage (through time) btwn 2 heterogenous orders: 1) assured calculable reliability 2) act of faith [unyoked there’s difference]

p. 33 following, not following Nietzsche: paradox of any fidelity

p. 295 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

S p. 130n before the word is the wordless word “yes,” a pre-originary pledge that precedes any engagement in language and action > no erasure is possible for such a pledge (memory before any souvenir), where faith defeats any narrative, la gage engage dans la langue

WAP pp. 12-3 CIPH—community of the question [?]: 1) answer to question 2) experience of question 3) thinking of “yes” before question, before philosophy, a yes w/ content only of the other, to whom a trace is addressed in the dark: this deconstructive thinking can/must lead to philosophy (to which it doesn’t belong); pledge of/before philosophy: space open & closed by pledge

——“thinking is faithful to an affirmation whose responsibility places it before philosophy”

DPi p. 275 Montaigne: fairest death is the most willed death, pulled like a thread > Derrida imagines [via fil of life, filet of blood] a tireless trapeze artist who is caught by net of belief, his opinion, dies on day net breaks, a willed/beautiful death > he decides to put an end to his belief

pp. 278-79 for Montaigne, there’s always something worth more than life, exceeding life, force of an opining (to say yes), belief, a force of force, a force of act of faith that says yes > this, acc. Montaigne, is the essence of religion: acceptance of sacrificial death & DP in shadow of a sur-viving supposedly worth more than life > religion grants the surviving of survival

IW p. 267 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] Protestantism makes faith come alive to its authenticity, new relation of religion to truth, no longer as correspondence (like science, objective knowledge) but as truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit), authenticity, most intimate Gewissen: [the Church?] internalizes what contests it

pp. 267-68 [vis-à-vis Cohen] how Gewissheit (certainty) connects w/ Wissenschaft, Gewissen, Selbstbewusstsein—knowledge/faith come together in German Protestantism > culture/scientific conscience of modern peoples founded on 2 types of Gewissheit (knowledge/faith)

TN pp. 128-29 so Nancy partagerait (would shares out and part) the senses, touching too; he does this by adding definite article “le” to toucher, then declaring there’s no “the touch”; Derrida compares this to propre, proche, même; then asks how we could write w/out them, without making believe we believe? asking the other to believe > le temps dune rature qui viendra signer lacte de foi partagée et partager (diviser, inquiéter, morceler) lacte de foi, la foi même?

***NOY p. 240 the “second” yes, doit arriver comme un renouvellement absolu, the structural “forgetting” of fidelity

AD p. 143n w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God > à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

p. 118 Levinas trying to delimit a faith in election safe from (à labri de) all “nationalist” temptation

ATAP p. 64 grace when writing of other absolves you from double bind, gift unbinds itself from double bind > grace can never be proven, improbable: belief itself

FALL (FAIL)

MC p. 349 [Nietzsche’s etymologizing in On Genealogy] méchance (mean, bad, low): bad luck; malchance: Austin’s “infelicity,” parasite (breach of contract) [the clinic, those who fell (ill)]

FL p. 282 from instituting violence to preserving law/contract [modern democracies] > passage from presence to representation, acc to Benjamin a Verfall, forgetting of originary violence in this differance [Derrida doesn’t see this as accidental?]

***HERP p. 212 via Heidegger, Verfall into optics, spectacle, noise > poets, thinkers not tolerated

A p. 67 Dasein takes shelter from standing before oneself [in anxiety of death] in gossip (Gerede), far from Unheimlichkeit, structural not accidental modes of Verfallen

PAS PAS p. (77) [Blanchot displaces logic of disavowal & denial] pas-de-dénégation doesn’t mean apotropaic can ever be suspended, it is a “double chute,il garde la chute contre elle-même > perverts up to the limit perversion and its other

——those who think denial is a simple gesture are more sheltered (plus abrités) than others

S p. 25 Heidegger rephrases Hegel’s “history of spirit unfolding in time” as “the development of history falls into time”

p. 28 Heidegger: factitious existence “falls (fällt)” from originary temporality, from which it has its possibility

pp. 59-60 [Heidegger appeals to depth (Tiefe) positively, sees destitution (Entmachtung) of spirit/world as a flattening, where dimension has become extension & number]

DS pp. 279-80(n) [quoting Mallarmé] rhythm, literary game par excellence: mimic suspense/laughter—rhythmic cadence, or case, all the falls, the silent fall of pen

OS p. 45 can’t extract thematic of Verfallen (re: time in Hegel & Heidegger) from ethicotheological orb, unless léchéance de lorbe redirected, in the void, toward un point de chute plus écarté (see DS)

——for Hegel, time is becoming/passing away, not simply that in which things pass away > Hegel critiques “fall” into time, intratemporality (Innerzeitigkeit) (but, Derrida adds, this “fall” shouldn’t be denied all dignity, see WM)

p. 63 still Platonism in Heidegger’s Verfallen (into time, Being)? > move from primordial to derivative (time) always metaphysical

pp. 63-4(n) in analytic of Dasein, relation of fall to proper, authenticity, enigmatic proximity (identity w/ itself of the questioning), concept of finitude

P p. 66 Heidegger on how blosse Ding is only a remainder (not properly determined in itself), a concept formed alongside, w/in, Christian creationism, matter/form, & concept of Überfall

p. 67 what if Überfall had structure of parergon: violent superimposition that falls on thing, enslaves it, “insults” the thing? but what if…

POS p. 53 how the “fall,” abasement (of writing) only functions via thought of origin

ROP p. 33 instead of “failure” of archaeological principle [of analysis], this principle is destined to limit of its arrest, finitude of its suspense > there’s chance in falling-due, given of fall

pp. 41-2 Lacan speaks of the insuccèsDerrida transforms it: “linsuccès qui échoue à arriver” > playing w/ syntax of to: 1) I do not arrive 2) I fail to arrive because I arrive

ATIA p. 4 symptom means “fall,” case, coincidence, what falls due (échéance), mishap

p. 20 Derrida not on board w/ Benjamin’s sad, mute nature (animal), because it’s logic occurs after the fall, original sin, in time of redemption

——the 2 falls of man, Prometheus/Adam, narrate (infinite) superiority over the animal: man’s property is unconditional & sacrificial

p. 21 to not be ashamed of shame: time when Adam called animals’ names before the fall [to think of his shame of shame before his cat, Derrida must call upon this other time]

——why would we owe truth anything? the debt of autobiography: confession > after the fall, must already conceive lying as evil, as hiding truth

***p. 44-5 comparing Genesis w/ Greek myths [re: fault, nakedness] as two symptomatic translations, whose internal necessities partially overlap re: the proper of man [default in propriety]: technics, sociality, emergence out of nature, knowledge, historicity [?], subjectivity, subjugating superiority over animal

p. 122 fixity of animal (re: communication, information) is, in Promethean & Biblical myths, related to animal’s perfection: man thus distinguished by lack, theory of man’s fall, fault

——for Lacan, man’s “autotelic specularity of the inside is thus linked to a defect, to a prematurity, to an incompleteness of the little man”

p. 130 Lacan designates castration complex as Freud’s scientific (nonmythological) original sin (being subjected to the signifier [nonmastery] gives human mastery over animals) [cf. pp. 139-40]

PS p. 182 for Artaud, history of God is the history of the work as excrement

FS p. 12 the project of infinite tradition must be acknowledged as such: that it can always fail is the mark of its pure finitude/pure historicity

p. 27 “fall” of thought into philosophy, analogical displacement of Being which anchors (retient) and irremediably represses discourse in metaphysics, gets history under way (est entamée)

SW p. 325 as though fate of humanity depends again on who holds power over women about the veil (St. Paul, abusive interpretation of Koran) [sin, fall or Verfallen, therefore the veil]

DPi p. 59 Badinter: courthouse theater, a privileged spectacle, is a failed incarnation

TB p. 112 [re: Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”] translation as Aufgabe (task)—translator must acquit himself, is at fault, fallen, in error, perhaps a crime: task to render [think reddere rationem, Leibniz], and possible “reconciliation”: Wiedergabe, Sinnwiedergabe (restitution of meaning)

RGE p. 262 for Bataille, poetry is fallen, retains metaphors from “servile domain,” but is not subordinated because it leads from known to unknown, by way of inner ruination

Gi p. 19 Streuung (a dissemination, a multiplication, not a multiplicity), Zerstreuung the intensive determination of the former—how can it not be contaminated by negating fall in zer-?

p. 25 for Heidegger, falling, alienation (Entfremdung), and downfall (Abzturz) not those of “moralizing critique”

Gii p. 62 end of text, in French, sometimes chute or envoi [re: whether Heidegger’s gathering has ever taken place]

REST p. 284 acc. Heidegger, oppositional pairs as Überfall, injure the thing in the thing: hypokeimonon (underneath) or hypostasis/symbebekota (on top) [which becomes in Latin: subjectum (substantia)/accidens], aisthēton/noēton (sensible/intelligible), hylē/eidos-morphē (matter/form-figure)

pp. 296-302 classically, the “thing” is informed matter, Heidegger asks whether this matter/form couple was secretly constituted around thing as work or product (being-product rather than being-thing) > re: Überfall of matter/form couple, has it fallen on the being-thing or being-product? blosse Ding is thing divested of its being-product: what we must think is the Rest

pp. 301-02 that all of a sudden the motifs of Heidegger’s Überfall in REST link up w/ Kant’s parergon in P [cf. P pp. 66-7] is prescribed in all rigor by flexibility of chance, wager, which could have left the place [the link?] empty [edge of frame, place of signature]

p. 305 remainder, instance of letting fall, this lowness: is it the foot?

——Van Gogh’s scene: “make oneself a present of the remainder (Glas)”

DST DST p. 213 Heidegger installs himself upside down in Plato’s mimetology [?], attempts to rehabilitate a mimesis defined as a “disintallation,” as a “fall” that has happened to truth > Heidegger reads alētheia in Republic as Unverstelltheit (installation, non-disinstallation, stele)

——if one no longer denounces mimesis as fallen, [contra Plato], can’t call it originary: being originary incompatible w/ mimesis

HLP pp. 69-70 radical Christianization of lie as originary corruption of human existence, as Kantian radical evil [Arendt risks secondarizing/banalizing history of lie if she maintains certainty of final victory of truth]

AFR p. 64 for Condillac, [the fact of facts] sensibility/experience due to original sin [historicity?]

p. 124 for Condillac, frivolity as structural destiny, original sin > an accident as essential fate

ATM p. 150 how can Levinas inscribe le tout autre in language of being, of the present, w/in its syntax, lexicon, under its law? > or: cette langue nest pas d’elle-même déliée, opens to tout autre?

——doing so in a way, where the fault (la faute) [see p. 149 Derrida’s fault, failing], which consists in inscribing tout autre in empire of same, alters the same enough to absolve it of itself

pp. 185-86 Derrida’s fault/violence against Levinas’ work can only wound Him [i.e. not EL] in his body, He/Il that preseals everything that carries a name > Derrida compares his fault to that of erasing God’s name from a book (a fault that is buried, mourned [not annihilated])

pp. 186-87 can one analogize the fault against God’s name w/ fault against any Name? only if analogy functions btwn absolute heterogeneities [?] [theonymic cemetery]

OG p. 106 for Derrida, writing as violence is originary, mustn’t be abstracted or isolated, not a fall/disease incurred by an innocent language

p. 260 (367) for Rousseau, society born by accident to repair the accidental catastrophe (Fall) [birth of supplement] of nature

pp. 282-83 theory of sensible origin of ideas (attention > imagination > pictogram), Cartesian critique of Leibnizian rationalism: no intact theological, metaphysical base

——sensible origin coincides w/ concept of sign as original sin > if experience is relation w/ plenitude, sign always a sign of the fall [Husserl, Hegel, ontotheology]

——model of Fall (Platonic or Judeo-Christian) can only be stated w/in common closure

EU p. 42 [in truth, since Descartes sees universal language as impossible] humans are btwn paradise of absolutely natural language & romance of universal transparency: this fall is history

——romance of universal language cannot tell a true story [i.e. is not history]

SPEC p. 260 [re: Freud’s speculation, a logic beyond that of position] the “position’s” fall (chute) would cause bankruptcy, ruin, discredit: today I’ll speak of speculation, I’m betting I will

FAMILY (FAMILIARITY)

GOD p. 63 Abraham’s “Here I am” requires that he renounces family loyalties

p. 134 filiation of impossible filiations: Kafka & Abraham, their spectral fathers, in scene of forgiveness, literature & secrecy

GT pp. 158-59 nothing can happen w/out family & w/out economy, but neither can anything happen in family, family in sealed enclosure of absolutely restricted economy, w/out chrematistic vertigo

FK p. 81 religion appropriates indemnification of all “proper,” all property: the letter, blood and soil, family, nation

H p. 7 foreigner can be a parricide only when in the family

p. 23 the right to hospitality commits a household, a line of descent, a family

PP p. 84 (91) plus tard, dans le même tissu, dans les mêmes textes, nous tirerons dautres fils, et de nouveau les même pour voir sy ourdir ou dénouer dautres desseins

p. 167 Plato rehearses “family scene” while also trying to master, to hide it, because it demands difference

PAS PAS p. (80) to say viens to a unique word (parole), somewhat plural (un singulier sauf à être plurielle), to say “Come” to her, that word, is to sacrifice right to call (appeler) another and say you to him [?]

p. (81) Blanchot’s tutoieing (viens) breaks w/ indiscreet familiarity, not negative theology, but describes its law, its jurisdiction, its perversion > can say toi w/out tutoieing [& reverse]

T p. xvii(n) ear-vulva, hymen, vesta, vestibule, hearth, familial

SH p. 58 poetry, literature, art, experience of the mask, an intense familiarity w/ ineluctable originarity of specter = ineluctable loss of origin > spectral errancy of words not an accident

FWT p. 35 fixed model of oedipal theory in Lacan & Freud > stable father, irreplaceable mother; transformation of family would transform psychoanalysis

——psychoanalysis always wanted to be a psychoanalysis of families

p. 37 transhistoricity of family bond, instituted, terribly overdetermined, will be diabolically complicated > always be “something of a family” [millennia from now]

p. 39 persistence of some ordering around family does not produce a determinable figure

pp. 39-40 [Derrida prefers not to get trapped btwn naturalism/constructivism] differance btwn psyché & genetico-biological laws > always something of a familial bond around birth, impossible to erase “birth,” a certain geneticism, perhaps birth is question of future, of arrival

p. 42 birth always familial but will come to seem less “natural” [re: “rented belly” (utero in affitto)]

OTO pp. 17-8 the living on of an ageless virgin mother (living long enough to bury her child), & the already dead father > logic of glas, and obsequence [one finds this in Christ’s family]

POOF p. 3 familiarity (oikeiótēs, in Plato’s Lysis) (being-at-home, being-close-to oneself) links friendship w/ laws & logics of universalization, ethics, law, right, equality, equity, democracy

pp. 92-3 in Menexenus, solid friendship (reconciliation) based on actual kinship (suggéneia), on homogeneity, homophilia, solid/firm affinity (bébaion) stemming from birth, native community, syngenealogy: this is a phantasm, what Joyce calls in Ulysses, re: the father, a ‘legal fiction’

——eugenicism (eugéneia) as authochtony, proper birth, homage to earth & mother go hand in hand with fraternization: an equality of birth compatible w/ aristocracy

***p. 93 logic of testimony, becoming-proof of a testimony that should never be equivalent to proof: its privileged place—kinship > in Menexenus, we survivors are witnesses that we belong to the same race, fervor of heir at funeral oration, supplementary proof: “we say so, and that is enough”

p. 138 Schmitt: friend originally meant only friend of blood, genealogical bond

TB pp. 113-14 one can think maturation of seed as a geneticist/vitalist metaphor, this would support genealogical/parental code > or, one can invert/overturn order, “metaphorical catastrophe”: only understand “family,” “life” by way of language & its sur-vival, [this reversal is operated expressly by Benjamin?]

DPi p. 227 re: “filiations,” it is very often difficult to separate familial dramaturgy, also that of sexual differences (man/woman, father/son, mother/son, brother/brother) in question of DP

p. 243n blood flows, blood disappears (lethal injection), blood that flows is both spilt blood & blood of genealogy, filiation, father & son

p. 259 fraternal filiation as debt, as being condemned > fraternal duty to pay ransom: to acquit oneself of a debt [follows Benveniste here: ghilde, Geld, damnum]

DST DST p. 202 imprint and caesura, sharp-edged signature (empreinte et césure, la signature aiguë), interrupts most powerful filiations > ineluctably: when tradition can’t secure what it repeats as its own traditionality (exemplarity, repetition, identification, imitation)

IW pp. 263-64 [vis-à-vis Cohen] Judeo-Protestant Platonism or world logocentrism made spiritual families possible, genealogy w/out limit, general economy (oikonomia, oikos as the law itself) > spiritual mondialisation: logos, spirit, idealism as moral conscience of philosophy & science

PSSS p. 255 will theater of psychoanalysis always be royal family, patriarchal, heterosexual? will it always treat sexual difference as binary opposition?

p. 261 psychoanalysis only “science” that intrinsically involves the proper name of its founder, a transferential filiation it claims to be able to analyze

***HST p. 410 exemplary substitution, child substitution (steal a child & replace w/ another), irreplaceable substitution > if so: every substitution recalls child substitution (the child is the first substitute)

C p. 186 family resemblance removes none [of the 127 coffins] from itself, from the absolute secret, from definitive detachment that isolates/ab-solves outside series

——not one (pas un seul) must be forgotten if one wants to see or touch something of the group (genealogy or even reproduction feigned)

p. 188 little princeps coffin has no relationship w/ family > and yet, in secret, in an immemorial past that was never present, he engendered this family

AD pp. 37-8 even if feminine alterity is “hospitable welcome par excellence,” even if she’s not a man, she remains human: woman w/out “height” of face, not most high: her familiarity accomplishes “the en-ergy of separation” [?]

OG p. 231 (330) Rousseau [like Aristotle, cf. BSi pp. 343-47] imagines a time when family is the only social structure—no language but that of gesture

SPEC p. 321 [Freud’s speculation on Ernst] needs no witness, no counter-testimony has weight before this teleological auto-institution

——net (filet) is in place, one pulls on a string (fil), getting a hand, foot, caught: cest un lasso ou un lacet > Freud caught himself in advance; rapporté différé (deferred overlapping) > describing in advance scene of its own description

——an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (dun après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

pp. 334-35 several families (in French analytic movement) bear same name [Freud’s name?] w/out knowing it [via Marie Bonaparte; “au moment où on croit décacheter (unsealed) un testament”]

——condition of filiation, mid-mourning (demi-deuil) [see “Ja ou le faux-bond”]: introjection and/or incorporation: la barre entre et et/ou ou > structurally as necessary as it is necessarily impure

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

pp. 340-41 all the interlacings of fort:da, tout ce qui senvoi in graphics of repetition that dislocates summary “triangle” > le trait oedipien nest quune rection pour le fil conducteur de la bobine [Oedipus most narrowly restricted effects of above repetition’s graphics]

——as if one were pulling this nebulous matrix, w/ disseminations w/out return, by only one of its string (fils), where matricial mother would be only what she is > for what it means to write oedipally, cf. Glas, which concerns itself w/ only strings/sons (fils), with gash (balafre) and demi-deuil in affectations of proper surname

p. 369 whatever becomes too familiar can be suspected of jealously guarding a secret [re: Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium]

FASCINATE

MONL p. 40 [re: barred access to Arabic, Berber] “the inscription of this limit could not leave traces”: multiply symptoms of a fascination

FL p. 298 Benjamin’s divine, bloodless violence cannot avoid making us shudder w/ its eery affinity to the final solution (resembles too closely to point of specular fascination) > Benjamin still too Heideggerian, too messianico-Marxist or archeo-eschatological [for Derrida]

A pp. 11-2 aporia, experience of what’s fascinating in the nonpassage: “not knowing where to go,” paralyzed by separation

EM p. 117 (139) question of humanism contemporary w/ spellbinding (fascinante) extension of “human sciences” w/in philosophical field

PP p. 105 (119) written traces don’t belong to phusis, not alive, or belong to Heraclitean phusis, in which truth takes shelter in its crypt (à sabriter en sa crypte) > “cryptogram” is a pleonasm

——acc. to king, pharmakon hypnotizes life of memory, taking it out of itself (la faisant sortir de soi) by monumentalizing it: médusée (medusad)

P pp. 86-9 Kant’s beauty [wild tulip] requires absolute interruption: straining toward end w/out goal, not pure if cut can be bandaged (pansable), no pure cut (if it could be prolonged, completed, supplemented), no beauty > everything in it straining toward the bout (end, blow)

——this fascination w/out desire, in view of an end never in view, a but en blanc [“point blank”] > interrupted finality must show itself as finality & interrupture, as edging

——it is the sans that counts for beauty, la bordure [edging] en sans de la coupure pure

PAS PAS pp. (45-6) a debt that annuls itself in being infinite > Derrida's debt to Blanchot’s machination sans machine, which is what interests him, what fascinates him, as does fascination

p. (79) what does sauf mean? save them from an outside not even proper to them? sauf: secret (dérobé), powerful word, language fascinates starting form it > like sans, pas: crumbles, precludes the set from understanding itself: “rien sauf le dehors” > sauvetage project part of writing project

p. (82) riveted by fascination itself

p. (83) Blanchot: looking at them (elles) as if they had risen from their graves, and, I remain in their fascination > cest la scène deau, la noyade et léventualité de viens

p. (87) wanting (le vouloir) to break fascination always effect of fascination? why break it? I love and desire fascination, any desire w/out it? [tu me fascine, je taime]; viens, word of fascination, defers in difference what it cannot break with—dare that another dissimulation not come

——always the other’s fascination, no opposition to fascination, only differences of force

p. (91) faire trembler dabord (trembling, first approach): denial of fear, frightens more, a fascination, la moindre possibilité de sarriver, in trembling one renounces mastery, use, domination, one does not know how to sign its effects > pas dinsistance distances itself on first approach

p. (100) acc. Derrida, all [?] Blanchot’s books concern fascinating ellipsis (lellipse fascinante) of what leaves the sea

PPHS p. 72 [method, compare to Nietzschean interpretation] Derrida will look 1) at the ruptures, breaks, discontinuities of long but finite historical continuum/sequence of metaphysics re: sign as referral to presence 2) and at the sequence itself, ample chains of predicates that aren’t interrupted by fascinating rupturing events

SH p. 29 ellipsis & caesura of discretion [Blanchot] inhabit the shibboleth (Joyce), it fascinates, seduces

p. 52 a date fascinates, but is not made to fascinate, crypt occurs wherever singular incision marks language (not the work of hermetic poet anxious to seduce w/ ciphers)

F p. xlii cryptonymic translations, art of chicanery, judicial pettifogging, hidden doors, detours > seduces, discourages, fascinates, fatigues

p. xlviii paelontologist médusé devant larête dun mot-chose, like a tomb burning in the grass, double-edged stare of a 2-faced Medusa (le double tranchant dun biface)

FS p. 4 form fascinates when one no longer has force to understand force w/in itself [decadence?]

DPi pp. 28-9 [via Genet, great witness/man of theater of our time] equal fascination w/ weapon of crime & weapon of capital punishment (another kind of crime) > fascination w/ spectacle, one condemned to death becomes parody, comedy, imitation of Christ

p. 58 theater of cruelty, scopic drive, fascinatio, enchantment that chains spectator to spectacle (fascio, to tense, tie, attach, fasciola is a bandage wrapping [bandelette]) > what links voyeur-spectator to fascinum, charm, enchantment, virile sex

——to executioner: “so, you got a hard-on! (tu bandes!)” (link to erection at moment of decapitation)

p. 59 all fascination: virtual involvement w/ perversity/perversion

p. 60 logic of fascination best argument against punishment as exemplarity: bad example risks becoming fascinating martyr, hero, the good example [Genet] (perversion of the imitation of Christ)

p. 94n DP seduces, vanity beyond death, those fascinated by it can take maximum pleasure from (jouir de) it

pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

TB p. 124 Benjamin’s untouchable (unberührbar) reminds Derrida of the hymen, of the wedding gown more visibly

——untouchable: fascinates, orients work of translator

PIO p. 17 mirror as predicament, necessary or fateful situation > caught in mirror’s fatal & fascinating trap

WAP p. 90 teaching body fascinates when it’s more than a center: its excentricity permits synoptic surveillance covering field of (indistinguishable) body taught & permits withdrawal, reserve, of body that does not surrender, offering itself from only one side [visor effect?]

p. 91 my body > cadaverization of my body, capturing by erasure, fascinating neutralization > my body only fascinates while playing dead, when erected in rigidity of cadaver (delegation of life)

D pp. 313-14 the opening, as presence, is not noticed as opening—we’re fascinated, glued to what presents itself: we’re unable to see presence as such, visibility of visible > never present themselves

p. 350 moment of present meaning: their “content” only surface effect into which you tombez sans cesse, fascinés by appearance

EL p. 203 Scholem’s equivocal use of word apocalypse, fascination w/ abyss : indecision that he can’t, doesn’t want, to master > apocalypse should be guarded (saved), and we should guard against it

PPT p. 12 le trait il sy attire et sy passe, de lui-même: situated, situates, btwn visible edging (la bordure visible) and phantom in center—from which we fascinate

C p. 186 theory of coffins, series w/out model, w/out example (procession in double band fascinates, can’t see there’s no example) > obsequence of this cortege in singular lineage

pp. 187-88 “don’t deliver them from fascination just when they’re falling into the abyss of the infinite—yet nil—distance, the outsize (démesuré) space”

BSi pp. 17-8 sovereign/beast outside law > beast: violation of law, also Benjamin’s grand criminal, reveals state doesn’t monopolize violence; sovereign: guarantor of law, heterogenous to law > haunting, uncanny fascination: beast/sovereign face

p. 70 sovereign state as Leviathan, as animal-machine, as prosthstatics > beast et (est) sovereign coupled across a copula: affinity through analogy, proportion, reciprocal fascination—or grafting

OG pp. 285-86 (404) science, philosophy, epistémè, movement of idealization, privilege of logos is that of phonetic writing, of a more algebraic, economical writing (by reason of certain condition of knowledge): mondial effacement of signifier > one believes one is exalting parole, when in fact, one is fascinated by a figure of technè

EU p. 62 double bind that knots around sublime body of “teacher of philosophizing” [i.e. philosophy eludes teaching, philosophizing requires it]: teacher haunts the scene, doesn’t dominate, or dominates like a ghost > one might say he fascinates/seduces if these connotations weren’t too closely tied to imagination/sensibility: for reason should break the charm [of sensibility?]

FATE

FL p. 275 via Benjamin, the threat of the law (to itself and outwards) is neither intimidation nor dissuasion (as pacifists, anarchists or activists believe): it is threatening like fate is threatening

S p. 97 duplicity of Geist, as its evil ghost, brings forth question: is ash good or evil? whiteness of ash which belongs to destiny consumed and consuming (conflagration of flame)

SW p. 349 signature (operation of poetic writing) must not be absolutely invulnerable: an “I” signs in the place of the wound (the other operates on us w/out knowing)—so virtual that it remains > bears bereaved memory of an unrefusable lesion > seems older than self: you may have forgotten it, but it carries on dictating all the blows of fate (as if we desired even the worst of them)

REST p. 305 for Heidegger, in Origin, the abyss (Abgrund) plays itself out like “veiled” destiny (fatum) which transfixes (transit) being

AFR p. 124 for Condillac, frivolity as structural destiny, original sin > an accident as essential fate

PSSS p. 256 these revenants must haunt our debates [Joshua Jung, Moses Freud] > cruel destiny of a proper name

C pp. 246-47 class is not lacking, it’s at work (series, lineage, rank, hierarchy, etc.) > but what doesn’t come under (nen relève plus) class is perhaps fate (le sort) > no classification table for fate

ATM p. 167 for Levinas, in search of God uncontaminated by Being, contact is a priori contamination > graver yet: risk of contamination that surfaces before contact, in necessity of tying interruptions together (insistence of ruptures)

——contamination is no longer a risk but a fate that must be assumed

SPEC p. 384 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] passage btwn transference & speculation > speculative transference orients, destines, calculates most original & most passive “first step” on very threshold of perception: desire for concept of perception belongs to destiny of this calculation

FATHER

KH p. 124 one telling to the next, author gets farther & farther away: mythic saying resembles a discourse w/out a legitimate father, orphan, bastard, distinguished from philosophy, in Phaedrus, which must have a father to answer for it

pp. 124-25 khōra is compared to mother & nurse, not part of oppositional couple, 3rd genus, does not belong to “race of women (genos gynaikōn), mother w/out engendering, not an origin, a before signifying no temporal anteriority [intelligible/sensible looks like father/son couple]

——relation of interval, of spacing to it what is lodged in it to be received

pp. 125-26 backwards steps (retours en arrière), rhythm of Timaeus, go beyond, under philosophical logos, normal couple, to a third, a bastard, hybrid, orphan (khōra) > necessary but not true

***p. 126 because philosophy can’t speak truly of that which looks like the mother, it speaks only of father/son, as if father engendered son all its own

GOD p. 98 Christianity, “seeing in secret,” God the Father restores economy interrupted by the dividing of heaven from earth

p. 106 the 2 economies: 1) calculation, Judaic 2) dissymmetric economy of sacrifice, “beyond the totality of the calculable as a finite totality of the same,” renunciation of merchandise, still relies on giving back (rendre), on yield, profit, but only father who sees in secret [can calculate]

p. 128 there’s always a Letter to the Father before the event (avant la lettre), signed by a son who publishes posthumously [Kafka, Johannes de Silentio]

p. 137 [re: Kafka’s Letter to My Father] speaking for the father, spécularité sans fond, who has authority to forgive?: demanding as a surplus my innocence, which is yours because you identify w/ me

p. 138 father accuses literary writing of parasitism, the son should have worked instead of written [pharmakon, meteor]

p. 145 woman spectacularly absent from scenes of forgiveness btwn father & son

GT p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

p. 161(n) the Good, in Republic, takes on features of father and of Capital, [Derrida’s fn references Dissemination, on bad faith of fraudulent merchandise, tampering w/ money, & on political economy] whereas Baudelaire is interested in copy of copy, phantasm

H p. 5 unbearable question, parricide question, threatens dogmatism of paternal logos

p. 9 madness, in Sophist, of the “foreign son,” parricide by a stranger

BL pp. 198-99 quasi-event of the murder of father, event w/out event, resembles fiction, myth, fable > real, effective guilt; question of belief & historical referent—irremediably fissured

——dead father more powerful than living one

LOBL pp. 153-54 letting trace involve or commit me in linguistic expropriation, do I break w/ maternal, mother tongue or w/ paternal law that kept me from mother?

AF p. 21 bind anew: an act of love (paternal) (sous peau neuve)

p. 38 scholar repeats the father’s circumcision [Yerushalmi calling Freud back to his father’s faith], even if only by figure

p. 48 Freud’s 3 errors, the 1st: patriarchy marks triumph of reason/science over senses

——maternity, as constructed as paternity [the usual thought is: mother real/ father figural], Freud makes a mistake in thinking only paternity is uncertain

p. 56 Yerushalmi would like be the first after Freud, alone in sharing a secret, an inheritor in lineage of arch-patriarchs [re: knowing Freud knew psychoanalysis was a Jewish science]

POO pp. 12-3 X (a child, Pierre, a trace) does not need your, the father’s name, does not return your, the father’s name [Derrida’s thinly veiled reference to Pierre]

——Philoctetus: the child is the problem [shield], always, that is the truth

SPOM pp. xvi-xvii the address “I’m going to teach you to live,” from lips of master, father to son > hesitates btwn address as experience, as education, as taming or training (dressage)

p. 173 father, singular ghost, arch-specter, capital (see Plato’s Republic 555e)

HERP p. 205 Heidegger thinks father as “Erzeuger,” one that produces, makes bloom, thinks king as “waltender Bewahrer,” guardian that governs, rules across, reigns over presence

A p. 1 disquieting phrases need to be sheltered behind paternity [re: “limits of truth” in quotes]

PP p. 76 king, father, does not need to write, testifies to his sovereign independence

p. 77 in speech, son & father remain together; in writing: absence of father (orphan)

——from vantage point of scepter, desire of writing, desire for orphanhood, is patricidal, criminal, a poisoned present

p. 79 for Plato, logos is a living being (zōōn), has a father, belongs to phusis (writing would have no head nor tail)

pp. 80-81 “father of logos” not a simple metaphor > in which case there could be no thought of paternity w/out logos

in metaphor “father of logos,” the “father” needs logos, would receive more from logos than it would transmit to it

p. 81 figure of the father is the figure of the good, capital, chief, good(s)

——living-beings, father and son, are announced to us w/in household (domesticité) of logos

“father of logos” a hearth which is the heart of all metaphoricity, not a simple metaphor

p. 82 son as interest on capital investment, as return, revenue, son as physical sun, analogon of intelligible sun (the Good, capital, origin of all onta); father as noooumena, son as horōmena

meaning of patēr sometimes exclusively financial capital [see p. 81]

——“hidden illuminating, blinding source of logos

pp. 82-3 good (father, sun, capital) hidden, blinding source of logos, that which one cannot speak about, capital cannot be counted, can only speak of offsprings, plurality of interests

——logos as a recourse to protect from blinding sun, even more protection against withdrawing sun, always risk w/ this recourse of kibdēleuma (false merchandise)

p. 84 father/son, filial threads, fils (yarns of sons and suns)

pp. 87-8 Ra, Ammon (hidden), hidden sun, the father of all things (came from an egg, and origin of egg); answer to “the chicken or the egg”: “O Ra, who art in they egg,” a “hidden egg”

p. 103 (117) to be in opposition, each term must be external to the other (good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, inside/outside) which means one of the oppositions must be matrix of all possible oppositions, thus Plato tries to dominate writing

***pp.142-44 (164-65) in pharmaceutical enclosure, an artful living organization of figures, all about father/son, legitimacy of inheritance, sperm, no mother; as living thing logos always issues from father, writing is weakened speech, ghost, living-dead, simulacrum (eidōlon), errant, pervert, outlaw, bad seed, doesn’t know his (father’s) name, identity, discourse w/out guarantor (répondant)

p. 146 being-there always a property of paternal speech, Socrates always associates speech and law, logos and nomos

——le père est, le père est (le fils perdu), writing, father is not, suspends question “what is?” which is always “what is the father?”

——writing kills father, opens violence, dead father as ultimate resource

p. 153 Socrates is surrogate father (midwife), accoucheur, supplementary relation btwn father and son

p. 166 [stranger (from Sophist) as first grammatologist?] grammar and dialectics can only be distinguished when truth is fully present, fills logos > but parricide in Sophist (impossibility of presence) establishes condition of discourse as diacritical principle of sumplokē

necessity of logos as necessity of parricide > absolute pre-condition crossed out by parricide at point of its arche-being—prevents difference btwn grammar and ontology

p. 167 absolute invisibility of origin of visibility, father (good-sun-capital), epekeina tēs ousias, a structure where all presences are supplements substituted for absolute origin

——“Platonism” rehearses “family scene” while also trying to master it, to conceal (dissimuler) it by drawing curtains over the dawning of the West

——transmission of dialectical mastery of pharmaka from father to son disrupted by family scene that constitutes & undermines passage btwn pharmacy & house

VM p. 89 Levinas seeks a second parricide, to murder the Greek father (who still holds us in his sway), a father Plato could only hallucinate murdering, “a hallucination within the hallucination that is already speech” > could a non-Greek succeed in doing what a Greek could never do? and do so by feigning to speak Greek, can one feign to speak a language?

TC p. 249 affirmation must be penetrated in repeating itself > murder of father is endless, repeated indefinitely [murder of father: presence representing itself, i.e. a sign, a repetition]

F p. xv le for du dedans (not intérieur) is not le tribunal de la conscience, even though enclosed w/in forum of self > it is the contradiction w/ in desire [?]: father’s penis neither comes [ne jouisse] nor goes [ni ne périsse] > from this contradiction we understand the solidity of crypt, the indefatigable effort to maintain it, & its failures, permeations from w/in & w/out, its seepings

FWT pp. 40-1 mother is perceived by senses, father judged by reason (Freud) > the monstrosity: to desire more than one mother [plus dune] [surrogate mothers], supplements of mothers

——mother becoming “legal fiction” (Joyce) just like father

pp. 43-4 fantasy of the genetic, “my flesh and blood!” > genitor is not the father! history of law folded into the fact that symbolic organization requires fantasmatic investments

p. 81 interest in Hamlet, privilege given to father/son, masculine installation of sexual difference > privilege of power, power of privilege, privilege of law as authority of father

p. 108 Derrida’s wares are more perverse, contraband, than his father’s (sees his father as exemplary figure of the victim, of “sacrifice,” voûté); perhaps Derrida is avenging his father by introducing disorder into “commerce,” whose trial he would be organizing

WM p. 243 for Aristotle, proper name is nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, father of all figures > everything turns around it, towards it > metaphor as substitution of proper names w/ fixed meaning & referent

POOF p. 100 as long as brothers remain faithful to memory of their fathers (specters of their fathers of noble birth), they are bound by testamentary tie (recalls their truth, truth qua political truth), a monumental memory that inaugurates truth as much as it recalls it

ROP pp. 91-2 after linking Nietzsche w/ Freud, Foucault casts Freud into the role of thaumaturge, doctor, judge, father (like Pinel)

OTO p. 16 father’s name, name of my death, my dead life

ATIA p. 54 the animality of the absolute father, killed/sacrificed to bring equality to brothers

——Derrida will treat Descartes as father, and Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, Lacan as mes re-pères exemplaires (exemplary references) to normative/dominant discourse of a worldwide anthropology

O pp. 44-5(n) acc. X (chiasmus) (thematic diagram of dissemination), semen [preface] just as likely to get lost as seminal differance as it is to be reappropriated by sublimity of father

——preface as father assuring/assisting his work, his son, idealizing, mastering his seed, auto-, homo-, re-insemination, btwn father & son alone > narcissism as law, on par w/ law, figure of Platonic boētheia (coming to aid of speech, helping logos): even better if just father, preface useless

p. 48 concept > engenderer & consumer (jouissant) of itself, relève its preface, plunges (senfonce) into itself > conception of concept an autoinsemination

——return of theological seed to itself, dispersion working for profit of Idea, exclusion as inclusion [not Hegel’s Jew?] > la vérité qui se parle dans le cercle logocentrique, cest le discours de ce qui revient au père

pp. 48-9n la logique (est) de ce qui revient au père (mortplus que jamais) comme à la loi et au logos: la relève elle même > elle est vraie et elle constitue la vérité du logocentrisme > signifier sublated in process of meaning > [Derrida links Freud’s “only one” libido (masculine) to the rightness of reason]

SW p. 343 ipse: the power itself, the law, law of father, of son, brother, laws of hospitality (hosti-pet-s, hospes, posis, despotes, utpote, “the mysterious -pse of ipse,” says Benveniste, naively astonished)

DPi pp. 106-07 in fighting for abolition, Hugo is both Father incarnated in Jesus (father as martyr defending son) & also the Son, Christ, the true reincarnated victim

DST DST p. 322n resistance to désistance is desire for assistance, paternal assistance, Oedipal help

unavoidable resistance to désistance as nonpathological inhibition, no rhythm w/out it, can say the same about the double bind (see p. 228 return to father, subject to law as inhibition, defense) [a safeguarding, a filiation, a subjectivity compelled by the caesura?]

PIO p. 4 Cicero opens his text on invention w/ question of the son as a question de ratione dicendi > scene of traditio, tradition, transfer, an allegory of metaphor

——does the child (son) invent himself specularly though parent’s narcissism > or is he an absolute invention (this being the truest response to parent’s desire): where truth is thought beyond any inheritance?

p. 5 to reinvent invention: required countersignature must be that of an other, a son no longer father’s invention, son must recognize invention as such, as if the heir were the sole judge, the legitimating authority > invention can never be private (can’t be countersigned by family)

RM p. 62 for Heidegger, Metasprache and Sputnik are the same, monstrous project of father, of metaphysics (mastery of form for form’s sake)

WAP pp. 128-29 [re: Hegel] are children insured against death of their father (capital, revenue) still children? or, haven't they always been? [same for widow who can count on revenues]

PJP p. 195 honesty of father: knowing himself to be dead [“us”?] > perjurer as symbolic orphan of father [baby daddy]: this knowledge pursued him in advance, he followed the knowing-oneself death of the father [everywhere]

p. 300n death of God, death of all paternity (of the Father): “seed of all romantic distress”

PSSS p. 264 Derrida would like to ask “What is to be done?”—beyond all possible cruelty & sovereignty, w/out alibi, this question is not foreign to paregicide

p. 267 Freud: “paternal nucleus” hidden behind every divine figure

C pp. 216-17 Titus-Carmel not like demiurge in Timaeus, who contemplates an unproduced, precedent paradigm, program of its forms: T-C deprives paradigm of its imperious transcendence, risks raising himself up as father’s father, ancestor of himself > but, in killing the paradigm, he kills his product, and thus his paternity: broken lineage: plus de famille, no command (stick [in English]), w/out archy or hierarchy (Khōra and its link to the bastard [?]) [baby daddy]

p. 217 for Plato, model/copy : “father/offspring”

p. 220 primordial place of “father” (presumed paradigm) depends on cartouche-performance—takes w/ one hand what it gives w/ the other (torturous surgery)

p. 222 [vis-à-vis Freud] father inferred from a sentence, declaration, judgment: “this is the father,” says the cartouche, paternity never touched, unnatural (different matter for maternity)

LI p. 42 Searle as only rightful son to commit parricide (a logic found in Sophist); Searle’s indebted/mortgaged signature > auto-authorized descendant

——[Derrida feels some guilt for impeding this procedure of inheritance]

TN p. 252 for Chrétian, hand of father is logos and Son (p. 255 Incarnation is the sign of the hand)

AD pp. 94-5 for Levinas, paternal “fecundity” (not feminine alterity anymore) opens infinite discontinuous time: protest against egoist protestation of subjectivity (that of Kierkegaard, Rosenzweig) > true anarchy, paternal: only effective protestation against “tyranny of the State”

p. 152n for Levinas, paternity, at instant of eroticism, not virility of war, state, heroism

BSi pp. 29-30 ipseity: king, father, husband, master

p. 30 Freud: all ravenous animals are fathers in disguise

p. 245 moral law already there before murder of father because it actualizes after remorse for the murder (not after the murder itself) [i.e. moral law born of remorse, already there]

OG p. 91 heliocentric concept of speech, analogical system: king, father, sun, logos > [ethnocentrism of this concept: all other languages delayed logocentrism]

p. 292 no one, certainly not the father, is there when one questions [baby daddy]

EU p. 6 [re: 16th century France] Latin as language of law, of father/science/school > greatest resistance to (natural, maternal) living language came from juridical world

pp. 11-2 given back to mother (liberated) to be better subjected to father [re: decree of Villers-Coterêts: justice would henceforth be carried out in French (not Latin)]

SPEC p. 317 mastery of PP [grand (-père) spéculateur], mastery in general, Herrschaft distanced from PP only to reappropriate itself: tauto-teleology makes other return in domestic specter

p. 327 [re: Ernst’s fort/da] double sending away (renvoi): whether father required to stay or go, mother is desired: “exclusive possession” [Freud & Ernst distance themselves from name of father, for Freud it is the name of the son-in-law]

——mother (woman) easier to possess/preserve when dead [?]—jealousy appeased

FV p. 458 psychoanalysis [Freud, Bonaparte] justifies crushing monotony of monosemic truth under heading Wiederholungszwang [i.e. Freud declaring sun another sublimated symbol of father]

p. 473 in Phaedrus, logos is its own father, answers for itself [re: Lacan’s relation to Freud’s text]

FEAR

KH pp. 103-04 khōra as abyss, mise en abyme, gaping hole, not exactly chaos or fright, but not Gaia, foundation, either > abyss in encyclopedic logic [of Timaeus], regulates all sites (lieux) on its edges (jobs in society, region, territory, country)

GOD pp. 55-56 another secret, another seal (supplementary seal), comes to overlay (sceller) the unlivable experience, another concealment (cèlement) to the tremor > afraid of the fear, tremble in form of not knowing: a double secret

——tremble in fear of unpredictable, unforeseeable, the untouchability of the arrival (tremo, tromeō, tromos, tremendus), enigma of trembling and tears, what are they metaphors or figures for?

DS p. 253 “themes” run aground (échoue) at edge lesser & greater than theme, where “there is” a text is made a possibility, a readability w/out signified (fright’s reflex declares: unreadable)

SPOM p. 181 man, most unheimlich of all ghosts, if Christ (absolute specter) causes fear and pain, man causes even more—man makes himself fear (se fait peur), becomes fear he inspires > thus contradictions of all humanism

p. 207 critical problematization as apotropaic shielding, battle against ghosts, fears them as it fears itself

p. 218 Freud’s conjuring mechanism: even though “es spukt” strongest example of Unheimlichkeit, one can’t begin there because on se fait trop peur, heimliche-unheimliche becomes undecidable

POOF pp. 172-73 difference btwn talking to them [o my friends/enemies] & speaking of them [there are no friends/enemies]: world of difference, fort/da, record their absence after having called

the contretemps [appealing to other presupposes his presence, allows him to come, while distancing/retarding his arrival] dictates, as insane as it is inevitable, the teleiopoetic sentence > expectation of Messiah as unbearable terror: hatred of what is thus awaited?

p. 174 teleiopoesis carries w/in it an irresistible disavowal, fearing all the chance & threat of the perhaps?: the called converted to the repressed, friend into enemy

pp. 281-82 in face of our envy, the aggression whereby nous nous faisons un ennemi, make ourselves our own enemy: hides/reveals our vulnerability > true fear/respect [?]: “At least be my enemy!”

MPM p. 38 we think this (immeasurable grief & life of faithful friendship): sublimity of mourning w/out sublimation, w/out Freud’s triumph, w/out ‘paranoid fear’

PP p. 120 (137) fear of death [child in us] (la crainte de la mort) gives occult medicine, sorcery (les envoûtements), its hold (donne prise) > le pharmakeus mise sur cette crainte

OH pp. 5-6 hope, fear, trembling, when a name might mask the absence of a face [re: “subject” of Europe”]

FWT p. 81 Marx’s critique of ideology is a critique of the revenant > reproduces panic fear of spectrality, pursues, distances himself from, chases (away) the ghost

p. 179 “subject” instituted only out of “fear” of unconscious, interrupts energy; one ethical/political “system,” one “idea” of Good/Right > constructions produced to resist a threat

DIF DIF p. 22 differance not announced by capital letter, it subverts all kingdoms > everything w/in us that wants a kingdom (le royaume) (that wants to capitalize) fears differance

DPi p. 149 for Nietzsche, at all solemn festivals, there comes back (nachwirkt) a remainder of fear that presided over all acts of memory, promises, oaths, engagements

***RGE ***RGE p. 275 Aufhebung: produced entirely w/in system/work of signification, from one infinite determination to the next, each one conserved in the other, transitions produced by anxiety of infinity—included w/in circle of absolute knowledge, never suspends totality of discourse (work, meaning, law), never exceeds its closure > restricted economy, circulation of prohibitions: history as truth of prohibitions

DST DST p. 210 hantise (obsessive fear), the way in which philosophy is haunted, visited, inhabited by madness > there is a domesticity of “philosophical madness”

p. 316n obsessionality, re: writing, no longer clinical category

——Bataille: what forces me to write is the fear of going mad

EL p. 215 la folie sacrée, la sacrée folie (sacred madness, damned madness) of Scholem: he doesn’t believe it possible to sacrifice (kill) sacred language—but he fears/desires it: fright before the possibility of the impossible [sacré, sacrifice]

***LI pp. 157-58 rant against non-reading pedants, dogmatists, full of fear, right to confuse everything in authoritarian manner

TN p. 354n via Vasseleu [“Touch, Digital Technology and the Ticklish”], Mcluhan's assertion that touch is the sense of electronic age coincides w/ Freudian fear of touching

AD p. 122 Levinas: the fear à-Dieu instills is not a finality, it is fear à leschatologique, which interrupts within the human both ontology and being-towards-death; one must fear the neighbor

LG p. 237 there is only content w/out edge, w/out boundary, w/out frame, there is only edge w/out content: interminable inocclusive invagination (inenarrable, unarrestable, insatiable) > terrible for those who require order in the name of the law

BSi p. 3 Nietzsche’s supreme silence: a fearsome sovereign mistress

pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

pp. 39-40 for Hobbes, sovereignty causes fear & fear makes the sovereign

p. 41 acc. Hobbes, fear exceeds corporeal presence, thus it is the passion/origin of law, the origin of crime too [terror] > no contrary to fear [like Nietzsche’s, Freud’s cruelty]: coextensive w/ all political passion; fear is primarily fear for one’s own proper body, fear is passion of life

p. 210 [vis-à-vis Cixous] love of wolf—love of fear, wolf loves by consum(mat)ing > nothing stronger than love, save death

p. 214 [vis-à-vis Fontaine] the lion’s sovereignty: 1) his name, Sire 2) common right—like others 3) courage, right to take 4) fear he inspires

——sovereign is the only one to name himself: ipse, to himself, to his title, to his name, to his might > majestas (from magnus, major), highness, grandeur, dignity, Kant’s Würde

OG p. 184 (261) for Rousseau, proper of man is fear (anticipation) of death

p. 188 (266-67) unlike Hobbes, for Rousseau, fearfulness of other, weakness, causes ferocity/cruelty, can’t declare war > slumbering pity [pre-society] neither incites justness nor malice

pp. 277-78 (392-93) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] absolute fear as original encounter w/ other as other, 1st passion, la face derreur de la pitié

p. 278 (393-94) for Rousseau, fear induces magnification that makes man speak [cf. 351n Vico]; [repetition of instrumental fear: aidez-moi (Northern need)] anguish & repetition

CIR p. 218 fear that kills me in face of death, not fear of dying (how simple that would be), but fear of replacing one more dead one before being able to die myself [so dead don’t bury the dead]

p. 274 I’ve been scared, me, in the evening, of the fear I inspire, fear of deathly silence that resounds at my every word

SPEC p. 270 visitation of “thing in itself” as supplement of its “own supplement” > expands double-effects: duplicity w/out original; the diabolical, for Rousseau brings fright to a climax

p. 297 for Freud, not Angst, not Furcht (fear), only Schreck (terror) causes trauma

p. 363 index of original normality [at this point of Beyond…] is the “primitive,” not child: primitives don’t face death [?], anxiety about death has no proper content

——death is the analogon of castration > castration not incompatible w/ thesis of death drive if one refers to syntaxic articulation of athesis: Derrida’s pointing to “it” at this moment

CHOR p. 103 phallogocentrism, “patrix,” is insurance against return of that which is feared as most agonizing risk

FEMINISM

R p. 67 voyoute, extremely rare word, artificial, a bit tomboyish, free & master of her own like man, air of liberated feminist—but voyou is always a man if not a ladies’ man

SP p. 57 mustn’t we reconcile Nietzsche’s apparently feminist propositions w/ his overwhelming corpus of “venomous (acharné) anti-feminism” > question still remains: de ce que je fais ici en ce moment

pp. 63-5 for Nietzsche, since man alone believes in woman-truth, women feminists are men too, lay claim to truth > perd le style (gone the style)

AD pp. 44-5 is Levinas’ feminine an androcentric hyperbole or a feminist manifesto? can one decide?

——feminine not empirical for Levinas, thought of welcome opens ethics, it’s marked by sexual difference (it will thus never again be neutralized) [v. different take from ATM?], this hospitality that precedes property can’t be appropriated

CIN p. 49 Woolf: “incarnadine the willows…for we have done with this ‘education’!”

EU pp. 27-9 Descartes and feminism: intelligible order has no sexual marks [cogito is “desexed,” w/out body, sexually neutral or indifferent]

——which is feminist: learn Latin? or be talked down to in vulgar language?

p. 29 women guardians of vulgar language

WBH p. 190 guardians of institution are guardians of Law > as women’s studies gains institutional legitimacy, it produces guardians of the Law; U.S. is a pioneer of women’s studies

——U.S. more faithful to 19th century model of University than most European countries

pp. 190-91 insidiously reproduce the old model (fundamentally phallogocentric) in modern University > would women’s studies become another cell in university beehive [?]

——women’s studies has uplifted from repression all sorts of forbidden feminine signatures

p. 191 the more proofs women’s studies brings to masculine directors of university (masculine, whether man or woman), the more women’s studies is legitimized by power of university, more it risks repressing fundamental question that must be posed

p. 192 as members of a university, we are all guardians of Law, and also naive in front of text, in front of Law [like both characters in Kafka’s “Before the Law”]; p. 193 Law in Kafka’s story neither male nor female

——1) positive/optimistic deconstruction: not submit to law 2) pessimistic deconstruction (more conscious of law of Law): radically deconstruct old model of university, not to open a field w/out law but new relation to Law, rediscover the Law—yet, no longer bored [?]

——is it only a question of strategy, isn’t strategy the real risk?

p. 193 to say woman is not a “subject,” 2 consequences: 1) radically revolutionary or deconstructive 2) dangerously reactive

——to say women are subjects keeps whole framework on which traditional university is built

p. 194 classical ruse of neutralization/neuterization (of sexual marks): “I think” is neither man nor woman, but we can verify that it’s already man

pp. 194-95 to say woman is on side of undecidability has only meaning of strategical phase, the side of woman becomes the side from which you begin to dismantle structure > but, as soon as you reach first stage of deconstruction, opposition man/woman no longer pertinent

——“woman” no longer best trope to refer to these things, same goes for undecidability itself!

——there’re many undecidables, one undecidability acts as a program, programming or unprogramming a program

p. 196 resistance opposed to deconstruction same as one opposed to woman’s studies, “something sexual at stake in the resistance to deconstruction,” deconstruction successful in U.S. among homosexuals, feminists

p. 199 gift beyond sexual duality > Heidegger’s attempt to neutralize sexual opposition and not sexual difference, liberating field of sexuality for very different sexuality, more multiple: no more sexes, one sex for each time, each gift, a sexual difference for each gift

p. 202 deconstruction [re: women’s studies], occupies both places, thus it is conservative and not conservative

p. 203 “woman” as “truth,” as that which stops the drift, but what about truth as movement of the drift [?]

CIR pp. 142-43 my absolute knowledge: writing promised unto death, writing that must come to an end > any reader (addressee) becoming the uncircumcised [son] to be confessed—line thrown to girl-martyrs [wondering why they’re reading Derrida]

CHOR p. 89 [quoted from SP] that which will not be pinned down by truth, is, in truth, feminine, but this should not be mistaken for woman’s femininity, nor female sexuality, by dogmatic philosopher, impotent artist, or inexperienced seducer still hoping to capture

p. 91 once feminism movements reappropriate stifled past, feminism will perhaps have to renounce all too easy progressivism

——“dogmatics” of feminism as telos, sinister mystification, will flounder in same homogenized, sterilized river of history of mankind [w/ its age-old dream of reappropriation]

p. 92 specular reversal of masculine “subjectivity” (even in its most self-critical form, when most jealous of itself and its “proper” objects) represents only one phase of feminism?

p. 93 perhaps Emma Goldman, wanting only a revolution to dance in, was thinking of tout autre history, w/ paradoxical laws, non-dialectical discontinuities, absolutely heterogenous pockets, incalculable sexual differences [Derrida’s own dream?]

pp. 93-4 to say ironically, “there is no one place for woman,” is neither anti-feminist nor feminist, is faithful to affirmative displacement: “dancing” of women

p. 94 there is a “reactive” feminism that even gains power today—that’s what Nietzsche mocks, and not woman or women [?]

pp. 94-5 lack of place, madness of dance, can also serve as alibi for deserting organized, patient, laborious “feminist” struggle

p. 95 poker-like gamble w/ no insurance: “each man and each woman must commit his or her own singularity, the untranslatable factor of his or her life and death”

——worldwide feminism can’t be separated from fundamental Europeanization of world culture

***p. 96 some can’t see beyond end of phallic forms in SP (bisexual complication of style, spur, umbrella): those people do not read the syntax and punctuation of a given sentence, arresting the text in a position, settling on a thesis, meaning or truth

——“phallogocentrism,” complicity of Western metaphysics w/ notion of male firstness > mistakes/anchorings of Western rationality assuage hermeneutic anxiety

——“essentializing fetishes” (truth, femininity, essentiality of woman or feminine sexuality as fetishes)—but one must be precise about fetishism [i.e. general fetishism in Glas], and its context, if only to displace it

p. 97 how can one breathe w/out punctuation, w/out multiplicities of rhythm, steps, how can one dance?

p. 98 [cf. WBH p. 198] could femininity, however irreducible it may be, remain derived from or subordinated to question of destination or thought of gift?

pp. 98, 100 Derrida introduced 2 phases of deconstruction for sake of clarity: 1) woman reverses structure & becomes dominant 2) “new” concept is forged

p. 100 new “concept” of woman? was there ever an old one? [deconstruct concept of concept]

pp. 100-01 when sexual difference is determined by opposition, acc. Hegelian dialectics, destines sexual difference for truth—in order to erase/neutralize sexual difference [in masculine sex?]

p. 103 phallogocentrism, “patrix,” is insurance against return of that which is feared as most agonizing risk

p. 105 very obscure area, passage btwn ontological difference & sexual difference not punctuated by polarities (originary/derived, ontological/ontic…)

——“hymen,” “invagination,” part of Derrida’s attempt to re-sexualize philosophical/theoretical discourse, but these terms no longer simply designate figures of feminine body: what remains undecidable concerns [but not only] line of cleavage btwn 2 sexes

p. 106 hymen does not exist, anything constituting value of existence is foreign to “hymen,” so how could one then attribute existence of hymen properly to woman? (same goes for invagination)

pp. 106, 465n invagination is always taken w/in syntax of expression “double chiasmatic invagination of borders,” doubly folded, redoubled, inversed: can we still recognize “representation of woman” in this movement?

——questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

p. 107 no monological discourse, no mono-sexual discourse, necessity for a chorus, a choreographic text w/ polysexual signatures

pp. 107-08 certain dissymmetry is law of sexual difference & relation to other (Derrida says this in opposition to violence of “democratic” platitudes), dissymmetry as inordinate, excessive, goes beyond coded marks, beyond grammar & spelling of sexuality

p. 108 in dreaming of saving the chance [of deconstructing sexuality], Derrida would like to believe in multiplicity of sexually marked voices, desire for sexuality w/out # can protect us, like a dream, from an implacable destiny that immures us (everything in life) in #2

——if merciless closure [of the 2] would arrest desire at wall of opposition, there would never be but 2 > tragedy would leave this strange sense, a contingent one, that we must affirm & learn to love instead of dreaming of innumerable: but doesn’t dream prove what is dreamt of?

——desire to escape combinatory itself, to invent incalculable choreographies, would remaineven beyond exchange of sexes w/ considerably varied rhythms

FETISH

MONL p. 64 identify in order to combat: impulses, phantasms, “ideologies” “fetishizations,” and symbolics of appropriation

FK p. 83 machine-like & faith as one and the same possibility, machine-like & sacrosancity (heilig, holy, safe, unscathed, free, “swollen”) of the phallic effect: phallus as phainesthai, phenomenon (day of phallus) & also phantasm, fetish, specter, its double: colossal automaticity [phallic in bold 2x]

pp. 83-4 phallus, the marionette, virtuality of virtuality, distinct from penis: parade fetish, the healthy, the automatic sur-viving, faith in most living as dead

——matrix of unlimited, general fetishization of Thing itself > read the unscathed as spontaneity of erection or pregnancy

***p. 87 Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

LOBL pp. ~137-38 no paradigmatic text, only cryptic haunting from mark to mark, no piece, no metonymy, no integral corpus, thus no fetishism

——double invagination, through labor of translation, can be brought to bear on gaine in Glas [cf. GLAS p. 210 “against” Hegel, Marx, and Freud on subject of fetishism]

p. ~143 surplus-value and process of fetishization: the wearing away, the using, of what is out of use, “under-glass” quality of text in translation

p. 163 embalm, fetish

p. 165 hymen is an “immediately” that weds symbiosis to synthanatosis (in a triumph w/out identity) [is the hymen not a fetish? embalm? encrypt? the at once of disavowal? cf. GLAS p. 210]

***MC p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

——this large, stereotomic margin of play is perhaps largest of all (during certain history) but not infinite [?] [see also Christianity/Capitalism not infinite]

SPOM p. 51 theologizing fetishization of money linked to ideology to religion (to idol or fetish)

pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

***——that’s not all: specificity of process can still capitalize spectralization > the first ghost effect (autonomized spirit) can be incorporated, negated, integrated as one’s own human body

——for Marx, this turns one into absolute ghost, ghost of ghost > delirious, hallucinogenic moment of Stirner’s hubris

pp. 186-87 the secret (Geheimnis) of the fetishism of the commodity, the “germ” of the money-form, une table tournante, example of an apparition

p. 209 as soon as there’s production there’s fetishism (idealization, autonomization, dematerialization, spectral incorporation, mourning work thus work)

——for Marx, all this co-extensive w/ commodity production; in our view, this is his gesture of exorcism

pp. 210, 243-44n for Marx, there’s a phantomatic objectivity before commodity value [?] product of labor petrifies, erects, hardens (feminine character of commodity-chimera?)

MPM pp. 93-4 de Man’s texts on promise pervert tranquil assurance of what we call “performative” > too much of promise is irremediable disturbance/perversion, is also a trap, also renders promise possible (indestructible), and comical

***F p. xlii cryptonomic translation makes taboo word a rebus, functions as undecipherable fetish

***pp. xliii-xliv Ichspaltung rethought when it is not Fetish vs. Thing (in-itself) but Fetish-Thing as cipher to be translated interminably

WM p. 216 inscription on coinage, scene of exchange btwn economic and linguistic > the 2 types of signifier supplement each other in problematic of fetishism in Nietzsche & Marx

POS p. 105n paraphrasing Freud, speaking of present/absent penis (the same thing), we must recognize truth as “normal prototype of the fetish”

SP p. 55 the feminine, that which cannot be pinned down by truth > this should not be mistaken for woman’s femininity, female sexuality, nor an essentializing fetish [for those inexperienced brobags (philosophers, artists) who believe they can capture]

pp. 107-09 re: veil, to delimit, undo, come undone, would this not return again to unveiling? the destruction of the fetish? as much as it is a question, this question is interminable

SW p. 350 [BEAUTIFUL PASSAGE, as if they all aren’t] could a “theory of fetishism” ever measure up to infinite tenderness of “my own tallith” (as if such phrase preceded ipseity, “I”)? stranger to all maudlin, effusion, pathos—to all “Passion” > yet, compassion w/out limit: absolute delay of verdict that is/was/will make itself arrive w/out luminous vision (glory) > belongs to the night, my white tallith, absolute night

——tallith not incommensurable w/ fetish, but a generalized not restricted fetishism (Glas); theory of fetish no longer merely a theory at moment of verdict

REST p. 267 question of fetishism extended beyond its “political economy,” its “psychoanalysis,” even beyond simple, traditional opposition btwn fetish & thing itself

pp. 267-68 for Freud, the shoe always a “form” of prosthesis, but always as a penis (woman’s penis too)? but Ferenczi recognizes in it the vagina

——Derrida’s reading of Freud’s shoe fetish: shoe replaces that which is lacking not because of its form but because of its directional situation > syntax of a movement upwards

——Freud does not designate the fetish as a detachable whole: a relatively detachable part of an always divisible ensemble

——for Freud, certain symbols cannot be masculine & feminine at same time, but bisexual symbolization remains archaic, irrepressible tendency going back to child ignorant of sexual difference

p. 327 as in fetishism trial, everything is a business & economy of detail, of la détaille (de-tailing/unsizing), you can’t do w/out detail

pp. 332-33 Heidegger & Shapiro bound themselves together to law of normal usage, the pair, ligatured worrying dismemberment in order to limit it: pair inhibits “fetishizing” movement, represses diabolical (i.e. a double, duplicity, w/out a pair)—pair rivets (rive) things to “normal” use

p. 334 what looks like a process of fetishization in Heidegger (uselessness of product at work in work) is, to Heidegger, a strange process of alētheia

pp. 334-35 compare two shoes (not a pair) to gaine in Glas, sheath (garment) > bisexuality of the double in 2 shoes > displace sexual decidability, philosophico-psychoanlatyical opposition btwn fetish & thing (castration as truth of truth)

pp. 335-36 shoes sheath (gainent), to what profit, what sex? an undone stricture of laces, the girdle too, perhaps allows (donnerait) to be seen [Derrida quotes Balzac describing a naked, living, female foot protruding from a canvas—visitors médusés]

p. 345 what’s essential for Heidegger is making the overflowing appear by “earth,” “shoes,” “world” > il faudrait les ressaisir à linstant où le hors-dusage détaché (relativement déstricturé) donne lieu, a sort of abyssal surplus value, une surenchère sans fond > we can speak of conditions of fetishization of product/work, surplus value forms a truth-effect, useless gives way to speculative exploitation, more than useful (plus quutile): useful for grasping usefulness of useful [cf. pp. 339-41 double/triple uselessness (work, product, useless for grasping usefulness)]

——when the detached calls for reattachment: a discourse is sketched, maneuver to call for adherence

p. 380 annexing narcissism to fetishism, we’d never be finished, 4 forms of rendering: 1) render oneself in painting 2) render something to oneself, se payer 3) to go somewhere (se rendre quelque part) 4) given in to someone (se rendre à quelquun), surrender

TR p. 120 if theft is to be a sin, it must be done for the crime itself, not for use value (to eat) but for exchange, fetish value (certain uselessness)

EL pp. 209-10 the turn to everyday sacredness (secular Hebrew): miraculous manna but also profanatory jouissance > sorcerers: sinister masquerade, quasi Esperanto or Valapük, living dead in a shoddy resurrection used for commerce > evacuation & perversion of meaning

——the false cadaver will avenge itself its carnival disguises, its cadaverous instrumentality

p. 211 for Scholem, for language to avenge itself against secularization: 1) it must be someone, bear the name of someone, remain attached to its creator 2) no iterability at source: technology is secondary or evil, can only befall (survenir) it [this exteriorizing of contamination is similar to Christian idealism, a spiritual interiorization separated from body, time, letter, carnal signifier]

p. 212 iconoclasm & idolatry at same time (if that’s possible): turn infinite value into a commercial one (both use & exchange)

——w/in “logic” of fetishism, no one ones who’s doing the fetishizing: Scholem or those he accuses? (via Enlightenment tradition prepared by Spinoza, it would be Scholem)

HST p. 411 grave substitution (one worthy of name), life for another, or life for something (contaminate logic of who w/ what, ethics w/ arithmetic, arithméthique) > (fetishism is only a figure of this)

***+R p. 179 simulacra of fetishes (fetishism generalized) because classical logics of fetishism opposes fetishized bit (mors) to thing itself (God, original referent, transcendental phallus)

TN p. 101 origin of fetishism [?], desire to touch what touches Jesus’ body (garments), touching w/out touching > made safe, immune, by faith of what touch signifies (not by touch itself)

BSi p. 219 to think the marionette, difference btwn marionettes, not the living of life but a living w/out being—simulacrum of being, prosthesis, substitute for the being of the thing itself—fetish—life death at same time > marionette [Marion’s Dieu sans lÊtre]

OG pp. 339-40n [re: certain interpretation of Rousseau] Derrida wonders if the singularity of each substitution [for Rousseau’s mother] loses significance, each cleavage blurred, when a totalitarian psychoanalysis of existentialist or phenomenological nature claims diffuse, total, sexuality

p. 152 (219) dangerous supplement inconceivable to reason: no longer diverting total enjoyment toward a substitute, but experiencing it or miming it directly and in its totality [not kissing the bed to get close to Mamma, but conjuring the presence of Mamma]

p. 204 (291) for Rousseau, child can’t relate to separated signifier, child will spontaneously donner la change, doesn’t treat largent pour largent > no relation to sign for itself, no fetish

——perverse use of signifier permitted & tolerated by imitation

EU p. 124 Glas: generalized fetishism, pull of the discourse of castration toward affirmative dissemination [also continues pursuing project of grammatology, etc.]

SPEC p. 310 [Ernst’s fort/da] collective unity [of toys] is apparatus of game that can dislocate itself > word for things in this theory of set is Zeug, which is also penis: supplementary complex that can reassemble parents

FV pp. 440-42 circular itinerary [re: Lacan’s Poe], Dupin & analyst find letter where they expect it: Queen wants letter-fetish brought back to her, exchanges one fetish for another w/out spending—because there’s equivalence here (assurance of return): circle of restricted economy, stricture of the ring

——castration-truth is that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring): brings signifier, fetish, phallus, letter back into their oikos, familiar dwelling, proper place

——the lack never lacks a place: indivisible circulation of proper

——lack does not have its place in dissemination

p. 442 for Lacan, Femininity is the Truth (of) castration, best figure of castration, because in logic of signifier it (elle) has always already been castrated > Femininity “leaves” something in circulation (here the letter), detaches something she never had, brought back to itself

——this 1st castration (pre-castration) affects w/ castration/femininity whoever holds the letter

CHOR p. 96 “essentializing fetishes” (truth, femininity, essentiality of woman or feminine sexuality as fetishes)—but one must be precise about fetishism [i.e. general fetishism in Glas], and its context, if only to displace it

FICTION

KH pp. 117 structure of inclusion in Timaeus: included [2nd] fiction, the theme of the prior fiction, which is its [the 2nd fiction’s] including form, its [the 2nd fiction’s] receptacle > mythopoetic string of events [see p. 121 each fiction as content given form in receptacle of another]

GOD p.125n via Kierkegaard, true fiction of every scene of forgiveness

GT p. 86 “Counterfeit Money”: title of all fiction

HASD p. 23 to doubt divine promise, transgress the injunction [of hyperessential, negative theological God], would be to see an opening (closing in on itself) of literariness, lawless law of fiction

MPM p. 34 we come to ourselves through memory of possible mourning, knowledge older than ourselves, de Man might say: unreadability of mourning

——mimetic interiorization not just fictive, is origin of fiction, takes place in a body, makes place for body, soul, “ours” > death constitutes and makes manifests limits of me, us, obliged to harbor something greater than us w/in us

p. 87n inexistence of past & death not futility/illusion, their literal non-presence is also their fictive or figurative value

VP p. 47 for Husserl, imagination neutralizes memory, it is a non-“positing” representation, keeps w/in itself primary reference to an originary presentation; pure ideality to which neutralization provides access is not fictional, thus Husserl’s beef w/ Hume and his fascination w/ Hume

FSW p. 219 pure words and pure things: “theoretical fictions”; words can be treated as things because of spacing, materiality of mark

SH p. 51 virtually at the same date because the originary date, as coded mark, is already a kind of fiction, singularity spoken of in generalities and fable of conventions (iterable marks)

F p. xxvii just because there is a necessary fictionalization of “original event” does not make verification gratuitous, one cannot reorder the story, nor the internal necessity of translations

***FWT p. 130 common possibilities of literature & democracy: 1) historicity (literature has acts, birthplaces, legacies; democracy defines itself by promising itself, by and in its historicity, its future-to-come) 2) power, credit of fiction [Montaigne/Pascal understood connection btwn right & fiction]

p. 173 psychoanalytic aim > not to seek refuge in a theological/humanist alibi > Derrida seduced by psychoanalysis’ audacity of thought, its courage, signing theoretical “fictions” in name of a knowledge w/out alibi (thus, the most “positive” knowledge”)

——[re: psychoanalysis’ method, teaching?] debt of all theoretical (juridical, ethical & political) positing to a performative power structured by a fiction, by figural invention: “the convention that guarantees every performative inscribes within itself the credit that is conferred upon a fiction”

DS p. 211[summary of what Mallarmé achieves] reference w/out referent, fiction that’s not imaginary, lustre where “medium” is shining, mimicry w/out imitation, only traces, announcements, souvenirs, avant-coups et après-coups

p. 214 hymen: “a medium, pure medium, of fiction,” “btwn perpetration and remembrance, memory of a crime never committed > penetrate, perpetrate the hymen, fictively, “solitary captive of the threshold

p. 227 double session has no middle, divided in 2 through fiction of a crease (du faux pli)

p. 236 chain “fiction,” “hymen,” “spacious,” gets caught in, while disrupting, ontological machine (dislocating oppositions)

p. 268n (to be continued) in The Uncanny, Freud is most attentive to undecidable ambivalence, play of double, though he separates fictional uncanny from the feeling itself

***p. 271 Mallarmé: all method is a fiction” > point de méthode—still a marching order (marche à suivre) > la dissémination dans le repli de lhymen, pas de méthode pour elle > [no circle-path to first step]

P p. 81 only a practice of theoretical fiction can work (against) the frame, (make or let it) play (it) (against) itself

——fiction must guard against the label fiction > which would be a recuperation of a metaphysics of truth

ROP pp. 95-6 acc. Foucault, Doctor attains power through credit given to fiction, secrecy effect [Derrida shows how, in this case, Foucault places Evil Genius on the side of reason/order/father]

ATIA p. 131 for Lacan, move from animal to human (to speech, to truth, to symbolic order): abyssal concept of a feined feint or pretended pretense (not merely the figure or simple feint)

O p. 36 the 2 fictions: 1) when fiction is in service of meaning, truth is (truth of) fiction, it is low on a hierarchy, accessory to concept 2) fiction outside mimetologism affirms itself as simulacrum, disorganizes all oppositions to which teleology of book sought to violently subordinate it

p. 58 “la dissémination (se) produit (dans) cela : coupe de plaisir” > il rythme et le plaisir et la répétition selon une coupe multiple > il [text, literature, the beyond of the whole] imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

DPi pp. 152-53 fiction, invented performance: which in the end we don’t believe, we pretend to believe, we make believe > no one could ever believe that homicide (crime) = DP (punishment)

SW p. 354 philosophy of nature, for the child I still am, was naivety itself, but also time of infinite apprenticeship, culture made up acc. fiction, the autobiography of lure (Dichtung und Wahrheit), beginning to write a novel of sericulture

CHM p. 54 if madness is the absence of a work, any philosopher/speaking subject can only evoke madness in language of fiction or fiction of language

RGE pp. 257-58 Bataille: only way for negativity to reveal what we are is to see ourselves dead, this is comedy! must live w/ impression of truly dying, difficult because necessity of spectacle/representation, nothing less animal than fiction of death > emphasis on simulacrum disrupts Hegel

PIO pp. 24-5 Derrida links tekhnē/fabula and historia/epistemē > man defined by human subject’s aptitude for invention: 1) narrative fiction, historical fabulation 2) technical or technnoepistemic innovation

HLP p. 32 for Rousseau, worst lie is calumny; a lie that doesn’t hurt anyone (doesn’t profit), not a lie, merely a “fiction” [“4th Reverie”]

PJP pp. 166-67 Derrida considers anacoluthon the most productive figure, a general formalization, forever inscribed in fictional singularity—Miller’s “polylogology”: multiplicity of voices, more than 1 voice in 1 voice, trace of perjury gets lost, leads us astray > dispersion threatens identity

p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

D p. 294 Mallarmé: mime sets up pure medium of fiction, perpetual allusion (in a hymen)

LI p. 77 in what way does speech act theory, philosophy, derive from fiction?

p. 96 logic of parasitism not one of distinction or opposition, neither same as nor different from what it parasites: possibility of fiction cannot be derived

pp. 99-100 another parasitic/fictional structure can always be added, “supplément de code” > everything becomes possible against the language-police

——never be able to de-limit object-fiction/object-parasite except by another counter-fiction

p. 105 Sarl’s 2 feints (double meaning of to pretend): 1) infelicitous ruse 2) a successful fiction (a good show)

——always police & tribunal there when a rule is invoked [re: context, event, signature], because conventions can be violated (in themselves and by fictionality that constitutes them)

TN pp. 275-76 touch is quasi-transcendental-ontologization, quasi because touchable of touch gives itself over as untouchable (se donne comme intouchable)—figuring, fictionalizing itself

NOY pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

OG p. 252 (357) Rousseau knows all factual illustrations of primitive presence are fictive [?], could care less about the facts

p. 267 for Rousseau, birth of society not a passage but a pure, fictive, unstable point > post-originary degradation analogous to pre-originary repetition

UWC p. 228 fiction is what figures but also what makes

FV p. 426 when literary writing occupies illustrative position: text in service of truth, to read general law in example, the most classical practice > Lacan: truth makes fiction possible

pp. 426-27 even Freud [thus not Lacan] indicates, in Das Unheimliche, literary fiction’s resistance to general law of psychoanalytic knowledge

p. 431 inscriber/inscribing function not to be confused w/ author > Lacan excludes textual fiction, indicates a general narrative w/in neutralized or naturalized frame, thus overlooks the frame

p. 432 structure of fiction reduced when related to its condition of truth, poor formalism which guarantees semantic content, doesn’t account for 1) “scription-fiction” and “scription-fictor” 2) narrating narration & narrator > complicity btwn formalist withdrawal (repli) and hermeneutic semanticism (or psychoanalysis applied to literature) [neglect of the subject-author, which, in some situations, might constitute progress or a legitimate demand]

p. 467 in Lacan, abyss effects are seriously controlled; fiction [only] manifests truth

pp. 467-68 Lacan’s highly classical interpretation of mimesis: Dichtung as detour toward truth, more truth in fiction, fiction manifests the truth [i.e. for Lacan, truth is not a fiction]

FIGURE

KH pp.146-47n the opposition btwn proper & figurative, relevance of rhetorical code [use of metaphor for that which defies metaphor] meets a limit w/ khōra

p. 125 khōra so virginal it doesn’t even have the figure of a virgin anymore

GOD pp. 55-6 tremble in fear of unpredictable, unforeseeable, the untouchability of the arrival (tremo, tromeō, tromos, tremendus), enigma of trembling and tears, what are they metaphors or figures for?

R p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

GT pp. 6-7 figure of circle essential to economics, gift must remain aneconomic

pp. 9-10 relation of gift to “present,” essential knot in interlace of this discourse [GT], in knot of Geflecht of which Heidegger says the circle is perhaps only one figure/particular case

pp. 94-5 overrunning the frame, which fixes space & time given: identification of figures (even the figure of metonymy) supposes stable relations btwn part & whole

FK pp. 48-9 figures of radical evil not simply figures; the whole evil: always inventing a new evil

FL pp. 278-79 for Benjamin, iterability precludes great founders, initiators, lawmakers (or “great” poets for Heidegger), preserves law, thus police become figure of this iterability

——police, index of ghostly violence, exemplary figure, figures w/out limit, w/out face or figure, not simply in uniform, a formless (gestaltlos) violence, all-pervasive specter

LOBL p. 131 mother as figure w/out figure

AF p. 20 circumcision carries literal singularity into figurality

——a document of an archive, leaves trace of incision right on skin [superficial, like literature] lips of a wound, pellicular superimposition [invagination & circumcision?]

p. 38 scholar repeats the father’s circumcision [Yerushalmi calling Freud back to his father’s faith], even if only by figure

p. 48 maternity, as constructed as paternity [the usual thought is: mother real/ father figural], Freud makes a mistake in thinking only paternity is uncertain

SPOM p. 136 via Marx, more new erupts in revolutionary crisis, more “out of joint,” more one must convoke the old, inheritance borrows from “spirits of the past” > figurality as the figure of borrowing, borrowing speaks, question of credit, faith, fiduciary

p. 150 figure of ghost, hidden figure of all figures, no meta-rhetoric of the ghost

p. 177 figures of death: differance of technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins in language, before language

HERP p. 165 friend has no face, no figure, no sex, at a distance neither absolutely infinite, nor absolute proximity (null) of an ownness (propriété) [see p. 70]

p. 175 what is the topos of the friend? a figureless figurehead?

HASD p. 23 in topolitology of secret, figures or places of rhetoric are also political stratagems, “shields” against the many

——“sacred allegories [iera synthemata],” would be conventional rhetoric if not for divine light of God, would be “cheap simulacrums of the figureless”

p. 27 figurative spatialization of current sense of speech and writing > in space btwn current sense and the other, the current sense is only a figure

——figuration and places (lieux-dits) of rhetoric, topos, constitute concern of apophatic procedures

p. 50 seal: figures the figuration of the unfigurable itself, seal as imprint displaces typography of khora > khora—makes copies of paradigm; seal—valid for entire text of creation

——text of creation exists as typographic inscription of nonparticipation in participation

MPM p. 26 de Man’s epitaph, the prosopopoeia he addresses to us from an incineration all the more sublime for having no tomb [cremated?]—emblazoned spirit: figure of effacement, the effacement of visible figure in prosopopoeia

——the sovereign, secret, ideal signature—the most giving: the one that knows how to efface itself

p. 27 de Man: prosopon poiein, to confer a mask or face, “prosopopoeia is the trope of autobiography…by which one’s name…is made memorable as a face” > (dis)figuration

p. 34 Freud’s “normal” “work of mourning”: interiorizing idealization—devouring the other—mimetic interiorization is not fictive, it’s the origin of fiction, of apocryphal figuration

pp. 38-9 all figures receive possibility from these paradoxical structures: 1) inclusion in set of a part greater than set 2) that which regulates our relation w/ other as other [not mourning in current sense], that the other is capable of dying (which is our “own” mortality too) conditions rhetoric of faithful memory, serves to seal an alliance & call us to an affirmation of the other

——[Derrida identifies various contexts, figures, in which to describe the limits imposed on figures: Errinerung, then Psyche, now Mnemosyne—one day Paul de Man]

p. 58 for de Man, memory of traces of a past never present, which always remain to come—from the future, this promise of resurrection of anterior past, is a formal element, place where fictions & figures are elaborated

pp. 58-9 if a past does not exist, no more does death—only mourning, figures of death, we inscribe in every trace (otherwise called “survivals”)—because they outlast us, trying their luck, in advance, “in memory of” [see p. 87n inexistence of past/death not futility/illusion]

p. 61 time, memory: nothing other than figure of the marks that efface anteriority of past, “memory of the present” marks itself > only memory can recognize differential “stamp,” mark, signature, that relates a present to presence itself

p. 64 ghosts always pass quickly, infinite speed, presence w/out present that in coming back only haunts > the ghost, le re-venant, the survivor, figure or fiction, presence w/out presence, instant w/out duration, not nothing

——recognize in figure of phantom the working of what Kant & Heidegger assign to transcendental imagination, “fantastic” temporalizing schemes and powers of synthesis > Kant: an art hidden in depths of soul

pp. 79-80 why there must be multiple figures

p. 80 all figures are ghostly figures, speak like phantoms and phantomize the text > never define trace or phantom w/out ironically/allegorically appealing from one to the other

p. 87n inexistence of past & death not futility/illusion, their literal non-presence is also their fictive or figurative value

p. 85 “even if this memory of prefiguration were possible, we know that it would offer no ‘anteriority’ that was not fictive or figural; it could only 'suppress' or ‘forget’ it”

p. 100 de Man: promise is “metafigural”, an allegory of a figure “which relapses into the figure it deconstructs”

p. 105 Montaigne: “good memory is scriptural, it retains its figure” vs. writing, hypomnesia, marks engraved w/in memory as on paper

p. 132 about de Man, Derrida says, “figures of rationality are profiled and outlined in the madness of the aporetic”

138-39 the undecidable that resists non-dialectizable oppositions will bear name, maintain rhetorical relation w/ opposition, will have figure of opposition, be figurable, will always let itself by parasited by figure of opposition [thus staging of promise as act or position]

A p. 20 paradox of aporia: multiple figures of aporia do not oppose figures to each other, “instead installs the haunting of the one in the other”

p. 35 border of absolute arrivant keeps one from discriminating btwn figures of arrivant > the dead, the revenant (the ghost, he or she that returns)

p. 58 if death figures a line of thought, it’s because it takes figure, has a privileged form, crosses the line [re: Heiddegger’s attempt to think death beyond all figure]

pp. 60-1 Heidegger not interested in revenant or mourning—just death itself, not its figures or experiences of demise (Ableben)

VM pp. 108-09 God’s face commands while hiding, more and less a face than all faces, face neither face of God nor figure of man but their resemblance, a resemblance thought w/out the Same

PP p. 81 figure of the father is the figure of the good, capital, chief, good(s)

***pp.142-43 (164-65) in the pharmaceutical enclosure, an artful living organization of figures, it is all about father/son, legitimacy of inheritance, sperm, no mother; as a living thing logos always issues from father, writing is weakened speech, ghost, living-dead, simulacrum (eidōlon), errant, pervert, outlaw, bad seed, adventurer, bum, doesn’t know identity, his name, father’s name

PAS PAS p. (60) the figure of the other, sans figure

p. (69) Blanchot’s figures, room, sea, staircase, etc. are going to be effaced, figures san figure; not places in space, but they have a certain horizontality (thus the attribution of spatial horizon)

p. (71) Blanchot: the figure’s disappearance, most human truth, truth closest to “me”

p. (82) drowning (noyade) is not a simple figure to be dragged into abyss of this other word (parole)

POOF p. 36 philosophers of the future will be at once its [the fundamentally other] figure & responsibility

pp. 238-40 via Michelet, fraternity always caught up in vertiginous process (mechanics) of hyperbolization: from the strict literal (‘natural’ fraternity) to the figurative literal (universal, infinite fraternity) > thus, [strictly] woman ‘does not yet know how to read’ fraternity, she is not included in the idiom, the singularity; but, [literally] she is like [the promise of] absolute fraternity, ‘more just than just,’ law beyond law

SH p. 61 figure of absolute future: monstrosity—Elijah, guest, other [re: word to be circumcised opened like a door to “who” would come]

F p. xxii Wolf Man tries to kill all dead figures w/in him, thus they are still alive

FWT p. 52 the coming of the one who or which comes doesn’t yet have a recognizable figure

***pp. 120-21 logic of exemplarity leads to an abyss (figurality undermines the entire question) [re: those w/ self-hatred resembling Jews]

p. 151 symbolic, spiritual [equivalence, re: justice]: figure of the unfigurable

WM p. 210 metaphor of (the) usure (of metaphor): the ruining of figure; usure as erasure, rubbing out, and usure as increasing return in the form of revenue, surplus value, supplementary capital

——metaphysics, supposedly, the history of the erasure of the sensory figure

p. 211 acc. Polyphilos, philosophy puts transparent figure (not exactly a metaphor) of primitive meaning, of original (always sensuous and material), into circulation: metaphor is no longer noticed, and taken for proper meaning (first meaning, first displacement, are forgotten)

***p. 216 to signify metaphorical process, coins have often been used, analogy w/in language described by analogy btwn language and something other than itself > but that which seems to figure [i.e. coins] cannot be contained w/in regional science, linguistics philology: opens a discourse on figuration itself

***p. 221-22n classical conception of metaphor concerns itself with economy of moving from one figure to another, not w/ very production of figure

p. 243 for Aristotle, proper name is nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, father of all figures > everything turns around it, towards it > metaphor as substitution of proper names w/ fixed meaning & referent

DS p. 261 hymen, one of those “beneficent figures” engendered by “the opposition btwn the closed and the open”: i.e. the fan, the book, the dancer

P p. 61 parergon stands out (se détache), not like work, which also stands out > parergon stands out against 2 grounds (fonds) [work, background], as that which merges (se fond), effaces itself; frame’s thickness as margin not figure—or figure that comes away of its own accord (senlève delle même)

***ROP p. 34 Lacan uses trinitarian figures to give firm consistency to a resistance supérieurement organisée > letter always arrives; here proceeds division btwn 3 & 4, btwn resistance bound up in repression & disseminal remaining, no longer belonging to economy of repression

p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

SP p. 41 what impresses mark of stylate spur in question of woman? this doesn’t concern la figure de la femme: question of figure open and closed by “woman” > concerns instead her abduction (senlever)

OTO p. 38 mother is the faceless figure of a figurant, an extra, gives rise to all figures by becoming anonymous, everything addresses/destines itself to her, she survives, as long she’s at bottom

ATIA p. 29 transgressal experience of limitrophy, trephō, trophē, trophos: to feed limit, train, nurse, make grow, thicken, fold, divide the line, multiply/increase limit’s figures [not efface the limit]

p. 78 radical evil and double figure of animal: innocent or demonic, apocalyptic

p. 131 for Lacan, move from animal to human (to speech, to truth, to symbolic order): abyssal concept of a feined feint or pretended pretense (not merely the figure or simple feint)

p. 132 Nietzsche & Kafka realized better than anyone: Mother, Law, God, Animal > indissociable figures of the same Thing

DPi p. 283 DP will survive (other figures will be invented for it) > still must militate against it

REST pp. 263-64 [re: les question de la démarche embarrassée (boîteuse ou louche?)] i.e. “Who is walking?” “On whose feet?” > idiomatic figures of questions seem necessary; “necessary: it’s an attribute,” still vague > better to say question-idioms the form of which is very fitting, clinging (collant) (tightly/flexibly) to figure or body of what you here wish to turn into an object (feet)

p. 284 acc. Heidegger, oppositional pairs as Überfall, injure the thing in the thing: hypokeimonon (underneath) or hypostasis/symbebekota (on top) [which becomes in Latin: subjectum (substantia)/accidens], aisthēton/noēton (sensible/intelligible), hylē/eidos-morphē (matter/form-figure)

p. 321 ask question of frame by way of figure/trajectory of lace: a stricture by alternate and reversible passage from inside to outside, under and over

pp. 336-37 [re: Heidegger’s stance that a picture is useless to apprehend the useful] this reason doubles up (se dédouble): un mouvement dentrelacement du lacet: 1) the interlacing of lace w/ itself 2) incompletely laced (entre-lacé), entrouvert (half-open) 3) figurer of lace interlaced with what is figured

——Heidegger’s argument hangs (tient) on 2 reasons that double each other, remarkable mode of interlacing: one reason marked in the other or in itself

DST DST p. 198 “singularity” not novelty, which is too bound up w/ periodization, or, in the best cases, w/ Heideggerian epochal structures

——Derrida’s reservation re: history of Being & its epochs, also re: “configuration”: presupposes too much consistency, too much identifiable collectedness in the figure

p. 315n Lacoue-Labarthe: subject in mirror is first of all subject in désistance, figure is never one, destabilizing division of figural (this muddles Lacan’s distinction btwn symbolic/imaginary)

p. 204 fidelity to the terrifying form, the ineluctable, that which lends itself to all figures and schemas; could there be fidelity w/out the faith called for in this dissymmetry?

p. 223 rhythm: spaced repetition of a percussion, inscriptive force (insensible) of a spacing > doesn’t belong to visible/audible figuration—still structures them (rhythmotypical, typorhythmic)

p. 224 Lacoue-Labarthe: [subject] ‘desists’ because must confront at least 2 figures (or one figure that is at least double) > destabilizing Lacan’s imaginary/symbolic

p. 226 via Lacoue-Labarthe, Lacan’s theoreticism, which is inscribed in the ontology of the figure, Lacan’s recasting of Freud to the gaze, the specular > an ontomimetological interpretation of mimesis

p. 227 Lacoue-Labarthe: figural is never one, it is the Other, and there is no unity or stability of the figural, imago has no fixity, no proper being

PIO p. 46 tout autre not any figures of ontotheological configuration (subject, consciousness, unconscious, self, man or woman)

TR p. 73 machine/event resembles a monster: there is no resemblance to a monster, so new figure of event-machine is no longer a figure [exemplary like woman]

p. 124 one always dealing w/ series of deconstructions: deconstruction of deconstruction of figures

p. 155 de Man: deconstruction of figural dimension threatens autobiographical subject

p. 156 de Man: text as body (always retraceable to metaphor) displaced [deconstructed] by text as machine, in this process suffers loss of illusion of meaning [dis-figuration, de-metaphorization]

IW p. 265 history’s harshest reality, its most murderous aspects—displacements of figures?

PSSS p. 267 Freud: “paternal nucleus” hidden behind every divine figure

p. 276 numerous figures of the impossible: hospitality, forgiveness, gift—above all [?] the “perhaps,” the “what if,” the unpredictability of event

p. 280 cruelty there will have been, cruelty before any personal figure, before “cruelty” is an attribute—no one’s fault

TN p. 16 can one figure an untouchable extension? difficult except for intelligible extension w/out body (Descartes, Kant) or insensible sensible (Hegel, Marx)

p. 30 Nancy’s 4 figures: 1) form of extension 2) fashioned 3) as trope 4) as visage (face)

p. 52 being unimaginable gives rise to phantasms, allegories, figures, metonymies: technics > no overcoming (surmonté) this mourning w/out mourning [of autobiography] by any “work of mourning”

p. 103 for Nancy, touching the limit > moment of decision

——philosophy, literally, has never touched anything > inversely, all one ever does is touch a limit (destiny of this figurality) [hymen]; to touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a border, an outline

pp. 103-04 touch untouchable-touchable surface/border/limit on exposing edge of an abyss

——philosophy will have “touched” something 2x: limit & unfoundable abyss beneath/beyond it

——there can only be a figure of touch, one only touches by way of figure > the object, the touchable thing, the "thing itself,” is the untouchable (gives itself, opens only in history of figure) p. 105 untouchable, the excess of inaccessible beyond, the origin of figural fiction: le toucher

p. 107 Derrida jokingly scolds himself for scolding Nancy: stop using this incredible vocabulary > abstain from ‘touching,’ ce concept sans répondant assuré: figures w/out figure, therefore w/out credit

p. 109 would figure of limit have to be tangible? isn’t the tangible the very contamination of the proper, of contamination itself, of contact/contagion/impurification?

p. 154 for de Biran, the hand is irreplaceable/dominant (teleological) and it’s pregnant w/ every kind of metonymy (pedagogical): best ontoteleological figure, best rhetorical figure

——“transcendentalism” always guided by such surreptitious exemplarism

p. 159 the 3 values of exemplarism [re: hand/touch]: 1) léchantillon quelconque (random sample), indifferent 2) teleological value—best example 3) et surtout, un simulacre déchantillon dont le symptôme trahirait une autre téléologie cachée: symptom of a metonymy, because touch always has been figural, some figural substitute courant sans fin to its “proper” abyss

p. 249 start from fire to think the touching of self-touching > not only fire but flames, since light means what is more than a figure: haptical light of self-consuming flames eludes worship, burns effigies spontaneously, “more than a figure,” the transfiguration of figurality

p. 260 God’s hand not a figuration, the hand in the proper sense, the hand of salvation, le main de là-dieu (the God-ward goodbye hand)

pp. 260-61 how to go from unfigurable to figurable (God to man’s hand) > question of passage, figural transfer—but one answer: passage, like Incarnation, Passion, Transubstantiation, mediation btwn infinite immediate & finite medium, btwn infinite & singular finite—is logos fashioned into flesh, the Son, the Hand of the Merciful Father [heterotautology]

pp. 275-76 touch is quasi-transcendental-ontologization, quasi because touchable of touch gives itself over as untouchable (se donne comme intouchable)—figuring, fictionalizing itself

p. 299 logic of limit [hymen?]: what lets itself be touched does so on its edge (sur son bord), thus it doesn’t let itself be touched/reached (ne se laisse pas atteindre)—exposing untouchable itself, the other edge of the edge (lautre bord du bord)

——one would also have to integrate the rhetoric, plus quune rhétorique quand elle franchit à chaque figure the limits btwn sensible/intelligible—finding itself on both sides of the limit

pp. 306-07 eyes meet, infinitely, mouths in contact [unsatisfied w/ insipid figures, however interesting/necessary], thought begins, jusquà labîme, plunging Narcissus into abyss: makes day or night possible > day and night themselves promising each other, au point du jour

WOG p. 24 the ‘thoughts of difference’ Derrida shares in common w/ Deleuze & Foucault concern that which resists, like difference, analogy of a certain community/contemporaneity: figure or face of the mask, simulacrum or lure (leurre)—or whatever cannot be configured

p. 26 the tout autre of the Greek, the figure of a tout autre unfigurable by him

LG p. 231 genre-clause (clause de genre): clin doeil, écluse (floodgate), clôture qui sexclut de ce quelle inclut, déclasse ce quelle permet de classer > unfigurable figure of clusion, forme sans forme, neither sees day nor brings itself to light

p. 235 edge (bord), borderline (ligne de bordure), overflowing (débordement) do not arise w/out a fold—which figure of folding? [the answer: double chiasmatic invagination]

CIN p. 53 cinder obviously a figure, but because word “cinder,” via the name, is supposed to name the thing (not the word), it names one thing in place of another, metonymy when cinder is separated, names one thing while figuring another from which il ne rest rien de figurable en elle

BSi pp. 25-6 sovereign depicted as artificial monstrosity of the animal [i.e. Leviathan] > figuration: always beginning of a fabulation or affabulation

p. 312 threshold as solid, indivisible, threshold as arkhē: commencement and commandment > archon, figure of sovereign himself

p. 349 Aristotle already described structure of biopolitics, just hadn’t seen, couldn’t have seen, all its figures

OG pp. 33-4 (51-2) moralism, preaching, in Saussure/Plato—casting writing, figuration, to the exterior > maléfique, sin (péché) (traitorous contamination)

p. 89 proper name becomes appellation (symbolic value [?]) only when inscribed w/in figuration > proper-ness of name does not escape spacing

p. 107 (156-57) Rousseau: figurative language initiates and proper meaning is discovered last > eschatology of proper (self-presence, self-proximity, own-ness)

p. 201-02 all Rousseau’s figures of evil occur in move from Greece to Rome (articulation over accentuation, no small city, consonant over vowel, northern over southern, capital over province)

p. 271 for Rousseau, language’s mother is passion, originarily metaphorical, thus need [contra passion] (light, clarity) operates after origin, pro-regresses by mastering, effacing the figure

IF p. 304 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] Spinoza exposed illusion of figures in politics & religion

UWC p. 228 fiction is what figures but also what makes

SPEC p. 333 fort:da: leads autobiographical specularity into an autothanatography that’s in advance expropriated into heterography

——usteron proteron, “preceding falsehood” of generations, when figure w/out figure, name w/out name, of the mother returns: this is the logic of obsequence (Glas) > la mère enterre tous les siens

CHOR p. 105 “hymen,” “invagination,” part of Derrida’s attempt to re-sexualize philosophical/theoretical discourse, but these terms no longer simply designate figures of feminine body: what remains undecidable concerns [but not only] line of cleavage btwn 2 sexes

p. 106 hymen does not exist, anything constituting value of existence is foreign to “hymen,” so how could one then attribute existence of hymen properly to woman? (same goes for invagination)

pp. 106, 465n invagination is always taken w/in syntax of expression “double chiasmatic invagination of borders,” doubly folded, redoubled, inversed: can we still recognize “representation of woman” in this movement?

FINAL SOLUTION (Heidegger, Nazis)

FL p. 294 Nazism either included “final solution” or this was an event w/in Nazism

p. 298 Benjamin’s divine, bloodless violence cannot avoid making us shudder w/ its eery affinity to the final solution (resembles too closely to point of specular fascination) > Benjamin still too Heideggerian, too messianico-Marxist or archeo-eschatological [for Derrida]

HERP p. 189 Heidegger called his belated confiding about his indulgence in Nazism: eine grosse Dummheit

p. 198 avoid good conscience of ridicule when thinking about Nazi potential of Heidegger’s thoughts > no discourse can dissociate the scientific, the military, and labor

p. 204 difference btwn Schmitt & Heidegger: polemos is everything for both but it’s not a “human war” for Heidegger [see also pp. 211-12 can Heideggerian hearing of Kampf be distinguished from [Nazi] regime? if strategy re: decision is not formalizable—is this still not a war economy?]

p. 211 Heidegger’s 3 creative “Gewalten” of historial destiny: poet, thinker, statesman > their work as Schaffen carries seal or signature of originary polemos/Kampf

——to say “Mein Kampf” would be ridiculous presumption to Heidegger [?] or does it appeal to an originary polemos?

POOF pp. 117, 134n Schmitt claims to be writing a purely theoretical diagnostics of the political, uses “diagnostics” as alibi in Nuremberg

VM p. 145 [Derrida will not let Levinas reduce Heidegger’s interminable wandering to a new paganism of the site, it is not an empirical “nationalism”]

S pp. 31-2 spirit’s affirmation, no quotations, spirit inflamed (and yes, I say this, because of the specters flame illuminates of terrifying moment) > Geist is flame, not pneuma or spiritus

p. 32 die Selbstbehauptung (self-affirmation) could not be what it is w/out spirit, and there is even a logic of spiritual guidance in Heidegger’s “terrifying” Rectorship Address [see pp. 34, 36-37]

p. 37 [re: Heidegger’s Rectorship Address] le profond et laltier (haughty) allied in most high: highest of what guides the spiritual guides of die hohe Schule and depths of forces of earth and blood

p. 39 perhaps Heidegger infused Nazism w/ spirit to absolve it? to save it?

p. 40 Heidegger’s Rectorship Address is diabolical because it capitalizes on the worst, both evils at once: sanctions nazism and a metaphysical gesture [spirit w/out quotations]

pp. 43-4 what seems in service of determinate politics [nazism] in Rectorship Address, w/ spirit awakening from Vor-fragen of Führung, could be a following of the will-to-know?

p. 121n Heidegger’s mediocre and hideous crossing-out of Husserl (erasing dedication of Sein und Zeit)

pp. 109-10 Nazism was not born in a desert but in a black European forest, world of spirit, culture (religions, philosophies, economic structures, religious/academic institutions)

SH p. 12 several singular events concentrated in same date, this concentration (Konzentration) a terrible word for memory, but also the gathering of soul, Kafka’s attention of prayer

p. 50 there is a holocaust (all-consuming) for every date: “every hour counts its holocaust”

p. 67 Jewish language, poetic language, this essence promises itself only in dis-identification (in the expropriation of the nothing, non-essence—[ashes?])

——how can German language receiver circumcision of poem’s date following the holocaust, the solution, the ash of all? how can you bless these ashes in German? [re: Celan]

FWT pp. 82-3 communism was perverted, Nazism was plan itself as perversion, accomplished

POS p. 55-6 Derrida mocks the doctors of scientific genealogy or ideological filiation re: Heidegger’s thought [Faye for one] > what’s lacking in the “problematic of the narrative” is reflection on what makes the theses unnarratable

OTO p. 7 Nietzsche’s name has poisoned milk in it, its legacy, mixed up in advance w/ worst of our times, and not by accident

pp. 23-4 Derrida not going to say Nazis falsified Nietzsche’s words: they were the only ones to institute his teachings on teaching

pp. 28-9 Derrida on complexity of Nietzsche’s desire for Führer and the one that Germany got

pp. 29-30 how can reactive degeneration [Nazism] exploit same utterances, rallying cries, of active forces [Übermensch]—nor did this specular ruse elude Nietzsche: is there a “programming machine”? marrying the 2 forces (family resemblances) in a set, as life (does) death? but no regional power could set limit on such a set > no ordinary “machine,” there’s “life” in it > plays w/ opposition life/death > is there a practical rewriting of the program, which would no longer be part of it? if so, would not be produced in books

pp. 30-1 [re: fact that Nazis could ape Nietzsche’s text] if you refuse conscious, deliberate textual intentions, the perversion is made possible by structure of text itself (its “remaining”), otherwise it would be unreadable > nothing absolutely contingent about fact that Nazis effectively brandished his name [Derrida wary of close reading that would preserve Nietzsche’s intention]

ATIA p. 26 animal genocide, farming Jews eternally [AX]

Gii p. 28 speak of Heidegger, speak of monstrosity

p. 32 Heidegger condemns biological-racial ideology of Nazi party

pp. 32, 39 Heidegger’s question of technology presented as protest, barely disguised condemnation of professionalization of University studies during Nazi regime

REST pp. 272-73 pathos of “call of the earth” of Feldweg, Holzwege, in ‘35-6, the peasant-proxy of Heidegger, not foreign to what made Goldstein march to New York

pp. 292-93 Derrida goes off, rather fancifully, on Heidegger’s “projection” of the peasant woman, calls the decision many names (i.e. ridiculous), then quasi-admits his story could be a projection

——Heidegger missed the detachability of the step, the possibility of the digressive

pp. 311-12 the whole “peasant” thing is accessory [re: peasant shoes]? even if part of Heidegger’s pathetic-fantasmatic-ideological-political investments

p. 368 peasant & artisanal “ideology” in painting, concern for truth in painting

——Heidegger’s “projection” there in the choice of model [Van Gogh’s painting] rather than in its analysis [i.e. Van Gogh shared this ideology, and did paint peasants]

HLP p. 60 Mein Kampf refers to “the colossal lie”

——Derrida affirms vigilance we need against Hitler’s rejection of objective truth (valid for everyone), his privileging of myth over science [overvaluation of performative, the constative maligned]; but, this vigilance could also suspect “activist,” “pragmatist” interpretations of truth, any possibility of institutive/performative speech

p. 63 Hitler used “old Machiavellian technique”: tell truth knowing the uninitiated will not take him seriously, “conspiracy in broad daylight,” “society w/ a secret”

EW pp. 286-87 Derrida, not excusing silence on Auschwitz, takes to task the sententious discourse of those who grandstand, accuse, and teach lessons w/ it—primarily to give oneself a good conscience

CF p. 37 Jankélévitch: forgiveness died in death camps

BSi p. 171 Heidegger [re: commitment to Nazism in 1933-34]: “I did a Dummheit

p. 226 [vis-à-vis Celan] January 20th [date Hitler drew up plans for ‘final solution’]—anniversary of death > sovereign decision to commit genocide

p. 271 Celan: are we not all descended from such dates [January 20th]?

p. 321 Heidegger’s talk against biologism, critique of something in Nazism

CIR pp. 312-13 imbecile asks Derrida what he did to help save Jews [didn’t know Derrida was Jewish?] > maybe he was right, perhaps you didn’t do enough to save Jews, always think the other is right, at the beginning or end of the book

FINITUDE

GOD pp. 56-7 trembling in mysterium tremendum? gift of infinite love, dissymmetry btwn gaze of God, and me not seeing what looks at me (gift and endurance of death in irreplaceable) > disproportion btwn infinite gift & my finitude > responsibility: salvation, sin, culpability, sacrifice

p. 101 commerce is reciprocal and finite exchange of wages, merchandise, reward; Christ’s economy of sacrifice as dissymmetry, but still payment, wages, merces

GT pp. 153-54 as long as money counts, produces effects, as long as it assures finite possibilities of decision & judgment, it is simply not different from money it counterfeits > a more powerful but not infinitely powerful [?] inscription of effects of reference on truth, convention, dispositifs

——opposition of conventional to natural is discredited, or, more rigorously, it is limited in its indispensable credit, in the speculation it will always have to authorize

R p. 17 by killing father Cronos (infinite order of time), Zeus wills out over time, touches the finitude of time, sovereignty as the instant of a decision, end to time and language

FK pp. 51, 100 autoimmunity of Christianity w/ capitalism unassignable end, but finite, exhausting itself

H p. 55 host must elect, choose, filter, must have power, no hospitality w/out finitude: Gewalt, force of law

***MC p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

——this large, stereotomic margin of play is perhaps largest of all (during certain history) but not infinite [?] [see also Christianity/Capitalism not infinite]

FL p. 278 what else can one love but ruins? one loves a monument in the ghost or silhouette of its ruins? its finitude

AF pp. 19-20 no archive drive w/out radical finitude, possibility of forgetfulness, death drive’s threat is infinite, radical evil & political-ethical questions

p. 94 archive made possible by destruction drive as originary finitude and expropriation, also no archive fever or desire w/out in-finite movement of radical destruction

OOG pp. 57-8 sedimentary retention [as habitus, occurs because living consciousness is finite] is general form of protention conceived as unique, universal form of Living Present

p. 127 spirit’s radical freedom: theoretical attitude (which the philosopher inaugurates), opens horizon of knowledge as a pre-having beyond finitude

SPOM p. 18 we are inheritors of plus dune parole and an injunction (singular) that is disjointed

——injunction of inheritance “choose and decide from what you inherit,” this choice, like memory, the condition of finitude

p. 207 jurer ou conjurer: the chance of thinking and its limit? the gift of its finitude? [nous gageons ici que la pensée ne vient jamais à bout de la pulsion conjuratoire]

HASD p. 29 trace as possibility of finitude, finite & infinite cause of trace appears secondary, an effect of trace or differance (which is finite insofar as it is infinite)

MPM p. 29 this finitude (finitude of friendship) does not take the form of a limit, but takes the form of the trace of the other in us, the other’s irreducible presence

——finitude of memory, formed by trace of other in us > approach or remembrance of future (memory of mourning, mourning of memory)

p. 33 possibility of death of the other in-forms any relation to other & finitude of memory

pp. 56-7 finitude of memory ≠ finite limitation or external limit

***p. 135 undecidable is the condition of deconstruction (on and in [sur, dans?] this condition); in the sense of condition of possibility and, at the same time, condition as situation or destiny

——this limit, this finitude, makes one write; deconstruction makes a path of writing through the aporia (impossible); deconstruction thinks only on the level of the impossible

POOF p. 80 Nietzsche’s overturning, [via dangerous perhaps], brought off in ‘field’ w/out limit, w/out assured, reassuring, ground—all the more finite for this very fact: a world that no longer holds together, one that resembles chaotic madness, disorder, randomness

p. 286 Nietzsche’s gift must also belong to a finite world > how to think dissymmetry of gift w/out exchange, infinite disproportion, from vantage point of terrestrial finitude? under its horizon w/out horizon [see p. 263] > infinitization itself is suspected of being an economic ruse, perverse seduction, stratagem, of loving one’s neighbor

pp. 286-87 Nietzsche’s friend of most distant belongs to finite earth (not world of Christian hinterworld) > friend’s finitude infinitizes the gift he gives [infinite differance is finite] : a friend who doesn’t give you the world (a finite one), gives you nothing [this is neither Greek nor Christian]

A pp. 1-2 as soon as truth is confined (determined to be finished) a border crossing does not seem impossible; there’s something else than truth, something better, truth is finite, cest fini

p. 55 for Heidegger, belief in immortality is secondary to being-toward-death, an affirmation of an originary finitude Hegel thought he reversed in Kant [the originary, underivable character of death, of finitude, forces us to decide on undecidable]

——Heidegger’s on Kant’s side, on this side of finitude > didn’t Hegel want to show unilaterality of border, and that one is already on the other side of the here?

EM p. 121 (144) phenomenology as relève of anthropology, no longer but still a science of man

——in all structures described in Phenomlhomme y reste en son relief, equivocal relation to relief (relevance) marque sans doute la fin de lhomme, man past, but also achievement of man > cest la fin de lhomme fini, end of finitude of man, unity of infinite and finite

p. 121n (144n) the relevance accomplished in Hegelian metaphysics persists wherever metaphysics, our language, maintains its authority, even in pre-Hegelian systems (i.e. in Kant, figure of finitude organizes capacity to know from emergence of anthropological limit)

p. 123 (147) “man” only has meaning in eschato-teleological situation, inscribed in metaphysics btwn 2 ends: 1) transcendental end 2) mortality, finitude

——finitude as origin of, that which unfolds, ideality

p. 134 (161) prescription of the end of man, prescribed since always, has done nothing but “modulate equivocality of the end, in the play of telos and death”

——dans la lecture de ce jeu: le fin de lhomme est la pensée de lêtre, lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre, la fin de lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre > lhomme est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-a-dire la fin de son propre > lêtre est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-à-dire la fin de son propre

VM p. 103 w/in thought of original finitude, how could writing be secondary?

pp. 106-07 for Levinas, asymmetry, non-light, commandment are violence and injustice only in relation to finite things, Levinas’ infinite God avoids a world of pure/worst violence, of immorality itself, by being infinite, does not rage war of single, naked finite man

——for Levinas, totality is always finite totality

——war played out btwn face and finite world w/out a face, isn’t this the difference in which absence-presence of God plays? wouldn’t this play precede God, permit us to think his essence?

p. 104 dissociation of thought and language, subordination of latter to former, is proper to philosophy of finitude [Cartesian Cogito of 3rd Meditation]

p. 112 space as wound and finitude of birth

pp. 114-16 [does Levinas try to preserve positive infinity alongside spatiality of face? should he name finite what he names infinitely other if it must pass through space, negation?]

p. 114 all philosophies that do not distinguish btwn thought and language are philosophies of original finitude, can they abandon this word, or are they prisoners to a classical framework?

p. 115 infinite alterity as irreducibly common horizon of Death and the Other, horizon of finitude, finitude of horizon

p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

——an economy of violence (economy irreducible to Levinas’ definition) that tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity

p. 119 only way to escape Hegel, for an instant, consider “false infinity,” original finitude, irreducible

——for Levinas, if Husserlian Cogito opened to infinite, it would be an object-infinity w/out alterity, a “false infinity” [Levinas never uses this Hegelian term, but idea of indefinite, negative form of infinity haunts his gestures]; Levinas makes true alterity nonnegativity, and the same (complicit w/ negativity) the false-infinity > would have seemed absolutely mad to Hegel

p. 129 that other as such only appears in relation to same is violence as origin of meaning and of discourse in reign of finitude

——infinitely other & infinitely same, if they have meaning for a finite being, is the same

p. 131 btwn original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, in which violence returned against violence, in which original finitude appears, in which other is respected w/in, by, the same

question of philosophy: why finitude? why must I think transcendental through ego, ipseity?

p. 132 for Husserl (transcendental phenomenology), “subjective a priori” only way to check totalitarianism of the neutral, impersonal “absolute Logic”: eschatology w/out dialogue [re: why finitude?] [revelation through faulty teletype]

p. 133 origin of question why finitude? why why? transcendental archi-factuality as violence? > naked, silent opening of question escapes phenomenology, permits appearance of history as such: it is the call (to) (of) an eschatology that dissimulates its own opening

——opening of question, inversion of transcendental dissymmetry, put to philosophy as logos, finitude, history, violence: interpellation of Greek by non-Greek, strange community of silent question > la phénoménologie et leschatologie peuvent interminablement entamer le dialogue, s’entamer en lui, sappeler lune lautre au silence

question “why finitude?” can be stated only by being forgotten in language of Greeks

——if other can only be respected/dissimulated by the same, then time is violence, living present originally marked by death > “presence as violence is the meaning of finitude, meaning of meaning as history”

p. 150 Malebranche says Being is infinitely slight because infinite; Heidegger says Being is nothing (determined), produced in difference (as difference), that it is produced “in simultaneity with” Nothingness, it is “finite in its essence” [VP p. 87 the infinite differance is finite]

pp. 317-18n Heidegger stops using Endlichkeit, it was never Christian-theological but idea of finite Being is ontotheological

—— thought that seeks to go to its very end in its language, the end envisaged under name of finitude, should abandon words & themes of finite/infinite & everything they govern > this is the impossible of beyond metaphysics which confirms necessity for this incommensurable overflow to take support from metaphysics

——Heidegger realized this in making difference [btwn Being & existent] fundamental

OH pp. 31-2 there is a crisis whenever the capital of infinity and universality finds itself in danger, when the eidos, limits, ends, confines, the finitude of Europe, emerges

VP p. 58 ideality of the form of presence can be repeated to infinity as return of the same, but retained in a finite movement

p. 87 infinite differance is finite

FSW p. 197 logo-phonocentrism is necessary and necessarily finite [Derrida’s faith?] > history of the possibility of symbolism

p. 228 instead of machine being a pure absence of spontaneity, its resemblance to psychical apparatus bears witness to finitude of mnemic spontaneity thus supplemented

——machine and thus representation is death and finitude w/in psyche, idea of finitude derived from movement of supplementarity

TC p. 248 following Artaud, Derrida describes a dialectic outside conventional Hegelianism > the indefinite movement of finitude, original repetition, origin of tragedy as absence of simple origin: dialectics as tragedy, only possible affirmation to be made against idea of pure origin

SH p. 15 date makes question “what is?” finite

FWT p. 5 contradictory tasks set to us by inheritance is a testimony to our finitude: finitude obliges us to inherit what is older, more powerful, more durable; same finitude obliges one to choose, select, sacrifice, exclude, let go, leave behind

p. 131 literature a recent invention, threatened by death, repeats its birth beginning from its end, from a finitude that is its resource & essential specter

OS pp. 63-4(n) in analytic of Dasein, relation of fall to proper, authenticity, enigmatic proximity (identity w/ itself of the questioning), concept of finitude

ROP p. 33 instead of “failure” of archaeological principle [of analysis], this principle is destined to limit of its arrest, finitude of its suspense > there’s chance in falling-due, given of fall

pp. 104-9 acc. Foucault, Freud introduces modernity to “originary finitude” by accounting for death (Derrida wonders if this wouldn’t put Freud on the side of madness w/ Nietzsche)

p. 109 finitude is derived for Kant, while it is originary for Heidegger

ATIA p. 17 that God wants to see Ish name the animals marks God as infinite, all-powerful, and finite > God does not know what will happen to him w/ language (doesn’t know what he wants)

p. 96 finitude of “I think” (anthropologism) is denied the animal by Heidegger & Kant

PS p. 326n (with remarkable/ambiguous exception of Hegel) God is Death: infinite life, life w/out difference > w/in life God-Death names finitude, difference w/in life > mais l'autre nom de la même chose ne veut pas dire la même chose que le premier nom, il n'en est pas synonyme et c'est toute l’histoire

FS p. 304n for Leibniz, man is finite in act, infinite in thought; in God, thought/action coexist

pp. 12-3 attempt-to-write, moment of overflow (can’t be understand via voluntarism): when play of meaning overflows signification, which is always enveloped by limits of nature, life, soul

——the project of infinite tradition must be acknowledged as such: that it can always fail is the mark of its pure finitude/pure historicity

WAP pp. 5-6 institution can forget its own elect (finite memory), its finitude also affects remembrance of what it wants to exclude: the surface of its archive thus inscribed w/ what it refuses, excludes (ex: Walter Benjamin not receiving a degree)

DPi pp. 129-30 abolitionists as eternalists fearing death, full of guilt [suspicion of a Nietzschean/Baudelairean cast], the evil of finitude, fallible finitude > for Baudelaire, these fearful men confess w/symptom of their abolitionism, an infinite protest against mortality

p. 256 DP ends finitude of “my life” > w/ calendar

——it is because my life is finite, “ended,” that I keep this relation to incalculability and undecidability as to the instant of my death

pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

p. 258 phantasm of end of finitude, the other side of an infinitization, is constitutive of finitude outside any real scene of verdict/DP [?] > DP thus an acting out or an effect of truth re: our own dreams of infinite survival assured by a calculated, decisive, interruption: in these dreams we play the role of judge, jury, executioner, assistants, the condemned > force of this phantasm so strong will probably guarantee forever the double survival of DP and abolitionist protest

***pp. 258-59 phantasm of infinitization at heart of finitude [dream of a verdict, the putting an end to finitude], theologico-political, an infinitization of survival assured by calculation itself, by cutting decision of DP, phantasm is one w/ God, belief in God

DST DST p. 208 how could a thinker of finitude, Heidegger, never avoid anything (ne jamais rien éviter)?

PIO p. 418n aleatory event of tout autre, beyond the incalculable as a still possible calculus [p. 45], et ne peut advenir que pour un être fini [only happens to a finite being]: la chance même de la finitude > what happens thus (échoit ainsi) is how finitude invents and appears to itself

PF p. xxvi perjurer can always give alibi: I was elsewhere, I wasn’t thinking (his finitude as alibi)

TR pp. 146-47 paradoxical antinomy of performative & event, the former neutralizes event in “I can” of mastery: vulnerability/finitude of body & corpus is limit of performative power

PJP p. 163 one cannot expect a finite subject to think/remember, at every instant, all ethical obligations he should answer > inhuman, indecent [Mount Moriah of GOD]

p. 167 essential finitude of discontinuous anamnesis inscribes ellipses/eclipses in identity of subject

——undecided btwn provocative irony, disarming sincerity: one responds both responsibly & irresponsibly

pp. 191 amnesia, irreducible distraction, disappearance at heart of finite thought: the resource, power of anacoluthon [see p. 194]

pp. 191-92 narrative of a disappearance: signature gets erased moment it enters literature [like question in EJQB]

PSSS p. 260 psychoanalysis is ineradicable, its revolution is irreversible—yet, like civilization, it’s mortal

HST p. 385 impossibility of forgiveness must be thought onto la racine la plus radicale of its paradox—it does not resist the impossibility of what wants to be conceived in it > concept of concept undergoes lépreuve of its essential precariousness, its finitude, its deconstructability

PPT pp. 7-8 trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

LI p. 79 [Derrida admits to lack of rigor] “engendering” an infinity of new contexts [from SEC] should be replaced by “engendering & inscribing itself,” or being inscribed in > for a context never creates itself ex nihilo, can’t create context on its own, can’t dominate a context either > this limit, finitude, is the condition by which contextual transformations remain possible

TN p. 53 the haptical, for every finite existence, recalls what is coming [Socrates], marks the limit at which or from which the presentation announces itself

pp. 138-39 touch is finitude, period, stop at this point > lefforcement (forceful exertion) always signs a finitude

p. 254 Chrétian admits to a veil in finite touch, a “phenomenological occultation” of the creature

p. 261 spacing & “distance” are thought by Chrétian [by Christian theology of flesh], reduced to phenomenology of finitude, que le toucher spirituel (infini, immédiat, etc.) aura commencé par élever et relever [differance serving to close closure]

p. 262 incarnation will never be phenomenon of an irreducible finitude

pp. 271-72 finite thinking: a limit that thinking touches w/out appropriating it for itself

p. 289 diastole w/out systole, interruption risks death at every moment, other heart se touche toi only to be exteposed to death: toi es (t) aussi ma mort [at heart of a finite thinking]

p. 298 touch is finitude, period

NOY p. 234 Nietzsche opposes Ja of innocent affirmation with Ja, Ja of the Christian ass

——Christian yes, a yes of finitude (repetition and memory); Derrida proposes a more ancient root to annul the alternative [limitless singular yes, finite ass yes]

AD p. 103 Levinas: à-Dieu is infinitely older than finite, diachrony of time “being destined” before any act of consciousness, destined as devotion itself, desire refers to à-Dieu, which is more profound, older than cogito

BSi pp. 224-25 for Derrida, hypothesis that bêtise always threatens imperturbable ithyphallus is the essential ithyphallic bêtise > ithyphallus’ hyperbolical desire is nil/empty of thought, this void pushes, pulses, compulses, makes one think of a drive that is absolutely bête, never gives up anything, absolute stranger to all thought

——priapism is infinite ithyphallism, foreign to finitude of erection (finitude makes erection possible) > thus, is detumescence castration?

OG p. 6 (15) crisis also a symptom: inflation of language, of sign “language,” inflation of sign itself, inflation itself > language’s historico-metaphysical epoch must determine totality of its problematic horizon, exposing its finitude when no longer self-assured, guaranteed (bordé), by infinite signified (which seemed to exceed it)

p. 25 (40-1) acc. Hegel, writing (an Umweg) betrays life/breath > finitude/paralysis, sterilizes spirit, principle of difference/death in becoming of being (is to speech, what China is to Europe)

p. 68 (99) “God’s death” & “return to finitude” belong to onto-theology they fight against > differance something other than finitude

p. 286 (405) forgetting & repression inadequate ideas to explain finitude and dissimulation

EU p. 63 [vis-à-vis Kant] metaphysics as the teacher’s mistress (maîtresse du maître), as censor > for a teacher, a finite being, no lifting of censorship, only strategic calculation: censorship against censorship, debate of the best censorship [the idea of philosopher’s legislation found everywhere in man’s reason], censorship of reason: [Derrida asks vis-à-vis Schelling] is this strategy an art?

p. 71 for Schelling, philosopher develops negative condition: consciousness of inanity of all finite knowledge > ability to translate, re-translate, the real to the ideal can be acquired—can be cultivated in a Bildung and become untransformable habitus, unalterable organ

pp. 75-6 most post-Kantians (incl. Nietzsche [?]) claim to have already reached the inaccessible: to think finitude, you have already thought the infinite (this becomes definition of thinking)

——post-Kantians accuse Kant of founding “criticism” in denegation, more responsible to found thought in inaccessible

p. 79 for Schelling, individuals, who are finite, must translate > if mind could simply be infinite, there’d be no need to translate > “originary knowledge” can become “real" in an individual, only in der Gattung (in the genus), i.e. in historical institutions > history: becoming-real of idea

FIRE

MONL p. 25 when hospitality auto-limits itself into a law [fire’s reflection]

pp. 50-52 Derrida on his relation to French language; the secret, a tattoo, blood mixed w/ ink, love by setting on fire, graft at the fire, mark, let come to itself in itself

p. 58 necessity of other in language, always re-marked: one more first time, historical and singular, determines & phenomenalizes itself by bringing it back to itself

GOD pp. 70-71 Dome of Rock, House of Lord in Jerusalem, place of dispute btwn monotheistic faiths of transcendent God, absolute other; they fight over it w/ fire & blood (now, more than ever)

GT p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

R p. 109 self finds itself infected as soon as soon as it (ipse) needs event, heteronomy

H p. anne 136 deconstruction leads to uncanny at heart of the most familiar, where “all we had seen was fire”

POR p. 18 (152) for Aristotle, theoretical thinker is above manual laborer, who acts w/out knowing, like fire burns

MPM p. 21 when we know our friend to be gone forever: terrifying lucidity, in light of incinerating blaze where nothingness appears

——we remain in disbelief itself, we will never believe in death or immortality

EM pp. 135-36 Nietzsche’s übermensch “burns his text and erases the traces of his steps,” a laughter bursting beyond metaphysics

VP p. 9 phenomenology (MOP in form of ideality) is also a philosophy of life, death is an empirical and extrinsic accident, everything is light, living light, blazes open passage to reduction

S pp. 3, 115-16n from spirit—to fire; history of title De lesprit

Rousseau was penning a condemnation of Helvétius’ De lesprit when he discovered the author was being prosecuted, he threw his text into the fire

pp. 31-2 spirit’s affirmation, no quotations, spirit inflamed (and yes, I say this, because of the specters flame illuminates of terrifying moment) > Geist is flame, not pneuma or spiritus

p. 32 for Heidegger, Geist not pneuma, not spiritus, but flame, and he says this can only be thought in German

p. 80 via Heidegger’s course on Schelling, spirit is only proper if it is close to itself, desire for gathering, a nostalgia, a Sehnsucht, where Sucht, etymologically, isn’t research but evil, evil inscribed in desire > evil as the desire to go out of oneself in order to return to oneself (motif, movement, trajectory of fire, not circle, of return)

——Heidegger: “in spirit there reigns the nostalgia for its own essence”

p. 81 in Der Ister, Hölderlin calls to the fire, Jetzt komme, Feuer!, fire as what comes, call for to-come > acc. Heidegger, Hölderlin, the Beseeler, has been struck by God of light, gift of spirit as incineration, cremation, almost becoming ash [MOP & annihilation of trace]

p. 84 spirit divides and gathers in conflagration, inflames and inflames itself [absolute spontaneity]

——furnace of spirit (embrasement de lesprit), spirit in-flames (lesprit en-flamme) (verb and noun)

p. 96 when Heidegger says spirit is fire he claims it is neither a metaphor nor a figure

p. 97 acc. Heidegger, spirit in-flames has evil in it already, thus an evil that is not Platonico-Christian, not of the body, evil is spiritual

p. 97 duplicity of Geist, as its evil ghost, brings forth question: is ash good or evil? whiteness of ash which belongs to destiny consumed and consuming (conflagration of flame)

p. 98 Heidegger: spirit flames devour, consume, everything, including the white of ash

——Trakl: “flame is the brother of the palest”

p. 136n [references to Hegel’s fire and spirit in Glas]

p. 101 Jewish thought as inexhaustible thinking of fire

p. 138n Luther: fire, tongues, sacred breath

p. 104 fire-writing, flame writes, writes itself, right in the flame (à même la flamme) > a Riss, frayage of this trait, a mark that leads spirit on the way to soul, pursues soul in way opened by its fire, trait de conflagration, lesprit en-flammetrace la route, il fraye la voie

p. 106 double mark, doubly remarkable trait [engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, affinity w/ Schlag]: it is the spirit in which it inscribes itself, traces itself, belongs to flame it divides

p. 111 wouldn’t Jews, Moslem, Christians respond to Heidegger’s retrait, flame and fire-writing in promise? [messianic echoes]

SH p. 43 unreadable is readable as unreadable, shibboleth transmitted to a few during finite time of incineration, heart to heart, mouth to ear, hand to hand, still universal by right (legible, coded, troped) > madness of fire: consumes a date from w/in > renders ash from 1st moment

p. 45 incineration takes place before any operations, burns from w/in (not present)

——date consumed from w/in, the expiring that is its production, genesis, inscription: its essence & chance

p. 50 there is a holocaust (all-consuming) for every date: “every hour counts its holocaust”

F F pp. xxxviii-xxxix crypt of language: contract w/ dead, mort-gage, dead must pledge to occupy place as dead, must engage dying self alive

——pledge as pocket [Genet’s matchbox] > double desire, thanato-poetic pleasure (plaisir) can catch fire

p. xlviii paelontologist médusé devant larête dun mot-chose, like a tomb burning in the grass, double-edged stare of a 2-faced Medusa (le double tranchant dun biface)

WM WM pp. 264-65(n) for Bachelard, the hidden (fire) is what demands metaphors, Derrida explains how this conceptualization, despite fact that Bachelard appeals to syntax, “a poetic mind is a syntax of metaphors,” still amounts to metaphor of the same > here, all metaphors have a semantic focal point, the hidden fire as life, nature

p. 268 one true metaphor (no more true metaphor): but assured legibility of the proper [presence disappearing in its own radiance, hidden source of light]

DS DS p. 266 hymen will have always disseminated: SPERM, burning lava, milk, spume, dribble of seminal liquor

p. 277 difference is the necessary interval, suspense btwn 2 outcomes, “lapse of time” btwn 2 shots, rolls, chances > a game of chance forever new, a play of fire forever young > fire & games (via Nietzsche, Heraclitus), play of luck w/ necessity: a hymen btwn chance & rule

OTO OTO pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

ATIA ATIA pp. 67-8 Valéry’s snake utters the first word (of Verb): “ME,” this “I am that I am,” first impurity, contamination of being, ontological creation, autobiographogenesis, becomes words of seducer > promise to breach purity of nothingness w/ performative

——I am HE,” auto-zoo-theo-morphic > snake as God, divinity diminished by fires of Seducer

FS FS p. 29 Dionysus is worked over by difference, always appears (to himself) by a relationship to his exterior, his death [fire]

O O p. 54 adventurous excess of writing not improv., throw of dice doesn’t contradict rigorous necessity of its “formal assemblage”: unity of chance & rule, program and its leftovers or extra (son reste ou de son surplus) [literature or book: atheistic face of this play, conflagration achieved, final clause located sur la tranche du livre fermé]

DPi DPi p. 3 stage lighting of DP, light of fire, never is sovereign more visible than when it makes itself voyante et voyeuse of execution > sovereign witnesses crime, witnesses itself, eye witness

pp. 148-49 memory/archivization engage suffering body in a machine, technical repetition, Mnemoteknik, must cause suffering, red of fire before red of blood > for N., punishment is not juridical: it’s a movement of life, writing to remember, inscription, imprint past in body

RGE RGE p. 274 via Bataille, affirmation of play outside meaning: potlach of signs that burns, consumes, wastes words in gay affirmation of death: a sacrifice & a challenge (un défi)

Gii Gii p. 27 Artaud: hand speaks like a language of fire

p. 60 Heidegger’s Geist (gheis): lifted, transported out of oneself, like a flame

IW IW p. 246 Rosenzweig associates abyss w/ volcanic fire (eruption), convulsive tremor marking rhythm of flow of lava—tempo of discontinuous rhetoric

D D p. 343 fire (black, white), transference from one text to another > consumption (relation btwn death & a certain sun) is textual like dissemination

pp. 343-44 like the crime, consumption/consummation of fire never takes place—this is what the hymen names: 1) penetration, act perpetrated by what enters, consumes, sows confusion btwn partners 2) virginal screen that stands btwn desire/consummation, perpenetration/remembrance

p. 351 transformations of meaning hinge on certain squaring of text, obligatory passage through open surface, detour through empty square, around the column of fire

EL EL p. 196 jealous, revengeful God of fire (Spinoza’s fright before jealousy of this God) [p. 203 Spinoza’s own fright repeats one he attributes to Hebrews who flee fire in divine word & who thus construct political plan Theological-Political Treatise describes]

p. 216 God speaks out—very fire of vindictive jealousy

C C p. 229 feu (sur) le paradigme [TN. fire on the paradigm, late paradigm], fuit, il-fût > suicide paradigm, retrac(t)ing by blowing itself up

TN TN pp. 13-4 tôt (soon): davance dévoré par cet autre du temps, consumed, burned, tostus refers to instant, au temps sans temps dune flamme > on the verge, it’s the end: no time for motion, trop tard

p. 51 following Nancy’s interpretation of The Death of the Virgin, [Life comme une Morte] a “tôt” announcing an apocalypse (an end not a future) > night of nonknowledge, every desire gathers momentum, Psyche ex-posed to other, surrendered but all too soon denied to the other’s eyes

p. 248 divine spirit as flame, sets itself on fire, figure of love & desire which spiritualizes hapto-onto-theo-teleology of Christian flesh > highest possibility

p. 249 start from fire to think the touching of self-touching > not only fire but flames, since light means what is more than a figure: haptical light of self-consuming flames eludes worship, burns effigies spontaneously, “more than a figure,” the transfiguration of figurality

E E p. 10 God has given himself to be seen in a spectacle, as if he masked/showed himself: an immense liberality which can only give itself to itself to be consumed [how can man’s freedom mimic God’s: by not resembling it?]

CIN CIN p. 19 no cinder w/out fire, that is what is owed (se doit) to fire, [yet, if possible] w/out shadow of sacrifice, at noon, w/out debt, w/out Phoenix, au lieu daucun placement, place solely of incineration

——“lincinéré nest plus rien fors la cendre [innermost cinder furnace], un reste qui se doit de ne plus rester, ce lieu de rien qui soit, un lieu pur se chiffrât-il [marked out]” > there are cinders, what takes place in letting a place occur

p. 21 dissemination expresses in “il y a là cendre” what is destined by the fire to dispersion w/out return, pyrificiation of what doesn’t remain, and returns to no one

p. 23 there are cinders only if there is a hearth, some fire or place, cinder as the house of being

p. 24 pure burning light: no sign of passage, pure consuming destruction, noon w/out contrary (Lichtgüsse)

p. 25 best paradigm for trace not the trail of the hunt, le frayage, wake in sea, nor love of step (pas) for its imprint, but the cinder (what remains w/out remaining from holocaust, from the all-burning [du brûle-tout]) > no longer makes a trace, or traces only by losing trace quelle reste à peine

p. 26 pure difference of absolute accident, play and pure difference, secret of imperceptible all-burning, does not even relate to its own conflagration, is nothing

——[question of the bridge asked 3x] 1) how from this consuming destruction w/out limit can something remain that primes dialectical process and opens history? 2) how could the purest of the pure, the worst of the worst, lincendie panique du brûle-tout, put forth some monument, i.e. pyramis 3) if all-burning destroys its letter, its body, how can it guard the trace of itself and breach/broach (entamer) a history where it preserves (se conserve) itself in losing itself?

——(ici séprouve la force implacable du sens, of mediation, of the negative) all-burning must pass into its contrary, guard itself: as soon as fire shows itself: il reste, il se retient, it loses itself as fire

pp. 26-8 the origin of history: pure difference ceases to be what it is to remain what it is, the going down (déclin), setting sun, passage to occidental history

p. 28 chance of substance as a sacrifice [?], the all-burning sacrifices itself as all-burning, erection of the pyramid guards life (the dead)—“Opfer,” even but better “holocaust,” burns all (caustos holos), even burns fire, holocaust contains seeds of ontology [re: Hegel]

pp. 28-30 this holocaust as the gift, before (if one could count time) ontology, w/out which the dialectical movement & history of Being couldn’t open, no engaging annulus of anniversary, no annulment in solar course from Orient to Occident

p. 30 gift & holocaust, before exchange, are not, but as soon as it burns, it burns its very act of burning and begins to be > the speculative, dialectic: the reflection (speculum) of holocaust’s holocaust, the blaze cooled by glass, ice mirror

——the gift can only be a sacrifice: that is the axiom of speculative reason > it must become philosophy, religion’s truth

p. 37 incineration celebrates perhaps the nothing of the all, destruction w/out return, mad w/ its desire, desperate disseminal affirmation but also its opposite: “no” to the work mourning, “no” of fire > how to accept working for his Highness (monseigneur) mourning?

p. 41 rebellion against Phoenix, affirmation of fire w/out place or mourning

p. 42 nothing out of reach of the tongue of fire (langue de feu), not even cinders if there are cinders there, save a chance (fors une chance)

p. 43 essence of cinder (its cinder itself): the insistent pharmakon of a plural body (doesn’t belong to itself) in which the retreat of fire disguises itself > if there is cinder, fire remains in retreat

p. 46 “give fire its due, light counterfires in order to stop the progression of a blaze, avoid a holocaust” > fire’s share (part) is impossible to delimit (by virtue of the lexicon, the ‘themes’)

OG OG p. 151 (216-17) slow place of pedagogy, Nature takes her time, outpaced by immediacy of dangerous supplement which burns the halting points (brûle les étapes), consumes lénergie sans retour

EU EU p. 19 in 1644, Courcelle’s Latin translation of Discourse of Method doesn’t include Descartes’ “I am speaking French” > when “original” speaks its language by speaking of its language, it prepares a suicide by translation, suicide by fire: almost w/out remainder [tells us about idiomaticity in general]

——this translating structure begins as soon as a reading of “original” text is instituted, offers up language to be read in its very erasure: erased traces of a path (odos), chemin deffacement, translation passing over/beyond the path of language [beyond Heidegger], passant son chemin

SPEC SPEC pp. 400-01 [fire-like] unleashed intensity of PP would destroy itself if it didn’t submit to moderating stricture, if it didn’t measure itself

——quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

FLESH [fixerup]

OOG OOG pp. 76-7 for Husserl, ideality comes to its Objectivity, “by means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic flesh”

——though it may seem this incarnation redescends toward language as indispensable medium, Husserl [in a manner Derrida thinks the most interesting difficulty of this text] returns to language to make truth appear in relation to all de facto culture and language > w/out language, truth would be psychological subjectivity bound in inventor’s head

——historical incarnation (in language) sets free the transcendental (truth), instead of binding it

SPOM SPOM pp. 4-5 when spirit becomes specter, an instant of flesh and phenomenality, an apparition

p. 157 acc. Marx, the ghost effect not only spiritualization, autonomization of spirit, idea, or thought (Hegelian idealism), but also supplementary moment after autonomization, one more simulacrum is added: a body, flesh (Leib)

p. 174 larcharnement (ferocity, w/ chair, flesh) dun chasseur > set out the living lifeless body of a ghost (le corps vivant sans vie dun fantôme) to trick prey (pour tromper sa proie)

***POOF ***POOF pp. 75-6 Nietzsche’s [?] virtual ‘perhaps,’ hypothesis w/out borders: in the process of exhausting the flesh of our events, uttermost live of our lives > no, not in the process of exhausting us, presence of such a process too reassuring, on verge of success: an absolute virtuality from which no event could escape, all becomes simply possible

VP VP pp. 13-4 necessary privilege of phonē, originative affinity w/ voice not logos in general > phenomenological voice: breath, transcendental flesh, transforms body of word into flesh, Körper into Leib, a geistige Leiblichkeit [see p. 70]> the “grip (prise)” phenomenology preserves itself w/in

p. 29 the “as such”: totality of body, of mundane, totality of the spatial, the visible > not worked over (ne sont pas travaillés) by Geist, which transforms Körper into Leib

TC TC p. 232 for Artaud, whatever can be said of body can be said of theater > must restore “existence” and “flesh”

SH SH p. 66 circumcision inscribes Nothing in the heart (flesh, living word), to the point of bleeding

DS DS pp. 205-06 if, in Mallarmé’s writings, mime mimics nothing, opens in its origin the very thing he’s tracing out, is this not the movement of truth? pure soliloquy? alētheia as manifestation, unveiling? but there is mimicry, mimicry imitating nothing, a difference w/out reference: a ghost that is the ghost of no flesh, w/out past, w/out death, birth, presence, past (preserved differential structure of mimēsis w/out Platonic metaphysical reappropriations)

PS PS pp. 179-80 Artaud’s metaphysics of flesh [MOP?] determines Being as life, its integrity must be restored > a thought governed by anguish of dispossession, my body stolen by the other, by death (as theft): my death is represented

pp. 192-93 for Artaud, furtive differance slipped in btwn 2 forms of writing, placing life outside the work, and making its origin (flesh) the epigraph, the breathless (essoufflé) sarcophagus of my discourse > only through writing made flesh, theatrical hieroglyphic, could double be destroyed

Gi Gi p. 18 Dasein must have body, bodiliness, prior to sexuality? Leiblichkeit draws Dasein into dispersion, thus into sexual difference? [see Gii pp. 38-9 Dasein as Leib]

EJQB EJQB p. 75 [re: Jabès] Jew reproached by rabbinical Jews for universalism, skeletal (décharnés) allegorism, for neutralizing event in realms of symbolic/imaginary [Jew as suffering allegory]

——Jew is split btwn 2 dimensions of letter: 1) allegory (no history, abstract universalism, cold skin of concept) 2) literality (empirical, actualized history, too warm flesh)

——“entre la chair trop vive de lévénement littéral et la peau froide du concept court le sens

TN TN p. 326n Nancy’s festering immundity, what is expulsed, the abjected/ejected of (auto-)immune—isn’t law of autoimmunity what commands all Christian thinking of “flesh”?

——risk finding that a deconstructed heart is a Christian one

p. 330n for Levinas, flesh not reduced to the face

p. 347n Derrida translates Husserl’s Leib as corps propre, body proper—not chair [pp. 349-50n]

pp. 349-50n can we efface Christian connotations of chair?

p. 55 flesh (sarx), Nancy’s Corpus is sarcastic, having it out w/ flesh, flesh of Christ

——Christianity a religion of blood > beyond point where any religion begins w/ experience of blood

——as if “touch in itself” were touching blood [Nancy’s self-expulsion] > rapport entre le sang et le sens, entre lecoup de senset lecoup de sang’ [sens, sang, cent, sans]

p. 58 when Nancy gives thought to birth of body, it’s sarcastic [having it out w/ flesh], mordant, une transsubstantiation acharnée qui inlassablement mord, remord et met à mort la chair > impossible auto-biography, transubstantiation of Eucharist itself: Corpus bursts out laughing

pp. 187-90 Merleau-Ponty diverts from Husserl while claiming accuracy: more interested in sensible reflexivity, discourse on flesh & incarnation, becoming-touch, becoming-visible of touch

pp. 227-28 for Didier Franck (cf. Chair et corps), flesh as a pre-given of time; Derrida asks why would that which is always given in time need to precede it?

p. 228 chair, carnal: cherishing and dear (carus), caritas, incarnation (caro, carnis)

pp. 230-31 Franck’s forced interpretation of Husserl places hyletic sensuality of flesh (contact, self-contact) before time: Franck overruns intentional analytic toward existential one, then overruns existential analytic > flesh opens time: archefacticity as con-tingency

p. 233 not everything re: “flesh” is Christian, but…

pp. 234-37 leibhaftig as incarnate? does Leib have flesh? > what about machine-bodies, technical supplements, which are both Körper and Leib [p. 361n Derrida points to his early work on Husserl]

p. 241 Derrida not sure one “flesh” can only be compared to another acc. sexuality, acc. “a” or “the” sexual difference

p. 242 to marginalize partes extra partes (nonliving, divisible, that which belongs as something foreign to flesh, a supplementary, transplanted graft) risks marginalizing the margin?

p. 258 [heterotautology?] transitivism: flesh wants a hand, God’s hand, must go beyond hand of man, then come back to Incarnation, to flesh, to receive hand of man from God

p. 245 Chrétian dissymmetrizes reflexivity of touching, places other exceeding the “I” at the carnal heart (coeur charnal) of ego [no thought more forceful in linking “flesh” to Christianity]

p. 257 [via Chrétian] for Aristotle, hand is “organ of organs,” can become anything because it is nothing, like the soul, touch w/out organs > this feeds into a thinking of Christian flesh

p. 261 theological thinking of flesh leaves no room for question of animal, technics

p. 272 via Nancy’s finite thinking, infinitism of Christian flesh finds itself contesté at heart of lattestation itself > we have no access to it but to refer touch to the limit

p. 367n Pascal: true sacrifice must be spiritual—the flesh that doesn’t perish [circumcision of heart]

AD AD p. 139n first Levinas believed that femininity was a modality of alterity [?], but in Otherwise than… he goes back further, nakedness before face presupposes feminine alterity: idea of skin is a “responsibility before eros”

p. 51 hospitality, the epochē of epochē, interruption of self, of phenomenology’s “principle of principles,” of presentation in person, “in the flesh”

CF CF pp. 46-7 for Hegel, only king/sovereign can forgive the unforgivable (a crime against forgiveness, against power to forgive): when ‘body of king’ in his sovereign function is threatened through other ‘body of king,’ his flesh (singular, empirical body)

EU EU p. 62 double bind that knots around sublime body of “teacher of philosophizing” [i.e. philosophy eludes teaching, philosophizing requires it]: teacher haunts the scene, doesn’t dominate, or dominates like a ghost > one might say he fascinates/seduces if these connotations weren’t too closely tied to imagination/sensibility: for reason should break the charm [of sensibility?] [chaire vacant]

FOLD

GT GT p. 54 “give time (day, life)” is to give nothing: one sees blurred lines btwn transcendental & conditioned, the fold of undecidability that permits all values to be inverted: to give life is to give death (i.e. strange crossing of idioms: “se donner le mort” means “to take one’s life [in English]”)

p. 81 language as a phenomenon of gift-countergift, of giving-taking, of exchange, all difficulties of nomination/writing are difficulties of self-naming, self writing (se nommer, sécrire)

——donner reviendrait à prendre et prendre à donner; this would fold itself over on language/writing beyond logocentric closure

p. 145 re: “Counterfeit Money,” what we’re saying about the (narrated) story also valid for (narrating) narrative > fold back on each other

***PP ***PP p. 104 (118) excess, displacement of series, nest pas une simple sortie hors de la série (ce geste tombe sous une catégorie de la série), a folding back (repli), a re-mark, cannot name it with a single concept w/out being off the mark (sans le manquer): it is a real and necessary challenge that writes itself, and we must begin by reading it

LOBL LOBL p. 100 “crisscross double invagination,” chiasma btwn double invagination possible because of iterability of the mark (folds coming from both borders)

pp. 100-01 double invagination constitutes story of stories, narrative of deconstruction in deconstruction: apparently outer edge of a clôture, makes no sign beyond itself, toward tout autre, w/out becoming dual, being “represented,” refolded, re-marked w/in the clôture > what the structure produces as an effect of interiority, this structure-effect is being deconstructed

PAS PAS p. (31) what does one know of force of de-distancing? and if the custody (garde) of knowledge is distanced? word knowledge would be refolded, re-employed > Blanchot’s reploiement formidable

pp. (31-2) Blanchot’s folding displaces typical opposition, hierarchy, value of value

VP p. 58 w/ ideal and pure freedom of re-presentation and reflection (essence of every lived-experience), Husserl thinks presence as constituted by fold of the return

F p. xxxv “conservative” repression installs in the unconscious what the Self treats as an exquisite corpse, a “surrealism” of folded sentences loses its creases, the paper flattens out, and there is a spot (lieu) of pleasure disguised as pain, which the therapist must exhume

POOF p. 13 the irreducible dissymmetry btwn hypothesis of shared friendship & idea that love can (must) survive the friend’s death—a doubling fold: friend bears our proper death, expropriates it, he bears my death & inherits it as the last survivor

p. 28 the all too of Human All Too Human, a rolling wave, a trembling, enveloped violence of a welling up wave falling back on itself, “when the excess of the beyond itself folds back into immanence,” turning around, coming to perhaps

p. 32 every instant begins at the end, address carries in its readability the signature of the addressee: it withdraws from space by penetrating it

p. 209 the dative version of omega ω would produce the meaning: ‘too many friends means no friend’ > this is the recoil (repli) version, more modest, it does reopen the question of “how many?”

p. 289 Derrida has insisted that the indefinite recoils (replis) in Zarathustra’s strategy must contain one fold or another that places history of brother in Bible & Koran beside Zarathustra (not in confrontation)

DS p. 177 double session finds its corner (coin) BTWN (ENTRE) literature & truth (that by which question “what is?” wants answering): figure of folding back, angle ensured by fold

p. 211 indefinite fold of word appearance (presence, simulacrum)

p. 227 double session has no middle, divided in 2 through fiction of a crease (du faux pli)

p. 229 necessity of folding (page of the hymen) not a secondary procedure, no smooth fold, hymen doesn’t simply adopt some fold > fold, in the lining which, of itself, the hymen was, at once its outside and its inside, no proper name, doesn’t exist: hymen, already torn, in the fold

——le pli (se) multiplie mais (nest) pas (un)

——in the morgue you’ve been able to read the folding (vous aurez pu lire que la pliure)

p. 238 “re-presentation” [Derrida via Mallarmé]: less concerned with setting forth things, the image of things, than setting up a machine > repetition-toward-itself of text as re-folding

p. 246 fold, crisscrossed groove (sillon croisé), turns whole into “too much,” “too little”

p. 251 sum can’t be totalized, nor is this non-totalizing exceeded by infinite richness of content of meaning or intention > define the limit otherwise: fold w/ no possibility of folding text back on itself (angle & intersection of re-mark), no reduction of its spacing > blank, fold: impossibility of (imaginary) theme beyond textual instance > these textual effects rich w/ kind of poverty, singular/regular monotony, disappear: one can’t see this because one thinks one is seeing themes

pp. 251-52 tropic twist of fan (éventail) (wings, plumes) inscribes very movement of structure of fan-as-text (surplus-mark, margin of meaning), spacing, fold, hymen btwn all meaning-effects > this supplementary valence/mark neither metaphor nor metonymy, no transcendental privilege

p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text, yet desire for reappropriation, structural site of theological trap, is produced, nourished, in very act of separating from it > le pli (se) plie: son sens sespace dune double marque, au creux de laquelle un blanc se plie

p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret angle of fold > “miniscule tomb”

p. 260 the rape has already taken place and will nevertheless never have been perpetrated > caught in folds of veil: where all truth comes undone

p. 270 fold, multi-pli-cations (folders, foldouts, etc.)—ploys (all the figures) & the re-mark of the fold-upon-itself of writing (again)

——but the fold is not a form of reflexivity (Hegel’s sublation)

——if fold had a limit somewhere, if mark, margin, or marche (limit, threshold, border) was fold’s other > there would be no text

SP p. 37 “question of style” always concerned w/ weight (le pesant) of pointy object (stiletto, stylus, rapier, quill), which attacks matter/matrix, leaving a mark

——also the protection against this threat, se pliant alors ou repliant, en fuite, derrière des voiles

ATIA p. 29 transgressal experience of limitrophy, trephō, trophē, trophos: to feed limit, train, nurse, make grow, thicken, fold, divide the line, multiply/increase limit’s figures [not efface the limit]

O p. 25 [nonsynonymous synonyms] > never enclosed in finite taxonomy > no lexicon as such, can’t be pinned to a point, marks of dissemination, undecidable acc. 2 of binary opposition, not sublatable into 3 of speculative dialectics > displaced along angle of certain re-folding (re-ploiement)

WAP p. 36 figure of fold, explicitation, complication, often imposes itself on us > not incompatible w/ circular band or invagination [re: right to teaching assumes knowledge/teaching of right][cf. 197n “chiasmatic invagination of borders”]

RGE p. 271 general economy does not overturn but comprehends (not by way of knowledge-gathering but by inscribing w/in its opening) absolute knowledge, folds its figures into nonbasis of expenditure, relates them to destruction of value > atheology, a-teleology, aneschatology

Gii p. 52 Heidegger’s unity [re: Geschlecht], not identity, but preserves the simplicity of the same—even in the form of the fold

DST p. 198 necessity of rhythm: necessity of a scansion that comes to fold & unfold thought

p. 213 fold or abyssal redoubling: désistance is first of all the désistance of truth: truth never resembles itself, so it resembles mimesis

RM p. 66 re-trait of metaphor > gives rise to an abyssal generalization of metaphor > trait has internal multiplicity, la structure pliée-repliée dun re-trait > opens out the borders or invaginates them

EJQB p. 64 pli douloureux de soi (painful folding of itself) par lequel lhistoire se réfléchit elle-même en se donnant le chiffre

p. 65 history: the only thing that begins by reflecting itself > this fold, this furrow (ride), is the Jew

PJP p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

p. 187 anacoluthic catastrophe finds one of its privileged places in fold where the guilty accuses the witness, makes him bear responsibility for the offense

D p. 299 by a folding-back (reploiement) or internal angle of surface: face (frons scaenae) contemplates itself as unconditioned opening of appearance, but explains itself as surface-effect, as conditioned [by square apparatus]

p. 302 present can only present itself by relating back to itself [folding back on itself], (com)plying with itself (en se pliant à soi) dans langle, along la brisure: a “crack (faille)” created by a joint, hinge

p. 303 possibility (potency) of present is its own limit, inner fold, impossibility—its impotence (btwn presence/castration) > same goes for “history,” “form”: language of metaphysics

TN p. 12 Nancy’s partes extra partes, everything outside another outside; p. 14 fold of becoming-inside of the first outside, nothing but surfaces & outsides w/out insides: superficies of surfaces are limits, exposed to a touch that can only leave them intact, untouchable > irreducible disseminal divisibility

p. 139 self-relation, “sefforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force sarrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

p. 291 the “self” is as indispensable as you in se toucher toi, an “I” unable to touch itself couldn't se plier à ce qui le déplie absolument, au tout autre qui, comme tout autre, habite mon coeur en étranger > no anthropological limit here > “divine,” “animal,” & life all derivative of se toucher toi

ATM p. 154 for Levinas, logos is not secondary/instrumental, it remains indispensable as fold (pli) that bends (se plie) to the gift, as the tongue (langue) of my mouth when I tear bread from it to give it to the other > it is also my body

AFR p. 131 for Condillac, there is no difference in general, only of degrees > this proposition comes to unfold (déplier) all concepts of rupture/repetition, this unfolding is time’s

E p p. 13 the fold of mimesis at origin of pure productivity: a gift for itself (pour soi) of God who makes a present of himself to himself

LG p. 235 edge (bord), borderline (ligne de bordure), overflowing (débordement) do not arise w/out a fold—which figure of folding? [the answer: double chiasmatic invagination]

OG p. 184 (261-62) image is death, it cannot represent & add representer to represented, thus presence of re-presented folded back on itself in the world, presence announces its dispossession w/in its own representer/death > subject: merely this movement of expropriation

ATAP p. 95 [apocalypse w/out apocalypse] X w/out X, sans marks internal/external catastrophe of apocalypse, catastrophe of sans doesn’t merge w/ announced end, is its pli: a closure w/out end, end w/out end > outside of apocalypse w/in apocalypse

——“do not seal”: i.e. do not close, do not sign

SPEC p. 296 repetition, reproductivity, works w/out saying anything, like death drive, not even “form,” w/out thesis, de-monstration makes its proof (preuve) sans montrer > de-monstration folds into everything it makes explicit, pas de démonstration remains (reste) in this restance

FOOTNOTE

FSW p. 212 Nachtrag (postscript, appendix, codicil) > present is only a call for a footnote

O p. 30n what if Hegelian text was a simulacrum, yielding undecidable signs of its pretence only in sub-text? Feuerbach wants to reclaim gravity of everything Hegel relegates to footnotes, everything that is against philosophy, that resists abstract thought

TR p. 91 is not every footnote a little Oedipal? a symptomatic swelling, a swollen foot (hindering text’s step-by-step advance)?

FV p. 420n basted effect of certain footnotes, animal-machines camouflaged in shadows (prudently left in corners)—threatening security of a space & a logic

p. 446 footnotes show what must not be said > Schelling: “[footnotes] should remain hidden”

FORCE

FL p. 234 force used strategically in deconstruction, risks substantialism or irrationalism if its differential character is not stressed

POOF p. 292 via Montaigne, time of name [“inexplicable force of destiny”?] bestows force of approach, power of proximity or ‘union’ that defies discourse: the name against discourse (before/after), name as force, affection, mediation (these nameless concepts, w/out common names)

pp. 292-93 [re: fraternal politics] women don’t have no chance, they have less > hegemony always relation of forces, laws of structure are tendential, impossibility of sheer (plus ou simple) exclusion, account for return of repressed, etc.

PAS PAS p. (30) “quand il la tient, il touche cette force dapproche qui rassemble la proximité, et, dans cette proximité, tout le lointain et tout le dehors

——this is the force, or rather the difference of force

p. (31) force is excessive because it is different, different than itself, double

FSW p. 213 distinction of force & meaning is derivative in relation to archi-trace

F p. xxxii Abraham and Torok: topos & force attempt the impossible, to grasp through language source from which language emanates

POS p. 82 incision of deconstruction (not voluntary decision, not absolute beginning) occurs along lines of force, forces of rupture, that are localizable in discourse to be deconstructed

S p. 62 that a spirit is force and is not force, has and does not have force, is a relation to double, a relation to haunting; Entmachtung (destitution) is inevitable (fatale), since ghost of spirit is never perceived

FS pp. 4-5 structuralism & literary criticism (structuralist in essence/destiny), lapse of attention paid to force (the tension of force itself) > even take revenge on force by declaring separation the condition of the work

——form fascinates when one no longer has force to understand force w/in itself [decadence?]

p. 5 panoramagram (image of structuralist instrument): obtain on flat surface, depth of objects on horizon > one can glance at field divested of its forces

——like melancholy for Gide, structural criticism only possible after defeat of force: a reflection of the constituted, constructed: historical, eschatological, crepuscular

p. 16 Leibniz critiqued Descartes for having explained everything in nature w/ figures & movements, of ignoring force by confusing it w/ quantity of movement [Derrida extending this critique to structuralism, Rousset, the best literary formalism]

p. 21 in structuralism, structure as one w/ geometrism: preformationsim, teleologism, reduction of force, value & duration

p. 27 Hegel demonstrated that explication of a phenomenon by a force is tautology; yet, one must consider this w/in language’s inability to emerge from itself, not solely w/in thought of force

——force is the other of language [by articulating it, becomes a phenomenon]

—— like structuralism, no concept of force in Husserl (brings phenomenology back to Platonism despite professed anti-Platonism); for Husserl, truth requires forgetting [of genesis, force, failure, crises]

p. 28 philosophy as twilight of forces, “sun-splashed (ensoleillé)” morning of images, forms, phenomena > matin des idées et des idoles, où le relief des forces devient repos, aplatit sa profondeur dans la lumière et s'étend dans l'horizontalité

——Apollonian ecstasy cannot embrace force, movement which displaces lines, nor force as desire for itself, nor writing > fallen Dionysianism, melancholy, nostalgia

DIF DIF p. 17 Nietzsche: “difference of quantity is the essence of force, the relation of force to force”

TB p. 113 untranslatability less to do w/ adequation than unique occurrence of a performative of force

DST DST p. 223 rhythm: spaced repetition of a percussion, inscriptive force (insensible) of a spacing > doesn’t belong to visible/audible figuration—still structures them (rhythmotypical, typorhythmic)

AFR p. 72 passage (continuity and/or rupture) from one operation to an other always amounts to difference, quantity, of force > via analogy, this quantity of force is always that of connection

p. 73 innovation as revelation, analysis as analogical process, energy connecting present to absent > concept of force as force of repetition (retracing, supplying)

——Derrida sees here a silent explosion in text or fission in each concept (Condillac, elsewhere, denounces obscurantist force of “metaphor” [hence analogical value])

pp. 73-5 for Condillac, primitive sense of force, attraction (a force that draws), proceeds from feeling of effort (sensible, physical), is transferred “figuratively” to metaphor [Derrida exposes how de Biran overplays notion of force in Condillac, which Condillac denounces elsewhere]

p. 93 insistence (quantity/quality of insistence), force, not a secondary value in philosophical discourse

p. 94 force, analogy, signification will always be ordered to a theory of need (don’t rush to oppose to theory of desire)

PSSS p. 270 for Freud, force against force, deferred economy of force: makes right (passage from violence to law)

***D p. 331 trace can only imprint itself by referring to another trace (the other), letting itself be upstaged (outrepasser)/forgotten: its force of production stands in relation to energy of its erasure

p. 363 innumerable as force, blows up (or out of) all frames, & it works through it (taken into account) from the inside [Kant’s mathematical sublime?]

+R p. 167 force of trait (disjointed forms a work): systasis of powerful ligatures holds, binds, disjecta membra, ladder is a scaffold, a synonym of POTENCE, garroted, bound (pillars, columns, frames, capitals)

LI LI p. 149 Derrida’s uneasiness about using words “force” and “power” [eg. Foucault’s micropowers]—he has 3 conditions for using them: 1) no power/force, only differences of power/force (like Nietzsche) 2) realize the greater force could be the “lesser” 3) account for fact that force/power quickly trapped in ruses of mastery

TN TN pp. 138-39 touch is finitude, period, stop at this point > lefforcement (forceful exertion) always signs a finitude

p. 139 force & virtual force (Jesus recognizes this mysterious force when someone touches him)

——self-relation, “sefforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force sarrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

pp. 140-41 Husserl & Kant begin w/ received impression, sensation, the “primary faculty” > thus we only imagine force, only know its phenomenal effects [?]

WOG p. 33n Derrida explains why he prefers to speak of force (differential force) rather than power or will to power > anti-voluntarism, etc.

BSi p. 8 Pascal: justice w/out force is impotent

pp. 178-79 if very meaning of lexicon of bêtise, being-bête, is not absolutely translatable (abyss of translation), one cannot reserve bêtise for man as sovereign & free > if meaning is linked to relation of forces, distinction btwn reaction/response loses its rigor and decidability [must revise everything]

p. 181 Derrida intentionally using “a Nietzschean-style language more acceptable to Deleuze”: force, differential, intensity (not Freudian unconscious)

p. 183 force-differential (unconscious mechanisms) btwn which tension/contradiction bound to localize > bêtise on both sides: side of sovereign (who), side of beast, the stupid, the other (what)

——pitiless lucidity of cogito, triumph of conscious self-positing self, the thesis of self always reflects itself as bêtise, bêtise always triumphs > Triumph of Life in bêtise

bêtise always on side of victor > bêtise must not find itself bête: that would be suicidal

p. 195 Valéry: weakness of force to believe only in force

p. 213 appeal to reason, a reason that is not one, as fact of name and force of the stronger

p. 320 logos: exercise of force or violence (Gewalt)

OG p. 178 (253) for Rousseau, “moral love” reflects history as denaturalization, this moral supplement is nothing, but still causes preference, forces force

FOREIGNER / STRANGER

GOD pp. 104-09 the 2 economies of salary [Christianity]: retribution (exchange), and love of foreigner; latter an interruption, an exceeding of the economy of the community, of Schmitt’s strict politics, interrupts self-consciousness, inaugurates exchange

H p. 3 question of foreigner: foreigner is in question, also, foreigner, putting the first question, puts me in question

p. 9 madness, in Sophist, of the “foreign son,” parricide by a stranger

p. 13 Socrates has characteristics of a foreigner [see p. 19]

p. 15 foreigner’s pain: cannot speak the language, is w/out defense before the law, foreign to the language of hospitality > can we only welcome the foreigner if we impose the violence that he speaks our language?

p. 17 at what point is a foreigner no longer foreign?

p. 25 foreigner vs. barbarian (absolutely other does not have a name or family name)

pp. 27-9 question posed to the foreigner: “what is your name?”

——what about unquestioning hospitality? more just, more loving to question or not to question? question of hospitality as question of question

p. 87 foreigner at birth (language) and burial

p. 129 Klossowski: stranger on the horizon like a liberator

p. 131 we let ourselves be interrogated by certain figures of the foreigner, “what?” “who?”

——question of foreigner, question of response and responsibility

SPOM p. 217 “absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous (es spukt),” unnameable, neutral power > this, which we have said nothing determinable urgently returns, insists, gives one to think, irresistible anguish, like that of future and death, doesn’t stem from but produces automatism of repetition alongside principle of reason > tout autre est tout autre

POOF p. 298 if no appurtenance in friendship, why call this foreigner (absolute foreigner) my friend? no appeasing response to this question

HERP p. 179 foreign language, we know it could be intelligible, bears on beings beside which Dasein can stand, friend as stranger must belong to a Volk, engaged in a history, Mitgeschehen

MPM p. 148 to lose one’s language in a foreign place is the terrible chance of the promise

VM p. 89 via Levinas, Eleatic Stranger, disciple of Parmenides, avait dû lui donner raison pour avoir raison de lui: pliant le non-être à être [other only in contrast to Being]

OH p. 121n privilege is by definition a delicateness in danger > danger comes from foreigner

p. 77 integrate immigrant, recognize and accept alterity of immigrant: 2 concepts of hospitality

S pp. 90-1 Heidegger interprets der Wahnsinnige in Trakl to mean that the stranger is on the way to elsewhere (as madness, de-ceased, toward the unborn, Artaud’s in-nate)—like a revenant, Derrida adds [p. 92 journey, Abgeschiedenheit of stranger]

F pp. xxx-xxxi crypt (foreigner in self) & the ghost effect (heterocryptic ghost returning from Unconscious of the other) > radical otherness in self (not unconscious) > law of another generation

FWT pp. 159-60 successful mourning is failed mourning, is unfaithful: denies alterity of dead other, of death as other > same goes for integration of immigrant/foreigner

——faithfulness prescribes impossibility of mourning at once [St. Augustine’s “I live on for my friend” in POOF]

SW p. 317 wait w/out horizon & someone else one knows too well, “even me why not,” an other yet to be born, who strikes dumb order of knowledge > too well-known, stranger head to foot

DPi p. 234 unbelieving, atheistic, skeptical, nominalist > a stranger to everything

Gii pp. 60-1 via Heidegger, German fremd relates to High German fram, underway toward, toward elsewhere > one could say: stranger does not wander (erre), is not w/out destination; Derrida compares this to Latin extraneus, outside of, extra

***PSSS p. 279 stranger [Derrida] speaks badly (mal) of evil, doesn’t believe in sovereign good or sovereign evil > he only suffers from it, but hopes to make it known

HST p. 369 in Massignon’s “The 3 Prayers of Abraham…”, monotheistic religions issued from patriarch who came to earth as “stranger, a hôte, gêr

pp. 401-02 dakhīl (intimate, interior, stranger due protection, protected by divine blessing) linked to hôte, hostis gār, stranger, enemy > hostipitality

p. 402 stranger is a digression that risks corrupting proximity to self of the proper > que veut dire létranger?

LI pp. 135-36 theoretical duty is thus always “ethical-political duty” > highly political nature of status of parasite: politics of immigration > what’s “foreign” touches all social institutions—everything

AD p. 64 many interruptions of self re: Sinai (broken tablets, veiling/unveiling of Moses’ face, etc.) > Sinai still provocation to think passage btwn ethical, messianic, eschatological and the political (today when the foreigner, the displaced, the refugee incur cruelty w/out precedent)

p. 68 Levinas’ transnational, universal hospitality, asylum (asile), inn (auberge) (“place offered to stranger”) not Kant’s cosmopolitical

WOG p. 32 the excluded of the city, place of the Stranger in philosopher [?]

BSi pp. 10-1 [Akela from Jungle Book, Fenrir] Plautus’ homo homini lupus: man as stranger is wolf [sovereign inflection of stranger] > Plato’s wolf-tyrant (lukos) in Republic Book 8 [lycology of politics]

p. 246 those asking for hospitality are exiles

pp. 261-62 unheimlich: 1) worrying aspect of foreignness as intimacy of one’s own home 2) says the essential bearing of Celan’s “Meridian” 3) associated w/ the foreigner 4) Geheimnis (the intimate, the folded back on itself, what has withdrawn in withdrawal, hidden inside of house and home), secret of encounter at most intimate heart of present

p. 265 acc. Heidegger, man is the most unheimlich—steps out of usual frontiers (Grenzen) of habit > man’s Grundzug (fundamental feature): being foreign to everything familiar

OG p. 123 (180) Lévi-Strauss’ ethnocentrism betrayed by haste of translation, satisfaction w/ domestic equivalents

——the foreigner has often been called stammerer or mute

FORGETTING AND MEMORY

GOD pp. 49-50 Christian “gift of death”: infinite love & goodness that infinitely forgets itself

p. 81 Gospels: God maintains trace of his suffering by “seeing in secret,” you forget suffering in his love, he forgets nothing

p. 94 God counts the tears, forgets nothing

GT pp. 15-16 forgetting of gift must be far more radical than repression, which always consists of keeping by exchanging places, its operation is systematic or topological

pp. 16-17 absolute forgetting (oubli absolu) which unbinds (délie) absolutely or infinitely more than excuse, forgiveness, acquittal: certain experience of trace, cinder, ashes

——forgetting and gift condition each other (unconditional)

***p. 17 something must come about in an instant, an instant that doesn’t belong to economy of time, time w/out time, a forgetting that forgets, but a forgetting that’s not nothing

p. 23 Blanchot says, more or less, forgetting is another name for Being

p. 35 the alogos, madness, of rendering account (logos) of the atopos (the gift), desire to think the impossible, to desire, to desire to give the impossible: madness as given & desired forgetting

pp. 35-6 how could one desire a gift that is non-ambivalent? a gift that would not be pharmakon, poison, that would be good? how does one desire forgetting

pp. 36-37 is madness the movement of the circle or its excess? besieges reason at its 2 borders (inside & outside)

——linked to double bind (stricture, ligature, obligation) > absolve, forget absolutely & forgive by giving (lier et délier absolument)

p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

pp. 101-02 subject as such: bordered, posed, identified, always calculates, reappropriates surplus-value, circular return, a certain capitalization

——despite labor of subject, production of surplus-value, gift takes place where there’s trace, dissemination, in excessive forgetting, forgetful excess of the gift

p. 112 annihilation of a remainder, as ashes sometimes testify, can play role of memory, of offering, of sacrifice

p. 147 violence of gift: takes by surprise in such a way as to trap, indebt the receiver, place, hold in a process of circulation, but this violence irreducible whether it repeats or interrupts the circle

——or: a surprise surprising enough to be forgotten w/out delay, beyond Being, epekeina tes ousia: secret about which one cannot speak, but can no longer remain silent

MONL p. 5 they have a short memory = out of training

p. 31 amnesia is active, dynamic, something other than mere forgetfulness

pp. 59-60 break with tradition, uprooting, amnesia w/out recourse: all of these unleash the genealogical drive, the desire of the idiom, impulse to anamnesis, destructive love of the interdict, tattooing of all colors on the body [see AF p. 10 erogenous color draws mask]

——madness of a hypermnesia, a supplement of loyalty, commit to traces of writing: toward an anamnesis of the entirely other > this is the most difficult thing [Aristotle says same about virtue]

OOG p. 98 in phenomenology, forgetfulness, a phenomenon of the ego, can never be radical

p. 119 new reduction (epochē) developed in Crisis cannot be a forgetting or negating, a subtraction or devaluation of what it de-sediments or neutralizes

***MC p. 366 “a lapsus gives another truth a chance”

AF pp. 11-12 archive requires repetition, repetition permits memory but is indissociable from death drive—so archive introduces forgetfulness, archiviolithic, always works against itself [auto-immunity]

——death drive destroys archive, unless it can be made up as idol, represented, painted, erotic simulacrum

——death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

p. 23 entire economy of archival law found in these 2 words: memorial & reminder

——arca: cupboard, coffin, prison cell

SPOM p. 136 dividing line of figural inheritance: mechanical reproduction of specter, and “an appropriation…so alive, so interiorizing” that it is life as forgetting, forgetting the maternal, “to make spirit live in oneself”

pp. 137-38 the 2 types of forgetting in Marx: 1) forgetting of revolutionary inheritance, forget specter (primitive, mother tongue), pre-inheritance, & parody, appropriate life of new language so that history can continue [remember while forgetting enough]; Marx: find again spirit of revolution w/out making its specter return 2) bourgeois forgetting: content to forget

——these 2 modalities contaminate each other in conjuration (or convoking) of dead because simulacrum consists in miming ghost or in simulating the phantasm of the other > but Marx holds to this [this?] difference as he holds to life

p. 139 once revolutionary task sets in, amnesia occurs, nothing but forgetting, “anachrony practices and promises forgetting”

——question of head, cap-, spirit > amnesiac order of capitalist bourgeoisie, the muzzle (gueule) replaces head at summit

p. 143 Marx’s revolutionary injunction “let the dead bury the dead”, the imperative of an “active forgetting,” as Nietzsche would put it

——neither the dead nor the living (the “only living,” the immortal living, the gods) have buried anyone (Marx knows this) > il faudra toujours que des mortels encore vivants enterrent des vivants déjà morts

spirit of past [not ghost?] convoked to anesthetize itself (sich betäuben), protects against its “own content,” protects against itself, makes you forget why and that you’re violent

POOF p. 100 “truth, freedom, necessity, and equality come together in the politics of fraternity”

——isn’t there no chance for a perhaps here? for an absolute housebreak or hospitality, an arrivance? > Greek fraternity founded on a perhaps that brought about its own forgetting, the forgetting of the perhaps [Heidegger’s forgetting of Being]

p. 127 would the decision be free or not? active or passive? conscious or unconscious? is the decision always linked to oblivion itself?

p. 295 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

p. 302 it is thanks to death that friendship can be declared, and never if not recalling > friendship declared during lifetime avows the same thing [so what is significance of actual death?]

MPM pp. 51-2 fidelity requires that one quote, let other speak, and that one not restrict oneself to quoting > double law of Mnemosyne or common law of double source Mnemosyne/Lethe

pp. 55-56 Paul de Man translates Hegel’s “Ich kann nicht sagen was ich (nur) meine” as ‘I cannot say I’ > effacing of I, a priori functional forgetting > “Autobiography as De-facement”

***pp. 61-2 de Man: memory of present is “a forgetting or a suppression of anteriority,” “memory effaces remembrance”

***p. 66 must keep in memory difference of Lethe from Mnemosyne, call this aletheia

——promise of the other (for the future, trace of the future) made to the other as an absolute past, the other’s sur-vival exceeds the “we” of a common present: brings together two friends, “incredible scene of memory,” written in absolute past; dictates madness of amnesic fidelity, forgetful hypermnesia, gravest and lightest

p. 71 we must remember the power of forgetting (what tradition calls “bad”: pharmakon, sign, figure of allegory) as opposed to forgetting in the sense of interior “recollection”

p. 84 allegorical Mnemosyne/ironical Lethe

p. 85 “even if this memory of prefiguration were possible, we know that it would offer no ‘anteriority’ that was not fictive or figural; it could only 'suppress' or ‘forget’ it”

A pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

EM p. 133 (161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

PP p. 105 memory and truth cannot be separated, movement of alētheia, a deployment of mnēmē as psychic life in its self-presentation to itself > powers of lēthē (writing, pharmakon) increase domains of death, nontruth, nonknowledge: fascinate, hypnotize, medusa [verb]

——acc. to king, pharmakon hypnotizes life of memory, taking it out of itself (la faisant sortir de soi) by monumentalizing it: médusée (medusad)

PAS PAS p. (29) forgetting is another name for pas, affecting without return the being of “is”

p. (33) Derrida proposes we hear Blanchot’s viens, a coming back w/out memory (le sous-venir sans mémoire), in Heidegger’s Ereignis

p. (54) double pas provokes double instantaneous but interminable preterition, forms a singular limit btwn keeping and loss, remembering and forgetting

——pas est loubli, pas doubli doublement affirmé (oui, oui)

p. (55) an infinite patience that crosses the limit in one stroke, a forgetting that overflows all philosophical and psychoanalytic determinations w/out omitting their pertinence

p. (67) forgetting beyond all our categories of forgetting (beyond economy of repressions working toward protection)

——every revolution needs to take account of Blanchot’s forgetting, forgetting w/out forgetting, a forgetting beyond the protection of repression, a forgetting that describes the whole history of dissimulation > pas dautre

X that is loubli tout autre is also the same X of philosophy, science

p. (69) nothing presents itself [in approach of “terrifyingly ancient,” terrifyingly becoming “subject” not accessory adverb], fors lobscène (save the obscene), what awaits as forgetting

p. (77) Blanchot: I forget nothing, it is in this way que jappartiens à loubli

p. (87) [on not citing his sources] the worst méconaissance of Blanchot’s text, hand over incommensurable in it to the market, the hierarchy, the dominant effects tied to name & law, but [other voice] there’s always benefits of mastery for sovereign renunciation, it’s gonna happen, il faut en rendre compte, the gift itself never forgets itself, nor the forgetting

p. (92) if being is another name for forgetting, places forgetting in a crypt, forgets forgetting, in naming forgetting one makes it disappear under its name [(un)names], vs. pas sous le nom doubli > le reste sans reste de cet effacement qui ne sefface plus, voilà ce quil y a peut-être, par chance, mais qui nest pas ou qui est pas

p. (93) forgetting must guard itself (se guarder) to preserve the gift, so the gift can give, the bank (berge) and contamination poison the gift

——to give must forget all the way up to what is given, one gives without having self (sans savoir)

p. (94) must be able to reject the gift, vomir ce qui tappelle à dire viens, forget in order to reject the poison, to not guard the gift

pp. (107-08) Blanchot: solemn and noble procession toward what goal? and then forgetfulness came

OH p. 13 we must not forget programs that do not forget us [re: Eurocentrism, anti-Eurocentrism]

p. 19 must be suspicious of repetitive memory and tout autre of absolutely new [cf. POOF p. 65], of anamnestic capitalization & amnesic exposure to what would no longer be identifiable

pp. 27-8 in the dated nature of dating, of currentness, lies a disquieting wrinkle, stigmata of anachrony marking all our days > traditional discourse of modernity, discourse of anamnesis w/ its goût de fin, if not for death

——horizon (ancient Greek) = limit; to see itself (Europe) on the horizon, is to see itself from its end, discourse of anamnesis—taste for finality (goût de fin), for death

p. 28 we did not choose this responsibility of our heritage [it is from the other, the language of our language], nor the capitalizing memory we have of it

TC p. 247 theater/festival of cruelty could only take place one time, w/out reserve, return, economy, history, must be forgotten, à la Nietzsche’s active forgetting (aktive Vergesslichkeit)

SH p. 38 ideality carries forgetting in its memory, the memory of forgetting itself, the truth of forgetting > reference to singular event annulled in ring’s annulation, the date’s turning-about, una volta, volte-face, revolt, revolution

p. 43 date es gibt, annulment at work when date inscribes its here and now in iterability, consigns itself to self-forgetfulness, succeeds in effacing itself

pp. 52-3 poem is a hermeneutic event, it has philosophical implications which draw out the limits of hermeneutic acuity; limit of philosophy and formal poetics not to be renounced, not a failure: they recall the forgetting of the mark’s annulment by forgetting it (by supposing date)

FWT p. 160 “one must forget well” (basically same transubstantiation as) “one must eat well”: il faut bien oublier la mort, il faut bien manger

love object is perpetuated in being betrayed/forgotten, the one who died must be forgotten

SP pp. 135-37 possible forgetting [?] of their code makes all texts open, undecipherable, and structurally posthumous (the author will die w/ the key inside, will forget it even)

pp. 141-43 for Heidegger, forgetting of a being incommensurable w/ forgetting of Being: [Derrida quotes Heidegger: can’t understand forgetting as a human fact, as omission, Being not umbrella of distracted philosopher, forgetting attacks essence of Being, is the Destiny of the essence of Being]

OTO pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

FS p. 27 like structuralism, no concept of force in Husserl (brings phenomenology back to Platonism despite professed anti-Platonism); for Husserl, truth requires forgetting [of genesis, force, failure, crises]

p. 27 when all value 1st constituted by theoretical subject, diaphanousness is supreme value, univocity > hence, difficulty in thinking genesis & mysterious failures called crises

——Husserl’s solution: forgetting is eidetically dictated, necessary, under rubric of “sedimentation” > for the development of truth

***p. 28 not abandon ourselves to structural formalism: must attempt emancipation, but only as a dream, emancipation is impossible unless we forget our history [contra Nietzsche?]

DIF DIF p. 23 Heidegger: when the essence of presencing unnoticeably becomes something present, the distinction btwn presencing and what is present (Anwesen und Anwesendem) is forgotten

p. 24 forgetting of ontological difference: disappearance of trace of trace > Heidegger: even the early trace (die frühe Spur) is obliterated when presence is in the position of the highest

WAP pp. 5-6 institution can forget its own elect (finite memory), its finitude also effects remembrance of what it wants to exclude: the surface of its archive thus inscribed w/ what it refuses, excludes (ex: Walter Benjamin not receiving a degree)

SW p. 349 signature (operation of poetic writing) must not be absolutely invulnerable: an “I” signs in the place of the wound (the other operates on us w/out knowing)—so virtual that it remains > bears bereaved memory of an unrefusable lesion > seems older than self: you may have forgotten it, but it carries on dictating all the blows of fate (as if we desired even the worst of them)

TB p. 116 does a work require translation? answer is apodictic, injunction even w/out translator there, the requirement of the other as translator: structure of original, relation of life to survival > a priori, even if forgotten > its apodictic essence: it is unforgettable, so forgetting is accidental, death would not change it at all

CHM p. 308n no history except of rationality/meaning: reappropriation of negativity—or forgets it (same thing) > history of truth, history of economy of negative: negativity not positive truth is the nonhistorical capital of history

p. 60 Derrida’s deconstruction of Foucault not a philosophia perrenis: historicity of philosophy located btwn hyperbole & finite structure, btwn closed totality and what exceeds it, in difference btwn history & historicity, in moment btwn hyperbole/madness/Cogito & forgetting > another statement of excess that’ll become another decline/crisis

pp. 62-3 crisis: 1) acc. Husserl, menace to reason/meaning by way of objectivism, forgetting of origins 2) krinein, choice & division btwn 2 ways: meaning, non-meaning (Parmenides’ logos and non-way [labyrinth, the palintrope]), division in which logos (in necessary violence of its irruption) separates from itself as madness, forgets its origin [back to 1)]—finitude > possibility as crisis?

——identity btwn consciousness of crisis & forgetting of it > crisis of reason: access to reason and attack of reason > Foucault teaches us to think: crises of reason in strange complicity w/ crises of madness

EJQB p. 76 is not the writing of the question, the first violence re: the question, a first response and repose, lerrance (wandering) as history, first crisis, first forgetting, the dissimulation of lerrance?

p. 78 books are always books of life, or of afterlife > written questions addressed to literature are forgotten, drained, by literature (mortifications, ruses of life, life negating itself in literature to survive): writing would die of pure vigilance to question (and also simple erasure of question)

——absolute interrogation (of God) will never belong to the book

***D p. 331 trace can only imprint itself by referring to another trace (the other), letting itself be upstaged (outrepasser)/forgotten: its force of production stands in relation to energy of its erasure

IW p. 293 via Renan, brutal unity of nation requires active, selective forgetting, one can’t tolerate something at origin of nation: act of originary violence, unavowable curse

p. 294 national forgetting as remembering a future promise (promise structurally involves forgetting, essential indifference to past)

p. 295 “desire to live together,” performative engagements, promises, inscribe necessity of forgetting in memory itself

PJP p. 163 le parjure forgot to remember the duty of memory (infinite at every instant), memory must be an ethical obligation [I did not think that I had to not forget]

p. 191 amnesia, irreducible distraction, disappearance at heart of finite thought: the resource, power of anacoluthon [see p. 194]

HST p. 382 no forgiveness w/out memory (but not reducible to act of memory), forgiveness is, above all, not to forget [Jankelevitch]

——that forgiveness is not forgetting [?] makes us laugh through tears/anguish

TN pp. 92-3 is it possible to change climates? I believe not > I don’t really believe this, not in an instant, w/ a loss of memory

***NOY p. 240 promise of memory, memory of promise, before all psychē, all morality

——the “second” yes, doit arriver comme un renouvellement absolu, the structural “forgetting” of fidelity

——“grâce à la menace de cet oubli [the cutting off, the becoming unique, the divisibility contre laquelle une signature se tend] la mémoire de la promesse, la promesse même peut franchir son premier pas, à savoir le second

——forgetting repetition in the promise so that “yes” is absolutely inaugural and “free”

TINO N pp. 208-09 “cinder” [ashes] renders better what Derrida meant by trace, remaining w/out remaining, cinder is not!, testifies w/out testifying, destruction of memory itself, absolute radical forgetting: absolute non-memory communicates w/ gift—not seeking to be recognized or saved; incineration as elementary form of experience

AD p. 96 for Levinas, forgetting the other would attest to its absolute truth

CF p. 57 all Nation-States founded in violence, all culture a type of colonialism > foundation scripted into State order to hide itself, sublimation/celebration of beginning as amnesia

CIN p. 39 if you no longer recall it, it’s because the incineration/consummation of cinder proceeds from cinder itself > trace destined like everything to disappear so as to lose its way or rekindle a memory

BSi p. 82 chase chimeras, centaurs: to forget them, domesticate them, repress them, cause them to flee

OG pp. 36-7 (54-5) to think writing first, a perversion, dangerous promiscuity, origin ungraspable, the violence of forgetting, auxiliary meaning not living (not spontaneous); representation mingles (senlace) w/ what it represents; infinite reference (renvoi): le double dédouble ce quil redouble

pp. 199-200 for Rousseau, origin as beginning of end, inaugural decadence, separation btwn song & speech: growth of music parallels writing as “dangerous supplement” > gradual forgetting (of voice of nature) usurps, separates, deprives: re-placement as effacement by forgetting

p. 286 (405) forgetting & repression inadequate ideas to explain finitude & dissimulation > forgetting & repression both products of a philosophy (of meaning)

CIR p. 272 they can’t stand that I say nothing refutable (nor tenable, nor valid), my capacity for silence & amnesia, not a strategy but “violence of the void through which God goes to earth to death in me”

pp. 272-73 never been able to contradict myself, still so young [cf. SW pp. 322-23], unforgettable power of my discourse—they grind even the mute ash, name of God in the ash > so I write, convenient for forgetting

FORGIVENESS

GOD pp. 85-86 sacrifice of Isaac is an abomination, it is criminal, unforgivable; today society not only participates in incalculable sacrifices (starving children, wars), it organizes them

p.125n via Kierkegaard, true fiction of every scene of forgiveness

p. 126 instead of asking forgiveness for misdeed, I ask forgiveness for preferring you to the other other—unforgivable in forgiveness; Abraham prefers secret that binds him to God than secret that binds him to the other other [Isaac, family]

p. 127 “one never asks forgiveness except for the unforgiveable”; p. 137 one doesn’t forgive someone who is innocent

p. 128 Abraham’s silence, secrecy of unforgivable, decision, would have “to be forgiven by the one he obeyed”

p. 131 reader of literature hypnotized, paralyzed before suspended perplexity, before secret path of secret, exposed and concealed, jealously guarded: who says what to whom? who asks forgiveness?

pp.132-33 “pardon for not meaning (to say),” secretless secret of literature, scene of forgiveness, its being “up in the air” keeps it secret, announces literature

——forgiveness as im-possible, experience of this impossibility is received differently

——the phrase [“pardon for…”] is “up in the air”: an appearance that comes from who knows where, contingency (touch, tact, contact), & pertinent (touching, tact, contact) > dwells suspended in air, even when it touches, meteoric, suspended like Abraham’s knife over Isaac’s head

p. 141 Judaic God repents, feels remorse, takes back his commands—i.e. the flood, his gesture resembles a confession, a plea for forgiveness [Christ is constantly taking back?]

p. 142 “who” can forgive, “what” can forgive? (who/what—impossible delimitation); Question of God: 1) can someone else forgive you? 2) can you forgive yourself?

p. 145 woman spectacularly absent from scenes of forgiveness btwn father & son

pp. 145,148 secret secret of forgiveness: to remain secret, and to become self-forgiveness (via specular identification), and in the ambiguity of se pardonner, to be deprived of sense in this narcissistic reflexivity

——to ask forgiveness is to identify with the other, auto-affect, hetero-affect

p.147 plea for forgiveness in inheritance of God’s retraction; God’s retraction, a double coming-back, covenant only sealed through repetition [Noah is twice forgiven], God goes back on himself; dissymmetrical contract of Covenant supposes double trait of this retreat (re-trait) (Entzug)

p. 148 forgiveness is a history of God, covenant btwn God & God through the human, à travers le travers de lhomme

——Derrida tells story: Levinas sadly explains how one has to ask forgiveness before saying “God” nowadays

pp. 148-49 whenever one asks for pardon, God is part of it: divine retraction as God observing human desire, not jealousy

p. 150 story of flood, of Noah, hesitate forever btwn justice & perversion: God won’t forgive himself for the fault in man, for man’s desire, regrets his creation

p. 157 literature asks forgiveness as from the very first word

GT pp. 16-17 absolute forgetting (oubli absolu) which unbinds (délie) absolutely or infinitely more than excuse, forgiveness, acquittal: certain experience of trace, cinder, ashes

p. 31 gift beyond responsibility forbids one to forgive those who don’t know how to give?

pp. 36-37 is madness the movement of the circle or its excess? besieges reason at its 2 borders (inside & outside)

——linked to double bind (stricture, ligature, obligation) > absolve, forget absolutely & forgive by giving (lier et délier absolument)

p. 116 reason for non-forgiveness [re: “Counterfeit Money”] convokes a whole philosophy whose high noon (sun w/out shadow) is very elliptical

p. 122 narrative gives possibility of impossibility of story as story of gift or forgiveness

LOBL p. 146 we always ask to be forgiven when we write

MPM p. 113 Austin’s cunning naïveté as he discusses promises and excuses

p. 148 always necessary to excuse oneself for appropriating to oneself this work of mourning

p. 149 “always necessary to excuse oneself for giving,” given its risk of its being in annulled in thanks, given that it never arrives in present

A p. 2 whenever someone speaks of someone else, cites or praises him or her, one must hear: this is the story of my life [re: Diderot accusing Seneca, pardoning Seneca, asking for pardon himself]

POOF pp. 51-2 Nietzsche’s address ‘Foes, there are no foes’ requests that we go beyond excuse & pardon, still moves in religious space of benediction or malediction?

FWT pp. 4-5 leave life in life & make it live again, “let live,” laisser, most beautiful, hazardous thing, like giving up, giving over the gift, forgiveness > deconstruction never w/out this love, pays homage to those it takes on, sen prendre

pp. 160-61 heritage of forgiveness at once Jewish, Christian, and Islamic w/ very strong Christian imprint: the criminal asks for forgiveness, recognizes his fault

p. 161 two logics of forgiveness: 1) forgive when asked for (this is the prevalent logic) 2) unconditional, forgive regardless, forgive “who” not “what” (this is scarcely visible)

p. 163 acc. Christian doctrine, God alone can forgive

pp. 163-64 for Arendt, forgiveness is a purely human experience, which, and Derrida is not convinced, only has meaning where right to punish is exercised; for Derrida, forgiveness has nothing in common w/ punishment, don’t need God to speak of transhuman, ahuman

pp. 164-65 forgive the unforgivable, the impossible: accomplish a gesture no longer measured by human immanence > origin of religion related to this possibility

——there is transcendence in idea of forgiveness

DPi p. xv capital punishment > question of unforgivable

p. 40 to think forgiveness, set out from unforgivable, irreversible, we spoke of some surviving (du sur-vivre) that leaves one defenseless before a death/injury that already occurred, where victims can no longer testify > not only speaking of death, but judgment of injury/wrong

——DP in relation to “Perjury & Pardon”: death of victims, those deprived by violence of request for possible forgiveness [i.e. raped South African women], death inflicted on innocent, voiceless

pp. 45-6 in series of seminars called “Pardon & Perjury,” Derrida insisted that forgiveness/pardon foreign to juridical space, unlike perjury > with DP, we have the sovereign pardon; w/ DP, forgiveness returns to the Lord, remains un-forgivable on Earth

p. 47 law of pardon: it must be lawless, absolute exception, beyond calculation

——paradox of knowing, wanting to know the exception (which must be unforeseeable); problematic of exception will articulate connection btwn pardon, perjury & DP (see p. 243)

p. 64 DP as Christian theater of sovereignty, mercy, right of pardon

pp. 156-57 Christianity’s stroke of genius: to believe/credit unbelievable meaning of Incarnation/Passion: creditor has paid your debt, forgiven the unforgivable: i.e. love, the creditor pays the debt, I give you what you don’t have, I forgive you > Nietzsche: “can one credit that?”

pp. 244-45(n) Christianity calls itself, the self-styled religion of forgiveness (Hegel): son and death of God-made-man, father sacrificing son to redeem sins of mankind, humanization of God

——can one think a “radically non-Christian deconstruction”? a deconstruction w/out sublation of Christian deconstruction? nothing is less certain [!] > would “to self-deconstruct (se déconstruire)” always be “to ask forgiveness”

pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

TR p. 83 Rousseau spent his life protesting his innocence, thus excusing himself, rather than asking forgiveness

p. 86 Rousseau confesses to proclaim his radical innocence (which God knows), unlike Augustine begging for pardon

pp. 91-2 for Rousseau, Jesus forgives his executioner as God, Socrates blesses him as a man

p. 92 Rousseau’s wager (from The Creed) to remain in religion of one’s birth, a quasi-Pascalian sense of machine: best calculation to obtain forgiveness from God

p. 100 paradoxical instance of “last word”: forgiveness, pardon, excuse, remission of sin, absolute absolution always proposed in figure of “last word”

——a pardon must be granted w/ assurance, promise of end of history

——disturbing proximity btwn pardon & last judgment (which pardon is not, pardon does not judge, foreign to courtroom), as close as possible to verdict

——“I forgive you” has structure of last word, hence its apocalyptic & millenarian aura

pp. 105-06 de Man assumes excuse & forgiveness are the same [?], and that it is easy to say “I forgive you,” he only analyses the one excusing him/herself (not the victim who forgives)

pp. 110-11 Derrida doesn’t believe, like de Man, that there are 2 dissociable modes: every confessional text is already both revealing (asserting a truth) and performing an excuse (apologizing) > undecidable, impossible distinction

——this undecidability makes for all the interest, obscurity, non-decomposable specificity of what is called confession, avowal, excuse, or an asked-for forgiveness

——touching on equivocation btwn constative (revealed truth) & performative (the excuse): originary or preoriginary synthesis w/out which there’d be no trace, inscription, body, materiality > it’s why we’re always asking for forgiveness in ambiguous, perjuring mode

p. 115 in every scene of inheritance, there’s laws of substitution (law period): responsibility, debt, duty—thus guilt & forgiveness

p. 118 discontinuity will help us go beyond the excuse come closer to event of forgiveness

pp. 118-19 event of forgiveness: 1) always supposes irreversible interruption, revolutionary caesura, end of history, at least of history as teleological process 2) inscription, material trace

pp. 127-28 relation of event & asking pardon, treading on toes (Algerian Jewish Marriage)

p. 133 forgiveness & excuse only possible where there’s quasi-machinelike survival of oeuvre

***p. 134 re: oeuvre as trace of its ambiguity, as if quasi-machine were already operating even before being produced in the world, in the vivid experience of living present

——formidable effects of machinelike automaticity: an a priori, programmed “I apologize” > automatic forgiveness self-destructs w/out delay (faster than “Mission Impossible” tapes), loses its meaning, its memory, annihilates its own archive

PJP p. 174 to ask forgiveness: must confirm sincerity of the first commitment [contract of Law, oath, promise to be true], thus attenuating betrayal (by calling it secondary): could not foresee the other “who,” 3rd party, other self > drama of diachrony, bifid structure

p. 198 ultimate signature (last pages of book) says something of debt that remains unpaid > no scene of perjury w/out forgiveness

——forgive me, we say to us

p. 200 forgiveness linked to impossible marriage

——sacrifice of Isaac: sort of rupture w/ marriage, infidelity to Sarah

——madness of marriage, madness of the oath; for Kierkegaard, one cannot suffer/repent together from an unhappy love: “unethical for her & me to sorrow thus in union [sorge]”

p. 201 marriage, machine of death, madness of alliance in Christian marriage: at center of question of perjury & forgiveness > ***Christianity marries everything

HST pp. 380-81 forgiveness granted to other—supreme gift of hospitality > host too must ask forgiveness, welcoming must be infinite, one can never give enough to surprise of visitor, messianic surprise: host, always lacking, at fault, unprepared

p. 381 unsolvable, vertiginous depth of sans-fond, irresistible whirlpool that carries forgiveness, gift, re-giving, re-dealing of forgiveness, to the abyss of the impossible

——to acquit oneself of forgiveness, to call it quits: repeats, countersigns evil

p. 382 no forgiveness w/out memory (but not reducible to act of memory), forgiveness is, above all, not to forget [Jankelevitch]

——that forgiveness is not forgetting [?] makes us laugh through tears/anguish

——Jew of any time, especially this century, undergoes lépreuve (test, ordeal, trial) of impossibility of forgiveness

pp. 382, 396 story of 2 Jewish enemies who forgive each other, fake it, “for laughs,” des justes assez justes to avow that they can’t forgive

pp. 382-83 survival guilt, reproach oneself before everything for which Auschwitz remains proper name/metonymy > asking forgiveness for being-there (être-là); (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas) debt prior to any borrowing: unacquittable fact of being-there, a being there originarily guilty

——asking for forgiveness occurs in the unforgivable; guilt of survivor (not only concentration camp survivor), anyone who is mourning; work of mourning is always “I survive”

p. 383 Levinas: ask forgiveness of other “as if” one were guilty of causing his misfortune/end [Derrida adds: “as if”?]

p. 385 impossibility of forgiveness must be thought onto la racine la plus radicale of its paradox—it does not resist the impossibility of what wants to be conceived in it > concept of concept undergoes lépreuve of its essential precariousness, its finitude, its deconstructability

——for forgiveness to be possible, what there is to forgive must remain unforgivable: otherwise exchange, excuse [see p. 380] > logical aporia (not just formal logic) but tragedy of compassion: intersubjectivity as destiny of hostage, madness of substitution

——Derrida’s classic logic of the impossible] to forgive the unforgivable is impossible: since forgiveness can only forgive the unforgivable, forgiveness must do the impossible

——forgive the fault itself not the subject, the fault must remain unforgivable in order to call for forgiveness on its behalf

——unforgivable as worst of the worst: resists any historical reconciliation

p. 386 forgiveness merges (se confondre) w/ lépreuve of aporia: possibility of impossible, impossible of the possible

——forgiveness, hospitality, gift affix condition of impossibility to the other: gift as most unforgivable

——complacent height: nothing more haughty (hautain) than “I forgive you”

——must welcome the infinite (for Levinas, that’s 1st hospitality), forgive beyond me, what is not mine to forgive [forgiving in my name but only in the name of the other]: must think substitution from limit-experiences (decision, gift, forgiveness), from possible-impossible, the impossible of the possible

p. 387 impossibility of the possible, possible of the impossible has an affinity w/ what Heidegger says of death [cf. A p. 68 for a different take?] > links gift of death w/ gift of forgiveness: where is forgiveness more impossible than border btwn living/dead?

***p. 388 the 3rd intrudes when 2 absolutes exchange place; the 3rd, question of justice, immediately betrays other’s finite-infinite singularity > thus: congenital perjury of justice

——must ask forgiveness for being just

——forgiveness for infidelity at heart of fidelity—suffice to say “at the heart”

——this tragedy, which discords the heart in its very accord, calls for forgiveness: original sin before original sin—prayer of mercy (miséricorde) rises

p. 389 God as name of he alone who can forgive > God can abandon me, but also (beauty of word abandonment), God is the only one to whom I can abandon myself, to God’s forgiveness

——love, mystical love, gives itself w/out giving anything but itself > abandons itself while asking forgiveness at the height of the other

pp. 391-92 for Levinas, threshold of solitude constitutes request for forgiveness, constitutes being-myself—a kind of ego cogito as an asking forgiveness from the other (a leap), as the very temporalizing of “I” [morality/psychology as ontology: the being in “being forgiven”]

——surviving, resurrection, as miracle of each instant (having to be forgiven—as survivor)

——resurrection/survival becomes miracle of each instant, where an “I” calls out for forgiveness (salvation, redemption, Messiah), every instant

p. 394 Levinas: “I” does not endow itself w/ this [temporal] alterity: impossibility of dialectical time is impossibility of saving oneself by oneself (alone)

——classical thesis of time (monad, event of negation) lacked thought of forgiveness (until Bergson & Heidegger)

p. 395 Levinas: freedom is not negating oneself but having one’s being pardoned by alterity of the other—dialogue w/ other, not silent dialogue w/ our soul, frees us

p. 396 mad laughter, le rire dément, at forgiveness in betrayal, betrayal in forgiveness

p. 397 infinite compassion: the decision of not being able to stop (as life itself never stops [ne se désarme]) > forgiveness, w/out saying anything

——X, great 3rd, God accords/grants forgiveness, renders substitution possible

——the definition of (a) today, sursis de vie, reconciliation in the impossible > great forgiveness as test/ordeal of unforgivable [re: 2 enemy Jews comically forgiving each other]

p. 398 last aporia of forgiveness, most artful, provoke laughter to point of madness [Beckett’s risus purus]

——circular commerce: force someone to forgive you, to invite you

pp. 398-99 that one can neither say nor even think “I invite you,” “I forgive you,” w/out destroying gift in commerce, calls for an inaudibility that would prevent living beings from forgiving each other > forgive before the death of the other & before my death

——forgiveness from dead to dead [cf. SPOM p. 220] most common, a forgiveness of procedure > it is a historical forgiveness right where forgiveness must remain irreducible to history, loses itself in oblivion, denatures itself in excuses and veniality (once forgiveness btwn living and living is forbidden)

——the scandalous aporia: can’t forgive the living (commerce), can’t forgive the dead (silent procedure, oblivion); can only forgive on forbidden threshold/border btwn life/death

p. 400 last vertigo/breath: forgiving in the name of the other: is this only forgiving the other in one’s/his place (à sa place) in substitution, or forgiving the other one’s/his name, i.e. what survives of him, pardonner au nom de lautre as (to) his first fault?

TN p. 47 in the beginning there’s abstinence: et le toucher parjure sans retard, unforgivably

p. 67 untouchable before vow of abstinence [cf. OG p. 109 spacing prior to prohibition of names]? a vow of abstinence requires promise of touch > touch haunting abstinence itself, intensifying transgression: unforgivable perjury at heart of interdict

p. 295 Nancy’s “transgression” close to Derrida’s “originary perjury as inevitable as it is unforgivable”

CF p. 27 no limit to forgiveness, heterogenous to excuse, regret, amnesty, prescription

pp. 28-9 theater of forgiveness, the singular Abrahamic language becoming universal idiom of law: agent & symptom of internationalism

——act of memory, appearance (comparution) before juridical instant, Nation-State tribunal

pp. 31-2 forgiveness not pure when aimed at reconciliation, determined finalities, at reestablishing normality by a work of mourning

***p. 32 dry & implacable formality of aporia, w/out mercy: forgiveness forgives only unforgivable

p. 33 forgiveness announces itself as impossibility itself

——archivization of unforgivable crimes by ‘universal conscience’ better informed than ever: reactivates/accelerates call to forgiveness

p. 34 for Hegel, all is forgivable except crime against spirit, against reconciling power of forgiveness

pp. 35-6 in Le Pardon, Jankélévitch delimits a “hyperbolic ethics,” beyond laws, ethics beyond ethics, undiscoverable place of forgiveness—but does not admit an unconditional forgiveness

p. 36 traditionally, forgiveness must have a meaning: salvation, reconciliation, redemption, atonement

p. 37 is forgiveness a faculty? a sovereign “I can,” a human power?

——Arendt: punishment & forgiveness put limits on crimes that would continue indefinitely

——Jankélévitch: forgiveness died in death camps

p. 38 “who,” “what,” do you forgive? from “whom,” for “what,” do you ask forgiveness?

——[Derrida disagrees w/ Jankélévitch’s ‘only forgive those who ask for forgiveness’]

p. 39 the excessive, mad, hyperbolic forgiveness, surprises like a revolution: to forgive not only the guilty one but the fault itself, where both are evil, irreversibly, repeatably

——this mad forgiveness heterogenous to politics, ordinary juridical practice > otherwise, calculated transaction, negotiations, hypothetical imperatives

pp. 40-1 ‘national reconciliation’ can appear honorable [re: crimes against humanity], but forgiveness not therapy of reconciliation

p. 42 forgiveness must engage 2 singularities: the guilty (perpetrator) & victim

——amnesty, reconciliation, reparation when 3rd intervenes (no longer pure forgiveness)

p. 43 equivocality, heterogeneity, confusion btwn order of forgiveness & order of justice [juridical] > one can mimic scene of “immediacy,” quasi-automatic forgiveness, to escape justice

——forgiveness has nothing to do w/ [State] judgment or public/political sphere

p. 44 only dead man can forgive—survivor not ready to substitute him/herself (immense, painful experience of survivor)

pp. 46-7 for Hegel, only king/sovereign can forgive the unforgivable (a crime against forgiveness, against power to forgive): when ‘body of king’ in his sovereign function is threatened through other ‘body of king,’ his flesh (singular, empirical body)

pp. 48-9 the impossibility of finding a language where the crime could be understood > forgiveness plunged lucidly into night of unintelligible (non-conscious or unconscious)

p. 49 ‘radical evil,’ or perhaps even worse, unforgivable evil, that which makes question of forgiveness emerge

p. 50 must forgiveness saturate the abyss (suture, reconcile)? but who could object to imperative of reconciliation? amnesties, work of mourning—political strategy, psycho-therapeutic economy

pp. 50-1 strategies ruses can hide abusively behind “rhetoric” or “comedy” of forgiveness

p. 51 I remain ‘torn’ btwn ‘hyperbolic’ ethical vision of pure forgiveness & reality of society (pragmatic processes of reconciliation) > w/out power or desire to decide > to change law necessary to refer to hyperbolic ethical vision of forgiveness

p. 58 odious sovereignty: “I forgive you”

***pp. 58-9 absolute victimization—no speech, stripped of any possibility to forgive (not always murder)

p. 59 Jankélévitch/Arendt: one only forgives where one can judge/punish > supposes power, force, sovereignty

pp. 59-60 Derrida’s mad, not so mad, dream of forgiveness w/out power: unconditional but w/out sovereignty

FORM AND CONTENT (psyche,

KH pp. 94-5 giving form to khōra, schematizing, repeats Plato’s discourse, in which skhemata are the forms which inform khōra, the forms are of it w/out belonging to it

p. 95 khōra never reached, broached [entamer?], touched, exhausted: not subject, not subjectile

——a virginity rebellious against anthropomorphism, not order of eidos or mimemes

pp. 117 structure of inclusion in Timaeus: included [2nd] fiction, the theme of the prior fiction, which is its [the 2nd fiction’s] including form, its [the 2nd fiction’s] receptacle > mythopoetic string of events [see p. 121 each fiction as content given form in receptacle of another]

p. 127 Plato never qualified khōra as matter (hylè) like Aristotle did

BL p. 213 generic distinction of form/content in literature: form is signifying expression, phenomena of language or rhetoric [don’t confuse form w/ framing]

POO p. 24 “let us (deconstructionists?) testify (témoignons) to a secret that is without content, without a content separable from its performative experience, from its performative tracing”

SPOM pp. 142-43 when Marx describes anachronistic dislocation (“there the words (Phrase) went beyond the content (Inhalt); here the content goes beyond the words”), he believes in the proper content, appropriate content

pp. 191 animism of wood, already matter becoming-immaterial, what would enlightenment be w/out the market? will there ever be progress w/out exchange-value?

p. 192 for Marx, capital contradiction, contradiction of automatic autonomy: 1) inert thing [table] appears inspired, has pneuma or psychē 2) remains caught in heavy thingness of hulē

——autonomy the mask of automatism, visor hides absence of living gaze, automaton mimes the living, Thing neither dead nor alive, it survives, war machine, theatrical machine, mekhanē

pp. 200-01 use-value before exchange value, hulē of wood, ordinary sensuous thing, table before dance > but it must have promised itself to iterability, no use-value w/out possibility of exchange & culture, of an hors-dusage

POR p. 14 (146) in-formation does not just offer content, it gives form: “in-formiert

VP p. 6 the ideality of ideality, living-present, self-presence of transcendental life; presence always the form, to infinity, through which an infinite diversity of contents will be produced > concrete ideality of “living present” justifies opposition btwn form and content ultimately and radically

p. 58 ideality of the form of presence can be repeated to infinity as return of the same, but retained in a finite movement

p. 63 for Husserl, “S is P” is original apophantic operation, the fundamental, primitive form

p. 84 [Husserl’s formalism, his “pure logical grammar,” limited by semantic theme, the sense determined on basis of relation to object > telos of epistemological rationality is irreducible origin of idea of pure grammar?]

FSW p. 214 when breaching, breaking of path, becomes route (via rupta) opened in nature, in wood (hyle) [see p. 229] > violent inscription of form opposed to writing, route acquires reversibility in time & space

DS pp. 248(n) “reflection” so loaded, reduces text to signified theme > thematicism as eudemonistic or hedonistic

——Freud’s inconsistency re: psychoanalysis of work of art: 1) going beyond formal limits toward theme (Stoff) in service of Lustprinzip 2) says, frustrated, the formal artist is given over to Lustprinzip

P p. 65 Kant’s “conceptual scheme” for any theory of art: rational/formal/logical vs. irrational/matter/illogical > thing as formed matter

p. 66 Heidegger on how blosse Ding is only a remainder (not properly determined in itself), a concept formed alongside, w/in, Christian creationism, matter/form, & concept of Überfall

p. 75 frame overflowed on 2 borders by what it overflows: it travaille [labors, gives, plays, see TN.] indeed; Kant is undoing the labor of the frame; the structurally bordered origin of surplus value creaks and cracks like wood, never fully exposed

p. 77 for Kant, pure sound & pure color as vibration of ether > purely formal, “universally compatible w/ certainty”—beautiful [what about color gold on frame?]

OS p. 34 in MOP, from Parmenides to Husserl, nonpresence always thought in the form of presence (or simply: in the form), past & future are past & future presents

p. 62 must think play of submission & subtraction as formal rule to read history of metaphysics w/in opening of Heidegger’s breakthrough [re: categories such as desire, movement, time]

GSP pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

p. 323n Koffka, disciple of Husserl, argues that “psychology of form” escapes critique of psychologism by means of its structuralism

FS p. 4 form fascinates when one no longer has force to understand force w/in itself [decadence?]

p. 5 w/in structure there’s not only form, relation & configuration > there’s an interdependency & totality that is always concrete

——structure is the formal unity of form & meaning

——in structuralism, content (living energy of meaning) is neutralized by form > they’ll say this is the author’s responsibility before the critic’s

p. 7 for Rousset, in the “literary fact” language is one w/ meaning, form belongs to content of work > all possible via imagination’s capacity for metaphor, unifying “form and content”

p. 20 medieval theology (Considérans): all forms, even monsters, beautiful, Formosus means beautiful > form is transcendentally beautifully: it is [Being] and makes things be [creating]

p. 21 Aristotle’s concept of movement: transition to the act, which is itself repose of the desired form

O p. 5 modes of presence: meaning, essence, objective or subjective existence, form (i.e. appearance, content, substance), sensible/intelligible presence

p. 11 lesson of Hegel’s to be maintained even beyond Hegelianism: complicity of empiricism/formalism

p. 21 neither formalism nor thematism can master irremediable structure of gap btwn empty form/full meaning: will miss it in attempt to master it

——Hegel allows for insistence [TN. (in + sistere) “standing firm in”] of a gap btwn form/content, btwn what he calls certainty and truth

pp. 21-2 Derrida explains many traps Hegel tries to avoid, i.e. rejecting formalism in name of inspiration (Begeisterung)

pp. 21-2n Hegel: math has for its Stoffe dead space & lifeless numerical unit

p. 23 Hegel: formalism as superficial analogy, empty application of formula, not inner life of self-movement (Selbstbewegung)

pp. 23-4 for Hegel, taxonomies, structures, formalisms offer dead limbs—et autres tableaux that pin down the living to death (épinglant le vif à mort)

pp. 29-30n Feuerbach on Hegel as a “game-player”: to Hegel the thinker, formally, absolute idea was an absolute certainty, to Hegel the writer, idea is a formal uncertainty

p. 31 tautology & heterology coupled together in speculative proposition > analytic/synthetic procedure mutually envelop each other: no more anteriority, belatedness of form, exteriority of content > concept enriches itself

p. 52 [in field of dissemination] formalism no longer fails (néchoue) before empirical richness [like in Hegel?] but before une queue, dont le se-mordre [self-bite] nest ni spéculaire ni symbolique

SW p. 336 for Freud (the Freud of Penismangel and pseudo-discovery of weaving), mother = matter = materia = Madeira = Holz = hylē

TB pp. 124-25 Benjamin’s metaphors of core (Kern)/shell, fruit/skin (Frucht/Schale) > core is btwn fruit/skin (tenor [Gehalt]/language [Sprache]) [very nuanced distinctions on all sides]

p. 127 still classical oppositional logic: expression before content (for Benjamin, expression is form and opposed to composition, which is usually on the side of form)

CHM p. 54 silence as madness: irreducible role of haunting language, outside and against which alone language can emerge: “against” designating 1) content from which form takes off by force 2) adversary against which I assure/reassure myself by force [jealous friends of solitude]

RGE p. 267 Bataille’s writing, in its major instance [see p. 266 major/minor play, both unknown to master], doesn’t tolerate distinction form/content

Gii pp. 37-8 for Heidegger, thinking as work of cabinetmaker (Schreiner), a joiner, attune to hidden plenitude of wood’s essence as it enters inhabited site, Handwerk

[re: Handwerk] w/out attunement to essence of wood, itself attuned to man’s dwelling: empty activity, commerce, taste for profit > (this is Heidegger’s hierarchy & evaluation)

REST pp. 265-66 when shoes no longer have strict relation avec un sujet porteur ou porté—they’re the lightened, anonymous, voided support (but so much the heavier abandoned à son inertie opaque) “of an absent subject whose name haunts the open form”

——never completely open, the shoe maintains a form, that of the foot > describes external surface or envelope of what is called a “form” [Derrida quotes from Littré, where “form” is wood in shape (figure) of foot, then he links figure to face—Shapiro sees Van Gogh’s in “his” shoes]

p. 284 acc. Heidegger, oppositional pairs as Überfall, injure the thing in the thing: hypokeimonon (underneath) or hypostasis/symbebekota (on top) [which becomes in Latin: subjectum (substantia)/accidens], aisthēton/noēton (sensible/intelligible), hylē/eidos-morphē (matter/form-figure)

pp. 296-302 classically, the “thing” is informed matter, Heidegger asks whether this matter/form couple was secretly constituted around thing as work or product (being-product rather than being-thing) > re: Überfall of matter/form couple, has it fallen on the being-thing or being-product? blosse Ding is thing divested of its being-product: what we must think is the Rest

PIO p. 3 btwn 17th-19th centuries, in the positive notion of rights, only form & composition display invention/originality—not content, “things,” thematics or meaning

RM p. 62 for Heidegger, Metasprache and Sputnik are the same, monstrous project of father, of metaphysics (mastery of form for form’s sake)

TR p. 81 “free signifier” ribbon like Lacan’s purloined letter: content is not important

p. 105 de Man: w/in certain perspective, no use of language that’s not radically formal, mechanical, even when concealed by aesthetic, formalistic delusions

pp. 150-51 de Man’s materiality: not physical but prosaic resistance to any aesthetic form, not something, nothing, yet it works, materialism as formalism in this materiality w/out matter

——resistance of letter (force of resistance w/out material substance) affects body: dissociative, dismembering, disseminating [materiality w/out matter, formality w/out form]

p. 153 isolated from its rhetoric [its tropes], grammar is purely formal—de Man: radically formal, mechanical > no text can be produced w/out this formal, grammatical element

EJQB p. 71 fragment: neither determined style nor failure, it’s the form of that which is written

AFR pp. 37-8 good metaphysics, extreme formalization, language of calculus, must reconstitute “metaphysics's prelinguistic and natural base,” it will have been natural & mute > thus, 2 good metaphysics (form, nature): good metaphysics = physics

p. 95 for Condillac, chain of signs is superstructural, & its principle is formal

D p. 303 possibility (potency) of present is its own limit, inner fold, impossibility—its impotence (btwn presence/castration) > same goes for “history,” “form”: language of metaphysics

p. 314 once ether (presence of present) has been called to mind: plupresent not merely presence but deformation irreducible to any form (presence, first matter in the last instance)

p. 351 form, another name for presence

EL p. 223 for Scholem, separation of form/content (Inhalt/Gestalt) only takes place via degradation, contamination of language > all oppositions are bourgeois mediations [Benjamin]

TN pp. 41-2 for Kant, only man has hand (telos): allows us to explore form, whereas coldness, heat, softness are just “vital”

p. 46 for Kant, time is a priori formal condition of all appearances > question of pure auto-affection in movement of temporalization

OG pp. 53-4 (78-9) Saussure’s reduction of phonic substance removes/opposes form from/to substance (Jakobson critiques glossematics [Hjelmslev] for similar misstep)

——radical dissimilarity of graphic/phonic excludes derivation [leads to formal truth?]

p. 60 (88) arche-writing at work in graphic and nongraphic expression, pattern uniting form & substance, all content & expression > opens temporalization, relationship w/ other & language

pp. 107-08 (158) writing as possibility of road? violent spacing of nature, silva is savage, via rupta is written, form imposed on hylè

FV p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

p. 432 structure of fiction reduced when related to its condition of truth, poor formalism which guarantees semantic content, doesn’t account for 1) “scription-fiction” and “scription-fictor” 2) narrating narration & narrator > complicity btwn formalist withdrawal (repli) and hermeneutic semanticism (or psychoanalysis applied to literature)

FORS (INNER SAFE, SAVE, EXCEPT)

GT p. 128 Derrida links pheuin, phusis to donation, thus bringing nature & production together [sometimes opposed]; fortune (fate, chance, fors, luck, fortuity) and necessity are allied

pp. 128-30 playing w/ fors, fortuna, ferre (fer, ferre; in Greek, pherô) which means to bear, & fero, “I report,” counterfeit money carries us to heart of question of reference & difference,

——dematerialization of money [late capitalism], can one quote money? fors, fortuna: Baudelaire reserves status of absolute exception for money (not the gift)

pp. 134-35 social function of beggar, madman: “the pocket of an indispensable internal exclusion,” like structure of pharmakos, incorporation w/out introjection (assimilation), an identity by exclusion, keeps outside w/in, lexception faite (fors) dune clôture ou dun clivage intérieur

LOBL p. 156 for intérieur (“conscience,” “inner tribunal,” “heart of hearts”), crypt

PAS PAS p. (69) nothing presents itself [in approach of “terrifyingly ancient,” terrifyingly becoming “subject” not accessory adverb], fors lobscène (save the obscene), what awaits as forgetting

F p. xi Abraham & Torok: [Wolf Man’s] jouissance jealously preserved (gardée) in his inner safe (for)

p. xiv crypt, an enclosure, history of an enclave, architecture, open square w/in space, secret interior w/in public square, a closure, a safe (for) in a forum (where free circulation of objects & speech occurs)

——hermetically sealed? yes and no [see SH p. 61], “jene sauve un for intérieur quen le mettant enmoi”, à part moi, dehors

p. xv forums are politico-juridical instances, require a third, a witness (like a duel), tribunal instruisant un procès, mettant en cause

——le for du dedans (not intérieur) is not le tribunal de la conscience (“jury box” of consciousness) even though enclosed w/in forum of self > it is the contradiction w/ in desire [?]

p. xvi crypt is a parasite inclusion/internalization, an inside heterogenous to inside of Self, an outcast in domain of introjection w/in which it violently takes its place, le for cryptique entretiens dans la répétition the mortal conflict it is impotent to resolve

pp. xvi- xvii incorporation (magic, secret, cryptic, instantaneous) seals loss of object, the dead, an exquisite corpse, loves the dead safe (save) inside me, as dead; introjection (slow, gradual, laborious, effective) dead save in me as living, enlarge the self (introj. as normal mourning)

p. xviii how to treat introj./incorp.: rigorous dissociation even if purity of dissociation remains theoretical: dissociation as excluding inclusion of one safe in another (dun for dans lautre)

p. xix topography of forum fragmented by secret—[its ‘lashing out’]

p. xix crypt, pocket of resistance, le for le plus intérieur (la crypte comme inconscience artificiel, comme artefact du Moi) devient le hormis (excepté, sauf, fors) > dizzying topology of inside/outside

——self does identify, to resist introjection: but only in “imaginary, occult” way; the “endocryptic identification” designed to keep topography intact and the place safe (le lieu sauf) are cryptofantasmatic, but the inclusion, divisions and partitions are real

p. xxi la topique des fors (the topography of safes) donne à penser, along w/ thought of crypt, the beyond-place (hors-lieu) or no-place (non-lieu), il faut garder sauf (hormis, exception faite, fors) in no-place the other place

——topography of crypt follows fracture line from no-place/beyond-place to other place: where “pleasure’s death,” marks the singular pleasure: sauf

p. xxii otherness before opposition btwn introj./incorp. not the contradiction of telos of Aufhebung, but undecidable irresolution: paradoxically incorp. doesn’t preserve other [garde une topique, mantient sauve], introj. more open [to other] > makes it impossible for the 2 to close over their proper, their death, their corpse

p. xxii crypt is catastrophe, catastrophe’s monument (forum is that which attempts to prevent catastrophe); but in trying to destroy it [crypt?], it is consolidated: this is the catastrophe

p. xxiii crypt constructed by its very ruin, held up by what saps it > in its contradiction, coffre-fort [fors] and ceaseless instability

p. xxvi the Thing is encrypted by crypt (for du Moi, self’s safe) not w/in (dans) it; crypted structure of ultimate referent [Thing] means double articulation (history, story) coalesces all these genres: myth, poem, novel, drama, translation > the narrated event never appears

p. xxviii steps “to the fore” [in English]

pp. xxxiv-xxxv tombstone is “illicit,” marks extreme jouissance, attempt to break in [analyze] isn’t illegal, a market is organized around crypt, when introjection is thwarted > evaluates rates (taux) of pleasure (jouissance) & pain (forum or for, la place de marché, fur

p. xxxvii Abraham and Torok decipher a story that was its own ciphering, tell the story of a story, from one word, one safe (for), to another

p. xlvii proper name: multiple economy of places, instances & safes (fors)

ROP p. 18 qui, fors Dieu, a jamais créé, ce qui sappelle créé, un concept?

DPi p. 102 Hugo (conscious of historical responsibility of writer/literature): writers of 18th century destroyed torture; writers of 19th century will destroy DP; p. 104 destroy it w/ divine hammer of pen > profoundly Christian stance, btwn profound flourish & faith, for intérieur

C pp. 195-96 excess zeal, the little one (paradigm) built like a crypt [Lacan’s objet a?], jealously keeps its secret at moment of greatest exhibition

——hermetically closed (portable temples called hermes): mute beneath its altuglassed transparency, seduces, attracts the dead man, makes him come back and more: fors in that casket

p. 208 coffin, as the odd, as the remainder, remains entire, divisible only by itself [prime: 127], as long as you deduct one—the paradigm coffin: belongs w/out belonging to series it makes possible > inscribes itself in series, leaves on it mark of its own subtraction

——transcendental mors, fors, exceptional piece; (fait) band à part (has a hard-on, keeps aloof)

p. 211 le Mhors-serie (I’m-out-of-series), Fors-series, the excluded necessary that marks the border of the Necessary itself: the necessary, the excepted, the contingent, sauf, fors

p. 231 coffin’s mutism: always a box in a box, some supplementary cartridge, a parergon > hors la boîte, fors la boîte: necessity to steal coffin (each time, differently) inscribed right on the “thing,” right on the cartouche [congenital perjury of justice]

pp. 239-40 date as place of crypt, stands in for it, only one that remains; why do I date? throw of a die: no one will know what was lived on the date (what was taken away), save (fors) the heart

TN pp. 179-80 intruder on inside, constitutively haunted by some hetero-affection related to spacing, a host, a parasite, pharmakon, ghost: [each of these figures] habite en revenant tout for intérieur (inhabit one’s heart of hearts as a ghost)

CIN p. 19 “lincinéré nest plus rien fors la cendre [innermost cinder furnace], un reste qui se doit de ne plus rester, ce lieu de rien qui soit, un lieu pur se chiffrât-il [marked out]” > there are cinders, what takes place in letting a place occur

p. 42 nothing out of reach of the tongue of fire (langue de feu), not even cinders if there are cinders there, save a chance (fors une chance)

SPEC p. 380 no one demands to know what devil thinks dans son for intérieur, Freud can think the devil w/out putting himself on the devil’s side (no written promise/contract w/ devil)

FORT/DA [fixerup]

POOF pp. 172-73 difference btwn talking to them [o my friends/enemies] & speaking of them [there are no friends/enemies]: world of difference, fort/da, record their absence after having called

the contretemps [appealing to other presupposes his presence, allows him to come, while distancing/retarding his arrival] dictates, as insane as it is inevitable, the teleiopoetic sentence > expectation of Messiah as unbearable terror: hatred of what is thus awaited?

S p. 66 silent play of quotation marks [re: spirit], Anführungsstriche, Anführungszeichen, “the hand calculates very fast,” Anführen, to conduct, dupe, brainwash, silent contrivances, fort/da, what shows or hides changes everything, and when one puts away after exhibiting, this is mise au pas (bringing to heel)

ROP p. 78 hinge (la charnière), place where flesh is laid out as a lure for the falcon > as hinge, an opening & closing, du gond (cardo), pivot; as flesh, a possible simulacrum or lure (fort/da)

DPi p. 37 instant of bandages, Christ’s being-there w/out being-there: this Dasein that is not a Da-sein, this Fort/Da-sein of Christ who’s dead but not dead, mort vivant

TB p. 132 translation, as holy growth of languages, announces messianic end, but sign of end only “present” in “knowledge of that distance,” Entfernung, remoteness

——can know this remoteness, not overcome it: fort/da (experience is translation)

REST p. 357 fort/da: every “step” implies this double movement (peasant woman now in, now out, of the picture), Heidegger’s whole discourse is supported by it [by abyss of fort/da?]

fort/da not a relation of opposition, each notion offers an eyelet to be traversed by the other, to the figure or the pointure of the other (Heidegger’s playing w/ the bobbin)

——fort: da, double eyelet [i.e. colon instead of slash]: how it must be “reknotted/taken up (renouer)” again in writing

——Da of Dasein (its proximity) lets distance of fort play w/in it

——Van Gogh’s painting could be called Painting [this made you howl w/ laughter, but too bad] or The Shoes or Fort/Da

p. 363 fort, da: la pointure joue de la virgule

p. 376 disparate: that which opens up fort: da of shoe size (pointure), possibility of dis-pairing, play of dis/appearing > double, Doppelgänger, not pair (unadaptable to walking [à la marche])

+R pp. 158-59 what is detached from my signature, da, a piece (morceau) of the other’s name, one of the most obsessive motifs in Glas

SPEC pp. 263-64 Freud’s avoidance of philosophy [of Nietzsche] (already in place like a counterfeiter) is inevitable (closest avoided in inevitable itself) > that the da be fort even before a judgment of denegation vienne y apposer la spécificité de son sceau

p. 294 fort/da: story of the PP (grandfather & pleasure principle)

p. 295 Freud his own grandson? put PP in question—Freud makes hypothesis of beyond [the PP] come back (revenir) only to dismiss (congédier) it again, that which comes back (revient) hasn’t truly come back (revenu) > only passed by in specter of its presence

p. 298 fort/da: argument of spool, not a story, not a myth > to give it a title is to accredit the deposit, the investiture

p. 299 Freud had a hard time recognizing himself among his own (les siens) > not unrelated to origin of objectivity (tribunal forbidden to judge the conditions of its establishment)

p. 300 law of oikos, open secret, family vacance (vacancy, vacation), secret for no one [everyone knows Freud is Ernst’s PP], domestico-familial, domestico-funerary

p. 301 [re: fort/da]: selbstgeschaffene (self-invented) game, spontaneity, auto-production, self-engendering of repetition itself, hetero-tautology (definition of Hegelian speculative): gives time, there is time

p. 302 “[PP, the spool, ça, SA, Ernst, Freud] fait semblant deloigner le PP pour le ramener sans cesse, pour constater quil se ramène lui-même” [hetero-tautology? bringing it all back home]

——fort/da and Freud’s speculative game: same application

p. 303 who causes (himself, who) to come back (revenir) in narrating this narrative [Freud? Ernst?]?

——autobiography of Freud as living description of his own writing, as if grandson were dictating to Freud what he had to set down on paper > not just tautological mirror, autobiography of the writing posits/deposits simultaneously—the psychoanalytic movement, elle performe et parie sur ce qui donna la chance [to psychoanalysis] > now Derrida: “je parie" that this double fort/da cooperates in initiating psychoanalysis

p. 304 en abyme of Freud’s writing [re: autobiography in fort/da narrative] has relation of structural mimesis w/ relation btwn PP & “its” death drive—latter hollows out the former en abyme, at origin of origin

p. 305 how can [Freud’s] autobiography give a worldwide (mondiale) institution its birth? what is autobiography if everything that follows from it is possible?

——speculator can survive legatee of an autobiographical speculation, institution of movement w/out limit: mutism/death of legatee, one of the possibilities that dictates/causes legatee to write

——one gives oneself one’s own movement, one inherits from oneself all the time

——sufficient provisions so ghost can always step up to the cashier (passer à la caisse); all that’s necessary is to pronounce a name guaranteeing a signature, one thinks

p. 308 to control everything, he has to act w/ dispatch (il se dépêche), Freud stages peremptory authoritarianism, unexplained decisions, unanswered questions

——Ernst will have to pay himself w/ bad habit [fort/da] for his good habit [not crying when mother is gone]

p. 309 for Freud, work consists in rassembler, searching in order to bring together, reuniting in order to give back (pour rendre) > play is dispersion that sends far away > fort/da is “a game (un jeu)”: reassemble the reassembling & dispersion, give & take back by oneself [work & play ?]

p. 310 collective unity [of toys] is apparatus of game that can dislocate itself > word for things in this theory of set is Zeug, which is also penis: supplementary complex that can reassemble parents

p. 312 proper noun beneath all this [Freud family]

——[grandson & son want each other to understand] but we know what a tautology can bring back by gushing over (peut faire revenir en dégorgeant)

p. 313 disappearance & return (Verschwinden und Wiederkommen)

——because speculator is a motivated observer, completion could never be declared by him > also, there’s a structure of incompletion in scene of writing: unconscious binds (lie) one to other [scene described & description], telecommunicated acc. same teleology

pp. 313-14 for Freud, in game of fort/da, the greatest pleasure is the re-turn (re-venir), Wiederkommen: yet, again becoming revenant, [spool] must be thrown away again > [Freud, the game] speculates on the return (retour): au départ de ce qui se doit de revenir

——Eisenbahn, Freud’s phobia of trains, he would have expected Ernst to play choo-choo

——“car la chose est un véhicule en translation (for the thing is a vehicle in convoy)”

p. 315 bed too serious, fort, but not fort enough, Freud wanted Ernst to play away from bed [?]

p. 316 Ernst doesn’t have la chose before him [fort/da], like it’s before Eurydice or the analyst

——analysand-locomotive (speculator/analyst the 1st analysand): for whom law of listening substituted for law of looking

pp. 316-17 curtains, veils, “skirt” of bed, hymen of fort:da, edge of bed (lit) [of reading?], va-et-vient, there would’ve been a hymen even w/out curtains > veil of this “skirt” is interest of bed (lit) and fort:da of all these generations

——[Derrida clearly explains the difference btwn fort/da and fort:da] “skirt” of bed, which hides the bars, forms inner chamber of fort/da, double screen which divides w/in itself—but dividing only by reassembling it w/ itself, sticking (piquant) to itself doubly, fort:da

pp. 317-18 what binds (lie) game to itself is re- of return, the returned or the returning (le revenu ou le revenant), revenance orders entire teleology, can be handed over to PP

——mastery of PP [grand (-père) spéculateur] as mastery in general, Herrschaft distanced from PP only to reappropriate itself: tauto-teleology makes other return in its domestic specter

pp. 317-18 death drive, w/out contradicting PP, hollows it out, older, not an other mastery (Herrschaft), but other than master, tout autre (not dialectically opposed to PP as life, living, alive)

p. 318 reappearance as a moment of the couple disappearance/reappearance, return to itself of return: greatest pleasure

p. 319 force of disappearance, of “fort” > capitalized pleasure (plaisir) (idealization) does w/out what it needs: one provides oneself w/ head of what one needs by doing w/out it (to have it)

——greatest pleasure, play w/ the dummy (le mort), [Ernst, Freud] speaks to himself telephonically, make himself re-, acc. law of PP: signing, contracting w/ himself

p. 320 fort/da: scene of writing that Freud’s playing, plays itself, plays him

——incomplete in its 2 pieces, thus completely incomplete, multiplying, supplementing

——every time one says “to do (faire),” should specify “to allow to do (laisser faire)” > Freud writes that he is writing, that’s what he’s doing, he does what he’s describing: what Ernst is doing

——detour of the télé, an entire chaine (network)

p. 321 [Freud’s speculation on Ernst] needs no witness, no counter-testimony has weight before this teleological auto-institution

——net (filet) is in place, one pulls on a string (fil), getting a hand, foot, caught: cest un lasso ou un lacet > Freud caught himself in advance; rapporté différé (deferred overlapping) > describing in advance scene of its own description

——an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (dun après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

p. 322 specularity not simply reappropriation

——speculator describes what he’s doing w/out doing so explicitly [Rousseau from OG], does w/out auto-analytic calculation, w/out calculation itself analyzing itself > thus the interest and necessity of the thing [for Freud? for Derrida?]

——inscription of a subject in his [Freud’s] text is also condition of the performance/pertinence of a text, beyond empirical subjectivity, supposing that could exist as soon as one writes, substitutes, supplements: notion of truth incapable of accounting for this performance

——autobiography as departure/return of a fort/da

p. 323 autobiographics of Beyond…, of word beyond [common name], imprints a prescription on fort:da, an overlapping (rapporté) by means of which proximity distances itself en abyme (Ent-fernung)

——under what headings (titres) can one say re: Ernst, Freud’s recalling himself? under several interlaced, serial headings (titres) [baby daddy]

p. 325 if, for Freud, distancing is a quasi-complete game unto itself in the great complete game, we were correct not to take the allegation of completion as coin of the realm (prendre pour argent comptant)

pp. 325-26 Derrida explains that a certain passage [on Freud’s indifference to whether Ernst invented game or not] is okay to extract, appears dissociable, a parasite from its immediate context, resonates like sound from elsewhere—murmur

p. 327 [re: Ernst’s fort/da] double sending away (renvoi): whether father required to stay or go, mother is desired: “exclusive possession” [Freud & Ernst distance themselves from name of father, for Freud it is the name of the son-in-law]

——mother (woman) easier to possess/preserve when dead [?]—jealousy appeased

p. 330 cremation [of Sophie, Ernst’s mother]: a form of Fortgehen, quite singular effects on work of mourning

p. 333 fort:da: leads autobiographical specularity into an autothanatography that’s in advance expropriated into heterography

——usteron proteron, “preceding falsehood” of generations, when figure w/out figure, name w/out name, of the mother returns: this is the logic of obsequence (Glas) > la mère enterre tous les siens

p. 340 all the interlacings of fort:da, tout ce qui senvoi in graphics of repetition that dislocates summary “triangle” > le trait oedipien nest quune rection pour le fil conducteur de la bobine [Oedipus most narrowly restricted effects of above repetition’s graphics]

p. 343 “literary fiction” in fort:da, fait-oeuvre in abyss of these repetitions, fairies, demons, unheimlich repetitions, what is most gripping (saisissant) and ungraspable (insaisissable) about Beyond…, for Freud too, who believed he could affix the seal of the Freuds to it [Beyond…] while hearing voices

pp. 354-55 (the) Weg (is) Umweg, weg as adverb signifies “far away,” fort!, go away!

p. 359 analytic of Da-sein (analytic of distance, proximity)—not so foreign to analysis of fort/da > economy of death, law of proper, auto-affection of fort:da, “eigenen Todesweg des Organismus

p. 370 [fort:da is a narrative] no thesis, only hypothesis, origin is speculative because the object cannot be the object of a thesis

p. 372 Derrida’s limiting the pleasure he can give himself tonight [re: comparison of fort/da to Symposium]

pp. 405-06 fort:da, pleasure is a kind of rhythm [Nietzsche], SPEC will have played fort:da of Nietzsche, the limping (boitement) of unterwegs, a step forward for nothing, only rhythm

FOUCAULT-LIKE? [fixerup]

FWT pp. 11-2 Derrida feels closer to Lacan than Foucault, he’s more daring a “deconstructor” > Foucault’s passage btwn epistemes neglects long sequences (hardens into oppositions)

p. 159 agrees/disagrees w/ Foucault’s claim death is less visible > spectral logic invades everything: work of mourning, technē of image; visibility is deferred, perhaps, transformation of visible field > never have things been as “visible” in global space as they are today

ROP p. 72 Foucault’s pathbreaking (frayage) History of Madness, like all frayage, does so at a price, bolting shut (verrouillant) other passages, ligaturing, suturing, comprimant, réprimant dautres veines

p. 73 [from CHM] Foucault does not question methodologically the opening that permits him to write a history of madness

p. 75 Lacan returns to an unsurpassability of Descartes, brings Descartes close to Freud > [is this part of Foucault’ critique of psychoanalysis? re: subject (of science)]

pp. 75-6 “The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis” > as its site of historical possibility? as historia rerum gestarum? from side where written [a parte subjecti], not what it describes?

p. 77 is Foucault’s ambivalence toward psychoanalysis (his crediting/discrediting it) due to Foucault or due to Freud?

p. 79 Derrida, playing w/ huis, huis clos, laujourdhui, describes Freud as door(keeper) [double figure de lhuis ou de lhuissier], standing guard, ushering in > does and does not belong to series in which Foucault inscribes him > hors-série [Copjec]

pp. 80-2 for Foucault, Freud returns to classical ages’ assessment of Madness as Unreason, but instead of excluding, confining Unreason, he wants to talk w/ it (this is his discovery); Freud undid the masking, silencing, positivist psychology imposed on Unreason

p. 83 Foucault’s great witnesses of madness, those who judge us: Nerval, Artaud, Van Gogh, Nietzsche, Hölderlin [but what about Freud?]

p. 85 [Derrida discussing debate w/ Foucault over the methodical neutralization of Descartes’ Evil Genius]

pp. 91-2 after linking Nietzsche w/ Freud, Foucault casts Freud into the role of thaumaturge, doctor, judge, father (like Pinel)

pp. 95-6 by treating Freud’s genius as bad, as authoritative violence of thaumaturgical doctor, Foucault is caught excluding the Evil Genius, as Descartes [contre Descartes]

——acc. Foucault, Doctor attains power through credit given to fiction, secrecy effect [Derrida shows how, in this case, Foucault places Evil Genius on the side of reason/order/father]

pp. 96-7 Foucault’s verdict: psychoanalysis will not be able to hear the voice of madness

pp. 99-100 how to think Foucault’s contradictions? Freud on one side then the other of the maddening dividing line? isn’t being right (avoir raison) & wrong part of the history of madness?

——Evil Genius on side of madness, & on side of exclusion-reappropriation (confinement)

pp. 101-02 for Foucault, psychoanalysis oscillates on both sides of dividing line, in two places, two times, at same time (but he does not think these two times w/ structural possibility of event)

p. 103 Foucault’s romanticism of madness like Novalis or Hölderlin

p. 126n Foucault’s “intentional” avoidance of referring to Heidegger

p. 110 Foucault’s wager, the end (fin) of finite man: “man would be effaced, like a face drawn in sand at the edge or limit of the sea” > trait (of face, limit) splits, becomes a limit, erasing and multiplying this limit endlessly > self-relation of limit at once erases/multiplies limit

p. 113 Foucault pulls back from (admits impasses of) epistēmē > mais seul ceux qui travaillent, seuls ceux qui prennent des risques en travaillant rencontrent des difficultés > responsibility dans lépreuve de laporie

p. 113-14 Derrida refers to his modest contribution re: a question for Foucault (doesn’t Foucault’s project belong too much to “the age of psychoanalysis”?)

pp. 117-18 Derrida concludes by putting words (modestly) into Foucault’s dead mouth: il aurait renvoyé dos à dos la maîtrise et la mort, cest-à-dire le même, la mort comme le maître

pp. 127-08n tone of Foucault’s eschatological promise [re: psychoanalysis fulfilling Christianity’s stratagems of sex] resonates w/ Christianity, Christian humanism

PS p. 170 for Foucault, enigma of the same permits continuity of meaning in absoluteness of rupture btwn madness and work > this is a historical relationship; but, for Derrida, to determine position of question (in history) is to eliminate an unexpected thought of historicity from memory

——re: Foucault, Derrida asks if fully historical field of interrogation [critical/clinical], would show us how something impossible de facto could present itself as impossible de jure [?]

DPi pp. 42-3 Foucault’s Discipline & Punish: duty to see punished (devoir de voir-punir)

CHM pp. 31-2 re: his relation to Foucault: interminable unhappiness (unhappy consciousness) of disciple > master might be absent

——must break the mirror, the glass, infinite speculation on master: start to speak

pp. 33-4 infeasibility of Foucault’s desire, a history of madness written by madness itself > madness before caught/paralyzed in nets (language) of classical reason

——for Foucault (sometimes), philosophy is a metaphor or metaphysics of political realm

p. 35 for Foucault, history of madness is the archaeology of a silence

——Derrida: wouldn’t an archaelogy of this silence repeat the act perpetrated against madness?

——all signs of silencing of madness are borrowed (by Foucault) from juridical province of interdiction

——Foucault speaks of silence too laterally, implicitly

——[Derrida asks question about Foucault’s responsibility, the manner in which Foucault seems to return to innocence, end all complicity] doesn’t suffice to imprison the delegate, the psychiatrist, and in doing so the whole adventure of Western reason (acc. Foucault, capture & objectification of madness): wouldn’t Foucault’s proceedings, verdict, reiterate the crime?

——if the Order is as powerful as Foucault says it is: infinite, universal complicity of those who understand “this language”

——“order is then denounced w/in order”

p. 38 had Foucault considered the historical origin/passageway [dislocation that liberated certain form of madness] to his project as prerequisite methodological/philosophical considerations > his whole effort would’ve been stifled

——acc. Foucault, reason shelters itself against madness—becomes a barrier to it > Foucault seeks the origin of this protectionism

pp. 38-9 Foucault’s Decision (re: point where madness & reason were split): both a fiat/decree/order & schism/dissension/caesura > this dissension is internal (cleavage, torment, w/in act of sentire), fission that divides it along lines of Hegelian Entzweiung [rupture, diremption]

p. 39 first dissension of logos [decisive split btwn madness/reason] quite another project than archaeology of silence

——much less-determined, archaic reason/logos: common root of reason/madness in classical age > not only common ground for all dissension, it’s the atmosphere in which Foucault’s language moves

pp. 39-40 Foucault’s bothersome idea re: Greek logos: it “had no contrary” > [Derrida wonders if there is already a dissension btwn madness & reason, a founding unity that already carries w/in it “free trade” of Medieval Ages]

——re: free circulation of mad in Foucault’s Stultifera navis, not so free as all that > and perhaps a socioeconomic epiphenomenon on surface of a reason divided against itself since dawn of its Greek origin

p. 40 Derrida’s problem w/ writing history of decision: risk construing division as event subsequent to unity of original presence > confirms metaphysics in its fundamental operation

p. 41 Foucault does not question “concept” madness, acts as if he knew what “madness” means

p. 42 if dissension re: madness dates from Socrates, Foucault’s historical description poses banal/inevitable problems of periodization & of geographical, political, ethnological limitation

——if exclusion of madness is fundamental structure of historicity, the origin of history, then Foucault’s example [re: “classical” moment] is a sample (échantillon) not a model

——or could he show it to be a unique exclusion, exemplary, an example revelatory by privilege?

p. 47 Foucault: “dreams or illusions are surmounted w/in the structure of truth; but madness is inadmissible for the doubting subject”

p. 55 if language is the break w/ madness, the closer and closer language gets to it, it’ll be separated only by “transparent sheet” (of which Joyce speaks) > this diaphaneity: “language, meaning, possibility, and elementary discretion of a nothing that neutralizes everything”

——thus, Foucault’s book a gesture of protection & internment

p. 57 Foucault’s book totalitarian? puts unprecedented excess of Cartesian Cogito in straitjacket? makes hyperbole re-enter the world: reduction to intraworldliness very meaning of what is called violence, makes possible all straitjackets

——in deconstructing Foucault, Derrida is not evoking an other world, an alibi, or evasive transcendence—a violence often the accomplice of “totalitarian” “good sense”

DST DST p. 210 hantise (obsessive fear), the way in which philosophy is haunted, visited, inhabited by madness > there is a domesticity of “philosophical madness”

——Derrida wary of every “return of the subject,” even in least dogmatic of returns, like that found in late Foucault (all “returns” omit rigorous reading of Heidegger)

PIO pp. 24-5 Derrida links tekhnē/fabula and historia/epistemē > man defined by human subject’s aptitude for invention: 1) narrative fiction, historical fabulation 2) technical or technnoepistemic innovation

pp. 29-30 if one draws a [historical] dividing line btwn use of word “invention,” must do so w/in great/fundamental reference to human tekhnē, this mythopoetic power that associates fable w/ historical, epistemic narrative [Foucault +/–]

pp. 31-2 a fold or joint, dividing line, separates 2 competing meanings of invention, not empirical or historico-chronological rift: 1) place found where located (unveiling, discovery), invention of truth, the cross (pre-17th century) 2) inventor gives place, upon finding it, invention of printing, tekhnē (post-17th century) [Foucault-like w/ added folded: 2nd still modeled on 1st]

WAP pp. 62-3 [contra Foucault] in speaking about the undecidability of the question of making the University a theme: “a paradoxical tropology whose places are never fully exposed”

p. 79 [when quasi-systematic deconstruction differs from Foucault: no empirical light-headedness]

——deconstruction must not choose btwn long, barely mobile networks & short, quickly outdated ones > must display strange logic: multiple powers of oldest machine can always be reinvested/exploited in new situation

AFR pp. 47-8(n) Derrida defends Condillac against Foucault’s assessment of a “deficiency,” “epistemological myths” > perhaps Condillac’s maintenance of calculus & genesis resists a classical opposition; Derrida then notes [re: relevance to scientific modernity]: imaginary upsurging of one epistēmē, its finitude, table, sets terrain for theory of general epistēmē, which makes table its determining norm [see Bennington’s Scatter p. 11]

LI p. 39 metaphysical premises (fundamentally moralistic) of performative, speech act, discursive events underlie hermeneutics of Ricoeur, archaeology of Foucault

pp. 139, 158-59n obscurantisme terroriste [Foucault called Derrida this, speaking to Searle]

TN pp. 216-17 [beyond Foucault] mouvance (trend) of thinking, not path or line (neo-Heideggerian[?]), structurally open unlike epistēmē, “paradigm,” which hypothesize historical space w/in strictly determinable contour > I read texts profitably and make unfair selections

BSi p. 65 the zooanthropological rather than biopolitical > horizon of BS

pp. 212, 215 erected marionettes, Sovereign in its Majesty, Most High—not merely a trope, [it’s sublimity is even practical]: surveillance (economic/military) strategy

EU pp. 51-2 [Foucault-like?] even if State censorship is reduced today [compared to Kant’s age], there’s a giant network of delegitimation, marginalization, that functions w/out censorship (stricto sensu): laws of capital, system of language, media politics, publishing structures, “physical & psychological” health, over-determined complexity of bio-psychic function > to point to forbidden shows censors know what they’re censoring, shows a lapse in organigram of prohibition: a principle of disturbance, a deconstructive counterforce

p. 100 [re: performativity of university] dream of studying every intersecting, dia- and synchronic code in class evaluations, jury reports > concept of university legible in every sentence

FRAGILITY [fixerup]

GSP p. 159 phenomenology “made necessary” by philosophical fragility of genetism

FS p. 6 to see structure more clearly, solicit it, threaten its supports: concentrate on its [structuralism’s] keystone (la clef de voûte) (possibility & fragility of its existence) > the secret place where structure is neither construction nor ruin but lability

WAP p. 10 the erection of institution betrays fragility of foundation: institution instituted against deconstructibility (reveals/deceives ground like a symptom would)

FRAGMENT

LOBL p. ~135 fragment as insaturable context

EJQB p. 71 fragment: neither determined style nor failure, it’s the form of that which is written

FRAME

GT pp. 94-5 overrunning [deborder] the frame, which fixes space & time given: identification of figures (even the figure of metonymy) supposes stable relations btwn part & whole

LOBL p. 88 literary studies in university don’t adequately explore problematic of judicial framing & jurisdiction of frames

P p. 18 from Glas: imagine a theft that stole only your frames [transvaluation of values]

pp. 42-3 the lacunary character (Mangelhaftigkeit) [Hegel] of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, its lack as its frame, lack of theory of frame, or lack in theory of frame [Kant blames nature, old age]

p. 43 arête/manque [re: theory of frame]

p. 50 ideal limit acts as frame for pure philosophy

p. 55 parergon is philosophical quasi-concept if it can be transported (intact, deformed) to other fields: in Kant’s Religion w/in… “General Remark” is a parergon of parergon: text is framed (cadrée), squared up (quadrillée) [also surveillance], by 4 topics (effects of grace, of miracles, of mysteries, of means of grace), they are parerga of religion, not integral but touching the integral

p. 61 Kant’s 3 examples of parergon: garment, column, frame [see pp. 57-61]

——parergon stands out (se détache), not like work, which also stands out > parergon stands out against 2 grounds (fonds) [work, background], as that which merges (se fond), effaces itself; frame’s thickness as margin not figure—or figure that comes away of its own accord (senlève delle même)

pp. 68-9 Kant’s table of 12 categories [of knowledge/understanding] is repeated for judgment—which is mediate knowledge of object (but it offers no knowledge…)

——Kant imports logical frame into nonlogical structure > the frame fits badly, violence of frame multiplies: theory of aesthetic in theory of beautiful in theory of taste in theory of judgment

pp. 70-1 Derrida reads footnotes, parentheses, hastily imported frames (re: Kant’s discrete admittance that there’s something of understanding in judgment) as invagination (pocket in “main” text) [Kant forced things, not Derrida?]

p. 71 no deconstruction of labor w/out theory of frame, any market presupposes a process of framing to liberate surplus value > in classical language, lack as product/production of frame

p. 73 only adornment: pure loss of value, waste of surplus value; a frame is essentially constructed and therefore fragile, holds & collapses, accidental [?]

——[MOP] what produces frame puts everything to work to efface frame effect, naturalize to infinity, in hands of God; deconstruction: neither reframe nor imagine absence of frame

pp. 73-4 effects of deconstructed frame would not be an absence of one, labîme [undo the frame] en coin dans ses angles et ses articulations, slyly—see picture from the side of the wood (not teleological, not harmony, internal becomes external); thickness taken into account

p. 75 position: opposition: frame [re: bad (adornment) and good (formal) parergon]

——frame overflows on 2 borders what it overflows: frame gives (labors) indeed; Kant is undoing the labor of the frame; the structurally bordered origin of surplus value creaks and cracks like wood, overflows and is deducted from what it produces, never exposed

p. 77 for Kant, pure sound & pure color as vibration of ether > purely formal, “universally compatible w/ certainty”—beautiful [what about color gold on frame?]

pp. 77-8 not all frames are square, still there’s a privilege of cadre

p. 80 that which is outside the frame naturalizes frame, there is no natural frame, there is frame, but it does not exist

p. 81 only a practice of theoretical fiction can work (against) the frame, (make or let it) play (it) (against) itself

p. 82 try to frame a perfume

p. 97 Derrida exploits Kant’s example of frame to ask whether parergon constitutes place/structure of free-wandering beauty (nothing prohibits the right to exploit the example)

pp. 97-100 [Derrida makes his move] Kant assigns free beauty to framing-foliation, signifying nothing > having to be interrupted, sans-theme & sans-text relate to end as nonrelation, finality w/out end, but this sans must be marked, the trace [?] > parergon: place/structure of free beauty?

pp. 100-01 adherent/vague beauty cannot relate—is there a frame btwn them? suspending relation, puts them in relation > which is the example of which?

——pure telos of beauty (as non-telos), telos of 2 beauties would be sans, nonpresentation of telos

REST pp. 303-04 line of detachment, the out-of-use, not only the one giving form to the shoes, there’s the line of the work qua picture in frame > frame makes a supplementary désoeuvrement, cuts out but also sews back together (invisible lace which pierces the canvas, like pointure)

pp. 318-19 crossing (over) certain lines, certain traits, like being in Heidegger’s Seinsfrage, or crossing the lines in a painting, or the lines of framing; at what moment do we (did Heidegger?) transgress these lines (traits), cross them? transgressing which law?

p. 320 you’re trying to justify [Heidegger] at any price? his “pathetic tirade”

——if Heidegger is not referring to painted shoes w/in the limits of a frame, which can only be crossed in one direction (from outside to inside), then…

p. 321 ask question of frame by way of figure/trajectory of lace: a stricture by alternate and reversible passage from inside to outside, under and over

p. 331 comes down to a decision about the frame, a border (bordure) which is double in its trait: joins together what it splits (partage): “at stake are (il y va) all the interests caught up in the trial (procès) of this split (partage),” what separates external from internal

p. 341 acc. Heidegger, there’s uselessness in what a painting represents/frames and uselessness in that the painting represents/frames, uselessness due to product’s (shoes’) detachment from milieu by the artifice of its reattachment: the line of the frame > useless in that it’s a work

p. 343 lace traits form the “frame” of the picture which appeared to frame them [i.e. the traits of the shoes draw out “this is a picture”] > we, the shoes, are bigger than the frame & incorporated signature

——law of parergon comprehends everything w/out comprehending (perverts all links btwn part & whole) vs. the obviousness of a framed painting detached in course of reattachment, in process of (un-re-)stricturation [law of parergon vs. that of (un-re-)stricture?]

p. 348 traits delimiting object & frame disqualify a priori by stricture/interlacing the question re: whether painting is required for a further step in thought

TR p. 93 it [re: Rousseau’s Confessions] precedes acc. substitution of one border for another: in this parergonal composition, in game of interlocking frames, we find mark of 2 limits: 1) crossing from Protestantism to Catholicism 2) [2x last word] last word of the other, last word of self

D pp. 297-98 “square mouth” —square horizontality of page, cadre, frame—squared opening

p. 351 “horizon”-value (pure infinite opening for presentation of present and experience of meaning) is, suddenly, framed (encadrée)—it is a part, and suddenly parts (fait partie, la voici partie)

p. 357 in scratching (gratter) on this textual matter, your recognize description of a painting, reframed, broken into, placed in another quadrilateral, w/ one side fractured: you are painting, writing while reading: tout le tissu verbal y est pris, et vous avec

p. 363 innumerable as force, blows up (or out of) all frames, & it works through it (taken into account) from the inside [Kant’s mathematical sublime?]

PPT pp. 7-8 partition of edge occurs everywhere (se passe partout) (in this book), protocol-frame is multiplied endlessly: lemmata, parerga, exergues, cartouches

——trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

p. 12 [external edge of passe-partout is the one closest to the painting?]

+R pp. 157-58 the phrase “what both cuts me off and prompts me (me souffle) w/ all the rest” performs, does what it says it’s doing: framing borders are jumped, margins saturated en abyme

***p. 180 human features when drawn [by Adami] > only frames or mounts

LI pp. 152-53 though nothing exists outside context, limit of frame/border of context always entails nonclosure: outside penetrates, thus determines, inside

E p. 7 why call them Fine-Arts (Beaux-Arts)? why not just call the product beautiful: because the product must still be implicated by its signature, beauty is ascribed to the passage btwn production/product; Fine-Arts: always of the frame & signature

FV p. 431 inscriber/inscribing function not to be confused w/ author > Lacan excludes textual fiction, indicates a general narrative w/in neutralized or naturalized frame, thus overlooks the frame

p. 432 Lacan is missing an elaboration of frame, signature, parergon > this lack permits scene of signifier to be reconstructed into a signified (inevitable process in logic of sign)

p. 483 certain psychoanalytic interpretations (invisible framing: frame w/in frame) vs. scene of writing w/ ruined (abîmé) limits

p. 485n coincidence in Poe; point is to show that due to structure of effects of framing—no totalization of bordering can occur: frame always enframed, parts w/out a whole

FRATERNITY / BROTHER

MONL p. 34 to those who celebrate “fraternity”: “listen, pay attention, you must wake up and leave…your mother tongue will no longer even respond to you, do not believe so quickly that you are a people, cease listening without protest to those who say ‘listen’….”

R p. 50 no worse threat to democracy than fraternity/brotherhood

p. 58 Christian & Islamic privileging figure of brother in ethics, law, politics [calls for a deconstruction of Christianity]

p. 61 Derrida, alongside Nancy in The Experience of Freedom, rethinks naissance > before genesis, creation, nation, nature [deconstruct fraternity]

AF p. 4 democracy provides more access to archive [see p. 95 w/ dead father, brothers share archive]

POOF p. viii a friendship/politics ‘beyond the principle of fraternity’? > the political rarely announces itself w/out State enforcing schematic of filiation (stock, genus, species, sex, blood)

——democracy—fraternization (brothers kill father): inclusion of women as sister, as a case of the brother [this neutralization an example of whole of political education]

p. 61 Nietzsche refers to his friends as brothers (all of Zarathustra read through this figural alignment) > addressees lay down law of genre, so their coming virtues are virile ones

pp. 92-3 in Menexenus, solid friendship (reconciliation) based on actual kinship (suggéneia), on homogeneity, homophilia, solid/firm affinity (bébaion) stemming from birth, native community, syngenealogy: this is a phantasm, what Joyce calls in Ulysses, re: the father, a ‘legal fiction’

——eugenicism (eugéneia) as authochtony, proper birth, homage to earth & mother go hand in hand with fraternization: an equality of birth compatible w/ aristocracy

p. 93 fraternity is a symbolic projection (convention) of natural , a ‘legal fiction’ authorizing a determined politics > has anyone ever met a brother in nature?

p. 94 no great discourse on friendship w/out rhetoric of epitaph (epitáphios), w/out appeal to the deceased [re: brothers at funeral]

——in Menexenus, must summon dead to be responsible before them, the dead are made to be born again: oath of this co-engagement thus resembles a fraternal conjuration

——in Menexenus, earth before mother in pledge of brothers (i.e. mother imitates earth)

p. 96 [re: Menexenus] call themselves brothers in the name of a single mother

——Christianization of fraternity or fraternization as essential structure of Christianity?

——Benveniste: frater and soror become religious names

***p. 99 necessity in Menexenus, everything decided where decision does not take place, where always-already taken place: at birth, day before birth, eugenic/noble birth > this makes noble, makes political, ties phúsis to nómos, ontology to oath (ties what is to what must be), obligatory process of a natural law: a synthetic a priori necessity

pp. 99-100 identification qua fraternization, bond btwn 2 necessities (ties): embedding of an ‘it is necessary’ in the filiation of what is, obligation to the natural [p. 102 isonomy from isogony]

p. 100 “truth, freedom, necessity, and equality come together in the politics of fraternity”

——isn’t there no chance for a perhaps here? for an absolute housebreak or hospitality, an arrivance? > Greek fraternity founded on a perhaps that brought about its own forgetting, the forgetting of the perhaps [Heidegger’s forgetting of Being]

——as long as brothers remain faithful to memory of their fathers (specters of their fathers of noble birth), they are bound by testamentary tie (recalls their truth, truth qua political truth), a monumental memory that inaugurates truth as much as it recalls it

pp. 148-49 via Schmitt, there can only be absolute hostility for a brother: history of friendship resembles an unavowable synonymy, a murderous tautology

——the absolute war, absolute politics, absolute hostility waged against the twin, the absolute friend > if the brother is also the absolute enemy, what does fraternization mean?

p. 149 [Derrida speaking to himself in parentheses] is one every born a brother? isn’t there always an oath? a memory? the brother is always a foster brother? would the sister than be a case of fraternity? [Schwurbrüderschaft]

pp. 149-50 via Schmitt, if enemy must be my brother & [Däubler's] Der Feind ist unser eigne Frage als Gestalt, the brother enemy is the questioning form of the question, which resembles the friend > a complaint, a crime, aggression, traumatism, war: when called into question by the question

p. 150 friendship of the perhaps: perhaps ‘prior’ to the question, prior even to affirmation that opens it up, before question takes form (friend–enemy as figure of brother), an exclamation mark before a question mark

p. 151 deadliest tragedy of fratricide: absolute enemy resembles absolute friend

pp. 151-52 [overflowing, rushed parentheses] Dupin [‘Purloined…’] calls himself a partisan, designates self-destruction of someone who resembles him like a brother: pitiless sympathy of war to death (among brothers) > monstrous truths, truth as monstrous

pp. 161-62 who can be my enemy? who is the non-I? who questions me? who can I recognize as my enemy? I am not theologian, I’m a jurist [who more than Schmitt could smile at this distinction], the jurist must recognize the enemy [?], redialecticzes the conditions of the question [via Hegelian exercise]: “the brother reveals himself as my enemy,” “fraternal kiss (den Bruderkuss)”

p. 165 ‘all men are brothers’: a responsibility, that is always, of course, exemplary (claim to universalism) > reconciles double imperative: brother (face & mirror, original & copy, one & other) is always exemplary & that is why there’s war

p. 171 La Boétie: nature, God, she made us recognize each other, brotherly love, everything serves to deepen our acquaintance w/ each other, including speech & freedom

pp. 181-83 via Montaigne (also Schmitt & Aristotle), the singularity of spiritual fraternity as a non-natural friendship, beyond the law (even though, acc. Aristotle, the best legislators care more for friendship than justice [see p. 192n]), alliance, election, oath, ‘covenant,’ w/out genus because occupying a genus of its own, the unique: no law of the genus for unique brother, a-genealogical

pp. 184-85 via Montaigne, law of secrecy placed above law of city, apolitical drive of friendship divides virtue or reason > double bind: 1) sovereign fraternity of secrecy btwn 2 w/out perjury 2) political secrecy of brotherhood begins w/ the 3rd, opens to perjury

pp. 185-86 does Montaigne (via túkhē [see 192n re: Cicero], exceptionality of friendship) add rupture of infinite to Greek philía? a reassuring principle would periodize, overdetermine, oppose Christian fraternity to Greek fraternity > Derrida won’t have it: the discrepancies of culture aren’t negligible but they are that of a generative graft, cultural body (so old & new) begins w/ prosthesis > no proper body w/out graft: endless politically consequences of this law—now more than ever, endlessly

pp. 187-88 Augustine’s infinitization qua conversion in God, on model of fraternal friendship? i.e. God demands we love the enemy

p. 202 Aristotle’s 2 forms of justice: 1) numerical equality (katarithmón), brothers 2) proportional equality (katanalogían), father-son [cf. Aristotle’s Politics]

pp. 227-28 Quinet & Michelet: realize Christianity’s dogma (grace) in the Political world, brotherly equality, Fraternity, promise of Christianity: book of the People is yourself, myself (not women though)

p. 233 once again referring to the ‘infinite’ Christianization of Greek fraternity, while reminding us that Greek phília carries w/in it the injunction of its infinitization, Derrida will privilege Christianiziation for the role it played in the theological-political graft that constructed political discourse of modern Europe

p. 268n via Leroux, fraternity links freedom & equality OR fraternity appears first as origin/principle > Christianity as an ‘infinite enlargement’ of [gentle] fraternity, still deploys a Greek memory: these 2 memories efficiently coupled in ideal instant of French Revolution

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

pp. 237-38 gravest of problems, not our intention to denounce fraternity: via Michelet, fraternity as ‘law beyond law,’ vision of universal/revolutionary fraternity [à la the Enlightenment], a hyperbole whose generosity can’t be opposed > [Derrida promising] a fraternity w/out fraternity (literal, strict, genealogical, masculine)

——what will be put into question re: fraternity is the exemplarist strategy (ethnocentrism, patriotism, nationalism), alleged universalism of nation, homeland: our homeland gives passage to homeland of all mankind

pp. 238-40 for Michelet, fraternity is another name for friendship, national singularity gives example of universal friendship, the boundless generosity (exemplary universalism) of Michelet’s andro-gallo-fraternocentrism

——fraternity always caught up in vertiginous process (mechanics) of hyperbolization: from the strict literal (‘natural’ fraternity) to the figurative literal (universal, infinite fraternity) > thus, [strictly] woman ‘does not yet know how to read’ fraternity, she is not included in the idiom, the singularity; but, [literally] she is like [the promise of] absolute fraternity, ‘more just than just,’ law beyond law

pp. 242-43 Derrida now links phúsis to phúein (grow, sprout, mature) [an offshoot of phúsis?], links that to genealogical fraternity > no doubt there’s Greek autochthonism in Heideggerian thought

pp. 259-60 for Kant, the black swan of moral friendship is a brother [for Juvenal, p. 258, black swan was a woman]: bond btwn 2 men w/ necessary supplementary complication of a 3rd man

pp. 260-62 Kant’s friend of man (not simply “one who loves man”), announces promise of cosmopolitanism, universal democracy, perpetual peace: inscribed in sensibility, but only in relation to purely rational Idea of equality (not only calculable measure, but also an obligation)

——Kant gives place to, configures, represents the friend of man: “all men are here represented as brothers under one universal father who wills the happiness of all” > father is not a man, not included in friendship he makes possible [via race, genealogy], can’t receive equal reciprocity

——Kant thus repeats the link btwn friendship & fraternity, he doesn’t confuse it w/ strict, literal, ‘natural,’ sensible fraternity [see p. 240] and yet he does not dispense w/ that sense either—repeats friendship’s indivisible link w/ virility of congeneric

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

p. 263 jusquici [up until now], for several 1000 years, le temps d'un clin d'œil [the twinkling of an eye], tremors have been registered, archived, by the archons of the same family [phallogocentric fraternization]

pp. 263-64 yes this book is French, but it’s not written only in French, that would claim for French exemplary privilege of translation for all other idioms [i.e. Montaigne, Hugo, etc. on fraternity & humanity] > instead, this books sets itself up to work and be worked relentlessly (s’acharne lui-même), au sens de la chasse, là où acharner revient à disposer un leurre de chair, close to the thing called France

p. 264 via Hugo, fraternity is universal in first being French, ‘sublimated France’: ‘natural law,’ ‘generosity,’ the brother

p. 265 Hugo: in the future, Paris will be the capital of what will be called Europe, which will be called Humanitydefinitive nation, what a majestic vision!

pp. 266-67 Hugo [re: humanist vision], like Marx, would like to swear (jurer) & abjure á la fois, on le voit à la fois accueillir et chasser, convoquer et conjurer le spectre, he would like to ‘let the dead bury the dead’ > Hugo: extinguishing of a people evaporating into fraternity

p. 271 fraternal friendship & ascension, height: Kant’s stellar sublimity of moral law, Nietzsche’s star friendship

pp. 272-73 Derrida explains how he does not want to exploit spectacular ‘news,’ that which screens out (fait écran) reflection [makes a screen of reflection], by projecting itself w/ pathetic, sensational, images of violence that are too easily mediatizable > yet, all these examples (immigration, globalization, new warfare) are in our mind & heart as Derrida strives to deconstruct fraternal link to friendship: how does humanitarian participate in fraternizing humanization?

p. 273 from w/in fraternization, greatest crime is betrayal of humanity (fall short of virtue of fraternity), the supreme perjury: fratricide as radical evil, only the brother can be betrayed

pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

——modesty would get woman to participate in universal fraternity (i.e. humanity), equalizes sexes by moralizing them: modest woman is a brother for man

——woman doesn’t become any less desirable! modesty belongs to history qua fraternization

p. 276 is there a worse jealousy than jealousy of self? is there any other? jealous of one’s very own brother: qui est le plus d’un, le supplément de l’un en trop? [the friend, says Nietzsche’s hermit]

pp. 276-77 are the 2 models of friendship antagonistic to each other? do they imply one another as supplementary ruses?: 1) absolute singularity of other, double singularity of dual, narcissism, secret-private-invisible-illegible-apolitical 2) universality, the 3rd friend, forever keeps question of secrecy from closing, law that interrupts singularity, manifest-public-testimonial-political > the hegemonic schema or familial symbol btwn these 2 models is fraternal, excludes the feminine or heterosexuality

p. 279 friendship via figure of the brother, in the name of the brother (not the father): sublime figure of virile homosexuality [excludes woman, excludes relation btwn man & woman]

p. 281 the double exclusion of feminine related to tension btwn politicization & depoliticization of friendship (tension on the inside of the political itself)

——Nietzsche tells us 3x: “woman is not yet capable of friendship”

p. 282 Derrida deduces the political register of friendship in Nietzsche: to be able to honor enemy in friend, a sign of freedom, neither slaves nor tyrants know this freedom > woman is either slave or tyrant, knows only how to love, can’t respect enemy (honor what she doesn’t love); the political translation of Nietzsche’s axiom: friendship is freedom plus equality [the double bind]

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

p. 284 the gift is that which gives friendship in Nietzsche > and yet, friendship still means freedom, equality, fraternity in Nietzsche

pp. 284-85 the 3 friendships in one, the same, those we must break (il faut en finir): 1) Aristotle’s 2) Christian fraternity 3) Enlightenment fraternity (sublated Christian fraternity)

pp. 289-90 returning ghost [of Zarathustra?] who promises is a testament, a ‘this is my body’ offered again to brothers > no mourning but mourning of brother?

——deferred mourning as friendship, no possible introj./incorp. > no successful death w/out remainder, that would be the return of the father (what brothers don’t want!) > this is what brothers are conjuring: love of the father (a scene framed thus: w/out a woman) [baby daddy]

p. 291 though Montaigne infinitizes friendship, he ensures mediation of solder (soudure) in the name of the brother (and the exclusion of woman) > via Montaigne, name ensures ‘fraternal solder’: owing to name, friendship begins prior to friendship, friendship survives friendship—friendship always begins by surviving

p. 294 who is the friend? beyond ego, presence, subject, etc.? distancing itself from all determinations? beyond the brother who capitalizes everything? > this a political question—will there be loud protests (by militants of a dogmatic humanism) if to think & live gentle rigor of friendship would be the law of friendship qua an experience of ahumanity?

pp. 295-96 the hyperbole of this friendship seems to engage w/ greatest risk (re: inherited concept of friendship) when Nietzsche speaks of ‘w/out sharing,’ ‘w/out reciprocity’ > can one,

then, still speak of equality & fraternity?

p. 305 Derrida confessing: he has more than one ‘brother,’ of more than one sex, and he loves having more than one (uniquely bound, each time, by a conjuration & so many unuttered oaths)

——this book has said nothing against the brother, one can’t protest from inside of history of brothers: the history won’t be thought, recalled, by taking up this side

pp. 305-06 the question “what is meant when one says ‘brother’?”, and the infinite price of friendship, supposes an affirmation, a pledge of a testimony irreducible to proof or certitude > this pledge retranslated into hypothesis/question: is it possible to think/implement democracy, keeping old name ‘democracy,’ & faithful memory of democratic reason (& reason tout court), while uprooting it from all these figures that prescribe fraternal friendship

PP p. 149 false brother is an infidel, traitor, simulacrum; legitimate brother inscribes truth in your soul

ATIA p. 12 what happens to brotherhood when there’s an animals? what happens to animals when one brother comes after another (Cain & Abel)?

p. 54 the animality of the absolute father, killed/sacrificed to bring equality to brothers

p. 110 for Levinas, “thou shalt not kill” is the 1st commandment to come from face of the other > refers only to the face, don’t murder the face, my neighbor, my brother, another human

DPi p. 174 in POOF, Derrida attempted to deconstruct Hugo’s fraternalism w/out indulgence

pp. 175-78 Marx rails against purported reconciliation in phrase fraternité, a class calculation, as is the abolition of DP

pp. 259-60 vis-à-vis Benveniste, fraternal filiation as debt, as being condemned > fraternal duty to pay ransom: to acquit oneself of a debt

——fra-gildan, to render, restitute, ghildes, fraternities linked by common interest > require gold (Geld) for reconciliation, restitution

PJP pp. 198-99 [re: Henri Thomas’ novel] a couple men united as one, “a single idiot,” brothers before impassible, inaccessible woman (the other, only one who decides, only guardian, only survivor, keeps watch at end of night, “w/out saying a word”)

PSSS p. 260 condemning/saving inscribe in concepts sovereignty & cruelty an ambiguity as unrelievable as autoimmunity itself: in any paregicide, any Oedipus, any totem + taboo, any republican or democratic installation of brothers, no way to know whether paregicide took place or not, took place w/out taking place, before any question about it [see HYMEN]

HST p. 363 Levinas still calls the other—my neighbor, my universal brother in humanity > Derrida: wouldn’t hospitality have to open to an other that isn’t my hôte? perhaps an “animal”?

AD p. 67 Levinas’ structural or a priori messiancity: fraternity, humanity, hospitality (not ahistorical but historicity w/out empirically determinable incarnation)

p. 144n for Kant & Levinas, brothers, irruption of equality, thus of the 3rd

p. 145n acc. Levinas, substitution, the-one-for-the-other (lun-pour-lautre) (inscribed in human fraternity), would be unintelligible for Plato—links this response to his parricide of Parmenides

BSi pp. 9-10 brothers as wolves, even enemy brothers [my kind]

p. 106 Lacan’s “fellow” [?] seems to follow Greco-Abrahamic, & especially Christian, notion of “neighbor,” “brother,” as totality of all creatures [re: when we treat animal as “fellow”]

p. 107 oath of brothers after founding criminality [killing baby daddy], trace of primitive crime remains ineffaceable in egalitarian, compassional, communitarian fraternity

——fraternalism frees us from all ethical obligation toward our non-fellow; worst human violence committed against humans considered non-fellows

p. 108 Derrida has attempted [throughout the years] to oppose/distinguish justice from right > obligation to le plus dissemblable, the méconnaissable—monstrously other: beginning of ethics, Law, is not human

——so long as there is recognizability & fellow, ethics is dormant

pp. 108-09 obligation to fellow, even if it’s a fact (can a fact ground, justify an ethics?), will never have founded a right, an ethics…

pp. 109-10 is Derrida just widening the parameters of “fellow”? no, the monstrously other binds me to the nonliving & inscribes concept of death in life > do we find a comparable obligation to the dead in murder of primal father [Freud]?

FREUD

GOD p. 92 Unheimlichkeit of Geheimnis, both Freud & Heidegger: beyond an axiomatic of the self or the chez soi as ego cogito

GT p. 75 illusion of ethnographic theory (Lévi-Strauss)—like Freud’s “sexual theory” of children

FK p. 90 the reaction to radical evil at the heart of Freudian thought, interminable Jewish question [?]

MC p. 351 Lucretius’ clinamen related to voluptas is the pleasure principle

p. 361 Freud: poets and artists anticipated and exceeded psychoanalysis

pp. 366-368 Freud trying to distinguish himself from the superstitious: different relation to future? no internal accidents? [same logic as the “letter always arrives”?]

——telepathy vs. thought-transference

p. 371 might the superstitious frame and contextualize even less than Freud?

——the superstitious “project psychology into the external world”

p. 372 Freud’s name, proper name, a certain autobiography constitutive of the very structure of psychoanalysis

p. 375 Freud seems to talk about Derrida’s dissemination, concept of drive, sublimation > is not [Freud’s] concept of drive, sublimation, the concept of bastardy?

AF p. 9 in Civilization & its Discontents, Freud does a captatio benevolentiae [re: diabolical death drive]: in the end I have nothing new to say, why archive this? would be pure loss (useless expenditure) [Derrida repeats gesture?] > radical perversion in this gesture: archive death drive as pure loss

***p. 14 Freud’s Mystic Pad still participates in Cartesian space [FSW pp. 227-28] > do new archival machines (ones Freud could never dreamed of) change anything?

p. 19 Freud’s 2 systems (Ucs & Pcs), 3 points of view (topic, dynamic, economic): that Freud integrates necessity of outside > prosthesis of the inside

pp. 26-31 the 3 condensed meanings of word “impression”:

1. scriptural or typographic: mark on surface, on substrate, Freud’s Mystic Pad, difference btwn Verdrängung and Unterdrückung

2. “Freudian impression” of the archive, opposed to rigor of concept, “archive” only a notion [in psychoanlaysis], one not destined to some sin of nominalism but the possibility & future of the concept, very concept of the future

3. “Freudian impression” left by Sigmund Freud on himself, and on anyone who speaks about him, to be marked by Freud w/out knowing it

p. 48 Freud’s 3 errors, the 1st: patriarchy marks triumph of reason/science over senses

——Freud makes a mistake in thinking only paternity is uncertain > maternity, as constructed as paternity [usual thought: mother real/ father figural],

pp. 85-87 Freud both accounted for ghosts, and tried to conjure them like Marx: [re: Gradiva’s ghost] Freud speaks of “real ghost,” and of a part of truth, the truth of delusion, haunted by specter of truth, truth is spectral as part of truth irreducible by explanation

pp. 91-2 [Freud oscillates btwn ana- and hypo- mnemic]

——Freud made possible the idea of an archive with repression, subjective, hypomnesia, psychic spacing

pp. 92-3 nearly ecstatic instant Freud dreams of [re: Studies on Hysteria]: origin speaking by itself, arkhē appears in the nude, w/out archive, anamnēsis w/out hypomnēsis

p. 94 belief, radical phenomenon of believing, the only relationship possible to the other as other has no irreducible place in Freudian psychoanalysis: Freud thinks one ought not to believe in ghosts [?] > archeological outbidding of a return to reality

p. 95 no one deconstructed authority of archontic principle better than Freud

p. 97 in Freud’s outbidding [see pp. 91-93 on 3 + 1 prostheses] wants to be an archivist more of an archaeologist than the archaeologist, exhume a more archaic impression

p. 101 we’ll always wonder what in this mal darchive did Freud burn, what may have burned of his secret passions, w/out him, w/out name, w/out symptom, w/out knowledge, w/out even an ash

BL pp. 192-3 Freud discovers repression as an answer to the question of the origin of moral law; man’s height, his 2 legs, creates repression, moral law

pp. 198-199 quasi-event of the murder of father, event w/out event, resembles fiction, myth, fable > real, effective guilt; question of belief & historical referent—irremediably fissured

——dead father more powerful than living one

HASD p. 25 onto-theological, metaphysical presuppositions sustain psychoanalytic theorems

FSW p. 197 why Derrida hesitates to utilize Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts: belong to history of metaphysics, logocentric repression which excludes written trace, calls it servile, excrement

p. 198 differance, pre-opening of ontic-ontological distinction, & of all the differences which furrow (sillonnant) Freudian conceptuality

p. 198 Freud never reflected on the precautions he takes, deconstruction will/does

——archi-trace, differance, neither Freudian nor Heideggerian concepts

p. 199 manipulate metaphors: 1) make the known an allusion to the unknown 2) making enigmatic through insistence of “metaphoric investment” > Freud does the latter

——our reading will let metaphoric investment “invade the entirety of the psyche”

p. 201 memory: essence of psyche for Freud > resistance, opening to effraction of trace

p. 203 Freud [of Beyond…] complies w/ dual necessity: differance at origin, crossing-out concept primariness > delay is in the beginning

——Freud’s deferral: Nachträglichkeit, Verspätung

p. 211 to speak of writing, to betray Freud more than ever

p. 212 Freud’s theme that there is no purity to living present, formidable for metaphysics, found in a conceptual scheme unequal to the thing itself

p. 215 perhaps read Freud like Heidegger reads Kant: like cogito, the unconscious is timeless only via vulgar concept of time

pp. 221-22 Freud privileging mneme to hypomnesis like in Phaedrus, like always > unlike Plato, psyche is caught up in an apparatus

p. 228 Freud augured a beyond and beneath of “Platonic” closure > by opening to theme of writing, writing as technē, as relation btwn life & death, btwn psychical and nonpsychical

p. 229 must extract Freud’s trace from metaphysics of presence it’s caught up in (particularly in concepts like perception, memory, unconscious, conscious, reality)

——Freud performed for us the scene of writing > le discours de Freud y est pris

p. 230 Derrida on fruitfulness of Freud’s radicalization of erasure of trace

F p. xx Derrida reverses Freud: Wo Ich war soll es werden [Wo Es war, soll Ich werden]

FWT p. 50 Freud’s 3 narcissistic wounds [inflicted on man’ ego]: Copernicus, Darwin, Freud

pp. 172-73 metapsychology—provisional weapon against philosophy of consciousness; all Freud’s machinery (id, ego, superego, ideal ego, ego ideal, etc.) will not hold up for very long

——Derrida prefers breaches and openings in Freud; reaffirmation of a thought w/out alibi: no theological/humanist alibi in psychoanalysis (makes it so pitiless, so cruel); indispensable audacity of thought—courage; use of theoretical fictions [i.e. pleasure principle vs. death principle]

pp. 173-74 Freud’s grand entities (ego, id, etc.) & Lacan’s grand conceptual oppositions (real, imaginary, symbolic) are too solid, substantialized—differance erases/displaces their borders

p. 176 Freud helps us question tranquil assurances of responsibility

p. 188 [re: murder of the father] Freud’s “historical” vs. “material” truth: one based on facts in real archive, the other discernible in symptoms [Yerushalmi neglects the latter]

POOF p. 112 Freud: Empedocles’ philía and neikos are same (in name & function) as our Eros (combine) and destructiveness (dissolve)

p. 135n Freud loves to tell Schopenhauerian fable of porcupines who, hoping to stay warm, stop cuddling because their quills hurt them: find mean distance btwn attraction/repulsion

ROP p. 79 Derrida, playing w/ huis, huis clos, laujourdhui, describes Freud as door(keeper), standing guard, ushering in > does and does not belong to series in which Foucault inscribes him > hors-série [Copjec]

ATIA p. 57 in SW, Derrida analyzed how pubic fleece led Freud into fatality of theoretical delirium

DIF DIF p. 17 before Heidegger purposely and radically questioned presence, Freud & Nietzsche did so, and, remarkably, they did so via motif of differance [remarkable :)]

p. 18 Spur and Bahnung in Freud: inseparable from differance, no breach w/out difference, no difference w/out trace: movement of trace, in Freud, a protection, deferring danger by constituting a reserve (Vorrat) > each of Freud’s concepts a detour in economy of differance

DPi pp. 159-60 sadism/masochism [cf. p. 168] > which is originary in Freud?; (Bemächtigung, Bewältigung—to dominate): cells sent to death, sacrificed, so that it, the state, can survive

O p. 49n Derrida not disputing la raison elle-même, the one (masculine) libido—“why not?” [cf. ROP p. 63] > to stand on head [call for feminine libido?] would put back/leave in place truth of phallocentric dialectic

PSSS pp. 250-51 “Why War (Warum Krieg)?” letters btwn Freud & Einstein, frontiers btwn phusis and psyche not well-defined: Einstein anticipates Freud (who is disillusioned)

p. 303n Freud didn’t like America because he couldn’t stomach the food

p. 256 Freud to Jung: I am Moses, you are Joshua

——these revenants must haunt our debates [Joshua Jung, Moses Freud] > cruel destiny of a proper name

p. 261 psychoanalysis only “science” that intrinsically involves the proper name of its founder, a transferential filiation it claims to be able to analyze

pp. 271-72 Freud on indirect methods to combat war, ruse of detour (Umweg)

——Freud advocates submitting life of drives to Diktatur der Vernunft, a Utopia > indirect stratagem of Eros/Thanatos: contrary to the cruelty drive, though cruelty knows no end

pp. 273-74 Freud’s indirection, oblique, angular, mediating nonstraightness: not just detour, strategic ruse, continuous transaction—but a leap, interruption, an ethical step

BSi p. 144 Deleuze accuses psychoanalysis (Freud) of dispossessing (brutalizing w/ machines of war) the Wolf Man (much like Artaud’s complaint about theft of his proper name)

SPEC pp. 273-74 performance of psychoanalytic theory: “in the theory of psychoanalysis…” [compare to Rousseau’s Confessions: singular performance] > Freud gave his coup denvoi, his singular certification: Freud seems to contract only w/ himself

p. 334 does Freud want survival of psychoanalysis in his name? does its structure require it?

p. 385 desire & throw of the dice beyond PP is Freud’s pleasure

p. 386 Freud’s signature in form of “if I wish to,” a seal, “auto-critique” w/out pity > what more to say after that? [cf. SW after Derrida, nobody can discover something behind veil]

p. 388 transference, ersatz, prosthesis, at the mouth, Freud’s surgeries, cigar: les pas de plus et les plus de pas [?]

FV pp. 417-18 Freud pays no attention to a fold in the text [Emperors], literary narrative is a secondary elaboration, thus an Einkleidung > since Andersens’ text has the text as its theme, it puts Freud’s text [interpretation] onstage

p. 418 Freud’s discourse: no more fiction than science

p. 451(n) [Lacan on properly inheriting, following the letter of Freud]

p. 457 dead king, Freud, only one to contract w/ himself, awaits restitution > restoration: carrying off last plume w/ his 1st hand [in dying, mobilizes many]: theory of the facteurs

p. 473 in Phaedrus, logos is its own father, answers for itself [re: Lacan’s relation to Freud’s text]

p. 477n by way of Lacan, Freud tells us very literally Heidegger’s What is Metaphysics?

FREUD

FSW p. 208 Freud: dream-interpreters were versed in symbolic riddling, a ground of interpretation giving the strongest credit to their Art

pp. 208-09 Egyptian priests read hieroglyphic code of dreams as a Traumbuch, as condensed meanings contained in storehouse of hieroglyphics [Freud pushes psychical writing further back]

p. 209 for Freud, dreamer invents his own grammar; Freud makes psychical writing so originary, any supposedly proper writing would have to be a metaphor for it

——Freud adds an idiomatic residue to symbolic, hieroglyphic dream-writing > thus limitation of Egyptian priest’s Chiffriermethode via Traumbuch [p. 210 but Freud proposes his own codes]

p. 210 it is the materiality of signifier that is relinquished in translation > when materiality is reinstated, translation becomes poetry

——since materiality of signifier constitutes idiom of dream scene, dreams are untranslatable

p. 218 dream-content (manifest) is a transposition which must be transposed back to dream-thoughts (latent)

——speech, phonetic writing, exceeded by overall writing of dreams, Egyptian cartoon captions, rebuses, picture puzzle (Bilderrätzel)

——in Freud & Artaud, subordination of speech on dream-stage

p. 219 Freud: proximity in dream reveals unthought connection like a & b in “ab”

TC p. 241 visual/plastic materialization of speech in Artaud’s theater and in Freud’s dreams, words as “things” [cf. F p. xl] (cartoon bubbles in Ancient Egypt [FSW p. 218]) > compare dreams to hieroglyphs, rebuses, a system of writing (instead of a language)

ROP p. 119n Freud: navel of dream, where it touches the unknown

p. 4 if the verborgene Sinn (hidden sense) is homogenous to order of analyzable > psychoanalytic reason as hermeneutic

p. 11 Freud sutures the unfathomable navel, omphalos, mit dem Unerkannten (unknown, “unknowable”), navel not a provisional limit, but a night, ab-solute unknown, attaché au lieu dont il part et dont il garde la marque de naissance > not only the gap (la béance), as Lacan reads this navel

——what forever exceeds the analysis of the dream: a knot that can’t be untied, un fil, qui, pour être coupé, comme un cordon ombilical, nen reste pas moins à jamais noué [knotted even when cut], à même le corps, a la place du nombril [name?] > la cicatrice est un noeud contre lequel lanalyse ne peut rien

pp. 12-3 Silberer’s “anagogic” interpretation concerns the most profound, depth of meaning, Stoff of dreams; Freud counters: some dreams can’t be interpreted, some dreams do not require over-interpretation (Uberdeutung)

FS p. 15 Delacroix: two lines give meaning; Freud: valley a common female dream symbol [column, hollowed margin]

REST p. 268 “according to the circumstances,” [Freud’s bisexuality of most dream-symbols] also occurs acc. syntax irreducible to semantic or “symbolic” substantiality

OG p. 335n Freud: mutism in a dream represents death

FV pp. 414-15 Stoff (incest w/ mother, murder of father), all else (i.e. tragic destiny) is secondary > the analytic deciphering: denuding (mise à nu) of this Stoff beneath secondary disguises: naked truth, truth as nakedness, meaning behind the formal disguises

——exhibiting, undressing (déshabillage), unveiling (dévoilement): acrobatics of metaphor of truth, metaphor of metaphor, truth of truth > when Freud intends to denude original Stoff: text coordinated à sa vérité nue, mais aussi à la vérité comme nudité

p. 416 [re: Benveniste on Aristotle’s categories (see p. 416n), Freud referring to The Emperors New Clothes] example of illustrative jubilation, treats element of its “scientific” discourse as marvelous paradigm there to be found, happily available (disponible) for instructing discourse

pp. 417-18 for Freud, dream recasts [Stoff] in Einkleidung (garment, disguising, falsifying), the emperor is the dreamer, the imposter is the dream

——Freud pays no attention to a fold in the text [Emperors], literary narrative is a secondary elaboration, thus an Einkleidung > since Andersens’ text has the text as its theme, it puts Freud’s text [interpretation] onstage

p. 418 if dream of nakedness is a dream of shame, nakedness is not natural: its truth is in shame

——hidden theme of Emperors… is the hidden theme, text as its theme, text as veil, movement of alētheia

FREUD & NIETZSCHE

BL p. 198 Freud: “creative sense of guilt” [compare to Nietzsche’s creative slave morality]

FSW p. 201 for both Freud & Nietzsche, psychē requires difference in exertion of forces, no breaching w/out difference

PSSS p. 239 acc. Nietzsche & Freud, psychic cruelty always inventing new resources: cruelty of psyche, state of soul, still of the living, but a non-bloody cruelty [Grausamkeit]

p. 271 for Nietzsche & Freud, only differences of intensity, modality, quality, w/ in a same cruelty

DST DST p. 202 signature interrupts, or rather marks w/ incision, the fold along which metaphysical ontomimetology is destined to divide, desist [ontomimetology in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, and more surreptitiously in Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan]

SPEC p. 262 what is the child’s debt in a play w/out debt? on what w/out debt does play speculate in secret? what is the place of such a secret? [re: Freud’s debt to Nietzsche]

p. 263 if one’s [intellectual] debt is always another’s, one is acquitted & guilty in advance? comment spéculer sur la dette dun autre à soi revenant (amounting to, coming back to oneself)?

——Nietzsche achieved findings of psychoanalysis w/out pain, using counterfeit coins [?] Freud’s évitement, avertissement

pp. 264-65 Nietzsche dared to link debt to the unconscious, a debt to that which one feels in advance acquitted, the debt of another that comes back to torment you

p. 266 for Freud, one can inherit conceptual simulacra, counterfeit money [Nietzsche, Schopenhauer], but it is lacking in guaranteed value of psychoanalysis > Freud’s rationalization, his naive self-assurance re: counterfeit money, a scene of intolerable inheritance

p. 269 death impels (pousse) the pas décriture: but de la vie, but sans but, stratégie sans finalité du vivant > Nietzsche’s no conservation, and life a rare genus of that which is dead

——Freud’s “perpetual recurrence of the same thing”: phantom of demonic, conjured up cadentially, limping (boiteux) devil

p. 272 if something is avoided w/ so much insistence, must be a tendency, a temptation, envy [re: Freud’s avoidance of Nietzsche]

p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

pp. 405-06 fort:da, pleasure is a kind of rhythm [Nietzsche], SPEC will have played fort:da of Nietzsche, the limping (boitement) of unterwegs, a step forward for nothing, only rhythm

pp. 408-09 for Nietzsche, pain is not in opposition to pleasure, will to suffer constitutes very aspiration of will to power [?] > would beyond the PP, for Nietzsche, be affirmation of life rather than return to inorganic [?]

——Nietzsche [Will To Power (699)]: one does not react to pain, it causes one to take a step

FREEDOM

GT pp. 122-23 condition common to gift & event: unconditionality > chance, tukhē, in an instant, disorder, surprise, irruptive, unmotivated, freedom of dice throw, coup de don, obey nothing but disorder, principles w/out principles, not necessary, gratuitous, déchirer la trame

——one must intend to give a gift, and yet all intentionality threatens the gift w/ self-keeping > intentional freedom & chance must miraculously agree w/ each other

p. 165n “freedom” in Kant’s speculative philosophy [?] can’t be demonstrated, it’s a “letter of credit for the moral law,” an assumption; also that (diabolical) evil can never be a motive

——faith/belief (act of faith/credit) given w/ monetary language, practical reason cannot be separated from chremastics as we interpreted it above

R p. 24 freedom and equality are reconcilable, so to speak, only in a turning or alternating fashion, only in alternation, must assure a turning to come and a returning to origin: govern and governed, in turn

p. 42 Levinas placed responsibility before and above “difficult freedom”

p. 46 for Nancy, “freedom is that which spaces and singularizes,” sharing (partage) as spacing

p. 47 Nancy’s freedom without measure, incommensurable, presubjective, precratic, “measures itself against nothing”

——Derrida prefers to call this the impossible: impossible as the only possibility, the condition of possibility > the antinomy at the heart of every -nomy

p. 51 Derrida considers the effectiveness of Nancy’s “freedom measuring oneself against the nothing”

FL p. 275 Marxist-Hegelian critique of violence in name of liberty, in name of what Benjamin calls formless freedom (gestaltlose Freiheit), are impotent, remain alien to juridical essence of violence, to “order of the law”

OOG p. 127 spirit’s radical freedom: theoretical attitude, opens horizon of knowledge as a pre-having beyond finitude

pp. 150-52(n) to pass from question “how” to question “why” (“why is there any historical factuality?”) we must exhaust question of historicity’s sense and historicity as sense > the “why,” the ontological question, owes its seriousness to a phenomenological certainty, arises only out of a teleological affirmation, i.e. out of freedom

——only phenomenology stripped Fact of its materiality [sense can always not be incarnated?]

FK p. 71 religion always prescribes response and responsibility; a way to think will and freedom w/out autonomy

POO p. 141n for Kant, the idea of moral perfection, which reason formulates apriori and

connects, inseparably, to free will > the “true original which lies in reason”

SPOM p. 112 exappropriation is the radical contradiction of all “capital,” property and appropriation, as well as ideas that depend on it: i.e. free subjectivity: “servitude binds (itself) to appropriation” > lexappropriation ne justifie aucune chaîne

POOF p. 171 La Boétie: nature, God, she made us recognize each other, brotherly love, everything serves to deepen our acquaintance w/ each other, including speech & freedom

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

p. 268n via Leroux, fraternity links freedom & equality OR fraternity appears first as origin/principle > Christianity as an ‘infinite enlargement’ of [gentle] fraternity, still deploys a Greek memory: these 2 memories efficiently coupled in ideal instant of French Revolution

p. 282 Derrida deduces the political register of friendship in Nietzsche: to be able to honor enemy in friend, a sign of freedom, neither slaves nor tyrants know this freedom > woman is either slave or tyrant, knows only how to love, can’t respect enemy (honor what she doesn’t love); the political translation of Nietzsche’s axiom: friendship is freedom plus equality [the double bind]

p. 284 the gift is that which gives friendship in Nietzsche > and yet, friendship still means freedom, equality, fraternity in Nietzsche

p. 306 when will we be ready for an experience of freedom & equality that’s capable of respectfully experiencing the friendship that would at last be just, just beyond law, measured against its measurelessness? > “O my democratic friends…”

S p. 43 spiritual duction as possibility of question, Vor-fragen, freedom of spirit comes before, in front, anticipates

——Vor-fragen of Führung, spirit, freedom of spirit, an Ursprung, leap, allows question to not solely reflect back on itself: why? why? why? > spirit = already questioning conduction

OH p. 122-23n Valéry: freedom is always a response

p. 59 liber (era, eri, bri): 1) free, emancipated, unbridled 2) name of Bacchus, wine 3) inner bark of tree used for writing, treatise

FWT p. 207n for Lacan, madness—limit of human freedom

p. 48 Derrida on why he rarely uses word “freedom” [re: machine]; didn’t Lacan say somewhere he never uses the word?

p. 52 what comes?: what calls upon & overwhelms my responsibility, responsibility before my freedom, freedom w/out autonomy

pp. 52-3 no “free subject,” but certain space of freedom opened by event, spacing liberated, dis-engaged, before & for the pledge (le gage); “with the determinism you spoke of”—no future

——event worthy of the name absolutely surprises me, so I can’t not respond, exposed beyond all mastery, dare I say, happily vulnerable

p. 127 literature is the [an-]institution of absolute candor & freedom, under no positive law, mutation in concept of responsibility

POS p. 22 voice is consciousness itself when phonē is signifying substance > signifier and signified unite, signifier erases itself, exteriority of signifier reduced by spontaneous proximity

P p. 91 Kant’s 2 beauties: 1) freie Schönheit (pulchritudo vaga [indefinite, vague]), w/out end, limit, pure 2) bloss anhängende Schönheit (pulchritudo adhaerens [adherent beauty]), “de-pendent on”

pp. 109-10 judgment of beauty opens historicity, inaugural example w/out concept, and also free, spontaneous (nothing less historical [?])

OS p. 45n Hegel: Notion is in and for itself absolute (total) negativity and freedom

OTO p. 33 Nietzsche exposes “academic freedom,” autonomous university, as ruse of State, a constraint more ferocious for disguising itself as laisser-faire [Hegel is accused here, too]

pp. 34-5 your ears grow into ass-ears (inverted cripple) when you think you are free, autonomous, w/ respect to the State > all ears for the phonograph dog, you’re a high-fidelity receiver

ATIA p. 83 the abyss of autos, ipseity, autokinesis: we must surrender (get) to the heart of the abyss btwn law of nature (reaction) & law of freedom (response & responsibility)

FS pp. 12-3 Derrida describes a hypocritical humanistic writing that imagines the will-to-write as an awakening of a freedom beyond affectivity: to write forgetting difference (finitude) in pure speech > could beauty then be distinguished from the letter itself? what about specificity?

DPi p. 113(n) for Blanchot, literature is revolutionary on the side of death; for Hugo, on the side of life

——Blanchot: “any writer who, by the very fact of writing, is not induced to think: I am the revolution, only freedom makes me write, is not really writing”

EJQB p. 66 Jabès renounced his verve, and capriciousness, maintained his freedom of speech

——site of freedom whose cult is not necessarily pagan, not an enclosure, ghetto, site of exclusion: when a Jew proclaims the Site, not a declaration of war, site is not empirical/national, it is immemorial, a future too, tradition as adventure > freedom granted to nonpagan Land only if separated from freedom by Desert of the Promise (Land keeping itself beyond proximity)

AFR p. 110 Condillac’s move from perception to imagination (and from one sign to another): on the march toward freedom, spontaneity of auto-affection > teleology: the complete sign, the true sign, is the instituted sign [after rupture, process magnetized toward greatest mastery possible]

——only arbitrary signs > sign’s active essence, its energy: freedom

***PSSS p. 250 if psychoanalysis taught us one thing: beware autonomy, supposed freedom, alleged spontaneity

p. 253 each psychoanalytic session, a micro-revolution, enfranchisement of regained spontaneity, freedom of speech, image/music of States General

p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds [cruor]

——this discontinuity calls for a leap, what Classical humanist philosophers call freedom, this interruption gives a chance

***EL p. 219 [re: “we” of apocalyptic speech] responsibility is ineluctable, finds sign of its freedom in this fatality > not Kantian practical universality, formalizable obligation: does not replace itself, delegate itself

HST pp. 390-91 responsibility before freedom as paradox of freedom: responsibility before the other in order to be free; no doubt one must be free to sin, to ask forgiveness

p. 395 Levinas: freedom is not negating oneself but having one’s being pardoned by alterity of the other—dialogue w/ other, not silent dialogue w/ our soul, frees us

p. 417 Abrahamic substitution not a homogenous, identical (cloning) replacement but that of exception, election > implicates (engage) each singularity in responsibility to give, to sacrifice themselves as pledge (comme gage) > still, not a free, voluntary act: there’s grace, a certain passivity

TN p. 157 Ravaisson doesn’t even stop at hand, his spiritualism/finalism overflows humanity of human (thus the hand), ontoteleology of life, ontotheology of desire/grace (freedom of spirit)

p. 160 Husserl offers hand as an example of free, spontaneous, immediate movement of ego-subject

p. 161 Nancy’s freedom no longer refers to an egological subject

p. 304 [re: Nancy’s “touch freedom!”] hyperbole, exact exaggeration, overbid in the impossible

E p. 5 for Kant, art is production of freedom by means of freedom

pp. 9-11 for Kant, imitation is aping (singerie), yet w/ the genius he conceives an imitation of divine freedom, distinguishing [briefly] between a good imitation and a bad copy: Nachahmung, Nachtmachung

genius capitalizes freedom, in same gesture naturalizes economimesis

——God has given himself to be seen in a spectacle, as if he masked/showed himself: an immense liberality which can only give itself to itself to be consumed [how can man’s freedom mimic God’s: by not resembling it?]

——w/ the figure of the innate genius, nature produces the arts, freedom itself

AD p. 3 Levinas’ “unconditional yes” exceeds and precedes my freedom

pp. 23-4 how could an automatic, proper “I” make an immanent “decision” w/out the tearing rupture (rupture déchirante) we associate w/ “free” decision?

p. 29 Levinas: to welcome the Other—put in question my freedom

BSi pp. 140-41 anthropocentered, humanistic logic: sovereignty of Law, freedom, responsibility (response) opposed to animal fixity, program, imaginary, hard-wired, coded reaction

pp. 148-49 for Descartes, bêtise would occur btwn infinite will & finite understanding; the excess, disproportion of will (freedom) over understanding leaves abyssal/vertiginous possibility of bêtise

pp. 152-53 for Deleuze [?], bêtise is thoughtful, a thinking, a matter of thought, a thinking and thoughtful freedom (i.e. proper to man) > Deleuze’s bêtise has a relation to ground (also Ungrund) influenced by Schelling’s discourse on human freedom

——for Schelling, only man w/ his freedom can relate to a groundless ground

p. 154 animal cannot be bête, not free, can’t come away from relation to ground

pp. 300-02 liberty & sovereignty (its limitless “I can”) are indissociable, double bind in 2 senses: 1) double injunction 2) duplicity in very concept of binding, obligation, bind, bond: stricture rather than structure, stricture that limits liberty along w/ sovereignty or sovereignty along w/ liberty

——double bind [#1 above]: deconstruct ontotheology of sovereignty w/out questioning liberty in name of which we put this deconstruction to work: think liberty differently, w/in distribution of a divisible sovereignty > think unconditional w/out indivisible sovereignty

pp. 308-09 question of responsibility is a question of threshold, from which one passes from reaction to response, same threshold as liberty, indivisible limen btwn beast & sovereign [these humanistic figurations of the threshold are being deconstructed]

pp. 310-11 supervised liberty is most common condition, and therefore supervised sovereignty > who would dare say we want to escape it?

OG p. 131 (191) paralysis of ideology: stopping at one determination [slavery] when the object in question [writing] could be something else as well [liberating]

p. 168 (238-39) acc. Heidegger’s history of metaphysics, liberty/truth became condition of presence: freedom of speech borrows no signifiers from exterior world—cannot be dispossessed

p. 286 (405) phonic auto-affection permits the epoch of man, epoch not of history but as history: greatest possible mastery, liberty, self-presence of life

——[in spite of Hegel’s follies, Derrida here affirms that concept of history is a concept of philosophy, that history is the history of philosophy]

UWC pp. 210-13 “as if”: 1) imagination, utopia 2) Kant’s “as if (als ob)” from Critique of Judgment, points to finality of nature, is neither order of nature nor order of freedom [agent of deconstructive ferment] 3) oeuvres dart, discursive idealities that define disciplines called Humanities, a subtle displacement of Kant’s idea: art is art not nature, it is free from all constraint/rules as if it were a product of nature

EU p. 104 via Kant, government must arrest its own power in face of freedom (Montesquieu), must even guarantee it > philosophy as absolute freedom but can’t give orders (who could be trained to inspect this?)

p. 105 Kant’s “heroic” effort to mark off juridical borders btwn 2 classes of [university] faculties > freedom of judgment, philosophy, the unconditioned condition w/out which there is no university

FRIEND

HERP p. 164 for Heidegger, we carry the friend w/ us, only a part, beyond his voice (Stimme) but in it, not the whole friend

p. 165 Heidegger’s carry the friend bei sich (with oneself) same expression used by Hegel for the concept remaining (bleibende) bei sich in absolute knowledge

——friend has no face, no figure, no sex, at a distance neither absolutely infinite, nor absolute proximity (null) of an ownness (propriété) [see p. 70]

——“voice of the friend” > a kind of oneness that does not exclude plurality

p. 171 the part of the friend Dasein carries “evokes,” can permit evocation > the voice, Ruf (call), Stimme (voice, call)

p. 174 [no friend w/out ear, no ear w/out friend] Dasein opening to voice of other as friend > absolutely originary [possibility of ethics?]

——an originary sharing (partage), an originary belonging

——shared belonging, in difference, inscribed, like an originary socius, through the ear, hearing the other-friend, the friend

p. 175 what is the topos of the friend? a figureless figurehead?

p. 176 voice of the friend (if originary) does not have to be friendly > philein/kampf (polemos): [philopolemology]

——to be opposed to friend, to not hear friend, is still to hear and keep it, to carry w/ self, bei sich tragen, the voice of friend

p. 178 Dasein (Daseins ear) is beside what is heard [see What Poets are For?], carries beside itself (bei sich) the voice of the friend > all depends on semantics of bei, beside, auprès de: neither very close nor infinitely distant

p. 179 foreign language, we know it could be intelligible, bears on beings beside which Dasein can stand, friend as stranger must belong to a Volk, engaged in a history, Mitgeschehen

p. 180 deconstruction, or rather Heidegger’s Destruktion: appropriation of the tradition (while “destructing”), calls itself (heisst): “open our ear (unser Ohr öffnen)” [to a friend?]

p. 181 a philein not yet philia, which philosophy (too young, too late) has no authority to question, because [philosophy] is born like an event coming over philein

p. 182 philein—to accord oneself to logos (Sprache, legein, which is already engaged, opened), co-respond, correspondence (not first w/ some subject)

——acc. Aristotle, there must be presence in act of friendship > can exhaust itself in non-address, immediate non-hailing (non-interpellation) [does Heidegger agree? see p. 176]

p. 193 Being and Time (book of the friend?): before & after the philosophical Eros of the question: the question of the question [see p. 201] (most & least erotic book)

pp. 193-94 for Heidegger, grace of friendship in originary Hinhören, accords, grants (Gönnen, Gewähren) favor (Gunst) or grace

p. 196 for Heidegger, originary Eris [Derrida had just mentioned Eros] as truth of philia—Blake’s “opposition is true friendship”

p. 201 philein, love, gathers Kampf, polemos, Auseinandersetzung in the memory of a lost homology

p. 209 [re: Heidegger] what assures homology of to auton, the reversible tautology btwn polemos and philein, what gathers tautology w/ itself, is logos > “philology,” tautology is otology

p. 217n can we read an “unconscious” affinity btwn impending arrival of friend and imminence of death? [Heidegger would protest—isn’t analytic of Dasein regulated by norms of absolute intentional meaning?]

POOF p. x friend will countersign complaint

p. 3 Cicero sees friend as narcissistic projection of ideal image [?] (ecstasy toward future): our own ideal image (sameness/other)

p. 24 find friend w/in oneself (Echo before Narcissus), the other in oneself, would ruin in advance what it makes possible: narcissism & self-exemplarity [however, wouldn’t change testamentary structure Derrida is discussing]

——une archi-amitié sinscrirait à même le sceau du testament [not Ciceronian exemplar]

p. 75 Nietzsche: when we outgrow our friends (who have not transformed) they become ghosts of our past, we hear them as if hearing a younger version of ourself

p. 138 Schmitt: friend originally meant only friend of blood, genealogical bond

——Plato: friend as a tie of nature, belonging to each other

pp. 177-78 if Aristotle says a friend is ‘one soul in two bodies,’ the friend has no home, no proper body, a visitor, traveller, guest, unheimlich (translated into Greek as atópos, mad?) > what would this say of the principle of convenance, which elsewhere defines political—in its bond to friendship [?]

p. 180 for Montaigne, in ‘holy bond’ of sovereign friendship, the friend is a man: marriage, heterosexual friendship, friendship btwn women—an ‘imaginary resemblance’

PAS PAS p. (103) when you say “I love you” does that make me unique?

FRIENDSHIP

R pp. 4-5 fidelity to come, to the to-come, to the future, always trembling, risky, is held in friendship, friendship of thought: yes, there is friendship to (be) thought: oui, il y a de lamitié à penser > we are guests to this snaking oath (serment) [D.H. Lawrence], in name of democracy

p. 18 I would like to try, with you, to return [to “Idea of Democracy”]

H p. anne 98 Levinas: “essence of language is friendship and hospitality”

HERP p. 182 acc. Aristotle, there must be presence in act of friendship > can exhaust itself in non-address, immediate non-hailing (non-interpellation) [does Heidegger agree? see p. 176]

p. 196 for Heidegger, originary Eris [Derrida had just mentioned Eros] as truth of philia—Blake’s “opposition is true friendship”

POOF p. 5 ridiculous fantasy/staging of death of friendship: friend signs your signature at your tomb > who never dreams such a scene?

p. 7 (23-4) Aristotle privileges to love over being loved, active over passive (potential) > Derrida points to a tense btwn active/passive, the question of aimance (lovence) [see pp. 24-5n] ——Aristotle places same & other in figure of the other [the friend], cette étrange configuration donne à penser

——more worthwhile (vaut mieux) “to love,” preeminence of form over matter > Derrida will demonstrate how, for once, w/ Aristotle, death situated on side of form & act: act of friendship bears death in itself

p. 9 for Aristotle, friendship linked to knowledge, science & self-consciousness held (tenue) in pledge, alliance, promise, performative chain [of friendship]

p. 10 if Prime Mover [Lover?] sets himself in motion w/out moving or being moved, isn’t he analogically the beloved, the absolute desirable? on the side of death?

——lover, subject, soul, life, breath, philetikoi [see p.12], necessary; beloved, philótimoi, object, accident, soulless, dead

p. 13 friendship can’t survive its act but can survive its object, it can love the inanimate, it lives, becomes psychic, from w/in resource of survival: the beloved might be dead > re: Aristotle on mother, not needing to be known also means not needing to know if what you love is there

——philía begins w/ the possibility of survival

pp. 14-5 time of surviving (btwn mourning & its possibility) gives itself in withdrawal, self-delivers, self-effaces 2x—constancy & beginning again: indefinite repetition of inaugural moment, keeps memory & anticipates > contre-jour of this contretemps, condition/possibility of friendship [friendship synonymous w/ experience of iterability]

——friendship as grieved act of loving (btwn effective & virtual)

p. 23 via Aristotle, friendship doesn’t come to nature—i.e. virtue [habit, hexis]

p. 33 perhaps good conscience keeps us from thinking friendship; Nietzsche: good conscience as pigtail (Zopf) of our grandfathers [chain of Plato’s prisoners]

p. 41 Derrida countersigns Nietzsche [re: arrivant thinkers, new philosophers], extends the duty to countersign again, to us, to me, to you, teleiopoetically: friendship w/out friendship of friends of solitude

p. 54 the 2 ways to say to oneself (keeping silent) that solitude is irremediable & friendship impossible, 2 ways to (se) partager the impossible: 1) compassionate [see p. 57], negative, keep silent in secret 2) affirmative, attune/join 2 disjointed jouissances at heart of dissociation itself, an ecstasy w/out plenitude [Nietzsche: open horizon w/out light]: a communion darrachement infini [see p. 57 Nietzsche: “finer still to join in laughing”]

pp. 54-5 allied in “joint acquiescence to disjunction,” monadic alterities, the proper of the alter-ego is never accessible [see SPOM p. 35]

pp. 55-6 Nietzsche’s silence (among friends), imperative/enigma of sense of decency (pudeur) [Why I am a Destiny]: an erasure w/out erasure, everything is possible in this silence > silence as interruption that substitutes testimony for know-how, faith for the test, the perhaps for certainty, other for same, friendship for calculation: different way of thinking among

——no silence among friends w/out laughter, which bares its teeth like death, doing evil & laughing at evil (not laughing it away) among friends

p. 63 once Nietzsche goes beyond Greek friendship, can we find unity in Greek culture anymore? > when he says, “in honor of friendship,” he knows (better than anyone) he is speaking Greek

pp. 69-70 ‘lovence’ as participle of a missing verb for friendship, cuts across all figures of philía (mysticism, courtly love, the Greek)

p. 71 Nietzsche envisions 2 people craving a new desire & lust for possession, a shared higher thirst for an ideal above them: that would be named friendship

p. 78 Lysis [on friendship] ties proper name to common one (lysis): emancipation, unbinding, untangling, absolution, even solitude > knot undone & what it means to be solitary

——history of friendship, history of men, of the couple, of 2 men

p. 94 no great discourse on friendship w/out rhetoric of epitaph (epitáphios), w/out appeal to the deceased [re: brothers at funeral]

p. 98 Benveniste’s etymology of phílos, its relation to home, hospitality & oath, but in Homer phílos has vague possessive quality (‘his knees,’ ‘his son’)

p. 153 in Lysis too [re: Schmitt], w/out enemy, there’s no friend [?] > friend as pharmacological, friendship of reparation

pp. 153-55, 169n in Lysis, existence of friend for sake of enemy (ekthrou éneka) is abandoned for hypothesis of desire (épithumia): friend is friend of what he desires, the oikeiéotēs, home, habitat, familiar, property, hómoion, the present, near, neighbor > friend: everything an economy can reconcile

——so, politics of friendship: w/out presence, w/out affinity, w/out analogy, aneconomic, truth & presence start to tremble

pp. 178-79 Montaigne’s audacious/uncontestable description of friend, via Aristotle, qua one soul (singularity) in 2 bodies (duplicity): philía most devoted to other becomes friendship of self, philautia (narcissism), a correspondence (convenance, oikeiótēs), all division is driven out, neither friend can give to each other > this is the communal/communist consequence: communism dreaming in secret of the secret, communism which doesn’t count, no further than to ‘one,’ so not even to ‘one’

——to maintain indivisibility of friendship, must harbor the taste of death, division only affects bodies

pp. 179-80 Montaigne follows Aristotle’s joint ownership of soul in friendship to a disproportionate inversion of dissymmetry: it’s the receiver who gives, gift w/out gift, giving what one doesn’t have (add Montaigne to Plotinus, Heidegger, Lacan)

pp. 181-83 via Montaigne (also Schmitt & Aristotle), the singularity of spiritual fraternity as a non-natural friendship, beyond the law (even though, acc. Aristotle, the best legislators care more for friendship than justice [see p. 192n]), alliance, election, oath, ‘covenant,’ w/out genus because occupying a genus of its own, the unique: no law of the genus for unique brother, a-genealogical

——Montaigne: true friendship doesn’t correspond to the hospitable, erotic, natural or social [4 ancient species of love]

p. 183 friendship beyond the law, justice, the political: is that the good (beyond being)? if so, should one judge/condemn one’s friend’s political faults?

p. 184 if, however, Montaigne believes that [true] friendship must possess reason & virtue [see pp. 192-93n], it could never be apolitical, because reason & virtue could never be private

pp. 184-85 via Montaigne, law of secrecy placed above law of city, apolitical drive of friendship divides virtue or reason > double bind: 1) sovereign fraternity of secrecy btwn 2 w/out perjury 2) political secrecy of brotherhood begins w/ the 3rd, opens to perjury

pp. 185-86 does Montaigne (via túkhē [see 192n re: Cicero], exceptionality of friendship) add rupture of infinite to Greek philía? a reassuring principle would periodize, overdetermine, oppose Christian fraternity to Greek fraternity > Derrida won’t have it: the discrepancies of culture aren’t negligible but they are that of a generative graft, cultural body (so old & new) begins w/ prosthesis > no proper body w/out graft: endless politically consequences of this law—now more than ever, endlessly

pp. 186-88 [1st] Augustine’s abyssal calculation, after death of his friend [Confessions IV], his close reading of Aristotle’s friends are ‘one soul in bodies twain’: survivre, ou non, au nom de lautre?

survive for yourself or person you’re mourning? question of gift, donner au nom de lautre, a narcissism that only occurs in name of other

——[2nd topology in Augustine] arithmetical challenge of arithmetic (indivisibility induces a desire for infinite multiplication of subject), economy w/out reserve, in originary guilt of friendship

——[3rd] infinitization qua conversion in God, on model of fraternal friendship? i.e. God demands we love the enemy

p. 188 that Augustine also reveals an infinitization of friendship using Aristotle suggests the untimely in each presumed model of friendship [disfiguring customary periodizations]

pp. 189-90 on difference btwn omega ω [w/out iota & spirit] in “O my friends…” and ᾠ [w/ both] [which, inconceivably, English translation failed to mark], vocative interjection or pronomial dative? > philological haunting, ω [w/out] as crypt w/ twin ghosts, the added spirit (aspiration) in memory or omission > do the friends remain motionless/indifferent in either case? [see p. 194, pp. 224-25n]

pp. 190-91n for Montaigne, marriage is a free market, this is it’s liability, it is contractual thus reversible, it’s a market w/out the immanence or disinterestedness of friendship > friendship has commerce only w/ itself

p. 191n for Montaigne, the alliance/election of perfect friendship functions like a seam (couture), it solders > solder & seam a vocabulary of artifice, so the question [of POOF]: why does the natural schema [re: friendship] remain [in the figure of one body?]?

pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe quà l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

——beyond the certainty of cogito, the friend only has to become evil to become Evil Genius

p. 196 if Montaigne’s disproportion of sovereign friendship is translated into the political, wouldn’t that endanger Aristotle’s principle of autarky, equality, mutuality [?] > but our question is always about political translation: is the political a universal translating machine?

pp. 196-97 [quasi-thesis of POOF] a justice that cares for the humanity in the human (a principle of infinity) would destroy finite proportionality that ordains calculation of worth, in this way it resembles Montaigne’s friendship > it doesn’t, however, in the sense that Montaigne’s disproportion is extremely rare, inegalitarian heteronomy remains in tact: what if a certain equality could be saved in respect of dissymmetrical/heteronomic singularities > this equality would be at once calculable/incalculable, it would count on the calculable

pp. 197-98 for Aristotle, one can not be friends w/ a tool (órganon), friendship irreducible to technologization: requires philía, puskhé, ánthrōpos, díkaion, nómos, sunthékē (convention, contract), koinōnía (communal sharing) > it is thus, out of a relation of proportion, a tendential law, that friendship finds its destiny in democracy

——no friendship w/ animals or gods, nor btwn animals & gods

pp. 198-99 Derrida wants to offer different aporias [hyper-aporetic] re: friendship than those Aristotle offered, knots of thought which perhaps promise something else, exceeding a lógos of friendship > a perhaps which may no longer be a mere working hypothesis [Derrida’s teleiopoetic force], another thought of decision, responsibility

p. 199 friendship is political if political comes down to creating the most friendships (Eudemian Ethics 1234b 22-3, Book III of Aristotle’s Politics), the good life as philía, as télos of pólis

p. 201 [re: Aristotle’s distinctions on friendship] let us be more precise, more just

pp. 201-02 men & women can have a virtuous friendship, but it’s unstable, child becomes the indispensable link of the bond: the difference from animal procreation is the testament

pp. 200-03 plodding through Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics, Derrida discusses Aristotle’s 3 friendships (pleasure, use, virtue), friendship is political and yet the highest friendship (virtue) is not political (use)

——Aristotle’s 2 forms of justice: 1) numerical equality (katarithmón), brothers 2) proportional equality (katanalogían), father-son [cf. Aristotle’s Politics]

pp. 203-04 in Aristotle, honor saves friendship from calculation, from the market—still, it’s proportioned via hierarchy, a hierarchy as sacralization of the beginning, qua command (arkhé)

pp. 204, 206 via Aristotle, the just wage (gage), a fee, salary, 3rd party & common measure—war ensues wherever common measure & straight and narrow path recoils (se dérobe) [translator also translates the Chapter Title, Replis,” as recoils] > in these grievances, where calculation becomes incalculable, where I can’t count on you, there is no friend

pp. 204-05 Aristotle continually analyses the ruses that allow one friendship to be smuggled into another: use into pleasure, wearing virtue’s mask > though ethical friendship is more beautiful, is bound by faith, beyond contract, legal friendship (political) is more necessary, more natural [?] [more grievances abound in the ethical?]

pp. 205-06 via Aristotle, in friendships trapped btwn pleasure & use, the straight & narrow path (euthōría) [Augustine on Christ] is lacking—makes it difficult to measure the just > as long as love is there, these relationships can function

pp. 206-07 on reciprocity in friendship where there is an obvious incongruity, how do you judge being loved in return (antiphileîsthai)?

pp. 208 about to venture on a decision re: omega ω in “O my friends…”, Derrida makes it clear that the guard-rails of a philological coup de théâtre will not efface the archive constructed on an error [p. 225n Agamben helped Derrida w/ all this]

——the improbable omega ω has a canonical authority protected by great names, the wager of this mistake, like a capital w/ bottomless surplus-value

p. 209 the dative version of omega ω would produce the meaning: ‘too many friends means no friend’ > this is the recoil (repli) version, more modest, it does reopen the question of “how many?”

pp. 210-12 does the autarkic (self-sufficient) man need a friend? [Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, Plato’s Lysis] > rarity is the virtue of friendship [p. 225n rarity also among Christian monks]

——scarcity, rareness, is worth more—sometimes to the extreme > scarcity sets the price of true friendship [hyperbole, incommensurable]

pp. 211-12 the hyperbole of an extreme middle in Aristotle, moderation, proper measure: this applies to # of friends & ‘threshold of tolerance’ re: border btwn pólis and ethnos [immigration]

p. 212 Aristotle’s 2nd hyperbole [re: friendship] is that of eros, where there is only 1 love

p. 213 vocative version, the “wrong” one, a self-contradiction that torments very act of enunciation, gaping-mouthed clamour (clameur à bouche bée) > the dative version is a neutral report

pp. 213-14 Derrida ties the chiasmus btwn the vocative & pronominal dative omega ω to the chiasmus btwn the constative & performative in general (‘speech act’ theory reduced to its rudiments): the call, the address, always overruns neutral observation, a minimum consensus (of friendship, of consent) is presupposed in the utterance [?]

pp. 214-15 that either address [re: omega ω] is addressed to someone will always expose utterance to undecidability because address to ‘someone’ presupposes the impossible: 1) neutral gender 2) ‘only one’ someone > for one person to receive a mark once, the mark must multiply, its iterability affirms plus dun (which allows & limits calculability), the 3rd party is there > there is never one, one is always more than one (w/ or w/out consent)

pp. 215-16 desire for one single friendship exposes possibility & impossibility of indivisible calculation: one time for all time(s) will never cease, immediately infinite in its finiteness, appears as such only in unceasing desire for repetition/multiplication [cf. Augustine in Confessions] > the subject, the ‘one’ friend is indivisible in its calculable identity, indivisible in its incalculable singularity, the one divides the other: it is here that the enemy is w/in the friend

pp. 216-17 Derrida now stresses that the sentence could never be independent of all determinable contexts, but that it’s ability to be contextualized demands that it can give way to another context > thus, everyone who uttered Aristotle’s rumored sentence affirmed its displacement/detachment from a unique context, willing or reluctantly, they said the plus dun of the addressee (for example, a feminine ‘one’): the sentence can’t be signed w/out marking this destinerrancy

——in such a way, Aristotle’s sentence was never neutral, always a project of friendship/enmity, & always a project of the corresponding political community (this is irrepressible)

***pp. 217-18 via name ‘Aristotle,’ doesn’t dream of an unusable friendship survive? beyond fatal syntheses or reconciliations of dialectics [the worst?] > this inflexible hyperbole of philía is not some indestructible, rigid, resistant solidity, sa vulnérabilité légère ne donnerait prise à aucun retournement [via dialectics]: a politics that would break from the old, tired, tiring, exhausted history: la belle tentation of the book you’re reading

——one must resist the temptation to keep (garder) its chance, never let it become program, never a grounding on virtue of perhaps

p. 220 Derrida, w/ great precautions [i.e. both enrich each other], describes hyperbolic limits that would distinguish love & friendship: 1) friendship: phenomenon of appeased symmetry, equality, reciprocity btwn 2 infinite disproportions, 2 absolute singularities 2) love: would raise or rend (déchirerait) the veil of this phenomenon (reveal its hidden, forgotten, repressed truth?), dés-espoir absolu de l'acte de foi et du renoncement absolus

pp. 220-21 to declare love, declare friendship, one cannot know [overdetermine, calculate, program] the who

pp. 221-24 via Aristotle’s prótē philía as teleía philía, telos of friendship as that which can’t be reached, inconceivable, self-contradictory, would be the desire for a perfect friend, for a friendship w/ God [Derrida offers 3 reasons why this is impossible]

——if man has friends, it’s because he thinks the other, thought of the other as thought of the mortal, and thus there is only thought in friendship > “O my friends…” the declaration of God, who knows only divine friendship

——aprosēgoría (non-address, silence, non-allocution) undoes many a friendship, Aristotle believes friendship requires proximity > Derrida wonders what he would have made of the telephone

pp. 228-29 one always takes a stand re: friendship > Derrida utters “O my friend…” in my own name > power of the name to survive bearer of the name: il y va donc du nom porté [borne], du port [bearing] ou du support [basis] du nom et du rapport [relation] au nom, la portée [range] du nom

pp. 230-31 read Aristotle’s discourse on philía as a discourse on language, difficulty of translation already w/in the Greek language: Freundschaft, amitié, friendship as frayage in thought of other/same

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

p. 234 “O my friends…” as a fabulous pedagogy [?]

p. 235 “O my friends…” a call, a prayer (eukhé) [neither true nor false, Aristotle] > can’t give friendship, were friendship not still to come [Heideggerian ek-stasis] > in the name of friendship, “no friend” respectfully declares the perfect sovereign friendship impossible

——vous-mes-amis-soyez-mes-amis-et-bien-que-vous-ne-le-soyez-pas-encore-vous-lêtes-déjà-puisque-je-vous-appelle-ainsi: “O my friends…” has structure & temporality of messianic teleiopoesis

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

pp. 238-39 for Michelet, fraternity is another name for friendship, national singularity gives example of universal friendship, the boundless generosity (exemplary universalism) of Michelet’s andro-gallo-fraternocentrism

p. 240 question “What is (tí estin) friendship?” & “Who is the friend (either sex)?” is nothing but the question “What is philosophy?”

pp. 241-42 [offering quasi-summary of HERP] moment that originary [Heraclitean] phileîn (accord, favour, solicitude Gunst) becomes jealous, nostalgic tension ‘determined by Eros [órexis]’: the step to philosophy, prepared by sophistry [Plato, Socrates] > is the strange voice of the friend, an ontological call [prior to subject, consciousness, even to Mitsein? see p. 243], interior & w/out, the “what is…?” of philosophy [?]

——as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

——via Heidegger, philía as opening, accord, in essential relation w/ phúsis as covering up, dissimulation of self > phúsis qua philía: lune, comme lautre, garde ce rapport à la fois généreux et jaloux à elle-mêmeelle aime à se cacher, krúptesthai phileîn > le retrait de la pudeur [decency] donne ici le mouvement même: gives the gift (donne le don), accords phúsis and philía

pp. 242-43 Derrida now links phúsis to phúein (grow, sprout, mature) [an offshoot of phúsis?], links that to genealogical fraternity > no doubt there’s Greek autochthonism in Heideggerian thought

p. 243 hard to follow Heidegger’s epochal scansion of philía, yes, anachronistic to find subject/object in Aristotle, but how can he say there's no anthropological or psychological vantage point?

——acc. Heidegger, Christianity is an education of passions, even a psychology, a psychological subjectivity—all post-Aristotelian friendships are Christian, same goes for ‘politics’

p. 244 is Heidegger’s Zusage (prior to the question) that agency of phileîn which is not yet the eroticized tension of philosophy?

——Derrida proposes to think a perhaps ‘prior’ to Zusage, arche-originary pledge preceding all questioning, a friendship that could never thrive in gathering (Versammlung), that which accords phília to phúsis to lógos

is the voice of the friend in Heidegger, that which rings out withdrawn from metaphysical subjectivity, a minimal ‘community,’ friendship prior to friendship & enmity?

——promise before friendships linked to ‘yes, yes’—beyond position > resituate the ‘concept of the political’

pp. 249-50 possibility of question “what is…?”, anterior affirmation, not presented as present-being, future anteriority of “O my friends…”

——the indivisible friend, identity to itself could not decide, unmoving autonomy, nothing could happen to it

——temporal torsion [O my friend, no friend, contretemps], dissymmetry envelops theoretical knowledge in performativity of prayer it could never exhaust, we return to question of the response

pp. 251 agency called ‘proper name’ can’t be reduced to registered name, to patronymic or social reference (its determining manifestation) > would Heidegger’s pre-Socratic phília be capable of doing w/out proper name, insofar as it is older than subjectivity?

——Montaigne loved his friend La Boétie before he met him, loved him in his name

pp. 252-56 via Kant, responsibility (response, speaking, time) of friendship linked to respect (distance, gaze, space) > Kant links highest friendship to ‘moral law,’ to distance, repulsion, links love to attraction—if it’s a duty to intend toward dignity of ‘sympathy’ & ‘communication (Mitteilung),’ ‘ardour’, excess, of love can break equality while maintaining reciprocity > there must be outward signs, (external) testaments of friendship [?]

——for Kant, friendship doesn’t produce happiness, the 2 feelings [in each person?] render mankind worthy of being happy

pp. 256-57 via Kant's suspicion of tenderness/gentleness in friendship, a catastrophic complication in natural law of attraction/repulsion, a rupture, love will tend toward the evil of reciprocal possession (fusion), love harbors hate w/in itself > friendship as sign/symptom of this possible perversion, and that which protects us from it: attraction must be against attraction, repulsion against repulsion

pp. 257-58 for Kant, friendship is rare, the rarity of keeping a secret, a black swan > [Derrida seems to hint that Kant is getting personal here: Kant murmurs a confession]

pp. 259 a few oddities that don’t surprise Kant: 1) no secrets in nature, secrets only there where there’s engagement, promise—and no one has the infinite intelligence to know for certain what the secret is 2) the impossible & necessary arithmetic returns: friendship as n + 1, plus dun, there’s always one more than the 2 friends, a 3rd, so how can the secret be kept? 3) merely moral friendship is not just ideal, the event of friendship happens, the black swan

pp. 259-60 for Kant, the black swan of moral friendship is a brother [for Juvenal, p. 258, black swan was a woman]: bond btwn 2 men w/ necessary supplementary complication of a 3rd man

pp. 260-62 Kant’s friend of man (not simply “one who loves man”), announces promise of cosmopolitanism, universal democracy, perpetual peace: inscribed in sensibility, but only in relation to purely rational Idea of equality (not only calculable measure, but also an obligation)

——Kant gives place to, configures, represents the friend of man: “all men are here represented as brothers under one universal father who wills the happiness of all” > father is not a man, not included in friendship he makes possible [via race, genealogy], can’t receive equal reciprocity

——Kant thus repeats the link btwn friendship & fraternity, he doesn’t confuse it w/ strict, literal, ‘natural,’ sensible fraternity [see p. 240] and yet he does not dispense w/ that sense either—repeats friendship’s indivisible link w/ virility of congeneric

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

p. 271 fraternal friendship & ascension, height: Kant’s stellar sublimity of moral law, Nietzsche’s star friendship

p. 275 for Kant, crime against humanity would be to disdain currency, to take counterfeit money for counterfeit [skeptic betrays mankind] > for Kant, virtue obligates that we turn counterfeit (small change) into gold, becoming-truth of the simulacrum, its verification, authentication [pp. 257-58 rare friend keeps secret, renounces possible public profit, that of circulating secret]

pp. 276-77 are the 2 models of friendship antagonistic to each other? do they imply one another as supplementary ruses?: 1) absolute singularity of other, double singularity of dual, narcissism, secret-private-invisible-illegible-apolitical 2) universality, the 3rd friend, forever keeps question of secrecy from closing, law that interrupts singularity, manifest-public-testimonial-political > the hegemonic schema or familial symbol btwn these 2 models is fraternal, excludes the feminine or heterosexuality

——the 3rd witnesses a law that interrupts vertigo of singularity (a dual narcissism), 3rd opens up & keeps from closing the question of secrecy > Nietzsche: for the hermit, the friend is always 3rd person (keeps the other 2 [w/in oneself] from sinking to the depths)

p. 278 [sometimes friendship linked to political], sometimes in name of morality that friendship is removed from criteria of politics > doù la surenchère sans fin dont nous avons tenté de formaliser la loi

——if friendship is above justice, it is as the most just: justice beyond justice

——the 2 dimensions of justice: 1) non-written 2) that codified by law

p. 279 friendship via figure of the brother, in the name of the brother (not the father): sublime figure of virile homosexuality [excludes woman, excludes relation btwn man & woman]

p. 281 the double exclusion of feminine related to tension btwn politicization & depoliticization of friendship (tension on the inside of the political itself)

——Nietzsche tells us 3x: “woman is not yet capable of friendship”

——Nietzsche’s hermit too attracted to the depths, nostalgic for elevation—dreams of a friend to gain altitude > friend’s nostalgia: wish to believe in other, wishing in vain to believe in ourselves > Derrida links this nostalgia to the Heideggerian nostalgia at origin of philosophical philía: elle nourrit [fires?] donc lenvie à légard de lautre comme de nous-mêmes, we envy each other, love as the attempt to leap beyond this envy

p. 282 Derrida deduces the political register of friendship in Nietzsche: to be able to honor enemy in friend, a sign of freedom, neither slaves nor tyrants know this freedom > woman is either slave or tyrant, knows only how to love, can’t respect enemy (honor what she doesn’t love); the political translation of Nietzsche’s axiom: friendship is freedom plus equality [the double bind]

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

***p. 284 if we find in Nietzsche a play of the Gospels against Aristotelian virtue, while Aristotelian heritage is reimplemented: enough to discourage a reassuring historical scansion, must think up different ways of doing history, that which defies tranquility of historian is a strategy of friendship, a war for friendship: lamitié, voilà lenjeu de ces stratagèmes sans fin

——the gift is that which gives friendship in Nietzsche > and yet, friendship still means freedom, equality, fraternity in Nietzsche

pp. 284-85 the 3 friendships in one, the same, those we must break (il faut en finir): 1) Aristotle’s 2) Christian fraternity 3) Enlightenment fraternity (sublated Christian fraternity)

p. 285 via Nietzsche, friendship is a thing of distance, a thing of the future: friends ready to hear will be ready when they have heard the teleiopetic word

——Nietzsche’s teleipoetic word accomplishes Gospel word in perverting it: promises spiritual fraternity, beyond milk & blood (owing to another blood, another eucharistic body [?])

pp. 286-87 Nietzsche’s friend of most distant belongs to finite earth (not world of Christian hinterworld) > friend’s finitude infinitizes the gift he gives: a friend who doesn’t give you the world (a finite one), gives you nothing [this is neither Greek nor Christian]

p. 287 Nietzsche’s Superman: awaited because he is origin/cause of man, Ursache, this friend promised via messianico-teleiopeotic perhaps, immemorially past > this friendship to come would still be too human, still deserves name ‘friendship’ [anthropological, humanist character of friendship is situated/delimited here, friendship of proximity/presence]

pp. 288-89 there are specters on both sides of us (past & future), the phantom friends we lost, the arrival of the Superman > ‘it is necessary to love’ = specters, they are to be loved

——disjunction of spectral distance marks past/future w/ non-reappropriable alterity [p. 307n cf. Düttmann, “What is Called love in…”]

p. 290 great canonical meditations on friendship (Cicero, Montaigne, Blanchot) all belong to experience of mourning > through the irreplaceable of the named, they always advance in testimonial order to confide/refuse death of unique to a universalizable discourse > simultaneously found/destabilize all oppositions, opens to abyss, se fracture

p. 291 though Montaigne infinitizes friendship, he ensures mediation of solder (soudure) in the name of the brother (and the exclusion of woman) > via Montaigne, name ensures ‘fraternal solder’: owing to name, friendship begins prior to friendship, friendship survives friendship—friendship always begins by surviving

p. 292 via Montaigne, time of name [“inexplicable force of destiny”?] bestows force of approach, power of proximity or ‘union’ that defies discourse: the name against discourse (before/after), name as force, affection, mediation (these nameless concepts, w/out common names)

——the 2 names: 1) very structure of testimonial survival stance, a certain spectrality, name survives a priori beyond presence 2) this general structure is enframed (arraisonné) in certain history, chance of filiation, inherited name, that of renown (again, woman excluded)

p. 293 is it another event [than Christian, Greek friendship] when Nietzsche, Blanchot, call the friend by a name no longer the name of man?

——the whole text has thought of Blanchot & Bataille, the “community w/ community,” w/out wanting to capitalize around them all their original thoughts

p. 294 who is the friend? beyond ego, presence, subject, etc.? distancing itself from all determinations? beyond the brother who capitalizes everything? > this a political question—will there be loud protests (by militants of a dogmatic humanism) if to think & live gentle rigor of friendship would be the law of friendship qua an experience of ahumanity?

——Blanchot [re: friendship]: “the fundamental separation from out of which that which separates becomes relation”

pp. 295-96 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

——the hyperbole of this friendship seems to engage w/ greatest risk (re: inherited concept of friendship) when Nietzsche speaks of ‘w/out sharing,’ ‘w/out reciprocity’ > can one, then, still speak of equality & fraternity?

p. 296 for Blanchot, the disaster is that w/out which there would be no friendship, disaster at the heart of friendship

pp. 296-97 what does ‘common’ mean once friendship goes beyond all living community? when it comes to friends only in dying? > common becomes valueless for thinking friendship

p. 297 Blanchot no longer has affinity w/ one Nietzsche (there is always plus dun): friendship is not a gift or promise, it’s the outside drawing near in its separateness/inaccessibility—pure desire is the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance, to die in common through separation

——the common becomes the pole end of a call > question regarding the ‘common’ should bring on a vertigo that asks ‘what is to be done?’ what’s to be done, politically, w/ this vertigo & its necessity?

p. 298 if no appurtenance in friendship, why call this foreigner (absolute foreigner) my friend? no appeasing response to this question

——this friendship announced would have nothing to do w/ community: so that each X without X, unceasing neutralization of one predicate by another (relation w/out relation, community w/out community, partage sans partage), would call on significations altogether different from part shared or held in common

pp. 298-99 desire in lovence (friendship or love) engages me w/ a particular him or her, a singular ‘who,’ desire of the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance (nécessairement infranchissable), where a politics of lovence would no longer imply motifs of community, which always risks bringing a brother back > risk must still be assumed to keep question of ‘who’ from being politically enframed (arraisonner) by schema of l'être-commun

pp. 299-301 inheriting the Greek, no actual rupture is possible, a heritage is affirmed provided it’s ‘still capable of being enriched’ > painful torsion of Greek friend, scarcely readable, is already full of contradiction > inherit Greek friend by contradicting it at heart of its contradiction

——Blanchot: philía, Greek & Roman, remains model of what is excellent in human relations—pure reciprocity & unrequited generosity

p. 301 Blanchot [on Foucault’s death]: “the intellectual friendship that his death, so painful to me, today allows me to declare to him, as (tandis que) I recall the words attributed by Diogenes Laertes to Aristotle: ‘Oh my friends, there is no friend’” > incredible audacity of this tandis que, and the singular use of the colon, an act of punctuation that unfurls a veil of mourning—will one have ever punctuated w/ more rigor?

p. 302 it is thanks to death that friendship can be declared, and never if not recalling > friendship declared during lifetime avows the same thing [so what is significance of actual death?]

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, Aristotle overtook to ruin the capital letters of Platonism, the eídos of friendship, by calling the witness to the stand, an “actual” friend > Derrida will take sign of this ruin & no longer answer call to witness stand

p. 305 Derrida confessing: he has more than one ‘brother,’ of more than one sex, and he loves having more than one (uniquely bound, each time, by a conjuration & so many unuttered oaths)

pp. 305-06 the question “what is meant when one says ‘brother’?”, and the infinite price of friendship, supposes an affirmation, a pledge of a testimony irreducible to proof or certitude > this pledge retranslated into hypothesis/question: is it possible to think/implement democracy, keeping old name ‘democracy,’ & faithful memory of democratic reason (& reason tout court), while uprooting it from all these figures that prescribe fraternal friendship

——democracy remains to come, this is its essence, indefinitely perfectible, always insufficient & future > even when there is democracy, it never exists

——when will we be ready for an experience of freedom & equality that’s capable of respectfully experiencing the friendship that would at last be just, just beyond law, measured against its measurelessness? > “O my democratic friends…”

MPM pp. 28-9 no friendship w/out finitude

p. 38 we think this (immeasurable grief & life of faithful friendship): sublimity of mourning w/out sublimation, w/out Freud’s triumph, w/out ‘paranoid fear’

***p. 66 must keep in memory difference of Lethe from Mnemosyne, call this aletheia

——promise of the other (for the future, trace of the future) made to the other as an absolute past, the other’s sur-vival exceeds the “we” of a common present: brings together two friends, “incredible scene of memory,” written in absolute past; dictates madness of amnesic fidelity, forgetful hypermnesia, gravest and lightest

p. 149 love, friendship, memory (moment two impossible promises are involved: “to what,” “to whom” are we destined) pledged beyond death, beyond what we call, without knowing what we speak, death; it involves, from the 1st moment, in reverse, the other is dead in us

PAS PAS p. (45) Blanchot’s text unchains law of absolute discretion, w/ intractable rigor, which it violates on its own scene w/ measureless obscenity; the only impossible discretion that would surprise his indiscretion > to remain in friendship under the law of the other: the sole sign of friendship, erased in advance

p. (104) friendship gives anonymity in the name, if it is possible, it hands over (livre) le nom sans nom

p. (106) Blanchot: “friendship for the demand to write which excludes all friendship”

FWT pp. 167-68 “friends of psychoanalysis”—affirm necessity of psychoanalysis’ future-to-come > consider whether psychoanalysis has yet to take place “up until now” > such a vigilant “friend” affirms, says “yes,” to its “secret” space, which calls for another ethics, law, rigor

PJP p. 181 acolyte, anacolytic, anakolouthia, analytic figure: as much an analyst as a breach, interruption> a rupture in a set (contract), be it that of friendship, community, being-together

TN pp. 336-37n pregnancy, only a woman can feel the heart of another in her; [Derrida to Nancy before surgery] “Don’t worry, I’ll wake up w/ you,” friend who keeps heart of other, this incredible survival > “heart” joins w/ thinking, w/ grace of gratitude, w/ love of friendship

FRIVOLOUS

AFR p. 68n archeology of frivolous is deviation of genius; Condillac: [periods of decline] man “of genius” deviates from analogy, reign of frivolous turns, far-fetched expressions, neologisms

***pp. 100-01 Condillac’s theory of analogy (operation of remarking): supply a language’s defects > remarks anteriority in the fact, an anteriority (of the fact) that becomes lacking in itself > supply what is necessary, is missing (il faut), but [remark] also presents itself as surplus value, a superabundance, frivolous futility > makes all commerce possible (as value & sign)

pp. 101-02 operation of suppléance (supplementation or supplying) produces overabundance & frivolous futility

pp. 118-19 frivolity (useless) is the congenital breach of sign (its entame, archē), since structure of sign’s deviation ensures frivolity has no origin, frivolity defies archeology, condemns it to frivolity: excessive relief, not even money or merchandise > sign’s disposability never presents itself

p. 119 for Condillac, bad metaphysics is frivolous, hollow signs, purely verbal; Condillac had to guard his discourse from frivolity as if from its infinitely alike double [doppelgänger]

p. 120(n) Condillac: “excess, difference, remainder then are words which signify precisely the same thing: but in using them the mental aspects are not the same…” [how not to be frivolous]

——did Condillac write in margins of a book he never read? is his discourse the frivolous repetition or identification of Leibniz’s statements? both attempted to save metaphysics from a frivolity that gnaws at it from inside > did Condillac plagiarize Leibniz, w/out knowing it?

p. 122 Condillac: frivolities are purely identical, speaking to speak, no need; re: example six is six, it’s the identity of terms that’s frivolous—not identity of ideas

p. 124 for Condillac, frivolity as structural destiny, original sin > an accident as essential fate

pp. 126-27 Condillac against frivolous obscurantism, erudition, against philosophers (inventors of prose) who did not “witness[ ]…impressions they caused” (unlike poets, orators), nor did they find rule of their discourse in “live interchange” > frivolous style is that of the written

p. 128 frivolity originates from deviation or gap of signifier, also from its folding back on itself in closed, nonrepresentative identity

——we escape frivolity only at semantic risk of nonidentity; Condillac names nonidentity metaphor, makes it the primordial structure of language to begin its analogical/teleological reappropriation

p. 128n repetitive structure of knowing gives rise to archeological interpretation of frivolous & to a metaphysics of plagiarism [Derrida quotes Condillac on plagiarism]

p. 132 for Condillac, degree, gradual difference, ruins “identical proposition,” dislocates is > yet, degree also makes synthesis of “identical proposition” possible (prohibiting frivolity)

——the frivolous: (time of a) difference (of degree), spacing which ontology isn’t capable of, con-, de-struction are breached, line of disintegration (not straight/continuous/regular); philosophy deviates from itself, strikes itself w/ blows from outside > deconstruction is possible

pp. 132-33 via Condillac, the sign’s vacancy (a frivolous one), suspension of its relation to object, intervenes before the sign: sign announced before sign

***p. 133 a “stretched sense” always risks being empty, [the analogic of the sign], means we never escape 2 imaginations, 2 identities, 2 metaphysics, 2 barbarisms > always a double or stand-in for idea itself: frivolity’s last/first garment

——frivolous extension (leaves idea w/out thing, sign w/out idea) increases w/ progress itself, follows teleological movement > extends to limit of what it disintegrates: commerce, language, institution

p. 134 need or desire? 1) frivolity comes to need through desire, desire opens direction of object, produces supplying (suppléante) sign, is thin, slight, inconstant 2) need is frivolous, need w/out desire is blind, no object, identical to itself, tautological, autistic: in such a case, desire would moralize need, subject it to law

——but don’t forget: in human order, w/ language, commerce, and supplementary deflection, the 2nd is 1st (metaphysics as humanism) > the need to desire (does not belong to nature)

p. 135 [re: need to desire, desire as end w/out end] moment stone (statue) comes to life, works to reduce gap, (not) become dead again—contrary to frivolous distraction, to headstrong identity of signs: fear of Medusa, legitimacy itself [fear of frivolous = fear of Medusa?]

FROZEN/OBJECTIFIED/BINDING

KH pp. 117-18 Socrates’ desire to animate representation of political, of ideal State, by seeing it at war, in relation to death, outside of its graphical hallucination (immobility) which is the only way poets, & Sophists can speak of politics [zoographic fiction, see p. 123]

H p. 85 law (is always) laid down, laid down against some nature, an instituted thesis > laws that command, impassive, oversees behind glass, tomb of glass

GOD p. 113 one must suppress the object of the gift, to keep in the gift only the giving

***MC p. 370 ever since Plato [repression of Democritus, a large symptom?], an organization of the throw: subject/object > repress chance, repress the mark, protect “normality,” isolate a solid context (stereotomy)

p. 373 not that all fiction, all inscription of proper names has literary dimension, but they arise in a place where limits are never real, never immobile, never solidonly the effects of contextual isolation > pragrammatological (intersection of pragmatics & grammatology)

FL p. 297 serialization of unique: objectification

AF p. 54 no objectivization is pure, nor in truth rigorously possible

p. 68 one cannot objectivize the archive [call on its names, employ it, make it gain in auctoritas] w/out remainder, archive produces more archive, never closed, opens to the future

SPOM p. 130 totalitarianism in Marxism/Communism can be explained as a fear of the ghost, Lenin and Stalin hardened themselves w/ “cadaverous rigor”

p. 195 the commodity objectifies by naturalizing

pp. 196-97 phantasmagoria of a commerce btwn market things makes socius seem natural, labor objectified in things, while denaturalizing thing become commodity

pp. 210, 243-44n for Marx, there’s a phantomatic objectivity before commodity value [?] product of labor petrifies, erects, hardens (feminine character of commodity-chimera?)

BL p. 215 all watchmen (critics, academics, literary theorists, writers, and philosophers), who guard positive laws, value of signatures, & identity of corpora, receive same answer in their appeal to the law: differance > plus de loi et plus de littérature

HERP p. 212 acc. Heidegger, when conflict stops, when one doesn’t hear the unheard, being is no longer kept, becomes an object, a spectacle, in the quelled visibility of objects facing us

——seeing a decay like that which occurs to hearing, suffers when polemos is quelled, sight degenerates into optics > creators (poets, thinkers, statesmen) are no longer tolerated [Nietzsche]

POOF p. 16 hexis binds 2x in same time, such contretemporality another name for psukhé, accounts for, registers, lépreuve du temps, withholds (en garder) its trace in the body [by way of inscription] > the yoke effect

p. 94 friendship can never elude rhetoric of epitáphios, transfixed celebration of spectrality, at once fervent & caught in petrified cold of its inscription (funeral speech, testamentary fervor of heir)

PP p. 73 pharmakon is but a formula learned by heart, dead, rigid knowledge shut up (enfermé) in biblia, foreign to living knowledge and dialectic

p. 88 acc. Theuth myth, language transmits the message of a fixed design

p. 140 (161) bewitchment (lenvoûtement) > always effect of representation, capturing, captivating, the form of the other, par excellence his face, the vultus

VP p. 12 for Husserl, transcendental psychologism substantializes distance, inconsistency, btwn transcendental and empirical self, freezes light at its source

FSW pp. 212-13 an immobile topography [& not a dynamic one] would freeze energy in “a naïve metaphorics of place” > for Freud, must rethink topology/space of conscious writing

FWT pp. 11-2 Derrida feels closer to Lacan than Foucault, he’s more daring a “deconstructor” > Foucault’s passage btwn epistemes neglects long sequences (hardens into oppositions)

DS p. 284n [Derrida comes back to i] reads little point as a decapitation right next to castrated pike > capital I (disseminates unity of meaning), ego, ice, échoplus-je > (I + Dé)irisation

P p. 80 reserve, savings, stock: self-protection of the work (ergon), binding (Verbindung) of energy, condition for “mastery” of pleasure-principle

GSP p. 155 certain atemporal fixedness in phenomenological ideal objectivity as concerns subjective becoming (Logical Investigations)

p. 159 neither structure (which isolates objective significations in their static originality) nor genesis (which effects abusive transitions from one region to the other) clarifies Husserl’s problem: foundation of objectivity

to point to prior circumscription of natural regions (domains of objectivity) in utilization of notions genesis and structure can only be derived from phenomenological critique > thus it is always rightfully primary

SW p. 353 silkworm secretes absolutely, a thing which would never be an object it would stand against

DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

——w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

***RGE p. 277 a text [Bataille’s] that traces, in silence, structure of the eye [illumination] > in contriving/weaving (tramer) “labsolu déchirement,” absolutely rends (déchire) its own tissue—once more “solid” and servile de se donner encore à lire

REST pp. 354-55 Verlässlichkeit laces and lets loose at same time, restitutes “profoundest” going-back behind the philosophemes of matter-form, subjectivity, law, etc., but also [restitutes] most naively archaic regression to trust, that which can let itself be had (se laisser prendre), can abandon itself to the primary/crudest trap, trap before all traps, to a lure constituted by mirror play of the world, its Spiegelspiel [Levinas-like critique? or affirmation of Duplicity?]

p. 360 Shapiro’s restitution brings a ghost back alive to a dead man, mais revenant, revenant vivant au mort: dès lors vivant, lui-même revenant, who is himself then a ghost returning, “personal object” coming back to the ghost (revenant au revenant)

——sacrifice in memory of another dead man, who [Goldstein] remains stony, like his name, mais revient aussi, comme un revenant, grâce au don de ce revenant

WAP p. 64-5 working w/ Bourdieu’s idea of objectification, Derrida sees an infinite task: “objectifiable” is not objectifiable: always exceeds scene of visibility

——achievement of “complete objectification” would ensure sociology’s absolute hegemony, i.e. absolute knowledge

pp. 65-6 what if truth of objectivity no longer took the form of an object?

p. 201n the fold of such supplement of objectification marks a differential limit which could as well apply to thematization (cf. DS)

AFR p. 135 [re: need to desire, desire as end w/out end] moment stone (statue) comes to life, works to reduce gap, (not) become dead again—contrary to frivolous distraction, to headstrong identity of signs: fear of Medusa, legitimacy itself [fear of frivolous = fear of Medusa?]

C p. 236 morceaux de mots as objects (which are abject)

TN p. 139 objectivity of being(s): 1) exposed before a gaze 2) opposes a resistance to touch > does the hand (being-before-the-hand) reconcile these two positional values of objectivity?

BSi pp. 160-61 bêtise as becoming “what” of “who”—monument, stone, becoming-thing of proper name

p. 300 culture of curiosity, treating, curing: violence of enclosing/objectifying

OG p. 292 (413) writing as painting is evil and remedy, pharmakon, zoographeme betrays being & speech, freezes (fige) them > writing as representation (painting) of la bête chassée: capture et meurtre magiques

——that writing carries death, Rousseau would agree w/out reservation

EU pp. 212-13 ontological-encyclopedic hegemony/structure, univerticality, tends to immobilize all recognized borders > all-powerful & powerless (destiny of philosophy subjected to State power)

——CIPH will outline different topology: horizontal, transversal, heterogenous > experiment

SPEC p. 299 Freud had a hard time recognizing himself among his own (les siens) [fort/da] > not unrelated to origin of objectivity (tribunal forbidden to judge the conditions of its establishment)

FV p. 464 for signifier to be kept (pour que le signifiant se garde) in its letter—no partition (if divisible, always can be lost en route) > materiality—indivisibility—idealization—point de capiton (staples signifier to signified) [?]: Lacan determines letter (no matter what he says) at point of its meaning (ideality): letter escapes partition, movement [no wonder he calls this “materiality” “odd”]

FUTURE ANTERIOR

KH pp. 100-01 mytheme, acc. Hegel, will have been a prephilosopheme promised to a dialectical Aufhebung > teleological future anterior resembles narrative while marking end of narrative fiction

FL p. 269 when people talk about “our time,” “our present” in the future anterior, they don’t know what they are saying > it’s precisely in this nonknowledge that the eventness of the event consists, what’s naively called its presence

S pp. 125-27n Derrida reminds of Matthew Arnold, his Babelian phrase Get Geist, his claim that Geist is untranslatable > in Get Geist spirit apostrophizes itself, a beginning—no beginning (pas de commencement): in the beginning there will have been (ghost of future perfect)

POOF pp. 34-5 how Nietzsche’s call to “new philosophers” asks them to come in the future & implies they have already arrived

PPHS p. 89 acc. Hegel, relève of space is time, time is truer than space: what space will have meant is time [future anterior], sensory intuition of sign relevé in passage of time

SH p p. 27 date is a future anterior, the slightest indetermination increases the chances (of a future anterior), gives time one assigns to anniversaries to come

DS p. 190 mimēsis imitates a mnēmē (a past present) > “hope,” anamnesis (future as past present due to return), the preface, the anterior future (future perfect) arrange things

ROP pp. 39-40 future anterior and conditional concerns archivization, what remains or does not remain

O pp. 20-1 teleological anticipation: soothing order of future perfect

IW p. 244 future anterior: can lead to retrospective distortions, can also tear down veils

D p. 308 double bottom, “theaters of memory,” deprives square of ground (suspended in air)

p. 309 such future perfect makes one text circulate in another, excludes eschatology > future perfect of innumerable imperfect, indefinite past that will never have been present

p. 329 imperfect, certain aorist, certain unlimitedness, “unreachable double bottom (double-fond insaisissable)”: past of an anterior future, future of an anterior past

C p. 195 paradigm most often designates an artificial model that already proceeds from a technē: artifact constructed in the past anterior > fac-simile origin of future anterior of model

ATM pp. 175-76 the future anteriority of Levinas’ seriasure [each interruption will be knotted w/ another] is an eschatology w/out [beyond/otherwise than] philosophical teleology, appealing to a past anterior to any past; this future anteriority is irreducible to ontology or Hegelian teleology [in spite of irreducible resemblance]

GATHERING [fixerup]

GT p. 26 “semantic horizon of anticipation that authorizes….” him [Marcel Mauss] to gather together phenomena of diverse sorts

FK p. 60n Derrida thinks Justice in relation to a sundering (déliaison), an always-safe, always-to-be-saved possibility of secret of disassociation, rather than bringing-together (Versammlung) re: dikē

SPOM adjoining—in name, dignity, the just, the right—the gathering up (rassemblement) of oneself, coherence, responsibility > what happens when time is unjust, out of time, ana-chronique?

p. 34 despite so many precautions, Heidegger runs risk of reducing justice to juridical-moral rules when he prioritizes gathering to the same over disjunction w/ its cinders

POOF pp. 242 as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

p. 244 is Heidegger’s Zusage (prior to the question) that agency of phileîn which is not yet the eroticized tension of philosophy?

——Derrida proposes to think a perhaps ‘prior’ to Zusage, arche-originary pledge preceding all questioning, a friendship that could never thrive in gathering (Versammlung), that which accords phília to phúsis to lógos

HERP p. 184 Being is gathering (versammelt) [of the same]—logos > transitivity of “ist”: that it gathers [indivisible?]

p. 187 logocentrism: not so much logos as the center but logos as Versammlung, the gathering that concenters what it configures [i.e. Being]

pp. 193-94 for Heidegger, grace of friendship in originary Hinhören, accords, grants (Gönnen, Gewähren) favor (Gunst) or grace

p. 197 why striking (marquant)? because prägen (mark, strike, leave imprint) is found so frequently in Heidegger > philosophy forged, stamped (geprägt) by Heraclitus in name of gathering, gathered originarily in one striking force, one trait > Kampf

HASD p. 57 for Heidegger, gathering of Geviert takes place in an indivisible topos, simplicity of point [of sword]: “the place (Ort) gathers toward itself at the greatest height and extremity”

MPM pp. 92-3 Heidegger rethinks “thought (Gedanke)” w/ Gedanc, bottom of the heart, gathering together of all that concerns us, more original than Pascal’s thinking of heart?

OH p. 18 every history, history of a culture, has a telos (promise, memory) toward which it dreams of gathering itself > anticipation & telos; and every history cannot be identified in advance, unanticipatable, non-masterable, that of which one has no memory

S pp. 8-9 Heidegger’s spirituality would be a nodal resistance in its most economical torsion, a truth of truth, the tautology of which does not need to be discovered/invented: spirit as another word for the One and Versammlung [Derrida is presenting this politely as an hypothesis, but he knows it’s true]

POS p. 40 gathering Derrida’s work into a “sheaf,” historic/systematic crossroads, is structural impossibility of limiting network of differance, not a master-word, always finds itself in others

ROP p. 34 divisibility of letter, truth w/out truth of deconstruction, distinguished both from das geistige Band [Hegel], & Heideggerian Versammlung > divisibility of letter undoes link of debt, symbolic, name of father (motifs qui lien et se lient au triangle ou au cercle de la réappropriation)

Gii p. 37 for Heidegger, thinking as work of cabinetmaker (Schreiner), a joiner, attune to hidden plenitude of wood’s essence as it enters inhabited site, Handwerk

p. 50 Heidegger always privileges gathering: only mentions hands (in the plural) to bring them together in prayer

p. 60 Ort as point of spear (die Spitze des Speers), first & foremost has power of gathering

——“everything concurs and conveys toward the point,” site always a site of gathering

——acc. Heidegger, great poet resists forces of dissemination or dislocation, privilege granted to unicity, value of gathering (indivisibility [?])

p. 62 end of text, in French, sometimes chute or envoi [re: whether Heidegger’s gathering has ever taken place]

MONL pp. 67-8 appeal to come (appel à venir) gathers language together in advance, not in unity, identity, but in singularity of its difference to itself: in difference avec soi not davec soi

LOBL p. 104 [extensive description] yes of event, yes of iteration, quotes, cites, in accordance w/ strange ring outside of presence, sur-vives

——ring is sealed by arrêt de mort (syntax, almost untranslatable, is sealed in this French expression)

p. 167 “and” as arrêt de mort, “and” of double bind, and I say “come,” “and immediately"-writing, annihilates time in ring of eternal return, yokes affirmation to itself in récit, the being-at-the-same-time of the other beyond time

FWT pp. 80-1 Derrida likes Heidegger’s positioning justice outside law but not its harmony w/ injustice > thinking justice on basis of logos, gathering, accord, Being as presence; for Derrida, harshness of justice—infinite disjunction demands its right, out of joint

DIF DIF p. 16 privilege granted to consciousness, to the “living present”: power to synthesize traces, to constantly reassemble them

DST DST pp. 318-19n Derrida wonders if Heidegger’s insistence on Ort, Erörterung, a unique site of gathering, leaves un-thought désistance or dislocation, which might be thought itself [this torments Derrida’s respect for Heidegger, along w/ Derrida’s insufficient concern re: authentic thought]

IW p. 257 syllogism: being by & w/ itself of logos, rassemble et se rassemble > to speak of itself

HST p. 373 Massignon: Abraham’s hospitality as a sign announcing the gathering of all nations

TN pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

AD pp. 28-9 Levinas’ welcome contests Heidegger’s motifs of gathering & collecting (colligere)

LG pp. 230-31 genre [i.e. “novel”], singular topos, gathers together the corpus and keeps it from identifying w/ itself > designation [“novel”] does not take part in the corpus

BSi p. 233 Celan, like Heidegger, evokes an impulse or step that gathers more than one in it

——mitsprechen: mit as condition of solitude, speaking with or to: con-voke, co-loquate

p. 319 Heidegger’s gathering: retains in a mutual belonging w/out dispersion

——logos or legein as gathering (more originary than logos as reason/logic) still deploys force/violence, a Durchwalten of physis > physis as Gewalt: deployment of sovereignty, of force [of logos] (no dissolving into void), in the highest acuity of its (sovereign) tension (Spannung)

p. 320 logos of John not a Heraclitean gathering of contraries, instead designates one particular entity [see p. 338]

ATAP pp. 94-5 apocalypse w/out apocalypse, w/out Last Judgment, no eschatology beyond tone of “Come” itself > the apocalypse of apocalypse [our apocalypse now], beyond good & evil: no longer collection of evil & good in legein of alētheia, in Geschick of lenvoi, or of Schicken of co-destination

SPEC p. 309 for Freud, work consists in rassembler, searching in order to bring together, reuniting in order to give back (pour rendre) > play is dispersion that sends far away > fort/da is “a game (un jeu)”: reassemble the reassembling & dispersion, give & take back by oneself [work & play ?]

p. 310 [Ernst’s fort/da] collective unity [of toys] is apparatus of game that can dislocate itself > word for things in this theory of set is Zeug, which is also penis: supplementary complex that can reassemble parents

GENEALOGY

GOD p. 23 genealogy’s axiom: history never effaces what it buries (enfouit), keeps (garde) secret of what it encrypts, the secret of the secret, cest une histoire secrète du secret gardé; genealogy is also an economy

C p. 243 all genealogies come down to classifying [a last dwelling place?], and you know Derrida’s taste for taxonomy

GENESIS

R p. 61 Derrida, alongside Nancy in The Experience of Freedom, rethinks naissance > before genesis, creation, nation, nature [deconstruct fraternity]

BL p. 191 law should never give rise to story > law of law: to be invested w/ categorical authority, law must have no history, genesis, no possible derivation

F pp. xxx-xxxi crypt (foreigner in self) & the ghost effect (heterocryptic ghost returning from Unconscious of the other) > radical otherness in self (not unconscious) > law of another generation

POOF p. 34 to wonder how something could be born from its antithesis, whether truth is born of error, one must be mad in eyes of ‘metaphysicians of all ages’ > one must go mad asking about an impossible genesis, one that contradicts its very origin, an anti-genesis [Derrida on Nietzsche]

POS p. 106-07n spacing as not only the space, but an operation, production, genetic (generative): spacing ensures no overlap of any two concepts, no privileging of a concept

ATIA p. 1 naked words, words from the heart, starting from Genesis

p. 17 come after the animal, named after him, this after is not in time: it’s the genesis of time

p. 24 figure of “historical turning point” remains too genetic, biological, zoological

pp. 67-8 Valéry’s snake utters the first word (of Verb): “ME,” this “I am that I am,” first impurity, contamination of being, ontological creation, autobiographogenesis, becomes words of seducer > promise to breach purity of nothingness w/ performative

——I am HE,” auto-zoo-theo-morphic > snake as God, divinity diminished by fires of Seducer

p. 76 reinterpretation of animal calls for another concept of machine, of semiotic machine > of cybernetics, artificial intelligence, zoo-, bio- engineering, the genic in general

p. 139 Lacan’s “generic prematuration of birth,” essential genesis of man’s castration complex > this “generic” trait, man escaping genre, by means of dé-génération (not degeneracy), whose defect engenders symbolic “generation” (law of Name, Father, Speech, Truth, Deceit)

GSP p. 156 the way Husserl moves from fixed (Ideas I) to genetic constitutions w/out breaking phenomenological continuity > unearthed “structural a prioris” of genesis itself

p. 157 how “untamed genesis” demanded of Husserl a metaphysics of history and a solid structure of telos, moving phenomenology beyond descriptive space, beyond phenomenology?

structuralist demand: descriptions of totality w/ internal legality (each element has meaning in its solidarity of correlation/opposition with every other); genetic demand: origin, foundation of structure > Husserl ceaselessly tried to reconcile the 2

p. 159 for [1st phase] phenomenology, all empiricism requires a prior [transcendental] regional circumscription of objectivity, not against all genetism, but certainly against skeptical “worldly genesis,” naturalism, causalism, positivism, science-of-facts (Tatsachenwissenschaft)

——neither structure (which isolates objective significations in their static originality) nor genesis (which effects abusive transitions from one region to the other) clarifies Husserl’s problem: foundation of objectivity

to point to prior circumscription of natural regions (domains of objectivity) in utilization of notions genesis and structure can only be derived from phenomenological critique > thus it is always rightfully primary

pp. 321-22n Husserl: norm of math found in mathematical, logic in logical, ethics in ethical

pp. 161-62 Derrida hypothesizes that Husserl excluded all genetic preoccupation (circa Ideas) in protest to historicist/psychologistic genetism: he saw all genesis as worldly, causal, associative [he later develops a non-empirical genesis]

pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

pp. 164-65 Husserl’s genesis work (after Ideas): attempts to reduce predicative sedimentation (scientific superstructure), subjective-relative truths in Lebenswelt, in order to “reactivate” untamed precultural life

——for Husserl, limits of genetic description of the ego itself (i.e. passivity/activity), are provisional, not definitive

——genetic description of ego prescribes task of a universal genetic phenomenology (a eidos of historicity) for Husserl, this is not a series of ruptures, revolutions, that tear open a previous finitude to lay bear a hidden infinity, giving voice to dynamis of silence > the ruptures are always already indicated [Telos] [Derrida wonders if this a metaphysical affirmation in a phenemonology]

p. 167 Telos/Vorhaben > infinite theoretical anticipation & infinite practical task: Kantian Idea as project of phenom.? makes it possible by overflowing its system (as its end?) > doesn’t enclose genesis of Being & meaning—is structurally genesis itself: origin/becoming, birth of history

pp. 167-68 to ask about meaning of structure or genesis, is to ask what precedes phenomenological reduction, to ask about possibility of question itself— ask about its [phenomenology’s] own death

FS p. 27 like structuralism, no concept of force in Husserl (brings phenomenology back to Platonism despite professed anti-Platonism); for Husserl, truth requires forgetting [of genesis, force, failure, crises]

p. 27 when all value 1st constituted by theoretical subject, diaphanousness is supreme value, univocity > hence, difficulty in thinking genesis & mysterious failures called crises

——Husserl’s solution: forgetting is eidetically dictated, necessary, under rubric of “sedimentation” > for the development of truth

DIF DIF p. 12 differance no more static than genetic

AFR pp. 47-8(n) Derrida defends Condillac against Foucault’s assessment of a “deficiency,” “epistemological myths” > perhaps Condillac’s maintenance of calculus & genesis resists a classical opposition

pp. 61-2 genius as trailblazing (frayage); Condillac: “we do not properly create any ideas; we only combine, by composing & decomposing” > Condillac still distinguishes genius (gives birth to new science, new branch, new art) from talent

——combinative concept of generation indispensable for Condillac’s critique of innatism: innatists choose btwn classifying innate ideas (calculus) & empiricism of genesis (engendering)

D p. 304 mathematicogenetic theory of groups: [if this were intended to mean anything] nothing prior to group (no originary unity prior to division)

BSi p. 313 Abrahamic commencements: 1) Bereshit, Genesis—animals before man 2) en arkhē en o logos, sovereign all-powerful creator of everything, Head, fiat of a logos producing zōē, light, phōs

OG p. 254 (359-60) structural analysis can cycle back to point zero w/ concept of catastrophic event: structuralism does not follow linear genesis

p. 259 (366) passage from nature to society can’t be described by alternative genesis/structure; advent of supplementarity as natural catastrophe neither in nor out of nature [Aristotle]: nonrational origin of reason

p. 291 (411) Rousseau broke w/ linear genesis

GENITIVE

OOG pp. 142-43 “the Absolute of the Idea as the Telos of an infinite determinability is the Absolute of intentional historicity”

——this “of” is neither objective nor subjective genitive > announces the Absolute of genitivity, the pure possibility of genetic relations, primordial interdependence of subject/object

H p. 3 question of foreigner: foreigner is in question, also, foreigner, putting the first question, puts me in question

MPM p. 87n when de Man quotes Mallarmé’s “this shallow calumniated stream called death” from “Tomb of Verlaine” (signatory of epitaph always writes on his own tomb), Derrida tells us genealogy of genitives cannot be broken by cenotaph or cremation: the tomb of Verlaine of Mallarmé of Paul de Man

VM p. 80 “liberty of the question”

p. 115 in classical infinitism (Descartes) neutralization of space to liberate positive infinity, body: exteriority, zero point, origin of space, an origin which has no meaning w/out of, origin inseparable from genitivity, from space it engenders/orients, an inscribed origin, written, traced

S p. 84 furnace (embrasement) of spirit (affects, affects itself, and gets affected by fire)

OH p. 10 culture of other: signals culture never has a single origin

WM p. 271 metaphor always carries its death w/in itself, this death is always the death of philosophy [but the genitive is double]

REST p. 373 once there is ghost (fantôme) or double as revenant, logic of identification is not easily appeased > ghost of Van Gogh: genitive translates the malaise, Unheimlichkeit, all by itself

PIO p. 39 “invention of the other” neither subjective nor objective, deconstruction as invention deconstructs this double genitive

***EJQB p. 74 double genitive (question of God) is embedding of ontological & grammatical w/in graphein

AD p. 23 yes, yes: the welcoming of the other (laccueil de lautre) (objective/subjective genitive)

WOG p. 28 deconstruction at work in the ‘origin,’ already from the ‘origin’ itself—upon deconstruction of the origin

GENIUS

SPOM p. 20 a genius [Shakespeare] operates, it always resists and defies à linstar dune chose spectral, “the animated work becomes that thing, the Thing that, like an elusive specter, engineers [singénier] a habitation without proper inhabiting, call it a haunting, of both memory and translation,” “a masterpiece always moves…in the manner of a ghost”

p. 21 [re: translation of “the time is out of joint”] lécart: irreducible inadequation to the other language, to stroke of genius of the event that makes the law, to all the virtualities of the original

——each translation aggravates, seals the inaccessibility to other language

WM pp. 244-45 acc. Aristotle (onomatism, doctrine of simple names), metaphor, like mimēsis, must come back (revient) to physis, to its truth and its presence: nature finds itself, its proper analogy, nature gives itself in metaphor, thus metaphor is a natural gift, a characteristic of genius > geniuses have more nature, more generosity, more seed; Derrida asks whether everything can be taken from me except the power to replace? can physis sow itself?

OTO p 24n [re: signature w/out value, to which is juxtaposed untimely signature] Nietzsche: rights of genius have been democratized, everyone relieved of the labor to form oneself, of personal necessity of culture (Bildungsarbeit, Bildungsnot)

DPi p. 209 exemplarity of Hugolian economy considerably exceeds the singular genius who represents it so well

REST p. 376 avoir fait marcher la destin, provoked someone to make an impossible bet: Van Gogh’s coup, genius of his unevenness (son impair)

PIO p. 5 invention is not natural, though often related to origin, genius, generation > thus question of son, signature & name

p. 415n Kant: talent for inventing things is called genius, unlike mere imitators, the inventor’s work is exemplary, it serves as a model (Beispeil) (exemplar) to be imitated

p. 38 ingenious: btwn natural genius & technical cunning

pp. 417-18n Kant: imagination, site of genius, it’s creative (schöpferisch)—still, academic rules must be followed if Kunstler wants work to fit Idea underlying it

p. 418n if there’s still no invention w/out genius, or brilliant flash of Witz, the generosity must no longer respond to principle of savings (dépargne), to a restricted economy of differance

TR pp. 76-7 French à propos allies necessity & chance, accidental (machinelike) relation to organic, obligatory link; esprit dà-propos: the art, the genius, the technique of grabbing a chance, making of Khairos or Chaos a significant, archivable, even ineffaceable event

AFR p. 40 philosophy is historical for Condillac: it always comes after cognition, after a scientific discovery; his philosophical method can only be established après coupor stroke (coup) of genius

p. 42 Locke inaugurates—but after Bacon & Newton (philosophy records pre-existence of good minds), philosophers are the first to recognize genius (Locke recognized Bacon)

pp. 61-2 genius as trailblazing (frayage); Condillac: “we do not properly create any ideas; we only combine, by composing & decomposing” > Condillac still distinguishes genius (gives birth to new science, new branch, new art) from talent

——combinative concept of generation indispensable for Condillac’s critique of innatism: innatists choose btwn classifying innate ideas (calculus) & empiricism of genesis (engendering)

pp. 64-5 genius finds what know one could find before, but various forms of finding (different origins of each science): find, discover, invent, come or light upon (rencontrer)

pp. 65-6 Condillac: genius can only prosper when language is not defective, when it’s easy/convenient, when a language has fixed principles—this is an epocha of great men

p. 68n archeology of frivolous is deviation of genius; Condillac: [periods of decline] man “of genius” deviates from analogy, reign of frivolous turns, far-fetched expressions, neologisms

p. 71 if there were only (natural, national) genius and progress of language—no history? > if genius is pure rupture, discontinuity, can’t be reduced to its own conditions—no history

——Condillac’s theory [where there is history]: imagination retraces: produces as reproduction the lost object of perception, brings to light what will have been there

pp. 82-3 Condillac: men of genius, favorite disciples of nature, make language seem less arbitrary—method of invention is only analogy itself (analogy: art of reasoning & speaking)

——that math can be a model for analogy: unlimited generality of principle of analogy

EL p. 192 Scholem against extinguishing category genius, Derrida adds: secularizing rationalization that flattens, levels out, resistance of any singularity/exception [Nietzsche-like]

E p. 10 for Kant, genius capitalizes freedom while naturalizing economimesis

p. 13 Kant’s genius poet doesn’t need to know what he is writing, nature dictates what he writes, divine production > hierarchical analogy: society of logos, sociology of genius, a logoarchy

OG p. 17 (29) Rousseau: to “judge genius” from books is like “painting a man’s portrait from his corpse”; Derrida: writing in the common sense is the dead letter, exhausts life, carrier of death

IF p. 304 to exclaim “genius!” as Flaubert does about Spinoza: astonishment of amateur autodidact

EU pp. 70-1 [vis-à-vis Schelling] can philosophy be acquired? is it innate? a free gift (ein freies Geschenk)? an art requiring genius of natural language?

——even if gift, must possess w/ practice

GENRE

KH p. 89-90 khōra as a name that announces the Other of the name, not logos, not mythos, neither this nor that, both this & that: “not lying when I say this” is that telling the truth?

——participates (while being excluded) in the intelligible in an aporetic way, genre beyond genre

p. 91 khōra, discourse on genre, genos (ethnos), gens, it is a triton genos [other 2 genus’: 1) immutable 2) sensible]

pp. 106-09 belonging of genos [true citizens, philosophers, politicians] to proper place guarantees truth of its logos & action, different to Sophists who have no place, wander

——Socrates speaks as true citizen while identifying w/ Sophist, feigns, simulacrum: tells you, you alone have place, gives you the floor > excludes himself by himself by giving back the word; no room for specialists of nonplace or simulacrum in the agora

p. 109 Socrates as khōra, 3rd genus, for he only resembles the genus of those w/ no place

——Heidegger: khōra prepares way for “Cartesian space”

LOBL p. 86 how could we make a genre work w/out referring to it quotationally?

p. 102 structure of invagination exposes precariousness of effects of “genre,” “mode, “corpus,” all historical fictions that certify its carte didentité

BL p. 207 law beyond sexual & grammatical gender, neutral

F p. xxvi the Thing is encrypted by crypt (for du Moi, self’s safe) not w/in (dans) it; crypted structure of ultimate referent [Thing] means double articulation (history, story) coalesces all these genres: myth, poem, novel, drama, translation > the narrated event never appears

DS p. 242 forms of writing subject to law of hymen (literature, theater, drama, ballet, dance, fable, mimicry), the rule of the cast-aside-reference, the being aside (référence écartée, être à l’écart)

p. 243 following Mallarmé, though this [sexual?] difference opens up play of all writing, must still distinguish genres, trace effects of each genre, whose structure is original in each case

p. 244 [re: specificity of genres] to join mime & dancer (they should be allied but not confused), two attitudes jealous of their respective silences: this is to confront too much difference!

——distinct trait of each genre finds itself commanding the work, employs discrepancy in its very structure [will to power], what remains is to find genres communicating

——different genres don’t fuse into total art (thus Mallarmé’s gripe w/ Wagner)

P p. 33 to go against feast [re: hermeneutic circle of philosophy & art] do not mix genres but extend metaphors (you can always try: question of style) > i.e. feast top to toe, circling step

ATIA p. 139 Lacan’s “generic prematuration of birth,” essential genesis of man’s castration complex > this “generic” trait, man escaping genre, by means of dé-génération (not degeneracy), whose defect engenders symbolic “generation” (law of Name, Father, Speech, Truth, Deceit)

PS p. 187 for Artaud, theater not one genre among others, summons totality of existence

PIO p. 7 singularity of event that produces itself by speaking about itself [Derrida’s essay], invents on subject of invention, bringing it about—while also describing generality of its genre, genealogy of its topos, sustaining tradition de inventione

TR pp. 82-3 [re: Rousseau’s relation to Augustine’s Confessions] mēkhanē of a dramaturgy, supplement of fiction, inscribe in the archive of a new, quasi-literary genre (confessions) > palimpsestuous [insect/incest], encrypted lineage

p. 98 machine-like operation of excuse: divides/multiplies, drags guilty into repetition of “last word” > eschatology becomes a genre, inexhaustible eschatology of final words

LG p. 223 “ne pas mêler les genre

p. 224 genre—limit drawn—norms, interdictions not far behind

——1) genre as phusis, a biological genre, or a human genre, genre of all that is general 2) genre as non-natural, as typology, associated w/ technē, thesis, nomos (i.e. literary, artistic genre)

p. 227 law of law of genre: principle of contamination, parasitical economy, participation w/out belonging

p. 229 can one identify a work of art if it doesn’t bear the mark of a genre?

p. 230 no genreless text, always genre & genres

——effect of code: in marking itself generically, text unmarks itself (se démarque) > because of trait, text participates in one or several genres

pp. 230-31 genre [i.e. “novel”], singular topos, gathers together the corpus and keeps it from identifying w/ itself > designation [“novel”] does not take part in the corpus

——genre-clause (clause de genre): clin doeil, écluse (floodgate), clôture qui sexclut de ce quelle inclut, déclasse ce quelle permet de classer > unfigurable figure of clusion, forme sans forme, neither sees day nor brings itself to light

pp. 240-41 [after Derrida describes the double chiasmatic invagination of La folie du Jour] are all these transgressions permitted by [publishing] law, à lintérieur de cet espace normé (normed space)? > but in La folie du jour “in whole and in part, the whole is a part (tout et partie , tout est partie)”

p. 242 récit of a récit w/out récit, whose visible space is but some border of itself w/out “self”: framing edge w/out content, w/out modal or generic boundaries: law of this textual event

——degenerescent self-engendering of a récit

p. 243 double chiasmatic invagination of edges excludes pure form, question of literary genre is not a formal one: covers motif of law in general of generation in the natural and symbolic sense

——Derrida includes very elusive, allusive reference to hymen [genre as gender], rapport sans rapport btwn masculine & feminine; genre (Gattung) and marriage in series gattieren, gatten, Gatte/Gattin

p. 244 [when Blanchot introduces sexual genre] sexual difference (aner, vir—sexual difference does not occur between a species and a genre)

p. 245 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] as long as I say “yes, yes,” I’m a woman and beautiful, man rendered other: secret and odd hymen > madness of sexual difference, mixing of genres

——transsexuality permits me, in a more than metaphorical & transferential way, to engender

p. 246 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] I bring forth to light (donne le jour) precisely the law as the right-to-sight (droit de voir), this law has “me” at its/her disposal? > the “I” sans “I” of narrative voice does not take place, engenders the lawmen [panoptic demand: synopsis]

p. 247 double affirmation not foreign to the genre, genius or spirit of law: no double affirmation w/out light of day and daylight becoming law > madness of the day

pp. 247-48 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] embrace the knees of the law > genous, je nous

p. 248 law demands a testimony oriented by a sense [genre] of history, ordonné par la raison and unity of “I think (je pense)”: originally synthetic apperception accompanying all representations

——that “I” does not always accompany itself > radically persecutes the law

p. 249 the law plays too, she plays upon her generation and genre, à naître [nêtre] comme personne (born like anybody or nobody) > born of the one for whom she becomes the law

p. 252 “a récit?” will not have been exemplary, w/ regard to the whole > contre-exemplaire de tout

genre always plays role of order’s principle: resemblance, analogy, identity and difference, taxonomic classification

——lépreuve of a récit brought to light the madness of genre—spinning (faire tourner) Peterson’s genre-disc, comme un soleil fou > dividing borders btwn literature and its others

——“this is the whole of it,” only what “I” see, kneeling [à genoux] at edge of literature, “le loi en somme, ce que je voit et que je dit que je vois en un récit où je/nous somme

ATAP p. 66 quoting title, a genre, genre making fun of a genre [re: Kant’s “Of an Overlordly Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy”]

SPEC pp. 275-78 strategy [Freud’s speculation] whose finality’s not clear, no known genre, it overflows, thus the hypothesis, the athesis of athesis > asking questions in the dark: Freud’s phosphorescent antennae

GESTELL

DST DST p. 207 Ge-stell: difficult to differentiate word from thing, for essential reasons > Lacoue-Labarthe: why does Heidegger go beyond Gestalt in search of Ge-stell?

p. 211 Ge-stell (bestellen, vorstellen, herstellen, nachstellen)

——does Heidegger avoid, pretend not pay attention to (fait semblant de ne pas faire attention), the relation btwn Gestell and Darstellung?

pp. 317-18n Lacoue-Labarthe: Gestalt and Darstellung can be derived from Ge-stell

to lose track of Darstellung is to lose track of abyssal structure that can always divide & fictionalize it [it being Darstellung] [re: Lacoue-Labarthe on Heidegger’s use of Gestell]

p. 215 Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger draws stehen and stellen together by identifying stal of stellein (to equip, to send word for) w/ sta of stele (column), he also links thesis via dhe to Setzung, Stellung, Lage—more philological Witz than true etymologism

RM p. 79 Ge-stell of the Gestalt in the joining (Gefüge) of which “der Riss sich fügt

GHOS T (fantôme)

GT p. 97 a “true” corpus is still, perhaps, counterfeit money, may be ghost or spirit, spirit of body & of capital (title, heading, is capital), no problem of canon if this institution were natural

p. 114 in Mauss, ghost & spirit linked in same time, same scene

R p. 86 to think democracy [Paulhan], to think “first to happen by (le premier venue),” at limit of “who” or “what,” living being, cadaver > “first to happen by” = “first to come”?

H p. anne 152 a place of haunting has no ghosts, ghosts come where they are exclude, death haunts us by remaining unthought

FL p. 253 the undecidable remains caught, lodged, as a ghost, an essential ghost, in every decision, every event, the ghostliness deconstructs from within all assurance of presence

p. 259 to think the holocaust one must be hospitable to the law of the ghost

p. 278 what else can one love but ruins? one loves a monument in the ghost or silhouette of its ruins? its finitude

pp. 278-79 for Benjamin, iterability precludes great founders, initiators, lawmakers (or “great” poets for Heidegger), preserves law, thus police become figure of this iterability

——police, index of ghostly violence, exemplary figure, figures w/out limit, w/out face or figure, not simply in uniform, a formless (gestaltlos) violence, all-pervasive specter

AF p. 39 a scholar of the future, one who dares to speak to a ghost [see SPOM] (Marcellus to Horation), speaking to ghosts conditions scholarship

p. 41 “I shall say we” to a ghost or newborn > indestructible covenant, extraordinary performative (like a circumcision)

p. 47 [re: Yerushalmi] monolinguist who says “we,” promises secrecy for a virtual response [re: Freud’s unknown conviction that psychoanalysis was a Jewish science], does Freud’s ghost murmur the secret in private [to Yerushalmi]?

p. 61 ghost makes the law especially when you contest him [return of the repressed]

p. 62 archival technē overflows singularity of event, i.e. the answering machine that outlives its moment of recording, the ghost speaks

pp. 85-87 Freud both accounted for ghosts, and tried to conjure them like Marx: [re: Gradiva’s ghost] Freud speaks of “real ghost,” and of a part of truth, the truth of delusion, haunted by specter of truth, truth is spectral as part of truth irreducible by explanation

LOBL p. 116 arrêt arrests itself, stands, stays unstable, remains on arête of itself, it a-rests (for) itself, no consciousness, perception, no watchfulness can gather this remnance, no “I”, hence ghosts, fantasies, epochal pause

pp. ~136-37 sur-vient, the event, Nietzsche’s Doppelgänger, ghosts, consists in nothing but coming about, being gone

pp. 164-65 double hymen w/ each woman; each woman double, death mask, cast, ghost, body at once living & dead, of other > utterly other “in relation to” one another: each one is the other

pp. ~171-72 think exteriority from angle of economy of the arrêt: greatest “bound” energy, bandée, tightly gathered around its own limit (Hemmung, Haltung) > immediately disseminated, sand, empty, unloaded, spontaneously: in trance of trans, ghosts, transes, folies du jour (cf. Glas on trépas, trans/partition [Derrida’s referring to Genet crossing national borderlines])

SPOM pp. xvi-221 [see SPECTER]

pp. xvii-xviii to learn-to-live w/ ghosts, in commerce w/out commerce of ghosts

——being-with specters: a politics of memory, inheritance and generations

p. xviii no justice w/out principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, devant les fantômes de ceux qui ne sont pas encore nés ou qui sont déjà morts > possibility provided by “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present”

p. 3 specter as a foreign guest

pp. 4-5 as soon as one no longer distinguishes spirit from specter, the former assumes a body, incarnates itself, as spirit, in specter > specter an instant of flesh and phenomenality, apparition

——flesh disappears in the apparition, dans la venue même du revenant ou le retour du spectre

p. 5 what spirit & specter have in common, one doesn’t know if it exists, doesn’t belong to knowledge, almost unnameable thing qui nous regarde

——ghost defies semantics, ontology, psychoanalysis, philosophy

p. 6 asymmetry, we see the ghost of king resembles the king, but can’t see what looks at us, this visor effect linked to everything we will say about specter in general > such is the difference btwn le spectre ou le revenant de lesprit, fut-ce de lesprit au sense de fantôme en general > supernatural, paradoxical phenomenology, ungraspable visibility of the invisible, the non-sensuous sensuous of Capital, intangibility of a proper body w/out flesh [see p. 156 are specter/ghost different?]

——specter takes on the form of someone other (quelqu’un d’autre), that is, a self, subject, person, consciousness, spirit; thus specter’s not icon, not ideal, not image of image (phantasma), nor simple simulacrum (thought it is so close to this)

p. 10 question of the event as question of the ghost: first time (but also last time) & repetition, tout autre > hauntology, logic of haunting: more powerful than ontology, harbors eschatology/teleology as effects, mise en scène pour une fin de lhistoire

——what is a ghost? what is effectivity/presence of a specter? > virtuality, ineffectivity, simulacrum? is there a there btwn thing itself & its simulacrum?

——après la fin de lhistoire, lesprit vient en revenant, il figure à la fois un mort qui revient et un fantôme dont le retour attendu se répète, encore et encore

follow a ghost, be followed by it, persecuted by very chase we are leading?

p. 11 question of repetition, specter is always a revenant, can’t control its comings and goings > commence par revenir

p. 51 money as ghost [?] a spectralizing disincarnation, a “who,” has a kind of body w/out property

p. 55 via Marx, in Timon of Athens [see pp. 96-7 Marx’s play]: Timon’s trust in money (simulacrum, ghost), an oath, a giving credit, to that which is unworthy of oath; not convention society, or law > cult of money as nature, prostitution, thus constant perjury, simulacrum, greed

pp. 57-8 Marx does not like ghosts, he believes in dividing line btwn ghost and actual reality, living effectivity > he believes enough to want to chase away, exorcise specters > but how to distinguish analysis that denounces magic from a counter-magic?

p. 78 logic of ghost, toward a thinking of event, exceeds binary, dialectical logic where effectivity or actuality (present, empirical, or not) is opposed to ideality (regulating or absolute non-presence)

p. 100 regiments of ghosts [the 10 plagues of “new world order” pp. 100-04] have returned camouflaged by archaic symptoms of paramilitary and of postmodern excess of arms (information technology, panoptical surveillance via satellite, nuclear threat)

p. 123 specter [of Communism] like Televisions of future, a phantomatic screen upon which all phantasms are projected

p. 124 via Marx, politicians are seers, visionaries, they form alliances to conjure away “specter of communism”; alliance signifies: death to the specter

p. 125 specter is what one thinks one sees on a imaginary screen where there’s nothing to see > specter first of all sees us

——spectacularizing speculation, theatricalization of speech, no shut-eye > so intent to watch the return (à guetter la retour) [on imaginary screen]

p. 130 totalitarianism in Marxism/Communism can be explained as a fear of the ghost, Lenin and Stalin hardened themselves w/ “cadaverous rigor”

p. 133 “frequency counts”: experience of the ghost as a rhythm, insistence

p. 135 “anxiety in the face of the ghost is properly revolutionary”

p. 141 figures of the ghost first of all faces, matter of masks, helmet, visor

p. 150 figure of ghost, hidden figure of all figures, no meta-rhetoric of the ghost

p. 154 acc. Marx, to call forth spirit and dismiss ghosts is to phantomalize, bewitch oneself w/ spirit

p. 155 Marx insists on discerning, the price of the krinein of the critique: he’s out to get the specter, not the spirit, believing in a decontaminating purification, as if ghost were not haunting the spirit, as if iterability did not erase critical assurance of distinction btwn these 2 concepts

p. 156-57 specter is of the spirit, il en participe, il en relève alors même quil le suit comme son double fantomal > the difference btwn the 2 tends to disappear in the ghost effect, a shadowy articulation plays btwn spirit and specter, entre lesprit dune part, le fantôme ou le revenant dautre part [see p. 6 are specter/ghost different?], Marx plays w/ double meaning of Geist

p. 157 acc. Marx, the ghost effect not only spiritualization, autonomization of spirit, idea, or thought (Hegelian idealism), but also supplementary moment after autonomization, one more simulacrum is added: a body, flesh (Leib)

ghost must return to body, flesh > spectrogenic process—incorporation

p. 158 often this body is a ghost of a ghost (the spirit), a prosthetic body (fetish): spiritualization = incorporation for Marx?

pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

***——that’s not all: specificity of process can still capitalize spectralization > the first ghost effect (autonomized spirit) can be incorporated, negated, integrated as one’s own human body

——for Marx, this turns one into absolute ghost, ghost of ghost > delirious, hallucinogenic moment of Stirner’s hubris

pp. 160-61 spectral effect, for Marx, a dialectical position (Setzung) of the ghostly body as body proper > where Stirner sees 1st moment as spectral and 2nd as successful, interiorization, subjectivation (plus de vie) Marx sees a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality (plus de mort)

p. 161 the egological body, Marx cries: ghost of all ghosts! > forum, agora [cf. F], gathering place toward which specters run

pp. 161-62 Stirner advocates auto-affection of “I-Me,” where no ghosts can haunt, no spacing, no interstice > thinks this epokhē reduces, exorcises the ghost, Marx thinks it reduces to the ghost

p. 166 “I am” = “I am haunted,” Ego = ghost; Es Spukt (translation misses impersonal, quasi-anonymity of German), “it spooks,” “it ghosts,” it specters,” ego inhabited by its own specter

——“es spukt” in Freud’s “Das Unheimliche,” production of figure the revenant (der Spuk)

p. 168 to see ghosts is to make oneself seen by ghosts

pp. 170-71 difference btwn specter and spirit is differance, specter is > carnal apparition of spirit, its phenomenal, fallen, guilty body, impatient, nostalgic waiting for redemption, for spirit

——ghost would be deferred spirit, promise or calculation of an expiation > this differance must be reckoned w/: it upsets all calculations, interests, capital > a transition btwn 2 moments of spirit, the ghost just passing through [see Hamacher, “Lingua Amissa,” Futures: Of Jacq.., p. 165]

——passage of “spirits,” “offspring of spirit” > spectrality of everything (Gespensterhaftigkeit Aller)

p. 172 at the head, the capital representation: man, capital ghost (das Hauptgespenst), arch-specter > if men exist in logic of abstract spirit, they are present in ghostly fashion, as specters

——humanity: collection of a series of ghosts

——who’s head of the head (larchi-specter, le fantôme capital) when ghosts are disseminated everywhere? qui mettre en tête parmi tous ceux quon se met en tête?

p. 173 Marx feigns to count ghosts, they are innumberable, and there is but one ghost (already too many, i.e. supplements), it is # itself, the arch-specter as father as capital or Plato’s good

p. 173 nominalism, conceptualism, realism—routed (mis en déroute) by (A)Thing called ghost

——“arithmetical desire” finds its spur, its origin, in the fact that ghosts are innumerable

p. 174 larcharnement (ferocity, w/ chair, flesh) dun chasseur > set out the living lifeless body of a ghost (le corps vivant sans vie dun fantôme) to trick prey (pour tromper sa proie)

——Derrida has a feeling about this, and it’s projected into what he’s doing: “it is never possible to avoid this precipitation, since everyone reads, acts, writes with his or her ghosts, even when one goes after the ghosts of others”

pp. 176-77 Marx wants not to want same “thing” as Stirner: a ghost; occupied w/ exorcism of ghosts, ghost hunt > Marx’s endless chase, his deconstructive critiques boomerang, lacharnement s'acharne

pp. 178-83 in German Ideology, Marx’s 10 ghosts (revenants, Gespenst), ils se suppléent pour passer tour à tour lun dans lautre, chacun figurant un tour de lautre: 1) God 2) Das Wesen 3) vanity of world 4) die guten und bösen Wesen 5) das Wesen und sein Reich 6) beings 7) Man-God, Christ 8) man 9) spirit of the people (Volksgeist) 10) everything (“Alles in ein Spuk zu verwandeln), thus, we must stop counting

p. 181 man, most unheimlich of all ghosts, if Christ (absolute specter) causes fear and pain, man causes even more—man makes himself fear (se fait peur), becomes fear he inspires > thus contradictions of all humanism

pp. 183-4 via Feuerbach, Marx refers to 2 theologies: 1) ordinary: believes in ghosts of sensuous imagination 2) speculative: believes in ghosts of non-sensuous abstraction

——theology is “belief in ghosts,” belief in general as alliance of 2 theologies

p. 190 synonyms for specter: life, thing, beast, object, commodity, automaton

pp. 190-91 this indeterminate Thing [re: Marx’s table] is a Father-Mother, gives birth through its head, whole lineage of fantastic creatures

p. 191 fantastic silhouette, autonomy of Marx’s table, inauguration of exchange-value, goes into trances, levitates, relieved of body like all ghosts, little mad too

p. 204 ghost is there [re: de-limitation of critique] in the opening of the promise, before its first apparition, from the first it will have come second, deux fois à la fois, itérabilité originaire, virtualité irréductible de cet espace et de ce temps

p. 205 is the ghost just the effect of the market economy? as Marx says, a finite delirium, a madness that will come to an end? same for spectrality in general?

p. 207 critical problematization as apotropaic shielding, battle against ghosts, fears them as it fears itself

p. 215 for Marx, ghost is the autonomizing of a representation (Vorstellung) whose genesis and real grounding (reale Grundlage) has been forgotten

——to dissipate this factitious autonomy must take into account modes of production & techno-economic exchange

p. 221 watch over a future in memory, this time, of an impure “impure impure history of ghosts”

——“intellectual” of tomorrow, “scholar” of future should learn justice from the ghost, should learn to speak to the ghost (if even in the other w/in oneself)

MSUB J p. 157 btwn sub and tile [the “-ject”]: persecuting evils, haunting the supports, substrata, substances > Artaud never stopped exorcising, conjuring the fiends (suppôts), succubi, sorcerers

p. 165 van Gogh did not paint ghosts, he reperspired nature, made it sweat, awful elementary pressures of commas [arrêt], scratches > now we can’t help seeing them too in the world

MPM p. 63 de Man on Baudelaire: write so fast, precipitously, don’t let the phantom escape > a resurrection, a “ghost” story, “Lazarus, arise!”

p. 64 ghosts always pass quickly, infinite speed, presence w/out present that in coming back only haunts > the ghost, le re-venant, the survivor, figure or fiction, presence w/out presence, instant w/out duration, not nothing

——recognize in figure of phantom the working of what Kant & Heidegger assign to transcendental imagination, “fantastic” temporalizing schemes and powers of synthesis > Kant: an art hidden in depths of soul

p. 80 all figures are ghostly figures, speak like phantoms and phantomize the text > never define trace or phantom w/out ironically/allegorically appealing from one to the other

A p. 35 border of absolute arrivant keeps one from discriminating btwn figures of arrivant > the dead, the revenant (the ghost, he or she that returns)

pp. 60-1 pass in spirit from hostage to host/guest to ghost, via Geist

——Heidegger not interested in revenant or mourning, just death itself, not its figures

pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

EM p. 123 (147) nous, we, arises (sélève) [like ghost?] [out of the folds of the 2 ends of man: 1) transcendental end 2) finitude]

PP p. 68 Plato’s Phaedrus: shame about “speechwriting,” fear branding of sophistry, man of non-presence and non-truth, logographer is a ghost-writer [?]

***pp. 103-04 what if pharmakon, writing, produced/opened up possibility of dualities that it itself cannot be comprehended by, leaving only its ghost to a logic seeking to govern it, folds one beyond logic, ghost leaves nothing (since truth, living flesh and reality are ghosts too, now)

***pp.142-44 (164-65) in pharmaceutical enclosure, an artful living organization of figures, all about father/son, legitimacy of inheritance, sperm, no mother; as living thing logos always issues from father, writing is weakened speech, ghost, living-dead, simulacrum (eidōlon), errant, pervert, outlaw, bad seed, doesn’t know his (father’s) name, identity, discourse w/out guarantor (répondant)

pp. 148-49 (171-72) from Phaedrus, soul-writing is good writing, is living and animate (zōnta kai empsukhon), written discourse is a ghost (eidōlon) of it

PAS PAS p. (83) Blanchot: looking at them (elles) as if they had risen from their graves, and, I remain in their fascination > cest la scène deau, la noyade et léventualité de viens

S p. 24 when Heidegger puts “spirit” in quotes it becomes a metaphysical ghost

p. 40 Geist is always haunted by its Geist, a ghost is always the other’s ventriloquist; metaphysics always returns in the sense of a revenant, Geist is the most fatal figure of revenance: the double which can never be separated from the single

pp. 125-27n Derrida reminds of Matthew Arnold, his Babelian phrase Get Geist, his claim that Geist is untranslatable > in Get Geist spirit apostrophizes itself, a beginning—no beginning (pas de commencement): in the beginning there will have been (ghost of future perfect)

p. 97 duplicity of Geist, as its evil ghost, brings forth the question: is ash good or evil, is it destiny or incineration?

p. 99 war of etymology [re: Geist], the ghosts flapping in what Artaud would call this “alchemical theater”

SH p. 57 words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts

F pp. xxx-xxxi crypt (foreigner in self) & the ghost effect (heterocryptic ghost returning from Unconscious of the other) > radical otherness in self (not unconscious) > law of another generation

p. xxxiii via Abraham, in deciphering poem, “translator” has written one: poetic translation or psychoanalytic interpretation [re: “ghost”] > clears path for other w/out unilateral privilege

pp. 118-19n ghost effect (ghost that comes haunting from someone else’s crypt, heterocryptography) ≠ crypt effect (foreigner incorporated in crypt of Self) > la revenance nest pas un retour du refoulé

“ventroliquist” speaks from topography w/in self or from foreign/parental topography

FWT p. 80 why figure of Hamlet?: relation of ghost and time

***pp. 159, 230-31n revenant different from specter/ghost (latter have horizons, are visible, come into light); revenant—think event & haunting together; revenant “almost” merges w/ trace itself

WM p. 258 in classical rhetoric, were metaphor to receive its name from metaphysics, it would be the catachresis: a “nontrue metaphor,” retracing metaphor through its philosophical ghost

POOF p. 75 Nietzsche: when we outgrow our friends (who have not transformed) they become ghosts of our past, we hear them as if hearing a younger version of ourself

DS p. 202 [Mimique] haunted by ghost or grafted onto arborescence of another text

pp. 205-06 if, in Mallarmé’s writings, mime mimics nothing, opens in its origin the very thing he’s tracing out, is this not the movement of truth? pure soliloquy? alētheia as manifestation, unveiling? but there is mimicry, mimicry imitating nothing, a difference w/out reference: a ghost that is the ghost of no flesh, w/out past, w/out death, birth, presence, past (preserved differential structure of mimēsis w/out Platonic metaphysical reappropriations)

ATIA p. 20 every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

REST pp. 287-88 Heidegger: from hypokeimenon to subjectum, Roman thought takes over (übernimmt) Greek words w/out corresponding co-originary experience, absence-of-ground (Bodenlosigkeit) of Western thought opens w/ this translation > a transfer, über, over and beyond Greek experience

——these words become ghostly (fantômatiques) doubles of themselves, leur simulacre légers, walk above/in the void, bodenlos

p. 361 putting shoes on acc. to its own size (sa pointure)? unconscious of Shapiro/Heidegger puts something of his own (sien) in them? > no, à la pointure du fantôme (the ghost’s size), of the unconscious of the other, in the final account (tout compte fait)

pp. 379-81 Artaud (protests against ghosts): no ghosts in Van Gogh, no visions, the torrid truth, hieroglyphics > Derrida cautions: “you can only give them [the ghosts] back (rendre) if you think you have them, and you can only think you’re giving them if you haven’t got them”]

p. 380 “to suicide” someone —make him come back (le faire revenir) as a ghost (fantôme) or make him stay (le faire rester) as a ghost, où il est, en somme assez bien enterré, ne disposant plus que de ses pas? > pas de revenant, pas de nom [don’t let the dead bury the dead]

p. 381 can a ghost (fantôme) be attributed as “the ghost-of”? > no distributive justice for this tribute: shoes always open to unconscious of the other, never possessed, still less kept (garder)

D p. 325 “I” that attends its own incessant, violent reinscription, a pure passageway for operations of substitution, a mere function or ghost

EL p. 191 [re: Scholem’s letter] a revenant proclaims terrifying return of a ghost

PPT p. 12 le trait il sy attire et sy passe, de lui-même: situated, situates, btwn visible edging (la bordure visible) and phantom in center—from which we fascinate

TN p. 205 Merleau-Ponty’s famous “phantom limb”

EU p. 62 double bind that knots around sublime body of “teacher of philosophizing” [i.e. philosophy eludes teaching, philosophizing requires it]: teacher haunts the scene, doesn’t dominate, or dominates like a ghost > one might say he fascinates/seduces if these connotations weren’t too closely tied to imagination/sensibility: for reason should break the charm [of sensibility?]

SPEC p. 269 Freud’s “perpetual recurrence of the same thing”: phantom of demonic, conjured up cadentially, limping (boiteux) devil

p. 305 one gives oneself one’s own movement, one inherits from oneself all the time

——sufficient provisions so ghost can always step up to the cashier (passer à la caisse); all that’s necessary is to pronounce a name guaranteeing a signature, one thinks

GIFT

GOD pp. 9-10 relation of gift to “present,” essential knot in interlace of this discourse [GT], in knot of Geflecht of which Heidegger says the circle is perhaps only one figure/particular case

p. 31 gift as gift w/out essence, can’t be seen in light of day, must be the secret, secrecy is the last word of the gift which is the last word of the secret

pp. 56-57 trembling in mysterium tremendum? gift of infinite love, dissymmetry btwn gaze of God, and me not seeing what looks at me (gift and endurance of death in irreplaceable) > disproportion btwn infinite gift & my finitude > responsibility: salvation, sin, culpability, sacrifice

pp. 112-13 via Baudelaire’s “The Pagan School,” any exchange w/ purpose, any remuneration, slightest hint of calculation transforms gift into counterfeit money

——one must give w/out knowing, w/out object; one must suppress the object of the gift, to keep in the gift only the giving

GT p. 7 gift interrupts economy, is aneconomic, is the impossible

pp. 7-9 obsessing over circle encircling us, Heidegger [see OS] on circle, point, as vulgar time; time as circle: one of most powerful, ineluctable representations in history of metaphysics ——can’t exactly escape circle, it’s a feast for thinking, but gift as instant of effraction of circle

——could only be a gift the instant the paradoxical instant tears time apart (what Kierkegaard means when he says decision is madness)

——why desire to interrupt circulation of circle, why desire the gift?

pp. 11-12 credit, good faith, we lend each other in conversation; credit/faith as precomprehension that condition “tautology” of gift, and make gift impossible: “one” has to give some “thing” to someone other

p. 12 gift annulled each time there is restitution or countergift

p. 14 temporalization of time (memory, present, anticipation, pro, re-tention, imminence of future, “ecstases”) destroys the gift via keeping (la garde), restitution, comprehending in advance

——recognition of the gift annuls it

p. 15 gift does not exist, represent itself

pp. 15-16 be careful, ethically vigilant re: gift w/out debt, there’s calculation & ruse (economy) even in the unconscious

——forgetting of gift must be far more radical than repression, which always consists of keeping by exchanging places, its operation is systematic or topological

p. 17 forgetting & gift condition each other (unconditional)

p. 24 subject and object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of the gift; subject as such never gives or receives a gift

p. 26 “there is gift,” not the same as “the gift exists” [ontological difference?]

p. 31 even if gift is a simulacrum, il faut (one must) rendre compte (render an account) of the possibility of this simulacrum, and render account of desire to render account > can’t be done w/out principle of reason (principium reddendae rationis)

——which law obligates one to answer for, to account for, a gift that calls one beyond all responsibility?

p. 35 the alogos, madness, of rendering account (logos) of the atopos (the gift), desire to think the impossible, to desire, to desire to give the impossible: madness as given & desired forgetting

——perhaps, mode of gift, (atopic, utopic) madness of desire to give the impossible, this madness would also be a forgetting, to forget the gift [secret of death]

pp. 35-6 how could one desire a gift that is non-ambivalent? a gift that would not be pharmakon, poison, that would be good? how does one desire forgetting

p. 40 demand of gift/countergift, circulatory differance, requirement of restitution “at term,” delayed “due date,” thing itself demands gift & restitution

GIFT OF DEATH

GOD p. 8 gift of death, marriage of responsibility & faith, history depends on this excessive beginning > new experience of death

p. 9 via Patočka, history of responsible, built on heritage and patrimony of secrecy, begins w/ Plato’s break from orgiastic mystery, continues w/ Christianity’s mysterium tremendum > a tremor in figures of death as figures of gift, or as gifts of death

***p. 32 contamination btwn: 1) renouncing oneself, denying the gift, as the generosity of the gift that must withdraw itself (se retirer), se cacher, sacrifice itself in order to give 2) repression that transforms gift into economy of sacrifice

——a heterogenous trembling that apprehends, gives oneself death in a new way

pp. 34-5 gift of death (le double fil irréductiblement entrelacé du don et de la mort): gift made to me by God, holding me in his hand and gaze, as he remains inaccessible to me

——new experience of death, the secret of death

p. 40 approach, apprehending, anticipating death (see coming what one can’t see, give oneself what one can probably never give in pure or simple way) [each approach confers on death a different value]

GIVE(N)

KH p. 96 es gibt always implicated in negative theology (in its Christian history?); what there is, there, is not; p. 97 there is khōra, but the khōra does not exist [importance of article]

p. 100 khōra beyond ontological, to give place w/out donor-subject giving something to someone [GT]

GOD p. 113 one must suppress the object of the gift, to keep in the gift only the giving

GT p. 4 [re: Madame de Maintenon (Maintenant)] desire as desire to give what one cannot give, pour le pouvoir de donner

p. 20 “it gives (ça donne),” not an utterance in propositional structure of Greek-Latin grammar

p. 21 Heidegger: to look ahead (vorblicken) to the It (Es) which gives (gibt) Being (Sein) & time (Zeit), we try to bring the It and its Being into view, capitalize the “It”, become foresighted

p. 22 the es gibt plays (spielt), play of 4’s as play of gift, manifests the unity of time’s 3 dimensions, la donne de ce jeu [relance], & la doña, la femme qui nous a requis depuis lexergue [Derrida then mentions a fine book, Finas’ Donne, which interlaces all these themes]

p. 26 “there is gift,” not the same as “the gift exists” [ontological difference?]

p. 28 most serious stake of political economy: certain social classes have more time than others; but time cannot be given, it is certainly not time that they possess

p. 49 Derrida thinking gift by way of idiomatic expressions: give a class, donner une facilité, donner le change [hunting expresson], etc.

p. 50 Husserl’s donating intuition (gebende Anschauung): principle of principles

p. 54 “give time (day, life)” is to give nothing: one sees blurred lines btwn transcendental & conditioned, the fold of undecidability that permits all values to be inverted: to give life is to give death (i.e. strange crossing of idioms: “se donner le mort” means “to take one’s life [in English]”)

p. 122 narrative gives possibility of impossibility of story as story of gift or forgiveness

p. 159n Heidegger uses formula “to give what one does not have” (like Lacan)

MONL p. 67 fatal precipitation of promise dissociated from will, intention, meaning-to-say [vouloir-dire], heralds uniqueness of language to came, “there is…” implies “it doesn’t exist”

——gift of language remains only on condition that it still remains to be given

FL p. 243 deconstruction is possible as an experience of the impossible, wherever one can replace, translate, determine the X of justice, wherever there is (the undeconstructible)

AF p. 38 [re: Yerushalmi] he doesn’t mean to give but to give back, a masterly decipherment, give back to Freud his own competence [to read Hebrew]

SPOM p. 27 “how does the concern w/ what there is to be (qu’il y a à être) [Heidegger] intersect, in order perhaps to exceed it, with the logic of vengeance or right?”

POR p. 19 (154) reflect on reflection, seize inaudible in sort of poetic telephony, “hear” hearing > this time of reflection is heterogeneous to what it reflects, gives time, chance of event

HERP p. 186 for Heidegger, ear is poetic (dichtende), hears in advance what it causes to burst forth, elle donne elle-même à entendre ce quelle entend [a heart?]

HASD p. 37 radically nonhuman, atheological, khōra is not the es of giving (es gibt), before all subjectivity, doesn’t create/produce, not even an event [avoid anthropo-, theomorphic schemas]

***p. 39 khora, neither an event nor a giving, neither an order nor a promise, the wholly other (tout autre), neither transcendent, absolutely distanced, nor immanent and close

MPM pp. 146-7 [re: de Man closer to Heidegger than he thinks] for Heidegger, memory too, like promise, gathers near what can come, toward the “future” > es gibt never gives anything in present, it calls as a promise; Heissen (“to call, ” “to command” > entrust, keep safely)

p. 149 “always necessary to excuse oneself for giving,” given its risk of its being in annulled in thanks, given that it never arrives in present

VM p. 89-90 Levinas describes es gibt as neutral unity of existence

p. 94 for Levinas, w/out the irruption of tout-autre, internal consciousness could not se donner le temps nor [give itself] the absolute alterity of every instant

p. 96 for Levinas, Western philosophy has been an ontology where Reason receives only what it gives itself

p. 147 following Levinas, what would a language w/out phrase offer the other? a master who forbids himself the phrase gives nothing, has no disciples, only slaves

POOF p. 11 Plotinus’ give what you don’t have > receiving a giving? joy of mother not needing to be known (Aristotle) [loving vs. being loved]

p. 235 “O my friends…” a call, a promise, a prayer (eukhé) [neither true nor false, Aristotle] > can’t give friendship, were friendship not still to come [Heideggerian ek-stasis] > in the name of friendship, “no friend” respectfully declares the perfect sovereign friendship impossible

PAS PAS p. (93) to give must forget all the way up to what is given, one gives without having self (sans savoir) [see p. (23) say “come” w/out knowing, having, seeing]

A p. 3 via Seneca & Diderot, one would guard jealously one’s time above all else; to “master” “my life” > know difference btwn giving one’s time & wasting one’s time

SH p. 3 the resistance thought of “once” gives one to think, let’s let ourselves be approached by this offering

p. 43 date es gibt, annulment at work when date inscribes its here and now in iterability, consigns itself to self-forgetfulness, succeeds in effacing itself

P p. 90 beautiful object, tulip, not lacking in anything, tel point de vue, de but en blanc, plie la totalité à se manquer elle-même > le sans de la coupure pure est sans manque—but for me to experience its totality, my knowledge lacks something—its end (bout); not the absence of end but the trace of the without [end] is origin of beauty; ça donne-le-beau: beauty gives nothing to be seen, sans is not visible, et pourtant il y en a et cest beau

ROP pp. 29-30 double bind drives deconstruction in rhythmic compulsion to track desire for origin, and to raise its stakes, la pousse à une surenchère > interminable drama of analysis, il fallait faire droit to the law deconstructed, w/ une affirmation donatrice unknown to yet driving analysis

SP p. 121 Heidegger’s giving of the gift cannot be thought of in terms of Being (neither subject nor object), not in Being’s horizon, nor truth, nor meaning; no essence of es gibt, no essence of woman or sexual difference > can’t apprehend/oppose to gift of Being a determined gift (whether body, subject, sex—la femme naura donc pas été mon sujet)

p. 127 like woman, like writing: il se donne en se dérobant

SW p. 316 veil given by God, and giving here is ordering (donner cest ici ordonner)

Gii p. 35 Heidegger’s es gibt goes beyond question of meaning of Being, w/out overturning it

p. 40 since, for Heidegger, essence of hand is not in its prehension, it’s also not in Hegelian grasping of Begriff, taking hold by mastery/manipulation > what is hand’s essence?: the gift, give w/out taking anything

p. 43 in Benveniste, “Exchange & Gift,” which Derrida referenced in GT, nothing less assured than distinction btwn giving/taking: bad & good gift (gift/Gift or pharmakon)

——hand gives & gives itself: animal rationale can only take, grasp

p. 301n Derrida sees Heidegger’s reflections on as such [re: borderline btwn man/animal] as similar to his reflections on the hand, ability to give or take as such [see p. 43]

REST p. 274 [Derrida’s “thesis”]: il y a shoes, neither present nor absent

p. 281 rendering homage [restitution?] is difficult, because of the “interminable outbidding of an analysis which is never finished tying together,” > and yet, il y a hommage, ça donne

——praise for Heidegger’s Es gibt, Sein starting from (returning to) Es gibt Sein

pp. 379-81 Artaud (protests against ghosts): no ghosts in Van Gogh, no visions, the torrid truth, hieroglyphics > Derrida cautions: “you can only give them [the ghosts] back (rendre) if you think you have them, and you can only think you’re giving them if you haven’t got them”]

p. 382 don’t have to render anything: just bet on the trap like others swear (jurent) on a Bible > il y aura eu à parier, ça donne à rendre, a remmettre [there will be something to bet, it gives…]

if faudrait rendreencore, donc, en se séparant, et même en laissant tomber [even in letting the matter drop, we’d render (something?)] [can’t tell the difference btwn imperative & no choice]

RM p. 67 withdrawal of Being donne lieu to metaphysics, ontotheology, producing concept of metaphor, producing/calling itself in a quasi-metaphorical manner

——not opposed to metaphor but will limitlessly extend/load (chargera) any metaphoric trait w/ supplementary surplus value; re-trait (at once +/–), double movement of being

p. 77 can’t say trait is, it conditions the ontological copula—like es gibt

***PSSS p. 276 originary affirmation, which advances itself in advance, lends [?] rather than gives itself?

D p. 307 nothing says present better, it seems, than il y a; but what is present is a scission, il y a cette coupure, what is present & at work is a “recoil (recul),” possibility of its triggering

p. 311 this [re: Numbers] reinscription (writing, a machination) takes place (a lieu), il y a sa violence

C p. 194 little princeps coffin is not given, not a prior given that would be natural, autochthonous: “models,” examples, referents (usually are)

p. 217 paradigm as revenge: le mort se venge, “model” is always le revenant rêvé: haunting does not befall it, but takes the first step (la hantise ne lui survient pas, elle donne le premier pas)

p. 240 there is the gift (es gibt) and there is what I couldn’t give: I want to keep it better than ever

TN pp. 67-8 il y a la (là) du tact > given as given as much as ordered (do touch but avoid contact)

pp. 94-5 w/out playing on words, never: il faudrait donc entendre et tendre tendrement ces motstender, tend, extend > “Tiens!”: “Take (Prends)!” (tender it, à tendre on sous-entend) is not “I give you (je te donne)” (obscene phrase: assumed certainty, expected recognition)

——“Tiens!”: that the other grasp or seize, keep what one extends to him, giving to “touch”

p. 120 philosophy—idealization, intuitionism as philosophy itself, where seeing the blind spot, a point, is touching it > fullness of immediate presence: actuality of what se donne en acte, energetically, effectively: hapto-tropologic metaphysics comes to its plenitude, pleroma

p. 226 Nancy: phenomenology touches/exceeds its own limit in Cartesian Meditations > pré-donation of the alter-ego”

pp. 227-28 for Didier Franck (cf. Chair et corps), flesh as a pre-given of time; Derrida asks why would that which is always given in time need to precede it?

pp. 275-76 touch is quasi-transcendental-ontologization, quasi because touchable of touch gives itself over as untouchable (se donne comme intouchable)—figuring, fictionalizing itself

ATM p. 153 re: Levinas, “astriction to giving” complicates quoted utterance “here I am,” what is said only once, what exceeds not the saying but the said in language

CIN p. 55 cinder, nothing that can be in the world, remains beyond everything that is (konis epekeina tēs ousias), giving itself (es gibt ashes)—it’s nothing

CIR pp. 284-85 writing w/out believing in one’s survival, in the inheritance of the last will, writing for the present, a made present, like SA wants to make truth: I don’t take my life, je me donne ici la mort

EU p. 92 Derrida continues to believe in the interest in light re: university, a task that remains for us given-to (donné-à), to what I don’t know (one might have once said: to doing or thinking)

pp. 221-22 thought of sendoff (envoi), dispensation or gift of being: one of most powerful/singular attempts to think history/structure of onto-theology: Shickung, Schicksal, Gabe, “es gibt Sein,” “es gibt Zeit” do not seem to belong w/in onto-theological philosophemes

SPEC p. 301 [re: fort/da]: selbstgeschaffene (self-invented) game, spontaneity, auto-production, self-engendering of repetition itself, hetero-tautology (definition of Hegelian speculative): gives time, there is time

pp. 336-37 same step (pas) [Freud’s step beyond PP] gives & suspends movement, es gibt, exemplary movement of paralysis [Derrida repeating too, cf. FSW, PAS] [démarche]

GLAS (OUTSIDE OF GLAS)

LOBL p. 91 “obsequent logic” in Glas

p. ~ 106-07 for Nietzsche, “writing should always mark triumph, Schreiben und Siegen-wollen, Nietzsche opposes this to dyspeptics for whom morsels get stuck in teeth [points to mors in Glas and “Fors”]

***pp. ~125-126 Glas, apocalyptic text, revelation through faulty teletype [Apokalupsis Ioannou, the Revelation of St. John the Divine] [p. ~164 translators refer to end of my apocalypse (Glas)]

p. ~127 apocalyptic, in other words capital unveiling [from GLAS]

***pp. ~137-38 double invagination, through labor of translation, can be brought to bear on gaine in Glas [cf. GLAS p. 210 “against” Hegel, Marx, and Freud on subject of fetishism]

p. 142 [like the 2 columns in Glas] Blanchot’s narrative held together w/ invisible hinge, double inner edge (bord)

pp. ~142-43 will they translate verre and vitre w/ glas? [funny]

SPOM pp. 224-25n Glas, “Fors” concern the problematic border btwn incorporation and introjection, effective but limited pertinence of this conceptual opposition, as well as the one [conceptual opposition] that separates failure from success in the work of mourning

p. 47 Hegel’s end of history rung a consonant note w/ many other glas

PAS PAS p. (104) in blanchâtre is cachalot, sperm-whale displaced in each syllable, economy of the syllable

POOF p. 84 disappearance of enemy, glas of the political as such

OS p. 65 lautre geste, le plus difficile, le plus inouï, le plus questionnant, celui pour lequel nous sommes le moins préparé, can only be sketched (esquisser), announced in calculated fissures of metaphysical text: 2 texts, 2 hands, 2 visions (together simultaneously & separated)

P p. 18 from Glas: imagine a theft that stole only your frames [transvaluation of values]

pp. 122-23 sublime (Erhaben), superelevation (what in Glas is called the élève), absolutely high, not measurable in height

p. 146 glas et galactique du colossos, the bridge [tree?] over the abyss which threatens to swallow everything, interval btwn dynamic/mathematical sublime, on edge of which analytic of sublime is broached (sentame): whirlpool heaves/tears tree into la dissemence laiteuse (the question is the cipher writing on the surface of nature)

ROP p. 33 Glas and The Post Card, books on bind (Band), nexum, desmos, stricture, “unsolvable-postal effect”

OTO pp. 17-8 the living on of an ageless virgin mother (living long enough to bury her child), & the already dead father > logic of glas, and obsequence [one finds this in Christ’s family]

ATIA p. 38 Chi-mère whose name decomposes in Glas

SW p. 350 tallith not incommensurable w/ fetish, but a generalized not restricted fetishism (Glas); theory of fetish no longer merely a theory at moment of verdict

REST p. 269 for Ferenczi, deviations (écarts) w/out essential norm [re: individual variants vs. universal symbols], supplements, overgarments, rain shoes, vaginas, sheath-effect

p. 307 [G-string as lace, gaine]

pp. 334-35 compare two shoes (not a pair) to gaine in Glas, sheath (garment) > bisexuality of the double in 2 shoes > displace sexual decidability, opposition btwn fetish & thing (castration as truth of truth)

pp. 335-36 shoes sheath (gainent), to what profit, what sex? an undone stricture of laces, the girdle too, perhaps allows (donnerait) to be seen [Derrida quotes Balzac describing a naked, living, female foot protruding from a canvas—visitors médusés]

p. 336 argument of girdle (gaine): things are always played out on both levels (sur les deux tableaux)

p. 340 logic of detachment as cut (opposition, leads to suturing-sublation, maintains problematic of castration truth) vs. logic of detachment as stricture (is tout autre, interlacing of differance of [or as] stricture, no suture, haunting, neither empty nor full, largument-de-la-gaine, can’t accommodate the couple, ces coupes oppositionelles, the ghost leases, le, la, les double(s) band-)

RM p. 73 Derrida attempted to regulate use of word recouper in Glas

+R p. 157 bait (amorce) for Christic phallus (Ichthys): track, graph or trace (Ichnos) of a voiceless bit (mors), Derrida translates title of Adami’s picture [on Glas] as Ich [I’m exhibiting Ichas an other]

Adami’s Glas: double column, double bind (bound by fastener called a spiral)—codicarium? quaternarium?; Glas takes its call from scarcely articulable gl

pp. 157-58 the phrase “what both cuts me off and prompts me (me souffle) w/ all the rest” performs, does what it says it’s doing: framing borders are jumped, margins saturated en abyme

pp. 158-59 what is detached from my signature, da, a piece (morceau) of the other’s name, one of the most obsessive motifs in Glas

plus dair, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature > each letter, bit or piece of word (mors ou morceau de mot) written w/ 2 hands, twice two hands, on each page

p. 160 gl of “angle”: wild, almost unnarratable event, not a morpheme, close to piercing (trouer) a hole in the arthron [articulation, joint], patch of color in graphesis, the trait in color, a rebel to appeased commerce (regulated exchange of 2 elements [lexical, pictural])

p. 161 fishing picture, record of a hunt: 2 death drives cross in an X (double diagonal): 1) pushes, attracts, holds down—descending column 2) the other, just as sublime, raises up, asphyxia of the phallus—ascending column

p. 162 Ich [the painting, but…] can’t be found in Glas; Ich captures/draws to itself a psicultural machination rhythmed by logic of double band (bind) or so-called sheath argument

p. 163 Adami shows what is forbidden to Glas, out of range of its signatory, signs the absolute reverse of a text: monstration, exhibition, exposes the exposition

p. 166 X (chiasmus), general intersection of Glas, its beginnings or ends en bandes tordues et écartées, also demiurgic operation in Timaeus [see quote: turn X into 2 circles, split Other from Same]

——quotation [Adami] cut out of Glas: outbidding speculating to infinity

pp. 166-68 double échelle (scale, ladder [double column]) hauled par-dessus le cadre, le marche, to dominate the overview

——force of trait (disjointed forms a work): systasis of powerful ligatures holds, binds, disjecta membra, ladder is a scaffold, a synonym of POTENCE, garroted, bound (pillars, columns, frames, capitals)

C C p. 186 “altuglass,” transparent glace (mirror), cold of death, le glas

p. 227 Derrida, in Glas, incorrectly thought Genet was talking about a trouser pocket

LI LI p. 110n ça, sa, Id, savoir absolu, sign of Saussurean signifier, s.a. (speech act), sa (feminine pronoun)

ATAP ATAP p. 69 tone, tonos, strap, cable, braided rope—privileged figure of everything subject to stricture (that which norms both theme & instrument or cord of Glas)

p. 90 Glas’ columns constantly shaken by apocalyptic agitations, laughs at apocalypse (mixing John of Gospel w/ Genet [GLAS p. 198])

EU EU p. 124 Glas: generalized fetishism, pull of the discourse of castration toward affirmative dissemination [also continues pursuing project of grammatology, etc.]

SPEC SPEC pp. 259-60(n) instead of “logic”—issue is to rebind (relier), by means of analysis, notions of lien, stricture, desmos, question of life death to that of position (Setzung, thesis, theme) [this functions as a supplementary “judas” from Glas, re: an incision tattooed btwn pages 270/272]

p. 333 fort:da: leads autobiographical specularity into an autothanatography that’s in advance expropriated into heterography

——usteron proteron, “preceding falsehood” of generations, when figure w/out figure, name w/out name, of the mother returns: this is the logic of obsequence (Glas) > la mère enterre tous les siens

p. 341 [focusing on Oedipus complex] as if one were pulling this nebulous matrix, w/ disseminations w/out return, by only one of its string (fils), where matricial mother would be only what she is > for what it means to write oedipally, cf. Glas, which concerns itself w/ only strings/sons (fils), with gash (balafre) and demi-deuil in affectations of proper surname

p. 356 [Freud’s death drive] autoteleguiding, suicide deferred, wishes to sound its own glas, wishes the impossible > most driven drive is drive of the proper, reappropriate oneself

GOD

GOD p. 34 gift of death (le double fil irréductiblement entrelacé du don et de la mort): gift made to me by God, holding me in his hand and gaze, as he remains inaccessible to me

p. 81 Gospels: God maintains trace of his suffering by “seeing in secret,” you forget suffering in his love, he forgets nothing

p. 98 Christianity, “seeing in secret,” God the Father restores economy interrupted by the dividing of heaven from earth

p. 108 God as the name of the possibility of keeping a secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior, a witness others cannot see, other than me, more intimate with me than myself, structure of invisible interiority, God calls me, I call myself God

p. 142 “who” can forgive, “what” can forgive? (who/what—impossible delimitation); Question of God: 1) can someone else forgive you? 2) can you forgive yourself?

p. 148 Derrida tells story: Levinas sadly explains how one has to ask forgiveness before saying “God” nowadays

p. 150 story of flood, of Noah, hesitate forever btwn justice & perversion: God won’t forgive himself for the fault in man, for man’s desire, regrets his creation

GT p. 23 God as the gift giver who knows he is giving: auto-recognition

R p. 114 only a God w/out sovereignty can save us? nothing is less sure, that is why we are talking, and what we are talking about [also re: democracy]

FK p. 64 descent of God ex machina, stage a “transcendental addressing machine”

pp. 64-5 oath, sworn faith (foi jurée), pledge to God as witness: creates the unproducible, cannot not produce God as already there [déjà]

H p. 100 eyes of God: law placard

AF p. 55 first archivist—God?

SPOM p. 52 becoming-god of gold, at once ghost & idol, a god apprehended by senses

HERP p. 215 acc. to Heidegger, Derrida speculates, if God of ontotheology can’t be addressed by prayer or sacrifice, God beyond ontotheology would be a God to which it was possible & necessary to sacrifice

HASD p. 6 becoming-theological of all discourse, God’s name as hyperbolic effect of negativity, every negative sentence haunted by God [Lacan’s names-of-the-father] > divinity not produced but productive (always already)

p. 7 [in absolutely singular logic] “God” names that without which one could not account for any negativity: grammatical or logical negation, illness, evil and neurosis

——instead of reducing religion to symptom [in this logic], the symptom would be a negative manifestation of God

p. 26 name of God can only be said in modality of secret denial (dénégation secrète)

——[re: Mystical Theology] difference btwn access to contemplation of God, and access to where God resides > God not even in his most holy places, il nest pas et il na pas lieu, ou plutôt il est et a lieu mais sans être et sans lieu, sans être sons lieu

——place of God—atopics, strange (atopos), mad, madness

pp. 28-9 [letter always arrives?] always possible to call on God, to call assumed origin of all speech by name of God, God always names trace of singular event rendering speech possible, all apophatic discourse opens w/ prayer

——God, other, as referent of a legein, which it caused—demand for meaning is God

p. 44 God is the Good that transcends the Good, the Being that transcends Being, this “logic” is that of the “without (sans)” > transcendence nothing other, and tout autre, than what it transcends

——[re: Meister Eckhart’s apophatic strategies] do we see nakedness of God or do we hear the voice of Mesister Eckhart himself?

p. 45 via Eckhart, God does not share in any modes of Being, but is not deprived of any of them

p. 50 God [of Christian negative theology] at once permits and does not permit participation in Him [w/ figure of the seal]

p. 53 Jewish, Islamic traditions connect name of God w/ name of place [?]

POOF pp. 221-24 via Aristotle’s prótē philía as teleía philía, telos of friendship as that which can’t be reached, inconceivable, self-contradictory, would be the desire for a perfect friend, for a friendship w/ God [Derrida offers 3 reasons why this is impossible]

——if man has friends, it’s because he thinks the other, thought of the other as thought of the mortal, and thus there is only thought in friendship > “O my friends…” the declaration of God, who knows only divine friendship

——aprosēgoría (non-address, silence, non-allocution) undoes many a friendship

VM pp. 106-07 for Levinas, asymmetry, non-light, commandment are violence and injustice only in relation to finite things, Levinas’ infinite God avoids a world of pure/worst violence, of immorality itself, by being infinite, does not rage war of single, naked finite man

——for Levinas, totality is always finite totality

——war played out btwn face and finite world w/out a face, isn’t this the difference in which absence-presence of God plays? wouldn’t this play precede God, permit us to think his essence?

p. 107 Man is a God arrived too early, a God who knows himself forever late in relation to the already-there of Being (qui se sait à jamais en retard sur le déjà-là de lÊtre)

pp. 108-09 God’s face commands while hiding, more and less a face than all faces, face neither face of God nor figure of man but their resemblance, a resemblance thought w/out the Same

p. 115 Derrida exposes impossibility of saving theme of positive infinity & face [which would have to have body, space, be finite, if positive infinity remains a theme] > face’s nonmetaphorical unity of body, glance, speech, thought can only be thought w/in horizon of infinite (indefinite) alterity as irreducibly common horizon of Death and Other > horizon of finitude

——infinite alterity as death cannot be reconciled w/ positive, present God

pp. 115-16 to exclude the equation God = Death would be to exclude every particular determination, but this has not been excluded by entirety of classical philosophy > God is named w/in difference btwn All and Nothing, w/in difference as difference itself > difference called history, God is inscribed in it

p. 135 eidos as noema in understanding or logos of the infinite subject (God) > how does transcendental idealism escape horizon of infinite subjectivity?

p. 146 Levinas seeks to oppose God to sacred divine, for God to be indicated in Space of Sacred, in light of deity > limit and wellspring (ressource) of finite-being as history: limit because God’s not there and wellspring because anticipation of thought of Being toujours voit venir Dieu

——Meister Eckhart: God operates, Deity does not [Deity permits thinking and naming of God]

——“ontological” anticipation, transcendence toward Being, helps us understand God, even as ether in which dissonance resonates > inhabits & founds language, Mitsein, all Being-together

pp. 149-50 God other name of Being? opens difference not simply indicated in it? ontic content of infinity would destroy ontic closure > would this not permit thought of Being, wouldn’t thought of Being be presupposed in thought of God?

p. 150 question about Being not only introduces question about existent-God, it supposes God as possibility of its question, answer w/in its question > God implied in every question about God, precedes every “method” > content of thought of God is that of a being about which no question could be asked (except by being asked by it)

p. 151 Nicholas of Cusa: God is absolute presupposition itself, of all things

PP pp. 101-02 (115) [Plato’s puritanical auto-immunity] illness as allergy to alien element, “normal” disease defends itself; God cannot have an allergic reaction > perfection and immortality: no relation to outside; but how can we exclude the parasitic supplement, pharmakon?

p. 138 (158) God true father of the bed, the clinical eidos, carpenter, demiurge, repeats eidos, painter does not generate anything, imitates

FSW p. 230 unerasable trace, not a trace, full-presence, son of God, sign of parousia, not a seed, not a mortal germ

FWT p. 74 Kant: (finite) subject of law—subject of duty > save God, who has no duty, and slave, who has duties but no rights [see ATIA pp. 99-100]

p. 163 acc. Christian doctrine, God alone can forgive

WM p. 266 when syntax is subordinated to semantics in concept of metaphor, what else will be found than a return to the same, the sun, the light, same circle, the dominant metaphor of the group, heightened by its power of dissimulation, escaping mastery: God or Sun?

p. 267 it is lumen naturale that allows Descartes to affirm his mind beyond all doubt, natural light constitutes the ether of thought > natural light proceeds from God and returns to God

ROP p. 18 qui, fors Dieu, a jamais créé, ce qui sappelle créé, un concept?

ATIA p. 17 that God wants to see Ish name the animals marks God as infinite, all-powerful, and finite > God does not know what will happen to him w/ language (doesn’t know what he wants)

pp. 43-4 God sets a trap for Cain, God as hunter, don’t fall prey to sin lurking there, a lure, a temptation [Derrida’s prowling and lurking]

***pp. 112-13 before fall, before institution of nakedness, Adam was a vegetarian, Cain too was a vegetarian: God’s preference in Abel, the beginning of historicity, goes against his original commandment, now he prefers sacrifice

p. 132 Nietzsche & Kafka realized better than anyone: Mother, Law, God, Animal > indissociable figures of the same Thing

——divinanimality, quasi-transcendental referent, sacrificed/disavowed foundation of what it founds: justice, symbolic, human order [brings Levinas & Lacan close] > difficulty of uttering discourse of transcendence/mastery e: animal in the name of God/Law

p. 152 for Heidegger, in Christianity, world (totality of created beings) is everything that’s not God, man’s “having” world, a standing-over-against world

GSP p. 324n God as Entelechy, acc. Husserl

PS p. 181 for Artaud, thief > great invisible Other, furtive persecutor doubles me everywhere: God

pp. 181-82 for Artaud, God is false value of initial worth of what is born: this false value becomes Value, for it doubled what never existed > the work (excrement) repeats this theft, steals another part of me [dispossessing my nonexistent ur-value prior to exiting the Orifice]

——God is proper name of what deprives us of our own nature, our own birth

——for Artaud, “the metaphor of myself is my dispossession w/in language” > this by way of the counterfeiter, God–Satan, who isn’t a creator, but the subject of all [dispossessing] oeuvres

——for Artaud, history of God is the history of the work as excrement

pp. 184-85 man as the scato-theological being (this is the essence of guilt), capable of being soiled by the work and thieving God > God is a sin agains the unnameable Divine

p. 326n (with remarkable/ambiguous exception of Hegel) God is Death: infinite life, life w/out difference > w/in life God-Death names finitude, difference w/in life > mais l'autre nom de la même chose ne veut pas dire la même chose que le premier nom, il n'en est pas synonyme et c'est toute l'histoire

FS p. 304n for Leibniz, man is finite in act, infinite in thought; in God, thought/action coexist

pp. 9-10, 303n God of Leibniz does not know the anguish of choice, only one book distributed through all books, God’s Will always chooses the “best”

——writing, not a determined pathos, an empirical state of writer, but responsibility of angustia: [Derrida is privileging a power of equivocality over creativity of classical God, anguish connoting a narrowing, a loss of breath, a restriction, constraint, and thus the anguish of choice]

——absence & haunting of divine sign (Jewish God) [cf. GOD], anguish of Hebraic ruah (pneuma), regulates modern books/criticism/aesthetics

p. 11 God imprints secondarity on every navigation of the human: 1) passage of deferred reciprocity btwn reading & writing? 2) absolute witness who’s already read what you will write: third party as transparency of meaning? [circular logos]

SW pp. 315-16(n) [re: Exodus 26:31] there are 2 veils/curtains btwn [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle & [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle of tabernacles [of holies/of sanctuaries] > 1st embroidered by artist, 2nd merely the work of a carpenter

p. 316 veil given by God, and giving here is ordering (donner cest ici ordonner)

——“for they shall make a sanctuary, I shall dwell in their bosom” > veil, curtain, drape is dwelling of God, his ethos, this Who (that dwells) is also a What, a 3rd party, the Law, text of law

——God as name of what gives the order to give the veil (btwn holy & holy of holies), veil as gift (that it is) ordered to give, gives to think separation from le tout autre (faith itself) > did this come to an end w/ death of Christ? can it be comprehended in veiled folds of Greek alētheia?

DPi pp. 10-11 Derrida’s 2 massively obvious facts: 1) abolition of DP does not include war time killing 2) those countries who practice Abrahamic religion find no contradiction btwn DP and “thou shalt not kill,” and neither does God: put to death those who don’t obey commandments

***p. 181 DP: divine weapon granted by sovereign God to sovereign monarch to fulfill providential law

***pp. 258-59 phantasm of infinitization at heart of finitude [dream of a verdict, the putting an end to finitude], theologico-political, an infinitization of survival assured by calculation itself, by cutting decision of DP, phantasm is one w/ God, belief in God

CHM pp. 58-60 Descartes interns his own hyperbole by temporalizing Cogito, certifying it through God (temporalizes the sharpest point, the instant), a hurried repatriation > God protects Descartes against madness of Cogito

PIO pp. 28-9 the invention conceived as discovery is a reduction of producere > invention as unveiling (not creating) for the first time, respects creationist theology, the inventor can never bring something into existence, that’s God’s work (God invented the laws but not the world [?])

pp. 42-3 Schelling’s invention, re: philosopher as an inventor of forms, still limited as invention of the same in guise of supplement of invention: man’s invention supplements God’s ideality: man as psyche of God, as supplying the lack in his revelation

——here, invention caught in infinite amortization, rationalistic humanism, carries out God’s program; human invention as desire of/for God

***PF pp. xxxiv-xxxv not exonerated by decision of the other in me (passive decision): don’t give in to alibi of the other (ultimate creditor whose debt remains mine to discharge, God)

——impossibility of acquitting oneself, duty not to want to acquit oneself: attest to this w/out “mercy,” w/out alibi

TR pp. 85-6 for Rousseau, work of evil, “wickedness of men,” must be trade secret of God, can’t accuse mēkhanē (strategy, machine) of men (but can’t accuse God—so must put blind trust in him)

pp. 108-09 confession not of order of knowledge, of making known; Augustine wonders why he must confess to God, who knows everything > answer: to convert fault into love [Nietzsche]

——not a truth to be revealed but truth to be “made,” to be “verified”

EJQB p. 67 [cf. FS p. 30 Nietzsche’s new table] breaking of Tables: rupture w/in God as origin of history

——God lets silence interrupt his voice and his signs, lets Tables be broken: letting us [Derrida identifying w/ Jews?] be interrogated

——writing is secondary, hermetic, for both God and man: comes from the stifling of his voice, the dissimulation of his Face > this difference, this negativity in God, is our freedom, transcendence, and the verb that can relocate purity of negative origin in possibility of question

p. 68 Schelling: question of “the irony of God” [always turned in on itself]

——Kafka: “we are nihilist thoughts in the brain of God”

——that which was impossible for classical rationalists: to proceed w/in duplicity of God’s questionability > God is not truthful: accede to virtue of lie

p. 71 Meister Eckhart: “God becomes God when creation says God” > this assistance given (secours porté) to God by man’s writing doesn’t contradict writing’s inability to “help itself (se porter secours)” (Phaedrus)

——isn’t the divine, la disparition de lhomme, announced in this distress of writing?

——God of classical philosophers had no need to write (never interrogated/interrupted himself)

p. 78 absolute interrogation (of God) will never belong to the book

IW pp. 279-80 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] “unheard-of” singularity of Jewish nation: its birth belongs to (God’s) Law, not to nature > inscribed in a history that began before it was born (though it was already its own)—history of this nation: supernatural, transhistorical, prehistoric

PJP p. 300n death of God, death of all paternity (of the Father): “seed of all romantic distress”

D p. 344 contraction into a dot (point), to where everything is present but nothing exists, pleroma, Orphic explanation [?], “drama of God,” zimzum, God going out of himself takes place [can find this in Hegel] > repetition of absolute present or undifferentiated origin

EL pp. 207-08 the vengeance of language (language as name of God) > a debt that leaves its signature in the language will be incurred by innocents, archiguilty, generations to come

——this is a logic that the cogito, practico-transcendental egology, cannot comprehend [i.e. cogito can’t comprehend language?]

p. 223 God’s voice sealed, on reserve in sacred language, like a signature, the oath of the covenant or faith tying us to God: content of this hidden speech will take form again, meaning will take on form in manifestation, to hear & to say will renew the covenant

——sacred language: “con-juration" itself (conjuration btwn God & us)

HST pp. 374-75 Massignon: God is guest, host, home (at once)

p. 389 God as name of he alone who can forgive > God can abandon me, but also (beauty of word abandonment), God is the only one to whom I can abandon myself, to God’s forgiveness

p. 397 X, great 3rd, God accords/grants forgiveness, renders substitution possible

LI p. 83 why did Descartes have to prove the existence of God twice? ][3rd and 5th Meditations?]

what does it mean to multiply/cite demonstrations/proofs of that beyond all substitution? God, exemplary case: unique, irreplaceable, both absolutely repeatable and unrepeatable

——[re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

——differance of stricture > the writing of God renders possible/impossible, serious/non-serious, strict/non-strict oppositions like “normal” & parasitic

TN p. 158 Ravaisson’s withdrawal of hand, does it get replaced, secretly, w/ hand of God? how does this figure of God’s hand relate to light, to flesh, to Incarnation, to Christ’s touch?

p. 260 God’s hand not a figuration, the hand in the proper sense, the hand of salvation, le main de là-dieu (the God-ward goodbye hand)

p. 367n [unable to determine who touches more: Christians or Jews] Muslims are hyperbolic heirs to this endless contradiction [of infinite]: Dieu se contraedit (how can we translate this into English?)

NOY p. 233 St. Paul: “in Him there has been only Yes (nai)” > de Certeau: this “yes” pierces field of distinctions/separations practiced by Hebraic epistemology

p. 233 de Certeau: “yes” (Ja) and the Separated (Ja, or Jahvé), yes brings together No-Name of Other and Yes of the Volition

ATM pp. 186-87 can one analogize the fault against God’s name w/ fault against any Name? only if analogy functions btwn absolute heterogeneities [?] [theonymic cemetery]

pp. 187-88 “je donne, je joue lingratitude contre la jalousie,” if God is exempt from jealousy (no desire for possession) must he not guard this exemption jealously, and in so doing lose himself? > ellipse de jalousie: le sans-jalousie se garde jalousement, autrement dit se perd, se-garde-se-perd: plus de jalousie [seriasure always a jalousie, series of traits & retraits, beyond the face]

E p. 10 God has given himself to be seen in a spectacle, as if he masked/showed himself: an immense liberality which can only give itself to itself to be consumed [how can man’s freedom mimic God’s: by not resembling it?]

p. 12 God furnishes the poet w/ his capital, gives him surplus value & means of giving surplus-value, God is a poet

——structure of economimesis has its analogon in the city: when poet isn’t writing, he’s just a man, must eat, receives subsidies from sun-king (sustaining labor force)

p. 13 the fold of mimesis at origin of pure productivity: a gift for itself (pour soi) of God who makes a present of himself to himself

AD p. 62 Levinas: to be “in the image of God” is not to be an icon of God, but to find oneself in his trace (Exodus 33)

p. 143n w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God

> à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

p. 104 God, one “who loves the stranger” excessively so, excess like the non-reciprocity decided in death, the trait or stroke, the hyphen (trait dunion) of adieu: beyond being, where he might not pardon me, or elect me

——for Levinas, God is not, not “contaminated by being”

BSi pp. 47-50 [vis-à-vis Balibar] Bodin, Hobbes—political sovereignty as mimesis of God (the sovereign sovereign): ontotheology of phrase “marks of sovereignty”

OG pp. 10-1 exposure to break btwn phonè and logos [via writing] de-constructs (de-sediments) signification of truth & God’s infinite understanding (pre- & post- Hegelian)

p. 71 (104) logos as sublimation of trace is theological from Plato to infinitist metaphysics: logocentrism…parousia, life w/out differance (name of God as name of indifference)

p. 98 (146) (from Descartes to Hegel) God is name & element that makes possible absolutely pure self-presence & knowledge > God’s infinite-understanding is the other name for logos as self-presence, produced as auto-affection through voice—excluding sensible, exterior, spatial writing

p. 247 (350-51) Rousseau looks for a limit “being born (naissante)”: childhood, God, pure language w/out supplement—alibi, in illo tempore

pp. 247-49 (351-53) [Artaud-like fantasy in Rousseau?] breath (of God), neume, superhumanity, not on the way to humanity (like child), body w/out organs, w/out spacing, pure presence w/ jouissance, inarticulate enough for jouissance de soi to remain uncorrupted by alterity

——not the child who does not have language because child has only one language, one organ

p. 250 (354-55) jouissance—pure presence to self-auto-affection accorded to God; interior, homogenous, no relation w/ object, welcomes no mortal difference

pp. 250-51 (355) acc. Rousseau, God distributes dédommagements man receives—il est la dispense du supplément (God is the exemption from, dispensation of, the supplement) (presence: utopia)

pp. 256-58 (363-35) light movement, chiquenaude, le doigt qui incline un monde, most eloquent model of sign (divine action), la baguette > actualizes virtual faculties dormant in man [is this God’s touch? Derrida includes varying degrees: perhaps not, perhaps, probably, certainly]

***CIR p. 119 nongrammatical syntax that remains to be invented to speak name of God

p. 155 quite rightly I pass for an atheist, what I call God: a voice talking to me w/out saying anything, feminine figure of Yahweh so strange, so familiar to me

p. 172 it’s to death I already owe everything I earn, I’ve succeeded in making it, as I have w/ God, it’s the same thing, my most difficult ally > costs a great deal of love, impossible but unfailingly faithful, forgive yourself the hurt you do yourself [death same as God]

GOD in

TB p. 105 God: name of the origin of tongues (lips, langues), name of father > God also sows confusion among his sons, poisons his gift (Gift-gift)

p. 107 God’s disseminates the Sem [languages], dissemination is here deconstruction

p. 116 translation, desire for translation, unthinkable w/out correspondence w/ thought of God

p. 117 every translator is committed, committed by the other before having committed himself?

p. 118 if original text demands translation, the original is indebted to the translator, original is 1st debtor: God weeps over his untranslatable name > [his Law as law of translation]

——double bind is the law, in name of God: most originary, most sacred, must be translated, deciphered: translation not 2nd (secondary): constructor cannot make universal tongue, deconstructor constrained by appeal to translation

GOOD

GOOD CONSCIENCE

GOD pp. 85-86 good conscience makes alibis, feels no responsibility before abyss, abundance of sacrifices (starving children, war crimes)—even when a few shown on TV

——those who remain concerned treated as nihilist, relativist, poststructuralist

FL p. 245 mystification and good conscience allow “I am just”

p. 248 good conscience dogmatically stops before any inherited determination of justice

p. 287 heart of courage in Benjamin, expose oneself to all risks, beyond certainty and good conscience

SPOM p. xiv “infinite responsibility, therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good conscience”

p. 17 good conscience at the end of history: capitalism, liberalism, parliamentary democracy

p. 33 good conscience loses chance of abyssal desert, “desert in desert,” chaotic desert as open mouth, coming of other (messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy) [see p. 209]

****p. 82 w/out experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on justice and the event > this is more honest, giving up on good conscience, conceding to economic calculations installed at border of event

pp. 97-8 cynicism of good conscience, manic disavowal [quotes Allan Bloom]: everything that stood in the way of human dignity has been refuted/buried by history

p. 233n a good conscience that is imperturbable because enveloped in ignorance or obscurantism

POO p. 133n that debt always haunts duty, and we seek beyond duty and debt, how can we have a good conscience?

p. 22 the worst nonresponse, to respond inadequately, and feign performative morality, modesty, sincerity

HERP p. 198 avoid good conscience of ridicule when thinking about Nazi potential of Heidegger’s thoughts > no discourse can dissociate the scientific, the military, and labor

A p. 19 choice of negative form (aporia) to designate a duty announces affirmation by avoiding good conscience at all costs

——the 2 forms of good conscience [1) grimace of indulgent vulgarity 2) subjective certainty] incompatible w/ absolute risk of every promise, engagement, responsibility

p. 20 good conscience has inexhaustible resources: even unsmiling of declared bad conscience—supplementary ruse

POOF p. 31 Nietzsche invites us [the ‘last Europeans’] to be done w/ the pigtail [Allegory of Cave], the wig of ‘good conscience,’ the belief in our own virtue

p. 33 perhaps good conscience keeps us from thinking friendship; Nietzsche: good conscience as pigtail (Zopf) of our grandfathers [chain of Plato’s prisoners]

pp. 35-7, 39 friends of solitude, jealous friends of solitude, jealous of his secret w/out secret, share what can’t be shared, jealous of ‘proper & profound solitude of midday-midnight’ [of singularity]: beyond good conscience, friendship w/ new philosophers

p. 42 language of madness, forced by most rigorous & profound necessity to say the insane, impossible, absurd, undecidable—to the disdain of philosophical good conscience (wants to hold out in shade of the Enlightenment): every “X without X” [i.e. “community w/out community”]

OH p. 41 when a certain knowledge opens up path in advance—decision is already made > irresponsibly, w/ good conscience, one applies the program

p. 72 any decision that does not endure antimony is a dangerous mystification, immorality plus good conscience, good conscience as immorality

p. 81 every time Europe, politics, responsibility, decision is reduced to what they must exceed (order of the present, of presentation [knowledge, certainty, judgment in the form “this is that”]), we have the very presentable face of good conscience

***FWT p. 132 double bind: must not give ground on either legitimate injunction, no decision, no responsibility worthy of the name that doesn’t endure this double injunction, this terrible law, the law of the law, which gives responsibility a chance, leaving no chance for good conscience [see 223n double bind a word coined to describe schizophrenic]

pp. 150-51 Derrida’s aporias are not meant to confound, reverse oppositions, but to suspend, mark, recall necessity of suspending naive confidence, common sense, conscious belief

p. 176 Freud helps us question tranquil assurances of responsibility

WAP p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

——double bind of philosophical commitment or pledge (droit, if a philosopheme, also submitted to law of double bind: unstable, deconstructible, it precedes itself, calls for indestructible responsibility)

——indestructible responsibility (because always revived in anxious raising of stakes [relancée dans une surenchère inquiète]) makes good conscience impossible

p. 19 good conscience: sigh of impatience, straight or indivisible line

p. 66 consciousness of limited responsibility: bonne conscience

DPi p. 138 Derrida warns against the good conscience that feels far from theater of DP > one must never stop thinking about the instant of execution, where there is no more beyond, or when beyond remains the beyond (beyond of after death, beyond of pardon, grace)

CHM p. 35 [Derrida asks question about Foucault’s responsibility, the manner in which Foucault seems to return to innocence, end all complicity] doesn’t suffice to imprison the delegate, the psychiatrist, and in doing so the whole adventure of Western reason (acc. Foucault, capture & objectification of madness): wouldn’t Foucault’s proceedings, verdict, reiterate the crime?

——if the Order is as powerful as Foucault says it is: infinite, universal complicity of those who understand “this language”

p. 57 in deconstructing Foucault, Derrida is not evoking an other world, an alibi, or evasive transcendence—a violence often the accomplice of “totalitarian” “good sense”

——violence of rationalists: good sense never divides itself enough, always determined too quickly

HLP p. 47 can a state stop lying about crimes it committed against humanity? can it confess? [p. 50 new performative, tribunal], state dissociated from what characterized it: good conscience

TR p. 88 [re: “to swear”] délire names extraordinary coincidence of irrationality of machine (beyond my control) & absolute sincerity (authentic innocence of my intentions)

——coincidence of infinite guilt & certainty in absolute, virgin, intact innocence> btwn infinite guilt & absence of guilty conscience

EW p. 286 a limited, calculable responsibility, the becoming-right of morality, is the dream of every good conscience or that of petty, grand inquisitors

pp. 286-87 Derrida, not excusing silence on Auschwitz, takes to task the sententious discourse of those who grandstand, accuse, and teach lessons w/ it—primarily to give oneself a good conscience [liberal snowflakes]

GRAMMA

A p. 15 border as limit (oros, Grenze, re: nun or Jetzt [now-point] Heidegger underlines) or border as tracing (grammē, Linie)

PP p. 69 an inscription, Delphikon gramma [Phaedrus (229d)], anything but oracle, prescribes silent cipher, signifies, orders autoscopy, autognosis [re: Socrates’ send-off of myths]

pp. 136-37 writing paints living word, painting (zōgraphia, zōgraphēma sometimes shortened to gramma), both interrogated by living word > masks, figurines, simulacra denature what they claim to imitate, writing & painting should aim at resembling/faithfulness to their model

p. 166 [stranger (from Sophist) as first grammatologist?] grammar and dialectics can only be distinguished when truth is fully present, fills logos > but parricide in Sophist (impossibility of presence) establishes condition of discourse as diacritical principle of sumplokē

necessity of logos as necessity of parricide > absolute pre-condition crossed out by parricide at point of its arche-being—prevents difference btwn grammar and ontology

VP p. 7 Husserl determines logos on basis of logic, giving logicity the normalcy of logos telos, the telos of being as presence; this requires distinction btwn pure logic or “pure logical grammar” and pure grammar [logic before language]

p. 21 Husserl believes he can isolate logical a priori from pure grammar

p. 60 Husserl has to extend to “I” a different grammar than “you” because it can function in solitude, w/out communication

p. 61 pure logical grammar functions, always, in relation to an object

p. 84 [Husserl’s formalism, his “pure logical grammar,” limited by semantic theme, the sense determined on basis of relation to object > telos of epistemological rationality is irreducible origin of idea of pure grammar?]

FSW p. 205 when Freud renounces neurology & anatomical localizations, trace becomes gramme, and region of breaching, a ciphered spacing

p. 209 for Freud, dreamer invents his own grammar; Freud makes psychical writing so originary, any supposedly proper writing would have to be a metaphor for it

PPHS pp. 102-04 Hegel: Chinese is too grammatical, entangled in dissemination of meanings & accents—in cold space of formal abstraction [Hegel contradicts privilege of sign over symbol?]

FWT p. 63 writing, trace, gramma or grapheme exceed opposition: human/nonhuman > extend field of living, or rather life/death relation

POS pp. 26-7 gram as differance neutralizes phonologistic propensity of “sign,” liberates “graphic substance” > gram not an element, interwoven w/ traces of other elements of chain/system

OS pp. 34-5n TN. difference btwn grammē and gramme

p. 49(n) time compared by Aristotle to movement and chance, w/out being either one of them, time can only occur en tēi psukhēi > time’s analogy: what is traced (le tracé) as line, grammē

p. 49n for Kant, inner intuition of time gives us no shape, so we make up for this via analogy: time is a line progressing to infinity > but where parts of line are simultaneous, parts of time are successive

p. 53n for Aristotle, circle is model of movement for time and grammē

p. 57 [quoting Aristotle, Derrida doesn’t concur w/ Bergson’s critique of Aristotelian time as cinematographic > Aristotle can’t identity time w/ gramme representing movement]

pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

——this would be a gramme that erases its tracing in a circle, removes limit of point

——we go around in circles trying to erase this circle > [time, still, introduces the thought of trace, if even to excise it]

ROP pp. 61-2 everyone, Ponge, Blanchot, Lacan tried to replace speech w/ writing after Derrida, to replace phoneme w/ grapheme is overcompensatory > trace, gramme, differance no more graphic than phonematic

OTO pp. 4-5 discourse on life/death occurs btwn logos and gramme, analogy & program, program & reproduction (since life is on the line, the trait [splitting of line] relating graphical to logical, also working btwn biological & biographical, thanatological & thanatographical)

PS p. 184 Derrida shows in Nietzsche & Hölderlin an equation btwn dancing, standing upright, and the work itself

——but, unlike Artaud, they treat erection metaphorically, it doesn’t exile itself into the work, expatriate itself to sovereignty of speech/writing, uprightness of letter, the tip of the pen

——does Nietzsche question relation of grammatical security & uprightness of letter?

——Heidegger foretells this relationship: Greeks interpret language visually, as grammata, in writing language comes to stand (paradoxically, this confirms disdain of writing in Phaedrus)

TR pp. 124-25 concept of “machine” indissociable from deconstruction: “a text whose grammaticality is a logical code obeys a machine” > no text w/out grammar, w/out machine, w/out “suspension of referential meaning”

p. 152 notion of grammar understood acc. trivium/quadrivium (see Warminski), but also as a machine of the letter (gramma), letter machine, writing machine

pp. 152-53 machine determined by grammar and vice versa

p. 153 isolated from its rhetoric [its tropes], grammar is purely formal—de Man: radically formal, mechanical > no text can be produced w/out this formal, grammatical element

OG p. 9 (19-20) if cybernetics ousts metaphysical concepts soul, life, value, choice & memory, it must conserve notion of writing, trace, grammè, graphemeuntil its own historico-metaphysical character is exposed [cybernetic program will be the field of writing]

——grammè (or grapheme), not human or nonhuman, not simple, can’t be defined w/in oppositions of metaphysics

***p. 84 Leroi-Gourhan invokes notion of program, not a recourse to differentiating man from animal but understood in cybernetic sense (only intelligible via possibility of trace): far beyond “intentional consciousness,” makes grammè appear as such > a “liberation of memory” (reading machines, electronic card indexes) that enlarges differance and possibility of putting in reserve: constitutes/effaces conscious subjectivity, its logos, and its theological attributes [baby daddy]

GRAMMAR

MPM p. 144 de Man: the incompatibility of grammar & meaning becomes explicit when linguistic structures are stated in political terms [on the grammar, historicity of law]

POOF pp. 250-52 a grammar beyond grammar of response, friendship a privileged locus for this reflection: 1) on répond de soi [for self]: subject, agency of ‘proper name’ 2) on répond d'abord à lautre [to]: more originary than other two, ‘insistence’ of Other, dissymmetrical anteriority that marks time as structure of responsibility 3) répondre devant [before]: marks, right on idiom, passage to institutional agency of alterity, no longer singular but universal, before the law, agency authorized

WM p. 249 first example of antikatēgoreisthai is grammar, thus, proper of man is grammar, ability to read & write > belongs to chain of what’s proper to man: logos, phōnē sēmantikē, mimēsis, metaphora

EJQB p. 74 double genitive (question of God) is embedding of ontological & grammatical w/in graphein

p. 76 nonquestion, act of faith, unpenetrated certainty that Being is a Grammar, world is in all its parts a cryptogram [this nonquestion not yet a dogma]

p. 78 to write: to confuse ontology & grammar; grammar: in which are inscribed all dislocations of dead syntax, all aggressions perpetrated by speech against language, every questioning of the letter

——all these tortures are forgotten in literature, as mortifications, as ruses of life

TN p. 177 Husserl analyzes solipsism w/ figure of manual touching and Herzgefühl, “heart sensation”

——but could I feel my heart w/out technē or grammar (grammar, like rhetoric, a form of technē)?

ATM p. 154 the grammatical utterance [“here I am”?] is there, but put out of joint (disloqué), making room (that is not a home) for an agrammaticality of the gift assigned from the other (depuis lautre)

——incorporating what it can’t assimilate, quoting the uncitable consists in accusing language [appearing as witness & accused], (sur)rendered (offerre) to a gift, as a gift which language can’t open up to on its own

GRAMMATOLOGY

MC p. 373 not that all fiction, all inscription of proper names has literary dimension, but they arise in a place where limits are never real, never immobile, never solidonly the effects of contextual isolation > pragrammatological (intersection of pragmatics & grammatology)

POS pp. 12-3 Derrida never attempted to oppose graphocentrism to logocentrism, OG not a mystification of writing’s value; OG proposes question/limits of science of writing

pp. 34-5 grammatology must liberate mathematization of language (which phonocentrism has always critiqued, for limiting that which links logos to phonē), but must be wary of Leibniz’s type of unifying, simple, mathematical language, which appeals to divine logos

pp. 35-6 grammatology must ceaselessly deconstruct everything that ties concepts/norms of scientificity to ontotheology, phono-logocentrism, must transgress w/out falling back into prescientific empiricism, it must affirm wherever science exceeds logocentric closure > grammatology inscribes and delimits science, marks/loosens limit closing classical scientificity

——grammatology vigilant practice of textual division (i.e. metaphysical presuppositions occurring w/ critical motifs, i.e. Hjelmslev’s glossematics)

ROP p. 52 OG about the impossibility of the science of grammatology

OG p. 4 (13-4) science of grammatology, of writing, though necessary, may never be established, never voir le jour [because of the phono-logocentric metaphysics determining it]

pp. 17-8 (29-30) natural writing (breath) pneumatological not grammatological

——interior holy voice of faith; natural law, native unity of voice & writing is prescriptive, commandment > good writing comprehended as that which had to be comprehended

pp. 27-8 (43) the science of writing born in period of world’s history, look for roots of scientificity, roots of historicity, thus science of possibility of science, history of history, a grammatics not logic?

p. 28 (44) “the origin of writing?”: [how does this question disrupt grammatology?]

p. 29 (44) linguistics aspires to be science of language

pp. 29-30 (45) the tension btwn autre geste [written w/out being uttered] and propos déclaré > where grammatology has a future beyond linguistics-phonology [re: Saussure]

p. 325n (47-8n) Martinet suggests replacing unity [bias] of word w/ “syntagm” (nothing to do w/ meaning), “group of several minimal signs” or “monemes”

p. 32 (49) Sausurre’s 2 systems of writing: ideographic, phonetic

pp. 33-4 (50-1) if writing is mere “figuration” of language—it is exiled, cast outside, a double > unrelated to interior of the system: “internal system” is an epistemological exigency constituted by possibility of phonetic writing

——but this science [deconstructive grammatology?], where opening of “image” conditions “reality,” can’t maintain classical scientific grid: external/internal, image/reality, representation/presence > this science inaugurates the originality of its field

pp. 43-4 (64) Saussure opens field of grammatology when he’s not talking about writing: so that what was chased off, proscribed to outside, never ceased to haunt language

p. 45 (66) for Hegel & Saussure, “symbols”: the only natural signs, only signs that escape semiology as grammatology

pp. 48, 51 (70, 74) substitute grammatology for semiology, le devenir-immotivé du symbole [via Pierce]: no more pertinence of synchronic/diachronic, and semiology no longer mastered by exemplary linguistic sign (master-sign)

***pp. 56-7 (82-3) arche-writing can never be an object of science, it is that which cannot be reduced to a form of presence

——Derrida uses word writing in relation to the vulgar concept of writing, which, historically, would have been impossible w/out dissimulation of arche-writing (desire of speech displacing its other)

p. 60 (88) arche-writing at work in graphic and nongraphic expression, pattern uniting form & substance, all content & expression > opens temporalization, relationship w/ other & language

——arche-writing cannot be an object in a linguistic system or the “immanent” system itself [glossematics] > but, doesn’t have a real field elsewhere

pp. 62-3 (91-2) differance does not exist, the never being-present outside plenitude > no science of this nonorigin

p. 74 (109) grammatology’s condition of possibility, the solicitation of logocentrism, is condition of impossibility, risks destroying concept of science, exorbitant aim (visée) beyond savoir

p. 75 (110-11) trace is nothing, exceeds question “what is?” > no longer sheltered in grammatological knowledge: no longer assurance of opposition fait/droit > no pure fait

p. 337n writing can’t be contained w/in a science—can’t have that ambition or modesty

GREEK

HERP p. 195 for Heidegger, anthropology & psychology depend on metaphysics of subjectivity, interpretation of man as subject; thus, psychology did not exist for Greeks, and Christianity (w/ its new relation to philein) is 1st stage in formation of passions for subject/psychology

POOF p. 63 once Nietzsche goes beyond Greek friendship, can we find unity in Greek culture anymore? > when he says, “in honor of friendship,” he knows (better than anyone) he is speaking Greek

p. 268n via Leroux, fraternity links freedom & equality OR fraternity appears first as origin/principle > Christianity as an ‘infinite enlargement’ of [gentle] fraternity, still deploys a Greek memory: these 2 memories efficiently coupled in ideal instant of French Revolution

VM p. 81 Heidegger & Husserl’s untraditional appeal to tradition: entirety of philosophy on basis of Greek source, can’t philosophize outside this medium

p. 82 that we are consigned to Greek element, a knowledge and confidence that is not comfortable, that torments us > Husserl’s crisis, a covering up of a transcendental motif beginning to accomplish Greek aim in Descartes & Kant: philosophy as science

——Heidegger says our thought has been desiccated, its return to Greek source, thought of Being, is a knowledge, security not in the world, possibility of our language & nexus of our world

——can the other of the Greek be named non-Greek? pensée pour laquelle le tout du logos grec est déjà survenu (erupted), humus apaisé non pas sur un sol, mais autour dun volcan plus anicen

p. 89 Levinas seeks a second parricide, to murder the Greek father (who still holds us in his sway), a father Plato could only hallucinate murdering, “a hallucination within the hallucination that is already speech” > could a non-Greek succeed in doing what a Greek could never do? and do so by feigning to speak Greek, can one feign to speak a language?

pp. 104-05 [Derrida on philology of other > autrui (substantive that’s not a noun), autre, heteron, alter-huic > what does autre mean before Greek heteron? before Judeo-Christian autrui?]

pp. 111-12 why does Levinas return to categories he rejected? Derrida’s not denouncing incoherence [w/ this question], he’s wondering about meaning of necessity, necessity of lodging oneself w/in traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it—does this imposed necessity cache-t-elle quelque ressource indestructible et imprévisible du logos grec? quelque puissance illimitée denveloppement dans laquelle celui qui voudrait le repousser serait toujours déjà surpris?

p. 133 question “why finitude?” can be stated only by being forgotten in language of Greeks

p. 152 nothing can so profoundly solicit Greek logos [& reawaken it to its mortality, its other] as irruption of tout-autre > Greek language offers hospitality to a thought which remains foreign to it [Jew/Christian in his home]

***p. 153 Greek logos not accidental for any thought; Greek miracle is impossibility for any thought to treat its sages as “sages of the outside” > by proferring epekeina tes ousias, by welcoming alterity into heart of logos, it has protected itself against every surprising convocation

——to live in difference btwn Jew and Greek, perhaps the unity we call history

——Greek logos provides understanding to those who understand eschatological prophecy and to those who don’t

S p. 68 Heidegger: Greek language and reflection, along w/ German, most powerful and spiritual language

p. 69 for Heidegger, signature of thought never individual, commits via community, people, in his or her own language; there are only some languages open to Being: German, Greek

pp. 71-2 Derrida imagines how Greeks would have responded to Heidegger’s claim about their pneuma via Geist > imagines they would claim prerogative of Greek

FWT p. 18 rigorously, “philosophy” exists nowhere other than in Greece, yet it tends toward liberating itself from this cultural limitation, will toward deracination [Husserl, Heidegger]

——the universal of philosophy (neither relativism nor nationalism) not a given, an essence, but an infinite process of universalization > in the name of European filiation we are liberating ourselves from Eurocentrism/ethnocentrism

HASD p. 53 Christianity did not cease to be Greek [both are apophatic, only Christianity is evental?]

SW p. 316 God as name of what gives the order to give the veil (btwn holy & holy of holies), veil as gift (that it is) ordered to give, gives to think separation from le tout autre (faith itself) > did this come to an end w/ death of Christ? can it be comprehended in veiled folds of Greek alētheia?

CHM pp. 39-40 Foucault’s bothersome idea re: Greek logos: it “had no contrary” > [Derrida wonders if there is already a dissension btwn madness & reason, a founding unity that already carries w/in it “free trade” of Medieval Ages]

p. 40 historico-philosophical motivations for Nietzsche’s/Heidegger’s fascination w/ pre-Socratics still to be examined (mystification)

WOG pp. 18-9 my relationship to ‘Greece’ is somewhat naive, limited by philological & historical incompetence

p. 19 horizon of Greek thing itself no longer assured in Derrida: neither as place, system of language, spiritual figure (‘Husserl’) or historial figure (‘Heidegger’)

p. 23n on the use of Greek words [in Foucault, Heidegger, Kuhn, Holton]: 1) new concept not in everyday language 2) new archeological discovery: restoration 3) authority of rare words

p. 25 ontology could not be more Greek, toward which Derrida has had only questions, reservations, and interminable parentheses

p. 26 Derrida took from Greeks: other of language, simulacrum, infinite alterity, while privileging epekeina tēs ousias, that which uproots ontology and metaphysics

p. 26 the remainder (of all ontology) and the contamination btwn tout autre and its regular reappropriation (economic redialectization) haunts all Derrida’s essays on the Greeks

——the tout autre of the Greek, the figure of a tout autre unfigurable by him

p. 28 deconstruction at work in the ‘origin,’ already from the ‘origin’ itself—upon deconstruction of the origin

pp. 29-32 Greeks definitely speak the truth, but at what cost, under what conditions?

p. 31(n) mediation through Nietzsche [re: Greeks] not constant—often ironic; PC very ironic about Nietzsche’s image of Socrates

p. 34 impossibility to read/translate Greek means those works can’t close upon themselves, already marked by irruption of other [an experience already there for the “original” Greeks]

p. 35 undecidability found a certain privilege in ‘Greek’ words, in philosophy, on [sur?] its borders, that is, beyond its confines [pharmakon, hymen, parergon]

pp. 35-6 Wolff & Alliez, when defining Derrida’s Greek inheritance, neglect relation btwn khōra and epekeina tēs ousias

p. 37 hen diapheron heautôi (Heraclitus) is Greek heritage Derrida is most faithful to, tries to think this “one differing from itself” alongside (“improbably”) the khōra > the very event of the même, the soi-même: under this sign, Derrida contrasted differance to ontological difference [cf. D p. 22]

OG p. 13 totality of metaphysics creates hierarchy of signifier/signified [signified is higher, not exterior like signifier] (Christian creationism, infinitism, both appropriating Greek conceptualism)

——signans (sensible), signatum (intelligible) [?]

GROUND (SUBSTANCE)

H p. 91 language most mobile, immovable, the absolute ground of all displacements

LOBL pp. 134-5 chose has always signified, in philosophy, that which doesn’t arrive > hupokeimenon or rēs, substance to which accidents happen, not only its accident

——its very not-happening happens to the “Come” in its pas de chose, procès, as arrêt de mort that can’t be decided, neither life nor death

SPOM p. 212 figure of absolute hospitality: strange, familiar, inhospitable > quasi-transcendental “messianism,” materialism w/out substance, materialism of the khōra for a despairing “messianism,” a curious taste of death, a foretaste (avant-goût), curious of what it conjures

p. 215 for Marx, ghost is the autonomizing of a representation (Vorstellung) whose genesis and real grounding (reale Grundlage) has been forgotten

MSUB J p. 157 btwn sub and tile [the “-ject”]: persecuting evils, haunting the supports, substrata, substances > Artaud never stopped exorcising, conjuring the fiends (suppôts), succubi, sorcerers

VM p. 101 face is most high because it is origin of space, kathauto, “substance,” presence, ousia [Feuerbach on height, substance, face] [engenders set outside of set]

——Aristotle compares transcendental principle of good to chief of armies, overlooked that it is the Face

pp. 142-43 humanism, separating man from animal, via analogy of God and human face [vis-à-vis Descartes, ambiguity of substance as concerns God and his creatures], is this not the original metaphor? Levinas’ metaphysical humanism

PP pp. 144-45 (166-67) democracy is like writing, Plato’s trial against democracy similar to that against pharmakon: excess, anarchy, orgy, flea market, fair, bazaar (pantopōlion); errant democratic man has no substance, not perverse in regular way, like signifier freed (affranchi) from logos

VP p. 72n for Husserl, that which is unnammeable is “absolute subjectivity,” a being of presence as substance, ousia, hypokeimenon > can name its attribute not its “absolute properties,” i.e. its substance [classical metaphysical scheme]

S pp. 15-6 Descartes’ cogito not exemplary precedent of existential analytic because sum is not questioned [leap rather than genealogy]; Descartes commits the thingification of the subject, positing (Ansatz) of subjectum or hypokeimenon, a substance or substratum

pp. 20-21 three forms of indifference: 1) stone, vorhandene entity 2) positive phenomenon of Dasein 3) paralyzing indifference, that of Descartes, substantializes a “who” as existing in form of Vorhandenheit > #2 and #3, however, are of the same capacity

——Heidegger’s Destruktion of “spirit,” vulgar concept of time, Daseins substance is not spirit but existence

pp. 62-3 for Heidegger, that which causes destitution of spirit is of spirit, is its double, its spectral duplicity; yet, this is not Descartes’ Evil Genius (böse Geist), the destitution, the demonic, comes from cogitos substantializaton, accepts lies, destruction, doesn’t question (Schellingian)

FSW p. 229 concept of subject requires concept of substance (thus presence)

PPHS p. 89 for Hegel, signifying substance is sound, “substance of expression” [glossematicians], most proper to be produced as time itself, sound relève from naturalness, linked to spirit’s relation to itself, the voice

p. 101 philosophy began in West because China grounded itself to a halt w/out opposition btwn substance and subjective freedom, could not reflect

WM p. 224 trope and arkhē have their own metaphorical charge, resist every meta-metaphorics, values of concept, foundation, theory > fundamental desire for firm/ultimate ground (to build artifice)

p. 224n Kant: Grund flows from, depends on, substance (Locke: support for accidents), not schematic but symbolic hypotyposes, expresses concept w/out direct intuitionism

POS p. 22 voice is consciousness itself when phonē is signifying substance > signifier and signified unite, signifier erases itself, exteriority of signifier reduced by spontaneous proximity

P p. 40 Kant: very depths of foundations (Grundlage) of principles is independent of experience: if not: ruin > Kant goes to bythos of abyss w/out knowing if it exists

p. 41 desire of reason, desire for the fundamental: desire to go to the bythos

p. 50 Kant’s intro (the foundation) came after he wrote Critique, tries to articulate critique w/ philosophy, Kant’s critique not metaphysics, it’s a crane (une grue) or dragline bucket (une drague) above the pit (la fosse), travaillant à gratter, fouiller, déblayer, looking to open up sure ground [compare to reading machine in Glas]

GSP pp. 321-22n Husserl: norm of math found in mathematical, logic in logical, ethics in ethical

DIF DIF p. 16 consciousness, self-presence—subject cannot be thought w/out reference to presence as hupokeimenon or ousia > subject of consciousness has always manifested itself as self-presence

WAP pp. 20-1 CIPH quasi-founded; self-founded (eminently philosophical concept), is anything ever self-founded?

Gii p. 38 Descartes says: hand so unique to body, almost separable, substance unto itself

REST p. 264 point does not bring foot in contact w/ a surface, doesn’t spread out on a surface (the soles, the ground)—surface is lower than the foot, goes lowest (Derrida’s never examined this)

pp. 267-68 Derrida on Freud’s shoe fetish: shoe replaces that which is lacking not because of its form but because of its directional situation > syntax of a movement upwards from le plus-bas

“according to the circumstances,” [Freud’s bisexuality of most dream-symbols] also occurs acc. syntax irreducible to semantic or “symbolic” substantiality

pp. 284-85 hypokeimenon as underneath, what is the fundamental ground of subjectivity? [re: Van Gogh’s shoes]: the “sole,” the rhythmic pas de contact of a march/walk/step, the ground, what about veils, the stocking (le bas), as what’s underneath the text? [all questions re: the thing]

——Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art intends to lead beyond, or to, eve of constitution of the subjectum, a Schritt zurück (backward step) on road of thought [?]

***pp. 287-88 Heidegger: from hypokeimenon to subjectum, Roman thought takes over (übernimmt) Greek words w/out corresponding co-originary experience, absence-of-ground (Bodenlosigkeit) of Western thought opens w/ this translation > a transfer, über, over and beyond Greek experience

——these words become ghostly (fantômatiques) doubles of themselves, leur simulacre légers, walk above/in the void, bodenlos

p. 290 for Heidegger, metaphorical (?) ground, this is the originary and fundamental experience of the Greeks, more than hypokeimenon > the underneath of the underneath (le dessous du dessous): a thinking of the abyss not mis-en-abyme

——abyss: “un des lieux ou non-lieux prêts à tout porter de ce jeu

p. 291 how that which is under hypokeimenon opens an abyss (change of direction) > a completely different topic: “more” carries away, thing no longer has value/figure of “underneath”

——thing still hidden away, wrapped up underneath in its investiture (hypokeimenon, subjectum: both still hide or veil)

——the hiding or veiling, figure of the veil, is drawn into undecidability by the hymen

pp. 291-92 gift, abyss, offering, there is abyss > essence of Van Gogh’s painting, via Heidegger’s Origin, opens onto an abyss (not attributive certainty, secure ground of [Cartesian-Hegelian] subjectivity)

——Origin an essay on the gift (Schenkung), one of 3 senses in which truth is said to come to its installation, institution, investiture (Stiftung), there’s also the “founding (Gründen)” > this truth which is also nontruth also opens onto the “abyss”

p. 305 remainder, instance of letting fall, this lowness: is it the foot?

——Van Gogh’s scene: “make oneself a present of the remainder (Glas)”

HST p. 388 substitution of hostage as un être-sous, être-dessous, not the beneath of subjectum, substantia, hypokeimenon but submitted (soumis), assujetti, to the height of the Most High (law above)

p. 409 substitution resists ontology, question of hypokeimenon, that which places itself “below,” underneath, the very proximate words substance/subjectivity

LI p. 34 for Derrida, ground is an undergound (slippery, shifting, mined & undermined)

p. 52 “permanence” and “substance” are, by essence, “presences”

p. 54 structure of remainder, implying alteration, renders all absolute permanence impossible

BSi pp. 152-53 for Deleuze [?], bêtise is thoughtful, a thinking, a matter of thought, a thinking and thoughtful freedom (i.e. proper to man) > Deleuze’s bêtise has a relation to ground (also Ungrund) influenced by Schelling’s discourse on human freedom

——for Schelling, only man w/ his freedom can relate to a groundless ground

p. 154 animal cannot be bête, not free, can’t come away from relation to ground

——for Schelling, there’s distinction btwn being (Wesen) as Grund & being as existence > must be Wesen prior to any ground: Urgrund or Ungrund that would not be oppositional, absolute indifference

pp. 308-10 logics of closure/enclosure, the threshold, le seuil interdit, question of responsibility (a question of threshold) throughout a decade of seminars [Derrida’s]

——not only do we not have a key to threshold, deconstruction doubts existence of threshold worthy of the name (threshold supposes indivisibility & solidity of ground)

——threshold (seuil), sill, soil, sole, solum, ground > are these ever secure?

OG pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

p. 129 (189) propositions of essence can never fit a scale (échelle)

p. 198 (283) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] in an archeoteleological concept of nature [eg. identification of word & song, avant et afin]: modification becomes one w/ substance it modifies: (nature & its other, archeology & eschatology, substance & mode, origin & genesis) > this logic wreaks havoc on juridical/methodological point of view, annuls difference btwn structural/genetic point of view

EU p. 223 CIPH should question motifs of “depth,” “foundation,” “reason (Grund),” distinguish between “basic (fondamentale)” and “end-oriented (finalisée)” research [see p. 227]

p. 225 [CIPH] “basic,” “fundamental” research should cease being ashamed of itself [due to pressure from sciences, especially social sciences], research the “basic” around series gift/destination w/out returning to hegemonic structure > a “scheme” that never becomes “program” or obligatory “theme”

FV pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

p. 483tn one reason, male libido, altus, at the bottom of things—highest truth

GUILLOTINE/KILLING MACHINE

FWT p. 86 for Robespierre, re: DP, cruelty is excess severity > guillotine: more democratic than torture

DPi pp. 61-2 coldness, cruelty, heartless machinism of guillotine, hard and cold like a machine (again juxtaposed to woman, who is apolitical, private, warm)

p. 62 guillotine is no one (inhuman, superhuman—divine) > techno-politics theatrically incarnated as dis-incarnated

p. 63 [guillotine as square w/out opening] [Name of Father—stitch, blade]

p. 63n Derrida directs class to lavishly illustrated, well documented: www.guillotine.net

p. 71(n) old sparky, the widow: “there is a need to laugh, to deride the killing machine”

p 192 guillotine: a humanitarian machine

pp. 192-93 invention of guillotine not just any moment in history: French Revolution, declarations of rights of man, death of monarchy of divine right (pp. 196-97 guillotine will be democratic, egalitarian > this will be the spirit of its invention)

p. 193 what must be proper to man for the guillotine to be interpreted as both a crime against humanity & serving the dignity of man (humanist)?

——Hugo, ironically: “Mr. Guillotine was a philanthropist”

——guillotine: [doesn’t erase or dry up blood but keeps it] withdraws hands of man

——Society of Jesus & medical corporation at origin of “humanitarian machine”

p. 194 guillotine made feminine to rhyme w/ machine

p. 195 Enlightenment concepts of guillotine not in contradiction w/ certain Christian humanism: the dignified, humanistic death; it is progressive: 1) egalitarian 2) individualist 3) mechanistic, machinisitic > only the machine can make everyone equal before the law

p. 196 Arasse: “the criminal will be decapitated; he will be so by the effect of simple mechanics”

——[re: the Mannaia] Father Labat: “very reliable machine, doesn’t prolong suffering”

p. 198 Arasse: “terrifying apparatus / gentle death”

p. 200 guillotine: gets rid of bloody hands of executioner (bourreau)

p. 205 guillotine in Place de l’Hôtel de Ville, Place de la Grève, these grave banks > but then it moved away from there: en grève (on strike), it was doing its job badly

p. 206 guillotine’s wooden uprights, buveuse de sang (blood swiller), flowing red > drinks the blood, makes it disappear

***p. 216 [Hugo’s bloody bloody description of guillotine]

p. 223 why are killing machines given female proper names? why do they make us laugh?

pp. 225-26 Cartesianism of Guillotin/guillotine, not only mechanism of individualism/egalitarian universalism, but also body/mind (Cartesian doxa, ideology), but also Descartes’ instantaneism (separate, indivisible instants) as part of anesthetic logic of moment of guillotine

——would the mind only know it was severed from its head when the crowd cheers? other determines instant of my death

——guillotine as pain killer: instant, no sensibility of duration of time: anesthesia—euthanasia—instantaneity

——“slight coolness on the neck”

p. 235 Camus: go see every execution—only thing that interests a man

p. 236 [Camus’ bloody description > eyewitness: decapitated, looked like a madman]

pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

HABIT

H p. anne 30 is the anguish of aporia enough to prevent the process of growing accustomed?

OOG pp. 57-8 sedimentary retention [as habitus, occurs because living consciousness is finite] is general form of protention conceived as unique, universal form of Living Present

PAS PAS pp. (95-6) the event adrift (en dérive) abducts (enlève) its simple past from an indefinite background of habitus or repetition, fond sans fond [quasi-now of récit]

TC p. 238 Western “illness,” incapable of wanting, victim of formal habit

***TN pp. 106-07 that we only have 5 senses, that each one is distinct: a praxis, way of being social, habit of some pretended ontophenomenological evidence

p. 346n Ravaisson: good habit as return to innocence through training

BSi p. 265 acc. Heidegger, man is the most unheimlich—steps out of usual frontiers (Grenzen) of habit > man’s Grundzug (fundamental feature): being foreign to everything familiar

EU p. 71 for Schelling, philosopher develops negative condition: consciousness of inanity of all finite knowledge > ability to translate, re-translate, the real to the ideal can be acquired—can be cultivated in a Bildung and become untransformable habitus, unalterable organ

HAND

GOD p. 101 Matthew: [on giving alms] “let not the left hand know…” [on sinning] “and if the right hand offend thee, cut it off”

GT pp. 159-60n Heidegger on gift, Heidegger uncovers an etymology of khreon that links it to hand, to reaching for, also links it to logos > Derrida wonders about credit cards, coded signatures

SPOM p. 214 via Marx, practical events, where thought becomes act (se fait agir); thought as Handeln in Heidegger

HERP p. 188 acc. Heidegger, dual hands, dual ears [ontic?], single hands, single ears [ontological: hear, give?] > passage from plural to singular is essential

S p. 11 for Heidegger [Heidegger’s Hand], pragma, praxism, pragmata present themselves as vorhandene, zuhandene > all in domain of hand, that is, human (writing is handwriting)

pp. 11-2 Heidegger’s discourse [on hand], all the more peremptory and authoritarian for hiding its discomfiture, preserves, sheltered in obscurity, the profoundest metaphysical humanism

p. 66 silent play of quotation marks [re: spirit], Anführungsstriche, Anführungszeichen, “the hand calculates very fast,” Anführen, to conduct, dupe, brainwash, silent contrivances, fort/da, what shows or hides changes everything, and when one puts away after exhibiting, this is mise au pas (bringing to heel)

OH p. 69 Derrida will subscribe to European analogic (ideality, capitalization) w/ one hand, write outside it w/ the other

FSW p. 226 two hands needed to operate Freud’s Mystic Pad

T p. xxv how to put one’s hands on tympanum so it can escape from hands of philosopher, so he can no longer recognize his phallogocentrism [play w/ mains, maintenant, maintain], no longer rediscover himself, no longer able to say: I will have anticipated it w/ absolute knowledge

p. xxv like w/ Mystic Pad, question of writing machine should upset (devrait fair basculer) space of proper body dans lentraînement sans limite des machines de machines et donc de machines à main coupée

p. xxviii intro to differance, cites, repercusses its rhythm w/out measure, incision conduite par une main aveugle pour navoir jamais vu que le part-et-dautre dun tissu > to weave (tramer) doesn’t play le jeu denchaînement, il joue lenchaînement, trouer, traverser, works on both sides (le part-et-dautre), leaves ear canal open, sous le coup dun enchaînement simulé, non-echo

SH p. 30 hand to hand, hands are given too, what is sundered gathers itself in name, alliance, pledge, promise, symbol

OS p. 32(n) MOP, privilege of presence, already marked in Parmenides: time, given by hand, pure maintaining (reinen Gegenwärtigens”), pure making-present (maintenant, Vorhandenheit)

p. 65 lautre geste, le plus difficile, le plus inouï, le plus questionnant, celui pour lequel nous sommes le moins préparé, can only be sketched (esquisser), announced in calculated fissures of metaphysical text: 2 texts, 2 hands, 2 visions (together simultaneously & separated)

P p. 139 colossal: that which (or presentation of that which) can be taken in hand [Fassen] or eye w/out possibility of being taken, thus crushes you not w/out pleasure, elevates you

POS p. 6 double play [double hands] rigorously respects philosophemes to the point of their nonpertinence, exhaustion, closure

OTO p. 20(n) institutions of “yes,” have need of ears: Nietzsche doesn’t expect the ears and hands for his truths today—my small ears no small interest to ladies, makes me a monster, anti-ass, Anti-Christ

SW p. 320 after Cixous’ laser surgery, she realizes eyes touch, eyes are hands/lips [lips associated w/ language in Hebrew]

DPi p. 193 guillotine: [doesn’t erase or dry up blood but keeps it] withdraws hands of man

p. 200 guillotine: gets rid of bloody hands of executioner (bourreau)

RGE p. 262 Bataille: “keep in one hand what the other gives” (to possess ruins is not to possess nothing)

——Derrida: that’s still Hegelian

***REST pp. 325-26 if police there is (and isn’t there always?) > Derrida polices too [?], “close reading,” counterpolices [?] oldest, most dogmatic, sinisterly authoritarian programs, massive meidatizing machines: pre-text of perception, of bare hands (mains nue), of real history, of living speech (vous enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte)

AFR p. 107n Condillac: “sensation becomes idea only by force of touch,” every touch representative of objects the hand holds; sensation of solidity: both idea and feeling, idea as feeling in soul that relates to something outside

+R p. 152 [Derrida on 2 hands] > to write one must be several

p. 159 each letter, bit or piece of word (mors ou morceau de mot) written w/ 2 hands, twice two hands, on each page

C p. 220 primordial place of “father” (presumed paradigm) depends on cartouche-performance—takes w/ one hand what it gives w/ the other (torturous surgery)

LI p. 34 this other hand, marked by Derrida’s false-start, dictated Reply to 3 + n authors [?]

p. 49 iterability disrupts presence, unity of ego in sender, du maintenant-écrivain (grasping w/ 1 hand his ballpoint pen) > stigmè of every mark already split

TN p. 41 for Kant, touch is only immediate sense, founds other 2 objective senses: sight & hearing > hierarchical privilege of touch; touch occurs in fingers, fingertips [“haptocentric” tradition]

pp. 41-2 for Kant, only man has hand (telos): allows us to explore form, whereas coldness, heat, softness are just “vital”

p. 95 touch gives nearness/proximity more than sight/hearing > proximity, proper, present

——one thinks first of all, and too much, of hands: take the gift (“Tiens!”), comprehension, prehension, captation, a plea (prière) > “tender extending” becomes violence itself: “Take that!”

p. 96 operation that inscribed some touching in all writing, surg-ical, Greek cheirourgia, cheir (hand), ergon (work) > even if machines/technology are indispensable

p. 138 to follow the history of touch, follow the hand as a sample (échantillon), more or less well sewn, following like un fil conducteur, follow the turns of the hand, and especially its finger > see what it circumscribes, and what it lets slip away (laisse échapper)

p. 139 objectivity of being(s): 1) exposed before a gaze 2) opposes a resistance to touch > does the hand (being-before-the-hand) reconcile these two positional values of objectivity?

p. 341n Diderot, in tradition of Anaxagoras: “man thinks because he has hands”

pp. 151-52 via de Biran, sense of “I” comes from hand: rough, too heavy resistance > he would know nothing about himself, if he did not experience resistance

p. 152 hierarchy/teleology [au sommet]: willing subject, quasi-sense that is touch (ultrasense), the hand [the whole hand, not just tip of an extremely pointy fingernail (ongle extrêmement aigu)]

pp. 152-53 Maine de Biran’s “humanualism (humainisme)”: only humans have hand, can touch in strongest sense (that elephant trunk “approximates” hand of man maintains hierarchy)

p. 154 hand, humanism, continuistic intuitionism, natural immediacy > so many celebrations of touching

——for de Biran, the hand is irreplaceable/dominant (teleological) and it’s pregnant w/ every kind of metonymy (pedagogical): best ontoteleological figure, best rhetorical figure

——“transcendentalism” always guided by such surreptitious exemplarism

p. 157 Ravaisson doesn’t even stop at hand, his spiritualism/finalism overflows humanity of human (thus the hand), ontoteleology of life, ontotheology of desire/grace (freedom of spirit)

p. 158 Ravaisson’s withdrawal of hand, does it get replaced, secretly, w/ hand of God? how does this figure of God’s hand relate to light, to flesh, to Incarnation, to Christ’s touch?

p. 160 Husserl offers hand as an example of free, spontaneous, immediate movement of ego-subject

pp. 162-63 for Husserl, fingers that touch (not signal, not show) deem contact the experience of presence, which is full, immediate, direct (Nancy’s syncope interrupts)

——auto-deictic function of finger turns back on itself: le se-sentir-toucher du doigt est aussitôt un se-sentir-touché du doigt [Doppelempfindungen]

pp. 164, 347-48n [footnoting Irigaray] finger/hand not only “auto-affecting” body part

p. 171 for Husserl, when I touch myself w/ my finger: no haptical mirror-effect, no insinuation of alterity

p. 177 Husserl analyzes solipsism w/ figure of manual touching and Herzgefühl, “heart sensation”

——but could I feel my heart w/out technē or grammar (grammar, like rhetoric, a form of technē)?

pp. 178-79 [Husserl on what happens when I touch another’s hand]

***pp. 181-82 how the hand led us to the other surface, the other of sense, while trying to demonstrate auto-affection

p. 182 Derrida’s 5 Tangents, chapters (5 fingers, 5 senses); hand as incarnation of logos > hand of son of God

p. 185 humainisme

pp. 192-93 the difference Derrida adds to Husserl’s alter-ego: recognize lirréductible écart even in the touchant-touché de ma propre main [there’s alter-ego in my own proper body as human ego]

p. 352n to show that shaking hands is not always privileged form of greeting, Derrida tells story about his own experience of Maori hongi: greeting by touching noses, weeping even

p. 202 [gestures of hand in Heidegger]

p. 207 “example of the hand” confirms anthropology of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception

p. 356n Merleau-Ponty’s failure to deanthropologize logos, hand still prevails in “hiatus”

p. 252 for Chrétian, hand of father is logos and Son (p. 255 Incarnation is the sign of the hand)

p. 257 [via Chrétian] for Aristotle, hand is “organ of organs,” can become anything because it is nothing, like the soul, touch w/out organs > this feeds into a thinking of Christian flesh

——hand has a privilege for Aristotle, but not as the organ of touch

p. 258 [heterotautology?] transitivism: flesh wants a hand, God’s hand, must go beyond hand of man, then come back to Incarnation, to flesh, to receive hand of man from God

pp. 258-59 hand of man analogous w/ God’s (logos of this analogy could mean proportional relation)

p. 260 God’s hand not a figuration, the hand in the proper sense, the hand of salvation, le main de là-dieu (the God-ward goodbye hand)

OG p. 260 for Rousseau, man’s work, the “hand,” can hold back degradation of nature [by supplementary operation]

FV pp. 456n, 458n Lacan on experiencing Freud’s “full speech” in its authenticity > Freud as the master of truth vs. Bonaparte and her (bad) 2nd hand writing (master vs. cook)

p. 457 dead king, Freud, only one to contract w/ himself, awaits restitution > restoration: carrying off last plume w/ his 1st hand [in dying, mobilizes many]: theory of the facteurs

HAND in Gii

Gii p. 27 Heidegger: thinking is genuine activity, lend a hand to the essence

——Artaud: hand speaks like a language of fire

p. 35 for Heidegger, human hand different than ape’s hand

——hand or gift > is this the site of sexual desire (Geschlecht in sexual difference)?

——Heidegger’s hand: holds, carries, welcomes, signs—presumably because man is a sign > (does Phenomenology of Spirit say anything different?)

——thinking of the hand, hand of thinking > thinking of human Geschlecht (not a humanism? or not a metaphysical, classical humanism?)

pp. 35-6 Heidegger could only write by pen [MOP?]

——hand is monstrosité (monstrasity), proper characteristic of man as the being of monstration

——“can’t talk about hand w/out talking about technology” [Derrida has just recalled photographs of Heidegger’s hands, way the hands seem deliberately staged, overflow the frame]

p. 37 learning for Heidegger, “work of hand or pen,” passes through entrsprechen, Entsprechung, zusprechen, Zuspruch > relate what we are doing to correspondence in us w/ what is essential

——for Heidegger, thinking as work of cabinetmaker (Schreiner), a joiner, attune to hidden plenitude of wood’s essence as it enters inhabited site, Handwerk

——no craft w/out correspondence btwn essence of wood & man’s essential inhabiting > thinking, teaching, teaching thinking is such a noble craft

——métier as translation of Handwerk (hand is lost in translation)

pp. 37-8 [re: Handwerk] w/out attunement to essence of wood, itself attuned to man’s dwelling: empty activity, commerce, taste for profit > (this is Heidegger’s hierarchy & evaluation)

p. 38 Heidegger: the hand is constantly in danger, writing of poetry too

——to think is a handiwork [w/out any perhaps] > elsewhere in Heidegger, thought is linked to Lichtung, to eye, or to hearing/voice—now to hand

——thinking is neither cerebral nor disincarnate

p. 39 hand thinks before being thought > it is thought, a thought, thinking

——Hand-werk, an artisanal protest against hand’s defacement in industrial automation of modern mechanization

——the hand is entirely singular, proper, particular (Mit der Hand hat es eine eigene Bewandtnis) > une chose à part

——Descartes says: hand so unique to body, almost separable, substance unto itself

p. 40 since, for Heidegger, essence of hand is not in its prehension, it’s also not in Hegelian grasping of Begriff, taking hold by mastery/manipulation > what is hand’s essence?: the gift, give w/out taking anything

——Heidegger: apes have organs that can grasp, do not have hands

p. 301n Derrida sees Heidegger’s reflections on as such [re: borderline btwn man/animal] as similar to his reflections on the hand, ability to give or take as such [see p. 43]

p. 41 everything Heidegger says about man takes on meaning and value w/in oppositional limit to animal (it is dogmatic and serious)

——man’s hand infinitely removed from prehensile organs through the abyss of its being “durch einen Abgrund des Wesens

——this abyss: speech & thought

p. 42 Heidegger: w/ man, 2 hands fold into 1, auto-affect each other: prayer (man is a sign)

p. 43 Heidegger: work of hand, thought, man’s hardest & simplest work

——hand gives & gives itself: animal rationale can only take, grasp [anti-Hegel, whose concept is the graspable] [Derrida refers to GT, where giving & taking are problematized]

——Vorhandenheit, étant subsistant, presence-at-hand; Zuhandenheit, être disponible, ready-to-hand [Derrida prefers the English translation in both cases, they keep the hand]

p. 44 [Heidegger’s rethinking of praxis/theoria in relation to hand]

p. 45 in seminar on Parmenides, Heidegger translates pragma as Handlung, so pragmata present themselves as Zuhandenes, Vorhandenes, w/in reach of hand > only a man w/ speech & thus hands can pray, murder, greet, give thanks, make oaths, signal (Wink)

——for Heidegger, Handschlag (handshake) > “grounds” alliance, accord, engagement (Bund)

——hand like alētheia (concealment/disclosure [Verbergung/Entbergung]: double movement)

p. 46 Heidegger: man does not have hands, the hand has essence of man w/in it [p. 50 it is the hand that has man]

——Derrida proposes “manuscripture" to Heidegger’s handwriting (Handschrift), given that typewriting, which Heidegger will indict, is also a handwriting

——Heidegger: typewriter “tears (entreisst) writing from the essential realm of the hand” [MOP]

——“typed” word only a copy (Abschrift)

——machine “degrades” word into means of commerce, offers the advantage, for those who enjoy degradation, of dissimulation > Heidegger: “typewriter makes everyone look the same”

pp. 46-7 writing is hand-writing in its essence, makes word manifest, monstre; co-belonging of hand & speech: ability to produce monstres that disclose concealment [still a phono-logocentrism, but one where handwriting is immediately bound to speech]

p. 47 typewriter becomes signless, a-signifying (zeichenlos), it dissimulates, a movement of withdrawal, subtraction (entziehen) [loses the hand]

p. 49 hand speaks by way of “necessity,” chreon, usage, Brauch [?] > if the chreōn allows one to think the present in its presence, if der Brauch is “the gathering”—then, before all technology, surgery, le main ny est pas pour rien

[for Heidegger, all technology of hand is surgery?]

pp. 49-50 monster man has a single hand

p. 50 hands in plural already or still organic or technical dispersion

——Heidegger thus avoids reference to mirror of hands found in Kant, play of right & left > this difference can only be sensible

——Heidegger always privileges gathering: only mentions hands (in the plural) to bring them together in prayer

——w/ respect to Heidegger’s hand, does one make love w/ a hand or hands? Derrida imagines Heidegger’s protest: the hand that gives itself, promises, engages in oath already tells you everything about loving, caressing, desiring——“perhaps, but why not say it then?”

p. 302n Heidegger: 2 hands clutch in haste, utilitarian violence (want #, quantity), don’t have patience of 1—the essential is not #, it’s the right time (die rechte Zeit)

——Derrida writes on typewriter w/ 3 hands btwn 3 tongues [re: 3rd ear as ear of other, a supplementary readability of Heidegger]

p. 57 [like pitting Bataille against Bataille (see RGE p. 338n)] > Derrida only “critiques” Heidegger by doing so from other places in his own text: he writes w/ 2 hands at least (i.e. his text is not homogenous)

HAPPINESS

DPi pp. 250-51(n) acc. Saint-Just, happiness a new idea in 18th century Europe > this century also invented the Terror & the guillotine

——eudaimon of Heidegger, not only pleasure, not hedonist enjoyment > but Heidegger does not mention how daimon stops talking to Socrates at moment of condemnation to death

——to be happy w/ happiness is to believe in it: like every belief, a belief of the other in oneself [Derrida emphasizes painful equivocality of this expression]

CHM pp. 31-2 re: his relation to Foucault: interminable unhappiness (unhappy consciousness) of disciple > master might be absent

——must break the mirror, the glass, infinite speculation on master: start to speak

OG p. 186 (264) Rousseau: nearer we are to jouissance, further from bonheur

imagination is differance of or w/in presence or jouissance

HAPTOCENTRISM/INTUITIONISM/CONTINUISM

TN p. 41 for Kant, touch is only immediate sense, founds other 2 objective senses: sight & hearing > hierarchical privilege of touch; touch occurs in fingers, fingertips [“haptocentric” tradition]

p. 100 Gospel as a general haptics, flesh that is touching–touched > “le salut sauve en touchant, et le sauveur, à savoir le touchant, est aussi touché: sauvé, sauf, indemnetouché par la grâce” > touching, purify, heal, save, extend hand [heal blindness by touching eyes = touch before sight]

p. 116 Derrida not more idealist, history of touch is idealistic—“cannot bring myself to believe in it very much”

p. 117 [but] the idea is seen rather than touched

p. 119 Nancy writes partes extra partes obsessively to break w/ immediacy of touch, challenge law of intuition at heart of contact

p. 120 philosophy—idealization, intuitionism as philosophy itself, where seeing the blind spot, a point, is touching it > fullness of immediate presence: actuality of what se donne en acte, energetically, effectively: hapto-tropologic metaphysics comes to its plenitude, pleroma

pp. 120-21 Phaedo, Republic: touch truth, relinquish corporeal senses

p. 121 Plato, Bergson, Berkeley, Maine de Biran, Husserl all carry out same formal constraint: haptical intuitionism fulfills well-known hegemony of eidetics (eye, figure, incorporal look)

——desire is intuitionistic—as soon as it’s weaned (sevré) of intuition > lethal contradiction, sign of its end, its telos (telos is haptico-intuitionistic)

——philosophy obediently under thumb of finger and eye

——epekeina tēs ousias (hyphen btwn Plato/Plotinus): Plotinus’ hyperbolic touching of the One as the Good, beyond being

p. 122 order of presences via haptical (if it was a finger point, command)

p. 123 intuitive vision becomes contact

pp. 124-25 Deleuze & Guattari’s preference of “haptic” to “tactile”: proximity > a continuistic postulation of desire, “smooth,” “body w/out organs”

p. 125 purely smooth, “body w/out organs” —Artaud’s great Christian fantasy: smooth/striated is an idealizing polarity

pp. 125-26 Deleuze & Guattari’s privilege of de jure over de facto privileges the striated (state power), already implicated in the problematic opposition [smooth/striated]

p. 127 w/ each blow, at every blow, Nancy dodges continuistic tradition while insisting on tactile

pp. 127-29 intuitionistic-continuistic logic of immediacy as irrepressible as desire itself, as intractable as language constraints, grammatical violence > this law has to happen, symptoms will crop up [does Nancy really avoid this logic?]

——who could finish w/ this tempting postulation? [i.e. “smooth” desire]

pp. 140-41 Husserl & Kant begin w/ received impression, sensation, the “primary faculty” > thus we only imagine force, only know its phenomenal effects [?]

p. 144 for Merleau-Ponty, “synaesthetic perception” is the rule: “co-existence of sentient & sensible” > a philosophy of immediate coincidence

p. 145 Merleau-Ponty: “absolute knowledge is not detachment, it is inherence,” “intuition is definitely not simply coincidence or fusion any more, it is extended to ‘limits’”; p. 343n M-P, acc. Derrida, still coincides—even w/ a “non-coincidence”

p. 146 M-P: sensation a form of communion, eating bread [Eucharist]

pp. 146-49 acc. de Biran, touch as transcendental, “faculty of movement,” withdraws from order of sensibility: exemplary sense (comparing other “senses” to touch: more or less sense on both sides of analogy)

p. 152 hierarchy/teleology [au sommet]: willing subject, quasi-sense that is touch (ultrasense), the hand [the whole hand, not just tip of an extremely pointy fingernail (ongle extrêmement aigu)]

p. 154 hand, humanism, continuistic intuitionism, natural immediacy > so many celebrations of touching

——for de Biran, the hand is irreplaceable/dominant (teleological) and it’s pregnant w/ every kind of metonymy (pedagogical): best ontoteleological figure, best rhetorical figure

——“transcendentalism” always guided by such surreptitious exemplarism

pp. 155-56 touch as middle term > where interval of divisibility is indivisible, continuism

p. 161 “eidetic” figure of optical intuitionism always confirms/fulfills itself in an intuition tactually filled-in & in hyperbole of continuistic haptocenteredness

pp. 162-63 for Husserl, fingers that touch (not signal, not show) deem contact the experience of presence, which is full, immediate, direct (Nancy’s syncope interrupts)

p. 171 for Husserl, when I touch myself w/ my finger: no haptical mirror-effect, no insinuation of alterity

pp. 171-72 German mit translated as en même temps > temporal coincidence gives intuitive plenitude (immediacy of time can’t be thematized—only argued by paralipsis [?])

p. 172 Husserl: “originally” not used here in temporal-causal sense but refers to “a primal group of Objects constituted directly in intuition (direkt anschaulich)”

p. 185 connection btwn “self-touching” of “human body” [flesh] and body of Christian ontotheology, its eucharistic ecstasy par excellence [Nancy too?]

pp. 190-91 Derrida defends Husserl’s stubborn conviction that we can’t know alter-ego, only through analogy, appresentation, that there’s an unbridgeable abyss (abîme infranchissable) > Husserl’s stance prevents risk of an immediate intutionism of the other

p. 201 Heidegger: thesis that all cognition aims at intuition has temporal meaning that all cognition aims at making present

p. 204 no optical intutitionism w/out haptocentrism, where smooth is blind, deaf, impassive > feel & taste, touch a bit of everything

p. 209 for Merleau-Ponty, is vision the infrastructure of “thought”? > Merleau-Ponty: a unique touch that accompanies us through all experiences

p. 213 Merleau-Ponty’s virtual synthesis of presentiment: the spanning (enjambement) “by the total being of my body” &, at the same time, the interruptions that don’t allow for spanning

p. 215 [Derrida’s not going to close off Merleau-Ponty in spite of disappointment]

pp. 247-59 [see CHRISTIANITY for Jean-Louis Chrétian’s haptocentrism]

p. 254 immediacy of touch [its illusion] may be most widespread philosophical naiveté

pp. 256-57 the 3 universals of touch: 1) common to all living beings 2) whole body, flesh 3) covers whole field of the sensible

p. 257 [via Chrétian] for Aristotle, hand is “organ of organs,” can become anything because it is nothing, like the soul, touch w/out organs > this feeds into a thinking of Christian flesh

p. 259 for Aristotle, absolute touching of pure actuality: nous in immediate contact w/ noēton

p. 367n Pascal: true sacrifice must be spiritual—the flesh that doesn’t perish [circumcision of heart]

p. 293 to touch as tact, thanks to you, because of you, is to break (rompre) w/ immediacy wrongly associated w/ touch (in ontology, self-presence, transcendental idealism, body proper, etc.)

p. 308 Nancy: “muscle-bound thinking,” “sacred-heart thinking,” vitalo-spiritualist fascism believes one can touch the sense of “touch,” ideologies of the “body”—w/ secret horror of bodies

——Nancy: epopteia, sight accomplished, consummation of Mystery of Sense Certainty, phallic & cephalic

OG p. 40 (59-60) for Saussure & Husserl, teleology of phonetic writing makes the crisis of nonphonetic writing psychological errors, these nonintutionisms exile from sense; for Husserl, unlike Saussure, empty formalism part of his teleology > dialectical use of negativity should force us to rethink crisis (crisis not a mere accident)

SPEC p. 380 [vis-à-vis Freud] speculation not intuitive (intellectual impartiality) but idiomatic, referential

p. 381 scientific intuition requires minimum of speculation in language’s irreducible metaphoricity

HARD, UNBLINKING EYES

SPOM p. 125 spectacularizing speculation, theatricalization of speech, no shut-eye > so intent to watch the return (à guetter la retour) [on imaginary screen]

POR p. 5 (132) for Aristotle, human distinguished from animals who have hard, dry eyes (tōn sklerophtalmōn), who alway see

——Derrida wants to cultivate a New Enlightenment, but also insists University must not be a scleropthalmic animal [must go dark, blink]

p. 10 (139) principle of reason (Satz vom Grund) tells us to protect [dominant] relation of ob-ject before a subject that says “I”, and is assured of presence [skleropthalmic]

——Heidegger’s caricature of principle of reason: hard, unblinking eyes (dominating, raping)

p. 20 (154) time for reflection [on university?], invagination of internal pocket, the chance for this event, chance of an instant, Augenblick, a wink, a blink [a beat, no longer hard eyes, see that what makes see is letting oneself stop seeing]

HASD p. 47 Eckhart: “the intellects who know how to close their eyes” [Derrida?]

VP p. 50 Husserl: presence lived experientially im selben Augenblick; Derrida: present as self-presence is as indivisible as a blink of an eye

p. 56 as soon as we admit continuity btwn now and non-now, perception and non-perception, we admit the other into the Augenblick, there is duration to the blink of the eye, duration closes the eye

F p. 118n unbeliever of Wolf Man can always resort to rubbing his eyes [tieret]

DS p. 224 simple opposition btwn activity & passivity (btwn all -er/-ed concepts) becomes too formally weak to encompass graphics of hymen, its spider web, the play of its eyelids

p. 261 hymen, not truth of unveiling: no alētheia, only wink of hymen: rhythmic fall, regular (w)inclined cadence (une cadence inclinée)

——hymen, one of those “beneficent figures” engendered by “the opposition btwn the closed and the open”: i.e. the fan, the book, the dancer

***RGE p. 277 a text [Bataille’s] that traces, in silence, structure of the eye [illumination] > in contriving/weaving (tramer) “labsolu déchirement,” absolutely rends (déchire) its own tissue—once more “solid” and servile de se donner encore à lire

LI p. 52 associating non-present w/ restance adds spectacular blinking-effect to warning light: rhythm of blinking essential to mark

p. 54 blinking, quasi-concept of “remainder” (repetition as differance)

LG p. 230 trait (supplementary & distinctive), re-mark of belonging doesn’t belong, this sans > a blink of the eye, w/out which nothing would come to light

p. 231 genre-clause (clause de genre): clin doeil, écluse (floodgate), clôture qui sexclut de ce quelle inclut, déclasse ce quelle permet de classer > unfigurable figure of clusion, forme sans forme, neither sees day nor brings itself to light

OG pp. 235-36 (335) via Rousseau, one can more naturally shut one’s eyes (child at breast [?]) than close one’s ears > the demanding attention of speech

HAUNTOLOGY (hantologie)

GOD p. 156 literature as inheritance of promise of betrayal, w/ the forswearing [Kafka’s Letter to Father] that haunts this oath?

***R p. 91 “to” of “to-come” wavers btwn: imperative injunction (call or performative) and patient perhaps of messiancity (nonperformative exposure)

——the two haunt each other, are each other’s alibis, withdrawing into the secret of irony, of which democracy gives the right: to fiction and literature

H p. anne 152 a place of haunting has no ghosts, ghosts come where they are exclude, death haunts us by remaining unthought

FL p. 259 how is the thought of the name articulated with haunting and the logic of the specter

FK p. 82 auto-immunity haunts community: hyperbole of community’s own possibility

AF p. 86 haunting requires a home, a place, ghosts are sensitive to idioms, welcoming this one, allergic to that one > law of oikos, economy

SPOM p. 3 haunting is historical, but not dated on a calendar, it’s untimely (intempestive)

p. 10 question of the event as question of the ghost: first time (but also last time) & repetition, tout autre > hauntology, logic of haunting: more powerful than ontology, harbors eschatology/teleology as effects, mise en scène pour une fin de lhistoire

p. 20 a genius [Shakespeare] operates, it always resists and defies à linstar dune chose spectral, “the animated work becomes that thing, the Thing that, like an elusive specter, engineers [singénier] a habitation without proper inhabiting, call it a haunting, of both memory and translation,” “a masterpiece always moves…in the manner of a ghost”

p. 25 can we find a rule of cohabitation in a house always haunted rather than inhabited by the meaning of the original?

p. 168 madness, to become a ghost [?], atopic, haunt all places at once

p. 198 harder and harder to tell the difference between haunt and inhabit

***p. 202 introduce haunting into every construction of a concept, beginning w/ being and time; ontology opposes hauntology in a movement of exorcism, ontology is a conjuration

POOF pp. 138-39 when the concrete starts to resemble the ghost, inversion of signs, effect of haunting > is the ‘partisan’ Schmitt’s specter?

pp. 218-19 we can’t exclude fact that when someone speaks they strive not to be understood, diabolical figure of death drive > so can the accord of hyperbolic lovence be possible, hoping to be understood beyond all dialectics, haunting (failure) must leave an imprint on the body it seems to threaten, merging indissociably, it’s impossible not to aspire to this haunting [a necessity]: instant of decision remains heterogenous, undecidable, crucial experience of perhaps

A p. 20 paradox of aporia: multiple figures of aporia do not oppose figures to each other, “instead installs the haunting of the one in the other”

PAS PAS p. (52) the other pas haunts or parasitizes, a transgressive passivity, not activity nor labor

S p. 62 that a spirit is force and is not force, has and does not have force, is a relation to double, a relation to haunting; Entmachtung (destitution) is inevitable (fatale), since ghost of spirit is never perceived

p. 64 for Heidegger, there’s a resignation of spirit into intelligence (Intelligenz), understanding (Verständigkeit), calculation (Berechnung), mass distribution (massenhafte Verteilung); however, Heidegger, says Derrida, would not agree w/ Derrida’s structure of haunting—would be a resignation to calculating authority: Derrida does not agree w/ imaginary Heidegger

F p. xxiii desire of Wolf Man no longer even his own—lhôte de ses hôte (haunting of a host of ghosts)

p. xxxvi the reason a code is indispensable to a crypt is because the ghosts floating around it exchange signs

***FWT pp. 159, 230-31n revenant different from specter/ghost (latter have horizons, are visible, come into light); revenant—think event & haunting together, “almost” merges w/ trace itself

DS p. 202 [Mimique] haunted by ghost or grafted onto arborescence of another text

ROP p. 86 Evil Genius as haunting backdrop (le fond de hantise) (perpetual threat) of what lets Cogito appear > how can what comes after (Cogito) be the absolute beginning?

pp. 87-9 “perpetual threat” (Foucault’s term) as shadow of haunting, threatens logic of historical ages, neither present nor absent, positive nor negative, inside nor outside; “announcing” [in its futural spectrality] poses similar problems for the historian as haunting

ATIA p. 75 for Mallarmé, in Igitur, the account of cogito, specular “perception,” comes w/ a zoomorphic clan, a haunting by chimera, “monsters,” “spiders”

FS p. 5 [metaphor of structuralism]: a city no longer inhabited, reduced to its skeleton, haunted by meaning & culture > cette hantise is the mode (absent/present) of thing itself in pure language (housed in pure literature)

pp. 9-10 absence & haunting of divine sign (Jewish God) [cf. GOD], anguish of Hebraic ruah (pneuma), regulates modern books/criticism/aesthetics

CHM p. 54 silence as madness: irreducible role of haunting language, outside and against which alone language can emerge: “against” designating 1) content from which form takes off by force 2) adversary against which I assure/reassure myself by force [jealous friends of solitude]

REST p. 265 when shoes no longer have strict relation avec un sujet porteur ou porté—they’re the lightened, anonymous, voided support (but so much the heavier abandoned à son inertie opaque) “of an absent subject whose name haunts the open form”

p. 340 logic of detachment as cut (opposition, leads to suturing-sublation, maintains problematic of castration truth) vs. logic of detachment as stricture (is tout autre, interlacing of differance of [or as] stricture, no suture, haunting, neither empty nor full, largument-de-la-gaine, can’t accommodate the couple, ces coupes oppositionelles, the ghost leases, le, la, les double(s) band-)

p. 377 haunting which works (travaille) the unpaired (thus the pair) irreducible to all the mimetologism (I don’t say the mimesis)

pp. 378-39 certain thinking/experience of nothingness (nonexistent) is required to question being of existent, and the difference of being and existent

——for Heidegger, cette pensée du néant alien to science, which deals only w/ existents: belongs to philosophy/poetry > nonexistent, there w/out being there as being present, a kind of haunting: Unhemlichekeit is condition of question of being, pivot (cheville) of the essence (see OS)

DST DST p. 210 hantise (obsessive fear), the way in which philosophy is haunted, visited, inhabited by madness > there is a domesticity of “philosophical madness”

p. 219 haunted by mimesis: loop or supplementary torsion, the ring both one more and one less in epochal chain, dissimulates itself [disorganizes/interrupts Heideggerian deconstruction?]

PIO p. 32 the 2nd notion of invention [dispositif] haunts & thus magnetizes the 1st [unveil what’s there] > this haunting at heart of question re: modern tekhnē

TR p. 159 event supposes surprise/contingency, thus exteriority or irreducibility to desire, exappropriation as work of inappropriable in desire > unless nondesire haunts every desire, abyssal attraction btwn the 2 (not simply exclusion, exteriority, opposition)

EL pp. 213-14 for Scholem, Sprache ist Namen, being of language resides in name, not in substantive but nominal, in power of naming (verbs were once names) > Derrida (via an internal reading) adds: must be a spectral haunting, there is a specter because there’s language, language can haunt because names haunt (neither present/absent) our sentences, language summons (convoque)—category of spectral revenant (not a flower of rhetoric) figures a beyond oppositional ontologic or dialectic of presence/absence

HST p. 360 the unlivable contradiction of extending (du tendre) and waiting (de lattendre); hantise (figure of visitation w/out invitation), au bord de la mort: it is to death that hospitality destines itself

p. 364 if every concept shelters or lets itself be haunted by another concept (one that’s no longer its other), no concept remains in place

C p. 217 paradigm as revenge: le mort se venge, “model” is always le revenant rêvé: haunting does not befall it, but takes the first step (la hantise ne lui survient pas, elle donne le premier pas)

p. 220 out-of-series: inhabits w/out residing, haunts, apparition of visitor is innumerable (throws arithmosophists off the trail) [re: 127 coffins]

pp. 244-45 how can we delimit all the features (traits) [of artwork] when the absent one haunts, obsesses, besieges (assiège) [plus quun autre] > avec égale sans (trait dunion: with-out [in English])

——la hantise fait la loi

LI p. 82 la hantise of the graft, herein no different from the parasite > never simply alien to and separable from the body it already haunts

TN p. 6 how to touch untouchable? > la hantise of thought of touch—ou la pensée comme hantise du toucher

p. 60 Nancy’s virtuosity w/ word touch (master of language) > or is this simply a symptom of a haunting obsession, a dread, w/in language itself?

p. 67 untouchable before vow of abstinence [cf. OG p. 109 spacing prior to prohibition of names]? a vow of abstinence requires promise of touch > touch haunting abstinence itself, intensifying transgression: unforgivable perjury at heart of interdict

——touching remains limitrophe > an inhibition constitutes its appetite: it eats w/out eating what it comes to cultivate, elevate, educate, dresser (train), trephein

p. 180 there would be auto-affection “effects,” but their analysis can’t escape hetero-affection that makes them possible, keeps haunting them

——constitution of body proper would thus assume passage outside through “technē of bodies,” spacing, death, nonliving, other, mourning > everything the “solipsistic” tries to keep out (maintenir au-dehors)

pp. 179-80 intruder on inside, constitutively haunted by some hetero-affection related to spacing, a host, a parasite, pharmakon, ghost: [each of these figures] habite en revenant tout for intérieur (inhabit one’s heart of hearts as a ghost)

p. 301 “facts of the day” [i.e. computer, cybersex], artefactual haunts and works through technics & desire (and work in general)—same labor, same pleasure, same torture, tripalium

BSi pp. 17-8 sovereign/beast outside law > beast: violation of law, also Benjamin’s grand criminal, reveals state doesn’t monopolize violence; sovereign: guarantor of law, heterogenous to law > haunting, uncanny fascination: beast/sovereign face

OG pp. 43-4 (64) Saussure opens field of grammatology when he’s not talking about writing: so that what was chased off, proscribed to outside, never ceased to haunt language

EU p. 62 double bind that knots around sublime body of “teacher of philosophizing” [i.e. philosophy eludes teaching, philosophizing requires it]: teacher haunts the scene, doesn’t dominate, or dominates like a ghost > one might say he fascinates/seduces if these connotations weren’t too closely tied to imagination/sensibility: for reason should break the charm [of sensibility?]

SPEC p. 293 PP always revient to itself, haunted by tout autre, retour never “acquits” speculation of PP

HEAR(ING) [see EAR]

HERP p. 164 Heidegger: unlike gods & poets, mortals hear like those who can’t hear (als nicht-hören-können), their understanding, das Überhören, the will-not-to-hear (Überhörenwollen)

p. 165 each Dasein carries w/in it a voice [friend] it hears

pp. 184-85 the deaf are unwilling to hear, the other ear over-hears the unheard through deafness > Hören and belonging (Gehören) [to logos]

p. 185 Heidegger’s 3 experiences of hearing: 1) immortal, Erhören (hear, answer a prayer) 2) deaf ear (Überhören) of mortals 3) poet hears the ist, before or at origin of philosophy

pp. 187-88 hearing: a gather, a self-recollection (Sichsammeln) toward the word (parole)

p. 188 “we do not hear because we have ears, we have ears because we hear” > for Heidegger, to hear we must forget the ears, to hear (hören) it’s necessary to listen, to hearken (horchen)

——mishearing, essential possibility for Heidegger [error in Aristotle]

p. 189 our organ of hearing is a necessary condition but not sufficient

p. 210 acc. Heidegger, originary strife projects what is not yet heard

p. 212 acc. Heidegger, when conflict stops, when one doesn’t hear the unheard, being is no longer kept, becomes an object, a spectacle, in the quelled visibility of objects facing us

——seeing a decay like that which occurs to hearing, suffers when polemos is quelled, sight degenerates into optics > creators (poets, thinkers, statesmen) are no longer tolerated [Nietzsche]

p. 213 Heidegger calls the fact of not hearing (überhören) the poet that announces future being of a people: a sacrifice [but they must be sacrificed, excluded, stranger to what they found?]

PPHS pp. 92-3 acc. Hegel, hearing more ideal than sight, double negation, i.e. sound (Ton)> inner vibration (inneren Erzitterns) of body, breath [trembling (of sound) prioritized by Hegel?]

HEART

GOD pp. 96-98 Matthew’s “to be learned by heart,” what is the heart, should it return to its correct place?: lemplacement juste du coeur, cest le lieu du meilleur placement

heart’s where you save real treasure, a capital beyond the terrestrial, the visible, an incorruptible capital, most secure, infinite profit

p. 99 if you are not pure of heart, if your justice does not exceed the men of letters, you wont receive your wages (mercedem), your salary, your great reward

pp. 99-100 heart as light, photology, because it is spiritual, not earthly, it cannot hide, cannot be encrypted, an omnipresence more radical & effective than a spy satellite

p. 109 onward march, merchandising of the infinite, hyperbole of this market (in the visibility of the invisible heart)

R p. 4 Derrida speaking from the bottom of his heart: the excessive gift goes straight to his heart, to what he holds dear, to what holds him to life > any words of welcome (hospitality) too modest

MONL p. 54 insidious Christian contamination: the respectful belief in inwardness, the preference for intention, the heart, the mind, mistrust of action given to the mechanicity of the body, against Pharisaism

FK pp. 48-9 figures of radical evil not simply figures; the whole evil: always inventing a new evil

——Kant: “radical perversion of human heart”

FL p. 283 Benjamin: culture of the heart (die Kultur des Herzens) gives men pure means with accord (Übereinkunft) in view [Derrida: stop at opposition btwn public/private to preserve non-violence?]

p. 287 heart of courage in Benjamin, expose oneself to all risks, beyond certainty and good conscience

***LOBL p. 117 I slice barbarously, illegitimately, as we always do, counting on implicit contract, impossible contract, that you’ve read “everything,” that you know the whole corpus by heart at every moment, w/ living heart that beats unceasingly (sans arrêt), w/out pulsation

***p. ~154 absolute crypt [heart] is unreadability—yet calls for infinite finite analysis, infinite-finite reada-translata-bility

p. 156 for intérieur (“conscience,” “inner tribunal,” “heart of hearts”) , crypt

p.159 Blanchot: “in the very heart of which lives the infinite”

pp. 162-63 crypt, heart, hymen (chambers of desire)

H p. 117 “no fixed address” of death, no phenomenal exteriority, interiority of the heart, nocturnal secret (a suffering both intimate & infinite)

p. anne 136 deconstruction leads to uncanny at heart of the most familiar, where “all we had seen was fire”

AF p. 79 if repetition is in the heart of future to-come, so is total annihilation of death drive

HERP p. 172 Heidegger mentions positively tradition of Scheler which goes back to Augustine [St. Anselm?] & Pascal: we access truth/knowledge on basis of love/charity—not vice versa

p. 186 for Heidegger, ear is poetic (dichtende), hears in advance what it causes to burst forth, elle donne elle-même à entendre ce quelle entend [a heart?]

MPM pp. 92-3 Heidegger rethinks “thought (Gedanke)” w/ Gedanc, bottom of the heart, gathering together of all that concerns us, more original than Pascal’s thinking of heart?

pp. 110-11 Heidegger: Gedanc [see pp. 140-141], heart, innermost essence of man, reaches outermost limits, the representation of interior/exterior does not arise

A p. 62 analysis of death, always close to the heart for Heidegger

PP p. 72 problem of writing linked to problem of “knowing by heart” [speech] > need pharmakon, biblia, if one has not learned speech by heart

p. 73 pharmakon is but a formula learned by heart, dead, rigid knowledge shut up (enfermé) in biblia, foreign to living knowledge and dialectic

p. 81 “father of logos” a hearth which is the heart of all metaphoricity, not a simple metaphor

PAS PAS p. (45) Blanchot: “come, and return to us what fittingly comes with (convenance) what disappears, the movement of the heart”

p. (78) Blanchot: “more secret and more interior than speech of the innermost heart” > “the secret is w/out depth (sans profondeur)”

POOF p. 29 dangerous perhaps > open heart [not programmed]

pp. 50-1 Nietzsche’s hospitality for mad arrivants, fool already on premises, a guest who would have preceded his host, sheer madness of inverting friend/enemy > requests only that they open the doors of their hearts to him

pp. 68-9 a passive decision, responsibility outside of knowledge, outside of subjective decisionism, occurs from the heartbeat of the other (blood arriving), which makes an exception for/of me > opens autonomy on to itself, matches decision to the gift, figure of the heartbeat: [passive decision doesn’t contradict sovereign decision, sovereign becomes guest, other?] [Derrida beyond Levinas] exception for/of me, by not contradicting sovereign decision, maintains responsibility; passive decision affirms sovereign decision but as a guest, an other

pp. 78-9 one might insist the world can’t wait for bibliophilic decision, “esoteric rarity,” and yet event is always absolutely urgent, cutting, conclusive, heartrending (déchirante)

FSW p. 217 fundamental property of writing is spacing: diastem (interval, interruption) & time becoming space, unfolding (not linear time) [see Nancy’s Corpus on diastole]

SH p. 6 Celan’s “becoming heart” compared to Pascal, Heidegger

p. 33 open-hearted, Im Herzmund (in heart’s mouth)

p. 59 circumcising the heart even before St. Paul

pp. 65-6 circumcision: decision of the word—inscribed in the body—just in the heart (precisely)

p. 66 circumcision inscribes Nothing in the heart (flesh, living word), to the point of bleeding

FWT pp. 89-90 Derrida is for abolition of DP, for reasons of principle [via Kant] / reasons of heart (stripped of sentimentality, allied w/ “reasons of principle”)

WM pp. 268-69 the East is where the sensible sun rises, the sun sets, is interiorized, in heart (eye) of the West

ATIA p. 1 naked words, words from the heart, starting from Genesis

PS p. 186 acc. Artaud, membering is dismembering; structure always structure of expropriation; “every organ is a parasite” of the body, the body has no need of organs; Heart: “dirtiest means that any being could have invented to pump life inside me” > Artaud as fearful of articulated body as articulated language

SW p. 316 “for they shall make a sanctuary, I shall dwell in their bosom” > veil, curtain, drape is dwelling of God, his ethos, this Who (that dwells) is also a What, a 3rd party, the Law, text of law

p. 344 St. Paul thought he knew the literality of the letter, thought he was distinguishing for the first time, & he prided himself on it, wrongly, the circumcision of the heart (breath, spirit) from that of the flesh (body, “acc. the letter”)

DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

——w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

p. 201n for Hugo, Christ’s law (blood of Christ, good blood) often confused w/ natural law—Christ’s heart will transform written, positive law > it’ll be spiritualized by gentle law of Christ

***p. 255-56 “my life” passes by way of the heart of the other, can only prefer living to dead, living present, where it “receives its life from the heart of the other” > “my life” depends on (tient au) the heart of the other

p. 257 protest in the name of my heart when I fight (en me battant), so that heart of the other will continue to beat (battre)—in me, before me, after me, w/out me: invested by responsibility

PF p. xxxiii passivity of resistance resists thought because it does the most, the impossible as heart of possible, makes the most happen

TR p. 87 the work that operates by itself, in quasi-machine like fashion: secret affinity btwn grace & machine, heart & automatism of marionette; re: Rousseau, excusing machine, writing machine

——machine kills time & redeems fault > grace will operate “sooner or later” by the work of the work at work (in machinelike fashion)

PJP p. 179 the suspension of metonymy, quotation, interruption, quasi anacoluthic change of subject > interruption in the obvious: shadow at heart of light

D p. 293 Soller: beating envelope, I was on its border

HST p. 388 due to congenital perjury of justice, one must ask forgiveness for infidelity at heart of fidelity—suffice to say “at the heart”

——this tragedy, which discords the heart in its very accord, calls for forgiveness: original sin before original sin—prayer of mercy (miséricorde) rises

C pp. 239-40 date as place of crypt, stands in for it, only one that remains; why do I date? throw of a die: no one will know what was lived on the date (what was taken away), save (fors) the heart

TN p. 35 isn’t the heart memory? isn’t it thinking of/as memory? ego touches its heart? we’ll guard the cardiogram of this cardio-logy > ghostly revenant at heart of (self-)feeling

p. 58 unlike Nancy, Derrida endlessly thinks about death w/out having had a change of hearts [socratic irony? also literal reference to Nancy’s surgery]

pp. 60-3 Nancy’s 4 metaphorical displacements of touch: 1) not to “touch” 2) finishing “touch” of pure Idea 3) anesthesia/euthanasia “as soon as it is touched…” 4) longing for touch

——Nancy’s thought of touch as flailing, weighing, scales or scourge of God (all senses of French fléau), exapropriation of most proper, autoimmune desire of proper, expulsion: eating one’s heart out > “saisie dessaisie ou dessaisissante (a seizing put-upon or at grips with one’s grasp)”

——unleavened bread—throbbing, bloody heart

p. 326n Nancy’s festering immundity, what is expulsed, the abjected/ejected of (auto-)immune—isn’t law of autoimmunity what commands all Christian thinking of “flesh”?

——risk finding that a deconstructed heart is a Christian one

p. 70 syncope of heartbeat gives rhythm to pulse or haptical compulsion: the cum of con-tact, a link where disconnection remains at work

p. 100 Jesus in pity (misertus/splagchnistheis)—he was moved, touched, his bleeding heart moves him to touch

pp. 336-37n pregnancy, only a woman can feel the heart of another in her; [Derrida to Nancy before surgery] “Don’t worry, I’ll wake up w/ you,” friend who keeps heart of other, this incredible survival > “heart” joins w/ thinking, w/ grace of gratitude, w/ love of friendship

p. 177 Husserl analyzes solipsism w/ figure of manual touching and Herzgefühl, “heart sensation”

——but could I feel my heart w/out technē or grammar (grammar, like rhetoric, a form of technē)?

pp. 177-78 Husserl struggles to describe the self-touch of the heart, w/out appealing to double apprehension of hand > heart sensation beneath the surface when you push on your chest [?]

p. 195 Nancy, partage—parting, sharing, spacing, syncope, irreducible partition, gives “it” a chance menacée, heartbeat’s the other’s beat (le même battementde lautre, du coeur de lautre)

——syncope is this partage of spacing

p. 245 Chrétian dissymmetrizes reflexivity of touching, places other exceeding the “I” at the carnal heart (coeur charnal) of ego [no thought more forceful in linking “flesh” to Christianity]

p. 282 heart: condition of desire, the effraction of the other, of what can’t return to self

——diastole, absolute generosity, generosity more generous than generosity itself, orients us toward epekeina tēs ousisas, Plotinus’ One

p. 283 the heart of this other heart cannot be touched, does not touch itself, it self touches you; it is the heart insofar as mappartient à toi

for there to be a good heart: possibility of bad heart must remain forever open, i.e. tout autre > good heart must be ready for the other, for treachery, for perjury (inevitable-impossible vow of abstinence, tactile’s fate); is this how we can translate Kant’s “evil heart”?

p. 284 this other heart that self touches you, gives pleasure where pleasure’s made more intense by not returning to me, diastole w/out systole > the ecstatic & haptical sans of “sans revenir à soi

——you beat the heart, you interrupt circulation

p. 289 diastole w/out systole, interruption risks death at every moment, other heart se touche toi only to be exposed to death: toi es (t) aussi ma mort [at heart of a finite thinking]

p. 290 “heart”: ultimate place of mourning, sanctuary of what one keeps when one can’t keep anything, name of what infinitely exceeds the inside

——my heart is first of all the other’s, greater than my heart in my heart

——[quasi-bibliography of Nancy on heart]

——you, metronome of my heteronomy, you resist my dreams of a reappropriating movement of self-presence, self-consciousness, absolute knowledge, which is why I love you, so painfully, at heart of pleasure itself

p. 305 the selfsame (même) heart exappropriates instant touched by other, no possible reappropriation (absolute mourning)

——apparently, women respond better to heart grafts [?]

BSi pp. 261-62 unheimlich: 1) worrying aspect of foreignness as intimacy of one’s own home 2) says the essential bearing of Celan’s “Meridian” 3) associated w/ the foreigner 4) Geheimnis (the intimate, the folded back on itself, what has withdrawn in withdrawal, hidden inside of house and home), secret of encounter at most intimate heart of present

OG pp. 173-74 (247-48) Rousseau contra Hobbes: pity/compassion is a natural law (beasts have it too), mother’s law, law of the (soft) voice, pity “takes the place of” instituted law, supplements law [though it works the other way around too]; mother’s law, written in our hearts by God > natural writing, writing of heart—not reason, before reason: writing (of reason) is w/out pity, transgresses law of voice, a perverse passion

pp. 204, 344n (292, 292n) teach by example or explanation? but will the child do it by heart or memory? is there virtue in imitating virtue? [Kant, Rousseau]

p. 211 for Rousseau, the rational privileging of harmonics over melody is a fault of the heart not reason [i.e. the heart moves toward reason]

p. 240 (341-42) the violent penetration of speech, passivity, reception obliged, interiorization, “sentendre-parler”—passion: Rousseau suspects speech’s violence, the complicity of voice & heart

——dérobement of thing in speech > conceals what vision places before us: 1) interiorize thing in depth of heart 2) speech installs a fiction, a lie, we touch the simulacrum more than truth

pp. 249-50 (354) via Rousseau, heart as organ of pure presence is not an organ, not inscribed w/in system of differences

HEGEL

O pp. 11-2 for Hegel, necessity of preface belongs to Bildung, external necessity of concept’s self-presentation, must take time into account as the existence (Dasein) of concept [legibility]

p. 13n Hegel: “Bildung (culture) must leave room for the earnestness of life in its concrete richness; this leads the way to experience of the thing itself”

WAP p. 117 “wrong of you to overlook Hegel’s sense of humor”

pp. 203-04n necessary to think of “Philosophies of Right,” given Hegel’s constant reformulating ——in Gymnasium: teach philosophical content first, not how to philosophize

p. 119 Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, not simply a theory of modern State but a determination of the State he was foundering in

p. 126 Hegelian manipulation [re: image of young Hegel] of répresentation always takes place inside bag full of negativities (more than one trick is hidden)

——[young?] Hegel feels calm (apaisement) before awful carnage of Antigone

p. 128 as always, Hegel raises (aiguise) the contradiction btwn the rationality of civil society and the overdetermined State to a catastrophic level, to achieve best resolution (apaisement) [in the name of pedagogy?]

p. 129 [Hegel’s pension not a secondary concern to history of philosophy]

p. 130 Hegel “took out insurance” on his Heirs (on the State, on the University)

p. 131 Hegel’s complex strategy for a post-Hegelian era (did he think of anything else?)

——childhood as pure memory, not yet speculation; young Hegel, very gifted, an example (pour example), the essence of a possibility, not exemplary (en example): all children should be able like young Hegel to play role, figure, of moment in pedagogy of the mind

p. 132 the “pas-encore du déjà” of young Hegel, a stage of understanding before speculation, thus forbidding what Hegel seems to be promoting: teaching philosophy in the Gymnasium

pp. 137-38 birth of state-controlled education around time of Hegel [?] > no philosophy prior to “age of Hegel” treated State education with such irreducible historical specificity

***——to neglect Hegel’s functional letter (“Report”) [as parergonal] a failure to move beyond prestatist problematics of education > a refusal to identify borders, exterior, a refusal to transform and transgress

pp. 138-39 Hegel’s pedagogical-philosophical propositions are in keeping w/ his system: which can fold and turn in on itself > often w/out breaking

——Engels: the internal necessities, conservatism, of Hegel’s system stifles the revolutionary side > but Derrida questions opposition of “method” and “system,” inner/outer, practice/theory

p. 139 even Marx & Engels thought it was reductive to say Hegel was a State philosopher

p. 141 Hegel’s pedagogy: privileging the memorization of content over form and wrest religious instruction from religion > bring it into speculative thought

——Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche all against utilitarian pedagogy

pp. 141-42 Hegel’s pedagogy aligns w/ or makes legible his theories of State in Principles of the Philosophy of Right

Hegel deems Protestantism “superior, more rational agent of reflection,” “general intelligence,” “general culture,” “our universities and our schools are our churches”

p. 142 Hegel: the contents of philosophy are the same as religion [form is different]

***p. 146 Hegel’s presupposition of the Idea is linked to entire onto-encyclopedia, and thereby entire Universitas, which cannot be dissociated from the system

p. 147 acc. Hegel, Jew is kindisch (childish), not kindlich (childlike) like Christian, because docile, submissive to heteronomy of their God [shows profound homology btwn Hegel’s pedagogical theory and entire philosophical teleology]

pp. 147-48 Derrida now wonders whether Hegel’s philosophy itself demands that no texts [i.e. his “Report”] be minor [preface? not even a text?] > passage from minor to major is tautological, reproduces heterotautology of speculative proposition

——Hegel’s system an immense school: auto-encylopedia of absolute spirit in absolute knowledge > never leave this school, mandatory instruction

——Universitas: onto-, auto-encyclopedic circle of the State

p. 154 Hegel on teaching Kant’s antinomies

pp. 156-57 acc. Hegel, when kids are younger they’re less inclined to care if a subject doesn’t fit their emotional interests or conform to their Vorstellungen

OG p. 25 Hegel: learn to read and write as a means to infinite culture

HEIGHT

GOD p. 63 single individual height over universal.

OOG pp. 115-16 three heights of historicity in Husserl: 1) general sense, essence of human existence moves in spiritual space of culture or tradition 2) European culture, theoretical project, philosophy 3) “conversion of philosophy into phenomenology”

p. 143 for Husserl, subjectivity “normed” in the Present, “fastened” to a “higher subjectivity,” higher sense investigation

R p. 84 event (im-possible) announces itself in the form of an injunction (comes from on high)

MC p. 349 the alterity of the other is the very high

p. 352 via Lucretius, infinite does not have height

SPOM p. xx Kant placed his unconditional dignity (Würdigkeit) higher than any economy

p. 140 the great specter of classical tradition (Rome) is convoked (positive conjuration) to allow one to rise to height of historic tragedy

POO p. 15 a higher responsibility, a more intractable (intraitable) moral exigency, uneven as it may be, [Nietzsche’s Aussermoralischen Sinn]; p. 133n “pure morality” go beyond duty, beyond duty as debt, duty w/out debt, a silent break w/culture and language

POOF p. 14 Aristotle’s primary friendship: the highest rank (stable, requires act of faith)

pp. 19-21 via Aristotle, one must choose & prefer friends (election & selection), it takes time > for Aristotle, those who don’t have friends count friends among things (prágmata), possessions, the malevolent place friends in field of calculable hypothesis > yet, the choice of friends, that their # must be small, reintroduces #, calculation, into multiplicity of incalculable singularities: a certain aristocracy in arithmetic of the choice

pp. 63-4 Derrida reads Nietzsche [re: GS 61] as advocating acceptance of gift & dependency, elevating logic of gift above self-sufficiency of a subject [Greek philosopher who refuses King’s donation], a logic that reorients friendship, calling friendship back to irreducibility of other—but perhaps this installs an irresponsible freedom, madness (friend–enemy), the worst?

p. 71 Nietzsche envisions 2 people craving a new desire & lust for possession, a shared higher thirst for an ideal above them: that would be named friendship

pp. 268-69n Derrida advises spouses who love each other to read Michelet’s Le Peuple [?] in bed at night: husband hesitating to betray justice, wife urging him to save the enemy, sacrifice for her, make her feel young again > Michelet: “woman is always higher or lower than justice”

p. 271 fraternal friendship & ascension, height: Kant’s stellar sublimity of moral law, Nietzsche’s star friendship

p. 281 Nietzsche’s hermit too attracted to the depths, nostalgic for elevation—dreams of a friend to gain altitude > friend’s nostalgia: wish to believe in other, wishing in vain to believe in ourselves > Derrida links this nostalgia to the Heideggerian nostalgia at origin of philosophical philía: elle nourrit [fires?] donc lenvie à légard de lautre comme de nous-mêmes, we envy each other, love as the attempt to leap beyond this envy

p. 288 Nietzsche: higher still than love of man is love of causes and of specters (Sachen und Gespenstern)

BL pp. 193-94 the height of the human, 2 legs, is what creates repression; turning away is an upward movement, purification, turns away from that which stinks: the history of the law

p. 207 height & law

HASD p. 46 height & proximity are topological

p. 57 for Heidegger, gathering of Geviert takes place in an indivisible topos, simplicity of point [of sword]: “the place (Ort) gathers toward itself at the greatest height and extremity”

p. 68n Eckhart’s “new adjunct writings” [highest adjunct, adjunct to God]

EM p. 130 (156) Heidegger: humanism does not realize the proper dignity of man, does not set humanitas high enough

p. 136 (163-64) is Nietzsche the last metaphysician as Heidegger reads him? or is Heidegger the last sleeping shudder (le dernier sursaut ensommeillé) of the higher man?

***VM p. 93 no matter how high, height is always accessible, most high is higher than height, does not belong to space, to this world

p. 101 face is most high because it is origin of space [Feuerbach on height, substance, face]

[engenders set outside of set]

p. 314n acc. Levinas, reciprocity of Buber’s I-thou does violence to height

PAS PAS p. (41) Blanchot: “at the highest point of contradiction, I was this illegitimate dead person”

pp. (107-08) Blanchot: solemn and noble procession toward what goal? and then forgetfulness came

S p. 37 [re: Heidegger’s Rectorship Address] le profond et laltier (haughty) allied in most high: highest of what guides the spiritual guides of die hohe Schule and depths of forces of earth and blood

p. 77 Schelling: spirit is breath of love, but love is the Most High [i.e. higher than spirit]

PPHS p. 83 the sign, “the height conserving in its depths the hegemony of the soul,” is the pyramid [later, Derrida will live through this tomb not, like Hegel, by negating it]

FWT p. 52 event falls upon me vertically from so high (not most high)—does not come upon me horizontally, also event surprises from behind, or I never see it, I feel or hear it/him (barely)

DS pp. 177-78 title—capital: carries its head too high, raises its voice, drowns out ensuing text

P pp. 114-15 Kant: moral pleases universally & positively, “morally good in the idea of highest finality—benevolence, purity, strength, equanimity”

pp. 122-23 sublime (Erhaben), superelevation (what in Glas is called the élève), absolutely high, not measurable in height

pp. 135-36 acc. Kant, sublime is absolutely large, w/out dimension, an unequal equal only to itself > why is there still reference to a cise in space? if absolutely large why not absolutely small? Kant’s preference of largeness is tautological: more is more (preference itself thinks more)

p. 137 why is quantum” for sublime, which is unmeasurable, always considered large? this logic must be similar to St. Anselm’s

p. 144 double trait of cise, limits and unlimits at the same time, divided line upon which colossus comes to cise itself—and incises itself w/out cise > the sublime

——Kant calls this “subjective,” this psychic ideality, “not in nature,” the psyche as kolossos, superelevated, beyond height

SP p. 47 Nietzsche: we wanderers see our heights as places of safety

p. 91 Nietzsche: in Sermon on the Mount, things not looked at from a height

ATIA p. 63 Derrida will produce a key not to free animals, but to rethink their proper, will offer high notes to change the stave (portée) (also a flat, to tone it down, change the tune)

p. 92 for Kant, the power to have the “I” is the erection of man, infinitely above: the subject

FS p. 18 Derrida shows how structuralism can rely on dimension of height, where values mount scalewise & Good is most high, to think quality (inner intensity) w/ out giving up on structure

DIF DIF p. 24 forgetting of ontological difference: disappearance of trace of trace > Heidegger: even the early trace (die frühe Spur) is obliterated when presence is in the position of the highest

DPi p. 33 [in Genet] Christlike ascension/elevation after the gallows, quasi-ressurection

p. 124(n) from Kant to Blanchot > no law w/out DP, homo noumenon above homo phaenomenon > one must raise oneself by means of law above life & inscribe from this height DP in law

pp. 221-22 DP speaks in 3rd person present (can’t say: “I am no more”), copula signifies instantaneous passage from being to nothingness (“he is no more”): stigmē, Most High, Last Judgment, God’s verdict (always instant of death of a 3rd party, never me, you, us)

***Gi p. 8 will not be a question of heights, thinking difference not up to it [in contrast to Nietzsche?]

——for Heidegger, sexual difference did not rise to height of ontological difference? > ontic predicate

p. 24 Heidegger, by going back “further,” higher > avoids religion, ethical, even dialectical schemas

***REST p. 264 point does not bring foot in contact w/ a surface, doesn’t spread out on a surface (the soles, the ground)—surface is lower than the foot, goes lowest (Derrida’s never examined this)

pp. 267-68 Derrida on Freud’s shoe fetish: shoe replaces that which is lacking not because of its form but because of its directional situation > syntax of a movement upwards from the very-low, most-low

***p. 338 the other one [the other lowness], always the supplement of lowness (le bas) [re: political insults in Heidegger/Shapiro’s correspondence]

pp. 370-71 lowly shoes levitate, il élève jusquà la figure, transfigured shoes (haloes of themselves) look up toward most high: the Face [by way of restitution]

D p. 365 invisible column—undecidable, unmasterable in its height, uncontrollable in extension > unique & innumerable like what is called (the) present

HST p. 386 complacent height: nothing more haughty (hautain) than “I forgive you”

——must welcome the infinite (for Levinas, that’s 1st hospitality), forgive beyond me, what is not mine to forgive [forgiving in my name but only in the name of the other]: must think substitution from limit-experiences (decision, gift, forgiveness), from possible-impossible, the impossible of the possible

p. 388 substitution of hostage as un être-sous, être-dessous, not the beneath of subjectum, substantia, hypokeimenon but submitted (soumis), assujetti, to the height of the Most High (law above)

p. 389 love, mystical love, gives itself w/out giving anything but itself > abandons itself while asking forgiveness at the height of the other

+R p. 163 into (over) the bargain (the market) (par-dessus le marché), not au-dessus (above) the market (the lure in which you would again let yourself be caught) > puts in play, or en abyme, the destructive simulacra of surplus value

C p. 194 w/out-example ejects the paradigm > still exhibits it in some way: raises it up (surélève) on rostrum of its catafalque, ex cathedra (in the pulpit it stays silent)

TN p. 19 knowledge of soul, acc. Aristotle, of the highest rank

p. 105 for Nancy, sublime: imagination feeling its powerlessness as it touches the limit (limit conceived as height, absolute height)

AD pp. 54-6 aphoristic energy of déliasion in Levinas’ ethical affirmation: from subordination (no interiorization), to welcome of Most High (host), to unicity of possibility of substitution (hostage)

p. 85 Levinas gives teaching magisterial height: teaching what “to welcome,” “to receive”

CIN pp. 4-5 [on the structure of the text CIN, tension btwn writing and speech] “vibration of grammar in the voice” destined for the eye, or the interior voice, absolutely low voice

BSi p. 207 sovereign, highest, most eminent capital or capitalization, monopolizes force/violence—Gewalt—gives reason in advance to force through right

pp. 212, 215 erected marionettes, Sovereign in its Majesty, Most High—not merely a trope, [it’s sublimity is even practical]: surveillance (economic/military) strategy

——“excellently eminent and excellently phallic erection of sovereign highness”

p. 245 snake, beast, low; albatross, sovereign, high

p. 256 17th century sovereign referred to as “Your Altitude”

pp. 256-59 Nietzsche’s superman, and the sovereign too, a hyperbolic, sublime, “higher than height,” more about excess than height, it’s the more than that counts, the surplus, absolutely more: could as well be a maximum of smallness, God as small (sovereign use of nanotechnology)

ATAP p. 94 “Come” doesn’t try to lead, can always be appropriated: “I am in the act of seducing you” can always increase seduction > “Come” can always lead back higher than itself toward conductive violence, toward authoritarian “duction”

CIR p. 63 “I am for an aristocracy w/out distinction, therefore w/out vulgarity, for a democracy of the compulsion to the highest price, you have to pay the price to read the price displayed”

EU p. 103 for Kant, the “higher” faculties are Theology, Law, Medicine (because closer to government power) > philosophy is lower, though his ideal enacts a reversal

pp. 212-13 ontological-encyclopedic hegemony/structure, univerticality, tends to immobilize all recognized borders > all-powerful & powerless (destiny of philosophy subjected to State power)

——CIPH will outline different topology: horizontal, transversal, heterogenous > experiment

p. 223 [re: CIPH] against pyramidal hierarchy [height?], for horizontality

FV pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

p. 483tn one reason, male libido, altus, at the bottom of things—highest truth

HEIDEGGER

KH p. 93 [re: inevitable anachronism, teleological retrospection, of translating khōra] Heidegger falls prey in spite of himself [see p. 147n Heidegger: Platonic philosophy prepared move from khōra and Ort (place, topos) to “space (Raum)” defined by extension (Ausdehnung)]

GOD p. 53 Heidegger doesn’t refer to infinite love to discuss primary guilt (Schuldigsein)

p. 92 Unheimlichkeit of Geheimnis, both Freud & Heidegger: beyond an axiomatic of the self or the chez soi as ego cogito

p. 94 being-towards-death, apprehension of gift of death (death as offering), “sacrifice”

GT pp. 9-10 relation of gift to “present,” essential knot in interlace of this discourse [GT], in knot of Geflecht of which Heidegger says the circle is perhaps only one figure/particular case

p. 14 temporalization of time (memory, present, anticipation, pro, re-tention, imminence of future, “ecstases”) destroys the gift via keeping (la garde), restitution, comprehending in advance

p. 19 for Heidegger, importance of rethinking time, privileged horizon for reelaboration of Being

p. 20 “it gives (ça donne),” not an utterance in propositional structure of Greek-Latin grammar

p. 80 language as a given for Heidegger is already the dialect (Mundart), idiom is the mother of the tongue

pp. 159-60n Heidegger on gift, Heidegger discovers an etymology of khreon that links it to hand, to reaching for, also links it to logos > Derrida wonders about credit cards, coded signatures

——also to khreon as presencing of what is present (das Anwesen des Anwesenden) (Quote fn. 161)

R p. 13 Derrida loves the image of the wheel (potter) [Heidegger’s Das Ding?]

p. 113 Brauch (use/practice) of capacity, VermogenDer Spiegel interview

p. 114 salut: retten, heilen, grüssen…btwn salvation and salute to the other

MONL p. 68 Derrida sounds very Heideggerian [?]: appeal to come (appel à venir) gathers language together…

p. 69 Heidegger says [?], “there is language that does not exist,” i.e. there is no metalanguage

OOG p. 69n Heidegger’s etymologies determine rather than follow (Husserl) orientation of investigation

p. 151 Derrida asks: why would there be any history instead of nothing?

FK pp. 51, 54 Heidegger’s rehearsal of and hollowing out of Christian motifs: Schuldigsein, Bezeugung, Gewissen

p. 54n Heidegger on Hölderlin: sacred of poetic only opens time of apparition of the gods, is divine, does not dream a god

p. 74n Heidegger would’ve reduced the debate over “return of religious” to dominant juridical system to “machine age” [he cares about something else]

p. 96 testimonial, sacredness in Heidegger, Bezeugung (attestation) [see A p. 30 testify to death] ——each time Heidegger uses Faktum (not empirical fact) led back to place where acquiescence is de rigueur

p. 97 Heidegger is more resistant to belief than sacredness

FL p. 261 don’t confuse Heidegger’s Destruktion w/ “destruction” at heart of Benjamin’s thought sought, but both sought condition of an authentic tradition & memory

LOBL p. 138 La Chose takes place w/out having place [Introduction to Meta… & OG sent to Olivia]

p. ~171 what is arrested here: authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) of a being-for-death

SPOM pp. 27-8 Heidegger on dikē as accord, joining, harmony (Die Fuge (joint) ist der Fug) thought on basis of presence (als Anwesen gedacht) vs. adikia as out of joint (aus der Fuge), error of stupidity

p. 28 Heidegger’s Weile as passage, a transitory moment, time of present that comes from future to the past, toward going of gone

pp. 28-9 Heidegger refuses to see nihilism in Ancient Greek thought of adikia, but a “trace” of the “tragic,” beyond esthetic-psychoanalytic, this trace calls us to thinking

p. 30 Heidegger’s thought of joining, jointure, a thinking of injunction

p. 31 Heidegger’s supplement of accord, giving what you don’t have (Plotinus), according presence to the other, beyond economy

pp. 31-5 [Derrida wrestles with Heidegger’s take on dikē, jointure, and its relation to adikia, disjointure or injustice, wondering if he skews the relation in favor of possibility of favor]

POOF pp. 57-8 in its very depth the keeping silent of Sein und Zeit never laughs (hear something here re: colloquy btwn Heidegger & Nietzsche) > little room for laughter in Heidegger

pp. 248-49 Schmitt & Heidegger give credit to oppositional logic (one Nietzsche smiles at) > Heidegger on technological deployment of modern ‘world wars,’ abandonment of Being, man as ‘most important raw material,’ lets his will be unconditionally equated w/ the process

POR p. 8 (137) one of Heidegger’s most insistent questions: how did the incubation of reason [starting w/ Aristotle’s “roots,” “principles,” “causes”] take until the 17th Century to become the principle of reason?

p. 9 (139) for Heidegger, principle of reason accompanied by interpretation of essence of beings as objects, an object present as representation (Vorstellung)

p. 10 (139) principle of reason (Satz vom Grund) tells us to protect [dominant] relation of ob-ject before a subject that says “I”, and is assured of presence

——Heidegger’s caricature of principle of reason: hard, unblinking eyes (dominating, raping)

——Heidegger makes language do its work [re: interaction btwn begegnen, entgegen, Gegenstand and Stellen, Vorstellen, Zustellen]

p. 12 (142) vis-à-vis Heidegger, one can longer distinguish btwn technology, science, theory and rationality, principle of reason cannot be separated from idea of technology [techno-science]

HERP HERP p. 172 Heidegger mentions positively tradition of Scheler which goes back to Augustine [St. Anselm?] & Pascal: we access truth/knowledge on basis of love/charity—not vice versa

——Heidegger critiques or enacts “destruction” of Aristotle’s broken theory of logos as judgment, but remains Aristotelian when saying only Dasein can have a friend—animal has no ear

p. 179 acc. Heidegger, philosophy addresses itself to us as a summons, we respond, in a correspondence (Entsprechen), lend an ear, w/ that toward which philosophy is underway (unterwegs)

p. 180 deconstruction, or rather Heidegger’s Destruktion: appropriation of the tradition (while “destructing”), calls itself (heisst): “open our ear (unser Ohr öffnen)” [to a friend?]

p. 181 caught in ring of circle once questioning philosophy, engaged by Greek tongue > acc. Heidegger, obscurely, authoritatively, Greek tongue alone is logos

p. 183 where Derrida is beyond Heidegger’s aim (propos) [acc. Derrida]: in the non synonymy of dissemblance, heterogeneity, disproportion, incommensurability, nonexchange, excess of every measure/symmetry > democracy to-come

pp. 190, 202 Heidegger on “the few” [poets, philosophers…] the few who tried to save sofon from (contre) the Sophists, from men of marketplace, “to save and protect (retten und schützen)”

pp. 191-92 for Heidegger, philosophy seeks after, comes later than harmony, this delay eroticizes philosophical search, tension of Eros; Heraclitus & Parmenides not philosophers, no straining, no erotic pas, in accord, Einklang, homology w/ logos

p. 196 for Heidegger, originary Eris [Derrida had just mentioned Eros] as truth of philia—Blake’s “opposition is true friendship”

p. 197 why striking (marquant)? because prägen (mark, strike, leave imprint) is found so frequently in Heidegger > philosophy forged, stamped (geprägt) by Heraclitus in name of gathering, gathered originarily in one striking force, one trait > Kampf

p. 205 polemos no stranger to crossing out of being (kreuzweise Durchstreichung), participates in the play of the fourfold (earth, sky, humans, immortals)

——Heidegger claims that all metaphysicians (strangers to the originarity of Heraclitus’ logos) committed an anachronic anthroplogization abusively reappropriating H’s word (parole)

***p. 206 Heidegger’s desire to hear better, w/ another ear, beyond consonance w/ narrow political, determined context toward horizon of a more open future

p. 209 how is Heidegger’s monology, this belonging-to-one-another of Speech [shiz produced by polemos must gather, join up, ally, couple] different from speculative proposition [Hegel]? both synthesize an autoheterology, a heterotautology—too big of a question? [see p. 214 reconciliation in Heidegger btwn friend & enemy]

p. 211 Heidegger’s 3 creative “Gewalten” of historial destiny: poet, thinker, statesman > their work as Schaffen carries seal or signature of originary polemos/Kampf [see p. 200]

——to say “Mein Kampf” would be ridiculous presumption to Heidegger [?] or does it appeal to an originary polemos?

p. 212 for Heidgeger, phusis: instituting institution, originary upsurging of force, power, or violence, of the Gewalten des Waltenden

acc. Heidegger, when conflict stops, when one doesn’t hear the unheard, being is no longer kept, becomes an object, a spectacle, in the quelled visibility of objects facing us

——seeing a decay like that which occurs to hearing, suffers when polemos is quelled, sight degenerates into optics > creators (poets, thinkers, statesmen) are no longer tolerated [Nietzsche]

p. 214 Heidegger almost never names the enemy, nor hatred, why such dissymmetry, a voice of friend in polemos, but not a voice of enemy?

p. 215 for Heidegger, Hölderlin’s sacrifice, which Germans have not heard, is an exemplary sacrifice, but how to respond to someone who says “You do not hear the sacrificed poet”?

p. 217n can we read an “unconscious” affinity btwn impending arrival of friend and imminence of death? [Heidegger would protest—isn’t analytic of Dasein regulated by norms of absolute intentional meaning?]

HASD HASD pp. 53-4 we can read What is Metaphysics? as a treatise on negativity, establishes basis for negative discourse and negation in experience of nothing

——strangeness of what is as le tout autre (das schlechthin Andere)—transcendence, which, acc. Heidegger, Plato properly expresses w/ epekeina tes ousias

p. 54 Heidegger says Plato’s khora fell short of thinking the place (Ort), preparing the way for Cartesian space [Derrida thinks this statement is problematic & reductive]

——but 17 years later, Heidegger says, “[hē khōra] heisst der Ort,” and refers to Plato’s khōrismos as the difference of place (die verschiedene Ortung) btwn Being and beings

p. 55 Heidegger: “Christian philosopher is a squared circle”

p. 69n Heidegger: for Kant, what is becomes an object of representation

p. 56 Heidegger avoids using but not mentioning “Being” [in Zur Seinsfrage]; Heidegger’s kreuzweise Durchstreichung of Being not an erasure w/ avoidance as essential function—a different designation, Being reduced to its turns, turnings, historical tropes (Zuwendungen)

p. 57 for Heidegger, gathering of Geviert takes place in an indivisible topos, simplicity of point [of sword]: “the place (Ort) gathers toward itself at the greatest height and extremity”

p. 58 Derrida remarks on the folds of denial in the conditional mode: if Heidegger were to write a theology

pp. 58-9 Heidegger privileges, by way of Luther, the revelation of Offenbarkeit, a revelation that occurs in the dimension of Being, over the religious Offenbarung

pp. 59-60 didn’t Heidegger write a theology of Being, of God? what’s the difference? “he [Heidegger] was not there w/out leaving a trace of all these folds”

——Heidegger w/ and w/out word “être” wrote a theology w/ and w/out God, left a trace no longer his own, mais qui reste quasiment la sienne > 3 adverbs: pas, sans, quasiment

p. 69n on subject of Ding, Heidegger associates Dionysius w/ Eckhart

MPM MPM pp. 7-8 Heidegger links law & being in Hölderlin, de Man contests

p. 64 recognize in figure of phantom the working of what Kant & Heidegger assign to transcendental imagination, “fantastic” temporalizing schemes and powers of synthesis > Kant: an art hidden in depths of soul

pp. 92-3 Heidegger rethinks “thought (Gedanke)” w/ Gedanc, bottom of the heart, gathering together of all that concerns us, more original than Pascal’s thinking of heart?

p. 96 via de Man, Heidegger rarely laughs and would probably be against irony as a pose of subjective mastery, never feels the exhilaration of a promise

p. 109 for Heidegger, thinking of essence of technology is not technology, is free of technicity, same for science [and he would say the same of rhetoric]

pp. 111, 152n Socrates is “purest thinker,” did nothing else but place himself in the draft, this is why he wrote nothing

pp. 110-11 Heidegger: Gedanc [see pp. 140-141], heart, innermost essence of man, reaches outermost limits, the representation of interior/exterior does not arise

p. 140 Heidegger protects agains abyssal risk of parasitic contamination, of an an-oppositional differance, thus risk and gravity of saying, “essence of technology is not foreign to technology”

——memory w/out anteriority, w/out origin, cannot become a Heideggerian theme

pp. 146-7 [re: de Man closer to Heidegger than he thinks] for Heidegger, memory too, like promise, gathers near what can come, toward the “future” > es gibt never gives anything in present, it calls as a promise; Heissen (“to call, ” “to command” > entrust, keep safely)

p. 151n for Heidegger, since science doesn’t think, thinking much watch over science, they cannot do so for themselves

A A p. 14 Heidegger thinks beyond “vulgar concept of time that privileges now,” Derrida asks: “is there anything other than vulgar time & vulgar death” [see OS]

p. 29 Heidegger’s hierarchy, desire to think death properly, division btwn ontic & ontological, imposes pure, rigorous, indivisible borders, borders that are crossed but shouldn't be

p. 35 Heidegger & Kant: man only example of not-man man (Dasein, finite reasonable being)

pp. 53-7 [Derrida on Heidegger’s incisive decisions and methodology in existential analytic]

p. 55 for Heidegger, belief in immortality is secondary to being-toward-death, an affirmation of an originary finitude Hegel thought he reversed in Kant

——Heidegger’s on Kant’s side, on this side of finitude > didn’t Hegel want to show unilaterality of border, and that one is already on the other side of the here?

p. 56 Heidegger’s methodologically rigorous choice to start from “this side” [phenomenology] goes hand in hand w/ what prevails, the pré-férance of pre-archic originarity of proper, eigentlich

p. 59 Heidegger’s existential analysis has no competence for dealing w/ political problems of burial, cult of the dead

——Heidegger refuses to use word universal even though his existential analysis of death wants to be (universal too humanistic for Heidegger, too dependent on Aufklärung)

p. 64 irreducible prescriptivity in mode of phenomenological attestation (Bezeugung) > one can and must testify to it

***p. 70 Heidegger pays no attention to logical form of contradiction (most proper possibility as possibility of an impossibility) > treats it as a condition of truth, its very unveiling (truth no longer measured in logical form of judgment)

pp. 71-2 greater and greater orientation toward death, for Heidegger, the incalculable nonmeasure [of truth], signifies possibility of measureless impossibility of existence

EM EM p. 123 (147) let’s not imprison Heidegger’s text in a closure he delimited better than anyone

p. 124 if we give up we-men (nous-hommes) in relation to metaphysical determinations (i.e. zōon logon ekhon, etc.), the proper of man remains inseparable from the question or truth of Being (this makes Heidegger’s Kehre even less pertinent)

p. 126 (151) reading of text Dasein is a hermeneutics > if one looks closely, phenomenological opposition “implicit/explicit” permits Heidegger to avoid vicious circle (posing question of Being on basis of ontological predetermination)

p. 127 (152) for Heidegger, motif of proximity caught in opposition which unceasingly regulates his discourse: in proximity of ontic, ontological Dasein is that which is farthest

——(152-53) before/after Heidegger’s Kehre > space of proximity and distance to Being

p. 128 (153) Heidegger’s radical questions re: humanism, his study of genesis of concept/value of “man” via Greek paideai in Rome, Christianizing of Latin humanitas, rebirth of Hellenism in 14th-18th centuries, makes secondary any metahumanist position not placed in his opening

p. 131 if Heidegger has radically deconstructed domination of metaphysics by the present, by leading us to think presence of the present, this thinking can only be metaphorized, and can’t simply decide to escape a profound necessity, language it deconstructs

p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (lespace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being), “an alternative always suspended over its ‘own proper’ abysm”: it is the text of dissemination

pp. 132-33n (159-60n) Derrida on privilege of spoken language in Heidegger [I’ll study it elsewhere?] leads back to Being as presence, Anwesenheit > but, is also erased when Heidegger announces a Wesen that wouldn’t be Anwesen (see OS [?])

——Heidegger: written form exerts wholesome pressure, present world crisis needs less philosophy, more thinking, less literature, we must liberate Dichtung from literature [?]

p. 136 (163-64) is Nietzsche the last metaphysician as Heidegger reads him? or is Heidegger the last sleeping shudder (le dernier sursaut ensommeillé) of the higher man?

VM VM p. 81 appeal to tradition found in Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s “ontology”: 1) entirety of philosophy has a Greek source 2) a reduction of metaphysics 3) the ethical loses its metaphysical specificity, coordinated with something other than itself

p. 87 Heidegger, according to Levinas, adds historicity to Husserl

p. 140 Heidegger allows Hegel’s discourse to grow and speak (Hegel’s discourse as that of all metaphysics)

p. 144 w/ “epochs,” being-history, Heidegger permits reemergence of thought of eschatology: “Being itself…is in itself eschatological”; eschatology different from messianic eschatology in that w/ former war is not an accident that overcomes Being, war not even negative, war is Being itself

pp. 317-18n Heidegger stops using Endlichkeit, it was never Christian-theological but idea of finite Being is ontotheological

—— thought that seeks to go to its very end in its language, the end envisaged under name of finitude, should abandon words & themes of finite/infinite & everything they govern > this is the impossible of beyond metaphysics which confirms necessity for this incommensurable overflow to take support from metaphysics

——Heidegger realized this in making difference [btwn Being & existent] fundamental

S S p. 1 Heidegger warns we should, he should, vermeiden (avoid, flee) the word “spirit”

p. 2 Heidegger would have to close up thinking-shop if called by the faith

pp. 11-2 Heidegger’s discourse [on hand], all the more peremptory and authoritarian for hiding its discomfiture, preserves, sheltered in obscurity, the profoundest metaphysical humanism

p. 46 geopolitics is a Weltpolitik of spirit, world is not earth, earth obscures the world, preeminence of mediocre, massification of man, destruction of earth

p. 54 Heidegger’s absolute limit btwn man and animal distances itself from biologism, philosophy of life, politics, and Rilke—and Nietzsche too

pp. 60-1 Heidegger’s destitution of spirit is not a crisis of spirit: crisis, acc. Derrida, would perhaps be treated by Heidegger as a symptom of Cartesian heritage

p. 64 Heidegger read Bergson

p. 68 Derrida finds Heidegger “horribly dangerous (terriblement dangereux)” and “wildly funny (follement drôle)” in his irrefutable, strange paradoxy [his tautologies?]

p. 69 in Der Spiegel interview, Heidegger: when they begin to think, the French speak German

p. 73 Heidegger saves Nietzsche’s text (from accusation of biologism, zoologism, racism [?]) by damning it: still metaphysics of absolute subjectity like Hegel: Nietzsche’s absolute subjectity that of body, impulsions, affects; Hegel’s that of the willing that knows itself

p. 131n Heidegger’s Kehre? from question to Zusage?: remove remnant of Aufklärung which still slumbered in privilege of the question? [Derrida is not having it]

pp. 132-33n Derrida avoids emphasizing a Kehre from Fragen to Zusage (the gage) in Heidegger by talking about a stratigraphy, a number of stratas that become visible, scarcely visible in Heidegger’s thought, so that resolution (Entschlossenheit), appeal (Rufsinn), original trustworthiness (Verlässlichkeit) are already there before “the turn”

FWT p. 165 Heidegger’s Destruktion has Lutheran origins which Derrida has always been interested in deconstructing, but can one pass through, overstep, this “Christian” landscape?

OS p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

the impossibility of the otherwise produces a trembling, a question of tout autre, think the tie btwn truth/presence, in a thought that doesn’t need to be true/present [no skeptical moment]

p. 44 Heidegger often considered Hegel to have covered over Kant’s audaciousness, though…

p. 50n Heidegger: Kant’s transcendental aesthetic can’t perceive something actually present (Anwesenden), to perceive something Gegenwärtigen, one couldn’t intuit a single now (Jetzt), since each now has essentially continuous extension in just passing and just coming (in sein Soeben und Sogleich)

p. 62 opening of Heideggerian breakthrough (percée): thought the excess of metaphysics

POS pp. 9-10 Derrida is “above all” made possible by Heidegger’s ontological difference (the unthought difference btwn Being and beings), yet Nietzsche is “perhaps” a move beyond the ontotheology of Heidegger, toward a differance no longer in language of West

p. 10 Heidegger recognized that economically/strategically he had to borrow language of metaphysics, as one always must do at moment one deconstructs this language

pp. 10-1 Heidegger’s phonologism, privileging of poem over literature

ROP p. 109 finitude is derived for Kant, while it is originary for Heidegger

SP pp. 73-5 Heidegger’s 3 warnings on reading Nietzsche:

1. simply aestheticizing his work as philosopher-artist would corroborate current order of philosophy

2. do not confuse “heroic-boastful” style (pseudo-transgressive exuberance) for “grand style”

3. must read Nietzsche as unremitting interrogation of Western civilization

pp. 75-9 Heidegger’s 3 propositions related to these warnings:

1. there’s only been a philosopher before art, a gossiping woman, a sterile woman (not a männliche Mutter); acc. Nietzsche, the old aesthetic nothing but that of passive, receptive consumers

2. Nietzsche’s art would be “metaphysical in its most intimate intention”

3. Nietzsche deals (most frequently) w/ Plato by simple inversion (Umdrehung), standing Platonic propositions on their head

pp. 79-81 Heidegger oscillates btwn reading in Nietzsche a simple Umdrehung (inversion) of Plato or something other > neither a direct flipping, nor an an-archical erasure of hierarchy (which consolidates established order), but “a transformation of hierarchical structure itself”

ATIA p. 129 Lacan and Heidegger both think animals can’t die [cf. p. 154 Heidegger implies animal unique from rock because of possibility of dying (sterben)]

DIF DIF p. 17 before Heidegger purposely and radically questioned presence, Freud & Nietzsche did so, and, remarkably, they did so via motif of differance [remarkable :)]

p. 25 Heidegger: usage (Brauch) has left a trace (Spur) in to khreon (necessity), quickly forgotten in destiny of Being, usage conjoins the dis- (Der Brauch fügt das Un-) > doesn’t dis of differance refer us beyond history of Being, beyond our language, beyond anything that can be named in it?

DPi p. 245 “deconstruction” of Christianity is very business of Christianity; no doubt Heidegger inherited Destruktion from Lutherian destructio

Gi p. 9 Heidegger rarely uses the world “political”—Schweigen (silence)

——the trace of Heidegger’s silence on sexuality doesn’t come from just anywhere, but Derrida won’t pin it down w/ a name (omission, foreclosure, unthought, repression, denial)

pp. 22-3 isn’t Heidegger repeating traditional philosophemes w/ new rigor, beginning w/ a neutralization, denying a negativity?

p. 24 Heidegger, by going back “further,” higher > avoids religion, ethical, even dialectical schemas

Gii p. 28 speak of Heidegger, speak of monstrosity

pp. 32, 39 Heidegger’s question of technology presented as protest, barely disguised condemnation of professionalization of University studies during Nazi regime

p. 60 Heidegger employs idiomatic untranslatability of opposition btwn geistig/geistlich to withdraw Gedicht (“site”) of Trakl from Platonic tradition, w/ its opposition aisthēton/noeton (“sensible” material/“intelligible” spirituality), and from Christian opposition spiritual/temporal

pp. 61-2 savage second blow of sexual difference, its Verwesung, vs. originary, tender sexual difference > Heidegger claims this schema is not Christian/Platonic, but it has no other content and even no other language than Platonism/Christianity > its archi-matinal origin, ultra-Western horizon, constituted by hollow of a repetition, same for Verfall, Ruf, Sorge in structure of Dasein

REST p. 260 [here we have Heidegger’s feet] [

Gii

“Heidegger’s Hand”]

p. 266 Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art, belongs to great discourse on place & truth

p. 281 praise for Heidegger’s Es gibt, Sein starting from (returning to) Es gibt Sein

p. 285 Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art intends to lead beyond, or to, eve of constitution of the subjectum, a Schritt zurück (backward step) on road of thought [?]

p. 307 Derrida imagines a gallery filled w/ all the female examples (figures) Heidegger uses

pp. 348-49 Verlässlichkeit > reliability anterior to any nameable subject (commitment), that which is verlässig deserves faith/credit/confidence

DST DST pp. 202, 315n for Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger succumbs to mimetology by refusing to take mimesis seriously

p. 205 Derrida has his doubts when Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger’s unthought (impensé) gathers in unity of single site, as if there were only one unthought for each “great” thought—as its secret law

WAP p. 126 how can you not burst out laughing before photo of Heidegger in shorts

IW p. 287 Rosenzweig speaks of Cohen breaking free from Hegel (by returning to Kant): math [which guides Cohen here] generates its elements not from empty nothing of 1 and universal 0, but determinate nothing of differential, a particular nothing [Derrida adds: Heidegger too]

EL p. 220 Heidegger attempted to think a non-Platonic, non-Christian “worldhood”

C p. 193 Riss/Zug and Geflecht > Heidegger

BSi p. 263 Unheimlichkeit just as important for Heidegger as for Freud (but scarcely pointed out)

p. 264 for Heidegger, in the questioning essence of man, man comes to himself as “who” not “what” (ipseity [Selbst] before any “I,” individual, we or community)

p. 280 for Heidegger, the object is Vorhandensein—the dead body of living being (animal or man) is neither Dasein, nor Zu-, nor Vor-handensein [?]

p. 305 Derrida speaks of Heidegger’s arrogant, smug condescension [still, Derrida likes it?]

pp. 307-08 Heidegger’s stubborn stupidity: only man has a relation to dying (sterben) as such

p. 322 Heidegger against strict, conventional division of man/animal [for very different reasons than Derrida], doesn’t make man unique enough

p. 323 Heidegger’s critique of biologism, i.e. biopoliticism: ek-sistence not simply a specific kind of living creature

OG pp. 19-20 (32-33) Heidegger’s reading of Nietzschean demolition irrefutable if it remains confined to metaphysical edifice, entirely other if one accepts the deconstruction at hand > is Nietzsche captive or deconstructive?

pp. 20-2 (34-6) the word “being” as Urwort (mot originaire) ensures “lêtre-mot” to all other words [Lacan’s name-of-the-father]

——does Heidegger transgress logocentrism of phonè by questioning being? or does the question precomprehend the word being? deconstructive breakthrough (percée) no longer circumscribed in ontic/ontological [?]

pp. 22-3 (36-8) Heidegger transgresses and contained (y est comprise) at same time in presence of logocentrism > his crossing-out (rature, kreuzweise Durchstreichung) of Being effaces presence of transcendental signified while keeping it legible: this last writing is a first writing (of an epoch), inasmuch as it de-limits onto-theology, metaphysics of presence, logocentrism > Heidegger must restore (provisionally) “transcendence” to Being to renounce project/word ontology [given risk of transgression becoming regression here, Derrida insists we go by way of Heidegger’s rigor alone]

——Heidegger questions privilege of “infinitive” and “3rd person singular of the present indicative” [to be, is]

p. 24 (38-9) the hesitation of Heidegger & Nietzsche is not “incoherence,” it is the trembling of deconstruction: deconstruction does not destroy structures from the inside, must inhabit, inhabits most when one doesn’t suspect it > borrow all subversive strategies from old structure

EU p. 88 Heidegger’s move beyond responsibility for a determinate knowledge or power: must first answer to being, for the call of being—must think this coresponsibility

pp. 221-22 thought of sendoff (envoi), dispensation or gift of being: one of most powerful/singular attempts to think history/structure of onto-theology: Shickung, Schicksal, Gabe, “es gibt Sein,” “es gibt Zeit” do not seem to belong w/in onto-theological philosophemes

pp. 227-30 [Derrida offers an example of what “fundamental” research of Heidegger might look like]

FV p. 471n Lacan reconstitutes Cartesian certainty, capturing in this chain (Descartes–Hegel–Husserl) Heideggerian motions which are allergic to it—rigorously speaking

pp. 474-75 full speech, contracts only w/ itself, system of truth > Lacan not proposing crude readjustment [i.e. American psychology] but rarity à la Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit

p. 477n by way of Lacan, Freud tells us very literally Heidegger’s What is Metaphysics?

CHOR p. 103 I am going too quickly, I’m schematizing excessively: Heidegger begins by denying all forms of security, all sedimented presuppositions of classical ontology

HEIDEGGER VS. LEVINAS

GOD p. 42 Heidegger’s death, which nobody can undergo but “myself,” death as irreplaceability, Levinas’ objection to this

pp. 47-8 we die for other (Levinas) / for self (Heidegger)

——offering death, offering life

FK p. 54 Levinas attempts to distinguish the sacred (heilig) from holiness (sainteté) > former “pagan,” natural; latter, of (Jewish) law, before or under Roman religion [Derrida is critical]

A pp. 38-9 does distinction btwn demise and dying avoid Levinas’ objection to Heidegger re: “mineness” of dying > in dying proper and properly speaking, no one can die for the other

VM pp. 87-8 for Levinas, eschatology “as the beyond of history withdraws beings from history’s jurisdiction” [?] [re: Levinas’ praise of Heidegger’s historicity (absent in Husserl) and then his move beyond Heidegger]

p. 88 even though Heidegger questions “inside/outside” of theoretism, of light, of subject/object, he retains what made it possible, light, unveiling; Levinas tries to describe an exteriority, separation, which precedes “division of Being”; how will he do this in a logos of “inside/outside”?

p. 89-90 Levinas [profoundly] describes es gibt as neutral unity of existence

p. 90 is Levinas’ or Heidegger’s originary difference more original?

——for Levinas, Heidegger’s Mitsein is derivative of originary relation with the other

p. 96 for Levinas, when 3rd term [party] is light of Being (which is not being nor non-being while same and other are) > theoretical relation is ontology

pp. 135-42 [Derrida defends Heidegger against Levinas]

pp. 135-36 acc. Levinas, Being has impoverished logic of “truism,” [?] valid for every existent except “the Other,” subordinates ethics to ontology,

——if “truism” = analytic affirmation (poverty of tautology) > wouldn’t Being escape form of (banal) truism, where subject is repeated in predicate?; acc. Derrida, because Being is nothing outside existent, not an archia, it can’t precede (as Levinas wants to argue) the existent in time or dignity, can’t subordinate ethical relation to ontological one

——every concept presupposes Being by dissimulating it, common root of essence & existence

——lêtre nest que lêtre-de cet étant et nexiste pas hors de lui comme une puissance étrangère

p. 137 if Being is radically foreign to ethics it is not as a counterethics, nor, as Levinas argues, is it a subordination of ethics to neutral violent power

——[Derrida defending Heidegger] Being is not even ontology or first philosophy in the sense of rank or excellence, because it is not the truly existent existent; Levinas: “Ontology, as first philosophy, is a philosophy of power”

p. 138 Being conditions respect for the other, as what it is: other > w/out Being’s “laisser-être” (of ethical commandment, freedom) violence to such a degree it couldn’t appear or be named

——need something outside me for ethics to be possible

pp. 138-39 acc. Derrida, Heidegger would not have accepted Levinas’s phrase “relation to the Being of existent,” nor his idea that “relation of Being of existent” [not a “relation of knowledge,” not a relation] would “dominate” “relation with an existent”

p. 140 Being is transcategorical, Heidegger would say of it what Levinas says of Other: “refractory to the category”

p. 145 [Derrida will not let Levinas reduce Heidegger’s interminable wandering to a new paganism of the site, it is not an empirical “nationalism”]

p. 148 for Levinas, origin of concept must be the gift of the world to the other as tout autre, not the thought of Being

——for Levinas, despite critique of Husserl’s “anhistoricism,” origin of meaning is nonhistory, “beyond history,” a Hebraic transhistoricity? can this nonhistory be uprooted from history, can eschatology be invoked separated from every reference to history?

——anhistoricity of meaning profoundly separates Levinas & Heidegger; for the latter, Being is history

p. 149 for Heidegger, concept is on the plane of ontic determination; for Levinas, it is on the plane of Being > for both, language is a coming forth and a holding back (réserve)

——isn’t thought of Being thought of the other before homogenous identity of concept, asphyxiation of the same?

***PS p. 180 for Artaud, death as structure of all theft, we do not die alone, the other strips us of ourselves [more Levinasian]

DPi p. 225 would the mind only know it was severed from its head when the crowd cheers? [re: Cartesianism of guillotine] other determines instant of my death [Levinas-like]

DST DST p. 215 Heidegger & Levinas so close, so heterogenous: passage for a thinking translation

HST p. 384 Levinas: my death as my part in death of other, death of other not only moment of “the mineness of my ontological function” [contra Heidegger]

p. 391 Levinas’ ethics, metaphysics, first philosophy vs. Heidegger’s ontology

EW pp. 278-79 in Western metaphysics, incl. Heidegger and Levinas, there’s a sacrificial structure, a place left open for noncriminal putting to death: executions of ingestion, incorporation, or introjection of the corpse > where does “symbolic” begin and end?

——Heidegger and Levinas’ discourses remain profound humanisms to the extent that they do not sacrifice sacrifice

AD p. 6 for Levinas, death is experience for the survivor of “without-response” > not, first of all, annihilation, non-being, nothingness: survivor’s guilt as guilt w/out fault/debt, as entrusted responsibility

——it is the murderer who identifies death w/ nothingness (Cain)

pp. 7-8 Levinas: [re: relation to death] “neither a seeing of being as in Plato nor an aiming toward nothingness as in Heidegger”

pp. 12-3 Levinas, unlike Heidegger, offers a debt w/out regret > of the order of the unconditional yes [Derrida’s only regret: not having said this to him enough]

pp. 28-9 Levinas’ welcome contests Heidegger’s motifs of gathering & collecting (colligere)

pp. 52-4 discretion of face, not unveiling/revelation but an opening before the opening, not an opening to phenomenality, not Heidegger’s Erschliessung, Erschlossenheit, Offenheit

p. 83 for Levinas, “substitution,” absolute passivity, “possibility of the impossible” that’s not Heidegger’s death, but the condition of the hostage, responsibility before/beyond death— impossibility of “slipping away (se dérober)”

p. 147n in the passage beyond totality (epekeina tēs ousias), we find Levinas’ strained and precarious filiation w/ Heidegger > unlike Levinas, Heidegger does not give in to “politism” of, nor fascination w/, a (supposedly Hegelian) totality

HEIR

GOD p. 128 there’s always a Letter to the Father before the event (avant la lettre), signed by a son who publishes posthumously [Kafka, Johannes de Silentio]

R p. 9 [re: Greek word democracy] heirs, legatees, the legacy & the allegation (play btwn legare & legere), “sending or putting off (renvoi) gestures toward the past of an inheritance only by remaining to come,” for democracy

POO p. 8 we are indebted to Kant, his heirs, to the great philosopher of critique

FWT p. 3 Derrida recognizes in himself the figure of an heir, in a deliberate, often happy way

pp. 3-4 heir must respond to double injunction: reaffirm what comes “before us,” necessary (il faut) to appropriate a past fundamentally inappropriable, reaffirm, relaunch otherwise, keep alive

——reaffirmation which continues & interrupts: one’s own decision as that of the other: signature against signature

p. 4 “I have always forbidden myself to injure or put to death” [avoid putting to death by reaffirming heritage] [don’t let dead bury the dead]

pp. 4-5 contradictory/uncomfortable double injunction: mad for absolute past, past whose (im)measure that of bottomless memory, while dreading nostalgia, fixation, cult of remembrance: nothing seems desirable save in this injunction > leave life in life & make it live again [this “heir]

p. 8 heritage not only a double injunction or reaffirmation but a choice, filtering, heir not only receives but is one who risks choosing

POOF p. 94 friendship can never elude rhetoric of epitáphios, transfixed celebration of spectrality, at once fervent & caught in petrified cold of its inscription (funeral speech, testamentary fervor of heir)

MONL p. 65 Derrida dreams of leaving marks that recall the entirely other prior-to-the-first language: degree zero-minus-one of memory, a desire for infinite salvation: scratch and graft, caress with claws, borrowed [see DEBT] claws

TB p. 114 Überleben and Übersetzen (survival & translation)

——for Benjamin, translator as survivor, agent of sur-vival, heir [man], the sur-vival of translation can make original text not only live longer but more & better

WAP p. 130 Hegel “took out insurance” on his Heirs (on the State, on the University)

p. 131 Hegel’s complex strategy for a post-Hegelian era (did he think of anything else?)

PIO p. 4 does the child (son) invent himself specularly though parent’s narcissism > or is he an absolute invention (this being the truest response to parent’s desire): where truth is thought beyond any inheritance?

LI p. 42 Searle as only rightful son to commit parricide (a logic found in Sophist); Searle’s indebted/mortgaged signature > auto-authorized descendant

——[Derrida feels some guilt for impeding this procedure of inheritance]

CF pp. 29-30 we are all heir to crimes against humanity, i.e. the revolutions that made this concept [human rights] possible

OG pp. 124-25 (182) [vis-à-vis Lévi-Strauss] birth of writing (in colloquial sense) most often linked to genealogical anxiety > genealogical relation & social classification as stitched steam (point de suture) [point de capiton?] of arche-writing: condition of (so-called oral) language and possibility of writing in colloquial sense

ATAP p. 82 every apocalyptic eschatology promised in name of light, we are heirs to these Lumières, cannot & must not forgo the Aufklärung; must keep enough apocalyptic desire (clarity, revelation) to deconstruct apocalyptic discourse

SPEC p. 265 Freud: “super-ego is the heir of the Oedipus complex and represents the ethical standards of mankind”

HERMENEUTICS

KH pp. 98-99 entire discourse on khōra, every yet-to-come history of interpretations, included in advance, this X receives all, teleologically programs history of hermeneutics[?], is that a history?

SPOM pp. 8-9 three things which decompose the single thing (spirit, specter, king): 1) mourning, localize, identify the dead, know who and where [ontology, hermeneutics, philosophy] 2) language, voice, “scull had a tongue in it” 3) work, “spirit of the spirit” is work, spirit works

HASD p. 27 inevitable problems w/ everything that can articulate speech or writing (literary criticism, hermeneutics, poetics): 1) figural spatialization (places of rhetoric) 2) meaning & reference [see p. 28 recall of Other preceding speech] 3) event, insofar as it takes place

EM p. 126 reading of text Dasein is a hermeneutics > if one looks closely, phenomenological opposition “implicit/explicit” permits Heidegger to avoid vicious circle (posing question of Being on basis of ontological predetermination)

POOF pp. 16-7 hexis, contretemporal habitus: yoke-effect (leffet de joug), binds 2x in same time: duration & omnitemporality, marks/hides in masking—another name for psukhé > hexis insufficient for friendship, remains a simulacrum

——hexis accounts for, registers, lépreuve du temps, withholds (en garder) its trace in the body [by way of inscription]

——analogy btwn spirit (nous) & animal body inscribes in living body habitus of this contretemps

p. 17 via Aristotle, must submit oneself to time in time like cattle, to have the habit form > history of subject as history of time

——conditions of possibility (hexis) don’t live up to act/event of friendship

PP p. 69 an inscription, Delphikon gramma [Phaedrus (229d)], anything but oracle > the imperative of self-knowledge not dictated by self-presence, hermeneutics assigns intuition

SH pp. 52-3 poem is a hermeneutic event, it has philosophical implications which draw out the limits of hermeneutic acuity; limit of philosophy and formal poetics not to be renounced, not a failure: they recall the forgetting of the mark’s annulment by forgetting it (by supposing date)

F pp. xiv-xv cryptological interpretation not hermeneutics, begins w/ reconnaissance of the territory (lieux)

DS p. 262 if no thematic unity, hermeneutic concept of polysemy must be replaced by dissemination

ROP p. 4 if the verborgene Sinn (hidden sense) is homogenous to order of analyzable > psychoanalytic reason as hermeneutic

p. 5 [here] analytic concern merges w/ hermeneutic drive, w/ principle of reason (reddere rationem): render sense at all cost (à tout prix), il faut rendre: fidelity, debt, duty, to restitute sense of sense > even if hidden, verborgene Sinn

SP p. 115 [re: Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, that he still belongs to history of metaphysics] reading opens internal necessity, a certain dehiscence, but no critical/destructive effect: mais elle en transforme la figure et réinscrit à son tour le geste herméneutique [see pp. 81-3]

p. 123 on following Nietzsche outside speculum, the hermeneutic circle > immeasurable, save for the the steps of a dove (quau pas de colombe) [these are the steps of the Übermensch]

p. 127 reading/writing perforates hermeneutic sail

DPi pp. 236-37 we've asked “what is an exception?” “what is cruelty?” “blood?” “man?” “proper to man?” “to humanitarian?” > neither rhetorical nor answerable, these questions showed “the vertigo or the abyss of their own impossibility” > nor did they simply recreate dizziness of hermeneutic circle (which they also did) which accumulates meaning, supposes pre-comprehension [link to imagining the phone call, imminence of verdict]

CHM pp. 32-3 the hermeneut, the analyst, must first know language of patient, the immediate materiality of sign (move from sign to signified, obvious meaning to latent)

Gii pp. 58 Heidegger’s Wechselbezug (relation of reciprocity) btwn Erörterung (discussion, awakened literalness of word, situates proper place of Gedicht) and Erläuterung (clarification, elucidation of poems [Dichtungen] themselves) > (announce unique site (Ort) of Gedicht rather than show)

——is this Wechselbezug what is called the hermeneutic circle?

PIO p. 13 event (also loeuvre) calls for new statutes/conventions that could record, account for, such events (neither speech act theory nor literary theory [formalist or hermeneutic variety] can account for such event)

TN p. 137 how to say anything that doesn’t get invested in these historical figures [of touch], their rhetorical circle, and their logical, hermeneutical twirling (tourbillon)?

FV p. 432 structure of fiction reduced when related to its condition of truth, poor formalism which guarantees semantic content, doesn’t account for 1) “scription-fiction” and “scription-fictor” 2) narrating narration & narrator > complicity btwn formalist withdrawal (repli) and hermeneutic semanticism (or psychoanalysis applied to literature) [neglect of the subject-author, which, in some situations, might constitute progress or a legitimate demand]

p. 484 border negligible for hermeneut interested in the center

CHOR p. 96 some can’t see beyond end of phallic forms in SP (bisexual complication of style, spur, umbrella): those people do not read the syntax and punctuation of a given sentence, arresting the text in a position, settling on a thesis, meaning or truth

——“phallogocentrism,” complicity of Western metaphysics w/ notion of male firstness > mistakes/anchorings of Western rationality assuage hermeneutic anxiety

HEXI HEXIS [fixerup]

ATIA p. 27 hexis as habitus, as dynamis, as capability, as power one possesses

HIDDEN

POOF p. 242 via Heidegger, philía as opening, accord, in essential relation w/ phúsis as covering up, dissimulation of self > phúsis qua philía: lune, comme lautre, garde ce rapport à la fois généreux et jaloux à elle-mêmeelle aime à se cacher, krúptesthai phileîn > le retrait de la pudeur [decency] donne ici le mouvement même: gives the gift (donne le don), accords phúsis and philía

PP pp. 87-8 Ra, Ammon (hidden), hidden sun, the father of all things (came from an egg, and origin of egg); answer to “the chicken or the egg”: “O Ra, who art in they egg,” a “hidden egg”

p. 88 Hermes’ stealing and stealing away not the hidden of father, fixed design

PAS PAS p. (99) border edge, hidden vicinity (un voisinage caché) [not depth]

WM p. 234n Leibniz seeking to find hidden concept or name beneath all syntactical relations

pp. 264-65(n) for Bachelard, the hidden (fire) is what demands metaphors, Derrida explains how this conceptualization, despite fact that Bachelard appeals to syntax, “a poetic mind is a syntax of metaphors,” still amounts to metaphor of the same > here, all metaphors have a semantic focal point, the hidden fire as life, nature

p. 268 one true metaphor (no more true metaphor): but assured legibility of the proper [presence disappearing in its own radiance, hidden source of light]

ROP p. 4 if the verborgene Sinn (hidden sense) (of dream), omphalos, is homogenous to order of analyzable > psychoanalytic reason as hermeneutic

p. 5 [here] analytic concern merges w/ hermeneutic drive, w/ principle of reason (reddere rationem): render sense at all cost (à tout prix), il faut rendre: fidelity, debt, duty, to restitute sense of sense > even if hidden, verborgene Sinn

REST pp. 291-92 gift, abyss, offering, there is abyss > essence of Van Gogh’s painting, via Heidegger’s Origin, opens onto an abyss (not attributive certainty, secure ground of [Cartesian-Hegelian] subjectivity)

——the hiding or veiling, figure of the veil, is drawn into undecidability by the hymen

——Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, lhymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

RM p. 64 Verhüllung (veiling), Verborgenheit (being-hidden), Being withholds (se retient), withdraws (se retire) (sich entzieht), retrait

AFR p. 33 Condillac replaces a metaphysics of essences/causes (the hidden) w/ metaphysics of phenomena & relation (the open)

SPEC pp. 334-35 several families (in French analytic movement) bear same name [Freud’s name?] w/out knowing it [via Marie Bonaparte; “au moment où on croit décacheter (unsealed) un testament”]

FV p. 446 footnotes show what must not be said > Schelling: “[footnotes] should remain hidden”

HIERARCHY [fixerup]

GOD p.14 Plato’s responsibility, or discipline, press one secret to work in service of another, put the demonic secret of Eros to work in this new hierarchy

SPOM p. 109 principle of selectivity guides & hierarchizes “spirits,” fatally excluding in turn, it will annihilate, by watching over some “en veillant (sur) ses ancetres” [dead bodies] and not others

HASD p. 21 where does speaker stand in relation to hierarchy [of negative theology] [see p. 65n for Derrida on Marion who distinguishes hierarchy of Theandric mystery from the “vulgar concept”: how can distance btwn the 2 give place to analogical translation of one into the other?]

POOF pp. 203-04 in Aristotle, honor saves friendship from calculation, from the market—still, it’s proportioned via hierarchy, a hierarchy as sacralization of the beginning, qua command (arkhé)

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

POR pp. 17-18 (151-52) theoretico-political hierarchy w/ philosopher at top found in Kant, Schelling, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and in Aristotle’s Metaphysics > all agree that essential feature of academic responsibility must not be professional education

p. 18 (153) [re: desiring to remove the university] anarchy risks reproducing hierarchy

A p. 28 death one of the names of a threat, an aporia, that risks paralyzing ontological, hierarchical, territorial apparatus to which Heidegger lends credit; death, in this sense, names what Heidegger early on called “ruination” [look up]

p. 29 Heidegger’s hierarchy, desire to think death properly, division btwn ontic & ontological, imposes pure, rigorous, indivisible borders, borders that are crossed but shouldn't be

VM p. 137 Being is beyond hierarchies [beyond Nietzsche’s height?]

——Being is not even ontology or first philosophy in the sense of rank or excellence

PP p. 167 disappearance of father’s face (good-sun-capital) is movement of differance, which opens to writing, which writing opens for itself, threatens hierarchical interiority of pharmacy

OH p. 65 via Valéry, most interesting moment of rhetorical capitalization of “capital” (its hierarchization): regional capital always calls for always threatened universal capital

T pp. xix-xxii two types of mastery (phallocentrism, logocentrism): 1) hierarchy [Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger] 2) envelopment [Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel] (whole in each part), system, encyclopedia, circle, homogeny

PPHS p. 91 sensory matter hierarchized acc. power of ideality; physical ideality as teleological anticipation, or inversely, concept and value of ideality a “metaphor” > the “history” of metaphysics; sensualist reduction & idealist teleology follow same line [circle]: “metaphor”

p. 93n [from Plato to Husserl] idealization: simultaneous confirmation of objectivity & interiority (one by the other), hierarchical classification

P p. 22 asking what art means, the vouloir-dire of art, tautology w/out reserve, logocentrism of question “What is art?”—teleology & hierarchy prescribed in envelope of this question

p. 102 hierarchy of art constituted on the analogical model of human language

p. 117 Kant’s hierarchical classification of fine arts, a humanism regulated by language & body of man, language dominated by speech & gaze

POS pp. 41-2 double writing, double gesture, double science, a writing in/of itself multiple [Derrida explains that the phase of overturning the hierarchy of an opposition is necessary, politically necessary, there are risks of rushing to neutralization, but to remain w/in this phase isn’t enough]

SP pp. 79-81 Heidegger oscillates btwn reading in Nietzsche a simple Umdrehung (inversion) of Plato or something other > neither a direct flipping, nor an an-archical erasure of hierarchy (which consolidates established order), but “a transformation of hierarchical structure itself”

FS pp. 19-20 Derrida explains that by opposing force to structure he’s not envisioning an economy of pure, shapeless force > he opposes one series to the other to make apparent the noncritical privilege granted to one of the terms (structure, site, spatiality): a strategy which uses strength of field to turn its own stratagems against it > dislocate, fissure the system: le dé-limitant de part en part [delimit as describe, mark, and delimit as un-limit]

——our discourse irreducibly belongs to system of metaphysical oppositions

O p. 4 idealist, spiritualist, phoncentrist: first and foremost logocentric (traditional, hierarchical opposition btwn speech & writing)

***pp. 24-5 dissemination sets up a pharmacy, can’t count by 1’s, 2’s, 3’s — everything starts w/ dyad (not conflictual, hierarchical, dual oppositions)

p. 36 the 2 fictions: 1) when fiction is in service of meaning, truth is (truth of) fiction, it is low on a hierarchy, accessory to concept 2) fiction outside mimetologism affirms itself as simulacrum, disorganizes all oppositions to which teleology of book sought to violently subordinate it

DPi pp. 6-8(n) Plato’s Laws (907d–909d, 951d–e): nocturnal council, priests (tōn hiereōn, literally a hierarchy), a syllogos (place where one discusses together) [not a synagogue: place where one goes together] w/ minister of education, guardian of law, only those in great syllogos can visit prisoner > soteriological function of sōphronistērion (save soul)

——Plato describes 3 types of prisons or houses of correction

Gii pp. 37-8 [re: Handwerk] w/out attunement to essence of wood, itself attuned to man’s dwelling: empty activity, commerce, taste for profit > (this is Heidegger’s hierarchy & evaluation)

WAP p. 200n ever since OG, Derrida has put in question (pyramidal, synoptical) hierarchy that, in the name of the question quid juris [?], subordinates sciences & regional ontologies to an absolute logic

p. 134 the force that dominates classification & hierarchization enjoins us to read what it is interested in, and renders inaccessible what it can’t read (holds true for discourse of educator, evaluatory procedures: grading, juries, so-called supervisory committees)

C pp. 220-21 production of paradigm via cartouche introduces necessary (fatal) perversion that cartouche alone performs > paradigm must have been preceded by its following: phantasmatics of a contingent remaining (beyond hierarchy, beyond phantasy)

pp. 246-47 class is not lacking, it’s at work (series, lineage, rank, hierarchy, etc.) > but what doesn’t come under (nen relève plus) class is perhaps fate (le sort) > no classification table for fate

LI p. 71 the way oppositions impose non-neutral hierarchies (classical logic) > eg. speech act theory’s demand for the “serious, literal, strict”

p. 93 speech act theory’s hierarchical axiology: set up value oppositions & subordinate these values to each other (normal/abnormal, parasite/nonparasite, fulfilled/void, serious/nonserious, literal/nonliteral, briefly: positive/negative, ideal/nonideal)

———Plato, Rousseau, Descartes, Husserl: good before evil, simple before complex, positive before negative, pure before impure, essential before accidental, imitated before imitation (not one metaphysical gesture among others—the metaphysical exigency)

p. 127 concept of iterability brings into the open what is disturbing or menacing the consistency of binary & hierarchical oppositions

TN pp. 122-23 Bergson’s beautiful program: convergence of all the senses (still a hierarchy)

pp. 223-24 mechanical technique (esp. machines) as a simulacrum of “sensible”—does not feel itself feel, does not hierarchize the “5 senses”: opens place for metonymic substitution

E pp. 4-5 proportional analogy btwn oppositions dissolves them, but first the oppositions must be produced, and there’s [almost?] always a regular hierarchy

p. 13 Kant’s genius poet doesn’t need to know what he is writing, nature dictates what he writes, divine production > hierarchical analogy: society of logos, sociology of genius, a logoarchy

pp. 23-5 what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of identification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

OG p. 13 totality of metaphysics creates hierarchy of signifier/signified [signified is higher, not exterior like signifier] (Christian creationism, infinitism, both appropriating Greek conceptualism)

——signans (sensible), signatum (intelligible) [?]

EU p. 223 [re: CIPH] against pyramidal hierarchy [height?], for horizontality

HIEROGLYPH / PASIGRAPHY/ LEIBNIZ / CHINESE / UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE

SEC p. 313 idea/sign relation preserved through all forms of writing [in Condillac] (hieroglyph, ideograph, phonetic): economic, mechanical, homogenous reduction, community of analogical participation

FSW pp. 208-09 Egyptian priests read hieroglyphic code of dreams as a Traumbuch, as condensed meanings contained in storehouse of hieroglyphics [Freud pushes psychical writing further back]

TC p. 240 speech’s rational transparency purloins the body in direction of meaning; glossopoeia (not yet discourse, not a shout); for Artaud, word is cadaver of psychic speech, wants to renew spellbinding unseparatedness of language/speech’s power > hieroglyphics

——language of life itself, “speech before words,” eve of the origin of languages

p. 241 visual/plastic materialization of speech in Artaud’s theater and in Freud’s dreams, words as “things” [cf. F p. xl] (cartoon bubbles in Ancient Egypt [FSW p. 218]) > compare dreams to hieroglyphs, rebuses, a system of writing (instead of a language)

p. 243 via hieroglyph, theater of cruelty will restore the sacred, which man-God representative system destroyed > man has been separated from life by God

PPHS p. 88 Leibniz’s project w/ mathematical writing, formal symbols, algebras, pasigraphies, hieroglyphic or ideographic writing do not “refer to the voice,” the word (vox) [see pp. 96-7, 102 Hegel believes Leibniz led astray by Chinese model, hieroglyphics]

pp. 97-8 acc. Hegel, Thoth’s hieroglyphics too concerned w/ sensory representation, like Lebiniz’s universal language

pp. 97n, 98 acc. Hegel, movement from symbolic hieroglyphic naturalism to colossi: spirit beginning to liberate itself, but colossi still require external light

pp. 97-8n Hegel: written language is still a hieroglyphic, its basis is on the sensuous image, not the letter itself

——Egyptian spirit: to labor for self-comprehension on stone [pyramids like pages of a book]

p. 99 Oedipus solves Sphinx’s riddle, beyond hieroglyph > enlightenment, even history

pp. 102-04 Hegel: Chinese is too grammatical, entangled in dissemination of meanings & accents—in cold space of formal abstraction [Hegel contradicts privilege of sign over symbol?]

F p. xxix Freud: symbol always symbol of an earlier symbolized; [Abraham & Torok’s method] body a hieroglyphic text, but object-text not a substance, not a “scripturalistic” interpretation, not “dead symbol” > Magic Word explores vibrant, vigilant effectiveness of symbol’s operative genesis

p. xlii cryptonomic translation makes taboo word a rebus, functions as undecipherable fetish

WM p. 234n Leibniz seeking to find hidden concept or name beneath all syntactical relations

DS p. 195 Mallarmé: dance, pantomime: hieroglyphic inscription

p. 237 hieroglyphic writing: dance, ballet, theater

p. 240 Mallarmé’s “cipher of pirouettes prolonged toward another motif” is, like the whole text: ciphered to 2nd degree > cipher of pirouettes is also pirouette as cipher (sign, hieroglyph)

p. 278n Mallarmé: English sometimes [?] monosyllabic like Chinese

POS pp. 34-5 grammatology must liberate mathematization of language (which phonocentrism has always critiqued, for limiting that which links logos to phonē), but must be wary of Leibniz’s type of unifying, simple, mathematical language, which appeals to divine logos

PS pp. 190-92 in order to achieve mastery over breath, & avoid capricious inspiration, theater of cruelty must use nonphonetic writing (hieroglyph, pasigraphy, mathematical formalism, Freud’s unconscious writing [?]) > universal grammar of cruelty: shouts, gestures, onomatopoeias

pp. 192-93 for Artaud, furtive differance slipped in btwn 2 forms of writing, placing life outside the work, and making its origin (flesh) the epigraph, the breathless (essoufflé) sarcophagus of my discourse > only through writing made flesh, theatrical hieroglyphic, could double be destroyed

FS pp. 9-10, 304n doesn’t pure speech require inscription, isn’t it a privileged representation of inscription? just like Leibniz’s essence requires existence (pushes out toward world), power > act?

——God of Leibniz does not know the anguish of choice, only one book distributed through all books, God’s Will always chooses the “best”

——for Leibniz, no tragedy of the book, only one Book, this same Book is distributed throughout all books [cf. Theodicy pp. 375-78]

——to write: 1) not only to conceive Leibnizian book as an impossible possibility (as Mallarmé names the limit) 2) ce n'est pas seulement savoir que le Livre n'existe pas et qu'à jamais il y a des livres où (se) brise, avant même d'avoir été un, le sens d'un monde impensé par un sujet absolu [the English translation of this sentence fails to capture the sense of the books themselves shattering] 3) nor is it to have lost the certainty of pages binding themselves into a “book of reason” 4) not only to know that the non-written can’t be relegated to having no basis by the obliging negativity of some dialectic 5) not only to know that through writing the best may not transpire 6) it is the impossibility of making meaning precede writing: it is to lower meaning while elevating inscription

REST REST pp. 379-81 Artaud (protests against ghosts): no ghosts in Van Gogh, no visions, the torrid truth, hieroglyphics > Derrida cautions: “you can only give them [the ghosts] back (rendre) if you think you have them, and you can only think you’re giving them if you haven’t got them”]

PIO PIO pp. 34-6 both Descartes & Leibniz demonstrate 2 meanings of word “invention” in phrase “invention of truth”—when pursuing a universal language: both speak of a universal characteristic, both think about a new machinery to be forged and found

——Leibniz, however, believes the invention of this language does not depend on human perfection of “true philosophy,” the language itself can lead us towards such perfection, the invention thus preceding knowledge/science, until, at last: to reason = to calculate

p. 36 Leibniz’s version of universal language confers productive facilitation, even if inaugural adventure is kept under teleological surveillance by fundamental analyticism

pp. 40-1 Leibniz, early theorist of “new species of logic” that integrates calculation of probabilities

AFR AFR pp. 37-8 good metaphysics, extreme formalization, language of calculus, must reconstitute “metaphysics's prelinguistic and natural base,” it will have been natural & mute > thus, 2 good metaphysics (form, nature): good metaphysics = physics

p. 47(n) Derrida planned to write Le Calcul des langues: an elsewhere that has yet to happen

p. 120n did Condillac write in margins of a book he never read? is his discourse the frivolous repetition or identification of Leibniz’s statements? both attempted to save metaphysics from a frivolity that gnaws at it from inside > did Condillac plagiarize Leibniz, w/out knowing it?

D D pp. 356-57 on Sollers' use of Chinese: solicitation of whole

+R +R p. 179 picture, film, hieroglyph: projection sped up to limit of instantaneity: gestus [Brecht] of interruption, suspense of breaching force, holding metonymic fragments, seized by death

OG OG p. 26 (41) non-phonetic hieroglyph (Leibniz, Chinese) menaces history/life of spirit because menaces substantiality, breaks the noun (nom) apart > describes relations not appellations

pp. 32-3 (49-50) how Saussure’s concept of the arbitrary strictly divides the uncertain frontiers btwn ideographic, pictographic, & phonetic scripts > arbitrariness appeals to opposition physis/nomos, physis/techné, whose ultimate function is perhaps to derive historicity

pp. 36-8 (56-7) writing as “trap,” pathology (blind), idolatry; for Saussure, Leibniz’s fixed language would be like a hen hatching a duck’s egg > “la perversion de lartifice engendre des monstres

p. 76 (112-13) the becoming-legible of nonoccidental language decentered theological prejudice

——pasigraphy, Chinese model in Leibniz’s project of universal language, Leibniz wrenches it from history and gives it to philosophy > the “Chinese” prejudice

——history of alphabet can only be accepted after recognizing multiplicity of scripts

pp. 77-8 (113-16) Leibniz & Descartes on universal language: must we discover true philosophy before developing the language? for Descartes, we would have to wait, & such language would only arise in paradise; Leibniz disagrees, envisions calculation and Reason merging, raisonner et calculer sera la même chose > a teleology in progress

——Descartes’ analyticism is intuitionist, Leibniz’s points beyond manifest evidence toward order: we will reason w/ little cost, follow the code > both thinkers include simple absolute

p. 330n (115n) acc. Descartes, if there was order—we would learn infinite words a day

pp. 78-9, 331n (117-18, 117n) Leibniz’s infinitist “logic of God”—logos, a characteristic & ontological argument, infinitist, technicism, leads to parole par la machine

——this non phonocentric universal characteristic vision doesn’t interrupt logocentrism

——Leibniz sees arbitrariness, artificiality, as independence from history

p. 80 (119-20) hyperbolic admiration of Chinese & Hieroglyphics serves domesticating purpose > complicity btwn rationalism & mysticism

pp. 90-1 Chinese has phonetic elements but not logocentric [?] [cf. BSi p. 348]

p. 92 Pound’s interest in ideogram a form of soliciting logocentrism

p. 99 (147) Leibniz’s pasigraphy, non-European scripts, inspired a breach which Rousseau sought to fill w/ the voice > a battle is declared, “Hegelianism” en sera la plus belle cicatrice

p. 237 (337) Rousseau [sometimes] places hieroglyphic, passionate langue before speech, a writing that is proximate and present, he praises this savage writing—traces like the wand (baguette), un dessin dans lespace (writing)

pp. 237-38 [review of Rousseau] voice immediacy, hieroglyphic immediacy, in and out of nature: [double bind of] need & passion, Rousseau describes une différance supplémentaire [writing/pity]

p. 238 (339) Rousseau’s first allusion to writing (movement of magic wand [baguette], hieroglyph) holds itself out of reach of all distinction (all difference of need from passion)

p. 239 [here] Rousseau privileges writing [?]: speech draws its energy from oral picto-hieroglyphics, from the visible (which has been compared to death)

pp. 282-83 theory of sensible origin of ideas (attention > imagination > pictogram), Cartesian critique of Leibnizian rationalism: no intact theological, metaphysical base

——sensible origin coincides w/ concept of sign as original sin > if experience is relation w/ plenitude, sign always a sign of the fall [Husserl, Hegel, ontotheology]

p. 284 (402-03) [re: certain historical interpretation of writing, Condillac, Warburton] linear progress of writing (quantitative condensation) > from one unique sign for each thing (not even signification but presence) to less ornamental, more economical, more attention to signified

pp. 285-86 (404) history of knowledge as desacralizaiton of signifier: history only conceivable btwn absolute pictograph & graphic expense reduced to presque rien

science, philosophy, epistémè, movement of idealization, privilege of logos is that of phonetic writing, of a more algebraic, economical writing (by reason of certain condition of knowledge): mondial effacement of signifier > one believes one is exalting parole, when in fact, one is fascinated by a figure of technè

pp. 303-04 (428-29) acc. Rousseau, Leibniz’s pure algebra, universal writing of science, total break from langue parlée, would be absolute evil, alienation > Rousseau: “la lettre tue

pp. 312-13 (440-41) unless there’s an extrinsic desire, Leibniz’s universal characteristic represents death of jouissance, scientific machine, pure state of representer > the telos of scriptural alienation

EU EU pp. 3-4 [re: Descartes’ Discourse on Method] to separate langue from discours (parole), to hypothesize language as method, formation of universal language, appeal to programmability of method, to a philosophical grammar (all systematic discourses: Leibniz, Bergson, Hegel, Marx)

——all philosophies of method, systematic discourses on concept of method, would thus exploit philosophemes already caught in language of philosophy, no invention then [?]

p. 32 “land of romance,” universal language, completed Babel > Aristotle, Plato: math as universal & common science w/out object

p. 33 investigation of mathesis universalis [Descartes’ Regulae] shouldn’t be stopped by equivocations of language (as Husserl would say of formal ontology) > Rule XIII: go from words to things

p. 34 Descartes: almost no more controversy if we could agree on meaning of words

pp. 34-5 Descartes’ thinking of universal language, a writing aid that could free thought for its own movement, would require but one word, one sign, for each atomic element [re: Hardy’s universal language] > only worth proposing in land of romance

p. 37 Hardy wants to feign a universal, primitive language > all natural languages would be genealogically derived from this romance of language

——Descartes jealously insists on adding “true philosophy” [he acts similarly w/ Augustine and St. Anselm] > stakes must be serious wherever there’s violent defamation, never forget this

pp. 38-40 Descartes distrusts “arcanum” (secret) in Hardy, but Derrida sees this as trading one utopia for another > Descartes’ will be a philosophical romance [a philosophy w/out secret as a deeper secret?]

——given inconvenience of memorizing every word, possibility of universal characteristic would be system of writing: printing of huge dictionary in all languages

——Descartes’ counter-proposal [to Hardy]: arcanum of “true science” > method, artificial intelligence, translating machine (could be taught in very little time): universality as principle of order, as path, passage, odos

p. 41 Descartes’ universal language would help men’s judgments, romance becomes the land of “true science,” where philosophy would have undivided dominion, it would be law, where order & path become method

——Derrida sees arbitrariness of sign in both Descartes’ vision of an absolutely natural language & in an artificial code

p. 42 [in truth, since Descartes sees universal language as impossible] humans are btwn paradise of absolutely natural language & romance of universal transparency: this fall is history

——romance of universal language cannot tell a true story [i.e. is not history]

p. 77 [re: use of word “translation” to refer to “transposition, transfer, transport” in a sense not strictly linguistic] for Schelling, language is a living phenomenon; Novalis, Goethe: nature an author to be translated w/ skill of a philologist

——Schelling: “nature is like some very ancient author whose message is written in hieroglyphics on colossal pages” [geologic?]

HISTORICITY

GOD p. 6 European history gets lost in details, doesn’t think abyss at heart of history that prevents totalization, misunderstands link btwn historicity & responsibility

p. 8 via Patočka, 2 heterogenous secrets: 1) secret of historicity 2) secret of orgiastic mystery which history of responsibility has to break w/

R p. 91 messianicity that at once interrupts and accomplishes intrinsic historicity [re: concept of democracy]

OOG p. 49 for phenomenology, irreducible historicity is only recognized after the event [re: phrasing of “in which it must have appeared,” necessity of Quod and Quomodo]

p. 64 for phenomenology, conditions of objectivity are conditions of historicity.

p. 104 Husserl reveals the univocity Joyce doesn’t: the apriori and the teleological condition for all historicity; that without which equivocations of empirical culture and history are possible [an impossible that makes Possible?]

p. 107 for Plato, wasn’t the eternity of essences another name for nonempirical historicity?

p. 115 Europe is the good example of historicity, incarnating in its purity the Telos of all historicity: universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditonality

pp. 115-16 three heights of historicity in Husserl: 1) general sense, essence of human existence moves in spiritual space of culture or tradition 2) European culture, theoretical project, philosophy 3) “conversion of philosophy into phenomenology”

p. 118 apriori structures of historicity could be questioned only by recourse to language, writing, the capacity of reactivation, and finally to method [this can be taken as Husserl’s method and as Derrida’s method]

p. 121 eidos of historicity, after Crisis, exceed limits assigned to it in Ideas I: absolute ideal Objectivity, this constituting history may be more profoundly constituted itself

p. 132 for Husserl, the origin of historicity will never be dependent on a history

p. 149 for Husserl, absolute is passage (historicity as passage of Speech, primordial Logos toward polar Telos)

——“method is not the neutral preface or perambulatory exercise of thought, rather, it is thought itself in the consciousness of its complete historicity”

p. 150 in going out from self to self of the Absolute of Living Present present, intentionality is the root of historicity, historicity is sense

p. 152 “access to Being and Being’s arrival must always already be contracted [stricture] or drawn together when phenomenology begins by claiming the right to speak (droit à parole)” > prescribing historicity for Being avoids simple misfortune of delay: phenomenology alone can open absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History, as auto-temporalization of Living Present

——delay is thus philosophical absolute, and absolute origin in general

FK p. 48 [historicity itself was an event] figure of Promised Land, essential bond btwn promise of place & historicity

——messianic or eschatological horizon delimits this historicity by having inaugurated it

BL pp. 214-15 that which makes literature possible is outside literature

——different periods of history of positive law give substance to literature, value of signatures [“authors”]

AF p. 75 along with openness to future, via Yerushalmi, Jew has historicity, obligation of memory, of the archive

SPOM p. 88 a new thinking of historicity calls us beyond metaphysical concept of history and end of history, either Hegel’s or Marx’s

p. 93 instead of reading Kòjeve’s end of history like Fukuyama, as capitalist paradise, Derrida reads an actor’s ploy, a demand that corresponds to law of law: where history comes to an end, historicity of history beings, finally has chance of promising itself

——where determined concept of man finished > là lhumanité pure de lhomme, de lautre homme et de lhomme comme autre commence ou a enfin la chance de sannoncerde se promettre > in an inhuman or a-human fashion

HASD pp. 39-40 historicity, événemantialité > significations foreign to khora

MPM p. 95 no act before speech, no speech before act > there is this “fact,” faktum, to which we’re recalled: already there, past never present, historicity itself, “ancientness” w/out history

p. 144 de Man: the incompatibility of grammar & meaning becomes explicit when linguistic structures are stated in political terms [on the grammar, historicity of law]

FWT p. 127 by inventing/violating modality of as if, revealing its infinity, literature endlessly opens up to historicity of political, w/ certain concept of democracy-to-come

as if an increased responsibility in absolute freedom of literature

p. 130 common possibilities of literature & democracy: 1) historicity (literature has acts, birthplaces, legacies; democracy defines itself by promising itself, by and in its historicity, its future-to-come) 2) power, credit of fiction [Montaigne/Pascal understood connection btwn right & fiction]

POS pp. 58-9 but what about historicity of history [Derrida will not simply enumerate histories like Socrates enumerates sciences, never asking about scientificity of science], but won’t historicity always demand an essence? ineluctable reappropriation of metaphysics, don’t we need to ask what is the “history” of “essence”?

P pp. 109-10 judgment of beauty opens historicity, inaugural example w/out concept, and also free, spontaneous (nothing less historical [?])

ATIA p. 24 history, historicity, historicality, all part of auto-biography, auto-definition, auto-situation of man [re: Derrida’s hesitation to claim there’s been a historical turning point in relation btwn man and animal, figure of turning pout too genetic, biological, zoological]

***pp. 112-13 before fall, before institution of nakedness, Adam was a vegetarian, Cain too was a vegetarian: God’s preference in Abel, the beginning of historicity, goes against his original commandment, now he prefers sacrifice

GSP p. 155 faithful comprehension [“true positivism”] of phenomenologist dispels shadow of a choice (might even say Husserl attuned to historicity of meaning, possibility of its becoming)

p. 165 genetic description of ego prescribes task of a universal genetic phenomenology (a eidos of historicity) for Husserl, this is not a series of ruptures, revolutions, that tear open a previous finitude to lay bear a hidden infinity, giving voice to dynamis of silence > the ruptures are always already indicated [Telos] [Derrida wonders if this a metaphysical affirmation in a phenemonology]

PS p. 170 for Foucault, enigma of the same permits continuity of meaning in absoluteness of rupture btwn madness and work > this is a historical relationship; but, for Derrida, to determine position of question (in history) is to eliminate an unexpected thought of historicity from memory

p. 178 acc. Artaud, letter is always stolen, because always open, never leads from subject to subject; autonomy of signifier as letter’s historicity, my vouloir-dire is submissive

FS p. 12 the project of infinite tradition must be acknowledged as such: that it can always fail is the mark of its pure finitude/pure historicity

p. 28 difference btwn Dionysus & Apollo, ardor & structure, cannot be erased in history, because not in history > it’s an original structure, the opening of history, historicity itself

CHM pp. 42-3 if great division btwn madness/Cogito is the historicity of history, could we write the history of historicity (the origin of history)? wouldn’t the hysteron proteron be more than a “logical fallacy”?

——if historicity is proper to reason: history of reason is not history of its origin but one of its determined figures

p. 54 historicity: neither ahistorical eternity, nor empirically determined moment of history of facts

pp. 60–1 speech, confined to temporal rhythm of crisis & reawakening [re: Cogito as madness, then against madness] opens discourse by making a mockery, humiliating madman w/in us: movement of temporalization, historicity in general, reign of finite thought must stay close to this violence to liberate and live as speech > madman as fool of logos, of father, king, master

EJQB p. 64 what’s in question: the incommensurable destiny of Judaism (as birth/passion of writing) that grafts (ente) “race born of the book” onto radical origin of meaning as literality, onto historicity itself: no history sans le sérieux (gravity) and labor of literality

p. 65 Jew elects writing which elects the Jews > responsible for truth’s suffusion w/ historicity, and history’s assignment of itself (s’assigne) to its empiricity

AFR p. 64 for Condillac, [the fact of facts] sensibility/experience due to original sin [historicity?]

TN p. 243 anthropocentric privilege fails to consider: 1) ultimate reduction of world 2) anything that’s not “human flesh,” i.e. technical prostheses 3) historicity that produces-human-beings-and-technics 4) that privileging human frees path toward Christian body

p. 247 Chrétian’s carnal figure of a spiritual touch, conversion of body (becoming-flesh) marked by historical event of revelation (Christian body): Incarnation, the Eucharist, by the giving, announcing, promising, and memory of Hoc est meum corpus

——no denial in Chrétian of body’s historicity: no abstract historicity w/out a history of touch, no essential archefacticity [Franck’s flesh?]; no thinking (Heidegger’s) of Offenbarkeit more originary than Offenbarung

p. 248 Christian body as post-sin, post-Incarnation historical body

AD p. 67 Levinas’ structural or a priori messiancity: fraternity, humanity, hospitality (not ahistorical but historicity w/out empirically determinable incarnation)

OG pp. 27-8 (43) the science of writing born in period of world’s history, look for roots of scientificity, roots of historicity, thus science of possibility of science, history of history, a grammatics not logic?

pp. 32-3 (49-50) how Saussure’s concept of the arbitrary strictly divides the uncertain frontiers btwn ideographic, pictographic, & phonetic scripts > arbitrariness appeals to opposition physis/nomos, physis/techné, whose ultimate function is perhaps to derive historicity

p. 121 writing as criterion of historicity or cultural value

pp. 178-79 perverse substitution as historicity itself or as degradation w/in history? doesn’t the former imply the latter? doesn’t concept supplement permit both interpretations?

p. 179 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] history also protects/resists abyss of evil > “moral love” (which is immoral, acc. Rousseau) becomes modesty (true morality of women)

HISTORICISM

POS pp. 104-05n critique of historicism indispensable, Derrida points to Husserl’s Philosophy as a Rigorous Science and Origin of Geometry, Hegel always the target (sometimes via Dilthey); can the critique of historicism be in the name of something other than truth and science?

HISTORY

KH pp. 98-99 entire discourse on khōra, every yet-to-come history of interpretations, included in advance, this X receives all, teleologically programs history of hermeneutics[?], is that a history?

GOD p. 8 gift of death, marriage of responsibility & faith, history depends on this excessive beginning > new experience of death

p. 9 this history [Christianity, Plato] will never come to a close, no history worthy of the name can be saturated or sutured

pp. 9-10 anabasis, or “conversion,” the turns in the history of secrecy, history of revolutions, history as revolution

GT p. 122 condition of knowing, desire to know (ēpistemē, historia rerum gestarum) [which Derrida relates to the possibility of narration], gives rise to history itself (res gestae, Geschehen, Geschichte)

——do Heidegger and Hegel argue the reverse? [history gives rise to narration?]

pp. 170-71 Icarus racing toward sun [via Baudelaire], sinking (sombre) not toward the bottom (fond) but toward abyss; unable to give his name, how could he ever claim he knows how to give? has no sepulture thus no proper name > the whole story? all of history?

FL p. 260 Benjamin grafted language of Marxist revolution onto messianism [see p. 263]: both announcing new historical epoch & beginning of a true history void of myth

HERP p. 179 foreign language, we know it could be intelligible, bears on beings beside which Dasein can stand, friend as stranger must belong to a Volk, engaged in a history, Mitgeschehen

OOG p. 46 for Husserl, not perception but history is the contrary to hallucination, imagination in general, the consciousness of historicity, reawakening of origins

pp. 46-8 Derrida wonders whether Husserl’s late interest in historicity, w/ genesis of geometry, would force a removal of eidetic/transcendental reductions > now that instituting facts become indispensable, invariable, sense would be indissociable from being (fact)

——but this indissociability has a rigorously determinable phenomenological sense > an iterative reduction that’s reactivating, noetic, reawakens that concealed under secondary passivities and infinite sedimentations (different [?] from imaginary variation of static phenomenology)

pp. 50-1 necessary “circle” as pure form of historical experience > return inquiry: history does not give sense to circulation of common coin, history supposes it > maintenance of circulation permits neutralization of worldly history, permits comprehension of how truth is possible

p. 52 return inquiry [tautology]: geometry’s development is a history only because it is a history> ground of unity is the world (not finite totality of sentient beings), but infinite totality of possible experiences in space

p. 65 is not the interconnecting of transcendental necessities at bottom the static, structural, normative schema for conditions of history rather than history itself?

p. 66 history [like creation ex nihilo] establishes the possibility of its own appearing.

p. 131 openness of infinite is openness of history itself, empirical history indistinguishable from nonhistory

p. 151 Derrida asks: why would there be any history instead of nothing?

AF p. 51 history: domination of constative over performative

p. 69 how could someone who promises a secret to a specter still be a historian? [re: Yerushalmi]

SPOM p. 17 what happens and deserves the name of an event after the end of history?

BL p. 191 law should never give rise to story > law of law: to be invested w/ categorical authority, law must have no history, genesis, no possible derivation

A p. 25 historians of death never ask the question “what is death?”

pp. 43-4 “culture of death”—a tautology? each culture treats death differently, w/ different partitions, culture of death = history of death (cult of ancestors, rituals of mourning/sacrifice)

p. 50 Ariès calls the “metaphysical” everything the historian must leave aside

EM p. 116 (137) hégéliano-husserliano-heideggerienne anthropology (in France) concerned itself with the concept of history but not the history of a concept, especially concerned w/ we, nous-hommes, totality of human-reality

p. 122 (146) for Hegel, Husserl: reason is history, and there is no history but of reason

PP p. 86 the Platonic traits, mythological figures re: origin of writing > opens relation btwn mythemes & philosophemes in western logos: a history, or History, constituted by philosophical difference btwn mythos and logos

VM p. 91 acc. Levinas, no time, no history, w/out absolute alterity of each instant

p. 92 Borges: “perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors,” light, for example, but what an example! which language can escape metaphor of light? [not night]

p. 94 could there be history (and work) if history did not truly meet alterity? as Levinas would have it—he does fulfill his anti-Hegelianism

——for Levinas, resistance to work, by provoking it, remains a moment of the same, a finite moment that forms a system and totality w/ agent > history: laborious procession of same

pp. 115-16 to exclude the equation God = Death would be to exclude every particular determination, but this has not been excluded by entirety of classical philosophy > God is named w/in difference btwn All and Nothing, w/in difference as difference itself > difference called history, God is inscribed in it

p. 117 against Levinas, Derrida sees history as transcendence, as excess over totality, history not totality transcended by eschatology, metaphysics, speech > but these movements themselves

p. 123 history would be meaningless, impossible w/out eschatology and transcendence, impossible as either finite totality or positive infinity

p. 130 infinitist dogmatism in pre-Kantian style does not pose question of responsibility of finite philosopher, overlooks irreducibility of history (infinite passage through violence)

p. 133 “living present” : originally and forever violent, freeing of absolute alterity in absolute same > if other can only be respected/dissimulated by the same, then time is violence, living present originally marked by death > “presence as violence is the meaning of finitude, meaning of meaning as history”

p. 145 for Heidegger, every epoch is erring (Irren), irreducible if Being is time and history

p. 148 that language hides its own origin is not a contradiction but history itself

——for Levinas, origin of concept must be the gift of the world to the other as tout autre, not the thought of Being

——for Levinas, despite critique of Husserl’s “anhistoricism,” origin of meaning is nonhistory, “beyond history,” a Hebraic transhistoricity? can this nonhistory be uprooted from history, can eschatology be invoked separated from every reference to history?

——anhistoricity of meaning profoundly separates Levinas & Heidegger; for the latter, Being is history

p. 153 to live in difference btwn Jew and Greek, perhaps the unity we call history

p. 316n connaturality of violence & discourse as very essence of history, ethnosociological (Lévi-Strauss) information would only confirm as factual example eidetic-transcendental evidence

OH p. 18 every history, history of a culture, has a telos (promise, memory) toward which it dreams of gathering itself > anticipation & telos; and every history cannot be identified in advance, unanticipatable, non-masterable, that of which one has no memory

p. 114n vis-à-vis Valéry, what has not yet happened in history: the capital event of a concept, which would be to think the event as such > the capital event is also the event of capital, the head

pp. 125-26n for Valéry, logos: calculation, reason, speech, discourse, knowledge > history

S p. 25 Heidegger rephrases Hegel’s “history of spirit unfolding in time” as “the development of history falls into time”

PPHS p. 71 process of sign has a history, signification is history comprehended: btwn original presence & its circular reappropriation in final presence

WM p. 215 usure of metaphor as continuist presupposition: history of metaphor has no breaks, is not heterogenous, but incurs progressive erosion

DS p. 184 concept of history has lived on possibility of meaning, on past/present/promised presence of meaning & truth > outside this system, concept of history reinscribed elsewhere, strategically

POS pp. 56-7 metaphysical concept of history, circular, linear, meaning fulfilling itself

——system of implications (teleology, eschatology, elevating & interiorizing meaning, continuity, truth, traditionality)

P pp. 20-1 for Hegel, art has a single meaning, une vérité une et nue, an etymon, that can be unveiled through history > wouldn’t this mean art is outside of history? but philosophers have always been too quick to deem art historical via opposition tekhnē/physis translated as art/nature

***p. 109 exemplary is a singular product, cannot be imitated, an example immediately valid for all (an historical event which points to an ahistorical, the concept can only come after the blow)

ROP p. 40 new techniques of the archive threaten the concept of history

SP pp. 85-9 the becoming-woman (becoming Christian) of the idea, the veiling of truth, is the beginning of history, the idea séloigne, devient transcendante, inaccessible, séduisante, the dream of death begins (Heidegger avoids this becoming-woman in his own analysis of History of an Error)

ATIA p. 24 history, historicity, historicality, all part of auto-biography, auto-definition, auto-situation of man [re: Derrida’s hesitation to claim there’s been a historical turning point in relation btwn man and animal, figure of turning pout too genetic, biological, zoological]

pp. 97-8 for Kant, a deus ex machina, a Maschinenwesen der Vorsehung (providential machine) regularizes course of history > man’s war is purposeful, has Triebfeder, unlike animal “war”

GSP p. 160 acc. Husserl, Dilthey’s Weltanschauungsphilosophie is a structural historicism, doesn’t avoid relativism or skepticism: confuses truth of facts w/ truths of reason [Leibniz’s terms]

HOLOCAUST

FL p. 259 to think the holocaust one must be hospitable to the law of the ghost

SH p. 50 there is a holocaust (all-consuming) for every date: “every hour counts its holocaust”

p. 52 poem, in offering itself, risks losing its time and place to the holocaustic generality of recurrence and readability of concept

FWT p. 113 every genocide is irreducibly singular

p. 114 those who internalize, who think they can assimilate, appropriate, habituate, subjectivize the worst [in a work of mourning], immunize, sacralize, and idealize it

p. 116 the worst thing [re: making use of Holocaust]: appropriation and instrumentalization of historical memory

pp. 135-36 movement toward more and more “humane” death penalties whitewashes act of killing; [E.R.] gas chambers & crematoria, all trace of living was effaced [see E.R. p. 154]

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

testify to what we can neither forget nor recall, a testimony w/out force of verdict or death sentence, to not write risks worst betrayal

——how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same

pp. 153-54 Shoah, mass killings > not, stricto sensu, DP (never a question, not even simulacrum, of legality, neither judgment, nor guilty parties, nor accusation, nor defense)

——some believe (incorrectly), DP minor next to genocides, war crimes, malnutrition, AIDS

ATIA pp. 79-80 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance > methodological fiction of men only seeing men, an ends of the animal (not man): 1) phenomenological question: is there world w/out animal? 2) a real hypothesis (if you’ll permit me): after animality, a sort of holocaust

PSSS p. 266 all the worst cruelties and terrors coincide w/ invention of human rights: Paris Commune, French Revolution, Shoah…

CIN pp. 24-30 holocaust as gift before every determinable being [see CIN in FIRE]

p. 46 “give fire its due, light counterfires in order to stop the progression of a blaze, avoid a holocaust” > fire’s share (part) is impossible to delimit (by virtue of the lexicon, the ‘themes’)

HOLY

AD pp. 4-5 Levinas’ meditation on ethics, on the transcendence of the holy over the sacred (paganism of roots, idolatry of place)

p. 61 Kadosh (the separated): holiness not sacredness

pp. 142-43n experience of à-Dieu: to have welcomed yes of other, infinity in separation, in its holiness > Adieu does not wait, is not, beyond being

——w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God

> à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

HOME

POOF p. 3 familiarity (oikeiótēs, in Plato’s Lysis) (being-at-home, being-close-to oneself) links friendship w/ laws & logics of universalization, ethics, law, right, equality, equity, democracy

p. 81 via Nietzsche, no longer any homes here, darkness falling on value of value, hence on the very desire for an axiomatic (a consistent, granted, presupposed system of values)

OH pp. 9-10 what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself, culture of oneself as culture of other, gathered and divided at the heart, home: [violent syntax] différence (d) avec soi

PP p. 81 living-beings, father and son, are announced to us w/in household (domesticité) of logos

p. 167 “Platonism” rehearses “family scene” while also trying to master it, to conceal (dissimuler) it by drawing curtains over the dawning of the West

——transmission of dialectical mastery of pharmaka from father to son disrupted by family scene that constitutes & undermines passage btwn pharmacy & house

WM pp. 251, 253 [exemplary nature of sun in relation to metaphor] if sun is always metaphorical, it has lustre [Mallarmé], is an artificial construction, always other than itself, emerging from itself (father, eye, seed, fire, egg) > via Du Marsais, the philosophical metaphor light of the spirit is a detour w/in (in sight of) reappropriation, presence, etc. (from Platonic eidos to Hegelian Idea), a trope, a borrowed dwelling (house) > here, light is one metaphor among metaphors, and borrowed dwelling, expropriation, becomes metaphor of metaphor

DIF DIF p. 4 the capital “a” of differance, a pyramid [A]; Hegel: body of sign is Egyptian pyramid > Derrida moves from pyramid to tomb, oikēsis > tomb of proper, familial residence, economy of death (this stone announces death of tyrant [cf. TN.]) [this tomb can’t even be made to resonate]

RM pp. 71-2 neighborhood (voisinage, Nachbarschaft) of Dichten and Denken: vicus, veicus, which perhaps refers to oikos and Sanskrit veca

EJQB p. 76 to be is to-be-in-the-book (être-dans-le-livre), book only threatened by nothing, if it came to be, the threat, it would be of the house and of the book

AD pp. 41-2 host is guest in own home, one who receives is received in receiving: Rosenzweig’s originary dispossession of ipseity, home [the Jew]

p. 43 for Levinas, woman’s interiority, a society w/out language, apolitical domesticity [Derrida is not going to deal w/ stakes of these androcentric attributions, like he did in ATM]

——Levinas: home already hospitable to its inhabitant—the feminine being [Klossowski]

p. 92 neither welcome nor hospitality w/out radical alterity: presupposes separation, social bond, unbinding, gives respiration: le chez-soi (at-home-with-oneself) would no longer be natural, rooted, but a response to a wandering (errance), phénomène de l'errance qu'il arrête

p. 93 for Levinas, allotted (allouée) home is not natural, it’s elected

p. 99 ex-propriety makes of the subject a hôte and hostage (gentle), someone who is in his own home in the home of the other—“anachronism of a debt preceding the loan”

pp. 106-07, 149n (Psalms 132:13) desire of Yahweh to reside > no desire w/out elective claim, w/out exclusive request for singular residence

BSi pp. 261-62 unheimlich: 1) worrying aspect of foreignness as intimacy of one’s own home 2) says the essential bearing of Celan’s “Meridian” 3) associated w/ the foreigner 4) Geheimnis (the intimate, the folded back on itself, what has withdrawn in withdrawal, hidden inside of house and home), secret of encounter at most intimate heart of present

OG p. 290 (410) imposition of form via spacing, beyond classical model of causality, a new transcendental aesthetic guided by inscription: writing, as Rousseau intuited, linked to to nature of social space > inscription as habitation in general

HOMOGENIZATION

PIO p. 40 homogenization of civil & military tech, private or governmental programming (of sciences, of arts)—is homogenization itself > it’s at work before integration of aleatory other, an integration achieved in political economy, this modern invention, the mirror of Leibniz’s games of chance, “a new species of logic”: chance acquires meaning in an economic horizon

HORIZON

GT p. 26 “semantic horizon of anticipation that authorizes” him [Marcel Mauss] to gather together phenomena of diverse sorts

MONL p. 22 threatening & threatened promise, monolingualism & tautology, impossibility of metalanguage, but there are effects of metalanguage: at the horizon, spectral, infinitely desirable, allows the mirage of another language to tremble

p. 71 in the waiting without horizon for a language that only knows how to keep people waiting

p. 73 let all my specters loose, a desire w/out horizon

FK p. 94n multiplicity of divine [via Serge Margel] commands us to return to unitary pre-comprehension, horizon of meaning, even if this horizon must be abandoned

FL p. 255 Kant’s regulative idea is a horizon (opening and a limit)

OOG p. 117 for Husserl, “horizon is always virtually present in every experience; for it is at once the unity and incompletion, the anticipated unity in every incompletion” > keeps infinite openness in tact, converting critical philosophy’s state of possibility into concrete infinite potentiality [capitalism, Levinas’ being]

***p. 80 when horizon becomes structure and essence: horizon normalizes, creates norms

p. 117 “horizon is always virtually present in every experience; for it is at once the unity and incompletion, the anticipated unity in every incompletion” > keeps infinite openness in tact, converting critical philosophy’s state of possibility into concrete infinite potentiality

——“horizon-certainty,” “horizon-knowledge,” “horizon-consciousness,” horizon as already there of the future

SEC p. 329 semantic horizon exceeded or punctured (crevé) by dissemination not polysemia

VM p. 95 acc. Levinas, concepts anticipate a horizon w/in which alterity is amortized as soon as it is announced—because foreseen, horizon always horizon of the same

p. 120 Idea in Kantian sense [Husserl] as infinite overflowing of horizon, never equal to intuition of an object, even God’s intuition [?]

——in phenomenology there’s no constitution of horizons only horizons of constitution

pp. 120-21 if infinity of Husserlian horizon has form of indefinite opening, doesn’t this keep it from totalization, from immediate present? is not intentionality respect itself? eternal irreducibility of other to same > w/out phenomenon of other as other no respect, respect supposes phenomenality, and ethics, phenomenology

p. 129 Hegel recognized negativity, anxiety or war in infinite absolute, as movement of absolute’s own history, whose horizon is a final pacification in which alterity would be absolutely encapsulated (résumée), if not lifted up (levée), in parousia

p. 149 God another name of Being (name because nonconcept)? > opening of the horizon not in the horizon

POOF p. 12 via Aristotle, loving the dead (beyond death, beyond life), carries philía to limit of its possibility, also its ultimate resource: horizon is limit & absence of limit, loss of horizon on the horizon, ahorizontality of horizon > I feel myself [autology], before any contract, borne to love dead other

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

p. 286 Nietzsche’s gift must also belong to a finite world > how to think dissymmetry of gift w/out exchange, infinite disproportion, from vantage point of terrestrial finitude? under its horizon w/out horizon [see p. 263] > infinitization itself is suspected of being an economic ruse, perverse seduction, stratagem, of loving one’s neighbor

OH p. 28 horizon (ancient Greek) = limit; to see itself (Europe) on the horizon, is to see itself from its end, discourse of anamnesis—taste for finality (goût de fin), for death

PAS PAS p. (69) Blanchot’s figures, room, sea, staircase, etc. are going to be effaced, figures san figure; not places in space, but they have a certain horizontality (thus the attribution of spatial horizon)

FSW p. 203 differance as non-originary origin, erases myth of origin, determined outside teleological/eschatological horizon [horizon key word here]

FS p. 26 [Levinas’] face as structuralist repose [?], peacefulness of a spectacle, horizon

WAP p. 16 philosophy has no horizon, if horizon means a limit, a line that encircles or delimits a perspective (interdisciplinarity: more horizontal identities than ever)

D p. 350 polysemy multiplies w/in horizon of final parousia, temporary detours of lived passion, a signifying martyrdom of truth past or truth to come [thus, dissemination not polysemy]

p. 351 “horizon”-value (pure infinite opening for presentation of present and experience of meaning) is, suddenly, framed (encadrée)—it is a part, and suddenly parts (fait partie, la voici partie)

HOSPITALITY

GT p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

MONL pp. 22-23 monolingual solipsism never belonging, never property, power of mastery, never pure “ipseity” (hospitality or hostility)

p. 25 when hospitality auto-limits itself into a law [auto-immunity?]

R p. 4 Derrida speaking from the bottom of his heart: the excessive gift goes straight to his heart, to what he holds dear, to what holds him > any words of welcome (hospitality) too modest

p. 63 antinomy: democracy has wanted only men and also aspires to offer hospitality to excluded

H p. 15 foreigner’s pain: cannot speak the language, is w/out defense before the law, foreign to the language of hospitality > can we only welcome the foreigner if we impose the violence that he speaks our language?

p. 23 the right to hospitality commits a household, a line of descent, a family

p. 25 irreducible pervertibility in law of hospitality: the law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right, w/ law or justice as rights [see p. 65 state perverts]

pp. 27-9 question posed to the foreigner: “what is your name?”

——what about unquestioning hospitality? more just, more loving to question or not to question? question of hospitality as question of question

p. 41 hostis chain (hosti-pet-s, potis, potest, ipse, etc.)

p. 47 hospitality & email (prosthetic apparatuses)

p. 51 inviolable immunity (the home) remains the condition of hospitality

p. 55 host must elect, choose, filter, must have power, no hospitality w/out finitude: Gewalt, force of law

p. 71 hospitality’s infinite idea should resist the law itself

p. 73 hospitality remains, like law, conditional, and thus conditioned on the unconditionality that is the basis of the law

p. 77 unconditional welcome of every other would include animals

p. 79 pervertibility (corruptibility) of hospitality—that it must actualize in laws

pp. 81-83 One + n, the antinomic addition, adds conditional laws to unconditional law of hospitality, Derrida’s even ok w/ using phrase “categorical imperative” (kept under erasure)

——hospitality must not pay a debt

p. anne 88 “madness in the relationship to the mother,” the very possibility of madness; p. 92 “the essence of madness must be related to the essence of hospitality, in the area of this uncontrollable outburst toward the one who is closest,” mother tongue as metaphor for “being-at-home in the other”

p. anne 94 [from mother to violence] eruption of violence which borrows its madness from mother, substituted for proximity, from hospitality to hostility > terrorism, hostage wars

p. anne 98 Levinas: “essence of language is friendship and hospitality”

p. 125 the guest becomes the host’s host

p. 127 infinite speed contracted into an absolute halt or haste, precipitation because delay, instant of an instant that is canceled out > thus always late & precipitous re: hospitality

p. 135 Levinas says language is hospitality

——absolute, hyperbolical, unconditional hospitality suspends language, a particular determinant one, and even the address to the other

——always threatened by this dilemma: 1) when unconditional hospitality is circumscribed by economy of circle (law, duty) [vs. ring?] 2) when unconditional hospitality dispenses w/ law

——absolute hospitality offers gift w/out reservations

——absolute and conditioned hospitality must pervert each other (capacity for perversion irreducible) [see p. 147]

p. 137 technological prostheses, whose refinements are unlimited in principle > still give fantasy of auto-nomy, auto-affection: is there hospitality w/out this, w/out auto-affection, the privileged figure of hearing oneself speak?

p. 155 narratives of hospitality testify without end in our memory

SPOM p. 82 hospitality w/out reserve is the condition of the event

p. 176 “as soon as there is some specter, hospitality and exclusion go together”

p. 212 figure of absolute hospitality: strange, familiar, inhospitable > quasi-transcendental “messianism,” materialism w/out substance, materialism of the khōra for a despairing “messianism,” a curious taste of death, a foretaste (avant-goût), curious of what it conjures

POO p. 14 invitation must not oblige, must leave free and take hostage

A p. 10 true hospitality is to receive hospitality from your guest (infinity lost in abyss of endekhomenon, the entire meditation of khora in Timaeus)

p. 11 guest must be free to come or not come

pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

VM p. 152 nothing can so profoundly solicit Greek logos as irruption of tout-autre > Greek language offers hospitality to a thought which remains foreign to it [Jew/Christian in his home]

***p. 153 Greek logos not accidental for any thought; Greek miracle is impossibility for any thought to treat its sages as “sages of the outside” > by proferring epekeina tes ousias, by welcoming alterity into heart of logos, it has protected itself against every surprising convocation

OH p. 73 whether hospitable or xenophobic, self-affirmation of identity always claims to be responding to call of universality, an inscription of universal in singular, unique testimony to human essence and to what’s proper to man

p. 77 integrate immigrant, recognize and accept alterity of immigrant: 2 concepts of hospitality

SH p. 61 figure of absolute future: monstrosity—Elijah, guest, other [re: word to be circumcised opened like a door to “who” would come]

F p. xxiii desire of Wolf Man no longer even his own—lhôte de ses hôte (haunting of a host of ghosts)

POOF pp. 50-1 Nietzsche’s hospitality for mad arrivants, fool already on premises, a guest who would have preceded his host, sheer madness of inverting friend/enemy > requests only that they open the doors of their hearts to him

p. 98 Benveniste’s etymology of phílos, its relation to home, hospitality & oath, but in Homer phílos has vague possessive quality (‘his knees,’ ‘his son’)

p. 229 who invites you to read a book? i.e. to invite the word of another into your home? how many of you are there? the rejoinder, the attention promised, remains virtual

FWT p. 59 pure hospitality or hospitality of visitation (doesn’t demand passport, not a political or juridical concept) vs. hospitality of invitation

——Derrida “concedes” perverse effects of absolute hospitality, limiting conditions of hospitality can be done w/ best intentions [also necessary to uphold laws, maintain sovereign mastery]

p. 60 absolute hospitality, risk, exposure to “who” comes, when love arrives > must maintain concept of this horizon w/out horizon though it cannot become a political/juridical concept

p. 97 Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal, for which Derrida has the greatest respect, conditioned universal hospitality w/ reference to nation-state & citizenship

ROP pp. 42-3 to say “we” when all alone, after the death of the other, is a common phenomena of destinerrance, of the letter’s never returning, une dérive interne, to which we have to return

——“we” modality of with, with the other, as guest, host, or parasite, we is always said by a single person, taking advantage, the one signs for the other (at the home of; apud, avuec, avoc, apud hoc)

ATIA p. 37 Derrida’s very early dream, obsession, before his bestiary [his texts], of an absolute hospitality (to so many animots), infinite appropriation—constituting everything thought or written w/in a zoosphere

SW p. 343 ipse: the power itself, the law, law of father, of son, brother, laws of hospitality (hosti-pet-s, hospes, posis, despotes, utpote, “the mysterious -pse of ipse,” says Benveniste, naively astonished)

PSSS p. 254 arrivant, hospitality of visitation not invitation, beyond all instituting utterances, ce qui arrive, event, puts to rout performative act, sometimes cruelly, perhaps beyond the death drive, exceeds rules of hospitality: unpredictable for hosts

HST p. 358 hospitality, possibility of laughter

——tears, work of mourning, as process of hospitality > also, the culture of smile, welcoming of a promise

p. 359 Tupinamba give tearful welcome: stranger hailed as revenant; hôte as ghost (spirit or revenant, holy spirit)

——hospitality: question of time, time of waiting, waiting beyond time

p. 360 [re: hospitality] se tendre, sattendre à, tenue/retenue (holding/withholding) [cf. A pp. 64-6]

——radical hospitality must consists in receiving w/out (extending) invitation

——the unlivable contradiction of extending (du tendre) and waiting (de lattendre); hantise (figure of visitation w/out invitation), au bord de la mort: it is to death that hospitality destines itself

pp. 361 hospitality: culture itself > les structure de laccueil, les structures daccueil

——no culture w/out culture of death says same thing as no culture w/out culture of hospitality: of the abode as last resting place (de la demeure comme dernieère demeure), mourning & memory

——hospitality: to be ready to not be ready > surprised, violated, expropriation: unprepared in mode that is not even “not yet”

p. 361 one must (il faut) welcome w/out “one must” (sans il faut)

——absolute hospitality: say “yes” to the coming of le tout autre, absolutely inanticipable stranger

p. 362 no hospitality if I welcome what I am ready to welcome

——madness of concept of hospitality: Messiah as hôte; visitation not invitation (not dialectical opposition) > invitation prepares for visitations

pp. 362-63 “the entire contradiction” more than a dialectical one: each concept hospitable to an other that never was “its other” (dialectical contradiction): autodeconstruction in every concept undoes the grip, the violence of taking, Begriff, capture, comprendre, cum-capio

the difference btwn extending hospitality to one’s chosen other (integratable immigrants), and a tout autre (absolute surprise, madness of the concept of hospitality, atopos)

p. 363 Levinas still calls the other—my neighbor, my universal brother in humanity > Derrida: wouldn’t hospitality have to open to an other that isn’t my hôte? perhaps an “animal”?

p. 364 experience, exercise of impossible hospitality: “the exemplary experience of deconstruction” > deconstruction of the concept, concept of concept, of the at-home

p. 369 in Massignon’s “The 3 Prayers of Abraham…”, monotheistic religions issued from patriarch who came to earth as “stranger, a hôte, gêr

pp. 370-71 acc. Massignon, Islam looks to Abraham more than Christianity > Islam is most faithful, exemplary heir, of the hospitality of hôte Abraham > Iqrā: right of hospitality

p. 373 Massignon: Abraham’s hospitality as a sign announcing the gathering of all nations

pp. 380-81 forgiveness granted to other—supreme gift of hospitality > host too must ask forgiveness, welcoming must be infinite, one can never give enough to surprise of visitor, messianic surprise: host, always lacking, at fault, unprepared

pp. 401-02 dakhīl (intimate, interior, stranger due protection, protected by divine blessing) linked to hôte, hostis gār, stranger, enemy > hostipitality

p. 408 hôte always passing through, iterability, come, come back

pp. 408-09 substitution, cloning, series; where does human begin? abortion: subject hôte-hostage, clone w/out father?

***p. 414 thoughts of hospitality at once ethics of substitution & ethics of holy/sacred hospitality

C p. 215 retrace one’s steps, narrative (récit), series, funeral procession/palindrome, revenir: le revenu de lusure, le revenant, lhôte, ghost, guest [both in English] > le coffin comme hôtel de passe (whore-hotel)

p. 220 out-of-series: inhabits w/out residing, haunts, apparition of visitor is innumerable (throws arithmosophists off the trail)

LI p. 90 parasite can never be excluded from body “proper” > “an owner” calls it parasite (jealously defending his oikos) > whatever violently “takes place” always something of a parasite, offered hospitality, a place, by host: never quite taking place is part of parasite’s success as an event

TN pp. 1-2 a question about the day came of me, to me, w/out invitation, before the day, “she” watches over day, pre-phenomenological, trans-phenomenological: “quand nos yeux se touchent, fait-il jour ou fait-il nuit?”

——Derrida determined to show limitless patience ready for infinite, time of experience itself

p. 352n to show that shaking hands is not always privileged form of greeting, Derrida tells story about his own experience of Maori hongi: greeting by touching noses, weeping even

pp. 224 when Nancy lets the other body co-appear (comparaître), doesn’t mean “come into presence,” but to “come” as hôte not shutting the door à larrivance de lhôte

p. 262 Derrida tempted to let himself be tempted to think, to desire, the least venial, least expiable temptation: substitution w/out sacrifice > would the neutral spacing (the khōra) offer hospitality to this substitution of substitution or detain it forever as a hostage?

EW pp. 282-83 “il faut bien manger” (it’s good to eat, one must eat well), a learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat, a rule offering infinite hospitality

——sublime refinement involved in respect for the other: a way of “Eating well” or “eating the good”

AD pp. 15-6 violence of host, to dare to say bienvenue: appropriate a home one has to give

pp. 17-8 Levinas proposes a teaching via welcoming that gives/receives something else, not ruse of master who feigns effacement behind figure of midwife: maieutics teaches nothing—unveils place where same gathers in itself as the same, in the position which is proper to it

p. 18 via Benveniste, hosti-pet-s: links hospitality & ipseity, like 2 sovereign powers > “guest-master”

pp. 19-20 Kant’s “w/ a view to perpetual peace”: universal hospitality in cosmopolitical law

pp. 20-1 hiatus btwn ethics of hospitality (Levinas’ 1st philosophy) & ethics of law/politics becomes negative when we want assurance of ontological foundation, want to deduce, derive

——if we think hiatus as opening (mouth, possibility of other speech), outside hierarchy of founding/founded, responsibility would impose itself btwn ethics, politics, law

p. 21 neither face nor hospitality can be thematized (what they have in common)

pp. 22-3 hospitality, welcome of face, attention: this series of metonymies are all the same only where they withdraw, like the other, from theme—each welcomes (says “yes” to) the other

p. 26 receiving beyond capacity of “I” > dissymmetrical disproportion marks law of hospitality

——Levinas, surprisingly, calls reason this hospitable receptivity (reorients philosophical tradition, which thinks sensibility as passive opposition to reason)

p. 35 the possibility of offering hospitality to the worst is necessary so good hospitality has a chance: yes of the other, yes to the other > impossibility of programming a limit btwn pervertibility/perversion is necessary

——idiom as ambiguous chance of hospitality

p. 36 Levinas: woman, other whose presence is discretely an absence, hospitable welcome par excellence, condition for home, recollection, inhabitation

p. 41 Levinas: in love transcendence goes further and less far than language, hospitality is not accomplished as Love [via the feminine?]

pp. 41-2 host is guest in own home, one who receives is received in receiving: Rosenzweig’s originary dispossession of ipseity, home [the Jew]

p. 43 Klossowski’s host [re: novel Roberte ce Soir] becomes guest of his guest because the woman is there—in this instance, possibility of pevertibility linked to sexual difference

p. 45 hospitality (feminine par excellence) that precedes property can’t be appropriated, arrives before the master

pp. 45-6 welcome is a quasi-synonym of hospitality: copula that brings them together binds phenomena of unbinding (déliasion) (infinite separation of any hospitality worth its name)

p. 46 hospitality, “radical separation,” experience of alterity, relation to other as ferential, referential, deferential bearing (portée) > this is Levinas’ metaphysics, first philosophy not ontology

——separation as “metaphysics,” an experience of hospitality, irruption of finite in infinite, the passage meta ta physika passes through hospitality of finite threshold that opens to infinity

p. 48 essence of what opens beyond being is hospitality

——for Levinas, hospitality is an intentionality that resists thematization

pp. 48-50 [see

COSMOPOLITANISM

]

p. 50 [like cruelty for Freud & Nietzsche] hospitality not circumscribed, has no contrary: allergy, rejection, xenophobia, even torture “welcomes”

p. 51 hospitality, the epochē of epochē, interruption of self, of phenomenology’s “principle of principles,” of presentation in person, “in the flesh”

pp. 71-2 acc. Levinas, messianic hospitality in Egypt despite slavery [Egyptians let Jews in?]

p. 73 Levinas: “to shelter the other in one’s own land or home, to tolerate the presence of the landless and homeless on the ‘ancestral soil,’ so jealously, so meanly loved—is that the criterion of humanness? unquestionably so”

p. 92 neither welcome nor hospitality w/out radical alterity: presupposes separation, social bond, unbinding, gives respiration: le chez-soi (at-home-with-oneself) would no longer be natural, rooted, but a response to a wandering (errance), phénomène de l'errance qu'il arrête

p. 106 questions of eschatological hospitality not posed (posent) in repose of place, they put one to the test (mettent à lépreuve) of an interrogation that endures sans repos

pp. 111-12 no hospitality w/out chance of spectrality; God uncontaminated by Being: rigorous definition of the Face, le tout autre > as spectral as it is spiritual? gives orders, gives pardon

CF pp. 16-7 ‘to cultivate an ethic of hospitality’: tautologous expression? hospitality is culture, ethics, residence, relation to ourselves & others

pp. 22-3 improve law of hospitality, do so btwn unconditional and conditional: pure unconditional law in danger of piety, irresponsibility, no potency, no form > the unconditional can be perverted at any moment

BSi p. 241 [re: D.H. Lawerence’s poem “Snake”] scene of hospitality at water source

p. 244 [re: “Snake”] sovereign as guest (hôte) commands, the first comer, comes before me

p. 246 those asking for hospitality are exiles

HOSTAGE

MONL pp. 19-20 alone in a genre [particular] that becomes a universal example, exemplarity of host as hostage: “universal hostage”

p. 72 Derrida has the illusion he cultivates his own desert, whereas a hostage’s place was reserved for him, as a summons (mise en demeure)

H p. 55 the other becomes a hostile subject, I risk becoming their hostage.

p. 107 Theseus, with Oedipus’ burial secret, becomes a retained hostage, a detained addressee

——everyone is hostage to the dead man (Oedipus)

A pp. 59-60 from kidnapping to hostage war (different modes of technology)

p. 60 pass from hostage to host/guest from host/guest to ghost in series: hostage, host, guest, ghost, holy ghost, Geist

pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

ATIA p. 106 Levinas reconfigures Descartes’ infinite will to “I am (following) after the infinite” > subject as host/hostage of the infinite

HST pp. 364-65 Levinas’ change of accent, scenery (paysage) (from Totality & Inf to Otherw): from peaceful welcome to violent hostage > no apparent inconsistency

——the same logic: the one welcoming comes 2nd, thus hostage > inseparability of concept of substitution & concept of subjectivity as hostage: hostage, responsible for all, therefore substitutable, precisely where he is absolutely irreplaceable

p. 376 hostage: “we offer ourselves as a pledge,” captivity, spiritual residence [re: Massignon’s Badaliya, Arabic name for substitution, a spiritual community he founded in Egypt]

p. 379 [re: Massignon’s, Kahil’s Badaliya] St. Paul: “while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his son” > a sacred deposit, mystical substitution, hostage as disappropriation

p. 385 for forgiveness to be possible, what there is to forgive must remain unforgivable: otherwise exchange, excuse [see p. 380] > logical aporia (not just formal logic) but tragedy of compassion: intersubjectivity as destiny of hostage, madness of substitution

p. 387 limit (of forgiveness) cannot be crossed (infranchissable)—and is crossed insofar as it can’t be [hymen] > ultimate compassion, very test of substitution (impossible), to be hostage and hôte of the other

p. 388 substitution of hostage as un être-sous, être-dessous, not the beneath of subjectum, substantia, hypokeimenon but submitted (soumis), assujetti, to the height of the Most High (law above)

p. 404 Levinas: memory of servitude in Egypt assembles humanity, ego is a hostage, ego ceaselessly missing itself, debt absorbed only by being increased; such is the pride of nonessence!

pp. 404-05 Levinas: man conceived as hostage for all the others [not selves for self]

pp. 409-10 an example is always a substitutable substitute > “you, for example” often violent address of one who has power/authority to take hostage: inscribes possible replaceability in address to other

+R p. 156 Derrida yielded to Adami (hooked like a fish [hostage]), as if his angular signature was waiting for me [Derrida], a stupefying advance > it became Derrida's business, made him speak

TN p. 262 Derrida tempted to let himself be tempted to think, to desire, the least venial, least expiable temptation: substitution w/out sacrifice > would the neutral spacing (the khōra) offer hospitality to this substitution of substitution or detain it forever as a hostage?

ATM p. 170 Levinas: the substitution of the hostage discovers the trace

p. 187 as a woman, by reversing dissymmetry [of tout autre in Levinas], Derrida has added rape [hostage to other, raped by other]

AD p. 7 Levinas: “responsibility for the other,” “responsibility of the hostage,” an experience of substitution & sacrifice

p. 56 for Levinas, the hôte is a hostage insofar as he’s a subject obsessed (thus besieged), persecuted, put into question in the place where he takes place—in election

p. 57 hostage: 1) a hôte given/received as a substitute pledge (gage) in places of power, at disposal of sovereign, hospitality w/out property, “accusation by everyone” 2) obsidium, obsidatus—condition of being captive/hostage, a state of siege, “persecuting obsession,” “responsibility for everyone” > acc. both lineages there’s a token of proof (gage) of substitution

p. 146n Badaliyasubstitution “as hostages”—Massignon’s persecution resonates, up to a point, w/ Levinas’

p. 83 for Levinas, “substitution,” absolute passivity, “possibility of the impossible” that’s not Heidegger’s death, but the condition of the hostage, responsibility before/beyond death— impossibility of “slipping away (se dérober)”

p. 99 ex-propriety makes of the subject a hôte and hostage (gentle), someone who is in his own home in the home of the other—“anachronism of a debt preceding the loan”

HUMANISM

KH p. 148n Heidegger: chaos, khaos, khaine, signifies the yawning, a split in two, close connection to aletheia, abyss which opens

——for Nietzsche, Chaos prevents a humanization (Vermenschung) of existence in its totality

MONL p. 39 “sovereign establishment (mise en demeure souveraine) [sovereign summons]… disguised under alibis of ‘universal’ humanism”

***FK pp. 78-9 from kenotic horizon of death of God to rights of human life (anthropological re-immanentization): an Abraham who would refuse to sacrifice his son and no longer envisage what was always madness [Pope speaks only of a certain “death of God”]

p. 93 humanitarian must keep peace, search for salvation, in new alliance btwn tele-technoscientific and 2 sources of religion: 1) the holy, unscathed 2) faith, fiduciary on the other

SPOM p. 53 prophet-gravedigger: anything but a humanist

p. 74 messianicity w/out messianism distinguished from “an idea of” democracy, from law or right, even human rights

p. 93 where determined concept of man finished > là lhumanité pure de lhomme, de lautre homme et de lhomme comme autre commence ou a enfin la chance de sannoncerde se promettre > in an inhuman or a-human fashion

p. 105 Derrida admits that the right’s stance on the hypocrisy of what’s called humanitarian should be saluted, while remaining vigilantly on guard for its manipulations

p. 172 humanity: collection or series of ghosts

p. 181 man, most unheimlich of all ghosts, if Christ (absolute specter) causes fear and pain, man causes even more—man makes himself fear (se fait peur), becomes fear he inspires > thus contradictions of all humanism

A p. 35 absolute arrivant makes possible everything (starting w/ humanity of man) it cannot be reduced to

p. 59 Heidegger refuses to use word universal even though his existential analysis of death wants to be (universal too humanistic for Heidegger, too dependent on Aufklärung)

EM p. 115 (135) humanism: Christian existential personalism

p. 115n (136) Sartre’s Nausea very ironically démonté his humanism elsewhere

pp. 115-16 (136-37) Sartre countersigned Corbin’s monstrous translation of Dasein: “réalité-humaine” > w/ Sartre and others of this period, concept of man is never examined

p. 116 (137-38) Sartre’s “metaphysical,” distinguished from phenomenological ontology which described essential specificity of regions, a purportedly neutral/undetermined unity of Being in-itself and Being for-itself > nothing other than unity of man and God: project of becoming God as the project constituting human-reality (atheism changes nothing); Sartre verifies Heidegger’s assessment “every humanism remains metaphysical,” ontotheological [see p. 118 (140n)]

p. 117 (139) question of humanism contemporary w/ spellbinding (fascinante) extension of “human sciences” w/in philosophical field

p. 121 (144) nous: assures proximity to itself of central being for which circular reappropriation is produced; nous: unity of absolute knowledge and anthropology, God & man, of onto-theo-teleology and humanism

——“lêtreet la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et lhumanisme

p. 123 (147) critique of empirical anthropologism affirmation of transcendental humanism (Husserl, Kant)

p. 128 (153) Heidegger’s radical questions re: humanism, his study of genesis of concept/value of “man” via Greek paideai in Rome, Christianizing of Latin humanitas, rebirth of Hellenism in 14th-18th centuries, makes secondary any metahumanist position not placed in his opening

——(154) for Heidegger, what is threatened in extension of metaphysics & technology is the essence of man, devastation of languages threat to essence of humanity

p. 130 (156) Heidegger: humanism does not realize the proper dignity of man, does not set humanitas high enough

VM p. 102 Blanchot: preeminence of oral discourse, tranquil humanist, nearness to speaker

pp. 142-43 humanism, separating man from animal, via analogy of God and human face [vis-à-vis Descartes, ambiguity of substance as concerns God and his creatures], is this not the original metaphor? Levinas’ metaphysical humanism

S pp. 11-2 Heidegger’s discourse [on hand], all the more peremptory and authoritarian for hiding its discomfiture, preserves, sheltered in obscurity, the profoundest metaphysical humanism

***pp. 39-40 price of the strategy of “spirit,” always turns back on “subject,” even when used to displace subject from racism, biologism, naturalism, the opposition requires a “unilaterality of subjectity,” an oppositional determination > whether “human rights” or democracy, freedom of spirit demarcates a metaphysics of subjectity that is blind to the irreducibility of complicity, contamination (even if, and there are, degrees)

pp. 55-6 though Derrida sees a “humanist teleology” in the hierarchization of man to animal (found in the negation imposed on animal w/ weltarm), one which requires not one ontology but the very possibility of the onto-logical, he isn’t criticizing it (it does denounce biologism, racism, and naturalism) > can we escape this program? can we transform it by “reconnoitering it right down to its most tortuous ruses and most subtle resources”?

OH p. 75 for Husserl, the European philosopher committed to universal reason is functionary of mankind

TC p. 234 theater of cruelty measures limit of representation: man is a representation of life, humanism > instead, life is cruelty, the nonrepresentable origin of representation

FWT p. 98 how can one be opposed to the humanitarian ideal? it’s not even “political” [Schmitt], but must remain vigilant to humanitarian alibis, suspect policies instrumentalizing “human rights”

p. 147 DP, like death itself, what’s “proper to man” > DP, at risk of shocking, always answered deeply “humanist” pleas

p. 173 psychoanalytic aim > not to seek refuge in a theological/humanist alibi > Derrida seduced by psychoanalysis’ audacity of thought, its courage, signing theoretical “fictions” in name of a knowledge w/out alibi (thus, the most “positive” knowledge”)

POOF p. 85 for Schmitt, any discussion of humanity is outside the political: there is no enemy of humanity > enemy is always public

p. 265 Hugo: in the future, Paris will be the capital of what will be called Europe, which will be called Humanitydefinitive nation, what a majestic vision!

pp. 272-73 Derrida explains how he does not want to exploit spectacular ‘news,’ that which screens out (fait écran) reflection [makes a screen of reflection], by projecting itself w/ pathetic, sensational, images of violence that are too easily mediatizable > yet, all these examples (immigration, globalization, new warfare) are in our mind & heart as Derrida strives to deconstruct fraternal link to friendship: how does humanitarian participate in fraternizing humanization?

p. 273 the question “what is a crime against humanity?” is pregnant w/ a future whose monstrosity ne porte pas de nom

from w/in fraternization, greatest crime is betrayal of humanity (fall short of virtue of fraternity), the supreme perjury: fratricide as radical evil, only the brother can be betrayed

pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

——modesty would get woman to participate in universal fraternity (i.e. humanity), equalizes sexes by moralizing them: modest woman is a brother for man

——woman doesn’t become any less desirable! modesty belongs to history qua fraternization

p. 275 for Kant, crime against humanity would be to disdain currency, to take counterfeit money for counterfeit [skeptic betrays mankind] > for Kant, virtue obligates that we turn counterfeit (small change) into gold, becoming-truth of the simulacrum, its verification, authentication [pp. 257-58 rare friend keeps secret, renounces possible public profit, that of circulating secret]

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

p. 287 Nietzsche’s Superman: awaited because he is origin/cause of man, Ursache, this friend promised via messianico-teleiopeotic perhaps, immemorially past > this friendship to come would still be too human, still deserves name ‘friendship’ [anthropological, humanist character of friendship is situated/delimited here, friendship of proximity/presence]

p. 288 for Zarathustra, humanity in default of an end also defaults itself (manque la fin se manque aussi elle-même) —is itself en manque dhumanité

p. 294 who is the friend? beyond ego, presence, subject, etc.? distancing itself from all determinations? beyond the brother who capitalizes everything? > this a political question—will there be loud protests (by militants of a dogmatic humanism) if to think & live gentle rigor of friendship would be the law of friendship qua an experience of ahumanity?

P p. 102 hierarchy of art constituted on the analogical model of human language

pp. 107-08 [and yet] for Kant, “happiness & culture presuppose that man puts to work what nature puts at his disposal”; Critique depends on reflexive humanism, pragmatic anthropology: to differentiate errant (w/out objective end) beauty from adherent must be view toward final causes

——man is not only an end of nature, he is the final end, goal, of nature, whole system of ends is oriented towards him

p. 116 Kant’s 3 fine arts: talking (words), figurative (gestures), play of sensations (tones) > a humanism

p. 117 Kant’s hierarchical classification of fine arts, a humanism regulated by language & body of man, language dominated by speech & gaze

ATIA p. 100 for Kant, “dignity” of man, his autonomy, his autotely, his capacity for moral autodestination (Selbstbestimmung), for moral autobiography > this is his privilege, assures Herrschaft

p. 102 Kant’s providential-machine (Maschinenwesen der Vorsehung), which teleologizes in advance all war machines, would prosecute war w/out mercy against animal in form pax humana

p. 112 why did Levinas never imagine the animal occupying place of the 3rd party, thus the 1st appeal to justice? > never an other other than the other human

p. 144 Lacan, Levinas & Heidegger all have a humanism elaborated against biologism (against metaphysical humanism [?])

FS pp. 12-3 Derrida describes a hypocritical humanistic writing that imagines the will-to-write as an awakening of a freedom beyond affectivity: to write forgetting difference (finitude) in pure speech > could beauty then be distinguished from the letter itself? what about specificity?

DPi p. 117 irreconcilable axiomatics (humanism of Enlightenment & its opposite): reign of terror, DP, etc.—divide will continue “for a long time”

p 192 guillotine: a humanitarian machine

pp. 192-93 invention of guillotine not just any moment in history: French Revolution, declarations of rights of man, death of monarchy of divine right (pp. 196-97 guillotine will be democratic, egalitarian > this will be the spirit of its invention)

p. 193 what must be proper to man for the guillotine to be interpreted as both a crime against humanity & serving the dignity of man (humanist)?

——Hugo, ironically: “Mr. Guillotine was a philanthropist”

——guillotine: [doesn’t erase or dry up blood but keeps it] withdraws hands of man

——Society of Jesus & medical corporation at origin of “humanitarian machine”

p. 195 Enlightenment concepts of guillotine not in contradiction w/ certain Christian humanism: the dignified, humanistic death; it is progressive: 1) egalitarian 2) individualist 3) mechanistic, machinisitic > only the machine can make everyone equal before the law

pp. 208-09 the logic of Aufhebungs remainder & fact that Christianity, unlike Judaism/Islam, is also an immanentist humanism (mediation of God made man) > brings Camus’ atheistic abolitionism closest to Hugo’s Christological transcendence

Gii p. 29 paradoxical/regular association of nationalism w/ cosmopolitanism, w/ humanism

p. 30 for Fichte, “we” of Geschlecht, question of humanity (Menschlichkeit) (versus animality) > teleological essence of humanity announced par excellence in Deutschheit

p. 31 for Fichte, the German ear will understand Menschlichkeit w/out historical explanation (etymology) [idomatic humanism], not so w/ Latin Humanität > humanitas is a suprasensible idea

p. 34 profound link btwn Europocentric universalism, humanism & nationalism

p. 35 thinking of the hand, hand of thinking > thinking of human Geschlecht (not a humanism? or not a metaphysical, classical humanism?)

PIO pp. 23-5 when invention means discovering something for first time—not creation ex nihilo (gods/animals don’t invent)

——invention always belonging to man, techno-epistemo-anthropocentric > invention’s value inscribed in structures that bind technical order w/ metaphysical humanism (differentially)

pp. 42-3 Schelling’s invention, re: philosopher as an inventor of forms, still limited as invention of the same in guise of supplement of invention: man’s invention supplements God’s ideality: man as psyche of God, as supplying the lack in his revelation

——here, invention caught in infinite amortization, rationalistic humanism, carries out God’s program; human invention as desire of/for God

AFR p. 134 but don’t forget: in human order, w/ language, commerce, and supplementary deflection, the 2nd is 1st (metaphysics as humanism) > the need to desire (does not belong to nature)

IW p. 277 Cohen: humanity of one’s home can become native soil (Mutterboden) of internationality, foundation of a spirit of peace

p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——truth of nationality is German idealism; the German spirit is the spirit of humanity

——Cohen suspects a narcissistic infatuation in Fichte’s national ego, mirror of a certain psyché, but also room for any other self in this national self, cosmopolitan logic, national self as “We”

LI p. 134 deconstruction of onto-theological humanism (of Heidegger too) > iterability of mark beyond all human speech acts

TN pp. 152-53 Maine de Biran’s “humanualism (humainisme)”: only humans have hand, can touch in strongest sense (that elephant trunk “approximates” hand of man maintains hierarchy)

p. 154 hand, humanism, continuistic intuitionism, natural immediacy > so many celebrations of touching

EW p. 274 vigil or beyond of question is anything but precritical, leads us to recognize processes of differance, trace, iterability, ex-appropriation at work everywhere, well beyond humanity

p. 276 perhaps more “worthy” of humanity to maintain a certain inhumanity, the rigor of a certain inhumanity [vigil of the trace]

p. 285 trace, iterability, mark, differance (possibilities or necessities) are themselves not only human

AD pp. 37-8 even if feminine alterity is “hospitable welcome par excellence,” even if she’s not a man, she remains human: woman w/out “height” of face, not most high: her familiarity accomplishes “the en-ergy of separation” [?]

p. 73 Levinas: “to shelter the other in one’s own land or home, to tolerate the presence of the landless and homeless on the ‘ancestral soil,’ so jealously, so meanly loved—is that the criterion of humanness? unquestionably so”

CF pp. 29-30 we are all heir to crimes against humanity, i.e. the revolutions that made this concept [human rights] possible

BSi pp. 70-1 international rights & crimes against humanity invoke a sovereignty of man himself (ipse, ipsissimus) above/beyond/before Nation-State sovereignty (Schmitt sees this as Entpolitisierung, humanity not a political concept)

p. 72 Schmitt: “concept of humanity” useful instrument of ideological expansion; Proudhon: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat

p. 73 for Schmitt, what’s terrifying (schrecklich) about a Nation’s pretentious appeal to “humanity” is how such a nation treats its enemy as hors la loi, hors lhumanité—treats them like beasts

p. 74 Schmitt doesn’t like hypocrisy of humanistic allegation/alibi > unehrliche Fiktion (dishonest fiction) of total depoliticization, peace w/out States

p. 75 Schmitt: war should speak its name: be honest, honorable (Ehre)

p. 77 Schmitt argues [and Derrida doesn’t (entirely) disagree]: Left uses hugely murderous weapon of “humanitarian,” “humanistic”

pp. 140-41 anthropocentered, humanistic logic: sovereignty of Law, freedom, responsibility (response) opposed to animal fixity, program, imaginary, hard-wired, coded reaction

OG p. 223 for Rousseau, only Europe can be itself & everything else at same time [re: language/society], pedagogical success & ethnological humanism have good fortune to appear in Europe

——Derrida says Rousseau simply wrong for not using this universal opening en fait

UWC p. 203 mondialisation wishes to be a humanization (human rights, concept of what’s proper to man)

p. 228 figure of humanist: a response to the question of work, the theology of work secularizes time > the clock sometimes represents an attribute of the humanist [14th century]

p. 231 powerful juridical performatives shape modern history of humanity of man: “human rights,” “crimes against humanity”

FV p. 474n classical [mis]treatment of animal [eg. in Lacan] condenses system’s greatest obscurity: obscurantist resistance in history of (humanist/phallogocentric) metaphysics

p. 475 acc. Lacan, the [full] speech which constitutes/forms the subject is forbidden to him > it speaks everywhere it can be read in his Being [this antinomy is very antinomy of the meaning Freud gave to unconscious]: true speech always operates through mediation of another subject, it is open to chain w/out end re: speeches in which dialectic of recognition is concretely realized in human community [?]

HUNT (see resentment, react)

GT p. 49 Derrida thinking gift by way of idiomatic expressions: give a class, donner une facilité, donner le change [hunting expression], etc.

SPOM p. 10 follow a ghost, be followed by it, persecuted by very chase we are leading?

p. 157 polemic, hunt, counter-sophism (Marx as paradoxical heir of Plato), how does the counter-sophist remain immune to sorcery, tricks of the sophist, since he must know them?

p. 159 Marx critiques Striner for raising the ante (relance) of negativity, a rage for reappropriation, accumulating ghostly layers [but does Marx fall prey to vertigo of denouncing sophistical “conjuring tricks”?]

p. 169 Marx on the hunt for Stirner uses his weapons against him [Audre Lorde]

p. 174 larcharnement (ferocity, w/ chair, flesh) dun chasseur > set out the living lifeless body of a ghost (le corps vivant sans vie dun fantôme) to trick prey (pour tromper sa proie)

——Derrida has a feeling about this, and it’s projected into what he’s doing: “it is never possible to avoid this precipitation, since everyone reads, acts, writes with his or her ghosts, even when one goes after the ghosts of others”

p. 175 specular circle: one chases after to chase away (on chasse pour chasser), one pursues (on pourchasse)

——le longtemps, cest le temps de cette chasse à l’éloignement (hunt for distance, a hunt w/ distance > pray & lure): distance hunt can only hallucinate, desire, defer proximity: lure & prey

pp. 176-77 Marx wants not to want same “thing” as Stirner: a ghost; occupied w/ exorcism of ghosts, ghost hunt > Marx’s endless chase, his deconstructive critiques boomerang, lacharnement s'acharne

p. 180 “is not the Christic moment, and within it the Eucharistic instant, the hyperbole of acharnement itself?”

PP p. 158 dictum pronounces itself against itself as soon as it finds its way into writing, “contradiction” as relation-to-self of diction chasing itself away by hunting its trap (scription); not a contingent contradiction [confirmed by Platonism in Rousseau, Saussure]

S pp. 104-06 from masculine spirit (that chases and hunts) to feminine soul (that guards and nourishes), the trait, re-trait (Riss from fire-writing), engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, soul bears the sadness

FWT p. 5 sen prendre, a kind of love, homage, taking on, attacking

POOF pp. 263-64 yes this book is French, but it’s not written only in French, that would claim for French exemplary privilege of translation for all other idioms [i.e. Montaigne, Hugo, etc. on fraternity & humanity] > instead, this books sets itself up to work and be worked relentlessly (s’acharne lui-même), au sens de la chasse, là où acharner revient à disposer un leurre de chair, close to the thing called France

DS p. 186n in the philosophical hunt for the sophist (in Sophist), an aporia w/ endless escape routes for the quarry (also a hunter)

ROP p. 78 hinge (la charnière), place where flesh is laid out as a lure for the falcon > as hinge, an opening & closing, du gond (cardo), pivot; as flesh, a possible simulacrum or lure (fort/da)

ATIA p. 3 Derrida turns “je suis” into “I follow (je suis)” > I hunt, chase after the animal: moves from confines (ends) of man to bordercrossing btwn man/animal

p. 10 Derrida’s shame before the cat, wanting to dress himself, chaser (himself out of the room), hunting/following the animal, hunting/following himself in the face-to-face w/ the animal > madness: no longer knowing (how) to respond to question: “who am I (following)?”

——the many meanings of being “after” the animal, Kant’s früher (animal is earlier)

p. 17 come after the animal, named after him, this after is not in time: it’s the genesis of time

p. 23 vous entraîner à ma suite (train you to follow me, drag you after me) > in coordination w/ hunting him (Derrida) down through labyrinths

p. 33 Derrida will sniff out, hunt down, like an animal, the reasons for confident usage of word “animal”

pp. 41-2 Bellerophon, figure of hunter, hunting/taming the Chimaera: Ecce animot, a chimera, neither species nor gender, living multiplicity of mortals, monstrous hybrid

pp. 43-4 God sets a trap for Cain, God as hunter, don’t fall prey to sin lurking there, a lure, a temptation [Derrida’s prowling and lurking]

p. 54 “to follow,” “to be,” “to pursue (poursuivre),” “to persecute”

pp. 54-5 adding syllogistic “therefore” to The Animal That I Am (Follow): “such procedural steps (démarche) should be followed” [machine of inheritance] > to follow: seek to find, seek to escape?

***p. 55 the animal sniffing out traces (which are always traces of an other), seeking to escape/find: the inevitable animot > what happens when man stands up/represses smell?

p. 55 re: following the animal, following the other > hunter/hunted, seducer/seduced, persecutor/fugitive constituted in the same animal in the same instant

p. 60 hunting as following

p. 64 suis of Qui/Que suis-je? (both être and suivre) the little third party as copula, comes btwn subject and itself, worries it (sacharne), hounds it, to hunt itself in the mirror

p. 69 in confession, I hunt and chase myself at the same time

***pp. 91-2 single embrace of Kant, Descartes, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger, like chasing, hunting, trying to take hold of cuttlefish, touch the animal in a way where it will expel its ink (encre), its anchor, in this case, w/ these folks, the ink as the ability to do the “I,” before autoreference; (in the name of autobiography) Derrida confides the animalist “vision” he has of what he does, what he writes > his “sole concern” is to not sacrifice to it any difference, fold, opening to-come

p. 128 for Lacan, animals dansité, sexual lure, hunt, but still just pretense not a lie (a trace, but not an ability to erase the trace, to pretend to pretend)

Gi p. 8 Derrida wonders about a reading machine (one must think of programming the machine & know how to do it) that would snare (gibier), hunt down, sexual difference in Heidegger

DST p. 209 Lacoue-Labarthe is not panting, harried, he is hunting (traque) (polemos w/out polemics) the most powerful thoughts of our tradition

WAP p. 63 must struggle w/ (sarchaner) and submit to Kantian tradition, & critique/overvalue its “object,” reinstitute it by deconstructing its genealogy

——le présent discours [Derrida’s] ne saurait échapper totalement à la loi de cet espace [Kant’s], même s'il tente au moins de laisser filtrer une autre lueur (another glimmer), ou plus précisément de se laisser infiltrer (let itself be infiltrated) par une lueur qui déjà vient d'ailleurs et passe par tant de lézardes (so many cracks)

TR p. 150 Rousseau gave such emphasis/privilege to his theft (at age 16), and de Man hounds him, sacharne sur lui, as if he where after him in this trace

+R p. 161 fishing picture, record of a hunt: 2 death drives cross in an X (double diagonal): 1) pushes, attracts, holds down—descending column 2) the other, just as sublime, raises up, asphyxia of the phallus—ascending column

p. 163 into (over) the bargain (the market) (par-dessus le marché), not au-dessus (above) the market (the lure in which you would again let yourself be caught) > puts in play, or en abyme, the destructive simulacra of surplus value

——Plato: sophistry as line fishing

C p. 189 Derrida prefers sacharner to harceler: [resonates w/] trap, hunt, bait, taste of flesh

p. 196 paradeigmatizō: to propose as a model, to blame, hound someone so to dishonor him; paradeigmatismos: an infamous punishment to make an example > (hi)story of coffin, the condemned example: an (exemplary) sentencing of the example: damned paradigm—to death!

p. 198 Titus-Carmel cadaverizes paradigm, hounds effigy of paradigm, feigning the feigning of it in a series of simulated reproductions, he reduces it, transforms it into tiny piece of waste

CIN p. 25 best paradigm for trace not the trail of the hunt, le frayage, wake in sea, nor love of step (pas) for its imprint, but the cinder (what remains w/out remaining from holocaust, from the all-burning [du brûle-tout]) > no longer makes a trace, or traces only by losing trace quelle reste à peine

cinder gets lost down to cinder of its cinder, he burns one more time, he burns what he still adores although he already burned it, he’s intent on it (il sy acharne)

BSi pp. 2-4 à pas de loup (wolf), à pas de colombe (dove) (silent commands order world); wolf, war (hunting), dove, order, peace > both silent

pp. 63-4 Rousseau confesses: I lived like a werewolf (loup-garou) (outlaw, savage) because I read

p. 64 chase, hunt, follow, pursue the wolves > to neglect a wolf, is that to chase one away?

p. 82 chase chimeras, centaurs: to forget them, domesticate them, repress them, cause them to flee

p. 159 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] bêtise of hunting bêtise, seeing only bêtise; absolute knowledge as very element of becoming-bête, as sovereignly bête

p. 184 truth of bêtise: upping ante, denying it (hyperbolically), always adds a supplement of bêtise

p. 281 narcissism of autopsy occurs after narcissistic hunt, capture > this setup mediated by institutions

***CIR p. 224 am someOne who the One God never stops de-circumcising, hounds [s’acharner?] herself to make bleed in dispersion: salus in sanguine

OG pp. 39-40 (58-9) the fact that there can be a usurpation of writing, the need to chase out writing as other (blindness, wandering, mourning)—a possibility that must be questioned

p. 45 (66) Saussure chasse lécriture dans les ténèbres extérieures du langage [contesting his theory re: arbitrariness of sign]

p. 139 (201-02) lure of ethics of speech resembles a hunter’s stratagem, term of falconry > to recognize writing in speech is to begin to think the lure (leurre)

p. 292 (413) writing as painting is evil and remedy, pharmakon, zoographeme betrays being & speech, freezes (fige) them > writing as representation (painting) of la bête chassée: capture et meurtre magiques

——that writing carries death, Rousseau would agree w/out reservation

IF p. 317 Flaubert: “acharne-toi sur une idée! ces femmes-là au moins ne meurent pas et ne trompent pas!”; Goethe: “beyond the graves, onward!”

HUSSERL

GT p. 14 temporalization of time (memory, anticipation, pro, re- tention) destroys the gift

p. 50 Husserl’s donating intuition (gebende Anschauung): principle of principles

OOG p. 55 axiomatics (from which alone every ideal of exhaustive and exact deductivity can take its sense) presuppose a sedimentation of sense, a radical ground (primordial evidence) which is already past, thus axiomatics exiled by Husserl from the origins to which he wants to return

p. 58 what must be called the dialectic of protention and retention despite Husserl’s repugnance for that word

p. 69n for Husserl, sense precedes act of language, whose value will always be expression

p. 71(n) for Husserl, “objects of the understanding” are preconstituted in predicative spontaneity, “timeless,” are on a “higher level” than “objects of receptivity” (contingent, flesh & blood lion)

p. 73 for Husserl, genuine objectivity is ideal identity beyond contingent validity [?]: “the automobile is the fastest means of travel” loses its validity w/out losing its omnitemporal ideality

p. 74 the way an outdated proposition remains unified & animated by intention of truth, authenticity, clarity (synonyms for Husserl) > absurd intention, “nonsense,” “countersense” continually points toward telos, owns up to telos in order to disown it (Stranger of Sophist)

p. 82 Derrida reversing Husserl, “are not no-communication and misunderstanding the very horizon of culture and language?”

p. 94 for Husserl, all factual writings in which truth could be sedimented nothing but sensible “exemplars,” they could all be destroyed w/out overtaking the very sense of absolute ideality

p. 99 w/ sedimented sense, first danger is passivity [for more of Husserl on passivity follow footnotes at bottom of page (p. 99n)]

pp. 102-04 Husserl & Joyce: two ways to achieve Hegelian endeavor to interiorize memory of culture

p. 124 for Husserl, pure geometry [exact ideality p. 133] prior to imagination and sensibility, Cartesian intellectualism

pp. 124-25n Husserl closer to Descartes than Kant here > since Kant no longer derives sensibility from a “sensualist” definition, he argues that geometry is not imaginary because grounded in pure sensibility; for Husserl, geometry is not imaginary because uprooted from all sensible ground

p. 145 in criticizing psychologism & in “the return to the things themselves,” “Husserl urged getting rid of the spectrum of the soul’s faculties and all the vestiges of classic substantialisms”

FK p. 85 sacrosanctifying nature of intentionality

POOF pp. 16-7 whole story of eidos, incl. Husserlian interp. of production of ideal objects (idealization), intemporality qua omnitemporality > [but] “takes time to do w/out time”

EM pp. 117-18 (140) Husserl not an anthropologist; Husserl worried something like Sein und Zeit would be anthropological

p. 122 (146) for Hegel, Husserl: reason is history, and there is no history but of reason

p. 123 (147) critique of empirical anthropologism affirmation of transcendental humanism (Husserl, Kant)

SEC pp. 318-19 Husserl on possibility of absence of referent: 1) “sky is blue” is understood w/ out presence of sky 2) absence of signified, possible crisis of meaning: a) manipulate symbols b) statements can have meaning w/out objective signification, i.e. “square circle” c) Sinnlosigkeit or agrammaticality, i.e. “green is or,” “abracadabra”

——Husserl uses above to rigorously dissociate sign or expression (Ausdruck) as signifying sign from a sign meaning something (bedeutsame Zeichen)

p. 320 Husserl’s interest is in purely logical grammar not pure grammar > “the green is or,” unacceptable in context determined by a will to know, still signifies an example of agrammaticality

——in French “le vert est ou” can become “le vert est où” or “le verre est où

VM p. 81 appeal to tradition found in Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s “ontology”: 1) entirety of philosophy has a Greek source 2) a reduction of metaphysics 3) the ethical loses its metaphysical specificity, coordinated with something other than itself

p. 82 that we are consigned to Greek element, a knowledge and confidence that is not comfortable, that torments us > Husserl’s crisis, a covering up of a transcendental motif beginning to accomplish Greek aim in Descartes & Kant: philosophy as science

p. 86 for Husserl, one cannot maintain primacy of objectifying act and irreducible originality of nontheoretical consciousness at same time

p. 87 Heidegger, according to Levinas, adds historicity to Husserl

p. 120 wasn’t it Husserl who showed us that vision, perception were inadequate, the infinite overflowing of horizons? did he really reduce this inadequation to condition of available objects?

pp. 315-16n passivity & activity of Husserl’s “constitution,” > not opposed to the encounter; if one rejects his definition, there must be a time/experience w/out “other” before the encounter

pp. 123-24 Husserl’s alter-ego, nonviolent respect of secret, of separation, we can only know the other through analogical appresentation > translates recognition of radical separation

p. 135 eidos as noema in understanding or logos of the infinite subject (God) > how does transcendental idealism escape horizon of infinite subjectivity?

——Husserl would say that Plato’s eidos realized outside noema, outside being thought

OH p. 75 for Husserl, the European philosopher committed to universal reason is functionary of mankind

VP p. 4 Husserl insists on the absence of all presuppositions (Voraussetzungslosigkeit) whether metaphysical, psychological or from natural sciences: does this not all still dissimulate a metaphysical presupposition?

——starting point in “Fatkum” of language not a presupposition so long as we’re attentive to contingency of example

p. 7 Husserl never posed the question of the transcendental logos, of the inherited language by which phenomenology produces/exhibits itself [logos is logicity first]

p. 9 [does Husserl separate mundane life from transcendental life more severely than Heidegger’s ontic/ontological separation?]

p. 11 Husserl neutralizes totality of world to phenomenon through transcendental reduction, thus arises the nothing that distinguishes parallels [trans. psychology from trans. phenom.]

pp. 11-2 for Husserl, transcendental consciousness not impaired by destruction of this world, we can think consciousness w/out body, w/out soul > can’t substantialize, endow w/ reality

p. 12 Husserl re-secures possibility and rigor of philosophy by reading difference btwn “pure psychology of consciousness” and “transcendental phenomenology of consciousness” through parallelism [?] [compare to parallelism via concept of life in transcendental psychologism on p. 11]

pp. 39-40(n) how Saussure makes a quasi-Husserlian move when declaring that the expressive value of “signifier” only happens in its “acoustic image” > sound as prior to phoneme

p. 47 for Husserl, imagination neutralizes memory, it is a non-“positing” representation, keeps w/in itself primary reference to an originary presentation; pure ideality to which neutralization provides access is not fictional, thus Husserl’s beef w/ Hume and his fascination w/ Hume

pp. 53-4(n) Husserl and Freud both view unconscious as “after-the-fact,” Freud’s Nachträglichkeit (après-coup), though Husserl utterly rejects its possibility

p. 63 for Husserl, “S is P” is original apophantic operation, the fundamental, primitive form

p. 70 Husserl tormented by possibility that writing inhabits inside of speech, itself at work in intimacy of thought

S p. 121n Husserl shows signs of the worst w/ his racism against Eskimos, Papuans, Indians [spirit not an accidental ornament for Husserl’s thought]

pp. 16-7 acc. Heidegger, Descartes, Husserl, both dogmatic, their concepts not ontologically clarified via Being

POS p. 5 juridically decisive for Derrida to pose question of privilege of voice in Western metaphysics, represented in its most critical, vigilant form: Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology

GSP p. 157 how “untamed genesis” demanded of Husserl a metaphysics of history and a solid structure of telos, moving phenomenology beyond descriptive space, beyond phenomenology?

p. 158 Derrida gives an account of how Husserl navigated Scylla and Charybdis of logicizing structuralism and psychologistic genetism re: mathematical/logical synthesis

p. 321n Husserl: no continuity btwn psychological development and logical unity

p. 164 Husserl always announcing/deferring a new “transcendental aesthetic”

FS p. 11 in Origin of Geo… Husserl teaches us: meaning must await being said or written to inhabit itself, it becomes by differing from itself: this is meaning (writing does not await prescription from some topos ouranios, or divine understanding)

p. 27 like structuralism, no concept of force in Husserl (brings phenomenology back to Platonism despite professed anti-Platonism); for Husserl, truth requires forgetting [of genesis, force, failure, crises]

CHM p. 60 Cogito as fugitive [cf. furtive in PS], ungraspable, escapes linear order, determinations of natural light > repeats itself in Husserlian Cogito [though Husserl had to reduce it to affirm madness of his reduction]

TN p. 31 feeling oneself feel is not corporeal but spiritual for Husserl & Descartes

p. 177 [Husserl utilizes a Hegel-like mediate immediacy re: touch]

pp. 178-79 [Husserl on what happens when I touch another’s hand]

p. 183 Husserl wants to be more Cartesian than Descartes

pp. 190-91 Derrida defends Husserl’s stubborn conviction that we can’t know alter-ego, only through analogy, appresentation, that there’s an unbridgeable abyss (abîme infranchissable) > Husserl’s stance prevents risk of an immediate intutionism of the other

p. 197 Husserl never solved the riddle of Einfühling (empathy)

BSi pp. 177-78 Husserl’s free ideality (i.e. the number “two” repeated identically) vs. bound (gebundene) idealities (ideal only in body)

OG pp. 64-5 (94-5) in Husserl’s changing premises of debate,” neither natural inside nor outside > must distinguish le son apparasissant from lapparaître du son > always divided w/in themselves btwn variance and invariability, an unheard difference, invisible > trace opens appearance

CIR pp. 306-08 nervous, worried, hunted, literature (beast playing dead, melding w/ foliage), delivering to world impregnable inedible simulacrum, the theory of the parasite virus, terrorizing others w/ instability he carries everywhere, one book open in the other

EU p. 117 Husserlian phenomenology, incomparable rigor—not Sartre, not Merleau-Ponty

HYPERBOLE

GOD p. 95 [hyperbole of instant of Abraham’s absolute sacrifice]

pp. 108-09 secret market of secrecy, “Christianity’s stroke of genius,” says Nietzsche, merchandise, give credit to the infinite [denounce all calculation & still yield surplus-value]

——no “exterior” critique to Christianity, to its worldwide event > demystifying it justifies proto-Christianity to come

——Christianity’s being-self is constituted in the hyperbole of this market (the profit of sacrifice)

p. 115 via Nietzsche’s “genius of Christianity,” moralizing the mechanisms of debt via moral duty & bad conscience, a hyperbolized repression: sacrificial hubris

p. 122 re: test God imposed on Abraham, where, all the way to hyperbole, “not meaning to say (de ne pas vouloir dire)” (keeping a secret) = not being able to mean (to say) (ne pas pouvoir vouloir dire)

MONL p. 48 hyperbolic taste for purity of language, an incorrigible hyperbolite: I always exaggerate.

p. 49 hyperbole is Plato’s word: excess beyond excess > impregnable, epekeina tes ousias

***p. 57 both at same time: 2 hyperboles, everything can and cannot be translated, “it is easy for me to hold firm between these two hyperboles”

R p. 41 Christian democracy would be hyperbolically autoimmune (let antidemocrats vote)

FK p. 82 auto-immunity haunts community: hyperbole of community’s own possibility

FL p. 248 rigorous deconstruction hyperbolically raises the stakes in the demand for justice, with a disproportion that inscribes excess and inadequation in itself [POO p. 11 oblique way is not less rigorous, quite the contrary]

H p. 75 unconditional, hyperbolical hospitality

p. 135 absolute, hyperbolical, unconditional hospitality suspends language, a particular determinant one, and even the address to the other

p. anne 140 hyperbole always comes first of all as a question

SPOM pp. 160-61 spectral effect, for Marx, a dialectical position (Setzung) of the ghostly body as body proper > where Stirner sees 1st moment as spectral and 2nd as successful, interiorization, subjectivation (plus de vie) Marx sees a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality (plus de mort)

HASD p. 20 plus dêtre: beyond and more than being (hyper, beyond)

p. 32 epekeina tes ousias, beyond beingness of Being, hyperbolism—sur, hyper > negativity serves the hyper movement that produces, attracts, guides it

pp. 33-4 the laughter and breath [what divine hyperbole!] of theatrical rhetoric in Republic [re: epekeina tes ousias] becomes serious prayer in Christianity

POOF p. 38 Nietzsche condemns “democratic sensibilities” in name of a hyperbolic democracy [?]

p. 40 at each instant discourse [Nietzsche’s] carried to its limit, on the edge of silence: transports itself beyond itself, hyperbolic, infinite build-up (surenchère), swept away by perhaps that undecides meaning in each decisive moment

p. 112 a hyperbolic build-up (surènchere) perhaps the origin of good & evil, both beyond being (Plato’s Good in Republic), a hyperbole common to both, makes them pass one into the other

pp. 211-12 the hyperbole of an extreme middle in Aristotle, moderation, proper measure: this applies to # of friends & ‘threshold of tolerance’ re: border btwn pólis and ethnos [immigration]

p. 212 Aristotle’s 2nd hyperbole [re: friendship] is that of eros, where there is only 1 love

***pp. 217-18 via name ‘Aristotle,’ doesn’t dream of an unusable friendship survive? beyond fatal syntheses or reconciliations of dialectics [the worst?] > this inflexible hyperbole of philía is not some indestructible, rigid, resistant solidity, sa vulnérabilité légère ne donnerait prise à aucun retournement [via dialectics]: a politics that would break from the old, tired, tiring, exhausted history: la belle tentation of the book you’re reading

pp. 238-40 via Michelet, fraternity always caught up in vertiginous process (mechanics) of hyperbolization: from the strict literal (‘natural’ fraternity) to the figurative literal (universal, infinite fraternity) > thus, [strictly] woman ‘does not yet know how to read’ fraternity, she is not included in the idiom, the singularity; but, [literally] she is like [the promise of] absolute fraternity, ‘more just than just,’ law beyond law

pp. 295-96 the hyperbole of this friendship seems to engage w/ greatest risk (re: inherited concept of friendship) when Nietzsche speaks of ‘w/out sharing,’ ‘w/out reciprocity’ > can one,

then, still speak of equality & fraternity?

FWT p. 142 DP either internal to criminal law, one punishment among others, or external, non-serial exemplarity, hyperbolic, foundation, condition, more/other than a penalty

ROP pp. 22-5 death drive and repetition compulsion (Wiederholungszwang), hyperbolic resistance of nonresistance, “resistance of the unconscious,” thwarts working through, une résistance qui n’a pas de sens (death drive), nest pas une résistance > [does this concept present analysis itself? is it the structure of analysis? does it fold over? upset the meaning of the series?]

p. 29 deconstruction as hyperbolicism of analysis: hyperdiabolicism (in certain people’s eyes)

DPi p. 157 via Nietzsche, Christianity (pretends to) open hyperbolic passage at limit of spiritualization, reversing the order of things (creditor offers himself in sacrifice)

p. 163 for Nietzsche, Christianity hyperbolically augments infinite disproportion, pleasure of “highest degree” that accompanies the law of cruelty: finite debt exceeds correspondence by responding w/ a pleasure of cruelty that becomes infinite

CHM p. 46 hyperbole of dreams (hyperbolic moment of doubt that will capitulate to evil genius)

p. 48 dreams as hyperbolical exaggeration of hypothesis: senses could deceive me

p. 49 intelligible generalization (math) submitted to hyperbolical doubt through fiction of evil genius

pp. 50-1 the imaginary novice philosopher, who Descartes mimes, objects: you would have to be mad to doubt your senses—so Descartes proposes the more natural hypothesis of dreams

——dreams become hyperbolical exasperation of hypothesis of madness: madman is not wrong enough, not mad enough (not good instrument of doubt: doesn’t cover totality of sensory field)

pp. 52-3 “at the same time” marks hyperbolical moment w/in natural doubt; “nevertheless” marks absolutely hyperbolical moment leading to hypothesis of evil genius > possibility of a total madness > subverts clear/distinct ideas, mathematical truths which escape natural doubt > madness will spare nothing this time [cf. pp. 50-1]

p. 56 hyperbolical (mad) audacity of Cartesian Cogito (critical experience of which we may be too self-assured to experience): return to original point, zero point, where determined meaning & nonmeaning come together in their common origin

pp. 56-7 Cogito, exceeding totality of world like epekeina tes ousias (Glaucon: “Lord what demonic hyperbole (daimonias hyperboles)?” [banally translated as “marvelous transcendence”]

——this demonic hyperbole more excessive than hybris, passion > opens, founds, makes possible

p. 57 Foucault’s book totalitarian? puts unprecedented excess of Cartesian Cogito in straitjacket? makes hyperbole re-enter the world: reduction to intraworldliness very meaning of what is called violence, makes possible all straitjackets

pp. 57-8 everything (in Descartes) can be reduced to determined historical totality except the hyperbolic project

pp. 58-60 Descartes interns his own hyperbole by temporalizing Cogito, certifying it through God (temporalizes the sharpest point, the instant), a hurried repatriation > God protects Descartes against madness of Cogito

pp. 61-2 from heights of “to-attempt-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole”: absolute opening, uneconomic expenditure, thought announces itself, frightens itself, reassures itself against annihilation by madness/death > always re-embraced by economy > relation btwn reason, madness, death is an economy: structure of deferral whose originality must be respected

——vouloir-dire-lhyperbole condition of silence, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

p. 62 vouloir-dire-lhyperbole not antagonistic to silence but its condition, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

——philosophy as this giant confession: attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole (to define it as such is to confess) > I philosophize only in terror, but in confessed terror of going mad

——confession is simultaneously: oblivion/unveiling, protection/exposure > economy

DST DST p. 203 question of obsession, of obsidionality, of exposure on all sides, arises w/ figure of a besieged (assiégée) power

traps everywhere, double bind and hyperbologic leave no way out (aucun issue)

p. 229 Lacoue-Labarthe is at every instant as close & as far as could be from Theodor Reik > tells you everything you need to think law of this paradox (hyperbologic) [re: rhythm]

pp. 322-23n Lacoue-Labarthe’s hyperbologic programs inevitable “logic” of mimesis, converts gift of everything to gift of nothing, to gift of thing itself

——play of de- might belong to hyperbologic, belongs to and escapes its own series: “gift of mimesis,” “gift of impropriety,” not negative (dialecticizable)

——organizes/disorganizes what it appears to determine

WAP p. 60 hyperbole (in pre-Kantian form: epekeina tes ousias): an excess beyond all disciplines, beyond circle of knowledge, encyclopedia; yet, as a symbol (symbolic order) it masters, overhangs (surplombe) entirety of what is > brings together & constitutes what it exceeds, makes appear by authorizing itself

——when you authorize yourself to pose the question quid juris: one makes appear (faire comparaître), comme devant un tribunal qui fait venir ou prévenir (le prévenu autant que le témoin), la totalité pré-venue ou pré-sumée, pré-sommée, du champ encyclopédique : paideia, skholē, training, Bildung, universitas;

p. 61 even a philosopher like Heidegger, who speaks against totality, is in the tradition of quid juris, says something about hyperbolic, hyper-symbolic relation that connects whole to what is beyond it, and thus permits one to speak about it > philosopher authorizes himself to speak du tout, de tout

hypersymbolic deposes what it posits, destructs by constructing: it thus authorizes University outside walls of institution, by metonymy or allegory

TN p. 46 for Nancy, the Thing touches itself when one touches nothing: exact hyperbole (Nancy’s writing) engulfs, exscribes itself (sex-crit), sabîme (sinks)

p. 161 “eidetic” figure of optical intuitionism always confirms/fulfills itself in an intuition tactually filled-in & in hyperbole of continuistic haptocenteredness

p. 304 [re: Nancy’s “touch freedom!”] hyperbole, exact exaggeration, overbid in the impossible

CF pp. 35-6 in Le Pardon, Jankélévitch delimits a “hyperbolic ethics,” beyond laws, ethics beyond ethics, undiscoverable place of forgiveness—but does not admit an unconditional forgiveness

BSi p. 230 sovereignty of poetry (dynamics of majesty/sovereignty), hyperbolic surenchère (Bataille’s sovereignty, Nietzsche’s superman)

HYPHEN

MONL p. 11 hyphen is never enough to conceal protests, anger, weapons, bombs

AF p. 74 is Jewishness the absolute uniqueness of this trait? to be open toward the future (à-venir), to be Jewish?: exemplary uniqueness of the trait dunion [btwn Jewishness & future]

S p. 38 spirit writes hyphen btwn authorities and history, world, people, will to essence, to know

DPi p. 23 to think DP, must think history/horizon of sovereignty as hyphen in theologico-political

C pp. 234-35 breakable, limping hyphen: not only an emblem, a coat of arms, but the symbol > acc. symballein, brings together pieces of a body divided in contract, pact, alliance [symballistic]

pp. 244-45 how can we delimit all the features (traits) [of artwork] when the absent one haunts, obsesses, besieges (assiège) [plus quun autre] > avec égale sans (trait dunion: with-out [in English])

AD p. 104 God, one “who loves the stranger” excessively so, excess like the non-reciprocity decided in death, the trait or stroke, the hyphen (trait dunion) of adieu: beyond being, where he might not pardon me, or elect me

BSi p. 13 man, a hyphen (mediation) in the theo-anthropo-zoological

p. 279 “perhaps,” “who knows,” as link, separating hyphen btwn beast & sovereign, inviting us, w/out ordering us, to go over the limit of knowledge

HYMEN

LOBL p. 77 hymen or alliance in the language of the other, strange vow by which we are committed in a language not our mother tongue > Derrida’s committed, are you? translators?

p. ~139 vitrifying structure of writing & desire > hymen (as syllepsis) and pane of glass p. ~141 Blanchot: glass doesn’t use up what I enjoy, read book behind pane of glass

p. 147 commitment [wedding proposal] in irresponsibility of speech [Blanchot’s character proposes in Slavic not French], arrêt of commitment, commitment thus arrêté, both in one’s language & the other’s—the hymen > mother tongue does away w/ commitment & seals it

p. 148 I am “irresponsible” and absolutely committed in the establishment of the language of the other, which I do as if the first moment, the “at once” is the occasion of the hymen, its chance and its law

p. 154 [reference to la double séance] hymen sarrête, comes about and is immediately forbidden, double-bind structure of event, its “madness”, every hymen intervenes like a crime, event, coup, its dissemination dissolves or absolves it in crowd by multiplying it incalculably

p. 155 essential irresponsibility of promise or response: crime of hymen > repeats itself endlessly, takes place w/out taking place [writing/reading]

p. 162 “come”: single word, yet intertwined in series, inscribes its own effacement in middle of and on invaginated boundaries of récit, of these crypts, death or bridal chambers, hymen brings alliance & separation [after theft of key]

——crypt, heart, hymen (chambers of desire)

pp. 164-65 double hymen w/ each woman; each woman double, death mask, cast, ghost, body at once living & dead, of other > utterly other “in relation to” one another: each one is the other

p. 165 an “immediately” that weds symbiosis to synthanatosis (in a triumph w/out identity) [is the hymen not a fetish? The at once of disavowal? (See Glas 210)]

pp. 165-166 hymen, double bind, double affirmation, yes, yes, come, come [re: Blanchot’s 2 ghostly fiancées in Larrêt de mort] signifies, desires, arrête life death, the life the death of the other, the other lives and dies > “for there is an other of the other and it is not the same” [see POO p. 11 “other of the other” is the very undeniable of ethics]

——hymen is a “double bind” because each of these bonds that bind is [?], in itself, double

pp. ~166-67 Miss Blind feminist objects to Derrida’s mad hypothesis re: hymen

pp. 168-69 [re: Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort] 2 women, like doctor, sign his death warrant, but always as countersignature, because death “given” is requested, demanded, received it with/from/in the hand of the other > another hymen

pp. 169-72 Derrida’s mad hypothesis, nothing to do w/ intention of “author” that the hymen btwn the 2 women in Larrêt de mort (separated by uncrossable glass partition of 2 stories) is the absolute terror, that they love and approach each other w/out the narrator

——terrifying affirmation of one hymen guards the terror of another

——2 women, 2 voices w/out voice, tele-phone each other: “come” > how do we read this unreadable hymen? it takes place as unreadable, from bottom of crypt in which it remains > it will have taken place where it remains: that’s the proof

——mad hypothesis overruns oppositional values that make rules and form the law in all the schools of reading, overruns delimitation of the fantasy as well

——everything took place as if narrator desired that the 2 women resembled each other > in accordance w/ hymen (pas w/out him)

AF p. 92 archive radically incompatible, heterogenous, in divorce w/ arkhē

HASD p. 41 the 2 traits of experience of prayer: 1) address to other as other (i.e. God), discourse, language, not predicative 2) economium or the celebration (hymnein, úμνéω)

MSUB J p. 167 subjectile interposes itself as the hymen btwn inside & outside, finally becoming the jetée (the spurt, a spurt like a fallen stone, dead) > objective, subjective, projectile, introjection, objection, dejection, abjection

p. 168 subjectile is the forceful throwing, casting and also what has to be traversed, pierced, the membrane, the paper > “the trajectory of what’s thrown upon it” dynamizes the skin in perforating it, passing to other side: “after having exploded the wall of the problem” [hymen]

BL p. 209 hymen of the law, its entry (Eintritt): ante portes (place of premature ejaculation), place & non-place: the adjournment ’til death of child is either premature ejaculation or non-ejaculation: no ejaculate w/out relation to the law [Lacan] > tabernacle empty, dissemination fatal

MPM pp. 10-1 if memory maneuvers btwn law and Being, can one think the being and law of memory? these questions move through transference & translation, above abyss; require impossible passageways: “the fragile resistance of a span” [hymen?]

A p. 7 pas [belongs to French?] involves the line that terminates all determination, peras (end, limit) not telos, puts us on path beyond, on other side, peraō eis khoran (penetrate into place, country)

T p. xvii(n) ear-vulva, hymen, vesta, vestibule, hearth, familial

SH p. 11 the other is wed in the secrecy of the encounter (w/ another date)

SP p. 99 hymen’s graphic, that of the pharmakon, inscribes castration’s effects w/in itself, w/out being reduced to it

p. 101 regular, rhythmic blindness takes place in Nietzsche’s text, he’s lost there too > il y a de la perte, dès quil y a hymen

pp. 109-11 Nietzsche’s analysis of sexual difference, “eternal war btwn sexes,” based on propriation, where woman takes shape acc. formalized law > woman is woman because she gives herself to a man who takes possession, or la femme en se donnant se donne-pour, simule et sassure ainsi la mâtrise possessive: if opposition give/take, possess/possessed, is a “transcendental snare” produced by hymen’s graphics, process of propriation would escape dialectics and ontological decidability

OTO p. 13 cannot think nor hear Nietzsche’s name w/out reaffirmation of the hymen, alliance or wedding ring, eternal return

pp. 21-2 for Nietzsche, culture (Bildung) begins when we know how to treat the living as living; Derrida discusses a pact, alliance, contract, a hymen w/ living language, w/ mother (tongue), against death (father): even good master of history (science of the father) trains for the sake of mother tongue, must know when to suppress ‘historical interest’ for culture to begin

***O p. 53n [general economy of hymen]: cette consumation [consumption, consummation], comme celle de lhymen, ne commence ni ne finit jamais, en quoi son identité se dé-pense

pp. 57-8 is pleasure literary in essence? if Vorlust, foreplay, prime (bonus) of seduction, formal moment of literature, ne se comble quà la fin du plaisir, then jouissance would be instance of seduction, prime supplémentaire de rien dautre: pleasure a formal, threshold phenomena, nul et sans fins, a repression lifted & maintained > graphics of hymen questions all couples, all oppositions (especially those of Freud)

TB pp. 123-24 for Derrida, “translation contract” is hymen or marriage contract (a seminar) > w/ promise to produce a child whose seed will give rise to history/growth

——Benjamin says as much, that in translation the original will enlarge itself > Derrida adds: this child can speak on its own, something other than a product subjected to law of reproduction > sacred and being-to-be-translated produce each other at edge of same limit

***——promise of reconciliation (even if unfulfillable) is a rare & notable event: kingdom is never reached, is untouchable > but the commitment takes place, bequeaths its record

——Benjamin’s untouchable (unberührbar) reminds Derrida of the hymen, of the wedding gown more visibly

——untouchable: fascinates, orients work of translator

***——text will be even more virgin, intact, after passage of translation: hymen, sign of virginity, more jealous of itself after the other hymen, the contract signed, marriage consummated (untouchable remnant remains intact)

REST p. 291 thing still hidden away, wrapped up underneath in its investiture (hypokeimenon, subjectum: both still hide or veil)

——the hiding or veiling, figure of the veil, is drawn into undecidability by the hymen

pp. 350-56 Heidegger’s Verlässlichkeit (reliability, solidity), [what Heidegger restitutes from Van Gogh’s painting?], anterior to opposition useful/sacred, comes from earth/world, from trait, the Ring required for a hymen per fidem, makes commitment possible, fidelity that predates everything

D p. 294 Mallarmé: mime sets up pure medium of fiction, perpetual allusion (in a hymen)

pp. 343-44 like the crime, consumption/consummation of fire never takes place—this is what the hymen names: 1) penetration, act perpetrated by what enters, consumes, sows confusion btwn partners 2) virginal screen that stands btwn desire/consummation, perpenetration/remembrance

HST p. 387 limit (of forgiveness) cannot be crossed (infranchissable)—and is crossed insofar as it can’t be [hymen] > ultimate compassion, very test of substitution (impossible), to be hostage and hôte of the other

TN p. 299 logic of limit [hymen?]: what lets itself be touched does so on its edge (sur son bord), thus it doesn’t let itself be touched/reached (ne se laisse pas atteindre)—exposing untouchable itself, the other edge of the edge (lautre bord du bord)

——one would also have to integrate the rhetoric, plus quune rhétorique quand elle franchit à chaque figure the limits btwn sensible/intelligible—finding itself on both sides of the limit

LG p. 243 Derrida includes very elusive, allusive reference to hymen [genre as gender], rapport sans rapport btwn masculine & feminine; genre (Gattung) and marriage in series gattieren, gatten, Gatte/Gattin

p. 244 [Blanchot’s] immense double affirmation both to life & death, forming an alliance or marriage bond w/ itself (“hymen”)

p. 245 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] as long as I say “yes, yes,” I’m a woman and beautiful, man rendered other: secret and odd hymen > madness of sexual difference, mixing of genres

——transsexuality permits me, in a more than metaphorical & transferential way, to engender

SPEC pp. 308-09 curtain (rideau): canvases, veils, hymens, umbrellas > Derrida neither has time nor taste (goût) to show how they accord to same law (accomplished by itself or done w/out)

pp. 316-17 curtains, veils, “skirt” of bed, hymen of fort:da, edge of bed (lit) [of reading?], va-et-vient, there would’ve been a hymen even w/out curtains > veil of this “skirt” is interest of bed (lit) and fort:da of all these generations

——[Derrida clearly explains the difference btwn fort/da and fort:da] “skirt” of bed, which hides the bars, forms inner chamber of fort/da, double screen which divides w/in itself—but dividing only by reassembling it w/ itself, sticking (piquant) to itself doubly, fort:da

pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

CHOR p. 99 hymen: 1) membranous fold 2) marriage > lies btwn inside/outside of woman, btwn desire & its fulfillment: once pierced there is no hymen

p. 105 “hymen,” “invagination,” part of Derrida’s attempt to re-sexualize philosophical/theoretical discourse, but these terms no longer simply designate figures of feminine body: what remains undecidable concerns [but not only] line of cleavage btwn 2 sexes

p. 106 hymen does not exist, anything constituting value of existence is foreign to “hymen,” so how could one then attribute existence of hymen properly to woman? (same goes for invagination)

——questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

HYMEN in

DS p. 181 Hymen: INTER Platonem et Mallarmatum [p. 219n btwn Mallarmé & Hegel]

p. 182n the hystera is supposed to be “behind” the hymen, but it exposes itself only through mimicry, transference & simulacrum

p. 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” [Wolf Man] > hymen

——masturbatory suicide

pp. 203-04 out of sight (a perte de vue): hymen & dissemination > une entaille y est marquée, qui ouvre encore sur un autre texte et pratique une autre lecture, lanalyse en serait infinie

p. 207n deconstruction’s ceaseless dissymmetry (i.e. what Hyppolite calls Mallarmé’s “materialism of the idea”) works alongside possibility of deconstruction’s neutralizing moment, the “logic of the hymen” is neither negatively neutral, nor neutral at all

p. 208 space of writing: “event” in which nothing happens—hymen, crime, suicide, spasm (laughter/pleasure): everything describes structure of text & effectuates its possibility > a lustre which is nothing beyond its own fragmented light

——for Mallarmé, ideality of idea, metaphysical name, is necessary to mark non-being, nonpresent, marks w/out breaking glass, alludes to epekeina tēs ousias: a hymen (closeness & veil) btwn Plato’s sun & Mallarmé’s lustre

***pp. 209-10 hymen (hymn): supreme spasm, sign of fusion, consummation, marriage, confusion or identification of two > nonpresence, gaping void of desire, & presence, fullness, satisfaction—now amount to same: yet there is not a single term, no fullness of the signified, it’s the difference that no longer functions (btwn empty signifier/full signified, image/thing)

——no more spatial heterogeneity of 2 poles: laccomplissement se résume dans le désir, le désir est (en avance sur) laccomplissement qui demeure, toujours mimé, un désir, “sans briser la glace

p. 210 temporal dislocation in hymen baffles decidability of different terms: is there even time, tenses, temporal differences, when there’s no central present/referent?

——rhythm as hymen (Dream?), “center of vibratory suspense”: soir, noir, noire, miroir, ivoire

p. 212 hymen as medium, as btwn, takes place in spacing btwn desire/fulfillment (indifferent to opposites)—not a center; interval, cave (antre), entre; space btwn 2 palisades (palisade always “full”)

——“hymen (out of which flows Dream), tainted w/ vice yet sacred

pp. 212-3 hymen as invisible veil, vaginal partition btwn inside/outside of woman

——if love or murder takes place, there’s no hymen; also, takes place when nothing happens, when there’s an all consuming consummation w/out violence, or a violence w/out blows/marks > die or come laughing

p. 213 hymenoptera, filmy membrane, uphainō (to weave, spin spider web), huphos (textile), humnos (a weave, wedding song, song of mourning), suo, suere (to sew), a little stitch (syuman), tissue on which so many bodily metaphors are written

p. 214 hymen: “a medium, pure medium, of fiction,” “btwn perpetration and remembrance, memory of a crime never committed > penetrate, perpetrate the hymen, fictively, “solitary captive of the threshold

p. 215 at the edge of being (au bord de lêtre): the entre of the hymen, masked gap, veil of virginity (where nothing’s taken place) & consummation, penetration of antre, release [one in the other] > mirror never passed through, ice never broke, at the edge of being

——hymen, comme tissu, envelops, outwits (déjoue) philosphemes, ontologies, dialectics, les retourne et les inscrit, suspense in the antre of perpenetration

pp. 215-16 play of commas (virgulae) inserts cuts, spacing, shortness of breath w/in continuum of sequence > hymen in perpetual motion, can’t get out of Mallarmé’s cave like you can Plato’s

p. 216 play of hymen at once vicious & sacred; nothing more perverse than rending penetration that leaves virgin womb in tact

p. 219 mimēsis of present referent gets lost in the hymen, lost presence, lost absolute knowledge

p. 220 Derrida not using hymen like Hegel used Aufhebung, Urteil (contradictory layers of signification, depth); what counts for hymen is form or syntactical praxis that (de)composes it

***——the word hymen could be lost, and its function would remain: we’ve been making believe everything can be traced to this name [see GOD p. 116], simply possesses a certain economic condensation, accumulation

——through “hymen” one marks what entre already marks, could replace w/ “identity,” “marriage,” “crime,” “difference”

pp. 220-21 hymen in text (crime, sexual act, incest, suicide, simulacrum) inscribed at very tip (à la pointe) of indecision

p. 221 hymen in relation to inter-, “btwn,” a syncategorem, syntactical plug, even Husserl calls this an incomplete signification, its syntactical (de)composition can never be mastered

——like Freud’s unconscious (syntax of “hymen” tolerates, remains insensitive, to contradiction)

p. 224 mime is both read & reading, written & writing, btwn the 2, in the suspense of the hymen, at once screen & mirror

——simple opposition btwn activity & passivity (btwn all -er/-ed concepts) becomes too formally weak to encompass graphics of hymen, its spider web, the play of its eyelids

p. 229 necessity of folding (page of the hymen) not a secondary procedure, no smooth fold, hymen doesn’t simply adopt some fold > fold, in the lining which, of itself, the hymen was, at once its outside and its inside, no proper name, doesn’t exist: hymen, already torn, in the fold

——le pli (se) multiplie mais (nest) pas (un)

——in the morgue you’ve been able to read the folding (vous aurez pu lire que la pliure)

p. 230 intermission or interim of hymen does not establish time [Setareh] > non-mastery, no present in truth presents itself there

——critical desire, philosophical desire, tries to regain mastery, reads hymen acc. this or that species of presence

p. 231 syntax of hymen’s fold makes it impossible to arrest its play of indecision [i.e. to stop it on “mental,” or “imaginary”]

p. 233 hymen, verra, vers [O p. 25 crisis of versus]

p. 233 Jean-Pierre Richard: beauty of glorious lie is what art tries to render true, to do so, must put it under glass

p. 236 “fiction,” “hymen,” “spacious” are caught in, while disrupting, ontological machine

p. 237 Mallarmé’s i: a slash that never cuts its wing, penna (feather pen), needles and scratches; hymen fastens down, tears, crinkles and folds the Crise de vers [m/f]

p. 240 Mallarmé: passing butterfly leaves a bit of sharp ingenuous nothing [about to break through hymen]

pp. 241-42 [Derrida quotes Mallarmé, says nowhere have the graphics of hymen been more strongly stressed]

p. 242 forms of writing subject to law of hymen (literature, theater, drama, ballet, dance, fable, mimicry), the rule of the cast-aside-reference, the being aside (référence écartée, être à l’écart)

——hymen as the double show, as the difference between the sexes, play of penna (bird, wing, feather, quill, beak, etc.), and process of metaphorical reproduction constantly being relaunched by gap, setting-aside, of being

p. 248n Aufhebung—most “relevant” way of (re)covering (up) graphics of supplementarity or hymen, le recouvrement le plus séduisant, because most similar > thus, must critique Aufhebung as decisive target, that which obfuscates specificity of “writing operation”

***p. 249 dialectical structure can’t account for graphics of hymen, is itself comprehended and inscribed w/in latter, separated from it only by itself, a simple veil that constitutes the very thing that tries to reduce it to nothing: desire

p. 252 blank as polysemic totality of whiteness plus the fanlike form of text (spaced-out splitting of whole), plus the writing site (hymen), no longer determinate signifier or signifier at all

p. 253 paper & hymen: blankness that allows for fold > forever re-marks itself as disappearance, erasure, non-sense

p. 257n virginity (newness, wholeness) always overlaid w/ opposite—virginity submits to operation of hymen of its own accord

p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

p. 261 hymen, not truth of unveiling: no alētheia, only wink of hymen: rhythmic fall, regular (w)inclined cadence (une cadence inclinée)

——if hymen constitutes itself as textual trace, if it always leaves something behind, it’s because its undecidability cuts it off from depending on any signified

——hymen, one of those “beneficent figures” engendered by “the opposition btwn the closed and the open”: i.e. the fan, the book, the dancer

——hymen is the structure of and/or, btwn and and or

pp. 261-62 hymen not even a signifier or sign [an event?], thus everything that comes from propagation-structure of hymen, i.e. text, is never truly made up of “signs” or “signifiers”

p. 262 supplementary addition [addiction] enriches itself w/ zeros > racing toward infinity: “more” and “less” are separated/united by next-to-nothing of the hymen

p. 265 hymen is not a phenomenon—it folds itself back into the antre, which is an abyss

——mark upon mark, text w/in text, margin in mark (endless repeat): an abyss

——writing en abyme, abyss will never have glint (léclat) of phenomenon > becomes white or black, lun et/ou lautre au carré de lécriture

p. 266 hymen will have always disseminated: SPERM, burning lava, milk, spume, dribble of seminal liquor

p. 269 dissemination, fold of hymen, somber white of cave or womb, au noir sur blanc du ventre, lieu de son émission éparse et de ses hasards sans retours [scattered emissions, chances, w/out return]

p. 271 dissemination in the folds of the hymen

p. 277 difference is the necessary interval, suspense btwn 2 outcomes, “lapse of time” btwn 2 shots, rolls, chances > a game of chance forever new, a play of fire forever young > fire & games (via Nietzsche, Heraclitus), play of luck w/ necessity: a hymen btwn chance & rule

pp. 281-82 exhausted library protected by pane of glass (verre) (by fortunes of a verse (vers) or hymen) > pane of glass serves as insulator & contact btwn library & turmoil [TACT]

p. 283 missing the V of the hymen; verses

p. 283n [re: Les Mots anglais] French grafted onto English—born of an “indissoluble hymen”

p. 284n M (at once male/maternal) as upside-down double V

p. 285 roll die in hymen, write, seminal spurt: hasard selon le programme génétique > limited to 6 surfaces [each guarding chance]

MONL p. 14 ipseity: before “I” the “I can” [semantic chain: hospes, hostis, hosti-pet, posis, potest…]

p. 31 surging wave [déferlment déchainé] of anamnesia that the double interdict unleashed > invent one’s language and “I” at the same time [see p. 70 on autobiography]

p. 61 desire is borne by the arrival itself, before ipseity (I-me)

BL p. 206 the narrative “I” frightens the law

LOBL p. 110 the Il (who says “I”) donne la mort, he, the narrator (I), kills

p. 116 arrêt arrests itself, stands, stays unstable, remains on arête of itself, it a-rests (for) itself, no consciousness, perception, no watchfulness can gather this remnance, no “I”, hence ghosts, fantasies, epochal pause

——larrêt de mort, “ingenious” decision, one of those that are made (sarrêtent) only in a language, escape signature by any “I”, untranslatable, decision is unreadable > unreadability does not arrest reading in face of opaque surface, it starts reading, writing, translating again

POO p. 143n use of “I” as an example, am I writing an autobiography? or writing about “I” in general, where I become exemplary

MPM p. 50 “I” effaces its singularity as it designates it

pp. 55-56 Paul de Man translates Hegel’s “Ich kann nicht sagen was ich (nur) meine” as ‘I cannot say I’ > effacing of I, a priori functional forgetting > “Autobiography as De-facement”

p. 56 memory effaces remembrances—like “I” effaces itself [I forgets I at beginning of sentence]

SEC pp. 328-29 for Austin, signature is equal to verbal utterance coming from “I”, for signature to maintain itself: pure reproducibility of pure event

——for Derrida, for a signature to function, to be legible, it must detach itself from present and singular intention of its production; its sameness alters its identity and singularity, divides the seal

VM p. 110 name of philosophical subject, when he says “I”, a pseudonym

OH p. 7 replace “I” w/ “we” > move from feeling to axiom

VP p. 10 in phenomenology, transcendental consciousness, the archi-region, is absolutely singular, transcendental “I” distinguished from human, empirical, natural “I”

pp. 62-3n wouldn’t [contra Husserl] universal element of expressivity forbid fulfillment of Bedeutung when we say “I” in solitude, dispossessing the subject of full intuition of “I”?

p. 63n Husserlian distinction btwn the manifested (subjective) and the expressed as named: “I” is always an indicative monstration; “glass of water, please” names the thing and manifests the desire

p. 80 for Husserl, “subjective” adverbs (here, there, above, below, none, yesterday) function as subjective and occasional expressions just like word “I”; these are different from contingent expressions which have plurivocity, and objective expressions which are absolutely pure of contamination: mathematical expressions

p. 81 for Husserl, the Bedeutung of “I,” for the one who speaks, is realized > immediate representation of our personality; but, isn’t every expression only possible in relation to absence of object, absence of intuition, meaning, in this example, the absence of “I”?

p. 81n Husserl: “I” is “a universally operative indexical of the fact”

p. 82 “my death is structurally necessary to pronouncing the ‘I,’” it is an active structure, and it must function against all falsehood, meaning “I am dead” must function as Bedeutung outside of intuition (fact of my death)

PAS PAS p. (43) Blanchot: instead of contradiction “I am, I am not,” rubbing (usant) against each other like stones, I write, “I think, therefore I am not”

p. (73) the one who says “I” depends by his name, in his identity, on terrifyingly ancient event of another viens, le même pourtant > the drowned (noyé) as the one who says “I”

F p. xx Derrida reverses Freud: Wo Ich war soll es werden [Wo Es war, soll Ich werden]

DS p. 275 Mallarmé: plus jeplumeplume jeplume jet [jai]

p. 284n [Derrida comes back to i] reads little point as a decapitation right next to castrated pike > capital I (disseminates unity of meaning), ego, ice, échoplus-je > (I + Dé)irisation

FWT p. 112 “I” am not alone w/ myself, “I” am not all-one, an “I” is not an indivisible atom

OS pp. 44-5 Heidegger, like Hegel, equates I = I w/ time, in the form “I think” is time

ATIA pp. 1-160 [see

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

and

COGITO

]

pp. 91-2 single embrace of Kant, Descartes, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger, like chasing, hunting, trying to take hold of cuttlefish, touch the animal in a way where it will expel its ink (encre), its anchor, in this case, w/ these folks, the ink as the ability to do the “I,” before autoreference; (in the name of autobiography) Derrida confides the animalist “vision” he has of what he does, what he writes > his “sole concern” is to not sacrifice to it any difference, fold, opening to-come

p. 92 for Kant, the power to have the “I” is the erection of man, infinitely above: the subject

pp. 92-3 Kant’s fundamental anthropocentrism, man possesses representation “I”: tautological, egological, autographical

——power of “I”: “I can I,” a divine injunction that empowers man (not simply speak I, but think I, be present as self, as I)

PS pp. 177-78 the “I” who hears becomes the “I” who speaks, stealing speech form the “I” who thinks he speaks and is heard in his own name: sintroduisant dans le nom de celui qui parle, cette différence nest rien, elle est le furtif: la structure du dérobement instantané et originaire sans lequel aucune parole ne trouverait son souffle [w/out Artaud’s valuation, this sentence affirms differance]

SW p. 350 could a “theory of fetishism” ever measure up to infinite tenderness of “my own tallith” (as if such phrase preceded ipseity, the ability to say “I”)?

PIO p. 17 for Austin, “I” has the privilege of the performative; parabasis (parekbasis)

PF p. 282n old, inexhaustible question of “I”: how can a universal substitute lodge itself in unicity resisting all substitution? > most universal in most singular of alibis w/out alibi

TR p. 71 Rousseau: thanks to active/passive, mechanical theft, I was able, finally, to sign “I”

pp. 125-26 violence of “I”: irreducibly singular, yet nothing more universal, anonymous

——w/ reference to unjust justice [phrase Derrida admits having stolen from de Man], where the law suspends reference right as it requires it, where chacun, “each one,” is appropriated (always theft/deceit) in utterance “I” > all justice begins in perjury

p. 126 since every “I” is an “I”——tout autre est tout autre as the same: (the) I can betray w/out least appearance becoming manifest > substitution “I” for “I”: root of perjury

——Rousseau: “sapproprier en secret ce mot chacun”

p. 128 Rousseau’s “I was as if,” the theft of the “I”: one cannot steal a “what” w/out stealing, even raping, a “who,” a woman, child, man

p. 134 deceit/theft of singular I by universal I, just injustice, ineluctable subterfuge/substitution

p. 135 what is terrifying: what cuts me off from my own initiative [?] > automaticity discuplates & threatens “me”—quasi-excuses, ghosts of excuses, quasi-faults, spectral silhouettes of pardons: “as if” of this quasi, limitless risk of becoming simulacrum, virtuality

IW p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

PJP pp. 166-67 Derrida considers anacoluthon the most productive figure, a general formalization of Miller’s “polylogology”: multiplicity of voices, more than 1 voice in 1 voice, trace of perjury gets lost, leads us astray > this dispersion threatens concept, identity, identity of “I”

D p. 298 “I” w/ only illusion of mastery, decided by a throw of dice: law of chance

p. 325 “I” that attends its own incessant, violent reinscription, a pure passageway for operations of substitution, a mere function or ghost

p. 326 “I”: passing passageway for permutation, repercussive percussion, full force of writing > dun coup, triggers (déclenche) tale & keeps (maintient) it in progress

——simulacrum [of “I”] as a force, le simulacre de lassistance: chambre obscure: feigns to transform the imperfect into present: impossible > et vous entraîne dans un nouveau vertige

p. 327 “I” as surface vacant of itself: foments (prepares a poison) cruel dispossession > reaches simulacrum point: où il peut à la fois teindre le tissu (stains the tissue) et feindre to tell you truth about it

——a summons, provocation, face-to-face [w/ what?]

HST pp. 391-92 for Levinas, resurrection/survival becomes miracle of each instant, where an “I” calls out for forgiveness (salvation, redemption, Messiah), every instant

p. 393 Levinas: future (avenir) as a resurrection of the present; “next instant” is an annulment of commitment to existence made in the instant; the “I’s” death in the empty interval: condition of new birth

——Levinas: response to the hope for the present is the very expression of the“I,” exigency to redeem instant of despair; hope for present as a primary fact in mystery of work of time

p. 394 for Levinas, “I” [never identical] not a being that attempts a new instant, “I” is exigency for the non-definitive; “I”: need for time

——Levinas: “I” does not endow itself w/ this [temporal] alterity: impossibility of dialectical time is impossibility of saving oneself by oneself (alone)

+R p. 157 bait (amorce) for Christic phallus (Ichthys): track, graph or trace (Ichnos) of a voiceless bit (mors), Derrida translates title of Adami’s picture [on Glas] as Ich [I’m exhibiting Ichas an other]

p. 160 survival movement, arrêt de mort, final trance, sursaut cambré tenu au mors: says “I” (am dead) or hoc est corpus meum > dominant fish, one that bites best, takes from sea a body of scaly writing, homogenous w/ signatory’s initials

——death dance in fish’s tail (queue) > rhythmos: cadence of writing, undulation of waves

p. 165 X as Chi, the other scene, Ich, Isch (man)—she, cri

C p. 211 le Mhors-serie (I’m-out-of-series), Fors-series, the excluded necessary that marks the border of the Necessary itself: the necessary, the excepted, the contingent, sauf, fors

p. 237 I am myself cartouche and cartouches(s) in the plural: “I” sign myself to death as soon as there’s the title, reduce myself to first heading, capital, shrunken head

LI p. 62 “I” no less iterable than any other word > whatever singularity function of “I” possesses: does not guarantee adequation btwn saying/meaning

p. 131 “I” w/ quotation marks marks tendencies, styles, types, situations rather than a person

TN p. 32 “I touches itself, I self touches (Je se touche)”: tactile figure of pure auto-affection

pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

pp. 97-8 Nancy’s heart transplant, lintrus, is not the quasi-transcendental strangeness that refers to all our “I’s,” and yet… [the 2 strangenesses keep making signs toward one another]

pp. 151-52 via de Biran, sense of “I” comes from hand: rough, too heavy resistance > he would know nothing about himself, if he did not experience resistance

pp. 176-77 for Husserl, introjection is a late, upper layer of experience

——can there be solipsism w/out introjection? “I” requires intersubjectivity?

p. 180 there would be auto-affection “effects,” but their analysis can’t escape hetero-affection that makes them possible, keeps haunting them

——constitution of body proper would thus assume passage outside through “technē of bodies,” spacing, death, nonliving, other, mourning > everything the “solipsistic” tries to keep out (maintenir au-dehors)

ATM pp. 154-55 Levinas’ “here I am” or “I think”: a restlessness driving me out of substantiality

AD p. 134n Levinas: “here I am (me voici),” pronoun in accusative, declined before any declension

pp. 23-4 how could an automatic, proper “I” make an immanent “decision” w/out the tearing rupture (rupture déchirante) we associate w/ “free” decision?

p. 26 receiving beyond capacity of “I” > dissymmetrical disproportion marks law of hospitality

——Levinas, surprisingly, calls reason this hospitable receptivity (reorients philosophical tradition, which thinks sensibility as passive opposition to reason)

p. 111 for Pascal, strip “I” of everything attributed to it, make it naked, bare; for Levinas, nudity is infinitely exposed vulnerability—skin

LG p. 246 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] I bring forth to light (donne le jour) precisely the law as the right-to-sight (droit de voir), this law has “me” at its/her disposal? > the “I” sans “I” of narrative voice does not take place, engenders the lawmen [panoptic demand: synopsis]

p. 248 law demands a testimony oriented by a sense [genre] of history, ordonné par la raison and unity of “I think (je pense)”: originally synthetic apperception accompanying all representations

——that “I” does not always accompany itself > radically persecutes the law

p. 252 lépreuve of a récit brought to light the madness of genre—spinning (faire tourner) Peterson’s genre-disc, comme un soleil fou > dividing borders btwn literature and its others

——“this is the whole of it,” only what “I” see, kneeling [à genoux] at edge of literature, “le loi en somme, ce que je voit et que je dit que je vois en un récit où je/nous somme

BSi p. 103 to uniquely human “I” of Descartes and Kant, Lacan adds superego (Law/Crime) > i.e. animals don’t have superego

p. 270 sovereignty of self-present ipseity, only man can say “I”—autodeictic (Kant, Heidegger, Descartes)

CIR p. 188 if you knew, G., my experience of prayers, you would know everything, my “without-interest” in the depths of me, “I” is only misdirection—presumed crime I’m calling circumcision

p. 190 trying to disinterest myself from myself, destroying “I” before death comes to meet it

p. 291 “I” even w/in same sentence not the same

SPEC p. 306 [given Freud’s “new” genre] new distinction btwn narrator’s “I” and author’s “I”

IDEA

VM p. 135 eidos as noema in understanding or logos of the infinite subject (God) > how does transcendental idealism escape horizon of infinite subjectivity?

——Husserl would say that Plato’s eidos realized outside noema, outside being thought

POOF pp. 16-7 whole story of eidos, incl. Husserlian interp. of production of ideal objects (idealization), intemporality qua omnitemporality > [but] “takes time to do w/out time”

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, Aristotle overtook to ruin the capital letters of Platonism, the eídos of friendship, by calling the witness to the stand, an “actual” friend > Derrida will take sign of this ruin & no longer answer call to witness stand

PP p. 109 once there’s a supplement, there’s a supplement of a supplement (this is its structure); Plato fears this fatal entrainment, though it’s linked to eidos as possibility of repetition of same

p. 111 (126-27) Plato’s eidos: repetition w/ no error

p. 126-27 Socrates turns poison into salvation by way of logos, gives hemlock an ontological effect: initiates one into contemplation of eidos and immortality of the soul

p. 138 (158) God true father of the bed, the clinical eidos, carpenter, demiurge, repeats eidos, painter does not generate anything, imitates

OH pp. 24-5 Europe: representation or figure of a universal idea; has confused its face, figure, w/ a point, a phallus; the idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, eidos, archē, telos, the idea of beginning, commanding, cap, captain, towards an accomplished end

——advanced point is at once beginning and end, divided as beginning and end (Heidegger on Ort as point of spear, and fromm, Frömmigkeit, from promos, what leads, lavant-garde)

pp. 31-2 there is a crisis whenever the capital of infinity and universality finds itself in danger, when the eidos, limits, ends, confines, the finitude of Europe, emerges

WM p. 253 via Du Marsais, the philosophical metaphor light of the spirit is a detour w/in (in sight of) reappropriation, presence, etc. (from Platonic eidos to Hegelian Idea), a trope, a borrowed dwelling (house) > here, light is one metaphor among metaphors, and borrowed dwelling, expropriation, becomes metaphor of metaphor

p. 254 though Hegel’s system is irreducible to Plato’s, the word Idea bears a traditional burden that continues Plato’s system in Hegel’s

DS p. 188 specularity of eidos > logos—speech < mirroring [repetition ordered by resemblance (homoiōsis), doubling as duplication]

p. 189 logos, faithful image of eidos > painting is a painting of a painting

p. 194 Mallarmé’s frequent use of word Idea, often enlarged, capitalized

p. 238 idée: i’s & dé (dice) [phallus-mark & chance]

p. 284n [Derrida comes back to i] reads little point as a decapitation right next to castrated pike > capital I (disseminates unity of meaning), ego, ice, échoplus-je > (I + Dé)irisation

FS p. 28 philosophy as twilight of forces, “sun-splashed (ensoleillé)” morning of images, forms, phenomena > matin des idées et des idoles, où le relief des forces devient repos, aplatit sa profondeur dans la lumière et s'étend dans lhorizontalité

O pp. 29-30n Feuerbach on Hegel as a “game-player”: to Hegel the thinker, formally, absolute idea was an absolute certainty, to Hegel the writer, idea is a formal uncertainty

AFR p. 106 Condillac: we learn externality from touch alone

p. 107n Condillac: “sensation becomes idea only by force of touch,” every touch representative of objects the hand holds; sensation of solidity: both idea and feeling, idea as feeling in soul that relates to something outside

IW pp. 259-61 for Cohen, Plato overprivileged vision, intuition, in determination of eidos > Cohen links German idealism to Plato’s neglected concept hypotheton: idea as hypothesis, that’s truly German, infinite task, rigorous science > idea (not as Being but as hypothesis)

——Cohen: this method of idea linked to Plato’s logon didonai (Rechenschaftsablegung)

——Cohen: eidoslogos, concept (logos) is verified through idea & its rendering of accounts

TN p. 161 “eidetic” figure of optical intuitionism always confirms/fulfills itself in an intuition tactually filled-in & in hyperbole of continuistic haptocenteredness

IF p. 299 Flaubert: Plato is very source of ideal

p. 301 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] philosophy as vast circulation, unending procession of received ideas > insofar as encyclopedia generates/preserves ideas, it carries w/in itself its own necrosis: idea always becoming-matter (from 1st instant) > hence stupidity of philosophy (easy to stereotype), hence impertinence of materialism & spiritualism

p. 307 via Flaubert, nature only a moment of the idea (Hegel, religion)

p. 311 Flaubert like Mallarmé: inscribed in locus of philosophical exhaustion, simulacrum of dialectic, both expose its limits & impossibility > simulacrum that discredits oppositions (both mimic Platonic-Hegelian Idea while emptying it of its metaphysical/dialectic content)

pp. 313-15 [Flaubert on the Idea]

pp. 314-15 [Flaubert will not “divert the least thing” from Art] still philosophical to seek truth (idea) of idea as a primal scene of negativity/resentment in art, scene of guilt-ridden indebtedness to idea

——via Flaubert, perspectivism, somewhat Nietzschean code of affirmation; Derrida “recklessly” hypothesizes that Flaubert may have found all this in Spinoza, who opposed the Cartesian idea > Spinoza’s idea does not give rise to any representation or any idea of an idea

p. 317 Flaubert: “acharne-toi sur une idée! ces femmes-là au moins ne meurent pas et ne trompent pas!”; Goethe: “beyond the graves, onward!”

EU p. 79 for Schelling, individuals, who are finite, must translate > if mind could simply be infinite, there’d be no need to translate > “originary knowledge” can become “real" in an individual, only in der Gattung (in the genus), i.e. in historical institutions > history: becoming-real of idea

IDEALITY

VP p. 6 the ideality of ideality, living-present, self-presence of transcendental life; presence always the form, to infinity, through which an infinite diversity of contents will be produced > concrete ideality of “living present” justifies opposition btwn form and content ultimately and radically

p. 8 “ideality is the salvation or mastery of presence in repetition” (this is why Husserl claims intuition is not reell), not a presence of anything that exists in the world, in correlation w/ ideal acts of repetition [idealization secured by a certain relation of “existent” to his death]

p. 45 absolute ideality is correlate of a possibility of indefinite repetition of the same > being for Husserl is ideality as repetition

——tradition assured to infinity > transmission and reactivation of origin; this is a valuation, an ethico-theoretical act, reawakening originary decision of philosophy as Platonic form

p. 45n for Husserl, possibilities cannot exist in the world, they are ideal objects

p. 53 via Husserl, Greek metaphysics of presence becomes “modern” metaphysics of presence as self-consciousness, metaphysics of idea as representation (Vorstellung)

p. 58 ideality of the form of presence can be repeated to infinity as return of the same, but retained in a finite movement

pp. 64-5 the complicity of idealization and the voice are unfailing: brings monstration [?] to completion; unity of phonē and technē, voice as technical mastery of the object, via objectivity of object > the ideal object can be repeated, to infinity, while remaining the same

p. 66 voice’s immediate erasure, its diaphaneity, makes phoneme most ideal of signs

p. 67 phoneme gives itself as mastered ideality of the phenomenon

p. 76 the more the signifier is ideal, more it augments potency of repetition of presence, the more it protects, preserves, reserves and capitalizes on sense

OOG p. 73 for Husserl, genuine objectivity is ideal identity beyond contingent validity [?]: “the automobile is the fastest means of travel” loses its validity w/out losing its omnitemporal ideality

SPOM p. 78 logic of ghost, toward a thinking of event, exceeds binary, dialectical logic where effectivity or actuality (present, empirical, or not) is opposed to ideality (regulating or absolute non-presence)

p. 213 “good Marxism” must adjust the value of Marx’s ‘helpful’ theory of autonomization and automatization of ideality, but he still exorcises “the spectral simulacrum in an ontology”

OH pp. 68-9 [threatened] ideality in capitalization: that which exceeds borders of sensible, opens onto infinite, gives rise to universal, “maxim of maximization,” nothing other than spirit itself (analogic)

PPHS p. 73 Hegel: idea is in full possession of itself while it is [its] other

p. 89 sign erases itself for Hegel, but, unlike for Derrida, preserves signified ideality, through passageway of time

p. 90 when ideality appears in nature: spirit hides itself outside itself in sensory matter

p. 91 sensory matter hierarchized acc. power of ideality; physical ideality as teleological anticipation, or inversely, concept and value of ideality a “metaphor” > the “history” of metaphysics; sensualist reduction & idealist teleology follow same line [circle]: “metaphor”

pp. 91-2 Hegel: light is original ideality—nature becoming subjective

p. 93n [from Plato to Husserl] idealization: simultaneous confirmation of objectivity & interiority (one by the other), hierarchical classification

SH p. 38 ideality carries forgetting in its memory, the memory of forgetting itself, the truth of forgetting > reference to singular event annulled in ring’s annulation, the date’s turning-about, una volta, volte-face, revolt, revolution

***F p. xxxviii introj. as idealization, incorp. refuses metaphor of substitutive supplement, refuses introj.; incorp. fantasy takes introj.'s oral metaphor literally: vomits into inside, into pocket of cyst

FWT p. 69 arguments for human sovereignty, and the idealism that goes along w/ it > always contains an insult, a contempt for animals

p. 114 those who internalize, who think they can assimilate, appropriate, habituate, subjectivize the worst [in a work of mourning], immunize, sacralize, and idealize it

DS p. 194 idea as presence of what is: Plato, as figure of thing itself; Descartes, as subjective representation; Hegel, as both (still Platonism)

***POS p. 51 logocentrism is matrix of idealism, dismantling logocentrism deconstitutes all variants of idealism/spiritualism > logocentrism wider concept than idealism & phonocentrism

p. 49 Derrida’s suspicion of “thought,” that it means nothing, that it is logocentric > substantified void of highly derivative ideality [Deleuze’s moral image of thought]

p. 66 insistence that matter, via Bataille’s general economy, is absolute exterior of opposition, is necessary, is related to essential strategy of “materialism,” yet “materialism” must avoid becoming a new “idealism,” adopting naive relation to referent or signified

p. 94 Houdebine says “no Aufhebung here,” Derrida responds: there is always Aufhebung, just as there is always repression, sublimation, idealization

P p. 50 ideal limit acts as frame for pure philosophy

ROP pp. 18-9 royal weaver of Platonic dialectic (then Aristotle, Hegel, Kant), belongs to order of ideational consciousness, cannot intervene to remove resistance of any sort

p. 33 the dogma/idealism of Lacan’s “letter always arrives,” one can never assemble anything in its indivisibility

ATIA p. 103 [via Adorno] the idealist conjuration, the making totem/taboo, insulting materialism, hatred for the animal [the animal that therefore I am as self-hatred]: the Jew, the woman

O pp. 43-4 Derrida includes long list of hasty breaks w/ idealism, precipitous leaps to the outside (i.e. expressivist practice of writing) > all of which would surely regress back

AFR pp. 57-8(n) de Biran's criticism of Condillac’s arbitrary also a criticism of rationalism, of alchemism (reduction to the gold of abstract, simple, fundamental element [ego]), of idealism

p. 105 [Diderot against idealists]

p. 107 was Condillac ever idealist? only idealist?

IW pp. 251-52 for Adorno, Kant star witness of German tradition/mind; for Cohen, relation btwn Judaism/Kantianism: historical culmination of idealism as essence of German philosophy

p. 259 what is German? = what is German Philosophy? = what is Idealism?

p. 266-67 for Cohen, Gewissen (Protestantism) completed form of Platonic idealism, put our trust “only in the work of one’s own conscience (allein die eigene Arbeit des Gewissens)”: liberates & burdens religious thought, emancipation & oppression at same time > pure internal responsibility

——conscience must institute itself, a self-instituting decision w/ no external guarantee from institutions of this world > thus Luther’s Doppelsinn of this Glaube: anti-, archi-institutional

C p. 218 bananas [re: Titus-Carmel’s The Great Cultu] would be copies of copies w/out example, phantasmata, if force of ductus did not carry the remainder beyond any phantasy, beyond the signature, proper name, nameable

——ductus’ contingency accounts for ideality of model, which always rises, fermentation of spirt (Geist), above an organic decomposition

LI p. 53 structure of iteration implies both identity (minimum of idealization) and difference (minimum of remainder)

——iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori > differential btwn & w/in elements

pp. 61-2 idealization (identity in repetition) is made possible by iterability, while broaching/breaching (entame) the idealization at once > iterability alters, contaminates, what it identifies

p. 71 iterability can be supplemented by differance, grapheme, trace > cannot be idealized, makes idealization possible but never pure, simple: iterability has an internal impure limit, prevents it from being identified, synthesized, reappropriated by that whose iteration it entame

p. 94 even Derrida’s discourse involves effect of idealism in some way

pp. 117-18 all concepts appeal to idealization, even “concept” of iterability > but it has a strange status: marks possibility/limit of idealization, thus conceptualization too

p. 119 alogical logic of iterability: it’s an ideal concept, but also the one that marks essential & ideal limit of all pure idealization > not the concept of nonideality

——repeatability of both (identificatory) iterability & (altering) iterability > necessity of thinking rule & event, concept & singularity, at once

——iterability thus a concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, & hence the concept, hence all distinction > marks the limit of idealization/conceptualization: “concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to nonconcept

p. 120 structural idealism, not illusion: constitutes condition of a certain classical value called scientific truth > iterability that makes such truth possible renders it inaccessible (not illusory)

TN p. 53 living moment of life an interiorization or expulsion? becoming-tangible of untouchable or an idealization?

p. 64 [is Christianity the only idealizing anesthesia, neutralization, universalism—or one case?]

p. 116 touch does not come as easily to Derrida as it does to Nancy—isn’t Nancy’s [every] origin “appropriable”?

——Derrida not more idealist, history of touch is idealistic—“cannot bring myself to believe in it very much”

p. 117 [but] the idea is seen rather than touched

p. 120 philosophy—idealization, intuitionism as philosophy itself, where seeing the blind spot, a point, is touching it > fullness of immediate presence: actuality of what se donne en acte, energetically, effectively: hapto-tropologic metaphysics comes to its plenitude, pleroma

BSi pp. 177-78 Husserl’s free ideality (i.e. the number “two” repeated identically) vs. bound (gebundene) idealities (ideal only in body)

OG p. 20 (33-34) transcendental signified: resource of sign, makes difference btwn signans/signatum absolute & irreducible > it is la voix sentend: conscience, auto-affection (spontaneity, ideality, universality, non-mondain of substance)

p. 30 (46) Saussure’s (Aristotle’s) phonocentrism: voixstate of soul; writing—symbols of voix

——one should call this a model, and not a structure, of a certain kind of writing: it does not function perfectly, but there’s an ideal directing a function ([thus] never completely phonetic)

p. 63 (92-3) for Saussure, signifier: sound-image, not real sound but psychic impression (what Husserl would call hylè/morphé structure, distinct from all mundane reality); for Saussure, signified: not thing but “concept” or, better yet, lidéalité du sens

pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

SPEC p. 319 force of disappearance, of fort > capitalized pleasure (plaisir) (idealization) does w/out what it needs: one provides oneself w/ head of what one needs by doing w/out it (to have it)

p. 382 normal repetition: idealizing interiorization, mastery (Hegel, Husserl)

FV p. 464 for signifier to be kept (pour que le signifiant se garde) in its letter—no partition (if divisible, always can be lost en route) > materiality—indivisibility—idealization—point de capiton (staples signifier to signified) [?]: Lacan determines letter (no matter what he says) at point of its meaning (ideality): letter escapes partition, movement [no wonder he calls this “materiality” “odd”]

p. 479 systemic & historical link btwn idealization, relève (Aufhebung), and the voice > Lacan’s elevation of signifier

p. 480 Lacan: “the phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance”

——Lacan reversed Hegel: not ideal signified but ideal signifier

IDENTITY

GOD pp. 145,148 secret secret of forgiveness: to remain secret, and to become self-forgiveness (via specular identification), and in the ambiguity of se pardonner, to be deprived of sense in this narcissistic reflexivity

——to ask forgiveness is to identify with the other, auto-affect, hetero-affect

MONL p. 10 all these problems of identity, as we foolishly say

p. 14 dogmatism of identity, preceded by ipseity?

pp. 14-5 “disorder of identity”: more threatened and artificial than ever

pp. 17-8 disorder of identity: does it favor or inhibit anamnesia? heighten desire for memory? both! exhausts us, point of losing our breath, our minds

p. 28 “only the interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic process of identification endures”

——“identificatory modalities: all the poles of imaginary projection in social culture”

pp. 67-8 appeal to come (appel à venir) gathers language together in advance, not in unity, identity, but in singularity of its difference to itself: in difference avec soi not davec soi

FK p. 78 quasi-spontaneous automaticity: confused identity, auto-immunity, auto-indemnify > detaches & reattaches (to family, proper) at same time, mystical or secret mechanicity: unheimlich

OOG p. 73 for Husserl, genuine objectivity is ideal identity beyond contingent validity [?]: “the automobile is the fastest means of travel” loses its validity w/out losing its omnitemporal ideality

LOBL p. 102 structure of invagination exposes precariousness of effects of “genre,” “mode, “corpus,” all historical fictions that certify its carte didentité

POO p. 17 exemplarity: “example itself, as such, overflows its singularity as much as its identity”

SPOM pp. 68-9 for Marx, ultimate support for dominant discourse: identity, self-identity of social class [Derrida believes he can suspend this idea while still inheriting from Marx]

p. 136 no pure identity if that which is most living have specters inside, weighed down by specters, which think

p. 200 before commodities, use-value intact, identical to itself [Derrida deconstructs]; p. 201 use-value as limit concept contaminated in advance

POOF pp. 99-100 identification qua fraternization, bond btwn 2 necessities (ties): embedding of an ‘it is necessary’ in the filiation of what is, obligation to the natural [p. 102 isonomy from isogony]

p. 106 a deconstructive thought of # and equality, power of universalization beyond State & nation, the account taken (la prise en compte) of anonymous/irreducible singularities, indifferently different [Schelling?], indifferent to particular difference, to the raging quest for identity corrupting the most indestructible desires of the idiom [democracy’s?]

A p. 11 border becomes a problem as soon as edge-line is threatened, a step crossing an indivisible line (customs, police, visa—all established upon institution of indivisibility or identity of line)

SEC pp. 317-18 isn’t iterability of writing also in speech and in all experience? > never permits unity of self-identity

EM p. 113 (134) national philosophical identity accommodates a nonidentity

VM p. 91 acc. Levinas, renounce the other is to enclose oneself in bad solitude of self-identity, to repress ethical transcendence

pp. 91-2 acc. Levinas, to see, know, have and will “unfold only within the oppressive and luminous identity of the same” (fundamental categories of ontology/phenomenology)

p. 109 w/out using these terms, Levinas warns against confusing idem (same) w/ ipse (ego), identity w/ ipseity > this happens immediately w/ Greek and German: autos, selbst

p. 317n for Heidegger, same is not a category, it is not the identical, not negation of difference

p. 149 thought of Being is thought of other before homogenous identity of concept, before asphyxiation of the same?

PP pp. 92-3 Thoth supplants and supplements (en le suppléant) its other (father, sun, life, speech, origin or orient); at same time Thoth takes shape from very thing it resists and substitutes for

——Thoth opposes itself, passes into its other > messenger-god is truly god of absolute passage btwn opposites: god of non-identity (if he had identity: coincidentia oppositorum)

p. 168 “at once (à la fois):” identity is doubled as its simulacrum, phantasm, at once (identity of presence, presence of its identity, doubled as soon as it appears)

OH pp. 9-10 what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself, culture of oneself as culture of other, gathered and divided at the heart, home: [violent syntax] différence (d) avec soi

p. 15 heading of the other: first condition of an identity that is not an egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other, not even anti-heading or decapitation

p. 27 identification is always cultural never natural, always has a capital form, advanced point, capitalizing reserve

p. 35 responsibility: making a chance of the memory of a name, of the idiomatic limit > an opening of identity to its future

p. 52 [summary of political responsibility today] denounce divergences btwn principle and the determined limits of their representation > task always urgent, infinite > identity instituted in responsibility as experience/experiment of the response

p. 73 whether hospitable or xenophobic, self-affirmation of identity always claims to be responding to call of universality, an inscription of universal in singular, unique testimony to human essence and to what’s proper to man

PAS PAS p. (29) Blanchot disquiets, suspends, infringes on categorical, the self-identity of the category (accusation, judgment) > [infringes] law of identity of “is” in predication

p. (73) the one who says “I” depends by his name, in his identity, on terrifyingly ancient event of another viens, le même pourtant > the drowned (noyé) as the one who says “I”

p. (85) double pas, its absolute heterogeneity, deprives of nothing save its identity to self, which prevents distancing from self > double pas, absolute rarefaction w/out the least lack

F p. xix self does identify, to resist introjection: but only in “imaginary, occult” way; the “endocryptic identification” designed to keep topography intact and the place safe (le lieu sauf) are cryptofantasmatic, but the inclusion, divisions and partitions are real

FWT pp. 20-22 Derrida distrusts cult of identitarian/communitarian discourse; resists narcissism of minorities developing everywhere—including w/in feminism > yet, “I can understand the vital urgency of an identitarian reflex,” I accept a momentary/prudent alliance [see WAP pp. 3-4], but he can soon mistrust, limit to solidarity in figures of communitarianism or nationalism

——I am not this or that, I am this and that, this rather than that, acc. the situation/urgency

WM p. 239 since, for Aristotle, mimēsis is not identity but gives us to see in action what is not to be seen in action, only in its resembling double, its mimēma, Derrida wants to leave open this energetic absence, this enigmatic division, the interval which makes scenes and tells tales

DS p. 234 inserting spacing into interiority does not allow inside to identify w/ itself (close upon itself)

POS p. 9 differance common root of oppositional concepts, as common root, is also element of the same (distinguished from the identical [Heidegger]) in which oppositions are announced

p. 23 communication: transmission of identity of signified object from one subject (presupposes subject) to another: A communicates B to C

p. 94 spacing makes it impossible for identity to be closed in on itself

OS p. 55 the now, presence in the act of the present: limpossibilité de coexister avec soi: avec soi, cest-à-dire, avec un autre soi, un autre maintenant, un autre même, un double

——this impossibility contradicts itself, time is name for possibility of impossible, this impossible possibility: alterity & identity of the now maintained in a differentiated element of a certain same

——the cum, or co- of coexsistence has meaning only on basis of its impossibility

ROP p. 21 inability to identify w/ oneself, unify oneself, gather oneself > alliance of destiny, namely tragedy, and chance as the possible or aleatory [no pertinence to dramatization]

p. 100 all identities (madness, reason, history) in history of madness would be divided from w/in, threatened in advance by parasitism, like a computer virus (though w/out any antivirus)

pp. 109-10 identity (of epoch) fissures, is divided (partagée) the moment a couple [Freud/Nietzsche] is split, even more so when the decoupling occurs in self-identity of some individual (i.e. Freud), historians have trouble with self-difference, cette différence à soi

SP pp. 103-05 no truth in itself of sexual difference in itself, homme/femme en soi > but, ontology w/ its verification of identity, w/ its arraisonnement, shelters (recèle) undecidability of sexual difference

OTO pp. 16-7 Nietzsche’s living mother/dead father, identity as double & neutral; “I know both, I am both” [“both” must be read as singular] > la vie la mort: the dead man the living feminine

PS p. 193 self-presence, Artaud’s “WE KNOW IT WAS WE WHO WERE SPEAKING > magic identification

p. 194 self-presence, unity, self-identity, proper: most profound and permanent ambition of Western metaphysics [?]

O O pp. 36-7 if nothing outside text, text not snug airtight (calfeutré) inside of an interiority or an identity-to-itself (dune identité à soi) > though “dehors à tout prix” can play a reassuring role, un certain dedans peut être terrible

p. 45 business (laffaire) of old name, of onymism in general, of false identity of mark, which dissemination must disturb (doit perturber) at the root [re: “Mallarmé,” guise of homonymy]

p. 53n [general economy of hymen]: cette consumation [consumption, consummation], comme celle de lhymen, ne commence ni ne finit jamais, en quoi son identité se dé-pense

Gii Gii p. 52 Heidegger’s unity [re: Geschlecht], not identity, but preserves the simplicity of the same—even in the form of the fold

REST REST p. 274 by owing the truth, one restitutes it, identifying as assigning points or proper size (pointure)

p. 278 what if, and Derrida sees it too, they’re 2 left shoes, a double that fudges (brouille) both “pair & identity” à la fois—paralyzes directionality, fait loucher vers le diable

——logic of false parity (rather than false identity) constructs the trap?

p. 368 identification, like attribution, has supplementary/parergonal structure > because demand for reattachment is insatiable, unsatisfied, always making a higher bid, always starts out again

p. 373 once there is ghost (fantôme) or double as revenant, logic of identification is not easily appeased > ghost of Van Gogh: genitive translates the malaise, Unheimlichkeit, all by itself

DST DST pp. 212-13, 318-19n w/ both Lacoue-Labarthe & Heidegger, Derrida wonders about unity of unthought—couldn’t the unthought be désistance, & doesn’t désistance enforce an irreducible dispersion that disidentifies even a concept of a subject that exceeds the metaphysical one?

pp. 319-20n delay as inevitable, delay re: one’s “own” birth, experience of “abortion” > a subject that cannot identify itself because ineluctably delayed [Lacan’s human born prematurely]

——condition of possibility of identification is its impossibility (both ineluctable) > subject identifies itself because it can never be identified

EJQB p. 75 Jew’s identification w/ himself doesn’t exist

AFR pp. 80-1 Condillac: if there is fundamentally only one machine, there is fundamentally only one property > unique property assures possibility of “identical propositions,” this self-evident identity (nontautological) is discovered by way of Reason, is “the only sign of evidence” > all modifications are those of first property modifying itself: sensibility

——Condillac’s non-Cartesian indubitability: first property which knows itself (sensibility)

p. 117 Condillac’s identical proposition as powerful circle, finality of the same, circle of identity, self-evidence [brings whole to part] [but how can this circle close if whole is different from part?]

p. 128 frivolity originates from deviation or gap of signifier, also from its folding back on itself in closed, nonrepresentative identity

——we escape frivolity only at semantic risk of nonidentity; Condillac names nonidentity metaphor, makes it the primordial structure of language to begin its analogical/teleological reappropriation

PJP pp. 166-67 Derrida considers anacoluthon the most productive figure, a general formalization of Miller’s “polylogology”: multiplicity of voices, more than 1 voice in 1 voice, trace of perjury gets lost, leads us astray > this dispersion threatens concept, identity, identity of “I”

p. 167 essential finitude of discontinuous anamnesis inscribes ellipses/eclipses in identity of subject

——undecided btwn provocative irony, disarming sincerity: one responds both responsibly & irresponsibly

D p. 365 only that which can be repeated in its identity can have unity

LI p. 53 structure of iteration implies both identity (minimum of idealization) and difference (minimum of remainder)

——iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori > differential btwn & w/in elements

pp. 61-2 idealization (identity in repetition) is made possible by iterability, while broaching/breaching (entame) the idealization at once > iterability alters, contaminates, what it identifies

p. 76 iterability: ruins (even ideally) the very identity it makes possible

TN p. 350n how could [Husserl’s] identical coincidence open up to anything else?

NOY p. 238 thought of history of Being affected by internal epochē, divides, suspends the yes: will is not identical to itself (along w/ many other things) > yes as the incalculable, the promise: [quasi-, fable of] “giving reason,” “giving an account,” the countability of the innumerable yesses

E pp. 23-5 what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of identification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

LG pp. 228-29 trait common to classes should follow a code that determines belonging, an identifiable trait identical to itself > but, this trait qua mark always a priori remarkable

OG p. 190 (269) via Rousseau’s pity, ours is the others, identification as non-identification

SPEC p. 290 [for Freud?] no mélange of pleasure–unpleasure is possible, mélange is madness > though topical distribution [in Beyond…] is effect of differance, it retains differance in reassuring medium & in oppositional logic > principle of identity is respected by topology, division of sites

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

FV pp. 460-61 analysand seeing his/her double: “uncontrollable anxiety” disrupts every verification of identity, obstacle for transference

WBH p. 199 gift determines, produces identity of giver & receiver, gives itself the right to determine, always a strike of force, irruption

IDEOLOGY

SPOM p. 71 ideologies reduce hiccups to empiricisms

pp. 207-08 for Marx, via reference to religious world, ideology’s incorporation in apparatuses endow them not only w/ autonomy but automaticity

POR p. 13 (143) literature and poetry can be used in ideological warfare as much as linguistics, rhetoric

SEC p. 314 careful use of “ideological” in relation to Condillac: theory of sign as representation of idea, which represents a perceived thing; communication vehiculates a representation as ideal content (which will be called meaning); writing as species w/in genus of communication

——“ideological” so rarely examined today for its possibility & history

VM p. 97 [for Levinas, against ontology, primacy > archia > chief > neutral] Levinas offers premises for non-Marxist critique of ideology

OG p. 131 (191) paralysis of ideology: stopping at one determination [slavery] when the object in question [writing] could be something else as well [liberating]

IDIOM

GT p. 80 language as a given for Heidegger is already the dialect (Mundart), idiom is the mother of the tongue

MONL p. 69 universal structure: messianic idiom

POOF pp. 238-40 via Michelet, fraternity always caught up in vertiginous process (mechanics) of hyperbolization: from the strict literal (‘natural’ fraternity) to the figurative literal (universal, infinite fraternity) > thus, [strictly] woman ‘does not yet know how to read’ fraternity, she is not included in the idiom, the singularity; but, [literally] she is like [the promise of] absolute fraternity, ‘more just than just,’ law beyond law

pp. 263-64 yes this book is French, but it’s not written only in French, that would claim for French exemplary privilege of translation for all other idioms [i.e. Montaigne, Hugo, etc. on fraternity & humanity] > instead, this books sets itself up to work and be worked relentlessly (s’acharne lui-même), au sens de la chasse, là où acharner revient à disposer un leurre de chair, close to the thing called France

p. 240 question “What is (tí estin) friendship?” & “Who is the friend (either sex)?” is nothing but the question “What is philosophy?”

A p. 79 contaminating contraband remains irreducible [insinuates itself in idiom of existential analysis]

VP p. 42 for Husserl, a sign is never an event if event means an “empirical singularity” that happens only “once,” is irreplaceable and irreversible > purely idiomatic sign would not be a sign

FL p. 245 “I cannot speak the language of the other except to the extent that I appropriate

it and assimilate it according to the law (loi) of an implicit third…inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of the idioms”

BL p. 210 Kant like Kafka knows the law is an idiom for you—never general

p. 213 literature: when the singular crosses the universal [Hegelian?], when the categorical engages the idiomatic

AF p. 78-9 (n) in response to Derrida’s statement that LUn se garde de lautre pour se faire violence can only be said/ thus archived so economically in French, Bennington wonders if Derrida committed violent election of the one: Derrida says he never spoke of absolute untranslatibility, and that his affirmation of idiomaticity is always one of deferral & impurity [both were ironic?]

p. 86 haunting requires a home, a place, ghosts are sensitive to idioms, welcoming this one, allergic to that one > law of oikos, economy

p. 90 archive always holds a problem for translation, it is repeatable and idiomatic

OH p. 35 responsibility: making a chance of the memory of a name, of the idiomatic limit > an opening of identity to its future

p. 44 double bind of European cultural identity: 1) necessary not to reconstitute centralizing hegemony (the capital) 2) necessary not to cultivate minority differences for their sake, untranslatable idiolects (not to multiply borders, marges, marches)

S p. 69 for Heidegger, signature of thought never individual, commits via community, people, in his or her own language; there are only some languages open to Being: German, Greek

p. 76 Geschick, Schickliche, Schicksal, Geschichte, untranslatable because this chain is deployed in its own idiomatic mission of history

FSW p. 209 Freud adds an idiomatic residue (syntax, grammar) to the symbolic, hieroglyphic dream-writing > thus limitation of Egyptian priest’s Chiffriermethode via Traumbuch

p. 210 it is the materiality of signifier that is relinquished in translation > when materiality is reinstated, translation becomes poetry

——since materiality of signifier constitutes idiom of dream scene, dreams are untranslatable

pp. 213-14 “repetition”—death as power, lack of power—institutes translatability, makes possible “language,” transforms absolute idiom into a limit toujours déjà transgressed (pure idiom is not language, becomes so only through repetition), repetition divides point of departure of first time; however, to only look at effect of repetition, at translation, obvious distinction btwn force & meaning, effaces intensity of death drive

T pp. leiris xxvi-xxvii [Leiris’ phonograph (purely sonorous idiom that cannot be expressed w/ words) “mirrors” literature on printing press tympanum]

SH p. 17 date always bound up w/ a proper name > gives us to think an idiom, each time, barely translatable [Derrida is also referring to his French phrasing]

p. 31 Babel w/in a single language, shibboleth marks multiplicity in language, insignificant difference as condition of meaning

p. 52 wherever signature enters idiom, leaving trace of incision (unique & iterable, cryptic & readable), there’s a date

F pp. xlvi-xlvii desire for idiom/idiom of desire wrenched open w/in system > never purely idiomatic (absolutely undecipherable) nor simply commonplace (conventional & transparent)

TB p. 104 Babel as metaphor of metaphor, narrative of narrative, translation of translation: not only structure hollowing itself out like that, but does so in its own way > its idiom would have to be saved

——multiplicity of idioms limits “true” translation & is a structural order, a coherence of construct: internal limit to formalization, incompleteness of constructure > up to a certain point justified to see there translation of a system in deconstruction

Gii p. 29 Geschlecht as idiom, a “we” that can hear Fichte’s address (not necessarily the Germans)

——organic community in nonnatural, spiritual sense

——“we” announces itself to itself from infinity of a telos of freedom/spirituality > engages, allies, promises itself acc. to circle of this infinite will

p. 30 for Fichte, “we” of Geschlecht, question of humanity (Menschlichkeit) (versus animality) > teleological essence of humanity announced par excellence in Deutschheit

p. 31 for Fichte, the German ear will understand Menschlichkeit w/out historical explanation (etymology) [idomatic humanism], not so w/ Latin Humanität > humanitas is a suprasensible idea

p. 60 Heidegger employs idiomatic untranslatability of opposition btwn geistig/geistlich to withdraw Gedicht (“site”) of Trakl from Platonic tradition, w/ its opposition aisthēton/noeton (“sensible” material/“intelligible” spirituality), and from Christian opposition spiritual/temporal

p. 61 the “situation (Erörterung)” of Gedicht needs recourse to idiom of Geschlecht (Geschlecht of idiom)? how to think Gedichts belonging, appropriation to a language, to a Geschlecht

REST pp. 263-64 [re: les question de la démarche embarrassée (boîteuse ou louche?)] i.e. “Who is walking?” “On whose feet?” > idiomatic figures of questions seem necessary; “necessary: it’s an attribute,” still vague > better to say question-idioms the form of which is very fitting, clinging (collant) (tightly/flexibly) to figure or body of what you here wish to turn into an object (feet)

p. 268 “to tell the truth”: necessary to hold in reserve excess of interpretation, supplement of reading—for the idiom of a syntactic variation > absolute idiom is name of a lure, but absolute “pas didiome” [see p. 381] does not authorize contentment w/ symbolic equivalences, “w/ off-the-peg universals (duniversaux de confection)”

DST DST p. 199 tie thinking of untranslatable idiom to logic of double constraint: one must avoid avoiding, one cannot avoid avoiding, il faut, il ne faut pas

p. 200 great task of translator, his agony, aporias, madness: proceed from initial strangeness, the gap opened by idiom of the original text [original text???????????]

p. 201 despite inevitable impurity of secret of idiom, experience of each remains, in its singular proximity, absolutely different [re: similar paths taken by Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, & Derrida]

RM pp. 61-2 via Heidegger, if idiom (“dialect”) is not only language of mother but mother of language, could this reversal help us think essence of maternity?

D p. 365 the unique (that which is not repeated—thus, has no unity), the inummerable, call it the present, is thus apeiron, the unlimited, the crowd, the imperfect

PPT p. 5 the “interest,” the revenue of the surplus value, remains untranslatable in idiom’s economic performance, in ellipses of its trait, the word by word or trait for trait in which it contracts

C pp. 191-92 [re: 127 coffin drawings in drawers] glossary tire, tirer, tiroir, tirage [draw, to draw, drawer, drawing (attracting)] (also à la tire of the pickpocket), leads to that of idiomatic trait, to duction or even “ductus” > one recognizes a draftsman even before he signs his name

——seduction/attraction of a drawer, seduce the haunting of a cenotaph

p. 231 inimitable ductus of pickpocket [idiom], repeating (transgression must be repeated to begin) > worst, most fatal of villainies: robbery/violation of tombs

TN p. 219 idiomatic singularity of a gesture is never pure or purely reappropriable and it can’t be separated from a scene, strategy, discursive tactics [where’s the bridge, the passage?]

AD p. 35 idiom, ambiguous chance, shibboleth of the threshold, preliminary chance of hospitality (i.e. French language)

——these chances accumulate places appropriate to the crypt (i.e. translating accueil and recueillement)

BSi p. 175 idiom (extraordinary magnetic field of meaning links idios of particular, singular idiom to idiotes, idiocy of simple, ignorant, naked, savage man)

——[re: bêtise as stupidity] the remainder/remnant is untranslated/untranslatable: totality of idiomatic network that coordinates values, quasi-synonymies, homonymies (i.e. bêtise and bête)

pp. 336-37 the untranslatability of bêtise (no word in world can translate it), even untranslatable from French into French > those who speak French, those privileged by the idiom, are commanded by complicated programs, contexts, pragmatic situations > privilege to unique event of language, the “poetic,” is contaminated by reactive or reactional animality [animal-machine]

OG p. 110 (162) death, violence, impossibility of pure point, “point vocative,” death of absolutely proper naming (the other as pure other) is death of pure idiom

CIR pp. 30-34 beyond G.’s program, G.’s generative grammar: surprise salvation of a backfire, something in the past withdrawn (if not content at least in the sap of the idiom) from effusion of the signature > obliging G., the other, “forgetting me on pretext of understanding me”

——nonsuturable, nonsaturable singularity of event: a perjury in G.’s machine

SPEC p. 360 desire for idiom—nothing less idiomatic

p. 380 [vis-à-vis Freud] speculation not intuitive (intellectual impartiality) but idiomatic, referential

IMAGINARY/FANTASY

MONL p. 28 “identificatory modalities: all the poles of imaginary projection in social culture”

p. 42 place of fantasy (France): infinite distance or incommensurable proximity (invisible and radiant hearth)

R p. 85 Kant’s as-if essential to regulative idea, imaginary approach tending towards universality; re: mondialisation, Kant’s word remains a regulative idea [Derrida on why he can’t take regulative idea seriously]

OOG p. 124 for Husserl, pure geometry [exact ideality p. 133] prior to imagination and sensibility, Cartesian intellectualism

pp. 124-25n Husserl closer to Descartes than Kant here > since Kant no longer derives sensibility from a “sensualist” definition, he argues that geometry is not imaginary because grounded in pure sensibility; for Husserl, geometry is not imaginary because uprooted from all sensible ground

H p. 89 language gives the fantasy of property

SPOM p. 140 a fantastics as general as it is irreducible, the law of an invincible anachrony, the untimely, the revolution is fantastic and anachronistic

***p. 185 character of the specter cannot be derived from a psychoanalysis of the imaginary

MPM p. 64 recognize in figure of phantom the working of what Kant & Heidegger assign to transcendental imagination, “fantastic” temporalizing schemes and powers of synthesis > Kant: an art hidden in depths of soul

VP p. 47 for Husserl, imagination neutralizes memory, it is a non-“positing” representation, keeps w/in itself primary reference to an originary presentation; pure ideality to which neutralization provides access is not fictional, thus Husserl’s beef w/ Hume and his fascination w/ Hume

PPHS p. 78 acc. Hegel, reproductive imagination (reproduktive Einbildungskraft) remains closed in on itself, self-identity of intelligence in passivity of impression [when simply received from pit]; productive imagination, the creation of signs, spirit as its own self-sprungness, but this sign is pure exteriorization of spirit, the scandalous idea of producing intuition

pp. 78-9 Kant & Hegel more analogous than usual re: [transcendental, productive] imagination, both describe receptive passivity & productive spontaneity, movement of temporalization

p. 80 Hegel: productive imagination as welding Mittelpunkt [site where opposites pass into one another]

——Hegel: reason makes truth out of imagination’s indifference

F p. xix self does identify, to resist introjection: but only in “imaginary, occult” way; the “endocryptic identification” designed to keep topography intact and the place safe (le lieu sauf) are cryptofantasmatic, but the inclusion, divisions and partitions are real

FWT pp. 43-4 fantasy of the genetic, “my flesh and blood!” > genitor is not the father! history of law folded into the fact that symbolic organization requires fantasmatic investments

POOF p. 82 [even if Nietzsche announces, calls for, texts by Bataille, Nancy, Blanchot, reading these texts as symptom-effects remains crude] reading not simply limited by reading in the language that the symptom-effect speaks [follow other traces] > otherwise, “reality” and “history” one distinguishes would remain undetermined & imaginary: i.e. the discourse of those ‘realistic’ champions of historical referent & actuality (effectivité)

***DS p. 235 the category of the imaginary: constructed out of ontological interpretation of mimēsis

P pp. 102-03 Kant’s reproductive (a certain mimesis) vs. spontaneous imagination > Kant closer to Nietzsche than Nietzsche thought (creative aesthetic)

p. 139 for Kant, imagination: intermediate btwn sensibility & understanding

ATIA p. 137 for Lacan, what is great about Descartes’ cogito is that the sum is transcendental, it’s beyond imaginary capture (the animal’s cogito, w/out sum, w/out “I”), the specular > [it is symbolic]

FS p. 7 for Kant, [productive] imagination was already art itself > originally, did not distinguish btwn beauty & truth

——for Rousset, in the “literary fact” language is one w/ meaning, form belongs to content of work > all possible via imagination’s capacity for metaphor, unifying “form and content”

***SW p. 331 “immobile archaism of the fantasy [Oedipus as eye-surgeon?] can outplay w/ its infinite anachronism all the lasers in the world”: (the unconscious) resists translation “in an age of technoscience,” never disarms, nor should we ever > more powerful than technical all-powerfulness

DPi p. 79 when U.S. reinstated DP, DP was only criticized for being cruel & unusual to sensibility & imagination, in sense of aisthesis, phantasia, phantasma

PIO p. 41 status of imagination shifts in/after Kant, rehabilitation of productive imagination from Kant to Schelling to Hegel

——does Kant’s Einbildungskraft (like produktive Vermögen, which Schelling & Hegel distinguish from reproductive Imagination) liberate philosophical inventiveness from subjection to theological rule (finding what’s already there)? I think not: it remains a passage [to the same] [not interruption]

pp. 417-18n Kant: imagination, site of genius, it’s creative (schöpferisch)—still, academic rules must be followed if Kunstler wants work to fit Idea underlying it

HLP p. 293n Arendt: ability to lie interconnected w/ ability to act; owe their existence to same source: imagination [technological use of images]

AFR pp. 76, 77-8(n) another disappropriation, fission, in 2 concepts of imagination, tampers w/ very concept of what disappropriates [re: Condillac]:

1. imagination as purely reproductive: disposition, material used by consciousness, perception

2. imagination as productive: force, free > new forms can be true or untrue (in order to supply, it adds something more)

pp. 78-9(n) via Condillac, the history/narrative we produce re: “progress of language,” via the imaginations [productive, reproductive], always risks resembling a fable

——if there are 2 concepts of imagination, there are 2 concepts/values of sign: 1) instrument of control, mastery 2) condition/instrument of exercising

p. 95 for Condillac, time secures moment when object goes missing from perception, moment perception is absent from itself > moment space of signs opens, w/ function of imagination [time as that which absents perception?]

C p. 218 bananas [re: Titus-Carmel’s The Great Cultu] would be copies of copies w/out example, phantasmata, if force of ductus did not carry the remainder beyond any phantasy, beyond the signature, proper name, nameable [cf. pp. 220-21 also beyond hierarchy]

——ductus’ [?] contingency accounts for ideality of model, which always rises, fermentation of spirt (Geist), above an organic decomposition

TN p. 105 for Nancy, sublime: imagination feeling its powerlessness as it touches the limit (limit conceived as height, absolute height)

pp. 105-06 cela se touche: “it itself touches itself,” “one touches it, it lets itself be touched” > imagination: possibility auto-affecting its essence of a nonessence: it is touched, in a movement de retrait ou de re-pli, becomes at moment it touches untouchable [re: imagination “touching” sublime]

BSi p. 80 analogy as mediation, Kant’s schema of imagination: btwn intuition & concept of understanding

p. 143 acc. Deleuze, psychoanalytic bêtise privileges depth of fantasy over planar affect, becoming-assemblage

EU pp. 66-7 for Schelling, thinking as Einbildungskraft, as post-Kantian originary unity > all differences translations of same > post-critical, critique of critique

p. 67 originary unity precedes opposition sensible/intelligible, math resembles philosophy, math belongs to world of reflected image > analogical translation btwn philosophy/math assured by symbol (Bild) > symbolicity developed in play of Abbildung, Einbildung

p. 68 for Schelling, reason & imagination one & same thing in Einbildungskraft (not Latinate Imagination, which is false fantasy) > one in the real [imagination, art], one in the ideal [reason would have to be ideal] > intertranslatability of rational & fantastic only amazing from standpoint of understanding [Hegel makes analogous move]

p. 69 In-Eins-Bildung (uni-formation) > paradox: concept of fundamental translatability linked poetically to a natural language [German] that resists translation

——In-Eins-Bildung: disseminates in profusion, its emanation (Ausfluss) traverses world of phenomena via reason & imagination

FV pp. 459-61 Lacan forecloses the double w/out mercy, contains it in the imaginary > imaginary/symbolic duality controls Unheimlichkeit, the anguishing disarray (laffolement angoissant) (w/out hope of closure, reappropriation, or truth) provoked by references (renvois) from simulacrum to simulacrum, double to double

——analysand seeing his/her double: “uncontrollable anxiety” disrupts every verification of identity, obstacle for transference

pp. 490-92 [re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

IMAGINATION

OG p. 151 (216) for Rousseau, danger of image, imaginary seduction, in writing & masturbation, “fatal advantage (funeste avantage)” > the supplement that “trompe (cheats) la nature

pp. 173-74 (247-48) Rousseau contra Hobbes: pity/compassion is a natural law (beasts have it too), mother’s law, law of the (soft) voice, pity “takes the place of” instituted law, supplements law [though it works the other way around too]; mother’s law, written in our hearts by God > natural writing, writing of heart—not reason, before reason: writing (of reason) is w/out pity, transgresses law of voice, a perverse passion

pp. 174-75 (248-49) for Rousseau, first there is self-love (lamour de soi) [not unnatural lamour-propre], and then love of the (m)other > pity is a suppléant, which can be supplanted by law/society

——pity protects man, vir, homo against love of woman, against the becoming (child becoming-man, mother becoming-woman) that is the great substitution > pity saves virility

p. 175 (250) for Rousseau, amorous passion perversion of natural pity—limits our attachment to a single person

pp. 175-76 (250) jealousy, a creation of culture, an arresting of nature by woman, stratagem of femininity > invention of culture denatures pity [which should reach out to every living thing]

——jealousy marks the gap btwn pity/love

p. 181 acc. Rousseau, “moral love” not biology but power of imagination > all depravity of culture related to possession of women (movement of preference/difference)

p. 182 imagination (perfectibility), for Rousseau, is more proper to man than reason > pity is born of imagination

p. 183 (260) imagination inaugurates perfectibility & liberty [whereas animal sensibility is passive, fixed] > activates pity

p. 184 (261) imagination belongs to same chain of signification as anticipation of death, is le rapport à la mort > both imagination & death are representative and supplementary (dispossession)

pp. 184-85 (262) system of terror (fear of death) & pity (power of identification), tragic scene of representation, imagination, death

——pity is innate (man & animal), imagination is the becoming-human of pity

p. 185 (263) virtuality (innateness) of pity—imagination (which activates reserve of pity) perverts itself, is subject of perversion > imagination awakens pity & transgresses it

pp. 185-86 (263-64) nature as limit concept—impossible equilibrium btwn reserve & desire, imagination breaks equilibrium, desire must leave its reserve; acc. Rousseau, ethics: to come closest to this limit

p. 186 (264-65) Rousseau: nearer we are to jouissance, further from bonheur

imagination is differance of or w/in presence or jouissance

——imagination alone has power of giving birth to itself, creates nothing: but receives nothing alien or interior to itself [khōra?] > other name of differance as pure auto-affection

p. 187 (265) human pity, imagine suffering of other as such, imagine passage from suffering to death: one & same limit/opening > relation w/ death & other: otherwise mute, solitude, animal

p. 188 (266-67) unlike Hobbes, for Rousseau, fearfulness of other, weakness, causes ferocity/cruelty, can’t declare war > slumbering pity [pre-society] neither incites justness nor malice

p. 188 (267) Rousseau’s neutral origin of ethico-political conceptuality [is this so different than Hobbes? i.e. no injustice w/out law]

p. 190 (269-70) via Rousseau’s pity, ours is the others, identification as non-identification

——Rousseau’s pity as distance, not “do onto others…” but “do good to yourself w/ as little evil as possible to others” > don’t interiorize other’s pain too much (it would no longer be the other’s)

p. 191 imagination as memory as time as pity > opens reign of law & concept: concept is Dasein [Hegel], exists as time

p. 195 music born of voice (not sound), thus from imagination–pity

p. 206 (293) acc. Rousseau, imitation & pity have same foundation: sort of metaphorical ecstasy > Rousseau: imitation rooted in perpetual desire to transport ourselves beyond ourselves

pp. 237-38 [review of Rousseau] voice immediacy, hieroglyphic immediacy, in and out of nature: [double bind of] need & passion, Rousseau describes une différance supplémentaire [writing/pity]

pp. 277-78 (392-93) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] absolute fear as original encounter w/ other as other, 1st passion, la face derreur de la pitié

p. 309 (436) for Rousseau, imagination irritates/ravages desire, representation (North, winter, death) as danger of supplement—whose efficiency is of the imagination

IMITATION OF CHRIST

SPOM p. 167 Marx “deconstruct[s] what resembles a speculative edification [re: Stirner]” by suggesting the resemblance to Christ is an identification, Marx takes apart a “construction”

p. 180 if every specter is distinguished from spirit by a quasi-incarnation, an incorporation, then Christ is most spectral of specters > greatest and most “incomprehensible of ghosts (unbegreiflichste Gespenst)”: no concept of incarnation w/out Jesus [Gespenst: Man-God (der Gottmensch)]

——Christic moment, eucharistic instance, hyperbole of acharnement itself?

p. 181 man, most unheimlich of all ghosts, if Christ (absolute specter) causes fear and pain, man causes even more—man makes himself fear (se fait peur), becomes fear he inspires > thus contradictions of all humanism

DPi p. 29 [w/ Genet] condemned to death becomes parody, comedy, imitation of Christ

pp. 106-07 in fighting for abolition, Hugo is both Father incarnated in Jesus (father as martyr defending son) & also the Son, Christ, the true reincarnated victim

p. 208(n) medicalization is Christic, medicalization of justice (balm/oil replace iron/fire) is done in the figure, history & narrative of Christ

p. 269 how long will DP survive Holy Father in Catholic church, how to measure time of the Son’s agony [?] (p. 276 Son’s agony, question of survival, blood in filiation)

***p. 283 nursing no illusion should not prevent us from being militant, this is composure (le sang-froid), courage, militate w/ cool heads (de sang-froid) [Derrida occupying position of the condemned and the abolitionist], grace, passion, love, J.C., as copy or abyss of exemplarity > Derrida doesn’t care if he’s imitating Christ, he wants to save what is left of life

REST pp. 275-76 everything on trial (tout chose en procès), publicized [re: Shapiro], the proximate cause is a trap: a double that doesn’t make a pair, makes a trap, can’t put one’s feet in them, Christic shade of bait [sole? proper subject? Van Gogh’s surrender?], Christ’s flesh is bait for the Devil (Muscipula Diaboli); in PAS, another type of trap > la paralyse

p. 369 for Shapiro, parousia of Van Gogh: the shoes are him > hoc est corpus meum, sacrificial offering of his flesh

TR p. 97 Jean-Jacques puts himself on the cross even as he seems to de-Christianize Augustine

p. 104 invention of Christ’s Body is an event, even though it’s a discovery of what’s already there

TN p. 55 flesh (sarx), Nancy’s Corpus is sarcastic, having it out w/ flesh, flesh of Christ

——Christianity a religion of blood > beyond point where any religion begins w/ experience of blood

p. 64 corps-corpse > when Freud lays Psyche on couch is he referring to the Christian body? to say Psyche is “extended,” is to say she remains tangible (against Kant, Descartes)

p. 101 origin of fetishism [?], desire to touch what touches Jesus’ body (garments), touching w/out touching > made safe, immune, by faith of what touch signifies (not by touch itself)

p. 279 for Chrétian, Christ is one, common body, not a plurality of bodies > Chrétian & Nancy deal w/ a different “yes,” or a different provenance of same “yes,” addressed to “you”

IMPERATIVES/FIDELITIES OF DECONSTRUCTION (RIGOR, AFFIRMATION)

GT p. 15 activate our critical and ethical vigilance

p. 31 one must render an account of the possibility of a simulacrum

p. 100 “we are no longer credulous enough to believe that we are setting out from things themselves by avoiding ‘texts’ simply by avoiding quotation or the appearance of ‘commentary’”

R pp. 4-5 fidelity to come, to the to-come, to the future, always trembling, risky, is held in friendship, friendship of thought: yes, there is friendship to (be) thought: oui, il y a de lamitié à penser > we are guests to this snaking oath (serment) [D.H. Lawrence], in name of democracy

p. 8 is Derrida’s definition of democracy just apophatic, negative theology? or is it rigorous?

pp. 30-31 [re: Islam and West] task 1: hermeneutic discovery of the anti-democratic in the Koran; task 2: political discovery of how democracy can be read into the Koran [Derrida wonders what it means that Aristotle’s Politics was absent in Islamic importation]

p. 33 since concept of democracy has always been suicidal, if there is to be a democracy to come must think life otherwise, life and the force of life [contra to Aristotle’s actuality as life?]

p. 83 [quoted in KH] democratic double injunction (around edges of khōra): 1) all-inclusive 2) secret entrusted to those worthy of it > paradox of example, good example

p. 89 [quoted in POOF] deconstruction guides us endlessly, orders us to engage, enjoins us to inherit a stance of survival coming through tired features (is this done in name of democracy?)

MONL p. 5 install myself resolutely in the very instant of performative contradiction

p. 34 to those who celebrate “fraternity”: “listen, pay attention, you must wake up and leave…your mother tongue will no longer even respond to you, do not believe so quickly that you are a people, cease listening without protest to those who say ‘listen’….”

***p. 57 vision of the New International w/ every word

***p. 68 messianicity w/out messianism: promise w/out content, or is all messianism shorn and severe? let us never rule it out!

FK p. 88 [Derrida

***H p. 45 to-and-fro btwn urgency of end-of-millenium and tradition from which we receive axioms, vocabulary, concepts: techno-political-scientific mutation obliges deconstruction

FL pp. 247-49 double movement of deconstruction re: justice:

- task of historical and interpretive memory is at heart of deconstruction, decons. is pledged, engaged (gageé, engagée) by demand for infinite justice, denouncing theoretical limits, where good conscience stops dogmatically, & denouncing concrete injustices rigorous deconstruction hyperbolically raises the stakes in the demand for justice, with a disproportion that inscribes excess and inadequation in itself [POO p. 11 oblique way is not less rigorous, quite the contrary]

- responsibility before memory is responsibility before concept of responsibility that regulates justice/appropriateness of our behavior, an epokhē of credit or credibility of axioms on property, intentionality, will, freedom, self, person, etc.

pp. 254-55 deconstruction does not compete, out of the running—vertigo: faster, “keeps us moving (fait courir)”

LOBL pp. ~121-22 temptation of exhaustive reading [of Shelly and Blanchot], recognize a “logic” that would enable us to read everything, in Larrêt de mort and elsewhere, down to smallest grain of sand, letter [cf. GLAS p. 208r metal teeth reading machine] > a wager: I feel both the impossibility and possibility, each equally essential (same wager as translation w/out remnant)

***SPOM p. 211 “ascesis strips the messianic hope of all biblical forms…all determinable figures…denudes itself in view of responding to that which must be absolute hospitality, the ‘yes’ to the arrivant(e), the “come” to the future (lavenir) that cannot be anticipated”

——“we must practice recognizing (sexercer à reconnaître)” those too familiar ghosts

——open, waiting for event as justice, this hospitality is absolute only if it “keeps watch (veille)” over its own universality (messianic is always revolutionary, has to be)

p. 221 watch over a future in memory, this time, of an impure “impure impure history of ghosts”

——“intellectual” of tomorrow, “scholar” of future should learn justice from the ghost, should learn to speak to the ghost (if even in the other w/in oneself)

POOF p. 42 language of madness, forced by most rigorous & profound necessity to say the insane, impossible, absurd, undecidable—to the disdain of philosophical good conscience (wants to hold out in shade of the Enlightenment): every “X without X” [i.e. “community w/out community”]

p. 81-2 what does it mean that it’s now necessary that we speak in aporias [very existence of deconstruction is necessary?]

***p. 284 if we find in Nietzsche a play of the Gospels against Aristotelian virtue, while Aristotelian heritage is reimplemented: enough to discourage a reassuring historical scansion, must think up different ways of doing history, that which defies tranquility of historian is a strategy of friendship, a war for friendship: lamitié, voilà lenjeu de ces stratagèmes sans fin

pp. 284-85 the 3 friendships in one, the same, those we must break (il faut en finir): 1) Aristotle’s 2) Christian fraternity 3) Enlightenment fraternity (sublated Christian fraternity)

pp. vii-308 [not that this is unique, but all POOF an imperative of deconstruction]

p. 289 Nietzsche’s abyssal altercation w/ Christian fraternity, that we’re tasked to relate ancient & new history (fraternity in Christianity, in Arabo-islamic culture too) > no justification in the shortcoming, the obliged shirking, of this task: nevertheless we believe in the seriousness of the obligation

POR p. 20 (154) keep the memory and the chance, desire for memory and exposure to the future, fidelity of a guardian faithful enough to keep the chance of a future > the singular responsibility of what he does not have and of what is not yet

POO p. 11 when Derrida says one should not approach experience of responsibility in a thetic way, to argue that this “do not do it” has a shortcoming, that it should appear before moral tribunal, misses its demonstrative rigor > strict rigor sheltered from all questioning [cf. GLAS pp. 50-1]

p. 12 I have demanded obliqueness by name; p. 14 but also oblique can be too frontal, diagonal, too much a geometrical calculus

p. 20 nonresponse as form of politeness, responsible form of vigilant exercise of responsibility > one cannot or one ought not to fail to respond (ought/can strangely co-implicated, perhaps)

MPM p. 38 we think this (immeasurable grief & life of faithful friendship): sublimity of mourning w/out sublimation, w/out Freud’s triumph, w/out ‘paranoid fear’

p. 65 Gedächtnis [w/out Erinnerung], a thinking memory, engagement beyond negativity, a reaffirmation of engagement, a memory that has mourned the dialectic (which is mourning itself), memory w/out mourning, rigorous fidelity of an affirmation, barely “amnesic”

p. 138 deconstructive schema of a text must let itself be contaminated, parasited by “relapsing” into very thing it deconstructs

VM p. 79 community of questions: unrelentingly ask questions, despite diaspora of institutes, despite publications & techniques that follow, accumulating themselves like capital or poverty

p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

p. 84 we will not choose btwn the opening and the totality, we will be incoherent, w/out systematically resigning to incoherence

PP p. 64 “not serious” and “serious” can both add nothing to a text, instead: reading or writing supplement rigorously prescribed > a play, il faut accorder le système de tous ses pouvoirs

A p. 79 fundamentalist dimension not tenable—can’t claim coherence or rigorous specificity

PAS PAS p. (88) read, re-read endlessly, w/out help of Blanchot, w/out my help

***OH pp. 56-8 have courage for a new critique of capital that avoids Marxist intimidation

pp. 76-9 the duty to respond to call of European memory, all other duties presuppose this one in silence [?]

——this same duty dictates welcoming foreigners, cultivating virtue of critical idea, but also submitting critique to deconstructive genealogy that exceeds it w/out compromising it, dictates a democracy to come (not even a regulative Kantian idea), tolerance of faith, minorities

FSW pp. 230-31 thought of trace fecundated by psychoanalysis: 1) study writing in a psychopathology of everyday life 2) a history of writing 3) a psychoanalysis of literature respectful of originality of the literary signifier (not yet begun) 4) problematize boundaries, psychoanalytic graphology (i.e. Melanie Klein)

T pp. xxiv-xxv the intransigence, rigor, that prevents philosophy from calculating its margin

p. xxix after every perforation, one [philosophy] is dying to replace w/ a glorious cadaver, ce temps timbré entre lécriture et la parole (s) appellent un coup de donc [Glas]: it suffices, barely, to wait!

SH p. 3 the resistance thought of “once” gives one to think, let’s let ourselves be approached by this offering

p. 41 date opens into madness, what there is to read, injunction in every reading; madness slumbers in aleatory encounter > chance among heterogeneities which break into making sense

p. 68 how to guard against double edge of shibboleth? w/ “living Nothing in the heart,” perhaps [St. Paul’s too literal, Derrida’s exorcism, from circle to ring]

FWT p. 4 [re: contradictory reaffirmation] passive reception, decision to say “yes,” then selection, interpretation, thus transformation: not to leave safe the very thing one respects before all else > not to leave safe: to save it, perhaps, yet again, w/out illusion of final salvation

p. 5 deconstruction endures experience of limit of concept, endures this excess, loves, an ecstasy of concept—jouissance—overflowing

p. 11 nothing serious in politics w/out “hairsplitting,” that sharpens, not intimidated by impatience of the media

p. 28 general ethics of vigilance re: signals of phallocentrism, racism seems necessary, its caricature is in the minority, in those cases conservatives have a right to complain

p. 112 “it is necessary to find the most precise and subtle mediations, also the most singular, a daunting task”

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

testify to what we can neither forget nor recall, a testimony w/out force of verdict or death sentence, to not write risks worst betrayal

——how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same

p. 136 anonymous [death] machines, purifying neutralization of DP, ensure nothing is visible, no blood > what is called for: history/economy of blood, of its sacrificial theatricality [Nietzsche]

p. 175 we must always reaffirm something of the past to avoid relapse into something worse

P p. 33 to go against feast [re: hermeneutic circle of philosophy & art] do not mix genres but extend metaphors (you can always try: question of style) > i.e. feast top to toe, circling step

p. 81 only a practice of theoretical fiction can work (against) the frame, (make or let it) play (it) (against) itself

——fiction must guard against the label fiction, show up remnants of angle in round frames > which would be a recuperation of a metaphysics of truth

pp. 94, 98 sharpen point(s)/edge (tranchant): [be more rigorous] (il faut bien aiguiser les pointes, les lames ou les fils…)

p. 116 Kant’s scruple would be index of critical vigilance if it bore upon a detachable part of system

POS pp. 66-7 we need to determine otherwise, the effects of ideality, meaning, reference > a “new” concept (first constituting itself) possesses “localizable effervescence in the work of nomination,” effect borrows its characteristics from opposition cause/effect & essence/appearance, w/out being reduced to them > this “fringe of irreducibility” should be analyzed

***pp. 68-9 if one does not develop a systematic strategy of deconstruction, textual irruptions risk falling into excess, into empirical experiments, or into classical metaphysics > but certain risks must be run [re: problematic first re: his own writing on “history of philosophy”]

OS p. 39 w/out rigorous critical/deconstruction of MOP, the very necessary attention to differences, coupures, mutations, leaps becomes ensnarled (sencombre) in slogans, dogmatic stupidities, empiricist precipitation > and discourse “put in question” [takes you from behind]

ROP p. 74 “one must” begin by listening to the canon, speaking the language of the patient, necessity of finding surface of manifest meaning > avant de et pour déstabiliser

p. 113 only those who work undergo the aporia, only ones who ever think, take responsibility, everyone else applies a program [re: Foucault losing faith in epistēmē]

ATIA p. 24 we’ll have to move continuously along the coming & going btwn the oldest & what is coming > the “again (de nouveau)” and “anew (à nouveau)” of repetition

p. 29 to think the war we find ourselves waging [against animals] is not only a duty, no one can escape it: thinking, perhaps, begins when animal looks at us and we are naked before it

pp. 63-4 je rêve, donc, au fond dun terrier introuvable et à venir: the schizis of a contradictory injunction > translate an inhuman language w/out the usual bêtise re: animal

***pp. 91-2 using Kant, Descartes, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger to touch the animal in a way where it will expel its ink (encre), its ink, its anchor, its “I,” ability for autoreference; Derrida has an animalist conception/perception of what he does, what he writes, and his “sole concern” is to not sacrifice to it any difference, alterity, fold, opening to-come

***p. 126 casting doubt on responsibility, decision, being-ethical > the essence of ethics, decisions, responsibility [no doubt would be a programmable reaction]

DIF DIF p. 26n w/out displaced reinscription of ontological chain the relation btwn ontology and whatever it masters will not be transformed rigorously and irreversibly > this reinscription will not be found in philosophical discourse, only on scene of text in general

p. 27 to know there’s nothing kerygmatic [not a master-name] about differance, we must perceive its decapita(liza)tion > must put into question the name of the name

O p. 54n the point is to work to set up or dismantle a scaffold, a scaffolding (un échafaudage), we need one to substitute, the time of a lapse, Mallarmé’s lustre for Plato’s sun

SW p. 331 “immobile archaism of the fantasy [Oedipus as eye-surgeon?] can outplay w/ its infinite anachronism all the lasers in the world”: (the unconscious) resists translation “in an age of technoscience,” never disarms, nor should we ever > more powerful than technical all-powerfulness

p. 349 I do not foresee the future thus promised, I foretell it

——the gage of my foretelling destines: calls to make come, beyond any truth of ontological revelation

——it destines itself to those men & women who will know how to read, of course—knowing how to read (voilà, the circle) only on basis of gage given > reading finally what you have to read

pp. 349-50 [to read the corpus that has known, from operation of other, how to undo itself from veiling/unveiling] you have to write, sign in turn, countersign in writing, something else, in another language, w/out betraying injection/call of first seal

——can’t prove it happened, only swear that it did: perjury must remain possible (a duty that must be respected)

WAP pp. 29-30 philosophy as most economical practice of natural language [?]: must know its virtual folds, potentialities, rhetorical effects

***p. 42 “thinking,” which entitles only this “no” of no pure instance, must, in the name of a democracy to come, “unremittingly interrogate” (that is deconstruct) the de facto democracy, its determinations > event/promise whose singularity doesn’t signify (self-) presence

p. 66 pursue demand (exigence) for responsibility interrogating w/out renouncing classical norms: sans limite, exercising “droit de réponse” at least as “question en retour” re: link btwn response & responsibility

——this knowledge, ce quon peut et ce quon doit en faire

p. 103 there are only singular, idiomatic, heterogenous styles, strategies of deconstruction unique to each situation > essential to account for this irreducible heterogeneity

DPi pp. 138-39 “one must” come as close, in body, to those on death row, to thinking “absolute imminence of execution,” or interminable, infinitely brief, suspension of imminence, instant of execution, no more beyond, or beyond where beyond remains beyond, or beyond where salvation might come > telephone line [appeal of love] [see p. 213 where Hugo says “we all dream” of the Last Day of a Condemned Man; Derrida’s imperative close to Hugo’s universalism?]

p. 240 deconstructing death a task for every kind of vigilance, a task of vigilance for the vigilant > when one loves keeping watch (la veille) and vigilance, when one loves period, one may sleep—but one dreams

CHM p. 308n think an ahistoricality, negativity so negative it wouldn’t be negative > affirm negativity in silence [negative dialectics?]: access nonclassical dissociation btwn thought & language

Gii p. 52 even the best translations need to be amended, not as evaluation but to wrestle w/ idiom (harass the word) > duty to defy conventional ideal of translation (one word for another)

REST p. 268 “to tell the truth”: necessary to hold in reserve excess of interpretation, supplement of reading—for the idiom of a syntactic variation > absolute idiom is name of a lure, but absolute “pas didiome” [see p. 381] does not authorize contentment w/ symbolic equivalences, “w/ off-the-peg universals (duniversaux de confection)”

p. 302 Heidegger’s subtraction of the product-work to get to the naked thing will not restitute the “remainder” to us as a “naked” thing: must “think” remainder otherwise

p. 327 as in fetishism trial, everything is a business & economy of detail, of la détaille (de-tailing/unsizing), you can’t do w/out detail

p. 376 bet on pair to limit absolute wager [cf. pp. 301-02 Derrida doesn’t limit absolute wager?], which limits & tightens itself (se resserre) to point of self-strangulation, tying itself so as not to absolve itself > the cunning twist (le retors) of le pari absolu: must never exclude disparate or absolute unneveness (limpair)

p. 382 don’t have to render anything: just bet on the trap like others swear (jurent) on a Bible > il y aura eu à parier, ça donne à rendre, a remmettre [there will be something to bet, it gives…]

if faudrait rendreencore, donc, en se séparant, et même en laissant tomber [even in letting the matter drop, we’d render (something?)] [can’t tell the difference btwn imperative & no choice]

DST DST pp. 198-99 is it a law? Derrida’s choosing or compulsion to introduce a translation of an untranslatable [re: désistement]

pp. 201-02 along with Lacoue-Labarthe, urgent to break with familial resemblances (airs), avoid genealogical temptations, assimilation or specular projection

——and it’s not because they’re impossible that the temptation becomes more avoidable

pp. 203-04 Lacoue-Labarthe’s warning (la mise en garde) of désistance, of traps everywhere, not protective, stands watch (veille) so you don’t forget you’re exposed on this and that side > exposure does not miss you (ne vous manquera pas) or me

——presupposes a contract, alliance, fidelity to the ineluctable, this terrifying form, the already there before me, that which lends itself to all figures and schemas; could there be fidelity w/out the faith called for in this dissymmetry [Levinas]?

——a singular fidelity to that which no longer demands fidelity

——“one must read, and to do this one must come to terms, negotiate, compromise”

***PF pp. xxxiv-xxxv not exonerated by decision of the other in me (passive decision): don’t give in to alibi of the other (ultimate creditor whose debt remains mine to discharge, God)

——impossibility of acquitting oneself, duty not to want to acquit oneself: attest to this w/out “mercy,” w/out alibi

PJP p. 194 Derrida is unable to reconstitute whole weave in which he cuts/selects—do not judge richness of Le Parjure from shreds extracted from it, in supplemental betrayal, for needs of current demonstration

PSSS p. 256 [re: psychoanalysis] everything remains to be done, dissensus must remain a fortunate fate

p. 264 Derrida would like to ask “What is to be done?”—beyond all possible cruelty & sovereignty, w/out alibi, this question is not foreign to paregicide

p. 270 cruel mutation of cruelty: a technical, scientific, juridical, economic, ethical, political, and terrorist policing mutation of our age

——must think a mutation of cruelty, more pscyhoanlaytico; new historical figures of an ageless cruelty, older than man

——think limit/horizon of psychoanalysis (yet to be thought)

***p. 271 it is necessary to cultivate (it is necessary for an “it is necessary” to take shape: ethical/juridical/political obligation) an economy of detour & difference: strategy, path, pathbreaking, road, even a method > “indirect” way of combatting cruelty drive

pp. 275-76 [AT IT AGAIN] what I name, what I call for: w/out alibi, w/ or w/out bliss, beyond possible, beyond horizon, beyond the beyond, beyond economy, appropriable, possiblebeyond death drive wherever Freud reintegrated it in economy of possible, economic conditionality

D D p. 297 structural transcendental illusion, one surface of Soller’s square opens to “classical representative scene” > this is a necessity, no nonplace left out, so no pure origin can stand guard over stage as if derived from intactness of absolute opening: any attempt to return to lintimité indemne et propre played out in illusion > nothing takes place but place

p. 350 one must choose btwn the text & the theme

LI LI p. 131 reconstitution of context can never be perfect but is a regulative ideal of an ethics of reading: recalling of a context never neutral, innocent, transparent, disinterested

p. 146 there is a “right track (bonne voie),” a better way in reading

——feeble to say that deconstruction is not rigorous because doesn’t believe in truth/stability: value of truth never contested, only reinscribed in more powerful, larger contexts

——w/in relatively stable interpretive contexts, should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion/consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, pedagogy

TN TN p. 31 one must always, as a duty, imperative, reconstitute the ample, tight webbing (le tissu ample et serré) of a quotation—though it’s impossible

p. 223 one should take the technical supplement into account

p. 298 a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

EW EW p. 273 subject and Dasein (still tied to a relation to self, reserved for man alone) constitute identity in name of a particular kinds of rights, a certain juridico-political calculation; deconstruction calls for different rights, more exacting articulation of rights, more responsibility

p. 276 perhaps more “worthy” of humanity to maintain a certain inhumanity, the rigor of a certain inhumanity [vigil of the trace]

pp. 282-83 “il faut bien manger” (it’s good to eat, one must eat well), a learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat, a rule offering infinite hospitality

——sublime refinement involved in respect for the other: a way of “Eating well” or “eating the good”

CF CF p. 51 I remain ‘torn’ btwn ‘hyperbolic’ ethical vision of pure forgiveness & reality of society (pragmatic processes of reconciliation) > w/out power or desire to decide > to change law necessary to refer to hyperbolic ethical vision of forgiveness

WOG WOG pp. 21-2 “one must never give up on analysing and explaining the resemblances, the ‘common genre,’ the analogies and commonalities” [re: society, history, politics]

——exploring these resemblances one task of Enlightenment of our time, even if not most important or urgent, even if our categories for configuration are radically insufficient > we must take account as well the fractures & anachronisms of resemblance: truth of homology best imposed by going through differences that blur one’s vision

BSi BSi pp. 14-6 clear signs of culture in animals, even incest taboos [political animal]; re: opposition man/animal > don’t rush to analogize, to resemblance: multiply attention to differences

p. 56 what is proper to man isn’t > look closer

OG OG p. 14 (25-6) rigor of deconstruction (demanded by constant risk of falling back w/in closure): mark conditions, limits, of every critical concept and designate their intimate relation w/ machine (whose deconstruction they permit), & simultaneously designate the crevice (faille) through which one glimpses the unnameable lueur de loutre-clôture (glimmer beyond the closure)

SPEC SPEC p. 344 bind always serves PP, to understand one must hear several voices, speak several languages, & count w/ several generations of computers

CHOR CHOR p. 107 no monological discourse, no mono-sexual discourse, necessity for a chorus, a choreographic text w/ polysexual signatures

IMPOSSIBLE [fixerup]

GOD pp.132-33 “pardon for not meaning (to say),” secretless secret of literature, scene of forgiveness, its being “up in the air,” keeps it secret, announces literature

——forgiveness as im-possible, experience of this impossibility is received differently

GT p. 7 gift interrupts economy, it’s not impossible but the impossible

p. 10 “thinking found its fit only in the disproportion of the impossible.”

pp. 11-12 credit, good faith, we lend each other in conversation; credit/faith as precomprehension that condition “tautology” of gift, and make gift impossible: “one” has to give some “thing” to someone other

p. 34 “exhausting faculty” of “nature” given to narrator of “Counterfeit Money” as a “gift”: to look for what cannot be found where & when one is looking for it

——to look for (chercher) the impossible is that form of madness

pp. 34-5 looking for “noon,” origin w/out shadow, w/out dialectical negativity, not any madness: sleepwalk in the vicinity of the impossible

p. 35 the alogos, madness, of rendering account (logos) of the atopos (the gift), desire to think the impossible, to desire, to desire to give the impossible: madness as given & desired forgetting

p. 122 narrative gives possibility of impossibility of story as story of gift or forgiveness

MONL pp. 2-3 common language: “Yes, I only have one language, yet it is not mine” > the impossible, inhabiting logical contradiction [suffer & take pleasure in this statement]

p. 68 promise [of which I speak], promises the impossible, possibility of all speech, yields no messianic, eschatological content [saves nothing]; yet resembles messianism, soteriology [addressed to totally other, finite mortal, w/out hope], structural opening: messianism w/out messianicity

R p. 47 Nancy’s freedom without measure, incommensurable, presubjective, precratic, “measures itself against nothing”

——Derrida prefers to call this the impossible: impossible as the only possibility, the condition of possibility > the antinomy at the heart of every -nomy

pp. 47-48 antinomy, impossibility, source of every autoimmune process

***p. 83 regulative Idea of Kant, a last resort, an alibi, w/ a certain dignity, can’t deny I might one day give in to it > infinite deferral or teleological vs. im-possible

***p. 84 im-possible (nonnegative) seizes me here and now, nonvirtualizable, what is most undeniably real and sensible (like the other, differance of the other)

——event (im-possible) announces itself in the form of an injunction (comes from on high)

FL p. 243 deconstruction is possible as an experience of the impossible, wherever one can replace, translate, determine the X of justice, wherever there is (the undeconstructible)

LOBL p. 99 impossible to tell which border forms the other, each comprehends the other by not comprehending the other > which one quotes the other?

p. 109 life being drawn through by a line, edge where it is impossible to settle: arreté

H p. 111 mourning is not allowed without a fixed (arrêté) place, monument, determinable topos, stopping point (arrêt) > promised w/out taking place, only possible mourning is an impossible one

p. 125 “impossibility of that ‘at the same time’ is at the same time what happens, once and every time, it is what is going to happen, what always happens”

POO pp. 22-3 impossible to respond, impossible not to respond, double bind, 2 hands nailed down [no choice]

——brought to a halt [arrêt?] when faced w/ contradictory orders

SPOM p. 42 guarantee of translatability as impossible as the disjunction of untranslatability

——deconstruction links an affirmation to the experience of the impossible, radical experience of perhaps

****p. 82 w/out experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on justice and the event > this is more honest, giving up on good conscience, conceding to economic calculations installed at border of event

p. 220 the impossible (“to let the dead bury their dead”) is possible, absolute evil (fully present life which doesn’t want to hear/know death), takes place (peut avoir lieu) > on basis of this terrible possibility, justice is desirable (through but also beyond law, right) [cf. HST p. 399]

HASD p. 14 from the moment I open my mouth, I have already promised at least to say: it is necessary to be silent > speak of the promise w/in the promise, as necessary as it is impossible: inscribes us by its trace in language—before language

MPM pp. 31-2 experience at heart of memory (Being & law), memorial, memoirs, mournful in essence, contracts itself together in impossible affirmation of mourning [affirmation is possible]

p. 135 undecidable is the condition of deconstruction (on and in [sur, dans?] this condition); in the sense of condition of possibility and, at the same time, condition as situation or destiny

——this limit, this finitude, makes one write; deconstruction makes a path of writing through the aporia (impossible); deconstruction thinks only on the level of the impossible

p. 136 de Man: “deconstruction of metaphysics” is impossible because in being rhetorical (btwn trope & persuasion) it is literary (doesn’t resolve relation btwn literature & philosophy)

POOF p. 29 perhaps as arrivant, arrivant of perhaps: at last the thought of perhaps (will come) > prevails over impossible, possibilization of possible impossible: undecidable and therefore decisive

p. 54 the 2 ways to say to oneself (keeping silent) that solitude is irremediable & friendship impossible, 2 ways to (se) partager the impossible: 1) compassionate [see p. 57], negative, keep silent in secret 2) affirmative, attune/join 2 disjointed jouissances at heart of dissociation itself, an ecstasy w/out plenitude [Nietzsche: open horizon w/out light]: a communion darrachement infini [see p. 57 Nietzsche: “finer still to join in laughing”]

***pp. 75-6 Nietzsche’s [?] virtual ‘perhaps,’ hypothesis w/out borders: in the process of exhausting the flesh of our events, uttermost live of our lives > no, not in the process of exhausting us, presence of such a process too reassuring, on verge of success: an absolute virtuality from which no event could escape, all becomes simply possible

A p. 4 via Seneca, death (immanence of a disappearance) seals union of possible and impossible

p. 15 deconstruction: aporetic experience of the impossible

p. 68 Derrida introduces the often cited: death is for Dasein the possibility of an impossibility

——Heidegger’s possibility of an impossibility, is this an aporia? do we situate it in the possibility of an impossibility or the impossibility? not the same thing [Derrida distinguishing his thought of impossible from Heidegger’s?] [cf. HST p. 387 there, Derrida remarks on their affinity]

***p. 70 Heidegger pays no attention to logical form of contradiction (most proper possibility as possibility of an impossibility) > treats it as a condition of truth, its very unveiling (truth no longer measured in logical form of judgment)

pp. 71-2 greater and greater orientation toward death, for Heidegger, the incalculable nonmeasure [of truth], signifies possibility of measureless impossibility of existence

p. 73 unique aporia of “expecting death”: 1) impossibility itself, dying as the aporia, impossibility of being dead, of “existing” one’s death 2) or that this impossibility is possible, appears as such, at whose limits one waits, limits of truth, but also possibility of truth

SEC p. 317 no context, no code can enclose written syntagma > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

PAS PAS p. (85) the gift w/out knowing (sans le savoir), the sole possible, the impossible

VM p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

p. 318n thought that seeks to go to its very end in its language, the end envisaged under name of finitude, should abandon words & themes of finite/infinite & everything they govern > this is the impossible of beyond metaphysics which confirms necessity for this incommensurable overflow to take support from metaphysics

——Heidegger realized this in making difference [btwn Being & existent] fundamental

OH p. 41 only possible invention—impossible one

p. 44 alliance of capital and a-capital (the other of capital): this seems impossible, it is, such is the nature of all responsibility

TC p. 249 idea of impossible theater of cruelty [Master Morality], w/out representation, which begins in repetition, doesn’t help regulate theatrical practice but helps conceive of its origin, limit, horizon of its death > Western theater encompassed w/in its own possibility, but repetition steals its center

SH p. 31 untranslatability connected w/ difficult passage (no pasarán), aporia, that isolates one poetic language from another (& multiplicity w/in language) > also ce pas impossible

OS p. 55 the now, presence in the act of the present: limpossibilité de coexister avec soi: avec soi, cest-à-dire, avec un autre soi, un autre maintenant, un autre même, un double

——this impossibility contradicts itself, time is name for possibility of impossible, this impossible possibility: alterity & identity of the now maintained in a differentiated element of a certain same

——the cum, or co- of coexsistence has meaning only on basis of its impossibility

——conversely, space of possible coexistence is space of impossible coexistence > simultaneity only via synthesis, temporal complicity [cumplicity]

TB p. 109 translation: its necessity as impossibility

RGE p. 262 via Bataille, we must find a speech which maintains silence, necessity of the impossible: to say in language (of servility) that which isn’t servile > silence (among all words) “most perverse, most poetic”

p. 270 sovereignty is impossible—therefore it is not, it is “this loss (perte)”

——general economy is not sovereignty itself, there is no sovereignty itself, la souveraineté dissout les valeurs de sens, de vérité, de saisie-de-la-chose-même

DST DST pp. 201-02 along with Lacoue-Labarthe, urgent to break with familial resemblances (airs), avoid genealogical temptations, assimilation or specular projection

——and it’s not because they’re impossible that the temptation becomes more avoidable

p. 320n condition of possibility of identification is its impossibility (both ineluctable) > subject identifies itself because it can never be identified

***PIO p. 15 deconstruction is impossible, possibility is danger of rule-governed procedures

——experience of the other as invention of the impossible (only possible invention)

pp. 45-6 impossibility of inventing the other, thus only invention: beyond the possible, very gentle, foreign to threats & wars—but dangerous

PF p. xxxiii to take other in w/out lodging chez soi is one formula for the possibility of the impossible

——passivity of resistance resists thought because it does the most, the impossible as heart of possible, makes the most happen

——impossible marks the limit of the possible or a power, the limit of an “I can”

TR p. 135 necessary/possible to account [?] for suffering, wound, trauma (of desire, living movement, proper body) via machine: machine’s possibility produces such desire, the “as if,” the quasi, the simulacrum, expropriation > giving an account is impossible because: condition of possibility is the condition of impossibility

——[re: impossible conditions of possible] place of thought that ought to be devoted to virtualization of the event by the machine: exceeds classical determinations of possibility (dynamis, power, Möglichkeit), exceeds classical opposition possible/impossible

pp. 159-60 [re: event, trauma] that which makes possible desire, some outside, some nondesire, some death: becoming possible of the impossible as im-possible (inappropriability of the other)

PJP pp. 190-91 even more impossible than report-confession: countersignature of acolyte (most impossible impossible: narrator himself) > unique impossibility [cf. IW p. 287 particular nothing]

p. 193 acolyte, narrator-friend-witness-countersignatory, “I am myself the rapport,” relation w/out relation, the impossible report/relation (and translation)

PSSS p. 241 Derrida evokes a beyond the death drive, beyond pleasure/reality principle, beyond drive for sovereign mastery, beyond cruelty—beyond the “mythology of drives” > the undecidable in psychoanalysis, the impossible other

p. 276 numerous figures of the impossible: hospitality, forgiveness, gift—above all [?] the “perhaps,” the “what if,” the unpredictability of event

——originary affirmation is attached to a life, but an im-possible life, a sur-vival, not symbolizable, but the only one worthy of being lived, w/out alibi, the one from which to depart

HST p. 381 unsolvable, vertiginous depth of sans-fond, irresistible whirlpool that carries forgiveness, gift, re-giving, re-dealing of forgiveness, to the abyss of the impossible

***p. 385 [Derrida's classic logic of the impossible] to forgive the unforgivable is impossible: since forgiveness can only forgive the unforgivable, forgiveness must do the impossible

p. 386 forgiveness merges (se confondre) w/ lépreuve of aporia: possibility of impossible, impossible of the possible

——forgiveness, hospitality, gift, affix condition of impossibility to the other: gift as most unforgivable

p. 387 impossibility of the possible, possible of the impossible has an affinity w/ what Heidegger says of death [cf. A p. 68 for a different take?] > links gift of death w/ gift of forgiveness: where is forgiveness more impossible than border btwn living/dead?

p. 397 the definition of (a) today, sursis de vie, reconciliation in the impossible > great forgiveness as test/ordeal of unforgivable [re: 2 enemy Jews comically forgiving each other]

EL p. 216 tautological & contradictory logic (speaks of the event of an impossible, makes of impossible the condition of possibility): secularization allows us to speak of a secularization that doesn’t take place

C p. 211 do the impossible: make mourning ones mourning (faire du deuil son deuil)

LI p. 54 structure of remainder, implying alteration, renders all absolute permanence impossible

TN p. 18 penser le toucher en touchant à lintouchable > injunction of impossible

p. 131 Nancy’s power of powerlessness, possibility of the impossible

p. 291 w/out lépreuve of impossibility of auto-affection—no love

——il faut saimer [French grammar: puts transitivity in reflexivity] says every “I love you” > this (impossible) auto-affection of love makes love possible

AD p. 35 the possibility of offering hospitality to the worst is necessary so good hospitality has a chance: yes of the other, yes to the other > impossibility of programming a limit btwn pervertibility/perversion is necessary

p. 83 for Levinas, “substitution,” absolute passivity, “possibility of the impossible” that’s not Heidegger’s death, but the condition of the hostage, responsibility before/beyond death— impossibility of “slipping away (se dérober)”

OG p. 143 (206) differance, breathing space, finitude, death makes presence/absence possible: makes possible very thing it makes impossible, produces what it forbids [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]: non-satisfaction (inassouvissement)

***p. 244 (347) supplementarity is nothing, not absence, presence, not essence/substance of man: it’s the opening of play (jeu) btwn presence/absence, dislocation of proper of man, the impossibility and thus the desire for proximity to self (pure presence)

p. 314 (443) impossibility of designating supplement escapes metaphysics by a hairsbreadth (par une pointe), “elle doit pour le reste puiser ses ressources dans la logique quelle déconstruit

UWC pp. 234-35 [all the impossibles] gift, forgiveness, invention, justice, friendship, hospitality, etc. confirm thinking of impossible possible, possible as impossible, an impossible-possible that can’t be determined by metaphysical interpretation of possibility or virtuality

——this thinking of impossible possible is not a thinking of necessity but a thinking of the dangerous “perhaps” > force of event always stronger than performative

p. 236 sovereign mastery of interior (proper power) ([indivisible] border of inside/outside) vs. divisible limit (because divisible, it has a history) > the divisible limit is the limit of the impossible, the “perhaps,” the “if”

CIR p. 159 my impossible homosexuality, always associated w/ name Claude

SPEC p. 356 [Freud’s death drive] autoteleguiding, suicide deferred, wishes to sound its own glas, wishes the impossible > most driven drive is drive of the proper, reappropriate oneself

INAUGURAL

GOD pp. 104-09 the 2 economies of salary [Christianity]: retribution (exchange), and love of foreigner; latter an interruption, an exceeding of the economy of the community, of Schmitt’s strict politics, interrupts self-consciousness, inaugurates exchange

PAS PAS p. (54) simulacrum of circle, EROS, the double pas, he/it that says viens inaugurates it by responding déjà

p. (59) the first sentence, no matter how inaugural it may seem, always recites itself in advance

DS p. 195 Mallarmé’s mime inaugurates, breaks into white page, follows no program

FS p. 11 it’s because writing is inaugural that it is dangerous and anguishing, doesn’t know where it’s going, essential precipitation toward meaning that it constitutes—is its future

——meaning must await being said/written in order to inhabit itself

DST DST p. 221 no matter how “free” or deconstructed the response, one cannot reduce the delay (retard): an event, a law, a call are already there (others are there, for/before whom one must answer); “response inaugurates nothing if it does not come after

***PIO pp. 5-6 no invention w/out advent, singular structure of event, makes come about what is new in a “first time ever,” [cf. première fois] inauguration of a possibility/power at disposal of everyone, thus conventions, belonging to a culture (heritage, pedagogical institution, discipline)

p. 6 for something to be a first time must also be a last time > archaeology & eschatology

acknowledge each other in irony of one & only instant

pp. 10-1 fable, logos, performative demonstration of thing it’s saying, says the saying: [in the beginning was the word] incipit, dispatch (envoi), evangelical message

——Ponge’s “Fable”: poetic performative, describes/carries out, on same line, its own generation; telling & told are undecidable, its constative is its performative (not content w/ announcing, it’s located ironically in evangelical tradition, reveals/perverts structure of envoi)

p. 12 inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

pp. 21-2 shouldn’t an inaugural invention deny/overflow environment of reception (which shouldn’t be able to welcome an authentic invention)? thus producing a disordering mechanism for every status assignable to it? isn’t an invention spontaneously deconstructive?

***p. 30 newness not necessarily the other

p. 34 invention’s “first time”: inaugural event and iterability > thus, no invention w/out status, w/out introduction or promise of publicity; iterability marked, remarked, at origin of invention, elle y forme une poche du premier instant: retroverted anticipation

——to invent is to produce iterability, & the machine for reproduction/simulation

AFR p. 42 Locke inaugurates—but after Bacon & Newton (philosophy records pre-existence of good minds), philosophers are the first to recognize genius (Locke recognized Bacon)

p. 43 how can Locke carve out a trail while repeating an earlier rupture? he applied a general law to particular domain

——by preceding analogically, he discovered an unknown > invention by analogy (or analysis): new “objects” created by transposing, proportioning, analyzing

IW p. 247 coming of an event initiates irruption (volcano), rupture and hence interruption of totalizing synthesis

EL pp. 208-09 return, repetition, revenance, the re- in language, as language insofar as it inaugurates possibility of revenge in language

C p. 188 w/out example because series will have posed singular problem of initiality

LI p. 78 “from the inception on (dès l’entame) as broached and breached (entamée) in its “origin” by iterability” [re: “-bility”]

TN p. 292 auto-hetero-affection inaugurates all experience: speech, declaration of love

***NOY p. 240 the “second” yes, doit arriver comme un renouvellement absolu, the structural “forgetting” of fidelity

——“grâce à la menace de cet oubli [the cutting off, the becoming unique, the divisibility contre laquelle une signature se tend] la mémoire de la promesse, la promesse même peut franchir son premier pas, à savoir le second

——forgetting repetition in the promise so that “yes” is absolutely inaugural and “free”

AD p. 9 [re: Levinas] as w/ all thoughts that are sources, I will never stop beginning to think anew on basis of new beginning they give me

p. 143n w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God

> à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

SPEC p. 395 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] Bindung inaugurates, assures, overflows PP (mastery), as seat of its condition

INCARNATION

GOD pp. 51-52 goodness beyond all calculation must forget itself, must be a gift renouncing itself, the movement of infinite love

——il faut un amour infini pour renoncer à soi et pour devenir fini, sincarner pour aimer ainsi lautre, et lautre comme autre fini [incarnation of fire]

——accession to responsibility through experience of irreplaceability, which is given through apprehension of death

——this responsibility must be guilt because responsibility is always unequal to itself: I will never be on the level of this infinite goodness > what gives my singularity, death & finitude, is what makes me unequal to the infinite goodness of the gift

——2 contradictory moments of responsibility: 1) to answer for what one does and gives as an irreplaceable singularity 2) efface the origin of what one gives

R p. 97 beast: incarnation of evil, satanic, diabolical, demonic, beast of apocalypse

OOG pp. 76-7 for Husserl, ideality comes to its Objectivity, “by means of language, through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic flesh”

——though it may seem this incarnation redescends toward language as indispensable medium, Husserl [in a manner Derrida thinks the most interesting difficulty of this text] returns to language to make truth appear in relation to all de facto culture and language > w/out language, truth would be psychological subjectivity bound in inventor’s head

——historical incarnation (in language) sets free the transcendental (truth), instead of binding it

pp. 88-9 the de jure purity of intentional animation, for Husserl, as linguistic or graphic body is a flesh, proper body (Leib) or a spiritual corporeality (geistige Leiblichkeit)

——writing no longer only mnemotechnical aid, possibility of being incarnated in a graphic sign is condition of Objectivity’s internal completion

p. 115 Europe is the good example of historicity, incarnating in its purity the Telos of all historicity: universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditonality

SPOM pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

***——that’s not all: specificity of process can still capitalize spectralization > the first ghost effect (autonomized spirit) can be incorporated, negated, integrated as one’s own human body

——for Marx, this turns one into absolute ghost, ghost of ghost > delirious, hallucinogenic moment of Stirner’s hubris

p. 166 acc. Marx, Stirner borrows disguises (Verkleidungen) of Hegelian idea, opposes himself to non-self, reappropriates himself as living, incarnate being

p. 180 if every specter is distinguished from spirit by a quasi-incarnation, an incorporation, then Christ is most spectral of specters > greatest and most “incomprehensible of ghosts (unbegreiflichste Gespenst)”: no concept of incarnation w/out Jesus [Gespenst: Man-God (der Gottmensch)]

——Christic moment, eucharistic instance, hyperbole of acharnement itself?

VM p. 100 other not signaled by face, he is the face, “absolutely present, in his face, the Other—w/out any metaphor—faces me”; face > does not incarnate anything other than subjectivity (self)

VP pp. 28-29 everything indicative, empirical, everything that incarnates expression, is not expression

PPHS p. 82 via Hegel, sign as unity of signifying body and signified ideality: incarnation

WAP pp. 4-5 institution of title/work can be incarnated by people, even single person: but this incarnation guaranteed by some institution > institution guards, guarantees title, thus already holds title; origin of power to entitle/accredit can never be phenomenalized; this not merely circle makes us rethink “repression,” “suppression,” “sacrifice”

DPi p. 59 Badinter: courthouse theater, a privileged spectacle, is a failed incarnation

p. 62 guillotine is no one (inhuman, superhuman—divine) > techno-politics theatrically incarnated as dis-incarnated

Gii p. 38 for Heidegger, to think is a handiwork > thinking is neither cerebral nor disincarnate

IW pp. 273-74 Cohen’s vision of German-Jew is a psycho-spiritual truth not yet incarnate in historical effectivity [to explain factual antisemitism in Germany, in America too]

TN p. 17 incarnation of Psyche is “posthumous”—what does this do to psych-ology (life of living)?

p. 19 death introduces drive of expropriation, but is still more tolerable than prosthesis, metonymic substitute, technical survival [lintrus] (complicates incarnation even more)

p. 158 Ravaisson’s withdrawal of hand, does it get replaced, secretly, w/ hand of God? how does this figure of God’s hand relate to light, to flesh, to Incarnation, to Christ’s touch?

p. 182 Derrida’s 5 Tangents, chapters (5 fingers, 5 senses); hand as incarnation of logos > hand of son of God

pp. 187-90 Merleau-Ponty diverts from Husserl while claiming accuracy: more interested in sensible reflexivity, discourse on flesh & incarnation, becoming-touch, becoming-visible of touch

p. 228 chair, carnal: cherishing and dear (carus), caritas, incarnation (caro, carnis)

pp. 234-37 leibhaftig as incarnate? does Leib have flesh? > what about machine-bodies, technical supplements, which are both Körper and Leib [p. 361n Derrida points to his early work on Husserl]

p. 357n acc. Franck, “analytics of incarnation” “overflows” phenomenology

p. 247 Chrétian’s carnal figure of a spiritual touch, conversion of body (becoming-flesh) marked by historical event of revelation (Christian body): Incarnation, the Eucharist, by the giving, announcing, promising, and memory of Hoc est meum corpus

——no denial in Chrétian of body’s historicity: no abstract historicity w/out a history of touch, no essential archefacticity [Franck’s flesh?]; no thinking (Heidegger’s) of Offenbarkeit more originary than Offenbarung

p. 248 Christian body as post-sin, post-Incarnation historical body

p. 252 for Chrétian, hand of father is logos and Son (p. 255 Incarnation is the sign of the hand)

p. 258 [heterotautology?] transitivism: flesh wants a hand, God’s hand, must go beyond hand of man, then come back to Incarnation, to flesh, to receive hand of man from God

pp. 260-61 how to go from unfigurable to figurable (God to man’s hand) > question of passage, figural transfer—but one answer: passage, like Incarnation, Passion, Transubstantiation, mediation btwn infinite immediate & finite medium, btwn infinite & singular finite—is logos fashioned into flesh, the Son, the Hand of the Merciful Father [heterotautology]

p. 262 incarnation will never be phenomenon of an irreducible finitude

AD p. 67 Levinas’ structural or a priori messiancity: fraternity, humanity, hospitality (not ahistorical but historicity w/out empirically determinable incarnation)

BSi pp. 50-2 Hobbes’ rage against the liars who appeal (to God) above the sovereign: 1) the lie of immediacy 2) partisans, civil disobedients: place a law above law 3) like the Jews, don’t accept sovereign as lieu-tenant of God > p. 53 [but!] acc. Hobbes, the sovereign mimics God, Christian incarnation; p. 54 lieutenant as suppléant for other along metonymic chain

FV pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

INCEST TABOO, L

GT p. 75 illusion of ethnographic theory (Lévi-Strauss)—like Freud’s “sexual theory” of children

OG p. 102 (151) phonologism: exclusion of writing, authority accorded to human sciences

p. 103 for Lévi-Strauss, each “comme” and “de même” authorize analogy btwn phonology and sociology: phonology exemplary as the example in a series, not a regulative ideal

——linguistic and metaphysical phonologism

pp. 103-04 Lévi-Strauss worth rereading: he sometimes effaces, sometimes accentuates, difference btwn physis & its other > prohibition of incest as suture (couture) of nature/culture: 1) strange exception in difference? 2) origin of the difference btwn nature/culture? > prohibition of incest as outside of system only a “scandal” if comprehended w/in system it conditioned

——for later Lévi-Strauss, difference btwn nature/culture only a methodological tool

p. 105 (154) for Lévi-Strauss, Rousseau founder/prophet of anthropology; Rousseau identified possibility of totemism in pity & metaphoricity

pp. 109-10 (161) [vis-à-vis Lévi-Strauss] ethnocentrism of “society w/out writing,” an innocent, nonviolent society > but, wherever proper names are obliterated, there’s writing

p. 113 re: Lévi-Strauss, confession of travelogue sets up relation btwn nature & society, ideal society & real society, other society & our society

p. 114 (167) that Lévi-Strauss will not be punished [for tricking girls into giving him names] gives to his fault an irremediable stamp (sceau)

pp. 114-15 (168) confessions of anthropologist [does an anthropologist write anything else?], 18th century, humility before a goodness European society has lost: a “zero degree,” native soil, an eschatology/teleology of full, immediate closing of history

p. 117 anthropological confession vs. theoretical discussion: difference btwn empirical/essential must assert its rights

pp. 117-18 (172) fantômes exsangues of philosophers of consciousness/intuition [Husserl, Descartes], Lévi-Strauss merely incriminating the specters that haunt school manuals

p. 118 would Marx, Freud, Rousseau have demanded more conceptual rigor from sweet Lévi-Strauss?

p. 119 (174) Lévi-Strauss treats native community like presence: attacked by outside, by writing

p. 120 Lévi-Strauss: no opposition btwn Buddhist criticism & Marxist criticism [Derrida objects]

——via Lévi-Strauss, Saussurianism exposed as ethnocentrism thinking itself anti-ethnocentric

p. 121 still ethnocentric to think West is bad, that writing exploits

p. 120 Lévi-Strauss appeals to an “epigenetist” leap from speech to writing: born suddenly

p. 123 (180) Lévi-Strauss’ ethnocentrism betrayed by haste of translation, satisfaction w/ domestic equivalents

——the foreigner has often been called stammerer or mute

p. 126 (184) via Lévi-Strauss, lécart btwn factual certainty of incident & late night theoretical interpretation

pp. 128-29 if Lévi-Strauss believes that writing doesn’t achieve “disinterest” of science, then he is not a scientist, a well-known pattern… [truth as theoretically infinite transmissibility has historical possibility only w/ writing]

pp. 138-39 the bricoleur (whose difference from engineer requires creationist theology) can’t account for already-thereness (déjà-là) of language—in which desire deludes itself

p. 349n (373n) in pre-history of sex there’s no incest taboo, same as childhood

pp. 264-66 for Rousseau, only one fundamental institution, right of law, social order as sacred right, original law must be a law [quasi-natural] > 1st law permits substitution in general

——Derrida wonders if prohibition of incest would be this sacred law

——for Rousseau, mother is only signified whose replacement by its signifier he prescribes [aka incest taboo], the sanctified interdict > hinge (brisure) btwn nature/culture

p. 266 w/in play of supplementarity, signified always replaced w/ another signifier; prohibition of incest doesn’t escape play [deconstructing decisive institution of law, eg. Lacan]

——language couples prohibition & transgression endlessly, point of nonreplacement doesn’t exist > that which is elusive in our indestructible & mortal desire

p. 267 in society, it’s always as if I had committed incest [cf. TR pp. 132-33 insect]

——for Rousseau, birth of society not a passage but a pure, fictive, unstable point > post-originary degradation analogous to pre-originary repetition

——if culture is broached w/in its point of origin—no linear order > morrow = eve of festival

INCORPORATION/INTROJECTION

GOD p. 22 repression & incorporation: either 2 economies, or one economy w/ 2 systems in move from mysterium to secretum (possibility of keeping the secret)

GT p. 109 [via psychoanalysis] circulation of auto-affective fantasmatics [imaginative incorporation] can disregard overflow of luxury or recognize in it an essential economic function

pp. 134-35 social function of beggar, madman: “the pocket of an indispensable internal exclusion,” like structure of pharmakos, incorporation w/out introjection (assimilation), an identity by exclusion, keeps outside w/in, lexception faite (fors) dune clôture ou dun clivage intérieur

SPOM p. 131 not “revisionist” to see genesis of totalitarianism in European politics as reciprocal reactions to fear of ghost communism inspired

——communism as monstrous realization, animist incorporation of emancipatory eschatology > couldn’t have been an ideological phantasm because it was inspired by the critique of ideology

pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

***——that’s not all: specificity of process can still capitalize spectralization > the first ghost effect (autonomized spirit) can be incorporated, negated, integrated as one’s own human body

p. 180 if every specter is distinguished from spirit by a quasi-incarnation, an incorporation, then Christ is most spectral of specters

MPM p. 6 two impossible mournings: 1) incorporate other as idol 2) refuse to incorporate: infinite remove

p. 35 il faut: one must follow the trace, remember that which did not exist, the law [Being and law], only there in the aporia of mourning and prosopopoeia: 1) success fails: other becomes part of us, bear him in us, like a future 2) failure succeeds: aborted interorization, respect for other as other, other remains alone, outside us, in his death > schema makes true mourning impossible

F p. xv father’s penis neither comes [ne jouisse] nor goes [ni ne périsse] in system of introjection, fantasy of incorporation

——introjection (redefinition of self); incorporation (fantasy of securing other w/in)

pp. xvi- xvii incorporation (magic, secret, cryptic, instantaneous) seals loss of object, the dead, an exquisite corpse, loves the dead safe (save) inside me, as dead; introjection (slow, gradual, laborious, effective) dead save in me as living, enlarge the self (introj. as normal mourning)

p. xvii crypt, place of silence, where a foreign body is kept as a foreigner, the self mimes introj. while incorp. makes secret; introjection speaks, incorporation silent, or speaks to ward off

——crypt is vault (le caveau) of a desire [refused introjection: failed/fake incorporation]

p. xviii reappropriation of other as other makes compromise btwn incorp./introj. irreducible

——fantasy of incorporation: introjection it is capable of > impossible

——fantasy (incorp.): maintains topoi, obeys conservative, “narcissistic” finality; Reality [related to secret] (multiplicity in cryptic incorp., plus dun): [changes place? pervert’s names-of-the-father?]

p. xviii how to treat introj./incorp.: rigorous dissociation even if purity of dissociation remains theoretical: dissociation as excluding inclusion of one safe in another (dun for dans lautre)

pp. xviii-xix crypt’s secret must be shared with a “third,” incorporated third excluded/implicated in scene: assembly of witnesses around Wolf Man’s crypt: whole strategy of testifying, witnesses testify by interrupting

p. xix self does identify, to resist introjection: but only in “imaginary, occult” way; the “endocryptic identification” designed to keep topography intact and the place safe (le lieu sauf) are cryptofantasmatic, but the inclusion, divisions and partitions are real

p. xxi incorp. never finishes anything off (inaccesible introj.); “nostalgic vocation” of incorp.

p. xxii otherness before opposition btwn introj./incorp. not the contradiction of telos of Aufhebung, but undecidable irresolution: paradoxically incorp. doesn’t preserve other [garde une topique, mantient sauve], introj. more open [to other] > makes it impossible for the 2 to close over their proper, their death, their corpse

p. xxxvii mouth’s empty cavity: 1) place for shouts, sobs, “deferred filling,” 2) place to call mother 3) then, via introj. or auto-affection, “phonic self-filling”

——1st paradigm of introjection: fill the mouths void w/ words [Abraham] > language substituted as a figure of presence w/in a community of empty mouths

*** p. xxxviii introj. as idealization, incorp. refuses metaphor of substitutive supplement, refuses introj.; incorp. fantasy takes introj.'s oral metaphor literally: vomits into inside, into pocket of cyst

p. xl fantasy of incorporation: treats words as things

HST HST pp. 414-15 mourning as both interiorized incorporation & presentation of external dead body > substitueries [“substitution” w/ “killings”]

C C p. 201 introjection of mors, morceau [Lacan’s objet a?] always lets drop a heterogenous remainder of incorporation > infinite analysis of mourning btwn introj./incorp.

LI LI pp. 75-6 “primary masochism” [a wolf of undecidability] poisons, how can one identify the intention, the speaker, the effect once border btwn pleasure/pain is upset?

——thus the limited responsibility of Sarl, vulnerable to parasitisms, the “conscious ego” cannot incorporate and does its best to exclude [despite Derrida’s vehemence, substituting Sarl for Searle demonstrates his uncanny generosity—he will not accuse a subject]

pp. 77-8 Sarl incorporates the parasite—retains the object w/in itself as something excluded > psychoanalytic incorporation delegitimizes Sarl’s claim of foreign body, impossible to assimilate, must be rejected

p. 84 Limited Inc as internal regulation by which capitalist system seeks to limit concentration and decision-making power: to protect itself from its own crisis (psychoanalysis’ incorporation)

p. 102 incorporation w/out introjection: indigestion desired by unconscious—keeps other alien

TN pp. 176-77 for Husserl, introjection is a late, upper layer of experience

——can there be solipsism w/out introjection? “I” requires intersubjectivity?

p. 192 pre-originary mourning (re: Husserl’s vigilant stance on alter-ego) tied to motif of exappropriation—interiorization, even introjection, never achieved

ATM ATM pp. 185-86 to bury a text that erased the name of God [dysgraphy] is not to annihilate it (burn the whole thing): by inhuming the fault, one keeps it; a work of mourning which can either 1) be successful through spiritual interiorization, introjection 2) or else be paralyzed in melancholic pathology (incorporation)

SPEC SPEC p. 335 condition of filiation, mid-mourning (demi-deuil) [see “Ja ou le faux-bond”]: introjection and/or incorporation: la barre entre et et/ou ou > structurally as necessary as it is necessarily impure

INDESTRUCTIBLE OR UNDECONSTRUCTIBLE

WAP p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

——double bind of philosophical commitment or pledge (droit, if a philosopheme, also submitted to law of double bind: unstable, deconstructible, it precedes itself, calls for indestructible responsibility)

——indestructible responsibility (because always revived in anxious raising of stakes [relancée dans une surenchère inquiète]) makes good conscience impossible

FK pp. 93-94 one can’t deny that possibility deconstructs the necessity, given figure or logic of denial (dénégation) > place where reason, science, philosophy, thought retain same resource as religion

***FL p. 243 justice is undeconstructible [see SPOM p. 33 deconstruction’s injunction, where it takes shape, its reaffirmed affirmation: thinking gift of undeconstructible justice]

——deconstruction is possible as an experience of the impossible, wherever one can replace, translate, determine the X of justice, wherever there is (the undeconstructible)

SPOM pp. 32-3 deconstruction takes shape in thinking gift and undeconstructible justice > always risking evil, expropriation and injustice, only way to render justice to the other as other, the irreducible possibility of Un-Fug

p. 112 “a deconstructive thinking, the one that matters to me here, has always pointed out the irreducibility of affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the undeconstructibility of a certain idea of justice…”

MPM p. 37 uncontrollable necessity, nonsubjectivizable law of thought beyond interiorization, beyond un-mourning thought mourning > can we accept it? affirm it? can no longer become a question

pp. 93-4 de Man’s texts on promise pervert tranquil assurance of what we call “performative” > too much of promise is irremediable disturbance/perversion, is also a trap, also renders promise possible (indestructible), and comical

PS p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

AF p. 41 “I shall say we” to a ghost or newborn > indestructible covenant, extraordinary performative (like a circumcision)

A p. 30 abyssal inquiry re: Heidegger’s delimitation of death, modes of ending, more than one limit, ends of man an indestructable (increvable) subject > death of Dasein not end of man, btwn the 2 there’s a divisible limit, perhaps, of ending, place where ending ends [?]

VM p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

pp. 111-12 why does Levinas return to categories he rejected? Derrida’s not denouncing incoherence [w/ this question], he’s wondering about meaning of necessity, necessity of lodging oneself w/in traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it—does this imposed necessity cache-t-elle quelque ressource indestructible et imprévisible du logos grec? quelque puissance illimitée denveloppement dans laquelle celui qui voudrait le repousser serait toujours déjà surpris?

p. 112 “syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

TB p. 116 does a work require translation? answer is apodictic, injunction even w/out translator there, the requirement of the other as translator: structure of original, relation of life to survival > a priori, even if forgotten > its apodictic essence: it is unforgettable, so forgetting is accidental, death would not change it at all

——translation, desire for translation, unthinkable w/out correspondence w/ thought of God

RGE p. 271 negative theology: still reserved, perhaps, a “superessentiality,” an indestructible meaning? > touching on limits & greatest audacities of discourse in Western thought

PIO p. 24 the double, indivisible movement of invention: gives place (donne lieu) to an event and produces a machine by introducing a gap (écart) in habit; novelty must surprise: no status ready/waiting to reduce it to the same

HLP p. 68 Derrida doesn’t believe that the effect of the lie, of betrayed veracity, remains indestructible as symptom [either way, logic of symptom can’t be contained w/in opposition good/bad faith]

TR p. 101 plus de faute [no more fault, more fault] > vicious circle of excusing & being guilty

——guilt as inscription that is ineffaceable, inexorable, inexonerable

AFR pp. 44-7 for Condillac, sensation is unmodifiable, first material, immediate presence, but also a germ for analogic sign > degrees of intensity, good analogy, “identical proportions”

——sensationalist metaphysics, via analogic, develops into semiotism: sign unfolds (développe) germ

IW p. 263 agathon is Plato’s anhypothetic [absolute hypothesis?]

PSSS pp. 276-77 a task w/out horizon for a new psychoanalytic Enlightenment: will calculate w/ the inflexible unconditionality of the unconditional [think POOF, counting event of friendship]

C p. 208 the odd is indivisible, remainder remains entire

LI p. 116 “self-presence” as desire/need is not simply a linguistic superstition Derrida keeps alive to win an argument, it is indestructible, “immortal”—also death, mortifère (death bearing) > is not “pure realization of self presence” also death?

TN p. 49 Mary: Christianity’s indeconstructible [?]

pp. 127-29 intuitionistic-continuistic logic of immediacy as irrepressible as desire itself, as intractable as language constraints, grammatical violence > this law has to happen, symptoms will crop up [does Nancy really avoid this logic?]

——who could finish w/ this tempting postulation? [i.e. “smooth” desire]

OG p. 14 (26) w/out exteriority of signifier, there is no sign, together they keep an indestructible solidity, can’t just “move on to something else”

p. 59 (87) desire to restrict (lier) le jeu is irresistible

p. 89 parousia of voice, presence to self of logos w/in voice, absolute hearing-oneself-speak, is a function responding to an indestructible but relative necessity w/in system that encompasses it

p. 266 language couples prohibition & transgression endlessly, point of nonreplacement doesn’t exist > that which is elusive in our indestructible & mortal desire

p. 280 (397) “to supplant/compensate for (suppléer)” defines writing, adds itself to presence, defers it in indestructible desire to rejoin it

EU p. 121 Derrida believes in indestructibility of ordered procedures of legitimation, titles, diplomas

SPEC p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

FV p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

INELECTUBLE [fixerup]

EL p. 219 [re: “we” of apocalyptic speech] responsibility is ineluctable, finds sign of its freedom in this fatality > not Kantian practical universality, formalizable obligation: does not replace itself, delegate itself

HST p. 384 for Levinas, when I mourn, I feel responsible, I murder: “my own,” those I believe I killed, I love > ineluctable empire of phantasm at origin of meaning [Blanchot also links thought of death to murder]

INFINITE

GOD pp. 56-57 trembling in mysterium tremendum? gift of infinite love, dissymmetry btwn gaze of God, and me not seeing what looks at me (gift and endurance of death in irreplaceable) > disproportion btwn infinite gift & my finitude > responsibility: salvation, sin, culpability, sacrifice

GT p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

R p. 88 justice w/ disjointure: out of joint, interruption of relation, unbinding > infinite secret of the other, threatens a communitarian idea of justice

H p. 71 hospitality’s infinite idea should resist the law itself

MC p. 352 via Lucretius, infinite does not have height

FL p. 254 justice is infinite because irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other before any contract, parce quelle est venue (because it has come, because it is a coming)

AF p. 100 unique is infinite “in the immense, incommensurable extent to which it remains unfindable”

OOG p. 117 for Husserl, “horizon is always virtually present in every experience; for it is at once the unity and incompletion, the anticipated unity in every incompletion” > keeps infinite openness in tact, converting critical philosophy’s state of possibility into concrete infinite potentiality

p. 128 for Husserl, aprioriness is not a concern, it is the institutive infinitization

SPOM p. 26 a justice beyond the economy of repression, not distributive, not calculable equality, outside of the economy of vengeance, incalculability of the gift and singularity, infinite asymmetry, the an-economic ex-position to others

POOF pp. 185-86 does Montaigne (via túkhē [see 192n re: Cicero], exceptionality of friendship) add rupture of infinite to Greek philía? a reassuring principle would periodize, overdetermine, oppose Christian fraternity to Greek fraternity > Derrida won’t have it: the discrepancies of culture aren’t negligible but they are that of a generative graft, cultural body (so old & new) begins w/ prosthesis > no proper body w/out graft: endless politically consequences of this law—now more than ever, endlessly

pp. 196-97 [quasi-thesis of POOF] a justice that cares for the humanity in the human (a principle of infinity) would destroy finite proportionality that ordains calculation of worth, in this way it resembles Montaigne’s friendship > it doesn’t, however, in the sense that Montaigne’s disproportion is extremely rare, inegalitarian heteronomy remains in tact: what if a certain equality could be saved in respect of dissymmetrical/heteronomic singularities > this equality would be at once calculable/incalculable, it would count on the calculable

p. 268n via Leroux, fraternity links freedom & equality OR fraternity appears first as origin/principle > Christianity as an ‘infinite enlargement’ of [gentle] fraternity, still deploys a Greek memory: these 2 memories efficiently coupled in ideal instant of French Revolution

p. 286 Nietzsche’s gift must also belong to a finite world > how to think dissymmetry of gift w/out exchange, infinite disproportion, from vantage point of terrestrial finitude? under its horizon w/out horizon [see p. 263] > infinitization itself is suspected of being an economic ruse, perverse seduction, stratagem, of loving one’s neighbor

pp. 286-87 Nietzsche’s friend of most distant belongs to finite earth (not world of Christian hinterworld) > friend’s finitude infinitizes the gift he gives [infinite differance is finite] : a friend who doesn’t give you the world (a finite one), gives you nothing [this is neither Greek nor Christian]

HASD p. 29 trace as possibility of finitude, finite & infinite cause of trace appears secondary, an effect of trace or differance (which is finite insofar as it is infinite)

VM p. 98 for Levinas, ethics, morality, is first philosophy; though Plato and Descartes thought the overflowing of infinity, only Levinas thought infinity as the face

p. 104 Levinas’ reading of Descartes’ 3rd Meditation supports entirety of his thought: absolute irreducibility of other, infinitely Other can only be infinity

p. 106 acc. Levinas, Husserl misunderstands Descartes’ 3rd Meditation, places infinite entirely w/in subjectivity, makes it an object, so phenomenology cannot account for ethics

p. 112 why must Levinas obliterate notion of spatiality re: the other, w/out erasing it, w/out making it illegible? > must he state infinity’s excess in language of the Same [inside-outside]?

p. 114 classical infinity, Descartes’ infinitism (thought goes further than language) betrays itself in language w/ negative word “in-finite,” total infinity would not need the word

p. 115 in classical infinitism (Descartes) neutralization of space to liberate positive infinity, body: exteriority, zero point, origin of space, an origin which has no meaning w/out of, origin inseparable from genitivity, from space it engenders/orients, an inscribed origin, written, traced

p. 119 for Levinas, if Husserlian Cogito opened to infinite, it would be an object-infinity w/out alterity, a “false infinity” [Levinas never uses this Hegelian term, but idea of indefinite, negative form of infinity haunts his gestures]; Levinas makes true alterity nonnegativity, and the same (complicit w/ negativity) the false-infinity > would have seemed absolutely mad to Hegel

p. 120 Idea in Kantian sense [Husserl] as infinite overflowing of horizon, never equal to intuition of an object, even God’s intuition [?]

——in phenomenology there’s no constitution of horizons only horizons of constitution

pp. 120-21 if infinity of Husserlian horizon has form of indefinite opening, doesn’t this keep it from totalization, from immediate present? is not intentionality respect itself? eternal irreducibility of other to same > w/out phenomenon of other as other no respect, respect supposes phenomenality, and ethics, phenomenology

p. 129 for Hegel (against Levinas), difference btwn same and other has no meaning in infinite, except to speak of anxiety of infinite which determines & negates itself > violence in horizon of infinite is that where differance is no longer valid, where peace would no longer have meaning

——infinitely other & infinitely same, if they have meaning for a finite being, is the same

p. 130 infinitist dogmatism in pre-Kantian style does not pose question of responsibility of finite philosopher, overlooks irreducibility of history (infinite passage through violence)

pp. 149-50 ontic content of infinity would destroy ontic closure > would this not permit thought of Being, wouldn’t thought of Being be presupposed in thought of God?

p. 150 Malebranche says Being is infinitely slight because infinite; Heidegger says Being is nothing (determined), produced in difference (as difference), that it is produced “in simultaneity with” Nothingness, it is “finite in its essence” [VP p. 87 the infinite differance is finite]

p. 152 worst violence (what some call Judaic experience of infinitely other), when one silently delivers oneself into hands of other in the night

VP VP p. 6 presence has always been, will always be, to infinity

p. 58 ideality of the form of presence can be repeated to infinity as return of the same, but retained in a finite movement

p. 87 Hegel seems more radical than Husserl in that he demands thought of positive infinite (possible only if it thinks itself), so that “the indefiniteness of differance may appear as such

——infinite differance is finite

SH SH p. 69n Baudelaire: “there is no point more piercing than that of the infinite”

DS DS p. 262 supplementary addition [addiction] enriches itself w/ zeros > racing toward infinity: “more” and “less” are separated/united by next-to-nothing of the hymen

ATIA ATIA p. 106 Levinas reconfigures Descartes’ infinite will to “I am (following) after the infinite” > subject as host/hostage of the infinite

GSP GSP p. 160 acc. Husserl, Dilthey’s Weltanschauungsphilosophie is a structural historicism, doesn’t avoid relativism or skepticism: confuses truth of facts w/ truths of reason [Leibniz’s terms]

for Husserl, pure truth missed when accounted for in historical totality, finite totality, factual totality > truth must open to infinite idea (Kant), w/out any limits, absolute, universal

PS PS p. 326n (with remarkable/ambiguous exception of Hegel) God is Death: infinite life, life w/out difference > w/in life God-Death names finitude, difference w/in life > mais l'autre nom de la même chose ne veut pas dire la même chose que le premier nom, il n'en est pas synonyme et c'est toute l'histoire

FS FS p. 305n for Rousset, infinity is the center, toward which literary act ascends: irreducible specificity of “movement” and also its qualitative specificity

SW SW p. 313 diminish the infinite, ad infinitum: the dream, temptation since ever

DPi DPi p. 258 an end will never put an end to finitude because: finality of this end will produce phantasm of this end of finitude, the other side of an infinitization (experience constitutive of finitude)

HST HST p. 386 must welcome the infinite (for Levinas, that’s 1st hospitality), forgive beyond me, what is not mine to forgive [forgiving in my name but only in the name of the other]: must think substitution from limit-experiences (decision, gift, forgiveness), from possible-impossible, the impossible of the possible

C C pp. 187-88 “don’t deliver them from fascination just when they’re falling into the abyss of the infinite—yet nil—distance, the outsize (démesuré) space”

p. 237 play of supplement can go on ad infinitum, or almost [?]

TN TN p. 272 via Nancy’s finite thinking, infinitism of Christian flesh finds itself contesté at heart of lattestation itself > we have no access to it but to refer touch to the limit

p. 298 pudeur: elle déploie ses voiles à l'infini > must must not, because can can’t (confess/betray)

——la loi marque ainsi le sans dan le sens ou dans lexistence

a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

E E p. 11 poetic gift is an add-on (un en-plus), given as a power to give by God so that, via the poet, this supplementary surplus value can return to the infinite source, the poet breaks from the circular economy, that is the passage to the infinite: passage of infinity btwn gift/debt

——[re: economimesis unfolding to infinity] “Kantism” passes into “Hegelianism”

AD AD p. 134n Levinas: à-Dieu not a finality, infinity is irreducibility of à-Dieu, fear of God to eschatology

p. 23 Levinas on cogito: “it is not I, it is the other that can say yes” > infinity welcomed in anarchy

p. 26 Levinas’ open door calls for the opening of an exteriority or of a transcendence of the idea of infinity > idea comes through the door: the door passed through is reason in teaching

pp. 45-6 welcome is a quasi-synonym of hospitality: copula that brings them together binds phenomena of unbinding (déliasion) (infinite separation of any hospitality worth its name)

pp. 142-43n experience of à-Dieu: to have welcomed yes of other, infinity in separation, in its holiness > Adieu does not wait, is not, beyond being

p. 102 à of à-Dieu is turned (tourné): by Infinity toward infinity

p. 103 à of à linfini and à-Dieu: ad-dresses, opens relation, responds to, responsible for > desire says A-Dieu

pp. 120-22 à-Dieu, so close to silence, also related to death, eipimeleia thanatou, Sein zum Tode

——le-plus-de-sens à linfinià lheure de la mort [the (no) more-sense to infinity…at the hour of death]

OG OG p. 13 totality of metaphysics creates hierarchy of signifier/signified [signified is higher, not exterior like signifier] (Christian creationism, infinitism, both appropriating Greek conceptualism)

——signans (sensible), signatum (intelligible) [?]

pp. 202-03 [re: Rousseau] strange unrepresentable infinite movement of circles of degradation: each brings us back to a more secret nature (new loss w/ new defense): neither horizon nor abyss, one cannot represent this infinity > the relation of representation (spacing) to original presence

pp. 298-99 (421-22) though Rousseau doesn’t make “travail de la mort,” play of difference, & operation of negativity serve in dialectical accomplishment of Hegel’s truth w/in horizon of parousia > still, a horizon of infinite restitution of presence [in Rousseau]

EU pp. 75-6 most post-Kantians (incl. Nietzsche [?]) claim to have already reached the inaccessible: to think finitude, you have already thought the infinite (this becomes definition of thinking)

——post-Kantians accuse Kant of founding “criticism” in denegation, more responsible to found thought in inaccessible

p. 79 for Schelling, individuals, who are finite, must translate > if mind could simply be infinite, there’d be no need to translate > “originary knowledge” can become “real" in an individual, only in der Gattung (in the genus), i.e. in historical institutions > history: becoming-real of idea

INHERITANCE

GOD pp. 80-81 can a secret be transmitted? (yes & no); we do not understand, w/ Kierkegaard, Abraham’s decision; we share w/ Abraham what can’t be shared [highest passion, faith], a secret we know nothing about, neither him nor us > an incessant repetition of the absolute beginning

p. 133 absolute secrecy, a secret to keep as a shared inheritance of a secret that can’t be shared, absolute dissymmetry

p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

——w/ no witness, can only come down to us in the trace of an inheritance

p.147 plea for forgiveness in inheritance of God’s retraction; God’s retraction, a double coming-back, covenant only sealed through repetition [Noah is twice forgiven], God goes back on himself; dissymmetrical contract of Covenant supposes double trait of this retreat (re-trait) (Entzug)

p. 156 singularity is sealed & betrayed by inheritance that confirms, reads, translates the covenant

——literature inherits from Abraham, betrays him

p. 157 properly phenomenological virtue of literature: puts thesis or arrest in quotations (parentheses) > literature’s relation to non-literary, religious remainder (Abrahamic moment), betrays in double sense of word: unfaithful to its history at moment it uncovers that history’s secret, reveals its “truth” (i.e. its [literature’s] own filiation) > literature must ask forgiveness for this double betrayal

GT p. 66 anthropologists returning to the good inheritance of primitive societies—nature

***p. 69n poisoned gifts of intellectual legacies, poison that never fails to call forth a counter-poison presented in guise of counter-gift

p. 106 “Purloined Letter” & “Counterfeit Money” proceed from surplus-value of remnant or a superfluity of revenue (income or inheritance)

R p. 9 [re: Greek word democracy] heirs, legatees, the legacy & the allegation (play btwn legare & legere), “sending or putting off (renvoi) gestures toward the past of an inheritance only by remaining to come”

***p. 89 [quoted in POOF] deconstruction guides us endlessly, orders us to engage, enjoins us to inherit a stance of survival coming through tired features (is this done in name of democracy?)

——abandoning inheritance/heritage of the name, in the name of the name, thereby betraying the heritage in the name of the heritage

OOG p. 43 phenomenology’s indifference to heritage

***H p. 139 urgent contemporary matters [new technologies] not only bring classical structures into present, they seem to deconstruct these inheritances of themselves

AF pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin): origin of beautiful > memories of death

p. 56 Yerushalmi would like be the first after Freud, alone in sharing a secret, an inheritor in lineage of arch-patriarchs [re: knowing Freud knew psychoanalysis was a Jewish science]

p. 67 can only illuminate, interpret an inheritance by inscribing oneself w/in it

SPOM p. xviii to learn-to-live w/ ghosts, in commerce w/out commerce of ghosts

——being-with specter a politics of memory, inheritance and generations

p. 7 visor effect: “to feel ourselves seen by a look which it will always be impossible to cross” > the inheritance of law

p. 18 we are inheritors of plus dune parole and an injunction (singular) that is disjointed

——one must choose, filter different possibilities of inheritance

——one always inherits around a secret

——the infinite does not inherit

——injunction of inheritance “choose and decide from what you inherit,” this choice, like memory, the condition of finitude

p. 24 “one never inherits without coming to terms with [sexpliquer avec (battling with)] some specter, and therefore with more than one specter, with the fault and the injunction of plus dun

p. 67 “inheritance is never a given, it is always a task”

——all questions on the subject of being are questions of inheritance, what is to be, what isn’t

——by mourning Marxism we inherit it

p. 68 reaction, reactionary, one interpretation of inheritance

p. 116 one cannot establish the state of a debt, do the balance sheet of an “exhaustive record,” one selects, performs, inheritance is kept secret, secret of a crime—of its very author

p. 136 via Marx, more new erupts in revolutionary crisis, more “out of joint,” more one must convoke the old, inheritance borrows from “spirits of the past” > figurality as the figure of borrowing, borrowing speaks, question of credit, faith, fiduciary

——dividing line of figural inheritance: mechanical reproduction of specter, and “an appropriation…so alive, so interiorizing” that it is life as forgetting, forgetting the maternal, “to make spirit live in oneself”

p. 137 pre-inheritance, mother, on the basis of which one inherits; for Marx, 2 types of forgetting of pre-inheritance: 1) revolutionary 2) bourgeois

p. 149 acc. Marx, parody > Louis Bonaparte > back-up ghost: fake magician > an inheritance that bequeaths, only, the alienation of self

HERP p. 177 as Dasein throws itself by anticipation toward death, it inherits & chooses, chooses the very possibility of inheritance (Kampf belongs to very structure of Dasein)

p. 180 deconstruction, or rather Heidegger’s Destruktion: appropriation of the tradition (while “destructing”), calls itself (heisst): “open our ear (unser Ohr öffnen)” [to a friend?]

VM p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

PAS PAS pp. (95-6) the event adrift (en dérive) abducts (enlève) its simple past from an indefinite background of habitus or repetition, fond sans fond [quasi-now of récit]

POOF pp. 61-2 the 3 ways to see virtue in Nietzsche: 1) deliberate perversion of heritage 2) restoration of meaning perverted by heritage 3) hyperbolic surenchère (more Greek than Greek, more Judeo-Christian than Judeo-Christian) > Nietzsche never discredits virtue

pp. 299-301 inheriting the Greek, no actual rupture is possible, a heritage is affirmed provided it’s ‘still capable of being enriched’ > painful torsion of Greek friend, scarcely readable, is already full of contradiction > inherit Greek friend by contradicting it at heart of its contradiction

FWT p. 1 choosing one’s heritage

pp. 3-4 heir must respond to double injunction: reaffirm what comes “before us,” necessary (il faut) to appropriate a past fundamentally inappropriable, reaffirm, relaunch otherwise, keep alive

——reaffirmation which continues & interrupts: one’s own decision as that of the other: signature against signature

——we do not choose our inheritance, it violently elects us

p. 4 think “life” on basis of heritage, not the other way around

p. 5 deconstruction is hyperconceptual: large-scale consumption of concepts that it produces as much as it inherits

——contradictory tasks set to us by inheritance: testimony to our finitude, which obliges us to inherit older, more powerful, more durable, and same finitude obliges one to choose, select, sacrifice, exclude

pp. 5-6 [re: responsibility as experience of inheritance] a double before (devant), to come before as in debt and before as in what is to come, always anachronism: devancer in the name of what came before, and devancer the name itself! [la devance, “owingness”]

——to invent one’s name, sign otherwise, in the name of the name passed down, if that’s possible

p. 8 heritage not only a double injunction or reaffirmation but a choice, filtering, heir not only receives but is one who risks choosing

p. 19 infinite task of deconstruction to challenge limits of our heritage while drawing from it (pass, go beyond, w/out necessarily betraying) [re: human rights, ceaselessly transformed]

p. 175 we must always reaffirm something of the past to avoid relapse into something worse

DS p. 211 displacement w/out reversal of Platonic heritage, always an effect of syntax, writing, language—not simply dialectical overturning of concept (signified)

OTO p. 7 only the name can inherit, so the name is always a dead man’s name

ATIA pp. 54-5 adding syllogistic “therefore” to The Animal That I Am (Follow): “such procedural steps (démarche) should be followed” [machine of inheritance] > to follow: seek to find, seek to escape?

SW p. 325 enough of inheriting amounts to same thing as enough of bequeathing

pp. 343-44 bookmark the fringes, they served once to accomplish a commandment, may another be accomplished w/ them [Kitsour…] > that’s what I’m doing, à contretemps, et signe et livre et date

p. 348 [read Cixous’ Savoir] only in a French to come, only happen in delayed form—inheriting w/out inheriting, reinventing mother & father [baby daddy]

p. 349 (but Paul remains, and Freud)

PIO p. 4 does the child (son) invent himself specularly though parent’s narcissism > or is he an absolute invention (this being the truest response to parent’s desire): where truth is thought beyond any inheritance?

TR p. 115 in every scene of inheritance, there’s laws of substitution (law period): responsibility, debt, duty—thus guilt & forgiveness

p. 297n Rousseau’s interest in justice of inheritance/reading: responsible countersignature

WAP pp. 49-50 one risks repeating Kant more naively, efficiently, clandestinely if one simply tries to skirt him (his philosophemes irrigate discourse underground)—can this paradoxical effect of capitalization be avoided?

——heritage always surreptitiously bequeaths to us the means of interpreting it

HST p. 413 estate law, suppléant, substitute as inheritor, ensures surviving, inheritors have family resemblance but are not clones

——at heart of logic of substitution/supplement there’s apparently a crossing of natural reproduction & technological reproducibility, natural series & institutional deviation, natural filiation & adoption as legal fiction > unless this logic threatens/ruins opposition nature/institution

C p. 197 coffin giving birth (a generator, genetrix): incalculable descendance [Phaedo]

p. 246 intraitable (uncompromising) umbilicus of coffin, its tongs leave (laissent) a mark; so many leashes (laisses) > laisse: let see, let do, let fall, and to leave a legacy, lais [old form of legs, legacy]

TN p. 183 any inheritance or filiation worthy of such names: transform, re-begin, re-invent, divert, sometimes also betrayal (trahison)

CF p. 35 inherit a heritage w/ a double & contradictory injunction: reinvent memory w/out norm or criteria

SPEC p. 266 for Freud, one can inherit conceptual simulacra, counterfeit money [Nietzsche, Schopenhauer], but it is lacking in guaranteed value of psychoanalysis > Freud’s rationalization, his naive self-assurance re: counterfeit money, a scene of intolerable inheritance

p. 292 Derrida examining what is irreducible to “speculation” in an economy of a scene of writing: scene of inheritance implicating the Freuds and psychoanalytic “movement”

p. 305 how can [Freud’s] autobiography give a worldwide (mondiale) institution its birth? what is autobiography if everything that follows from it is possible?

——speculator can survive legatee of an autobiographical speculation, institution of movement w/out limit: mutism/death of legatee, one of the possibilities that dictates/causes legatee to write

——one gives oneself one’s own movement, one inherits from oneself all the time

——sufficient provisions so ghost can always step up to the cashier (passer à la caisse); all that’s necessary is to pronounce a name guaranteeing a signature, one thinks

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

p. 339 “transference (Übertragung)” attempts to reduce “resistances” of patient, only displaces resistance, operates a resistance, as a resistance > no legacy (legs) w/out transference > inheritance of transference, legs, legation, delegation, differance of transference

p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

——document is ciphered, will remain secret if author dies before “his own (les siens),” all “his own” will be those who believe they can decipher the will (testament) of this code

pp. 347-48 Freud’s metaphor of the “vesicle,” protoplasmic bulb, amortizes excitations from outside world [and inside], protects, can be transferred to every corpus [i.e. text]: transference from one legatee to the other, like the simulacrum of secret

p. 349 Vorbilder (models), necessity of metaphoric detour whenever Freud doesn’t know what he’s talking about re: interminable band, contra-band, quantity of binding—so he uses rhetoric of code, message, envoi, postal network

p. 353 demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

pp. 356-57 but S is never P [re: Freud’s death drive], since heterology is involved, there’s force & thus legacy, sending, envoi: the proper is not the proper

FV p. 451(n) [Lacan on properly inheriting, following the letter of Freud]

p. 457 dead king, Freud, only one to contract w/ himself, awaits restitution > restoration: carrying off last plume w/ his 1st hand [in dying, mobilizes many]: theory of the facteurs

p. 487 [profiting from remnant] by means of a remnant of paternal inheritance, one the debtors left out of account, Dupin draws revenue, surplus-value of a capital that works by itself, calculating (rigorous economy) > Dupin can pay for a sole luxury [Dupin’s desire to read]: cuts across restricted economy like gift w/out return

INJUNCTION (see Oath)

SPOM p. 30 Heidegger’s thought of joining, jointure, a thinking of injunction

p. 33 irreducible possibility of Un-fug: resource & injunction of reaffirmed affirmation

p. 36 deconstruction not taste for void or destruction when aimed at philosophical responses that totalize, deny possibility of the question > but following ethical/political imperative, appeal of thought, injunction itself

p. 41 no promise nor injunction w/out disjunction

MSUB J p. 166 “nature” conceals even the source of its interdiction > Artaud wants to tear apart veil of birth and reveal “naked nature”

SH p. 61 command (appeal, desire, supplication, prayer) [re: imperative beschneide das Wort]

INNOCENCE

GOD p. 137 [re: Kafka’s Letter to My Father] speaking for the father, spécularité sans fond, who has authority to forgive?: demanding as a surplus my innocence, which is yours because you identify w/ me

INSCRIPTION [fixerup]

KH p. 113 khōra as myth w/in myth, inscribed for a moment, while having a bearing on the place of inscription, oneiric, bastard reading, heterogenous to philosopho-mytheme which orders myth to its philosophical telos

AF pp. 26-31 the 3 condensed meanings of word “impression”:

1. scriptural or typographic: mark on surface, on substrate, Freud’s Mystic Pad, difference btwn Verdrängung and Unterdrückung

2. “Freudian impression” of the archive, opposed to rigor of concept, “archive” only a notion [in psychoanlaysis], one not destined to some sin of nominalism but the possibility & future of the concept, very concept of the future

3. “Freudian impression” left by Sigmund Freud on himself, and on anyone who speaks about him, to be marked by Freud w/out knowing it

SPOM p. 202 “mystical character” of commodity is inscribed before being inscribed, traced before being written letter for letter, everything begins before it begins > but Marx wants to know the instant the ghost comes on stage—this is a manner of exorcism

POOF p. 16 hexis binds 2x in same time, such contretemporality another name for psukhé, accounts for, registers, lépreuve du temps, withholds (en garder) its trace in the body [by way of inscription] > the yoke effect

p. 94 friendship can never elude rhetoric of epitáphios, transfixed celebration of spectrality, at once fervent & caught in petrified cold of its inscription (funeral speech, testamentary fervor of heir)

pp. 218-19 we can’t exclude fact that when someone speaks they strive not to be understood, diabolical figure of death drive > so can the accord of hyperbolic lovence be possible, hoping to be understood beyond all dialectics, haunting (failure) must leave an imprint on the body it seems to threaten, merging indissociably, it’s impossible not to aspire to this haunting [a necessity]: instant of decision remains heterogenous, undecidable, crucial experience of perhaps

MPM p. 56 inscription of memory effaces interiorizing recollection, not because of external limit or finite limitation of memory, but because of [allegorical] structure of relation to Other

MSUB J p. 170 to speak of the subjectile, we must speak by insertion and precipitation, acceleration of rhythmical projection [see MPM p. 62] and inscription of projectile, beyond “words and images”

VM p. 113 structure [inside-outside] has no meaning w/out included origin, inscribed eastern horizon which is neither w/in nor w/out space

p. 115 in classical infinitism (Descartes) neutralization of space to liberate positive infinity, body: exteriority, zero point, origin of space, an origin which has no meaning w/out of, origin inseparable from genitivity, from space it engenders/orients, an inscribed origin, written, traced

PP p. 69 an inscription, Delphikon gramma [Phaedrus (229d)], anything but oracle, prescribes silent cipher, signifies, orders autoscopy, autognosis [re: Socrates’ send-off of myths]

p. 149 soul-inscription, inscription of truth in soul, uses a metaphor [Plato admits it] that philosophy will never be able to do w/out, must borrow from simulacrum; metaphoricity is logic of contamination, contamination of logic

——good writing can only be described through metaphor of the bad

pp. 159-60 origin of the world as a trace, a receptacle, womb, matrix, w/out any form of presence or presence of form, because this would be an inscription w/in the mother

——“Plato’s metaphors”? passage beyond all “Platonic” oppositions, toward aporia of originary inscription

p. 161 la khōra est grosse de tout ce qui se dissémine ici, inscription produces the son and at the same time the constitution of structurality

FSW p. 214 when breaching, breaking of path, becomes route (via rupta) opened in nature, in wood (hyle) [see p. 229] > violent inscription of form opposed to writing, route acquires reversibility in time & space

p. 226 traces produce space of their inscription by acceding to period of their erasure, traces constituted by double force of repetition & erasure, of legibility & illegibility

SH p. 11 inscription breaks silence of pure singularity

p. 45 date consumed from w/in, the expiring that is its production, genesis, inscription: its essence & chance

ATIA p. 135 Derrida substituted trace for signifier to ensure that erasure and inscription could be included in the same structure

FS pp. 9-10, 304n doesn’t pure speech require inscription, isn’t it a privileged representation of inscription? just like Leibniz’s essence requires existence (pushes out toward world), power > act?

——to write: 1) not only to conceive Leibnizian book as an impossible possibility (as Mallarmé names the limit) 2) ce n'est pas seulement savoir que le Livre n'existe pas et qu'à jamais il y a des livres où (se) brise, avant même d'avoir été un, le sens d'un monde impensé par un sujet absolu [the English translation of this sentence fails to capture the sense of the books themselves shattering] 3) nor is it to have lost the certainty of pages binding themselves into a “book of reason” 4) not only to know that the non-written can’t be relegated to having no basis by the obliging negativity of some dialectic 5) not only to know that through writing the best may not transpire 6) it is the impossibility of making meaning precede writing: it is to lower meaning while elevating inscription

p. 30 writing, moment of depth as decay > original valley of the other w/in Being; incidence & insistence of inscription

DIF DIF p. 24 trace: à la fois, monument & mirage, traced & erased, living & dead, living in its simulation of life’s preserved inscription: a pyramid, to be deciphered otherwise, text w/out voice

O pp. 6-7n differance inscribes contradictions, is the critical limit of idealizing powers of la relève (Aufgehoben), which reduces contradictions to homogeneity of single model

p. 44 preface’s (double inscription’s) semantic envelopment in Book (representative of ontotheology, absolute knowledge) > restance (left-overness) of its textual exteriority should not be confused w/ Book’s physical thickness

p. 58 “la dissémination (se) produit (dans) cela : coupe de plaisir” > il rythme et le plaisir et la répétition selon une coupe multiple > il [text, literature, the beyond of the whole] imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

DPi pp. 148-49 memory/archivization engage suffering body in a machine, technical repetition, Mnemoteknik, must cause suffering, red of fire before red of blood > for N., punishment is not juridical: it’s a movement of life, writing to remember, inscription, imprint past in body

RGE p. 253 can one inscribe in lexicon/syntax of a language, our language (of philosophy), that which exceeds opposition of concepts governed by this communal logic?

***p. 260 by interpreting negativity as labor, by betting for discourse/meaning/history, Hegel bet against play, chance, blinded himself to what made his own bet possible > each stage through spirit (each suspension of play) was a phase of play: play includes work of meaning (meaning of work) not in terms of knowledge but in terms of inscription: meaning inscribed in meaningless play

p. 271 general economy does not overturn but comprehends (not by way of knowledge-gathering but by inscribing w/in its opening) absolute knowledge, folds its figures into nonbasis of expenditure, relates them to destruction of value > atheology, a-teleology, aneschatology

***p. 277 a text [Bataille’s] that traces, in silence, structure of the eye [illumination] > in contriving/weaving (tramer) “labsolu déchirement,” absolutely rends (déchire) its own tissue—once more “solid” and servile de se donner encore à lire

Gi p. 25 Geschlecht as inscription, stroke, imprint [Schlag]

Gii pp. 53-4 Schlag (blow, also race/species in figurative sense) & Geschlecht > Heidegger: our language calls the humanity that has received imprint of striking, or cast in this striking (Schlag), Geschlecht

das Zwiefache, double, dual duplicitous fold of sexual difference

——die Zwietracht der Geschlechter, duality of sexes as dissension, war, disagreement

DST DST p. 223 rhythm: spaced repetition of a percussion, inscriptive force (insensible) of a spacing > doesn’t belong to visible/audible figuration—still structures them (rhythmotypical, typorhythmic)

p. 224 though Heidegger recalled that Georgiades translated rhuthmos as Gepräge (imprint, seal, type, character), this didn’t prevent him from bringing typos back to ontotypology & subject back to epoch of subjectity

***RM p. 72 for Heidegger, most grave and engraving signature of decision engages/allies 2 families in German language:

1. Ziehen (Zug, Bezug, Gezüge, durchziehen, entziehen)

2. Reissen (Riss, Aufriss, Umriss, Grundriss, etc.)

pp. 72-3 trait (that plural word): possibility of language, logos, lexis, inscription

p. 75 Being’s inscription narrive quà seffacer, cf. differance/trace

TR p. 101 plus de faute [no more fault, more fault] > vicious circle of excusing & being guilty

——guilt as inscription that is ineffaceable, inexorable, inexonerable

p. 103 not only accusation & judgment in confession, there’s the executioner (carrying out of the sentence): sentence endured in pleasure of writing, ambiguous enjoyment at heart of terrible, severe jubilation of inscription: one steps up to cashier right away to collect interest on a capital that will assume value only “sooner or later,” after my death, in my absence

p. 104 confession is always more and/or less guilty (for addressor & addressee) in act of its inscription than the fault being confessed: that confession is never innocent is a first machine, undeniable program

pp. 110-11 touching on equivocation btwn constative (revealed truth) & performative (the excuse): originary or preoriginary synthesis w/out which there’d be no trace, inscription, body, materiality > it’s why we’re always asking for forgiveness in ambiguous, perjuring mode

p. 113 there is the archived event and the archiving event (as inscription): these can be indissociable, contemporary, but not the same thing (structurally)

pp. 118-19 event of forgiveness: 1) always supposes irreversible interruption, revolutionary caesura, end of history, at least of history as teleological process 2) inscription, material trace

p. 122 ribbon: subjectile on which one writes & piece of machine thanks to which one will never have done w/ inscribing [Derrida's deconstructs de Man’s claim “ribbon” is a “free signifier’]

WAP p. 122 double metaphoric of inscription (Plato, Cousin): bad writing (occults, perverts) is cryptic, artificial, secondary, voiceless > must be replaced by good writing

D p. 311 this [re: Numbers] reinscription (writing, a machination) takes place (a lieu), il y a sa violence

p. 357 in scratching (gratter) on this textual matter, your recognize description of a painting, reframed, broken into, placed in another quadrilateral, w/ one side fractured: you are painting, writing while reading: tout le tissu verbal y est pris, et vous avec

LI p. 79 [Derrida admits to lack of rigor] “engendering” an infinity of new contexts [from SEC] should be replaced by “engendering & inscribing itself,” or being inscribed in > for a context never creates itself ex nihilo, can’t create context on its own, can’t dominate a context either > this limit, finitude, is the condition by which contextual transformations remain possible

OG pp. 65-6 (96) writing of difference, fabric (tissu) of trace, permits difference btwn space & time to be articulated in unity of “same” proper body, permits graphic chain to be adapted to a spoken chain > difference is articulation

pp. 66-7 (97) that the “imprint” is irreducible means speech is originarily passive in relation to an absolute past that can never be fully mastered, brought to presence

pp. 107-08 (158) writing as possibility of road? violent spacing of nature, silva is savage, via rupta is written, form imposed on hylè

p. 290 (410) imposition of form via spacing, beyond classical model of causality, a new transcendental aesthetic guided by inscription: writing, as Rousseau intuited, linked to to nature of social space > inscription as habitation in general

SPEC p. 322 inscription of a subject in his [Freud’s] text is also condition of the performance/pertinence of a text, beyond empirical subjectivity, supposing that could exist as soon as one writes, substitutes, supplements: notion of truth incapable of accounting for this performance

p. 354 death drive: Freud’s “inertia inherent in organic life”

——living is differential of force organized by force of inscription [how did Derrida get here?]

p. 374 complex scene of signature in which inscription arrives only to erase itself

——Plato remains behind (derrière) Socrates’ signature

FV p. 431 inscriber/inscribing function not to be confused w/ author > Lacan excludes textual fiction, indicates a general narrative w/in neutralized or naturalized frame, thus overlooks the frame

INSTANT

GOD p. 73 “the concept of the instant is always indispensable”

p. 66 instant of decision is madness; like gift & “gift of death,” instant irreducible to presence, act of giving death, sacrifice, suspends labor of negative, labor itself, perhaps even work of mourning

p. 69 every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of this world, “I am raising my knife over the other, to this or that other I owe absolute fidelity”

p. 79 [we are all Abraham in every instant] responsibility and relation of gift of death of each instant

p. 95 in the instant (no-time-lapse) when Abraham raises the knife, when he decides, instant of absolute sacrifice of economy, law of oikonomia, sacrifice of home, proper, one’s own kin

——but God, who didn’t know what Abraham would do [here Kierkegaard Christianizes the story] reinscribes absolute sacrifice in an economy of reward w/ absolute gift (gives back Isaac)

p. 139 a question of time at the outside of an instant

GT p. 9 could only be a gift the instant the paradoxical instant tears time apart (what Kierkegaard means when he says decision is madness)

***p. 17 something must come about in an instant, an instant that doesn’t belong to economy of time, time w/out time, a forgetting that forgets, but a forgetting that’s not nothing

pp. 122-23 condition common to gift & event: unconditionality > chance, tukhē, in an instant, disorder, surprise, irruptive, unmotivated, freedom of dice throw, coup de don, obey nothing but disorder, principles w/out principles, not necessary, gratuitous, déchirer la trame

R p. 17 by killing father Cronos (infinite order of time), Zeus wills out over time, touches the finitude of time, sovereignty as the instant of a decision, end to time and language

p. 100 sovereignty: silent and unavowable, betrays democracy, the stigmatic point of an indivisible instant

MONL p. 5 install myself resolutely in the very instant of performative contradiction

OOG pp. 109-11 the Living Present > most responsible security of every phenom. reduction: “in the ultimate juridical instant (instance) is announced the most radical unity of the world”

***FL pp. 274-75 revolutionary instant vs. or as exceptional decision > effaces/blurs distinction btwn founding/preserving law, inscribes iterability in originarity

H p. 101 delay and haste, halting and hastening, rhythm of Oedipus’ journey; p. 127 infinite speed contracted into an absolute halt or haste, precipitation because delay, instant of an instant that is canceled out > thus always late & precipitous re: hospitality

p. 129 Klossowski: surprise in the instant

SPOM p. xix Derrida’s instant, spectral moment, furtive & untimely

POOF p. 32 every instant begins at the end, address carries in its readability the signature of the addressee: it withdraws from space by penetrating it

p. 40 at each instant discourse [Nietzsche’s] carried to its limit, on the edge of silence: transports itself beyond itself, hyperbolic, infinite build-up (surenchère), swept away by perhaps that undecides meaning in each decisive moment

POR p. 20 (154) time for reflection [on university?], invagination of internal pocket, the chance for this event, chance of an instant, Augenblick, a wink, blink, a beat, no longer hard eyes [see that what makes see is letting oneself stop seeing]

——desire for memory & exposure to future brought together in same instant

MPM p. 60 memory of present divides the instant? inscribes difference in presence of present?

p. 61“representation,” “time,” “memory”…opening perspectives of difference and distance in the uniqueness of the moment

p. 64 ghosts always pass quickly, infinite speed, presence w/out present that in coming back only haunts > the ghost, le re-venant, the survivor, figure or fiction, presence w/out presence, instant w/out duration, not nothing

p. 85 “Must one at each instant reinvent filiation?” Is this a signature of faithful memory or betrayal, figure of simulacrum?

VM p. 91 acc. Levinas, no time, no history, w/out absolute alterity of each instant

p. 119 only way to escape Hegel, for an instant, consider “false infinity,” original finitude, irreducible

p. 129 for Hegel, difference btwn same and other has no meaning in the infinite, or only does as an anxiety of the infinite that determines and negates itself

PAS PAS pp. (70-1) Blanchot: approach, reanimate the instant, summons (appel), reconquer [madness?]

VP p. 41 no need for communication in the psychical act, no need to indicate psychical acts; Husserl: “acts are lived by us in the very instant (Augenblick)”

p. 50 Husserl: presence lived experientially im selben Augenblick; Derrida: present as self-presence is as indivisible as a blink of an eye

p. 51 “sharp point of the instant”: identity of lived-experience present to itself

p. 56 as soon as we admit continuity btwn now and non-now, perception and non-perception, we admit the other into the Augenblick, there is duration to the blink of the eye, duration closes the eye

T p. xxix after every perforation, one [philosophy] is dying to replace w/ a glorious cadaver, ce temps timbré entre lécriture et la parole (s) appellent un coup de donc [Glas]: it suffices, barely, to wait!

OS pp. 39-40 nun, often translated as instant, functions in Greek like “now (maintenant)” > nun is form in which time cannot not be given, yet nun is not, is both no longer (nest plus) & not yet (nest pas encore), a no-thing (ne-ant), doesn’t participate in presence

SP pp. 161-63n la signature et le texte tombent lun hors de lautre, se sécrètent, se séparent, et sexcrètent, se forment de la coupure même qui les décapite, les échafaude en tronc sans tête, dès linstant de leur itérabilité > expropriative commencement marks everything erected w/ structure of etron [fecal matter]

OTO p. 14 btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

O p. 54n the point is to work to put up or dismantle a scaffold, a scaffolding (un échafaudage), we need one to substitute, the time of a lapse, Mallarmé’s lustre for Plato’s sun

WAP pp. 16-7 philosophy, by right, must claim to be justified, at every moment (thus rupture), to put into question every “presupposition” (incl. those of “philosophy”) > vertical self-institution

***p. 42 “thinking,” which entitles only this “no” of no pure instance, must, in the name of a democracy to come, “unremittingly interrogate” (that is deconstruct) the de facto democracy, its determinations > event/promise whose singularity doesn’t signify (self-) presence

***DPi p. 138 one must never stop thinking about this instant of execution (no good conscience)

pp. 221-22 DP speaks in 3rd person present (can’t say: “I am no more”), copula signifies instantaneous passage from being to nothingness (“he is no more”): stigmē, Most High, Last Judgment, God’s verdict (always instant of death of a 3rd party, never me, you, us)

pp. 225-26 Cartesianism of Guillotin/guillotine, not only mechanism of individualism/egalitarian universalism, but also body/mind (Cartesian doxa, ideology), but also Descartes’ instantaneism (separate, indivisible instants) as part of anesthetic logic of moment of guillotine

——would the mind only know it was severed from its head when the crowd cheers? other determines instant of my death

——guillotine as pain killer: instant, no sensibility of duration of time: anesthesia—euthanasia—instantaneity (Augenblick)

RGE p. 259 Bataille’s negative w/out reserve, in an instant, not even negative since not convertible to positive truth

p. 263 Bataille’s instant (nest pas un point de présence pleine et inentamée): furtive [cf. PS] (il ne se donne pas, il se vole), il se glisse et se dérobe entre deux présences

REST p. 305 remainder, instance of letting fall, this lowness: is it the foot?

——Van Gogh’s scene: “make oneself a present of the remainder (Glas)”

PIO p. 6 for something to be a first time must also be a last time > archaeology & eschatology

acknowledge each other in irony of one & only instant

TR pp. 130-31 only once of instant caught in amber coffin (mosquito sucking blood)

PJP p. 173 ultimate resource/fatality of the anacoluthon: multiplicity of times, instants, interruption time inscribes in “me” > the perjurer can always ask to be excused

HST pp. 391-92 for Levinas, resurrection/survival becomes miracle of each instant, where an “I” calls out for forgiveness (salvation, redemption, Messiah), every instant

p. 393 Levinas: future (avenir) as a resurrection of the present; “next instant” is an annulment of commitment to existence made in the instant; the “I’s” death in the empty interval: condition of new birth

——at moment where everything is lost, everything is possible

——Levinas: response to the hope for the present is the very expression of the“I,” exigency to redeem instant of despair; hope for present as a primary fact in mystery of work of time

TN pp. 13-4 tôt (soon): davance dévoré par cet autre du temps, consumed, burned, tostus refers to instant, au temps sans temps dune flamme > on the verge, it’s the end: no time for motion, trop tard

pp. 92-3 is it possible to change climates? I believe not > I don’t really believe this, not in an instant, w/ a loss of memory

ATM p. 144 what is said inside (dedans) can infinitely overflow all context, at a stroke (dun coup)

AD p. 152n for Levinas, paternity, at instant of eroticism, not virility of war, state, heroism

INSTITUTION

GT p. 97 a “true” corpus is still, perhaps, counterfeit money, may be ghost or spirit, spirit of body & of capital (title, heading, is capital), no problem of canon if this institution were natural

LOBL pp. ~95-6 [re: tampering w/ ideal translatability & national language] a pedagogical institution can bear these 2 poles as long as nothing touches the borders of language

AF p. 7 archival violence: exergue, capitalize on ellipse, accumulates capital in advance, anticipates so to institute (Gewalt)

——archive at once institutive & conservative [see FL], revolutionary & traditional, an eco-nomic archive: keeps, puts in reserve, saves, but in unnatural fashion (forcing obedience to law)

POO p. 144n identifiable institutions stabilize, arrest turbulence, master, order, to be able to make decisions, to be able > literature is exemplary in the face of this, it always does something other, something other than itself: for example: philosophy (literature & philosophy)

***OTO pp. 19-20 good news of EROS is message, is a teaching, address/destination of doctrine, is untimely, differant, since news repeats an affirmation (yes, yes), must give rise to magisterial institution, institutions of the “yes,” which have need of ears

WAP pp. 4-5 institution of title/work can be incarnated by people, even single person: but this incarnation guaranteed by some institution > institution guards, guarantees title, thus already holds title; origin of power to entitle/accredit can never be phenomenalized; this not merely circle makes us rethink “repression,” “suppression,” “sacrifice”

——an institution remembers, it is made for that

pp. 5-6 institution can forget its own elect (finite memory), its finitude also effects remembrance of what it wants to exclude: the surface of its archive thus inscribed w/ what it refuses, excludes (ex: Walter Benjamin not receiving a degree)

p. 69 not neutral, every institution calls for or at least implies a taking sides (prise de parti)

REST p. 264 marche almost same word as mark, margins, also Pas > necessity of walking, lowest degree, most subjective or underlying level of culture/institution: pair of shoes

PIO p. 23 institutional structure of invention requires [?] neutralizing stamp of reason [verb used here: arraisonner]

p. 26 “statute”: stance, stays erect, it’s essentially institutional, defines while prescribing, stable, order, supposes a group (like invention, it’s only human, not animal/theological)

pp. 43-4 invention, invenire (advent of future-to-come) comes back to the same as soon as it receives a status legitimized by an institution: what is being invented are institutions > for this to happen invention must be possible: this statutory economy of public invention does not break the psyché, does not go beyond the mirror

AFR p. 133 frivolous extension (leaves idea w/out thing, sign w/out idea) increases w/ progress itself, follows teleological movement > extends to limit of what it disintegrates: commerce, language, institution

IW pp. 255-56 via Cohen, re: delirium of German-Jewish psyche, Derrida evokes a true symptom, can’t be made into object by scientific rationalism (violent structure of interpretation/institution)

p. 266-67 conscience must institute itself, a self-instituting decision w/ no external guarantee from institutions of this world > thus Luther’s Doppelsinn of this Glaube: anti-, archi-institutional

C pp. 231-32 who signs the theft? Cartouche as great robber: this is my cartouche, I stole it, I am it, this is the body of my name > Cartouche left an institution: commonizing of proper name

LI p. 147 that socio-institutional conditions are unstable is true source of an anxiety that “deconstruction” merely reveals > “de-” of deconstruction not demolition of what is constructing itself but what remains to be thought beyond constructivist/destructionist scheme—literacy is at stake [i.e. must be able to read this instability]

CF p. 48 the 3rd as survivor in general (institution, sociality, transgenerational heritage)

BSi p. 281 narcissism of autopsy occurs after narcissistic hunt, capture > this setup mediated by institutions

OG pp. 18-9 (31) to the question “what is the sign?” the answer has always been the signified, which is never contemporary, proximity to logos as phonèpresence: no relation to trace, signifier

——what if sign escapes the instituting question of philosophy: “what is (ti esti)…?” what if we can only think of the sign as (is) [crossed-out] and (thing) [crossed-out, fixerup]? [Heidegger’s crossing-out]

p. 44 (65) [Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure] if “writing” signifies inscription & the durability of the sign, then the very idea of institution (hence the arbitrariness of the sign) is unthinkable outside writing, unthinkable outside horizon itself, outside world as space of inscription > opening to spatial distribution of signs (regulated play) [overturn opposition physis/nomos]

***pp. 46-8 (68-70) Derrida calls instituted trace “unmotivated” (immotivée), asks that the word “institution” not be so quickly interpreted w/in classical oppositions; “unmotivated” deconstructs Saussure’s arbitrary, thinks its possibility en-deçà de (short of) lopposition dérivée btwn nature/convention, symbol/sign > becoming-unmotivated of trace requires synthesis where le tout autre sannonce comme tel: not more natural than cultural

p. 219 (313) natural cause of language avoids Condillac’s theologico-moral usteron proteron

——for Rousseau, no social institute before language, which owes its form to natural causes > language includes and constructs whole social structure

p. 232 (331) le langage na pu surgir quà partir de la dispersion

——que le langage doive traverser lespace, soit tenu de sespacer, ce nest pas là un trait accidentel mais le sceau de son originela dispersion originelle laisse sa marque dans le langage: articulation (which seems to introduce difference as an institution) has for ground/space dispersion that is natural: space itself

UWC pp. 217-18 not every travail an event in itself, doesn’t always produce an oeuvre, not every performative (always authorized by an institutional “as if”) produces oeuvre

EU p. 44 question of censorship btwn Reason & university: censorship as institution, censorship outside the institution

p. 79 for Schelling, individuals, who are finite, must translate > if mind could simply be infinite, there’d be no need to translate > “originary knowledge” can become “real" in an individual, only in der Gattung (in the genus), i.e. in historical institutions > history: becoming-real of idea

***FV p. 481n [re: psychoanalysis] institution built on male child’s experience > at stage of genital organization, there’s only maleness (antithesis isn’t femaleness but being castrated): phallogocentrism is no accident/error, its old, enormous root must be accounted for [described] > but, its description is a “participant” when it induces a practice, ethics, institution, a politics that insures truth of a tradition

WBH p. 190 guardians of institution are guardians of Law > as women’s studies gains institutional legitimacy, it produces guardians of the Law; U.S. is a pioneer of women’s studies

INTENTIONALITY

OOG p. 150 in going out from self to self of the Absolute of Living Present present, intentionality is the root of historicity, historicity is sense

FK p. 85 sacrosanctifying nature of intentionality

GT pp. 122-23 condition common to gift & event: unconditionality > chance, tukhē, in an instant, disorder, surprise, irruptive, unmotivated, freedom of dice throw, coup de don, obey nothing but disorder, principles w/out principles, not necessary, gratuitous, déchirer la trame

——one must intend to give a gift, and yet all intentionality threatens the gift w/ self-keeping > intentional freedom & chance must miraculously agree w/ each other

HERP p. 217n can we read an “unconscious” affinity btwn impending arrival of friend and imminence of death? [Heidegger would protest—isn’t analytic of Dasein regulated by norms of absolute intentional meaning?]

VM p. 121 isn’t intentionality respect itself? the other appearing as other for the same?

p. 125 would return to intentional phenomenon acquiesce to violence of fact, is there thus an irreducible zone of factuality, an original, transcendental, preethical violence? > would it be tied to phenomenality itself & possibility of language? embedded in root of meaning & logos

VP p. 28 intentionality in every expression explains Derrida’s choice of vouloir-dire for Bedeutung

p. 29 despite passive genesis, Husserl’s intentionality is still taken in tradition of metaphysical voluntarism

pp. 28-9 everything indicative, empirical, everything that physically incarnates expression, is foreign to expressivity, to pure intention

pp. 31-2 difference btwn indication and expression is functional or intentional not substantial

pp. 77-8 Derrida notes uniqueness of Husserl’s division between intuition and intentionality, that the “fulfilling” intuition is not essential to the expression, to the intention of meaning: this allows for a pure logical grammar: absence of object is not absence of meaning

pp. 78-9 [now] in presence (of object), intentionality and intuition fuse [?], and its structure disappears, can they ever be fused in intentional meaning can function w/out intuition [?]

pp. 82-3 Husserl’s contradiction: “I” must always be new but doesn’t ideal nature of Bedeutung exclude the “always new” > Derrida uses Husserl’s logic against him, explaining that we understand “I,” even when “I am dead,” because intention does not require intuition

T p. xi Marges concerns relevance of limit, a reading of the Hegelian Aufhebung, a reading beyond Hegel’s own intention, beyond that which is inscribed on the internal vestibule of his ear, where Hegel’s text would be a writing machine of “conscious intention,” thus a mechanical reader

OTO pp. 30-1 [re: fact that Nazis could ape Nietzsche’s text] if you refuse conscious, deliberate textual intentions, the perversion is made possible by structure of text itself (its “remaining”), otherwise it would be unreadable > nothing absolutely contingent about fact that Nazis effectively brandished his name [Derrida wary of close reading that would preserve Nietzsche’s intention]

GSP pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

FS p. 14 [for deconstruction] history of the work is not only its past, it is the impossibility of the text ever being present > legitimating intention keeps to internal truth, avoids thinking a subjective origin that is not simply psychological/mental

HLP p. 34 what a [classical] lie does: address to another, intentional act, consciousness, presence-to-self of knowledge > lying a betrayal of contract & duty to other [classical lie presumes MOP]

p. 35 intention to lie pertains to saying & meaning to say (vouloir-dire)—not to the said

——St. Augustines’s lie is a labyrinth where one can take a wrong turn at any step: will, intentionality of consciousness, desire/will to deceive (fallendi cupiditas, voluntas fallendi)

EL tautological & contradictory logic (speaks of the event of an impossible, makes of impossible the condition of possibility): secularization allows us to speak of a secularization that doesn’t take place

LI p. 56 Derrida does not impose a clean break w/ intention but calls into question its telos, its fulfillment, its actualization in a plenitude that would be present to & identical w/ itself

——intention is differing/deferring in its inception

p. 58 differing/deferring effects intention & object thus aimed at (signified/referent)

——plenitude of intentional meaning (vouloir-dire), meaningfulness, consciousness, presence, originary intuition > all organize phenomenology [what Derrida is questioning]

p. 59 [from SEC] structural unconsciousness, absence of intending actual utterance, prohibits any saturation of context (total presence)

p. 64 [fulfilled/actualized intentionality called into question again]

——[re: conforming to code, grammaticality] a minimum making-sense is incommensurate w/ adequate understanding of intended meaning > this incommensurability is irreducible, “inheres” in intention itself, riven (creusé) w/ iterability

p. 72 expressionist & representationalist description of language: intention adequate to, realizes, expression (dehiscence is there even before divide btwn intention/expression)

p. 73 no intention can ever be fully conscious

pp. 75-6 “primary masochism” [a wolf of undecidability] poisons, how can one identify the intention, the speaker, the effect once border btwn pleasure/pain is upset?

——thus the limited responsibility of Sarl, vulnerable to parasitisms, the “conscious ego” cannot incorporate and does its best to exclude [despite Derrida’s vehemence, substituting Sarl for Searle demonstrates his uncanny generosity—he will not accuse a subject]

p. 97 speech act theory seeks the founding categories of all ethical-political statements: relation of intentionality to conventionality or to rules (in the best Kantian tradition)

p. 105 iterability doesn’t limit intentionality in general but its consciousness, its presence to itself

p. 121 telos of “fulfillment” (in this I believe Husserl was right) is not accidental, separable from concept of intentionality—conditions it [cf. p. 56 is there disingenuousness here?]

——this telos, a “longing for metaphysical plenitude,” can be lived/described w/out romantic, even mystical pathos sometimes associated w/ these words

p. 122 for Searle, “realization” signifies “actualization” or “fulfillment”: “serious/literal” are exemplary qualities of idealized realization of intention, what language ought to do

p. 129 plenitude is telos, but structure of this telos is such that attainment = death/paralysis > thus, telos divided/split, this non-end not an extraneous vestige but most intimate and irreducible other in intentionality; plenitude orients and endangers intention [“dispossessed of long-for presence…”]

——non-end lasts wherever there’s life, language, intention, mark, finite infinite of differance

p. 130 iterability not merely a law of intentionality, though it introduces the structural limit of its telos > Derrida distrusts figure of intention, which grows increasingly obscure [Derrida not in “conflict” w/ intentionality, just observes limit to its telos > intentionality no more telos than arché]

E p. 18 rhetoric often compared to a machine, because there’s no intention inside > false life, empty symbolism of these sophistical tekhnai

AD p. 48 for Levinas, hospitality is an intentionality that resists thematization

INTERDICT

MONL pp. 31-2 double interdict: can’t speak the other language, can’t speak the one language

——but interdict wrong word, never enacted as law, no, it’s the fundamental interdiction, the absolute interdiction [TACT]

INTEREST

SPOM pp. 91-2 injunction, pledge, “necessary” promise “il faut lavenir” marks any opening to the event and conditions interest (not indifference) to anything whatsoever, to all content, no desire w/out it

GT p. 154, time of story given to the narrator, oriented toward him, not w/out interest

R p. 85 Derrida refuses to give up on a certain “interest of reason”

p. 104 United States, w/out consulting anyone, gives itself the right to protect its “vital interests”

PP p. 82 son as interest on capital investment, as return, revenue, son as physical sun, analogon of intelligible sun (the Good, capital, origin of all onta); father as noooumena, son as horōmena

meaning of patēr sometimes exclusively financial capital

DPi p. 140 the Latin interest: 1) finding oneself being btwn space larger than oneself 2) fiduciary calculation, surplus value, search for profit/capitalization, monetary or psychological economy

pp. 150-51 Derrida: Nietzsche always interesting even if you don’t agree w/ him, he’s interesting because he sniffs out partie honteuse, modestly hidden or negated interest

p. 165 Baudelaire & Nietzsche (less narrowly) confine interest to zoo-psychobiology (conscious or unconscious motivations of the individual) > “we must” think interest in relation to that of the (global) state’s interest in maintaining/suspending DP

p. 170 Derrida intends to displace Baudelairean, Nietzschean, Marxian [cf. pp. 175-79] question of interest, economy, DP

p. 180 for Kant, government has an interest in treating man as more than a machine, in a manner appropriate to his dignity; that is w/ disinterested interest, interest w/out interest > beyond any market price, any calculable interest, any pathological interest, treat him as an end in-itself

***p. 254 1) being-unscathed (l’être-indemne): safe, sound, intact, virgin, heilig, unhurt, holy 2) becoming-indemnified (l’être-indeminsé): rendered unscathed again, reimbursed, redemption of debt

——indemnity signals toward interest, economy

pp. 254-55 I [Derrida] am against the DP, I am interested in saving my neck, the life I love: and by “I,” I mean “I,” me, and also whoever says “I” in its place or in mine: ultimate resource of my interest in the end of DP—an interest so originary/primordial, it risks being shared by supporters of DP?

***p. 262 zone btwn capital & capital punishment (de-cap-itation), causes vertigo, where calculating drive, interest of capital, is no longer calculable, becomes infinite, when death w/out return is part of market > theologico-political: phantasm of infinitization in heart of finitude

RGE p. 252 slumber of reason, ruse of reason, slumber in the form of reason, vigilance of Hegelian logos (engenders monsters then puts them to sleep) > la raison veille sur un sommeil profond auquel elle est intéressée

REST p. 279 “what interestedness can have motivated such a faux-pas?” “why lucidity only around the edges of this macula?” [re: Schapiro’s hasty identification]

pp. 282-83 whose shoes (whose feet) (the subject of reattachment): the capital subject of this contract [btwn Shapiro & Heidegger], they each have one piece of symbolon, share common interest, coded commitment

TR p. 101 [re: Confessions] loeuvre generates/capitalizes a sort of interest (won’t be so bold as to say surplus value) of guilt: overproduces shame that is archived (not effaced)

PPT p. 5 the “interest,” the revenue of the surplus value, remains untranslatable in idiom’s economic performance, in ellipses of its trait, the word by word or trait for trait in which it contracts

E p. 15 for Kant, “meditation on a disinterested pleasure…provokes a moral interest in the beautiful” > interest taken in disinterestedness

——[re: disinterested pleasure] a moral revenue drawn from a natural production w/out interest to us; one takes wealth w/out interest, the singular moral surplus value of sansstill, the trace (Spur) of a purpose in nature is what makes our stock in moral value rise

OG p. 239 (340) Rousseau cannot declare unity of the advantage of writing (l’intérêt d’écrire), can only describe it in contraband: writing–need, speech–passion

SPEC pp. 316-17 curtains, veils, “skirt” of bed, hymen of fort:da, edge of bed (lit) [of reading?], va-et-vient, there would’ve been a hymen even w/out curtains > veil of this “skirt” is interest of bed (lit) and fort:da of all these generations

p. 322 speculator describes what he’s doing w/out doing so explicitly [Rousseau from OG], does w/out auto-analytic calculation, w/out calculation itself analyzing itself > thus the interest and necessity of the thing [for Freud? for Derrida?]

INTERIORIZE / INTERIORITY

GOD p. 8 Platonism > Christianity (exteriority, accessible – interiority, inaccessible)

***GT p. 170 secret of literature has no depth, no interiority, spread on the surface of the page, non-psychological structure, not subjective though responsible for most radical effects of subjectivity, a post card, a bank note, a “letter of credit” [see LOBL p. ~101, &

SUBJECTILE

]

MONL p. 54 insidious Christian contamination: the respectful belief in inwardness, the preference for intention, the heart, the mind, mistrust of action given to the mechanicity of the body, against Pharisaism

LOBL pp. 100-01 double invagination constitutes story of stories, narrative of deconstruction in deconstruction: apparently outer edge of a clôture, makes no sign beyond itself, toward tout autre, w/out becoming dual, being “represented,” refolded, re-marked w/in the clôture > what the structure produces as an effect of interiority, this structure-effect is being deconstructed

pp. 164-65 interruption, connectionless connection of arrêt > passes through insides w/out insides of ego of récitant

MPM p. 34 mimetic interiorization not just fictive, is origin of fiction, takes place in a body, makes place for body, soul, “ours” > death constitutes and makes manifests limits of me, us, obliged to harbor something greater than us w/in us

p. 35 Erinnerung (memory & interiorization)

p. 37 uncontrollable necessity, nonsubjectivizable law of thought beyond interiorization, beyond un-mourning thought mourning > can we accept it? affirm it? can no longer become a question

p. 67 de Man: “art leaves interiorization of past forever behind” > no dialectical passage from symbol to sign; art (like thought of thinking memory) linked to sign not symbol

p. 71 thinking, not bereaved interiorization, thinks at boundaries, thinks the boundary, the limit of interiority

——we must remember the power of forgetting (what tradition calls “bad”: pharmakon, sign, figure of allegory) as opposed to forgetting in the sense of interior “recollection”

OOG pp. 102-04 Husserl & Joyce: two ways to achieve Hegelian endeavor to interiorize memory of culture

PP pp. 121-22 (138-39) in Laws judge must introject, internalize the letter, grammata [tou Dephikou grammatos], into his soul; anamnesic dialectics, repetition of eidos, self-knowledge, self-mastery > a forgetting of childhood, exorcism of child, teaches child to speak

p. 149 Plato prefers one writing over the other, a good writing over bad, a fertile trace (endgenders w/in) over a sterile one (une semence dépensée au-dehors en pure perte, risk of dissemination)

PAS PAS p. (31) force of approach defined “à-partir-deléloignement du proche, gathering proximity and distance in an inclusion w/out interiority

p. (79) assimilating interiority of mastery can also be terrible thus compulsion toward outside could be defense > sauf le dehors, tout sauf le dehors

FSW p. 196 acc. Freud, repression is not forgetting, not exclusion, an interior representation

***p. 224 Mystic Pad depth w/out bottom, stratification of surfaces, whose interior is a similarly exposed surface, perfectly superficial exteriority open to incision of scratch

TC pp. 242-43 Artaud rejects psychoanalytic theater for its secret interiority > theater of cruelty a theater of dreams, of calculated dreams, cruelty as consciousness, exposed lucidity

PPHS pp. 76-7 Vorstellung, remembered-interiorized intuition; Erinnerung, interiorized memory, places images in reserve, like water in unconscious pit, like vein at bottom of mine > passage to conceptuality

p. 87n Hegel: creative memory, mnēmosynē, freely bestows on sign a value that only has value conferred on it by spirit > [because sign is arbitrary, unlike symbol, it resonates w/ spirit, solely]

p. 93n [from Plato to Husserl] idealization: simultaneous confirmation of objectivity & interiority (one by the other), hierarchical classification

p. 105 acc. Hegel, silence of writing, space of calculation, interrupts movement of Aufhebung, interiorization of past (Erinnerung), history of spirit

T p. xix resistance to deconstruction: infinite mastery > assurance of Being & interiorization of every limit as being, as its own proper

SH p. 57 no worse loss than death of name (still, a date remains) > mourning, interiorization of other in Erinnerung, the preserving of other in sepulcher/epitaph, is denied us; words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts > incinerated beyond of date, words lost w/out sepulcher

FWT p. 78 work is always work of mourning, internalizes, appropriating idealization

p. 114 those who internalize, who think they can assimilate, appropriate, habituate, subjectivize the worst [in a work of mourning], immunize, sacralize, and idealize it

pp. 150-151 Kant tries to eliminate revenge, all interest, from death penalty, but for Derrida this is impossible (at least according to Kant’s logic); also, regulating lex talionis means I inflict this punishment on myself [perfect dialecticism]

WM p. 221 for Pierre Louis, in Plato, metaphor plays role of pedagogical ornament, what matters is signified content, intention of truth [Derrida calls these paradoxical & traditional propositions]

pp. 225-26 it appears that the inactive or dead metaphor has no interest to philosophy, since its meaning has already been interiorized, relevé, through Erinnerung (author did not intend it)

pp. 268-69 the East is where the sensible sun rises, the sun sets, is interiorized, in heart (eye) of the West

DS pp. 184-85 book is a dialogue or dialectic, our soul resembles a book when we talk to ourselves, a false dialogue, w/out voice, deficient logos [compare to Husserl’s Bedeutung]

pp. 188-89 painting & writing: inscriptions written inside the outside > portrait of innermost logos, book

p. 205 interminable network of Pierrot’s (mimes), already remarked as grafting inside Mallarmé’s text, which thus no longer has an inside

p. 219n Hegel: curtain hanging before inner-world is drawn away, go behind it ourselves to see [curtain-raising of philosophical we, subject of absolute knowing]

p. 234 inserting spacing into interiority does not allow inside to identify w/ itself (close upon itself)

***POS p. 33 couple outside/inside, representation of language as “expression,” are structural lures (what Kant would’ve called a transcendental illusion)

pp. 33-4 from perspective of expressivism, text is nonsignifying, from perspective of differance, text produces all signification, “only nonexpressivity can signify,” “interiority” of meaning already worked over by its own exteriority

ATIA p. 79 Descartes’ argument is not that animals don’t resemble humans (they do!), it’s that we can’t make an interior analogy (judgment) based on exterior resemblance

p. 122 for Lacan, man’s “autotelic specularity of the inside is thus linked to a defect, to a prematurity, to an incompleteness of the little man”

FS p. 14 [for deconstruction] history of the work is not only its past, it is the impossibility of the text ever being present > legitimating intention keeps to internal truth, avoids thinking a subjective origin that is not simply psychological/mental

O pp. 36-7 if nothing outside text, text not snug airtight (calfeutré) inside of an interiority or an identity-to-itself (dune identité à soi) > though “dehors à tout prix” can play a reassuring role, un certain dedans peut être terrible

p. 47 for Hegel, philosophy is unique > produces its object & its method out of its own interiority

DPi pp. 191-92 sans sang (U.S., Eucharist—real presence of blood of God): interiorization of blood in noncruel DP > turning point as a return, ce trop ou ce trope of blood

RGE p. 259 Aufhebung collaborates w/ Errinerung (interiorizing memory of meaning)

PIO p. 9 no matter how outstretched (tendus) we are toward the other, everything we say or do remains w/in us: part of us wounded, conversing w/ ourselves in work of mourning, of Erinnerung

——even if metonymy of other w/in ourselves already constituted our relation to living other, [actual?] death brings relation into a more abundant light (un plus de lumière) > makes the breaking of the mirror more necessary (difficult): at instant of death, limit of narcissistic reappropriation is terribly sharp > must no longer be concerned w/ other in ourselvesyet, that’s all we can be concerned w/ > narcissistic wound enlarges (saccroît) for want of being (ne plus pouvoir être) narcissistic, no longer appeased in that Erinnerung we call work of mourning

——beyond internalizing memory to Gedächtnis, another way to think

LI p. 103 inner purity & exterior supplement—this is myth itself (mythology of a logos)

IW p. 261 acc. Cohen, Kant is holy of holies, innermost sanctum of German spirit, & Kant represents most intimate affinity (die innerste Verwandschaft) w/ Judaism

——this kinship (Kant, German, Jew) is sealed in most intimate depth, most essential interiority, is sacredness itself, historical sacredness of spirit > p. 262 absolute interiority

EL pp. 204-05 Scholem protests against Christianizing Messianism, interiorizing & spiritualizing, a flight seeking to escape verification of Messianic, apocalyptic claim

TN p. 53 living moment of life an interiorization or expulsion? becoming-tangible of untouchable or an idealization?

p. 192 pre-originary mourning (re: Husserl’s vigilant stance on alter-ego) tied to motif of exappropriation—interiorization, even introjection, never achieved

p. 290 “heart”: ultimate place of mourning, sanctuary of what one keeps when one can’t keep anything, name of what infinitely exceeds the inside

E p. 14 for Kant, the purpose-lessness (le sans-fin) of the experience of beauty leads us inside ourselves, there’s an interiorizing suppléance, a slurping (suçotement), by which we find our moral destination w/in, consume w/in what we can’t consume outside; this inside purpose, teleology, is moral and analogously relates to natural harmony

p. 20 for Kant, hearing (w/ its allergy to prosthesis) distinguished from sight by its auto-affective structure, an internal sense, its “form” is time > not an anthropological but a psychological space

AD p. 39 systematic totality, architechtonics [?]: habitability of habitation, interiority of an economy

BSi p. 298 Derrida on how zoos hide limits, interiorize, hollowed-out (en creux) limits [ditch instead of bars] > repressive violence w/ liberal, idealist, spiritualist grimace

OG p. 12 Hegel privileges sound (speech, voice), because it is a hearing of an interior vibration

——voice, phonè, sentendre-parler, saffecte lui-même (hearing-oneself-speak, affecting oneself), ideality

——phonocentrism se confond (merges) w/ onto-theology, produces these subdeterminations of presence: sight as eidos, substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as point (stigmè) of now (nun), consciousness, cogito, subjectivity, co-presence of other & self…

pp. 17-8 (29-30) natural writing (breath) pneumatological not grammatological

——interior holy voice of faith; natural law, native unity of voice & writing is prescriptive, commandment > good writing comprehended as that which had to be comprehended

pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

p. 240 (341-42) the violent penetration of speech, passivity, reception obliged, interiorization, “sentendre-parler”—passion: Rousseau suspects speech’s violence, the complicity of voice & heart

——dérobement of thing in speech > conceals what vision places before us: 1) interiorize thing in depth of heart 2) speech installs a fiction, a lie, we touch the simulacrum more than truth

SPEC p. 382 normal repetition: idealizing interiorization, mastery (Hegel, Husserl)

INTERPRETATION

T pp. xv-xvi how to interpret (interpretation as neither a theory nor discursive practice of philosophy) the discourse that organizes economy of its [philosophy’s] representation, its weave, so nothing surprises: reasons from w/in vault (cave) of its autism

LI p. 120 that all interpretation and all language are problematic: a stroke of luck?

p. 157n the “mis-“ of misunderstanding/misinterpreting is not inevitable [re: Habermas’ reading of Derrida] but a structural possibility that must be taken into account at all times

p. 147 the play of differance makes “guardrails,” “doubling commentary,” possible & necessary; “doubling commentary”: a reading that is interpretive, inventive, or “productive”

p. 148 every referent, all reality, has structure of a differential trace, can only refer to “real” in an interpretive experience

EU pp. 100-01 interpretation of poem, philosopheme, theologeme always proposes an institutional model, consolidating an existing one or constituting a new one: calls for politics of community of interpreters > every text/element of corpus bequeathes/reproduces several injunctions

——every text opens/closes, double bind, undecidability, an overdetermination that can’t be mastered

p. 102 minimal responsibility today (of someone belonging to research/teaching institution): make political implications of system and its aporias as clear and thematic as possible

——every operation we (students, teachers, research community) pursue together: always institution at play, contract signed, image of ideal seminar constructed, a socius implied

INTERRUPTION

GOD p. 98 Christianity, “seeing in secret,” God the Father restores economy interrupted by the dividing of heaven from earth

pp. 104-09 2 economies of salary: retribution (exchange), and love of foreigner, an interruption, an exceeding of the economy of the community, of Schmitt’s strict politics, interrupts self-consciousness, inaugurates exchange

p. 125 God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, not the God of philosophers of ontotheology, but one who interrupts & retracts his order

GT p. 7 gift interrupts economy, it’s not impossible but the impossible

p. 8 why desire to interrupt circulation of circle, why desire the gift?

p. 156 interruption opens space of absolute heterogeneity—infinite secret

R p. 91 messianicity that at once interrupts and accomplishes intrinsic historicity [re: concept of democracy]

FK p. 99 socius as the secret of testimonial experience, a certain faith, address/relation to tout autre, that is, socius as non-relationship of absolute interruption: Levinas, Blanchot

FL pp. 269-270 via Benjamin, terrifying moments of suffering, crime, torture: “mystical” epochē, moment of suspense, instance of nonlaw, founding or revolutionary violence, a pure performative act that wouldn’t have to respond to anyone, interrupts

LOBL p. 86 quotation interrupts very belonging to which it is a necessary condition

pp. 164-65 interruption, connectionless connection of arrêt > passes through insides w/out insides of ego of récitant

SPOM p. 6 spectrality interrupts all specularity, de-synchronizes, calls us to anachrony

p. 153 Marx wants to interrupt filiation to Hegel

pp. 184-85 “lineage of patrimony [from Plato to Marx] [nominalism, conceptualism, realism, rhetoric, logic, proper meaning…] is wrought, but never interrupted” by the question of the idea, question of the concept, concept of the concept, the question of life-death, opening onto a dimension of irreducible sur-vival or surviving (survivance)

POOF pp. 27-8 Nietzsche’s upheaval (soulèvement), interruption of Aristotle’s “O my friends…”, a seismic wave, a revolution of the political (more discreet than revolutions known under the name): refuses “accepted propriety of its [“O my friends…”] paradox,” counter-testimony

p. 29 suspension, imminence of interruption, the other, revolution, chaos: risk of an instability

VM p. 90 [Derrida on Levinas’ method] uses philosophy’s own light to reveal that philosophy’s surface is severely cracked (lézardes), that its solidity is its rigidity > progresses along cracks, negates negations, neither/nor, poetic force of metaphor a trace of this wounding of language

p. 103 forever discreet, interrupting all historical totalities through its freedom of speech, face not “of this world”

——être derrière le signe qui est dans le monde, cest ensuite demeurer invisible au monde dans lépiphanie

PP p. 96 Plato cannot see the links (les liasons), les laisser dans lombre ou les y interrompre > they go on working, outside his text? thanks to him? in his text? outside his text?

PAS PAS p. (36) Blanchot: she would have wanted to devote her final force to interruption and stifling

p. (48) risk of interruption is run, programmed in the night, by the récit

p. (57) from where the right to interrupt? unjustifiable violence of interruption, nothing more servile, indiscreet, unspeakable than generalizing, appropriating the unique, breaking the seal of an absolute singularity [re: citing from Friendship, on single friendship btwn Bataille & Blanchot]

p. (96) Derrida always interrupts Blanchot’s citations very arbitrarily, he is interested, like Blanchot, in logic of parts and partage

FSW p. 225 most interesting analogy of Mystic Pad is time, discontinuous time, time as spacing, withdrawal of perception, periodic non-excitability > interruption/restoration of contact

T p. xii “can one puncture the tympanum” of philosophy—its percussion (which amortizes impressions, typoi resonate)—a place of exteriority, alterity where one can still treat of philosophy?

——is there any ruse which will prevent philosophy from borrowing its categories from logos of other, affecting itself w/out delay [see POOF p. 1]

——philosophize w/ hammer, batter their ears, Dionysiansism, sound of tympani

p. xvii if tympanum is a limit, unhinge concept of limit > no limit in general, every limus, the limes, short cut, the oblique

PPHS p. 105 Hegel critiques mute writing, released from voice, thus he critiques mathematical symbolism, operations of formal understanding

——acc. Hegel, silence of writing, space of calculation, interrupts movement of Aufhebung, interiorization of past (Erinnerung), history of spirit

SH p. 6 “caesura is the law”: gathers in the discretion of the discontinuous, in the cutting in of relation to other, interruption of address as address itself

F p. xix le tiers incorporé est gardé pour être supprimé [held in to be crossed out]: assembly of witnesses around Wolf Man’s crypt (forum): whole strategy of testifying > on sy coupe tout le temps, witnesses testify by interrupting, wounded by angular edges of forum

FWT p. 83 revolution, interruption, radical caesura in ordinary course of History > revolution only event worthy of the name (all responsibility: revolutionary)

DS p. 236 “fiction,” “hymen,” “spacious” are caught in, while disrupting, ontological machine

P pp. 86-9 Kant’s beauty [wild tulip] requires absolute interruption: straining toward end w/out goal, not pure if cut can be bandaged (pansable), no pure cut (if it could be prolonged, completed, supplemented), no beauty > everything in it straining toward the bout (end, blow)

p. 98 isn’t the frame exactly what Kant means by free-wandering beauty? but, unlike frame, that which is beautiful tends towards meaning, a tension, vection, rection that must be absolutely interrupted [from concept, end] to liberate beauty [not stopgap of sublime, though]

POS p. 24 “I do not believe” in decisive ruptures, unequivocal “epistemological break[s]”, breaks are always reinscribed in old cloth that must be undone interminably

pp. 40-1 if there’s a definition of differance, it’s the limit, interruption, destruction of Hegel’s relève, wherever it is

***pp. 68-9 if one does not develop a systematic strategy of deconstruction, textual irruptions risk falling into excess, into empirical experiments, or into classical metaphysics > but certain risks must be run [re: problematic first re: his own writing on “history of philosophy”]

ROP p. 12 how can the cut be the tie itself? how can the link be the interruption?

GSP p. 165 genetic description of ego prescribes task of a universal genetic phenomenology (a eidos of historicity) for Husserl, this is not a series of ruptures, revolutions, that tear open a previous finitude to lay bear a hidden infinity, giving voice to dynamis of silence > the ruptures are always already indicated [Telos] [Derrida wonders if this a metaphysical affirmation in a phenemonology]

O p. 52 dissemination also explains itself, “the apparatus explains itself,” constitutes itself into a program (heterogeneity, absolute exteriority of seed), but one that is not formalizable, infinity of its code, sa rupture, not saturated w/ self-presence: “it is attached (tient), so to speak, to the incessant falling of a supplement to the code

RGE pp. 260-61 in doubling lordship (la maîtrise), sovereignty doesn’t remove itself from dialectics or its synthesis like an independent morsel (une pièce) > such an abstract negation would consolidate ontologics > sovereignty not simply a caesura or interruption but an opening, irruption: sovereignty inscribes dialectical synthesis, provides economy of reason w/ its unlimiting boundaries of non-sense, makes it function in sacrifice of meaning (du sens)

REST p. 261 interlacing of interruption points, a purely faked multiplicity [Derrida confessing about the multiple voices, the dialogue occurring in essay?], periods remain w/out destination, but they have authority in common [cf. ATM how do interruptions interlace?]

DST DST p. 201 secret: the w/out relation (sans-rapport) [compare to Lacan’s no sexual relation], the separation, the interruption

p. 202 imprint and caesura, sharp-edged signature (empreinte et césure, la signature aiguë), interrupts most powerful filiations > ineluctably: when tradition can’t secure what it repeats as its own traditionality (exemplarity, repetition, identification, imitation)

——signature interrupts, or rather marks w/ incision, the fold along which metaphysical ontomimetology is destined to divide, desist [ontomimetology in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, and more surreptitiously in Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan]

PF pp. xxi-xxii [re: Peggy Kamuf’s collection] invention: 1) discovery of what appeared already to be found there 2) making exist what’s not yet there: becomes public/readable at instant of irreplaceable signature that interrupts/displaces continuity of unveiling discovery

EJQB p. 67 God lets silence interrupt his voice and his signs, lets Tables be broken: letting us [Derrida identifying w/ Jews?] be interrogated

p. 71 God of classical philosophers had no need to write (never interrogated/interrupted himself)

——no signification w/out interruption

——if nature refuses the leap (saut), Scripture will never be nature: proceeds by leaps alone

——to write: courage to lose one’s life, to die away from nature

IW p. 247 coming of an event initiates irruption (volcano), rupture and hence interruption of totalizing synthesis

PJP p. 173 ultimate resource/fatality of the anacoluthon: multiplicity of times, instants, interruption time inscribes in “me” > the perjurer can always ask to be excused

p. 179 the suspension of metonymy, quotation, interruption, quasi anacoluthic change of subject > interruption in the obvious: shadow at heart of light

***p. 196 the “us” of the anacoluthon, not absolute knowledge, interrupts forever: no one says better, “we are not present to the truth of us” than the acolyte

——when we are present, truth’s not there; suivre/être [see ATIA]

p. 200 sacrifice of Isaac: sort of rupture w/ marriage, infidelity to Sarah [marriage as Christian madness]

+R p. 163 rigor/joyous severity of trait, petrifying (médusante) impassivity of line > disjunction works on any equality, unhinges, interrupts, truncates > “integrity in dispersion”

TN pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

p. 38 acc. Nancy, laughter as philosopher’s presence to himself, contact successfully interrupted gives pleasure of syncope, pleasure of which it is depriving itself

pp. 111-12 syncope, interruption in contact, a history of never touching touch

pp. 113-14 interruption of auto-affection of mouth imparts speech [?]

p. 131 to continually tell a story, start again, stems (tient) from impossible alliance of contact & syncope

pp. 162-63 for Husserl, fingers that touch (not signal, not show) deem contact the experience of presence, which is full, immediate, direct (Nancy’s syncope interrupts)

p. 284 this other heart that self touches you, gives pleasure where pleasure’s made more intense by not returning to me, diastole w/out systole > the ecstatic & haptical sans of “sans revenir à soi

——you beat the heart, you interrupt circulation

ATM p. 154 [vis-à-vis Levinas] interdictory language is interdicted but continues speaking, can’t help itself, can only continue strangely interrupting itself > essential function of a quotation: quoting the uncitable accuses language, (sur)rendered to a gift language can’t open up on its own

pp. 155-56 Levinas negotiates his negotiation w/ the unnegotiable in a way where he negotiates the negotiation (he reties the thread, weaves his interruptions of the same), to give the other a chance [Derrida refers to a double negation here], reprend dans sa toile lhistoire de toutes ses ruptures

——interruptive breakthrough occurs, ineluctable au moment même when Levinas’ philosophical récit claims to reappropriate the tear (déchirure) w/in the continuum of its (sa) texture

p. 157 Levinas’ “en ce moment même” [of reappropriation] obligated by the second “en ce moment même” [of interruption] > forms a text w/ its own tear (déchirure), this “series” does not enclose the Other but opens itself up from out of irreducible difference—before any present moment

p. 162 no tear (déchirure) possible in Levinas’ text w/out a certain notching (échancrure) of the 2nd moment, and certain contamination btwn the 2 > he likes the tear he detests contamination

pp. 163-64 for Levinas, interruption puts an end to the authority of the Said, the thematical, dialectical, the same, the economical

——Levinas describes how the enveloping continuum or tissue of the State, the dialectic, etc., preserves itself by cutting out interruptions and retying/maintaining itself in suppressing them: Levinas reties cut threads (not continuous ones): this is the trace of his diachrony, trace of discontinuity

pp. 164-65 if the State leaves a trace of interruptions too, how does Levinas’ tracing of them differ? it ties together interruptions btwn threads [i.e. doesn’t tie threads], a series out of series (hors-série) > series: hiatus must insist

——Levinas obligates w/out constraint, by way of nonphenomenality, to read the trace as trace, interruption as interruption (i.e. acc. as such no longer reappropriable as phenomenon of essence)

——since interruption is not a cut but logic of ab-solute de-stricturation, since it is reappropriable: to insist on the hiatus, the series is necessary > series has no single knot, but knots a multiplicity of retied knots (noeuds re-noués)

——opening of interruption is never pure

pp. 166-67 [Derrida wonders about the risk of Levinas’ obligated negotiation, what he calls an inevitable “concession”: to stricture interruptions, contaminate, interrupt them]

p. 167 for Levinas, in search of God uncontaminated by Being, contact is a priori contamination > graver yet: risk of contamination that surfaces before contact, in necessity of tying interruptions together (insistence of ruptures)

pp. 167-68 no edges in this interruptive series, in this incomparable stricture, but tapering points (establishing continuity at a distance [?]) > binding & unbinding, the lace (lacet) of obligation is in place (not a trap): an ob-ligation that un-binds, opens up religion in this very unbinding

——interruptions unbound “together,” in the “same” sériature, in dia-synchrony, a serial one time of “several times” that took place only once

pp. 174-75 for Levinas, to make passage to other, there can’t be an absolute erasure, withdrawal must appear, “He,” only there in seriasure, a series of hiatuses (mouth agape), enlaced erasures

p. 179 the retrait Levinas re-marks is not unique, though it remarks the unique, its seriasure is unique > not his signature but his seriasure

pp. 187-88 “je donne, je joue lingratitude contre jalousie,” if God is exempt from jealousy (no desire for possession) must he not guard this exemption jealously, and in so doing lose himself? > ellipse de jalousie: le sans-jalousie se garde jalousement, autrement dit se perd, se-garde-se-perd: plus de jalousie [seriasure always a jealous, series of traits & retraits, beyond the face]

AD p. 9 if relation to other is an infinite separation, death comes to hollow out (creuser) even more infinitely this separation: interruption déchirante (rending) au coeur de linterruption même?

p. 52 interruption se produit, se décide—in name of ethics

p. 118 hiatus ensures that analysis encounters dissociation in structure of arguments, heterogeneity: text knows how to interrupt itself

p. 136n law of substitution, from substitution as law: the 3rd interrupts (distances) w/out interrupting (distancing)

INTERVIEW

POS p. 55 offers a traveler’s impression

INVAGINATE (INVAGINATION)

GT p. 81 question of the “come” of the “come back” will invaginate, efface, all borders, will redouble endlessly ambivalence of gift as good or bad, gift or poison (Gift-gift)

pp. 134-35 social function of beggar, madman: “the pocket of an indispensable internal exclusion,” like structure of pharmakos, incorporation w/out introjection (assimilation), an identity by exclusion, keeps outside w/in, lexception faite (fors) dune clôture ou dun clivage intérieur

LOBL p. 97 possible from “first trace” on, which is why there is no first trace: the outside opens a pocket [cf. F p. xix crypt: pocket of resistance]

p. 100 “crisscross double invagination,” chiasma btwn double invagination possible because of iterability of the mark (folds coming from both borders)

pp. 100-01 double invagination constitutes story of stories, narrative of deconstruction in deconstruction: apparently outer edge of a clôture, makes no sign beyond itself, toward tout autre, w/out becoming dual, being “represented,” refolded, re-marked w/in the clôture > what the structure produces as an effect of interiority, this structure-effect is being deconstructed

p. 102 structure of invagination exposes precariousness of effects of “genre,” “mode, “corpus,” all historical fictions that certify its carte didentité

p. 118 infinite violence [of what’s strictly called] “double bind,” double invagination, double obligation, double demand > sans arrêt and arrêt de mort, no reconciliation

p. 128 all interdictions of pas, its double bind and invagination, make it possible to read the unreadability of impossible event, (the after-life of resurrection) of this “news”

***pp. ~137-38 no paradigmatic text, only cryptic haunting from mark to mark, no piece, no metonymy, no integral corpus, thus no fetishism

——double invagination, through labor of translation, can be brought to bear on gaine in Glas

p. 142 Blanchot’s narrative held together w/ invisible hinge, double inner edge (bord)

p. 162 “come”: single word, yet intertwined in series, inscribes its own effacement in middle of and on invaginated boundaries of récit, of these crypts, death or bridal chambers, hymen brings alliance & separation [after theft of key]

POR p. 19 (154) invagination of internal pocket: empty place for chance (for great and precious freedom of play) [re: time of reflection on university]

POOF p. 32 every instant begins at the end, address carries in its readability the signature of the addressee: it withdraws from space by penetrating it

DS p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text > le pli (se) plie: son sens sespace dune double marque, au creux de laquelle un blanc se plie

P pp. 70-1 Derrida exposes footnotes, parentheses and imported frames (something of understanding in judgment) as invagination (pocket in main text) [Kant forced things, not Derrida?]

ROP p. 30 double bind at work on examples of all undecidable figures (hymen, pharmakon…), carry predicates incompatible btwn themselves, in their very btwn, interlacing, sumplukē, chiasmatic invagination > but each one, in its sumplukē, makes up a single trace [?]

p. 69 what happens when you apply chiasmatic invagination of borders to analysis? to its phallogocentrism (mastery)? > can psychoanalysis belong to anyone, anymore?

OTO pp. 35-6 the umbilicus has you by the ear, the ear is “taking notes,” the master a mouth (ear, mouth: both invaginated, involuted orifices) > the umbilical cord of State (dead father, cold monster) education, like a leash, commands us to write—that’s uncanny

WAP p. 36 figure of fold, explicitation, complication, often imposes itself on us > not incompatible w/ circular band or invagination [re: right to teaching assumes knowledge/teaching of right][cf. 197n “chiasmatic invagination of borders”]

REST p. 339 for Heidegger, the picture is doubly useless, depicts, “shows,” being-products that’re out-of-service, w/out use-value > multiple edge(s) (bordures) detach being-product from subjective scope (portée subjective), simultaneously baiting (inducing/luring) reattachment of subjective scope

——edge (bordure) less simple when turned inside out [invaginated?], not simple at all w/ the lace & the hemmed holes (trous bordés), the eyelets comme lieu de passage [figure of decapitation here too]

***RM p. 57 closure is not a circular limit (bordering homogenous field), but a more twisted (plus retorse) structure, another figure: “invaginated”

——representation of a linear & circular closure surrounding a homogenous space is a self-representation of philosophy in its onto-encyclopedic logic

p. 66 re-trait of metaphor > gives rise to an abyssal generalization of metaphor > trait has internal multiplicity, la structure pliée-repliée dun re-trait > opens out the borders or invaginates them

p. 67 withdrawal of Being donne lieu to metaphysics, ontotheology, producing concept of metaphor, producing/calling itself in a quasi-metaphorical manner

——word re-trait designates quasi-catachrestic violence, abuse I impose on language, hopefully justified by necessity of good, economic formalization

——re-trait as chiasmatic invagination of borders [?]

HST p. 364 border btwn ethical/political no longer insured: the 3rd (le tiers) gives birth to justice & finally state, 3rd announces himself in duel of the face-to-face, & the face: the beyond the state (condition of ethics) had to produce itself in the state

——this is a topological invagination: “outside produce[s] an enclave in the inside of the inside”

AD pp. 76, 80 Levinas’ “beyond-in (au-delà-dans)” of State of David [?], a sort of enclave inside and outside of itself, participates in politics while going beyond it > [deconstructive invagination]

——transcendence in immanence, the door as the bearing (porte que porte)

LG pp. 227-28 trait that marks membership (lappartenance) divides > boundary (bordure) of set comes to form by invagination—an internal pocket larger than the whole

——consequences of this division & overflowing (débordement) as singular as they are limitless (quillimitables)

p. 235 edge (bord), borderline (ligne de bordure), overflowing (débordement) do not arise w/out a fold—which figure of folding? [the answer: double chiasmatic invagination]

p. 236 in Blanchot’s La folie du jour, one reads (sees w/out seeing) the crumbling (effondrement) of the upper edge, initial edge, the one regulated by common law [as first line] > forms a pocket inside corpus, invagination: trait of first line, borderline, splits while remaining the same—traverses the corpus it bounds

p. 237 there is only content w/out edge, w/out boundary, w/out frame, there is only edge w/out content: interminable inocclusive invagination (inenarrable, unarrestable, insatiable) > terrible for those who require order in the name of the law

——a lower edge of invagination intersects invagination of upper edge: trait splits again into an internal & external edge

p. 238 une autre bouche ou une autre boucle invaginante—double chiasmatic invagination of edges

p. 239 [all this due to Blanchot’s layering play w/ récit (recite, story, true account)] the other enunciates a decision: tears the toile (canvas, web) of a text as it envelops itself indefinitely in itself

p. 242 récit of a récit w/out récit, whose visible space is but some border of itself w/out “self”: framing edge w/out content, w/out modal or generic boundaries: law of this textual event

——degenerescent self-engendering of a récit

p. 243 double chiasmatic invagination of edges excludes pure form, question of literary genre is not a formal one: covers motif of law in general of generation in the natural and symbolic sense

EU p. 106 Kant’s strict separation of knowledge (truth) & power (action) distinguishes sets in excess of themselves, covering the whole of which they’re supposed to be only a part > whole forms poche invaginée in every part or subset (sous-ensemble): intestine division, folding partition inside space

pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

——provocation to think brings together in same instant desire for memory & exposure to future

SPEC pp. 390-91 resolution, solution [of Freud’s argument?]: band closer, mount tension until released [these are Freud’s schemas] > relating what Freud says to what he does (writing’s démarche, its performance), interlacings can no longer be undone, can’t be closed or opened—trait divided [see p. 391n double chiasmatic invagination of borders]: there can be no accounting, reckoning

CHOR p. 105 “hymen,” “invagination,” part of Derrida’s attempt to re-sexualize philosophical/theoretical discourse, but these terms no longer simply designate figures of feminine body: what remains undecidable concerns [but not only] line of cleavage btwn 2 sexes

p. 106 hymen does not exist, anything constituting value of existence is foreign to “hymen,” so how could one then attribute existence of hymen properly to woman? (same goes for invagination)

pp. 106, 465n invagination is always taken w/in syntax of expression “double chiasmatic invagination of borders,” doubly folded, redoubled, inversed: can we still recognize “representation of woman” in this movement?

——questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

INVENTION

MONL p. 31 surging wave [déferlment déchainé] of anamnesia that the double interdict unleashed > invent one’s language and “I” at the same time

p. 55 one would have to invent oneself

p. 64 prosthesis of origin: prior-to-the-first time of pre-originary language must be invented

p. 87 “to-come” gestures toward invention, invention not of the event but through it

FK pp. 48-9 figures of radical evil not simply figures; the whole evil: always inventing a new evil

OH p. 41 only possible invention—impossible one

FWT p. 6 to invent one’s name, sign otherwise, in the name of the name passed down, if that’s possible

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

WM pp. 242-43 sun in Plato’s Republic (VI-VII); strangely, Aristotle discusses the power of metaphors when a missing term must be invented > i.e. sun cast forth flame,“sowing around a god-created flame”; Derrida wonders if this is more an “enigma,” secret narrative, asyndeton, than a metaphor

ATIA pp. 64-5 Derrida invented the perverse game of homonymy re: suis (follow, am) because he thought he had, and he didn’t remember encountering it [Sagi]

PIO p. 1 invention (new, original, unique) breaks w/ rhetoric of modesty (convention, etiquette, contract) > w/ all conditions of social interaction

——invention always presupposes some illegality, a breaking of the contract

p. 2 for Cicero, invention vs. disposition: invention finds or discovers, concerns ideas; disposition places, arranges, locates, concerns words & things > this is, acc. Derrida, traditional philosophical topos, (see de Man’s “Pascal’s Allegory of Persuasion”)

p. 3 “is the invention of the other an allegory, a myth, a fable?”

——btwn 17th-19th centuries, in the positive notion of rights, only form & composition display invention/originality—not content, “things,” thematics or meaning

——[17th-19th centuries?] ideas not invented, they are universal, belong to everyone, thus ideas could not ground a property right

p. 4 vis (inventive power)

——Cicero opens his text on invention w/ question of the son as a question de ratione dicendi > scene of traditio, tradition, transfer, an allegory of metaphor

——does the child (son) invent himself specularly though parent’s narcissism > or is he an absolute invention (this being the truest response to parent’s desire): where truth is thought beyond any inheritance?

——Derrida’s discourse on invention, not inventive through & through: must sign exploiting rule-governed resources > all comes down to that signed innovation

p. 5 to reinvent invention: required countersignature must be that of an other, a son no longer father’s invention, son must recognize invention as such, as if the heir were the sole judge, the legitimating authority > invention can never be private (can’t be countersigned by family)

——invention is not natural, though often related to origin, genius, generation > thus question of son, signature & name

***pp. 5-6 no invention w/out advent, singular structure of event, makes come about what is new in a “first time ever,” [cf. première fois] inauguration of a possibility/power at disposal of everyone, thus conventions, belonging to a culture (heritage, pedagogical institution, discipline)

——invention begins by being susceptible to repetition, exploitation, reinscription

p. 6 enigmatic collusion of invenire, inventio, event, advent, lavenir, adventure, convention

p. 7 singularity of event that produces itself by speaking about itself [Derrida’s essay], invents on subject of invention, bringing it about—while also describing generality of its genre, genealogy of its topos, sustaining tradition de inventione

——recent discourse on invention seeks both recognition for general truth value on subject, and, du même coup, for the “operative value of a technical apparatus henceforth available to all”

pp. 7, 411-12n Bach’s Inventions not merely didactic techniques

p. 412n what happens when eurēma [Eureka] translated as inventio?

p. 10 since 17th century in Europe, 2 authorized examples of invention: stories (fictional or fabulous) or machines

——an alibi as an invention (by fabulation) > no corresponding reality outside narrative

——invent by producing new operational possibility (printing or nuclear weaponry) > politics of invention à la fois politics of culture & war

——grasp unity of 2 measures of invention: 1) fabula/fictio: art 2) tekhnē, epistemē, istoria, methodos, art, know-how, procedure, knowledge, research

p. 12 inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

p. 13 event (also loeuvre) calls for new statutes/conventions that could record, account for, such events (neither speech act theory nor literary theory [formalist or hermeneutic variety] can account for such event)

***p. 15 deconstruction is impossible, possibility is danger of rule-governed procedures

——experience of the other as invention of the impossible (only possible invention)

——double blow of “Fable” is its invention > gives itself, by itself, a patent of invention

p. 20 is the psyche an invention?

pp. 20-1 “Fable” has status of invention, from double position of author/reader, signatory/countersignatory, insofar as it proposes a machine, tekhnē, a self-quoting invention, a printing matrix > process w/out beginning or end, an exergue as impossible as it is necessary

pp. 21-2 shouldn’t an inaugural invention deny/overflow environment of reception (which shouldn’t be able to welcome an authentic invention)? thus producing a disordering mechanism for every status assignable to it? isn’t an invention spontaneously deconstructive?

pp. 22-3 why this new desire for “invention” (not creation, institution, etc.)? that worn-out (usé), classical word? desire for invention dreams of inventing a new desire, still contemporary w/ a certain weariness, exhaustion, but also accompanies a desire for deconstruction (lifting [lever] contradiction that might exist btwn invention/deconstruction)

p. 23 deconstruction is inventive or nothing at all, marches ahead, marks a trail, opens passage, doesn't settle for methodical procedures: produces rules, other conventions, new performatives

——its process (démarche) involves an affirmation linked to invention, but it can only do so by deconstructing conceptual/institutional structure, as if it were necessary to reinvent the future

——institutional structure of invention requires [?] neutralizing stamp of reason [verb used here: arraisonner]

pp. 23-5 when invention means discovering something for first time—not creation ex nihilo (gods/animals don’t invent)

——invention only by recourse to lexicon, syntactical rules, prevailing code—a certain submission to conventions (a given configuration)

——the double, indivisible movement of invention: gives place (donne lieu) to an event and produces a machine by introducing a gap (écart) in habit; the “coming,” the venire, the event of novelty must surprise: no status ready/waiting to reduce it to the same

——coming about (survenue) of the new always due to operation of human subject, invention always belongs to man as inventing subject, techno-epistemo-anthropocentric > invention’s value inscribed in structures that bind technical order w/ metaphysical humanism (differentially)

——Derrida links tekhnē/fabula and historia/epistemē > man defined by human subject’s aptitude for invention: 1) narrative fiction, historical fabulation 2) technical or technnoepistemic innovation

p. 25 the invention must create the statutory conditions not only to be recognized, legitimized, institutionalized, but also to occur, to come about (survenir)

——how can we sort out the conditions that made an invention possible if the invention modifies structure of context itself?

p. 26 “statute”: stance, stays erect, it’s essentially institutional, defines while prescribing, stable, order, supposes a group (like invention, it’s only human, not animal/theological)

p. 415n Kant: talent for inventing things is called genius, unlike mere imitators, the inventor’s work is exemplary, it serves as a model (Beispeil) (exemplar) to be imitated

pp. 27-8 status of invention via politics of patent, programming of patented inventions (even integrating margin of chance)—are programmed inventions still inventions? still open to future?

p. 28 status of invention: an originality made available (disponible) to everyone

pp. 28-9 the invention conceived as discovery is a reduction of producere > invention as unveiling (not creating) for the first time, respects creationist theology, the inventor can never bring something into existence, that’s God’s work (God invented the laws but not the world [?])

pp. 29-30 if one draws a [historical] dividing line btwn use of word “invention,” must do so w/in great/fundamental reference to human tekhnē, this mythopoetic power that associates fable w/ historical, epistemic narrative [Foucault +/–]

——circa 17-century (btwn Descartes & Leibniz), invention becomes technoscientific, production of independent, self-reproductive recurrence, capable of reiterative simulation, a dispositif

pp. 31-2 a fold or joint, dividing line, separates 2 competing meanings of invention, not empirical or historico-chronological rift: 1) place found where located (unveiling, discovery), invention of truth, the cross (pre-17th century) 2) inventor gives place, upon finding it, invention of printing, tekhnē (post-17th century) [Foucault-like w/ added folded: 2nd still modeled on 1st]

p. 32 the 2nd notion of invention [dispositif] haunts & thus magnetizes the 1st [unveil what’s there] > this haunting at heart of question re: modern tekhnē

pp. 33-4 method of invention (discover places) vs. method of doctrine (dispose oneself in place)

——invention’s “first time”: inaugural event and iterability > thus, no invention w/out status, w/out introduction or promise of publicity; iterability marked, remarked, at origin of invention, elle y forme une poche du premier instant: retroverted anticipation

——to invent is to produce iterability & the machine for reproduction/simulation

***p. 36 universality (ideal objectivity, unlimited recurrence) in invention blurs signature of invention: name of individual (singular empirical entity) is associated w/ invention in inessential, extrinsic, accidental, aleatory way > this gives rise to enormous problem of property rights

p. 37 juridical mechanisms re: patenting inventions are also inventions

——Convention of Paris 1883: artist invents what cannot incur industrial exploitation

——Leibniz, modern politics of invention: master the aleatory

pp. 38-9 for Leibniz, inventor shouldn’t fall upon truth by chance, he must know chance, anticipate it, grasp it: this preserves/nullifies chance (cf. governmental policies)

p. 39 invention of tout autre beyond possible status, still invention because one prepares to let the other come > deconstruction is that which gets ready for the coming of the other (deconstructs this double genitive) > to invent: to “know” how to say “come” and answer “come” of other

p. 416n to call all invention that of mark/trace (rather than language), btwn culture & nature: man/animal opposition [cf. Bergson on p. 418n] no longer accredited, privileges the postal, movement of envoi, differance

p. 42 Schelling first to say philosophical invention is ars inveniendi

pp. 42-3 Schelling’s invention, re: philosopher as an inventor of forms, still limited as invention of the same in guise of supplement of invention: man’s invention supplements God’s ideality: man as psyche of God, as supplying the lack in his revelation

——here, invention caught in infinite amortization, rationalistic humanism, carries out God’s program; human invention as desire of/for God

p. 418n aleatory event of tout autre, beyond the incalculable as a still possible calculus [p. 45], et ne peut advenir que pour un être fini [only happens to a finite being]: la chance même de la finitude > what happens thus (échoit ainsi) is how finitude invents and appears to itself

pp. 43-4 invention, invenire (advent of future-to-come) comes back to the same as soon as it receives a status legitimized by an institution: what is being invented are institutions > for this to happen invention must be possible: this statutory economy of public invention does not break the psyché, does not go beyond the mirror

pp. 44-5 “our current lassitude results from the invention of the same & the possible, from the invention that is always possible”

p. 45 other as the uninvented, in invention, must let other come, not make the other: deconstructive invention as opening, uncloseting, destabilizing foreclusionary structures

——beyond the possible invention, invention of the other that would come while miming/repeating economy of same

——to invent the other is impossible, thus it’s the only invention: the invention that invents us

p. 46 invention is not only performative, unsettles conditions of performative

——power of closure ensured by economy of the same, not to be rejected, criticized, combatted > economic circle of invention reappropriates what it sets in motion, the differance of the other (which can’t be reduced to meaning, truth, existence)

——sole concern of invention of the other (the coming of invention): allow adventure or event of tout autre to come > future-to-come

p. 418n if there’s still no invention w/out genius, or brilliant flash of Witz, the generosity must no longer respond to principle of savings (dépargne), to a restricted economy of differance

PF pp. xxi-xxii [re: Peggy Kamuf’s collection] invention: 1) discovery of what appeared already to be found there 2) making exist what’s not yet there: becomes public/readable at instant of irreplaceable signature that interrupts/displaces continuity of unveiling discovery

TR p. 104 invention of Christ’s Body is an event, even though it’s a discovery of what’s already there

AFR p. 43 how can Locke carve out a trail while repeating an earlier rupture? he applied a general law to particular domain

——by preceding analogically, he discovered an unknown > invention by analogy (or analysis): new “objects” created by transposing, proportioning, analyzing

p. 61 invention of a new science: “new combinations” exist (new science at once example and discovery of this) > generative or combinative model (separately) insufficient

p. 73 innovation as revelation, analysis as analogical process, energy connecting present to absent > concept of force as force of repetition (retracing, supplying)

——Derrida sees here a silent explosion in text or fission in each concept (Condillac, elsewhere, denounces obscurantist force of “metaphor” [hence analogical value])

pp. 82-3 Condillac: men of genius, favorite disciples of nature, make language seem less arbitrary—method of invention is only analogy itself (analogy: art of reasoning & speaking)

——that math can be a model for analogy: unlimited generality of principle of analogy

p. 85 ensemble of rules, method: so to repeat science & multiply discoveries

pp. 126-27 Condillac against frivolous obscurantism, erudition, against philosophers (inventors of prose) who did not “witness[ ]…impressions they caused” (unlike poets, orators), nor did they find rule of their discourse in “live interchange” > frivolous style is that of the written

PJP p. 168 “invention” hesitates undecidably btwn creative and revelatory invention > perhaps btwn fiction/truth, lying/veracity, perjury/fidelity

IPSEITY

MONL p. 1 monolingualism creates my solitude, my ipseity.

p. 14 ipseity: before “I” the “I can” [semantic chain: hospes, hostis, hosti-pet, posis, potest…]

pp. 22-3 monolingual solipsism never belonging, never property, power of mastery, never pure “ipseity” (hospitality or hostility)

p. 61 desire is borne by the arrival itself, before ipseity (I-me)

R pp. 14-15 how can we reconcile the turning unity, autos = ipse, the One, the homogeneity of democracy with its heterogeneity, dissymmetry, disseminating multiplicity

p. 17 democratic sovereignty replaces theogonic politics with something just as phallocentric, phallo-paterno-filio-fraterno-ipsocentric (ipsocratic, though tautological, because ipseity already implies force)

pp. 44-5 in The Experience of Freedom, Nancy puts to use Heidegger’s Jemeinigkeit, as singularity of time, each time, as other time, also “ipseity of singularity”; Derrida has concerns this risks saving the “I can” of voluntary-conscious-intentional-deciding-I-myself, while acknowledging that Nancy divides it, ruins it, w/ interval or trace of a spacing [see p. 51]

***p. 55 the unconscious remains the most vital reserve of the self-destructive conservation of the “subject” or of egological ipseity; without autoimmunity, no sadism, masochism, consciousness, death drive

p. 90 no democracy w/out deconstruction (and reverse): democracy is the autos [ipse] of deconstructive self-delimitation

H p. 53 I want to be master of my house, ipse, to receive whoever I like there

VM p. 109 w/out using these terms, Levinas warns against confusing idem (same) w/ ipse (ego), identity w/ ipseity > this happens immediately w/ Greek and German: autos, selbst

p. 128 preethical, transcendental violence institutes relationship btwn 2 finite ipseities

SW p. 343 ipse: the power itself, the law, law of father, of son, brother, laws of hospitality (hosti-pet-s, hospes, posis, despotes, utpote, “the mysterious -pse of ipse,” says Benveniste, naively astonished)

HLP p. 67 classical lying: liar knows the truth, knows he is lying, the self excludes the self-lie (the other is other enough, an enemy to be deceived in his belief)

——unless we think the other w/in oneself, an ipseity more originary than ego, a divisible ipseity, oneself as enemy

BSi pp. 29-30 ipseity: king, father, husband, master

p. 66 sovereign: he, himself, ipse; beast: she, tamed (mastered) > suspension of pendulum is double

——potsedere (possess), potest, possum (power, “I can”) > ipse (self & power) > Benveniste thinks etymological shift from power (despotēs) to himself (ipse) enfeebles, not Derrida

p. 67 master-self, sovereignty (positionality of self: thesis), ipsissimus (the absolutely himself)

——sovereignty, in minimal, strict sense, always a moment of dictatorship: a performative verdict, a Diktat, has no account to render other than to itself (ipse)

p. 68 Benveniste: dem-pot(i)-[skr.], “master of house,” power of oneself [ipse as sovereignty]

pp. 70-1 international rights & crimes against humanity invoke a sovereignty of man himself (ipse, ipsissimus) above/beyond/before Nation-State sovereignty (Schmitt sees this as Entpolitisierung, humanity not a political concept)

p. 264 for Heidegger, in the questioning essence of man, man comes to himself as “who” not “what” (ipseity [Selbst] before any “I,” individual, we or community)

p. 270 sovereignty of self-present ipseity, only man can say “I”—autodeictic (Kant, Heidegger, Descartes)

p. 283 zoos profitable to knowledge and economy [physiocratic theory of economy]

——nomos of oikos: taming, training, the domus of the dominus > oikonomia also general condition of ipseity as sovereign mastery over beast

IRIGARAY

KH p. 108 belonging authorizes truth of logos, political effectivity

***p. 126 because philosophy can’t speak truly of that which looks like the mother, it speaks only of father/son, as if father engendered son all its own

GOD p. 13 Patoçka: Plato’s novel idea is will to leave womb of Earth Mother, follow path of “pure light,” subordinate (podřídit) orgiastic entirely to responsibility

p. 76 does system of sacrificial responsibility & double “gift of death” require exclusion (sacrifice) of woman? [re: absence of women in Isaac & Abraham story and “Bartleby the Scrivener”]

p. 91 angel, postman, prophet, intermediary by which I hear God

p. 145 woman spectacularly absent from scenes of forgiveness btwn father & son

GT p. 12 gift can’t be content with giving to itself (se donner)?

p. 153 two-to-speak: secret of literature & secret of counterfeit money

LOBL pp. 153-54 letting trace involve or commit me in linguistic expropriation, do I break w/ maternal, mother tongue or w/ paternal law that kept me from mother?

SPOM p. 171 [for Marx, spectrality of everything, that of fathers, sons, brothers? no memory of dead mother!]

HERP p. 183 correspondence—going & coming

MSUB J p. 164 subjectile: consistency of the btwn itself

PP p. 126 (144) pharmakon is aneidetic, no ideal identity, not simple not composite but difference btwn eidos and its other

pp. 142-43 (164-65) in the pharmaceutical enclosure, an artful living organization of figures, it is all about father/son, legitimacy of inheritance, sperm, no mother

p. 152 (175) pharmakon is liquid (opposites pass more easily btwn each other), water [see Laws on protecting water], everything in sperm which overflows wastefully (se dépense sans réserve) [living speech: non-diverted seminal potency]

VM p. 91 acc. Levinas, renounce the other is to enclose oneself in bad solitude of self-identity, to repress ethical transcendence

p. 113 langage, fils de la terre et du soleil: écriture > one could never come across a language w/out rupture of space, no aerial or aquatic language, in which alterity would be more lost than ever > structure of inside-outside/day-night has no meaning in pure space [proscribed words], inhabits conceptuality itself

p. 139 Nietzsche and Renan reduce Heidegger’s Being to a metaphor by referring to its etymological association w/ respiration

PAS PAS p. (23) For Derrida laller-et-venir part of strange advance of viens (event, affirmation)

p. (25) tel va-et-vien nes pas une circulation spéculaire

pp. (48-9) event, going-to-come rather than a coming-and-going (aller-venir plutôt que va-et-vient)

VP p. 68 is there another auto-affection as pure as speech? [Irigaray’s 2 lips]

S p. 77 [Irigaray’s no air to breathe] Derrida on spirit’s link to pneuma > might just make das Wehen (the breath, the sigh) breathless, the breathless-making “spiration” of spirit

DS p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

p. 259n lèvreslivre

ATIA pp. 82-3 animal judged as automaton, as spectacle, before specular subject—who doesn’t want to find himself reflected in image of animal

pp. 86-7 properly phenomenological logic of “I am” means there is only “I think” > breath, life are secondary: “I breathe, therefore I am” concludes nothing > indubitability of existence depends on thought (not being-in-life)

O p. 40 ontospeleology, another name for mimetology, is not mimesis, an enigma of redoubtable power, but an interpretation of mimesis that misapprehends/distorts logic of double [cf. p. 36]

D p. 312 Soller’s open square: open side, air, mirror, veil

p. 314 not enough to make air itself appear (call presence to mind), “air” is not a simple medium: opening carved out of it is a closed opening, false exit: a mirror—not any mirror, the tain of…

——once ether (presence of present) has been called to mind: plupresent not merely presence but deformation irreducible to any form (presence, first matter in the last instance)

p. 346 before being milieu of work/production, as a breakthrough, air is “air”: a “quotation,” empty medium of text as generalized quotation

——outside “illusion” of originary presence, never anything but overdetermination

p. 347 air as seeds

TN p. 332n [Derrida quotes Irigaray on caress]

pp. 164, 347-48n [footnoting Irigaray] finger/hand not only “auto-affecting” body part

SPEC pp. 316-17 curtains, veils, “skirt” of bed, hymen of fort:da, edge of bed (lit) [of reading?], va-et-vient, there would’ve been a hymen even w/out curtains > veil of this “skirt” is interest of bed (lit) and fort:da of all these generations

——[Derrida clearly explains the difference btwn fort/da and fort:da] “skirt” of bed, which hides the bars, forms inner chamber of fort/da, double screen which divides w/in itself—but dividing only by reassembling it w/ itself, sticking (piquant) to itself doubly, fort:da

p. 327 [re: Ernst’s fort/da] double sending away (renvoi): whether father required to stay or go, mother is desired: “exclusive possession” [Freud & Ernst distance themselves from name of father, for Freud it is the name of the son-in-law]

——mother (woman) easier to possess/preserve when dead [?]—jealousy appeased

FV pp. 465-66 [in Purloined Letter] Queen wishes to play on 2 contracts [must be read elsewhere?]: Queen’s desire to retain (garder) or refind the letter doubles her pact w/ the King

IRONY

MPM p. 63 irony of using another signature to talk about yourself

——this allegorical story of signature includes theme of “Lazarus, arise!” a “ghost” story, resurrection

pp. 81-2 for de Man, allegory (narrative) and irony (momentary & pointed, instantanéiste) are both figures of ghostly disjunction, duplication, doubling > together they form the rhetoric of memory, forgetting, recalling anteriority

pp. 82-3 for de Man, allegory (feigns storytelling) is diachronic (ideal time, never here or now) & irony (feigns amnesia) is synchronic (forgetting, no prefigurative duration) > neither has a past anterior

p. 96 via de Man, Heidegger rarely laughs and would probably be against irony as a pose of subjective mastery, never feels the exhilaration of a promise

p. 145 promise prohibits the gathering of Being in presence (as its condition), the condition of the possibility and impossibility of eschatology, ironic allegory of messianism

pp. 152-53n when de Man equates absolute irony w/ consciousness of madness, end of consciousness, he protects irony from its German-Romantic determination [as mastery]

——via de Man’s “irony is unrelieved vertige,” never stop turning, madness because it has no reason to stop, because reason is tropic

***R p. 91 “to” of “to-come” wavers btwn: imperative injunction (call or performative) and patient perhaps of messiancity (nonperformative exposure)

——the two haunt each other, are each other’s alibis, withdrawing into the secret of irony, of which democracy gives the right: to fiction and literature

***KH p. 119 btwn text & theme, structure w/out an indivisible origin > theater of irony, w/out end, w/out bottom [abyss]; to isolate a theme, “philosophy-of-Plato,” would be to violently misrecognize, deny textual scene, questions of topology in general

PP p. 93 mimicry of Thoth prevents dialectics, an ironic doubling preventing fulfillment or eschatological reappropriation, he is never present, he invented play, his propriety is impropriety

p. 119 (136) Socratic irony doesn’t bring pharmakon in contact with transparent logos, but reverses its powers, retourne la surface, reveals impropriety of pharmakon, that it can always turn against itself

PIO pp. 12-3 for de Man, irony is structure of instant: “climaxes in…single brief moment of a final pointe” (“a synchronic structure”); allegory (other face of irony) unfolds in diachronic of narrative

pp. 16-7 de Man: unreachable anteriority of allegory, allegory & irony [?], their inauthenticity, distance from totality > they are linked in temporal predicament, the same temporal void

p. 19 Schlegel: irony is “permanent parabasis”

EJQB p. 68 Schelling: question of “the irony of God” [always turned in on itself]

PJP p. 166 more than 1 voice in 1 voice, dispersion, threatens concept of perjury, threatens identity, threatens concept “I”; Schlegel’s “permanent parabasis of irony”

p. 167 essential finitude of discontinuous anamnesis inscribes ellipses/eclipses in identity of subject

——undecided btwn provocative irony, disarming sincerity: one responds both responsibly & irresponsibly

ATAP p. 90 distinguishing deconstruction from simple progressive demystification [à la style of Lumières]? or why has deconstruction taken on an apocalyptic tone, multiplied distinctions btwn closure & end? I intended to analyze a genre rather than practice it, an ironic non-belonging

ISLAMIC WORLD

R pp. 28-29 Islam, or certain Islam, only regimes that do not present themselves as democratic

pp. 30-1 [re: Islam and West] task 1: hermeneutic discovery of the anti-democratic in the Koran; task 2: political discovery of how democracy can be read into the Koran

——Islam represents only religious culture resists the European process of secularization and politicization

pp. 31-2 absence of Aristotle’s Politics in Arab philosophical corpus—symptomatic? privilege given instead to Platonic philosopher king

***p. 33 [re: Algeria] immunize against suicide of democracy by committing the suicide (value of this strategy can neither be confirmed nor refuted)

p. 40 September 11th

p. 58 Christian & Islamic privileging figure of brother in ethics, law, politics [calls for a deconstruction of Christianity]

pp. 95-107 [section heading] “(No) More Rogue States” (terrorism a flawed description)

FK pp. 5-6n [in Anidjar’s introduction] Hegel on Islam, no nationalism like Judaism [?] (lacks particularity); Islam has a universalism, Judaism doesn’t > Christianity has both

p. 46 Islam is not Islamism, latter operates in name of former > thus, question of the name

p. 51 via Kant’s “formal rigor,” a law that programs an infinite spiral of outbidding; today both “fundamentalisms” & “integrisms” hyperbolize this outbidding

p. 81 “fundamentalisms” react against that which they are partially linked

pp. 88-9 in our “war of religion” 2 violences: 1) hypersophistication of military tele-technology 2) “new archaic violence,” counters the first & everything it represents, revenge

——in name of Islam, in name of “religion,” desperate (auto-immune) gesture, attacks blood of its own body

p. 91 fundamental difference btwn 3 original “great monotheisms”: Islam doesn’t concern itself w/ Levinas’ “God is the future” or Heidegger’s “last god” announcing himself in every absence of future

——the 2 types of auto-immune supplementarity imposed by religious reactivity to technology: 1) violent sundering (Entwürzelung) from all roots, all sacred: identity, proper name, culture, memory 2) counter-fetishism, animism of technology as evil [See H p. 53 & SPOM p. 64]

H p. 145 in Algeria, 1919, Muslims refuse citizenship that would relinquish religious laws (personal status)

SPOM pp. 72-3 in the Middle East, war of “appropriation[s] of Jerusalem” [is today the world war] mobilize “the most archaic and most modern spectral forces”

——re: these holy alliances, Marxism remains indispensable and structurally insignificant

p. 102 inter-ethnic wars driven by “a primitive conceptual phantasm of community”

FWT p. 176 Islam has remained inaccessible to psychoanalysis

POOF p. 89 under Schmitt’s criteria, defending Europe against Islam would be more than a political war, it would be a combat w/ the political at stake, a struggle for politics

DPi p. 91 Koranic Law prevailing in Iran permits a family to grant pardon for DP

PSSS p. 255 resistance of Arabo-Islamic culture, East Asia, to psychoanalysis (Judeo-Christian Greek?)

HST pp. 370-71 acc. Massignon, Islam looks to Abraham more than Christianity > Islam is most faithful, exemplary heir, of the hospitality of hôte Abraham > Iqrā: right of hospitality

TN p. 367n [unable to determine who touches more: Christians or Jews] Muslims are hyperbolic heirs to this endless contradiction [of infinite]: Dieu se contraedit (how can we translate this into English?)

ITERABILITY

FK p. 83 no to-come w/out iterability, w/out heritage & possibility of repeating, w/out messianic memory and promise, messiancity more originary than all messianism, opens the worst

p. 100 no alliance of 2 [faith & religion], plus dun at once more than 2: iterability, division at source > supplement introduces incalculable in heart of calculable; pure faith = pure madness

***FL p. 272 foundation is a promise, ever positing pro-met even if promise is not kept, iterability inscribes the promise as guard in the most irruptive instant of foundation, inscribes the possibility of repetition at the heart of the originary, so there is no real distinction between preserving violence and founding, positing is always a call for preserving: differential contamination

***pp. 274-75 revolutionary instant vs. or as exceptional decision > effaces/blurs distinction btwn founding/preserving law, inscribes iterability in originarity

pp. 278-79 for Benjamin, iterability precludes great founders, initiators, lawmakers (or “great” poets for Heidegger), preserves law, thus police become figure of this iterability

——police, index of ghostly violence, exemplary figure, figures w/out limit, w/out face or figure, not simply in uniform, a formless (gestaltlos) violence, all-pervasive specter

POOF pp. 214-15 that either address [re: omega ω] is addressed to someone will always expose utterance to undecidability because address to ‘someone’ presupposes the impossible: 1) neutral gender 2) ‘only one’ someone > for one person to receive a mark once, the mark must multiply, its iterability affirms plus dun (which allows & limits calculability), the 3rd party is there > there is never one, one is always more than one (w/ or w/out consent)

MC pp. 359-60 starting w/ the stoikheia (letter, trait, number, proper name) & its marking insignificance (re-markable insignificance), Derrida explains how a mark’s supposed identity, solidity of its stereotypy, its indestructbility/indivisibility requires difference/division

——ideal iterability allows every mark to withdraw from a context, in whole or in part, its insignificance allows it to continue to divide, proliferate identities, destinerring

——Derrida says mark, trace rather than signifier, letter, word, or the generality of stoikheion—to extend mark beyond verbal sign, beyond human language (and beyond atomism) > thus he does not affirm “arbitrariness of sign” like Hegel, Saussure

p. 360 “my clinamen has to do w/ the divisibility of the mark”

H p. 65 absolute porosity of techno-devices meant for keeping secrets, iterability that makes secrets accessible

LOBL p. 81 starting point: “no meaning can be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation” > structure of remnant/iteration (I have said this many other ways)

p. 96 “there is no speech act not already the iteration of another”

p. 104 [extensive description] yes of event, yes of iteration, quotes, cites, in accordance w/ strange ring outside of presence, sur-vives

AF p. 100 singularity haunted by its own iterability, immanent divisibility, from the origin

——faithful memory of singularity is given over to the specter

POO p. 140n iterability comes form law & contaminates singularity

SPOM p. 155 Marx insists on discerning, the price of the krinein of the critique: he’s out to get the specter, not the spirit, believing in a decontaminating purification, as if ghost were not haunting the spirit, as if iterability did not erase critical assurance of distinction btwn these 2 concepts

p. 177 figures of death: differance of technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins in language, before language

pp. 200-01 use-value before exchange value, hulē of wood, ordinary sensuous thing, table before dance > but it must have promised itself to iterability, no use-value w/out possibility of exchange & culture, of an hors-dusage

p. 204 ghost is there [re: de-limitation of critique] in the opening of the promise, before its first apparition, from the first it will have come second, deux fois à la fois, itérabilité originaire, virtualité irréductible de cet espace et de ce temps

SEC p. 315 iter (from itara, other, in Sanskrit) > everything that links otherness to repetition

——writing not structurally legible (iterable) beyond death of addressee wouldn’t be writing

——no code of writing is structurally secret, can always be iterable for a 3rd party

p. 317 no context, no code can enclose written syntagma > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

pp. 317-18 isn’t iterability of writing also in speech and in all experience? > never permits unity of self-identity

p. 318 identity of mark is its iterability—possibility of being repeated in absence of referent, and outside of an intention of signification

p. 324 “ritual is not an eventuality, but, as iterability, is a structural characteristic of every mark”

pp. 325-26 Austin excludes determined modification of a general citationality, general iterability [cf. GLAS, general fetishism] w/out which no “successful” performative?

p. 326 Austin doesn’t deny iterability, “constructs a differential typology of forms of iteration” [?]

——could a performative not succeed if it didn’t repeat “coded” or iterable statement?

SH SH p. 43 date es gibt, annulment at work when date inscribes its here and now in iterability, consigns itself to self-forgetfulness, succeeds in effacing itself

p. 51 virtually at the same date because the originary date, as coded mark, is already a kind of fiction, singularity spoken of in generalities and fable of conventions (iterable marks)

ROP ROP pp. 31-2 iterability as condition/constitution of identity, ideality, of all concepts, but also (double bind) that which resists hierarchical and binary oppositions, a quasi-concept, inconceivable concept > not confusion, approximation, but “reaffirmed exigency of analysis”

SP SP pp. 161-63n la signature et le texte tombent lun hors de lautre, se sécrètent, se séparent, et sexcrètent, se forment de la coupure même qui les décapite, les échafaude en tronc sans tête, dès linstant de leur itérabilité > expropriative commencement marks everything erected w/ structure of etron [fecal matter]

***ATIA ***ATIA p. 112 all thinkers who demand response to be human don’t think iterability essential to every response: which adds an automatic, mechanical reaction to the most alive, authentic, responsible

p. 125 Derrida has problem w/ fact that Lacan’s ethics, the subject, founded on distinction btwn reaction/response > destiny of iterability: automaticity of reaction in every response

***p. 112 all thinkers who demand response to be human don’t think iterability essential to every response: which adds an automatic, mechanical reaction to the most alive, authentic, responsible

***SW ***SW pp. 348-49 this irreducible reality of an event (outside discourse but not text)—is so unlike you? > but, it’s the signature, a hem, on the edge, forever heterogenous, a tear, overlap, remaining caught in poetic stitches—thus the effects of anticipated iterability

TB TB p. 116 does a work require translation? answer is apodictic, injunction even w/out translator there, the requirement of the other as translator: structure of original, relation of life to survival > a priori, even if forgotten > its apodictic essence: it is unforgettable, so forgetting is accidental, death would not change it at all

REST REST p. 278 what if, and Derrida sees it too, they’re 2 left shoes, a double that fudges (brouille) both “pair & identity” à la fois—paralyzes directionality, fait loucher vers le diable

p. 283 no symbolic contract in case of double that does not form a pair > not 1 (même) chose in 2, but a 2 in identity

PIO PIO p. 34 invention’s “first time”: inaugural event and iterability > thus, no invention w/out status, w/out introduction or promise of publicity; iterability marked, remarked, at origin of invention, elle y forme une poche du premier instant: retroverted anticipation

——to invent is to produce iterability & the machine for reproduction/simulation

TR TR p. 133 oeuvre as trace implies structure of sur-vival, what cuts the oeuvre off from the operation, cut assures archival independence, quasi-machinelike autonomy: iterability, power of repetition

p. 136 machineness (machinalité): materiality that’s not necessarily a corporeality, programming, repetition, iterability, technicity (cutting off from living subject)

WAP WAP p. 53 “deconstruction is an institutional practice for which the concept of institution remains a problem” > not a critiquing or discrediting, a following of the graphics of iterability > philosophy & most vigilant practice of deconstruction share same responsibility: struggle to recognize right to philosophy & extension of philosophical teaching/research [hymen]

D D p. 323 sign becomes what it is only through possibility of its reissue (sa réédition)

HST p. 408 hôte always passing through, iterability, come, come back

LI pp. 108-09n [re: neologism texter] signature, événement quon texte: process of iteration, like surnombre [of Dissemination], marks pluralization that fractures the event, the unique, while causing it to occur (arriver)

p. 44 logical force of iter: ties repetition to alterity

p. 46 Searle explains [to Derrida] that from standpoint of iterability no difference btwn speech & writing > Derrida responds: it is so “clear,” I am so “aware,” argument was indispensable to SEC

pp. 48-9 structural & essential, iterability is at work in all facts, each mark divided or multiplied in advance > a more powerful “logic”—graphics of iterability undercuts classical opposition of fact & principle (le droit), factual & possible (virtual), necessity & possibility

——iterability disrupts presence, unity of ego in sender, du maintenant-écrivain (grasping w/ 1 hand his ballpoint pen) > stigmè of every mark already split

p. 53 remainder (nothing in common w/ scripta manent) bound up w/ minimal possibility of re-mark & w/ structure of iterability

——structure of iteration implies both identity (minimum of idealization) and difference (minimum of remainder)

——iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori > differential btwn & w/in elements

——permanence depends on dialectical opposition of presence/absence > differential structure of iteration escapes this logic

——coupure intervenes moment there’s a mark, its positive condition of emergence, it is iterability itself, that which is remarkable in mark, re- of repeated, re- of repeating, condition/effect of iterability, merges w/ it, cuts across (recoupe) iterability, cutting the cut/break in remark

pp. 56-7 unity of signifying form due to its iterability, possibility of being repeated in absence of a determinate signified

pp. 61-2 idealization (identity in repetition) is made possible by iterability, while broaching/breaching (entame) the idealization at once > iterability alters, contaminates, what it identifies

p. 62 [vis-à-vis iterability altering, contaminating] no choice but to mean to say something other than what we mean to say: accident is never an accident

——etymology has no value as proof: if Sanskrit itara does not mean alterity, etymology’s mistake confirms law of iterability

p. 64 conforming to code, grammaticality, a minimum making-sense is incommensurate w/ adequate understanding of intended meaning > this incommensurability is irreducible, inheres in intention, riven (creusé) w/ iterability

p. 71 iterability can be supplemented by differance, grapheme, trace > cannot be idealized, makes idealization possible but never pure, simple: iterability has an internal impure limit, prevents it from being identified, synthesized, reappropriated by that whose iteration it entame

p. 76 economics that accounts for iterability, which questions traditional philosophy of oikos, of proprecan’t be separate from economy of Unconscious, of graphematics of undecidables

p. 76 iterability: ruins (even ideally) the very identity it makes possible

p. 78 “from the inception on (dès l’entame) as broached and breached (entamée) in its “origin” by iterability” [re: “-bility”]

p. 86 fundamental deconstructive questions necessitated by graphematics of iterability

pp. 98-9 not conflating parasitism & citationality but identifying possibility they have in common [i.e. iterability] (use of or that signifies neither equivalence, dissociation, nor opposition)

——citationality not confused w/ iterability but traced back to it

——[from SEC] acc. Austin, relative purity (specificity) of each performative does not emerge in opposition to iteration or citationality but to other kinds of iteration constituted by general iterability > such iterations violate rigorous purity of every speech act (event of discourse)

p. 102 iterability displaces dividing-line btwn opposition nature/convention

p. 105 iterability doesn’t limit intentionality in general but its consciousness, its presence to itself

p. 107 iterability at once condition/limit of mastery: entame it

pp. 117-18 all concepts appeal to idealization, even “concept” of iterability > but it has a strange status: marks possibility/limit of idealization, thus conceptualization too

p. 119 alogical logic of iterability: it’s an ideal concept, but also the one that marks essential & ideal limit of all pure idealization > not the concept of nonideality

——repeatability of both (identificatory) iterability & (altering) iterability > necessity of thinking rule & event, concept & singularity, at once

——iterability thus a concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, & hence the concept, hence all distinction > marks the limit of idealization/conceptualization: “concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to nonconcept

pp. 127-28 margin, parasite, iterability belong w/out belonging to the class of concepts of which they must render an accounting—to theoretical space they organize in a “quasi”-transcendental manner: something happens by or to set theory > all this must be rendered (rendre compte et raison) by us enlightened modern thinkers, right?

p. 129 repeatability of same ensures that full presence of a singularity, in being repeated, references something else, thus rending the full presence it announces

——this something else is why iteration is different from simple repetition

p. 130 iterability not merely a law of intentionality, though it introduces the structural limit of its telos > Derrida distrusts figure of intention, which grows increasingly obscure [Derrida not in “conflict” w/ intentionality, just observes limit to its telos > intentionality no more telos than arché]

p. 134 deconstruction of onto-theological humanism (of Heidegger too) > iterability of mark beyond all human speech acts

TN p. 332n Levinas, by way of Husserl, proposes the word sentance to describe an immediate iteration “whose sensation is the event itself”

AD p. 70 election not restricted to particular place/identity, inseparable from what seems to contest it: substitution

——iterability: replaceability of unique in experience of unicity [see p. 72]

OG p. 209 (297) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

JEALOUS TENSION [fixerup]

GOD p. 62 ethical must sometimes be refused in name of responsibility that doesn’t calculate, that keeps its secret, that tyrannically [Nietzsche], jealously refuses violence of accounts and justifications, declining autobiography that is auto-justification: egodicée

pp. 67-8 secrecy essential to sacrificial responsibility, absolute, infinite, duty in name of God as tout autre, who must remain transcendent, hidden, secret, jealous of love, commands he gives

p. 131 reader of literature hypnotized, paralyzed before suspended perplexity, before secret path of secret, exposed and concealed, jealously guarded: who says what to whom? who asks forgiveness?

pp. 148-49 whenever one asks for pardon, God is part of it: divine retraction as God observing human desire, not jealousy

MONL p. 8 division, why one writes and how one dreams of writing: place of jealousy divided btwn vengeance and resentment.

p. 23 terror inside language; p. 24 nothing but jealousy unleashed, “[language] takes its revenge at the heart of the law”

——no absolute appropriation/reappropriation because no natural property of language, only appropriative madness, jealousy without appropriation [see p. 63]

p. 51 is language not born of vindictive jealous?

POO p. 144n “the secret remains intact, my politeness (see S p. 8) unblemished, my reserve unbreached, my modesty more jealous than ever (see TB p. 124)” [respond w/out responding]

MPM p. 60 de Man on Baudelaire: représentation du présent [re: memory of present] combines incompatibility of repetitive & instantaneous pattern (tension); Baudelaire faithful to seduction of the present; for him, memory applies more to present that past

A p. 3 via Seneca & Diderot, one would guard jealously one’s time above all else; to “master” “my life” > know difference btwn giving one’s time & wasting one’s time

——jealousy: primitive passion for the proper, for proper possibility re: one’s existence

OH p. 122n Valéry: capital would consume Frenchmen w/ “concentration camp” of jealousy

***PAS p. (75) vigilance (jalousie) links (enchaînant) affirmation to its repetition, bond (lien) w/out pact, w/out debt

p. (100) structure of name, text, signature complicates premises when one precipitates oneself toward the guarantee of filiation [does jealousy always overdetermine?]

LOBL p. 125 “the initial [re: J.] keeps (garde) the secret like a grave—jealously”

p. 141 Blanchot on watching “her” approach a truth “compared to which mine lost all interest”

HERP p. 189 for Heidegger, Heraclitus and poets [?] experience lovence (aimance), before philosophy, love w/out strife before Eros, desire, or, at least, a jealous tension

p. 201 moment of question as struggle, moment of Eros when philosophy becomes a question tensed/plunged into mourning, jealous/inquisitive about being?

POOF pp. 35-7, 39 friends of solitude, jealous friends of solitude, jealous of his secret w/out secret, share what can’t be shared, jealous of ‘proper & profound solitude of midday-midnight’ [of singularity]: beyond good conscience, friendship w/ new philosophers

pp. 41-2 Nietzsche: today we even need to be scarecrows, insofar as we are jealous friends of our most midday/midnight solitude > “friends of solitude” even called to be conjurers

pp. 64-5 Nietzsche on ‘love’ denounces the right to property, love of thy neighbor as desire for more possessions, ‘love’ is the cupidity of possessing > ‘love btwn the sexes’ is egotism itself, jealousy that tends only toward possession (Besitzen)—[this love spawned from Christian friendship?]

——Nietzsche advocates another love, a love more loving than love, whose ‘just name’ would be friendship

pp. 241-42 [offering quasi-summary of HERP] moment that originary [Heraclitean] phileîn (accord, favour, solicitude Gunst) becomes jealous, nostalgic tension ‘determined by Eros [órexis]’: the step to philosophy, prepared by sophistry [Plato, Socrates] > is the strange voice of the friend, an ontological call [prior to subject, consciousness, even to Mitsein? see p. 243], interior & w/out, the “what is…?” of philosophy [?]

——as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

p. 242 via Heidegger, philía as opening, accord, in essential relation w/ phúsis as covering up, dissimulation of self > phúsis qua philía: lune, comme lautre, garde ce rapport à la fois généreux et jaloux à elle-mêmeelle aime à se cacher, krúptesthai phileîn > le retrait de la pudeur [decency] donne ici le mouvement même: gives the gift (donne le don), accords phúsis and philía

p. 276 is there a worse jealousy than jealousy of self? is there any other? jealous of one’s very own brother: qui est le plus d’un, le supplément de l’un en trop? [the friend, says Nietzsche’s hermit]

p. 281 Nietzsche’s hermit too attracted to the depths, nostalgic for elevation—dreams of a friend to gain altitude > friend’s nostalgia: wish to believe in other, wishing in vain to believe in ourselves > Derrida links this nostalgia to the Heideggerian nostalgia at origin of philosophical philía: elle nourrit [fires?] donc lenvie à légard de lautre comme de nous-mêmes, we envy each other, love as the attempt to leap beyond this envy

pp. 281-82 in face of our envy, the aggression whereby nous nous faisons un ennemi, make ourselves our own enemy: hides/reveals our vulnerability > true fear/respect [?]: “At least be my enemy!”

S pp. 107-08 origin as hétérogène à lorigine: 1) originarily heterogenous 2) heterogenous to what is called the origin, other than the origin 3) heterogenous and or insofar as at the origin: because and although (bien que) at the same time—is logical form of tension that makes this thought vibrate

F p. xi Abraham & Torok: [Wolf Man’s] jouissance jealously preserved (gardée) in his inner safe (for)

FWT p. 5 sen prendre, a kind of love, homage, taking on, attacking

p. 14) btwn French language & me there will have been, will be, more love [i.e. more than Lacan], mad love, reciprocal jealousy [i.e. insane idea that French language is jealous of Derrida]

p. 93 nationalism always state-nationalism today: a zealous, jealous, vindictive vindication of nation as a sovereign state

DS p. 244 [re: specificity of genres] to join mime & dancer (they should be allied but not confused), two attitudes jealous of their respective silences: this is to confront too much difference! (too close proximity)

P p. 94 envy, jealousy, mortification at work w/in our affect > the beautiful this does w/out everything, w/out you, w/out its class [re: Kant’s free beauty]

p. 98 isn’t the frame exactly what Kant means by free-wandering beauty? but, unlike frame, that which is beautiful tends towards meaning, a tension, vection, rection that must be absolutely interrupted [from concept, end] to liberate beauty [not stopgap of sublime, though]

ROP p. 26 resistance [to analysis] as double bind, other or outside at heart of internal auto-affective tension > it provokes analysis and dialectic to infinity, in order to resist both absolutely

ATIA p. 14 disavowal of being seen by the animal [Derrida believes it has happened to Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger, Kant] > jealous of, anxious about, what is proper to man

WAP p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

——double bind of philosophical commitment or pledge (droit, if a philosopheme, also submitted to law of double bind: unstable, deconstructible, it precedes itself, calls for indestructible responsibility)

TB p. 124 Benjamin’s untouchable (unberührbar) reminds Derrida of the hymen, of the wedding gown more visibly

——untouchable: fascinates, orients work of translator

***——text will be even more virgin, intact, after passage of translation: hymen, sign of virginity, more jealous of itself after the other hymen, the contract signed, marriage consummated (untouchable remnant remains intact) [cf. POO p. 144n my modesty more jealous than ever] (untouchable remnant stays in tact)

DPi p. 58 theater of cruelty, scopic drive, fascinatio, enchantment that chains spectator to spectacle (fascio, to tense, tie, attach, fasciola is a bandage wrapping [bandelette]) > what links voyeur-spectator to fascinum, charm, enchantment, virile sex

——to executioner: “so, you got a hard-on! (tu bandes!)” (link to erection at moment of decapitation)

CHM p. 54 silence as madness: irreducible role of haunting language, outside and against which alone language can emerge: “against” designating 1) content from which form takes off by force 2) adversary against which I assure/reassure myself by force [jealous friends of solitude]

C pp. 195-96 excess zeal, the little one (paradigm) built like a crypt [Lacan’s objet a?], jealously keeps its secret at moment of greatest exhibition

——hermetically closed (portable temples called hermes): mute beneath its altuglassed transparency, seduces, attracts the dead man, makes him come back and more: fors in that casket

LI p. 90 parasite can never be excluded from body “proper” > “an owner” calls it parasite (jealously defending his oikos) > whatever violently “takes place” always something of a parasite, offered hospitality, a place, by host: never quite taking place is part of parasite’s success as an event

p. 141 Derrida’s “conservatism”: I am for safeguards, memory, jealous conservation of #s of traditions (in university & in scientific, philosophical, literary theory) > I am actively committed to safeguards: at same time (in same text), I call into question foundation of these traditions

p. 152 “double writing”: irreducible divisibility, “quasi-transcendental,” must partition itself along 2 sides of a limit and respect the rules (to certain extent) of what it deconstructs

——without this tension, contradiction, could anything be done? change?

TN p. 35 for Nancy, excès de la façon (fashioning) sur lessence, et que lune supplée lautre, at origin of feeling oneself touch oneself; spectral revenant, prosthesis at heart of (self-)feeling > revenant, btwn life/death, dictates impossible mourning, sans fin—life itself [re: spacing irreducible to extensio]; p. 321n shouldn’t this spacing (what I call differance/trace) be linked to Heidegger’s tension of distancing (Gespanntheit) rather than Descartes’ extensio or even Freud’s Ausdehnung

NOY p. 240 the “second” yes, doit arriver comme un renouvellement absolu, the structural “forgetting” of fidelity

——“grâce à la menace de cet oubli [the cutting off, the becoming unique, the divisibility contre laquelle une signature se tend] la mémoire de la promesse, la promesse même peut franchir son premier pas, à savoir le second

yes, (already but always) faithful countersignature, can’t be counted: it always sends itself off in number (il senvoie toujours en nombre)

ATM pp. 187-88 “je donne, je joue lingratitude contre la jalousie,” if God is exempt from jealousy (no desire for possession) must he not guard this exemption jealously, and in so doing lose himself? > ellipse de jalousie: le sans-jalousie se garde jalousement, autrement dit se perd, se-garde-se-perd: plus de jalousie [seriasure always a jealous, series of traits & retraits, beyond the face]

pp. 189-90 WE NEED A NEW BODY, UN AUTRE SANS PLUS DE JALOUSIE, THE MOST ANCIENT STILL (ENCORE) TO COME

AD p. 73 Levinas: “to shelter the other in one’s own land or home, to tolerate the presence of the landless and homeless on the ‘ancestral soil,’ so jealously, so meanly loved—is that the criterion of humanness? unquestionably so”

CF CF p. 52 States remain jealous of their own sovereignty in limiting that of others [re: Gulf war]; for Arendt, sovereignty only imposed where it’s ‘possible,’ imposed on the weak by the strong

BSi BSi p. 183 force-differential (unconscious mechanisms) btwn which tension/contradiction bound to localize > bêtise on both sides: side of sovereign (who), side of beast, the stupid, the other (what)

pp. 200-01 Valéry wagers on CAP: le cap Pensée; the high point (comble) of internal politics, a multipli-city of selves, when the excess that exceeds un-counts the other & outside > jealousy is always the hight point that completes me, supplements me because receives, welcomes, no longer chases out other in me: one only ever jealous of oneself, the selfsame > explains all the loves and wars (which take place btwn the same, the others as the same): as soon as there’s a double capitalized phallic erection (CAP, standing, being on a cape) here called Thought

pp. 201-02 the World Trade Center as image of Valéry’s double capitalized phallic erection (jealous of themselves) > double turn makes one think of double tower (tour)

p. 319 logos or legein as gathering (more originary than logos as reason/logic) still deploys force/violence, a Durchwalten of physis > physis as Gewalt: deployment of sovereignty, of force [of logos] (no dissolving into void), in the highest acuity of its (sovereign) tension (Spannung)

ATAP ATAP p. 69 agogic function of leader, il Duce, Führer, mystagogue, jealously protects unveiling of secret: elite beings, distinguished subjects [Donald Trump]

CIR CIR p. 65 I know, dead jealous, I am not the contemporary of those I mentioned yesterday: I belong to the blind man blackmailing me

p. 76 secret I’m jealously seeking as last word of my jealousy, continually turning around it w/out knowing secret of my suffering

pp. 91-2 escarre [mother’s bedsore], oh my jealousy, as long as I have not sutured you, I have not understood you, escarre closes on blood of new skin > as long as I have not written Of the indubitable foundation or the cogito of my jealousy, or again The Confessions of a Mother, I will have failed my life & written nothing: unfathomable perjury, incurable facial paralysis, mask, etc.

p. 256 day of circumcision: a de-cision was taken in me w/out me > Jealousy & virginity, my two nipples

***p. 268-70 in all the history of humanity, have never known anyone happier, luckier, more euphoric than I (isn’t this a priori true?) > and yet [double bind] remained counterexample of myself: sad, deprived, neurotic, jealous, disappointed

EU EU p. 37 Descartes jealously insists on adding “true philosophy” to Hardy’s universal language [Descartes acts similarly w/ Augustine and St. Anselm] > stakes must be serious wherever there’s violent defamation, never forget this

SPEC SPEC pp. 285-86 reality principle’s end (autonomy): cut off from all pleasure, from all auto-affective relation, in service of a pleasure too jealous of itself, that would asphyxiate itself

p. 327 [re: Ernst’s fort/da] double sending away (renvoi): whether father required to stay or go, mother is desired: “exclusive possession” [Freud & Ernst distance themselves from name of father, for Freud it is the name of the son-in-law]

——mother (woman) easier to possess/preserve when dead [?]—jealousy appeased

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

p. 340 exemplary narcissistic wound [for Freud]: jealousy over birth of new baby, proof of infidelity of object of child's affection, undoes (défait) the bind (lien) (Bindung) to parent of opposite sex

——demi-deuil: irreducible category, no gradations

p. 341 [via Freud] program of all jealousies, model of betrayal: birth of the other child

p. 369 whatever becomes too familiar can be suspected of jealously guarding a secret [re: Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium]

p. 407 death drive doesn’t work in silence (like in French translation), but goes unnoticed (unauffällig), has to do w/ time (link to Kant, Aristotle)—thus rhythm: do feelings of tension exist to distinguish btwn bound/unbound energy or do they exist in relation to absolute magnitude?

CHOR CHOR p. 92 specular reversal of masculine “subjectivity” (even in its most self-critical form, when most jealous of itself and its “proper” objects) represents only one phase of feminism?

JEALOUSY [fixerup]

BL p. 211 text [Kafka’s] jealously guards its inconsistent content, brings reader before the law > endless differance until death

——neither arrives no lets anyone arrive

OG pp. 175-76 (250) for Rousseau, jealousy, a creation of culture, an arresting of nature by woman, stratagem of femininity > invention of culture denatures pity [which should reach out to every living thing]

——jealousy marks the gap btwn pity/love

JEW

GOD p. 125 God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, not the God of philosophers of ontotheology, but one who interrupts & retracts his order

p. 141 Judaic God repents, feels remorse, takes back his commands—i.e. the flood, his gesture resembles a confession, a plea for forgiveness [Christ is constantly taking back?]

FK pp. 5-6n [in Anidjar’s introduction] Hegel on Islam, no nationalism like Judaism [?] (lacks particularity); Islam has a universalism, Judaism doesn’t > Christianity has both

p. 90 the reaction to radical evil at the heart of Freudian thought, interminable Jewish question [?]

H p. 89 “language is also the experience of expropriation, of an irreducible exappropriation” makes us all wandering Jews, mother tongue is the tongue of the other [universalizes election], desert in all of us

R p. 21 Jews wore the rouelle [re: rogue] (little red & white wheel, ancestor to yellow star)

AF p. 13 Jew (or Devil, radical evil, all which is irreconcilable to God in “Christian science”) can be reinvested as an economistic resource of an archive that capitalizes everything [Sagi]

——devil can justify, such is destination of Jew in Aryan ideal

p. 45 classically—science, philosophy, intrinsically independent of the singular archive of its history

——via Yerushalmi, but w/ a Jewish science, archive becomes a founding moment for science as such

p. 48 Jewishness, openness to future [see p. 72]

——acc. Yerushalmi, psychoanalysis would be Judaism w/out God

p. 70 indetermination en abyme when Yerushalmi in-determines Jewishness & science one by the other

p. 75 along with openness to future, via Yerushalmi, Jew has historicity, obligation of memory, of the archive

——2 specificities, exclusivities, responsibilities, in absolute privilege of election

p. 74 is Jewishness the absolute uniqueness of this trait? to be open toward the future (à-venir), to be Jewish?: exemplary uniqueness of the trait dunion [btwn Jewishness & future]

p. 76 remember to remember the future, Yerushalmi: “only in Israel and nowhere else is the injunction to remember felt as a religious imperative to an entire people” [makes Derrida tremble]

***p. 77 Derrida trembles when Yerushalmi declares “only in Israel” [is there future, is there past], logic of election, question of proper name, exemplarity > place of all violences

——if it is just to remember to guard and gather archive, it’s just as just to remember the others, tout autre est tout autre [invaginates]

VM p. 145 [Derrida will not let Levinas reduce Heidegger’s interminable wandering to a new paganism of the site, it is not an empirical “nationalism,” nor is Hebraic nostalgia for Land]

——for Heidegger, the Site, not an empirical Here but always an Illic, for Jew & for Poet

p. 152 worst violence (what some call Judaic experience of infinitely other), when one silently delivers oneself into hands of other in the night

p. 153 to live in difference btwn Jew and Greek, perhaps the unity we call history

p. 313n Abraham exemplar of unhappy consciousness for Hegel

S p. 101 Jewish thought as inexhaustible thinking of fire

SH p. 37 what is proper to the Jew is to have no property of essence > Jewish is not Jewish

pp. 53-5 Jew as poet, as “he” w/ unpronounceable name, as witness to the universal through absolute singularity, by virtue of and in name of the other

p. 55 (in its fearful political ambiguity state of Israel could be named shibboleth) [in parentheses]

p. 60 anyone who experiences circumcision (body cut, shibboleth, blessing, purification) is a Jew

——displace literality of belonging if, w/ Judaism, nothing properly belongs, anyone or no one may be a Jew, Jew: no one’s name, the only one, no one's circumcision

pp. 62-3 Celan’s poem about the poem, the becoming-poetic of the word, its becoming-Jewish, “TO ONE, WHO STOOD BEFORE THE DOOR [Kafkas Vor dem Gesetz]: a narrative of circumcision

p. 67 Jewish language, poetic language, this essence promises itself only in dis-identification (in the expropriation of the nothing, non-essence—[ashes?])

——how can German language receiver circumcision of poem’s date following the holocaust, the solution, the ash of all? how can you bless these ashes in German? [re: Celan]

FWT FWT pp. 112-13 incalculable inner multiplicity is Derrida’s torment, his work, travail, his tripalium, passion, labor, also that which makes him work > I do not believe this division/nonidentity to oneself is exemplarily Jewish, but who would dare say it isn’t?

——nothing matters more to Derrida than his Jewishness, & it matters so little

p. 116 to say “I’m Jewish, I can’t be accused when disconcerted by Israel”—programmed death of slightest lucidity, responsibility, deadly trap must be avoided at all costs

——the worst thing [re: making use of Holocaust]: appropriation and instrumentalization of historical memory

pp. 120-21 logic of exemplarity leads to an abyss (figurality undermines the entire question) [re: those w/ self-hatred resembling Jews]

p. 193 against Sartre’s idea that anti-Semitism produces the Jew

POOF POOF pp. 304-05 when Blanchot claims that Judaism was the foundation of our relationships w/ the other (autri), Derrida believes this is highly problematic while possessing imposing necessity (this is unquestionable when one calls Judaism the thing one defines: a circle Derrida can’t engage here [heterotautology?]) > Derrida wonders why he can’t subscribe, like Blanchot, to words “community” or this statement on Judaism—which response is more hyperbolically Jewish?

P P p. 134 for Kant & Hegel, pas crossing line finite/infinite interrupts symbolic beauty > Judaism as historical figure of sublime irruption: ban on representation (Kant), Hebraic poetry (Hegel)

SP SP pp. 67-9 the double role of woman as truth’s recession, and as the nonbeliever in truth, she is like the Jew in her “delight in dissimulation,” affirmative power

——does Nietzsche refer to Jew because of the way circumcision marks simulation & castration?

ATIA ATIA p. 103 [via Adorno] the idealist conjuration, the making totem/taboo, insulting materialism, hatred for the animal [the animal that therefore I am as self-hatred]: the Jew, the woman

p. 112 principle of life (torat haïm) never prevented animal sacrifice in Judaism

p. 141 I’m not trying to be the last one speaking, the last Jew, the last of the eschatologists > I would like to write a long text one day

PS PS p. 171 [using Blanchot’s pathetic error, Derrida shows how Artaud's unique example, his history, will be erased on the way to truth, given to the doctors: a pre-Hegelian treatment]

FS FS pp. 9-10 absence & haunting of divine sign (Jewish God) [cf. GOD], anguish of Hebraic ruah (pneuma), regulates modern books/criticism/aesthetics

SW SW pp. 315-16(n) [re: Exodus 26:31] there are 2 veils/curtains btwn [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle & [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle of tabernacles [of holies/of sanctuaries] > 1st embroidered by artist, 2nd merely the work of a carpenter

p. 316 God as name of what gives the order to give the veil (btwn holy & holy of holies), veil as gift (that it is) ordered to give, gives to think separation from le tout autre (faith itself) > did this come to an end w/ death of Christ? can it be comprehended in veiled folds of Greek alētheia?

p. 322 verdict neither torn nor lifted cloth > if veil is neither torn nor lifted is it still not hung btwn holy & holy of holies? > who knows? we must dare the “perhaps”: “the fulgurating nearness of this day depends/tends” toward who or what I know not yet

DPi DPi pp. 18-20 the transition, the trance btwn when Jews have received commandments but have yet to hear the “judgments” > as if they know God’s about to invent DP after uttering “thou shalt not kill,” terrified by this divine word electing them > Moses says, “Do not tremble”

DST DST p. 322n [re: Reik] Derrida asks: can we link that which is not yet ontotypological or mimetological in pre-Platonic Greece w/ experience of non-musical Jewish shofar?

WAP WAP p. 147 acc. Hegel, Jew is kindisch (childish) not kindlich (childlike) like Christian because docile, submissive to heteronomy of their God [shows profound homology btwn Hegel’s pedagogical theory and entire philosophical teleology]

EJQB EJQB p. 64 what’s in question: the incommensurable destiny of Judaism (as birth/passion of writing) that grafts (ente) “race born of the book” onto radical origin of meaning as literality, onto historicity itself: no history sans le sérieux (gravity) and labor of literality

p. 65 history: the only thing that begins by reflecting itself > this fold, this furrow (ride), is the Jew

——Jew elects writing which elects the Jews > responsible for truth’s suffusion w/ historicity, and history’s assignment of itself (s’assigne) to its empiricity

——[vis-à-vis Jabès] situation of Jew exemplary for situation of poet

p. 66 wisdom of poet culminates its freedom in passion of translating obedience to the law of the word into autonomy > w/out which, and if passion becomes subjection, poet is mad

——poet & Jew: born (not here) elsewhere, autochthons only of speech & writing, of Law: sons of the land to come

——site of freedom whose cult is not necessarily pagan, not an enclosure, ghetto, site of exclusion: when a Jew proclaims the Site, not a declaration of war, site is not empirical/national, it is immemorial, a future too, tradition as adventure > freedom granted to nonpagan Land only if separated from freedom by Desert of the Promise (Land keeping itself beyond proximity)

p. 67 autochthons of the Book (poet, Jew)

p. 68 separation of life & thought: infinite anchoritism (writing as moment of Desert, Judaic experience as reflection)

p. 68 Pharisees, those misunderstood men of literality, the “separated ones”

——Jewish consciousness is the unhappy consciousness

p. 69 nemein: common root of division, naming, nomadism > nomadic Jew struck by infinity & the letter in the desert

***——poet or Jew: protects the desert that protects his speech (can speak only in desert), his writing (traced [sillonner] only in desert) > invents unfindable/unspecifiable pathway (un chemin introuvable et inassigné) > dont aucune résolution cartésienne ne peut nous assurer la droite ligne et lissue

p. 73 via Jabès, Jew’s destiny: summoned btwn voice/cipher (acc. Levinas, btwn Socratic/Hebraic, btwn poverty/wealth of letter, btwn pneumatic/grammatical)

p. 74 can one sever oneself from Jewish community?

p. 75 [re: Jabès] Jew reproached by rabbinical Jews for universalism, skeletal (décharnés) allegorism, for neutralizing event in realms of symbolic/imaginary [Jew as suffering allegory]

——Jew’s identification w/ himself doesn’t exist

——Jew is split btwn 2 dimensions of letter: 1) allegory (no history, abstract universalism, cold skin of concept) 2) literality (empirical, actualized history, too warm flesh)

IW pp. 246-47 for Rosenzweig, Jewish speech: dissociative, irruptive power, convulsive rhythm of volcanic production

——coming of an event initiates irruption, interruption of totalizing synthesis

p. 247 Jew and German: “lack of transition,” a ruptivity, “and,” a continuity outside dialectical synthesis > disjunctive conjunction, aphoristic seriality

p. 248 Rosenzweig in reference to Cohen’s overflowing, volcanic, teaching habits: “nothing more Jewish than this lack of transition”

pp. 251-52 for Adorno, Kant star witness of German tradition/mind; for Cohen, relation btwn Judaism/Kantianism: historical culmination of idealism as essence of German philosophy

p. 252 acc. Cohen, exile of Judaism to Alexandria, its Hellinization (Jewgreek), made it cosmopolitan, universalized it: Greek the 3rd term which brings German and Jew together

——acc. Cohen, Philo (a Führer), Plato’s Jewish heir: prepared the way for Christianity > part of a current that reconciled Hellenism w/ Judaism: mediation of logos & holy spirit

pp. 254-55 if, for Cohen, race is reducible to biologico-naturalist schema, racism not of issue re: Jew & the German, they relate through psyche, artificially, nonnaturally: alliance of religious & philosophical

pp. 255-56 if German-Jewish relation is a delirium, cannot be made into object (such object being an “artificial” reflection), then Cohen’s discourse on it could very well be symptom of madness it describes, but a true symptom: a truth it speaks that’s not of order of positive objectivity

p. 257 acc. Cohen, only Judeo-German, only Judeo-Protestant (no Judeo-Catholic, no Judeo-Muslim)

p. 258 acc. Cohen, German Protestantism absolutely privileged, unique mimesis of Greek ideas [“Christianity is unthinkable w/out logos”], Reformation opposes logos, eidos, hypotheton to ecclesial dogma > [p. 257 ensures unique relation of German-Jew]

p. 261 acc. Cohen, Kant is holy of holies, innermost sanctum of German spirit, & Kant represents most intimate affinity (die innerste Verwandschaft) w/ Judaism

——this kinship (Kant, German, Jew) is sealed in most intimate depth, most essential interiority, is sacredness itself, historical sacredness of spirit > p. 262 absolute interiority

***p. 263 it’s as if Cohen tells Jews/Catholics: recognize the Protestant spirit that already inhabits you: a demand for hypothesis, truth, science, beyond instituted dogma [Jewish & German]

pp. 263-64 [vis-à-vis Cohen] Judeo-Protestant Platonism or world logocentrism made spiritual families possible, genealogy w/out limit, general economy (oikonomia, oikos as the law itself) > spiritual mondialisation: logos, spirit, idealism as moral conscience of philosophy & science

pp. 268-69 Cohen translates “I am that I am” as God is Being (One), Jewish Yahweh merges w/ agathon, anhypotheton, escapes all image, perception: God is Love, Greco-Platonic Eros (at source of knowledge & aesthetic feeling) [Jew, Greek, Protestant]

pp. 269-70 Cohen thinks of Maimonides as medieval Jewish-Protestantism (founds religion on great, rigorous rationalism)

pp. 270-71 for Cohen, 2 principles of Judaism: 1) God’s oneness 2) “purity of the soul”—this is the foundational pillar (Grundpfeiler) of Jewish piety

p. 271 Ibn Ezra, first to doubt Moses wrote 5 books (acc. to Spinoza), says: human reason is mediator btwn God/Man, there is thus reconciliation (Versöhnung) btwn God/Man, and a redemption of man’s sins > for Cohen, in Judaism, redemption presupposes human psyche [pp. 271-72 Cohen’s Judeo-Protestantism, but how does he explain Jewish duty, commandments?]

pp. 271-72 acc. Cohen, Kant & Judaism both unite duty & freedom, universal law & autonomy > Kant’s thought interpreted as profound Judaism

——Hegel’s philosophical antisemitism toward Kant (rather, anti-Judaism) reappears in Nietzsche’s contra Kant [?]

pp. 272-73 though Kant includes an antisemitic note in Anthropology from a Pragmatic, Cohen maintains Kant's quasi-Judaism > besides, w/ what is antisemitism not compatible?

pp. 273-74 Cohen’s vision of German-Jew is a psycho-spiritual truth not yet incarnate in historical effectivity [to explain factual antisemitism in Germany, in America too]

p. 275 re: Cohen’s Judeo-Kantian spirit, at deepest foundation of all morality, God’s law founds right and state, makes possible juridical feeling > analogy made to Kant’s feeling of respect: Kant states new Verbindungslinie btwn ethics & religion (gathers together soul & spirit)

pp. 275-76 Kant, Jew, German: co-substantial reciprocity, their socius (alliance, spiritual symbiosis, psyche) is very socius that makes subjectum a moral being, a freedom, a person

pp. 278-79 for Rosenzweig, double bind of Jewish thinker [?]: impossible/possible to be Kant’s disciple

pp. 279-80 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] “unheard-of” singularity of Jewish nation: its birth belongs to (God’s) Law, not to nature > inscribed in a history that began before it was born (though it was already its own)—history of this nation: supernatural, transhistorical, prehistoric

p. 281 Rosenzweig on Jewish Nation: “its very birth became the great moment of its life, its mere existence already joined it with its destiny”

pp. 288-89 for Cohen, political socialism corresponds to generalization of priesthood (Lutheran/ Jewish motif), and to messianism: German State, in its modernity, is priestly & messianic

——socialist policy: morality inspired by universal priesthood: Judeo-German messianism

PJP p. 200 sacrifice of Isaac: sort of rupture w/ marriage, infidelity to Sarah [marriage as Christian madness]

PSSS p. 239 Derrida doesn’t [:)] draw link btwn non-bloody cruelty & the Jewish joke about analyst who chose his profession because he didn’t like sight of blood [doesn’t want to reopen history of Judaism & potential universality of psychoanalysis]

p. 256 Freud to Jung: I am Moses, you are Joshua

EL pp. 194-95 for Rosenzweig, Zionism is a linguistic evil: turns a language of names into one of political information

pp. 212-13 prophesying about modern Israel, Scholem sees risk of commercializing the sacred [?]

——can’t be denied/affirmed: State of Israel indirect consequence of Nazi genocide

HST p. 382 Jew of any time, especially this century, undergoes lépreuve (test, ordeal, trial) of impossibility of forgiveness

pp. 382, 396 story of 2 Jewish enemies who forgive each other, fake it, “for laughs,” des justes assez justes to avow that they can’t forgive

TN p. 250 Chrétian’s divine touch: immediate transitivity, dissymmetry—and reciprocity; w/ Jew, w/ Levinas’s caress, dissymmetry is an excess over me: no reciprocity/mutuality in experience of divine [p. 252 both Chrétian & Levinas capitalize the Son—Il, Fil?]

p. 367n letter (touchable), spirit (untouchable), Jews/Christians—who touches more? Hegel’s hardness of Jews

NOY pp. 233 St. Paul: “in Him there has been only Yes (nai)” > de Certeau: this “yes” pierces field of distinctions/separations practiced by Hebraic epistemology

AD pp. 41-2 host is guest in own home, one who receives is received in receiving: Rosenzweig’s originary dispossession of ipseity, home [the Jew]

p. 64 many interruptions of self re: Sinai (broken tablets, veiling/unveiling of Moses’ face, etc.) > Sinai still provocation to think passage btwn ethical, messianic, eschatological and the political (today when the foreigner, the displaced, the refugee incur cruelty w/out precedent)

pp. 65-6 “Torah before Sinai,” law before event, recognition of Torah by those for whom event of Sinai means nothing? a recognition by some 3rd, that would replace unique w/ unique? > a universal message in election of Israel (humanitarian hospitality uprooted from singularity of event, which becomes empirical, allegorical, “political” in restricted sense)

p. 69 absolute past: “word of God” —will have taken place before taking place, older than Sinai—truth of messianic exceeds national identity; p. 142n absolute “lateness”: older yes

p. 70 election not restricted to particular place/identity, inseparable from what seems to contest it: substitution

pp. 71-72 acc. Levinas, messianic hospitality in Egypt despite slavery [Egyptians let Jews in?]

p. 73 question of borders, question of Israel

pp. 73-4 for Levinas, state of Caesar, pure essence of state, “refuge of idolatry,” place of corruption par excellence; state of David—messianic, beyond “politics”

pp. 76, 80 Levinas’ “beyond-in (au-delà-dans)” of State of David [?], a sort of enclave inside and outside of itself, participates in politics while going beyond it > [deconstructive invagination]

——transcendence in immanence, the door as the bearing (porte que porte)

p. 141n [Levinas discusses a pre-Christian turning of the cheek (Lamentations 3:30)]

p. 105 [re: a return to Jerusalem] a promise remains, its possibility remains effective, but ethics demands the effectivity be effectuated: an ineffectual promise betrays its promise [?]—is realization of promise already politics? which politics?

pp. 112-13 for Levinas, Torah–Jerusalem [inscribe promise in earthly Jerusalem], co-presence of justice, system, State > negotiation w/ non-negotiable must find “better” or less bad (moins mauvaise): nothing counts more, nothing weighs more heavily (rien ne compte plus gravement) than quotations around word better (meilleur)—it’s not good, it’s a stopgap (pis-aller)

BSi p. 246 those asking for hospitality are exiles

CIR pp. 252-53 sign of circumcision will ensure Jewish nation an eternal existence > this sign of circumcision & election is foreign to understanding and true virtue

p. 288 before speech, among Jews alone, there’s circumcision

pp. 312-13 imbecile asks Derrida what he did to help save Jews [didn’t know Derrida was Jewish?] > maybe he was right, perhaps you didn’t do enough to save Jews, always think the other is right, at the beginning or end of the book

SPEC p. 302 woman perpetuates race by risking the name: analytic “movement” as genealogy of son-in-law, Judaic law

JOUISSANCE [fixerup]/PLEASURE

GOD p. 13 Patoçka: Plato’s novel idea is will to leave womb of Earth Mother, follow path of “pure light,” subordinate (podřídit) orgiastic entirely to responsibility

GT p. 148 perversity can always secretly corrupt the “donner raison à lautre”: ratio, logos, is on your side [re: “Counterfeit Money”], what counts, can be counted, you took maximum pleasure

——link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

R p. 15 Aristotle’s Prime Mover, the first desirable, gives a life that exceeds the life of a human, continuous, unending—for us, impossible

——energeia of this pure activity is “pleasure (hēdonē), circle of taking pleasure in oneself (jouissance de soi); a specular auto-affection that accords w/ thinking of thought

——questions of politics must pass through desire and pleasure

MONL pp. 2-3 common language: “Yes, I only have one language, yet it is not mine” > the impossible, inhabiting logical contradiction [suffer & take pleasure in this statement]

AF pp. 92-93 nearly ecstatic instant Freud dreams of [re: Studies on Hysteria]: origin speaking by itself, arkhē appears in the nude, w/out archive, anamnēsis w/out hypomnēsis

PP pp. 99-100 (113) hubris—pharmakon used for excess pleasure & pain, pharmakon hateful because artificial, drugs make illness worse, writing makes memory worse

FSW p. 198 difference btwn pleasure/reality principle: original possibility of economy of death, of detour, deferral

TC pp. 246-47 [see NIETZSCHE & HEGEL on pure expenditure, death, repetition of affirmation, maintaining presence, consume pure difference w/ pleasure]

F p. xi Abraham & Torok: [Wolf Man’s] jouissance jealously preserved (gardée) in his inner safe (for)

p. xv le for du dedans (not intérieur) is not le tribunal de la conscience, even though enclosed w/in forum of self > it is the contradiction w/ in desire [?]: father’s penis neither comes [ne jouisse] nor goes [ni ne périsse] > from this contradiction we understand the solidity of crypt, the indefatigable effort to maintain it, & its failures, permeations from w/in & w/out, its seepings

p. xxi topography of crypt follows fracture line from no-place/beyond-place to other place: where “pleasure’s death,” marks the singular pleasure: sauf

pp. xxxi-xxxii via Abraham’s “radical semantic change that psychoanalysis introduced into language,” beneath paleonymy of inherited concepts, working w/ remnants [i.e. beneath “pleasure” we find pain]: to bring intending non-presence into phenomenology

p. xxxv exquisite pleasure (nearing orgasm) disguised by repression as exquisite pain, le lieu where exquisite corpse has folded so much it appears flat > challenges us to exhume: “accuse-moi

pp. xxxv-xxxvi language inhabits crypt as “mots enterrés vifs,” words relieved of communicative function, marking, in a way, that le désir a été dune certaine manière satisfait, que la jouissance a eu lieu

pp. xxxviii-xxxix crypt of language: contract w/ dead, mort-gage, dead must pledge to occupy place as dead, must engage dying self alive

——pledge as pocket [Genet’s matchbox] > double desire, thanato-poetic pleasure (plaisir) can catch fire

pp. xxxiv-xxxv tombstone is “illicit,” marks extreme jouissance, attempt to break in [analyze] isn’t illegal, a market is organized around crypt, when introjection is thwarted > evaluates rates (taux) of pleasure (jouissance) & pain (forum or for, la place de marché, fur

p. xxli “cryptonyms of repressed pleasure words” [re: Grateloup, tieret, rub, scar, Thing]

FWT p. 5 deconstruction endures experience of limit of concept, endures this excess, loves, an ecstasy of concept—jouissance—overflowing

POOF pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

WM pp. 237-38(n) imitation sets man apart from beasts, man alone takes pleasure in imitating > metaphor, an effect of mimēsis and homoiosis, manifestation of analogy, a subordinate means of knowledge: full truth preferred to metaphor

——to be learning something, recognizing resemblance (the same), is the greatest pleasure, this pleasure is the second [?] “cause” of mimēsis and metaphor

pp. 239-40(n) mimeme (neither thing itself, nor tout autre) > elliptical syllogism of mimēsis provides as recompense a dividend of pleasure, “everything like & akin to oneself is pleasant”: finishing work, laughter of resemblance (also, we should not spend all our time imitating monstrous things)

DS p. 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” > hymen

***pp. 209-10 hymen (hymn): supreme spasm, sign of fusion, consummation, marriage, confusion or identification of two > nonpresence, gaping void of desire, & presence, fullness, satisfaction—now amount to same: yet there is not a single term, no fullness of the signified, it’s the difference that no longer functions (btwn empty signifier/full signified, image/thing)

——no more spatial heterogeneity of 2 poles: laccomplissement se résume dans le désir, le désir est (en avance sur) laccomplissement qui demeure, toujours mimé, un désir, “sans briser la glace

pp. 248(n) “reflection” so loaded, reduces text to signified theme > thematicism as eudemonistic or hedonistic

——Freud’s inconsistency re: psychoanalysis of work of art: 1) going beyond formal limits toward theme (Stoff) in service of Lustprinzip 2) says, frustrated, the formal artist is given over to Lustprinzip

POS pp. 6-7 to “deconstruct” faithful/violent to philosophy, a certain textual work that produces great pleasure, a writing interested in itself that enables us to read philosophemes as symptoms (a word Derrida suspects), the symptom of thinking Being as presence [via Heidegger]

P pp. 37-8 object of 3rd Critique? affect (Gefühl)? pleasure/unpleasure? desire? 1st Critique cuts itself off from interests of desire, excludes desire’s reason, reasons’s desire, desire for reason

p. 39 for Kant, system of pure philosophy (metaphysics) is not yet possible; only critique is possible, produces krinein, in-between > pure philosophy sews everything up, includes critique w/in

——critique detaches, only a moment, related to desire, pleasure/unpleasure, Spur

p. 47 “grosse Schwierigkeit” of critical judgment of beauty [un plaisir désintéressé], auto-affection must cathect w/ pure objectivity, universality w/out concept, pure pleasure w/out enjoyment > Wohlgefallen (I-please-myself-in), Je-me-plais-à-me-plaire-à > auto-affection immediately goes outside: is pure hetero-affection, tout autre cathects me, w/out which, there’d be no universality

p. 76 for Kant, no transition to pleasure/displeasure from concepts (save pure practical laws where there is interest, but not attached to judgment of taste)

p. 79 Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

p. 113 acc. Kant, pleasure of knowing (which once existed in a time immemorial [absolute past in a Critique?]), a pleasure of the same—mastery of dissimilar, reduction of heterogenous

pp. 130-31 “pleasing-oneself-in” of sublime suspends play, elevates to seriousness, nur negativ, relates to moral law, both presuppose violence done to senses, w/ sublime violence done by imagination, not reason > imagination mutilates itself, conceals itself, binds, robs itself: sacrificial violence gains by losing > organizes expropriation w/in calculation > imagination organizes theft of its own freedom, feels sacrifice/theft at same time as the Ursache to which it submits [see GOD]

OS p. 39 pleasure one takes in repetition ultimately cannot appear before tribunal of any law > the limit of such a tribunal—philosophy—is in question here

ROP pp. 21-2 Freud’s 5 resistances in “Inhibition, Symptom, Anxiety,” one of which is the ego benefiting from the illness > Derrida finds such behavior so commonplace, he wonders by what confused concept of illness this could be an interesting singularity

SP pp. 37-9 question of style, des voiles, laissons lélytre flotter entre masculin et féminin > our tongue [the French one] assures la jouissance [re: double gender of des voiles]

p. 77 Hegel on passivity of clittoral pleasure (de la jouissance clitoridienne)

ATIA p. 61 there is a certain jouissance (anguish) when an animal looks at Derrida naked

DIF DIF pp. 18-9 in Beyond Pleas…, difference btwn pleasure/reality principle is only differance as detour [if “only,” then not differance as relation to impossible presence?]

O p. 48 concept > engenderer & consumer (jouissant) of itself, relève its preface, plunges (senfonce) into itself > conception of concept an autoinsemination

——return of theological seed to itself, dispersion working for profit of Idea, exclusion as inclusion [not Hegel’s Jew?] > la vérité qui se parle dans le cercle logocentrique, cest le discours de ce qui revient au père

p. 55 ma torture, mon plaisir [Mallarmé]

pp. 57-8 is pleasure literary in essence? if Vorlust, foreplay, prime (bonus) of seduction, formal moment of literature, ne se comble quà la fin du plaisir, then jouissance would be instance of seduction, prime supplémentaire de rien dautre: pleasure a formal, threshold phenomena, nul et sans fins, a repression lifted & maintained > graphics of hymen questions all couples, all oppositions (especially those of Freud)

——le plaisir serait toujours formel et de limen

p. 58 “la dissémination (se) produit (dans) cela : coupe de plaisir” > il rythme et le plaisir et la répétition selon une coupe multiple > il [text, literature, the beyond of the whole] imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

DPi p. 94n DP seduces, vanity beyond death, those fascinated by it can take maximum pleasure from (jouir de) it

pp. 155-56 for Nietzsche, jouissance of causing pain, le jouir > right to cruelty

p. 158 mechanism of cruelty: take (infinite) pleasure in doing evil for evil’s sake > “genealogy of morals”: theater of cruelty, history of cruelty, prehistory of history as cruelty

p. 163 for Nietzsche, Christianity hyperbolically augments infinite disproportion, pleasure of “highest degree” that accompanies the law of cruelty: finite debt exceeds correspondence by responding w/ a pleasure of cruelty that becomes infinite

p. 250 eudaimon of Heidegger, not only pleasure, not hedonist enjoyment > but Heidegger does not mention how daimon stops talking to Socrates at moment of condemnation to death

RGE p. 255 servile condition of mastery & entire history it makes possible > absolute privilege given to slave, truth of the master is the slave: deferred pleasure, limited stakes, delaying disappearance of thing (labor) > the condition of history/meaning/philosophy/discourse

REST p. 368 identification, like attribution, has supplementary/parergonal structure > because demand for reattachment is insatiable, unsatisfied, always making a higher bid, always starts out again

HLP p. 44 paradigm of lie has an essential link to experience of sexual pleasure

TR p. 103 not only accusation & judgment in confession, there’s the executioner (carrying out of the sentence): sentence endured in pleasure of writing, ambiguous enjoyment at heart of terrible, severe jubilation of inscription: one steps up to cashier right away to collect interest on a capital that will assume value only “sooner or later,” after my death, in my absence

p. 104 police, prosecutors, torturers know jubilatory pleasure of handling confession machines

pp. 130-31 re: mosquito caught mid-bite in amber coffin or 2 midges making love, a jouissance took place whose archive we preserve, archive of a singular event 54 million years ago > archive of man’s confessions a few centuries ago, fractions of second in history of life, earth, & the rest

EJQB pp. 75-6 if writing isn’t a tearing of self toward other w/in a confession of infinite separation, if it takes pleasure for its own sake, it destroys itself—in plenitude, Identity, roundness of egg [cf. p. 66 Jabès renouncing verve, capriciousness]

PSSS pp. 257-58 death drive, origin of all cruelty—from sadism to primary masochism > this death drive sends reality/pleasure principles into crisis

***p. 279 psychoanalysis only possible approach, w/out alibi, to all virtual translations btwn the cruelties of a suffering “for the pleasure of it” [?] [I you we cruel-suffer]

C p. 195 Derrida will have to change formulas constantly, abandon them like waste products, leftovers of supper interrupted in full enjoyment by an entombment, after declarations which have nothing in common with the thing itself: this is my body, this my name

p. 201 analogy belongs to order of contingent > appeals neither to model nor example (i.e. both Sade & Titus-Carmel ration the remainder, stage a work & jouissance re: remainder [excrement]) [Derrida is “randomly” comparing Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins to Sade’s 120 days]

——arithmetic compulsion and la narration comptable in Sade’s 120 Days, part of the fun > its regular cadence, rhythmic operation: to excrete excrement, swallow it, en escompter la jouissance

introjection of mors, morceau [Lacan’s objet a?] always lets drop a heterogenous remainder of incorporation > infinite analysis of mourning btwn introj./incorp.

p. 230 rocket of a female orgasm (la fusée dune jouissance féminine) [?]

LI p. 72 submission to classical normativity/hierarchy in the name seriousness cannot be taken seriously

——why not say it was all a parasitic joke (transform infelicity into jouissance)—maybe we will!

TN p. 38 acc. Nancy, laughter as philosopher’s presence to himself, contact successfully interrupted gives pleasure of syncope, pleasure of which it is depriving itself

pp. 75-6 caress, to take or give pleasure?; the order/command “Tiens!” [TN. there, here, hold on to this, take it] is not the same order as tact (the trembling, relinquishment [dessaisissement] at heart of seizing [saisie]) [beyond Lacan’s: “never give up on your desire”?]

p. 93 for Levinas, the peace that is ethical found more in the tender caress that renounces possession than in erotic violence acharnée à jouir

pp. 112-13 phone sex: phantasm of ecstatic pleasure promises pleasure (through phainesthai)

p. 185 connection btwn “self-touching” of “human body” [flesh] and body of Christian ontotheology, its eucharistic ecstasy par excellence [Nancy too?]

***pp. 229-30 anesthetic interruption in heart of aesthetic phenomenality, anesthetics very ecstasy at heart of pleasure, pleasure as differance w/out delay > plier, prier and invent substitutes, prostheses, fetishes, cultures, technics (all of “history,” before and beyond “hand of man”)

p. 284 this other heart that self touches you, gives pleasure where pleasure’s made more intense by not returning to me, diastole w/out systole > the ecstatic & haptical sans of “sans revenir à soi

——you beat the heart, you interrupt circulation

p. 289 [re: Nancy’s list of touchable bodies] finite series, symphonic “yes” of pleasure

p. 290 you, metronome of my heteronomy, you resist my dreams of a reappropriating movement of self-presence, self-consciousness, absolute knowledge, which is why I love you, so painfully, at heart of pleasure itself

——you break me from dialectic (which does not exclude it)

p. 301 “facts of the day” [i.e. computer, cybersex], artefactual haunts and works through technics & desire (and work in general)—same labor, same pleasure, same torture, tripalium

E p. 8 for Kant, science is not art, has no beauty in it, because no pleasure can be taken in it

——yet, in his Introduction, he claims that in an immemorial past, pleasure could not be separated from knowledge, so the Witz (bon mot), the only scientific pleasure, carries this repressed past in it

——Kant distinguishes agreeable arts from Fine-Arts, the former aims at enjoyment (jouissance, Genuss), the latter dispenses w/ concept (ohne Zweck) and enjoyment, but seeks pleasure (Lust)

pp. 9-10 for Aristotle, imitation is unique to man, belongs to essential definition of man, man takes pleasure in it, it is from it he learns his first knowledge

p. 21 Kant: sublime occurs due to a momentary checking (Hemmung, an arrest), and its pleasure (admiration or respect) is a negative pleasure

p. 22 vomit gives too much enjoyment, suspends the suspension of non-consummation (which accompanies pleasure bound up w/ representation): it burns up all work as mourning work

OG p. 337n alētheia, privileged instance of a vision filled & satisfied by presence

p. 143 (206) differance, breathing space, finitude, death makes presence/absence possible: makes possible very thing it makes impossible, produces what it forbids: non-satisfaction (inassouvissement)

p. 151 (216) [Rousseau] masturbation pleasure irremediable loss of vital substance > exposure to madness & death

——for Rousseau, danger of image, imaginary seduction, in writing & masturbation, “fatal advantage (funeste avantage)” > the supplement that “trompe (cheats) la nature

p. 152 (219) dangerous supplement inconceivable to reason: no longer diverting total enjoyment toward a substitute, but experiencing it or miming it directly and in its totality [not kissing the bed to get close to Mamma, but conjuring the presence of Mamma]

pp. 153-54 (221-22) restitution of presence by language: symbolic/immediate, se passe de passer par le monde: touching is touched, jouissance not deferred: auto-affection se donne pour autarcie pure, it does not wait (nattend pas) > but, auto-affection pure speculation, present delivered is chimera, the no longer deferred is absolutely deferred: acc. Rousseau, sign/image/representation sont des illusions qui donnent le change (sidetrack us) [differance w/out delay]

——Rousseau’s pernicious habit of donner la change [satisfying his wants, sidetracking, giving money]

——supplement is maddening, it breaches/broaches (entame) our pleasure and our virginity [hymen]

p. 155 (223) for Rousseau, as dangerous as the supplement is, cohabitation w/ women is even more dangerous, “jouir!” another name for death

p. 157 (226) Rousseau: no intermediary btwn everything & nothing, must substitute

pp. 165-66 (235-36) w/ 2 supplements (writing, onanism), auto-affection manifests by leaving a trace of itself in the world, exteriority of space, touchant-touché admits the world as 3rd party, here jouissance and se-donner-une-présence welcome the other in small difference separating lagir du pâtir (doing from suffering)

p. 186 (264) Rousseau: nearer we are to jouissance, further from bonheur

imagination is differance of or w/in presence or jouissance

p. 234 (333) for Rousseau, the wand (la baguette) that traces w/ so much pleasure does not fall outside the body (ne tombe pas hors du corps)

pp. 247-49 (351-53) [Artaud-like fantasy in Rousseau?] breath (of God), neume, superhumanity, not on the way to humanity (like child), body w/out organs, w/out spacing, pure presence w/ jouissance, inarticulate enough for jouissance de soi to remain uncorrupted by alterity

p. 250 (354-55) jouissance—pure presence to self-auto-affection accorded to God; interior, homogenous, no relation w/ object, welcomes no mortal difference

pp. 262-63 (371-72) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] no opposition applied to passage btwn state of nature & state of society, to becoming-present of presence (a lasting passage like the present in Reveries): a supplementarity, festival (fête), w/out jeu; moment of festival: pure continuity > society formed morrow of festival (indifference of pleasure & desire): de la danse à la loi

p. 268 local difference: differance btwn desire & pleasure

p. 280 (397) for Rousseau, present is always the presence of a jouissance, jouissance always the welcoming of presence > language (anxious research of learning): the spacing btwn 2 jouissances

pp. 296-97 (418-20) for Rousseau, perversity of sacralizing the representer/signifier

——sovereignty as presence/jouissance of present > liberty when signifier suspended & power rendered to the represented/signified; sovereignty not the same as drawing up laws

p. 312 for Derrida, there’s an interior doubling of presence, a constitution/frustration of jouissance, a call & trace that Rousseau tries to elude

pp. 312-13 (440-41) writing/double opens desire and re-gardent la jouissance—Rousseau searches for un salut (haven) dans lécriture

——unless there’s an extrinsic desire, Leibniz’s universal characteristic represents death of jouissance, scientific machine, pure state of representer > the telos of scriptural alienation

EU p. 113 so young & so old, one and the same thing, anachrony in oneself, confusion of identity > this confusion has suddenly gotten much worse—leaving me speechless

——écart alternatif entre la jouissance et la fécondité

SPEC p. 275 in German, Lust (pleasure) also designates jouissance and desire

p. 397 irresolution of scene of writing—a Bindung, tends itself (se tend), ceaseless posting, no final orgasm, beyond of pleasure remaining the end of pleasure > pleasure at its proper moment? still don’t know what it is: secousses orgasmiques, joussiance, deferred as soon as obtained

pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

p. 399 pleasure—ungraspable limit btwn 2 limits, un en-deçà et un au-delà qui réduisent un pas à rien

producing itself, regenerating: only pleasure, pleasure as counter-pleasure, band contra band, tout se passe alors dans des différences de bandage—not general economy (absolute expenditure) but strictural economy (to the point of its inevitable collapse)

pp. 400-01 PP (the master) is not master > pleasure, the great speculator, calculates w/ effects of aphrodisiac stricture (Socrates wanted nothing to do with proper name of Aphrodite)

JOYCE

OOG pp. 102-04 re: equivocity of a culture’s interiorized memory, Joyce takes responsibility for all equivocation itself, rediscovers poetic value of passivity

——Husserl’s project: to reduce, impoverish language to reach a pure source of historicity is the transcendental parallel to Joyce’s

——Joyce’s will to master nightmare of history could only succeed by allotting its share to univocity

VM p. 153 Jewgreek, greekjew: most Hegelian of modern novelists

T pp. leiris xiii-xiv perce-oreille/Persephone, ear-wig

SH p. 29 Joyce and shibboleth; Derrida doesn’t believe Joyce’s first & true desire was to keep professors busy—and nothing could be more foreign to Celan

FS p. 302n translation of Hegel not finished (thank the Lord!): thus explaining Proust, Joyce, Faulkner > Flaubert feared Hegel, rightfully so; Mallarmé, uniquely, approached Hegel: [why he (alone) knew he couldn’t complete the book?]

TB p. 107 Finnegans Wake, “he war” > Babelian book

CHM p. 31 “a transparent sheet separates it from madness” (Joyce speaking of Ulysses)

p. 55 if language is the break w/ madness, the closer and closer language gets to it, it’ll be separated only by “transparent sheet” (of which Joyce speaks) > this diaphaneity: “language, meaning, possibility, and elementary discretion of a nothing that neutralizes everything”

——thus, Foucault’s book a gesture of protection & internment

C p. 215 tracking an exhumed body, in the wake’s wake (sillage), exultation of a funeral vigil, blackmail (faire chanter) the dead, Finnegans Wake > faire vibrer le sarcophage: sous le charme

JUDGMENT

LOBL p. 115 judgment as that which is impossible to reach in each crisis, arrêt, decision

FL p. 252 judge—calculating machine, decision to calculate is not of the order of the calculable

SPOM p. 155 Marx insists on discerning, the price of the krinein of the critique: he’s out to get the specter, not the spirit, believing in a decontaminating purification

HERP p. 172 Heidegger critiques or enacts “destruction” of Aristotle’s broken theory of logos as judgment, but remains Aristotelian when saying only Dasein can have a friend—animal has no ear

***A p. 70 Heidegger pays no attention to logical form of contradiction (most proper possibility as possibility of an impossibility) > treats it as a condition of truth, its very unveiling (truth no longer measured in logical form of judgment)

VM pp. 144-45 Heidegger calls original dissimulation of Being beneath the existent, prior to any error in judgment, erring (Irren), every epoch is in an epoch of erring

VP p. 63 for Husserl, “S is P” is original apophantic operation, the fundamental, primitive form [see p. 84]

PP p. 112 for Plato, only truth as presence of the present is discriminative > discrimination become so subtle it separates nothing, the same from itself (this movement is only possible within structure of ambiguity and reversibility of pharmakon)

OH p. 31 crisis is not appropriate word any more for event of other heading: crisis [krinein, moment of decision] has always inspired a Selbstbesinnung (self-contemplation), a regaining of “direction (sens)” > protestant, capital discourse

SH pp. 32-3 tragic inversion of shibboleth, corruption of its differential value, from condition of alliance to discriminating limit, policing, normalization, methodical subjugation

p. 46 to bless no one, only chance for an act of faith > otherwise dogma, certainty, judgment

FWT p. 42 mustn’t crush dimensions of living being [biology, cultural] into each other, all life (animal & human) survives by knowing how to discern (btwn forms of life, btwn “living” and “dead”)

DS pp. 236-37 literary criticism, linked to possibility of decidability, to krinein, goes into crisis > Cris de vers

p. 245 “literary criticism” —ontological interpretation of mimesis? krinein proceeds precisely from out of that which is being threatened by the re-tempering (retrempe) of literature

P p. 27 for Kant, problem of communication btwn aesthetic judgment and organic finality is internal

p. 39 for Kant, system of pure philosophy (metaphysics) is not yet possible; only critique is possible, produces krinein, in-between > pure philosophy sews everything up, includes critique w/in

——critique detaches, only a moment, related to desire, pleasure/unpleasure, Spur

question of Urteil, of function of copula

p. 93 paradox of 3rd Critique: singularities must give rise to universalizable judgments > Kant’s free beauty: self-subsisting, always beautiful once

ATIA p. 74 for Descartes, the specter/ghost “conjured” by judgment is simulacrum of “real man,” spectral man as animal-machine, this animal-machine we’re trying to “flush out”

***p. 136 no human, no animal, no God has mastery over erasure of trace, nor power to “judge” its erasure

SW p. 346 “this very mild, this terrible Paul” > whose monstrous progeniture are our history/culture, he points to nature & tells us to judge for ourselves [re: woman wearing veils]

CHM pp. 308-09n no error in perception for Descartes, only in will of judgment [like Aristotle]

TR p. 100 disturbing proximity btwn pardon & last judgment (which pardon is not, pardon does not judge, foreign to courtroom), as close as possible to verdict

AFR p. 107 for Condillac, error & obscurity only in judgment not perception [like Aristotle, like Descartes]

LI p. 158n jugement dautorité: preferred method/practice of all dogmatism

BSi p. 148 if bêtise not an error (bad judgment) but hebetated (dulled) judgment, aptitude for wrong judgment, it could be there in absolute knowledge [stupidity of encyclopedic knowledge]

p. 149 if bêtise is not an error [Deleuze’s stance], no pragamatic use of bêtise does not refer (if obscurely) to abyss of jus (justice, justness, judge) [not faulty judgment but judgment of judge, judgment from which one expects some justness]

p. 168 from apophantics to apophatics: trying to describe bêtise [vertigo]

OG p. 351n Rousseau & Descartes [Aristotle too]: our senses never deceive us, only our judgments

EU p. 105 Kant’s “heroic” effort to mark off juridical borders btwn 2 classes of [university] faculties > freedom of judgment, philosophy, the unconditioned condition w/out which there is no university

JUSTICE

GOD p. 99 if you are not pure of heart, if your justice does not exceed the men of letters, you wont receive your wages (mercedem), your salary, your great reward

p. 114 Nietzsche’s diagnosis of cruelty is also aimed at economy, speculation, commercial trafficking in institution of morality & justice, & that which exceeds economy as exchange, le commerce du re-merciement [wage, profit of infinite]

——and Christianity’s self-destruction of justice by means of grace

p. 150 story of flood, of Noah, hesitate forever btwn justice & perversion: God won’t forgive himself for the fault in man, for man’s desire, regrets his creation

GT p. 138 laws turn gift into exchange, economy, contractual circulation, (distributive) justice

p. 171 a gift is not signed, does not calculate w/ a time that would do it justice

R p. 39 ultrapolitical (democracy not only political—btwn law and justice)

p. 77 [Nietzsche-like?] [Derrida by way of Aristotle by way of Plato] the “just more than one,” a god among men, not a part of a whole or calculable series; law, calculability, would betray justice for those who are the law > fable of sovereignty returns

pp. 84-85 no justice, neither political nor ethical, when following calculated law like automatic machine

p. 88 justice w/ disjointure: out of joint, interruption of relation, unbinding > infinite secret of the other, threatens a communitarian idea of justice [See SPOM p. 30 joining is a thinking of injunction] [hetergeneous inseparability of law & justice developed in FL, then SPOM in discussion w Heidegger's dikē (gathering, harmony, adjoining)]

p. 220 the impossible (“to let the dead bury their dead”) is possible, absolute evil (fully present life which doesn’t want to hear/know death), takes place (peut avoir lieu) > on basis of this terrible possibility, justice is desirable (through but also beyond law, right) [cf. HST p. 399]

FK p. 56 messiancity w/out messianism, the event, [from desert] opening to the future, to the coming of the other as the advent of justice

p. 60n Derrida thinks Justice in relation to a sundering (déliaison), an always-safe, always-to-be-saved possibility of secret of disassociation, rather than bringing-together (Versammlung) re: dikē

FL p. 233 “enforce the law:” justice as law needs force

p. 235 why deconstruction is about justice

p. 238 Pascal/Montaigne: a powerless justice is not a justice [see ROP p. 125n Montaigne/Pascal on mystical foundation of law]

p. 240 authority of laws rests on credit granted to them, this justice of law, justice as law, is not justice

***p. 243 the possibility of deconstruction which is btwn justice & law

——deconstruction is possible as an experience of the impossible, wherever one can replace, translate, determine the X of justice, wherever there is (the undeconstructible)

——justice is undeconstructible [see SPOM p. 33 deconstruction’s injunction, where it takes shape, its reaffirmed affirmation: thinking gift of undeconstructible justice]

pp. 247-49 double movement of deconstruction re: justice:

1. task of historical and interpretive memory is at heart of deconstruction, decons. is pledged, engaged (gageé, engagée) by demand for infinite justice, denouncing theoretical limits, where good conscience stops dogmatically, & denouncing concrete injustices

2. responsibility before memory is responsibility before concept of responsibility that regulates justice/appropriateness of our behavior, an epokhē of credit or credibility of axioms on property, intentionality, will, freedom, self, person, etc.

***p. 248 justice addresses itself to the singularity of the other, despite or because it pretends toward universality [?][See MONL; injustice: to judge the other based on a language they can’t understand]

p. 249 anguishing moment of suspense [who will claim to be just by economizing on anguish?], interval of spacing, in which revolutions take place [cf. GLAS p. 207]

p. 250 Levinas speaks of infinite right, “Jewish humanism,” disproportion of justice, holiness (sainteté), but Derrida moves away in the context of FL

***p. 251 justice and law are not a true distinction because justice demands law [WTP]

***p. 254 the justice of deconstruction is invincible to all skepticism: accepts madness and mysticism, deconstruction existed as justice before it became an academic discourse

——justice is infinite because irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other before any contract, parce quelle est venue (because it has come, because it is a coming)

pp. 255-56 all constatives presuppose a performative: “I promise to make a sentence for you” > presuppose an act of justice, w/ irreducible thoughtlessness and unconsciousness in such urgency

——Derrida relates this to Levinas’ “la vérité suppose la justice (truth supposes justice),” “la justice, il ny a que ça de vrai” (dangerously parodying French idiom), and Saint Augustine’s idea that truth must be “made” [cf. AF p. 59 Augustine makes truth again, & again cf. POO p. 26]

p. 256 rigorously distinguish “to-come” from future, which loses openness, loses coming of other, w/out which there’s no justice, la justice reste à venir, elle a à venir, elle est à-venir

p. 257 incalculable justice commands calculation

——perhaps justice: the experience of absolute alterity, unpresentable, the chance of the event and the condition of history

——justice is all fields: literary, ethical, etc.

p. 289 for Benjamin, what is sacred is the justice of life not mere life

H p. 27 “justice is heterogeneous to the law to which it is yet so close, from which in truth it is indissociable”

p. 73 becoming-law of justice

AF pp. 77-8 injustice of the justice of the one, the unique, violence of unity

p. 76 Yerushalmi: justice is the opposite of forgetting, the direction of memory

SPOM p. xviii no justice w/out principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, devant les fantômes de ceux qui ne sont pas encore nés ou qui sont déjà morts > possibility provided by “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present”

p. xix to be just: a spectral moment, untimely

p. xx commitment of justice, to whom? to life (natural life, life of spirit) of living being > that this is irrefutable carries justice beyond present life, non pas vers la mort mais vers une sur-vie, where life & death are traces of traces

——alors il y a de l’esprit, des esprits, et il faut compter avec eux > le plus d’un

p. 26 only “our time,” the epoch, doesn’t happen in anachrony [?], especially when “things aren’t going well” > but, w/ other, isn’t this disjuncture the very possibility for the good, the just, to be announced, possibility of the other?

——how to distinguish btwn the disjuncture of the unjust and the disjuncture that opens up the infinite asymmetry of the relation to the other, the place for justice?

——a justice beyond the economy of repression, not distributive, not calculable equality, outside of the economy of vengeance, incalculability of the gift and singularity, the an-economic ex-position to others

p. 27 a trajectory without heading, assurance, a trajectory of a precipitation which trembles, vibrates, orients, disorients: the question here addressed to us under the name justice

pp. 27-8 Heidegger on dikē as accord, joining, harmony (Die Fuge (joint) ist der Fug) thought on basis of presence (als Anwesen gedacht) vs. adikia as out of joint (aus der Fuge), error of stupidity

p. 30 Heidegger especially wants to wrest gift away from spirit of revenge, where people equate the just (das Gerechte) w/ the avenged (das Gerächte)

pp. 30-33 [via Heidegger on dikē, on gift w/out debt] heterogeneity of pre—, absolute precedence rendered to singularity of other, irreducible possibility of Un-Fug, anachronic disjointure, what comes before me, as in, comes from the future: the very coming of the event

——relation of deconstruction to justice, to what must be rendered to singularity of other w/out debt, w/out duty

pp. 31-5 [Derrida wrestles with Heidegger’s take on dikē, jointure, and its relation to adikia, disjointure or injustice, wondering if he skews the relation in favor of possibility of favor]

p. 32 wouldn’t thinking the gift as justice, as what one does not have (Plotinus), and comes back or belongs to the other, risk inscribing “whole movement” of justice in presence, coming into presence? [Heidegger’s gathering]

pp. 32-3 deconstruction takes shape in thinking gift and undeconstructible justice > always risking evil, expropriation and injustice, only way to render justice to the other as other, the irreducible possibility of Un-Fug

p. 33 Marx’s legacy: the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice, messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy

p. 34 despite so many precautions, Heidegger runs risk of reducing justice to juridical-moral rules when he prioritizes gathering to the same over disjunction w/ its cinders

p. 37 “there is the pledge (il y a le gage),” even before, perhaps, a decision confirms it > responds w/out delay to demand of justice

p. 112 “a deconstructive thinking, the one that matters to me here, has always pointed out the irreducibility of affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the undeconstructibility of a certain idea of justice…”

p. 220 the impossible (“to let the dead bury their dead”) is possible, absolute evil (fully present life which doesn’t want to hear/know death), takes place (peut avoir lieu) > on basis of this terrible possibility, justice is desirable (through but also beyond law, right) [cf. HST p. 399]

HERP p. 95 Heidegger, translating justice (dikē) as Fuge (joint, accord, coupling), wonders how adikia can give justice > the gift of what we don’t have as only gift possible

SH pp. 65-6 circumcision: decision of the word—inscribed in the body—just in the heart (precisely)

POOF pp. 63-4 Derrida reads Nietzsche [re: GS 61] as advocating acceptance of gift & dependency, elevating logic of gift above self-sufficiency of a subject [Greek philosopher who refuses King’s donation], a logic that reorients friendship, calling friendship back to irreducibility of other—but perhaps this installs an irresponsible freedom, madness (friend–enemy), the worst?

——temptation to match Nietzsche’s gesture, call he seems to be making for another justice, one that breaks w/ equivalence of right & vengeance: what’re political consequences for democracy?

——what would an equality be that no longer calculates? exceeding all reappropriation of the proper

p. 91 for Plato, ideal state only occurs when philosopher (that is, justice) is bound to power > though this is out of reach, it must be described, because ideal gives meaning to every term/concept of political philosophy

pp. 196-97 [quasi-thesis of POOF] a justice that cares for the humanity in the human (a principle of infinity) would destroy finite proportionality that ordains calculation of worth, in this way it resembles Montaigne’s friendship > it doesn’t, however, in the sense that Montaigne’s disproportion is extremely rare, inegalitarian heteronomy remains in tact: what if a certain equality could be saved in respect of dissymmetrical/heteronomic singularities > this equality would be at once calculable/incalculable, it would count on the calculable

p. 201 [re: Aristotle’s distinctions on friendship] let us be more precise, more just

p. 202 Aristotle’s 2 forms of justice: 1) numerical equality (katarithmón), brothers 2) proportional equality (katanalogían), father-son [cf. Aristotle’s Politics]

pp. 205-06 via Aristotle, in friendships trapped btwn pleasure & use, the straight & narrow path (euthōría) [Augustine on Christ] is lacking—makes it difficult to measure the just > as long as love is there, these relationships can function

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

pp. 268-69n Derrida advises spouses who love each other to read Michelet’s Le Peuple [?] in bed at night: husband hesitating to betray justice, wife urging him to save the enemy, sacrifice for her, make her feel young again > Michelet: “woman is always higher or lower than justice”

p. 278 if friendship is above justice, it is as the most just: justice beyond justice

——the 2 dimensions of justice: 1) non-written 2) that codified by law

p. 306 when will we be ready for an experience of freedom & equality that’s capable of respectfully experiencing the friendship that would at last be just, just beyond law, measured against its measurelessness? > “O my democratic friends…”

FWT pp. 80-1 Derrida likes Heidegger’s positioning justice outside law but not its harmony w/ injustice > thinking justice on basis of logos, gathering, accord, Being as presence; for Derrida, harshness of justice—infinite disjunction demands its right, out of joint

pp. 81-2 Derrida faithful to one of the “spirits of Marx,” idea of justice beyond failures of communism

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

p 229n Levinas justifies lex talionis > a “message of universalism,” not a reveling in revenge, seeks only justice

ATIA p. 112 why did Levinas never imagine the animal occupying place of the 3rd party, thus the 1st appeal to justice? > never an other other than the other human

DPi p. 68 sovereign exception & DP > is state, third party, witness already there in singular, savage, secret crime, when murderer claims to do ones own or to do oneself justice? where does murder begin?

——both abolitionists and proponents of DP allow logic of exception

p. 80 Kant: no justice in strict legal sense if not bound by punishment

p. 208(n) medicalization is Christic, medicalization of justice (balm/oil replace iron/fire) is done in the figure, history & narrative of Christ

pp. 230-31 vengeance/justice? kill for a reason—you are agent of DP; kill for no reason—not even guilty

p. 265 Beccaria’s human justice, utilitarianism (divine justice is inaccessible to men, only God can put to death): equality & common utility are nature of human justice

p. 271 CI (and thus DP) is priceless, w/out interest, so Beccaria’s utilitarianism is not the law, is pathological; for Kant, justice can’t be evaluated, transcendent to calculation, to price of life, priceless > transcendence (maybe) of the “sur,” surviving beyond life (drive)

REST p. 381 can a ghost (fantôme) be attributed as “the ghost-of”? > no distributive justice for this tribute: shoes always open to unconscious of the other, never possessed, still less kept (garder)

DST DST p. 201 désistancela juste démesure (precise inordinancy), strange measure (une étrange mesure)

p. 209 de Man’s “no blind spot (tache aveugle)” in Rousseau made Derrida impatient > but impatience should incite one to take one’s time, impatience is never justified

p. 220 Lacoue-Labarthe (w/ rigor & prudence) follows folds of what can no longer be called scene, period, history—a deportation whose measurelessness (démesure) seems to defy hope of judgment/justice > and yet, there’s an il faut, there’s philosophy & its law

TR pp. 125-26 violence of “I”: irreducibly singular, yet nothing more universal, anonymous

——w/ reference to unjust justice [phrase Derrida admits having stolen from de Man], where the law suspends reference right as it requires it, where chacun, “each one,” is appropriated (always theft/deceit) in utterance “I” > all justice begins in perjury

p. 126 since every “I” is an “I”——tout autre est tout autre as the same: (the) I can betray w/out least appearance becoming manifest > substitution “I” for “I”: root of perjury

p. 297n Rousseau’s interest in justice of inheritance/reading: responsible countersignature

WAP pp. 58-60 hyperjuridicism of philosophy, question of quid juris, right to judge the judge, the right of right, the justice of justice [cf. FL]

IW p. 296 soldier’s conscience: national development serves universal justice

PSSS p. 251 Kant (said this better than anyone): no right w/out coercion

——juridical decision approaches ideal of justice to extent that the community has at its disposal force of constraint to command respect for its ideal

***HST pp. 382, 396 story of 2 Jewish enemies who forgive each other, fake it, “for laughs,” des justes assez justes to avow that they can’t forgive

p. 388 the 3rd intrudes when 2 absolutes exchange place; the 3rd, question of justice, immediately betrays other’s finite-infinite singularity > thus: congenital perjury of justice

——must ask forgiveness for being just

——forgiveness for infidelity at heart of fidelity—suffice to say “at the heart”

TN pp. 56-7 madness: [Nancy] “world is its own rejection,” condition of thinking the event > just madness, call for different thinking of the just

p. 310 “consentement exaspéré,” un salut exespéré (ex-hoped for salvation), un salut juste à venir (a just salut to come, a salut just on its way…), un salut sans salvation, worthy of the name

ATM p. 170 Levinas: in the just war waged against war, trembling, relaxed virility w/out cowardice—passivity more passive than any passivity

AD p. 10 for Levinas, relate to tout autre by way of heteronymous curvature > relation to other— justice

pp. 29-30 the 3rd, illeity of 3rd (not the 3rd man), begins justice, comes w/out waiting [w/out delay of differance?], affects face to face, but doesn’t interrupt the “welcome of the face”

pp. 33-4 violence of pure face to face (hospitable welcome, narcissistic closing [renfermement]): in double bind w/ the 3rd (protects against vertigo of ethical violence while violating its purity)

——pure face to face as oath (serment) before the letter, debt before every contract or loan (emprunt), must perjure itself in bind w/ 3rd: in operation of justice can no longer distinguish btwn fidelity of oath & perjury of false witness

——justice as law begins w/ perjury > violates; sigh of just man: “Quai-je à faire avec la justice?”

p. 110 exceeding and obsessing the political/juridical: beyond law in the law > everything face exceeds marks demand for justice as law (law of justice must bend to itself)

p. 118 Levinas’ ContraDiction, intimate caesura but also respiration of saying > non-dialectizable justice

CF p. 43 equivocality, heterogeneity, confusion btwn order of forgiveness & order of justice [juridical] > one can mimic scene of “immediacy,” quasi-automatic forgiveness, to escape justice

——forgiveness has nothing to do w/ [State] judgment or public/political sphere

BSi p. 8 Pascal: justice w/out force is impotent

p. 10 the Thing (Heidegger’s Ding) as Cause, place of assemblies, debates, decisions of justice

p. 108 Derrida has attempted [throughout the years] to oppose/distinguish justice from right > obligation to le plus dissemblable, the méconnaissable—monstrously other: beginning of ethics, Law, is not human

——so long as there is recognizability & fellow, ethics is dormant

pp. 109-10 is Derrida just widening the parameters of “fellow”? no, the monstrously other binds me to the nonliving & inscribes concept of death in life > do we find a comparable obligation to the dead in murder of primal father [Freud]?

p. 149 if bêtise is not an error [Deleuze’s stance], no pragamatic use of bêtise does not refer (if obscurely) to abyss of jus (justice, justness, judge) [not faulty judgment but judgment of judge, judgment from which one expects some justness]

KAFKA

BL p. 184 Kafka: law’s generosity, it accepts only so you feel you haven’t omitted anything

p. 189 “Before the Law”: the meta-structure of the title itself

p. 204 messengers/interrupters—attendants

p. 209 read “Before the Law” w/in elliptic envelop of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason & Freud’s Totem and Taboo

p. 210 Kant like Kafka knows the law is an idiom for you—never general

pp. 216-220 Derrida’s mise en abyme w/ Trial

KANT

FK p. 87 Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

FL p. 254 “idea of justice” not Kant’s regulative idea, or an any other messianic promise of the same type (messianic promise w/ content) (i.e. Kantian, eschato-teleology of neo-Hegelian type, Marxist, Jewish, Christian or Islamic type)

p. 255 Kant’s regulative idea is a horizon (opening and a limit)

BL p. 190 Kant: typology, symbolic presentation of moral good (beauty, a symbol of morality), respect for law which only appears in law > “as if” in maxim: reconciles practical reason w/ historical teleology (narrative), w/ possibility of unlimited progress

OOG pp. 134-35 for anticipation to leap to the infinite, it must already be ideal, anticipation authorizes and prescribes presence for consciousness of an Idea in the Kantian Sense (not imaginary)

p. 136 “again and again” places math in infinite task > grounded by Living Present: primordial Absolute in an indefinite protention, animated and unified by Idea (in the Kantian Sense)

p. 138 phenomenology stretched btwn finitizing consciousness of its principle & infinitizing consciousness of its final institutions: the Endstiftung indefinitely deferred in its content but evident in its regulative value

——no phenomenology of Idea, it is the possibility of evidence and openness of “seeing” itself

[see Husserl quote on p. 139]

p. 141 phenomenology: starts from a lived anticipation [Idea in Kantian sense would be operative not thematic] as radical responsibility absent in Kant

SPOM p. 81 undetermined messianic hope, ce rapport eschatologique à lavenir, at heart of democracy and communism, concept[s] or promise[s] that arise in a diastema (“out of joint”), a “to come” in future present, not a Kantian regulating idea that would retain future modality of the living present

VM p. 120 Idea in Kantian sense [Husserl] as infinite overflowing of horizon, never equal to intuition of an object, even God’s intuition [?]

——in phenomenology there’s no constitution of horizons only horizons of constitution

OH pp. 68-9 [threatened] ideality in capitalization: that which exceeds borders of sensible, opens onto infinite, gives rise to universal, “maxim of maximization,” nothing other than spirit itself

p. 78 democracy to-come not a Kantian regulative idea, not a certain future, but a democracy that has structure of promise > memory of that which carries the to-come here and now

P p. 110 in Kant, sans of free beauty compressed/oriented by regulatory idea of maximal consensus among men [universal?]

GSP p. 160 for Husserl, pure truth missed when accounted for in historical totality, finite totality, factual totality > truth must open to infinite idea (Kant), w/out any limits, absolute, universal

p. 162 exactitude of math vs. rigor of eidetic descriptive science (inexact or “anexact”) > phenomenology cannot be closed: infinite idea (in the Kantian sense) keeps open > this idea is the production of exactitude [essences of phenomena possibility of closure?]

p. 167 Telos/Vorhaben > infinite theoretical anticipation & infinite practical task: Kantian Idea as project of phenom.? makes it possible by overflowing its system (as its end?) > doesn’t enclose genesis of Being & meaning—is structurally genesis itself: origin/becoming, birth of history

PIO pp. 42-3 Schelling’s invention, re: philosopher as an inventor of forms, still limited as invention of the same in guise of supplement of invention: man’s invention supplements God’s ideality: man as psyche of God, as supplying the lack in his revelation

——here, invention caught in infinite amortization, rationalistic humanism, carries out God’s program; human invention as desire of/for God [Kantlike?]

EU p. 57 Kant’s bio-architectural idea of the university, a living organism: architectonics as organic scientificity, bio-technological > this harmony (btwn State power & Faculty of Philosophy), as regulative idea, inspires Kant’s politics of university

KHORA from KHORA

KH p. 89-90 khōra as a name that announces the Other of the name, not logos, not mythos, neither this nor that, both this & that: “not lying when I say this” is that telling the truth?

——participates (while being excluded) in the intelligible in an aporetic way, genre beyond genre

p. 91 double exclusion (neither this nor that), participation (both this & that), can we transport this logic, para-logic from one set to another

——displacement from type of existent thing to type of discourse via metonymy (sensible/intelligible > mythos/logos)

—— khōra, discourse on genre, genos (ethnos), gens, it is a triton genos [other 2 genus’: 1) immutable 2) sensible]

pp. 92-3 khōra as mother, nurse; but khōra doesn’t get along w/ rhetoric, metaphor, more situating than situated: no longer belongs to horizon of sense, nor meaning of being

p. 93 leave khōra untranslated, thinking & translation here traverse the same experience/experiment (expérience): “place,” “location,” “region,” “country” & its figures, “mother,” “nurse,” “receptacle,” “imprint-bearer” [see p. 126, these figures not even true figures]

——[re: inevitable anachronism, teleological retrospection, of translating khōra] Heidegger falls prey in spite of himself [see p. 147n Heidegger: Platonic philosophy prepared move from khōra and Ort (place, topos) to “space (Raum)” defined by extension (Ausdehnung)]

pp. 146-47n the opposition btwn proper & figurative, relevance of rhetorical code [use of metaphor for that which defies metaphor] meets a limit w/ khōra

p. 147n Heidegger: khōra as that which withdraws, “makes place” for something else

p. 94 structural law: inevitability of tropology & anachronism, [desire for] totalizing apprehension of interpretations of khōra [re: translating, thinking khōra]

——w/ no essence, how could khōra be beyond its name? it anachronizes being, and it is like nothing, there beyond its name

pp. 94-5 giving form to khōra, schematizing, repeats Plato’s discourse, in which skhemata are the forms which inform khōra, the forms are of it w/out belonging to it

p. 95 khōra never reached, broached [entamer?], touched, exhausted: not subject, not subjectile

——a virginity rebellious against anthropomorphism, not order of eidos or mimemes

pp. 95-96 does not give or receive by letting itself be conceived, perhaps we can think reception (dekhomai, dekhomenon) via khōra

p. 96 es gibt always implicated in negative theology (in its Christian history?); what there is, there, is not; p. 97 there is khōra, but the khōra does not exist [importance of article]

——khōra: something which is not a thing, escapes from order of multiplicities (genus, species, individual type)

p. 97 risk of feminizing khōra, a female proper name?

——khōra must keep its impropriety, having nothing of its own, this is what we must keep for it

p. 98 khōra can’t receive the female gender she’s given

——difference btwn calling it/her (elle) in the same manner & calling it/her by the same name [khōra], difference btwn appellation (discourse) & name? is Timaeus an example of this difference or exemplary?

pp. 98-99 entire discourse on khōra, every yet-to-come history of interpretations, included in advance, this X receives all, teleologically programs history of hermeneutics[?], is that a history?

p. 99 khōra possesses all she receives but not as properties

p. 100 khōra beyond ontological, to give place w/out donor-subject giving something to someone [GT]

——silhouette of a “logic,” impossible to formalize, is this “bastard” logos [outside logic of noncontradiction] mythos?

pp. 103-04 khōra as abyss, mise en abyme, gaping hole, not exactly chaos or fright, but not Gaia, foundation, either > abyss in encyclopedic logic [of Timaeus], regulates all sites (lieux) on its edges (jobs in society, region, territory, country)

p. 104 mise en abyme of discourse on khōra, site of politics, politics of sites; and other that would not be their other [Hegel’s other]

p. 105 guardians of city have nothing of their own just like khōra? and the city takes all measures so no parent can recognize their own (child) > a site where law of proper no longer has meaning

p. 106 Derrida less concerned w/ art of Plato [re: mises en abyme of khōra and politics] but in a constraint, a programme, the being-programme of the programme, the being-logical of logic: Plato apprehends them as such, though in a dream, put en abyme

pp. 106-09 belonging of genos [true citizens, philosophers, politicians] to proper place guarantees truth of its logos & action, different to Sophists who have no place, wander

——Socrates speaks as true citizen while identifying w/ Sophist, feigns, simulacrum: tells you, you alone have place, gives you the floor > excludes himself by himself by giving back the word; no room for specialists of nonplace or simulacrum in the agora

p. 109 Socrates as khōra, 3rd genus, for he only resembles the genus of those w/ no place

——Heidegger: khōra prepares way for “Cartesian space”

***p. 110-11 Socrates effaces himself before those he addresses to receive all (pandekhēs), what kind of reception is this? Kantian intuitus derivativus or pure sensibility, the gift of hospitality?

——w/ Socrates still sense of debt, gift & counter-gift: he is ready to receive the discourses of which he becomes welcoming > khōra glimpse beyond debt?

p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

——is Socrates someone, something, play of proper names more abyssal than ever, “who are you, Khōra?

p. 112 en abyme reflected w/out limit, feeling of dizziness, up against inside face of what wall: chaos, chasm, khōra

p. 113 khōra as myth w/in myth, inscribed for a moment, while having a bearing on the place of inscription, oneiric, bastard reading, heterogenous to philosopho-mytheme which orders myth to its philosophical telos

abyss of khōra doesn’t open all at once, fracture of abyss announced in muted, subterranean way, preparing, propagating simulacra & mises en abymes

what Marx calls “Egyptian model” [fn refers to unpublished seminar on khōra & Marx, Hegel], ekmageion, print-bearer, imprint, seal

pp. 114-15 in Timaeus, Greeks who have no writing (unlike Egyptians), need myth (destined to perpetual childhood) > memory of city, its salvation, entrusted to the writing of the other [who is the master here?]

p. 115 oral maze inscribed in place which receives everything, Timaeus, addressed to “the one who, as we do, and before us [see p. 117], receives everything,” in this theory of receptions—Socrates

p. 116 [re: a logic of living memory in Timaeus] effacement (of secondary impressions) would be the figure for the middle (mil-lieu), both for space and time, would not affect originary impression (that of child), ineffaceable once engraved in virgin wax

***——what about a virgin wax that is always virgin, always older, preceding any possible impression, and thus younger, achronic, anachronistic [cf. SW pp. 322-23]

pp. 116-17 each narrative content (fable, legend, myth, fiction) becomes in turn a different tale, each tale a receptacle, harboring/lodging (hypodokhè), the most insistent determination of khōra

but there is no tale of her, a secret w/out secret remains forever impenetrable à son sujet

——structure of inclusion in Timaeus: included [2nd] fiction, the theme of the prior fiction, which is its [the 2nd fiction’s] including form, its [the 2nd fiction’s] receptacle > mythopoetic string of events [see p. 121 each fiction as content given form in receptacle of another]

pp. 124-25 khōra is compared to mother & nurse, not part of oppositional couple, 3rd genus, does not belong to “race of women (genos gynaikōn), mother w/out engendering, not an origin, a before signifying no temporal anteriority [intelligible/sensible looks like father/son couple]

——relation of interval, of spacing to it what is lodged in it to be received

pp. 125-26 backwards steps (retours en arrière), rhythm of Timaeus, go beyond, under philosophical logos, normal couple, to a third, a bastard, hybrid, orphan (khōra) > necessary but not true

p. 125 khōra so virginal it doesn’t even have the figure of a virgin anymore

***p. 126 because philosophy can’t speak truly of that which looks like the mother, it speaks only of father/son, as if father engendered son all its own

p. 127 Plato never qualified khōra as matter (hylè) like Aristotle did

KHORA

MONL p. 71 [Derrida’s quilting point?] passage points = places of transcendence, absolute elsewhere in eyes of Greco-Latino-Christian philosophy & yet inside it > epekeina tes ousias, khōra, negative theology, Freud, Artaud, Blanchot, Levinas, Eckhart

R p. 82 khōra or spacing before any reappropriation by a theologico-political history or revelation, even before negative theology (which is fundamentally linked to Christianity)

——democracy-to-come would be like khōra of political

SPOM p. 212 figure of absolute hospitality: strange, familiar, inhospitable > quasi-transcendental “messianism,” materialism w/out substance, materialism of the khōra for a despairing “messianism,” a curious taste of death, a foretaste (avant-goût), curious of what it conjures

POOF pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

p. 290 great canonical meditations on friendship (Cicero, Montaigne, Blanchot) all belong to experience of mourning > through the irreplaceable of the named, they always advance in testimonial order to confide/refuse death of unique to a universalizable discourse > simultaneously found/destabilize all oppositions, opens to abyss, se fracture

POO p. 27 taste for secret histories, secret like khōra, outside all periodization, all epochalization

FK pp. 55-56 desert, nocturnal light, before “link” of religare (man to man & man to god), condition of link, most anarchivable, the holding back, Verhaltenheit, responsibility of repetition in wager (gage) of decision or affirmation (re-legare), a fiduciary “link” before all positive religion, prior to opposition btwn sacred/profane: “messianic,” or “chora”

p. 57 khōra, place of absolute exteriority, and place of bifurcation btwn 2 approaches to the desert > [Derrida links Platonic, Plotinian epekeina tes ousias to Christian act of birth]

p. 58 khōra exterior to all historical revelation, all anthropo-theological experience

p. 59 khōra, secret, desert of the desert (last desert, before the first), neither a threshold nor a mourning, btwn event and possibility, or virtuality of the event, not the desert of revelation

——a khōra w/out faith or law, an utterly faceless other

——khōra is nothing but not nothing in which anxiety of Dasein would still be open to question of Being > immemoriality of a desert

p. 100 [bottom w/out bottom of always virgin impassibility] khōra of tomorrow in languages we no longer, don’t yet, speak: makes way w/out generosity, neither divine, nor human > dispersion of ashes not promised there, nor death given

BL p. 208-09 law becomes something by being a nothing that constantly defers access to itself [tabernacle]; atopology [khōra] erases event, annuls the event, nullification gives birth to the law

HASD p. 31 the 2 paradigms of Greek “negative theology”: epekeina tes ousias of Republic, khora of Timaeus

——epekeina tes ousias as excess beyond Being, inauguration of Good > has more affinity with Christian apophases [Dionysus] than khora

pp. 34-6 khōra—“third species” > gives place, atemporality itself of spacing

pp. 35-6 khōra as metaphor—woman (1st strategy); khōra as negative theology (2nd strategy): Derrida favors 2nd strategy because it calls attention to possibility beyond metaphor

p. 37 “spacing of khora introduces a dissociation or a difference in the proper meaning that it renders possible, thereby compelling tropic detours which are no longer rhetorical figures”

——khōra as receptivity, receptacle, transcends opposition btwn figurative and proper meaning

***——radically nonhuman, atheological, khōra is not the es of giving (es gibt), before all subjectivity, doesn’t create/produce, not even an event [avoid anthropo-, theomorphic schemas]

p. 38 one respects khora by always calling it in the same way, not limited to same name > a phrase is necessary

***p. 39 khora, neither an event nor a giving, neither an order nor a promise, the wholly other (tout autre), neither transcendent, absolutely distanced, nor immanent and close

——unique address of khora is not a prayer, a celebration, or an encomium, does not speak to You

——Good [more Christian like] is formless like khora, but gives form unlike khora, which doesn’t engender

pp. 39-40 historicity, événemantialité > significations foreign to khora

pp. 48-9 prayer, quotation of prayer, & apostrophe weave same text > there is a text because of this repetition, this place is the event, future of what is promised, initiated, not motionless like khora

contrary to khora, Christian apophasis is initiated by event of revelation which is also a promise, Jerusalem as place of event, place is event

p. 50 seal: figures the figuration of the unfigurable itself, seal as imprint displaces typography of khora > khora—makes copies of paradigm; seal—valid for entire text of creation

pp. 50-51 khora is not valid for all of creation (not physical) only types for Paradigms

p. 54 Heidegger says Plato’s khora fell short of thinking the place (Ort), preparing the way for Cartesian space [Derrida thinks this statement is problematic & reductive]

——but 17 years later, Heidegger says, “[hē khōra] heisst der Ort,” and refers to Plato’s khōrismos as the difference of place (die verschiedene Ortung) btwn Being and beings

A A p. 7 pas [belongs to French?] involves the line that terminates all determination, peras (end, limit) not telos, puts us on path beyond, on other side, peraō eis khoran (penetrate into place, country)

p. 10 true hospitality is to receive hospitality from your guest (infinity lost in abyss of endekhomenon, the entire meditation of khora in Timaeus)

p. 11 [khora receives, permits all crossings?]

PP PP pp. 159-60 origin of the world as a trace, a receptacle, womb, matrix, w/out any form of presence or presence of form, because this would be an inscription w/in the mother

——“Plato’s metaphors”? passage beyond all “Platonic” oppositions, toward aporia of originary inscription

p. 161 la khōra est grosse de tout ce qui se dissémine ici, inscription produces the son and at the same time the constitution of structurality

PAS PAS p. (81) she/it has no place, only what comes before place, what places itself before the place of every proper name (the Thing, pronoun, prénom)

VP pp. 71-2 for Husserl, intuition of time is a reception that receives nothing, an originary impression that engenders itself, a pure spontaneity, which creates nothing

S p. 8 Derrida has problems w/ Heidegger’s interpretation of khōra in Introduction to Metaphysics

p. 127n Meister Eckhart: Augustine says Gemüt is like a receptacle (sloz) of spiritual images

FSW pp. 200-01 Freud wants to maintain a permanence of trace and the virginity of the receiving substance [see pp. 204, 223] > such apparatus almost unimaginable

——Φ neurones (no trace of impression, perceptual), Ψ neurones (retain trace)

pp. 221-22 Freud’s interest in finding virginal writing surface, a slate that does not conserve imprints, erases traces

T p. xxvii khōra—as tympanum, watches over its margins as virgin, homogenous, negative space, leaving its outside outside, w/out mark, w/out opposition > ready to receive and repercuss type

OTO p. 38 mother is the faceless figure of a figurant, an extra, gives rise to all figures by becoming anonymous, everything addresses/destines itself to her, she survives, as long she’s at bottom

GSP pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

O p. 16 in thus remaining [outside of oppositions, i.e. sensible/intelligible], does a preface exist? son espacement (préface à une relecture) sécarte au lieu de la khōra > remarkable limen of the text: what can be read of dissemination > limen: mark, march, margin, mise en marche: citation

C pp. 216-17 Titus-Carmel not like demiurge in Timaeus, who contemplates an unproduced, precedent paradigm, program of its forms: T-C deprives paradigm of its imperious transcendence, risks raising himself up as father’s father, ancestor of himself > but, in killing the paradigm, he kills his product, and thus his paternity: broken lineage: plus de famille, no command (stick [in English]), w/out archy or hierarchy (Khōra and its link to the bastard [?]) [baby daddy]

TN p. 49 Mary: Christianity’s indeconstructible [?]

p. 262 Derrida tempted to let himself be tempted to think, to desire, the least venial, least expiable temptation: substitution w/out sacrifice > would the neutral spacing (the khōra) offer hospitality to this substitution of substitution or detain it forever as a hostage?

***WOG p. 35 khōra, utterly resistant to historical narrative, not eternal or ahistorical like intelligible idea > radically foreign to all oppositions & heterogenous to epekeina tēs ousias (the one that doesn’t participate in Being, gives rise to history, narratives, myths, Good and God)

p. 36 khōra, non-event, a place or a taking place, an-ontological, an-anthropo-theological; epekeina tēs ousias, event > fragile limit btwn certain event & non-event

p. 37 hen diapheron heautôi (Heraclitus) is Greek heritage Derrida is most faithful to, tries to think this “one differing from itself” alongside (“improbably”) the khōra > the very event of the même, the soi-même: under this sign, Derrida contrasted differance to ontological difference [cf. D p. 22]

SPEC p. 346-47 neither permanent traces nor resistance in [Freud’s] Perception-Consciousness (free circulation of energy w/out obstacle or binding), permanent trace supposes frayage (Bahnung) and an overcome resistance

KING

R p. 16 for Aristotle, the One [i.e. Prime Mover] is above multiplicity, we should not all be kings, Aristotle’s against polykoirania

pp. 20-21 roué qualifies one who turns a trick, the voyou (rogue) w/ his leading astray (dévoiement), debauchery, worklessness, always a seduction, licentious, libertine [always men, sexual difference]

——democracy always associated w/ this figure, w/ taking too many libertine, liberalism, “everything is allowed,” announces a beheading of monarchical sovereignty

pp. 75-7 acc. Statesmen of Plato, Politics of Aristotle, democracy, government of greatest #, is only best when laws are broken, exact reverse of Monarchy

HERP p. 205 Heidegger thinks father as “Erzeuger,” one that produces, makes bloom, thinks king as “waltender Bewahrer,” guardian that governs, rules across, reigns over presence

FWT p. 89 the 2 competing discourses justifying regicide [re: French Revolution]: 1) king is enemy of nation 2) a citizen traitor [porous borders btwn these logics, Schmitt’s “partisan”]

pp. 89-90 for Kant, nothing more ruinous for foundations of sovereignty than “formal” regicide; ——was king killed or just his body? (“formal” execution, judgement vs. assassination)

p. 143 for Hugo, “social edifice of past” rested on 3 pillars: 1) priest 2) king 3) executioner

PP p. 144n Plato speaks about writing from position of king? while suspecting non-“democratic” politics of writing

DIF DIF p. 22 differance not announced by capital letter, it subverts all kingdoms > everything w/in us that wants a kingdom (le royaume) (that wants to capitalize) fears differance

DPi pp. 100-01 in logic where king has 2 bodies (carnal, immortal), beheading king, splitting king in 2, reduces king to 1 single body: either a noncitizen (public enemy) or citizen traitor

***p. 181 DP: divine weapon granted by sovereign God to sovereign monarch to fulfill providential law

TB p. 123 promise of reconciliation (even if unfulfillable) is a rare & notable event: kingdom is never reached, is untouchable > but the commitment takes place, bequeaths its record

pp. 125-26 for Benjamin, best translation resembles a royal cape, clothes remain separate from body while also wedding it—not wedded to it

——folds of this cape, gown, protect king, it is like his scepter, visibility of law, but what counts (has power) is what’s under the cape (body of king) > don’t assume there’s a phallus underneath

——hermaphrodite: royal cape as wedding gown, king inseparable from royal couple, wedding King & Queen, around which translation quilts, sews, hems, embroiders, busies its tongue

PSSS p. 257 imperative will always be the question of principle, the principle, of sovereign prince, princedom

pp. 259-60 who’s to say our republic is still not monarchical, that instead of a paregicide, the king’s neck was saved, erected by decapitation; never know if States General, at moment of first convocation, condemned or saved king’s head > both gestures indissociable

——condemning/saving inscribe in concepts sovereignty & cruelty an ambiguity as unrelievable as autoimmunity itself: in any paregicide, any Oedipus, any totem + taboo, any republican or democratic installation of brothers, no way to know whether paregicide took place or not, took place w/out taking place, before any question about it [see HYMEN]

——2+n bodies of the king

p. 264 question “What is to be done?”, not foreign to paregicide—beyond cruelty/sovereignty, w/out alibi

p. 265 king, authorized by God, Father of Christ

CF pp. 45-6 right of grace, order of law above law (right beyond right): monarch’s divine right to pardon transcends/neutralizes the law > this [sovereign exception] has been reappropriated into republican heritage

pp. 46-7 for Hegel, only king/sovereign can forgive the unforgivable (a crime against forgiveness, against power to forgive): when ‘body of king’ in his sovereign function is threatened through other ‘body of king,’ his flesh (singular, empirical body)

BSi pp. 29-30 ipseity: king, father, husband, master

p. 194 free sovereignty over social body & one’s own body (like the king’s 2 bodies) > duel w/ marionette transforms winner into a machine (in playing angel, one plays the beast [Pascal])

pp. 285-86 [bibliography re: king’s 2 bodies] king’s living (mortal) body has at its disposal an eternal, celestial, sublime body

——after death, “dignity” of king’s body during lifetime separated from “sovereignty” (majesty) that survives him, is inherited from one king to next

p. 293 visor-effect: king sees w/out [his gaze, origin of his seeing, his eyes] being seen

——[during spectacle of autopsy/sovereignty] an éclat > fragment of light touches everything

p. p. 295 Marin adds 3rd body to king: 1) historical–mortal 2) politico-juridical 3) sacramental > acc. Derrida, #2 allies itself w/ #3

OG p. 91 heliocentric concept of speech, analogical system: king, father, sun, logos > [ethnocentrism of this concept: all other languages delayed logocentrism]

EU p. 12 king: someone who makes you learn his language, in learning it, you countersign his force: power demonstrated through fact of translation > this is a paradigmatic event, not structural necessity of master-slave dialectic

——can only say “I want to speak my mother tongue” in language of the king

***p. 13 relation of linguistic subjugation [forced to share language] to the clearing/controlling of borders, roads, routes, regions, territories [see p. 8 method (odos)] > power of spacing, body of writing, to clear a path (language here is neither secondary nor primary)

p. 44 via Kant, re-enforcement of law always passes by way of dead king

FV p. 457 dead king, Freud, only one to contract w/ himself, awaits restitution > restoration: carrying off last plume w/ his 1st hand [in dying, mobilizes many]: theory of the facteurs

KNOW-HOW

FK p. 83 technical, automatic, machine-like [the possibility of faith, its very chance], a chance that entails risk of radical evil, otherwise it would simply be pure know-how, pure knowledge, annulment of future, programme, proof, predictability, providence

***p. 91 growing disproportion btwn knowledge &. know-how (use of artifacts/protheses of which one is totally ignorant)

OH p. 45 following program—application of know-how > ethics & politics become a technology, no longer order of practical reason or decision, begins to be irresponsible

PIO p. 10 grasp unity of 2 measures of invention: 1) fabula/fictio: art 2) tekhnē, epistemē, istoria, methodos, art, know-how, procedure, knowledge, research

HST p. 392 Levinas: tools suppress intermediary times, contract duration, machines sum up instants, produce speed, echo impatience of desire [modern tools are machines]

E p. 5 for Kant, art is a power, aptitude, property, destiny of man (Geschicklichkeit des Menschen), and is distinguished from science (where to know is to know how to do, to be able to)

BSi pp. 34-5 fable, for, fari, to speak, to say, fabula, something said > make so as to know: 1) bring knowledge to the other 2) give impression, effect, of knowledge, of knowing, simulacrum of knowing: a savoir-faire to “faire savoir where there is no knowing worthy of the name

pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

p. 88 know-how of fox, cunning, know-how to trick, perjure, dissimulate, not make known; p. 90 le savoir-faire sans faire-savoir (know-how w/out making known)

EU pp. 57-8 Kant’s architectonics (of Reason) as internal principle, organic whole or organic purposiveness (finalité), one sets out from a purpose (on part de la fin), as in every organic totality > organic “metaphor” in Critique of Pure Reason presages the 3rd Critique

——if one does not set out from architectonic principle, one only achieves “technical” unity, “know-how”

pp. 207-09 calling for competences that aren’t only theoretical: a know-how, the capacity for performance, that avoids classical institutional calculation > CIPH will encourage “research training,” develop technical competence (database, telematics, “artificial intelligence”) & a new kind of “philosophical” reflection [baby daddy]

KNOWLEDGE (EPISTEMOLOGY,

GOD pp. 91-2 to know thyself, misunderstanding of knowledge, doesn’t know the secret

p. 92 secret of secrecy: we have no knowledge of it, and it is there for no one (et quil nest là pour personne), a secret doesn’t belong, never at home or in its place (chez soi)

——what’s the sense of saying “my” secret, if the secret can only be revealed au tout autre

GT p. 122 condition of knowing, desire to know (ēpistemē, historia rerum gestarum) [which Derrida relates to the possibility of narration], gives rise to history itself (res gestae, Geschehen, Geschichte)

FK p. 43 “religion” involved in reacting antagonistically, re-affirmatively outbidding itself > in this place knowledge & faith bound to each other by band of their opposition

p. 68 temptation of knowledge: to believe not only in what one knows one knows but to know, have faith, in what knowledge is

——the scholar’s (Benveniste’s) scruple, assurance and also hesitation, between the proper meaning and its other > quasi-automatic, machine-like, also religious: restraint of response

p. 83 pure knowledge, pure know-how: annulment of the future

p. 90 knowledge & faith, technoscience & religion, alliance of calculable and incalculable

***p. 91 growing disproportion btwn knowledge &. know-how (use of artifacts/protheses of which one is totally ignorant)

POO p. 23 testimony never reducible to proof, verification, demonstration > knowledge [cf. F p. xxvii]

SPOM p. 45 no progress of knowledge could saturate the opening which has no knowledge

POR p. 4 (130) via Aristotle, knowledge as knowing to learn and to teach

——sight is privileged sense re: knowledge, knowing for sake of knowing linked to sight as senseless sensation (sight privileged even when no praxis in view)

A p. 19 to protect decision or responsibility by knowledge, theoretical assurance, is to transform this experience into deployment of program

SEC p. 320 Husserl’s interest is in purely logical grammar not pure grammar > “the green is or,” unacceptable in context determined by a will to know, still signifies an example of agrammaticality

PP p. 74 writing linked to myth, both contra knowledge (sought w/in oneself)

p. 75 writing as repeating w/out knowing (through a myth [?])

p. 120 Socrates must renounce knowledge as power, passion and pleasure, must consent to die, let his body die, to achieve alētheia, epistēmē, which are also powers

p. 123 dialectical inversion of pharmakon or dangerous supplement makes death à la fois acceptable and null > immortality of soul, acts like antibody, dissipates its terrifying fantasy, le pharmarkon inverti, qui met en fuite tous les épouvantails: origin of epistēmē, opening to truth as possibility of repetition, submission of “greed for life (epithumein zēn)” to law (king, father, chief, capital)

p. 140 (160) knowledge, epistēmē, antidote: remaining measured against hubris, cet entraînment démesuré qui emporte lêtre dans le simulacre, le masque et la fête

p. 146 le père est, le père est (le fils perdu), writing, father is not, suspends question “what is?” > which is always “what is the father?”

VP p. 4 idea of knowledge and theory of knowledge are metaphysical?

p. 22 is sign not the sole thing which falls outside question “what is?” while producing this question

pp. 83-4 knowledge as norm, intuition adequate to its object, already opened by promise, telos, in truth, the pro-visional [difference btwn intuition/intention] as essence of meaning (vouloir-dire), discourse adheres to discursive essence when false, attains its entelechy when true

——“pure logical grammar” > le sens nattend pas la vérité insofar as it expects it (en tant quil lattend)

——[Husserl’s formalism, his “pure logical grammar,” limited by semantic theme, the sense determined on basis of relation to object > telos of epistemological rationality is irreducible origin of idea of pure grammar?]

PAS PAS p. (31) what does one know of force of de-distancing? and if the custody (garde) of knowledge is distanced? word knowledge would be refolded, re-employed > Blanchot’s reploiement formidable

p. (85) the gift w/out knowing (sans le savoir), the sole possible, the impossible

S p. 124n Valéry: knowledge devours everything, turns all to ash

FSW p. 196 repression of writing since Plato constitutes philosophy as epistēmē: truth as unity of logos and phonē > deconstruction of logocentrism not psychoanalysis of philosophy

PPHS p. 81 “why” no longer marks question of “en-vue-de-quoi,” re: telos/eskhaton of signification, nor is it a question of origin

POOF p. 9 for Aristotle, friendship linked to knowledge, science & self-consciousness held (tenue) in pledge, alliance, promise, performative chain [of friendship]

p. 11 for Aristotle, a friend chooses knowing rather than being known, counts, refers, prefers, chooses to love > irreducible difference btwn active/passive, cest elle qui compte et permet de compter

p. 28 Nietzsche’s interruption no longer the knowledge of the dying sage

pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe quà l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

p. 240 question “What is (tí estin) friendship?” & “Who is the friend (either sex)?” is nothing but the question “What is philosophy?”

pp. 241-42 [offering quasi-summary of HERP] moment that originary [Heraclitean] phileîn (accord, favour, solicitude Gunst) becomes jealous, nostalgic tension ‘determined by Eros [órexis]’: the step to philosophy, prepared by sophistry [Plato, Socrates] > is the strange voice of the friend, an ontological call [prior to subject, consciousness, even to Mitsein? see p. 243], interior & w/out, the “what is…?” of philosophy [?]

——as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

pp. 249 possibility of question “what is…?”, anterior affirmation, not presented as present-being, future anteriority of “O my friends…”

——temporal torsion [O my friend, no friend, contretemps], dissymmetry envelops theoretical knowledge in performativity of prayer it could never exhaust, we return to question of the response

SH p. 15 question “what is…[a date]?” is finite, signed, engaged, by a place, time, language(s)

——philosophical regime that “what is?” governs

F p. xxxv self: a cemetery guard (crypt is enclosed w/in self as excluded), self makes rounds (round & round) of crypt like he’s the proprietor, but he’s not, uses knowledge to keep visitors away

***FWT p. 50 [re: extremely difficult to think the event w/ the machine] taking account of event (that which defies accounting), knowing how not to ignore/deny it, is knowledge too, scientific responsibility [giving account (reddere rationem, logon didonai)]

p. 53 must be a leap from knowledge to decision, doesn’t take place w/out other, “passive” decision, decision of other, this doesn’t exonerate me [Derrida can prove this rationally, in the name of reason to come] > still necessary to know as much as possible before deciding

p. 173 psychoanalytic aim > not to seek refuge in a theological/humanist alibi > Derrida seduced by psychoanalysis’ audacity of thought, its courage, signing theoretical “fictions” in name of a knowledge w/out alibi (thus, the most “positive” knowledge”)

P pp. 89-91 nonknowledge is point of view whose irreducibility gives rise to the beautiful (purity of the trace of the sans) > Kant: no science of the beautiful, only critique

p. 113 acc. Kant, pleasure of knowing (which once existed in a time immemorial [absolute past in a Critique?]), a pleasure of the same—mastery of dissimilar, reduction of heterogenous

ROP pp. 43-4 what is getting archived, the trace arriving to efface itself, beyond presence & absence, is impossible to know—not the order of knowledge

SP p. 111 can no long ask “what is property?” > because propriation, a sexual operation, before which we didn’t know sexuality [?], is undecidable, more powerful than ti esti, than veil of truth, meaning of being, it organizes all ontological statements > lhistoire (de la) vérité (est) un procès de propriation

OTO p. 6 painfully difficult for life to become object of science, would require a philosophy of life, a whole politics, which inscribes the bio-graphical w/in the bio-logical

——not the same for science of nonlife, of the dead, wins its claim to scientificity w/out delay: the co-implication btwn scientific object & the dead concerns desire to know

FS p. 11 no knowledge can keep writing from its essential precipitation toward meaning (which writing constitutes, which is writing’s future)

***DIF pp. 14-5 answer to “what is differance?” (w/out turning question back on itself) would reassert MOP

SW p. 314 no chance of savoir (belonging to oneself) > you’ll end up in imminence > un-veiling still movement of veil: a disappearing, drawing aside, to let something be seen, let be, to let

p. 317 wait w/out horizon & someone else one knows too well, “even me why not,” an other yet to be born, who strikes dumb order of knowledge > too well-known, stranger head to foot

RGE p. 257 Bataille: man who sacrifices vs. sage who surrenders to knowledge

p. 274 discursive knowledge is neutral, neutrality has a negative essence (ne-uter), negative side of transgression

DST DST p. 203 epochē sets, suspends, in parentheses > what do epochs of “What is…?” have to do, or not to do, w/ madness?

PIO p. 10 grasp unity of 2 measures of invention: 1) fabula/fictio: art 2) tekhnē, epistemē, istoria, methodos, art, know-how, procedure, knowledge, research

pp. 29-30 if one draws a [historical] dividing line btwn use of word “invention,” must do so w/in great/fundamental reference to human tekhnē, this mythopoetic power that associates fable w/ historical, epistemic narrative [Foucault +/–]

——circa 17-century (btwn Descartes & Leibniz), invention becomes technoscientific, production of independent, self-reproductive recurrence, capable of reiterative simulation, a dispositif

HLP p. 29 phenomenon of lie intrinsically foreign to problem of knowledge (irreducibly ethical dimension)

——(in principle and in its classical determination) a lie is not an error

TR pp. 108-09 confession not of order of knowledge, of making known; Augustine wonders why he must confess to God, who knows everything > answer: to convert fault into love [Nietzsche]

——confession not a truth to be revealed but a truth to be “made,” to be “verified”

p. 112 de Man’s “twilight zone btwn knowing & not-knowing” consubstantial w/ confession

AFR pp. 47-8(n) Derrida defends Condillac against Foucault’s assessment of a “deficiency,” “epistemological myths” > perhaps Condillac’s maintenance of calculus & genesis resists a classical opposition; Derrida then notes [re: relevance to scientific modernity]: imaginary upsurging of one epistēmē, its finitude, table, sets terrain for theory of general epistēmē, which makes table its determining norm [see Bennington’s Scatter p. 11]

p. 61 invention of a new science: “new combinations” exist (new science at once example and discovery of this) > generative or combinative model (separately) insufficient

p. 132 for Condillac, degree, gradual difference, ruins “identical proposition,” dislocates is > yet, degree also makes synthesis of “identical proposition” possible (prohibiting frivolity, advancing knowledge)

IW pp. 267-68 [vis-à-vis Cohen] how Gewissheit (certainty) connects w/ Wissenschaft, Gewissen, Selbstbewusstsein—knowledge/faith come together in German Protestantism > culture/scientific conscience of modern peoples founded on 2 types of Gewissheit (knowledge/faith)

TN pp. 151-52 via de Biran, sense of “I” comes from hand: rough, too heavy resistance > he would know nothing about himself, if he did not experience resistance

NOY pp. 232-33 de Certeau: knowledge’s procedure is essentially a “no,” mystic postulate advances a limitless “yes”

——St. Paul: “in Him there has been only Yes (nai)” > de Certeau: this “yes” pierces field of distinctions/separations practiced by Hebraic epistemology

E p. 8 for Kant, science is not art, has no beauty in it, because no pleasure can be taken in it

——yet, in his Introduction, he claims that in an immemorial past, pleasure could not be separated from knowledge, so the Witz (bon mot), the only scientific pleasure, carries this repressed past in it

p. 25 question “what is?”: offers a paregoric parergon, constructs framework to capture energy of unassimilable, it softens, remedies, w/ speech, consoles, exhorts w/ the word

BSi p. 34 a seminar that teaches knowledge must be w/out fable

pp. 34-5 fable, for, fari, to speak, to say, fabula, something said > make so as to know: 1) bring knowledge to the other 2) give impression, effect, of knowledge, of knowing, simulacrum of knowing: a savoir-faire to “faire savoir where there is no knowing worthy of the name

——“storytelling,” convention of some historical as if, fabular > a moral lesson, a political strategy, pedagogical artifice to credit a fable: to make known (political logic, rhetoric)

p. 147 “how is a synthetic a priori possible?” and Deleuze’s “how is bêtise (and not error) possible?”: transcendental questions of possibility > but, Deleuze’s question removes possibility from epistemological economy, from determination of Being, from objectivity of object

p. 270 in Celan, “perhaps’s” withdraw poem from dimension/authority of knowledge

pp. 272-73 poetic revolution (beyond sovereignty [?]), revolution in revolution—minuscule dethroning of majesty exceeds knowledge > signed by repetition of “perhaps’s,” “who knows”

p. 278 “beast & sovereign” as an incitement to think limits of knowledge (horizon that will constantly border but also un-border)

p. 279 “perhaps,” “who knows,” as link, separating hyphen btwn beast & sovereign, inviting us, w/out ordering us, to go over the limit of knowledge

——knowledge no stranger to power, power no stranger to seeing, having, willing > autopsic/autoptic knowledge: take power over object of knowledge

p. 283 zoos profitable to knowledge and economy [physiocratic theory of economy]

p. 291 scene, theater, visibility of autopsy: violence of light > energeia of seeing, knowing

p. 293 [during spectacle of autopsy/sovereignty] an éclat > fragment of light touches everything

p. 296 globalization of autopsic model, knowledge that de-vitalizes by looking at life (simple objectification) > the 2 senses of autopsia: cadaver & divine power

OG pp. 4-5 (14) rigorous investigation beyond closure of knowledge, take positivity of science to its limits—monstrous, breaks absolutely w/ normality > faithful to lavenir (for which there is yet no exergue [chapter title: exergue])

p. 10 (20) history and knowledge (istoria and epistémè) > detours for the purpose of (en vue de) reappropriating presence

pp. 18-9 (31) to the question “what is the sign?” the answer has always been the signified, which is never contemporary, proximity to logos as phonèpresence: no relation to trace, signifier

——what if sign escapes the instituting question of philosophy: “what is (ti esti)…?” what if we can only think of the sign as (is) [crossed-out] and (thing) [crossed-out, fixerup]? [Heidegger’s crossing-out]

pp. 33-4 (50-1) if writing is mere “figuration” of language—it is exiled, cast outside, a double > unrelated to interior of the system: “internal system” is an epistemological exigency constituted by possibility of phonetic writing

——but this science [deconstructive grammatology?], where opening of “image” conditions “reality,” can’t maintain classical scientific grid: external/internal, image/reality, representation/presence > this science inaugurates the originality of its field

p. 46 (67-8) science, asleep, uncritical re: tradition it inherits, this sleep the assured means of breaching (dentamer) the deconstruction of la plus grande totalité: epistémè, metaphysical logocentrism

——deconstruction clarifies dream rather than allowing itself to be clarified by it [?]

p. 74 (109) grammatology’s condition of possibility, the solicitation of logocentrism, is condition of impossibility, risks destroying concept of science, exorbitant aim (visée) beyond savoir

pp. 74-5 (110) question of origin merges w/ essence [re: what is writing?]

p. 75 (110-11) trace is nothing, exceeds question “what is?” > no longer sheltered in grammatological knowledge: no longer assurance of opposition fait/droit > no pure fait

***p. 92 (139) writing as eclipse that surprises/obscures glory of word [cf. GLAS, faulty tele-type], dislocates founding categories of language & grammar of epistémè

in contrast, theory, what unites science & philosophy in epistémè, tends toward filling in the breach rather than toward forcing the closure (plutôt à colmater les brèches quà forcer la clôture)

p. 93 (142) thinking (what we already know we haven’t begun), “mesuré à la taille de lécriture, s’entame seulement dans l’epistémè” > in a certain manner, thought gives you nothing to say

pp. 163-64 (234) concept of supplement as blind spot (tache aveugle) in Rousseau: the not seen that opens & limits visibility

——that we know this now a priori: not a knowledge at all

pp. 285-86 (404) science, philosophy, epistémè, movement of idealization, privilege of logos is that of phonetic writing, of a more algebraic, economical writing (by reason of certain condition of knowledge): mondial effacement of signifier > one believes one is exalting parole, when in fact, one is fascinated by a figure of technè

ATAP pp. 93-4 “Come” precedes & calls event, opens scene, no theme, supports no metalinguistic citation, not an order, not a prayer, not obscurantism—just beyond “What is?” > perhaps where Ereignis and Enteignis unfold movement of propriation

EU p. 85 for Kant, that scholars alone can judge other scholars, a tautology: essence of knowledge as knowledge of knowledge

p. 94 State or trans-State capitalist powers, re: storage of information in data banks > once library no longer ideal type of archive: university no longer “guardian” or “trustee” of knowledge (this centralizing representation once constituted mission of university itself)

p. 99 fields of publishing, archiving, mediatization have expanded as strikingly as have overcoding & hyper-formalization of language > where does publication begin? [via Kant, publication of knowledge, not knowledge itself, is submitted to authority]

p. 106 Kant’s strict separation of knowledge (truth) & power (action) distinguishes sets in excess of themselves, covering the whole of which they’re supposed to be only a part > whole forms poche invaginée in every part or subset (sous-ensemble): intestine division, folding partition inside space

LABOR (WORK)

GOD p. 66 instant of decision is madness; like gift & “gift of death,” instant irreducible to presence, act of giving death, sacrifice, suspends labor of negative, labor itself, perhaps even work of mourning

GT p. 36 is work of mourning still a desire to keep? gift vs. grief, gift as non-work [see FWT p. 78]

pp.101-02 subject as such: bordered, posed, identified, always calculates, reappropriates surplus-value, circular return, a certain capitalization

——despite labor of subject, production of surplus-value, gift takes place where there’s trace, dissemination, in excessive forgetting, forgetful excess of the gift

R pp. 20-21 roué qualifies one who turns a trick, the voyou (rogue) w/ his leading astray (dévoiement), debauchery, worklessness, always a seduction, licentious, libertine [always men, sexual difference]

——democracy always associated w/ this figure, w/ taking too many libertine, liberalism, “everything is allowed,” announces a beheading of monarchical sovereignty

SPOM pp. 8-9 three things which decompose the single thing (spirit, specter, king): 1) mourning, localize, identify the dead, know who and where [ontology, hermeneutics, philosophy] 2) language, voice, “scull had a tongue in it” 3) work, “spirit of the spirit” is work, spirit works

p. 45 messianic extremity, eskhaton, exceeds, at each moment, final term of a phusis, such as work, production, and telos of any history

p. 164 Marx opposes work [see pp. 161, 163] to Stirner's work of mourning, his hyper-phantomality, Marx determines differance or deferral as practical and as delay of reappropriation [he doesn’t eliminate death, expropriation, at heart of living—puts it to work?]

p. 195 secret of commodity form is substitution (quid pro quo), but one w/ ruse, perverse intervention of souffleur, parole soufflée > abnormal play of mirrors [men no longer recognize in the substitution made by commodity the social character of their own labor], commodity turns men into specters, vampires > can’t see their reflection, “but who is not so deprived?” Derrida adds

pp. 210, 243-44n for Marx, there’s a phantomatic objectivity before commodity value [?] product of labor petrifies, erects, hardens (feminine character of commodity-chimera?)

p. 214 pertinence of division btwn manual & intellectual labor appears more limited than ever

HERP p. 211 Heidegger’s 3 creative “Gewalten” of historial destiny: poet, thinker, statesman > their work as Schaffen carries seal or signature of originary polemos/Kampf

VM pp. 92-3 Levinas’ desire (metaphysics, ethics, metaphysical transcendence) unlike Hegel’s desire which requires negation and assimilation; for Hegel, acc. Levinas, desire is not separated from enjoyment, only deferred in work (thus, Hegelian desire would be same as need)

p. 94 for Levinas, resistance to work, by provoking it, remains a moment of the same, a finite moment that forms a system and totality w/ agent > history: laborious procession of same

——for Levinas, concrete (nonformal) tautology or false (finite) heterology [compare to “false infinite”], along w/ the negative (work, history, etc.), never has a relation w/ other > no negativity in metaphysical transcendence

PAS PAS p. (52) the other pas haunts or parasitizes, a transgressive passivity, not activity nor labor

FWT p. 78 work is always work of mourning, internalizes, appropriating idealization

pp. 112-13 incalculable inner multiplicity is Derrida’s torment, his work, travail, his tripalium, passion, labor, also that which makes him work > I do not believe this division/nonidentity to oneself is exemplarily Jewish, but who would dare say it isn’t?

——“I” am working around a dehiscence, division (more than 1, 2, 3, beyond all arithmetic, calculability)

P p. 71 no deconstruction of labor w/out theory of frame, any market presupposes a process of framing to liberate surplus value > in classical language, lack as product/production of frame

p. 75 frame overflowed on 2 borders by what it overflows: it travaille [labors, gives, plays, see TN.] indeed; Kant is undoing the labor of the frame; the structurally bordered origin of surplus value creaks and cracks like wood, never fully exposed

***pp. 80-1 le se-protéger-de-oeuvre (ergon), énergie captée, bordée, condition for mastery of PP, self-protection of energeia > energeia not as pure, total presence (prime mover), but as (par)ergon against what’s lacking in it, lack not as a substantial emptiness, but as impossibility of arresting differance in its contour, in a pose, of localizing lack, like metaphysics does, in its proper place: castration as truth > whether parergon borders (works against) free energy or essential lack, the 2 determinations sont le même (métaphysique)

POS p. 65 never separate trace, gram, text, exteriority of writing from work, outside its Hegelian affiliation > operation of double mark or re-mark

ROP p. 113 Foucault pulls back from (admits impasses of) epistēmē > mais seul ceux qui travaillent, seuls ceux qui prennent des risques en travaillant rencontrent des difficultés > responsibility dans lépreuve de laporie

O p. 6 direction or chain of the “metaphysical” can’t be opposed by concept, rather by process of textual labor, the movement of differance, which cannot be relevédisorganizes opposition

TB p. 133 translation: task of pure limit, an infinite labor to rejoin (doesn’t exclude gradations, virtuality, interval & in-btwn) > can one quote a signature?

CHM p. 43 cannot say, speak, madness; Foucault: it is the “absence of the work”

pp. 54, 309n work, reason, discourse starts w/ appeal to “as such,” to meaning of Being [before determination of existence/essence] (thus, madness: silence, nonmeaning, absent in work)

——like nonmeaning, silence is the work’s limit & profound resource

RGE p. 255 servile condition of mastery & entire history it makes possible > absolute privilege given to slave, truth of the master is the slave: deferred pleasure, limited stakes, delaying disappearance of thing (labor) > the condition of history/meaning/philosophy/discourse

p. 259 Kant & Hegel revealed most permanent philosophical determinations of negativity (truth, history, meaning, time, ideality) > their revolution: taking negative seriously, giving meaning to its labor

***p. 275 Aufhebung: produced entirely w/in system/work of signification, from one infinite determination to the next, each one conserved in the other, transitions produced by anxiety of infinity—included w/in circle of absolute knowledge, never suspends totality of discourse (work, meaning, law), never exceeds its closure > restricted economy, circulation of prohibitions: history as truth of prohibitions

Gii p. 43 Heidegger: work of hand, thought, man’s hardest & simplest work

E p. 5 for Kant, difference btwn free, liberal art and mercenary art is the difference btwn play/work

p. 12 God furnishes the poet w/ his capital, gives him surplus value & means of giving surplus-value, God is a poet

——structure of economimesis has its analogon in the city: when poet isn’t writing, he’s just a man, must eat, receives subsidies from sun-king (sustaining labor force)

OG pp. 224-25 for Rousseau, absolute North is death, need usually isolates men—in North it begins society: what was needed was not énergie but clarity, work replaces passion, represses desire

——force of need/work turns song into articulation: Northerner fights against force of death w/ another force of death [economy of death]; liberated passion impossible in North

p. 260 for Rousseau, man’s work, the “hand,” can hold back degradation of nature [by supplementary operation]

pp. 299-300 (423) age of labor, civil society, lhomme policé, money & phonetic writing—elle gagne en universalité: signifiers that are nonsignifying, circulation of arbitrary signs in phonetic writing, alphabet is commercial, a trader > anonymous supplement substituted for a thing

UWC p. 209 “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”: begin at once at end & at beginning > begin w/ end as if it were the beginning [event or telos?]

p. 213 impossible attempt to link “as if” to thinking of event: what happens when “taking place” of le travail, when the place itself, becomes virtual, becomes subject to mode “as if”?

pp. 216-17 work of a worker (travailleur) must be recognized as craft/trade/profession in market (a semantics rooted in socio-ideological history dating back to Christian Middle Ages) > when is there an oeuvre? professor’s authority not based on production of oeuvre

pp. 217-18 not every travail an event in itself, doesn’t always produce an oeuvre, not every performative (always authorized by an institutional “as if”) produces oeuvre

p. 221 work not reducible to activity of act or production of product > virtualization of work complicates disproportion btwn production & work

p. 222 work supposes zone of passivity as much as productive activity

——what we call “professions” tend to be nonmercenary arts, imply testimonial commitment, responsibility under oath (freely declared): physician, lawyer, professor

p. 223 “as if” mondialisation du monde had as its horizon/origin the disappearance of work (travail) [its virtualization] > work, labor, travail have always implied the real, effective (wirklich) [not virtual]

——“as if” [the end of work]: neither sci-fi utopia of Augustine’s “at the end w/out end,” in fine sine fine (Sabbath w/out evening), nor memory of immemorial (nostalgia for earthly paradise)

——original sin > introduction of work, expiation would be the end of work

p. 224 difficult to think work (travail) beyond good & evil > activity of work: freedom, life, production, history good; passivity of work: affect, passion, evil, suffering, pain

pp. 224-25 [re: “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”] logical skeleton of this “as if” proposition: world & work can’t co-exist, one would have to choose one or the other > the becoming-world of world, mondialisation, often speaks of “end of work”

p. 225 techno-scientific virtualization of work, the putting-into-common, any “community” [Aristotle’s city] > mutation of taking place of event, of oeuvrethat which arrives

p. 227 history of work, “craft,” trade, profession > there are those “w/out work” who want more, those w/ too much who want less

p. 228 figure of humanist: a response to the question of work, the theology of work secularizes time > the clock sometimes represents an attribute of the humanist [14th century]

p. 229 in 12th & 13th century, scholarly life became craft/trade (negotia scholaria): salary & glory articulated economic functioning & professional conscience

SPEC p. 268 deconstruction: works otherwise or w/out working (if work is determined as opposition)

p. 309 for Freud, work consists in rassembler, searching in order to bring together, reuniting in order to give back (pour rendre) > play is dispersion that sends far away > fort/da is “a game (un jeu)”: reassemble the reassembling & dispersion, give & take back by oneself [work & play ?]

LACAN-LIKE?

GT p. 24 subject and object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of the gift; subject as such never gives or receives a gift

pp. 51-53 transcendental signified or signifier as general equivalent, “transcendental” makes possible every categorial determination, all givens (to be/to have, thing/person)

——Lacan’s “symbolic order” guards gift against dissemination, against itself

***R p. 55 the unconscious remains the most vital reserve of the self-destructive conservation of the “subject” or of egological ipseity; without autoimmunity, no sadism, masochism, consciousness, death drive

MONL p. 25 neither lack nor alienation, alienation without alienation > origin of our responsibility, structures peculiar property of language

——abiding “alienation” appears constitutive like lack, but it isn’t lack

p. 67 [compare Lacan’s Y a d lUn to Derrida’s “there is some language”]

p. 71 [Derrida’s quilting point?] passage points = places of transcendence, absolute elsewhere in eyes of Greco-Latino-Christian philosophy & yet inside it > epekeina tes ousias, khōra, negative theology, Freud, Artaud, Blanchot, Levinas, Eckhart

FK [in general] how is Derrida

FL p. 271 Derrida hesitates to call the readability of violence Lacan’s symbolic order

LOBL p. 121 in Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, there’s a 2nd death after resurrection [Lacan’s btwn 2 deaths]

p. 163 there’s an arrêt btwn 2 deaths [in Larrêt de mort], thus hypertopia [see p. 140]

pp. 165-166 hymen, double bind, double affirmation, yes, yes, come, come [re: Blanchot’s 2 ghostly fiancées in Larrêt de mort] signifies, desires, arrête life death, the life the death of the other, the other lives and dies > “for there is an other of the other and it is not the same” [see POO p. 11 “other of the other” is the very undeniable of ethics]

MC p. 354 the indivisibility of Lacan’s letter creates dogma

p. 360 why the letter, name, is divisible but still iterable (re-markable in its difference)

——mark beyond human language [letter still human?]

p. 369 letter always arrives means the unconscious has no accidents, no internal chance [see p. 375 biogenetics: no randomness, no bastardy]

***p. 370 ever since Plato [repression of Democritus, a large symptom?], an organization of the throw: subject/object > repress chance, repress the mark, protect “normality,” isolate a solid context (stereotomy)

H p. 39 read from another angle, not simply a triangle

***SPOM p. 185 character of the specter cannot be derived from a psychoanalysis of the imaginary

PAS PAS p. (68) viens doesn’t give place to any order, w/out law, w/out anything namable that may be desired, demanded from a lack

p. (85) double pas, its absolute heterogeneity, deprives of nothing save its identity to self, which prevents distancing from self > double pas, absolute rarefaction w/out the least lack

VP p. xxviii must—refers to “force of law” [see end of Lacan’s Sinthome] [Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values in VP]

p. 43 [we can see the letter always arrives in Husserl’s assurance that there must be a formal identity to the sign that allows repetition beyond all empirical deformations]

FSW p. 198 must deconstruct linguistic phonologism in psychoanalysis [?]

SH pp. 14-5 dating amounts to signing; signature marks provenance of what is given (sent), destined (whether or not it arrives) > one signs a date from a given place

FWT p. 8 no opportunism or relativism in fact that Derrida is sometimes allied w/ Lacan, and sometimes in objection

pp. 11-2 Derrida feels closer to Lacan than Foucault, he’s more daring a “deconstructor” > Foucault’s passage btwn epistemes neglects long sequences (hardens into oppositions)

p. 14 in Derrida’s [torrid relation w/] touching/mistreating (toucher à) the French language, letting himself be touched/mistreated, in his attention not to signifier but to letter, address, destination, mise-en-scène, he is closest to Lacan, but “Lacan is so French!”, “so much more French than I am”

——and Derrida had the maddest love affair w/ the French language

p. 48 Derrida on why he rarely uses word “freedom” [re: machine]; didn’t Lacan say somewhere he never uses the word?

pp. 173-74 Freud’s grand entities (ego, id, etc.) & Lacan’s grand conceptual oppositions (real, imaginary, symbolic) are too solid, substantialized—differance erases/displaces their borders

p. 207n for Lacan, madness—limit of human freedom

***P pp. 80-1 le se-protéger-de-oeuvre (ergon), énergie captée, bordée, condition for mastery of PP, self-protection of energeia > energeia not as pure, total presence (prime mover), but as (par)ergon against what’s lacking in it, lack not as a substantial emptiness, but as impossibility of arresting differance in its contour, in a pose, of localizing lack, like metaphysics does, in its proper place: castration as truth > whether parergon borders (works against) free energy or essential lack, the 2 determinations sont le même (métaphysique)

p. 90 beautiful object, tulip, not lacking in anything, tel point de vue, de but en blanc, plie la totalité à se manquer elle-même > le sans de la coupure pure est sans manque—but for me to experience its totality, my knowledge lacks something—its end (bout); not the absence of end but the trace of the without [end] is origin of beauty; ça donne-le-beau: beauty gives nothing to be seen, sans is not visible, et pourtant il y en a et cest beau

POS p. 82 signifier exceeding signified still maintains logocentrism (stuck in phase of overturning hierarchy, not beyond opposition)

pp. 84-7 dissemination situates the more or less that resists effect of subjectivity, appropriation > disorganizes, marks writing of Lacan’s “symbolic”: la dissémination figure ce qui ne revient pas au père, affirms endless substitution, does not overlook duplicity, simulacrum [like Lacan’s “symbolic”?]

——possibility for a mark to “disembed” itself, “unsew-it,”that which is no longer integrated in “symbolic” > violence & unconscious effects of simulacrum

——cannot be reclaimed by imaginary, neither veil nor truth, signifier nor signified

——dissemination is play of castration w/out metaphysical/romantic pathos of negativity > dissemination “is” angle of play of castration

——Lacan’s “symbolic” a new subjectivity, interiorization

——dissemination puts at stake (play) castration’s position as transcendental signifier/signified (phallus, transcendental signifier, as correlate to primary signified, mother’s desire)

***pp. 107-113n Lacan’s phonocentrism, “full speech,” his uncritical use of Hegel, his “theft” of Derrida’s writing, his elliptical style as one of evasion, “homonymic” feint

p. 113n Lacanian triangle: unmodifiable transcendental or ontological structure

ROP p. 11 Freud sutures the unfathomable navel, omphalos, mit dem Unerkannten (unknown, “unknowable”), navel not a provisional limit, but a night, ab-solute unknown, attaché au lieu dont il part et dont il garde la marque de naissance > not only the gap (la béance), as Lacan reads this navel

——what forever exceeds the analysis of the dream: a knot that can’t be untied, un fil, qui, pour être coupé, comme un cordon ombilical, nen reste pas moins à jamais noué [knotted even when cut], à même le corps, a la place du nombril [name?] > la cicatrice est un noeud contre lequel lanalyse ne peut rien

p. 33 the dogma/idealism of Lacan’s “letter always arrives,” one can never assemble anything in its indivisibility

p. 34 divisibility of letter, truth w/out truth of deconstruction, distinguished both from das geistige Band [Hegel], & Heideggerian Versammlung > divisibility of letter undoes link of debt, symbolic, name of father (motifs qui lien et se lient au triangle ou au cercle de la réappropriation)

——Lacan uses trinitarian figures to give firm consistency to a resistance supérieurement organisée > letter always arrives; here proceeds division btwn 3 & 4, btwn resistance bound up in repression & la restance disséminale, no longer belonging to economy of repression

pp. 46-7 Lacan’s original relation with philosophers (not w/ philosophy), abandoned historiography, staged singular desire of the philosopher, an illumination, a “searchlight effect (coup de phare),” toward which Derrida has great favor/fervor > Lacan was “so much more a philosopher than Freud!”

p. 48 “antiphilosophy” > the thing least deserving of interest in the world

p. 51 Derrida quite likes Lacan’s “dit dici,” hears didici, Latin, didactic, I will have taught/told you

pp. 54-5 Lacanian discourse as most strenuous use of all Derrida finds deconstructible, his discourse the most to be deconstructed: primacy of signifier, logo-, phono-, phallogo-centrism, full speech as truth, circular return of reapproprition towards proper place (whose borders are circumscribed by lack)

p. 56 Lacan too at home w/ philosophers, too philosophical, while Derrida was (not breaking with them, but) reconsidering the contracts

——too much Sartrian neo-existentialism, too much uncritical Heidegger, too much Hegel/Kojève [Kojève not only anthropologized Phenom…, he Heideggerianized it]

pp. 57-9 the arbitrary 8 motifs [pour faire penser à l'institution de l'infini debout] Derrida finds deconstructible in Lacan: 1) proper, circular return to place of lack 2) truth as adequation 3) “full speech” 4) the mechanical archive as “alienating” 5) transcendental phallus 6) phonocentrism 7) failure to account for literary structure of narration 8) a “spiriting away” of double in Poe, which would have brought symbolic and imaginary closer together, thus blurred tripartite as well

p. 60 idealism of the indivisibility of the letter, “the materiality of the signifier,” the place of the signifier

pp. 61-2 everyone, Ponge, Blanchot, Lacan (incomparable listener) tried to replace speech w/ writing after Derrida, to replace phoneme w/ grapheme is overcompensatory > trace, gramme, differance no more graphic than phonematic

pp. 62-3 Derrida agrees w/ Lacan that there is one libido (as Freud first argued), it is the question of reason, principle of reason > d'un trait tiré de la raison ou d'une traite tirée [check drawn] sur la raison

p. 64 in EN, in interminable conversation w/ Lacan, Derrida thinks contingency, singularity, event, tukhē, which is also a thinking of death, whose signifier would be the phallus

p. 66 [quoting EN] Derrida will not accept Heidegger’s being-for-death nor Lacan’s, latter linked to phallocentered signifier

——[quoting EN] Lacanian scandal re: what he says on the animal: en un mot, that death happens to the immortal who lacks for lacking nothing, not to the mortal being-for-death [?]

p. 67 [quoting EN] difference “w/” Lacan: the lack does not have its place in dissemination

p. 75 Lacan returns to an unsurpassability of Descartes, brings Descartes close to Freud > [is this part of Foucault’ critique of psychoanalysis? re: subject (of science)]

SP pp. 59-61 [re: truth-castration as man’s affair, and woman’s suspension of it] [English translation seems horrible] Derrida is asking that we take off the head (décapitonner) of Lacan’s discourse, w/ its truth speaking, castration & phallocentrism > by deploying metaphorics of veil

ATIA p. 55 those who wish, out of desire or need, to make an ironclad distinction btwn desire/need

p. 100 Derrida introduces Adorno’s attack on Kant’s cruelty, compares it to Lacan’s Kant Avec Sade, though points out that Lacan not concerned w/ Kant’s cruelty towards animals

p. 119 Lacan marks, perhaps, a step beyond and step this side of Freud re: relation among the human, unconscious, and animot

pp. 121-22 for Lacan, mirror (imaginary) is enough to bring an animal from solitary to gregarious form (which is not social); animal does not have unconscious, language, sometimes develops it through domestic transference [?]

p. 122 for Lacan, man’s “autotelic specularity of the inside is thus linked to a defect, to a prematurity, to an incompleteness of the little man”

pp. 123-24 for Derrida, “fixity” of code [automaticity of iterability], is well put by Lacan, but put in the wrong place: Derrida wants to inscribe it beyond strict opposition animal/man

p. 125 Derrida has problem w/ fact that Lacan’s ethics, the subject, founded on distinction btwn reaction/response > destiny of iterability: automaticity of reaction in every response

p. 126 Derrida affirms Lacan’s “the subject receives even the message he emits [from the Other]” as a way to inscribe reaction/response in all vicissitudes of the living

***pp. 128-9 for Lacan, animal can inscribe the trace but not erase it [for Derrida inscription erases itself, mechanically, this is iterability]

p. 129 Lacan and Heidegger both think animals can’t die [cf. p. 154 Heidegger implies animal unique from rock because of possibility of dying (sterben)]

p. 131 for Lacan, move from animal to human (to speech, to truth, to symbolic order): abyssal concept of a feined feint or pretended pretense (not merely the figure or simple feint)

——Levinas’ 3rd party, an other of the other, in contrast to Lacan’s “there is no Other of the Other” > but, for both of them, what about the animal-other?

p. 133 dogma: to assert w/out appealing to testimony or knowledge (which are different) [re: Lacan’s distinction btwn pretense & pretense of pretense] [Derrida wonders if the dogmatism is here inspired by the difficulty/impossibility of discernment re: pretense]

p. 137 for Lacan, what is great about Descartes’ cogito is that the sum is transcendental, it’s beyond imaginary capture (the animal’s cogito, w/out sum, w/out “I”), the specular > [it is symbolic]

p. 139 Lacan’s “generic prematuration of birth,” essential genesis of man’s castration complex > this “generic” trait, man escaping genre, by means of dé-génération (not degeneracy), whose defect engenders symbolic “generation” (law of Name, Father, Speech, Truth, Deceit)

O p. 49n same denial at work in Greater Logic when preface is placed in parentheses as when psychoanalytic phallocentrism places anatomy in parentheses?

pp. 57-8 is pleasure literary in essence? if Vorlust, foreplay, prime (bonus) of seduction, formal moment of literature, ne se comble quà la fin du plaisir, then jouissance would be instance of seduction, prime supplémentaire de rien dautre: pleasure a formal, threshold phenomena, nul et sans fins, a repression lifted & maintained > graphics of hymen questions all couples, all oppositions (especially those of Freud)

DPi p. 162 Derrida scolds Lacan for relegating Nietzsche to “cheap junk (la pacotille)”

CHM p. 37 “the fact of language is probably the only fact ultimately to resist all parenthization” [letter always arrives?]

DST DST p. 315n Lacoue-Labarthe: subject in mirror is first of all subject in désistance, figure is never one, destabilizing division of figural (this muddles Lacan’s distinction btwn symbolic/imaginary)

p. 224 Lacoue-Labarthe: [subject] ‘desists’ because must confront at least 2 figures (or one figure that is at least double) > destabilizing Lacan’s imaginary/symbolic

p. 226 via Lacoue-Labarthe, Lacan’s theoreticism, which is inscribed in the ontology of the figure, Lacan’s recasting of Freud to the gaze, the specular > an ontomimetological interpretation of mimesis

——the “loss (perte) of the subject” in Lacan calls for a suturing that obliterates désistance

PIO p. 13 [re: “Fable”] no metalanguage: essential instability, rapid oscillation btwn performative/constative (fiction/nonfiction), constitutes event > disturbs norms, rules, statues

TR p. 81 “free signifier” ribbon like Lacan’s purloined letter: content is not important

pp. 150, 154 de Man’s dissociating metonymic structure (deconstruction of metaphor) (Lacan, Deleuze-like)

p. 155 for de Man, deconstruction wherever metaphorical totality shifts to metonymical aggregate

p. 159 de Man: deconstruction/dissemination independent of any desire (mechanical/arbitrary like a grammar) [Derrida quickly claims this argument is both defensible & indefensible]

——event supposes the arbitrary & exteriority to desire

AFR pp. 129-30 Condillac: need as uneasiness caused by absence of object you deem necessary [lack], this uneasiness determines actions of body’s/soul’s faculties, this determination is desire

PJP p. 195 honesty of father: knowing himself to be dead [“us”?] > perjurer as symbolic orphan of father [baby daddy]: this knowledge pursued him in advance, he followed the knowing-oneself death of the father [everywhere]

PSSS p. 252 pleasure/reality principle—same in differance > cruelty drive more ancient than principles?

p. 258 mastery, sovereignty (Herrschaft, Bemächtigung), linked to a drive for power, possession, an “I can,” a performative power (Bemächtigungstrieb), via sworn faith (organizes Lacan’s symbolic), indissociable from Bewältigung (exercise of power, movement of appropriation)

p. 276 “I can,” “I may,” mastery of performative, dominates/neutralizes (in order of “symbolic,” symbolically) the event it produces

***p. 278 wherever there is law & performative, event has been neutralized, reappropriated by performative force or symbolic order

+R p. 169 double ladder, erected, riveted, shackled, never arrives > steps: symbolic of sexual act [no sexual rapport?]

C p. 195 excess zeal, the little one (paradigm) built like a crypt [Lacan’s objet a?], jealously keeps its secret at moment of greatest exhibition

p. 204 “things won’t stop computing in me,” Derrida wants to touch the necessity of the contingency of Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins [compare to Lacan’s: can’t stop being-written]

TN pp. 75-6 caress, to take or give pleasure?; the order/command “Tiens!” [TN. there, here, hold on to this, take it] is not the same order as tact (the trembling, relinquishment [dessaisissement] at heart of seizing [saisie]) [beyond Lacan’s: “never give up on your desire”?]

BSi p. 90n [Derrida disputes Lacan’s “animals cannot cross certain threshold of dissimulation”]

pp. 102-03 Lacan’s “return” to Freud [proclaimed loyalty to psychoanalytic tradition] both helps us & forbids us from thinking

p. 103 to uniquely human “I” of Descartes and Kant, Lacan adds superego (Law/Crime) > i.e. animals don’t have superego

p. 106 Lacan’s “fellow” [?] seems to follow Greco-Abrahamic, & especially Christian, notion of “neighbor,” “brother,” as totality of all creatures [re: when we treat animal as “fellow”]

p. 141 [on Lacan’s “subject of the signifier”]

p. 145 Lacan accused Derrida of “coupling” [?] Torok & Abraham

OG p. 7 (16) writing as “signifier of the signifier” no longer means accidental doubling, fallen (déchue) secondarity, but overflows, goes beyond extension of language > comprehends language

——signified always already (toujours déjà) functions as signifier: effacing = overflowing

——secondarity of writing effects all signifieds

——advent of writing, advent of a play which effaces all those abris du hors-jeu (out-of-bounds shelters [transcendental signifieds]) that surveil field of language > destroying the concept sign

p. 324n (32n) at limit, if we try to claim the signifier is prior to the signified [reversing the classical structure], the whole concept of sign is destroyed

——to declare “primacy” of signifier w/in a logic that privileges the signified is absurd

p. 180 supplement (a lack = an excess)

***p. 296 (418) split of signifier/signified as naive critique of loss of presence [no matter which side of opposition is privileged]

***SPEC p. 290 [for Freud?] no mélange of pleasure–unpleasure is possible, mélange is madness > though topical distribution [in Beyond…] is effect of differance, it retains differance in reassuring medium & in oppositional logic > principle of identity is respected by topology, division of sites

p. 304 the unanalyzed remainder of an unconscious remains [re: Freud’s autobiographical, writing], Derrida: “je parie” that it will be transmitted blindly by all who “return to Freud”: remainder that works the scene is illegible—i.e., restance, yet the only urgency of what reste à faire

p. 324 postal relay (relais) makes it possible for letter not to arrive, divides structure of letter from outset (dentrée), neither relay nor analysis if letter were indivisible & always arrived

——the a fortiori of the a priori

pp. 334-35 several families (in French analytic movement) bear same name [Freud’s name?] w/out knowing it [via Marie Bonaparte; “au moment où on croit décacheter (unsealed) un testament”]

p. 340 all the interlacings of fort:da, tout ce qui senvoi in graphics of repetition that dislocates summary “triangle” > le trait oedipien nest quune rection pour le fil conducteur de la bobine [Oedipus most narrowly restricted effects of above repetition’s graphics]

pp. 378-79 Freud’s “to let develop” [re: Aristophanes’ speech] mortgages irresponsibility, no engagement, epokhē of judgment, speaks from no-place [Lacan takes Beyond… too seriously?]

FV p. 421 for Lacan, truth inhabits fiction [Derrida exposes limitation of this stance]

——all Lacan’s work takes problematic of Freud’s Beyond…seriously

p. 422(n) Lacan translates Wiederholungszwang as “repetition automatism,” the pre-eminence of signifier over signified > consequence: “literary” text does w/out reference to author [Derrida implies that Lacan takes, at times, his distrust of psychobiography too far in other direction: formalist neutralization of effects of signature]

p. 423 letter has no proper meaning, volante, volée; Lacan claims the letter isn’t content w/ having meaning > Derrida intends to show that w/ Lacan the letter is content to have one meaning, and one alone

p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

p. 425 [Derrida’s syntactical deconstruction of Lacan] re: letter, manque à sa place [missing from its place] becomes manque a sa place [lack has its place]

brief glance re: Lacan’s advances: breaks w/ naive semanticism & psychobiographism, elaborates logic of signifier, includes problematic of Freud’s Beyond

pp. 426-27 even Freud [thus not Lacan] indicates, in Das Unheimliche, literary fiction’s resistance to general law of psychoanalytic knowledge

LACAN AND THE PURLOINED LETTER

FV p. 427 “Seminar” treats only content (narrated face) of Poe’s Purloined Letter, not narration itself

p. 428 Lacan analyzes displacement of signifier as signified, as recounted object of a short story

——when Lacan sees “triads,” he misses a scene, there’s always supplement of square > square’s opening complicates the calculations

pp. 429-30 Lacan neutralizes 4th character, the general narrator, thus neutralizes narrating operation

p. 431 inscriber/inscribing function not to be confused w/ author > Lacan excludes textual fiction, indicates a general narrative w/in neutralized or naturalized frame, thus overlooks the frame

p. 432 Lacan is missing an elaboration of frame, signature, parergon > this lack permits scene of signifier to be reconstructed into a signified (inevitable process in logic of sign)

——structure of fiction reduced when related to its condition of truth, poor formalism which guarantees semantic content, doesn’t account for 1) “scription-fiction” and “scription-fictor” 2) narrating narration & narrator > complicity btwn formalist withdrawal (repli) and hermeneutic semanticism (or psychoanalysis applied to literature) [neglect of the subject-author, which, in some situations, might constitute progress or a legitimate demand]

p. 436 Lacan’s exclusion of 4th, exclusion of scene of writing, of 3rd + or – 1: a demand for truth > must take account of remainder in operation of writing, not just narrated content (signifier, the written, letter)

——“ce qui se laisse toujours presque (feint) de soi-même (se) mettre de côté, a lécart, comme le quart” [that which (feigns) to put itself aside, apart, as the 4th]

pp. 436-37, 39 “Seminar” insists on topos, single proper itinerary of letter, if meaning [in the general sense] is indifferent to letter, meaning of the letter is not, meaning of letter as truth itself

——not naive topology but still a topos, Heideggerian-like veiled/unveiled castration placed at the hole (trou) of the woman, letter comes back to Being, to the nothing that is the opening btwn woman’s legs (Queen)

pp. 437-38 Derrida on Lacan: circulation, acquitting of a debt, a proper place [not naive, empirical topology], detour from [woman’s] hole to itself permits signified to return to its origin—indivisible locality, signifier must never be lost, divided, fragmented

p. 439 Lacan’s decisive pauses—commonly of Heideggerian type

pp. 440-42 circular itinerary, Dupin & analyst find letter where they expect it: Queen wants letter-fetish brought back to her, exchanges one fetish for another w/out spending—because there’s equivalence here (assurance of return): circle of restricted economy, stricture of the ring

——castration-truth is that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring): brings signifier, fetish, phallus, letter back into their oikos, familiar dwelling, proper place

——the lack never lacks a place: indivisible circulation of proper

——lack does not have its place in dissemination

p. 442 for Lacan, Femininity is the Truth (of) castration, best figure of castration, because in logic of signifier it (elle) has always already been castrated > Femininity “leaves” something in circulation (here the letter), detaches something she never had, brought back to itself

——this 1st castration (pre-castration) affects w/ castration/femininity whoever holds the letter

pp. 442-43 letter found “in” the text which escapes, from 4th side, eyes of Dupin/analyst [letter not found in sealed interior of Poe’s tale, not assignable lack, definable hole]

——the text The Purloined Letter: the open, the very open, letter that is fiction

p. 443 at moment Dupin/Lacan finds letter [by drawing triangles/circles], moment it returns to its proper course, acc. desire of Queen, they no longer see the map itself: la carte that the “text” is, deviation of the four (lécart du quatre) w/ no promise of topos or truth

pp. 443-44 for Derrida, letter can always not arrive > Lacan’s symbolic, Lacan’s castration, protects letter from its divisibility/fragmentation

p. 444 dissemination threatens law of signifier & castration as contract of truth, dissemination entame unity of signifier, i.e. the phallus

pp. 444-45 via Bonaparte, internal necessity of reading other texts by Poe > when Bonaparte names crossroads (carrefour), quadrifurcum named absentmindedly, omitted like a frame

pp. 448-49 for Bonaparte, gold = penis > for Lacan, money = signifier “most destructive” of signification

p. 449 politics of ostrich [see also pp. 436, 453]

p. 450 Lacan (as Dupin) knows how to return to letter of Freud, knows how to find it where it is found (se trouve) for purposes of restitution

p. 451(n) [Lacan on properly inheriting, following the letter of Freud]

p. 452 analyst has seen what no one else has: place of the thing btwn the legs

pp. 452-53 Dupin’s feminization: possess the letter [?] > letter has one place, occupied by all those who possess it

p. 453 [proper] address of letter: law that binds King & Queen

——there are only ostriches, the more one presents one’s rear, the more one is master: can’t avoid being plucked (laisser plumer)

p. 454 for Lacan, letter’s destiny is arrival at destination

pp. 456n, 458n Lacan on experiencing Freud’s “full speech” in its authenticity > Freud as the master of truth vs. Bonaparte and her (bad) 2nd hand writing (master vs. cook)

p. 457 dead king, Freud, only one to contract w/ himself, awaits restitution > restoration: carrying off last plume w/ his 1st hand [in dying, mobilizes many]: theory of the facteurs

pp. 459-61 Lacan forecloses the double w/out mercy, contains it in the imaginary > imaginary/symbolic duality controls Unheimlichkeit, the anguishing disarray (laffolement angoissant) (w/out hope of closure, reappropriation, or truth) provoked by references (renvois) from simulacrum to simulacrum, double to double

——analysand seeing his/her double: “uncontrollable anxiety” disrupts every verification of identity, obstacle for transference

p. 461 Bonaparte falls back onto dogmatic imprudence (appeal to author’s unconscious), Lacan falls back, w/ incomparable philosophical vigilance, onto Truth > [both Bonaparte & Lacan] castration of mother as ultimate meaning & proper site of letter: “real intersubjectivity,” “solution in broad daylight”—proper as relation to lack itself, in proper place/body

p. 462 to designate the works of “young” Lacan: academics who hurry to cut to the quick that which doesn’t bear partition

p. 462n circulation, always circulation of truth: toward truth, cause & effect of circle, causa sui, proper course (trajet) and destiny of letter > truth as cause (Ursache)

pp. 462-63 Lacan’s emphasis on logos as phonē, writing relevé by voice, phonetic fact is only a fact w/in limits of “phonetic” systems of writing (beyond relation of de facto to de jure, Derrida interested in Lacan’s implied equivalence btwn symbolic articulation & phonematicity)

——non-phonetic field’s enormity no longer needs to be demonstrated

pp. 463-64 the 2 truths lean on, support each other (sétaient): 1) adequation, circular return, garde et regarde, circuit of pact, control, guardianship (la garde) of the phallus as guardianship of the lack 2) veiling-unveiling as structure of lack, a proper place: les contours étant-la place du manque à être

p. 464 for signifier to be kept (pour que le signifiant se garde) in its letter—no partition (if divisible, always can be lost en route) > materiality—indivisibility—idealization—point de capiton (staples signifier to signified) [?]: Lacan determines letter (no matter what he says) at point of its meaning (ideality): letter escapes partition, movement [no wonder he calls this “materiality” “odd”]

pp. 464-65 [phonematic limitation of letter, phonē spared divisibility] voice: spontaneous self-presence one can retain (garder) w/out paper, w/out envelope, always available (disponible) > Lacan’s not attentive to writing w/in the voice, before the letter

——sheltered (à labri) from disseminating threat/power in OG, agency of Lacan’s letter is the relève of writing in system of speech

pp. 465-66 [in Purloined Letter] Queen wishes to play on 2 contracts [must be read elsewhere?]: Queen’s desire to retain (garder) or refind the letter doubles her pact w/ the King

p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

p. 467 in Lacan, abyss effects are seriously controlled; fiction [only] manifests truth

pp. 467-68 Lacan’s highly classical interpretation of mimesis: Dichtung as detour toward truth, more truth in fiction, fiction manifests the truth [i.e. for Lacan, truth is not a fiction]

***p. 468 Lacan’s insistence on opposition truth/reality as orthodox as can be [p. 468n full speech]

pp. 468-69 the 2 truths: adequation (original contract: acquitting of debt), unveiling (lack on basis of which contract contracts in order to reappropriate what’s been detached)

——w/out return, divisibility rebels against lack

p. 469 for Lacan, analyst links truth to power of speech: power of communication as a contract btwn 2 present things

p. 470n Lacan’s “True Speech”: “subject is founded in this act as being the other”

p. 470 Lacan thinks beyond the truthful, beyond lying: adequation/unveiling in present speech don’t await exterior verification, they guarantee each other intrinsically: adequation of full speech to itself [see p. 471n]

p. 471n Lacan reconstitutes Cartesian certainty, capturing in this chain (Descartes–Hegel–Husserl) Heideggerian motions which are allergic to it—rigorously speaking

p. 472 Lacan’s authentic: “appel propre du vide

——for Lacan, ideal process of analysis: “realization” of full speech as assumption of desire (of castration)

pp. 472-73 present speech, anamnesis, irreplaceable properness, inalienable singularity > disqualification of recording or repetition in the name of the act of living (present speech): a well known program

p. 473 in Phaedrus, logos is its own father, answers for itself [re: Lacan’s relation to Freud’s text]

pp. 474-75 full speech, contracts only w/ itself, system of truth > Lacan not proposing crude readjustment [i.e. American psychology] but rarity à la Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit

p. 474n classical [mis]treatment of animal [eg. in Lacan] condenses system’s greatest obscurity: obscurantist resistance in history of (humanist/phallogocentric) metaphysics

p. 475 acc. Lacan, the [full] speech which constitutes/forms the subject is forbidden to him > it speaks everywhere it can be read in his Being [this antinomy is very antinomy of the meaning Freud gave to unconscious]: true speech always operates through mediation of another subject, it is open to chain w/out end re: speeches in which dialectic of recognition is concretely realized in human community [?]

p. 476n Lacan advocates reconciliation (Versohnung), re: reintegration [of letter?]

p. 477 point de capiton safeguards indivisible, living, non-fragmentary integrity of phallus

p. 477n Lacan: when patient can speak to you (analyst) about himself [sic]—analysis is over

——by way of Lacan, Freud tells us very literally Heidegger’s What is Metaphysics?

p. 478n Lacan integrates Freudian phallocentrism w/ phonocentric Saussurian semio-linguistics

pp. 478-79 voice guards against the phallus becoming divisible, being reduced to part object, voice as ideal guardianship of partial/divisible object: mors disséminable (ce qui tombe)

p. 479 systemic & historical link btwn idealization, relève (Aufhebung), and the voice > Lacan’s elevation of signifier

p. 480 Lacan: “the phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance”

——Lacan reversed Hegel: not ideal signified but ideal signifier

pp. 480-82 all phallogocentrism articulated based on (individual, perceptual, cultural, historical) situation where phallus is mother’s desire (to the extent she doesn’t have it) > though phallus isn’t the organ, it mostly symbolizes the penis > thus, phallogocentrism as androcentrism & woman as absolute Other

***p. 481n [re: psychoanalysis] institution built on male child’s experience > at stage of genital organization, there’s only maleness (antithesis isn’t femaleness but being castrated): phallogocentrism is no accident/error, its old, enormous root must be accounted for [described] > but, its description is a “participant” when it induces a practice, ethics, institution, a politics that insures truth of a tradition

pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

p. 483tn one reason, male libido, altus, at the bottom of things—highest truth

p. 483 certain psychoanalytic interpretations (invisible framing: frame w/in frame) vs. scene of writing w/ ruined (abîmé) limits

p. 484 “in” a library, in books, everything begins, thus nothing begins, only dérive, disorientation—from which one does not emerge [nothing outside text]

——border negligible for hermeneut interested in the center

p. 485 remarkable ellipsis of The Purloined Letter

p. 485n coincidence in Poe; point is to show that due to structure of effects of framing—no totalization of bordering can occur: frame always enframed, parts w/out a whole

pp. 485-86n when letter isn’t allergic to partition, linguistic unit (le sème) “phallus” wanders, begins by disseminating, not even disseminating itself

——The Purloined Letter, title of the text, not only its object; everyone drops (laisser tomber) [the text] like they do the preface

p. 487n Poe: it is in matters beyond limits of rule that skill of analyst is evinced

p. 487 [profiting from remnant] by means of a remnant of paternal inheritance, one the debtors left out of account, Dupin draws revenue, surplus-value of a capital that works by itself, calculating (rigorous economy) > Dupin can pay for a sole luxury [Dupin’s desire to read]: cuts across restricted economy like gift w/out return

p. 488 mise en abyme of narration [re: Poe]

——reading [for narrator of Purloined…], treasure w/out price

——[re: Poe’s Purloined…] no neutralization possible when public corporation (société anonyme) of capital & desire inaugurates narration

***p. 489 even when letter arrives, its capacity not to arrive torments it, affects “subject,” “character,” “position” [w/ divisibility]

p. 490 Poe: “the sable divinity would not herself dwell with us always; but we could counterfeit her presence”

pp. 490-91n meaning of letter not important for Lacan? false! no one would worry about it if it didn’t have a determined meaning > meaning of letter for Lacan: betrayal of a pact

pp. 490-92 [re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence, [Lacan’s] triangular logic very limited play w/in the play

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

——double, Unheimlichkeit, doesn’t belong to triad, triangle carried into a labyrinth of doubles, w/out original, fac-similes

p. 493 mise en abyme of title: the text is the object

pp. 493n, 494 Dupin as the biggest dupe [not the master/analyst of truth, like Lacan believes], He-addresses-her-the-Queen-the-address-dupes-her (Il-ladresse-la-Reine-ladresse-la-dupe)

——Dupin, real dupe, duped by truth

p. 494 [4s] four kings, ministers, prefects of police, queens, etc.

pp. 494-95 signer dispossessed, signature in quotations: ce reste est encore de la littérature

LANGUAGE

GT p. 18 beyond a mode of Being, language before linguistics [our obsession here, in GT]

p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

p. 48 gift of language said to be natural, maternal

p. 80 language as a given for Heidegger is already the dialect (Mundart), idiom is the mother of the tongue

***——language elle vole, elle nous souffle, withdraws (soustrait) the responsibility it seems to inaugurate, this originary supplementarity extends far beyond language in strict sense to all textuality

p. 81 language as a phenomenon of gift-countergift, of giving-taking, of exchange, all difficulties of nomination/writing are difficulties of self-naming, self writing (se nommer, sécrire)

——donner reviendrait à prendre et prendre à donner; this would fold itself over on language/writing beyond logocentric closure

MONL pp. 2-3 common language: “Yes, I only have one language, yet it is not mine” > the impossible, inhabiting logical contradiction [suffer & take pleasure in this statement]

p. 17 language and possession

p. 23 terror inside language; p. 24 nothing but jealousy unleashed, “[language] takes its revenge at the heart of the law”

p. 30 people must yield to the homo-hegemony of dominant languages, the languages of master, capital, machine

p. 31 surging wave [déferlment déchainé] of anamnesia that the double interdict unleashed > invent one’s language and “I” at the same time

p. 51 is language not born of vindictive jealous?

p. 58 necessity of other in language, always re-marked: one more first time, historical and singular, determines & phenomenalizes itself by bringing it back to itself

***pp. 60-62 the monolingual is promised [an eschatological or messianic horizon this promise can’t deny, or can merely deny] one language that’s forever deprived, the monolingual is aphasic, thrown into absolute translation

——political decision in writing & reading: inscribe undecidable (chance, terror) in ipseity of host, avoid temptation to make prior-to-the-first-language a language of the master (new master)

p. 67 fatal precipitation of promise dissociated from will, intention, meaning-to-say [vouloir-dire], heralds uniqueness of language to came, “there is…” implies “it doesn’t exist”

——gift of language remains only on condition that it still remains to be given

p. 69 Heidegger says [?], “there is language that does not exist,” i.e. there is no metalanguage

LOBL p. ~101 one never writes in one’s own language or in a foreign language > derive all consequences of this, from each element: hence the triumph (necessarily double & equivocal, because also a phase of mourning)

OOG p. 69n for Husserl, sense precedes act of language, whose value will always be expression

p. 71(n) for Husserl, “objects of the understanding” are preconstituted in predicative spontaneity, “timeless,” are on a “higher level” than “objects of receptivity” (contingent, flesh & blood lion)

p. 79 phenomenological origin of language = constitution of intersubjectivity, the condition of objectivity

p. 122 language and intersubjectivity precede geometry, along w/ [fuzzy] corporeality of pregeometrical shapes, pure bodies w/ color, weight, hardness

H p. 15 foreigner’s pain: cannot speak the language, is w/out defense before the law, foreign to the language of hospitality > can we only welcome the foreigner if we impose the violence that he speaks our language?

p. 87 two sources of sighs, two nostalgias, their dead ones and their language > return home or exiles find home in language

p. 89 language gives the fantasy of property

p. 91 language most mobile, immovable, the absolute ground of all displacements

p. anne 98 Levinas: “essence of language is friendship and hospitality”

p. 133 speaking the same language a matter of ethos, not just linguistic operation

p. 135 Levinas says language is hospitality

FL p. 286 for Benjamin, original sin is when language serves only as means, becomes idle chatter (Geschwätz) [before “bourgeois,” language pure manifestation?]

SPOM p. 66 Marx rare thinker of past to think originary indissociability of technics and language, tele-technics

p. 177 figures of death: differance of technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins in language, before language

MPM pp. 96-7 de Man “parodies” Die Sprache spricht w/ Die Sprache versprichtlanguage promises (itself), no originary Sprechen modalized into promise [would Heidegger protest?] [see S p. 93-4]

MSUB J p. 159 subjectile embodies the paradox of excess (does it or does it not belong to language?)

A pp. 6-7 insofar as a sentence speaks, it testifies to its belonging to a language, an inclusion different from any other mode of inclusion (social class, soil, blood, citizenship, geo-graphic, etc.)

——once totalities are overdetermined, contaminated, by events of language (of mark), which they also imply, they are no longer identical to themselves

p. 9 shibboleth effect, untranslatability (essential incompleteness of translation), borders of untranslatability w/in original language itself

pp. 36-7 Heidegger says animal cannot experience death as such, and that animal cannot speak [Derrida draws out undeveloped relation btwn language and death]

——if death can’t be experienced as such both to language and to what exceeds language, border btwn animal & Dasein would become unassignable

p. 76 language as origin of “nontruth” of death, does man experience death in purity? Death of other becomes first, again

p. 79 [consider existential analysis as a witness] belonging w/out belonging condition of testimony, and of its language first of all

EM pp. 111-12 possibility of international philosophical colloquium must take place in a medium > universality of philosophical discourse, linked to group of languages & “cultures”

p. 121 (144) “lêtreet la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et lhumanisme

p. 128 (154) for Heidegger, what is threatened in extension of metaphysics & technology is the essence of man, devastation of languages threat to essence of humanity

p. 133 (161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

——this trembling can only come from a certain outside—already requisite within the very structure that it solicits

VM p. 89 can one feign to speak a language? [re: Levinas]

p. 95 via Levinas, language cannot makes its own possibility a totality and include w/in itself its own origin or end

p. 104 dissociation of thought and language, subordination of latter to former, is proper to philosophy of finitude [Cartesian Cogito of 3rd Meditation]

p. 112 deportation from its [logos’] own site toward the Site, toward spatial locality, is the metaphor congenital to philosophical logos > metaphor (before being rhetorical procedure) would be emergence of language itself

p. 113 langage, fils de la terre et du soleil: écriture > one could never come across a language w/out rupture of space, no aerial or aquatic language, in which alterity would be more lost than ever > structure of inside-outside/day-night has no meaning in pure space [proscribed words], inhabits conceptuality itself

——no one thought original equivocality of language more profoundly than Hegel, accommodated duplicity & difference w/in speculation

p. 114 think Levinas’ infinitely-other, to think unthinkable-impossible-unutterable beyond (tradition’s) Being and Logos

p. 115 classical infinitism of Cartesian type, thought goes much further much faster than language [thought vs. body (language)?], would handle questions re: Levinas’ other by neutralizing space to liberate positive infinity

p. 125 would return to intentional phenomenon acquiesce to violence of fact, is there thus an irreducible zone of factuality, an original, transcendental, preethical violence? > would it be tied to phenomenality itself & possibility of language? embedded in root of meaning & logos

p. 146 “ontological” anticipation, transcendence toward Being, helps us understand God, even as ether in which dissonance resonates > inhabits & founds language, Mitsein, all Being-together

p. 149 for Heidegger, concept is on the plane of ontic determination; for Levinas, it is on the plane of Being > for both, language is a coming forth and a holding back (réserve)

PP p. 88 acc. Theuth myth, language transmits the message of a fixed design

p. 129 in shadows of Plato’s pharmacy [like a crypt, cave], prior to oppositions (conscious/unconscious, freedom/constraint, voluntary/involuntary), where “language” is not pertinent

OH p. 28 we did not choose this responsibility of our heritage [it is from the other, the language of our language], nor the capitalizing memory we have of it

p. 61 affirmation (faith) in language defies all metalanguage

p. 93 language (mark) threatens rigor of public/private distinction

VP p. 12 [re: not substantializing Husserlian “transcendental”] language never escapes analogy, is analogy through & through > classical war of language, casting metaphors against metaphors, takes place in difference > le langage garde la différence qui garde le langage

p. 29 the opposition of the soul and the body always depends on an interpretation of language

p. 30 Husserl draws a border btwn language itself, btwn express and non-express in language, not btwn language and non-language

PAS PAS p. (68) chance and necessity de la langue, la nécessité, la chance, marque encore la chance, the risk: que lautre de la langue se passe dans le pas au-delà de la langue, not its other but the other sans elle (language)

p. (91) Blanchot’s example of how speaking negates the existent of which it speaks: ‘This woman!’ > Hölderlin, Mallarmé, all poets, felt act of naming is marvelous/disquieting

——Blanchot: ideal negation, deferred assassination that is language, my language does not kill anyone (woman can always die, her death announced, already present in my language)

S p. 68 can one speak of “logic” in region of originarity of language (le langage), of a given language (langue)?

p. 69 for Heidegger, signature of thought never individual, commits via community, people, in his or her own language; there are only some languages open to Being: German, Greek

pp. 129-30n before the question, the question mark, language is already there, we have already said yes to it, given a pledge, acquiesced (Zusage,which also means promise, is for Heidegger a commitment of language toward language)

p. 130n before the word is the wordless word “yes,” a pre-originary pledge that precedes any engagement in language and action > no erasure is possible for such a pledge (memory before any souvenir), where faith defeats any narrative, la gage engage dans la langue

FSW pp. 213-14 “repetition”—death as power, lack of power—institutes translatability, makes possible “language,” transforms absolute idiom into a limit toujours déjà transgressed (pure idiom is not language, becomes so only through repetition), repetition divides point of departure of first time; however, to only look at effect of repetition, at translation, obvious distinction btwn force & meaning, effaces intensity of death drive

PPHS p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

SH p. 31 insignificance of language, can only take on meaning in relation to a place (border, house, threshold, site) > formation of alliances, codes, contracts

——untranslatability connected w/ difficult passage (no pasarán), aporia, that isolates one poetic language from another (& multiplicity w/in language) > also ce pas impossible

p. 32 every poem: one time alone its own language (especially when they’re many), shibboleth

p. 67 circumcision is a determination, defines & decides, but to ask for circumcision is not to ask for meaning or object > circumcision always binds body to language

F p. xxxii Abraham and Torok: topos & force attempt the impossible, to grasp through language source from which language emanates

pp. xxxv-xxxvi language inhabits crypt as “mots enterrés vifs,” words relieved of communicative function, marking, in a way, that le désir a été dune certaine manière satisfait, que la jouissance a eu lieu

WM p. 251 sun structures metaphorical space of philosophy, represents what is natural in philosophical language, makes possible oppositions (appearing/disappearing, visible/invisible, present/absent)

——when metaphysics opposes formal/artificial language to a natural one, “natural” leads us back to physis as solar system, to a history of relationship earth/sun in system of perception

DS p. 250 diacriticity of language, its inexhaustibility, prevents a theme from being a theme

pp. 262-64n [re: Mallarmé’s use of Or] Or (substantive noun/adverb of time), gold turned to nothing; Igitur, adverb-name (also means “therefore”), has affinities w/ Or, or marks the hour (today) > temps dor, “Il Signor,” “qui signore,” “signe or,” in the golden antre of a glottis (glossa, gold ingot, lingot, lingua) > throw of linguistic dice

POS p. 19 “everyday language” neither innocent nor neutral, language of Western metaphysics, carries w/ it considerable presuppositions

p. 33 couple outside/inside, representation of language as “expression,” are structural lures (what Kant would’ve called a transcendental illusion)

ATIA pp. 120-21 for Lacan, human is not a beast of prey, but a beast that is prey to language [this is thought while distinguishing anthropological from zoological]

FS pp. 3-4 Derrida links structuralist obsession w/ an anxiety (inquiétude) about (sur) language, an anxiety of (du) language and in (dans) language itself

——structuralist attitude, et notre posture aujourdhui devant ou dans le langage, not only moments in history: étonnement, plutôt, par le langage comme origine de lhistoire > par l'historicité elle-même

p. 5 [metaphor of structuralism]: a city no longer inhabited, reduced to its skeleton, haunted by meaning & culture > cette hantise is the mode (absent/present) of thing itself in pure language (housed in pure literature)

p. 27 Hegel demonstrated that explication of a phenomenon by a force is tautology; yet, one must consider this w/in language’s inability to emerge from itself, not solely w/in thought of force

——force is the other of language [by articulating it, becomes a phenomenon]

TB pp. 118-19 at edge of the language, from this edge to the other of proper name: debt contracts the trait (to-be-translated from one language to the other) of relation of living subject to his name

p. 131 for Benjamin, languages intend (as Babelian event) toward being-language of language, this is “pure language,” not transcendent to each language, not Leibnizian universal language

——translation, as the accord of tongues, lets the being-language of language resonate, announcing it rather than presenting it

DPi pp. 252-53 can only condemn a person/subject answerable to his or her name to death > genocide not sensu stricto DP, can’t DP a language (though languages are killed)

CHM p. 37 “the fact of language is probably the only fact ultimately to resist all parenthization” [letter always arrives?]

p. 54 if madness is the absence of a work, any philosopher/speaking subject can only evoke madness in language of fiction or fiction of language

Gi pp. 20-1 the spatial, spacing dispersion, origin of spacing first manifested in language > language determined by spatial meanings (Raumbedeutungen) [via Heidegger]

Gii p. 30 Geschlecht, in Fichte, is/inhabits living language of inspirited breath vs. dead language torn from its root

——acc. Fichte, children learn language as if signs for sensible things were arbitrary (willkürlich) > must reconstitute past development of national language

PIO p. 19 tain prohibits transparency & authorizes invention of mirror, is a trace of language

——tain (btwn 2 lines) is language itself [“word”] (associates/dissociates forever: Eros/Psyche) [tain like hymen?]: an unbearable violence, a perversion that obeys law of language

RM p. 60 Geflecht, interlacing, in Der Weg zur Sprache, interlaces Sprache and Weg: a binding-unbinding interlacing (entrelacement liant-déliant) (entbindende Binde)

——a circle that is not a vicious circle, yet still interlaced in advance > Sprache and Weg are “already in advance of us (uns stets schon voraus)”

p. 76 Heidegger: the unity of the being of Sprache shall be called Aufriss

pp. 77-8 always plus dune language in the language: the capture of the crossing (croisement) that allies Ziehen and Reissen, this capture (à la fois violent/faithful, laissant sauf) affects the captor, abduction (captation), translation, into other’s language [French retrait, English re-tracing] > all this already at work (à loeuvre) in the other’s languages, these dealings make for a work (fait oeuvre)

PF p. xxviii in MONL, non-belonging to language, structure of alibi

TR p. 105 de Man: w/in certain perspective, no use of language that’s not radically formal, mechanical, even when concealed by aesthetic, formalistic delusions

***WAP pp. 104-05 il ny a pas le choix, a political theme: every monolingualism restores mastery

——unity of language always vested and manipulated simulacrum, a positivist dogma and, à la fois, a phenomenon that can be found nowhere > so: play, graft between languages, w/in the languages in language, thus we can struggle against colonizing principle

EJQB p. 71 language is the rupture w/ totality itself (there is an essential lapse, not the nocturnal memory of all language) [letter is the separation/limit]

AFR pp. 82-3 Condillac: men of genius, favorite disciples of nature, make language seem less arbitrary—method of invention is only analogy itself (analogy: art of reasoning & speaking)

——that math can be a model for analogy: unlimited generality of principle of analogy

EL pp. 223-24 we inhabit paradox of language too quickly: the thinking of language that deconstructs philosophical oppositions of semiotism inherited from Platonism/Enlightenment risks rejecting science, philosophy (& a nationalist risk [?]) [against homogenizing deconstruction]

LI p. 120 that all interpretation and all language are problematic: a stroke of luck?

ATM p. 148 [re: giving to EL w/out restitution] excess that overflows language sets it into motion at moment of traversing it > this traversal is not transgression (passage of a sharply dividing limit) > metaphor of overflowing no longer fits—too linear [?]

p. 154 passage beyond language requires language, or requires text as a place for the trace of a step (pas) that passes beyond language, not (present) elsewhere [not classical]

——[vis-à-vis Levinas] interdictory language is interdicted but continues speaking, can’t help itself, can only continue strangely interrupting itself > essential function of a quotation: quoting the uncitable accuses language, (sur)rendered to a gift language can’t open up on its own

p. 158 when Levinas says responsibility is “probably” the essence of language: must allow language freedom to betray its own essence [ethical] so that it can surrender (se rendre) to it

p. 168 “lace of obligation holds language…prevents it from falling apart in passing through eyelets of a texture [reappropriation?]: alternatively inside and outside, below and above, before and beyond”

***WOG p. 27 deconstruction of logocentrism never more misunderstood than when seen as theory of language

CIN p. 46 “language poisons for us the most secret of our secrets…one must even sacrifice one’s own sacrifice to it”

OG p. 6 (15) crisis also a symptom: inflation of language, of sign “language,” inflation of sign itself, inflation itself > language’s historico-metaphysical epoch must determine totality of its problematic horizon, exposing its finitude when no longer self-assured, guaranteed (bordé), by infinite signified (which seemed to exceed it)

p. 7 (16) writing as “signifier of the signifier” no longer means accidental doubling, fallen (déchue) secondarity, but overflows, goes beyond extension of language > comprehends language

——signified always already (toujours déjà) functions as signifier: effacing = overflowing

——secondarity of writing effects all signifieds

——advent of writing, advent of a play which effaces all those abris du hors-jeu (out-of-bounds shelters [transcendental signifieds]) that surveil field of language > destroying the concept sign

p. 52 (75) how is language [demandons-nous] not a species of writing?

p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

p. 106 for Derrida, writing as violence is originary, mustn’t be abstracted or isolated, not a fall/disease incurred by an innocent language

pp. 141-42 (203-05) dispossession institutes/deconstitutes me (is a law of language)—dessaisissement spéculaire, power of death at heart of living speech > dispossessed of longed-for presence in attempt to seize it [Rousseau recognized this]

p. 216 (309) orientation is a disorientation, the structure of language; Rousseau’s geography of language: oriented toward its origin comme à son orient > occident as la fin, la chute, la cadence, léchéance, la mort, la nuit

p. 218 (312) Rousseau’s morphological classification of language: typology linked to topology (place of origin) [North/South: need/passion]

p. 219 (313) natural cause of language avoids Condillac’s theologico-moral usteron proteron

——for Rousseau, no social institute before language, which owes its form to natural causes > language includes and constructs whole social structure

p. 232 (331) le langage na pu surgir quà partir de la dispersion

——que le langage doive traverser lespace, soit tenu de sespacer, ce nest pas là un trait accidentel mais le sceau de son originela dispersion originelle laisse sa marque dans le langage: articulation (which seems to introduce difference as an institution) has for ground/space dispersion that is natural: space itself

p. 242 (345) for Rousseau, convention pulls language beyond/out of the cry (arrache la langue au cri) w/ consonants, tenses (i.e. articulation): language born out of its own degeneration

pp. 242-43 (345) complexity of zero degree, origin, nothing but a point in the system of supplementarity? [despite what he declares, nothing Rousseau writes authorizes simple origin]

——history of language as history du supplément dorigine

p. 244 (346) Rousseau tries to describe a language not yet corrupted by articulation, supplementarity, convention > time of that language: mythic limit btwn déjà and pas-encore

pp. 272-73 [Condillac, Vico, Kafka, Rousseau: language as originarily metaphorical, poetic, prior to reason?] > Rousseau does not believe language of action (need) precedes speech (language of passion)

EU p. 11 need to bring more clarity to the understanding of a language is both a juridical & philosophical pursuit (policing too)

p. 13 relation of linguistic subjugation [forced to share language] to the clearing/controlling of borders, roads, routes, regions, territories [see p. 8 method (odos)] > power of spacing, body of writing, to clear a path (language here is neither secondary nor primary)

p. 64 natural languages fixed, rooted, re-rooted in event of Bible translation > Luther suffices as emblem

LAST SUPPER

POO p. 19 no vegetarian can avoid “sublimity of mystical cannibalism, cannibalism in mourning”

LATE

SW pp. 318-19 verdict: end of the end of history, everything is going to start again—is there a heritage looming at this instant/point of verdict? > I am no longer in question re: this unknown verdict, one that, if it came, would be so tortuous, so against the rhythm, that it would mime quasi-resurrection of new year by sealing forever the “so late, too late, sero” > “late” (always tautology) means “so late,” “too late, absolutely”

p. 319 was it even to Christ my poor old incorrigible Augustine finally addressed: “you were w/ me, I was not w/ you, beauty so ancient and new” > or because it is already late?

p. 340 to pray too late or à contretemps: to pray alone (“I always pray alone”); don’t keep prayer waiting, & it comes before everything, never lets itself be waited for

——prayer: before question, before “this is,” before dialogue, reply, knowledge, “neither true nor false”—even a Greek knew that [Aristotle]

——this don’t be late to prayer is how Derrida tries to calculate time of verdict awaiting him > but its evening is so internal to it, its “so late,” its “too late,” “I despair of ever effacing it, sero te amavi” [Augustine’s “late have I loved you”]

pp. 341-42 the 2 categorical imperatives of tallith/prayer: don’t be late, must be living skin: untenability of these imperatives the very possibility of the promise

***pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

DPi pp. 55-6 contretemps of “too soon,” “too late” — essential anachronism of DP

LAUGHTER/SERIOUS

KH p. 100 philosophy only becomes serious in the path of logic, sublates myth

p.101 Parmenides is serious, recourse to myth is not

pp. 101-02 acc. Hegel, Plato uses myth because he’s impotent, a ludico-mythological drift (dérive), Aristotle Hegel’s guarantor of seriousness

p. 102 Aristotle: “those who philosophize w/ recourse to myth are not worth treating seriously”

p.112-113 play of mythic logic. recreation. becoming (oneiric bastard reasoning)

MPM pp. 93-4 de Man’s texts on promise pervert tranquil assurance of what we call “performative” > too much of promise is irremediable disturbance/perversion, is also a trap, also renders promise possible (indestructible), and comical

p. 96 via de Man, Heidegger rarely laughs and would probably be against irony as a pose of subjective mastery, never feels the exhilaration of a promise

EM pp. 135-36 Nietzsche’s übermensch “burns his text and erases the traces of his steps,” a laughter bursting beyond metaphysics

PP p. 64 “not serious” and “serious” can both add nothing to a text, instead: reading or writing supplement rigorously prescribed > a play, il faut accorder le système de tous ses pouvoirs

p. 150 good-writing is serious (spoudē), pharmakon, ephemeral produce is a game (paidia)

OH p. 82 paleonyms: “identity,” “culture,” “Europe,” “capital” > take them very seriously, cautiously, lightly, only in quotation marks

HASD pp. 33-34 the laughter and breath [what divine hyperbole!] of theatrical rhetoric in Republic [re: epekeina tes ousias] becomes serious prayer in Christianity

PAS PAS p. (76) Blanchot makes a laughing stock (fait rire) of the opposition btwn clarification (explicitation) and cut (coupure) > léclat de rire

isn’t the thought of la paralyse a thought of the obscene Medusa? good for laughter too

p. (77) logic of double band arrests laughter and shamelessness (limpudeur) when they shield themselves (se défendent) against anguish and affirmation > contamination btwn laughs and violations is inevitable

p. (94) Blanchot: this laughter ran along border of space, w/out crossing it, seemed to be that space

S p. 125n to be sensitive to humor despite seriousness [in Heidegger’s presumptions German, Greek re: Geist] could become an obligation (ethical, political), a chance, chance de lesprit

POOF pp. 55-6 Nietzsche’s silence (among friends), imperative/enigma of sense of decency (pudeur) [Why I am a Destiny]: an erasure w/out erasure, everything is possible in this silence > silence as interruption that substitutes testimony for know-how, faith for the test, the perhaps for certainty, other for same, friendship for calculation: different way of thinking among

——no silence among friends w/out laughter, which bares its teeth like death, doing evil & laughing at evil (not laughing it away) among friends

pp. 57-8 in its very depth the keeping silent of Sein und Zeit never laughs (hear something here re: colloquy btwn Heidegger & Nietzsche) > little room for laughter in Heidegger

p. 113 [re: friend–enemy] is ultimate pessimism the absolute ambivalence of those hospitable to death drive [Freud, Empedocles]? > fool & sage never stop laughing w/ each other

p. 280 we shall laugh interminably at Ferenczi’s letter to Freud [Ferenczi treats Freud like a father–god], we shall also take it seriously [see p. 279 for a swift recap of all questions in POOF, now associated, via this letter, w/ psychoanalysis]

T p. xxi why not just laugh, why deconstruct? and how could you ever convince the pertinence of impertinence

DS p. 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” [Wolf Man] > hymen

p. 213 a mark w/out mark, a margin, btwn pleasure & desire, only takes place when doesn’t, when all consuming consummation w/out violence: death or orgasm while laughing

pp. 225-26 [on conscious intention of author] does not matter to us here, reader should not know why, burst of laughter deep inside antre answers these questions

pp. 279-80(n) [quoting Mallarmé] rhythm, literary game par excellence: mimic suspense/laughter—rhythmic cadence, or case, all the falls, the silent fall of pen

P p. 34 undecidability of abyss: bottom-less & bottom of bottom, “filling up the abyss” > satire of abyss, comic effect

pp. 130-31 “pleasing-oneself-in” of sublime suspends play, elevates to seriousness, nur negativ, relates to moral law, both presuppose violence done to senses, w/ sublime violence done by imagination, not reason > imagination mutilates itself, conceals itself, binds, robs itself: sacrificial violence gains by losing > organizes expropriation w/in calculation > imagination organizes theft of its own freedom, feels sacrifice/theft at same time as the Ursache to which it submits [see GOD]

SP p. 61 woman plays w/ castration, does not believe in it, nor its opposite (much too clever for that), but she can’t seduce w/out it, needs castration’s effects, but as she plays w/ it, she anticipates her laughter (at man)

ATIA p. 35 Nietzsche tries to teach us to laugh again [in Ecce Homo], by plotting to let all his animals loose into philosophy, “reanimalizes” genealogy of the concept

DIF DIF p. 27 there will be no unique name: must think this w/out nostalgia, hors du myth of pure mom/dad language, must affirm like Nietzsche met laffirmation en jeu, dans un rire et un pas de la danse

DPi p. 71(n) old sparky, the widow: “there is a need to laugh, to deride the killing machine”

p. 149 religions: Systeme der Gausamkeit, festivals, theater of cruelty, are serious, there is no laughter, one suffers & causes suffering to take pleasure > cruelty not one part among others: it is the essence of life, life makes itself suffer to keep itself in memory, an interpretation of sacrificiality

——at all solemn festivals, there comes back (nachwirkt) a remainder of fear that presided over all acts of memory, promises, oaths, engagements

p. 223 why are killing machines given female proper names? why do they make us laugh?

RGE p. 252 the other dawn (awake from slumber of reason—which anticipated all figures of its beyond, all forms & resources of its exterior—except, perhaps, laughter)

——anguish mustn’t be called the negative of laughter for fear of being sucked back into Hegel’s discourse

p. 253 for Bataille, laughter is extreme point of “experience,” makes Hegelian discourse dislocate itself > must know what one’s laughing at, a complicity w/out reserve

——can one inscribe in lexicon/syntax of a language, our language (of philosophy), that which exceeds opposition of concepts governed by this communal logic?

p. 256 laughter at independence of self-consciousness: liberates itself by enslaving itself, starts to work, enters dialectics > laughter alone exceeds dialectics, an absolute risking of death, absolute renunciation of meaning

——a laughter that never appears, exceeds phenomenality, the absolute possibility of meaning

——word “laughter” must be read in a burst (dans léclat)

——Bataille’s “major” laughter laughs at a “minor” one—sovereign operation also needs life [?], simulates (as comedy) absolute risk: laugh at this simulacrum > pour se rapporter à soi dans la jouissance de soi > léclat du rire est ce presque rien où sombre absolument le sens

p. 335n laughter’s burst does not maintain itself (not negative), laughs at Aufhebung

pp. 256-57 that there must be meaning, that nothing must be definitely lost in death, that Hegel refers to death as “abstract negativity” > Bataille finds all this laughable: submission to self-evidence of meaning, to its imperative, to its work, to its deferred enjoyment, to its seriousness

——this submission is essence & element of Hegelian ontologics

——le comique absolu, cest langoisse devant la dépense à fonds perdus, devant le sacrifice absolu du sens: sans retour et sans réserve

p. 257 acc. Bataille, to be indifferent to comedy of Aufhebung (like Hegel was)—to blind oneself to experience of sacred, to heedless sacrifice of presence & meaning

——Aufhebung amortizes absolute expenditure (la dépense absolue), works the “putting at stake” into an investment (à élaborer la mise en jeu en investissement) > it’s laughable

***——figure of experience that mimes through sacrifice the risk of absolute death, the feint through which the risk can be lived; philosophy can’t think this simulacrum, Bataille can only say it, feign to say it, in the Hegelian logos > ce rire qui se confond, dans le simulacre, avec louverture du sacré

pp. 257-58 Bataille: only way for negativity to reveal what we are is to see ourselves dead, this is comedy! must live w/ impression of truly dying, difficult because necessity of spectacle/representation, nothing less animal than fiction of death > emphasis on simulacrum disrupts Hegel

REST p. 262 Van Gogh’s shoes laugh at us

WAP p. 117 “wrong of you to overlook Hegel’s sense of humor”

——as much modesty as coyness in my irony > still, seriousness of concept never absent

p. 126 how can you not burst out laughing before photo of Heidegger in shorts

D pp. 301-02 to present oneself, to stand upright (se dresser), always a murder, a castration > an erection that can only display itself in play, laughter, pointed teeth of cut

HST p. 358 hospitality, possibility of laughter

pp. 359-60 Abraham/Sarah laugh at Isaac’s birth; Yishaq means “he laughs”

p. 382 no forgiveness w/out memory (but not reducible to act of memory), forgiveness is, above all, not to forget [Jankelevitch]

——that forgiveness is not forgetting [?] makes us laugh through tears/anguish

p. 396 mad laughter, le rire dément, at forgiveness in betrayal, betrayal in forgiveness

——demented laughter, et il dément mentir, as denagation of lying while still lying (even while disavowing/avowing lying)

——laughter that says the truth of lying: logic of symptom always stronger than an ethics of truthfulness (véracité)

p. 398 last aporia of forgiveness, most artful, provoke laughter to point of madness [Beckett’s risus purus]

LI p. 108n how can Sarl take something not serious so seriously?

p. 34 let’s be serious, can we?

p. 71 the way oppositions impose non-neutral hierarchies (classical logic) > eg. speech act theory’s demand for the “serious, literal, strict”

——speech act theory should (to escape traditional logic) assert right of its own speech acts to be non-serious

p. 72 submission to classical normativity/hierarchy in the name seriousness cannot be taken seriously

——why not say it was all a parasitic joke (transform infelicity into jouissance)—maybe we will!

p. 84 did Derrida make seriousness of philosophical discourse skid towards literary play [parasitizing Descartes’ title in SEC]? unless seriousness were already the para-site of such play

p. 122 for Searle, “realization” signifies “actualization” or “fulfillment”: “serious/literal” are exemplary qualities of idealized realization of intention, what language ought to do

p. 125 Derrida, as a classical philosopher (which, it is true, he remains as well), doesn’t see a big difference btwn “just a little serious” and “not serious at all”

TN p. 37 Nancy’s Logodaedalus bursts (éclatant) w/ laughter of thought

p. 38 acc. Nancy, laughter as philosopher’s presence to himself, contact successfully interrupted gives pleasure of syncope, pleasure of which it is depriving itself

p. 58 when Nancy gives thought to birth of body, it’s sarcastic [having it out w/ flesh], mordant, une transsubstantiation acharnée qui inlassablement mord, remord et met à mort la chair > impossible auto-biography, transubstantiation of Eucharist itself: Corpus bursts out laughing

p. 113 laughter, especially a peal or burst, is like a syncope, even if it shakes up whole body—it’s a thing of the mouth

p. 119 weep, weigh, think, complain, laugh [think each transitively & intransitively]

BSi p. 180 difficult for Derrida to laugh very long w/ Deleuze [re: jokes against psychoanalysis]

p. 246 [Derrida tells a good joke?] “the one to be sorriest for [in Eden] is the snake”

OG p. 50 (73) for Plato (Phaedrus 277e), play, childishness, paidia of writing opposed to adult gravity (spoudè) of speech

ATAP p. 90 Glas’ columns constantly shaken by apocalyptic agitations, laughs at apocalypse (mixing John of Gospel w/ Genet [GLAS p. 198])

LAW

GT p. 6 soon as there is law, law of partition (partage) [see p. 80], law as partition (moira), soon as there is nomy—there’s economy (oikonomia) > exchange, circulation, return (retour); figure of circle, amortization

p. 76 one must render account of law that dissolves the gift in an Aufklarung of relational logic, that privileges, like Lévi-Strauss, the logic of exchange

p. 138 laws turn gift into exchange, economy, contractual circulation, (distributive) justice

p. 145 Derrida effectively reminds us that the characters are before the law in the same way as narration and textual dissemination [literature in general]

MONL p. 10 law: first condition of madness

p. 23 terror inside language; p. 24 nothing but jealousy unleashed, “[language] takes its revenge at the heart of the law”

p. 25 when hospitality auto-limits itself into a law [auto-immunity?]

R p. 13 democracy as the turning, the wheel, the sovereignty that gives the force of law, circularity, sphericity > either identity btwn origin/conclusion or by turns, in turn, each in turn

p. 47 impossible as the only possibility, the condition of possibility: the antinomy at the heart of every -nomy

p. 77 [Nietzsche-like?] [Derrida by way of Aristotle by way of Plato] the “just more than one,” a god among men, not a part of a whole or calculable series; law, calculability, would betray justice for those who are the law > fable of sovereignty returns

p. 84 more impossible & yet necessary: separate autonomy & democracy, sovereignty & unconditionality, law & justice [Derrida reminds audience of UWC]

FK p. 57 “mystical foundation of authority” [Montaigne, Pascal], the law of law, event which doesn’t belong to set it founds, decision of other in undecidable > links secret, belief, credit to foundation, knowledge, science

p. 99 pure attestation indispensable to science, philosophy, religion; it can gather or scatter itself, trust in the pledge (gage) of the other unites 1) belief in other 2) sacralization of presence-absence 3) sanctification of law > divides in various ways

H p. 55 host must elect, choose, filter, must have power, no hospitality w/out finitude: Gewalt, force of law

p. 71 hospitality’s infinite idea should resist the law itself

p. 73 hospitality remains, like law, conditional, and thus conditioned on the unconditionality that is the basis of the law

p. 79 pervertibility (corruptibility) of hospitality—that it must actualize in laws

p. 81 plurality adds conditional laws to unique and singular

p. 85 law always instituted against, an instituted thesis

p. 135 always threatened by this dilemma: 1) when unconditional hospitality is circumscribed by economy of circle (law, duty) [vs. ring?] 2) when unconditional hospitality dispenses w/ law

FL p. 233 insist on possibility of a justice, indeed of a law [loi] that exceeds or contradicts law, no relation to law, may just as well demand law and exclude it [law of death?]

——“enforce the law:” justice as law needs force

p. 234 how can the force behind law be just? Gewalt: violence and legitimating authority, no anterior legitimacy to the institution of law

p. 238 Pascal/Montaigne: a powerless justice is not a justice [see ROP p. 125n Montaigne/Pascal on mystical foundation of law]

p. 240 authority of laws rests on credit granted to them, this justice of law, justice as law, is not justice

p. 243 the possibility of deconstruction which is btwn justice & law, deconstructibility of law makes deconstruction possible

p. 244 law is the element of calculation, not justice

p. marginal laws (AIDS response) could be most important

p. 245 “I cannot speak the language of the other except to the extent that I appropriate

it and assimilate it according to the law (loi) of an implicit third…inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of the idioms”

——apply rule w/out justice, Kant would say, I acted in conformity with duty but not through duty or out of respect for the law (loi)

p. 264 Benjamin’s “philosophy of law”: 1) die rechtsetzende Gewalt vs. die rechtserhaltende Gewalt 2) violence that makes vs. violence that destroys 3) justice of end vs. power of law creation

p. 266 both Jusnaturalism (natural law [in style of Aristotle or Aufklärung p. 296]) and positive law (historical evolution of law) share same dogmatic presupposition, acc Benjamin: “natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to ‘justify’ the means, positive law to ‘guarantee’ the justness of the ends through the justification of the means”

——positive law blind to unconditionality of ends, natural law to conditionality of means

——Benjamin’s statements on divine justice not always incompatible w/ theological basis for all jusnaturalisms

p. 267 all law wants to monopolize violence, tautology of the violence of the law, protect itself [autoimmunity]; performative tautology or a priori synthesis structures any founding of law, so one can “credit” the validity of each performative, guarantee

——criminal lays bare the violence of the juridical order itself

p. 274 criminal & prophet

——acc. to Benjamin, antimilitary pacifists fail to recognize law-preserving violence

pp. 274-75 figure of revolutionary instant, exceptional decision, which metaphorizes an anterior law, is also a contamination > effaces, blurs distinction btwn foundation/preservation

p. 275 via Benjamin, the threat of the law (to itself and outwards) is neither intimidation nor dissuasion (as pacifists, anarchists or activists believe): it is threatening like fate is threatening

——Marxist-Hegelian critique of violence in name of liberty, in name of what Benjamin calls formless freedom (gestaltlose Freiheit), are impotent, remain alien to juridical essence of violence, to “order of the law”

p. 276 death penalty as right to law, testifies that law is a violence contrary to nature, something “rotten” at the heart of law; police are a more spectral version of death penalty

p. 277 police are the force of law, contamination of founding/preserving

p. 282 from instituting violence to preserving law/contract [modern democracies] > passage from presence to representation, acc to Benjamin a Verfall, forgetting of originary violence in this differance [Derrida doesn’t see this as accidental?]

p. 292 Benjamin: mythic law (juridical fiction) has bastardized “eternal forms of pure divine violence,” divine violence w/out law

LOBL p. 98 law = demand for story

p. 171 arrêt de mort brings about the arrêt of the law

AF p. 2 arkheion, house of commanders, guardians, of archons, whose documents speak the law

——archives take place in a house arrest

p. 7 every archive at once institutive & conservative [see FL], revolutionary & traditional, an eco-nomic archive: keeps, puts in reserve, saves, but in unnatural fashion (forcing obedience to law)

p. 22 lawmakers w/out which one can’t have archives, conservation (memory) puts into reserve (“store”), accumulates, capitalizes, stocks a quasi-infinity of layers (hypermnesic, hypomnesic epidermises of books & penises)

p. 40 juridical fiction produces continuity of fiction

p. 81 nomological arkhē, law of institution (thesis, nomos, themis) is thesis

SPOM p. xviii Derrida distinguishes here btwn justice & law (not speaking of laws) [see p. 220]

p. 7 visor effect: “to feel ourselves seen by a look which it will always be impossible to cross” > the inheritance of law

p. 25 Hamlet complains that the law stems from vengeance before Nietzsche, before Heidegger, before Benjamin

POOF pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

pp. 276-77 the 3rd witnesses a law that interrupts vertigo of singularity (a dual narcissism), 3rd opens up & keeps from closing the question of secrecy > Nietzsche: for the hermit, the friend is always 3rd person (keeps the other 2 [w/in oneself] from sinking to the depths)

BL p. 187 singular relationship to the law must come in contact w/ “general or universal” essence of law, w/out being able to do so

——no such thing as literary essence, name literature destined to remain improper: has something to do w/ drama of name, law of name, name of law

——paradox, enigma before-the-law > ainigma, a relation, story, fable

p. 191 does law share the conditions of its possibility w/ the literary object?

——a law should never give rise to any story? this is the law of law [secret of secret? see FWT p. 132]: no history [see pp. 192, 194 cannot tolerate its history], genesis, derivation [also see p. 205 law of law as differance]

p. 191 all stories on law tell of its revelation

——the law itself is what is invisible in each law; silence, discontinuity, withheld site

192 to enter into relation w/ law, to be tempted by the impossible (its origin)

pp. 193-94 the height of the human, 2 legs, is what creates repression; turning away is an upward movement, purification, turns away from that which stinks: the history of the law

p. 196 no itinerary, no path to accede to the law, but law is accessible “at all times to everyone”

——problem of exemplarity [knowing how to enter into the law] w/ re: to Kant’s respect for the law > the example would be the effect of the law, only summoned before the law

p. 197 unreadability of law, law as prohibition? no, let’s abandon, suspend this formula

p. 199 origin of literature at same time as origin of law; story of prohibition (law) is a prohibited story

p. 200 he who asserts the law, turns his back on it

——he who awaits the law, faces it [or see p. 201 before the law w/out facing it]

p. 202 blindness & separation before the law

p. 203 law is interdit (prohibition, prohibited): terrifying double bind of its own taking place

pp. 203-04 to have rapport w/ law one must have no rapport w/ law, remain ignorant who/what it is

p. 204 before = outside the law

p. 205 law prohibits by interfering, deferring the “férance,” reference, rapport, relation > what cannot be approached is the origin of differance: the law of law (neither natural nor institutional) [also see p. 191 on law of law]

p. 206 via Heidegger’s “truth” as non-truth as truth of truth, truth w/out truth guards itself > truth and law would be the guarding itself (Wahrheit): look btwn guardian & man

——law calls for responsibility and guarding, the being-for-death before it

p. 207 law is not a woman, not a feminine figure—even if man wants to enter, penetrate it (that’s its trap [makes you think it’s feminine?])

p. 208-09 law becomes something by being a nothing that constantly defers access to itself [tabernacle]; atopology [khōra] erases event, annuls the event, nullification gives birth to the law

p. 209 hymen of the law, its entry (Eintritt): ante portes (place of premature ejaculation), place & non-place: the adjournment ’til death of child is either premature ejaculation or non-ejaculation: no ejaculate w/out relation to the law [Lacan] > tabernacle empty, dissemination fatal

pp. 214-15 different periods of history of positive law give substance to literature, value of signatures [“authors”]

p. 216 literature as subversive juridicity

——literature makes law, power of performativity—sidestep existing laws which condition its emergence (jouer la loi [play, deceive the law])

POO pp. 28-9 literature’s authorization to say everything acknowledges right to absolute nonresponse

——this nonresponse is hyperbolic condition of democracy (democracy to-come) contradicts historically limited democracy where calculable subject has to tell truth, has to reveal secret before the law (doctors, confession, psychoanalyst, lawyer, national defense)

MPM pp. 7-8 Heidegger links law & Being in Hölderlin, de Man contests

——Derrida adds: impossible to reduce a thinking of the law to a thinking of Being

p. 8 name must appeal to law in some way

pp. 10-1 if memory maneuvers btwn law and Being, can one think the being and law of memory? these questions move through transference & translation, above abyss; require impossible passageways: “the fragile resistance of a span” [hymen?]

p. 24 fatality (of tropological dislocation) is the law, non-totalization [impossibility of coming into being], the law of the law, that the law takes turns w/, as if it were, its own supplement

——in terms of speech acts, law takes form of the performative

p. 35 il faut: one must follow the trace, remember that which did not exist, the law [Being and law], only there in the aporia of mourning and prosopopoeia: 1) success fails: other becomes part of us, bear him in us, like a future 2) failure succeeds: aborted interorization, respect for other as other, other remains alone, outside us, in his death > schema makes true mourning impossible

p. 144 de Man: the incompatibility of grammar & meaning becomes explicit when linguistic structures are stated in political terms [on the grammar, historicity of law]

p. 145 disjunction of memory & promise is the law, the text of law, the law of text

PP pp. 121-22 (138-39) in Laws judge must introject, internalize the letter, grammata [tou Dephikou grammatos], into his soul; anamnesic dialectics, repetition of eidos, self-knowledge, self-mastery > a forgetting of childhood, exorcism of child, teaches child to speak

p. 123 dialectical inversion of pharmakon or dangerous supplement makes death à la fois acceptable and null > immortality of soul, acts like antibody, dissipates its terrifying fantasy, le pharmarkon inverti, qui met en fuite tous les épouvantails: origin of epistēmē, opening to truth as possibility of repetition, submission of “greed for life (epithumein zēn)” to law (king, father, chief, capital)

p. 124 eidos, truth, law, epistēmē, dialectics, philosophy: names of the pharmakon that must oppose to pharmakon of Sophists, the bewitching fear of death

——Socrates must listen to the Laws like they’re a phonic spell

p. 126 Socrates turns pharmakon, hemlock, through logos, into salvation, deliverance

p. 152 (176) logos and nomos purify poisoned waters

VM p. 111 for Levinas, he is concerned w/ essence of Ethics, not laws or moral rules, but, asks Derrida, wouldn’t an Ethics beyond law be the law of laws?

P (I) p. (11) la force de hantise [that drives Derrida to Blanchot or Blanchot to Blanchot], injunction of a truth w/out truth, toujours au-delà de la fascination dont on parle à leur sujet > fascination de la loi, ce qui semble inimaginable, ou inconcevable, sinon impensable

PAS PAS p. (33) law w/out law of é-loignement: impossible topic of essentiality

p. (61) Blanchot: circle of law is this: must be a crossing for there to be a limit, uncrossable that in its desire, its call, has already crossed the line [appele à franchir]

p. (62) pas de don has to recall itself in order to come about: knot (pas) of truth, truth of knot (pas) > begins to be ensnared in trap of law

SH p. 14 meridian binds (“das Verbindende,” both binds and connects), provokes, at noon, the encounter [shortest shadow], example of law > “a date would be the gnomon [nom, shadow, not mine] of these meridians”

FWT pp. 43-4 fantasy of the genetic, “my flesh and blood!” > genitor is not the father! history of law folded into the fact that symbolic organization requires fantasmatic investments

p. 52 [see p. 68 heteronomy: the other is my law]

pp. 80-1 Derrida likes Heidegger’s positioning justice outside law but not its harmony w/ injustice > thinking justice on basis of logos, gathering, accord, Being as presence; for Derrida, harshness of justice—infinite disjunction demands its right, out of joint

***p. 132 double bind: must not give ground on either legitimate injunction, no decision, no responsibility worthy of the name that doesn’t endure this double injunction, this terrible law, the law of the law, which gives responsibility a chance, leaving no chance for good conscience [see 223n double bind a word coined to describe schizophrenic]

pp. 150-51 deconstruction of DP makes untenable from w/in distinction btwn internal punishment (poena naturalis) & external (poena forensis): [Kant does Derrida’s work for him] since guilty should sign off on punishment, all executed punishment would be like a suicide > no law immune from interest, revenge, the sacrificial (for Kant, moral/judicial reason is sacrificial)

ATIA p. 14 only poets/prophets face address of the animal, not juridical, civil men

p. 132 Nietzsche & Kafka realized better than anyone: Mother, Law, God, Animal > indissociable figures of the same Thing

FS pp. 25, 306n structuralist demand for flat/horizontal, letter of the Law, can’t bear volume, lability

O p. 26 dissemination blows up (saute) security of point, arrested in name of the law: it is at the risk, to risk this blowup (to make this jump, faire sauter) that dissem. broaches/has been broached

pp. 44-5(n) preface as father assuring/assisting his work, his son, idealizing, mastering his seed, auto-, homo-, re-insemination, btwn father & son alone > narcissism as law, on par w/ law, figure of Platonic boētheia (coming to aid of speech, helping logos): even better if just father, preface useless

SW p. 316 “for they shall make a sanctuary, I shall dwell in their bosom” > veil, curtain, drape is dwelling of God, his ethos, this Who (that dwells) is also a What, a 3rd party, the Law, text of law

DPi pp. 20-1 ten commandments: allegorico-narrative or “historical staging of the very structure of the absolute law as founded on DP” > origin of social contract, state, community, people

p. 86 since sovereign has right to suspend law, he authorizes absolute maintenance of DP: this performative power cannot be juridical: to create law (droit) don’t need the law (droit) > a-legal

p. 92 via Schmitt, origin of law cannot be legal or rational

p. 110 Hugo: “law of laws” = universal conscience

***p. 116 Blanchot repeats core argument of right-wing philosopheme found in Kant, Hegel: man’s dignity is to risk life in law > right as right of literature & right of death as right of DP

——human law implies: something worth more than life, life must be liable to be sacrificed (not sacred [?]), sacrifice raises, raises itself above egoism, above anxiety of individual life

p. 117 Blanchot’s right to death: right to give it, giving it to oneself (en se la donnant), inflicting DP; right to accede to death (not natural) by exceeding natural life > both the right that gives birth to literature and the law that gives birth to the law itself: literature thinks this right of/to right

p. 124(n) from Kant to Blanchot > no law w/out DP, homo noumenon above homo phaenomenon > one must raise oneself by means of law above life & inscribe from this height DP in law

pp. 127-28 for Kant, CI, eye for an eye, talionic law, surpasses value of life and all price: no law will ever be founded on unconditional love of life (life for life’s sake)—on the absolute refusal of any sacrifice of life

p. 135 re: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, writing down laws that have no juridical force behind them, not a binding obligation [contract]

p. 148 because cruelty “is” for Nietzsche, DP has no original place, just one of a series of tortures/spectacles > Nietzsche traces genealogies of law back to prehistoric animal-human life always ready to leave symptoms in law itself > cruelty of DP not a matter for law

p. 151 Nietzsche’s arche-genealogical question is the question of origin of law, of penal law as origin of calculation, rule of calculation > whence comes equivalence btwn injury/pain

p. 201n for Hugo, Christ’s law (blood of Christ, good blood) often confused w/ natural law—Christ’s heart will transform written, positive law > it’ll be spiritualized by gentle law of Christ

PF p. 281n provocatio, Imperial Roman Law, to make an appeal to the law (lex, btwn legere and ligare [typo? should be legare?]), link to lecture (reading), legacy, allegation, alibi

——the 2 etymologies of law [?]

1. lego, avi, atum, legare: delegate, bequeath, unburden onto another (send off, send back)

2. lego, legi, lectum, legere: pick, gather, privilege, select, choose

——compare to religion, which links legere to ligare (link), and not legare (bequeath)

HLP p. 64 Derrida likes U.S. phrase “civil disobedience” (Thoreau), that respectable tradition where raison détat does not dispense last word in ethics

——resist positive laws (not all laws), laws that betray their own foundation

TR p. 115 in every scene of inheritance, there’s laws of substitution (law period): responsibility, debt, duty—thus guilt & forgiveness

IW pp. 279-80 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] “unheard-of” singularity of Jewish nation: its birth belongs to (God’s) Law, not to nature > inscribed in a history that began before it was born (though it was already its own)—history of this nation: supernatural, transhistorical, prehistoric

——passage, path of letter, path toward law (path & leap): a step beyond in the path-less (im Weglosen) [Rosenzweig and Kafka’s Vor dem Gesetz]

PJP p. 173 davoir perjuré en jurant: 2 moments of perjury envelop each other; was the promise not to lie, the swearing, truthful?

——the 2 moments are rigorously distinct & strangely indiscernible: difference of times inscribed under law, contract, this law is the Law itself (annuls the difference, sublates into fidelity of oath)

——structural signification of oath, Law itself, origin of Law: commit to not be affected by time

——but the perjurer can always plead the discontinuity of time

PSSS p. 270 for Freud, force against force, deferred economy of force: makes right (passage from violence to law)

***p. 278 wherever there is law & performative, event has been neutralized, reappropriated by performative force or symbolic order

C p. 244 la hantise fait la loi

LI pp. 132-33 every police (red light) is not repressive: law not necessarily tied to negativity, prohibition, repression

p. 134 laws, in their normality, entail something fictional, depend on some structural power that allows fictions, lies, to take place: thus importance of studying literature to understand law

TN pp. 66-7 law of law > law of tact: must touch w/out touching, ne pas toucher [touch/tamper] à la chose même, & 1st of all—the law itself, the untouchable > kept at a distance by the gaze (regard), respect law rather than person, respect law as the cause of respect

AD p. 136n law of substitution, from substitution as law: the 3rd interrupts (distances) w/out interrupting (distancing)

p. 110 exceeding and obsessing the political/juridical: beyond law in the law > everything face exceeds marks demand for justice as law (law of justice must bend to itself)

LG pp. 225-26 law of impurity, contamination in heart of law, condition for possibility of law, the a priori of a counter-law: a line or trait, internal division, impurity, corruption, etc.

p. 226 law can’t edge through (inabordable) nor edge away from (indébordable) the counterlaw (contre-loi) that constitutes it: reasons of edges (bords)

p. 237 there is only content w/out edge, w/out boundary, w/out frame, there is only edge w/out content: interminable inocclusive invagination (inenarrable, unarrestable, insatiable) > terrible for those who require order in the name of the law

p. 246 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] I bring forth to light (donne le jour) precisely the law as the right-to-sight (droit de voir), this law has “me” at its/her disposal? > the “I” sans “I” of narrative voice does not take place, engenders the lawmen [panoptic demand: synopsis]

p. 247 double affirmation not foreign to the genre, genius or spirit of law: no double affirmation w/out light of day and daylight becoming law > madness of the day

p. 248 law demands a testimony oriented by a sense [genre] of history, ordonné par la raison and unity of “I think (je pense)”: originally synthetic apperception accompanying all representations

——that “I” does not always accompany itself > radically persecutes the law

p. 249 the law plays too, she plays upon her generation and genre, à naître [nêtre] comme personne (born like anybody or nobody) > born of the one for whom she becomes the law

p. 250 [re: Blanchot] for the law to see her day is her madness—what she loves madly like glory > he, the author, brings forth light of day to a mother who can’t say “I”

p. 251 law is mad, but mad is not a predicate of law, no madness w/out law

p. 252 lépreuve of a récit brought to light the madness of genre—spinning (faire tourner) Peterson’s genre-disc, comme un soleil fou > dividing borders btwn literature and its others

——“this is the whole of it,” only what “I” see, kneeling [à genoux] at edge of literature, “le loi en somme, ce que je voit et que je dit que je vois en un récit où je/nous somme

BSi p. 16 every law (contract, authority, credit) not necessarily political

p. 41 acc. Hobbes, fear exceeds corporeal presence, thus it is the passion/origin of law, the origin of crime too [terror] > no contrary to fear [like Nietzsche’s, Freud’s cruelty]: coextensive w/ all political passion; fear is primarily fear for one’s own proper body, fear is passion of life

p. 42 political contract, a prosthesis, nomos as thesis (opposed to physis), convention, positing

——thus provisional, historical, always deconstructible > declared immortal because not

p. 103 to uniquely human “I” of Descartes and Kant, Lacan adds superego (Law/Crime) > i.e. animals don’t have superego

p. 217 power that makes the law, legitimation of arbitrary violence, passes via fable

p. 245 moral law already there before murder of father because it actualizes after remorse for the murder (not after the murder itself) [i.e. moral law born of remorse, already there]

p. 279 sovereign majesty & bestiality as more than [see pp. 256-59], as upping the ante, going outside the law to make the law; the “perhaps” that does justice to the possibility of pas and event, “liberated, cleared, disengaged by wagering (dégageaient, désengageaient en la gageant)

OG pp. 92-3 no law w/out possibility of trace, what is lost in thought of trace (complicity of origins, arche-writing) is the myth of the simplicity of origin

p. 131 re: Lévi-Strauss, Rousseau would have shuddered to hear a self-proclaimed disciple describe law as follows… [when everyone can read, “ignorance of law is no defence”]

pp. 262-63 (371-72) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] no opposition applied to passage btwn state of nature & state of society, to becoming-present of presence (a lasting passage like the present in Reveries): a supplementarity, festival (fête), w/out jeu; moment of festival: pure continuity > society formed morrow of festival (indifference of pleasure & desire): de la danse à la loi

pp. 264-66 for Rousseau, only one fundamental institution, right of law, social order as sacred right, original law must be a law [quasi-natural] > 1st law permits substitution in general

——Derrida wonders if prohibition of incest would be this sacred law

p. 266 w/in play of supplementarity, signified always replaced w/ another signifier; prohibition of incest doesn’t escape play [deconstructing decisive institution of law, eg. Lacan]

p. 298 (421) “labîme, cest le creux qui peut rester ouvert entre la défaillance de la nature et le retard du supplément” [abyss as delay, hollow, open]; pure law restores (gives back to people) liberty, gives back to presence its sovereignty [sutures abyss], pure law a supplement of supplement

EU pp. 6-7 “nationalist” dimension of Protestantism, Calvin translating Institution of the Christian Religion into French, royal decree that laws must be pronounced in French—encouraged end of Latin’s hegemony > Latin: language of the law, of father/science/school, nondomestic

p. 17 cogito as je pense gives speech & law to French legal subject [invites tourism?]

p. 44 via Kant, re-enforcement of law always passes by way of dead king

p. 49 every critique of censorship is a critique of judgment, censorship is a judgment, proposes laws, tribunal, code > censere, to evaluate (réputer), compute, count—ratio, “census,” “cens,” is enumeration of citizens

pp. 109-10 question of droit du droit not juridical, event of foundation never comprehended w/in logic it founds > foundation of a university not a university event (only the anniversary of the foundation would be), foundation of reason isn’t legal, isn’t rational: only w/in epoch of law can one distinguish btwn legal/illegal conflicts

SPEC p. 299 Freud had a hard time recognizing himself among his own (les siens) [fort/da] > not unrelated to origin of objectivity (tribunal forbidden to judge the conditions of its establishment)

WBH p. 190 guardians of institution are guardians of Law > as women’s studies gains institutional legitimacy, it produces guardians of the Law; U.S. is a pioneer of women’s studies

p. 192 as members of a university, we are all guardians of Law, and also naive in front of text, in front of Law [like both characters in Kafka’s “Before the Law”]; p. 193 Law in Kafka’s story neither male nor female

p. 192 1) positive/optimistic deconstruction: not submit to law 2) pessimistic deconstruction (more conscious of law of Law): radically deconstruct old model of university, not to open a field w/out law but new relation to Law, rediscover the Law—yet, no longer bored [?]

p. 197 deconstruction not transgression of the Law, it is the Law: it is an affirmation, and affirmation is on side of Law: as soon as you affirm a desire, you perform something which is the Law, the Law says, “yes” (Law is not simply negative, that’s hard to understand)

——deconstruction is another way of writing Law, affirming new mode of Law, thus not a movement of transgression or liberation

——Kafka’s “Before the Law” is the Law, his signature, or signature of the text, makes the law

p. 200 receiver as determining fact of gift, one who responds, performativity of text produces receiver w/out pre-existing [him/her/it]

——Declaration of Independence signed by God, signs American people into existence, they didn’t exist before it

——it is by the gift that Law is produced, the signature engenders sender, receiver, signer

LEGIBILITY (CODE) [fixerup]

SEC p. 315 no code of writing is structurally secret, can always be iterable for a 3rd party

p. 317 a written sign can break with its context (set of presences which organize moment of inscription), still be legible, can always be lifted from interlocking chain, grafted into other chains ——no context, no code can enclose it > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

p. 326 could a performative not succeed if it didn’t repeat “coded” or iterable statement?

VM VM p. 112 why must Levinas obliterate notion of spatiality re: the other, w/out erasing it, w/out making it illegible? > must he state infinity’s excess in language of the Same [inside-outside]?

PP PP p. 63 text is forever imperceptible, its laws and rules [legibility?] are not “harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret,” but can never be booked (se livrent) in the present

FSW FSW p. 226 traces produce space of their inscription by acceding to period of their erasure, traces constituted by double force of repetition & erasure, of legibility & illegibility

SH SH pp. 24-5 in shibboleth (river), there’s suspension of meaning, almost opposite of phenomenological “epokhe,” which preserves meaning > those who couldn’t pronounce “shi” marked themselves as unable to remark a mark thus coded

p. 31 insignificance of language, can only take on meaning in relation to a place (border, house, threshold, site) > formation of alliances, codes, contracts

p. 43 unreadable is readable as unreadable, shibboleth transmitted to a few during finite time of incineration, heart to heart, mouth to ear, hand to hand, still universal by right (legible, coded, troped) > madness of fire: consumes a date from w/in > renders ash from 1st moment

p. 48 privilege of code (clock, calendar) [in Celan], that which allows one to call off the hours, to class (calare) > calendar, clock, name return of tout autre in the same > hour writes, speaks

p. 51 virtually at the same date because the originary date, as coded mark, is already a kind of fiction, singularity spoken of in generalities and fable of conventions (iterable marks)

WM WM p. 268 one true metaphor (no more true metaphor): but assured legibility of the proper [presence disappearing in its own radiance, hidden source of light]

DS DS p. 253 “themes” run aground (échoue) at edge lesser & greater than theme, where “there is” a text is made a possibility, a readability w/out signified (fright’s reflex declares: unreadable)

SP SP pp. 131-33 remainder: no proper itinerary, no center, could mean nothing, no end to parodying play w/ meaning, grafted beyond any contextual body or finite code

pp. 135-37 possible forgetting [?] of their code makes all texts open, undecipherable, and structurally posthumous (the author will die w/ the key inside, will forget it even)

ATIA ATIA p. 122-23 acc. Lacan, animal caught in a code w/out response, pre-wired response, pre-wired behavior

PS PS pp. 188-89 Artaud: “give words the importance they have in dreams”

——reclaim onomatopoeia, “no more masterpieces” > Artaud seeks a depth of illegibility

DIF DIF p. 24 text of metaphysics is comprehended (compris) > encore lisible, and to be read: not surrounded but traversed by limit, marked in its interior by multiple furrow (sillon) of its margin

O p. 3 I will not feign, acc. to code, either premeditation or improvisation

p. 52 dissemination, apparatus explains itself, constitutes itself into a program, but one that is not formalizable, infinity of its code not saturated w/ self-presence: “it is attached (tient), so to speak, to the incessant falling of a supplement to the code

RGE p. 276 absurd for transgression of Book by writing to be legible only in a determined sense

REST pp. 282-83 whose shoes (whose feet) (the subject of reattachment): the capital subject of this contract [btwn Shapiro & Heidegger], they each have one piece of symbolon, share common interest, coded commitment

p. 382 “useless hermeticism [Artaud]” of crypted remainder, secret already legible, separation already in the word, the letter, the pair > opening of secret

PIO p. 4 Derrida’s discourse on invention, not inventive through & through: must sign exploiting rule-governed resources > all comes down to that signed innovation

TR pp. 124-25 concept of “machine” indissociable from deconstruction: “a text whose grammaticality is a logical code obeys a machine”

——no text conceivable w/out grammar (machine), no machine w/out “suspension of referential meaning”

LI p. 64[re: conforming to code, grammaticality] a minimum making-sense is incommensurate w/ adequate understanding of intended meaning > this incommensurability is irreducible, “inheres” in intention itself, riven (creusé) w/ iterability

pp. 64-5 [re: Sarl and I] our common and minimal code has been the existence & effects of the code > [from SEC] context as protocol of code, mark doesn’t have meaning outside context—there’s only contexts w/out any center, absolute anchoring (ancrage)

p. 99 [from SEC] acc. Austin, relative purity (specificity) of each performative does not emerge in opposition to iteration or citationality but to other kinds of iteration constituted by general iterability > such iterations violate rigorous purity of every speech act (event of discourse)

pp. 99-100 another parasitic/fictional structure can always be added, “supplément de code” > everything becomes possible against the language-police

——never be able to de-limit object-fiction/object-parasite except by another counter-fiction

p. 100 or, or rather, even parentheses, i.e. “citation (iterability)” > not genus/species, not identity, classical logic fractured in its code, parasitic contamination entame all these relations, which is why words have to be qualified, supplemented by others

LG pp. 228-29 trait common to classes should follow a code that determines belonging, an identifiable trait identical to itself > but, this trait qua mark always a priori remarkable

p. 230 effect of code: in marking itself generically, text unmarks itself (se démarque) > because of trait, text participates in one or several genres

BSi pp. 168-70 bêtise not exactly stupidity, foolishness, imbecility, idiotic, Dummheit, Kleinigkeit, etc. [example of nonsynonymous synonym]

——still, difference btwn these words can only be marked in context, which doesn’t imply an absolute relativity of context: bêtise can’t mean anything at all, not an idealized, objective, “free” ideality > translation problems occur in same language, same cultural code

OG pp. lxxxix-lxxxx (8) epoch [of Rousseau] preserves a legibility which disturbs time of line, line of time

pp. 22-3 (36-8) Heidegger transgresses and contained (y est comprise) at same time in presence of logocentrism > his crossing-out (rature, kreuzweise Durchstreichung) of Being effaces presence of transcendental signified while keeping it legible: this last writing is a first writing (of an epoch), inasmuch as it de-limits onto-theology, metaphysics of presence, logocentrism > Heidegger must restore (provisionally) “transcendence” to Being to renounce project/word ontology [given risk of transgression becoming regression here, Derrida insists we go by way of Heidegger’s rigor alone]

p. 50 (73) to think play radically must follow Husserl and Heidegger to the end, conserve legibility of their thought, must know le jeu du monde before attempting to understand all forms of play in the world > play, as absence of transcendental signified, not a play in the world

p. 76 (112) the becoming-legible of nonoccidental language decentered theological prejudice

pp. 160-61 minimal readability of French Literature: a language already there, somewhat our own > same for network of significations marked by psychoanalytic theory (even if we’ll never master it)

EU pp. 86-7 nostalgia for Friedrich Wilhelm’s reprimand of Kant, a time of common code, minimum translatability > know to whom one is addressing, know where to situate power

——being-ill (mal-être) more serious than malaise or crisis, im-pertinence of codes (productive instruments of decidability, guarantees of a problematic) can go hand in hand w/ greatest power, source of being-ill—those who feel good about this situation are hiding something

SPEC p. 304 “the site of the legible, like the origin of writing, is carried away w/ itself (le site du lisible, comme lorigine de lécriture, sy emporter)”

p. 342 document is ciphered, will remain secret if author dies before “his own (les siens),” all “his own” will be those who believe they can decipher the will (testament) of this code

LEVINAS

TN p. 77 caress, voluptuousness, contact beyond contact: beyond light (phenomenality), totality [Derrida doesn’t linger on Levinas’ hasty conclusions re: food, sexuation]

pp. 77-9 Levinas’ language is hostage to rhetoric as he describes what Derrida risks calling quasi-messianic: “not yet, from a future never future enough” where “caress aims at the tender”

——Derrida compares Levinas’ caress to the event, but wonders it if it’s simply valid for any event worth the name

——“exorbitant ultramateriality,” “paroxysm of materiality”

p. 80 Levinas has the courage [?] to say man caresses the untouchable of the feminine (the caressed) [see POOF where Aristotle privileges the lover over the beloved]

——feminine as untouchable threat that threatens Levinas’ ethics [face]

p. 81 the threat of beyond the ethical, beyond the face: equivocation of caress

——this equivocation [re: Levinas’ caress] of negation w/out negativity marked by recurrence of “as if” and “without” (x w/out x, “essence of this non-essence”)

p. 82 caress: pure experience before concept

pp. 83-9 Levinas’ feminine, profanation, the uncovering of the hidden still hidden, young animal, irresponsible animality, a not Good epekeina tēs ousias, uncovered virginity, mortuary mask

——Levinas: “equivocation constitutes the epiphany of the feminine”

pp. 84-5 Levinas interprets Aristophanes’ myth as the very disaster of Eros, the defeating of desire in incest

p. 86 Levinas feminizes contradiction untouchable-touchable

p. 89 [Derrida is so forgiving] even though obvious social/sexual hierarchy, Levinas’ [sexism] occurs in radical asocial vacuum

p. 90 Levinas: lovers, dual solitude, excludes the third [triple solitude: each partner is solitary and so is the witness], the contrary of social relation > nothing attained, touched w/ caress

——Derrida asks: where is borderline (la ligne) btwn beyond possible exceeding [Levinas’] caress, making it possible, and beyond possible that opens the ethical [face?], making it possible?

p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 330n Derrida tempted to say, not only does [Levinas’] caress border on messianic, the messianic can only be stroked (caressed), only way for messianic to show throw

p. 332n Levinas, by way of Husserl, proposes the word sentance to describe an immediate iteration “whose sensation is the event itself”

pp. 92-3 the invincible stratagems of Levinas’ caress: a paternal, virile, fraternal, phallocentric filiation > an avowedly shameful confession (movements as irreproachable as they are guilty)

p. 93 for Levinas, the peace that is ethical found more in the tender caress that renounces possession than in erotic violence acharnée à jouir

p. 240 Franck’s caress is sexed > caress before shock/blow? [Heideggerian like double blow?]

p. 310 caress (bad or good) hits like a phone call to the heart

AD p. 36 Levinas: woman, other whose presence is discretely an absence, hospitable welcome par excellence, condition for home, recollection, inhabitation

pp. 37-8 even if feminine alterity is “hospitable welcome par excellence,” even if she’s not a man, she remains human: woman w/out “height” of face, not most high: her familiarity accomplishes “the en-ergy of separation” [?]

p. 39 woman as welcoming before ethics (avant lethique), before illeity of face, before teaching, before height [?]

——non-light of feminine, inviolable violability

p. 40 acc. Levinas, feminine transcends light and phenomenology (Plato, Husserl), a “way of existing” in the “hiding” of modesty

p. 41 Levinas: in love transcendence goes further and less far than language, hospitality is not accomplished as Love [via the feminine?]

p. 43 Klossowski’s host [re: novel Roberte ce Soir] becomes guest of his guest because the woman is there—in this instance, possibility of pevertibility linked to sexual difference

p. 139n first Levinas believed that femininity was a modality of alterity [?], but in Otherwise than… he goes back further, nakedness before face presupposes feminine alterity: idea of skin is a “responsibility before eros”

p. 43 for Levinas, woman’s interiority, a society w/out language, apolitical domesticity [Derrida is not going to deal w/ stakes of these androcentric attributions, like he did in ATM]

——Levinas: home already hospitable to its inhabitant—the feminine being

pp. 44-5 is Levinas’ feminine an androcentric hyperbole or a feminist manifesto? can one decide?

——feminine not empirical for Levinas, thought of welcome opens ethics, it’s marked by sexual difference (it will thus never again be neutralized) [v. different take from ATM?], this hospitality that precedes property can’t be appropriated

p. 60 “illeity,” sometimes designates interruption of face to face, sometimes very transcendence of the face in the face-to-face (a certain experience of “feminine alterity”): He (Il) in the depth of you

pp. 94-5 for Levinas, paternal “fecundity” (not feminine alterity anymore) opens infinite discontinuous time: protest against egoist protestation of subjectivity (that of Kierkegaard, Rosenzweig) > true anarchy, paternal: only effective protestation against “tyranny of the State”

LETTER [fixerup]

MC p. 354 the indivisibility of Lacan’s letter creates dogma

p. 360 why the letter, name, is divisible but still iterable (re-markable in its difference)

——mark beyond human language [letter still human?]

p. 369 letter always arrives means the unconscious has no accidents, no internal chance [see p. 375 biogenetics no randomness, no bastardy]

SPOM p. 145 letter: spectral body

PP pp. 121-22 (138-39) in Laws judge must introject, internalize the letter, grammata [tou Dephikou grammatos], into his soul; anamnesic dialectics, repetition of eidos, self-knowledge, self-mastery > a forgetting of childhood, exorcism of child, teaches child to speak

p. 159 Plato uses letter, alphabet, for pedagogical ends > never thematizes law of difference made apparent, the irreducibility of structure & relation, of proportionality, w/in analogy

WM pp. 236-37 for Aristotle, brutes and humans both make sounds, but only humans make sounds that can become intelligible, meaningful, sounds that become letters

——for Aristotle, the letter, the stoikheion, has no meaning in itself, but is capable of entering formation/composition of a phōnē sēmantikē, it is the atom of the voice (phōnē adiairetos)

ROP p. 34 divisibility of letter, truth w/out truth of deconstruction, distinguished both from das geistige Band [Hegel], & Heideggerian Versammlung > divisibility of letter undoes link of debt, symbolic, name of father (motifs qui lien et se lient au triangle ou au cercle de la réappropriation)

p. 40 Derrida frustrated that at colloquia no one ever goes into detail, swept away by voice, do w/out minutiae of letter (the micrological displacements where I incorrigibly persist in hoping things get decided—at a given moment, that’s never given)

pp. 42-3 to say “we” when all alone, after the death of the other, is a common phenomena of destinerrance, of the letter’s never returning, une dérive interne, to which we have to return

——“we” modality of with, with the other, as guest, host, or parasite, we is always said by a single person, taking advantage, the one signs for the other (at the home of; apud, avuec, avoc, apud hoc)

p. 60 idealism of the indivisibility of the letter, “the materiality of the signifier,” the place of the signifier

ATIA p. 8 question of the animal, question of the letter

PS p. 178 acc. Artaud, letter is always stolen, because always open, never leads from subject to subject; autonomy of signifier as letter’s historicity, my vouloir-dire is submissive

p. 184 Derrida shows in Nietzsche & Hölderlin an equation btwn dancing, standing upright, and the work itself

——but, unlike Artaud, they treat erection metaphorically, it doesn’t exile itself into the work, expatriate itself to sovereignty of speech/writing, uprightness of letter, the tip of the pen

——does Nietzsche question relation of grammatical security & uprightness of letter?

——Heidegger foretells this relationship: Greeks interpret language visually, as grammata, in writing language comes to stand (paradoxically, this confirms disdain of writing in Phaedrus)

p. 188 Artaud advocates the stigmata, the wound, not the tattoo (still too much liberated letter)

FS pp. 25, 306n structuralist demand for flat/horizontal, letter of the Law, can’t bear volume, lability

DIF DIF p. 15 if Saussure’s opposition speech/language is rigorous, differance would be play of differences w/in language & relation of speech/language, the detour, the silent promise I must make to speak (but differance forbids this essential dissociation: archi-writing before the letter))

REST pp. 363-34 shoe, like letter, does not always arrive at its destination: condition of revenance [Derrida replaces “letter” w/ “shoe,” quoting a passage from FV]

p. 382 “useless hermeticism [Artaud]” of crypted remainder, secret already legible, separation already in the word, the letter, the pair > opening of secret

TR p. 151 resistance of letter (force of resistance w/out material substance) affects body: dissociative, dismembering, disseminating [materiality w/out matter, formality w/out form]

pp. 151-52 textual event inseparable from formal materiality of the letter

p. 152 notion of grammar understood acc. trivium/quadrivium (see Warminski), but also as a machine of the letter (gramma), letter machine, writing machine

EJQB p. 69 nemein: common root of division, naming, nomadism > nomadic Jew struck by infinity & the letter in the desert

p. 71 absence: letter’s ether & respiration (can’t be reduced by letter)

——letter (separation & limit), liberation of meaning from aphoristic solitude

p. 72 signifying absence/separation, letter lives as aphorism, it is solitude, articulates solitude: letter of law can’t be outside difference, can’t end interruption, distance, (non)relation to other

——animality of letter assumes forms of letter’s desire, anxiety, solitude [cf. p. 73 metaphor is this animality?]

p. 75 Jew is split btwn 2 dimensions of letter: 1) allegory (no history, abstract universalism, cold skin of concept) 2) literality (empirical, actualized history, too warm flesh)

EL pp. 198-99 try as best one can to do an internal reading (stay as close to letter as possible) > but simple event of name breaches supposed interiority of text (pure internal reading impossible)

+R p. 159 each letter [re: Adami’s drawing] has the same arched, slightly in-curved rigidity, supple flexion of an erect phallus—fish btwn life/death

——plus dair, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature > each letter, bit or piece of word (mors ou morceau de mot) written w/ 2 hands, twice two hands, on each page

TN p. 367n letter (touchable), spirit (untouchable), Jews/Christians—who touches more? Hegel’s hardness of Jews

OG p. 17 (29) Rousseau: to “judge genius” from books is like “painting a man’s portrait from his corpse”; Derrida: writing in the common sense is the dead letter, exhausts life, carrier of death

pp. 296-97 (418-20) acc. Rousseau, return to inalienable immediacy of self-possession (jouissance de soi), unrepresentable sovereignty—the end of written law > there is a social contract before writing, but always threatened by letter

pp. 303-04 (428-29) acc. Rousseau, Leibniz’s pure algebra, universal writing of science, total break from langue parlée, would be absolute evil, alienation > Rousseau: “la lettre tue

SPEC p. 324 postal relay (relais) makes it possible for letter not to arrive, divides structure of letter from outset (dentrée), neither relay nor analysis if letter were indivisible & always arrived

——the a fortiori of the a priori

FV p. 422 for Lacan, letter is held—never possessed

p. 423 letter has no proper meaning, volante, volée; Lacan claims the letter isn’t content w/ having meaning > Derrida intends to show that w/ Lacan the letter is content to have one meaning, and one alone

p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

p. 425 [Derrida’s syntactical deconstruction of Lacan] re: letter, manque à sa place [missing from its place] becomes manque a sa place [lack has its place]

pp. 436-37, 39 “Seminar” insists on topos, single proper itinerary of letter, if meaning [in the general sense] is indifferent to letter, meaning of the letter is not, meaning of letter as truth itself

——not naive topology but still a topos, Heideggerian-like veiled/unveiled castration placed at the hole (trou) of the woman, letter comes back to Being, to the nothing that is the opening btwn woman’s legs (Queen)

pp. 442-43 letter found “in” the text which escapes, from 4th side, eyes of Dupin/analyst [letter not found in sealed interior of Poe’s tale, not assignable lack, definable hole]

——the text The Purloined Letter: the open, the very open, letter that is fiction

pp. 443-44 for Derrida, letter can always not arrive > Lacan’s symbolic, Lacan’s castration, protects letter from its divisibility/fragmentation

p. 450 Lacan (as Dupin) knows how to return to letter of Freud, knows how to find it where it is found (se trouve) for purposes of restitution

p. 451(n) [Lacan on properly inheriting, following the letter of Freud]

pp. 452-53 Dupin’s feminization: possess the letter [?] > letter has one place, occupied by all those who possess it

p. 453 [proper] address of letter: law that binds King & Queen

——there are only ostriches, the more one presents one’s rear, the more one is master: can’t avoid being plucked (laisser plumer)

p. 454 for Lacan, letter’s destiny is arrival at destination

p. 462n circulation, always circulation of truth: toward truth, cause & effect of circle, causa sui, proper course (trajet) and destiny of letter > truth as cause (Ursache)

p. 464 for signifier to be kept (pour que le signifiant se garde) in its letter—no partition (if divisible, always can be lost en route) > materiality—indivisibility—idealization—point de capiton (staples signifier to signified) [?]: Lacan determines letter (no matter what he says) at point of its meaning (ideality): letter escapes partition, movement [no wonder he calls this “materiality” “odd”]

pp. 464-65 [phonematic limitation of letter, phonē spared divisibility] voice: spontaneous self-presence one can retain (garder) w/out paper, w/out envelope, always available (disponible) > Lacan’s not attentive to writing w/in the voice, before the letter

——sheltered (à labri) from disseminating threat/power in OG, agency of Lacan’s letter is the relève of writing in system of speech

p. 476n Lacan advocates reconciliation (Versohnung), re: reintegration [of letter?]

pp. 485-86n when letter isn’t allergic to partition, linguistic unit (le sème) “phallus” wanders, begins by disseminating, not even disseminating itself [baby daddy]

***p. 489 even when letter arrives, its capacity not to arrive torments it, affects “subject,” “character,” “position” [w/ divisibility]

pp. 490-91n meaning of letter not important for Lacan? false! no one would worry about it if it didn’t have a determined meaning > meaning of letter for Lacan: betrayal of a pact

p. 493 mise en abyme of title [The Purloined…]: the text is the object

LIFE

R p. 33 since concept of democracy has always been suicidal, if there is to be a democracy to come must think life otherwise, life and the force of life [contra to Aristotle’s actuality as life?]

FL p. 288 for Benjamin, mythological violence of law sacrifices the living, whereas divine violence sacrifices life to save the living (destructive)

p. 289 for Benjamin, what is sacred is the justice of life not mere life

LOBL p. 79 “What is life?” asks of its essence and its value

p. 109 life being drawn through by a line, edge where it is impossible to settle: arreté

p. 134 more-than-life (sur-vie) marks a reprieve, excess triumphs over life, worth more than eternity of life but presents itself before the arrêt de mort

***p. 161 how do we let a text live? letting someone read is like letting them live [re: Derrida pointing us toward Blanchot]

SPOM p. xvi je voudrais apprendre à vivre enfin (I would like to learn to live finally)

p. xiv man’s life always more than a paradigm, other than a symbol > a proper name (see p. 220 on man) [one should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure? martydom]

p. xx commitment of justice, to whom? to life (natural life, life of spirit) of living being > that this is irrefutable carries justice beyond present life, non pas vers la mort mais vers une sur-vie, where life & death are traces of traces

——alors il y a de l’esprit, des esprits, et il faut compter avec eux > le plus d’un

p. 235n the closure or principle of ruin (see p. 220 on ash) of a philosophy of life, since negativity must be there

A p. 3 via Seneca & Diderot, one would guard jealously one’s time above all else; to “master” “my life” > know difference btwn giving one’s time & wasting one’s time

VM p. 153 Hegel’s speculative logic: living logic which reconciles formal tautology and empirical heterology [after having thought prophetic discourse in preface to Phenom…]

PP p. 73 pharmakon is but a formula learned by heart, dead, rigid knowledge shut up (enfermé) in biblia, foreign to living knowledge and dialectic

p. 81 living-beings, father and son, are announced to us w/in household (domesticité) of logos

pp. 135-36 writing stripped of its path-breaking force, pure repetition, dead repetition, tautological, hollow, repetition of death > writing is not living repetition of the living

pp. 168-69 two tautologies, repetitions: 1) life coming back to itself: eidos, logos, mnēmē, phōnē, requires dialectics, didactics 2) life going out of itself beyond return, unreserved spending, irreducible excess, play of supplement [can’t think these apart from one another]

VP p. 9 phenomenology (MOP in form of ideality) is also a philosophy of life, death is an empirical and extrinsic accident, everything is light, living light, blazes open passage to reduction

——metaphor, concept of life allows Husserl to assert a parallelism btwn empirical life and transcendental life, which are radically heterogenous to each other [is Husserl’s parallelism different from that of transcendental psychologism? see pp. 11-2]

pp. 12-3 strange unity of life in Husserl: 1) biological life 2) concept of psychē is life as self-relation > the pre-transcendental becomes the ultra-transcendental, Derrida says maybe concept of life calls for another name

p. 67 presence to itself of animating act, this intimacy of life to itself is why we say speech is alive, we hear our voice, thus the deaf are dumb

FWT p. 4 think “life” on basis of heritage, not the other way around

pp. 4-5 leave life in life & make it live again, “let live,” laisser, most beautiful, hazardous thing, like giving up, giving over the gift, forgiveness > deconstruction never w/out this love, pays homage to those it takes on, sen prendre

p. 42 mustn’t crush dimensions of living being [biology, cultural] into each other, all life (animal & human) survives by knowing how to discern (btwn forms of life, btwn “living” and “dead”)

OTO p. 8 Nietzsche: “I live on my own credit (Ich lebe auf meinen eigenen Kredit hin)”

p. 9 Nietzsche never knows if anyone will honor the inordinate credit he grants himself in his name, & in the name of the other; autobiography as secret contract (annulus), encrypted credit account: for Nietzsche, his life, the “I-live,” is perhaps mere prejudice (Vorurteil)

——[Nietzsche’s] life can only be verified after or during arrêt de mort > when the bearer of the name, whom, in our prejudice, we call living, will have died

——if life returns, it will return to the name, not to the living, “in the name of the living as a name of the dead”

p. 14 it is life, as the living feminine, that must return eternally, selectively > life allied to herself by nuptial annulus, wedding ring

——btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

ATIA p. 24 tremble at borderline btwn bios and zoē

pp. 86-7 properly phenomenological logic of “I am” means there is only “I think” > breath, life are secondary: “I breathe, therefore I am” concludes nothing > indubitability of existence depends on thought (not being-in-life)

p. 104 mark, gramma, trace, differance refer differentially to all living things, all relations btwn living and nonliving

p. 111 metaphysics begins w/ “I am” not “I am living,” leaving an unthought “thinking of life,” the living present where Derrida began too, to deconstruct

p. 112 principle of life (torat haïm) never prevented animal sacrifice in Judaism

——all thinkers who demand response to be human don’t think iterability essential to every response: which adds an automatic, mechanical reaction to the most alive, authentic, responsible

p. 126 Derrida affirms Lacan’s “the subject receives even the message he emits [from the Other]” as a way to inscribe reaction/response in all vicissitudes of the living

***p. 160 to “let” something “be” “as such,” you would have to “let be” in your absence, in your death [thus, for Heidegger, being-toward-death and “as such” constitutive of each other], but is this ever possible? can we let the being be? Nietzsche would say no, that the objective is always caught in the living, in life, in perspective > whatever the difference btwn animals, remains an “animal” relation

——Derrida’s strategy re: border(s) btwn animal/human: there is no pure and simple “as such”

PS p. 324n TN. Blanchot does to Artaud what hegel does to Novalis (Beautiful Soul) > extract the life from the thought

p. 326n (with remarkable/ambiguous exception of Hegel) God is Death: infinite life, life w/out difference > w/in life God-Death names finitude, difference w/in life > mais l'autre nom de la même chose ne veut pas dire la même chose que le premier nom, il n'en est pas synonyme et c'est toute l'histoire

O p. 23 Hegel: formalism as superficial analogy, empty application of formula, not inner life of self-movement (Selbstbewegung)

p. 48n for Hegel, life is essential philosophical determination of concept & spirit (vegetal, biological traits), organicity of encyclopedic logic [inborn germ of death]

DPi p. 15(n) for Rousseau, the state gives you life: life is a conditional gift of the state

——for my life to be safe/assured, must promise to lose it

pp. 111-12 Blanchot: literature is Terror in that its being is where “life bears death and maintains itself in death itself” [quotation from Hegel] [see RGE p. 335n]

p. 120 for Hugo, inviolability of human life—an inalienable property > right of property over one’s own life no less sacred than patrimonial right of family (domicile as right of property)

pp. 129-30 for Kant, life for life’s sake is unworthy of human dignity, failure to inscribe death in law, return to animal (feminine)

p. 141 disinterest as pure interest of pure reason [?] > [Kant’s disinterest raises itself above the living, sacrifices the living]

p. 142 for Nietzsche, hostility to life is inherent to life

p. 202 Hugo’s “inviolability of life” a principle of life that sentences death sentence to death

***p. 255-56 “my life” passes by way of the heart of the other, can only prefer living to dead, living present, where it “receives its life from the heart of the other” > “my life” depends on (tient au) the heart of the other

p. 256 it belongs to life not to be immortal, but also to have a future where instant of death is not calculable

——to be against DP is to be against calculation, calculable decidability of you will die on such and such a day, at such and such an hour > no future w/ anticipation of calculable instant > “my life” must keep a relation to the coming of the other as coming of the to-come (venue de là-venir)

——DP ends finitude of “my life” > w/ calendar

p. 272 Kant: man of honor values honor more highly than life, willing to accept DP, but a scoundrel considers it better to live in shame then not at all

TB pp. 113-14 one can think maturation of seed as a geneticist/vitalist metaphor, this would support genealogical/parental code > or, one can invert/overturn order, “metaphorical catastrophe”: only understand “family,” “life” by way of language & its sur-vival, [this reversal is operated expressly by Benjamin?]

RGE p. 255 Hegel’s master/slave an economy of life [vs. economy of death]

——ruse of life, ruse of reason

Gi pp. 15-6 Daseins neutrality makes possible concrete facticity of human, the analytic precedes “the existent,” not a philosophy of life

p. 23 ontology of life requires a “privative interpretation” [could one speak of a method?]; in Heidegger, life is neither pure Vorhandensein nor Dasein: what is life, then?

EJQB p. 73 metaphor (animality of letter): primary & infinite equivocality of signifier as life > psychic subversion of inert literality (i.e. nature) or of speech returned to nature

p. 78 books are always books of life, or of afterlife > written questions addressed to literature are forgotten, drained, by literature (mortifications, ruses of life, life negating itself in literature to survive): writing would die of pure vigilance to question (and also simple erasure of question)

***PSSS p. 276 originary affirmation is attached to a life, but an im-possible life, a sur-vival, not symbolizable, but the only one worthy of being lived, w/out alibi, the one from which to depart

——one cannot justify pacifism, right to life, setting out from an economy of life, can only be done on basis of a sur-vival that owes nothing to alibi of some mytho-theological beyond

D pp. 303-04 life & presence as privileged examples [of folding back onto their own limit, folding back in their very triggering] > inscribes difference in heart of life

LI p. 90 as if the simulation of “real life” were not part of “real life”!

TN p. 17 incarnation of Psyche is “posthumous”—what does this do to psych-ology (life of living)?

p. 19 Aristotle’s Peri psuchēs (de Anima) is treatise on the pure life of the living

p. 53 living moment of life an interiorization or expulsion? becoming-tangible of untouchable or an idealization?

EW p. 278 do we have a responsibility to the living? “no” > because the question is asked through canonized or hegemonic discourse of Western Metaphysics (even Heidegger & Levinas)

BSi p. 28 Hobbes: “Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul” > soul as principle of life, vitality, vivacity

——state, a robot, an animal monster, giant prosthesis designed to amplify

——animal-machine, living-machine, machine of death: serving the living > prosthstate, and yet vitalist in that it mimics the body > civil war [like Schmitt?] death of the State

p. 41 acc. Hobbes, fear exceeds corporeal presence, thus it is the passion/origin of law, the origin of crime too [terror] > no contrary to fear [like Nietzsche’s, Freud’s cruelty]: coextensive w/ all political passion; fear is primarily fear for one’s own proper body, fear is passion of life

p. 176 nonknowledge of bête, spirit of seminar; the living in life itself outplays opposition btwn bêtise and its supposed contrary > Nietzsche one of most eloquent witnesses of this theme: both man & animal, both idiotic & cunning—no decidable limit

p. 183 pitiless lucidity of cogito, triumph of conscious self-positing self, the thesis of self always reflects itself as bêtise, bêtise always triumphs > Triumph of Life in bêtise

bêtise always on side of victor > bêtise must not find itself bête: that would be suicidal

pp. 263-64 Heidegger’s problem w/ zōon logon ekhon, it’s “zoological,” late-on-the-scene, does not question the essence of life

pp. 305-07 for Heidegger, Den Eigensinnigen ist Leben nur Leben, for the stubborn, for those with one thing in mind, life is only, merely, life > stubborn bêtise that doesn’t ask any questions

p. 314 for John, there must be an ontological affinity btwn life, zōē, and logos [in the beginning was the word] > zoo-logy, a life in logos, a zōē

***OG pp. 7-8 (17) privilege of phonè necessary moment of economy (of “life,” of “history,” of “être comme rapport à soi”), not historical contingency: not a choice that could have been avoided

p. 20 (34) effacement of signifier in voice is the condition of the idea of truth: ce leurre est lhistoire de la vérité, & the constituent closure: the word is lived (vécu) as elementary, indecomposable > transparent experience/expression of “être,” of word “être

pp. 61-2 (91) transcendental reduction—refers to lebendige Gegenwart (The Living Present), reduces trace > commanded by theme of presence

p. 71 (104) logos as sublimation of trace is theological from Plato to infinitist metaphysics: logocentrism…parousia, life w/out differance (name of God as name of indifference)

***p. 165-66 (236) auto-affection, universal structure of experience, being capable of being affected by other, capable of symbolizing, another name for “life,” the as-for-itself or for-itself: subjectivity—gains in its mastery of the other to the extent that its power of repetition idealizes itself (s’idéalise) > the external, the signifier, becomes my spontaneity, and escapes me less and less

p. 167 (237) masturbation & writing totally indistinguishable inasmuch as each puts into play (met en jeu) the presence of the present, the life of the living

FV pp. 472-73 [vis-à-vis Lacan] present speech, anamnesis, irreplaceable properness, inalienable singularity > disqualification of recording or repetition in the name of the act of living (present speech): a well known program

LIFE/DEATH

GOD pp. 15-17 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

***p. 48 dying of or for the other, the most ancient, institutes responsibility as giving oneself death, se-donner-le-mort ou offrir sa mort, cest-à-dire sa vie > ethical dimension of sacrifice

GT p. 102 death: the fact that the gift does not return to the donor; death not a natural accident, can only be thought setting out from (à partir du) the gift > neither death nor immortal life can give anything, only a singular surviving can give, “life” in an “economy of death”

R p. 109 autoimmunity, cruelty itself, autoinfection of all autoaffectivity, the self, ipse, autos finds itself infected (once it needs event, time, other) precedes or anticipates oppositions btwn physis & its others (tekhnē, nomos, thesis) > life-death

LOBL p. 108 sur, “on”, the entire enigma of “supplementary logic” [cf. GLAS p. 81r “sur” vs. “dans”]

——survival & revenance, living on & returning from the dead: goes beyond life and death, supplementing each w/ sudden surge, a reprieve

p. 122 reaffirmation, triumph over (sur, hyper), living-on, a supplement of life that is better than life and better than death, better than truth > la Chose par excellence: sur-vérité [see pp. 137-38 la sur-vérité du survivre][Blanchot calls la Chose the event]

pp. 134-5 chose has always signified, in philosophy, that which doesn’t arrive > hupokeimenon or rēs, substance to which accidents happen, not only its accident

——its very not-happening happens to the “Come” in its pas de chose, procès, as arrêt de mort that can’t be decided, neither life nor death

pp. 136-37 survivre delays at once life & death, line of least sure sur-, no clear-cut opposition, living on like differance, beyond identity & difference > tele-phone, tele-gram only 2 modes of this teleography in which trace, grapheme, does come secondarily but marks telic structure a priori

pp. 165-166 hymen, double bind, double affirmation, yes, yes, come, come [re: Blanchot’s 2 ghostly fiancées in Larrêt de mort] signifies, desires, arrête life death, the life the death of the other, the other lives and dies > “for there is an other of the other and it is not the same” [see POO p. 11 “other of the other” is the very undeniable of ethics]

pp. ~171-72 economy: stricture not coupure [pre-capitalist machine?], always external constraint that arrests a text in general, i.e. anything, for example life death

POO p. 31 no responsiveness [in English], is that death [Levinas says so]? death dealt? I see no reason not to call that life, existence, trace [w/out being the contrary]

SPOM pp. 160-61 spectral effect, for Marx, a dialectical position (Setzung) of the ghostly body as body proper > where Stirner sees 1st moment as spectral and 2nd as successful, interiorization, subjectivation (plus de vie) Marx sees a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality (plus de mort)

p. 235n the supplement of an internal-external fold, in abyssal fashion, marks the closure or principle of ruin of a philosophy of life, and of subjectivity: si on intégrait à la vie de cette subjectivité vivante le travail de la négativité ou de lobjectivité, les phénomènes ou plutôt les non-phénomènes de la mort, etc., pourquoi sobstiner encore à appeler cela vie?

pp. 184-85 “lineage of patrimony [from Plato to Marx] [nominalism, conceptualism, realism, rhetoric, logic, proper meaning…] is wrought, but never interrupted” by the question of the idea, question of the concept, concept of the concept, the question of life-death, opening onto a dimension of irreducible sur-vival or surviving (survivance)

POOF pp. ix-xi the 3 meanings of political crime: 1) assassinations that litter History 2) crime in which political being of politics is constituted [Schmitt, force of law] 3) crime that reduces politics to something else, crime against man qua political animal > w/in these crimes, infinite abysses of imputability, edges of juridical, techno-biological, are we sure we can distinguish btwn death & killing? btwn homicide & genocide? why should a question of # persist in these questions?

p. 5 apostrophic pledge (gage apostrophique et sa citation): could apostrophe (uttered on edge of life, i.e. death) ever offer a pledge w/out substitution?

p. 12 via Aristotle, loving the dead (beyond death, beyond life), carries philía to limit of its possibility, also its ultimate resource: horizon is limit & absence of limit, loss of horizon on the horizon, ahorizontality of horizon > I feel myself [autology], before any contract, borne to love dead other

A p. 24 in crossing a border, one changes/exchanges death (on change le mort, on change de mort), one passes from figure of death as trespass (passage of line, transgression of border, pas au-delà) to another figure of border btwn life and death

——every culture characterized by way of its dealing w/, its “living” death as trespass

pp. 45-6 no escaping ontologico-juridico-transcendental tradition [method], except w/ death, aporia, unique exclusion from system, “life death” no longer falls under case of what it makes possible

p. 60 biopolitics is also thanato-politics, which is euthanato-politics, il faut bien mourir

PP p. 93 Thoth, god of resurrection, interested in death as a repetition of life, life as a rehearsal for death

PAS PAS pp. (40-1) “Go (Va)” says the same thing as viens, moves away at same pas, towards a place w/out passage, toward a living (vivre) qui vautpeut-être même mourir

FSW p. 203 “no doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, differance”—but there’s no life present at first, life is trace so we can say life is death

p. 228 Freud augured a beyond and beneath of “Platonic” closure > by opening to theme of writing, writing as technē, as relation btwn life & death, btwn psychical and nonpsychical

p. 230 erasure [of trace] is death itself

PPHS pp. 82-3(n) Derrida, through Hegel, describes tomb, family crypt (caveau), oikēsis, as the sign of death that capitalizes (thésaurise) on life by marking that life continues elsewhere, il la tient donc aussi à labri de la mort; at the heart of this monument, this sign of death, soul keeps itself alive, needs this works of death > the sign, “the height conserving in its depths the hegemony of the soul,” is the pyramid [later, Derrida will live through this tomb not, like Hegel, by negating it]

p. 94n classical take on writing as “practical exterior activity,” as that which “comes to the aid” condemns all mnemotechniques, all langue machines, all supplementary repetitions > life of spirit is thusly forced to emerge from its interior

F p. xxxix double desire of crypt, pocket [Genet’s “matchbox,” Glas], pour garder la vie et mettre le mort dans sa poche [near the pudenda], où se tient le plus précieux (money, title, share of stock market): “prise aussi pour le chantage (blackmail) de lautre”: your wallet or your life

FWT p. 63 writing, trace, gramma or grapheme exceed opposition: human/nonhuman > extend field of living, or rather life/death relation

OTO pp. 4-5 discourse on life/death occurs btwn logos and gramme, analogy & program, program & reproduction (since life is on the line, the trait [splitting of line] relating graphical to logical, also working btwn biological & biographical, thanatological & thanatographical)

p. 7 masks return a constant yield of protection, a surplus value as the ruse of life, ruse incurs losses once surplus value “does not return again to the living, but to and in the name of names, the community of masks” ——[cf. above]: “nothing ever comes back to the living”

pp. 16-7 Nietzsche’s living mother/dead father, identity as double & neutral; “I know both, I am both” [“both” must be read as singular] > la vie la mort: the dead man the living feminine

pp. 18-9 Nietzsche’s “I am a Doppelgänger”: a contradiction of “double” beyond negativity of dialectical opposition, Blanchot’s Pas au-delà, a single pas, beyond opposition life/death

pp. 21-2 for Nietzsche, culture (Bildung) begins when we know how to treat the living as living; Derrida discusses a pact, alliance, contract, a hymen w/ living language, w/ mother (tongue), against death (father): even good master of history (science of the father) trains for the sake of mother tongue, must know when to suppress ‘historical interest’ for culture to begin

pp. 29-30 how can reactive degeneration [Nazism] exploit same utterances, rallying cries, of active forces [Übermensch]—nor did this specular ruse elude Nietzsche: is there a “programming machine”? marrying the 2 forces (family resemblances) in a set, as life (does) death? but no regional power could set limit on such a set > no ordinary “machine,” there’s “life” in it > plays w/ opposition life/death > is there a practical rewriting of the program, which would no longer be part of it? if so, would not be produced in books

ATIA p. 31 given the heterogeneity at the edge of “the human,” the multiplicity of organizations of relations btwn life/death, relations so abyssal/intertwined no exteriority of one term to other, to say animal, in the singular, is to utter a bêtise > confirms animality disavowed & complicit in war of the species

PS p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

DIF DIF p. 24 trace: à la fois, monument & mirage, traced & erased, living & dead, living in its simulation of life’s preserved inscription: a pyramid, to be deciphered otherwise, text w/out voice

O pp. 23-4 for Hegel, taxonomies, structures, formalisms offer dead limbs—et autres tableaux that pin down the living to death (épinglant le vif à mort)

***DPi p. 37 instant of bandages, Christ’s being-there w/out being-there: this Dasein that is not a Da-sein, this Fort/Da-sein of Christ who’s dead but not dead, mort vivant

pp. 111-12 Blanchot: literature is Terror in that its being is where “life bears death and maintains itself in death itself” [quotation from Hegel]

pp. 237-39 unlike Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida asks question of DP before death > pre-comprehending indubitable separation of state of life from state of death calculated by other, by 3rd party, common sense: the point, blade of knife, instant of passing, stigmē of a point; how could we know this clear-cut, sharp limit?

——calculable credit granted to word “death” indexed to presuppositions in which “capital punishment” finds its place: where it’s indissociable from murder/suicide

***p. 255-56 “my life” passes by way of the heart of the other, can only prefer living to dead, living present, where it “receives its life from the heart of the other” > “my life” depends on (tient au) the heart of the other

p. 256 must go from quasi-tautological opposition of life to death to a more specific opposition: opposition of life to DP

RGE p. 254 Lordship’s putting at stake of life (mettre en jeu, Daransetzen des Lebens) has meaning, it’s a moment in constitution of meaning, presentation of essence, truth

——for history (that is, meaning) to form a continuous chain, to be woven (se trame), master must experience his truth (éprouve sa vérité) (must stay alive once raised above life)

p. 335n Bataille quotes Hegel’s “life of mind…endures death and in death maintains its being” [Blanchot quotes this too, see DPi pp. 111-12]

EJQB p. 78 to write: to confuse ontology & grammar; grammar: in which are inscribed all dislocations of dead syntax, all aggressions perpetrated by speech against language, every questioning of the letter

——all these tortures are forgotten in literature, as mortifications, as ruses of life

——life negates itself in literature only so it may survive better—be better

D p. 292 technicity as metaphor that transports life into death, a non-accidental extra, which, in its act of falling (en y tombant): la branche (plugs it in) et la déclenche (and triggers it off): “force vivante

EL p. 215 [vis-à-vis Scholem] the 2 abysses (of life, of death) (each one en abîme in other): 1) loss of names/signification 2) the abyss into which one falls, revenge for not realizing language/names are abyssal

HST p. 387 impossibility of the possible, possible of the impossible has an affinity w/ what Heidegger says of death [cf. A p. 68 for a different take?] > links gift of death w/ gift of forgiveness: where is forgiveness more impossible than border btwn living/dead?

pp. 398-99 the scandalous aporia: can’t forgive the living (commerce), can’t forgive the dead (silent procedure, oblivion); can only forgive on forbidden threshold/border btwn life/death

+R p. 159 each letter [re: Adami’s drawing] has the same arched, slightly in-curved rigidity, supple flexion of an erect phallus—fish btwn life & death

——plus dair, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature > each letter, bit or piece of word (mors ou morceau de mot) written w/ 2 hands, twice two hands, on each page

TN p. 47 acc. Aristotle, touch: co-extensive w/ animal life, the genus of senses

——animals die w/ too much touch: an originary prohibition, reserve of touch holds life on the brink (au bord) of exaggeration, touching a question of life & death

p. 51 following Nancy’s interpretation of The Death of the Virgin, [Life comme une Morte] a “tôt” announcing an apocalypse (an end not a future) > night of nonknowledge, every desire gathers momentum, Psyche ex-posed to other, surrendered but all too soon denied to the other’s eyes

p. 291 pure life & pure death: infinitely the same

LG p. 244 [Blanchot’s] immense double affirmation both to life & death, forming an alliance or marriage bond w/ itself (“hymen”)

BSi pp. 109-10 is Derrida just widening the parameters of “fellow”? no, the monstrously other binds me to the nonliving & inscribes concept of death in life > do we find a comparable obligation to the dead in murder of primal father [Freud]?

p. 219 to think the marionette, difference btwn marionettes, not the living of life but a living w/out being—simulacrum of being, prosthesis, substitute for the being of the thing itself—fetish—life death at same time > marionette [Marion’s Dieu sans lÊtre]

p. 307 bêtise as stubborn opinion of life & death, one proper meaning for each

OG pp. 130-31 (190-91) Lévi-Strauss hypothesizes that primary function of writing is the enslavement of other humans, Derrida says yes, then describes how structure of society (castes, class, organs of capitalization, stocks), the origin of life in general, appears wherever it’s possible to defer (différer) presence, cest-à-dire la dépense ou la consommation, et dorganiser la production, cest-à-dire la réserve en général; he then adds [strangely] that the increase in differance [as proven by its extraordinary increase past few millenniums w/out change in organism] modifies life less & less as it spreads out (sétend): should differance grow infinite, a possibility excluded by its essence, would be God or death

p. 143 (205-06) Rousseau’s sacrifice: never began to live until he looked upon himself as a dead man, until he affirmed writing [death in life, differance] > aiming at a symbolic reappropriation of presence that differance will have breached/broached

p. 196 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] transgressing space, mastering exteriority (the inanimate), arts of space carry death w/in themselves—painting, often dead, carries you to depth of desert; voice, song, more alive [?]

p. 209 (297) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

p. 233 (332) natural immediacy is à la fois origine et fin, in the double sense of birth & death, unfinished sketch and finished perfection (esquisse inachevée et perfection finie) [how Rousseau’s contradiction is only apparent, how his law of concept of nature constrains natural law]

p. 311 Rousseau: “we are born and die every moment of our life”

EU p. 23 violence comes from both sides, each term of opposition marked by other side (not simply passage btwn 2 poles): law/nonlaw, writing/speech, death/life, paternal/maternal language): always 2 forces of frayage and resistance: each bearing life/death at once

SPEC p. 285 from whichever end (bout) [i.e. pleasure or reality], it is death, inscribed but non-inscribable in structure, in process of structure—stricture: death already (déjà) life death

***p. 340 repetition as reproduction, reproduction of life-death, wiedererleben, poses no problem [to Freud] as long as satisfaction is found elsewhere [i.e. nothing beyond PP]

p. 357 in both Freud & Heidegger, life death no longer opposed in the proper [both interpret death as proper? unlike Levinas & Derrida]

p. 359 Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

pp. 360-61 notion of guarding (garde) is gathered, guarded (particularly in its strategico-military code), at moment Freud defines conservative drives: they are the guardians/sentinels of life (Lebenswachter), veillent sur la vie, la surveillent, gardent et regardent, montent la garde auprès delle > but they are also the satellites (Trabanten) or sentinels of death > Myrmidons, bodyguards, satelles, agents (generally armed), couriers, obeying revolution of a greater body (absolute power): le mort

p. 376 to speculate: not only going beyond a given oppositional limit but the very notion of limit as front btwn two opposed terms—eg. the identifiable terms where every term terminates: life/death [Derrida’s eschatology?]

p. 401 w/ Causa, lAutre Choseno opposition btwn pleasure & unpleasure, w/in & beyond, life & death: graphics of strictural supplement not oppositional, knowns no negation, no lack; in graphics, desire is sanssans,” is of a “sans sans sans”

CHOR p. 95 poker-like gamble w/ no insurance: “each man and each woman must commit his or her own singularity, the untranslatable factor of his or her life and death”

LIE

GT pp. 150-51 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

MONL p. 3 lying by confessing the lie of not possessing language

p. 20 one can testify only to the unbelievable: what is most believable > even false testimony presupposes this unbelievable testimony

H p. 67-71 Kant against lying, duty to speak truth comes from freedom & pure intentionality of subject, but it introduces police everywhere (in our internal cellphones, our emails, most secret faxes of our private lives)

——w/out right to lie > Kant subordinates rights of the home

HASD pp. 17-8 [blurring lines btwn conscious/unconscious, man/animal] if animals can’t keep secrets, because they can’t represent as such, secret linked to Vorstellung, linked to lying, not presenting in speech that which one has an articulated representation, keep to oneself

PP p. 83 supplement introduces possibility of the equivocal, dissimulation, deception, lies

POOF p. 46n German proverb: “perhaps is practically a lie (eine halbe Luge)”

pp. 59-60 Nietzsche’s dissimulation (sage acts the fool), for friendship’s sake be an enemy, knowing how to lie to divert wicked lucidity, dissimulate in order to preserve: feigning to be precisely what he is, he loves them enough not to want to do them all the evil he wants for them

p. 72 friendship–enemy btwn logic of unconscious & logic of lie: these 2 logics can’t help but haunt each other, et de partager même le concept de cette hantise qui travaille le langage de notres temps

pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

——modesty would get woman to participate in universal fraternity (i.e. humanity), equalizes sexes by moralizing them: modest woman is a brother for man

p. 274 Kant explains that empty gestures, those of politesse, lead to genuine dispositions of soul > Derrida extrapolates: history of becoming-true of an illusion, une histoire qui se fait comme histoire qu'on se raconte: elle se fait alors qu'on la raconte, on se la raconte pour la faire [history made while story being told] > a trial (procès) of verification

——a good philosophical computer could convert Kant’s history of truth qua history of error into Hegelian software, then Nietzschean—il le fait déjà [Derrida], n'est-ce pas [baby daddy]

WM p. 252 [Aristotle on obfuscation and lies re: metaphors, bad metaphors, and that which is worse than metaphors]

DS p. 233 Jean-Pierre Richard: beauty of glorious lie is what art tries to render true, to do so, must put it under glass

ATIA p. 21 why would we owe truth anything? the debt of autobiography: confession > after the fall, must already conceive lying as evil, as hiding truth

p. 33 the question of whether animals can respond, is also can they erase (seffacer), can they lie, pretend, cover their own tracks

p. 69 to confess the narcissism of confession is to admit that guilt, the lie, perjury are lodged in heart of promise, in veracity itself, in naked/intransitive simplicity of “I am”

p. 127 Lacan distinguishes btwn animal sexual pretense (feinte) and the deception (tromperie) of speech

p. 128 Lacan always uses Freud’s famous: why tell me you’re going to X so I think you’re going to Y, whereas you are indeed going to X

pp. 142-43 for Heidegger, ‘as’-structure founds logos, animal deprived of logos because w/out “as such” > apophantic logos: becoming language of “as such” [deception belongs to essence of logos]

p. 145 Aristotle: “poets tell many a lie (polla pseudontai aoidoi)”

PS pp. 193-94 concepts of alienation/inalienation, madness, belong to an epoch of metaphysics that determines Being as the life of a proper subjectivity > difference laid bare by Artaud, can only be conceived beyond metaphysics, like Heidegger’s difference or Duplicity (opens/conceals truth)

SW p pp. 349-50 [to read the corpus that has known, from operation of other, how to undo itself from veiling/unveiling] you have to write, sign in turn, countersign in writing, something else, in another language, w/out betraying injection/call of first seal

——can’t prove it happened, only swear that it did: perjury must remain possible (a duty that must be respected)

PF p. xxvi alibi tells the story of a lying, every lie is first of all a perjury

——perjurer can always give alibi: I was elsewhere, I wasn’t thinking (his finitude as alibi)

HLP p. 29 phenomenon of lie intrinsically foreign to problem of knowledge (irreducibly ethical dimension)

——(in principle and in its classical determination) a lie is not an error

pp. 29-30 lying, deceiving & being mistaken > pseudological

——pseudos: lie & falsehood, poetic invention

p. 30 for Aristotle, liar chooses, pseudos in anthropos is the lie (also pseudos in things, pragma; also pseudos in utterance, logos)

——Heidegger: Dasein: possibility to lie & deceive (Lüge, Täuschung)

p. 31 se tromper > being-mistaken? or lie to oneself? > can one lie to oneself [Augustine seems to exclude this possibility]?

——history of lie, that of false witness, of perjury

p. 32 for Rousseau, worst lie is calumny; a lie that doesn’t hurt anyone (doesn’t profit), not a lie, merely a “fiction” [“4th Reverie”]

p. 33 possibility of lying to oneself: magnetic field and line of division of our problem

p. 34 impossible to prove someone lied (did it on purpose): “I didn’t mean to deceive, I didn’t mean to say that”

——what a [classical] lie does: address to another, intentional act, consciousness, presence-to-self of knowledge > lying a betrayal of contract & duty to other [classical lie presumes MOP]

p. 35 lying as making him believe [dimension of credit/faith irreducible], bad faith of liar, betrayal of implicit sworn faith, surprising the good faith of his addressee

——intention to lie pertains to saying & meaning to say (vouloir-dire)—not to the said

——St. Augustines’s lie is a labyrinth where one can take a wrong turn at any step: will, intentionality of consciousness, desire/will to deceive (fallendi cupiditas, voluntas fallendi)

pp. 35-6 frank concept of lie: keep decidable, rigid, square, even though its limits can’t be trusted

p. 36 [method] Derrida, w/ finesse & rigor, engages mobile & fluid folds of lie’s complication, such a demand risks losing sight of “classical defining edge of the lie” > difficult to delimit this edge, but without it no ethics, right, politics would survive

——can never be done w/ silence, dissimulation, can never tell the whole truth

——Montaigne: reverse side of truth has 100,000 shapes, no defined limits

pp. 36-7 the feint that is the faked orgasm at the heart of and exterior to any concept of lie

p. 37 prayer (doesn’t have a delimitable space w/in language), not in jurisdiction of the lie versus veracity, where performative depends on constative claims (reference to values of truth, reality)

——if concept of frank lie has a history, it’s caught up in a becoming that risks relativizing its authority/value

——serviceable, generous, officious lie (mendacium officiosum)

p. 38 complexities of history, historicity, of the lie [have there been ruptures in concept lie?]

p. 39 for Rousseau, lie meaningless outside “sacred name of truth,” “holy truth”

p. 40 Oscar Wilde’s complaint: “decay of lie”; Arendt (describes a mutation in history of lie): hyperbolic growth of lie [absolute lie]

p. 41 absolute lie [Arendt] still supposes absolute knowledge

p. 42 for Arendt, modern lie no longer hides, it destroys [does it destroy Kantian Heiligkeit (sacrosanctity)?]

——for Kant, in Augustinian tradition, sacred duty, unconditional imperative not to lie; Schürmann: sacred, in Heidegger, keeps historical connotation, while awe and piety direct toward event, presencing (which is not at all historical)

p. 43 for Kant, opposite of lie is Wahrhaftigkeit (true-meaning-to-say), veracity, veridicity [not truth, not reality]

p. 44 paradigm of lie has an essential link to experience of sexual pleasure

p. 45 Kant might say: “all language is structured by this promise of veracity,” “[when you lie] you cease speaking”; Derrida: difficult to refute unless one thinks specter of possible lie that haunts veracity

——rational law of sacred veracity: condition of history, human sociality

pp. 51-2 Arendt & Kant both neglect “logic of unconscious” & theory of “performative” re: the lie [cf. POOF p. 72]

***p. 56 to hurry to produce an “effect of truth” w/out a certain conscientiousness: neither to lie, nor to error, nor Arendt’s self-deception

p. 57 to lie to oneself is not “bad faith” > must account for mediatic techno-performativity and logic of phantasma (spectral), or symptomatology of unconscious

p. 60 Mein Kampf refers to “the colossal lie”

——Derrida affirms vigilance we need against Hitler’s rejection of objective truth (valid for everyone), his privileging of myth over science [overvaluation of performative, the constative maligned]; but, this vigilance could also suspect “activist,” “pragmatist” interpretations of truth, any possibility of institutive/performative speech

p. 61 opposition veracity/lie homogenous w/ testimonial problematic, not w/ epistemological one of true/false or of proof

p. 290n Kant: permit lying, destroy very possibility of promises

p. 61 for Koyré, totalitarian regimes keep traditional structure > affirm (dogmatically) classical concept of lie/truth, require it, reverse the hierarchy, grant primacy to lie

p. 62 Koyré: totalitarian regimes founded on primacy of the lie

——“the earth, she, doesn’t lie” (earthly, feminine, naturalism)

p. 63 Hitler used “old Machiavellian technique”: tell truth knowing the uninitiated will not take him seriously, “conspiracy in broad daylight,” “society w/ a secret”

p. 65 w/out meta-interpretive norm not only difficult to define lie, fundamentally irreparable

p. 293n Arendt: ability to lie interconnected w/ ability to act; owe their existence to same source: imagination [technological use of images]

——lying w/ images, “facts” structured by simulacrum/virtual, “live television,” by means of selective/interpretive performativity, destroys even reference to the alterity of what it replaces: produces indubitable “truth effect” > absolute lie can survive w/out anyone knowing [evil genius]

p. 66 for Arendt, Derrida extrapolates, no (political) history w/out lying > Arendt sees the liar as the “man of action”

p. 67 classical lying: liar knows the truth, knows he is lying, the self excludes the self-lie (the other is other enough, an enemy to be deceived in his belief)

——unless we think the other w/in oneself, an ipseity more originary than ego, a divisible ipseity, oneself as enemy

p. 293n maintain regime of perhaps [re: the possibility of an absolute lie, televisual effect] to avoid effacing, again, history of lie into a history of truth

pp. 67-8 though Marxist concept of ideology remains a negative topology, is fundamentally obscure, has theoretical limitations, it is very valuable, marks site/place beyond truth/lie structure

***p. 68 classical determination of truth as indefinite survival of “stable,” bebaion, denies what must be admitted: lie can (must) last to infinity (and never appear as such)

——Derrida doesn’t believe that the effect of the lie, of betrayed veracity, remains indestructible as symptom [either way, logic of symptom can’t be contained w/in opposition good/bad faith]

p. 69 Freud treats lie as revealing symptom, avowal of another truth

——Arendt makes lie epiphenomenal accident of parousia of truth

——history of frank lie: Greek thematic of pseudos, of eidōlon, of phantasma, of rhetoric, of sophistics, of political useful lie [Republic]—curative, preventative lie of pharmakon [holy lie]

pp. 69-70 radical Christianization of lie as originary corruption of human existence, as Kantian radical evil [Arendt risks secondarizing/banalizing history of lie if she maintains certainty of final victory of truth]

——Dasein: “bears w/in it self the possibilities of deceit & lying”

***p. 70 one cannot think the lie itself w/out taking into account its survival to infinity, its radical perversion, and its technical mutations in simulacrum or iconic substitutes

TR p. 83 confession (a veracity of testimony) never makes concessions to lies of literature

pp. 110-11 touching on equivocation btwn constative (revealed truth) & performative (the excuse): originary or preoriginary synthesis w/out which there’d be no trace, inscription, body, materiality > it’s why we’re always asking for forgiveness in ambiguous, perjuring mode

——one can always bear false witness in equivocation of const./perform., no one will be able to theoretically prove someone has lied > lie remains improbable [in mode of confession], even where, in another mode, one is certain of it

——beg to be believed where perjury always possible, precisely unverifiable

——a necessity of solitude, no intuition of alter ego felt by addresser & addressee [on either side of excuse/apology/forgiveness]

EJQB p. 68 that which was impossible for classical rationalists: to proceed w/in duplicity of God’s questionability > God is not truthful: accede to virtue of lie

PJP p. 166 every lie is a perjury, every perjury implies a lie, betrays a promise or implicit oath (“I owe you the truth”)

p. 169 Miller: lie is performative & constative

p. 170 genus <> species : lie <> perjury

p. 172 lie concerned w/ veracity not truth; already perjured by promising to tell the truth

p. 178 Miller: “storytelling” (lying/narration), memory as precarious support of narrative continuity

p. 183 anacoluthon gives rise to fictions or perhaps undecidable lie, perjury, that never can be excluded on part of narrator, author

HST p. 396 mad laughter, le rire dément, at forgiveness in betrayal, betrayal in forgiveness

——demented laughter, et il dément mentir, as denagation of lying while still lying (even while disavowing/avowing lying)

LI pp. 70-1 what is re-markable about the mark includes margin w/in mark > mark is remarkable in that it “is” also its margin

——line of margin can never be determined rigorously: divides the dividing-line & its unity at once > iterability allows for “negative” double, lie, also conditions so-called “positive” values

p. 134 laws, in their normality, entail something fictional, depend on some structural power that allows fictions, lies (mendacious inventions), to take place: thus importance of studying literature to understand law

TN p. 296 tact (touch w/out contact) > avowal of impossible confession: confession is perjurious, confession is inexpiable, is the fault > le vertige of comedy that absorbs (aspire) every confession, tragedy of lies in good faith, lies w/ hand on heart

NOY p. 234 quasi-transcendental or ontological structure of yes prescribes double destiny, a destiny of duplicity?

BSi pp. 50-2 Hobbes’ rage against the liars who appeal (to God) above the sovereign: 1) the lie of immediacy 2) partisans, civil disobedients: place a law above law 3) like the Jews, don’t accept sovereign as lieu-tenant of God > p. 53 [but!] acc. Hobbes, the sovereign mimics God, Christian incarnation; p. 54 lieutenant as suppléant for other along metonymic chain

pp. 84-5 to lie: one is not addressing the other as man > Machiavelli offers this Kantian argument but concedes that when faith in law doesn’t work a prince should become a beast

OG p. 118 for Rousseau, the sensible cogito, interior voice, never lies

pp. 133-34 Rousseau & Lévi-Strauss on books piling, filled w/ lies; book of nature: look, don’t read

p. 308 (434) for Rousseau, le plein air—voice, nature, franc parler, absence of detour

FV p. 470 Lacan thinks beyond the truthful, beyond lying: adequation/unveiling in present speech don’t await exterior verification, they guarantee each other intrinsically: adequation of full speech to itself [see p. 471n]

LIGHT

OOG p. 149 re: Husserl, Absolute is Passage, is dangerous, lAbsolu dun Danger, for if light of sense is only through passage, light can be lost along the way (inauthenticity)

GOD p. 13 Patoçka: Plato’s novel idea is will to leave womb of Earth Mother, follow path of “pure light,” subordinate (podřídit) orgiastic entirely to responsibility

pp. 99-100 heart as light, photology, because it is spiritual, not earthly, it cannot hide, cannot be encrypted, an omnipresence more radical & effective than a spy satellite

FK p. 46 wherever arché of light commands, possibility more originary than manifestation > light there in discourse of philosophy, revelation, also, via Enlightenment, opposed to religion [war of light]

pp. 54-55 revealability (Offenbarkeit), revelation (Offenbarung), which is first? former prior to all religion, or revelation the origin of light, the very invisibility of visibility?

H p. 103 [Oedipus’ dying words] “last time I see lightless light,” Oedipus weeps for tangible light

HASD p. 23 “sacred allegories [iera synthemata],” would be conventional rhetoric if not for divine light of God, would be “cheap simulacrums of the figureless”

pp. 32-3 Being must be created by what exceeds the border, the Good, intelligible sun, something that far surpasses (hyperekhontos) [Republic 509b], excess of God, light is in Good’s image

——light produced by sun is son of the Good (neither visible, nor sight or vision), excess itself described by what it exceeds, even negative discourse retains ontology, does not interrupt analogical continuity [btwn perceptible/intelligible sun, the Good and that to which it gives birth, allusion to triton genos, i.e. khora]

MPM p. 21 when we know our friend to be gone forever: terrifying lucidity, in light of incinerating blaze where nothingness appears

——we remain in disbelief itself, we will never believe in death or immortality

EM p. 122 (145) thinking of appearance (phainesthai) linked to thinking of telos

p. 131n (157n) Heidegger: Being is the transcendens pure and simple, léclaircie (Lichtung) elle-même

pp. 132-33 (158-60) [here Derrida shows limits of Heidegger’s deconstruction?] prevalence given to phenomenological metaphor (phainesthai, shining, lighting, clearing, Lichtung) opens to space of presence, presence of space, opposition near & far > thought prior to opposition space & time, opening of a spacing which belongs to neither, dislocates while producing presence of the present

VM pp. 84-5 imperialism of theoria bothers Levinas: especially phenomenology’s infusion w/ light, way it predetermined Being as object

——“it’s difficult to maintain a philosophical discourse against light”

pp. 85-6 for Levinas, sun of epekeina tes ousias (fecundity, generosity) will always illuminate inexhaustible source of thought, Plato places Good beyond Being, beyond light of Being [see p. 312n Descartes’ infinite does this too]; “ex-cendence”

p. 87 Levinas’ method risks accusing theoretism, that which separates, of not separating

p. 91 acc. Levinas, solipsism is structure of reason, soliloquy of reason, solitude of light, philosophy makes common cause with oppression and totalitarianism of the same

——Levinas calls the community of Platonic light, logic of noncontradiction, “formal logic”

pp. 91-2 acc. Levinas, to see, know, have and will “unfold only within the oppressive and luminous identity of the same” (fundamental categories of ontology/phenomenology)

p. 92 Borges: “perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors,” light, for example, but what an example! which language can escape metaphor of light? [not night]

p. 96 for Levinas, when 3rd term [party] is light of Being (which is not being nor non-being while same and other are) > theoretical relation is ontology

pp. 112-13 “syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

——langage, fils de la terre et du soleil: écriture > one could never come across a language w/out rupture of space, no aerial or aquatic language, in which alterity would be more lost than ever > structure of inside-outside/day-night has no meaning in pure space [proscribed words], inhabits conceptuality itself

*** p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

——an economy of violence (economy irreducible to Levinas’ definition) that tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity

***p. 118 metaphysics unable to escape its ancestry in light, always supposes phenomenology in its critique of phenomenology [re: Levinas]

p. 129 “other” is the name, the unthinkable unity of light and night > “phenomenon supposes original contamination by the sign”

VP p. 9 phenomenology (MOP in form of ideality) is also a philosophy of life, death is an empirical and extrinsic accident, everything is light, living light, blazes open passage to reduction

p. 12 for Husserl, to substantialize distance btwn mundane (psychological) and transcendental self would be to freeze light at its source

OH p. 107 press brings light of day to its publicity, (se) donner…(pour) le jour, gives daylight to day itself > right of response hardly exists

S p. 81 in Der Ister, Hölderlin calls to the fire, Jetzt komme, Feuer!, fire as what comes, call for to-come > acc. Heidegger, Hölderlin, the Beseeler, has been struck by God of light, gift of spirit as incineration, cremation, almost becoming ash [MOP & annihilation of trace]

PPHS pp. 72-3 theory of sign on basis of being-present, authority of lêtre-en-vue: telos of reappropriation [see POOF p. 65], coordination of sign & light of parousia, speaking logos as close as possible to itself in concept & consciousness

p. 77 possession of pit > gives forth its property, produces light

pp. 91-2 Hegel: light is original ideality—nature becoming subjective

WM p. 253 via Du Marsais, the philosophical metaphor light of the spirit is a detour w/in (in sight of) reappropriation, presence, etc. (from Platonic eidos to Hegelian Idea), a trope, a borrowed dwelling (house) > here, light is one metaphor among metaphors, and borrowed dwelling, expropriation, becomes metaphor of metaphor

pp. 256-57 Fontanier on why we say light of reason and light of day

p. 267 it is lumen naturale that allows Descartes to affirm his mind beyond all doubt, natural light constitutes the ether of thought > natural light proceeds from God and returns to God

p. 268 one true metaphor (no more true metaphor): but assured legibility of the proper [presence disappearing in its own radiance, hidden source of light]

DS p. 208 space of writing: “event” in which nothing happens—hymen, crime, suicide, spasm (laughter/pleasure): everything describes structure of text & effectuates its possibility > a lustre which is nothing beyond its own fragmented light

——for Mallarmé, ideality of idea, metaphysical name, is necessary to mark non-being, nonpresent, marks w/out breaking glass, alludes to epekeina tēs ousias: a hymen (closeness & veil) btwn Plato’s sun & Mallarmé’s lustre

FS p. 27 darkness (self-concealment) /light (self-revelation) founding metaphor of Western philosophy as metaphysics: photology

p. 28 philosophy as twilight of forces, “sun-splashed (ensoleillé)” morning of images, forms, phenomena > matin des idées et des idoles, où le relief des forces devient repos, aplatit sa profondeur dans la lumière et s'étend dans lhorizontalité

SW p. 329 [re: laser] this radiance requires two parallel mirrors perpendicular to cutting rays (like in nature, double mirror w/ 2 voices)

Gii p. 38 to think is a handiwork [w/out any perhaps] > elsewhere in Heidegger, thought is linked to light or Lichtung, to eye, or to hearing/voice—now to hand

PIO p. 9 even if metonymy of other w/in ourselves already constituted our relation to living other, [actual?] death brings relation into a more abundant light (un plus de lumière) > makes the breaking of the mirror more necessary (difficult): at instant of death, limit of narcissistic reappropriation is terribly sharp > must no longer be concerned w/ other in ourselvesyet, that’s all we can be concerned w/ > narcissistic wound enlarges (saccroît) for want of being (ne plus pouvoir être) narcissistic, no longer appeased in that Erinnerung we call work of mourning

RM p. 61 Er-aügnis (light, clearing, eye) in Ereignis

PJP p. 179 the suspension of metonymy, quotation, interruption, quasi anacoluthic change of subject > interruption in the obvious: shadow at heart of light

p. 190 veracity—light

TN p. 249 start from fire to think the touching of self-touching > not only fire but flames, since light means what is more than a figure: haptical light of self-consuming flames eludes worship, burns effigies spontaneously, “more than a figure,” the transfiguration of figurality

AD p. 40 acc. Levinas, feminine transcends light and phenomenology (Plato, Husserl), a “way of existing” in the “hiding” of modesty

p. 98 the 2 ways State dissimulates the face: 1) bringing to light makes face’s invisibility invisible 2) effaces its unicity in generality > both of these are the same

LG p. 230 trait (supplementary & distinctive), re-mark of belonging doesn’t belong, this sans > a blink of the eye, w/out which nothing would come to light

p. 246 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] I bring forth to light (donne le jour) precisely the law as the right-to-sight (droit de voir), this law has “me” at its/her disposal? > the “I” sans “I” of narrative voice does not take place, engenders the lawmen [panoptic demand: synopsis]

p. 247 double affirmation not foreign to the genre, genius or spirit of law: no double affirmation w/out light of day and daylight becoming law > madness of the day

CIN p. 46 “give fire its due, light counterfires in order to stop the progression of a blaze, avoid a holocaust” > fire’s share (part) is impossible to delimit (by virtue of the lexicon, the ‘themes’)

BSi p. 287 layers of light in spectacle of autopsy [includes the historiography of Louis XIV’s autopsy]

p. 291 scene, theater, visibility of autopsy [sovereign]: violence of light > enargeia of seeing, knowing; enargeia: fulguration of sun, can’t look at directly

p. 293 [during spectacle of autopsy/sovereignty] an éclat > fragment of light touches everything

OG pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

p. 165 (235) supplement/onanism: contournent un danger et réservent une dépense > in spite & thanks to them, we’re authorized to see the sun, the light that keeps us on surface of mine [see pp. 148-49 furnace, blindness]

ATAP p. 82 every apocalyptic eschatology promised in name of light, we are heirs to these Lumières, cannot & must not forgo the Aufklärung; must keep enough apocalyptic desire (clarity, revelation) to deconstruct apocalyptic discourse

EU p. 25 cogito as the easiest: distinct, clear, natural light of “pure reason”

p. 92 Derrida continues to believe in the interest in light re: university, a task that remains for us given-to (donné-à), to what I don’t know (one might have once said: to doing or thinking)

FV p. 461 Bonaparte falls back onto dogmatic imprudence (appeal to author’s unconscious), Lacan falls back, w/ incomparable philosophical vigilance, onto Truth > [both Bonaparte & Lacan] castration of mother as ultimate meaning & proper site of letter: “real intersubjectivity,” “solution in broad daylight”—proper as relation to lack itself, in proper place/body

LIMIT

GT p. 40 demand for term & temporization, very structure of the thing, demand for limit, boundary, margin, a demand which dawns in gift-counter-gift

SPOM p. 207 jurer ou conjurer: the chance of thinking and its limit? the gift of its finitude? [nous gageons ici que la pensée ne vient jamais à bout de la pulsion conjuratoire]

POOF p. 12 via Aristotle, loving the dead (beyond death, beyond life), carries philía to limit of its possibility, also its ultimate resource: horizon is limit & absence of limit, loss of horizon on the horizon, ahorizontality of horizon

p. 27 limit is also a chance: must receive address of other at particular address, in singular language

p. 129 [intensity qua stability] an intensity can always increase & gain on itself out to its extreme limit; p. 142 Schmitt’s criteria [re: partisan] are false ones, quasi-concepts, criteria of degree of intensity (i.e. indefinitely extensive)

A p. 15 border as limit (oros, Grenze, re: nun or Jetzt [now-point] Heidegger underlines) or border as tracing (grammē, Linie)

pp. 14-5 [Derrida quickly reviews many places in his own work where he studied aporetology, paradoxical limitrophy, double bind]

p. 20 the 2 versions of aporia’s nonpassage: 1) impermeable, only opens via shibboleth, closed borders (i.e. during war) 2) impasse of no limit, limit too porous, no opposition btwn 2 sides

p. 23 three limits: 1) territories, countries, languages, States… 2) discourses: theology, sciences… 3) types of border (conceptual de-terminations)

p. 30 abyssal inquiry re: Heidegger’s delimitation of death, modes of ending, more than one limit, ends of man an indestructable (increvable) subject > death of Dasein not end of man, btwn the 2 there’s a divisible limit, perhaps, of ending, place where ending ends [?]

pp. 40-1 aporia of death, one of the place-names that forms following braid btwn 3 forms of limits, keeps it from coming undone [see pp. 78-80 border, closure, demarcation] 1) problematic closure (around thematic entity) 2) anthropological border (animals don’t have borders, laws) 3) conceptual demarcation, logical de-finition (decontaminate 2 concepts, oppose them rigorously)

EM p. 121n (144n) the relevance accomplished in Hegelian metaphysics persists wherever metaphysics, our language, maintains its authority, even in pre-Hegelian systems (i.e. in Kant, figure of finitude organizes capacity to know from emergence of anthropological limit)

OH p. 28 horizon (ancient Greek) = limit; to see itself (Europe) on the horizon, is to see itself from its end, discourse of anamnesis—taste for finality (goût de fin), for death

p. 35 responsibility: making a chance of the memory of a name, of the idiomatic limit > an opening of identity to its future

——all names designate a negative limit & a chance

PAS PAS p. (61) Blanchot: circle of law is this: must be a crossing for there to be a limit, uncrossable that in its desire, its call, has already crossed the line [appele à franchir]

S pp. 79-80 following a limit in a way where division is almost impossible because it touches both sides of limit [re: limit btwn philosophemes and the sayings of Dichter]

TC p. 249 Artaud kept himself as close as possible to the limit, possibility & impossibility of pure theater

T pp. x-xi philosophy has always thought its other, that which limits it; does to think the other solely mean relever, to control the other? or does the limit/passage always reserve one more coup; to think the proper of the other, the other as such is to miss it, to miss the missing of the other [on manque (de) le manquer]: examine the relevance of the limit

p. xvi play of limit/passage [re: Being as relevant movement of reappropriation], no question answer but displace concept of limit, limit of concept (can’t just create new limit)

p. xvii if tympanum is a limit, unhinge concept of limit > no limit in general, every limus, the limes, short cut, the oblique

p. xix resistance to deconstruction: infinite mastery > assurance of Being & interiorization of every limit as being, as its own proper

FWT p. 207n for Lacan, madness—limit of human freedom

DS p. 251 sum can’t be totalized, nor is this non-totalizing exceeded by infinite richness of content of meaning or intention > define the limit otherwise: fold w/ no possibility of folding text back on itself (angle & intersection of re-mark), no reduction of its spacing > blank, fold: impossibility of (imaginary) theme beyond textual instance > these textual effects rich w/ kind of poverty, singular/regular monotony, disappear: one can’t see this because one thinks one is seeing themes

p. 256n lime, lima, limus—oblique (obliquity/curvature of teeth of a file)

p. 270 if fold had a limit somewhere, if mark, margin, or marche (limit, threshold, border) was fold’s other > there would be no text

P p. 50 ideal limit acts as frame for pure philosophy

POS p. 6 keep at the limit, not the death, of philosophy, and besides, the dead wields a very specific power [Derrida does not believe in the death of whatever: God, book, philosophy]

p. 12 “one is never installed w/in transgression, one never lives elsewhere, transgression implies that the limit is always at work”

pp. 40-1 if there’s a definition of differance, it’s the limit, interruption, destruction of Hegel’s relève, wherever it is

OS p. 57 Aristotle: [strange logic re: now as limit, whereas no determinate divisible thing has a unique limit]

pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

——this would be a gramme that erases its tracing in a circle, removes limit of point

p. 61 like “point: line,” now as limit (peras) is only time’s accident, time not thought on basis of now, thus mathematization of time has limits (always accidents/potentialities) [taken in all senses]

ROP p. 110 Foucault’s wager, the end (fin) of finite man: “man would be effaced, like a face drawn in sand at the edge or limit of the sea” > trait (of face, limit) splits, becomes a limit, erasing and multiplying this limit endlessly > self-relation of limit at once erases/multiplies limit

***ATIA p. 29 transgressal experience of limitrophy, trephō, trophē, trophos: to feed limit, train, nurse, make grow, thicken, fold, divide the line, multiply/increase limit’s figures [not efface the limit]

pp. 30-1 discussion is interesting [re: animals] once limit is abyssal (rather than limit as discontinuity): once frontier is not a single, indivisible line, but more than one internally divided lines (folds, foliations): “what are the edges of a limit that feed on an abyss?”

O p. 16 in thus remaining [outside of oppositions, i.e. sensible/intelligible], does a preface exist? son espacement (préface à une relecture) sécarte au lieu de la khōra > remarkable limen of the text: what can be read of dissemination > limen: mark, march, margin, mise en marche: citation

WAP p. 16 philosophy has no horizon, if horizon means a limit, a line that encircles or delimits a perspective (interdisciplinarity: more horizontal identities than ever)

TB p. 133 translation: task of pure limit, an infinite labor to rejoin (doesn’t exclude gradations, virtuality, interval & in-btwn) > can one quote a signature?

CHM p. 54 like nonmeaning, silence is the work’s limit & profound resource

Gii p. 41 everything Heidegger says about man takes on meaning and value w/in oppositional limit to animal (it is dogmatic and serious)

——man’s hand infinitely removed from prehensile organs through the abyss of its being “durch einen Abgrund des Wesens

——this abyss: speech & thought

REST pp. 303-04 line of detachment, the out-of-use, not only the one giving form to the shoes, there’s the line of the work qua picture in frame > frame makes a supplementary désoeuvrement, cuts out but also sews back together > all these cutting outs, the shoes, the laces, the frame itself, going btwn outside & inside, limits have to be thought as lace [p. 307 G-string as lace, gaine]

RM p. 58 metaphysics [quotes from DIF] is not “surrounded but traversed by its limits,” “marked on its inside by the multiple track (sillon) of its margin”

PF p. xxxiii impossible marks the limit of the possible or a power, the limit of an “I can”

——passivity marks all unconditional pure events (gift, forgiveness, hospitality, death), marks and thus doubly limits most active, productive performativity

TR p. 93 it [re: Rousseau’s Confessions] precedes acc. substitution of one border for another: in this parergonal composition, in game of interlocking frames, we find mark of 2 limits: 1) crossing from Protestantism to Catholicism 2) [2x last word] last word of the other, last word of self

D p. 303 possibility (potency) of present is its own limit, inner fold, impossibility—its impotence (btwn presence/castration) > same goes for “history,” “form”: language of metaphysics

pp. 303-04 life & presence as privileged examples [of folding back onto their own limit, folding back in their very triggering] > inscribes difference in heart of life

***p. 304 each germ is its own term—finds its term w/in itself as its own internal limit, faisant angle avec sa proper mort [tracing, grafting, semen already swarming (essaimée)]

p. 366 limits of square/cube—indefinitely specular unfolding/refolding: not limits at all > opening of its own inscription—tout autre, la même, another geometry to come [EROS]

HST p. 387 limit (of forgiveness) cannot be crossed (infranchissable)—and is crossed insofar as it can’t be [hymen] > ultimate compassion, very test of substitution (impossible), to be hostage and hôte of the other

LI p. 39 Derrida likes excessively prolonging the pleasure of the threshold (limen) [?]

p. 71 argument of principle concerns a structural limit, argument is of the same kind as the set-argument [re: speech act theory’s own differentiation of itself from other theories, & thus its reliance on the metaphorical: ruined analogical value btwn speech act theory and other theories]

——iterability can be supplemented by differance, grapheme, trace > cannot be idealized, makes idealization possible but never pure, simple: iterability has an internal impure limit, prevents it from being identified, synthesized, reappropriated by that whose iteration it entame

p. 107 iterability at once condition/limit of mastery: entame it

pp. 152-53 though nothing exists outside context, limit of frame/border of context always entails nonclosure: outside penetrates, thus determines, inside

TN p. 6 limit, deprived of body, does not touch itself, does not let itself be touched

p. 12 Nancy’s partes extra partes, everything outside another outside; p. 14 fold of becoming-inside of the first outside, nothing but surfaces & outsides w/out insides: superficies of surfaces are limits, exposed to a touch that can only leave them intact, untouchable > irreducible disseminal divisibility

p. 53 the haptical, for every finite existence, recalls what is coming [Socrates], marks the limit at which or from which the presentation announces itself

p. 67 untouchable before vow of abstinence [cf. OG p. 109 spacing prior to prohibition of names]? a vow of abstinence requires promise of touch > touch haunting abstinence itself, intensifying transgression: unforgivable perjury at heart of interdict

——touching remains limitrophe > an inhibition constitutes its appetite: it eats w/out eating what it comes to cultivate, elevate, educate, dresser (train), trephein

p. 98 Nancy: limit must come to be touched not seen

p. 103 for Nancy, touching the limit > moment of decision

——philosophy, literally, has never touched anything > inversely, all one ever does is touch a limit (destiny of this figurality) [hymen]; to touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a border, an outline

pp. 103-04 touch untouchable-touchable surface/border/limit on exposing edge of an abyss

——philosophy will have “touched” something 2x: limit & unfoundable abyss beneath/beyond it

——there can only be a figure of touch, one only touches by way of figure > the object, the touchable thing, the "thing itself,” is the untouchable (gives itself, opens only in history of figure)

p. 105 for Nancy, sublime: imagination feeling its powerlessness as it touches the limit (limit conceived as height, absolute height)

p. 109 would figure of limit have to be tangible? isn’t the tangible the very contamination of the proper, of contamination itself, of contact/contagion/impurification?

p. 131 always writing a story, tangent touches line/surface w/out intersection, a tangent touches one point, point is nothing, a limit w/out depth or surface, untouchable even as a figure

p. 139 self-relation, “sefforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force sarrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

p. 194 Nancy: no art of touch, touch is sense as threshold

p. 223 to proclaim “essential originarity” of technical [as Nancy does] translates this “law” into a classical language that meets its limit here

pp. 271-72 finite thinking: a limit that thinking touches w/out appropriating it for itself

p. 272 via Nancy’s finite thinking, infinitism of Christian flesh finds itself contesté at heart of lattestation itself > we have no access to it but to refer touch to the limit

p. 289 limit, border (bord), which are nothing, make any gift possible

p. 297 one never touches except by touching a limit at (à) the limit (truism in any profound thinking of limit)

p. 299 logic of limit [hymen?]: what lets itself be touched does so on its edge (sur son bord), thus it doesn’t let itself be touched/reached (ne se laisse pas atteindre)—exposing untouchable itself, the other edge of the edge (lautre bord du bord)

——one would also have to integrate the rhetoric, plus quune rhétorique quand elle franchit à chaque figure the limits btwn sensible/intelligible—finding itself on both sides of the limit

BSi pp. 296-98 curiosus: avid knowledge and care (cura), Heidegger’s unwholesome curiosity (Neugier, Neugierde) > curious in the beast, in the madman (zoo, asylum): caring and locking up, installing limits, an art and technique, perhaps tekhnē itself

p. 298 Derrida on how zoos hide limits, interiorize, hollowed-out (en creux) limits [ditch instead of bars] > repressive violence w/ liberal, idealist, spiritualist grimace

pp. 308-10 logics of closure/enclosure, the threshold, le seuil interdit, question of responsibility (a question of threshold) throughout a decade of seminars [Derrida’s]

——not only do we not have a key to threshold, deconstruction doubts existence of threshold worthy of the name (threshold supposes indivisibility & solidity of ground)

——threshold (seuil), sill, soil, sole, solum, ground > are these ever secure?

p. 310 every economy & ecology presupposes limits, thresholds, and therefore (bunches of) keys

p. 311 zoos, asylums: made people, all the mad animals, love the ecosystem of limits

p. 312 threshold as solid, indivisible, threshold as arkhē: commencement and commandment > archon, figure of sovereign himself

pp. 333-34 the motif of passage of what passes and comes to pass (passe et se passe) in history has no solid foundation, no indivisible line > requires a rethinking the figure of of threshold, requires greater vigilance to our irrepressible desire for single, solid threshold

p. 334 abyss not a bottom or bottomless depth of hidden base > if there is abyss, there’s plus dun sol, plus dun seul seuil, plus dun seul seul [(no) more (than one) solid, single threshold, single single]

***OG pp. 244-45 (347-48) supplement extends beyond man: man calls himself man by drawing limits (excluding other): purity of nature, madness, divinity, childhood

——approach to limits (madness, divinity, childhood, animality, etc.) feared as threat of death & desired as life w/out differance: truth-value of these limit concepts only has meaning w/in closure of game (clôture du jeu), they belong to an epoch of supplementarity

p. 245 (348) must be death via grapheme before phoneme: word & thing are referential limits produced/marked by supplementarity

UWS p. 236 sovereign mastery of interior (proper power) ([indivisible] border of inside/outside) vs. divisible limit (because divisible, it has a history) > the divisible limit is the limit of the impossible, the “perhaps,” the “if”

EU p. 109 [re: politico-juridical system of university] Derrida beyond [?] political right/left, on the side of a tireless parasite [passe et repasse la limite] seeking conflict or perpetual peace in a university that has from its birth (dès sa naissance) en mal (been wanting) dapocalypse et deschatologie

pp. 210-12 [CIPH] external/internal limitrophes > give them a place and opportunity worthy of them: lexploration aux limites, singular, out-of-ordinary (insolite) incursions, limitrophic or aleatory

pp. 218-19 “thinking” proceeds to limits of these unavoidable words of legitimation: art, science, philosophy, technique, practice, law, etc.

——permanent opening: never suture w/ assurance (tranquility) of doctrine or dogma

p. 223 Derrida declares limits in order to lift/distance/disappropriate them [Rousseau describes doesn’t declare]

SPEC p. 376 to speculate: not only going beyond a given oppositional limit but the very notion of limit as front btwn two opposed terms—eg. the identifiable terms where every term terminates: life/death [Derrida’s eschatology?]

pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

p. 399 pleasure—ungraspable limit btwn 2 limits, un en-deçà et un au-delà qui réduisent un pas à rien

producing itself, regenerating: only pleasure, pleasure as counter-pleasure, band contra band, tout se passe alors dans des différences de bandage—not general economy (absolute expenditure) but strictural economy (to the point of its inevitable collapse)

p. 401 quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

FV p. 483 certain psychoanalytic interpretations (invisible framing: frame w/in frame) vs. scene of writing w/ ruined (abîmé) limits

LINE (TRAIT)

GT p. 91 what is a border (bord) or an approach (aborder) once the indivisibility of the trait is no longer secure (assurée)? gift will always be w/out border

——gift overruns border & suspends its relation to border, is beyond transgression

p. 98 “another border already divided itself in indefinite abyssal supplements”

A p. 11 a line (police) line must be indivisible = identity, when line is divided, as it is by its 1st tracings, it splits in two > there is a problem (shield) as soon as the being one-self of anything is divided (intrinsic division)

***pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (narrivent quà seffacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

MC MC p. 360 “my clinamen has to do w/ the divisibility of the mark”

SEC SEC pp. 328-29 for Derrida, for a signature to function, to be legible, it must detach itself from present and singular intention of its production; its sameness alters its identity and singularity, dividing the seal [cf. LI pp. 30-1]

PAS PAS p. (73) Blanchot: summons to cross the uncrossable has already crossed the line

S p. 104 fire-writing, flame writes, writes itself, right in the flame (à même la flamme) > a Riss, frayage of this trait, a mark that leads spirit on the way to soul, pursues soul in way opened by its fire, trait de conflagration, lesprit en-flammetrace la route, il fraye la voie

pp. 104-06 from masculine spirit (that chases and hunts) to feminine soul (that guards and nourishes), the trait, re-trait (Riss from fire-writing), engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, soul bears the sadness

p. 106 double mark, doubly remarkable trait [engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, affinity w/ Schlag]: it is the spirit in which it inscribes itself, traces itself, belongs to flame it divides

pp. 106-07 acc. Heidegger, difference or duality inscribed by the trait (Riss) is not division, it is the gathering (Versammlung) of the place (Ort), the de-cease (Abgeschiedenheit), in the one (Ein), the soul Gemüt, Ein Geschlecht, none other than Geist [path-breaking (frayage) of trait]

DS p. 223 mime mimes a kind of writing, is himself written in a kind of writing, nothing of what is can lie beyond medium/speculum reading-writing > there is 1) writing w/out book, marking tip (la pointe du trait) proceeds w/out past upon virgin sheet 2) infinite number of booklets in other booklets > Mallarmé reads, writes while reading, while reading text written by Mime, who himself reads in order to write

ROP pp. 62-3 Derrida agrees w/ Lacan that there is one libido (via Freud), it is the question of reason, principle of reason > d'un trait tiré de la raison ou d'une traite tirée [check drawn] sur la raison

p. 110 Foucault’s wager, the end (fin) of finite man: “man would be effaced, like a face drawn in sand at the edge or limit of the sea” > trait (of face, limit) splits, becomes a limit, erasing and multiplying this limit endlessly > self-relation of limit at once erases/multiplies limit

OTO pp. 4-5 discourse on life/death occurs btwn logos and gramme, analogy & program, program & reproduction (since life is on the line, the trait [splitting of line] relating graphical to logical, also working btwn biological & biographical, thanatological & thanatographical)

FS p. 28 Apollonian ecstasy cannot embrace force, movement which displaces lines, nor force as desire for itself, nor writing > fallen Dionysianism, melancholy, nostalgia

TB pp. 118-19 at edge of the language, from this edge to the other of proper name: debt contracts the trait (to-be-translated from one language to the other) of relation of living subject to his name

pp. 121-22 Benjamin uses metaphor of amphora, ammetaphor, to describe contact btwn languages; metamphora adjoins along broken line (not infinite/straight line): Derrida compares to Heidegger, Rilke, Hölderlin’s urn (re: word/thing) > amphora is one w/ itself while its openness forbids its totality, always giving/receiving [open square]

REST pp. 281-82 [re: Shapiro/Heidegger correspondence] reciprocal legitimation, effects of a common code, mutual desire for truth: the 2 parts of the pair (identity & difference, total identity in concept or formal semantics, difference and non-overlap in directionality of traits)

pp. 303-04 line of detachment, the out-of-use, not only the one giving form to the shoes, there’s the line of the work qua picture in frame > frame makes a supplementary désoeuvrement, cuts out but also sews back together (invisible lace which pierces the canvas, like pointure)

pp. 318-19 crossing (over) certain lines, certain traits, like being in Heidegger’s Seinsfrage, or crossing the lines in a painting, or the lines of framing; at what moment do we (did Heidegger?) transgress these lines (traits), cross them? transgressing which law?

p. 331 comes down to a decision about the frame, a border (bordure) which is double in its trait: joins together what it splits (partage): “at stake are (il y va) all the interests caught up in the trial (procès) of this split (partage),” what separates external from internal

p. 341 acc. Heidegger, uselessness of what a painting represents and uselessness in that the painting represents, uselessness due to product’s (shoes’) detachment from milieu by the artifice of its reattachment: the line of the frame

p. 343 lace traits form the “frame” of the picture which appeared to frame them [i.e. the traits of the shoes draw out “this is a picture”] > we, the shoes, are bigger than the frame & incorporated signature

p. 348 traits delimiting object & frame disqualify a priori by stricture/interlacing the question re: whether painting is required for a further step in thought

p. 352 Verlässlichkeit is not natural, comes from the combat btwn earth & world, and its trait, other threads in Heidegger too: Ring, Geviert (fourfold), Gering (circuit)

RM p. 50 metaphor withdraws, it gets by w/out everything, withdraws at instant it overflows every limit, marking w/ supplementary trait one more turn, re-turn, re-tracing or retreat (re-trait)

p. 52 epoch of metaphor: suspensive retrait and return supported by line (trait) delimiting a contour

p. 64 Verhüllung (veiling), Verborgenheit (being-hidden), Being withholds (se retient), withdraws (se retire) (sich entzieht), retrait

pp. 64-6 quasi-metaphor of Being, since it is nothing, since its as obliterates its as such

——metaphysics as tropics, corresponds to an essential withdrawal of Being > Being, the metaphor of metaphor (quasi-metaphor), overload of a supplementary trait, fold: re-trait

p. 66 re-trait of metaphor > gives rise to an abyssal generalization of metaphor > trait has internal multiplicity, la structure pliée-repliée dun re-trait > opens out the borders or invaginates them

***p. 72 for Heidegger, most grave and engraving signature of decision engages/allies 2 families in German language:

1. Ziehen (Zug, Bezug, Gezüge, durchziehen, entziehen)

2. Reissen (Riss, Aufriss, Umriss, Grundriss, etc.)

pp. 72-3 trait (that plural word): possibility of language, logos, lexis, inscription

pp. 73-4 trait of recoupe [Bezug] (btwn Dichten/Denken) belongs to neither, not a common trait, concept, metaphor > if trait could be something, we might call it the unique seal of their alliance, but it’s never fully originary nor, as a path-breaking (frayage), is it fully derivative: makes way for naming thus not nameable, il na pas dapprochant en tant que tel

——Riss, tracement de frayage, incises, tears; Heidegger names “Mark,” “march,” as limit, Grenz-

p. 74 entame (breach/broach incision) best approaches translation of Aufriss (rift-design), le trait (Riss) dune entame, dune ouverture traçante, frayante, a non-voluntary decision > other French translations of Aufriss: gravure (engraving), tracé-ouvrant (opening sketch)

——entamées, les deux parallèles se coupent à linfini, se recoupent, sentaillent: each one [Denken and Dichten] signs in some way in the body of the other, the one in the place (au lieu) of the other: sign there the contract w/out contract of their neighborhood

p. 75 the trait of lentame (breaching-broaching incision) marks Ereignis as propriation, event of propriation (not an originary instance prior/proper to the 2 quil entame et allie)

via Ereignis, re- of retrait no accident, no accident occurring to trait, does not appear, no proper, structurally in withdrawal: gap, trace, border, traction, effraction, differentiality

——Being’s inscription narrive quà seffacer, cf. differance/trace

pp. 75-6 metaphysical unity of opposition determined only “starting from (à partir de)” the re-trait of the trait > the “starting from” sy abîme lui-même

p. 76 repetition of incision stated violently in Riss, Ent-Ziehung, Ent-fernung, and in the Enteignen (rectraction of propriety) that hollows out every Ereignis

performative of Heidegger’s writing of Aufriss (entame) > decree to name what’s still unknown under its name > Aufriss calls to us

——Heidegger: the unity of the being of Sprache shall be called Aufriss

——Heidegger: Riss is the same word as marking (ritzen)

p. 77 Aufriss joins (articulates, spaces, holds together) the opening of Sprache

incision remains veiled, trait of incision is veiled, withdrawn

——le trait, il arrive à seffacer dans un autre, reinscribing itself heterologically, allegorically

——can’t say trait is, it conditions the ontological copula—like es gibt

Heidegger’s nontautological fashion (like Sprache, Ereignis): trait treats or treats itself, traces the trait, retraces or re-treats the withdrawal > a strange contract that doesn’t precede, for once, its own signature (sa propre signature), and therefore carries it off (et donc l’emporte)

pp. 77-8 always plus dune language in the language: the capture of the crossing (croisement) that allies Ziehen and Reissen, this capture (à la fois violent/faithful, laissant sauf) affects the captor, abduction (captation), translation, into other’s language [French retrait, English re-tracing] > all this already at work (à loeuvre) in the other’s languages, these dealings make for a work (fait oeuvre)

——Heidegger’s crossing of Ziehen w/ Reissen first occurs in “Origin of the Work of Art”: Zug zum Werk (attraction toward the work), work as sumballein, allegoreuein, nonwithdrawal of truth as truth, Un-verborgenheit > truth as originary combat (Urstreit) > a combat that’s an attraction of reciprocal belonging, a Grundriss

for Heidegger, trait does not split adverse sides—attracts adversity toward unity of a contour (Umriss), a frame, a framework

p. 79 Ge-stell of the Gestalt in the joining (Gefüge) of which “der Riss sich fügt

——rhetorical determination encounters its own possibility in the trait > trait not comprehended w/in set it makes possible

——retrait no more proper, literal, than figurative

——retrait not confused w/ words it makes possible, including French/English words crossed or grafted here

p. 80 retrait breaches/broaches/inscribes ontological difference itself

——retrait is plural, singularly plural [Nancy] in itself, divides itself, gathers up in withdrawal of withdrawal > elsewhere, Derrida called this pas

D p. 295 Derrida’s text: re-marks passage [in Soller’s], repeats square by closing angle, opens another surface of writing to-come: play w/ cardo, hinge, cardinal points; remarque dangle: all lines broken

p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

PPT p. 4 event makes a contract w/ itself at instant when singularity of trait divides, in order to link itself to play, chance & economy of language > set economy going by exposing it to chance

p. 5 the “interest,” the revenue of the surplus value, remains untranslatable in idiom’s economic performance, in ellipses of its trait, the word by word or trait for trait in which it contracts

pp. 5-6 Riss: opens above gulf, holds together opposite edges [is Derrida’s trait the same?]

pp. 7-8 essential parasitizing opens every system to its outside, divides unity of the line (trait) purported to mark the system’s edges

——trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

p. 11 trait is never common, never even one, w/ & w/out itself, its divisibility founds texts, traces, remains

——in [classical] discourses on painting, trait always determined as opposition-slash > what happens before difference becomes opposition? becoming always been a concept of determinate opposition

p. 11 trait never appears, never itself—contracts in its retreat? marks the difference of form/content of the appearing

——lentame of the origin: opens, w/ trace, w/out initiating anything

p. 12 le trait il sy attire et sy passe, de lui-même: situated, situates, btwn visible edging (la bordure visible) and phantom in center—from which we fascinate

+R p. 155 trait for trait—each stands for all the others: by this fact, never chance left for equivalence

p. 163 rigor/joyous severity of trait, petrifying (médusante) impassivity of line > disjunction works on any equality, unhinges, interrupts, truncates > “integrity in dispersion”

p. 167 force of trait (disjointed forms a work): systasis of powerful ligatures holds, binds, disjecta membra, ladder is a scaffold, a synonym of POTENCE, garroted, bound (pillars, columns, frames, capitals)

C C p. 193 Riss/Zug & Geflecht > Heidegger

pp. 191-92 [re: 127 coffin drawings in drawers] glossary tire, tirer, tiroir, tirage [draw, to draw, drawer, drawing (attracting)] (also à la tire of the pickpocket), leads to that of idiomatic trait, to duction or even “ductus” > one recognizes a draftsman even before he signs his name

——seduction/attraction of a drawer, seduce the haunting of a cenotaph

p. 238 contingent can do w/out discourse, a masterpiece can’t do w/out a cartouche (on the market & in itself: if you insist on this distinction) > even when the cartouche remains, is defunct: pas de cartouche, plus de cartouche > what will have been able to do w/out it? never touched, aussi impassible et invulnérable quaux harcèlements du trait: cest peut-être quil était déjà dans la tombe, le cartouche

AD AD p. 104 God, one “who loves the stranger” excessively so, excess like the non-reciprocity decided in death, the trait or stroke, the hyphen (trait dunion) of adieu: beyond being, where he might not pardon me, or elect me

LG LG pp. 227-28 trait that marks membership (lappartenance) divides > boundary (bordure) of set comes to form by invagination—an internal pocket larger than the whole

——consequences of this division & overflowing (débordement) as singular as they are limitless (quillimitables)

pp. 228-29 trait common to classes should follow a code that determines belonging, an identifiable trait identical to itself > but, this trait qua mark always a priori remarkable

p. 230 trait (supplementary & distinctive), re-mark of belonging doesn’t belong, this sans > a blink of the eye, w/out which nothing would come to light

OG OG p. 209 (297-98) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

——trait is spacing itself, marks figures, works on surface of painting & time of music

SPEC SPEC p. 261 to account/read the athetic, Derrida unsatisfied w/ dérive (drifting), too continuous/homogenous movement, travels away w/out saccade > prefers double bind, des effondrements de bord, la rive se partage en son trait même

p. 357 all these silences by which a trace works on a text, not indivisible simplicity of limes or marginal trait (S is P, “this has [not] been thought”)—rather: the non-thematized, implicit, mode of foreclosure, disavowal

p. 372 variation-of-the-trait-in-relation-to-the-object, not only the theme of Symposium but its performance, its condition

LITERATURE

GOD p. 110 possibility of literature announced, folded, in repli of fathomless secret [Gospel fold of Abrahamic], more Abrahamic than Greek, à se donner la mort à mort

p. 131 every text consigned to public space can become a literary object [Schreber]

——reader of literature hypnotized, paralyzed before suspended perplexity, before secret path of secret, exposed and concealed, jealously sealed: who says what to whom? who asks forgiveness?

——future of a perhaps in literature, a secret that perhaps might not be one

pp.132-33 “pardon for not meaning (to say),” secretless secret of literature, scene of forgiveness, its being “up in the air” keeps it secret, announces literature

——forgiveness as im-possible, experience of this impossibility is received differently

——the phrase [“pardon for…”] is “up in the air”: an appearance that comes from who knows where, contingency (touch, tact, contact), & pertinent (touching, tact, contact) > dwells suspended in air, even when it touches, meteoric, suspended like Abraham’s knife over Isaac’s head

p. 134 filiation of impossible filiations: Kafka & Abraham, their spectral fathers, in scene of forgiveness, literature & secrecy

p. 138 father accuses literary writing of parasitism, the son should have worked instead of written [pharmakon, meteor]

p. 140 fabled reader (deciphers) vs. infinite reader (sees in the secret the avowal of literature)

p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

——w/ no witness, can only come down to us in the trace of an inheritance

p. 153 after the flood, God reminds himself of the promise of the covenant, in the meteoric [trace] of a rainbow, that is, not merely in spontaneous, living, autoaffective memory [Derrida here showing literature’s relation to Jewish God]

p. 154 literature desacralizes the world like Abraham’s sacrifice [in the name of a secret w/out content]

***p 156 literature, w/ its right to say & hide everything, inseparable from a democracy to come

——singularity is sealed & betrayed by inheritance that confirms, reads, translates the covenant; literature inherits from Abraham, betrays him > secularization of holy revelation?

——literature as inheritance of promise of betrayal, w/ the forswearing [Kafka’s Letter to Father] that haunts this oath?

p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (loeuvre)

——properly phenomenological virtue of literature: puts thesis or arrest in quotations (parentheses) > literature’s relation to non-literary, religious remainder (Abrahamic moment), betrays in double sense of word: unfaithful to its history at moment it uncovers that history’s secret, reveals its “truth” (i.e. its [literature’s] own filiation) > literature must ask forgiveness for this double betrayal

——asks forgiveness as from the very first word

GT p. 86 “Counterfeit Money”: title of all fiction

p. 94 reader is not deceived [like narrator], experiences a secret w/out depth, a secret w/out secret

p. 97 Baudelaire’s “Counterfeit Money,” its play w/ title, links literature to belief, credit, thus capital, economy, politics

——a “true” corpus is still, perhaps, counterfeit money, may be ghost or spirit, spirit of body & of capital (title, heading, is capital), no problem of canon if this institution were natural

pp. 101-02 writing subject does not have to be giving subject; subject as such: bordered, posed, identified, always calculates, reappropriates surplus-value, circular return, a certain capitalization

——despite labor of subject, production of surplus-value, gift takes place where there’s trace, dissemination, in excessive forgetting, forgetful excess of the gift

pp. 102-105 whole economy of narrative [“Counterfeit Money”] proceeds from a remainder, change returned, return of an unproductive expenditure [capitalizes?]

p. 110 literature & its relation to capital, city, polis, transformation of monetary forms [late capitalism] (dematerializaiton of money & all the scenes that depend on it)

pp. 150-51 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

——literature as place of non-place of frame, triptych w/ dislocated frame, 3 + or – excluded 4th, all positions exchangeable to infinite, an ex-propriation that forbids a return to self, most powerful or interesting speculation

——readers are at once debtors & creditors, like the narrator, we are the beggar, the 3rd party excluded from the secret of the dual scene

pp. 152-3 readability of text structured by unreadability of secret, narrator in situation analogous to reader; crypt gives to be read, eternally unreadable

——[no depth beyond literary phenomenon] inviolability of secret depends on essential superficiality, bare device of being-two-to-speak (lêtre-deux-à-parler), a secret beyond reserve of technique, thing, being, thing thought (same could be said for money)

pp. 169-70 Baudelaire inscribes a naturalization in institution called literature, narrator occupies place of nature; via simulacrum, narrative resembles birth of literature

***p. 170 secret of literature has no depth, no interiority, spread on the surface of the page, non-psychological structure, not subjective though responsible for most radical effects of subjectivity, a post card, a bank note, a “letter of credit” [see LOBL p. ~101, &

SUBJECTILE

]

MONL p. 66 most authoritarian cultural clichés = indefatigable generation of the literary superego

R p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature

FL p. 257 justice is all fields: literary, ethical, etc.

MC p. 344 “psychoanalysis,” “literature”—proper names that point to historical, singular events or series of events; p. 345 it is not certain such “worlds” exist

p. 360 privilege of literature: its proper name is a place of chance

p. 373 not that all fiction, all inscription of proper names has literary dimension, but they arise in a place where limits are never real, never immobile, never solidonly the effects of contextual isolation > pragrammatological (intersection of pragmatics & grammatology)

***p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

——this large, stereotomic margin of play is perhaps largest of all (during certain history) but not infinite [?] [see also Christianity/Capitalism not infinite]

H p. 49 literature is self-censoring, requires “competence”

p. 139 through philosophy and literature we interrogate our language

AF p. 40 juridical fiction produces continuity of fiction

***POO pp. 28-9 Derrida does not like literature for its own sake, for some pleasure, or aesthetic, but for the secret, the passion of the secret, the secret of the passion > in place of the secret only remainder remains, not even literature.

——literature: right to say everything, w/out ever touching the secret

——each time literary work is censured, democracy is in danger

——literature’s authorization to say everything acknowledges right to absolute nonresponse

——this nonresponse is hyperbolic condition of democracy (democracy to-come) contradicts historically limited democracy where calculable subject has to tell truth, has to reveal secret before the law (doctors, confession, psychoanalyst, lawyer, national defense)

p. 143n literary is only exemplary of what happens everywhere

p. 144n identifiable institutions stabilize, arrest turbulence, master, order, to be able to make decisions, to be able > literature is exemplary in the face of this, it always does something other, something other than itself: for example: philosophy (literature & philosophy)

——literature’s exemplarity: secret in tact, modesty more jealous than ever

BL p. 185 juridical fiction: “legal personality of the text”

pp. 185-86 instability of of the judicial events, the positive law, re: literature, re: several or singular authors > these problems arise in every historical modulation

p. 187 no such thing as literary essence, name literature destined to remain improper: has something to do w/ drama of name, law of name, name of law

p. 191 does law share the conditions of its possibility w/ the literary object?

p. 199 origin of literature at same time as origin of law; story of prohibition (law) is a prohibited story

p. 207 knowing neither who nor what is the law: literature begins

p. 209 semantic contents of philosophy could never explain the “literary” of this story w/out story [re: Kafka’s “Before the Law”]

pp. 213 what differs in each literature is framing and reference

——literature: perturbs referentiality while revealing essential structure of referentiality

——literature: when the singular crosses the universal [Hegelian?], when the categorical engages the idiomatic

——generic distinction of form/content in literature: form is signifying expression, phenomena of language or rhetoric [don’t confuse form w/ framing]

pp. 214-15 that which makes literature possible is outside literature

——different periods of history of positive law give substance to literature, value of signatures [“authors”]

p. 215 all watchmen (critics, academics, literary theorists, writers, and philosophers), who guard positive laws, value of signatures, & identity of corpora, receive same answer in their appeal to the law: differance > plus de loi et plus de littérature

——overflowing of literature, literariness does not belong to literature

——work, opus, does not belong to field, transforms it

p. 216 literature as subversive juridicity

——literature makes law, power of performativity—sidestep existing laws which condition its emergence (jouer la loi [play, deceive the law])

SICL pp. 40-1 literature is not Greek-poetry: relation to a specific juridico-politico guarantee

HASD p. 23 to doubt divine promise, transgress the injunction [of hyperessential, negative theological God], would be to see an opening (closing in on itself) of literariness, lawless law of fiction

MPM p. 136 de Man: “deconstruction of metaphysics” is impossible because in being rhetorical (btwn trope & persuasion) it is literary (doesn’t resolve relation btwn literature & philosophy)

EM pp. 132-33n (159-60n) Heidegger: written form exerts wholesome pressure, present world crisis needs less philosophy, more thinking, less literature, we must liberate Dichtung from literature

PP pp. 158-59 the 3 eras of “Platonism” (Plato, Saussure, and Rousseau), which put writing out of question while borrowing from it all its demonstrative/theoretical resources, must comes to term w/: 1) generalized sort of writing 2) a “contradiction”: written proposal of logocentrism 3) construction of “literary” work

SH p. 48 philosophy finds itself in vicinity of poetic, of literature, the blurred border (no place, utopia) btwn empirical (contingency of the outer) and necessary (necessity of inner) > indecision of this limit most provokes thought [Derrida attacks the idea that philosophy loses itself there]

p. 58 poetry, literature, art, experience of the mask, an intense familiarity w/ ineluctable originarity of specter = ineluctable loss of origin > spectral errancy of words not an accident

FWT p. 127 literature transforms/displaces status of public space, affects w/ irreducible novelty > transforms public space w/in, amidst, like “new technologies” of communication/reproduction

——literature is the [an-]institution of absolute candor & freedom, under no positive law, mutation in concept of responsibility

p. 127 by inventing/violating modality of as if, revealing its infinity, literature endlessly opens up to historicity of political, w/ certain concept of democracy-to-come

as if an increased responsibility in absolute freedom of literature, a certain mode of address

p. 128 beyond good and evil: only country of literature

p. 129 we should only censor when something is not literature [?]

p. 130 common possibilities of literature & democracy: 1) historicity (literature has acts, birthplaces, legacies; democracy defines itself by promising itself, by and in its historicity, its future-to-come) 2) power, credit of fiction [Montaigne/Pascal understood connection btwn right & fiction]

p. 131 literature a recent invention, threatened by death, repeats its birth beginning from its end, from a finitude that is its resource & essential specter

POOF pp. 302-03 via Deguy, is literature [linked to democracy, which has no unconditional virtue] the very thing which remains intolerable to the geopolitical process of a becoming-worldwide (mondialité)? > absolute theologization qua absolute politicization

DS p. 177 double session finds its corner (coin) BTWN (ENTRE) literature & truth (that by which question “what is?” wants answering): figure of folding back, angle ensured by fold

p. 223 literature voids itself in its limitlessness

p. 235n Mallarmé: beyond is literature’s [?] agent, dismantle literary mechanism to display nothing

pp. 236-37 literary criticism, linked to possibility of decidability, to krinein, goes into crisis > Cris de vers

p. 245 “literary criticism” —ontological interpretation of mimesis? krinein proceeds precisely from out of that which is being threatened by the re-tempering (retrempe) of literature

pp. 279-80(n) [quoting Mallarmé] rhythm, literary game par excellence: mimic suspense/laughter—rhythmic cadence, or case, all the falls, the silent fall of pen

p. 285 the crisis of literature takes place when nothing takes place (a lieu) but the place > instance where no one is there to know

POS pp. 10-1 Heidegger’s phonologism, privileging of poem over literature

p. 71 Derrida’s texts belong neither to “philosophical” nor “literary” register, communicate w/ other texts that can be called “philosophical” or “literary” acc. a kind of paleonomy

ROP p. 24 Bartleby as figure of death, as secret of literature, makes narrator (man of law) talk

FS p. 5 [metaphor of structuralism]: a city no longer inhabited, reduced to its skeleton, haunted by meaning & culture > cette hantise is the mode (absent/present) of thing itself in pure language (housed in pure literature)

O p. 54 adventurous excess of writing not improv., throw of dice doesn’t contradict rigorous necessity of its “formal assemblage”: unity of chance & rule, program and its leftovers or extra (son reste ou de son surplus) [literature or book: atheistic face of this play, conflagration achieved, final clause located sur la tranche du livre fermé]

p. 56 literature is beyond of everything: author would have to disappear along w/ literature

——literature is the exception in the whole and the exception to everything (lexception de tout) (subtraction w/out lack), part (pièce) which exists by itself [solitude], marks le tout autre

pp. 57-8 is pleasure literary in essence? if Vorlust, foreplay, prime (bonus) of seduction, formal moment of literature, ne se comble quà la fin du plaisir, then jouissance would be instance of seduction, prime supplémentaire de rien dautre: pleasure a formal, threshold phenomena, nul et sans fins, a repression lifted & maintained > graphics of hymen questions all couples, all oppositions (especially those of Freud)

DPi p. 30 literature (past 3/4 centuries) coincides w/ abolitionist thought > risky hypothesis

pp. 34-5 time of bandages: when body not found—when Jesus is not dead but not yet elevated, resuscitated > the lodging made ready for literature: ascension w/out ascension, elevation w/out elevation, immanence w/out immanence, imminent yet unaccomplished resurrection

——moment before noli me tangere [p. 35n unique moment, since Jesus is generally a touching Jesus], moment where mourning can’t set to work, there’s no corpse > when Mary and Antigone weep over absence of burial

p. 37 instant of bandages, Christ’s being-there w/out being-there: this Dasein that is not a Da-sein, this Fort/Da-sein of Christ who’s dead but not dead, mort vivant

p. 102 Hugo (conscious of historical responsibility of writer/literature): writers of 18th century destroyed torture; writers of 19th century will destroy DP; p. 104 destroy it w/ divine hammer of pen > profoundly Christian stance, btwn profound flourish & faith, for intérieur

p. 105-06 for Hugo, responsibility, sacred right of writer—cosmopolitical

——writer’s right a right that gives the right to go beyond rights, “civil disobedience”; for Hugo, DP too human, abolition is divine law

***p. 108 [vis-à-vis Hugo] border line of right to literature divides a good & bad Christianity

pp. 111-12 Blanchot: literature is Terror in that its being is where “life bears death and maintains itself in death itself” [quotation from Hegel]

p. 113(n) for Blanchot, literature is revolutionary on the side of death; for Hugo, on the side of life

——Blanchot: “any writer who, by the very fact of writing, is not induced to think: I am the revolution, only freedom makes me write, is not really writing”

p. 114 Blanchot’s “literature as right to death” is not against DP, literature as last act, last judgment, theater of cruelty, both eschatological & apocalyptic

p. 117 Blanchot’s right to death: right to give it, giving it to oneself (en se la donnant), inflicting DP; right to accede to death (not natural) by exceeding natural life > both the right that gives birth to literature and the law that gives birth to the law itself: literature thinks this right of/to right

pp. 117-19 Derrida believes in correctness of interpreting Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to Death” as a terrorist, terrorizing thinking of literature > but: 1) literary language is contradictory 2) death is a principle of salvation/resurrection 3) dying becomes an impossibility

pp. 119-20 literature “expresses w/out expressing,” “this death w/out death” defines horizon w/out horizon of responsibility w/out responsibility of writer

——Blanchot: literature divided btwn 2 slopes, interminable “resifting (ressassement) of words”

Gii pp. 48-9 logo-phonocentrism in Heidegger: writing declines thought, escapes draft when it enters literature [Derrida briefly directs us to Heidegger’s meditation on chreōn, Brauch, necessity, logos]

TR pp. 82-3 possible fiction, mēkhanē of a dramaturgy, supplement of fiction, inscribe in the archive of a new, quasi-literary genre (confessions) > palimpsestuous [insect/incest], encrypted lineage

——confession (a veracity of testimony) never makes concessions to lies of literature

EJQB p. 78 books are always books of life, or of afterlife > written questions addressed to literature are forgotten, drained, by literature (mortifications, ruses of life, life negating itself in literature to survive): writing would die of pure vigilance to question (and also simple erasure of question)

——absolute interrogation (of God) will never belong to the book

——to write: to confuse ontology & grammar; grammar: in which are inscribed all dislocations of dead syntax, all aggressions perpetrated by speech against language, every questioning of the letter

——all these tortures are forgotten in literature, as mortifications, as ruses of life

——life negates itself in literature only so it may survive better—be better

——pure literature is nonliterature or death

——literature, perhaps: dreamlike displacement of the question

PJP p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

pp. 191-92 narrative of a disappearance: signature gets erased moment it enters literature [like question in EJQB]

D p. 292 no one can enter Soller’s Numbers who thinks literature/thought ought to exorcise the machine (that the 2 have nothing to do w/ each other)

LI p. 84 did Derrida make seriousness of philosophical discourse skid towards literary play [parasitizing Descartes’ title in SEC]? unless seriousness were already the para-site of such play

p. 134 laws, in their normality, entail something fictional, depend on some structural power that allows fictions, lies, to take place: thus importance of studying literature to understand law

LG p. 229 all texts left open, eternally remarkable—possibility of becoming literature

p. 252 lépreuve of a récit brought to light the madness of genre—spinning (faire tourner) Peterson’s genre-disc, comme un soleil fou > dividing borders btwn literature and its others

——“this is the whole of it,” only what “I” see, kneeling [à genoux] at edge of literature, “le loi en somme, ce que je voit et que je dit que je vois en un récit où je/nous somme

BSi pp. 156-57 acc. Deleuze, “best” literature, not pseudo-literature, not philosophy, lets itself be haunted by bêtise

IF pp. 312-13 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] as paradoxical as it sounds, Hegel frees passage for literature or writing called Art > having reached its end, one can discredit philosophy by treating it as art

UWC p. 208 Derrida links new concept of humanities [a deconstructive one] w/ democratic institution called literature, to a certain simulacrum, a certain “as if”

p. 228 fiction is what figures but also what makes

p. 232 “literature,” its link to performative force of “as if,” to the right to say everything (or not to say everything), which founds both democracy & unconditional sovereignty claimed by Humanities

CIR p. 78 desire for literature is circumcision, text read does not suffice, has to be eaten, sucked

pp. 306-08 nervous, worried, hunted, literature (beast playing dead, melding w/ foliage), delivering to world impregnable inedible simulacrum, the theory of the parasite virus, terrorizing others w/ instability he carries everywhere, one book open in the other

EU p. 115 Derrida’s 1st thesis title: The Ideality of the Literary Object > Derrida tells Hyppolite: if I saw where I was going, I wouldn’t take another step

SPEC pp. 261-62 Beyond… is a-thetic, no (final) judgment, indefinite suspension re: life death > death drive appears/disappears while telling stories, making scenes: myths, fables (literary)

p. 343 “literary fiction” in fort:da, fait-oeuvre in abyss of these repetitions, fairies, demons, unheimlich repetitions, what is most gripping (saisissant) and ungraspable (insaisissable) about Beyond…, for Freud too, who believed he could affix the seal of the Freuds to it [Beyond…] while hearing voices

p. 344 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] speculating, “author” already no longer there, no longer responsible, leaves document in your hands > “literary”: make of it what you will, it’s up to you—you’re more than ever on board

p. 345 no theses in science or literature (athetic), every thesis is philosophical

FV p. 419 literature that puts truth on stage, can it be read by psychoanalysis? abyssal structure, this space overflowed by powers of simulacrum

p. 420 in France, “literary criticism” marked by psychoanalysis has not asked question of the text

pp. 426-27 even Freud [thus not Lacan] indicates, in Das Unheimliche, literary fiction’s resistance to general law of psychoanalytic knowledge

pp. 494-95 signer dispossessed [re: The Purloined…], signature in quotations: ce reste est encore de la littérature

LOBBY [fixerup]

FWT pp. 117-18 treat word “lobby” w/ caution we would treat a toxic substance

LOGIC [fixerup]

KH p. 100 “according to Hegel…and we are thinking after Hegel and according to him, following his thought” [philosophy only becomes serious after sublating mythic form, i.e. when it becomes logical]

——silhouette of a “logic,” impossible to formalize, is this “bastard” logos [outside logic of noncontradiction] mythos? [re: khōra]

p. 106 Derrida less concerned w/ art of Plato [re: mises en abyme of khōra and politics] but in a constraint, a programme, the being-programme of the programme, the being-logical of logic: Plato apprehends them as such, though in a dream, put en abyme

***A p. 70 Heidegger pays no attention to logical form of contradiction (most proper possibility as possibility of an impossibility) > treats it as a condition of truth, its very unveiling (truth no longer measured in logical form of judgment)

VM p. 91 Levinas calls the community of Platonic light, logic of noncontradiction, “formal logic”

p. 95 or Levinas, encounter w/ other, separation, rupture (brisure) of “formal logic”

PP pp. 103-04 what if pharmakon, writing, produced/opened up possibility of dualities that it itself cannot be comprehended by, leaving only its ghost to a logic seeking to govern it, folds one beyond logic, ghost leaves nothing (since truth, living flesh and reality are ghosts too, now)

p. 149 soul-inscription, inscription of truth in soul, uses a metaphor [Plato admits it] that philosophy will never be able to do w/out, must borrow from simulacrum; metaphoricity is logic of contamination, contamination of logic

VP p. 7 Husserl determines logos on basis of logic, giving logicity the normalcy of logos telos, the telos of being as presence; this requires distinction btwn pure logic or “pure logical grammar” and pure grammar [logic before language]

S p. 68 can one speak of “logic” in region of originarity of language (le langage), of a given language (langue)?

IW p. 256 channeling Cohen, logos is the région where symptom can be true, logos speaks of itself; to speak of logic, of objective knowledge, in opposition to logos, is to speak of nothing but its “logical” manifestation: perhaps there is a “meta-logic,” but not a meta-logos

p. 257 syllogism: being by & w/ itself of logos, rassemble et se rassemble > to speak of itself

LI p. 119 alogical logic of iterability: it’s an ideal concept, but also the one that marks essential & ideal limit of all pure idealization > not the concept of nonideality

LOGO-PHONOCENTRISM

HERP p. 187 logocentrism: not so much logos as the center but logos as Versammlung, the gathering that concenters what it configures [i.e. Being]

PP pp. 158-59 the 3 eras of “Platonism” (Plato, Saussure, and Rousseau), which put writing out of question while borrowing from it all its demonstrative/theoretical resources, must comes to term w/: 1) generalized sort of writing 2) a “contradiction”: written proposal of logocentrism 3) construction of “literary” work

OH p. 125n via Valéry, originary & transcategorical character of spirit, original spiritualism a logocentrism born in Mediterranean

pp. 125-26n Valéry: the word “spirit” > first commerce of the world [logocentrism]

FSW p. 196 repression of writing since Plato constitutes philosophy as epistēmē: truth as unity of logos and phonē > deconstruction of logocentrism not psychoanalysis of philosophy

p. 197 logo-phonocentrism is necessary and necessarily finite > history of the possibility of symbolism

——repression of writing, the writing interior to speech contained outside it, repression of that which threatens presence > mastering of absence

——why Derrida hesitates to utilize Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts: belong to history of metaphysics, logocentric repression which excludes written trace, calls it servile, excrement

p. 230 for Freud, erasure of trace, as movement of pure auto-affection, temporalization, makes repression “itself” possible, escapes binarism and makes binarism possible on basis of nothing > useful to deconstruct logocentrism and to exercise at different levels of writing in general

***PPHS p. 75 in Peri Hermeneias [Aristotle spells out logo-phonocentrism]: spoken words (ta en tēi phōnēi) are symbols of mental experiences, written words are symbols of spoken words, mental experiences are the same for all

pp. 75-6 Saussure places semiology under jurisdiction of psychology [repeats Aristotle’s logo-phonocentrism]

pp. 93-4 teleological concept of sound [in Hegel]: logocentrism

p. 94 [list of phono-logocentrists]: Saussure, Rousseau, Plato, Hegel [they all treated writing as accessory question]

p. 95 acc. Hegel, phonetic alphabet most open to infinite development of tradition, most historic element of culture

FWT p. 63 treatment of animal: logocentrism > proffered the discourse of hegemony: of mastery

P p. 22 asking what art means, the vouloir-dire of art, tautology w/out reserve, logocentrism of question “What is art?”—teleology & hierarchy prescribed in envelope of this question

POS pp. 10-1 Heidegger’s phonologism, privileging of poem over literature

pp. 12-3 Derrida never attempted to oppose graphocentrism to logocentrism, OG not a mystification of writing’s value; OG proposes question/limits of science of writing

pp. 24-5 logo-phonocentrism’s reduction/erasure of writing, more the effect of an axiological/ethical experience of the practice of the alphabet than the practice itself [re: Saussure]

pp. 34-5 grammatology must liberate mathematization of language (which phonocentrism has always critiqued, for limiting that which links logos to phonē), but must be wary of Leibniz’s type of unifying, simple, mathematical language, which appeals to divine logos

p. 35-6 grammatology must ceaselessly deconstruct everything that ties concepts/norms of scientificity to ontotheology, phono-logocentrism, must transgress w/out falling back into prescientific empiricism, it must affirm wherever science exceeds logocentric closure > grammatology inscribes and delimits science, marks/loosens limit closing classical scientificity

p. 49 Derrida’s suspicion of “thought,” that it means nothing, that it is logocentric > substantified void of highly derivative ideality [Deleuze’s moral image of thought]

p. 50 Derrida associates linearism [of history] w/ logo-phonocentrism, semantism, idealism

p. 51 re: logocentrism, a powerful historical/systematic unity must be determined first, instead of taking dross for gold once a rupture is allegedly delineated > logocentrism is matrix of idealism, dismantling logocentrism deconstitutes all variants of idealism/spiritualism > logocentrism wider concept than idealism & phonocentrism [did Derrida change his mind? see BSi p. 348]

pp. 64-5 realism, sensualism, “empiricism” are modifications of logocentrism > and “materialism” is often invested w/ ideas of reality, presence, plenitude, content

p. 82 signifier exceeding signified still maintains logocentrism (stuck in phase of overturning hierarchy, not beyond opposition)

ROP pp. 61-2 everyone, Ponge, Blanchot, Lacan tried to replace speech w/ writing after Derrida, to replace phoneme w/ grapheme is overcompensatory > trace, gramme, differance no more graphic than phonematic

O p. 4 idealist, spiritualist, phoncentrist: first and foremost logocentric (traditional, hierarchical opposition btwn speech & writing)

p. 15 in Hegelian concept of method, self-presentation of concept (lêtre auprès de soi du logos absolu) is true pre-face, essential pre-dicate of all writing

p. 48 concept > engenderer & consumer (jouissant) of itself, relève its preface, plunges (senfonce) into itself > conception of concept an autoinsemination

——return of theological seed to itself, dispersion working for profit of Idea, exclusion as inclusion [not Hegel’s Jew?] > la vérité qui se parle dans le cercle logocentrique, cest le discours de ce qui revient au père

pp. 48-9n la logique (est) de ce qui revient au père (mortplus que jamais) comme à la loi et au logos: la relève elle même > elle est vraie et elle constitue la vérité du logocentrisme > signifier sublated in process of meaning > [Derrida links Freud’s “only one” libido (masculine) to the rightness of reason]

***DPi p. 23 but will history/horizon resist deconstruction of scaffolding of these scaffolds? scaffolding as construction/architecture to be deconstructed, the speculation, calculation, market (speculative idealism) that provides its supports; deconstruction of carno-phallogocentrism always deconstruction of DP’s historical scaffolding > history as scaffolding of this scaffold

CHM p. 41 classical reason a doctrine of tradition, the tradition of logos (is there another tradition?)

p. 61 in historicity in general, finite thought only possible by making a mockery, humiliating the madman w/in us, the fool a logos who is father, master, king

Gii pp. 46-7 writing is hand-writing in its essence, makes word manifest, monstre; co-belonging of hand & speech: ability to produce monstres that disclose concealment [still a phono-logocentrism, but one where handwriting is immediately bound to speech]

p. 48 acc. Heidegger, Socrates is purest thinker of West, wrote nothing, placed himself in the draft—withdrawing movement, in Zug (pull) of withdrawal (des Entziehens)

pp. 48-9 logo-phonocentrism in Heidegger: writing declines thought, escapes draft when it enters literature [Derrida briefly directs us to Heidegger’s meditation on chreōn, Brauch, necessity, logos]

WAP p. 104 logic that makes language a transparent medium, an extrinsic accident, which makes the linguistic secondary: is, paradoxically, a logocentric position

IW pp. 263-64 [vis-à-vis Cohen] Judeo-Protestant Platonism or world logocentrism made spiritual families possible, genealogy w/out limit, general economy (oikonomia, oikos as the law itself) > spiritual mondialisation: logos, spirit, idealism as moral conscience of philosophy & science

p. 264 [theatricalization of mondialisation via Cohen] greatest violence, logocentric psychosis [Derrida ends paragraph: “end of fable, or truth of truth”] [Nietzsche’s “History of an Error”]

+R pp. 173-74 this [chromatic] tr, which works inside & outside language, is not logocentrism, not a consecration of analogy, not a hypercratylean theory of language: what’s at stake is violence & the arbitrary > it breaches (fraye) an entirely different body

LI p. 104 that the dependency-relation of writing to speech is different “in mathematical & logical symbolism” is essential argument for Derrida re: deconstruction of phono-logocentrism

E p. 19 for Kant, hearing is closest to freedom and spontaneity, one must use term hearing-oneself-speak (le sentendre-parler) because the structure is auto-affective; the mute thus do not have reason, the mouth (indissociable from ear) is not simply an analogy of expression: it is the ground of analogy, regulates analogy, it is logos itself [necessary]

p. 20 for Kant, hearing (w/ its allergy to prosthesis) distinguished from sight by its auto-affective structure, an internal sense, its “form” is time > not an anthropological but a psychological space

p. 21 logo-phonocentric system doesn’t exclude a negative, negative is its business, it’s work, it excludes what can’t be digested, represented, eaten, irreducible heterogeneity: vomit

p. 25 w/in logocentric system (w/in the name), one simply can’t name what’s outside it, to say it would be to eat it—or, what is no longer absolutely different—to vomit it

***WOG p. 27 deconstruction of logocentrism never more misunderstood than when seen as theory of language

BSi p. 318 Heidegger asks how logos became Herrschaft (sovereign, master) over Being

***pp. 338-39 the (mis)translation of logos brings w/ it the whole of culture; whole force of history at work to produce this translation [logos as Christ] > whole of history at play in motif of beast & sovereign and their relation to zoōn: “there are no limits, no frontiers that can contain these issues of translation”

p. 343 logocentrism: forced hegemony of logos as speech, a “European” operation, logocentrism of Abrahamic languages > everything organized based on forced translations

p. 347 acc. Aristotle, phonē (which animals also have) does not suffice to define logos

***p. 348 phonocentrism, authority of the vocal, is universal: hegemony of logocentrism is not

EU pp. 118-19 the existence of constraints [re: devaluation of writing] practiced at the price of contradictions, denials, dogmatic decrees > Derrida didn’t study these constraints w/in a limited topos of culture/ontology, he proposed their nonclosed, fissured system: logocentrism (as found in Western philosophy) and phonocentrism (in its widest scope)

p. 121 universitas has essential tie w/ logocentric, onto-encyclopedic system

p. 124 phallocentrism & logocentrism (essentially indissociable) wherever I could spot them > everywhere, even where unnoticed

FV pp. 462-63 Lacan’s emphasis on logos as phonē, writing relevé by voice, phonetic fact is only a fact w/in limits of “phonetic” systems of writing (beyond relation of de facto to de jure, Derrida interested in Lacan’s implied equivalence btwn symbolic articulation & phonematicity)

——non-phonetic field’s enormity no longer needs to be demonstrated

p. 478n Lacan integrates Freudian phallocentrism w/ phonocentric Saussurian semio-linguistics

LOGO-PHONOCENTRISM in OF GRAMMATOLOGY

OG p. 3 (11-2) logocentrism as most powerful ethnocentrism: the metaphysics of phonetic writing

——history of metaphysics as history of truth, as the truth of truth, the debasement of writing, its repression outside (hors) of “full (pleine)” speech

***pp. 7-8 (17) privilege of phonè necessary moment of economy (of “life,” of “history,” of “être comme rapport à soi”), not historical contingency: not a choice that could have been avoided

——system of “hearing (understanding) -oneself-speak,” of the so-called noncontingent signifier, organizes: difference btwn worldy/non-worldly, outside/inside, ideality/nonideality, universal/nonuniversal, transcendental/empirical, etc. > dominated history of world during entire epoch

——writing as secondary, as technique: a translator of a full speech present to itself, its signified, its other

pp. 9-10 (20) ideality of math, graphie, already questions “signifiant sensible,” never been absolutely linked to a phonetic production

p. 11 Aristotle’s phono-logocentrism: voice, spoken symbols, immediately proximate to the universal language of mental experience (pathēmata tes psychēs), closest to the thing, the signified

——logocentrism is also phonocentrism

p. 12 Hegel privileges sound (speech, voice), because it is a hearing of an interior vibration

——voice, phonè, sentendre-parler, saffecte lui-même (hearing-oneself-speak, affecting oneself), ideality

——phonocentrism se confond (merges) w/ onto-theology, produces these subdeterminations of presence: sight as eidos, substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as point (stigmè) of now (nun), consciousness, cogito, subjectivity, co-presence of other & self…

pp. 14-5 (26-7) signified–immediate; signifier–mediate (exterior)

——writing as metaphoricity itself: a simulated immediacy; w/in logocentrism: bad writing is finite, artificial, sensible; good writing is infinite, soul-writing, Book of God (natural)

pp. 30-1 (46) Saussure’s (Aristotle’s) phonocentrism: voixstate of soul; writing—symbols of voix

——one should call this a model, and not a structure, of a certain kind of writing: it does not function perfectly, but there’s an ideal directing a function ([thus] never completely phonetic)

——factum of phonetic writing commands our entire culture/science, not one fact among others > still, does not respond to a necessity of an absolute/universal essence

pp. 33-4 (50-1) if writing is mere “figuration” of language—it is exiled, cast outside, a double > unrelated to interior of the system: “internal system” is an epistemological exigency constituted by possibility of phonetic writing

p. 40 (59-60) for Saussure & Husserl, teleology of phonetic writing makes the crisis of nonphonetic writing psychological errors, these nonintutionisms exile from sense; for Husserl, unlike Saussure, empty formalism part of his teleology > dialectical use of negativity should force us to rethink crisis (crisis not a mere accident)

p. 71 (104) logos as sublimation of trace is theological from Plato to infinitist metaphysics: logocentrism…parousia, life w/out differance (name of God as name of indifference)

p. 72 (105) linearism, what Heidegger calls “vulgar concept of time,” inseparable form phonologism

pp. 76-80 [see

LEIBNIZ

for logocentrism of universal characteristic despite its non-phonocentrism]

p. 82 “logocentric teleology” is a pleonasm

pp. 88-9 impossibility of pure phoneticization, always already undermines mute signifier > distinction btwn phonetic/nonphonetic is legitimate & indispensable though derivative re: synergy & fundamental synesthesia

p. 89 parousia of voice, presence to self of logos w/in voice, absolute hearing-oneself-speak, is a function responding to an indestructible but relative necessity w/in system that encompasses it

pp. 90-1 Chinese has phonetic elements but not logocentric [?] [cf. BSi p. 348]

p. 91 heliocentric concept of speech, analogical system: king, father, sun, logos > [ethnocentrism of this concept: all other languages delayed logocentrism]

pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

pp. 92-3 phoneticization of writing: science, religion, politics, economy, monetary calculation

p. 99 (148) “structuralism” stuck in logocentrism, thinks it’s not

p. 102 (151) phonologism: exclusion of writing, authority accorded to human sciences

p. 103 for Lévi-Strauss, each “comme” and “de même” authorize analogy btwn phonology and sociology: phonology exemplary as the example in a series, not a regulative ideal

——linguistic and metaphysical phonologism

pp. 109-10 (161) [vis-à-vis Lévi-Strauss] ethnocentrism of “society w/out writing,” an innocent, nonviolent society > but, wherever proper names are obliterated, there’s writing

pp. 134-35 (195-96) w/out writing no violence, no hierarchy, no deception [Derrida affirming Lévi-Strauss beyond his logocentrism]

p. 120 via Lévi-Strauss, Saussurianism exposed as ethnocentrism thinking itself anti-ethnocentric

p. 121 still ethnocentric to think West is bad, that writing exploits

p. 167 (237) masturbation (“sexual” auto-affection) & writing totally indistinguishable inasmuch as each puts into play (met en jeu) the presence of the present, the life of the living [still, this totality is severely articulated and differentiated]

——logocentric longing par excellence is to distinguish the two

p. 212 when Rousseau accuses Rameau of ethnocentrism [for privileging harmonic orientation toward music], his privileging of presence (melody) is a symmetrical counter-ethnocentrism

pp. 285-86 (404-05) science, philosophy, epistémè, movement of idealization, privilege of logos is that of phonetic writing, of a more algebraic, economical writing (by reason of certain condition of knowledge): mondial effacement of signifier > one believes one is exalting parole, when in fact, one is fascinated by a figure of technè

——phonic auto-affection permits the epoch of man, epoch not of history but as history: greatest possible mastery, liberty, self-presence of life

——[in spite of Hegel’s follies, Derrida here affirms that concept of history is a concept of philosophy, that history is the history of philosophy]

——Hegel’s (folly) formula must be taken à la lettre: history is nothing but the history of philosophy, absolute knowledge is fulfilled (accompli) > what exceeds this closure is nothing, neither presence of being, nor meaning, history, philosophy—but [this nothing, writing] announces itself w/in thought of this closure, a place in the text which philosophy does not command

pp. 286-87 (406) the epoch of truth, what Nietzsche calls abbreviation of signs [retreat of signifier?] [Derrida defends Nietzsche against reading that restores truth, fundamental ontology, in Nietzsche’s thought] [Heidegger’s reading?]

pp. 288-89 surface of page distributes itself differently depending on whether one is reading or writing (writing sensible/ reading intelligible > but, opposition disqualified: it’s impossible to purely separate writing/reading), coordination of hand/eye > that phoné must see itself, handle itself, in temporal linearity, this is only one way of speech [i.e. ethnocentric universalism]

——[Derrida is questioning very space of page, its determination by movement of hand, linearity, wonders about abandonment of boustrophedon, turning of the ox, writing by furrows > linear, phonographic techniques homogenize space—age of transaction?] [baby daddy]

LOGOS

KH p. 127 organicist motif, well-composed logos must look like a living body, found in Phaedrus, Timaeus

GT pp. 159-60n Heidegger on gift, Heidegger discovers an etymology of khreon that links it to hand, to reaching for, also links it to logos > Derrida wonders about credit cards, coded signatures

——also to khreon as presencing of what is present (das Anwesen des Anwesenden)

H p. 5 unbearable question, parricide question, threatens dogmatism of paternal logos

OOG p. 147 Logos (always has form of a Telos) is not the real transcendence but the ideal Pole for bringing about transcendental subjectivity itself

p. 148 [like Hegel like Husserl] Logos is the pure movement of its own historicity, goes beyond “Fact” as the “ready-made” of history

p. 149 for Husserl, there’s nothing outside pure historicity of passage of Speech, “Logos and the Telos are nothing outside the interplay (Wechselspiel) of their reciprocal inspiration” > Absolute is Passage

HERP p. 172 Heidegger critiques or enacts “destruction” of Aristotle’s broken theory of logos as judgment, but remains Aristotelian when saying only Dasein can have a friend—animal has no ear

p. 181 for Heidegger, only in Greek is logos immediate (an authorization, on Heidegger’s part, that produces intelligence)

——caught in ring of circle once questioning philosophy, engaged by Greek tongue > acc. Heidegger, obscurely, authoritatively, Greek tongue alone is logos

p. 182 philein—to accord oneself to logos (Sprache, legein, which is already engaged, opened), co-respond, correspondence (not first w/ some subject)

p. 184 Being is gathering (versammelt) [of the same]—logos > transitivity of “ist”: that it gathers

p. 187 logocentrism: not so much logos as the center but logos as Versammlung, the gathering that concenters what it configures [i.e. Being]

POOF pp. 242 as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

p. 244 Derrida proposes to think a perhaps ‘prior’ to Zusage, arche-originary pledge preceding all questioning, a friendship that could never thrive in gathering (Versammlung), that which accords phília to phúsis to lógos

p. 190 to strive to recall—nostalgia; Aristotle, metaphysics: reactive nostalgia, a mourning for originary philein, semideafness that hears but not the originary gathering of logos

pp. 191-92 for Heidegger, philosophy seeks after, comes later than harmony, this delay eroticizes philosophical search, tension of Eros; Heraclitus & Parmenides not philosophers, no straining, no erotic pas, in accord, Einklang, homology w/ logos

p. 205 Heidegger claims that all metaphysicians (strangers to the originarity of Heraclitus’ logos) committed an anachronic anthroplogization abusively reappropriating H’s word (parole)

PP p. 79 if logos not submitted to laws of life, living discourse, is not a living creature, w/ a body proper, it would lose its head and tail (i.e. what would happen through writing)

p. 81 in metaphor “father of logos,” the “father” needs logos, would receive more from logos than it would transmit to it [p. 80 no thought of father w/out logos]

——living-beings, father and son, are announced to us w/in household (domesticité) of logos

——what does a logos indebted (redevable) to a father mean?

p. 82 the good (father, sun, capital) > “hidden illuminating, blinding source of logos

pp. 83-4 recourse to logos, in fear of being blinded by direct intuition of father, good, capital, il faut se tourner vers lui, even when seems to withdraw > le logos est donc la ressource

p. 86 the Platonic traits, mythological figures re: origin of writing > opens relation btwn mythemes & philosophemes in western logos: a history, or History, constituted by philosophical difference btwn mythos and logos

p. 117 (133) in Gorgias’ analogy “logos/soul : pharmakon/body,” the name of the relation is the same as one of its terms, logos: this comprehension an act of domination and decision

p. 126-27 Socrates turns poison into salvation by way of logos, gives hemlock an ontological effect: initiates one into contemplation of eidos and immortality of the soul

p. 128 cure by logos, exorcism, must call on very thing it’s expelling (chasse), et au surplus quelle met dehors, “pharmaceutical operation must exclude itself from itself”

——pharmakon, letter installing itself inside living organism (logos-zōōn), robbing it of nourishment; “logic” tries to keep the parasite outside, the outside out

***pp.142-43 (164-65) in the pharmaceutical enclosure, an artful living organization of figures, it is all about father/son, legitimacy of inheritance, sperm, no mother; as a living thing logos always issues from father, writing is weakened speech, ghost, living-dead, simulacrum (eidōlon), errant, pervert, outlaw, bad seed, adventurer, bum, doesn’t know identity, his name, father’s name

p. 146 being-there always a property of paternal speech, Socrates always associates speech and law, logos and nomos

p. 147 certain voice, command of logos that Socrates obeys > forbids more than it bids (qui interdit plutôt quelle ne dicte)

p. 152 (176) logos and nomos purify poisoned waters

p. 154 seed must submit to logos, do violence to itself, since sperm is opposed to law of logos > when Plato turns live speech into psychic graphē he does so w/ a problematic of truth: lécriture en tè psuchè nest pas une écriture de frayage, mais seulement denseignement, de transmission, écriture daletheia

p. 166 [stranger (from Sophist) as first grammatologist?] grammar and dialectics can only be distinguished when truth is fully present, fills logos > but parricide in Sophist (impossibility of presence) establishes condition of discourse as diacritical principle of sumplokē

necessity of logos as necessity of parricide > absolute pre-condition crossed out by parricide at point of its arche-being—prevents difference btwn grammar and ontology

VM p. 137 for Heidegger, Logos “is the Logos of no one” > anonymous as possibility of name and responsibility

***p. 153 Greek logos not accidental for any thought; Greek miracle is impossibility for any thought to treat its sages as “sages of the outside” > by proffering epekeina tes ousias, by welcoming alterity into heart of logos, it has protected itself against every surprising convocation

VP p. 7 Husserl determines logos on basis of logic, giving logicity the normalcy of logos telos, the telos of being as presence; this requires distinction btwn pure logic or “pure logical grammar” and pure grammar [logic before language]

S p. 68 can one speak of “logic” in region of originarity of language (le langage), of a given language (langue)?

OH pp. 125-26n for Valéry, logos: calculation, reason, speech, discourse, knowledge > history

T p. xvi Being [one reading of it] assures permeable/transparent continuity, logos posits/negates itself en laissant sourdre sa propre voix

WM p. 213 white mythology [vis-à-vis Anatole France]: metaphysics, culture of West, erased w/in itself fabulous scene that produced it, this scene remains active—inscribed in white ink; white man takes his own mythology, his own logos, the mythos of his idiom, for universal Reason

DS p. 188 specularity of eidos > logos—speech < mirroring [repetition ordered by resemblance (homoiōsis), doubling as duplication]

p. 189 logos, faithful image of eidos > painting is a painting of a painting

POS pp. 34-5 grammatology must liberate mathematization of language (which phonocentrism has always critiqued, for limiting that which links logos to phonē), but must be wary of Leibniz’s type of unifying, simple, mathematical language, which appeals to divine logos

OTO pp. 4-5 discourse on life/death occurs btwn logos and gramme, analogy & program, program & reproduction (since life is on the line, the trait [splitting of line] relating graphical to logical, also working btwn biological & biographical, thanatological & thanatographical)

ATIA pp. 142-43 for Heidegger, ‘as’-structure founds logos, animal deprived of logos because w/out “as such” > apophantic logos: becoming language of “as such” [deception belongs to essence of logos]

p. 157 Aristotle’s non-apophantic logos (neither enunciative nor declarative): euchē, prayer, entreaty, requesting; for Derrida, these would open breach in whole apparatus [of “as such”?]

FS p. 11 God imprints secondarity on every navigation of the human: 1) passage of deferred reciprocity btwn reading & writing? 2) absolute witness who’s already read what you will write: third party as transparency of meaning? [circular logos]

DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

CHM p. 61 in historicity in general, finite thought only possible by making a mockery, humiliating the madman w/in us, the fool a logos who is father, master, king

pp. 62-3 crisis: 1) acc. Husserl, menace to reason/meaning by way of objectivism, forgetting of origins 2) krinein, choice & division btwn 2 ways: meaning, non-meaning (Parmenides’ logos and non-way [labyrinth, the palintrope]), division in which logos (in necessary violence of its irruption) separates from itself as madness, forgets its origin [back to 1)]—finitude > possibility as crisis?

——identity btwn consciousness of crisis & forgetting of it > crisis of reason: access to reason and attack of reason > Foucault teaches us to think: crises of reason in strange complicity w/ crises of madness

RGE p. 252 slumber of reason, ruse of reason, slumber in the form of reason, vigilance of Hegelian logos (engenders monsters then puts them to sleep) > la raison veille sur un sommeil profond auquel elle est intéressée

IW p. 256 channeling Cohen, logos is the région where symptom can be true, logos speaks of itself; to speak of logic, of objective knowledge, in opposition to logos, is to speak of nothing but its “logical” manifestation: perhaps there is a “meta-logic,” but not a meta-logos

p. 257 syllogism: being by & w/ itself of logos, rassemble et se rassemble > to speak of itself

p. 258 acc. Cohen, German Protestantism absolutely privileged, unique mimesis of Greek ideas [“Christianity is unthinkable w/out logos”], Reformation opposes logos, eidos, hypotheton to ecclesial dogma > [p. 257 ensures unique relation of German-Jew]

p. 261 Cohen: eidoslogos, concept (logos) is verified through idea & its rendering of accounts

LI p. 103 as though an auxiliary/parasite could not supplant, as if “parasite” is a simple addition

——inner purity & exterior supplement—this is myth itself (mythology of a logos)

TN p. 182 Derrida’s 5 Tangents, chapters (5 fingers, 5 senses); hand as incarnation of logos > hand of son of God

p. 252 for Chrétian, hand of father is logos and Son (p. 255 Incarnation is the sign of the hand)

p. 255 for Chrétian, logos [le Verbe, the Word] is revealed to man (call of responsibility), but not his property

pp. 258-59 hand of man analogous w/ God’s (logos of this analogy could mean proportional relation)

ATM p. 154 for Levinas logos is not instrumental, it’s the fold that bends (pli) to the gift, as the tongue (langue) of my mouth when I tear bread from to give it to the other, it is also my body

E p. 13 analogy of God and poet proceeds from and returns to logos, source as mouth and outlet (embouchure)

——discursive metaphors (i.e. nature says, dictates, prescribes) that function as analogies of analogy > in such cases, nature is properly logos (toward which one must always return)

——Kant’s genius poet doesn’t need to know what he is writing, nature dictates what he writes, divine production > hierarchical analogy: society of logos, sociology of genius, a logoarchy

p. 19 for Kant, hearing is closest to freedom and spontaneity, one must use term hearing-oneself-speak (le sentendre-parler) because the structure is auto-affective; the mute thus do not have reason, the mouth (indissociable from ear) is not simply an analogy of expression: it is the ground of analogy, regulates analogy, it is logos itself [necessary]

pp. 23-5 what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of identification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

BSi p. 14 an analogy [re: beast & sovereign] is always a reason, a logos, a calculus > a relation of production in which identity and difference co-exist

p. 313 Abrahamic commencements: 1) Bereshit, Genesis—animals before man 2) en arkhē en o logos, sovereign all-powerful creator of everything, Head, fiat of a logos producing zōē, light, phōs

p. 314 for John, there must be an ontological affinity btwn life, zōē, and logos [in the beginning was the word] > zoo-logy, a life in logos, a zōē

p. 318 Heidegger asks how logos became Herrschaft (sovereign, master) over Being

p. 319 logos or legein as gathering (more originary than logos as reason/logic) still deploys force/violence, a Durchwalten of physis > physis as Gewalt: deployment of sovereignty, of force [of logos] (no dissolving into void), in the highest acuity of its (sovereign) tension (Spannung)

p. 320 logos: exercise of force or violence (Gewalt)

——logos of John not a Heraclitean gathering of contraries, instead designates one particular entity [see p. 338]

——acc. Heidegger, logos becomes Jesus by way of Philo, who attributed to logos function of mediator (mesitēs) > distancing logos from its Greek originarity (what holds contraries together)

pp. 320-21 ten commandments (oi deka logoi), logos as kērux, kērigma, holy proclamation, also logos as angelos, herald, gospel, logos of redemption, logos of eternal life, logos of zōē, i.e. Christ

p. 337 logos: language, discourse, reason, calculation, counting (ratio)

***pp. 338-39 the (mis)translation of logos brings w/ it the whole of culture; whole force of history at work to produce this translation [logos as Christ] > whole of history at play in motif of beast & sovereign and their relation to zoōn: “there are no limits, no frontiers that can contain these issues of translation”

p. 347 Aristotle: city is natural reality, man destined to live in city [Aristotle links politics & logos]

——acc. Aristotle, phonē (which animals also have) does not suffice to define logos

OG pp. 13-4 (25) that a signified must be able to “take place” in its pure intelligibility (absolute logos): the theology of the sign (perhaps this epoch, whose closure we’ve outlined, will never end)

p. 29 (45) unity of phonè, glossa, logos, lunité articulée du son et du sens dans la phonie > this presupposition prior to all oppositions > re: this unity, writing always derivative: “sign of sign” says Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel

p. 71 (104) logos as sublimation of trace is theological from Plato to infinitist metaphysics: logocentrism…parousia, life w/out differance (name of God as name of indifference)

p. 91 heliocentric concept of speech, analogical system: king, father, sun, logos > [ethnocentrism of this concept: all other languages delayed logocentrism]

p. 98 (146) (from Descartes to Hegel) God is name & element that makes possible absolutely pure self-presence & knowledge > God’s infinite-understanding is the other name for logos as self-presence, produced as auto-affection through voice—excluding sensible, exterior, spatial writing

FV p. 473 in Phaedrus, logos is its own father, answers for itself [re: Lacan’s relation to Freud’s text]

LOVE

MONL pp. 50-2 Derrida on his relation to French language; the secret, a tattoo, blood mixed w/ ink, love by setting on fire, graft, mark, let come to itself in itself

GOD pp. 50-1 to think responsibility w/in criteria of salvation, the Good as infinite love, the gift of death, requires event of Christianity, or makes Christianity possible

p. 67 a betrayal that is not simply a breach of trust, Abraham must hate what he loves, must offer gift of death to whom he loves

p. 81 Gospels: God maintains trace of his suffering by “seeing in secret,” you forget suffering in his love, he forgets nothing

FL p. 278 what else can one love but ruins? one loves a monument in the ghost or silhouette of its ruins? its finitude

AF p. 21 bind anew: an act of love (paternal) (sous peau neuve)

p. 37 coup de foudre, love at first sight, love & transference, “what if” of the future in the instant

LOBL p. ~146-47 translation as transference, transference is love, one text loves the other in translation

HERP p. 172 Heidegger mentions positively tradition of Scheler which goes back to Augustine [St. Anselm?] & Pascal: we access truth/knowledge on basis of love/charity—not vice versa

p. 181 a philein not yet philia, which philosophy (too young, too late) has no authority to question, because [philosophy] is born like an event coming over philein

p. 189 for Heidegger, Heraclitus and poets [?] experience lovence (aimance), before philosophy, love w/out strife before Eros, desire, or, at least, a jealous tension

pp. 194-95 “philia ist das Gönne der Gunst,” philia is the other’s proper, gift to the other of what is to the other its own proper

——Heidegger, translating justice (dikē) as Fuge (joint, accord, coupling), wonders how adikia can give justice > the gift of what we don’t have as only gift possible

p. 201 philein, love, gathers Kampf, polemos, Auseinandersetzung in the memory of a lost homology

HASD p. 69n Eckhart: “the nature of love is that it transforms man into the thing he loves”

MPM p. 32 the coming of the impossible other, we love as such, affirming this to be good

p. 149 love, friendship, memory (moment two impossible promises are involved: “to what,” “to whom” are we destined) pledged beyond death, beyond what we call, without knowing what we speak, death; it involves, from the 1st moment, in reverse, the other is dead in us

POOF p. 62 Nietzsche distinguishes love & friendship (a 2nd division w/in lovence): love gets confused w/ permutations btwn singularities of you & me, doesn’t abstain ‘prudently,’ ‘wisely’

pp. 64-5 Nietzsche on ‘love’ denounces the right to property, love of thy neighbor as desire for more possessions, ‘love’ is the cupidity of possessing > ‘love btwn the sexes’ is egotism itself, jealousy that tends only toward possession (Besitzen)

——Nietzsche contesting Christian revolution of love: neighbor’s proximity as the ruse of proper & appropriation

——Nietzsche advocates another love, a love more loving than love, whose ‘just name’ would be friendship

pp. 65-6 following Nietzsche beyond Eros? if love is always a lust for new possession, we must acquiesce to principle of ruin at heart of utterly new > would this leave open the chance to accord w/ the “love whose just name would be friendship” [?]—just once, it would happen, friendship as the name for this impossible event [only once btwn 2]

——but how could there be a right name for such an event, for any event? how could you convince the partner of such rightness at the moment of the act?

pp. 179-80 Montaigne follows Aristotle’s joint ownership of soul in friendship to a disproportionate inversion of dissymmetry: it’s the receiver who gives, gift w/out gift, giving what one doesn’t have (add Montaigne to Plotinus, Heidegger, Lacan) [for Montaigne, this is friendship not marriage] [p. 181 generosity consists in supplying means to let someone do you a favor]

p. 183 Montaigne: true friendship doesn’t correspond to the hospitable, erotic, natural or social [4 ancient species of love]

pp. 205-06 via Aristotle, in friendships trapped btwn pleasure & use, the straight & narrow path (euthōría) [Augustine on Christ] is lacking—makes it difficult to measure the just > as long as love is there, these relationships can function

p. 212 Aristotle’s 2nd hyperbole [re: friendship] is that of eros, where there is only 1 love

p. 219 w/out possibility (which must be neither living nor dead) of perjury, radical evil, absolute crime—no responsibility, freedom, decision > “I love you” (promise, prayer) can’t hope to prove anything at all, must remain unilateral/dissymmetrical, no mutuality/agreement can reduce the disproportion, the very condition of sharing (partage)

p. 220 Derrida, w/ great precautions [i.e. both enrich each other], describes hyperbolic limits that would distinguish love & friendship: 1) friendship: phenomenon of appeased symmetry, equality, reciprocity btwn 2 infinite disproportions, 2 absolute singularities 2) love: would raise or rend (déchirerait) the veil of this phenomenon (reveal its hidden, forgotten, repressed truth?), dés-espoir absolu de l'acte de foi et du renoncement absolus

pp. 220-21 to declare love, declare friendship, one cannot know [overdetermine, calculate, program] the who

pp. 252-56 via Kant, responsibility (response, speaking, time) of friendship linked to respect (distance, gaze, space) > Kant links highest friendship to ‘moral law,’ to distance, repulsion, links love to attraction—if it’s a duty to intend toward dignity of ‘sympathy’ & ‘communication (Mitteilung),’ ‘ardour’, excess, of love can break equality while maintaining reciprocity > there must be outward signs, (external) testaments of friendship [?]

pp. 256-57 via Kant's suspicion of tenderness/gentleness in friendship, a catastrophic complication in natural law of attraction/repulsion, a rupture, love will tend toward the evil of reciprocal possession (fusion), love harbors hate w/in itself > friendship as sign/symptom of this possible perversion, and that which protects us from it: attraction must be against attraction, repulsion against repulsion

p. 281 Nietzsche’s hermit too attracted to the depths, nostalgic for elevation—dreams of a friend to gain altitude > friend’s nostalgia: wish to believe in other, wishing in vain to believe in ourselves > Derrida links this nostalgia to the Heideggerian nostalgia at origin of philosophical philía: elle nourrit [fires?] donc lenvie à légard de lautre comme de nous-mêmes, we envy each other, love as the attempt to leap beyond this envy

p. 282 Derrida deduces the political register of friendship in Nietzsche: to be able to honor enemy in friend, a sign of freedom, neither slaves nor tyrants know this freedom > woman is either slave or tyrant, knows only how to love, can’t respect enemy (honor what she doesn’t love); the political translation of Nietzsche’s axiom: friendship is freedom plus equality [the double bind]

pp. 288-89 there are specters on both sides of us (past & future), the phantom friends we lost, the arrival of the Superman > ‘it is necessary to love’ = specters, they are to be loved

——disjunction of spectral distance marks past/future w/ non-reappropriable alterity [p. 307n cf. Düttmann, “What is Called love in…”]

——Nietzsche: higher still than love of man is love of causes and of specters (Sachen und Gespenstern)

p. 305 Derrida confessing: he has more than one ‘brother,’ of more than one sex, and he loves having more than one (uniquely bound, each time, by a conjuration & so many unuttered oaths)

PAS PAS p. (87) wanting (le vouloir) to break fascination always effect of fascination? why break it? I love and desire fascination, any desire w/out it? [tu me fascine, je taime]; viens, word of fascination, defers in difference what it cannot break with—dare that another dissimulation not come

p. (88) can one love anything other than the name? that which still lets self omit itself

p. (106) Derrida’s ideal to drown in true sea of Blanchot’s text, to have loved it as the original first name

S p. 77 Schelling: spirit is breath of love, but love is the Most High [i.e. higher than spirit]

FWT pp. 4-5 leave life in life & make it live again, “let live,” laisser, most beautiful, hazardous thing, like giving up, giving over the gift, forgiveness > deconstruction never w/out this love, pays homage to those it takes on, sen prendre

p. 31 scene of rape [never completely erased] informs lovers’ desires

——“couple” not transgressed by homosexual coupling

p. 60 absolute hospitality, risk, exposure to “who” comes, when love arrives > must maintain concept of this horizon w/out horizon though it cannot become a political/juridical concept

p. 68 Derrida gave seminar on “Eating the Other,” studied Kleist’s Penthesilea > love: temptation to eat the other

ROP p. 67 transference (love) has never needed the clinic to claim its victims

p. 70 I love memory, how else can one love?

SP p. 93 Nietzsche: “the spiritualization of sensuality is called love: it represents a great triumph over Christianity [?]”

pp. 153-57n [Nietzsche quote, love as possession]

SW p. 319 was it even to Christ my poor old incorrigible Augustine finally addressed: “you were w/ me, I was not w/ you, beauty so ancient and new” > or because it is already late?

pp. 353-54 Celan: “Aschenglorie (…) grub ich mich in dich und in dich > [I in you—love itself] love made itself make love next to watching dreaming child [too old, forbidden to be old, still young]

pp. 156-57 Christianity’s stroke of genius: to believe/credit unbelievable meaning of Incarnation/Passion: creditor has paid your debt, forgiven the unforgivable: i.e. love, the creditor pays the debt, I give you what you don’t have, I forgive you > Nietzsche: “can one credit that?”

TB p. 122 for Benjamin, fleeting (flüchtig), infinitely small point of contact where 2 bodies of text touch > movement of love: “pass into its own language the mode of intention of the original”

DPi pp. 156-57 Christianity’s stroke of genius: to believe/credit unbelievable meaning of Incarnation/Passion: creditor has paid your debt, forgiven the unforgivable: i.e. love, the creditor pays the debt, I give you what you don’t have, I forgive you > Nietzsche: “can one credit that?”

p. 240 deconstructing death a task for every kind of vigilance, a task of vigilance for the vigilant > when one loves keeping watch (la veille) and vigilance, when one loves period, one may sleep—but one dreams

p. 250 to run toward DP, to run toward suicide, to want to have done w/ the other > out of excess hatred/love

pp. 282-83 still be eating flesh in vegetarianism (will eat waiting for Christ, assimilate his blood as commanded, how can one love w/out being tempted to take it w/in oneself: Love & Eucharist), still be DP after abolition, other figures will be found for it

Gii p. 50 w/ respect to Heidegger’s hand, does one make love w/ a hand or hands? Derrida imagines Heidegger’s protest: the hand that gives itself, promises, engages in oath already tells you everything about loving, caressing, desiring——“perhaps, but why not say it then?”

TR pp. 108-09 confession not of order of knowledge, of making known; Augustine wonders why he must confess to God, who knows everything > answer: to convert fault into love [Nietzsche]

——not a truth to be revealed but truth to be “made,” to be “verified”

IW pp. 268-69 Cohen translates “I am that I am” as God is Being (One), Jewish Yahweh merges w/ agathon, anhypotheton, escapes all image, perception: God is Love, Greco-Platonic Eros (at source of knowledge & aesthetic feeling) [Jew, Greek, Protestant]

HST p. 384 for Levinas, when I mourn, I feel responsible, I murder: “my own,” those I believe I killed, I love > ineluctable empire of phantasm at origin of meaning [Blanchot also links thought of death to murder]

p. 389 love, mystical love, gives itself w/out giving anything but itself > abandons itself while asking forgiveness at the height of the other

pp. 396-97 I love you, forgive me for loving you too much, not enough, for loving other in you, missing you, failing to reach you

p. 407 all poetical declarations of love as sickness of the other? > an other always more ancient and more to come than me, as if I carry w/in me the mourning of me carried by the other

pp. 407-08 impossible grammar of “I love you”: tragic/comic desire to want to die first and to want to survive you to console you at the time of my death (guard in me your mourning of me)

p. 411 Rousseau: mother’s love can’t be substituted

TN p. 80 Levinas has the courage [?] to say man caresses the untouchable of the feminine (the caressed) [see POOF where Aristotle privileges the lover over the beloved]

p. 107 Derrida poking fun at himself, how he’s abstaining from touching Nancy, claiming touch is impossible–prohibited, and we love to call this loving—abstaining, like the Messiah

p. 291 w/out lépreuve of impossibility of auto-affection—no love

——il faut saimer [French grammar: puts transitivity in reflexivity] says every “I love you” > this (impossible) auto-affection of love makes love possible

p. 292 auto-hetero-affection inaugurates all experience: speech, declaration of love

AD p. 41 Levinas: in love transcendence goes further and less far than language, hospitality is not accomplished as Love [via the feminine?]

p. 139n first Levinas believed that femininity was a modality of alterity [?], but in Otherwise than… he goes back further, nakedness before face presupposes feminine alterity: idea of skin is a “responsibility before eros”

CIN p. 21 nothing will have taken place but the place, there are cinders, there is place (il y a lieu) > this untranslatable, like a hidden proper name, carries everything away toward prescribed limit, recognition, debt, obligation > place (proper name) for giving, rendering, celebrating, loving, friendship, dissemination…

pp. 23-5 why the phrase “il y a là cendre” doesn’t belong to him [Derrida] > cinder lent, given, to so many others, cinder remains virginal (the only thing he loves), in tact (intacte), the sentence doesn’t even say the cinder

p. 43 no Phoenix, no monument, aucune érection qui tienneou tombe, the cinder w/out ascension, the cinders love me [cf. “proximity loves me” from PC], “they change sex, they re-cinder themselves, they androgynocide themselves”

pp. 56-8 [quoting from PC] Derrida telling “you” [his love?] to eat all his ashes, to approach him by slowly advancing toward death, an absolute reconciliation

BSi pp. 60-1 Socrates: wolf loves lamb like lover adores beloved

p. 197 faire lamour / faire la moue (distaste)

p. 210 [vis-à-vis Cixous] love of wolf—love of fear, wolf loves by consum(mat)ing > nothing stronger than love, save death

p. 243 in D.H. Lawerence’s “Snake,” “my snake”: declaration of love comes after virtual/aborted murder

OG pp. 174-75 (248-49) for Rousseau, first there is self-love (lamour de soi) [not unnatural lamour-propre], and then love of the (m)other > pity is a suppléant, which can be supplanted by law/society

——pity protects man, vir, homo against love of woman, against the becoming (child becoming-man, mother becoming-woman) that is the great substitution > pity saves virility

p. 175 (250) for Rousseau, amorous passion perversion of natural pity—limits our attachment to a single person

pp. 175-76 (250) jealousy, a creation of culture, an arresting of nature by woman, stratagem of femininity > invention of culture denatures pity [which should reach out to every living thing]

——jealousy marks the gap btwn pity/love

p. 178 (253) acc. Rousseau, women force men to love one theme, one representation, they turn men into women

——physical love urges sexes to union, moral love (which is immoral) fixes desire on particular object

——for Rousseau, “moral love” reflects history as denaturalization, this moral supplement is nothing, but still causes preference, forces force

p. 179 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] history also protects/resists abyss of evil > “moral love” (which is immoral, acc. Rousseau) becomes modesty (true morality of women)

p. 262 (371) Rousseau: cradle of nations, first fires of love born at water wells; p. 267 “well of oath” in Genesis XXI

CIR p. 172 it’s to death I already owe everything I earn, I’ve succeeded in making it, as I have w/ God, it’s the same thing, my most difficult ally > costs a great deal of love, impossible but unfailingly faithful, forgive yourself the hurt you do yourself [death same as God]

SPEC pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

——death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

WBH p. 198 opposition is 2, is man/woman, sexual difference can be an indefinite # of sexes > w/ the 2, the classical sense of sexual difference, gift is impossible, all you can call “gift” (love, jouissance) is forbidden by dual opposition

p. 200 receiver as determining factor of gift, one who responds, performativity of text produces receiver w/out pre-existing [him/her/it]

MACHINE

GOD p. 66 instant of decision is madness; like gift & “gift of death,” instant irreducible to presence, act of giving death, sacrifice, suspends labor of negative, labor itself, perhaps even work of mourning

GT p. 9 could only be a gift the instant the paradoxical instant tears time apart (what Kierkegaard means when he says decision is madness)

p. 34 “exhausting faculty” of “nature” given to narrator of “Counterfeit Money” as a “gift”: to look for what cannot be found where & when one is looking for it

——to look for (chercher) the impossible is that form of madness

pp. 34-5 looking for “noon,” origin w/out shadow, w/out dialectical negativity, not any madness: sleepwalk in the vicinity of the impossible

p. 35 the alogos, madness, of rendering account (logos) of the atopos (the gift), desire to think the impossible, to desire, to desire to give the impossible: madness as given & desired forgetting

pp. 36-37 is madness the movement of the circle or its excess? besieges reason at its 2 borders (inside & outside)

——linked to double bind (stricture, ligature, obligation) > absolve, forget absolutely & forgive by giving (lier et délier absolument)

p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

pp. 134-35 social function of beggar, madman: “the pocket of an indispensable internal exclusion,” like structure of pharmakos, incorporation w/out introjection (assimilation), an identity by exclusion, keeps outside w/in, lexception faite (fors) dune clôture ou dun clivage intérieur

MONL p. 10 law: first condition of madness

p. 24 no absolute appropriation/reappropriation because no natural property of language, only appropriative madness, jealousy without appropriation [see p. 63]

p. 60 madness of a hypermnesia, a supplement of loyalty, commit to traces of writing: toward an anamnesis of the entirely other > this is the most difficult thing [Aristotle says same about virtue]

R p. 7 turning of the question, double question, question of question, like being locked in a circular machine that does not work or turn just right [Olivia]

pp. 84-85 no justice, neither political nor ethical, when following calculated law like automatic machine

FK pp. 78-9 from kenotic horizon of death of God to rights of human life (anthropological re-immanentization): an Abraham who would refuse to sacrifice his son and no longer envisage what was always madness [Pope speaks only of a certain “death of God”]

p. 100 no alliance of 2 [faith & religion], plus dun at once more than 2: iterability, division at source > supplement introduces incalculable in heart of calculable; pure faith = pure madness

FL p. 255 the just decision (rend time, defy dialectics) as madness, via Kierkegaard, madness because hyper-active and suffered, retains something passive

***p. 254 the justice of deconstruction is invincible to all skepticism: accepts madness and mysticism, deconstruction existed as justice before it became an academic discourse

p. 257 madness of justice: the incalcuable and giving idea of justice is close to the bad, the worst, can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation > assurance against the worst will only suture the opening

AF p. 14 Freud’s Mystic Pad still participates in Cartesian space [FSW pp. 227-28] > do new archival machines (ones Freud could never dreamed of) change anything?

p. 62 archival technē overflows singularity of event, i.e. the answering machine that outlives its moment of recording, the ghost speaks

SPOM p. 168 madness, to become a ghost [?], atopic, haunt all places at once

p. 205 is the ghost just the effect of the market economy? as Marx says, a finite delirium, a madness that will come to an end? same for spectrality in general?

SEC p. 312 history of writing conform to law of mechanical economy: gain most space & time by means of most convenient abbreviation

p. 316 to write is to produce a mark that is a kind of machine, legible in scribe’s absence (this drifting of absolute responsibility, this orphaned writing > what Plato condemns in Phaedrus)

OH p. 64 Valéry: Mediterranean has been a veritable machine for making culture

PAS PAS p. (35) Blanchot: to sleep in a passivity exactly like death, madness therefore

p. (47) the other of language: the maddest referential opening

FSW pp. 196-231 [see MYSTIC WRITING PAD MACHINE]

PPHS p. 94n classical take on writing as “practical exterior activity,” as that which “comes to the aid” condemns all mnemotechniques, all langue machines, all supplementary repetitions > life of spirit is thusly forced to emerge from its interior

pp. 107-08 for Hegel, machine works as a negation w/out relève, thus Hegel could never think a machine that could work! that which doesn’t work in service of meaning: pure loss

——but Derrida sees machine working by itself, outside > Hegel’s logic, syntax, concepts, engaged in system of this unpower [of course, not enough to “essentialize” technology]

——[Hegel on calculation and machine] a “living,” “thinking,” “speaking” protest against repetition

T p. xi Marges concerns relevance of limit, a reading of the Hegelian Aufhebung, a reading beyond Hegel’s own intention, beyond that which is inscribed on the internal vestibule of his ear, where Hegel’s text would be a writing machine of “conscious intention,” thus a mechanical reader

pp. xix-xxii as long as the tympanum of philosophical mastery is not destroyed, all liberties (denegation, precipitation, ignorance, or stupidity) one takes w/ philosophical order will remain activated a tergo by misconstrued philosophical machines > called back to order

pp. leiris xxiv-xxv [song as margin—ineffable and machinery]

p. xxv like w/ Mystic Pad, question of writing machine should upset (devrait fair basculer) space of proper body dans lentraînement sans limite des machines de machines et donc de machines à main coupée

question of machine one more time, btwn pit & pyramid, in the margins (of Hegelian text)

F pp. xxxvi-xxxvii machinery of words, calculating shrewdness, mêkhanê, theater of words, autonomization of language > in The Magic Word who holds the dictionaries?

p. xliii machinery would attest to existence of crypt

FWT FWT pp. 4-5 contradictory/uncomfortable double injunction: mad for absolute past, past whose (im)measure that of bottomless memory, while dreading nostalgia, fixation, cult of remembrance: nothing seems desirable save in this injunction > leave life in life & make it live again [this “heir]

p. 10 ostracism of madness, acc. E.R., begins, for Derrida, not w/ Descartes but w/ Socrates’ victory over the pre-Socratics

***p. 132 double bind: must not give ground on either legitimate injunction, no decision, no responsibility worthy of the name that doesn’t endure this double injunction, this terrible law, the law of the law, which gives responsibility a chance, leaving no chance for good conscience [see 223n double bind a word coined to describe schizophrenic]

p. 207n for Lacan, madness—limit of human freedom

POOF p. 28 via Nietzsche’s fool, thought of friendship to come lends itself to madness

pp. 32-3 that there can only be friends w/ enemies, that when one desires enemies, we can only count friends—madness looms (in every teleiopoetic event), plus de sens, empty resembles overflow

p. 34 to wonder how something could be born from its antithesis, whether truth is born of error, one must be mad in eyes of ‘metaphysicians of all ages’ > one must go mad asking about an impossible genesis, one that contradicts its very origin, an anti-genesis [Derrida on Nietzsche]

p. 42 language of madness, forced by most rigorous & profound necessity to say the insane, impossible, absurd, undecidable—to the disdain of philosophical good conscience (wants to hold out in shade of the Enlightenment): every “X without X” [i.e. “community w/out community”]

pp. 50-1 Nietzsche’s hospitality for mad arrivants, fool already on premises, a guest who would have preceded his host, sheer madness of inverting friend/enemy > requests only that they open the doors of their hearts to him

***pp. 219-20 how this madness [undecidable, beyond dialectics] can negotiate w/ what it isn’t, translated & protected in good sense of ‘things,’ proofs, guarantees, symbols, concepts—in a politics: this is the whole of history

DS p. 187n [Derrida describes six-pronged scheme re: tradition of mimesis, which have produced, like a machine, all clichés and criticisms on the topic]

p. 236 chain “fiction,” “hymen,” “spacious,” gets caught in, while disrupting, ontological machine (dislocating oppositions)

p. 238 “re-presentation” [Derrida via Mallarmé]: less concerned with setting forth things, the image of things, than setting up a machine > repetition-toward-itself of text as re-folding

OTO pp. 29-30 how can reactive degeneration [Nazism] exploit same utterances, rallying cries, of active forces [Übermensch]—nor did this specular ruse elude Nietzsche: is there a “programming machine”? marrying the 2 forces (family resemblances) in a set, as life (does) death? but no regional power could set limit on such a set > no ordinary “machine,” there’s “life” in it > plays w/ opposition life/death > is there a practical rewriting of the program, which would no longer be part of it? if so, would not be produced in books

ATIA ATIA p. 10 Derrida’s shame before the cat, wanting to dress himself, chaser (himself out of the room), hunting/following the animal, hunting/following himself in the face-to-face w/ the animal > madness: no longer knowing (how) to respond to question: “who am I (following)?”

O O p. 20 effect of dissemination: lose one’s head, not know where it is

WAP p. 78 somewhat Foucault-like vision of network of programs as profound machine, though the additional idea that this machine reinvests, reemploys, itself in each determined configuration

p. 79 [when quasi-systematic deconstruction differs from Foucault: no empirical light-headedness]

——deconstruction must not choose btwn long, barely mobile networks & short, quickly outdated ones > must display strange logic: multiple powers of oldest machine can always be reinvested/exploited in new situation

DPi DPi p. 158 Nietzsche: for too long earth as been a madhouse (Irrenhaus) > the psychical cruelty of God as executioner [of Christ] [suicide?], a will becoming mad, willing itself mad, mad about itself, pure sovereignty, madness of voluntary freedom

***p. 167 questioning as cruelty, initiates torture, threatens to causes subject to lose his/her head

p. 236 [Camus’ bloody description > eyewitness: decapitated, looked like a madman]

Gi p. 8 Derrida wonders about a reading machine (one must think of programming the machine & know how to do it) that would snare (gibier), hunt down, sexual difference in Heidegger

Gii p. 46 Derrida proposes “manuscripture" to Heidegger’s handwriting (Handschrift), given that typewriting, which Heidegger will indict, is also a handwriting

——Heidegger: typewriter “tears (entreisst) writing from the essential realm of the hand” [MOP]

——“typed” word only a copy (Abschrift)

——machine “degrades” word into means of commerce, offers the advantage, for those who enjoy degradation, of dissimulation > Heidegger: “typewriter makes everyone look the same”

p. 47 typewriter becomes signless, a-signifying (zeichenlos), it dissimulates, a movement of withdrawal, subtraction (entziehen) [loses the hand]

TR p. 88 [re: “to swear”] délire names extraordinary coincidence of irrationality of machine (beyond my control) & absolute sincerity (authentic innocence of my intentions)

——coincidence of infinite guilt & certainty in absolute, virgin, intact innocence> btwn infinite guilt & absence of guilty conscience

p. 137 via Rousseau, as if one always had to excuse oneself for failing to do so: and once one does, one is excused in advance or condemned forever > madness of this machine (interests us)

PJP p. 174 oath, sworn faith, and the Law force psycho-phenomenology of self to lie [not 2 sequential moments, but perjured in advance]; which is madder: psyche, logos, ego—or the oath?

p. 197 maddening irregularity of anacoluthon: dispersal/disavowal of “you,” “us,” where is the reader, the supposed addressees?

p. 200 if Christianity demands marriage, it’s a form of madness [Kierkegaard]

p. 201 Christian marriage: (this madness) sworn faith of 2 sinners who unite to ask forgiveness together, repentance for a mortal sin

——marriage, machine of death, madness of alliance in Christian marriage: at center of question of perjury & forgiveness > ***Christianity marries everything

——never get married, it is madness in Christian lands, and has no sacramental sense outside Christianity; is it more mad to lose one’s senses inside or outside Christian lands? > perhaps it’s even more impossible to decide where frontiers of Christian lands are drawn

D p. 292 no one can enter Soller’s Numbers who thinks literature/thought ought to exorcise the machine (that the 2 have nothing to do w/ each other)

p. 300 every term depends on place [in?] machine—entrained into an ordered series of cuts

p. 324 re: Soller’s Numbers, Plato’s cave contained in an incommensurably, imprévisiblement, more complicated machine

pp. 363-64 because innumerable beyond/short of what can be read by machine: excess & lack (defect)

HST p. 361 hospitality: to be ready to not be ready > surprised, violated, expropriation: unprepared in mode that is not even “not yet”

p. 362 madness of concept of hospitality: Messiah as hôte; visitation not invitation (not dialectical opposition) > invitation prepares for visitations

p. 385 for forgiveness to be possible, what there is to forgive must remain unforgivable: otherwise exchange, excuse [see p. 380] > logical aporia (not just formal logic) but tragedy of compassion: intersubjectivity as destiny of hostage, madness of substitution

p. 396 mad laughter, le rire dément, at forgiveness in betrayal, betrayal in forgiveness

——demented laughter, et il dément mentir, as denagation of lying while still lying (even while disavowing/avowing lying)

p. 398 last aporia of forgiveness, most artful, provoke laughter to point of madness [Beckett’s risus purus]

C p. 204 “things won’t stop computing in me,” Derrida wants to touch the necessity of the contingency of Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins [compare to Lacan’s: can’t stop being-written]

TN pp. 56-7 madness: [Nancy] “world is its own rejection,” condition of thinking the event > just madness, call for different thinking of the just

p. 62 waking from anesthesia, sense certainty becomes madness > Rimbaud: senses in disarray

pp. 68, 328n do but do not touch > this is not a formula, contact sans contact is madness! somnambulist reproduction of paradoxical formulas is always possible [Heidegger, Intro…]

E p. 17 for Kant, the “as if” of the poet (“as if” of nature) is better, sincerer, more loyal than the “as if” of the orator, who wears a mask, deceives, his “as if” is “machine-like”

p. 18 rhetoric often compared to a machine, because there’s no intention inside > false life, empty symbolism of these sophistical tekhnai

BSi p. 161 bêtise as madness of definition, “S is P,” definite articles le or la, bêtise is defining as much as defined > category is a signature of bêtise

p. 173 sovereign decision, mad and bête

OG p. 151 (216) [Rousseau] masturbation pleasure irremediable loss of vital substance > exposure to madness & death

——for Rousseau, danger of image, imaginary seduction, in writing & masturbation, “fatal advantage (funeste avantage)” > the supplement that “trompe (cheats) la nature

EU p. 40 Descartes’ counter-proposal [to Hardy]: arcanum of “true science” > method, artificial intelligence, translating machine (could be taught in very little time): universality as principle of order, as path, passage, odos

MADN ESS

LOBL p. 89 Blanchot’s Death Sentence, “title runs wild and drives the reader mad”

p. 150 madness of understanding “yes”

MC p. 376 Derrida ends Mes Chances by telling us to read section in Phaedrus about the divinity of madness recognizing all chances

H p. 9 blindness & madness

p. 11 in Sophist, madness described as being upside-down [Hegel > Marx]

***AF p. 87 hallucination, specters “leave a part” of truth, the truth of a delusion, truth is spectral

MSUB J pp. 162-63 grammar & etymology of forcener > lose one’s sense, beyond sense, without sense, hors sens (fors and sen) > can’t forcener un subjectile in French w/out forcing the grammar: corresponds w/ German Wahnsinnige (without sense) not Geisteskrank (mental illness) [Sinnan originally means to travel, stretch towards; Indo-European sent and set mean path]

——forcené: for, fort, force, for, and né, letting or, hors, sort incubate in it

p. 167 to meet back up with innate nature (in-né), must force the subjectile, rendering it mad from birth, desiring birth

HASD p. 26 place of God—atopics, strange (atopos), mad, madness

MPM pp. 152-53n when de Man equates absolute irony w/ consciousness of madness, end of consciousness, he protects irony from its German-Romantic determination [as mastery]

——de Man: sanity can only exist when we’re willing to function w/in conventions of duplicity & dissimulation

——via de Man’s “irony is unrelieved vertige,” never stop turning, madness because it has no reason to stop, because reason is tropic

p. 132 about de Man, Derrida says, “figures of rationality are profiled and outlined in the madness of the aporetic”

PP pp. 130-34 expulsion, sacrifice, exorcism of pharmakos played out on boundary line btwn inside/outside, expulsion of evil or madness to restore sōphrosunē

pp. 164-65 when the Stranger (in Sophist) thinks parricide, writing, this requires superhuman strength, risks madness

——Stranger insists he thinks to and fro (anō kai katō) and is not scatterbrained (manikos)

VM p. 95 Levinas’ eschatology as encounter (rencontre) w/ unforeseeably other seems infinitely hopeless, awaiting nothing; Levinas even calls it renunciation [madness?]

p. 102 Levinas: “to love the Torah more than God” is “protection against the madness of a direct contact with the Sacred”

S pp. 90-1 Heidegger interprets der Wahnsinnige in Trakl to mean that the stranger is on the way to elsewhere (as madness, de-ceased, toward the unborn, Artaud’s in-nate)—like a revenant, Derrida adds

***SH p. 40 date is mad, always more or less than what it says it is, we are mad for dates, those ashes which dates are, remains w/out being > music, Sichelschrift

p. 41 date opens into madness, what there is to read, injunction in every reading; madness slumbers in aleatory encounter > chance among heterogeneities which break into making sense [re: Wahnsinn, Wahn/wann]

p. 43 unreadable is readable as unreadable, shibboleth transmitted to a few during finite time of incineration, heart to heart, mouth to ear, hand to hand, still universal by right (legible, coded, troped) > madness of fire: consumes a date from w/in > renders ash from 1st moment

ROP ROP p. 71 can there be a witness to madness, a third that provides reason w/out objectifying? w/out examining (arraisonner)? [Nietzsche’s no accusation, GS 276]

p. 72 can there be a history of madness?

p. 86 Evil Genius as haunting backdrop (le fond de hantise) (perpetual threat) of what lets Cogito appear > how can what comes after (Cogito) be the absolute beginning?

pp. 99-100 how to think Foucault’s contradictions? Freud on one side then the other of the maddening dividing line? isn’t being right (avoir raison) & wrong part of the history of madness?

——Evil Genius on side of madness, & on side of exclusion-reappropriation (confinement)

p. 100 all identities (madness, reason, history) in history of madness would be divided from w/in, threatened in advance by parasitism, like a computer virus (though w/out any antivirus)

PS PS p. 169 [madness (outside of work) as clinical; work as critical]

p. 174 Artaud howls under headings: existence, flesh, life, theater, cruelty > promising an art prior to madness & work

***p. 183 metaphysical determination of madness as disease of alienation had to be contemporary w/ proprius [Latin era] > proper subject, absolutely close to himself

p. 193 madness as reduction of work (loeuvre) and difference, inalienable life; other madness: metaphysics that lives w/in difference (alienation) > madness is the work or the absence of it

p. 194 Derrida suggests we wonder about link btwn concept of madness/concept of metaphysics by thinking how no [Heideggerian] “destruction” of history of metaphysics simply surpasses it

TB TB p. 117 every translator is committed, committed by the other before having committed himself?

pp. 132-33 rhythm, twists & turns from abyss to abyss, deconstructs the tower > madness on both sides (interior/exterior limit) > impossible task: the infinite guilt absolves you immediately

REST REST p. 273 temptation to stand shoes upright again, to return them to authentic subject: la structure de la chose et du procès oblige, alors, toujours, à en rajouter (to keep adding to it) > to put back becomes a supplementary retortion, delirious dramaturgy > these shoes are hallucinogenic

DST DST p. 316n obsessionality, re: writing, no longer clinical category

——Bataille: what forces me to write is the fear of going mad

p. 203 epochē sets, suspends, in parentheses > what do epochs of “What is…?” have to do, or not to do, w/ madness?

p. 210 acc. Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe speaks of madness w/out “demagoguery” or “psychagogy,” granting it the dignity of a major question

——hantise (obsessive fear), the way in which philosophy is haunted, visited, inhabited by madness > there is a domesticity of “philosophical madness”

pp. 215-16 désistance brings to light anoia, not to be confused w/ madness though it can resemble it > double bind btwn 2 madnesses: 1) one of disintalling 2) one of reason, defensive stiffening (crispation) in assistance [Kafka], imitation, identification > madness against madness

p. 229 for Lacoue-Labarthe [?], anyone linked to edge of madness (au bord de la folie), the autobiographical (allobiographical) adventure, and its doubles, and the other, and death, is concerned w/ rhythm (the musical obsession) (Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Rousseau, Reik, Mallarmé)

EJQB p. 66 wisdom of poet culminates its freedom in passion of translating obedience to the law of the word into autonomy > w/out which, and if passion becomes subjection, poet is mad

AFR p. 91 Condillac extends Locke’s statement that false connections of ideas makes madness/folly: true connection of ideas makes reason

PSSS p. 249 “mad”: invent destination, address, addressee of grievance

——“mad” as a movement w/ no target, no telos, where movement of (counter-)transference has not yet taking place, is seeking its place, its subjects [is this an analytic site?]

——threat of death, whose mourning/grievance would be born in advance, invades place left vacant for transferential destination

EL p. 215 la folie sacrée, la sacrée folie (sacred madness, damned madness) of Scholem: he doesn’t believe it possible to sacrifice (kill) sacred language—but he fears/desires it: fright before the possibility of the impossible [sacré, sacrifice]

ATM p. 151 Levinas: psyche as a seed of folly, a psychosis, not an ego (Moi), but me (moi) under assignation—arrachement-à-soi-pour-un-autre (torn-up-from-oneself-for-another)

CF p. 39 the excessive, mad, hyperbolic forgiveness, surprises like a revolution: to forgive not only the guilty one but the fault itself, where both are evil, irreversibly, repeatably

——this mad forgiveness heterogenous to politics, ordinary juridical practice > otherwise, calculated transaction, negotiations, hypothetical imperatives

LG [vis-à-vis Blanchot] p. 247 double affirmation not foreign to the genre, genius or spirit of law: no double affirmation w/out light of day and daylight becoming law > madness of the day

p. 250 [re: Blanchot] for the law to see her day is her madness—what she loves madly like glory > he, the author, brings forth light of day to a mother who can’t say “I”

p. 251 law is mad, but mad is not a predicate of law, no madness w/out law

p. 252 lépreuve of a récit brought to light the madness of genre—spinning (faire tourner) Peterson’s genre-disc, comme un soleil fou > dividing borders btwn literature and its others

ATAP pp. 71-2 perversion of voice of reason: mix voice of reason w/ voice of oracle (2 voices of other in us), a hermetic, hermeneutic seduction > oracular parasitizes voice of reason, elevates the voice, raises the tone > for Kant, this is Verstimmen (to be deranged, delirious), désaccordement of cords/voices [tone] in head: vision w/out concept turned impatiently toward most “crypted” secret > poetico-metaphorical overabundance

SPEC p. 290 [for Freud?] no mélange of pleasure–unpleasure is possible, mélange is madness > though topical distribution [in Beyond…] is effect of differance, it retains differance in reassuring medium & in oppositional logic > principle of identity is respected by topology, division of sites

MADNESS in COGITO AND THE HISTORY OF MADNESS

CHM p. 32 madness seems [emphasis on seems] to be dismissed, denied entry to philosopher’s city (this last tribunal of Cogito: could not possibly be mad)

p. 33 madness can only be spoken about by that “other form of madness” that allows men “not to be mad,” i.e in relation to reason? [Foucault via Pascal]

pp. 33-4 infeasibility of Foucault’s desire, a history of madness written by madness itself > madness before caught/paralyzed in nets (language) of classical reason

——for Foucault (sometimes), philosophy is a metaphor or metaphysics of political realm

p. 35 for Foucault, history of madness is the archaeology of a silence

——Derrida: wouldn’t an archaeology of this silence repeat the act perpetrated against madness?

——all signs of silencing of madness are borrowed (by Foucault) from juridical province of interdiction

——Foucault speaks of silence too laterally, implicitly

——[Derrida asks question about Foucault’s responsibility, the manner in which Foucault seems to return to innocence, end all complicity] doesn’t suffice to imprison the delegate, the psychiatrist, and in doing so the whole adventure of Western reason (acc. Foucault, capture & objectification of madness): wouldn’t Foucault’s proceedings, verdict, reiterate the crime?

——if the Order is as powerful as Foucault says it is: infinite, universal complicity of those who understand “this language”

——“order is then denounced w/in order”

p. 36 “no Trojan horse unconquerable by reason,” the best spokesman of the mad are those who betray them best

p. 40 re: free circulation of mad in Foucault’s Stultifera navis, not so free as all that > and perhaps a socioeconomic epiphenomenon on surface of a reason divided against itself since dawn of its Greek origin

p. 43 cannot say, speak, madness; Foucault: it is the absence of the work

p. 47 Foucault: “dreams or illusions are surmounted w/in the structure of truth; but madness is inadmissible for the doubting subject”

——madness rejected form very interiority of thought itself [Foucault on Descartes]

——Montaigne haunted by thought of going mad in very action of thought itself

p. 50 madness, in Descartes, not privileged, nor submitted to particular exclusion [excluded as much as, along w/, the senses—prior to hypothesis of evil genius]

pp. 50-1 the imaginary novice philosopher, who Descartes mimes, objects: you would have to be mad to doubt your senses—so Descartes proposes the more natural hypothesis of dreams

——dreams become hyperbolical exasperation of hypothesis of madness: madman is not wrong enough, not mad enough (not good instrument of doubt: doesn’t cover totality of sensory field)

p. 308n madness is not directly included (where Descartes discusses dreams) to be excluded, more an epistemological index > madness not Descartes’ theme in Meditations

pp. 51-2 [prior to evil genius] if madness is only a perversion (fault) of the senses, it is corporeal, in alliance w/ body, much less serious than fault we succumb to in dreams > not other of Cogito

——real distinction of substances expels madness to outer shadow of Cogito, then it is the other of Cogito > can’t be mad when I think and have clear ideas

——[prior to evil genius] epistemological deficiency of madness, this error in the senses, could translate madness into sin [Foucault cheerfully demonstrates this path]

pp. 52-3 “at the same time” marks hyperbolical moment w/in natural doubt; “nevertheless” marks absolutely hyperbolical moment leading to hypothesis of evil genius > possibility of a total madness > subverts clear/distinct ideas, mathematical truths which escape natural doubt > madness will spare nothing this time [cf. pp. 50-1]

p. 53 what is de facto and what de jure in relation to Cogito & madness?

pp. 53-4 all discourse, philosophy, must escape madness in fact/principle if it is to have intelligible meaning (discourse must carry normality w/in itself) > not a defect linked to determined historical structure but essential universal necessity > the meaning of meaning

——subversion of madness as natural comfort, prephilosophical confidence

p. 54 silence as madness: irreducible role of haunting language, outside and against which alone language can emerge: “against” designating 1) content from which form takes off by force 2) adversary against which I assure/reassure myself by force [jealous friends of solitude]

——like nonmeaning, silence is the work’s limit & profound resource

——essentializing madness as such risks disintegrating psychiatric findings

p. 54 if madness is the absence of a work, any philosopher/speaking subject can only evoke madness in language of fiction or fiction of language

p. 55 language as break from madness, closer and closer language gets to it, still has Joyce’s “transparent sheet,” “elementary discretion of a nothing that neutralizes everything”

——thus, Foucault’s book a gesture of protection & internment

——Descartes installs possible menace (of madness) in very heart of intelligible > as long as doubt is unresolved no knowledge can master madness

***——Cogito: valid even if I am mad, not sheltered from an emprisoned madness but ascertained/attained w/in madness itself

p. 59 for Descartes, thinking and saying what is clear & distinct is same thing—Derrida adds that, for St. Anselm, the insipiens, the insane man, couldn’t think because he couldn’t think what he said > madness as voluble silence that couldn’t think its own words

——philosophy as reassurance against anguish of madness at point of greatest proximity to it

pp. 60–1 speech, confined to temporal rhythm of crisis & reawakening [re: Cogito as madness, then against madness] opens discourse by making a mockery, humiliating madman w/in us: movement of temporalization, historicity in general, reign of finite thought must stay close to this violence to liberate and live as speech > madman as fool of logos, of father, king, master

p. 62 philosophy as this giant confession: attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole (to define it as such is to confess) > I philosophize only in terror, but in confessed terror of going mad

——confession is simultaneously: oblivion/unveiling, protection/exposure > economy

MALLARM

WM p. 219 Mallarmé’s texts on linguistics, aesthetics, political economy, what he wrote re: sign or, check oppositions of literal/figural, metaphoric/metonymic, figure/ground, syntax/semantic

DS p. 180 Mallarmé’s coils, shells, motifs, lustre of title > Mallarmé’s only use [?] of word syntaxier (syntaxer): “never would the sovereign bow fall”

p. 186n Mallarmé’s Mimique, its mimodrama, its double science, concerns an obliterated history of relations btwn philosophy & sophistics

p. 194 if, in Mallarmé, mime mimics nothing, does the mime still mimic the “idea”? can Mimique be read as a neo-mimetologism? no, doesn’t even imitate, nothing prior to his gestures > no present has supervised the tracing of his writing

——Mallarmé’s frequent use of word Idea, often enlarged, capitalized

p. 195 Mallarmé’s mime inaugurates, breaks into white page, follows no program

——dance, pantomime: hieroglyphic inscription

——Hamlets in Mallarmé: ghosts of castrated point, quill (in the form of an I or A)

p. 196n Mallarmé: “direct simplifying instinct,” “poet translates silence”

p. 200 mimodrama is described as anamnesis by Mallarmé, but in reference to a past never present [ABSOLUTE PAST]

p. 202 a system that is closed-in on itself would be checked by a safety-catch (un cran darrêt)——wrong to interpret Mallarmé’s Mimique as oriented toward its abysses, its false bottoms, as if they were pretextual referents > a writing that refers back only to itself is some other writing

pp. 205-06 if, in Mallarmé’s writings, mime mimics nothing, opens in its origin the very thing he’s tracing out, is this not the movement of truth? pure soliloquy? alētheia as manifestation, unveiling? but there is mimicry, mimicry imitating nothing, a difference w/out reference: a ghost that is the ghost of no flesh, w/out past, w/out death, birth, presence, past (preserved differential structure of mimēsis w/out Platonic metaphysical reappropriations)

p. 206 Mallarmé’s mimicry: a double of nothing simple, a double nothing anticipates—or at least a double of another double; for this double, reality is death, it never breaks the glass

p. 207(n) Mallarmé is more patient, subtle, discreet, efficient, does not suppress the double (make it dialectical, bringing us back to presence, to perception of the thing itself)

——Mallarmé’s simulacrum of Plato/Hegel separated from what it imitates w/ barely perceptible veil

p. 211[summary of what Mallarmé achieves] reference w/out referent, fiction that’s not imaginary, lustre where “medium” is shining, mimicry w/out imitation, only traces, announcements, souvenirs, avant-coups et après-coups

p. 223 Mallarmé reads, writes while reading, while reading text written by Mime, who himself reads in order to write

p. 229 Mallarmé: Edgar Allen Poe was the absolute literary case

p. 231n Derrida’s respect/debt for/to scholarship on Mallarmé [despite his deconstruction of it], rigorous need for it

p. 237 Mallarmé’s i: a slash that never cuts its wing, penna (feather pen), needles and scratches; hymen fastens down, crinkles and folds this i [m/f]

***p. 257n Mallarmé: “to paint, not the thing, but the effects it produces”

***p. 271 Mallarmé: all method is a fiction” > point de méthode—still a marching order (marche à suivre) > la dissémination dans le repli de lhymen, pas de méthode pour elle > [no circle-path to first step]

p. 273n Mallarmé: “your ringlets will drop their curls in the space btwn 2 rings”

p. 277 Mallarmé’s play (on “plume,” on “winds [brise]”) anathema to thematization, to deciphering meaning > coin-entre

p. 278n Mallarmé: English sometimes [?] monosyllabic like Chinese

FS p. 302n translation of Hegel not finished (thank the Lord!): thus explaining Proust, Joyce, Faulkner > Flaubert feared Hegel, rightfully so; Mallarmé, uniquely, approached Hegel: [why he (alone) knew he couldn’t complete the book?]

p. 25 Mallarmé unrealized unity of Book by making conceptual categories securing it tremble

O p. 54n the point is to work to set up or dismantle a scaffold, a scaffolding (un échafaudage), we need one to substitute, the time of a lapse, Mallarmé’s lustre for Plato’s sun

p. 55 Mallarmé: lift a corner of the veil, fragment of total book—scintillate (the whole that’ll never be)

BSi p. 226 Mallarmé told Degas poetry not made w/ ideas but w/ words

IF p. 311 Flaubert like Mallarmé: inscribed in locus of philosophical exhaustion, simulacrum of dialectic, both expose its limits & impossibility > simulacrum that discredits oppositions (both mimic Platonic-Hegelian Idea while emptying it of its metaphysical/dialectic content)

MAN

SPOM p. xiv man’s life always more than a paradigm, other than a symbol > a proper name (see p. 220 on man) [one should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure? martydom]

p. 181 man, most unheimlich of all ghosts, if Christ (absolute specter) causes fear and pain, man causes even more—man makes himself fear (se fait peur), becomes fear he inspires > thus contradictions of all humanism

p. 220 can neither get rid of essence of man, nor believe in it (see p. xiv on life)

ATIA p. 3 for Nietzsche, man as promising animal, can be disciplined > for all time and what remains, man in passage toward surrendering to promise of the animal at unease w/ itself

p. 5 if “dressing oneself,” clothing, is proper to man, it arrives w/ all the others: speech, reason, logos, history, laughing, mourning, burial, gift, the concept of the concept

EM p. 113 (133) interest in universality of anthropos a sign of West’s attempt to interiorize, master what’s different from it, leffet de cette différence dun tout autre ordre, where philosophical colloquium has no meaning, this other space neither barren, nor desert-like

pp. 115-16 (136-37) Sartre countersigned Corbin’s monstrous translation of Dasein: “réalité-humaine” > w/ Sartre and others of this period, concept of man is never examined

pp. 120-21 (143) Hegel’s Phenomenology as truth of soul, the relevé of anthropology, of man

p. 122 (145-46n) in spite of Kant’s critique of anthropology, man is sole example of rational being

p. 124 (148) though Dasein not simply man of metaphysics, everything in Letter on Humanism and beyond returns to “proper of man,” guided by concept of proximity

pp. 126-27 (151) Dasein serves as exemplary text to read Being, lhomme reste le lien ou le fil conducteur paléonymique that ties analytic of Dasein to totality of metaphysical tradition

——“on voit donc que le Dasein, sil nest pas lhomme, nest pourtant pas autre chose que lhomme

p. 128 (153) Heidegger’s radical questions re: humanism, his study of genesis of concept/value of “man” via Greek paideai in Rome, Christianizing of Latin humanitas, rebirth of Hellenism in 14th-18th centuries, makes secondary any metahumanist position not placed in his opening

——(154) for Heidegger, what is threatened in extension of metaphysics & technology is the essence of man, devastation of languages threat to essence of humanity

p. 129n (155n) Heidegger: metaphysics, thought of subject, treats man on basis of animalitas, essence of man is not heeded

VM p. 107 Man is a God arrived too early, a God who knows himself forever late in relation to the already-there of Being (qui se sait à jamais en retard sur le déjà-là de lÊtre)

TC p. 233 theater of cruelty born by separating death from birth and erasing the name of man

FWT p. 66 “proper of man”: none of the traits believed to be man’s alone are man’s alone > either an animal possesses them, or man does not possess them as surely as is believed

FS p. 304n for Leibniz, man is finite in act, infinite in thought; in God act/thought coexist

Gii p. 42 Heidegger: w/ man, 2 hands fold into 1, auto-affect each other: prayer (man is a sign)

PIO pp. 24-5 Derrida links tekhnē/fabula and historia/epistemē > man defined by human subject’s aptitude for invention: 1) narrative fiction, historical fabulation 2) technical or technnoepistemic innovation

HLP pp. 65-6, 292n Arendt places man in his “singularity” outside of political, “unpolitical by nature”

TN pp. 166-67 “principle of principles” gives us no choice [?]: commands us to begin w/ “us,” that is, w/ most proper, proximate Ego; this “man,” this “we” comes before most radical phenomenological reduction, the one that suspends the world

p. 167 teleological hierarchy, axiological scale: phenomenology begins w/ man

——Husserl: man filled w/ soul through & through

E pp. 9-10 for Aristotle, imitation is unique to man, belongs to essential definition of man, man takes pleasure in it, it is from it he learns his first knowledge

EW p. 269 via “logic” of trace or differance, re-appropriation produces the opposite of what it aims for, thus ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man

BSi pp. 12-3 acc. Rousseau via Caligula, kings are gods, people are beasts > reason of sovereign (man himself disappears btwn beast & sovereign)

p. 13 man, a hyphen (mediation) in the theo-anthropo-zoological

p. 56 what is proper to man isn’t > look closer

p. 265 acc. Heidegger, man is the most unheimlich—steps out of usual frontiers (Grenzen) of habit > man’s Grundzug (fundamental feature): being foreign to everything familiar

p. 266 man sovereignly excels in being unheimlich

p. 322 Heidegger against strict, conventional division of man/animal [for very different reasons than Derrida], doesn’t make man unique enough

OG p. 85 linear thought reduces history (perhaps we need another word), linear always the unfolding presence of anthropos > this line becomes originary presence acc. to straight line/circle

***pp. 244-45 (347-48) supplement extends beyond man: man calls himself man by drawing limits (excluding other): purity of nature, madness, divinity, childhood

p. 286 (405) phonic auto-affection permits the epoch of man, epoch not of history but as history: greatest possible mastery, liberty, self-presence of life

——[in spite of Hegel’s follies, Derrida here affirms that concept of history is a concept of philosophy, that history is the history of philosophy]

UWC p. 203 light, truth, Enlightenment—question of man

p. 231 powerful juridical performatives shape modern history of humanity of man: “human rights,” “crimes against humanity”

MAP/ITINERARY

MONL p. 58 write without itinerary, or map

p. 61 languages w/out itinerary that can’t arrive

MSUB J p. 171 “the phrase [Artaud’s] is not softened, it no more lets itself be domesticated than it masters the map”

MARGINS

***MC p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

——this large, stereotomic margin of play is perhaps largest of all (during certain history) but not infinite [?] [see also Christianity/Capitalism not infinite]

OH p. 44 double bind of European cultural identity: 1) necessary not to reconstitute centralizing hegemony (the capital) 2) necessary not to cultivate minority differences for their sake, untranslatable idiolects (not to multiply borders, marges, marches)

PAS PAS p. (88) all paradoxes de la marge, de la marche, de la limite multiply when they are determined as borders (en bords)

T p. xv [Derrida’s oblique ear—not perpendicular—to hear the margins] tympanum squints (louche) [so does the slave who loves secrets in On the Geneal…]

p. xvi if there are margins, is there still a philosophy? the philosophy?

p. xxii(n) margin, march, demarcation pass btwn denegation (plurality of modes) and deconstruction (systematic unity of a spiral)

p. xxiii margin not a secondary virginity (but an other text)—an inexhaustible reserve, stereographic activity of an entirely other ear

p. xxiv mark, marche, margin, limit (same word) > one declares nothing by saying that philosophy’s margin is w/in or w/out, w/in and w/out; still its [philosophy’s] margin

pp. xxiv-xxv the intransigence, rigor, that prevents philosophy from calculating its margin

pp. leiris xxiv-xxv [song as margin—ineffable and machinery]

p. xxv question of machine one more time, btwn pit & pyramid, in the margins (of Hegelian text)

pp. xxv-xxvi [deconstruction:] limitrophic violence imprinted acc. new types, eat margin in luxating the tympanum (relation to itself of double membrane) > [i.e.:] think singular tympanum in ear, sewn up, domesticated march, alongside several tympan of printing machine [manual]

p. xxvii khōra—as tympanum, watches over its margins as virgin, homogenous, negative space, leaving its outside outside, w/out mark, w/out opposition > ready to receive and repercuss type

DS p. 251 tropic twist of fan inscribes very movement of structure of fan-as-text (surplus-mark, margin of meaning), spacing, fold, hymen btwn all meaning-effects

p. 258 mark (same word as margin or marche): word and blank between words > marked twice

p. 270 if fold had a limit somewhere, if mark, margin, or marche (limit, threshold, border) was fold’s other > there would be no text

***p. 271 Mallarmé: all method is a fiction” > point de méthode—still a marching order (marche à suivre) > la dissémination dans le repli de lhymen, pas de méthode pour elle > [no circle-path to first step]

OS pp. 60-1 metaphysical texts already have resources of their own criticism [re: circle of circles of time] (announces itself in the margin) [doubling of de-limitation]

P p. 61 parergon stands out (se détache), not like work, which also stands out > parergon stands out against 2 grounds (fonds) [work, background], as that which merges (se fond), effaces itself; frame’s thickness as margin not figure—or figure that comes away of its own accord (senlève delle même)

pp. 73-4 effects of deconstructed frame would not be an absence of one, labîme [undo the frame] en coin dans ses angles et ses articulations, slyly—see picture from the side of the wood (not teleological, not harmony, internal becomes external); thickness taken into account

DIF DIF p. 24 text of metaphysics is comprehended (compris) > encore lisible, and to be read: not surrounded but traversed by limit, marked in its interior by multiple furrow (sillon) of its margin

O pp. 15-6 why is the critique of formalism, of math, explained precisely in the preface? what is this third term? these fallen, dead signs? that can’t be inside philosophy nor in margins of book

——in thus remaining [outside of oppositions, i.e. sensible/intelligible], does a preface exist? son espacement (préface à une relecture) sécarte au lieu de la khōra > remarkable limen of the text: what can be read of dissemination > limen: mark, march, margin, mise en marche: citation

p. 33 this new text, cest aussi le débord infini de sa représentation classique, a breakthrough (effraction), lining fringe [?], de-limitation, would be called a posteriority or an empiricism [by Hegel]

CHM p. 56 (Foucault’s narration imbedded w/in impenetrable point of certainty, as are all projects of thinking totality by escaping it) > can only escape, w/in existence, in direction of infinity or nothingness, this margin of the possible: not human (as in anthropological factuality, but demonic/metaphysical), first awakens to itself in war w/ evil genius, resists him by reducing natural man w/in: nothing less reassuring than Cogito at its proper and inaugural moment

REST p. 264 marche almost same word as mark, margins, also Pas > necessity of walking, lowest degree, most subjective or underlying level of culture/institution: pair of shoes

pp. 341-42 [re: interlacing correspondence] detachment of one mark marks, re-marks, overmarks that of the other—in itself interlacing it > use mark (march, margin) to avoid/deconstruct “show,” “represent,” “paint,” “say” [interlace doesn’t bring together 2 detachable identities]

RM p. 58 metaphysics [quotes from DIF] is not “surrounded but traversed by its limits,” “marked on its inside by the multiple track (sillon) of its margin”

D p. 300 Soller: toujours cette marge, cette coupure, mince immensité latente

p. 342 column is nothing, no meaning in itself, a hollow phallus > guarantees innumerable passage of dissemination and playful displacement of margins

+R pp. 157-58 the phrase “what both cuts me off and prompts me (me souffle) w/ all the rest” performs, does what it says it’s doing: framing borders are jumped, margins saturated en abyme

p. 179 ça (quoi?) aura/marché

LI p. 70 “marginal, fringe” cases: most decisive indices wherever essential conditions are grasped

pp. 70-1 what is re-markable about the mark includes margin w/in mark > mark is remarkable in that it “is” also its margin

——line of margin can never be determined rigorously: divides the dividing-line & its unity at once > iterability allows for “negative” double, lie, also conditions so-called “positive” values

pp. 127-28 margin, parasite, iterability belong w/out belonging to the class of concepts of which they must render an accounting—to theoretical space they organize in a “quasi”-transcendental manner: something happens by or to set theory > all this must be rendered (rendre compte et raison) by us enlightened modern thinkers, right?

TN p. 242 to marginalize partes extra partes (nonliving, divisible, that which belongs as something foreign to flesh, a supplementary, transplanted graft) risks marginalizing the margin?

EU pp. 93-4 for Kant, parasite could be contained to a margin of university > today, university is what has become its margin

p. 95 university as a child of metaphysics & tehnē > once this offspring exceeds places assigned to it, becomes invasive margin: university “idea” reigns everywhere

——parasite everywhere there’s language, public, publishing > to wish to control/exclude parasites is a misunderstanding of speech acts

MARIONETTE (OR DECONSTRUCTION OF BIOPOLITICS) (see AUTOPSY)

A p. 60 biopolitics is also thanato-politics, which is euthanato-politics, il faut bien mourir (ars de bene moriendi)

***FK pp. 83-4 phallus, the marionette, virtuality of virtuality, distinct from penis: parade fetish, the healthy, the automatic sur-viving, faith in most living as dead

p. 86 machine, mechanics, reproduces the dead in the living; the marionette, the dead machine, automation acc. phallic effect

TR p. 87 the work that operates by itself, in quasi-machine like fashion: secret affinity btwn grace & machine, heart & automatism of marionette; re: Rousseau, excusing machine, writing machine

p. 158 play with marionettes, Marion of the ribbon [re: Rousseau’s Confessions] as the instant of fictive generations, like all those automatic virgins ambling about btwn Gospels & Kleist

BSi p. 65 the zooanthropological rather than biopolitical > horizon of BS

p. 186 Celan: the artist turns nature to stone, “be a Medusa’s head” (monkey, automata, art)

p. 187 [feminine?] marionette: btwn who/what, sensible/insensible—tekhnē btwn art & technique, btwn life & politics

p. 189 Valéry & Monsieur Teste doubles of marionettes—who makes who speak?

——in Kleist’s “On the Marionette Theater,” consciousness that passes through infinity becomes pure unconsciousness, that of a god or mannequin, grace of prosthesis

p. 191 I kill bêtise first, I kill the marionette in me, the animal-machine (so as not be killed by it)

pp. 191-92 [têtu, entêté] essence itself as headstrong stubbornness in being, bêtise, pigheadedness (entêtement)? the marionette (other) in me I wish to condemn to death? > bêtise hits you over the head (tête), acephalic manner > bêtise not proper to man, but to all those capital beings w/ heads?

p. 193 [Monsieur] Testes, tête, test, terstis (third), témoin, testicles

pp. 212, 215 erected marionettes, Sovereign in its Majesty, Most High—not merely a trope, [it’s sublimity is even practical]: surveillance (economic/military) strategy

p. 216 deciding actors [political leaders] consecrated by election of their erection to status of marionette in the puppet show [in English]

p. 218 never certain of distinction btwn 2 marionettes [its force, its fable] discredits lebendige Gegenwart, Husserl’s living now

p. 219 to think the marionette, difference btwn marionettes, not the living of life but a living w/out being—simulacrum of being, prosthesis, substitute for the being of the thing itself—fetish—life death at same time > marionette [Marion’s Dieu sans lÊtre]

pp. 220-21 sexual difference, 2 marionettes—those afraid of “it’s not so simple,” afraid of sexual difference, of equivocality of living being: of the subtle difference, or blurred difference, btwn sponte sua, autonomy, and reactive automaticity

——phallic figure haunted by virgin girl

——quasi-mechanical, automatic reaction of phallic erection

p. 222 phallus as marionette avant la lettre: simulacrum, prosthetic, automatic machine—is the phallus human at all? > phallic erection is a machine but also the attribute of sovereignty

p. 223 [in some cultures] women break their hymen on wooden phallus (simulacrum of phallus)

——ithyphallic: hardness, straight, rigid, standing phallus

pp. 224-25 for Derrida, hypothesis that bêtise always threatens imperturbable ithyphallus is the essential ithyphallic bêtise > ithyphallus’ hyperbolical desire is nil/empty of thought, this void pushes, pulses, compulses, makes one think of a drive that is absolutely bête, never gives up anything, absolute stranger to all thought

——priapism is infinite ithyphallism, foreign to finitude of erection (finitude makes erection possible) > thus, is detumescence castration?

p. 229 [Celan] French Revolution (monkey & marionette), beast and sovereign, “Long Live the King”—majesty of present [a transference of sovereignty?]

p. 251 [via Celan via Büchner’s Dantons Death] art as species of marionette > marionette: an allegorical personification of technē, technical who and what

p. 256 [review of marionette: life/death; virgin/phallus; spontaneous/automatic]

——if phallus is proper to sovereign, is it proper to man?

pp. 263-64 Heidegger’s problem w/ zōon logon ekhon, it’s “zoological,” late-on-the-scene, does not question the essence of life

p. 266 man sovereignly excels in being unheimlich

p. 288 as soon as there is absolute knowledge, everything prescribed for Sun King as a program [the king, the historian, the reader—who isn’t manipulated by history like a marionette?]

p. 290 trap of sovereignty, trap of transfer of sovereignty > in all these fictions and simulacra blood flows, no less cruelly, irreversibly: beast & sovereign bleed, so do marionettes

——political revolution w/out poetic revolution of political > just a transfer of sovereignty

——Bemächtigungstrieb: beyond other drives, beyond death drive, think sovereignty through drive, transference, inheritance, transmission, sovereignty itself is nothing, is excess, beyond everything

p. 305 can we really separate bios and zōē ?

p. 313 Abrahamic commencements: 1) Bereshit, Genesis—animals before man 2) en arkhē en o logos, sovereign all-powerful creator of everything, Head, fiat of a logos producing zōē, light, phōs

p. 314 for John, there must be an ontological affinity btwn life, zōē, and logos [in the beginning was the word] > zoo-logy, a life in logos, a zōē

p. 316 when was distinction btwn zōē/bios ever secure?; p. 317 Derrida doesn’t understand Agamben sometimes

p. 323 Heidegger’s critique of biologism, i.e. biopoliticism: ek-sistence not simply a specific kind of living creature

pp. 324-25 [more Agamben bashing, zoopolitics preferable to biopolitics]

pp. 327-28 Derrida does not accept Agamben’s distinction btwn “attribute of the living being” and “specific difference that determines the genus zōon

pp. 329-30 Derrida believes there are new things happening w/ bio-power but not that it’s new—it’s arch-ancient, bound w/ very idea of sovereignty

***pp. 338-39 the (mis)translation of logos brings w/ it the whole of culture; whole force of history at work to produce this translation [logos as Christ] > whole of history at play in motif of beast & sovereign and their relation to zoōn: “there are no limits, no frontiers that can contain these issues of translation”

p. 349 Aristotle already described structure of biopolitics, just hadn’t seen, couldn’t have seen, all its figures

(RE)MARK

MONL p. 27 body of the martyr, body of language and writing, marks as scars, Derrida a Franco-Maghrebian martyr

——mark, re-mark, experience of language, what gives rise to articulation btwn ontological universality & testimonial singularity of martyred existence > universal destiny assigns us to a single language which cannot be appropriated

p. 58 necessity of other in language, always re-marked: one more first time, historical and singular, determines & phenomenalizes itself by bringing it back to itself

SEC p. 316 absence—death of addressee (inscribed in mark) > value or effect of transcendentality linked to possibility of writing, to this “death”

——to write is to produce a mark that is a kind of machine, legible in scribe’s absence (this drifting of absolute responsibility, this orphaned writing > what Plato condemns in Phaedrus)

p. 317 a written sign can break with its context (set of presences which organize moment of inscription), still be legible, can always be lifted from interlocking chain, grafted into other chains ——no context, no code can enclose it > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

p. 320 Husserl’s “green is or” still example of agrammaticality: a mark can be cited [is legible?], written, function cut off from “original” meaning > can engender infinitely new contexts

——cela ne suppose pas que la marque vaut hors contexte, mais au contraire quil ny a que des contextes sans aucun centre dancrage absolu

MC pp. 359-60 starting w/ the stoikheia (letter, trait, number, proper name) & its marking insignificance (re-markable insignificance), Derrida explains how a mark’s supposed identity, solidity of its stereotypy, its indestructbility/indivisibility requires difference/division

——ideal iterability allows every mark to withdraw from a context, in whole or in part, its insignificance allows it to continue to divide, proliferate identities, destinerring

——Derrida says mark, trace rather than signifier, letter, word, or the generality of stoikheion—to extend mark beyond verbal sign, beyond human language (and beyond atomism) > thus he does not affirm “arbitrariness of sign” like Hegel, Saussure

p. 360 “my clinamen has to do w/ the divisibility of the mark”

HASD p. 5 the prayer can be mimicked, risk of mimicry (also a piece of luck) inscribed in structure of the mark

PP p. 104 (118) excess, displacement of series, nest pas une simple sortie hors de la série (ce geste tombe sous une catégorie de la série), a folding back (repli), a re-mark, cannot name it with a single concept w/out being off the mark (sans le manquer): it is a real and necessary challenge that writes itself, and we must begin by reading it

P (I) p. 14 event (rencontre, décision, appel, nomination, initial incision dune marque): another cause than causality? undecidable, outside calculation, “tout ne serait-il pas livré au programme (wouldn’t this all be booked in the program)?”

PAS PAS p. (51) two pas’ do not touch in the same (must not, need not, that’s how it works et que ça saute); that’s how marks are left (by Blanchot); marking time, pas marks pas

OH p. 93 language (mark) threatens rigor of public/private distinction

S p. 106 double mark, doubly remarkable trait [engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, affinity w/ Schlag]: it is the spirit in which it inscribes itself, traces itself, belongs to flame it divides

SH p. 28 to have a shibboleth at one’s disposal, not simply know this meaning (difference btwn shi and si), but to be capable of doing the difference—doing here means marking

p. 52 a date fascinates, but is not made to fascinate, crypt occurs wherever singular incision marks language (not the work of hermetic poet anxious to seduce w/ ciphers)

DS pp. 193-94 double mark, mark erases mark, undecidable stroke > this syntax escapes pertinence of truth, inscribes truth w/in its play [“Mallarmé exemplifies this”—suspect such a claim]

pp. 203-04 out of sight (a perte de vue): hymen & dissemination > une entaille y est marquée, qui ouvre encore sur un autre texte et pratique une autre lecture, lanalyse en serait infinie

***p. 215n “event” (historical event, if you wish) has form of a repetition, the mark (readable because doubled) of a quasi-tearing (quasi-déchirure), a dehiscence [etymology of dehiscence follows]

p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text, yet desire for reappropriation, structural site of theological trap, is produced, nourished, in very act of separating from it > le pli (se) plie: son sens sespace dune double marque, au creux de laquelle un blanc se plie

——mark (same word as margin or marche): word and blank between words > marked twice

POS p. 46 DS re-marks a nerve, fold, angle, doubled fold of undecidable, a mark marks both marked and the mark, re-marked site of mark, can’t be counted on list of themes—hollow is the relief: hymen, fold, square, blank, margin, supernumber, column, air, chandelier

p. 59 re: concept “history,” must use double gesture: can’t strike name from vocabulary, must overturn traditional concept & mark interval, so that interval is not simply reappropriated

***pp. 59-60 there’s a general text, an overflow, everywhere a discourse and its order (essence, meaning, ideality, consciousness) is put back into position of mark in a chain that this authorizing discourse believes it governs (and it does [?])

—— (writing of text has exterior limit of a certain re-mark [?]) general text not limited to writing on page, that’s only a determined type, like “literature,” of this re-mark

p. 65 never separate trace, gram, text, exteriority of writing from work, outside its Hegelian affiliation > operation of double mark or re-mark

SP p. 39 déjà, nom de ce qui sefface ou davance se soustrait, laissant néanmoins une marque, une signature soustraite dans cela même don il se retire [Derrida talking about “himself”]

O p. 4 structure of double mark (caught [pris], both seized [emprunté] & entangled [enfermé], in binary opposition)

——one of the terms retains old name to destroy opposition to which it no longer quite belongs

——repetition w/out identity, one mark inside, the other outside deconstructed system: double reading, double writing, double science: structure itself is worked in turn

p. 25 the 3 is no longer ideality of speculative solution, but the “effect” of a strategic re-mark > referring name of 1 of the 2 terms [in dual opposition] to absolute outside of opposition (marked once again in exposé of differance)

p. 54 if we can question and think about formula of absolute knowledge, the “part” then is bigger than the whole, strange subtraction of a remark, dissemination would then constitute the whole as a totality-effect

RGE p. 259 Bataille must mark his text (must mark the point of no-return of destruction, linstance dune dépense sans réservenot negativity), and he does, so as not to return to positive, pre-Kantian MOP [MOFP] [Žižek thinks otherwise, calls Bataille pre-Kantian]

p. 263 difference btwn Bataille/Hegel (btwn 2 differences): Bataille evokes absolute difference that’s not in service of presence > continuum, communication, instant (concepts of Batailles’ sovereign operation) not identical [MOP] but mark/sharpen incision of difference

Gii pp. 51-2 concern ourselves w/ Geschlecht of Geschlecht: a mark (de)composed, perhaps no longer a word, follow its translations, decomposition, disarticulatons, genealogy of its body unified on basis of or acc. the split (partage) of pieces of words > Geschlechts genealogical composition inseparable from decomposition of human Geschlecht

REST p. 270 [slight difference from Bataille, not sliding?] nous piétinons, nous ne patinons même pas, nous pataugeons (floundering) w/ slightly indecent complacency

pp. 341-42 [re: interlacing correspondence] detachment of one mark marks, re-marks, overmarks that of the other—in itself interlacing it > use mark (march, margin) to avoid/deconstruct “show,” “represent,” “paint,” “say” [interlace doesn’t bring together 2 detachable identities]

pp. 336-37 [re: Heidegger’s stance that a picture is useless to apprehend the useful] this reason doubles up (se dédouble): un mouvement dentrelacement du lacet: 1) the interlacing of lace w/ itself 2) incompletely laced (entre-lacé), entrouvert (half-open) 3) figurer of lace interlaced with what is figured

——Heidegger’s argument hangs (tient) on 2 reasons that double each other, remarkable mode of interlacing: one reason marked in the other or in itself

TR p. 93 it [re: Rousseau’s Confessions] precedes acc. substitution of one border for another: in this parergonal composition, in game of interlocking frames, we find mark of 2 limits: 1) crossing from Protestantism to Catholicism 2) [2x last word] last word of the other, last word of self

AFR pp. 96-8n for Condillac, theoretical knowledge can be remarked, noted, signed, thus he is critical of all unconscious perception (practical knowledge) > remarking remarked against unconsciousness in general [Condillac’s critique of Leibniz, who Condillac knew insufficiently]

p. 99 acc. Condillac, theoretical is only a supplying remark (remarque suppléante) of the practical

***pp. 100-01 Condillac’s theory of analogy (operation of remarking): supply a language’s defects > remarks anteriority in the fact, an anteriority (of the fact) that becomes lacking in itself > supply what is necessary, is missing (il faut), but [remark] also presents itself as surplus value, a superabundance, frivolous futility > makes all commerce possible (as value & sign)

D p. 364 no (trade) mark ever gets registered (se dépose) w/out certain lacking of names and #s, this lack provokes over-production, surplus value [then registering of mark?]

LI pp. 49-50 differance as positive condition, as possibility > possible absences remark mark in advance, re-mark part of mark itself: supplement, mark, trace of presence-absence

p. 52 associating non-present w/ restance adds spectacular blinking-effect to warning light: rhythm of blinking essential to mark

——phenomenon of repeatability is condition of possibility of survival of text [not vice versa]

p. 53 coupure intervenes moment there’s a mark, its positive condition of emergence, it is iterability itself, that which is remarkable in mark, re- of repeated, re- of repeating, condition/effect of iterability, merges w/it, cuts across (recoupe) iterability, cutting the cut/break in remark

p. 61 possibility of death inscribed in functional structure of mark

pp. 64-5 [re: Sarl and I] our common and minimal code has been the existence & effects of the code > [from SEC] context as protocol of code, mark doesn’t have meaning outside context—there’s only contexts w/out any center, absolute anchoring (ancrage)

pp. 70-1 what is re-markable about the mark includes margin w/in mark > mark is remarkable in that it “is” also its margin

——line of margin can never be determined rigorously: divides the dividing-line & its unity at once > iterability allows for “negative” double, lie, also conditions so-called “positive” values

p. 134 deconstruction of onto-theological humanism (of Heidegger too) > iterability of mark beyond all human speech acts

LG pp. 228-29 trait common to classes should follow a code that determines belonging, an identifiable trait identical to itself > but, this trait qua mark always a priori remarkable

——can one identify a work of art if it doesn’t bear the mark of a genre?

p. 230 effect of code: in marking itself generically, text unmarks itself (se démarque) > because of trait, text participates in one or several genres

CIN p. 40 [“Ah no, above all not”] Phoenix, the mark, in my fundamental language

OG p. 209 (298) trait is spacing itself, marks figures, works on surface of painting & time of music

p. 302 (427) isn’t a mark always possibility of writing?

MARX

KH p. 113 what Marx calls “Egyptian model” [fn refers to unpublished seminar on khōra & Marx, Hegel], ekmageion, print-bearer, imprint, seal

GT pp. 42, 44 Mauss, against Marx, must thing rationality of credit on basis of gift, not the economism of the reverse

p.136 Baudelaire: “What do you say to that, citizen Proudhon?”

R p. 88 justice w/ disjointure: out of joint, interruption of relation, unbinding > infinite secret of the other, threatens a communitarian idea of justice [See SPOM p. 30 joining is a thinking of injunction] [hetergeneous inseparability of law & justice developed in FL, then SPOM in discussion w Heidegger's dikē (gathering, harmony, adjoining)]

***FK p. 52 for Marx, critique of religion premise of all ideology-critique: 1) is this, whether he would have wanted it or not, a rational criticism? 2) does he deconstruct Christian axiomatics of Kant? >

——do principles of Marxist critique appeal to a heterogeneity btwn faith & knowledge, practical justice & cognition?

SPOM p. “Oh, Marx’s love for Shakespeare!”

p. 13 no thinker’s lesson more urgent than Marx’s

p. 14 Marx incorporated thought of his own irreducible historicity

——lucid about political worldwide, about irreducibility of technical, about law, international law, and nationalism

——no future w/out the memory and inheritance of Marx (now that the “dogma machine” is dying out)

***p.15 the mark of Marx’s inheritance is undeniable

p. 19 Blanchot: we are all subject to Marx, unless failing in everything

***p. 33 Marx’s legacy: the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice, messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy

pp. 38-9 Derrida, w/out delay, wants to avoid neutralizing anesthesia of new theoreticism and prevent philosophico-philological return to Marx from prevailing > though it’s necessary too

pp. 40-1 Marx’s 3rd voice, according to Blanchot, is science, but a science that subverts, a science that calls science a radical transformation itself, always in play > Marx does not formulate this very much

p. 46 no disavowal has managed to get rid of Marx’s ghosts

p. 47 one part of Marx thought the dividing line btwn ghost and actuality should be crossed, like utopia itself, another tried to believe in dividing line as real limit, conceptual distinction

p. 51 religion, not one ideology among others for Marx

pp. 57-8 Marx does not like ghosts, he believes in dividing line btwn ghost and actual reality, living effectivity > he believes enough to want to chase away, exorcise specters > but how to distinguish analysis that denounces magic from a counter-magic?

***——Marx, like Hegel, hostile toward ghosts, conspires w/ them in order to exorc-analyze their spectrality [see Hamacher Pleorama]

p. 59 exorcism conjures away evil in ways that are irrational, mystifying, exorcism misleads us w/ respect to its magical, authoritarian dogmatism [unscathed]

p. 63 “an interpretation that transforms what it interprets” contradicts speech act theory and 11th Thesis on Feuerbach

p. 66 Marx rare thinker of past to think originary indissociability of technics and language, tele-technics

pp. 68-9 we can inherit via Marx idea that there’s hegemonic forces represented by dominant rhetoric & ideology w/out supporting his idea of superstructure or (self-)identity of social class

p. 84 Marx is not forthcoming in nature [?]

p. 114 dictatorship of the proletariat, and excuses for it, “the effect of an ontological treatment of the spectrality of the ghost”

pp. 116-17 state of the debt [to Marx]: 1) one cannot establish the state of a debt, do the balance sheet of an “exhaustive record,” one selects, performs, inheritance is kept secret, secret of a crime—of its very author 2) hypocritical alibis of world market, of new slavery, until we face “foreign Debt” w/ spirit of Marxist critique 3) re-elaboration of concept of State requires vigilant reference to Marx (re: illusions of its legal autonomy, and its withering or reinscription elsewhere)

p. 121 the 3 world traumas: psychological, Freud, biological, Darwin, cosmological Copernicus… where does Marx fit in?

***p. 126 [MOP in Marx] Manifesto calls for living, present reality [see p. 240n Marx & Max’s deconstruction limited where they oppose spectral onto-theology to flesh-and-blood presence]

p. 132 Marx was obsessed (obsédé) by ghosts, he harassed (harcelait) the obsession

p. 140 Marx is not just pointing, “he’s taking the pulse of history,” “listening to a revolutionary frequency”

p. 141 Marx aims for head, for chief, for mask, for visor [figures of the ghost: faces]

——Marx perhaps as aware as we are of contamination of spirit (Geist) by specter (Gespenst), fatal anachrony, but he wants to be done w/ it

pp. 142-43 when Marx describes anachronistic dislocation (“there the words (Phrase) went beyond the content (Inhalt); here the content goes beyond the words”), he believes in the proper content, appropriate content

p. 143 Marx’s revolutionary injunction “let the dead bury the dead”, the imperative of an “active forgetting,” as Nietzsche would put it

——neither the dead nor the living (the “only living,” the immortal living, the gods) have buried anyone (Marx knows this) > il faudra toujours que des mortels encore vivants enterrent des vivants déjà morts

p. 144 acc. Marx, in social revolution of 19th century, anachronism will not be erased in plenitude, parousia, presence to itself of present, time still “out of joint” but properly so: no credit, no borrowed figures > [excess of untimely dis-identification that can never exist?]

——[Derrida asks about poetic difference of social revolution]

p. 151 Marx made fun of Stirner w/ “an ingenuousness that would like to appear feigned”

p. 153 Marx ends up trying to distinguish spirit and specter

——Marx wants to interrupt filiation to Hegel

p. 155 Marx insists on discerning, the price of the krinein of the critique: he’s out to get the specter, not the spirit, believing in a decontaminating purification, as if ghost were not haunting the spirit, as if iterability did not erase critical assurance of distinction btwn these 2 concepts

p. 157 polemic, hunt, counter-sophism (Marx as paradoxical heir of Plato), how does the counter-sophist remain immune to sorcery, tricks of the sophist, since he must know them?

p. 159 Marx critiques Striner for raising the ante (relance) of negativity, a rage for reappropriation, accumulating ghostly layers

——in denouncing Stirner’s “conjuring tricks” Marx risks “giv[ing] into the vertigo to which such tropics necessarily lead”

p. 161 “Marx denounces a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality” in Stirner when he names the body proper, the I, ipse, property (als die Meinige, als Mein Eigentum)

***p. 161 the first determining content of Marx’s promise is the wanting to be done with ghosts

p. 163 for Marx, “only this,” only practicality, work, production, techniques (see also p. 177) can get “the ghost”: “when one has destroyed a phantomatic body, the real body remains”

——[the “actual relations (wirkliche Verhältnisse)” must be dealt w/ once ghost has been exorcised]

p. 164 Marx opposes work [see pp. 161, 163] to Stirner's work of mourning, his hyper-phantomality, Marx determines differance or deferral as practical and as delay of reappropriation [he doesn’t eliminate death, expropriation, at heart of living—puts it to work?]

p. 165 to be done with ghost, to have it, to identify it, to situate it, see it, possess w/out being possessed, but to possess a specter, is that not to be possessed? [Stirner and Marx disagree over best way to put ghosts to death, same end—different means?] [Die Besessenen]

p. 167 Marx “deconstruct[s] what resembles a speculative edification [re: Stirner]” by suggesting the resemblance to Christ is an identification, Marx takes apart a “construction”

p. 171 Stirner brings forth concepts indeterminately, homogeneously, in “the dark element of a nocturnal obscurity,” what Marx calls a “Negroid state” (im negerhaften Zustande)

p. 174 Marx bound to his victim [Stirner] in a troubling fashion

pp. 176-77 Marx wants not to want same “thing” as Stirner: a ghost; occupied w/ exorcism of ghosts, ghost hunt > Marx’s endless chase, his deconstructive critiques boomerang, lacharnement s'acharne

——both Marx & Max [p. 161 critique of ghostly] wage war on whatever represents the body (prosthesis, difference, etc.) > “le moi vivant est auto-immune, ils ne veulent pas le savoir,” to protect life

pp. 177-78 Marx to Max: je my connais mieux que toi en spectres; le fantôme, ça me regarde > to conjure ghosts, il faut passer par lépreuve laborieuse du détour, il faut traverser et travailler les structures pratiques, les médiations solides de leffectivité réelle, “empirique” > in this time of the detour, you must accept relative autonomy of ghostly reality

——Marx will never be done w/ it, en sacharanant lui-même contre ce double, he risks going after his own ghost: a specter at once speculative & specular > so he counts, to close the account

pp. 178-83 in German Ideology, Marx’s 10 ghosts (revenants, Gespenst), ils se suppléent pour passer tour à tour lun dans lautre, chacun figurant un tour de lautre: 1) God 2) Das Wesen 3) vanity of world 4) die guten und bösen Wesen 5) das Wesen und sein Reich 6) beings 7) Man-God, Christ 8) man 9) spirit of the people (Volksgeist) 10) everything (“Alles in ein Spuk zu verwandeln), thus, we must stop counting

p. 184 Marx & Saint Max, heirs to Platonic tradition, associate image w/ specter, idol w/ phantasm, phantasma, eidola (Phaedo, Timaeus): living-dead, figures of dead souls > survival and return of living-dead as essence of the idol

p. 188 phenomenological good sense “may perhaps be valid” for use-value, or only for use-value, phenomenology of good sense, of perception (at work in Marx), of Enlightenment, has nothing mysterious about it, use-value as the proper of man

p. 200 before commodities, use-value intact, identical to itself [Derrida deconstructs]; p. 201 use-value as limit concept contaminated in advance

***p. 205 does Marx’s exorcism sign and seal the whole logic of Capital? however virtual, preparatory > is this conjuration ceremony, vital surviving oath, injunction, what puts Capital in motion, and part of the revolutionary promise?

——is the ghost just the effect of the market economy? as Marx says, a finite delirium, a madness that will come to an end? same for spectrality in general?

p. 209 as soon as there’s production there’s fetishism (idealization, autonomization, dematerialization, spectral incorporation, mourning work thus work)

——for Marx, all this co-extensive w/ commodity production; in our view, this is his gesture of exorcism

pp. 210, 243-44n for Marx, there’s a phantomatic objectivity before commodity value [?] product of labor petrifies, erects, hardens (feminine character of commodity-chimera?)

p. 215 for Marx, ghost is the autonomizing of a representation (Vorstellung) whose genesis and real grounding (reale Grundlage) has been forgotten

——to dissipate this factitious autonomy must take into account modes of production & techno-economic exchange

pp. 215-216 Marx wants to keep all fixed ideas in the head

p. 219 Marx should not have wished for the “dead to bury the dead,” and, in truth, he knew how to bring the dead to life

p. 242n all senses, for Marx, theorize, thus kill, create oppositions that need to be lifted (levées) by social practice

***VM ***VM p. 118 can a method be borrowed like a tool?

FWT FWT p. 81 Marx’s critique of ideology is a critique of the revenant > reproduces panic fear of spectrality, pursues, distances himself from, chases (away) the ghost

POOF POOF pp. 266-67 Hugo [re: humanist vision], like Marx, would like to swear (jurer) & abjure á la fois, on le voit à la fois accueillir et chasser, convoquer et conjurer le spectre, he would like to ‘let the dead bury the dead’ > Hugo: extinguishing of a people evaporating into fraternity

WM WM p. 216 inscription on coinage, scene of exchange btwn economic and linguistic > the 2 types of signifier supplement each other in problematic of fetishism in Nietzsche & Marx

——Marx on gold serving as symbol of itself, and that “nothing can serve as symbol of itself”

p. 216-17n Marx against etymologism (like Rousseau, Leibniz, Plato), rails against Stirner, who refutes communist abolition of property via etymology: essential “having” in Eigentum (property)

POS POS pp. 63-4 Marx, Lenin, Engels formulated differentiated/contradictory relation to Hegel insufficiently; still, must decipher this insufficiency by analyzing a heterogeneity

p. 106n Marx definitively criticizes use of master-words in German Ideology

SP SP p. 37 “question of style” always concerned w/ weight (le pesant) of pointy object (stiletto, stylus, rapier, quill), which attacks matter/matrix, leaving a mark

——also the protection against this threat, se pliant alors ou repliant, en fuite, derrière des voiles

PS PS p. 325n Artaud sometimes writes like Marx of 1844 Manuscripts: alienation & property

O O p. 21 dissemination disrupts circulation that turns after-affect of meaning into an origin [Marx’s commodity?]

p. 30 n Feuerbach wants to reclaim gravity of everything Hegel relegates to footnotes, everything that is against philosophy, that resists abstract thought

pp. 32-3 Marx avoids formal anticipation in his preface to Capital [?] asserts difference in form btwn Darstellungsweise (method of presentation) and Forschungsweise (method of inquiry)

pp. 37-6(n) Derrida makes a sweeping comparison btwn 6th song in Maldoror, Marx’s distinction btwn method of inquiry/method of presentation & Descartes’ theory re: synthetic method (demands assent, Principles of Philosophy) & analytic method (shows way, Meditations)

p. 49n Derrida not disputing la raison elle-même, the one (masculine) libido—“why not?” > to stand on head [call for feminine libido?] would put back/leave in place truth of phallocentric dialectic

DPi DPi pp. 175-78 Marx rails against purported reconciliation in phrase fraternité, a class calculation, as is the abolition of DP

***pp. 178-79 Marx, as he does so often, by reducing juridical/judicial phenomena so quickly/brutally to ideological & superstructural effects of class struggle, doesn’t take into account relative autonomy, duration, efficacy of the juridical

***TR ***TR p. 118 Derrida not sure if Marx’s thought and his heritage can be reduced to dialectic

AFR AFR p. 95 for Condillac, chain of signs is superstructural, & its principle is formal

SPEC SPEC p. 267 when French Heideggerians translate Abbauen as “to deconstruct,” or when Marx’s aufgelöst is translated as deconstructed: pass off the already-there (déjà-là) of a word as the anteriority of a concept > w/ Marx, “deconstruction” would be limited to “intellectual critique” of superstructures

p. 268 Marx makes little of ghosts, revenants [presages SPOM]

MARXISM/COMMUNISM

H pp. anne 72-4 utopias from Marxism to fascism, turning into ideology, use implacable logic of economic efficiency, they claimed to be against, a nostalgia for a timeless fixity “that would keep in its hands the means of its exercise”

p. 78 politics of redemption troubled from inside by an inhumanity that closes up around its obsession

FL p. 260 Benjamin grafted language of Marxist revolution onto messianism [see p. 263]: both announcing new historical epoch & beginning of a true history void of myth

p. 275 Marxist-Hegelian critique of violence in name of liberty, in name of what Benjamin calls formless freedom (gestaltlose Freiheit), are impotent, remain alien to juridical essence of violence, to “order of the law”

p. 298 Benjamin is too messianico-marxist, archeo-eschatological for me

SPOM p. 47 “Marxism” haunted by what it attempted to foreclose

p. 62 people are afraid of crypto-Marxists, of no longer recognizing “Marxism” [Derrida?]

p. 67 have Marx’s heirs helped us think about spectrality? yes and no, we must filter, select

——the most living part of Marxism puts the question of the spectral back “on the drawing board”

——by mourning Marxism we inherit it

pp. 72-3 in the Middle East, war of “appropriation[s] of Jerusalem” [is today the world war] mobilize “the most archaic and most modern spectral forces”

——re: these holy alliances, Marxism remains indispensable and structurally insignificant

p. 73 Marxism must carry with it a messianic eschatology

p. 74 eschatology of Marxist critique and that of religions cannot accept the epochē of the content, whereas, for deconstruction, it is essential to the messianic

p. 88 the latency period, gap, btwn heralded fall of “Marxist” dictatorships & their actual fall could not be represented, calculated, by traditional Marxist discourse and liberal discourse

——this is where a new thinking of historicity calls us beyond metaphysical concept of history and end of history, either Hegel’s or Marx’s

p. 90 Kojève: United states as “final stage of Marxist communism,” the end of “out of joint,” an “eternal present,” lannulation de lécart btwn desire & need

p. 93 Kojèvian Marxism: historicity begins after history

p. 95 deconstruction never been (non) Marxist, faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism > il y en a plus d’un et ils son hétérogènes [this can never be repeated too often (on ne le répétera jamais assez)]

p. 108 “fidelity to the inheritance of a certain Marxist spirit would remain a duty”

p. 109 “we” will not please Marxists, insisting on the spirt of Marxism as spirits in the plural and in the sense of specter, allowing untimely specters to come back

p. 110 certain spirit of Marxism., a critique which wants to transform, re-evaluate, self-reinterpret; this spirit distinguished from one that rivets to Marxist doctrine, to “dialectical method,” concepts of labor, social class, etc.

——must we cite Marx to say “I am Marxist,” “I am not Marxist”?

p. 112 Althusser tried to dissociate Marxism from teleology and messianic eschatology

p. 113 all of us heirs of Marx and Marxism, to absolutely unique promise which is in principle non-religious

p. 114 [Derrida on those who excuse Communist Russia as accidental corruption, still defend dictatorship of proletariat] necessary deployment of essential logic, effect of an ontological treatment of the spectrality of the ghost

p. 115 [Derrida gives a summary of how deconstruction (of proper, of logocentrism, etc.) would be impossible in pre-Marxist space, but that deconstruction avoids Marxist ontology, orthodoxy]

p. 209 we are affirming Marxism, however secret and contradictory it appears

p. 213 “good Marxism” must adjust the value of Marx’s ‘helpful’ theory of autonomization and automatization of ideality, but he still exorcises “the spectral simulacrum in an ontology”

pp. 231-32n deconstruction w/ & beyond Marxism > decons. doesn’t just radicalize, it questions the root & its presumed unity, the radical’s complicity w/ ontology

POOF pp. 81-2 compulsive droning of political “realism” that would refuse to read all the warnings & pleas of disjunction > what does it mean that, henceforth, ineluctable voice of necessity (its most responsible voice) resounds in this way [in disjunction, what has reality become?]?

pp. 84, 107n Schmitt’s Nazism as part of his lucidity, the courage of his fear, his attunement to all border-crossings he needed to repress > some surprising filiations btwn Marxist & Schmittian thought

***POR p. 16 (149) social sciences steeped in Marxist, Weberian, neo-Weberian methodology, they are controlled by the spaces they claim to analyze——same goes for Marx and Freud, en tant quils sont normés par un projet de pratique scientifique et par le principe de raison > even when claiming to be revolutionary, they don’t trouble the “most conservative forces of a University”

***EM p. 117 (138) anthropologism common ground of Marxism, social-democracy, democratic-Christianity

S p. 64 for Heidegger, Marxism’s falsification of spirit occurs w/ transformation of spirit into superstructural, powerless intellect, and, symmetrically, organization of people as living mass

VM p. 97 [for Levinas, against ontology, primacy > archia > chief > neutral] Levinas offers premises for non-Marxist critique of ideology

OH pp. 56-8 have courage for a new critique of capital that avoids Marxist intimidation

FWT pp. 79-80 [Derrida on his unique relation to Marxism, on being reduced to silence, chosen silence, on the significance, for French “logics,” of the strange Rue dUlm]

pp. 82-3 communism was perverted, Nazism was plan itself as perversion, accomplished

pp. 94-5 for Derrida, though communism can’t be reduced to crimes of Gulag, it must never be separated

POS pp. 48-9 “evolution” of “thought” a Marxist idea

pp. 62-3 never against Marx/Marxism, lacunae intentional, work still to come: not yet an adequate work on relation btwn Marx & Hegel (contradiction, dialectics, difference)

——Marxist texts [any texts, for that matter] not to be read hermeneutically, as if they have a finished signified lying beneath textual surface

pp. 71-5 Houdebine asks if a Marxist contradiction can be in strategic excess of metaphysical dualities, Derrida doesn’t believe Marxist text is homogenous enough to liberate these concepts definitively, advocates reading, analyzing sediment of “old names,” reading “Greek materialists”

OTO pp. 33-4 Nietzsche’s critique of journalism always linked to critique of cultural machinery of State and educational apparatus [Derrida reads this as striking re: media today] > Nietzsche’s critique would make “ideology” critique appear as symptomatic, degenerative, as new subjection to Hegelian State (but, there are many Marxist views of State, and one would also…)

PS p. 328n Artaud against surrealists bowing down to communists > wants real revolution

O p. 6 to remain content w/ reversal is to operate w/in immanence of system to be destroyed

WAP p. 30 “classes”—goes too fast [instead, Derrida says: certain groups or social circles w/ their dialects and subcodes]

p. 72 Derrida wonders, suspecting all forms of reproduction, even the concept of it, whether deconstruction can proceed with such a philosopheme, w/ “Marxist philosophy” [does Marx simply reproduce philosophical properness w/out posing problem of contradiction?]

p. 104 not so easy to say domination, mastery, is politico-economic—philosophical language can remain hegemonic, even when other forms of domination beat a retreat (battent en retraite)

pp. 109-10 that the “left” would not privilege teaching philosophy either (like current State)

RGE p. 337n via Bataille, consumption of [general economy’s?] excess of energy by a determined class is not the destructive consuming of meaning, it’s the significative reappropriation of surplus value w/in restricted economy > if sovereignty is absolutely revolutionary, revolution w/in restricted economy (reorganization of world of work, redistribution of values w/in space of meaning) is still a necessary phase w/in strategy of general economy

HLP p. 60 Derrida affirms vigilance we need against Hitler’s rejection of objective truth (valid for everyone), his privileging of myth over science [overvaluation of performative, the constative maligned]; but, this vigilance could also suspect “activist,” “pragmatist” interpretations of truth, any possibility of institutive/performative speech

pp. 67-8 though Marxist concept of ideology remains a negative topology, is fundamentally obscure, has theoretical limitations, it is very valuable, marks site/place beyond truth/lie structure

***TR p. 118 Derrida not sure if Marx’s thought and his heritage can be reduced to dialectic

IW pp. 288-89 for Cohen, political socialism corresponds to generalization of priesthood (Lutheran/ Jewish motif), and to messianism: German State, in its modernity, is priestly & messianic

——socialist policy: morality inspired by universal priesthood: Judeo-German messianism

PSSS p. 271 Freud: communism is an illusion, get rid of man’s aggressive inclination by guaranteeing satisfaction of all material needs

***+R p. 175 “left-realism” (codified simplification or politicist stereotype) annuls scientific event, squeezing out thickness of culture, ideological efficacity [opposite of formalism?]

C pp. 246-47 class is not lacking, it’s at work (series, lineage, rank, hierarchy, etc.) > but what doesn’t come under (nen relève plus) class is perhaps fate (le sort) > no classification table for fate

WOG p. 24 under the sign of difference (Foucault, Deleuze too), ‘We Other Greeks’ displaced/deformed (not reversed) an inherited dialecticism that had a Platonic origin before Hegelian, Marxist dialectic

BSi p. 77 Schmitt argues [and Derrida doesn’t (entirely) disagree]: Left uses hugely murderous weapon of “humanitarian,” “humanistic”

OG p. 332n writing’s instrumentalization, the suspension of being-upright (cf. FS, PS) > writing’s structural solidarity w/ capitalization [Rousseau, Engels, Court de Gebelin]

ATAP p. 80 West dominated by powerful program of ends: Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx (trying to forget differences btwn Hegel & Marx perhaps another eschatology of Marxism): end of Oedipus, of class struggle, of God, of history, of religions, of Christianity & morals (ça, the most serious naiveté), of subject, of man, of earth, of literature: in blood, fire, earthquake, napalm descending sky by helicopters, like prostitutes—the nuclear thunder & the great whoring

MASKS (SIMULACRUM)

LOBL p. 125 everything that preserves the dead: sculpture, mask, embalm

pp. 164-65 double hymen w/ each woman; each woman double, death mask, cast, ghost, body at once living & dead, of other > utterly other “in relation to” one another: each one is the other

SPOM p. 8 helmet effect (authority) needs visor effect

——both mask and helmet share the (supreme sign of) power: looking w/out being seen

p. 141 btwn spirit & specter, tragedy & comedy, difference of time btwn 2 masks

p. 192 for Marx, capital contradiction, contradiction of automatic autonomy: 1) inert thing [table] appears inspired, has pneuma or psychē 2) remains caught in heavy thingness of hulē

——autonomy the mask of automatism, visor hides absence of living gaze, automaton mimes the living, Thing neither dead nor alive, it survives, war machine, theatrical machine, mekhanē

AF pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin): origin of beautiful > memories of death

MPM p. 27 de Man: prosopon poiein, to confer a mask or face, “prosopopoeia is the trope of autobiography…by which one’s name…is made memorable as a face” > (dis)figuration

PP pp. 136-37 writing paints living word, painting (zōgraphia, zōgraphēma sometimes shortened to gramma), both interrogated by living word > masks, figurines, simulacra denature what they claim to imitate, writing & painting should aim at resembling/faithfulness to their model

p. 140 (160) knowledge, epistēmē, antidote: remaining measured against hubris, cet entraînment démesuré qui emporte lêtre dans le simulacre, le masque et la fête

pp. 149-50 pharmakon: perversion, makeup, masks

p. 168 “at once (à la fois):” identity is doubled as its simulacrum, phantasm, at once (identity of presence, presence of its identity, doubled as soon as it appears)

SH p. 58 poetry, literature, art, experience of the mask, an intense familiarity w/ ineluctable originarity of specter = ineluctable loss of origin > spectral errancy of words not an accident

DS p. 191 internal division w/in mimēsis, double of itself, destined to mime or mask itself, everything played in paradox of supplementary double

POS p. 43 Derrida’s undecidables, unities of simulacrum, “false” verbal properties that can’t be included in philosophical binary, but still inhabit it, resisting, disorganizing, w/out ever constituting a 3rd term, a solution: hymen, gram, incision, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, margin

OTO p. 7 masks (any theory of simulacrum) propose/produce themselves by returning a constant yield of protection, a surplus value as the ruse of life, ruse incurs losses once surplus value “does not return again to the living, but to and in the name of names, the community of masks” ——[cf. above]: “nothing ever comes back to the living”

p. 11 Dionysus vs. Crucified, name of versus, countername, suffices to pluralize (in a singular fashion) homonymic mask & proper name, to lead all threads of name astray in labyrinth (ear): proceed, then, by seeking out the edges, inner walls, the passages

p. 17 alliance in which Nietzsche seals/forges his signatures, and simulates them: demonic neutrality of midday delivered from the negative and from dialectic

RGE p. 256 Bataille’s “major” laughter laughs at a “minor” one—sovereign operation also needs life [?], simulates (as comedy) absolute risk: laugh at this simulacrum > pour se rapporter à soi dans la jouissance de soi > léclat du rire est ce presque rien où sombre absolument le sens

p. 263 in order to save what does not want to be saved (silence, play, absolute risk), must redouble language, must have recourse to strategies, ruses, simulacra, masks

DST DST p. 214 truth never resembles itself, withdraws, masks itself, se désister (never ceases)

HLP p. 70 one cannot think the lie itself w/out taking into account its survival to infinity, its radical perversion, and its technical mutations in simulacrum or iconic substitutes

TR p. 135 what is terrifying: what cuts me off from my own initiative [?] > automaticity discuplates & threatens “me”—quasi-excuses, ghosts of excuses, quasi-faults, spectral silhouettes of pardons: “as if” of this quasi, limitless risk of becoming simulacrum, virtuality

TN p. 35 Nancy: faceless mouth, structure of a mask

E p. 10 God has given himself to be seen in a spectacle, as if he masked/showed himself: an immense liberality which can only give itself to itself to be consumed [how can man’s freedom mimic God’s: by not resembling it?]

CIN p. 43 essence of cinder (its cinder itself): the insistent pharmakon of a plural body (doesn’t belong to itself) in which the retreat of fire disguises itself > if there is cinder, fire remains in retreat

BSi pp. 5-6 the wolf looms, fabulous animal, a fantasma in sense of revenant, wolf more terrifying when not there, a metonymic substitute come to announce/conceal, to manifest/mask

——a loup [party mask], feminine visor-effect: see w/out being seen

OG p. 35 (52) one must exorcise (that is, conjurer) writing (mask, perversion, disguise, debauchery) w/ the good word (bonne parole)

pp. 226-27 (322) via Rousseau, a written accent, “il ny a là quun fard (makeup) dissimulant le cadavre de laccent,” writing hides language, masks the already decomposed corpse of language

ATAP p. 83 still philosophical, onto-eschato-teleological interpretation to say apocalyptic strategy is fundamentally one, to say its diversity is simply masks, appearances or simulacra

SPEC p. 270 dialectics acquits itself [allays uneasiness] of double, opposes mask to original “in person”

MASTERY

KH pp. 114-15 in Timaeus, Greeks who have no writing (unlike Egyptians), need myth (destined to perpetual childhood) > memory of city, its salvation, entrusted to the writing of the other [who is the master here?]

GT pp. 155-56 several meanings of vous avez raison: 1) animal rationale (logon ekhon) 2) know how to count, account, principle of reason, we are men of knowledge, good narrators 3) our calculation has prevailed, we have controlled (arraisonné) (the other) by reasoning

MONL p. 23 master does not have exclusive possession of anything, only possesses, usurps unnaturally, rapes, colonizes through “unnatural process of politico-phantasmatic constructions”

p. 24 master thinks his “speech act” works

p. 30 people must yield to the homo-hegemony of dominant languages, the languages of masters, capital, machine

p. 62 political decision in writing & reading: inscribe undecidable (chance, terror) in ipseity of host, avoid temptation to make prior-to-the-first-language a language of the master (new master)

H p. anne 28 “thought is in essence a force of mastery…breaking up the unknown to possess it, shed light on it, name it”

p. 53 I want to be master of my house, ipse, to receive whoever I like there

p. 123 master: prisoner of his place and power

POO p. 144n identifiable institutions stabilize, arrest turbulence, master, order, to be able to make decisions, to be able > literature is exemplary in the face of this, it always does something other, something other than itself: for example: philosophy (literature & philosophy)

SPOM pp. xvi-xvii the address “I’m going to teach you to live,” from lips of master, father to son > hesitates btwn address as experience, as education, as taming or training (dressage)

p. 65 dominant discourse [re: Marxism]: hegemony & “incontestable self-evidence,” testimony, regarding it: 1) public space of testimony: a) political b) mass-media culture c) scholarly, academic culture 2) to speak of dominant “Marxist” discourse is still to speak in Marxist code

pp. 68-9 we can inherit via Marx idea that there’s hegemonic forces represented by dominant rhetoric & ideology w/out supporting his idea of superstructure or (self-)identity of social class

POR p. 10 (139) principle of reason (Satz vom Grund) tells us to protect [dominant] relation of ob-ject before a subject that says “I”, and is assured of presence

——Heidegger’s caricature of principle of reason: hard, unblinking eyes (dominating, raping)

p. 14 (146) for Heidegger, principle of reason depends on delivery (Zustellung) of atomic energy > all Stellen (Vorstellen, Nachstellen…) characterize information tactics of modern technology

——information most economic, clearest, fastest, instructs men about safeguarding (Sicherstellung) their needs, ta khreai > computers, data banks, constructed on basis of this calculable language: all this, via Heidegger, assures man’s mastery over earth [Derrida can’t elaborate on this point]

MPM pp. 152-53n de Man: against Schlegel, Hegel on irony’s mastery, way it rises above finite determinations

EM p. 113 (133) interest in universality of anthropos a sign of West’s attempt to interiorize, master what’s different from it, leffet de cette différence dun tout autre ordre, where philosophical colloquium has no meaning, this other space neither barren, nor desert-like

PP p. 96 “no absolute privilege allows us absolutely to master its textual system [re: use of pharmakon in Plato]”

p. 97 the “drug” side of pharmakon creates surprises for those who try to manipulate it as master/subject

p. 114n (130n) Isocrates: sophists should pay since they are in need of such help from masters of logos

p. 167 “Platonism” rehearses “family scene” while also trying to master it, to conceal (dissimuler) it by drawing curtains over the dawning of the West

——transmission of dialectical mastery of pharmaka from father to son disrupted by family scene that constitutes & undermines passage btwn pharmacy & house

VM p. 147 following Levinas, what would a language w/out phrase offer the other? a master who forbids himself the phrase gives nothing, has no disciples, only slaves

PAS PAS p. (34) female voice in Pas wonders if Derrida [?] will show economical mastery, render himself untranslatable in the proposal (propos)

p. (50) certitude, mastery, puts limits on madness, uses Witz, this slavish, economic vulgarity (of our epoch), masters what occurs in blank spaces [btwn 2 pas], condenses davance (in advance)

——psychoanalysis already warned us, Witz always denies relation to other, always apotropaic

pp. (50-1) Blanchot unleashes what Witz contains or denies, a transparent, neutral, impassive surface of language of writing, beyond/before les lignes de rupture ou de front (psychoanalysis, literature, philosophy, political practice/thought)

——Derrida would praise him for this if that were not another kind of mastery

p. (60) mastery, getting by too well, je men tirais trop bien, does not allow chance of event, must be disabled, wrecked, for something other to happen finally: the best & worst > la dérive [Blanchot’s] guards against security, anchorage, property and against, perhaps, ce qui arrive, le pire ou le meilleur, venant den face ou de labîme [?]

p. (65) Derrida questions himself about whether he hides a new economy, new mastery behind the undecidable > [responds] nothing that doesn’t expose itself & remove itself

p. (79) assimilating interiority of mastery can also be terrible thus compulsion toward outside could be defense > sauf le dehors, tout sauf le dehors

p. (80) diabolical duplicity works with mastery in mind, lays traps in labyrinth, sees staircase as a space to lay traps, not as spacing of its very own pas?

VP p. 8 “ideality is the salvation or mastery of presence in repetition” (this is why Husserl claims intuition is not reell), not a presence of anything that exists in the world, in correlation w/ ideal acts of repetition [idealization secured by a certain relation of “existent” to his death]

pp. 64-5 the complicity of idealization and the voice are unfailing: brings monstration [?] to completion; unity of phonē and technē, voice as technical mastery of the object, via objectivity of object > the ideal object can be repeated, to infinity, while remaining the same

p. 66 voice’s immediate erasure, its diaphaneity, makes phoneme most ideal of signs

p. 67 phoneme gives itself as mastered ideality of the phenomenon

OH p. 18 every history, history of a culture, has a telos (promise, memory) toward which it dreams of gathering itself > anticipation & telos; and every history cannot be identified in advance, unanticipatable, non-masterable, that of which one has no memory

FSW p. 197 repression of writing, the writing interior to speech contained outside it, repression of that which threatens presence > mastering of absence

TC p. 238 no project of mastery will have leveled theater of cruelty in advance

T pp. x-xi philosophy and mastery of the limit, relever

p. xix resistance to deconstruction: infinite mastery > assurance of Being & interiorization of every limit as being, as its own proper

pp. xix-xxii two types of mastery (phallocentrism, logocentrism): 1) hierarchy [Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger] 2) envelopment [Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel] (whole in each part), system, encyclopedia, circle, homogeny

——as long as the tympanum of philosophical mastery is not destroyed, all liberties (denegation, precipitation, ignorance, or stupidity) one takes w/ philosophical order will remain activated a tergo by misconstrued philosophical machines > called back to order

FWT p. 63 treatment of animal: logocentrism > proffered the discourse of hegemony: of mastery

p. 93 is Bataille’s sovereignty still theologico-political like Hegel’s mastery? > both are sacrificial

WM p. 224 concept of concept cannot not retain gesture of mastery

DS p. 230 critical desire, philosophical desire, tries to regain mastery, reads hymen acc. this or that species of presence

OS p. 65 only presence is mastered, trace (is) that which eludes mastery

P p. 80 reserve, savings, stock: self-protection of the work (ergon), binding (Verbindung) of energy, condition for “mastery” of pleasure-principle

***pp. 80-1 le se-protéger-de-oeuvre (ergon), énergie captée, bordée, condition for mastery of PP, self-protection of energeia > energeia not as pure, total presence (prime mover), but as (par)ergon against what’s lacking in it, lack not as a substantial emptiness, but as impossibility of arresting differance in its contour, in a pose, of localizing lack, like metaphysics does, in its proper place: castration as truth > whether parergon borders (works against) free energy or essential lack, the 2 determinations sont le même (métaphysique)

p. 113 acc. Kant, pleasure of knowing (which once existed in a time immemorial [absolute past in a Critique?]), a pleasure of the same—mastery of dissimilar, reduction of heterogenous

POS p. 14 to risk meaning nothing is to start to play, enter play of differance which prevents any word, any concept, from summarizing or governing from a theological presence, centralizing the movement and spacing of differences

pp. 90-1 cannot expect “efficacity” of theory/praxis of deconstruction to be immediate, deferred acc. complex networks > regional “effects” of this trembling have a nonregional opening [to the, in the, “general text” (which is neither a reflection nor an effect)] > no pretention to mastery

p. 106n Marx definitively criticizes use of master-words in German Ideology

ROP p. 13 acc. Foucault, that which has already been mastered can no longer be mastered

p. 69 what happens when you apply chiasmatic invagination of borders to analysis? to its phallogocentrism (dominance of master)? > can psychoanalysis belong to anyone, anymore?

pp. 117-18 Derrida concludes by putting words (modestly) into Foucault’s dead mouth: il aurait renvoyé dos à dos la maîtrise et la mort, cest-à-dire le même, la mort comme le maître

ATIA p. 18 staring at his cat, Derrida wonders if this is the same abyss, same vertigo, as when God waited for Adam to name the animals, this awful tale of Genesis, who was born first, before the names? who has remained the despot?

p. 100 for Kant, “dignity” of man, his autonomy, his autotely, his capacity for moral autodestination (Selbstbestimmung), for moral autobiography > this is his privilege, assures Herrschaft

p. 130 Lacan designates castration complex as Freud’s scientific (nonmythological) original sin (being subjected to the signifier, a nonmastery that gives human mastery over animals)

p. 132 divinanimality, quasi-transcendental referent, sacrificed/disavowed foundation of what it founds: justice, symbolic, human order [brings Levinas & Lacan close] > difficulty of uttering discourse of transcendence/mastery e: animal in the name of God/Law

***p. 136 no human, no animal, no God has mastery over erasure of trace, nor power to “judge” its erasure

DIF DIF p. 4 the capital “a” of differance, a pyramid [A]; Hegel: body of sign is Egyptian pyramid > Derrida moves from pyramid to tomb, oikēsis > tomb of proper, familial residence, economy of death (this stone announces death of tyrant [cf. TN.]) [this tomb can’t even be made to resonate]

p. 7 strategically differance seemed most proper one [?] to think/master, though maintained w/in structural limits of mastery

p. 27 to know there’s nothing kerygmatic [not a master-name] about differance, we must perceive its decapita(liza)tion > must put into question the name of the name

O p. 5 no speculative dialectic of same and other can master “difference” (economy of mark-erasure, trace) because such dialectic always remains an operation of mastery

p. 21 neither formalism nor thematism can master irremediable structure of gap btwn empty form/full meaning: will miss it in attempt to master it

DPi pp. 238-39 alleged mastery over limit btwn life/death organizes every calculation btwn dead & living, presupposes ability of giving death, mastering instant of death; calculable credit we grant to “death” indexed to set of presuppositions in which “capital punishment” finds a place of inscription where it’s indissociable from murder & suicide; if we can’t master instant of death, one could neither talk of murder, suicide, DP…

pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

CHM pp. 31-2 re: his relation to Foucault: interminable unhappiness (unhappy consciousness) of disciple > master might be absent

——must break the mirror, the glass, infinite speculation on master: start to speak

RGE p. 254 Lordship’s putting at stake of life (mettre en jeu, Daransetzen des Lebens) has meaning, it’s a moment in constitution of meaning, presentation of essence, truth

——for history (that is, meaning) to form a continuous chain, to be woven (se trame), master must experience his truth (éprouve sa vérité) (must stay alive once raised above life)

p. 255 servile condition of mastery & entire history it makes possible > absolute privilege given to slave, truth of the master is the slave: deferred pleasure, limited stakes, delaying disappearance of thing (labor) > the condition of history/meaning/philosophy/discourse

Gii p. 40 since, for Heidegger, essence of hand is not in its prehension, it’s also not in Hegelian grasping of Begriff, taking hold by mastery/manipulation > what is hand’s essence?: the gift, give w/out taking anything

PIO p. 37 Leibniz, modern politics of invention: master the aleatory

RM p. 62 for Heidegger, Metasprache and Sputnik are the same, monstrous project of father, of metaphysics (mastery of form for form’s sake)

PF p. xxxiii performative mastery: neutralizes & annuls event

TR pp. 146-47 paradoxical antinomy of performative & event, the former neutralizes event in “I can” of mastery: vulnerability/finitude of body & corpus is limit of performative power

WAP p. 69 by naturalizing [the classroom] one neutralizes, conceals (dissimule), an active machinery, the structures, constraints, forms, settings (cadres), the parergonal, by which the dominating mastery, not neutral at all, centers itself: il n'y a pas de place neutre ou naturelle dans lenseignement

p. 104 not so easy to say domination, mastery, is politico-economic—philosophical language can remain hegemonic, even when other forms of domination beat a retreat (battent en retraite)

p. 168 hegemonic belatedness (retard-hégémonique): [presence, glory, of the empire after its demise?]

AFR p. 78 [re: Condillac’s ambiguity of 2 imaginations] major strategic operation of mastery is to control ambiguity & risks, the strategy is almost mastery itself

——mastery, if there is any, does not exist: it must possess what is not, never itself

p. 110 Condillac’s move from perception to imagination (and from one sign to another): on the march toward freedom, spontaneity of auto-affection > teleology: the complete sign, the true sign, is the instituted sign [after rupture, process magnetized toward greatest mastery possible]

——mastery is the institution of arbitrary signs entirely at our disposal or control

PSSS pp. 240-41 death drive (Todestrieb), cruel drive of destruction, annihilation, but also cruelty in Bemächtigungstrieb (drive for power, sovereignty, mastery)

p. 258 mastery, sovereignty (Herrschaft, Bemächtigung), linked to a drive for power, possession, an “I can,” a performative power (Bemächtigungstrieb), via sworn faith (organizes Lacan’s symbolic), indissociable from Bewältigung (exercise of power, movement of appropriation)

p. 276 “I can,” “I may,” mastery of performative, dominates/neutralizes (in order of “symbolic,” symbolically) the event it produces

D pp. 351-52 column is not, passage of dissemination, “phallic” significance of column is a semic effect, reflection on 4th surface (described center, represented mastery of dissemination); “is”—procures calm, consciousness of ideal mastery > operation of 4th surface

——column has no being, belongs to no one

C p. 238 contingent can do w/out discourse, a masterpiece can’t do w/out a cartouche (on the market & in itself: if you insist on this distinction) > even when the cartouche remains, is defunct: pas de cartouche, plus de cartouche > what will have been able to do w/out it? never touched, aussi impassible et invulnérable quaux harcèlements du trait: cest peut-être quil était déjà dans la tombe, le cartouche

LI p. 107 iterability at once condition/limit of mastery: entame it

p. 149 Derrida’s uneasiness about using words “force” and “power” [eg. Foucault’s micropowers]—he has 3 conditions for using them: 1) no power/force, only differences of power/force (like Nietzsche) 2) realize the greater force could be the “lesser” 3) account for fact that force/power quickly trapped in ruses of mastery

ATM p. 147 the trap of obeying Levinas in restituting nothing, one becomes deaf to his obligation, but it only feels like a trap when inclined toward mastery, when one pretends to escape from absolute dissymmetry

E p. 22 the ultimately disgusting is unrepresentable, lexclu absolu, if one could name or represent it, it could enter auto-affective circle of master/reappropriation > must be insensible too (unnameable, un-intelligible), the absolute other of the system [Derrida compares this structure to that of the colossal]

AD p. 18 via Benveniste, hosti-pet-s: links hospitality & ipseity, like 2 sovereign powers > “guest-master”

p. 45 hospitality (feminine par excellence) that precedes property can’t be appropriated, arrives before the master

BSi pp. 29-30 ipseity: king, father, husband, master

p. 31 for Freud, thanks to technology, mastery over nature, man has become a “prosthetic God”

p. 67 master-self, sovereignty (positionality of self: thesis), ipsissimus (the absolutely himself)

——sovereignty, in minimal, strict sense, always a moment of dictatorship: a performative verdict, a Diktat, has no account to render other than to itself (ipse)

p. 68 Benveniste: dem-pot(i)-[skr.], “master of house,” power of oneself [ipse as sovereignty]

p. 205 Valéry [in Monsieur Teste] tries to neutralize/master Unheimlichkeit [see BSi pp. 200-01 in

CAP(ITAL)

]

p. 283 zoos profitable to knowledge and economy [physiocratic theory of economy]

——nomos of oikos: taming, training, the domus of the dominus > oikonomia also general condition of ipseity as sovereign mastery over beast

p. 318 Heidegger asks how logos became Herrschaft (sovereign, master) over Being

OG p. 106 (156) ontotheology of logos (par excellence w/ Hegel): powerless, oneiric effort to master absence by reducing the metaphor w/in absolute parousia of sense/meaning (sens)

p. 139 ethics of speech: delusion of presence mastered

***p. 165-66 (236) auto-affection, universal structure of experience, being capable of being affected by other, capable of symbolizing, another name for “life,” the as-for-itself or for-itself: subjectivity—gains in its mastery of the other to the extent that its power of repetition idealizes itself (s’idéalise) > the external, the signifier, becomes my spontaneity, and escapes me less and less

p. 286 (405) phonic auto-affection permits the epoch of man, epoch not of history but as history: greatest possible mastery, liberty, self-presence of life

——[in spite of Hegel’s follies, Derrida here affirms that concept of history is a concept of philosophy, that history is the history of philosophy]

***UWC p. 235 necessary to dissociate unconditional independence (of thought, deconstruction, Humanities, justice) from any phantasm of indivisible sovereignty (mastery)

SPEC p. 317 mastery of PP [grand (-père) spéculateur], mastery in general, Herrschaft distanced from PP only to reappropriate itself: tauto-teleology makes other return in domestic specter

pp. 317-18 death drive, w/out contradicting PP, hollows it out, older, not an other mastery (Herrschaft), but other than master, tout autre (not dialectically opposed to PP as life, living, alive)

p. 325 drive for mastery (Bemächtigungstrieb), beyond PP [?], plays a strangely erased role (what’s the difference btwn a drive and a principle?)

p. 348 PP as author or as authority, it/he only increased by dissidents speaking against it

——PP loses mastery w/ flooding (Überschwemmung), psychic apparatus no longer seeks pleasure, occupied only w/ binding (binden) excitations, w/ “mastering (bewältigen)” them

p. 351 tendency to stricturing (binding, mastering) foreshadows PP w/out being it, everything en différance de stricture > repetition itself > but there never is repetition itself > allure of this more or less tightened lace

p. 382 normal repetition: idealizing interiorization, mastery (Hegel, Husserl)

pp. 392-93 PP, mastery w/ no regional limit, all other mastery (politics, etc.) derived form it

p. 395 no relève of PP—not Hegelian [since PP always master?] > in fact, function of PP, (postal) binding, determines interpretation of Aufhebung

p. 400 the démesure shared by pleasure & unpleasure must be interrupted by PP > PP must weaken both to achieve mastery, takes its profits in moderation

pp. 400-01 PP (the master) is not master > pleasure, the great speculator, calculates w/ effects of aphrodisiac stricture (Socrates wanted nothing to do with proper name of Aphrodite)

pp. 402-03 s’il faut se rendre à ce quil faut echaîner strictement [if it’s necessary to submit to what must follow strictly] re: le mot de maîtrise, going beyond oppositional logic—is there mastery?

p. 403 Bemächtigungstrieb, drive not reduced to other drives, takes place in others, quasi-transcendental privilege, donner, prendre, envoyer, destiner, transcendental tautology

——drive to dominate: drivenness of drive

p. 404 Laplanche & Pontalis compare Bemächtigung (power, possession, domination) to Bewältigung (violent exercise of power) > the “posts” are always posts of power (i.e. dynamics of sadism are dynamics of power)

——Freud asks how sadism can be deduced from Eros if it tends to destroy the object

pp. 404-05 auto-heterology of drive for postal power, more originary than, independent of, PP > the only one to permit definition of death drive, an original sadism

——beyond the pleasure principle—power: that is, les postes [erection, position & delay]

FV p. 453 [proper] address of letter: law that binds King & Queen

——there are only ostriches, the more one presents one’s rear, the more one is master: can’t avoid being plucked (laisser plumer)

MATERIALISM

SPOM p. 212 figure of absolute hospitality: strange, familiar, inhospitable > quasi-transcendental “messianism,” materialism w/out substance, materialism of the khōra for a despairing “messianism,” a curious taste of death, a foretaste (avant-goût), curious of what it conjures

MPM pp. 52-3 “original materialism” in de Man > matter w/out presence, w/out substance

PAS PAS p. (80) political consequence of “materialist theses,” which still mark time (piétinent) in metaphysics [link to nihilism]

POS p. 64 Derrida is “materialist” to the extent that matter in Bataille’s general economy designates radical alterity

pp. 64-5 realism, sensualism, “empiricism” are modifications of logocentrism > and “materialism” is often invested w/ ideas of reality, presence, plenitude, content

p. 65 “matter” problematic when it reconstitutes “transcendental signified,” becoming ultimate, classical referent, absolutely anterior to work of the mark (or is this simply political strategy?)

p. 66 insistence that matter, via Bataille’s general economy, is absolute exterior of opposition, is necessary, is related to essential strategy of “materialism,” yet “materialism” must avoid becoming a new “idealism,” adopting naive relation to referent or signified

pp. 67, 106n in critique of interiority/subjectivity must be careful not to “objectify” reassuring outside, or to make heterogeneity of “matter” a new transcendental, whether it be that of the Law, or the (appeasing/cruel) Element of the mother (Freud on mother/matter relation)

——matter as differential substitution would have relationship w/ mother as much as it would w/ death, phallus, excrement, semen, infant (everything not subject to rèleve)

p. 75 Democrites’ rhythmos as writing & rhythm, a materialism before Marx [?], repressed, silenced, ontologized by Plato

IF p. 301 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] philosophy as vast circulation, unending procession of received ideas > insofar as encyclopedia generates/preserves ideas, it carries w/in itself its own necrosis: idea always becoming-matter (from 1st instant) > hence stupidity of philosophy (easy to stereotype), hence impertinence of materialism & spiritualism

MATERIALITY

FSW p. 210 agreeing w/ Saussure that signifier/signified two sides of same paper, originary writing must still produce space & materiality of sheet itself

——it is the materiality of signifier that is relinquished in translation > when materiality is reinstated, translation becomes poetry

——since materiality of signifier constitutes idiom of dream scene, dreams are untranslatable

p. 219 pure words and pure things: “theoretical fictions”; words can be treated as things because of spacing, materiality of mark

F p. xxxvi encrypted, coded text written on crypt is not written on a pre-existing partition, the partition is the material of the text

DS p. 207n deconstruction’s ceaseless dissymmetry (i.e. what Hyppolite calls Mallarmé’s “materialism of the idea”) works alongside possibility of deconstruction’s neutralizing moment, the “logic of the hymen” is neither negatively neutral, nor neutral at all

pp. 253-54 supplementary “blank,” in marking itself, intervenes btwn all series, prevents semantic seriality from closing itself, cest encore lui qui libère des effets de série > makes us take agglomerates for substances

ATIA p. 125 Lacan’s materiality of speech/corporality of language

CHM pp. 32-3 the hermeneut, the analyst, must first know language of patient, the immediate materiality of sign (move from sign to signified, obvious meaning to latent)

TR pp. 75-6 mechanistic materiality w/out materialism or matter (p. 80)

p. 113 no archive w/out body (Derrida prefers “body” to “matter”)

p. 136 machineness (machinalité): materiality that’s not necessarily a corporeality, programming, repetition, iterability, technicity (cutting off from living subject)

p. 146 subjectile, very body of event, archival and auto-deictic body [re: Rousseau’s Confessions]

——revelation of truth nothing w/out saving body of inscriptions

pp. 146-47 paradoxical antinomy of performative & event, the former neutralizes event in “I can” of mastery: vulnerability/finitude of body & corpus is limit of performative power

pp. 150-51 de Man’s materiality: not physical but prosaic resistance to any aesthetic form, not something, nothing, yet it works, materialism as formalism in this materiality w/out matter

——resistance of letter (force of resistance w/out material substance) affects body: dissociative, dismembering, disseminating [materiality w/out matter, formality w/out form]

pp. 151-52 textual event inseparable from formal materiality of the letter

p. 153 isolated from its rhetoric [its tropes], grammar is purely formal—de Man: radically formal, mechanical > no text can be produced w/out this formal, grammatical element

——de Man’s materiality strategic/fictional not metaphysical

p. 154 de Man associates his “materiality,” concept of textual event, w/ deconstruction & dissemination

——materiality: useful name for that which resists appropriation

p. 156 de Man: text as body (always retraceable to metaphor) displaced [deconstructed] by text as machine, in this process suffers loss of illusion of meaning [dis-figuration, de-metaphorization]

pp. 158-59 materiality would imply the effect of arbitrariness, machinelike value of arbitrary > the event supposes the arbitrary [tension btwn machine & event]

D p. 290 Soller’s Numbers is exemplary re: the reader, cette fois enfin, the text shows (montrée) that a reader cannot choose his/her place in a text > does so by composing surfaces retournées & par une mise en scène matérielle exacte

TN pp. 77-9 Levinas’ language is hostage to rhetoric as he describes what Derrida risks calling quasi-messianic: “not yet, from a future never future enough” where “caress aims at the tender”

——“exorbitant ultramateriality,” “paroxysm of materiality”

FV p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

p. 464 for signifier to be kept (pour que le signifiant se garde) in its letter—no partition (if divisible, always can be lost en route) > materiality—indivisibility—idealization—point de capiton (staples signifier to signified) [?]: Lacan determines letter (no matter what he says) at point of its meaning (ideality): letter escapes partition, movement [no wonder he calls this “materiality” “odd”]

MATHEMATICS

OOG p. 27 math-object the exemplary object of phenomenology [see OOG in PHENOMENOLOGY]

POR p. 18 (152) acc. Aristotle, math developed in Egypt due to leisure time enjoyed by priestly caste

PP p. 109 memory contaminated by its first substitute, hypomnēsis > Plato dreams of memory w/ no sign, no supplement, no pharmakon, in realm of mathematical intelligibility [?]

VP p. 80 for Husserl, “subjective” adverbs (here, there, above, below, none, yesterday) function as subjective and occasional expressions just like word “I”; these are different from contingent expressions which have plurivocity, and objective expressions which are absolutely pure of contamination: mathematical expressions

PPHS p. 88 Leibniz’s project w/ mathematical writing, formal symbols, algebras, pasigraphies, hieroglyphic or ideographic writing do not “refer to the voice,” the word (vox) [see pp. 96-7, 102 Hegel believes Leibniz led astray by Chinese model, hieroglyphics]

p. 105 Hegel critiques mute writing, released from voice, thus he critiques mathematical symbolism, operations of formal understanding

——acc. Hegel, silence of writing, space of calculation, interrupts movement of Aufhebung, interiorization of past (Erinnerung), history of spirit

WM p. 220 can there be a mathematical metaphor?

p. 227 difficult to think math provides metaphors because it is not attached to ontic region and has no empirical sensory content [is math metaphorical in field of transcendental apriori?]

P p. 25 acc. Hegel, natural/mathematical sciences [unlike aesthetics] need no introduction: their object is determined/given in advance, and the method it requires

POS pp. 34-5 grammatology must liberate mathematization of language (which phonocentrism has always critiqued, for limiting that which links logos to phonē), but must be wary of Leibniz’s type of unifying, simple, mathematical language, which appeals to divine logos

p. 35 math always been model of science

OS p. 59 Aristotle differentiates numbering # [actual #] from that which can be numbered (horse, man, time), time thus not a mathematical being

p. 61 like “point: line,” now as limit (peras) is only time’s accident, time not thought on basis of now, thus mathematization of time has limits (always accidents/potentialities) [taken in all senses]

GSP p. 157-58 Husserl refuses to believe #s/math fall from heaven, pure Platonic idealism, but also refuses, when subjectifying math, to explain #s via “psychologism”: 1) distinguishes # from concept, psychological artifact 2) math irreducible to psychological temporality 3) designates an intentional dimension of objectivity, which no psychological genesis could institute [Frege would call this possibility a bloodless specter (blutloses Gespenst)?]

p. 158 Derrida gives an account of how Husserl navigated Scylla and Charybdis of logicizing structuralism and psychologistic genetism re: mathematical/logical synthesis

p. 162 exactitude of math vs. rigor of eidetic descriptive science (inexact or “anexact”) > phenomenology cannot be closed: infinite idea (in the Kantian sense) keeps open > this idea is the production of exactitude [essences of phenomena possibility of closure? cf. 322n]

O p. 13 preface like math, formality exterior to concept [Derrida is the greatest mathematician]

p. 13 for Hegel, preface has some affinity w/ math: a machine devoid of meaning or life

p. 21 for Hegel, math’s method is alien to concept, to truth’s self-movement

pp. 21-2n Hegel: math has for its Stoffe dead space & lifeless numerical unit

p. 23 Hegel: formalism as superficial analogy, empty application of formula, not inner life of self-movement (Selbstbewegung)

pp. 23-4 for Hegel, taxonomies, structures, formalisms offer dead limbs—et autres tableaux that pin down the living to death (épinglant le vif à mort)

WAP pp. 47-8 Kant links mathematics’ apriori w/ concept of right

CHM p. 49 intelligible generalization (math) submitted to hyperbolical doubt through fiction of evil genius

pp. 52-3 “at the same time” marks hyperbolical moment w/in natural doubt; “nevertheless” marks absolutely hyperbolical moment leading to hypothesis of evil genius > possibility of a total madness > subverts clear/distinct ideas, mathematical truths which escape natural doubt > madness will spare nothing this time [cf. pp. 50-1]

AFR pp. 47-8(n) Derrida defends Condillac against Foucault’s assessment of a “deficiency,” “epistemological myths” > perhaps Condillac’s maintenance of calculus & genesis resists a classical opposition; Derrida then notes [re: relevance to scientific modernity]: imaginary upsurging of one epistēmē, its finitude, table, sets terrain for theory of general epistēmē, which makes table its determining norm [see Bennington’s Scatter p. 11]

pp. 65-6 Condillac: genius can only prosper when language is not defective, when it’s easy/convenient, when a language has fixed principles—this is an epocha of great men

p. 83 that math can be a model for analogy: unlimited generality of principle of analogy

pp. 83-4 for Condillac, philosophers who were geometers (the least mathematical) think too synthetically (contra analytically) (Leibniz, Descartes, Mallebranche), Locke was not a geometer

IW p. 287 Rosenzweig speaks of Cohen breaking free from Hegel (by returning to Kant): math [which guides Cohen here] generates its elements not from empty nothing of 1 and universal 0, but determinate nothing of differential, a particular nothing [Derrida adds: Heidegger too]

D p. 304 mathematicogenetic theory of groups: [if this were intended to mean anything] nothing prior to group (no originary unity prior to division)

C p. 201 arithmetic compulsion and la narration comptable in Sade’s 120 Days, part of the fun > its regular cadence, rhythmic operation: to excrete excrement, swallow it, en escompter la jouissance

LI p. 104 that the dependency-relation of writing to speech is different “in mathematical & logical symbolism” is essential argument for Derrida re: deconstruction of phono-logocentrism

OG pp. 9-10 (20) ideality of math, graphie, already questions “signifiant sensible,” never been absolutely linked to a phonetic production

EU p. 32 “land of romance,” universal language, completed Babel > Aristotle, Plato: math as universal & common science w/out object

pp. 32-3 Descartes: universal mathematics, most necessary & easiest science, most universal science (unrestricted to particular subject matter), others sciences are branches of math

pp. 60-1 for Kant, math as “construction” of concepts, recourse to pure sensibility (pure receptivity of the given) > math only rational science that can be learned [i.e. philosophy is rational but can’t be learned]

p. 67 for Schelling, originary unity precedes opposition sensible/intelligible, math resembles philosophy, math belongs to world of reflected image > analogical translation btwn philosophy/math assured by symbol (Bild) > symbolicity developed in play of Abbildung, Einbildung

p. 70 for Schelling, math is different from philosophy: the latter provokes/challenges translation, whereas math solves or annuls translation problems

MEANING

EM p. 134 (161-62) Derrida’s attention to system and structure, la réduction du sens, neither restores classical motifs nor erases them > rather, determining possibility du sens on basis of “formal” organization which in itself has no sens: a critique [sic] of phenomenologies (Husserl, Hegel), which aspire for une réduction au sens

SEC p. 314 careful use of “ideological” in relation to Condillac: theory of sign as representation of idea, which represents a perceived thing; communication vehiculates a representation as ideal content (which will be called meaning); writing as species w/in genus of communication

pp. 318-19 Husserl on possibility of absence of referent: 1) “sky is blue” is understood w/ out presence of sky 2) absence of signified, possible crisis of meaning: a) manipulate symbols b) statements can have meaning w/out objective signification, i.e. “square circle” c) Sinnlosigkeit or agrammaticality, i.e. “green is or,” “abracadabra”

——Husserl uses above to rigorously dissociate sign or expression (Ausdruck) as signifying sign from a sign meaning something (bedeutsame Zeichen)

p. 320 Husserl’s interest is in purely logical grammar not pure grammar > “the green is or,” unacceptable in context determined by a will to know, still signifies an example of agrammaticality

——in French “le vert est ou” can become “le vert est où” or “le verre est où

p. 329 semantic horizon exceeded or punctured (crevé) by dissemination not polysemia

VM p. 125 would return to intentional phenomenon acquiesce to violence of fact, is there thus an irreducible zone of factuality, an original, transcendental, preethical violence? > would it be tied to phenomenality itself & possibility of language? embedded in root of meaning & logos

VP p. 76 the more the signifier is ideal, more it augments potency of repetition of presence, the more it protects, preserves, reserves and capitalizes on sense

pp. 83-4 knowledge as norm, intuition adequate to its object, already opened by promise, telos, in truth, the pro-visional [difference btwn intuition/intention] as essence of meaning (vouloir-dire), discourse adheres to discursive essence when false, attains its entelechy when true

——“pure logical grammar,” le sens nattend pas la vérité insofar as it expects it (en tant quil lattend)

p. 88 differance thought prior to or from presence tells us to interrogate presence w/in closure of knowledge > it must also be thought otherwise: dans louverture dune question inouïe nouvrant ni sur un savoir ni sur un non-savoir comme savoir à venir, approaching that on basis of which sa clôture announces/decides itself: openness of this question doesn’t belong to system of vouloir-dire

FSW p. 213 distinction of force & meaning is derivative in relation to archi-trace

PPHS p. 88 for Derrida, contents of semiology cannot be exhausted by the metaphysical theory which regulates bedeuten (meaning) by the telos of speech

SH pp. 24-5 in shibboleth (river), there’s suspension of meaning, almost opposite of phenomenological “epokhe,” which preserves meaning > those who couldn’t pronounce “shi” marked themselves as unable to remark a mark thus coded

p. 31 Babel w/in a single language, shibboleth marks multiplicity in language, insignificant difference as condition of meaning

——insignificance of language, takes on meaning in relation to a place (border, house, threshold) > formation of alliances, codes, contracts

p. 49 poet is provoked, constituted, by the hour, its caesuras > poetic rhythm or spacing at heart of origin of meaning, meaning of language

F p. xxxii via Abraham and Torok, no meaning can come into being w/out topography

——Abraham and Torok: topos & force attempt the impossible, to grasp through language source from which language emanates

WM p. 228 signifier as sensory metaphor & signified as meaning (sens) use same root (sensus, Sinn) > what permitted the sensory to be removed from the senses?

p. 233 for Aristotle, onoma can be both verbs & nouns, anything that has phōnē sēmantikē, anything that has intelligible meaning outside syntax, not a syncategorem [see p. 234n on Leibniz]

p. 236 Fontanier: prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs not tied to substantive idea, just ways of seeing

——Aristotle: noun as element of metaphor, first semantic unity, smallest signifying element, composite phōnē sēmantikē, each of its elements are insignificant (asēmos) w/out meaning; noun is different from verb only in atemporality

pp. 236-37 Aristotle’s definition of noun, the element of metaphor, is a theory of the name, articulated w/ ontology > value of metaphor systematically chained to values of discourse, voice, meaning, resemblance, or to logos, phōnē sēmantikē, sēmainein, onoma, mimēsis, homoiosis

p. 248n for Aristotle, poet (man of metaphor) is btwn sophist and philosopher: multiplies meaning, not for sake of deception, but to return to identity of meaning; philosopher finds truth of meaning, beyond signs and names

p. 266 most invariable characteristic of concept of metaphor: unity/continuity of meaning dominates play of syntax, subordination of syntax

DS p. 184 concept of history has lived on possibility of meaning, on past/present/promised presence of meaning & truth > outside this system, concept of history reinscribed elsewhere, strategically

pp. 254-55 thematism leaves out formal, phonic, graphic “affinities,” ignores play that takes word apart > thematism gathers semes linked by meaning (or signified concept)

p. 261 “sure revelation of meaning” > hymen w/out fold, marriage w/out difference

p. 284n [Derrida comes back to i] reads little point as a decapitation right next to castrated pike > capital I (disseminates unity of meaning), ego, ice, échoplus-je > (I + Dé)irisation

OS p. 51 question of meaning (sens) always posed w/in closure of metaphysics: sens (meaning, essence) governed by ousia as presence, as act, as end of movement, energeia (the sens of time thought on basis of present as nontime, as Being)

p. 52 for Bataille, process of preserving meaning is “vulgar”; Heidegger would agree [?]: meaning linked to metaphysical closure

pp. 54-5 via Aristotle, a now cannot co-exist w/ another now, its double, can only succeed it: only a single, same now can coexist: this is meaning, sense itself, united to presence

POS p. 32 metaphysics always attempts to uproot presence of meaning from differance

pp. 33-4 from perspective of expressivism, text is nonsignifying, from perspective of differance, text produces all signification, “only nonexpressivity can signify,” “interiority” of meaning already worked over by its own exteriority

p. 56 metaphysical concept of history: meaning developing itself in straight, circular line

GSP p. 155 phenomenologist as “true positivist”: self-effacing before originality, primordiality of meanings > faithful comprehension of phenomenologist dispels shadow of a choice (might even say Husserl attuned to historicity of meaning, possibility of its becoming)

p. 165 in late Husserl, [quasi-Hegelian teleological reason] movement of meaning can only be a norm/value not essence

FS p. 5 in structuralism, content (living energy of meaning) is neutralized by form > they’ll say this is the author’s responsibility before the critic’s

p. 10 to write is the impossibility of making meaning precede writing: it is to lower meaning while elevating inscription

p. 11 it’s because writing is inaugural that it is dangerous and anguishing, doesn’t know where it’s going, essential precipitation toward meaning that it constitutes—is its future

——meaning must await being said/written in order to inhabit itself [Husserl teaches this]

pp. 12-3 attempt-to-write, moment of overflow (can’t be understand via voluntarism): when play of meaning overflows signification, which is always enveloped by limits of nature, life, soul

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

p. 49n signifier sublated in process of meaning (the signified) > Hegel’s dialectic

p. 50(n) logos spermatikos, philosophy of the seed, romanticism, myth of semantic depth, genetic pro-gram [quoting from OG]

TB p. 133 sacred text is transferability making its translation untranslatable

——sacred text (absolute text): pas de sens (not poverty of meaning, but no meaning that would be itself) > sacred text surrenders itself to translation; commands right away the translation it refuses

CHM pp. 53-4 all discourse, philosophy, must escape madness in fact/principle if it is to have intelligible meaning (discourse must carry normality w/in itself) > not a defect linked to determined historical structure but essential universal necessity > the meaning of meaning

——subversion of madness as natural comfort, prephilosophical confidence

pp. 307-08n Freud’s latent content as danger to all historians of meaning [cf. p. 44]

***——all history can only be the history of meaning

——no history except of rationality/meaning: reappropriation of negativity—or forgets it (same thing) > history of truth, history of economy of negative: negativity not positive truth is the nonhistorical capital of history

RGE p. 254 Lordship’s putting at stake of life (mettre en jeu, Daransetzen des Lebens) has meaning, it’s a moment in constitution of meaning, presentation of essence, truth

——for history (that is, meaning) to form a continuous chain, to be woven (se trame), master must experience his truth (éprouve sa vérité) (must stay alive once raised above life)

pp. 255-56 conservation of Aufhebung: circulation & self-reproduction as reproduction of meaning

p. 256 a laughter that never appears, exceeds phenomenality, the absolute possibility of meaning

pp. 256-57 that there must be meaning, that nothing must be definitely lost in death, that Hegel refers to death as “abstract negativity” > Bataille finds all this laughable: submission to self-evidence of meaning, to its imperative, to its work, to its deferred enjoyment, to its seriousness

——this submission is essence & element of Hegelian ontologics

——le comique absolu, cest langoisse devant la dépense à fonds perdus, devant le sacrifice absolu du sens: sans retour et sans réserve

p. 259 Aufhebung collaborates w/ Errinerung (interiorizing memory of meaning)

p. 259 Kant & Hegel revealed most permanent philosophical determinations of negativity (truth, history, meaning, time, ideality) > their revolution: taking negative seriously, giving meaning to its labor

pp. 262, 265 servility/work as desire for meaning, techne as unfolding of truth > how writing of lordship (which seeks to maintain trace) becomes writing of servility (for Bataille)

p. 270 writing of sovereignty and general economy are similar: 1) both sciences 2) both relate objects to destruction, w/out reserve, of meaning > neither are sovereignty itself, “this loss,” but the “relation to the loss of meaning”

p. 275 Bataille designates (as never before) the transgressive relationship that links world of meaning to world of nonmeaning

Gii p. 41 everything Heidegger says about man takes on meaning and value w/in oppositional limit to animal (it is dogmatic and serious)

——man’s hand infinitely removed from prehensile organs through the abyss of its being “durch einen Abgrund des Wesens

——this abyss: speech & thought

EJQB p. 74 the encounter (rencontre) is separation (breaks unity of Being by welcoming [accueillant] other into source of meaning) > contredit lalogique,dans le fragile chaînon du est

——only possible to say this by conceptualizing meaning, which is exile from Being, Being never is, never shows itself, never present, is never now

p. 75 “entre le chair trop vive de lévénement littéral et la peau froide du concept court le sens

D p. 350 moment of present meaning: their “content” only surface effect into which you tombez sans cesse, fascinés by appearance

HST p. 384 for Levinas, when I mourn, I feel responsible, I murder: “my own,” those I believe I killed, I love > ineluctable empire of phantasm at origin of meaning [Blanchot also links thought of death to murder]

C pp. 230-31 [la cartouche is a cartridge] dissemination of cartouches/cartridges (en tous sens, en tout genre) never exhausts a total > no total of meaning and genres (masculine/feminine)

LI pp. 64-5 [re: Sarl and I] our common and minimal code has been the existence & effects of the code > [from SEC] context as protocol of code, mark doesn’t have meaning outside context—there’s only contexts w/out any center, absolute anchoring (ancrage)

p. 150 always repression in stabilizing determination of a context, repression at origin of meaning, an irreducible violence > can’t say it’s “bad”

TN p. 55 as if “touch in itself” were touching blood [Nancy’s self-expulsion] > rapport entre le sang et le sens, entre lecoup de senset lecoup de sang’ [sens, sang, cent, sans]

OG p. 325n (47-8n) Martinet suggests replacing unity [bias] of word w/ “syntagm” (nothing to do w/ meaning), “group of several minimal signs” or “monemes”

p. 57 (84) unity of sound & meaning (sens): reassuring closing (fermeture) of play

p. 89 absolute parousia of literal meaning: presence to self of logos w/in voice

p. 107 (156-57) Rousseau: figurative language initiates and proper meaning is discovered last > eschatology of proper (self-presence, self-proximity, own-ness)

FV p. 423 letter has no proper meaning, volante, volée; Lacan claims the letter isn’t content w/ having meaning > Derrida intends to show that w/ Lacan the letter is content to have one meaning, and one alone

pp. 490-91n meaning of letter not important for Lacan? false! no one would worry about it if it didn’t have a determined meaning > meaning of letter for Lacan: betrayal of a pact

MEDIUM

DS p. 211 medium: 1) middle, btwn extremes, neither/nor 2) element, ether, matrix

MEDUSA

PP p. 105 (119) written traces don’t belong to phusis, not alive, or belong to Heraclitean phusis, in which truth takes shelter in its crypt (à sabriter en sa crypte) > “cryptogram” is a pleonasm

——acc. to king, pharmakon hypnotizes life of memory, taking it out of itself (la faisant sortir de soi) by monumentalizing it: médusée (medusad)

PAS p. (76) isn’t the thought of la paralyse a thought of the obscene Medusa? good for laughter too

F p. xlviii paelontologist médusé devant larête dun mot-chose, like a tomb burning in the grass, double-edged stare of a 2-faced Medusa (le double tranchant dun biface)

O pp. 40-1n to understand this network [Derrida has just proliferated footnote w/ gratings, columns, squares, stones and poisons from Maldoror] by way of “this is that,” one would lose about everything in the expectation (pour attendre)

——pierre dattente, pierre dangle, pierre dachoppement auront, dès la porche de la Dissémination, mais aussi plus tôt, muni le trébuchet, encombrant lexamen du lecteur médusé [glut the gorgonized reader]

——[Derrida proceeds to link the stone to the phallus and then to Freud’s Das Medusenhaupt, what if the phallus has no center?]

——if “assumption” of castration is same as denial of it: “apotropaics would always have one more surprise up its sleeve (plus dune suprise)”

——dissemination “threatens signification” [not “threatens castration”]

REST pp. 335-36 shoes sheath (gainent), to what profit, what sex? an undone stricture of laces, the girdle too, perhaps allows (donnerait) to be seen [Derrida quotes Balzac describing a naked, living, female foot protruding from a canvas—visitors médusés]

AFR p. 135 [re: need to desire, desire as end w/out end] moment stone (statue) comes to life, works to reduce gap, (not) become dead again—contrary to frivolous distraction, to headstrong identity of signs: fear of Medusa, legitimacy itself [fear of frivolous = fear of Medusa?]

D pp. 289, 358-59 liminary question, Medusa, stone, flange, pierre dangle et dattente (cornerstone, toothing stone) > other enumeration, squarely written, remains in reserve, undecipherable

+R p. 163 rigor/joyous severity of trait, petrifying (médusante) impassivity of line > disjunction works on any equality, unhinges, interrupts, truncates > “integrity in dispersion”

C p. 242 cords, laces, Medusa’s snakes

TN p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 308 Nancy: epopteia, sight accomplished, consummation of Mystery of Sense Certainty, phallic & cephalic

——Nancy: epopteias only face—Medusa

BSi p. 186 Celan: the artist turns nature to stone, “be a Medusa’s head” (monkey, automata, art)

p. 251 Medusa as capital head—erection, castration

MELANCHOLY

F p. xxxvi Wolf Man’s crypt not melancholic crypt, doesn’t shelter his own object, but illegitimate object of another [his sister] > if cemetery guard lacks ownership of the tombs, at least he’s entitled to position, Wolf Man is in position of guard as proxy [pp. 199-20n position as guard has been mortgaged, Derrida haunted by this word, this “death pledge”]

FWT p. 79 “melancholy” [re: communism, Althusser], interminable/irreducible “half-failure,” structurally defeatist behavior

ATIA p. 18 give in to melancholy, risk domestication: project/write/overinterpret the sentence of the silent animal, assign it words it has no need of

pp. 18-20 in avowing his desire to avoid appropriative projection before animal’s gaze, to avoid tradition [Benjamin, Heidegger] that assigns deep sadness (Traurigkeit) to animal’s Benommenheit (inability to respond to name it’s given, inability to experience being “as such”)

——for Benjamin, animal/nature not sad because mute but mute because sad: not the sadness of passivity, of not being able to name, but of receiving ones name > a foreshadowing of mourning

——every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

p. 146 Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts begins by describing philosophy, metaphysics, homesickness and melancholy as forms of nostalgia

FS p. 5 like melancholy for Gide, structural criticism only possible after defeat of force: a reflection of the constituted, constructed: historical, eschatological, crepuscular

p. 28 Apollonian ecstasy cannot embrace force, movement which displaces lines, nor force as desire for itself, nor writing > fallen Dionysianism, melancholy, nostalgia

MEMORY

KH p. 116 [re: a logic of living memory in Timaeus] effacement (of secondary impressions) would be the figure for the middle (mil-lieu), both for space and time, would not affect originary impression (that of child), ineffaceable once engraved in virgin wax

***——what about a virgin wax that is always virgin, always older, preceding any possible impression, and thus younger, achronic, anachronistic [cf. SW pp. 322-23]

MONL p. 8 before any memory writing destines itself to anamnesia

p. 16 artifice and precariousness of citizenship appear better when it is inscribed in memory as a recent acquisition

p. 31 surging wave [déferlment déchainé] of anamnesia that the double interdict unleashed > invent one’s language and “I” at the same time

FL p. 248 “task of historical and interpretative memory is at the heart of deconstruction”

——responsibility before memory is responsibility before the very concept of responsibility that regulates the justness of our behavior

p. 253 memory of undecidability must keep a living trace that forever marks a decision as such [is that possible? does that mark its death?]

p. 261 don’t confuse Heidegger’s Destruktion w/ “destruction” at heart of Benjamin’s thought sought, but both sought condition of an authentic tradition & memory

***H p. 155 narratives of hospitality testify without end in our memory

AF p. 35 w/out transgenerational memory (2 types: ancestral or biological), there would be no question of memory or archive

p. 42n [re: 2 def. of circumcision] 1) symbolic substitute of castration of the son by primitive father (structural) 2) “conducting fossil” for investigating memory of heritage (historical)

LOBL p. 117 I slice barbarously, illegitimately, as we always do, counting on implicit contract, impossible contract, that you’ve read “everything,” that you know the whole corpus by heart at every moment, w/ living heart that beats unceasingly (sans arrêt), w/out pulsation

OOG pp. 102-04 Husserl & Joyce: two ways to achieve Hegelian endeavor to interiorize memory of culture

SPOM p. xviii to learn-to-live w/ ghosts, in commerce w/out commerce of ghosts

——being-with specter a politics of memory, inheritance and generations

p. 36 memories don’t recognize borders btwn ghosts of different generations, revenants pass through walls

p. 45 opening of the future is its memory

HERP p. 201 philein, love, gathers Kampf, polemos, Auseinandersetzung in the memory of a lost homology

MSUB J p. 166 “the property of a theme is what an expropriation has deprived us, and it is as if we had been deprived of our own memory, distanced from our own birth”

MPM p. xix memories so overwhelming, we prefer to be alone w/ them

p. xxiv Mémoires: changes from singular to plural, ungenders

p. 3 Derrida, lover of memory, never knew how to tell a story, never received gift (doron) of Mnemosyne, the wax imprint, an eidolon [Derrida has a relation to memory beyond the imprint?]: keeps the memory loses the narrative

pp. 10-1 if memory maneuvers btwn law and Being, can one think the being and law of memory? these questions move through transference & translation, above abyss; require impossible passageways: “the fragile resistance of a span” [hymen?]

p. 19 de Man’s affirmation of memory, an alliance or ring more ancient, secret, resistant than familial or strategic alliances it makes possible, but is never reduced to

p. 20 ”yes” commits w/ no content must repeat itself: yes yes, must bind itself to memory for memory, if anything’s to come from future [alliance btwn memory and seal of yes, yes]

p. 29 finitude of memory, formed by trace of other in us > approach or remembrance of future (memory of mourning, mourning of memory)

pp. 31-32 experience at heart of memory (Being & law), memorial, memoirs, mournful in essence, contracts itself together in impossible affirmation of mourning [affirmation is possible]

p. 33 possibility of death of the other in-forms any relation to other & finitude of memory

p. 34 we come to ourselves through memory of possible mourning, knowledge older than ourselves, de Man might say: unreadability of mourning

——inconsolable [infinitely responsible] before finitude of memory: [want memory to be infinite?] possibility of impossible commands whole rhetoric of mourning, describes essence of memory > w/ dark light of this nothing (death of other) we learn other resists closure of our interiorizing memory [Freud’s “normal” “work of mourning” (ideally, quasi-literally devouring body/voice of other)]

——mimetic interiorization not just fictive, is origin of fiction, takes place in a body, makes place for body, soul, “ours” > death constitutes and makes manifests limits of me, us, obliged to harbor something greater than us w/in us

p. 35 Erinnerung: memory & interiorization

p. 38 Mnemosyne, mother of all muses, living source of inspiration—technique always feeds off Mnemosyne

——Gedächtnis calls itself beyond interiorizing memory (Erinnerung), beyond inclusion of part in whole, thinks itself as a “part” which is greater than “whole” > trace beyond mournful memory

p. 49 memory name of something preserves an essential & necessary relation w/ possibility of name

p. 50 “in memory of” both proper name and common noun (nom et nom), death reveals a proper name could always lend itself to repetition (in absence of bearer) becoming a common noun

pp. 55-6 de Man, via Hegel: memory effaces remembrances, like “I” effaces itself [I forgets I at beginning of sentence], “I cannot say I”

p. 56 inscription of memory effaces interiorizing recollection, not because of external limit or finite limitation of memory, but because of [allegorical] structure of relation to Other (see p. 29)

p. 57 de Man: illusion that continuity can be restored by act of memory another moment of transition

pp. 57-8 de Man talks failure & negative, Derrida says failure of memory is not failure and negativity a power > creates discontinuity & distance

p. 58 where Derrida’s memory differentiates from Hegel’s: no link btwn Wesen & Gewesenheit, the present doesn’t pull from a past that was present, but a trace never present

——what if ontological difference is translated into rhetoric of memory? or vice versa?

***pp. 58-9 “there is only memory—past does not exist”

p. 60 de Man on Baudelaire: représentation du présent [re: memory of present] combines incompatibility of repetitive & instantaneous pattern (tension); Baudelaire faithful to seduction of the present; for him, memory applies more to present that past

p. 60 memory of present divides the instant? inscribes difference in presence of present?

——difference btwn simple present and presence of present is never present > arises only for memory

p. 61 Baudelaire: “by plunging into past may lose the memory of the present,” “the stamp time imprints on our senses” “representation,” “time,” “memory”…opening perspectives of difference and distance in the uniqueness of the moment

——time, memory: nothing other than figure of the marks that efface anteriority of past, “memory of the present” marks itself > only memory can recognize differential “stamp,” mark, signature, that relates a present to presence itself

p. 65 memory w/out memory (thinking memory); Gedächtnis w/out Erinnerung (symbolist introjection), not re-animated in the interiority of consciousness

——Gedächtnis [w/out Erinnerung], a thinking memory, engagement beyond negativity, a reaffirmation of engagement, a memory that has mourned the dialectic (which is mourning itself), memory w/out mourning, rigorous fidelity of an affirmation, barely “amnesic”

p. 86 I can’t tell stories so I turn to myth > Mnemon: an auxiliary, a technician, artist of memory, hypomnesic servant [Derrida?]

p. 92 Heidegger: is memory a container for thought [Gedachtes]? or does thinking rest in memory [Gedächtnis]?

p. 104 the 2 masculine values (singular or plural) of mémoire always suppose spatial inscription whereas la mémoire, even pluralized, does not

p. 105 Montaigne: “good memory is scriptural, it retains its figure” vs. writing, hypomnesia, marks engraved w/in memory as on paper

pp. 106-07 to distinguish Gedächtnis (thinking memory) from Erinnerung (interiorizing memory) de Man marks irreducible link btwn memory & technical dimension of memory (art of writing, hypomnesic, exteriority of Mnemon, archivation, data banks, artificial memory)

p. 137 there is no beyond-the-undecidable, remains to be thought, incalculable order of tout autre, there is no inside-the-undecidable, but an other (singular) memory calls us w/out leading us back to any anteriority > there never existed an older, more original “third term”

p. 140 memory w/out anteriority cannot become a Heideggerian theme

PP p. 91 pharmakon of writing is hypomnēsis (re-memoration) not mnēmē (living, knowing memory)

p. 109 space of writing, space as writing, opens in violent movement of surrogation, difference btween mnēmē and hypomnēsis.

——memory contaminated by its first substitute, hypomnēsis > Plato dreams of memory w/ no sign, no supplement, no pharmakon, in realm of mathematical intelligibility [?]

p. 112 (128) Plato imitates the imitator to restore the truth of what they imitate: that is, the truth itself [i.e. both Plato and sophists advise exercise of memory]

p. 122 what species of protection (amuntērion) is the dialectic? counter-poison that’s not antidote [?] > acc. Plato’s Stranger, 2 forms of artificial (poiein, protection), of the 2nd form: 1) antidote either human or divine 2) problēmata (shield, fence), either armaments or fences, fences (clôtures, phragmata) can be screens (alexētēria) or protections, finally garments, art of weaving: problematic space of protection

——[anamnesic] dialectic as antidoteness of antidote, passage btwn human & divine, before their division, also dialectic as science of sumplokē [see p. 67], art of weaving (tissage), if there are 2 sorts of texture

p. 111 (126) opposition btwn mnēmē and hypomnēsis institutes all oppositions of Platonism, the boundary line is major decision of philosophy, maintains, institutes itself, contains its fond advers

OH pp. 47-8 nationalism always a philosopheme, justifies itself in name of a privilege in the memory of the universal, of the transcendental, of the ontological > no one is more universal than the one that is we; cosmopolitanism & nationalism have always gotten on together

p. 70 via Valéry, people who read are responsible for, respond before, turn memory into “solid value,” create an absolute surplus value, increase of universal capital, “world’s wealth” increases

VP p. 47 for Husserl, imagination neutralizes memory, it is a non-“positing” representation, keeps w/in itself primary reference to an originary presentation; pure ideality to which neutralization provides access is not fictional, thus Husserl’s beef w/ Hume and his fascination w/ Hume

p. 55 for Husserl, primary memory and primary anticipation are non-presences, non-perceptions, required for presence of perceived present [retentional memory is perception?]

pp. 57-8(n) [way and reasons why Husserl separates retention (still in the now) from a secondary memory]

FSW p. 201 memory is essence of psyche for Freud; differential forces [à la Nietzsche] become psychē and mnēmē

p. 206 Freud: what is unique about my memory-traces (Errinerungsspuren), memory is present several times, at least 3 registrations (Niederschriften): perception, preconscious, unconscious

p. 214 Hegel, Plato, Proust perhaps, believe past present can be awakened in its truth

pp. 227-28 Freud’s Writing Pad (machine) can’t run of itself (like living memory of Plato), a dead complexity w/out depth, multiplicity of layered surfaces

——“life as depth belongs only to the wax of psychical memory,” Plato’s mnemic writing

p. 330n Freud: memory renews by itself its means to action (unlike photograph)

PPHS p. 87 Hegel: German language bestowed direct kinship btwn Gedächtnis and Gedanke

p. 87n Hegel: creative memory, mnēmosynē, freely bestows on sign a value that only has value conferred on it by spirit > [because sign is arbitrary, unlike symbol, it resonates w/ spirit, solely]

DS p. 190 mimēsis imitates a mnēmē (a past present) > “hope,” anamnesis (future as past present due to return), the preface, the anterior future (future perfect) arrange things

p. 191 internal division w/in mimēsis: 1) Plato often disqualifies mimēsis 2) Plato links anamnēsis to alētheia, and it is very hard to separate mnēmē from mimēsis

p. 193 mimesis commanded by process of truth 1) mimēsis presents thing itself, the physis that produces itself, it is the movement of phusis (which prefers the crypt), is linked to mnēmē, which unveils, un-forgets 2) or mimēsis sets up homoiōsis or adaequatio btwn 2 terms, a face-to-face, imtator/imitated, faithful imitation will efface itself by restoring freedom of true presence

p. 200 mimodrama is described as anamnesis by Mallarmé, but in reference to a past never present [ABSOLUTE PAST]

p. 211[summary of what Mallarmé achieves] reference w/out referent, fiction that’s not imaginary, lustre where “medium” is shining, mimicry w/out imitation, only traces, announcements, souvenirs, avant-coups et après-coups

ROP p. 70 I love memory, how else can one love?

WAP p. 5 an institution remembers, it is made for that

DPi pp. 148-49 memory/archivization engage suffering body in a machine, technical repetition, Mnemoteknik, must cause suffering, red of fire before red of blood > for N., punishment is not juridical: it’s a movement of life, writing to remember, inscription, imprint past in body

PJP p. 163 le parjure forgot to remember the duty of memory (infinite at every instant), memory must be an ethical obligation [I did not think that I had to not forget]

p. 166 “re-mind”: already a mnemotechnics at heart of & not outside the thinking of thought [cf. Nietzsche’s On the Genea]

TN p. 35 isn’t the heart memory? isn’t it thinking of/as memory? ego touches its heart? we’ll guard the cardiogram of this cardio-logy > ghostly revenant at heart of (self-)feeling

OG p. 70 trace, arche-phenomenon of “memory,” prior to oppositions nature/culture, animal/humanity [Levinas, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud]

p. 84 Leroi-Gourhan invokes notion of program, not a recourse to differentiating man from animal but understood in cybernetic sense (only intelligible via possibility of trace): far beyond “intentional consciousness,” makes grammè appear as such > a “liberation of memory” (reading machines, electronic card indexes) that enlarges differance and possibility of putting in reserve: constitutes/effaces conscious subjectivity, its logos, and its theological attributes [baby daddy]

pp. 204, 344n (292, 292n) teach by example or explanation? but will the child do it by heart or memory? is there virtue in imitating virtue? [Kant, Rousseau]

MEMORY-FUTURE

R p. 86 structure of a promise: the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now

FK p. 83 no to-come w/out iterability, w/out heritage & possibility of repeating, w/out messianic memory and promise, messiancity more originary than all messianism, opens the worst

AF p. 98 when stones speak, when desire is revealed as a memory, moves us into the future

SPOM p. 25 is a day infinitely foreign to vengeance [w/out it], heterogeneous at its source, to come or more ancient than memory itself? impossible to decide, today: “the time is out of joint”

p. 45 opening of the future is its memory

p. 221 watch over a future in memory, this time, of an impure “impure impure history of ghosts”

——“intellectual” of tomorrow, “scholar” of future should learn justice from the ghost, should learn to speak to the ghost (if even in the other w/in oneself)

POR p. 20 (154) chance of an instant, Augenblick, a wink, blink: desire for memory & exposure to future brought together in same instant > guardian faithful enough to keep chance of a future

——(155) can one keep chance? can one keep both memory & chance? je suis plutôt tenté de penser que lune ne se garde pas sans lautre, sans garder lautre et sans garder de lautre [double guard of university]

MPM p. 20 ”yes” commits w/ no content must repeat itself: yes yes, must bind itself to memory for memory, if anything’s to come from future [alliance btwn memory and seal of yes, yes]

p. 29 finitude of memory, formed by trace of other in us > approach or remembrance of future (memory of mourning, mourning of memory)

p. 35 il faut: one must follow the trace, remember that which did not exist, the law [Being and law], only there in the aporia of mourning and prosopopoeia: 1) success fails: other becomes part of us, bear him in us, like a future 2) failure succeeds: aborted interorization, respect for other as other, other remains alone, outside us, in his death > schema makes true mourning impossible

p. 58 for de Man, memory of traces of a past never present, which always remain to come—from the future, this promise of resurrection of anterior past, is a formal element, place where fictions & figures are elaborated

pp. 58-9 if a past does not exist, no more does death—only mourning, figures of death, we inscribe in every trace (otherwise called “survivals”)—because they outlast us, trying their luck, in advance, “in memory of” [see p. 87n inexistence of past/death not futility/illusion]

***p. 66 promise of the other (for the future, trace of the future) made to the other as an absolute past, the other’s sur-vival exceeds the “we” of a common present: brings together two friends, “incredible scene of memory,” written in absolute past; dictates madness of amnesic fidelity, forgetful hypermnesia, gravest and lightest

p. 145 disjunction of memory & promise is the law, the text oNYlaw, the law of text

pp. 146-7 [re: de Man closer to Heidegger than he thinks] for Heidegger, memory too, like promise, gathers near what can come, toward the “future” > es gibt never gives anything in present, it calls as a promise; Heissen (“to call, ” “to command” > entrust, keep safely)

A p. 34 absolute arrivant, no more commands than commanded by memory of originary event where archaic is bound to final extremity (telos, eskhaton)

OH p. 35 responsibility: making a chance of the memory of a name, of the idiomatic limit > an opening of identity to its future

pp. 52-3 word “avant-garde” [see pp. 25, 48-50]: capitalizes on figurehead, phallic point, advanced initiative of guarding, anticipating to conserve, thus “avant-garde position”

p. 78 democracy to-come not a Kantian regulative idea, not a certain future, but a democracy that has structure of promise > memory of that which carries the to-come here and now

VP p. 88 what “begins” “beyond” absolute knowledge: unheard-of thoughts, sought across the memory of old signs

POOF p. 100 as long as brothers remain faithful to memory of their fathers (specters of their fathers of noble birth), they are bound by testamentary tie (recalls their truth, truth qua political truth), a monumental memory that inaugurates truth as much as it recalls it

——obligatory bond of memory forms condition of their [the Greeks] political freedom

D p. 329 imperfect, certain aorist, certain unlimitedness, “unreachable double bottom (double-fond insaisissable)”: past of an anterior future, future of an anterior past

p. 334 cited text, prior past still to come

EU pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

——provocation to think brings together in same instant desire for memory & exposure to future

MESSIANICITY

R p. 86 to-come: democracy does not exist, never present, not because deferred but because aporetic in its structure (force without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality, indivisible sovereignty and divisible or shared sovereignty, a despairing messianicity)

p. 88 democracy to come inscribed in axiomatic of messiancity w/out messianism

***p. 91 “to” of “to-come” wavers btwn: imperative injunction (call or performative) and patient perhaps of messiancity (nonperformative exposure)

——the two haunt each other, are each other’s alibis, withdrawing into the secret of irony, of which democracy gives the right: to fiction and literature

——messianicity that at once interrupts and accomplishes intrinsic historicity [re: concept of democracy]

***MONL pp. 60-2 the monolingual is promised [an eschatological or messianic horizon this promise can’t deny, or can merely deny] one language that’s forever deprived, the monolingual is aphasic, thrown into absolute translation

p. 68 promise [of which I speak], promises the impossible, possibility of all speech, yields no messianic, eschatological content [saves nothing]; yet resembles messianism, soteriology [addressed to totally other, finite mortal, w/out hope], structural opening: messianism w/out messianicity

METAPHOR

HASD pp. 35-6 khōra as metaphor—woman (1st strategy); khōra as negative theology (2nd strategy): Derrida favors 2nd strategy because it calls attention to possibility beyond metaphor

EM EM p. 131 Being is nothing, not a being, cannot be said, cannot say itself, except in ontic metaphor

pp. 131-33 (157-60) if Heidegger has radically deconstructed domination of metaphysics by the present, by leading us to think presence of the present, this thinking can only be metaphorized, and can’t simply decide to escape a profound necessity, language it deconstructs

——[here Derrida shows limits of Heidegger’s deconstruction?] prevalence given to phenomenological metaphor (phainesthai, shining, lighting, clearing, Lichtung) opens to space of presence, presence of space, opposition near & far > thought prior to opposition space & time, opening of a spacing which belongs to neither, dislocates while producing presence of the present

PP PP p. 65(n) histos (1. standing up of a mast, beam of loom; 2. weave 4. spider web, honeycomb of bees) of metaphor, metaphor of histos

p. 81 in metaphor “father of logos,” the “father” needs logos, would receive more from logos than it would transmit to it [p. 80 no thought of father w/out logos]

p. 81 “father of logos” a hearth which is the heart of all metaphoricity, not a simple metaphor

p. 149 soul-inscription, inscription of truth in soul, uses a metaphor [Plato admits it] that philosophy will never be able to do w/out, must borrow from simulacrum; metaphoricity is logic of contamination, contamination of logic

——good writing can only be described through metaphor of the bad

p. 160 “Plato’s metaphors” [re: khōra]? passage beyond all “Platonic” oppositions, toward aporia of originary inscription

p. 163 (189) Plato’s scriptural “metaphor” intervenes whenever difference and relation are irreducible, every time otherness introduces determination and puts a system into circulation

VM VM p. 90 [Derrida on Levinas’ method] uses philosophy’s own light to reveal that philosophy’s surface is severely cracked (lézardes), that its solidity is its rigidity > progresses along cracks, negates negations, neither/nor, poetic force of metaphor a trace of this wounding of language

p. 92 Borges: “perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors,” light, for example, but what an example! which language can escape metaphor of light? [not night]

p. 100 other not signaled by face, he is the face, “absolutely present, in his face, the Other—w/out any metaphor—faces me”; face > does not incarnate anything other than subjectivity (self)

p. 112 philosophy “think[s] the metaphor in the silent horizon of the non-metaphor: Being”

——deportation from its [logos’] own site toward the Site, toward spatial locality, is the metaphor congenital to philosophical logos > metaphor (before being rhetorical procedure) would be emergence of language itself

——inhabit metaphor’s ruins, shabiller des lambeaux de la tradition et des haillons du diable: by using tradition’s words, one can use [them] up (user), les frotter comme une vieille pièce de monnaie fruste et dévaluée, on peut dire que la vraie extériorité est la non-extérioritée sans être lintériorité, on peut écrire par ratures et ratures de ratures: crossing out writes, still writes in space

p. 129 if other is called trace it can only be metaphorical, for it must be made to appear

p. 138 Being resists every metaphor, neither above nor besides, no rank

p. 139 Nietzsche and Renan reduce Heidegger’s Being to a metaphor by referring to its etymological association w/ respiration

p. 139 for Hegel, empiricism always forgets it uses the words “to be”; empiricism: thinking by metaphor w/out thinking the metaphor as such

pp. 142-43 humanism, separating man from animal, via analogy of God and human face [vis-à-vis Descartes, ambiguity of substance as concerns God and his creatures], is this not the original metaphor? Levinas’ metaphysical humanism

PAS PAS p. (37) water: a movement w/out pas, beyond all tension (crispation) of pas, degree zero of an infinite metaphor [see p. (84) sans as degree o]

VP p. 9 metaphor, concept of life allows Husserl to assert a parallelism btwn empirical life and transcendental life, which are radically heterogenous to each other [is Husserl’s parallelism different from that of transcendental psychologism? see pp. 11-2]

p. 52 if punctuality of instant is a myth, a spatial or mechanical metaphor, an inherited metaphysical concept, if presence of presence isn’t simple, all of Husserl’s logic is threatened

p. 72 only by means of metaphor can we describe movement from one “now” to next, borrowing its concepts from order of objects of experience temporalization makes possible

p. 73 acc. Husserl, as soon as we insert a determinate being into description of auto-affection [in time] we are speaking in metaphor,

——time itself is a metaphor that indicates and dissimulates auto-affection, at same time

S p. 51 for Heidegger, privation (Privation) in Dasein, in structure of “as,” structure of “something as something (die Struktur des Etwas als Etwas),” not same as animal’s privation (Entbehrung)

p. 96 when Heidegger says spirit is fire he claims it is neither a metaphor nor a figure

FSW p. 199 manipulate metaphors: 1) make the known an allusion to the unknown 2) making enigmatic through insistence of “metaphoric investment” > Freud does the latter

——our reading will let metaphoric investment “invade the entirety of the psyche”

p. 209 for Freud, dreamer invents his own grammar; Freud makes psychical writing so originary, any supposedly proper writing would have to be a metaphor for it

p. 220 nonspsychical system (machine metaphor) of psychical (like Heidegger’s nontechnology of technology)

p. 228 Freud augured a beyond and beneath of “Platonic” closure > by opening to theme of writing, writing as technē, as relation btwn life & death, btwn psychical and nonpsychical

——this opening never made explicit, but became urgent in relation to the [failure] of rhetorical device of metaphor [re: Mystic Pad]

PPHS p. 91 sensory matter hierarchized acc. power of ideality; physical ideality as teleological anticipation, or inversely, concept and value of ideality a “metaphor” > the “history” of metaphysics; sensualist reduction & idealist teleology follow same line [circle]: “metaphor”

SH p. 21 carrier-pigeon, in Celan, transports, transfers, but not a metaphor: [alliance?]

WM p. 215 usure of metaphor as continuist presupposition: history of metaphor has no breaks, is not heterogenous, but incurs progressive erosion

pp. 215-16 concept usure belongs to concept of metaphor itself: where does erosion begin and end w/in particular figure of metaphor? paradigms of coin/metal imposed w/ remarkable insistence

***p. 216 to signify metaphorical process, coins have often been used, analogy w/in language described by analogy btwn language and something other than itself > but that which seems to figure [i.e. coins] cannot be contained w/in regional science, linguistics philology: opens a discourse on figuration itself

pp. 217-19 for Saussure, value in language, which allows exchange btwn words, allows metaphor, requires 1) dissimilar exchange 2) similar comparison

——value, gold, eye, sun carried along in same tropic movement

p. 220n metaphors appear more original if plucked like a flower [Plato’s rhetoric of flowers], those that have ceased to be original are more technical, economical, artificial

pp. 220-21 as long as concept of metaphor is not solicited, method of opposition btwn physis/tekhnē, physis/nomos, remains in tact

p. 221 for Pierre Louis, in Plato, metaphor plays role of pedagogical ornament, what matters is signified content, intention of truth [Derrida calls these paradoxical & traditional propositions]

***p. 221-22n classical conception of metaphor concerns itself with economy of moving from one figure to another, not w/ very production of figure

——metaphor (most general), historically, always subsumes simile, comparison, analogy

p. 241 [re: Aristotle ]metaphor marks moment du tour ou du détour, opens wandering of semantic, noun carrying itself elsewhere; signification in state of availability, btwn nonmeaning, preceding language (which has meaning), and truth of language, which says thing such as it is in itself

——as moment of detour in which truth might still be lost, metaphor belongs to mimēsis, fold of physis, veiling, when nature has yet to re-find its proper nudity

——axiology of truth alone can answer question of whether bad metaphors are metaphors, this axiology is not neutral, belongs to interior of rhetoric

pp. 250-51 sun is the paradigm of sensory and of metaphor: it turns and hides; first because aisthēton, sensory, can always not present itself [sun set], and second because it is exactly w/ metaphor that sensory absents itself: thus all metaphor attempts to describe turning of the sun

——metaphor means heliotrope: turned toward the sun, turning movement of the sun

——if best metaphor is never absolutely good, wouldn’t bad metaphor be the best example?

p. 266 most invariable characteristic of concept of metaphor: unity/continuity of meaning dominates play of syntax, subordination of syntax

p. 268 because metaphoric is plural from the start, it cannot escape syntax, it organizes its division w/in syntax, cannot be what it is except in erasing itself, indefinitely constructing its destruction

***p. 268-71 metaphor’s 2 courses [classic, deconstructive] of self-destruction [the 2nd self-destruction, the other self-destruction, resembles the former, can be taken for it]:

1. the relève of metaphor, interiorization, return to itself of the sun, summarize-interiorize-dialecticize-master-relever; metaphor is either a provisional loss, or that which, through detour, can return to the same, to a full language w/out syntax, pure nomination

2. disrupts hierarchy of syntax and semantics, no longer about extending or confirming a philosopheme, but unfolding it w/out limit, “wresting its [philosopheme’s] borders of propriety from it,” explode reassuring opposition metaphoric/proper: “supplement of a code which traverses its own field, endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, no ontology can reduce it”

pp. 270-71 opposition of metaphoric and proper have never done anything but reflect and refer to each other in their radiance [deconstruction can explode this opposition]

p. 271 metaphor always carries its death w/in itself, this death is always the death of philosophy [but the genitive is double]

DS p. 190 only metaphors of painting and writing are linked to psyche > in “reality,” literally, acc. Plato, writing & painting deal in copies, copies of copies, incapable of intuition of thing itself

p. 242 forms of writing subject to law of hymen (literature, theater, drama, ballet, dance, fable, mimicry), the rule of the cast-aside-reference, the being aside (référence écartée, être à l’écart)

——hymen as the double show, as the difference between the sexes, play of penna (bird, wing, feather, quill, beak, etc.), and process of metaphorical reproduction constantly being relaunched by gap, setting-aside, of being

——Mallarmé: dancer is not a woman, but a metaphor, “veil of generality” “belonging to no woman in particular”

pp. 251-52 tropic twist of fan (éventail) (wings, plumes) inscribes very movement of structure of fan-as-text (surplus-mark, margin of meaning), spacing, fold, hymen btwn all meaning-effects > this supplementary valence/mark neither metaphor nor metonymy, no transcendental privilege

——this is why it is always represented by metaphor/metonymy

p. 258 tropological structure circulates infinitely, always w/ supplement of an extra turn: plus dmétaphor, plus de métonymie > if everything’s metaphorical, no more metaphor, if everything becomes metonymical, part always greater than whole, how could one arrest metonymy?

p. 281n opposition btwn metaphor & metonymy is purely semantic—deconstructed by superficial, profound, that is abyssal operation of versification (vers, verssensvers, versus, verre), morcelante et reconstituante (hiver, pervers, envers, travers, vertige, rêve)

PS p. 182 for Artaud, “the metaphor of myself is my dispossession w/in language” > this by way of the counterfeiter, God–Satan, who isn’t a creator, but the subject of all [dispossessing] oeuvres

p. 184 Artaud wanted to destroy metaphor, the standing upright as metaphorical erection in written work

FS p. 303n TN. is there an origin of metaphor? “to be?” notion of breathing [Nietzsche]?

***p. 17 “metaphor is never innocent” > orients research, fixes results: when spatial model is hit upon, critical reflection can rest w/in it

p. 27 darkness (self-concealment) /light (self-revelation) founding metaphor of Western philosophy as metaphysics: photology

——“fall” of thought into philosophy, analogical displacement of Being which anchors (retient) and irremediably represses discourse in metaphysics, gets history under way (est entamée)

p. 29 lécriture est l'issue comme descente hors de soi en soi du sens: métaphore-pour-autrui-en-vuc-d'autrui-ici-bas, métaphore comme possibilité d'autrui ici-bas, métaphore comme métaphysique où l'être doit se cacher si l'on veut que l'autre apparaisse

TB p. 104 Babel as metaphor of metaphor, narrative of narrative, translation of translation: not only structure hollowing itself out like that, but does so in its own way > its idiom would have to be saved

pp. 121-22 Benjamin uses metaphor of amphora, ammetaphor, to describe contact btwn languages; metamphora adjoins along broken line (not infinite/straight line): Derrida compares to Heidegger, Rilke, Hölderlin’s urn (re: word/thing) > amphora is one w/ itself while its openness forbids its totality, always giving/receiving [open square]

PIO p. 4 Cicero opens his text on invention w/ question of the son as a question de ratione dicendi > scene of traditio, tradition, transfer, an allegory of metaphor

EJQB p. 73 metaphor (animality of letter): primary & infinite equivocality of signifier as life > psychic subversion of inert literality (i.e. nature) or of speech returned to nature

AFR p. 73 innovation as revelation, analysis as analogical process, energy connecting present to absent > concept of force as force of repetition (retracing, supplying)

——Derrida sees here a silent explosion in text or fission in each concept (Condillac, elsewhere, denounces obscurantist force of “metaphor” [hence analogical value])

LI p. 71 argument of principle concerns a structural limit, argument is of the same kind as the set-argument [re: speech act theory’s own differentiation of itself from other theories, & thus its reliance on the metaphorical: ruined analogical value btwn speech act theory and other theories]

OG pp. 14-5 (26-7) signified–immediate; signifier–mediate (exterior)

——writing as metaphoricity itself: a simulated immediacy; w/in logocentrism: bad writing is finite, artificial, sensible; good writing is infinite, soul-writing, Book of God (natural)

pp. 106-07 (156) irreducibility of metaphor: irremediable absence of proper name (in ellipsis of originary writing)

p. 206 (293) acc. Rousseau, imitation & pity have same foundation: sort of metaphorical ecstasy > Rousseau: imitation rooted in perpetual desire to transport ourselves beyond ourselves

pp. 272-73 [Condillac, Vico, Kafka, Rousseau: language as originarily metaphorical, poetic, prior to reason?] > Rousseau does not believe language of action (need) precedes speech (language of passion)

pp. 275-76 (390-91) [vis-à-vis Rousseau’s distinction btwn literal/metaphor] if speech doesn’t pass through reference to object, instead producing sign via literalization of passion, literal expression remains a metaphor preceded by nothing, opening an exchange to the outside: no literal meaning precedes it, no rhetor watches over (surveille) it

SPEC p. 381 scientific intuition requires minimum of speculation in language’s irreducible metaphoricity

p. 384 w/out borrowing, nothing begins, il ny a pas de fonds propre, there’s no transference of fund, lemprunt rapporte, produces surplus value, is the prime mover of every investment > on commence ainsi par spéculer, en pariant sur une valeur à produire comme à partir de rien: all these “metaphors” confirm, as metaphors, the necessity of what they state

FV p. 415 Bouhours: metaphors are transparent veils, costumes, beneath which one recognizes the costumed person

——exhibiting, undressing (déshabillage), unveiling (dévoilement): acrobatics of metaphor of truth, metaphor of metaphor, truth of truth > when Freud intends to denude original Stoff: text coordinated à sa vérité nue, mais aussi à la vérité comme nudité

METAPHOR in RM

RM p. 48 metaphor transports us, we are, metaphorically, the content & tenor of this vehicle

p. 49 can’t treat metaphor w/out negotiating the loan I take out from it in order to speak about it

——automobility, automoticity of metaphor

pp. 49-50 [cf. Pas] the dérive or dérapage (skidding) as un certain jeu de lancre in surrounding waters (parages): Derrida can only stop engines (machines) of this floating vehicle [my discourse on metaphor], which would still abandon it to its unforeseeable dérive [more metaphorico]

p. 50 nothing that does not go on w/ & through (rien qui ne se passe avecpar) metaphor

——metaphor withdraws, it gets by w/out everything, withdraws at instant it overflows every limit, marking w/ supplementary trait one more turn, re-turn, re-tracing or retreat (re-trait)

p. 51 Aristotle’s 4 types of metaphor (Poetics): 1) from genus to species (apo genous epi eidos), ex. “here stands my ship” 4) proceeds by analogy, kata to analogon

p. 52 worn out, tired subject of the us (usury, usage, usual) of metaphor

——epoch of metaphor: suspensive retrait and return supported by line (trait) delimiting a contour

p. 55 Derrida deconstructed in WM the common interpretation of metaphor as transfer from sensible to intelligible

p. 56 Derrida’s “disconcerting (déroutante) tactic” to use usure doubly, not wily, manipulative or triumphant perversity: “corresponds to intractable structure in which we are limited & carried away in advance”

——usure as “wear and tear” and usure as usury, the production of a surplus value acc. to laws other than a continuous & linearly accumulative capitalization (must deconstruct what’s accredited in psychoanalytic, Nietzschean genealogical, and economico-political regions)

p. 59 WM marks itself off from making death or dead metaphor its watchword (mot dordre) [Ricouer’s accusation] by saying there’re 2 deaths/self-destructions of metaphor > 2 deaths means problem of death is infinitely complicated

p. 61 du Marsais: metaphor as “borrowed home”

pp. 61-3 different economies of metaphoric transfer (Übertragung): 1) translation in traditional (ideal) sense: transport of intact signified into another language 2) the more violent inveigling (captatrice), seductive, transformative capture by another language, fatherland, motherland—w/ such translation, proper mother tongue violated at moment of import/export

pp. 63-4 Derrida accused of turning his text into a “herbarium”—but, he has written about ontoanthological motif of flower (cf. “Le sans de la coupure pure,Survivre,” Glas)

pp. 64-6 quasi-metaphor of Being, since it is nothing, since its as obliterates its as such

——metaphysics as tropics, corresponds to an essential withdrawal of Being > Being, the metaphor of metaphor (quasi-metaphor), overload of a supplementary trait, fold: re-trait

——even Plato’s eidos (visible/invisible) submits to metaphorico-metonymic displacement

p. 66 re-trait of metaphor > gives rise to an abyssal generalization of metaphor > trait has internal multiplicity, la structure pliée-repliée dun re-trait > opens out the borders or invaginates them

——metaphysics can only be exceeded, withdrawal of Being, if metaphor withdraws—insofar as metaphor is a metaphysical concept

p. 67 withdrawal of Being donne lieu to metaphysics, ontotheology, producing concept of metaphor, producing/calling itself in a quasi-metaphorical manner

——not opposed to metaphor but will limitlessly extend/load (chargera) any metaphoric trait w/ supplementary surplus value; re-trait (at once +/–), double movement of being

p. 68 unlike metaphors that give us access to the unknown, “withdrawal of Being” gives us to think less Being or metaphor than the Being or the metaphor of the withdrawal—gives us to think more about the the way, the vehicle, the making-way

pp. 69-70 when Heidegger says “House of Being,” it’s less so the house can determine Being, more so we can rethink the house

——this is an unheimlich maneuver, not pure inversion, outside the familial transport of colloquial metaphor (rethinks economic value & the proper, not a judicative statement: “S is P”)

——Being, which is nothing: makes possible metaphoricity & its withdrawal

——no proper term in this écart sans écart

pp. 70-1 to state condition of metaphoricity nonliterally: withdrawal by which what is distanced (entfernt) in the non-near of proximity is withdrawn & sheltered

p. 71 plus de métalanguage > toujours une métaphore de plus au moment où la métaphore se retire (in opening out [évasant] its limits)

p. 72 isn’t there a metaphor of withdrawal that authorizes one to speak of ontological difference and withdrawal of metaphor?

METAPHOR IN PHILOSOPHY

WM p. 209 “metaphor seems to involve the usage of philosophical language in its entirety,” “the usage of natural language as philosophical language”

——usure very history/structure of philosophical metaphor [TN. usure: 1) acquisition of too much interest 2) deterioration through usage]

p. 210 metaphor of (the) usure (of metaphor): the ruining of figure; usure as erasure, rubbing out, and usure as increasing return in the form of revenue, surplus value, supplementary capital

——la figure sensible qui sabrite et qui suse, jusquà paraître inaperçue, dans chaque concept métaphysique

p. 210 acc. Polyphilos in France’s Garden of Epicurus: metaphysicians are knife-grinders (rémouleurs), they efface the exergue on coins, lose value, change words from physical to metaphysical

pp. 210-11 philosophy erases the sensory image, deflowers and deteriorates by way of concept: this would “save the integrity of capital,” another philosophy, the virtue of the sensory image

p. 211 acc. Polyphilos, philosophy puts transparent figure (not exactly a metaphor) of primitive meaning, of original (always sensuous and material), into circulation: metaphor is no longer noticed, and taken for proper meaning (first meaning, first displacement, are forgotten)

——as an economic rule: in order to reduce labor of rubbing, metaphysicians choose worn out (usé) words, words “a bit obliterated already” > we are unwitting metaphysicians in proportion to usure of our words

pp. 211-12 absolute usure of sign in use of negative words (ab-solute, in-finite, in-tangible, non-Being) > negative dissolves finite determination, suspends apparent metaphoricity by breaking tie that binds (lattache qui retient) them to meaning of particular being, to totality of what is

——how does this negativity relate to Aufhebung, unity of loss & profit?

p. 214(n) [Renan, Nietzsche, Freud, Bergson, Lenin all discuss metaphor in philosophy]

p. 215 to simply read philosophical concepts w/in hidden history of metaphor is to privilege diachrony at expense of system, and invests in symbolist conception of language

pp. 219-20 plus de métaphore: layer of primary philosophemes can’t dominate (itself), gets “carried away (semporte)” when one of its products (concept of metaphor) attempts to include under its own law the totality to which it belongs > there would always be an extra metaphor, the metaphor w/out which metaphor could not be constructed, a metaphor of metaphor, a metaphor less (en moins), le tour de plus devenant le tour de moins: tropic supplementarity

p. 224 “optic metaphor opens up every theoretical point of view under the sun”

——trope and arkhē have their own metaphorical charge, resist every meta-metaphorics, values of concept, foundation, theory > fundamental desire for firm/ultimate ground (to build artifice)

p. 225 Hegel: metaphorical element in use of word disappears, words becomes literal, word carried over from sensuous to spiritual [i.e. Fassen, begreifen]: relevé into a spiritual meaning

pp. 225-26 it appears that the inactive or dead metaphor has no interest to philosophy, since its meaning has already been interiorized, relevé, through Erinnerung (author did not intend it)

——movement of metaphorization (its erasure by way of usage), movement of idealization

***p. 226n Heidegger: once distinction sensory/nonsensory [the distinction Heidegger privileges re: value of metaphor] is deemed inadequate, metaphysics loses its rank as authoritative thought: “the metaphorical exists only w/in the borders of metaphysics”

p. 227 metaphors of sensory type, but also a transcendental/formal aesthetics of metaphor leading to a priori forms of space/time, hearing as understanding (entendement)

p. 227(n) when Nietzsche claims that there’s metaphor in every phonic enunciation doesn’t he make every signifier a metaphor of the signified, isn’t this a metonymy of the sign?

p. 228 concept of metaphor is a philosopheme > double and contradictory effect: philosophy has control over its metaphorics, and its metaphorics are a blind spot w/in philosophy

pp. 228-29 oppositions (physis/tekhnē, physis/nomos, sensible/intelligible, space/time, etc.) are made possible by “tropic” movements which do not make up a “proper” language; these metaphors, tropologies, obey the law of supplementarity (btwn concept and field)

——to overlook this vigil of philosophy would be to posit thesis of an essence rigorously independent of what transports it, i.e. philosophy’s unique thesis

——via law of supplementarity, fill the concept of metaphor, recognize the limit of its plasticity

p. 230-31 why a rhetoric (code, program) of philosophy or metaphilosophy is not pertinent here (take most derivative effects for original characteristics, repeat hidden prior meaning)

p. 231(n) Aristotle (1st systematic situating of metaphor): “metaphor consists in giving (epiphora) the thing a name that belongs to something else (allotriou),” transference from species to species, genus to species, species to genus, or analogy; Aristotle first to make all language metaphor: an impoverishing generalization

pp. 236-37 Aristotle’s definition of noun, the element of metaphor, is a theory of the name, articulated w/ ontology > value of metaphor systematically chained to values of discourse, voice, meaning, resemblance, or to logos, phōnē sēmantikē, sēmainein, onoma, mimēsis, homoiosis

pp. 237-38(n) imitation sets man apart from beasts, man alone takes pleasure in imitating > metaphor, an effect of mimēsis and homoiosis, manifestation of analogy, a subordinate means of knowledge: full truth preferred to metaphor

——Aristotle reproaches Plato for using “poetic metaphors” and hollow language when he said Ideas are the paradigms in which other things participate

——to be learning something, recognizing resemblance (the same), is the greatest pleasure, this pleasure is the second [?] “cause” of mimēsis and metaphor

p. 239(n) Aristotle privileges the metaphor that is closer to energeia, that is moving: “man in bloom” over man as “four-square”

p. 241 for Aristotle, if metaphor, risk and chance of mimēsis, can miss the true, it is because metaphor must count w/ a determined absence [moment of detour]

——metaphor risks disrupting the semantic plenitude to which it should belong

pp. 241-42 Aristotle’s 4 types of metaphor: 1) genus to species 2) species to genus 3) species to species 4) analogy (he privileges analogy, which has nothing hidden or elliptical about it)

p. 243 for Aristotle, proper name is nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, father of all figures > everything turns around it, towards it > metaphor as substitution of proper names w/ fixed meaning & referent

pp. 244-45 acc. Aristotle (onomatism, doctrine of simple names), metaphor, like mimēsis, must come back (revient) to physis, to its truth and its presence: nature finds itself, its proper analogy, nature gives itself in metaphor, thus metaphor is a natural gift, a characteristic of genius > geniuses have more nature, more generosity, more seed; Derrida asks whether everything can be taken from me except the power to replace? can physis sow itself?

p. 247 Derrida distinguishes btwn Aristotle's kurion and idion, both generally translated as proper > generally, properness is exterior to form (metaphorical or not) of discourse, but not the case w/ kurion and idion [a properness of language]; accident is not proper to a thing’s essence

p. 248n for Aristotle, poet (man of metaphor) is btwn sophist and philosopher: multiplies meaning, not for sake of deception, but to return to identity of meaning; philosopher finds truth of meaning, beyond signs and names

p. 249(n) dividing essence from proper permits the play of metaphor, doesn’t involve thing itself in play of substitutions, metaphor is mediate, abstract, medium of quasi-synonymy

——antikatēgoreisthai: reciprocal substitution of two predicates related to identical concrete subject

——first example of antikatēgoreisthai is grammar, i.e. what is proper to man is grammar, ability to read & write > belongs to chain of what’s proper to man: logos, phōnē sēmantikē, mimēsis, metaphora

***p. 250 sun turns in metaphor, philosophical metaphor turns toward the sun, flower of rhetoric, un tournesol, heliotrope

p. 251 sun (w/ its appearing/disappearing, presence/absence) structures metaphorical space of philosophy, represents what is natural in philosophical language

pp. 251, 253 [exemplary nature of sun in relation to metaphor] if sun is always metaphorical, it has lustre [Mallarmé], is an artificial construction, always other than itself, emerging from itself (father, eye, seed, fire, egg) > via Du Marsais, the philosophical metaphor light of the spirit is a detour w/in (in sight of) reappropriation, presence, etc. (from Platonic eidos to Hegelian Idea), a trope, a borrowed dwelling (house) > here, light is one metaphor among metaphors, and borrowed dwelling, expropriation, becomes metaphor of metaphor

pp. 253-54 everything in discourse of metaphor, passing through sign eidos, articulated w/ analogy btwn intelligible (nous) and visible (sensory) sun

p. 254 philosophy, as theory of metaphor, will have been a metaphor of theory > permits/provokes transformation of presence into self-presence

p. 257 philosophical language, system of catachreses, “forced metaphors,” reveal original “ideas,” truth, by a twisting return toward already-there of meaning > revelation, unveiling

p. 258 metaphor is less in philosophical text than philosophical text is in metaphor

——in classical rhetoric, were metaphor to receive its name from metaphysics, it would be the catachresis: a “nontrue metaphor,” retracing metaphor through its philosophical ghost

pp. 262-63(n) by placing metaphor en abyme, Nietzsche is responsible for the need to find a new distinction than that btwn metaphor and concept

——Nietzsche takes risk of continuity btwn metaphor & concept, describes metaphorical tissue of man as spider’s web, Derrida follows web, tissu, tisser, to weave, honey bees, Marx

pp. 264-65(n) for Bachelard, the hidden (fire) is what demands metaphors, Derrida explains how this conceptualization, despite fact that Bachelard appeals to syntax, “a poetic mind is a syntax of metaphors,” still amounts to metaphor of the same > here, all metaphors have a semantic focal point, the hidden fire as life, nature

***p. 266 when syntax is subordinated to semantics in concept of metaphor, what else will be found than a return to the same, the sun, the light, same circle, the dominant metaphor of the group, heightened by its power of dissimulation, escaping mastery: God or Sun?

——dominant metaphor, major signified of ontotheleogy: circle of the heliotrope

p. 268 one true metaphor (no more true metaphor): but assured legibility of the proper [presence disappearing in its own radiance, hidden source of light]

FS p. 27 darkness (self-concealment) /light (self-revelation) founding metaphor of Western philosophy as metaphysics: photology

OG p. 71 (104) logos as sublimation of trace is theological from Plato to infinitist metaphysics: logocentrism…parousia, life w/out differance (name of God as name of indifference)

p. 106 (156) ontotheology of logos (par excellence w/ Hegel): powerless, oneiric effort to master absence by reducing the metaphor w/in absolute parousia of sense/meaning (sens)

METAPHYSICAL ANTI-SEMITISM

GT pp. 130-31n Derrida not too convinced by those who defend anti-Semitism of Celine, Baudelaire; exterminate all the witnesses? there’s no anti-Semitism in that?

AF p. 44 anti-Semitic unconscious [re: Yerushalmi’s attempt to make psychoanalysis Jewish in the future, revealing “historical truth” of anti-Semitism]

IW pp. 271-72 acc. Cohen, Kant & Judaism both unite duty & freedom, universal law & autonomy > Kant’s thought interpreted as profound Judaism

——Hegel’s philosophical antisemitism toward Kant (rather, anti-Judaism) reappears in Nietzsche’s contra Kant [?]

pp. 272-73 though Kant includes an antisemitic note in Anthropology from a Pragmatic, Cohen maintains Kant's quasi-Judaism > besides, w/ what is antisemitism not compatible?

EL p. 221 Kant’s most calmly characteristic anti-Semitism: Jews are cheaters, merchants; yet who can blame them, they’re richer than everyone else (sanctioned by ancient precepts)

AD p. 88 anti-Semitism & cosmopolitanism: Stoicism, Pauline Christianity, Enlightenment (Kant)

BSi pp. 50-2 Hobbes’ rage against the liars who appeal (to God) above the sovereign: 1) the lie of immediacy 2) partisans, civil disobedients: place a law above law 3) like the Jews, don’t accept sovereign as lieu-tenant of God > p. 53 [but!] acc. Hobbes, the sovereign mimics God, Christian incarnation; p. 54 lieutenant as suppléant for other along metonymic chain

METAPHYSICS

POR p. 4 (130) acc. Aristotle, metaphysics associates sight w/ knowledge

HERP p. 205 Heidegger claims that all metaphysicians (strangers to the originarity of Heraclitus’ logos) committed an anachronic anthroplogization abusively reappropriating H’s word (parole)

POOF p. 270n Heidegger: in accomplishment of metaphysics, metaphysics becomes ‘psychology,’ psychology & anthropology are last word of metaphysics—psychology & technics go hand in hand

EM p. 116 (138) Heiddeger: “every humanism remains metaphysical” > metaphysics, the other name of ontotheology [see p. 118 (140n)]

p. 121 (144) thinking of end of man prescribed in metaphysics, in thinking truth of man > difficulty today to think an end of man not organized by dialectics of truth & negativity, an end of man that’s not a teleology in first person plural

——nous: assures proximity to itself of central being for which circular reappropriation is produced; nous: unity of absolute knowledge and anthropology, God & man, of onto-theo-teleology and humanism

——“lêtreet la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et lhumanisme

p. 128 (154) for Heidegger, what is threatened in extension of metaphysics & technology is the essence of man, devastation of languages threat to essence of humanity

pp. 135-36 Nietzsche’s übermensch “burns his text and erases the traces of his steps,” a laughter bursting beyond metaphysics

VM p. 108 for Levinas, metaphysics is essence of discourse w/ God

***p. 118 metaphysics unable to escape its ancestry in light, always supposes phenomenology in its critique of phenomenology [re: Levinas]

p. 140 Heidegger allows Hegel’s discourse to grow and speak (Hegel’s discourse as that of all metaphysics)

p. 142 for Heidegger, metaphysics thinks Being of existent but not the difference btwn Being and existent

p. 150 Heidegger never meant transgression of metaphysics as new metaphysical thesis, always remarked on “strange simplicity” of thought of Being

VP p. 23 why phenomenology belongs to metaphysics: exteriority of indication in relation to expression

S p. 74 “is a metaphysics of race more or less serious than a naturalism or biologism of race?”

WM pp. 210-11 classical motif, etymon of a primitive sense always determinable, interprets degradation as passage from physical to metaphysical > [valuing sensory image as “original figure,” against the concept, is its own conceptualization]

p. 258 in classical rhetoric, were metaphor to receive its name from metaphysics, it would be the catachresis: a “nontrue metaphor,” retracing metaphor through its philosophical ghost

p. 269n Rousseau: metaphysics used to be an instinct, became a science when it ceased to be good

DS pp. 191-92 never has anteriority of 1st (simple) over 2nd (double) been displaced by a metaphysical system, double de-presents, il le multiplie par suite, le double vient après le simple, the flesh & blood, limage survient à la réalité > this is ontology

pp. 205-06 one of most typical metaphysical reappropriations of writing: if mimesis mimics nothing then it is the act of unveiling itself, alētheia, a primordial union btwn alētheia and mimeisthai

OS pp. 60-1 metaphysical texts already have resources of their own criticism [re: circle of circles of time] (announces itself in the margin) [doubling of de-limitation]

p. 62 must think play of submission & subtraction as formal rule to read history of metaphysics w/in opening of Heidegger’s breakthrough [re: categories such as desire, movement, time]

POS p. 32 metaphysics always attempts to uproot presence of meaning from differance

p. 56 metaphysical concept of history: meaning developing itself in straight, circular line

ATIA p. 146 Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts begins by describing philosophy, metaphysics, homesickness and melancholy as forms of nostalgia

PS p. 194 Derrida suggests we wonder about link btwn concept of madness/concept of metaphysics by thinking how no [Heideggerian] “destruction” of history of metaphysics simply surpasses it

FS p. 27 darkness (self-concealment) /light (self-revelation) founding metaphor of Western philosophy as metaphysics: photology

——“fall” of thought into philosophy, analogical displacement of Being which anchors (retient) and irremediably represses discourse in metaphysics, gets history under way (est entamée)

Gii p. 42 Heidegger: only when man speaks does he think, not the other way around, as metaphysics still believes

RM p. 57 closure is not a circular limit (bordering homogenous field), but a more twisted (plus retorse) structure, another figure: “invaginated” (there is never “the” metaphysical”)

——representation of a linear & circular closure surrounding a homogenous space is a self-representation of philosophy in its onto-encyclopedic logic

p. 62 for Heidegger, Metasprache and Sputnik are the same, monstrous project of father, of metaphysics (mastery of form for form’s sake)

pp. 64-5 metaphysics as series of guises, turns, modes, figures—vast structural process of epochē of Being withholding itself, holding itself in withdrawal > metaphysics as tropics, a singular metaphoric detour

——even Plato’s eidos (visible/invisible) submits to metaphorico-metonymic displacement

LI p. 93 Derrida cannot accept distinction btwn strategical decision & metaphysical presupposition: every strategy has a decision concerning metaphysics > the more confident, implicit, the more its order and calm reigns over methodological technicity

——speech act theory’s hierarchical axiology: set up value oppositions & subordinate these values to each other (normal/abnormal, parasite/nonparasite, fulfilled/void, serious/nonserious, literal/nonliteral, briefly: positive/negative, ideal/nonideal)

———Plato, Rousseau, Descartes, Husserl: good before evil, simple before complex, positive before negative, pure before impure, essential before accidental, imitated before imitation (not one metaphysical gesture among others—the metaphysical exigency)

WOG p. 28 unity of history of metaphysics a domestic representation (economic reappropriation)

p. 37 closure is not end of metaphysics, which doesn’t have a self-identity

OG p. 3 (12) history of metaphysics as history of truth, as the truth of truth, the debasement of writing, its repression outside (hors) of “full (pleine)” speech

p. 13 totality of metaphysics creates hierarchy of signifier/signified [signified is higher, not exterior like signifier] (Christian creationism, infinitism, both appropriating Greek conceptualism)

——signans (sensible), signatum (intelligible) [?]

p. 101 (149) metaphysics: exemplary system of defense against violence of writing > what is violence if something in it is equivalent to operation of the trace?

pp. 136-38 (197-201) in MOP, the ideal community speaks w/in earshot (à portée dallocution) [Rousseau, Lévi-Strauss, Anarchists, Fourier, Libertarians]

p. 314 (443) impossibility of designating supplement escapes metaphysics by a hairsbreadth (par une pointe), “elle doit pour le reste puiser ses ressources dans la logique quelle déconstruit

EU p. 180 metaphysics of morals deals w/ freedom not nature, rights & duty, to possess metaphysics is a duty > everyone has this metaphysics and thus this duty—a Faktum

for Kant, metaphysics: a priori system of knowledge by simple concepts

METAPHYSICS OF PRESENCE (MOP)

GT p. 100 no problematic of gift on basis of metaphysics of presence, or sign, signifier, signified, or value > only w/ problematic of trace of text

MONL p. 70 phallogocentrism, Western metaphysics > not a single homogenous thing

LOBL p. 145 MOP uses a logic of truth as presentation substituted for a logic of truth as representative equivalence [FL p. 282]

AF pp. 92-93 nearly ecstatic instant Freud dreams of [re: Studies on Hysteria]: origin speaking by itself, arkhē appears in the nude, w/out archive, anamnēsis w/out hypomnēsis

***SPOM p. 126 [MOP in Marx] Manifesto calls for living, present reality [see p. 240n Marx & Max’s deconstruction limited where they oppose spectral onto-theology to flesh-and-blood presence]

VM p. 152 can there be an experience of the Other, or has experience always been determined by a metaphysics of presence?

VP p. 4 phenomenology’s “principle of all principles”: evidentness, present or presence of originary intuition

p. 6 the ideality of ideality, living-present, self-presence of transcendental life; present to infinity, is that through which an infinite diversity of contents will be produced > justifies opposition btwn form and content ultimately and radically

p. 7 Husserl treats logicity before language in logos, giving logicity the normalcy of logos telos, the telos of being as presence; this requires a specific distinction btwn pure logic and pure grammar

p. 8 the ideality of metaphysics of presence means that presence is not anything that exists in this world > does this mean the “existent” is in a relation to death?

***p. 46 presence as universal form of all existence, transgression of all empirical, and first of all mine, but even beyond my death, this present still is, must be to be universal; if the possibility of the sign is this relation to death, erasure of sign in metaphysics is dissimulation of this relation to death; I am only possible through my disappearance, death; I am originarily means I am mortal

p. 87 w/in the metaphysics of presence, we believe in absolute knowledge as closure or the end of history, it has taken place, consciousness of self in infinity of parousia, this history’s closed

——MOP [via phenomenology] tirelessly exhausts itself trying to make difference derivative

FSW p. 229 must extract Freud’s trace from metaphysics of presence it’s caught up in (particularly in concepts like perception, memory, unconscious, conscious, reality)

——concept of subject requires concept of substance (thus presence)

TC p. 246 dialectics as economy of repetition, economy of truth, movement by which expenditure is reappropriated into presence [Being and dialectics? eternal repetition]

pp. 246-47 [see NIETZSCHE & HEGEL on pure expenditure, death, repetition of affirmation, maintaining presence, consume pure difference w/ pleasure]

PPHS p. 71 when Being is presence, sign can only be a transition, lieu de passage, (provisional) bridge btwn 2 moments of full presence, the bridge can be relevé

pp. 72-3 theory of sign on basis of being-present, authority of lêtre-en-vue: telos of reappropriation [see POOF p. 65], coordination of sign & light of parousia, speaking logos as close as possible to itself in concept & consciousness

p. 73 if Hegel completed metaphysics, as is often said, his work is the most powerful example of the coordination of sign to presence

p. 80 “is dialectics the resolution of the sign in the horizon of the nonsign, of the presence beyond the sign?”

p. 103n [TN. Derrida often compares philosophical treatment of writing to Freud’s “kettle logic”]

***T pp. xv-xvi how to interpret (interpretation as neither a theory nor discursive practice of philosophy) the discourse that organizes economy of its [philosophy’s] representation, its weave, so nothing surprises: reasons from w/in vault (cave) of its autism

SH p. 47 [MOP] Celan: Aschenkelle (ash-ladle) draws from tub [better than manger/trough] of being, launders > soapy; ash uses up being, is not a being-that-remains, there is ash, but ash is not

F p. xxxvii 1st paradigm of introjection: fill the mouths void w/ words [Abraham] > language substituted as a figure of presence w/in a community of empty mouths

WM WM p. 213 white mythology [vis-à-vis Anatole France]: metaphysics, culture of West, erased w/in itself fabulous scene that produced it, this scene remains active—inscribed in white ink; white man takes his own mythology, his own logos, the mythos of his idiom, for universal Reason

p. 253 via Du Marsais, the philosophical metaphor light of the spirit is a detour w/in (in sight of) reappropriation, presence, etc. (from Platonic eidos to Hegelian Idea), a trope, a borrowed dwelling (house) > here, light is one metaphor among metaphors, and borrowed dwelling, expropriation, becomes metaphor of metaphor

pp. 244-45 acc. Aristotle (onomatism, doctrine of simple names), metaphor, like mimēsis, must come back (revient) to physis, to its truth and its presence: nature finds itself, its proper analogy, nature gives itself in metaphor, thus metaphor is a natural gift, a characteristic of genius > geniuses have more nature, more generosity, more seed; Derrida asks whether everything can be taken from me except the power to replace? can physis sow itself?

DS DS p. 194 idea as presence of what is: Plato, as figure of thing itself; Descartes, as subjective representation; Hegel, as both (still Platonism)

OS OS p. 32(n) MOP, privilege of presence, already marked in Parmenides: time, given by hand, pure maintaining (reinen Gegenwärtigens”), pure making-present (maintenant, Vorhandenheit)

pp. 32-3(n) chain of interdependent concepts (ousia, parousia, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart, gegenwärtigen, Vorhandenheit) deposited only at beginning/end of Sein un Zeit > who better than Heidegger to think of problem of translation re: these terms

pp. 33-8 [Heidegger’s footnote that links Hegel’s vulgar concept of time to Aristotle]

p. 34 in MOP, from Parmenides to Husserl, nonpresence always thought in the form of presence (or simply: in the form), past & future are past & future presents

p. 36 acc. Heidegger, [MOP] privilege of form of “now” and “point”

p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

the impossibility of the otherwise produces a trembling, a question of tout autre, think the tie btwn truth/presence, in a thought that doesn’t need to be true/present [no skeptical moment]

p. 51 question of meaning (sens) always posed w/in closure of metaphysics: sens (meaning, essence) governed by ousia as presence, as act, as end of movement, energeia (the sens of time thought on basis of present as nontime, as Being)

——[re: ousia as presence] Hegel makes Aristotle’s nonpresence of time explicit by calling it negativity

pp. 52-3 transition from parousia to absolute subjectivity does not disrupt Aristotelianism: prime mover, presence, desire, eros, “desire is desire of presence,” absolute subjectivity, circle, return to self, parousia as self-presence > prime mover, noēsis noēseōs, as subject

p. 53n for Hegel, time erases time, Tilgen (to erase) is also an Aufhebung: given that time is pure exterior self, parousia is end of time

p. 54 for Aristotle, potentiality & act are not symmetrical: governed by teleology of presence, act (energeia) as presence (ousia, parousia)

pp. 54-5 via Aristotle, a now cannot co-exist w/ another now, its double, can only succeed it: only a single, same now can coexist: this is meaning, sense itself, united to presence

p. 55 the now, presence in the act of the present: limpossibilité de coexister avec soi: avec soi, cest-à-dire, avec un autre soi, un autre maintenant, un autre même, un double

POS POS pp. 6-7 to “deconstruct” faithful/violent to philosophy, a certain textual work that produces great pleasure, a writing interested in itself that enables us to read philosophemes as symptoms (a word Derrida suspects), the symptom of thinking Being as presence [via Heidegger]

P P p. 73 [MOP] what produces frame puts everything to work to efface frame effect, naturalize to infinity, in hands of God; deconstruction: neither reframe nor imagine absence of frame

ATIA ATIA p. 33 Derrida will sniff out, hunt down, like an animal, the reasons for confident usage of word “animal”

p. 72 for Descartes, for thought to be present to itself, to be present, must exclude/suspend all life, the living body (becomes machine, corpse), animal life, auto-affection

p. 111 secondariness of “I am living” to “I think,” unthought side of a thinking of life, a “living present”: thus began deconstruction, w/ Husserl & everything that followed, questioning autobiography of ego in its living present

PS PS p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

——not critiquing Artaud from standpoint of metaphysics, Derrida reveals complicity: Artaud must enclose himself in closure of presence to denounce naive implications w/in difference

DIF DIF p. 9 classically, sign is treated as deferred presence, as differance of temporization > sign is thus provisional, secondary > Derrida questioning this logic: to think originary differance, one would have to recognize origin, archi-, telos, eskhaton have always denoted presence: ousia, parousia

p. 16 absolute privilege: ether [closure] of metaphysics > form or epoch of presence: consciousness as meaning in self-presence

O p. 45 MOP as effacement or sublimation of seminal differance, restance of outwork gets internalized, domesticated into ontotheology of great book

CHM p. 40 Derrida’s problem w/ writing history of decision: risk construing division as event subsequent to unity of original presence > confirms metaphysics in its fundamental operation

D p. 302 present can only present itself by relating back to itself [folding back on itself], (com)plying with itself (en se pliant à soi) dans langle, along la brisure: a “crack (faille)” created by a joint, hinge

p. 303 possibility (potency) of present is its own limit, inner fold, impossibility—its impotence (btwn presence/castration) > same goes for “history,” “form”: language of metaphysics

——“present” only marked in citation, storytelling, fiction

TN p. 130 ontology of presence: pleonasm

OG p. 24 (39) Hegel already caught up in passage beyond himself, in deconstruction, by summing up philosophy of logos, assigning to presence the eschatology of parousia, describing self-proximity of infinite subjectivity

p. 60 (88) concept of experience belongs to metaphysics, can only use it [deconstructively] sous rature, “experience” always a relationship w/ presence [cf. Nietzsche’s On the Genea… Preface 1]

pp. 61-2 (91) transcendental reduction—refers to lebendige Gegenwart (The Living Present), reduces trace > commanded by theme of presence

pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

——(from Descartes to Hegel) God is name & element that makes possible absolutely pure self-presence & knowledge > God’s infinite-understanding is the other name for logos as self-presence, produced as auto-affection through voice—excluding sensible, exterior, spatial writing

p. 140 (202) silence as much a myth of full presence [as full speech]

p. 296 (417-18) representation dispossesses, re-presents, wrenches presence from itself

——naiveté of MOP: to see representation as restorative

pp. 309-12 (436-39) MOP in Rousseau appears wherever fatality of supplement seems to limit it, he is more interested in presence of the present, essence as presence, as life, as self-presence, energeai, as re-birth (permits all repetitions/returns of origin)—no memory, no anticipation, no souvenir, no distinction, point deau, an unimaginable pleasure, the sleeping imagination [Rousseau’s beautiful depiction in Reveries]

——for Derrida, there’s an interior doubling of presence, a constitution/frustration of jouissance, a call & trace that Rousseau tries to elude

METHOD (1) Deconstruction

GOD p. 78 formula tout autre est tout autre disturbs while reinforcing Kierkegaard’s discourse, it means that Abraham’s God is found everywhere something is wholly other; and since each of us is infinitely other in absolute singularity [Abraham’s election is universalized?]

GT p. 22 the es gibt plays (spielt), play of 4’s as play of gift, manifests the unity of time’s 3 dimensions, la donne de ce jeu [relance], & la doña, la femme qui nous a requis depuis lexergue [Derrida then mentions a fine book, Finas’ Donne, which interlaces all these themes]

p. 145 Derrida effectively reminds us that the characters are before the law in the same way as narration and textual dissemination [literature in general]

pp. 148-49 not probing soul of literary character, merely analyzing semantic and intentional possibility of utterances, such as they are readable on surface itself

R p. 59 how to analyze received concepts w/out subscribing

p. 60 one of me wants fraternity, one does not

p. 72 original word is aporetic and then the “vertiginous semantic abyss” of all translations

p. 91 Democracy-to-come can either be defined neutrally or also inscribe a performative and attempt to win conviction

MONL p. 48 I try to impart a tone, rhythm

——hyperbolic taste for purity of language, an incorrigible hyperbolite: I always exaggerate

p. 50 appropriate formidable, enviable and inaccessible words, domesticate, coax (amadouer), love by setting on fire, perhaps destroy, mark, transform, graft at the fire, let come in another way, to itself in itself

***p. 57 both at same time: 2 hyperboles, everything can and cannot be translated, “it is easy for me to hold firm between these two hyperboles”

pp. 59-60 break with tradition, uprooting, amnesia w/out recourse: all of these unleash the genealogical drive, the desire of the idiom, impulse to anamnesis, destructive love of the interdict, tattooing of all colors on the body [see AF p. 10 erogenous color draws mask]

——madness of a hypermnesia, a supplement of loyalty, commit to traces of writing: toward an anamnesis of the entirely other > this is the most difficult thing [Aristotle says same about virtue]

OOG pp. 5-6 [quoted from “Form and Meaning”] no choice [undecidable] btwn 2 lines of thought but to reflect on circularity that makes one pass into the other, by repeating the circle, an elliptical change of site, producing a non-negative deficiency as ellipsis of form and meaning

p. 118 apriori structures of historicity could be questioned only by recourse to language, writing, the capacity of reactivation, and finally to method [this can be taken as Husserl’s method and as Derrida’s method]

FK p. 99 “not a reciprocal condition, but rather the possibility that every knot can come undone, be cut or interrupted”

H pp. anne 8-10 “Derrida’s taking it to the limit when he works over a concept up to the point of its turning back toward the enigma that bears it”

pp. anne 12-4 you should interpret everything I haven’t said (my silences, what’s forbidden)

——[re: not knowing one’s own knowledge] leave the keys w/ the other to “unlock words from their enclosure” [AF p. 58 key is a seal]

pp. anne 54-6 step beyond border, threshold, because inability to mark a stable territory provokes thought

MC p. 346 I address you w/out knowing you, something arrives [Nietzsche’s future philosophers]

pp. 357-8 chance encounters that follow implacable program of contextual necessity, juggler: relance (revive, raise the stakes)

***FL p. 250 deconstruction grafts 2 styles together: 1) ahistorical, logico-formal paradoxes and 2) historical or anamnesic: meticulous readings, genealogies

***LOBL p. 117 I slice barbarously, illegitimately, as we always do, counting on implicit contract, impossible contract, that you’ve read “everything,” that you know the whole corpus by heart at every moment, w/ living heart that beats unceasingly (sans arrêt), w/out pulsation

p. 130 [3 options re: relation btwn Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort and the Gospels] 1) Gospel as paradigm 2) récit as paradigm (of Gospel) 3) seriality w/out paradigm [cf. GLAS]

AF p. 53 Derrida will set up cartography of borders [Yerushalmi] assigns himself [to deconstruct them]

SPOM pp. 228-29n Derrida races to set up preliminary debate with Balibar [impressive!]

p. 95 deconstruction never been (non) Marxist, faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism > il y en a plus d’un et ils son hétérogènes [this can never be repeated too often (on ne le répétera jamais assez)]

p. 111 “deconstruction is not a methodical or theoretical procedure,” because it is “never a stranger to the event”

——deconstruction beyond critique: insists on “certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation”

p. 174 larcharnement (ferocity, w/ chair, flesh) dun chasseur > set out the living lifeless body of a ghost (le corps vivant sans vie dun fantôme) to trick prey (pour tromper sa proie)

——Derrida has a feeling about this, and it’s projected into what he’s doing: “it is never possible to avoid this precipitation, since everyone reads, acts, writes with his or her ghosts, even when one goes after the ghosts of others”

p. 195 secret of commodity form is substitution (quid pro quo), but one w/ ruse, perverse intervention of souffleur, parole soufflée > abnormal play of mirrors [men no longer recognize in the substitution made by commodity the social character of their own labor], commodity turns men into specters, vampires > can’t see their reflection, “but who is not so deprived?” Derrida adds

POOF p. 13 [Derrida “confesses,” in parentheses, intended method to go beyond Aristotle]

pp. 102-03 re: privileged reference to Menexenus (can never absolutely be justified), Derrida explains how deconstruction functions whether Plato is ironic or not, decons. belongs to heritage of Platonic irony > his irony still offers glimpses of mirrors, identities, ‘ideal self’ of the people

p. 229 Derrida discusses his own personal responsibility re: the privileged discourses on friendship he has chosen to discuss > he’s not submitting to their authority, he’s thinking about forces or procedures that have placed them in the major position

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

pp. 237-38 gravest of problems, not our intention to denounce fraternity: via Michelet, fraternity as ‘law beyond law,’ vision of universal/revolutionary fraternity [à la the Enlightenment], a hyperbole whose generosity can’t be opposed > [Derrida promising] a fraternity w/out fraternity (literal, strict, genealogical, masculine)

——what will be put into question re: fraternity is the exemplarist strategy (ethnocentrism, patriotism, nationalism), alleged universalism of nation, homeland: our homeland gives passage to homeland of all mankind

pp. 263-64 yes this book is French, but it’s not written only in French, that would claim for French exemplary privilege of translation for all other idioms [i.e. Montaigne, Hugo, etc. on fraternity & humanity] > instead, this books sets itself up to work and be worked relentlessly (s’acharne lui-même), au sens de la chasse, là où acharner revient à disposer un leurre de chair, close to the thing called France

p. 278 [sometimes friendship linked to political], sometimes in name of morality that friendship is removed from criteria of politics > doù la surenchère sans fin dont nous avons tenté de formaliser la loi

p. 288 Derrida has not substituted name Nietzsche for Zarathustra: les choses sont déjà assez imprenables et inappropriables avec chacun deux

p. 289 Derrida has insisted that the indefinite recoils (replis) in Zarathustra’s strategy must contain one fold or another that places history of brother in Bible & Koran beside Zarathustra (not in confrontation)

MSUB J p. 166 under the words (mots), hors sens, when you let attraction of words, motifs, motets [anthems] play under the meaning, you draw, sing, rather than speaking, you write the unwritable > this passage also convokes multiplicity of voices in a “motel,” rhythm, vibration

BL p. 184 Derrida concedes presuppositions, conventions [on authorship of text], while exposing them

p.186 is deconstructive insistence too trivial? “I think not!”

HASD pp. 31, 36 Derrida keeps saying: “I can’t get into this here” [performing negative theology]

p. 44 [Derrida, speaking about Meister Eckhart’s apophatic strategies, the aporias of politics of doctrine, also speaks of his own] “the voice of an utterance can conceal another, which it then appears to quote without quoting it, presenting itself as another form, namely as a quotation of the other”

MPM p. 58 what if ontological difference is translated into rhetoric of memory?

p. 72 via de Man, figure of “defective cornerstone,” “neglected corners” > required by architecture [of system], deconstructs from w/in

A p. 14 Derrida reminds us of his method [in OS] (orient confirmation [of Heidegger] toward another suggestion, even will supporting it): can the experience of the time be anything other than vulgar?

pp. 31-32 “deconstruction” of Heidegger’s border between dying & perishing, if it does not discredit it, gives it another status

***pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (narrivent quà seffacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

pp. 78-80 a braid that can’t be cut, 3 twisting movements w/out end: 1) aporia 2) impossible circumscription that foils every methodological strategy, stratagem of delimitation [no knowable edge btwn anthropology & existential analysis] 3) irreducibility of contaminating contraband

EM pp. 134-35 (161-62) Derrida’s attention to system and structure, la réduction du sens, neither restores classical motifs nor erases them > rather, determining possibility du sens on basis of “formal” organization which in itself has no sens: a critique [sic] of phenomenologies (Husserl, Hegel), which aspire for une réduction au sens

this critique would extend to Heidegger who situates his destruction of metaphysical humanism in hermeneutical question on the meaning or truth of Being

——strategic bet (le pari stratégique), radical trembling coming from outside, trembling played out in violent relationship of West to its other, whether that other is “linguistic,” economic, political, military > military/economic violence have structural solidarity w/ “linguistic” violence

p. 135 (162-63) two strategies of deconstruction interwoven: 1) exit from within terrain 2) change terrain, discontinue > 1) risks sinking into autism of closure 2) risks inhabiting more naively the inside one claims to have deserted

PP p. 67 hypothesis of a rigorous, sure, subtle form [re: Phaedrus] is more fertile, discovers new chords, surprises w/in more secret organization of themes, names, words, unties sumplokē patiently interlacing arguments > magisterial: affirms and effaces w/ suppleness, irony, discretion

p. 84 (91) plus tard, dans le même tissu, dans les mêmes textes, nous tirerons dautres fils, et de nouveau les même pour voir sy ourdir ou dénouer dautres desseins

p. 96 Plato cannot see the links (les liasons), les laisser dans lombre ou les y interrompre > they go on working, outside his text? thanks to him? in his text? outside his text?

pp. 107-08 (122-23) on eve of Platonism, morning after Hegelianism, we cannot “overturn (renversées)” or “reject” philosophia, epistēmē in name of writing, we can displace, we can “mime absolute knowledge” > what philosophy would call simulacrum

p. 130 (148) rigorously untangle hidden forces linking present word w/ absent word w/out drowning in undifferentiated generality [re: Plato’s non-usage of pharmakos]

VM p. 81 Husserl, Heidegger taught us [Derrida] rigor

pp. 113-14 [do for all words what Hegel did for Aufhebung]

PAS PAS p. (24) jaccumule pour prévenir la prévention

p. (34) usually, pour faire droit à un autre texte, Derrida exposes avoidances in a text > Blanchot’s texts one of the few (lun des très rares) where Derrida is willing, joyfully, to simply withdraw (retrait)

p. (48) when one gives up rendering account (on sinterdit de rendre compte) of the multiple meanings of pas, one gives up that which takes logic, dialectics, sense toward a coming of the event

p. (57) from where the right to interrupt? unjustifiable violence of interruption, nothing more servile, indiscreet, unspeakable than generalizing, appropriating the unique, breaking the seal of an absolute singularity [re: citing from Friendship, on single friendship btwn Bataille & Blanchot]

p. (65) Derrida questions himself about whether he hides a new economy, new mastery behind the undecidable > [responds] nothing that doesn’t expose itself & remove itself

p. (96) Derrida always interrupts Blanchot’s citations very arbitrarily, he is interested, like Blanchot, in logic of parts and partage

VP p. 6 the security of presence is founded on the non-empirical, the sign, the non-foundation, exposing this removes this security

p. 26 passing from commentary to interpretation

p. 45 have to articulate the commentary on the interpretation

S p. 8 why not stand firm and interrogate prescription and proscription? [re: phrase axiomatics of Destruktion, which Heidegger would have refused], axiomatics only suspect in epochal schema

pp. 55-6 though Derrida sees a “humanist teleology” in the hierarchization of man to animal (found in the negation imposed on animal w/ weltarm), one which requires not one ontology but the very possibility of the onto-logical, he isn’t criticizing it (it does denounce biologism, racism, and naturalism) > can we escape this program? can we transform it by “reconnoitering it right down to its most tortuous ruses and most subtle resources”?

pp. 85, 94 Heidegger would refuse designation “commentary” for ontological statement, Derrida asks if we do anything other than commentary [at moment he goes beyond commentary]

FSW p. 199 manipulate metaphors: 1) make the known an allusion to the unknown 2) making enigmatic through insistence of “metaphoric investment” > Freud does the latter

——our reading will let metaphoric investment “invade the entirety of the psyche”

T p. xviii(n) tympanum, Dionysianism, Ariadne’s Thread, labyrinth: by means of the breach (fellure) of philosophical identity, which amounts to addressing the truth to itself in an envelope, to hearing it speak inside without opening its mouth or showing its teeth, the bloodiness of a disseminated writing separates the lips, violates the embouchure of philosophy, contact w/ another code, a unique event, unreadable as such, inaudible, btwn earth & sea, w/out signature

pp. xix-xxii as long as the tympanum of philosophical mastery is not destroyed, all liberties (denegation, precipitation, ignorance, or stupidity) one takes w/ philosophical order will remain activated a tergo by misconstrued philosophical machines > called back to order

pp. xxiv-xxv delimit the space of a closure that’s not represented by philosophy’s name, acc. to straight circular line enclosed in homogenous space, prevent philosophy from calculating its margin, a limitrophic violence imprinted by new types > 1) overflows and cracks (déborde et fait craquer), count in margins more or less than what’s said/read, déferlement qui tient à la structure de la marque [same word as limit, marche, marge] 2) luxate the pretensions to univocal rigidity [vanne ouverte à une double entente ne formant plus un seul système]

pp. xxv-xxvi [deconstruction:] limitrophic violence imprinted acc. new types, eat margin in luxating the tympanum (relation to itself of double membrane) > [i.e.:] think singular tympanum in ear, sewn up, domesticated march, alongside several tympan of printing machine [manual]

pp. leiris xxvi-xxvii [Leiris’ phonograph (purely sonorous idiom that cannot be expressed w/ words) “mirrors” literature on printing press tympanum]

p. xxviii intro to differance, cites, repercusses its rhythm w/out measure, incision conduite par une main aveugle pour navoir jamais vu que le part-et-dautre dun tissu > to weave (tramer) doesn’t play le jeu denchaînement, il joue lenchaînement, trouer, traverser, works on both sides (le part-et-dautre), leaves ear canal open, sous le coup dun enchaînement simulé, non-echo

PPHS p. 72 [method, compare to Nietzschean interpretation] Derrida will look 1) at the ruptures, breaks, discontinuities of long but finite historical continuum/sequence of metaphysics re: sign as referral to presence 2) and at the sequence itself, ample chains of predicates that aren’t interrupted by fascinating rupturing events

F pp. xii-xiii je marrête ici, déjà (tombe en arrêt [vault to a stop]), setting on the “edge of the crypt” a voiceless word, a blank stone of a scruple [see p. xlviii], to engage others to it, of a crypt

p. xviii how to treat introj./incorp.: rigorous dissociation even if purity of dissociation remains theoretical: dissociation as excluding inclusion of one safe in another (dun for dans lautre)

FWT p. 12 Derrida looks for price to be paid when theoretical progress is made [re: Foucault] via presupposition > makes it possible to accelerate and to absorb shock of acceleration (break)

p. 14 in Derrida’s [torrid relation w/] touching/mistreating (toucher à) the French language, letting himself be touched/mistreated, in his attention not to signifier but to letter, address, destination, mise-en-scène, he is closest to Lacan, but “Lacan is so French!”, “so much more French than I am”

pp. 150-51 Derrida’s aporias are not meant to confound, reverse oppositions, but to suspend, mark, recall necessity of suspending naive confidence, common sense, conscious belief

p. 165 Derrida pursues necessity of hyper-atheological discourse, while ceaselessly meditating on Abrahamic culture w/out trying to destroy/disqualify it

——Derrida wants to deconstruct deconstruction of the Lutheran trace found in Heidegger’s Destruktion; how does one pass, step through

——we should never want to avoid getting caught in a tight spot—how else could we go anywhere?

WM p. 239 since, for Aristotle, mimēsis is not identity but gives us to see in action what is not to be seen in action, only in its resembling double, its mimēma, Derrida wants to leave open this energetic absence, this enigmatic division, the interval which makes scenes and tells tales

pp. 254-55 stratified reading [re: Idea in Plato, Hegel]: neither pure etymology, nor pure origin, neither homogenous continuum nor absolute synchronism or simple interiority of system to itself > simultaneous critique of transcendental history of philosophy & of systematic structures perfectly closed over their technical/synchronic manipulation (bodies of work identified acc. “proper name" of signature)

***DS pp. 207-08(n), the last instance of the mime, no referent (signified, process of truth) in this last instance, but still inseparable from metaphysical search for arkhē, telos, eskhaton; to erase metaphysical concept of last instance would defuse necessary critique it permits in certain contexts > the “general economy” of double science (a bifid, dissymmetrical writing that takes double inscription of concepts into account) constitutes, in a displaced sense, the last instance

p. 231n Derrida’s respect/debt for/to scholarship on Mallarmé [despite his deconstruction of it], rigorous need for it

p. 271 point de méthode; Mallarmé: all method is a fiction; Derrida—still a marching order (marche à suivre)

P p. 97 Derrida exploits Kant’s example of frame to ask whether parergon constitutes place/structure of free-wandering beauty (nothing prohibits the right to exploit the example)

POS pp. 6-7 double play [double hands] rigorously respects philosophemes to the point of their nonpertinence, exhaustion, closure

——to “deconstruct” faithful/violent to philosophy, a certain textual work that produces great pleasure, a writing interested in itself that enables us to read philosophemes as symptoms (a word Derrida suspects), the symptom of thinking Being as presence [via Heidegger]

——to read this symptom is not ingenious discovery of single person, is due to total transformation that can’t be called “historical,” or “worldwide” anymore

p. 69 Derrida’s theoretical theses inscribed in [his?] texts have “dissimulated the texts’ texture [those he’s writing about?]” (and inversely), “this is completely deliberate on my part”

OS p. 39 “there is no chance that within the thematic of metaphysics anything might have budged” w/ respect to concept of time, from Aristotle to Hegel > founding concepts, entire system, substance, cause, etc. sufficed > one cannot interrupt, transgress, exceed “metaphysics” w/out acknowledging this powerful systematic truth

p. 65 lautre geste, le plus difficile, le plus inouï, le plus questionnant, celui pour lequel nous sommes le moins préparé, can only be sketched (esquisser), announced in calculated fissures of metaphysical text: 2 texts, 2 hands, 2 visions (together simultaneously & separated)

ROP p. 35 “deconstruction’s” double bind: 1) inherit from Enlightenment, affirmed/displaced in Freud, Husserl, & even Heidegger 2) tirelessly analyze resistance that clings to the elementary

p. 40 lamenting that no one goes into details at a colloquia, Derrida says, “I incorrigibly persist in hoping things get decided” in”those microscopic or micrological displacements”

p. 49 I never discuss a philosopher or corpus as if it where a homogenous body

p. 74 “one must” begin by listening to the canon, speaking the language of the patient

OTO p. 4 Derrida will proceed in a way that some will find inadmissible, some will accept as law, others will judge to be not aphoristic enough

p. 32 we will not decide through hermeneutic, exegetic interpretations, but will offer political interventions which politically rewrite the text and its destination

***ATIA p. 29 transgressal experience of limitrophy, trephō, trophē, trophos: to feed limit, train, nurse, make grow, thicken, fold, divide the line, multiply/increase limit’s figures [not efface the limit]

p. 30 explore foliated consistency of abyssal limit

***pp. 91-2 single embrace of Kant, Descartes, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger, like chasing, hunting, trying to take hold of cuttlefish, touch the animal in a way where it will expel its ink (encre), its anchor, in this case, w/ these folks, the ink as the ability to do the “I,” before autoreference; (in the name of autobiography) Derrida confides the animalist “vision” he has of what he does, what he writes > his “sole concern” is to not sacrifice to it any difference, fold, opening to-come

p. 118-19 [instead of being against an idea, Derrida argues “more is required”]

p. 133 instead of objecting to argument, recast conceptual framework due to fragility of a logic [in this case Lacan’s]

GSP p. 154 to impose a debate, from w/in a philosophy [that of “genesis & structure”], begins w/ aggression, infidelity, even if it can set free meaning of latent process

***PS p. 174 when we “appear” to regret silence or defeat before unique it’s only to shatter & decompose it more

——no commentary can escape these defeats [silences before the unique] unless it destroys itself as commentary: exhuming unity in which are embedded the differences (madness/work, psyche/text, example/essence) supporting both criticism & clinic

——approaching archaic, tumultuous ground through a “negative” route, historical in a sense never given thematic value > can’t be tolerated by metaphysical concept of history

——these are not methodological prolegomena or generalizations announcing a new treatment for Artaud, they indicate the question Artaud wants to destroy, which he indefatigably denounced

p. 176 we will follow Artaud’s intention (restore Danger by reawakening theater of cruelty, un monde où la structure du dérobement noffrît plus aucun abri) > with exception dun glissement calculé

p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

——not critiquing Artaud from standpoint of metaphysics, Derrida reveals complicity: Artaud must enclose himself in closure of presence to denounce naive implications w/in difference

p. 328n we could not avoid the violence of the example the moment we proscribed it, but perhaps we can better understand the necessity of this incoherence

FS pp. 19-20 Derrida explains that by opposing force to structure he’s not envisioning an economy of pure, shapeless force > he opposes one series to the other to make apparent the noncritical privilege granted to one of the terms (structure, site, spatiality): a strategy which uses strength of field to turn its own stratagems against it > dislocate, fissure the system: le dé-limitant de part en part [delimit as describe, mark, and delimit as un-limit]

——our discourse irreducibly belongs to system of metaphysical oppositions

DIF DIF p. 7 delineating differance is strategic & adventurous: 1) strategic: because no transcendent truth outside the field can govern (theologically) the totality of the field 2) adventurous: because this strategy has no goal, no telos, strategy w/out finality, blind tactics

p. 12 use words for their strategic convenience to deconstruct at most decisive point [re: history, constitution, production]

***pp. 16-7 system of differance no longer tolerates oppositions passive/active, indeterminate/determinate, cause/effect > consciousness as “effect” or “determination” w/in system of differance: strategically, one continues to operate acc. lexicon one is de-limiting

p. 24 text of metaphysics is comprehended (compris) > encore lisible, and to be read: not surrounded but traversed by limit, marked in its interior by multiple furrow (sillon) of its margin

O p. 54n the point is to work to set up or dismantle a scaffold, a scaffolding (un échafaudage), we need one to substitute, the time of a lapse, Mallarmé’s lustre for Plato’s sun

SW p. 312 diminishing stitch, reduce (not undo), decrescendo, “diminution” consists in saying less, letting more be understood > stitch so as to let “rhetoric appropriate the truth of the verdict”

——all your new work is neither Testament nor Odyssey? the opposite, I call them to the witness-stand, knowing they’ll always be bigger than the tapestry I’m trying to sew them into (a crossing)

***DPi p. 200 take forever to follow hematochromatic corpus in Hugo: so I limit myself to a few schematic & preliminary points of reference: &! go read…

p. 243 vertigos, head spinning, head falling (one blow of guillotine), turn around neck of decollation [cf. GLAS, O], everything turns around what turns (not merely rhetorical turns), turns of phrase given to expression “condemned to death” or “condemned to die”: revolution, conversion, faith and DP, DP and belief > highs & lows we climb up/down to point of vertigo

RGE p. 260 since Hegel’s [all] logic is an interpretation, is submitted to an interpretive decision, it can be interpreted against him > reinterpretation: simulated repetition of Hegelian discourse

——minute displacement disjoints articulations, trembling spreads out—old shell cracks

pp. 272-73 reading of Bataille: 1) must not isolate notions (“experience,” “interior”) as if they were their own context: error to remain blind [?] to a traditional culture wishing to be taken as natural element of discourse 2) must not submit contextual attentiveness to system of meaning promising absolute formal mastery (this would erase excess of nonmeaning)

p. 338n long explanation justifying a method which chooses points of strength over weak ones: Bataille against Bataille [see Gii p. 57 same done w/ Heidegger] > interpretation attempts to bind major moments together (rules of force, rules of weakness)

——this “method,” named w/in closure of knowledge, is justified by what we’re writing about: suspension of epoch of meaning & truth

Gi p. 9 to find sexual difference in Heidegger, seek contours of Heidegger’s silence (non-dit)

——wager that nothing is at standstill around a silence, the traces of that silence do not come from just anywhere

Gii pp. 51-2 concern ourselves w/ Geschlecht of Geschlecht: a mark (de)composed, perhaps no longer a word, follow its translations, decomposition, disarticulatons, genealogy of its body unified on basis of or acc. the split (partage) of pieces of words > Geschlechts genealogical composition inseparable from decomposition of human Geschlecht

p. 57 [like pitting Bataille against Bataille (see RGE p. 338n)] > Derrida only “critiques” Heidegger by doing so from other places in his own text: he writes w/ 2 hands at least (i.e. his text is not homogenous)

p. 58 to ask about paths (odoi) of Heidegger, his step (pas) and rhythm, his Hand-werk of writing—questions beyond method (doutre-méthode)

REST pp. 263-64 [re: les question de la démarche embarrassée (boîteuse ou louche?)] i.e. “Who is walking?” “On whose feet?” > idiomatic figures of questions seem necessary; “necessary: it’s an attribute,” still vague > better to say question-idioms the form of which is very fitting, clinging (collant) (tightly/flexibly) to figure or body of what you here wish to turn into an object (feet)

pp. 267-68 from Van Gogh’s shoes to Freud’s show fetish to Bataille’s “Big Toe” > from market de la pointure (of sizes), rising/falling stocks, to speculation on Bataille [general economy]

p. 303 a certain type of strict commentary on Heidegger, a restitution of him, becomes obscene, his language is no longer recognizable > thinking otherwise means thinking otherwise than he who attempts to think the remainder “properly”—that is, otherwise than properly

***pp. 325-26 if police there is (and isn’t there always?) > Derrida polices too [?], “close reading,” counterpolices [?] oldest, most dogmatic, sinisterly authoritarian programs, massive meidatizing machines: pre-text of perception, of bare hands (mains nue), of real history, of living speech (vous enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte)

DST DST p. 203 [re: Lacoue-Labarthe’s désistance] exemplary, superior probity that, w/out ceding to dogmatic moralism, submits ethical demand to trial (lépreuve) of thought

p. 208 resistance indicates sensitive point (lieu sensible) in a reading > point (point) of incomprehension that organizes it

PIO p. 23 deconstruction is inventive or nothing at all, marches ahead, marks a trail, opens passage, doesn't settle for methodical procedures: produces rules, other conventions, new performatives

——its process (démarche) involves an affirmation linked to invention, but it can only do so by deconstructing conceptual/institutional structure, as if it were necessary to reinvent the future

p. 45 other as the uninvented, in invention, must let other come, not make the other: deconstructive invention as opening, uncloseting, destabilizing foreclusionary structures

——beyond the possible invention, invention of the other that would come while miming/repeating economy of same

RM pp. 49-50 [cf. Pas] the dérive or dérapage (skidding) as un certain jeu de lancre in surrounding waters (parages): Derrida can only stop engines (machines) of this floating vehicle [my discourse on metaphor], which would still abandon it to its unforeseeable dérive [more metaphorico]

p. 67 word re-trait designates quasi-catachrestic violence, abuse I impose on language, hopefully justified by necessity of good, economic formalization

p. 73 Derrida attempted to regulate use of word recouper in Glas

HLP p. 36 [method] Derrida, w/ finesse & rigor, engages mobile & fluid folds of lie’s complication, such a demand risks losing sight of “classical defining edge of the lie” > difficult to delimit this edge, but without it no ethics, right, politics would survive

TR pp. 92-3 potential dynamic of sequencing can & must be interpreted

WAP p. 68 re: analysis of the institution of philosophy & publishing, Derrida speaks from an internal border [implying he is w/in the “institution,” he has authority, he is published]

p. 79 [when quasi-systematic deconstruction differs from Foucault: no empirical light-headedness]

——deconstruction must not choose btwn long, barely mobile networks & short, quickly outdated ones > must display strange logic: multiple powers of oldest machine can always be reinvested/exploited in new situation

pp. 100-02 Derrida does not multiply remarks on structure of reference, article of title, value of contextuality [i.e. minutiae, syntax] to divert from urgency, but to determine it by exposing 2 alibis of philosophy

AFR pp. 108-09 to introduce (not saturate, not intrude [sintroduire]): seduce the text (not the reader), surprise it close to its content > a rigorous “abyss”

——follow lines, grafts, borders, ribs: analyze its machine of oppositions, its program, and what breaches the program, defeats its teleology, undecides its circle: suspend text on one of its nervures après-coupées (cut-after-the-fact-ribs)

IW p. 285 re: Heidegger & Cohen’s nationalist call to duty: let’s not imprudently bring these 2 gestures together, but not forget common web of a tradition

D p. 294 [let’s mark in hollow, mute, invisible angle] statistical accumulation of “quotations,” [like constraints of that angle] accumulation as feigning to present the text > “this” text & all that touches it—still “that” text; generalized simulacrum: intertext of 2 fictions (btwn primary text & commentary) [Derrida will call D “this” text w/ a certain irony]

p. 295 Derrida’s text: re-marks passage [in Soller’s], repeats square by closing angle, opens another surface of writing to-come: play w/ cardo, hinge, cardinal points; remarque dangle: all lines broken

p. 357 in scratching (gratter) on this textual matter, your recognize description of a painting, reframed, broken into, placed in another quadrilateral, w/ one side fractured: you are painting, writing while reading: tout le tissu verbal y est pris, et vous avec

+R p. 156 Derrida yielded to Adami (hooked like a fish [hostage]), as if his angular signature was waiting for me [Derrida], a stupefying advance > it became Derrida's business, made him speak

C p. 195 Derrida will have to change formulas constantly, abandon them like waste products, leftovers of supper interrupted in full enjoyment by an entombment, after declarations which have nothing in common with the thing itself: this is my body, this my name

pp. 196-97 Derrida tries to preserve what he invests in word paradigm, a word that’s too much used, worn down (usé), on all sides—thus irreplaceable > what he invests in the word is assaulted by investments of other, from capital (interest & usury): its measure accumulates in surplus value

LI p. 48 “I repeat…it can never be repeated too often”: absence of receiver from sender, structural necessity that makes writing possible

p. 55 “classical concept” as target: a tortuous, complex strategy > exploit target against itself by discovering it to be “basis” of an operation directed against itself, or discovering “in it” the cryptic reserve of something utterly different

p. 114 dual writing of Limited Inc: 1) classical point by point response, norms of classical philosophy 2) multiply statements to render oppositions [on which speech act theory relies] insufficient

p. 138 deconstruction aims to analyze & if possible transform network of presuppositions of any legitimacy

TN p. x On TouchingJean-Luc Nancy is intentionally dated, get you to read him

p. 43 multiplying questions: get carried away en touchant their loss of sense

p. 184 “too large for dimensions of present essay” [chapter title has exorbitant in it]

pp. 206-07 Merleau-Ponty: visual experience is truer than tactical experience > yet, since M.-P. often uses “example of hand,” Derrida will follow a few of his lines (ses lignes) [i.e. lines of the hand] whose tracings brouille une statique des frontières that would stabilize “parallelism” or establish privilege

pp. 216-17 [beyond Foucault] mouvance (trend) of thinking, not path or line (neo-Heideggerian[?]), structurally open unlike epistēmē, “paradigm,” which hypothesize historical space w/in strictly determinable contour > I read texts profitably and make unfair selections

p. 231 Derrida obeys thematic focus [for a bit?]

p. 266 insistence that comes down to thinking, no longer a simple rhetorical movement

ATM p. 173 a performative w/out present, w/out self-congratulatory success, not an act of prowess

pp. 187-88 “je donne, je joue lingratitude contre la jalousie

E p. 5 Derrida mentions a tightrope walker in Kant, encourages “anyone” to take the plunge (put in something of himself): Kant, Nietzsche, Genet

pp. 20-1 [re: internal, exemplorality of mouth’s auto-affection] what is not regulated by exemplorality, what is its bord ou le débord absolu? > the border which traces limit/frame of its parergon? the border that doesn’t enter into this framed, hierarchized, regulated theory? what is excluded & what gives form to exemplorality proceeding from this exclusion? [can’t be named]

AD p. 9 [re: Levinas] as w/ all thoughts that are sources, I will never stop beginning to think anew on basis of new beginning they give me

p. 80 [to discuss the “political”] would need a guiding thread (fil conducteur) or touchstone (pierre de touche) in the context that concerns us

p. 106 Derrida hardly dares break up (larrêter) Levinas’ text acc. to crude pedagogy, he’ll try nonetheless, inviting us to read original [double violence? invitation as conditioned hospitality]

p. 118 hiatus ensures that analysis encounters dissociation in structure of arguments, heterogeneity: text knows how to interrupt itself

WOG p. 27 [vis-à-vis Alliez] deconstruction tirelessly repeats the text while altering it, to be sure > this is not only done by favouring “irruptive emergence of nomadic concepts or undecidable concepts”

p. 40 quotation marks around “Greeks,” “me,” “we others,” around every autos, something other than playful coquettishness or simulacrum of signature

LG p. 227 “avant den venir à lépreuve dun certain exemple, je tenterai de formuler [formulate before the ordeal, test, proof of an example, i.e. Blanchot]

BSi pp. 26-7 for Hobbes, man as artist mimics art of God [cf. E Kant-like?]; Leviathan is artificial, thus sovereignty a human artifact, monster prosthetic made in lab, and not indivisible, absolute, as Hobbes argues (commentary > interpretation: consequences beyond explicit intention)

***pp. 180-81 “I do not wish to homogenize things and erase differences,” but no criteria to conclude that man alone is exposed to bêtise, no criteria to exclude the animal

p. 225 configuration of motifs vs. diachronic linear reading (read whole text from A to Z) [baby daddy]

p. 269 [method in seminar] experience w/ you, and reconnoiter the corner turned

p. 278 “beast & sovereign” as an incitement to think limits of knowledge (horizon that will constantly border but also un-border)

pp. 312-13 trousse (case, kit), trousseau (bunch of keys) > the etymology of these words includes everything Derrida’s been working on in BS [how Derrida can open up to “everything”—elsewhere, again]

p. 336 certain indispensable schemata appear more clearly when you improvise

OG pp. 29-30 (45) the tension btwn autre geste [written w/out being uttered] and propos déclaré > where grammatology has a future beyond linguistics-phonology [re: Saussure]

p. 50 (73) to think play radically must follow Husserl and Heidegger to the end, conserve legibility of their thought, must know le jeu du monde before attempting to understand all forms of play in the world > play, as absence of transcendental signified, not a play in the world

p. 61 (89-90) Derrida discusses the importance of appealing to the transcendental, the necessity of a pathway, ce parcours doit laisser dans le texte un sillage > no transcendental pathway (glossematics) would be naive objectivism; ultra-transcendental would leave no sillage, be pre-critical > these 2 end up resembling each other [this leads to deconstructive logic of trace]

pp. 70-1 (102-03) one can only justify the choice of word trace w/in une topique, it’s an historical calculation & strategy: a # of givens belonging to our discourse have imposed this choice on Derrida > Levinas—trace as absolute past, Heidegger—undermining ontology as presence/full speech, Nietzsche & Freud—Spur, and use of [trace?] in biology > all make enigmatic: propre, proche, presence

p. 111 (163-64) after describing how Lévi-Strauss bartered w/ some girls to find out everyone’s names, Derrida says “there is much to say about the fact that it is little girls…” w/out ever saying more [his method re: sexual difference?]

pp. 149-50 (214-15) [re: Rousseau] draw out a signification the presumed future reading can’t dispense w/ (faire léconomie) > can’t prejudge the discipline of a future reading, thus far no model of reading can measure up to the text (a text more legible than has been thus far thought)

p. 150 (215) Derrida not looking for a truth signified in Rousseau but an engagement and appurtenance “qui enserrent dans le même tissu, le même texte, lexistence et lécriture”—same [text, tissue] is here called supplement, another name for differance

pp. 161-62 ex-orbitant [method]: certain point of exteriority to totality of age of logocentrism, broach the orbitary (orbita) orb (orbis) > decons. has no methodological or logical intra-orbitary assurances, can never justify un point de départ absolutely: surely before Rousseau was chosen the exit and the critique of the repression of writing had been prepared (amorcé) [?]: [deconstruction designated as errant or empirical—only means something w/in closure]

——departure (la sortie) is radically empiricist, affected by nonknowledge as it ventures out deliberately > very concept of empiricism destroys itself, avowal of empiricism sustains itself only on basis of strength of question

pp. 221-22 (316) nous gagnerons à en recomposer le système [re: Rousseau’s origin of language in Essay and Emile]

***p. 229 (326) Rousseau declares what he wishes to say: writing/articulation are post-originary malady; he describes what he does not wish to say: articulation (space of writing) at origin of language

p. 239 (340) Rousseau cannot declare unity of the advantage of writing (l’intérêt d’écrire), can only describe it in contraband: writing–need, speech–passion

p. 251 (356) Rousseau declares point-zero, but describes…

p. 269 (379) “fermons langle et pénétrons dans la texte”—to where writing is named

p. 315 (443-44) Rousseau describes w/out declaring, en contrebande, the originary exteriority of writing: alterity

***CIR p. 240 tearing off my skin like I always do, unmask, de-skin myself, while sagely reading others like an angel, dig down in myself to the blood, in them, so as not to scare you, so as to indebt you toward them, not me

pp. 306-08 nervous, worried, hunted, literature (beast playing dead, melding w/ foliage), delivering to world impregnable inedible simulacrum, the theory of the parasite virus, terrorizing others w/ instability he carries everywhere, one book open in the other

EU p. 9 Derrida has insisted enough elsewhere [on connection btwn marque, marche, marge] to go quickly here

pp. 17-8 the 3 orders (not equally divided, nor can they be discussed apart) that impacted Descartes’ decision to write in French: 1) reinforce establishing of French Law 2) pedagogical facilitation (for women) 3) link btwn philosophical system & some language

p. 43 we will not conduct ourselves toward ligne surplombante to dominate totality of an epoch or historical territory [re: using Kant to think university]

——find exemplary indications w/out isolating external considerations

p. 65 Derrida’s going to add a “modest supplement” to Antoine Berman’s Lépreuve de létranger: supplementarity (itself) [dick]—problematic of onto-theology in certain concept of translation

pp. 92-3 locate untranslatable nodes in Kant’s The Conflict…, that which doesn’t reach us, remains outside usage of our era > but, rather than simply take inventory of what no longer is, or of certain contradictions—treat the un-translatable experience in excess of dialectical rationality: as a signal that university [since its origin] can’t comprehend [translate] itself in purity of its inside

p. 124 phallocentrism & logocentrism (essentially indissociable) wherever I could spot them > everywhere, even where unnoticed

p. 223 Derrida declares limits in order to lift/distance/disappropriate them [Rousseau describes doesn’t declare]

SPEC p. 269 Freud’s speculation, interminable detour (Umweg): quil décrit lui-même, écrit et désécrit, pas décriture [like Rousseau, Freud describes but doesn’t declare]

p. 273 Derrida opens to first page of Beyond… as naively as possible, not wanting to be paralyzed by legitimacy of methodological/juridical protocols

p. 274 the contractual institution that permits one to say “je-nous” > Freud’s signature engageant et représentant tous les tenants de la théorie: ça marche et fait marcher comme ça [is Derrida speaking about himself too?]

p. 298 Freud’s haste, urgency, to solve the problem of beyond the PP is something other, of another order: not the demonstrative declaration or manifest argument [like Rousseau in OG]

p. 304 the unanalyzed remainder of an unconscious remains [re: Freud’s autobiographical, writing], Derrida: “je parie” that it will be transmitted blindly by all who “return to Freud”: remainder that works the scene is illegible—i.e., restance, yet the only urgency of what reste à faire

pp. 325-26 Derrida explains that a certain passage [on Freud’s indifference to whether Ernst invented game or not] is okay to extract, appears dissociable, a parasite from its immediate context, resonates like sound from elsewhere—murmur

p. 339 je le suppose relu [re: Freud’s Beyond…]—gagner le temps (or essential form of that which interests the speculation)

p. 364 [Derrida’s associative talent, hears :] whispering—correspondence—Mother/PP

p. 370 Symposium comes to us filtered, deserves minute analysis of tissue of lacunae [re: active selection], would compose another fable

p. 390 if Freud uses ungelöst (unresolved) colloquially is it abusive to reawaken allegedly sleeping metaphors? Certainly! [in any case, Derrida’s not tracking down hidden metaphors or secret intention of Freud’s writing]

FV p. 420n basted effect of certain footnotes, animal-machines camouflaged in shadows (prudently left in corners)—threatening security of a space & a logic

CHOR p. 103 I am going too quickly, I’m schematizing excessively: Heidegger begins by denying all forms of security, all sedimented presuppositions of classical ontology

METHOD (2) Others

FL p. 292 when we sign, we speak in non-constative, prescriptive, evaluative manner [re: end of Benjamin’s essay]

OOG p. 38 despite appearances, “philosophers of method” more sensitive to historicity, though they remove digressions from history’s path

p. 149 “method is not the neutral preface or perambulatory exercise of thought, rather, it is thought itself in the consciousness of its complete historicity”

——Husserl’s method: bring [passage] to consciousness, Selbstbesinnung, Verantwortung, avoid risk of inauthenticity, loss of Speech > light

***POR p. 16 (149) social sciences steeped in Marxist, Weberian, neo-Weberian methodology, they are controlled by the spaces they claim to analyze——same goes for Marx and Freud, en tant quils sont normés par un projet de pratique scientifique et par le principe de raison > even when claiming to be revolutionary, they don’t trouble the “most conservative forces of a University”

HASD p. 5 prayer purports to be prior to method, methodological rules, in negative theology

p. 27 inevitable problems w/ everything that can articulate speech or writing (literary criticism, hermeneutics, poetics): 1) figural spatialization (places of rhetoric) 2) meaning & reference [see p. 28 recall of Other preceding speech] 3) event, insofar as it takes place

A pp. 45-6 request for foundation or for condition of possibility speaks language of methodic order: 1) an order as in a whole 2) an order as in a sequence 3) an order as in a command

——no escaping ontologico-juridico-transcendental tradition [method], except w/ death, aporia, unique exclusion from system, “life death” no longer falls under case of what it makes possible

p. 52 for Heidegger, methodological propositions, problematic closures apply to “metaphysics of death”

——existential analytic is method independent of, anterior to, this side (Disseits) of metaphysics

***p. 53 methodological urgency in being-toward-death: we can only start from here (len deça) (not Platonic, Christian), ontico-ontological priority of Dasein, “exemplary” point of departure (that we are hear to question & wait, expect each other)

pp. 53-4 Heidegger places analytic of Dasein re: death here, on this side, before all ontical speculation operating beyond (ultra, meta, trans), by way of an uncontested, irrecusable decision (a performative incision) on the undecidable question of “here”: a testimony w/out proof

pp. 54-7 the 3 reasons Heidegger’s authoritative decision on what must remain undecided seems so decisive: 1) superordinating of existential analytic 2) the originary, underivable character of death, of finitude, forces us to decide 3) prevalence of phenomenological tradition, pre-ferring, pre-férance [with an “a”], pre-archic orgiinary of proper, eigentlich

p. 56 decision to decide from “here” not simply methodological decision: decides that a method is pre-ferable to no-method, this absolute decision turns into non-decision since, as unconditional decision re: place/taking-place of decision, it relies on prevalence of what can’t be decided (i.e. death), leaving questions undecided, that would make one hesitate btwn decision/non-decision

——Heidegger’s methodologically rigorous choice to start from “this side” [phenomenology] goes hand in hand w/ what prevails, the pré-férance of pre-archic originarity of proper, eigentlich

p. 64 irreducible prescriptivity in mode of phenomenological attestation (Bezeugung) > one can and must testify to it

pp. 78-80 a braid that can’t be cut, 3 twisting movements w/out end: 1) aporia 2) impossible circumscription that foils every methodological strategy, stratagem of delimitation [no knowable edge btwn anthropology & existential analysis] 3) irreducibility of contaminating contraband

p. 87n Derrida notes, w/out developing, Blanchot’s neutral reference to Heidegger, neither approbation nor critique

VM p. 90 [Derrida on Levinas’ method] uses philosophy’s own light to reveal that philosophy’s surface is severely cracked (lézardes), that its solidity is its rigidity > progresses along cracks, negates negations, neither/nor, poetic force of metaphor a trace of this wounding of language

***p. 118 can a method be borrowed like a tool? method always shelters, anticipates the being which one encounters > this is why, since Plato, decision of philosophy has always seen itself as a science

p. 150 question about Being not only introduces question about existent-God, it supposes God as possibility of its question, answer w/in its question > God implied in every question about God, precedes every “method” > content of thought of God is that of a being about which no question could be asked (except by being asked by it)

F p. xiii method & element of The Magic Word: new cryptology, anasemic retranscription of all concepts, “antisemantics”

pp. xiv-xv cryptological interpretation not hermeneutics, begins w/ reconnaissance of the territory (lieux)

p. xv [method] the break-in technique (leffraction) that permits one to penetrate the crypt: locating crack or lock, choosing angle of entry, and proceed by force

p. xxvi Abraham and Torok translate by setting each language at an angle w/ itself: shattered (brisée) linearity

pp. xxviii [re: Abraham’s psychoanalysis] joy of breaking wall btwn rational & irrational, condition necessary for “scientific truth and poetic truth” to belong to “same essence”

——this poetic truth not gratuitous literary estheticism, nor unveiling presence > truth is “poetic” in that it writes a text on and in a text, hieroglyph on hieroglyph

pp. xxviii-xxix [Abraham & Torok’s method] body a hieroglyphic text, but object-text not a substance, this isn’t a “scripturalistic” interpretation, not “dead symbol” > Magic Word explores vibrant, vigilant effectiveness of symbol’s operative genesis

——writing not essentially verbal or phonetic, body signs even before any “proper” name > in principle no difference btwn verbal behavior of patient & paramecium faced w/ obstacle

p. xxix Abraham: symbol to semantic might just be symbol to symbol; what we most seek is to place symbol back into dynamism of intersubjective functioning

p. xxx phenomenology’s method: intentional analysis, phenomenological reduction, discounting constituted theses, return to actual constituting operations [Abraham sought passageway through phenomenology & psychoanalysis]

p. xxxi Torok and Abraham’s method, goes beyond anticipations of a program: introduced an essential déportment (unruliness) [re: “transphenomenology,” relay, conversion]

p. xxxiii via Abraham, in deciphering poem, “translator” has written one: poetic translation or psychoanalytic interpretation [re: “ghost”] > clears path for other w/out unilateral privilege

p. xxxiii-xxxiv anasemia: 1) narrative (superposing of “account (récit)”), story, fable w/in concept 2) angle 3) sepulcher

p. xxxiii Abraham’s arch-psychoanalytic, anasemic method: “as fantastic as a fairy tale,” “as rigorous as a mathematics”

p. xlii cryptonomy follows contacts, straight lines or surfaces in most economical way, angular, this makes cryptonomic the once inflexible logic of castration

WM pp. 220-21 as long as concept of metaphor is not solicited, traditional method remains in tact

DS p. 211 displacement w/out reversal of Platonic heritage, always an effect of syntax, writing, language—not simply dialectical overturning of concept (signified)

***p. 257n Mallarmé: “to paint, not the thing, but the effects it produces”

***p. 271 Mallarmé: all method is a fiction” > point de méthode—still a marching order (marche à suivre) > la dissémination dans le repli de lhymen, pas de méthode pour elle > [no circle-path to first step]

OS p. 35 Hegel taught us: results are nothing w/out becoming, w/out itinerary or method

p. 56 Aristotle says w/out saying [Rousseau describing w/out declaring]: the dyad as the minimum

P p. 25 acc. Hegel, natural/mathematical sciences [unlike aesthetics] need no introduction: their object is determined/given in advance, and the method it requires

SP p. 115 [re: Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, that he still belongs to history of metaphysics] reading opens internal necessity, a certain dehiscence, but no critical/destructive effect: mais elle en transforme la figure et réinscrit à son tour le geste herméneutique

p. 123 Heidegger warns against transforming Being into species/case of genus proprier, a mere incident in Ereignis > futility of such conceptual reversal btwn species/genus

ATIA pp. 81-2 Descartes’ 2 criteria (he calls them “methods”) for differentiating authentic from mimetic simulacrum of automaton (still govern method of Lacan & Heidegger): 1) the inability to respond 2) a lack which is not the lack of man, the lacking of the lack of man

FS pp. 22-3 Proust’s aesthetic/critical method not outside the work, but heart of its creation > the end of the book engenders its beginning (Derrida compares Proust to Hegel)

O p. 6 to remain content w/ reversal is to operate w/in immanence of system to be destroyed

p. 14n Hegel: true method of philosophy is the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic

p. 15 in Hegelian concept of method, self-presentation of concept (lêtre auprès de soi du logos absolu) is true pre-face, essential pre-dicate of all writing

——Spinoza critiques Descartes’ method like Hegel does all methods: cannot be external to the concept > if path of science is itself science: method no long preliminary

pp. 16-7 Hegel: true method beyond mathematical method [why must Hegel always preface his books complaining about formalism? assuring us that philosophy doesn’t need a preface?]

p. 21 for Hegel, math’s method is alien to concept, to truth’s self-movement

p. 31 tautology & heterology coupled together in speculative proposition > analytic/synthetic procedure mutually envelop each other: no more anteriority, belatedness of form, exteriority of content > concept enriches itself

pp. 32-3 Marx avoids formal anticipation in his preface to Capital [?] asserts difference in form btwn Darstellungsweise (method of presentation) and Forschungsweise (method of inquiry)

pp. 37-6(n) Derrida makes a sweeping comparison btwn 6th song in Maldoror, Marx’s distinction btwn method of inquiry/method of presentation & Descartes’ theory re: synthetic method (demands assent, Principles of Philosophy) & analytic method (shows way, Meditations)

p. 38 preface can only be a discourse on method, a set of formal rules, after forging of irruptive track of a method that constructs itself w/ no predetermined itinerary [artifice of preface]

p. 47 for Hegel, philosophy is unique, must produce object & method out of its own interiority

CHM pp. 32-3 the hermeneut, the analyst, must first know language of patient, the immediate materiality of sign (move from sign to signified, obvious meaning to latent)

p. 44 before writing a history: must do an autonomous, internal analysis of philosophical content (when totality of meaning is clear, I can rigorously situate in total historical form—which is never)

RGE p. 260 since Hegel’s [all] logic is an interpretation, is submitted to an interpretive decision, it can be interpreted against him > reinterpretation: simulated repetition of Hegelian discourse

——minute displacement disjoints articulations, trembling spreads out—old shell cracks

p. 269 conscientious concern for preliminaries is Hegelian (philosophical)

——Bataille’s sovereignty refuses to submit to preliminaries > method of getting to no method

——Hegel 1st to have demonstrated onotological unity of method & historicity, so sovereignty exceeds not only subject but history, not as ahistorical, but as superhistorical—takes its responsibilities from completion/closure of history

p. 270 Bataille’s writing relates all philosophemes (semantemes) to sovereign operation, à la consumation sans retour de la totalité du sens—acknowledges the rule that constitutes what it will deconstitute

Gi p. 23 Heidegger’s method [?] in Sein und Zeit: subject positive cognitions to regional ontologies, and these to a fundamental ontology (1st opened by existential analytic of Dasein)

Gii pp. 58 Heidegger’s Wechselbezug (relation of reciprocity) btwn Erörterung (discussion, awakened literalness of word, situates proper place of Gedicht) and Erläuterung (clarification, elucidation of poems [Dichtungen] themselves) > (announce unique site (Ort) of Gedicht rather than show)

——is this Wechselbezug what is called the hermeneutic circle?

pp. 61-2 savage second blow of sexual difference, its Verwesung, vs. originary, tender sexual difference > Heidegger claims this schema is not Christian/Platonic, but it has no other content and even no other language than Platonism/Christianity > its archi-matinal origin, ultra-Western horizon, constituted by hollow of a repetition, same for Verfall, Ruf, Sorge in structure of Dasein

DST DST p. 203 thus Lacoue-Labarthe’s “style,” ethos, multiplying parentheses, rhythm of warnings, which don’t protect anyone > warning stands watch so no one will fail to expose oneself

p. 208 how can Lacoue-Labarthe trace the “hole” into which Heidegger “could not avoid falling”? is it a method, do we have to name it? neither a matter of seeing or knowing > Lacoue-Labarthe names a strategy: “turning movement,” “taken from behind,” “cut off from its support”

p. 220 Lacoue-Labarthe (w/ rigor & prudence) follows folds of what can no longer be called scene, period, history—a deportation whose measurelessness (démesure) seems to defy hope of judgment/justice > and yet, there’s an il faut, there’s philosophy & its law

p. 321n Derrida’s description of Lacoue-Labarthe’s description of Reik’s methodical failure: a floundering (enlisement), failure, abortion—slow sinking (enfoncement lent) structure of limit w/out opposition: not the single blow of failure, a repetition (sinking), a narrative

PIO p. 10 grasp unity of 2 measures of invention: 1) fabula/fictio: art 2) tekhnē, epistemē, istoria, methodos, art, know-how, procedure, knowledge, research

pp. 33-4 method of invention (discover places) vs. method of doctrine (dispose oneself in place)

p. 38 logic distinguishing chance from method and method of invention from method of pedagogical expositions—calls for deconstruction > it’s in this way that deconstruction is no longer subject to this logic

RM p. 49 can’t treat metaphor w/out negotiating the loan I take out from it in order to speak about it

AFR p. 33 used to be you could criticize metaphysics only as such > by doing so, one founded a new metaphysics

pp. 81-2 Condillac transposes Newtonian discourse [into the mind (lâme) as general principle of analogy?]: analogy creates language & method

pp. 82-3 Condillac: men of genius, favorite disciples of nature, make language seem less arbitrary—method of invention is only analogy itself (analogy: art of reasoning & speaking)

——that math can be a model for analogy: unlimited generality of principle of analogy

p. 85 ensemble of rules, method: so to repeat science & multiply discoveries

——for Condillac, Descartes’ success: taught us his method of self-reflection so it could be perpetuated [methodological operation as revolutionary operation]

IW p. 252 for Cohen to link German & Jew, he must use a comparative logic which associates two terms w/ a 3rd (Greek)

p. 287 Rosenzweig speaks of Cohen breaking free from Hegel (by returning to Kant): math [which guides Cohen here] generates its elements not from empty nothing of 1 and universal 0, but determinate nothing of differential, a particular nothing [Derrida adds: Heidegger too]

PSSS p. 271 it is necessary to cultivate (it is necessary for an “it is necessary” to take shape: ethical/juridical/political obligation) an economy of detour & difference: strategy, path, pathbreaking, road, even a method > “indirect” way of combatting cruelty drive

pp. 271-72 Freud on indirect methods to combat war, ruse of detour (Umweg)

——Freud advocates submitting life of drives to Diktatur der Vernunft, a Utopia > indirect stratagem of Eros/Thanatos: contrary to the cruelty drive, though cruelty knows no end

pp. 273-74 Freud’s indirection, oblique, angular, mediating nonstraightness: not just detour, strategic ruse, continuous transaction—but a leap, interruption, an ethical step

EL p. 220 [seemingly in vein of deconstruction] Scholem maneuvered, compromised, negotiated w/ significations (concepts/words) he radically contested—while having to use them

+R p. 181 picking out enlarged detail: indissociable demonstration of cinematographic & psychoanalytical technique > one & the same mutation [via Benjamin?]

LI p. 40 Sarl delivers conclusion before giving demonstration, putting reader in proper state of mind, aiming to produce certain effects [doesn’t Derrida do that sometimes?]

p. 130 to ignore or pretend to take no account of a tradition, to rest blindly in it, repeat its most problematic gestures

TN p. 32 Nancy’s “saying too much,” a retracting by effacing, neutralizing its literality by dint of tropes

pp. 33-4 Nancy’s intentionally pedagogical translation of Descartes

p. 238 [re: Franck’s translation of leibhaftig] risks of effacing when interpreting through such an active translation

AD p. 74 very thrust (poussée) of Levinas’ thought: makes borderline (ligne de frontière), semantic identity of all the words he uses, tremble

LG p. 232 brutal, mercilessly depleting selectivity—a certain police brutality an accomplice to concern for professional competence

BSi p. 51 political philosophers [i.e. Hobbes] show periodized political agenda > while adapting to broader historical sequences

OG pp. 22-3 (36-8) Heidegger transgresses and contained (y est comprise) at same time in presence of logocentrism > his crossing-out (rature, kreuzweise Durchstreichung) of Being effaces presence of transcendental signified while keeping it legible: this last writing is a first writing (of an epoch), inasmuch as it de-limits onto-theology, metaphysics of presence, logocentrism > Heidegger must restore (provisionally) “transcendence” to Being to renounce project/word ontology [given risk of transgression becoming regression here, Derrida insists we go by way of Heidegger’s rigor alone]

EU pp. 3-4 [re: Descartes’ Discourse on Method] to separate langue from discours (parole), to hypothesize language as method, formation of universal language, appeal to programmability of method, to a philosophical grammar (all systematic discourses: Leibniz, Bergson, Hegel, Marx)

——all philosophies of method, systematic discourses on concept of method, would thus exploit philosophemes already caught in language of philosophy, no invention then [?]

p. 8 method: following the road; odos, becoming-road of a path; “clearing (frayage)” as the presumed “metaphor” of method as figure for the path or road (via rupta) as language

p. 13 relation of linguistic subjugation [forced to share language] to the clearing/controlling of borders, roads, routes, regions, territories [see p. 8 method (odos)] > power of spacing, body of writing, to clear a path (language here is neither secondary nor primary)

p. 41 Descartes’ universal language would help men’s judgments, romance becomes the land of “true science,” where philosophy would have undivided dominion, it would be law, where order & path become method

SPEC p. 308 to control everything, he has to act w/ dispatch (il se dépêche), Freud stages peremptory authoritarianism, unexplained decisions, unanswered questions

FV p. 416 [re: Benveniste on Aristotle’s categories (see p. 416n), Freud referring to The Emperors New Clothes] example of illustrative jubilation, treats element of its “scientific” discourse as marvelous paradigm there to be found, happily available (disponible) for instructing discourse

METONYMY

MPM p. 37 allegorical metonymy—where part stand for whole and for more than whole it exceeds

——parts of memory that seem greater & older than us: manifests in open but nocturnal space of agora, plus de lumière [Nietzsche’s not bright but open horizon]

KH p. 91 double exclusion (neither this nor that), participation (both this & that), can we transport this logic, para-logic from one set to another

——displacement from type of existent thing to type of discourse via metonymy (sensible/intelligible > mythos/logos)

A pp. 78-9 death is figure of the aporia in which “death” and death can replace (metonymy that carries name beyond name, beyond name of name) all that is possible as impossible: love, gift, other, testimony

SH p. 22 date is always also metonymy (part of event standing for whole)

DS p. 258 tropological structure circulates infinitely, always w/ supplement of an extra turn: plus dmétaphor, plus de métonymie > if everything’s metaphorical, no more metaphor, if everything becomes metonymical, part always greater than whole, how could one arrest metonymy?

p. 281n opposition btwn metaphor & metonymy is purely semantic—deconstructed by superficial, profound, that is abyssal operation of versification (vers, verssensvers, versus, verre), morcelante et reconstituante (hiver, pervers, envers, travers, vertige, rêve)

ATIA p. 6 proper names can serve as metonymies for events difficult to date

pp. 60-1 what right should be given to this double metonymy: 1) speak of modesty whenever there’s monstration/simulation/dissimulation 2) declare animal modesty exists

——is all “hiding of oneself” modesty? is there modesty not directed toward genitalia? the metonymy has been arrested/concentrated on phallic region

REST p. 283 Van Gogh’s shoes incur the detachment of metonymy, diplomatic representation, an emissary of being for work, so not at work, etc. (same goes for neck & feet)

pp. 342-43 there’s a reattachment always, already, in process of retightening the unstrictured > les souliers font marquer (font marcher, font marché-de), shoes make move, make a market, are bigger than the frame

the detached must also be understood as “representative mission to be reattached to its origin of emission” [father-son]

pp. 344-45 [re: the interlaced correspondence]: interminable overflowing of whole, la surenchère en plus-value de la correspondance débordante (subordante), occurs btwn general element (discourse, writing, painting) & particular determinate element > element worth more than whole, and whole plays the part [metonymy/synechdoche no longer what they are]

p. 360 Derrida sees 5 ways a pair can be detached (won’t tell us yet) [does he tell us at the end of essay, in relation to various spectral effects?]

PIO p. 9 no matter how outstretched (tendus) we are toward the other, everything we say or do remains w/in us: part of us wounded, conversing w/ ourselves in work of mourning, of Erinnerung

——even if metonymy of other w/in ourselves already constituted our relation to living other, [actual?] death brings relation into a more abundant light (un plus de lumière) > makes the breaking of the mirror more necessary (difficult): at instant of death, limit of narcissistic reappropriation is terribly sharp > must no longer be concerned w/ other in ourselvesyet, that’s all we can be concerned w/ > narcissistic wound enlarges (saccroît) for want of being (ne plus pouvoir être) narcissistic, no longer appeased in that Erinnerung we call work of mourning

TR pp. 150, 154 de Man’s dissociating metonymic structure (deconstruction of metaphor) (Lacan, Deleuze-like)

p. 155 for de Man, deconstruction wherever metaphorical totality shifts to metonymical aggregate

PJP p. 179 the suspension of metonymy, quotation, interruption, quasi anacoluthic change of subject > interruption in the obvious: shadow at heart of light

p. 187 anacoluthon’s metonymy blurs/complicates all frontiers, instigates all substitutions

D p. 316 each part of mirror larger than whole (mirror smaller than itself): 4th surface paradigm of this relation

——the inside of text will always have been outside it; reciprocal contamination of body proper, violent expatriation, poison affirmed—mercury in its tain is a poison

PPT p. 13 [re: uses of passe-partout] there could always be one use that could be taken out of the series and surround the rest, play among the others, one more turn

+R p. 155 trait for trait—each stands for all the others: by this fact, never chance left for equivalence

TN p. 17 nothing takes place but place (rien na lieu que du lieu), extensions tiennent lieu (taking place of) > every metonymy announces, remains a sign of mourning

——publishing: risk exposure to so many metonymies

p. 19 death introduces drive of expropriation, but is still more tolerable than prosthesis, metonymic substitute, technical survival [lintrus] (complicates incarnation even more)

p. 154 for de Biran, the hand is irreplaceable/dominant (teleological) and it’s pregnant w/ every kind of metonymy (pedagogical): best ontoteleological figure, best rhetorical figure

——“transcendentalism” always guided by such surreptitious exemplarism

p. 159 the 3 values of exemplarism [re: hand/touch]: 1) léchantillon quelconque (random sample), indifferent 2) teleological value—best example 3) et surtout, un simulacre déchantillon dont le symptôme trahirait une autre téléologie cachée: symptom of a metonymy, because touch always has been figural, some figural substitute courant sans fin to its “proper” abyss

p. 221 “a lieu et tient lieu: a lieu tout en tenant lieu, a lieu pour tenir lieu…” [this goes on, Derrida then compares taking the place of to translation, where it is a considerable event in thinking; 356n TN. “thank you”]

pp. 223-24 mechanical technique (esp. machines) as a simulacrum of “sensible”—does not feel itself feel, does not hierarchize the “5 senses”: opens place for metonymic substitution

LG pp. 227-28 trait that marks membership (lappartenance) divides > boundary (bordure) of set comes to form by invagination—an internal pocket larger than the whole

——consequences of this division & overflowing (débordement) as singular as they are limitless (quillimitables)

pp. 240-41 [after Derrida describes the double chiasmatic invagination of La folie du Jour] are all these transgressions permitted by [publishing] law, à lintérieur de cet espace normé (normed space)? > but in La folie du jour “in whole and in part, the whole is a part (tout et partie , tout est partie)”

CIN p. 53 cinder obviously a figure, but because word “cinder,” via the name, is supposed to name the thing (not the word), it names one thing in place of another, metonymy when cinder is separated, names one thing while figuring another from which il ne rest rien de figurable en elle

BSi pp. 50-2 Hobbes’ rage against the liars who appeal (to God) above the sovereign: 1) the lie of immediacy 2) partisans, civil disobedients: place a law above law 3) like the Jews, don’t accept sovereign as lieu-tenant of God > p. 53 [but!] acc. Hobbes, the sovereign mimics God, Christian incarnation; p. 54 lieutenant as suppléant for other along metonymic chain

MIMESIS

KH p. 95 khōra never reached, broached [entamer?], touched, exhausted: not subject, not subjectile

——a virginity rebellious against anthropomorphism, not order of eidos or mimemes

POO p. 26 the secret is the possibility of homonymy, and mimesis

p. 140n “mime, ritual, identifying conformity have no place in morality”

——Kant’s pure law whose concept conforms to no example (no mimesis)

SPOM p. 192 for Marx, capital contradiction, contradiction of automatic autonomy: 1) inert thing [table] appears inspired, has pneuma or psychē 2) remains caught in heavy thingness of hulē

——autonomy the mask of automatism, visor hides absence of living gaze, automaton mimes the living, Thing neither dead nor alive, it survives, war machine, theatrical machine, mekhanē

HASD p. 5 the prayer can be mimicked, risk of mimicry (also a piece of luck) inscribed in structure of the mark

MPM p. 34 mimetic interiorization not just fictive, is origin of fiction, takes place in a body, makes place for body, soul, “ours” > death constitutes and makes manifests limits of me, us, obliged to harbor something greater than us w/in us

MSUB J p. 163 if you tried to write like Artaud, you would miss him completely

p. 164 a mime would say we have to be done w/ subjectile, and he wouldn’t be wrong, it’s a judgment of God, we are spectators of it, “having done with it, interminably”

PP p. 93 mimicry of Thoth prevents dialectics, an ironic doubling preventing fulfillment or eschatological reappropriation, he is never present, he invented play, his propriety is impropriety

p. 97 Plato presents writing as occult, suspect, power, just like painting, optical illusions, techniques of mimēsis in general > his mistrust for mantic, magic, sorcerers is well known

pp. 107-08 (122-23) on eve of Platonism, morning after Hegelianism, we cannot “overturn (renversées)” or “reject” philosophia, epistēmē in name of writing, we can displace, we can “mime absolute knowledge” > what philosophy would call simulacrum

p. 112 (128) Plato imitates the imitator to restore the truth of what they imitate: that is, the truth itself [i.e. both Plato and sophists advise exercise of memory]

pp. 136-37 writing paints living word, painting (zōgraphia, zōgraphēma sometimes shortened to gramma), both interrogated by living word > masks, figurines, simulacra denature what they claim to imitate, writing & painting should aim at resembling/faithfulness to their model

p. 138 (158) God true father of the bed, the clinical eidos, carpenter, demiurge, repeats eidos, painter does not generate anything, imitates

p. 139 (160) mimesis is magical, is like the pharmakon, witchcraft; Plato: if imitation imitates perfectly it is no longer imitation

TC p. 234 Artaud & Nietzsche want done w/ imitative concept of art

F p. xvii crypt, place of silence, where a foreign body is kept as a foreigner, the self mimes introj. while incorp. makes secret; introjection speaks, incorporation silent, or speaks to ward off

WM pp. 236-37 Aristotle’s definition of noun, the element of metaphor, is a theory of the name, articulated w/ ontology > value of metaphor systematically chained to values of discourse, voice, meaning, resemblance, or to logos, phōnē sēmantikē, sēmainein, onoma, mimēsis, homoiosis

p. 237 for Aristotle, only man can mimic [cf. ATIA p. 35 (still prowling around)], mimēsis is tied to possibility of meaning/truth: “the power of truth, as the unveiling of nature (physis) by mimēsis, congenitally belongs to the physics of man, to anthropophysics”; physis includes its own exteriority, its double, says itself, gathers itself

pp. 237-38(n) Aristotle: just like in philosophy, an acute mind will find resemblances in things far apart

——imitation sets man apart from beasts, man alone takes pleasure in imitating > metaphor, an effect of mimēsis and homoiosis, manifestation of analogy, a subordinate means of knowledge: full truth preferred to metaphor > for Aristotle, logos, mimēsis, alētheia one & same possibility

——to be learning something, recognizing resemblance (the same), is the greatest pleasure, this pleasure is the second [?] “cause” of mimēsis and metaphor

——Aristotle: human voice is organ most apt to imitate

pp. 239-40(n) mimeme (neither thing itself, nor tout autre) > elliptical syllogism of mimēsis provides as recompense a dividend of pleasure, “everything like & akin to oneself is pleasant”: finishing work, laughter of resemblance (also, we should not spend all our time imitating monstrous things)

p. 239 since, for Aristotle, mimēsis is not identity but gives us to see in action what is not to be seen in action, only in its resembling double, its mimēma, Derrida wants to leave open this energetic absence, this enigmatic division, the interval which makes scenes and tells tales

p. 241 for Aristotle, if metaphor, risk and chance of mimēsis, can miss the true, it is because metaphor must count w/ a determined absence [moment of detour]

pp. 244-45 acc. Aristotle (onomatism, doctrine of simple names), metaphor, like mimēsis, must come back (revient) to physis, to its truth and its presence: nature finds itself, its proper analogy, nature gives itself in metaphor, thus metaphor is a natural gift, a characteristic of genius > geniuses have more nature, more generosity, more seed; Derrida asks whether everything can be taken from me except the power to replace? can physis sow itself?

POS p. 84 castration & mimesis: general title of all works in Dissemination and “White Mythology” [Derrida includes other “themes” on this page as well]

p. 87 dissemination via death drive links new concept of repetition to value of mimesis

P pp. 102-03 Kant’s reproductive (a certain mimesis) vs. spontaneous imagination > Kant closer to Nietzsche than Nietzsche thought (creative aesthetic)

ATIA pp. 81-2 Descartes’ 2 criteria (he calls them “methods”) for differentiating authentic from mimetic simulacrum of automaton (still govern method of Lacan & Heidegger): 1) the inability to respond 2) a lack which is not the lack of man, the lacking of the lack of man

O p. 40 ontospeleology, another name for mimetology, is not mimesis, an enigma of redoubtable power, but an interpretation of mimesis that misapprehends/distorts logic of double [cf. p. 36]

p. 53 “dissemination, soliciting physis as mimesis, places philosophy on stage and its book at stake (en jeu)”

SW pp. 334-35 for Freud, women discovered one technique, weaving (veiling), but really they just copied nature (pubic hair) > unveiled the means of veiling

——if tekhnē never broke radically w/ physis—why reserve this animal naturality to woman? > woman weaves like a body secreting its own textile, like a worm, a worm w/out worm, a worm concerned to hide her non-being

REST p. 377 haunting which works (travaille) the unpaired (thus the pair) irreducible to all the mimetologism (I don’t say the mimesis)

DST DST p. 213 for Lacoue-Labarthe, mimesis is an essence w/out essence, is not, does not exist—desists (not negative)

——if one no longer denounces mimesis as fallen, [contra Plato], can’t call it originary: being originary incompatible w/ mimesis

——fold or abyssal redoubling: désistance is first of all the désistance of truth: truth never resembles itself, so it resembles mimesis

——how is it possible to resemble mimesis w/out already being contaminated by it?

p. 216 désistance: mimesis or its double, cela même quelle double et abîme (what it doubles & engulfs)— alētheia

p. 217 mimesis as désistance (w/out being it) is missed when one decides to identify it, one misses what it lacks and that this lack is not proper; Lacoue-Labarthe: mimesis ek-sists, better yet “de-sists,” infinity of substitution & circulation (must think of Nietzsche again)

pp. 218-19 for Heidegger, opposition btwn inadequate/adequate circumscribed by alētheias withdrawal—yet, Lacoue-Labarthe’s mimesis haunts alētheia w/ unstable homoiōsis

abyss of pre-originary mimesis, “precedes” truth, introduces desire for homoiōsis > Derrida explains how, w/ this thinking, Lacoue-Labarthe dislocates Heidegger’s epochal history

p. 219 haunted by mimesis: loop or supplementary torsion, the ring both one more and one less in epochal chain, dissimulates itself [disorganizes/interrupts Heideggerian deconstruction?]

p. 221 Lacoue-Labarthe: traversed from the beginning by discourse of others, “subject” does not incur a simple Spaltung (splitting) > the latter, w/ its oppositional logic (absence/position), creates obsession w/ appropriation dominating analysis of mimesis, & also its economic, political bearing

pp. 322-23n Lacoue-Labarthe’s hyperbologic programs inevitable “logic” of mimesis, converts gift of everything to gift of nothing, to gift of thing itself

——play of de- might belong to hyperbologic, belongs to and escapes its own series: “gift of mimesis,” “gift of impropriety,” not negative (dialecticizable)

——organizes/disorganizes what it appears to determine

p. 230 caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

PIO p. 415n Kant: talent for inventing things is called genius, unlike mere imitators, the inventor’s work is exemplary, it serves as a model (Beispeil) (exemplar) to be imitated

D p. 294 Mallarmé: mime sets up pure medium of fiction, perpetual allusion (in a hymen)

E pp. 5-6 [acc. Kant] free, liberal art: 1) play, not salaried work, free man (artist) is not homo oeconomicus, is more human 2) free, liberal art can utilize mercenary art w/out being contaminated by it 3) a productive, spontaneous, not reproductive (mimetic) imagination

——genius of poetry, the highest of Fine-Arts: full expression of productive imagination receives its rules from Nature, thus breaking from mimesis > free unfolding-refolding of physis

pp. 9-11 for Aristotle, imitation is unique to man, belongs to essential definition of man, man takes pleasure in it, it is from it he learns his first knowledge

——for Kant, imitation is aping (singerie), yet w/ the genius he advocates an imitation of divine freedom, distinguishing [briefly] between a good imitation and a bad copy: Nachahmung, Nachtmachung

p. 13 the fold of mimesis at origin of pure productivity: a gift for itself (pour soi) of God who makes a present of himself to himself

BSi pp. 47-50 [vis-à-vis Balibar] Bodin, Hobbes—political sovereignty as mimesis of God (the sovereign sovereign): ontotheology of phrase “marks of sovereignty”

OG p. 152 (219) dangerous supplement inconceivable to reason: no longer diverting total enjoyment toward a substitute, but experiencing it or miming it directly and in its totality [not kissing the bed to get close to Mamma, but conjuring the presence of Mamma] ma]

p. 197 (282) via Rousseau, exceed nature, then return to it, imitate it, but keep a minimal (almost nil) difference > nature as ailleurs, archeo-teleologic, alibi (elsewhere in space), in illo tempore (elsewhere in time)

p. 203 w/ song, the living arts, outside imitates the inside, “paints” passions, is expressive; w/ inanimate arts, reproduction of the outside on the outside [painting?] > both externalize

pp. 203-04 for Rousseau, art and mimesis are disastrous (supplement) & emergence from inanimate, expression of passion

pp. 204, 344n (291-92, 292n) teach by example or explanation? but will the child do it by heart or memory? is there virtue in imitating virtue? [Kant, Rousseau]

——for Rousseau, child can’t relate to separated signifier, child will spontaneously donner la change, doesn’t treat largent pour largent > no relation to sign for itself, no fetish

——perverse use of signifier permitted & tolerated by imitation

p. 206 (293) acc. Rousseau, imitation & pity have same foundation: sort of metaphorical ecstasy > Rousseau: imitation rooted in perpetual desire to transport ourselves beyond ourselves

p. 209 (297) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

EU pp. 60-1 for Kant, historical imitation, mnemotechnics, not inventive production of reason [Leibnizian motif: sees reason as ahistorical]

SPEC p. 341 demon, revenance which repeats its entrance, revient w/out having been called by PP > like Socrates’ demon, which made everyone write, this automaton produces effects of ventriloquism, w/out origin, emission, addressee, tele w/out telos

FV pp. 467-68 Lacan’s highly classical interpretation of mimesis: Dichtung as detour toward truth, more truth in fiction, fiction manifests the truth [i.e. for Lacan, truth is not a fiction]

MIMESIS in DOUBLE SESSION

DS p. 182n the hystera is supposed to be “behind” the hymen, but it exposes itself only through mimicry, transference & simulacrum

p. 185 when writing is regarded as mimēsis, it can only be valued is ratio to truth it’s imitating

p. 186n le double parricide [Plato’s]: Homer (for mimetic poetry), Parmenides (for neglecting mimesis > his logos, the “paternal thesis” would prohibit doubling)

——Mallarmé’s Mimique, its mimodrama, its double science, concerns an obliterated history of relations btwn philosophy & sophistics

p. 187 mimēsis either simulates falsely or adheres dutifully to model (homoiōsis): ex. writing > logos

p. 187n [Derrida describes six-pronged scheme re: tradition of mimesis, which have produced, like a machine, all clichés and criticisms on the topic]

p. 188n in Cratylus, Socrates oscillates [?] first nomination excludes mimēsis, words can’t, mimelike, resemble the form of a thing; later, right name can be taken for image of thing in its “truth”

p. 190 mimēsis imitates a mnēmē (a past present) > “hope,” anamnesis (future as past present due to return), the preface, the anterior future (future perfect) arrange things

p. 191 internal division w/in mimēsis: 1) Plato often disqualifies mimēsis 2) Plato links anamnēsis to alētheia, and it is very hard to separate mnēmē from mimēsis

——internal division w/in mimēsis, double of itself, destined to mime or mask itself, everything played in paradox of supplementary double

pp. 191-92 never has anteriority of 1st (simple) over 2nd (double) been displaced by a metaphysical system, double de-presents, il le multiplie par suite, le double vient après le simple, the flesh & blood, limage survient à la réalité > this is ontology

——priority of art over nature still privileges order 1 then 2, the preference, the precedence (pré-séance) of the imitated

p. 192 via Heidegger, 2 orders of truth [Derrida’s not sticking to Heidegger’s sequence]: 1) unveiling of what’s concealed (alētheia), presenting itself 2) truth is agreement (homoiōsis or adaequatio) > both orders privilege the precedence (pré-séance) of imitated

p. 193 mimesis commanded by process of truth 1) mimēsis presents thing itself, the physis that produces itself, it is the movement of phusis (which prefers the crypt), is linked to mnēmē, which unveils, un-forgets 2) or mimēsis sets up homoiōsis or adaequatio btwn 2 terms, a face-to-face, imtator/imitated, faithful imitation will efface itself by restoring freedom of true presence

p. 194 if, in Mallarmé, mime mimics nothing, does the mime still mimic the “idea”? can Mimique be read as a neo-mimetologism? no, doesn’t even imitate, nothing prior to his gestures > no present has supervised the tracing of his writing

p. 195 Mallarmé’s mime inaugurates, breaks into white page, follows no program

——dance, pantomime: hieroglyphic inscription

p. 198 mime: writes himself on white page he is

p. 200 mimodrama is described as anamnesis by Mallarmé, but in reference to a past never present [ABSOLUTE PAST]

p. 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” > hymen

pp. 203-04n “psychic Proteus,” perfect scoundrel [definition of mime, of Derrida?]

p. 205 interminable network of Pierrot’s (mimes), already remarked as grafting inside Mallarmé’s text, which thus no longer has an inside

pp. 205-06 if, in Mallarmé’s writings, mime mimics nothing, opens in its origin the very thing he’s tracing out, is this not the movement of truth? pure soliloquy? alētheia as manifestation, unveiling? but there is mimicry, mimicry imitating nothing, a difference w/out reference: a ghost that is the ghost of no flesh, w/out past, w/out death, birth, presence, past (preserved differential structure of mimēsis w/out Platonic metaphysical reappropriations)

p. 206 Mallarmé’s mimicry: a double of nothing simple, a double nothing anticipates—or at least a double of another double; for this double, reality is death, it never breaks the glass

p. 211[summary of what Mallarmé achieves] reference w/out referent, fiction that’s not imaginary, lustre where “medium” is shining, mimicry w/out imitation, only traces, announcements, souvenirs, avant-coups et après-coups

p. 214 mime (Pierrot): solitary captive of threshold

p. 219 mime is acting (joue) moment he is ruled by no actual (effective) action and aims toward no verisimilitude, plays out difference w/out reference, he is not an imitator, mimes imitation

p. 223 mime mimes a kind of writing, is himself written in a kind of writing, nothing of what is can lie beyond medium/speculum reading-writing > there is 1) writing w/out book, marking tip (la pointe du trait) proceeds w/out past upon virgin sheet 2) infinite number of booklets in other booklets > Mallarmé reads, writes while reading, while reading text written by Mime, who himself reads in order to write

p. 224 mime is both read & reading, written & writing, btwn the 2, in the suspense of the hymen, at once screen & mirror

p. 234 certain mimic inscribes a graft in one corner, holding antre open

***p. 235 the category of the imaginary: constructed out of ontological interpretation of mimēsis

p. 244 [re: specificity of genres] to join mime & dancer (they should be allied but not confused), two attitudes jealous of their respective silences: this is to confront too much difference!

p. 245 “literary criticism” —ontological interpretation of mimesis? krinein proceeds precisely from out of that which is being threatened by the re-tempering (retrempe) of literature

pp. 279-80(n) [quoting Mallarmé] rhythm, literary game par excellence: mimic suspense/laughter—rhythmic cadence, or case, all the falls, the silent fall of pen

MIMETOLOGY [fixerup]

POS p. 70 [Derrida on mimetologism as determined interpretation of mimesis]

O p. 36 the 2 fictions: 1) when fiction is in service of meaning, truth is (truth of) fiction, it is low on a hierarchy, accessory to concept 2) fiction outside mimetologism affirms itself as simulacrum, disorganizes all oppositions to which teleology of book sought to violently subordinate it

p. 40 ontospeleology, another name for mimetology, is not mimesis, an enigma of redoubtable power, but an interpretation of mimesis that misapprehends/distorts logic of double [cf. p. 36]

DST DST pp. 202, 315n for Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger succumbs to mimetology by refusing to take mimesis seriously

p. 202 signature interrupts, or rather marks w/ incision, the fold along which metaphysical ontomimetology is destined to divide, desist [ontomimetology in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, and more surreptitiously in Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan]

p. 213 Heidegger installs himself upside down in Plato’s mimetology [?], attempts to rehabilitate a mimesis defined as a “disintallation,” as a “fall” that has happened to truth > Heidegger reads alētheia in Republic as Unverstelltheit (installation, non-disinstallation, stele)

p. 221 Platonism denounces in mimesis (in désistance) madness, feminization, hysteria

p. 226 via Lacoue-Labarthe, Lacan’s theoreticism, which is inscribed in the ontology of the figure, Lacan’s recasting of Freud to the gaze, the specular > an ontomimetological interpretation of mimesis

p. 228 Platonic (ontotypological, ontoeidectic, mimetological)

p. 322n [re: Reik] Derrida asks: can we link that which is not yet ontotypological or mimetological in pre-Platonic Greece w/ experience of non-musical Jewish shofar?

MONDIALATINISATION

GOD pp. 99-100 heart as light, photology, because it is spiritual, not earthly, it cannot hide, cannot be encrypted, an omnipresence more radical & effective than a spy satellite

pp. 108-09 secret market of secrecy, “Christianity’s stroke of genius,” says Nietzsche, merchandise, give credit to the infinite [denounce all calculation & still yield surplus-value]

——no “exterior” critique to Christianity, to its worldwide event > demystifying it justifies proto-Christianity to come

R p. 18 mondialisation, is it democracy or theogony? celestial vault itself used to be represented as turning wheel

p. 80 post-Kantian world: questions of international/cosmopolitan

p. 81 in Kant’s Perpetual Peace, Weltrepublik not governed by democratic paradigm

p. 85 Kant’s as-if essential to regulative idea, imaginary approach tending towards universality; re: mondialisation, Kant’s word remains a regulative idea [Derrida on why he can’t take regulative idea seriously]

FK p. 50tn “world” vs. “globe”

p. 51 via Kant’s “formal rigor,” a law that programs an infinite spiral of outbidding; today both “fundamentalisms” & “integrisms” hyperbolize this outbidding

***pp. 51-52 mondialatinization (strange alliance btwn Christianity, as experience of death of God, & tele-technoscientific capitalism) is at same time hegemonic & finite, “ultra-powerful” and in process of exhausting itself [see pp. 67, 100]

p. 58 perfectibility and precariousness, the horizon of finitude for globalization

pp. 66-67 hyper-imperialist appropriation (Anglo-American remains Latin), in mondialatinization “no semantic cell can remain alien, “heilig,” safe & sound > word “religion” calmly applied to all that which has always been foreign to it, same goes for “cult,” “faith,” “belief,” “sacred,” “saved”

——we can’t see its limit, but we know it’s finite

p. 81 no incompatibility btwn “return of religious” and rationality, which is to say, the tele-techno-capitalistic-scientific fiduciarity in all its mediatic/globalizing [mondial?] dimensions

pp. 92-93 singularity of our time: International can only combat using means of adversary that is in truth the same, same but double, contemporary in blatant anachrony of dislocation

——“contemporary” movements (ecologists, humanists…) search for salvation in new alliance btwn tele-technoscientific & two sources of religion: 1) heilig, unscathed 2) faith, belief

SPOM p. 100 regiments of ghosts [the 10 plagues of “new world order” pp. 100-04] have returned camouflaged by archaic symptoms of paramilitary and of postmodern excess of arms (information technology, panoptical surveillance via satellite, nuclear threat)

——borders blackened btwn civil & international war, worn down beyond wear (noircissons encore le tableau de cette usure au-delà de lusure)

pp. 102-03 archaism, not bad in itself, more outdated than ever in ontopology it supposes, by tele-technic dis-location > this unheard of acceleration no less arch-originary than the archaism it has dislodged (déloge)

——local differance donne place et donne lieu, spacing of a displacement gives movement its start, stability, sedentarization depends on it > all national rootedness is in the memory of displacement

p. 104 tension btwn international and nation-states

p. 117 hypocritical alibis of world market, of new slavery, until we face “foreign Debt” w/ spirit of Marxist critique

POOF p. 87 “we, speakers of Latin that we are”

p. 158 Schmitt would argue that “globalization” is a strategy of depoliticization [this would include the attempt to bring women into the political?]

pp. 272-73 Derrida explains how he does not want to exploit spectacular ‘news,’ that which screens out (fait écran) reflection [makes a screen of reflection], by projecting itself w/ pathetic, sensational, images of violence that are too easily mediatizable > yet, all these examples (immigration, globalization, new warfare) are in our mind & heart as Derrida strives to deconstruct fraternal link to friendship: how does humanitarian participate in fraternizing humanization?

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, is literature [linked to democracy, which has no unconditional virtue] the very thing which remains intolerable to the geopolitical process of a becoming-worldwide (mondialité)? > absolute theologization qua absolute politicization

MSUB J pp. 161-62 Latin is stubborn, need to use words in order to express ideas that are clear; for me, ideas that are clear are dead > Descartes’ “clear ideas”

EM p. 128 (153) Heidegger’s radical questions re: humanism, his study of genesis of concept/value of “man” via Greek paideai in Rome, Christianizing of Latin humanitas, rebirth of Hellenism in 14th-18th centuries, makes secondary any metahumanist position not placed in his opening

OH pp. 57-8 word “capital,” like “cap,” like “culture,” like “colo,” in “colony” and “colonization,” like “civilization,” is Latin word

FWT p. 92 aporia: international capitalist forces, neoliberalism or the market > mode of resistance to “State” or “State” called upon to resist these forces [?]; p. 216n globalization strategy of depoliticisation in service of political interests

p. 178 Europe exports: 1) norms, advancements, language [re: consolidation of rights, laws, to sovereignty of subject] 2) its auto-hetero-deconstructive capacity or auto-immunity

——globalization is Europeanization

DS p. 182n [early reference to mondialatinisation?] crucial hinge of Western philosophy: translation of Greek into Latin

ATIA p. 54 Derrida will treat Descartes as father, and Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, Lacan as mes re-pères exemplaires (exemplary references) to normative/dominant discourse of a worldwide anthropology

PS p. 183 metaphysical determination of madness as disease of alienation had to be contemporary w/ proprius [Latin era] > proper subject, absolutely close to himself

DPi p. 56 new public space of mondialisation (so unequal, heterogenous)

p. 70 “worldwide market dominated by laws & a philosophy of international law that are European & Romano-Christian”

p. 76 capital punishment along w/ debate on capital, period, one of best entry points to think mondialisation (not globalisation) (refers to monde of Christian thought)

p. 140 the Latin interest: 1) finding oneself being btwn space larger than oneself 2) fiduciary calculation, surplus value, search for profit/capitalization, monetary or psychological economy

Gii p. 29 paradoxical/regular association of nationalism w/ cosmopolitanism, w/ humanism

p. 31 for Fichte, the German ear will understand Menschlichkeit w/out historical explanation (etymology) [idomatic humanism], not so w/ Latin Humanität > humanitas is a suprasensible idea

IW pp. 263-64 [vis-à-vis Cohen] Judeo-Protestant Platonism or world logocentrism made spiritual families possible, genealogy w/out limit, general economy (oikonomia, oikos as the law itself) > spiritual mondialisation: logos, spirit, idealism as moral conscience of philosophy & science

p. 264 [theatricalization of mondialisation via Cohen] greatest violence, logocentric psychosis [Derrida ends paragraph: “end of fable, or truth of truth”] [Nietzsche’s “History of an Error”]

pp. 267-68 [vis-à-vis Cohen] how Gewissheit (certainty) connects w/ Wissenschaft, Gewissen, Selbstbewusstsein—knowledge/faith come together in German Protestantism > culture/scientific conscience of modern peoples founded on 2 types of Gewissheit (knowledge/faith)

pp. 288-89 for Cohen, political socialism corresponds to generalization of priesthood (Lutheran/ Jewish motif), and to messianism: German State, in its modernity, is priestly & messianic

——socialist policy: morality inspired by universal priesthood: Judeo-German messianism

PSSS pp. 243-44 all which resists psychoanalysis in the mondialisation of today, e.g. psycho-pharmacological medicine, positivist science, but mainly an archaic onto-theological metaphysics of sovereignty, individual or state (freedom, consciousness, intention, ego, will), barely scratched or thought or deconstructed by psychoanalysis—is this psychoanalysis’ own autoimmunity? its resistance?

pp. 245-46 psychoanalysis has failed to say anything original about mondialisation, tele-technic virtuality—has resisted, in autoimmune fashion, changing, thinking through, fundamental axioms of ethics, law, politics > must be a revolution re: concepts cruelty, sovereignty, resistance

pp. 261-62 American hegemony at once obvious & more critical/vulnerable re: globalization, worldwide-ization underway

TN pp. 54, 59-60 Christianity confusedly/surely informs doxa of mondialisationcan globalization of world be dechristianized? > “à moins, murmure le trouble-fête (spoilsport) que je reste,” lighting votive candles, Christianity carries w/in itself resource/law of destricturation, passage beyond itself

pp. 63-4 for Nancy, history of world/body is Christian? or is it a universal “history”? or the history of the production of every “universalism,” “mondialisation”—through the obligatory passage of a surreptitious, autoimmune, globalatinizing Christianization? couldn’t every culture have produced this idealizing anesthesia, this neutralization, this euthanasia of the body?

CF pp. 28-9 theater of forgiveness, the singular Abrahamic language becoming universal idiom of law: agent & symptom of internationalism

——act of memory, appearance (comparution) before juridical instant, Nation-State tribunal

p. 29 performative event of Nuremberg trial: crime against humanity

——this theater as ‘good’ movement and also as simulacra, automatic ritual, parasites invited to this ceremony of culpability

pp. 30-1 ‘globalization’ [mondialisation?] of forgiveness as virtually Christian convulsion-conversion-confession before divine, sacred “man-made-God-by-God”

p. 32 mondialatinisation, Roman Christianity overdetermines all language of law, politics, even ‘return of the religious’—no secularization interrupts it, on the contrary!

p. 33 archivization of unforgivable crimes by ‘universal conscience’ better informed than ever: reactivates/accelerates call to forgiveness

BSi p. 282 French Revolution inaugurates new form (sovereignty of people, international model) of same fundamental structure of sovereignty (knowing-power, knowing-how-to-see): walls destroyed, but architectural model not deconstructed

p. 296 globalization of autopsic model, knowledge that de-vitalizes by looking at life (simple objectification) > the 2 senses of autopsia: cadaver & divine power

OG p. 52 (75) closure of this epoch & civilization in process of disappearing dans sa mondialisation elle-même [?]

UWC p. 203 mondialisation wishes to be a humanization (human rights, concept of what’s proper to man)

pp. 209-10 “as,” “as if,” politics of the virtual (not a virtual politics) in cyberspace or cyberworld of worldwide-ization > delocalizing, virtualization of communication, publication, archivization

——where there’s trace there’s some virtualization (i.e. virtualization not absolutely novel)

p. 210 new technical “stage” of virtualization > the accelerated rhythm/extent/power of capitalization of such virtuality: digitalization, computerization, virtually immediate mondialisation of readability destabilize university habitat, topology of event no longer “campus”

p. 212 mondialisation has to go through U.S.

p. 223 “as if” mondialisation du monde had as its horizon/origin the disappearance of work (travail) [its virtualization] > work, labor, travail have always implied the real, effective (wirklich) [not virtual]——“as if” [the end of work]: neither sci-fi utopia of Augustine’s “at the end w/out end,” in fine sine fine (Sabbath w/out evening), nor memory of immemorial (nostalgia for earthly paradise)

p. 224 mondialisation, unlike “globalization” or Globalisierung, marks a reference to notion of world in a Christian history

pp. 224-25 [re: “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”] logical skeleton of this “as if” proposition: world & work can’t co-exist, one would have to choose one or the other > the becoming-world of world, mondialisation, often speaks of “end of work”

p. 225 techno-scientific virtualization of work, the putting-into-common, any “community” [Aristotle’s city] > mutation of taking place of event, of oeuvrethat which arrives

p. 227 worldwide market violently inegalitarian > capitalistic situation more tragic in absolute figures than ever

EU p. 5 Latin, then American English: privileged media of philosophical or techno-scientific communication

pp. 6-7 “nationalist” dimension of Protestantism, Calvin translating Institution of the Christian Religion into French, royal decree that laws must be pronounced in French—encouraged end of Latin’s hegemony > Latin: language of the law, of father/science/school, nondomestic

pp. 11-2 given back to mother (liberated) to be better subjected to father [re: decree of Villers-Coterêts: justice would henceforth be carried out in French (not Latin)]

pp. 16-7 easy to recognize linguistic minorities today since in no way threatens linguistic unity of nation-state

CHOR p. 95 worldwide feminism can’t be separated from fundamental Europeanization of world culture

MONEY (GOLD) [fixerup]

GT p. 49 Derrida thinking gift by way of idiomatic expressions: give a class, donner une facilité, donner le change [hunting expresson], etc.

p. 83 via Mauss, difference btwn true money, non-true money & counterfeit money

p. 86 “Counterfeit Money”: title of all fiction

p. 95 this is perhaps counterfeit money: this perhaps is the intentional dimension[?], the credit, the act of faith that structures all money

p. 97 Baudelaire’s “Counterfeit Money,” its play w/ title, links literature to belief, credit, thus capital, economy, politics

p. 110 literature & its relation to capital, city, polis, transformation of monetary forms [late capitalism] (dematerializaiton of money & all the scenes that depend on it)

pp. 116-7 Mallarmé links aesthetics w/ political economy via alchemy: alchemy as precursor to political economy, “null stone, dreaming of gold, once called philosophical…foreshadows, in finance, the future credit, preceding capital or reducing it to the humility of money!”

p. 124 isn’t counterfeit money the truth of capital? everything that depends on faith & credit?

pp. 128-30 playing w/ fors, fortuna, ferre (fer, ferre; in Greek, pherô) which means to bear, & fero, “I report,” counterfeit money carries us to heart of question of reference & difference,

——dematerialization of money [late capitalism], can one quote money? fors, fortuna: Baudelaire reserves status of absolute exception for money (not the gift)

p. 132 Baudelaire’s future: a good sense that will condemn everything except money

p. 150 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

p. 152 [no depth beyond literary phenomenon] inviolability of secret depends on essential superficiality, bare device of being-two-to-speak (lêtre-deux-à-parler), a secret beyond reserve of technique, thing, being, thing thought (same could be said for money)

pp. 153-54 as long as money counts, produces effects, as long as it assures finite possibilities of decision & judgment, it is simply not different from money it counterfeits > a more powerful but not infinitely powerful [?] inscription of effects of reference on truth, convention, dispositifs

——opposition of conventional to natural is discredited, or, more rigorously, it is limited in its indispensable credit, in the speculation it will always have to authorize

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

pp. 158-59 nothing can happen w/out family & w/out economy, but neither can anything happen in family, family in sealed enclosure of absolutely restricted economy, w/out chrematistic vertigo

p. 159 khrema signals in direction of monetary sign; w/ “Counterfeit Money” we’re at heart of truth w/out truth, law w/out law, duty w/out duty concentrated & lost in enigma of khrē, khrema, khraomai: one must, need, lack, desire, be indigent poor, owe, ought, need, utility, interest, thing, event, fatality, prayer

pp. 159-60n Heidegger on gift, Heidegger discovers an etymology of khreon that links it to hand, to reaching for, also links it to logos > Derrida wonders about credit cards, coded signatures

——also to khreon as presencing of what is present (das Anwesen des Anwesenden)

p. 161(n) the Good, in Republic, takes on features of father and of Capital, [Derrida’s fn references Dissemination, on bad faith of fraudulent merchandise, tampering w/ money, & on political economy] whereas Baudelaire is interested in copy of copy, phantasm

p. 165n “freedom” in Kant’s speculative philosophy [?] can’t be demonstrated, it’s a “letter of credit for the moral law,” an assumption; also that (diabolical) evil can never be a motive

——faith/belief (act of faith/credit) given w/ monetary language, practical reason cannot be separated from chremastics as we interpreted it above

p. 169 true, authentic money, nature’s gift of a present

SPOM p. 51 money, spectralizing disincarnation, not lifeless body, but life w/out individual property, general property of money deprives all personal property (Eigentümlichkeit) of difference

——Shakespeare understood this phantomalization of property > Marx: little connection btwn money, general form of property, and personal peculiarity (persönlichen Eigentümlichkeit)

p. 52 becoming-god of gold, at once ghost & idol, a god apprehended by senses

p. 55 via Marx, in Timon of Athens [see pp. 96-7 Marx’s play]: Timon’s trust in money (simulacrum, ghost), an oath, a giving credit, to that which is unworthy of oath; not convention society, or law > cult of money as nature, prostitution, thus constant perjury, simulacrum, greed

——money produces a remainder, is but a shadow of a great name

p. 56 via Marx, Schein-gold, money (Geld) as origin of spirit (Geist) and avarice (Geiz), transfiguring idealization of commodities: spectropoetic

pp. 186-87 the secret (Geheimnis) of the fetishism of the commodity, the “germ” of the money-form, une table tournante, example of an apparition

POOF p. 275 for Kant, crime against humanity would be to disdain currency, to take counterfeit money for counterfeit [skeptic betrays mankind] > for Kant, virtue obligates that we turn counterfeit (small change) into gold, becoming-truth of the simulacrum, its verification, authentication [pp. 257-58 rare friend keeps secret, renounces possible public profit, that of circulating secret]

pp. 285-86 quoting Matthew, Derrida asks whether there isn't still profit of a sublime economy, economy beyond economy, in Nietzsche? or does the absolute gift (advising against love of one’s neighbor) break the ruse of this sublime economy? like Kant, isn’t there still best exchange rate for virtue?

VM p. 112 inhabit metaphor’s ruins, shabiller des lambeaux de la tradition et des haillons du diable: by using tradition’s words, one can use [them] up (user), les frotter comme une vieille pièce de monnaie fruste et dévaluée, on peut dire que la vraie extériorité est la non-extérioritée sans être lintériorité, on peut écrire par ratures et ratures de ratures: crossing out writes, still writes in space

PP p. 114 (130) Isocrates: sophists should pay since they are in need of such help from masters of logos

F p. xxxix pocket near pudenda, extra flap of cloth, where most precious thing is kept: money, title, share in stock market [crypt as wallet]

WM p. 209n TN. exergue as place on coin for inscription, ex-ergon, “outside the work,” epigraph

pp. 215-16 concept usure belongs to concept of metaphor itself: where does erosion begin and end w/in particular figure of metaphor? paradigms of coin/metal imposed w/ remarkable insistence

***p. 216 to signify metaphorical process, coins have often been used, analogy w/in language described by analogy btwn language and something other than itself > but that which seems to figure [i.e. coins] cannot be contained w/in regional science, linguistics philology: opens a discourse on figuration itself

——inscription on coinage, scene of exchange btwn economic and linguistic > the 2 types of signifier supplement each other in problematic of fetishism in Nietzsche & Marx

——Marx on gold serving as symbol of itself, and that “nothing can serve as symbol of itself”

p. 219 Mallarmé’s texts on linguistics, aesthetics, political economy, what he wrote re: sign or, check oppositions of literal/figural, metaphoric/metonymic, figure/ground, syntax/semantic

DS p. 177 double session finds its corner (coin) BTWN (ENTRE) literature & truth (that by which question “what is?” wants answering): figure of folding back, angle ensured by fold

pp. 262-64n [re: Mallarmé’s use of Or] Or (substantive noun/adverb of time), gold turned to nothing; Igitur, adverb-name (also means “therefore”), has affinities w/ Or, or marks the hour (today) > temps dor, “Il Signor,” “qui signore,” “signe or,” in the golden antre of a glottis (glossa, gold ingot, lingot, lingua) > throw of linguistic dice

——Mallarmé: “ashes-total-gold- (cendres-or-total-),” “dispersal goldenly consumed,” or devalued, mined out, plus de nom

p. 264n gold, lingot, lingua, glottis, glossa

p. 264 le son OR, le SON or (by way of lateral unconscious pressure)

p. 277 crisis of literature est marquée au coin de cet excès > figure of corner testifies to this in all its recastings/retemperings (corner, coin, angle, seal, fold, hymen, open recess, etc.) [coin-entre]

P p. 80 reserve, savings, stock: self-protection of the work (ergon), binding (Verbindung) of energy, condition for “mastery” of pleasure-principle

ROP p. 57 to identify someone w/ what they get paid for is not to read

O p. 59 if you wanna see for yourself, encounter by chance, enmeshed (engrenés) in some corner (coin), ce quil en est de la coupe or/livre

DPi p. 140 the Latin interest: 1) finding oneself being btwn space larger than oneself 2) fiduciary calculation, surplus value, search for profit/capitalization, monetary or psychological economy

pp. 259-60 vis-à-vis Benveniste, fraternal filiation as debt, as being condemned > fraternal duty to pay ransom: to acquit oneself of a debt

——fra-gildan, to render, restitute, ghildes, fraternities linked by common interest > require gold (Geld) for reconciliation, restitution

pp. 260-61 dapnaō, to spend, dapanē, expenditure, dapanēria, prodigality, daptō, devour, consume, damnum (w/out p), injury sustained through forcible seizure, curtailment of resources

——curtailment of capital, head > capital punishment

——for Benveniste, damnare is “to compel to spend,” expense considered as “sacrifice of money” > give money for nothing

Gii pp. 59-60 [meanings of Geschlecht and Schlag (i.e. imprint of a coin)]

AFR pp. 118-19 frivolity (useless) is the congenital breach of sign (its entame, archē), since structure of sign’s deviation ensures frivolity has no origin, frivolity defies archeology, condemns it to frivolity: excessive relief, not even money or merchandise > sign’s disposability never presents itself

OG p. 154 (221-22) Rousseau’s pernicious habit of donner la change [satisfying his wants, sidetracking, giving money]

p. 204 (291) for Rousseau, child can’t relate to separated signifier, child will spontaneously donner la change, doesn’t treat largent pour largent > no relation to sign for itself, no fetish

——perverse use of signifier permitted & tolerated by imitation

pp. 299-300 (423) age of labor, civil society, lhomme policé, money & phonetic writing—elle gagne en universalité: signifiers that are nonsignifying, circulation of arbitrary signs in phonetic writing, alphabet is commercial, a trader > anonymous supplement substituted for a thing

p. 300 (424-25) money/phonetic writing both substitute an anonymous supplement for the thing

——both open an aggression against the life they make circulate

SPEC p. 325 if, for Freud, distancing is a quasi-complete game unto itself in the great complete game, we were correct not to take the allegation of completion as coin of the realm (prendre pour argent comptant)

pp. 384-85 to describe structural necessity of borrowing as provisional/external fatality is classical logic [Freud often does this]: suspense is provisional, notes/coins must be guaranteed in final judgment

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

FV pp. 448-49 for Bonaparte, gold = penis > for Lacan, money = signifier “most destructive” of signification

MONOLINGUALISM

MONL p. 1 monolingualism in which I draw my breath is, for me, my element: absolute habitat, preceded me

——cannot challenge indisputable monolingualism in me, except by testifying to its omnipresence in me

***WAP pp. 104-05 il ny a pas le choix, a political theme: every monolingualism restores mastery

——unity of language always vested and manipulated simulacrum, a positivist dogma and, à la fois, a phenomenon that can be found nowhere > so: play, graft between languages, w/in the languages in language, thus we can struggle against colonizing principle

pp. 105-06 double bind of techno-science (formalization)/philosophy (mother/natural tongue): 1) formalization of techno-science resists monolingual hegemony of philosophy as onto-encylopedia—science of sciences 2) philosophy can still point to dogmatic philosophemes in science

MONSTER [fixerup]

MSUB J p. 166 Artaud’s neologism innée, where nature collides w/ its contrary, “suffering of the pre-natal,” appears as monstrosity [Lacan’s extimacy?]

VP pp. 36-7 Hinzeigen (“monstration"), Anzeigen (referral); for Husserl, to keep self-presence from being absolutely nothing, there must be a Hinzeigen w/out Anzeigen

POOF pp. 151-52 [overflowing, rushed parentheses] Dupin [‘Purloined…’] calls himself a partisan, designates self-destruction of someone who resembles him like a brother: pitiless sympathy of war to death (among brothers) > monstrous truths, truth as monstrous

p. 273 the question “what is a crime against humanity?” is pregnant w/ a future whose monstrosity ne porte pas de nom

SH p. 61 figure of absolute future: monstrosity—Elijah, guest, other [re: word to be circumcised opened like a door to “who” would come]

P p. 125 an object is “prodigious,” monstrous (not colossal), when, by size, it annihilates & reduces to nothing the end which constitutes its concept, exceeds the final limit, overflows end & concept

——colossal is almost too (presque trop) large for presentation: singular originality w/out edging (bordure) or simple overspill (débordement) > how can we think of this “almost too,” this incised in excess

OTO p. 20(n) institutions of “yes,” have need of ears: Nietzsche doesn’t expect the ears and hands for his truths today—my small ears no small interest to ladies, makes me a monster, anti-ass, Anti-Christ

ATIA pp. 41-2 Bellerophon, figure of hunter, hunting/taming the Chimaera: Ecce animot, a chimera, neither species nor gender, living multiplicity of mortals, monstrous hybrid

FS p. 20 medieval theology (Considérans): all forms, even monsters, beautiful, Formosus means beautiful > form is transcendentally beautifully: it is [Being] and makes things be [creating]

Gii p. 28 speak of Heidegger, speak of monstrosity

p. 33 le monstre > la monstre (montre) > what shows in order to warn or put on guard, a watch, prescribes the divisions of a line of verse [m/f]

pp. 33-4 Hölderlin: we are a sign/monster (Zeichen) w/out sense (deutungslos): on verge of being lost in translation > Heidegger’s bond btwn Zeichen, zeigen, Aufzeigung, btwn sign & monstration

p. 36 hand is monstrosité (monstrasity), proper characteristic of man as the being of monstration

——“can’t talk about hand w/out talking about technology” [Derrida has just recalled photographs of Heidegger’s hands, way the hands seem deliberately staged, overflow the frame]

pp. 46-7 writing is hand-writing in its essence, makes word manifest, monstre; co-belonging of hand & speech: ability to produce monstres that disclose concealment [still a phono-logocentrism, but one where handwriting is immediately bound to speech]

pp. 49-50 monster man has a single hand

RM p. 62 for Heidegger, Metasprache and Sputnik are the same, monstrous project of father, of metaphysics (mastery of form for form’s sake)

TR p. 73 machine/event resembles a monster: there is no resemblance to a monster, so new figure of event-machine is no longer a figure

p. 74 “us”: those of us who find ourselves inhabiting this uninhabitable machine-event monster, who refuse to subordinate one to the other

+R p. 163 Adami shows what is forbidden to Glas, out of range of its signatory, signs the absolute reverse of a text: monstration, exhibition, exposes the exposition

can never gather the event together in a spectacle [can draw a double band]

ATM p. 161 the Relation to the Other is not a phenomenal monstration, and is not readable w/in the uncertainty of rigorous limits of a lexicon, language, semiotics, logic, etc.

BSi pp. 25-6 [how can politics rise above the natural while also being a monstrous, bestial fable?]

p. 34 television: the monstration immediately a moral demonstration

OG pp. 4-5 (14) rigorous investigation beyond closure of knowledge, take positivity of science to its limits—monstrous, breaks absolutely w/ normality > faithful to lavenir (for which there is yet no exergue [chapter title: exergue])

pp. 36-8 (56-7) writing as “trap,” pathology (blind), idolatry; for Saussure, Leibniz’s fixed language would be like a hen hatching a duck’s egg > “la perversion de lartifice engendre des monstres

pp. 41-2 (60-2) writing: absence of signatory/referent, a “fixité” different from speech’s, a monstrosity, écart naturel dans la nature > must contain it like a leper

SPEC p. 296 repetition, reproductivity, works w/out saying anything, like death drive, not even “form,” w/out thesis, de-monstration makes its proof (preuve) sans montrer > de-monstration folds into everything it makes explicit, pas de démonstration remains (reste) in this restance

MOTHER

GOD p. 13 Patoçka: Plato’s novel idea is will to leave womb of Earth Mother, follow path of “pure light,” subordinate (podřídit) orgiastic entirely to responsibility

KH pp. 92-3 khōra as mother, nurse; but khōra doesn’t get along w/ rhetoric, metaphor, more situating than situated: no longer belongs to horizon of sense, nor meaning of being

pp. 124-25 khōra is compared to mother & nurse, not part of oppositional couple, 3rd genus, does not belong to “race of women (genos gynaikōn), mother w/out engendering, not an origin, a before signifying no temporal anteriority [intelligible/sensible looks like father/son couple]

——relation of interval, or the spacing to what is lodged in it to be received

pp. 124-25 khōra is compared to mother & nurse, not part of oppositional couple, 3rd genus, does not belong to “race of women (genos gynaikōn), mother w/out engendering, not an origin, a before signifying no temporal anteriority [intelligible/sensible looks like father/son couple]

——relation of interval, of spacing to it what is lodged in it to be received

***p. 126 because philosophy can’t speak truly of that which looks like the mother, it speaks only of father/son, as if father engendered son all its own

GT p. 48 gift of language said to be natural, maternal

p. 80 language as a given for Heidegger is already the dialect (Mundart), idiom is the mother of the tongue

H p. anne 88 “madness in the relationship to the mother,” the very possibility of madness; p. 92 “the essence of madness must be related to the essence of hospitality, in the area of this uncontrollable outburst toward the one who is closest,” mother tongue as metaphor for “being-at-home in the other”

p. 89 “language is also the experience of expropriation, of an irreducible exappropriation” makes us all wandering Jews, mother tongue is the tongue of the other [universalizes election], desert in all of us

p. anne 94 [from mother to violence] eruption of violence which borrows its madness from mother, substituted for proximity, from hospitality to hostility > terrorism, hostage wars

LOBL p. 131 mother as figure w/out figure

pp. 153-54 letting trace involve or commit me in linguistic expropriation, do I break w/ maternal, mother tongue or w/ paternal law that kept me from mother?

AF p. 48 maternity, as constructed as paternity [the usual thought is: mother real/ father figural], Freud makes a mistake in thinking only paternity is uncertain

SPOM p. 136 dividing line of figural inheritance: mechanical reproduction of specter, and “an appropriation…so alive, so interiorizing” that it is life as forgetting, forgetting the maternal, “to make spirit live in oneself”

PP pp. 142-43 (164-65) in the pharmaceutical enclosure, an artful living organization of figures, it is all about father/son, legitimacy of inheritance, sperm, there’s no mother > this will not be held against us, if you look closely can you see her unstable form?

pp. 159-60 origin of the world as a trace, a receptacle, womb, matrix, w/out any form of presence or presence of form, because this would be an inscription w/in the mother

FWT p. 35 fixed model of oedipal theory in Lacan & Freud > stable father, irreplaceable mother; transformation of family would transform psychoanalysis

pp. 37, 205n so many configurations of families, so much can be done w/ man & woman, 3 + n parents > i.e. one mother donates egg, one mother carries baby, one mother adopts

pp. 40-1 mother is perceived by senses, father judged by reason (Freud) > the monstrosity: to desire more than one mother [plus dune] [surrogate mothers], supplements of mothers

——mother becoming “legal fiction” (Joyce) just like father [Rousseau’s “Maman”]

p. 42 birth always familial but will come to seem less “natural” [re: “rented belly” (utero in affitto)]

——mother vs. maternity [Higher Men]

POOF p. 93 even maternity is a ‘legal fiction’ (despite what Freud, Joyce, says)

——eugenicism (eugéneia) as authochtony, proper birth, homage to earth & mother go hand in hand with fraternization: an equality of birth compatible w/ aristocracy

p. 94 in Menexenus, earth before mother in pledge of brothers (i.e. mother imitates earth)

pp. 95-6 in Menexenus, birth from same mother, one mother, cause for political excellence

POS pp. 67, 106n in critique of interiority/subjectivity must be careful not to “objectify” reassuring outside, or to make heterogeneity of “matter” a new transcendental, whether it be that of the Law, or the (appeasing/cruel) Element of the mother (Freud on mother/matter relation)

——matter as differential substitution would have relationship w/ mother as much as it would w/ writing, remainder, death, phallus, excrement, semen, infant (everything not subject to rèleve)

OTO p. 16 [via Nietzsche] mother, who is living on, outlive me long enough to bury me, living on is the name of the mother, “this survival is my life whose shores she overflows”

pp. 21-2 for Nietzsche, culture (Bildung) begins when we know how to treat the living as living; Derrida discusses a pact, alliance, contract, a hymen w/ living language, w/ mother (tongue), against death (father): even good master of history (science of the father) trains for the sake of mother tongue, must know when to suppress ‘historical interest’ for culture to begin

p. 38 mother is the faceless figure of a figurant, an extra, gives rise to all figures by becoming anonymous, everything addresses/destines itself to her, she survives, as long she’s at bottom

ATIA p. 38 Chi-mère whose name decomposes in Glas

p. 132 Nietzsche & Kafka realized better than anyone: Mother, Law, God, Animal > indissociable figures of the same Thing

SW p. 336 for Freud (the Freud of Penismangel and pseudo-discovery of weaving), mother = matter = materia = Madeira = Holz = hylē

REST p. 353 Verlässlichkeit > pre-originary gift (don) or abandon [Derrida scolds his interlocutor (“don’t play utilities”) for hurrying to recognizes schemas: “to/from THE-MOTHER for reliability]

p. 354 Heidgger’s precontractual/precontracted marriage [messiancity w/out messianism?]

RM RM pp. 61-2 via Heidegger, if idiom (“dialect”) is not only language of mother but mother of language, could this reversal help us think essence of maternity?

D D p. 322 fertility of mother-site (androgynous), M (male, mère), m/f, milk, milky way, mère, énumère

HST HST p. 411 Rousseau: mother’s love can’t be substituted

C C p. 222 [vis-à-vis Freud] father inferred from a sentence, declaration, judgment: “this is the father,” says the cartouche, paternity never touched, unnatural (different matter for maternity)

TN TN pp. 28-9 mouth before speaking, before orality, wouldn’t this be the mother’s lips, giving ex-

LG LG p. 250 [re: Blanchot] for the law to see her day is her madness—what she loves madly like glory > he, the author, brings forth light of day to a mother who can’t say “I”

BSi BSi p. 29 Hobbes shares Freud’s prejudice: only mother is certain generatrix of a child

OG OG pp. 144-46 [see SUPPLEMENT (ROUSSEAU’S DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENT) for wholeness of mother nature, and danger of supplementing her plenitude, forcing her to see her child love another]

p. 152 (217) Rousseau: all evil caused because mothers shirk their duty as mothers

pp. 173-74 (247-48) Rousseau contra Hobbes: pity/compassion is a natural law (beasts have it too), mother’s law, law of the (soft) voice, pity “takes the place of” instituted law, supplements law [though it works the other way around too]; mother’s law, written in our hearts by God > natural writing, writing of heart—not reason, before reason: writing (of reason) is w/out pity, transgresses law of voice, a perverse passion

pp. 265-66 for Rousseau, mother is only signified whose replacement by its signifier he prescribes [aka incest taboo], the sanctified interdict > hinge (brisure) btwn nature/culture

CIR CIR p. 23 Derrida’s mom: “I have a pain in my mother”

p. 80 “a sleeping water [mother, too human inhuman, mortal immortal] in the henceforth appeased depth of the abyss, this volcano I tell myself I’m well out of”

pp. 91-2 escarre [mother’s bedsore], oh my jealousy, as long as I have not sutured you, I have not understood you, escarre closes on blood of new skin > as long as I have not written Of the indubitable foundation or the cogito of my jealousy, or again The Confessions of a Mother, I will have failed my life & written nothing: unfathomable perjury, incurable facial paralysis, mask, etc.

p. 147 I confess (myself) means I confess my mother means I own up to making my mother own up

EU EU p. 6 [re: 16th century France] Latin as language of law, of father/science/school > greatest resistance to (natural, maternal) living language came from juridical world

pp. 11-2 given back to mother (liberated) to be better subjected to father [re: decree of Villers-Coterêts: justice would henceforth be carried out in French (not Latin)]

SPEC SPEC p. 327 [re: Ernst’s fort/da] double sending away (renvoi): whether father required to stay or go, mother is desired: “exclusive possession” [Freud & Ernst distance themselves from name of father, for Freud it is the name of the son-in-law]

——mother (woman) easier to possess/preserve when dead [?]—jealousy appeased

p. 333 fort:da: leads autobiographical specularity into an autothanatography that’s in advance expropriated into heterography

——usteron proteron, “preceding falsehood” of generations, when figure w/out figure, name w/out name, of the mother returns: this is the logic of obsequence (Glas) > la mère enterre tous les siens

p. 341 [focusing on Oedipus complex] as if one were pulling this nebulous matrix, w/ disseminations w/out return, by only one of its string (fils), where matricial mother would be only what she is > for what it means to write oedipally, cf. Glas, which concerns itself w/ only strings/sons (fils), with gash (balafre) and demi-deuil in affectations of proper surname

FV FV p. 461 Bonaparte falls back onto dogmatic imprudence (appeal to author’s unconscious), Lacan falls back, w/ incomparable philosophical vigilance, onto Truth > [both Bonaparte & Lacan] castration of mother as ultimate meaning & proper site of letter: “real intersubjectivity,” “solution in broad daylight”—proper as relation to lack itself, in proper place/body

pp. 480-82 all phallogocentrism articulated based on (individual, perceptual, cultural, historical) situation where phallus is mother’s desire (to the extent she doesn’t have it) > though phallus isn’t the organ, it mostly symbolizes the penis > thus, phallogocentrism as androcentrism & woman as absolute Other

MOTIF

MSUB J p. 165 [re: Artaud] motif (how will they translate it?) > has advantage of substituting dynamics and energy of motion for stability of a -ject (jet), “forces,” “strokes,” “commas,”

p. 166 under the words (mots), hors sens, when you let attraction of words, motifs, motets [anthems] play under the meaning, you draw, sing, rather than speaking, you write the unwritable > this passage also convokes multiplicity of voices in a “motel,” rhythm, vibration

p. 170 through the subjectile, motion of motif “assures synergy of visible and invisible”

——motion of motif, w/out totalization, subjectilian wall: “of this dissociation in the body of which there will always be marked the singularity of the event made work”

DS p. 240 Mallarmé’s “cipher of pirouettes prolonged toward another motif” is, like the whole text: ciphered to 2nd degree > cipher of pirouettes is also pirouette as cipher (sign, hieroglyph)

DST DST p. 201 insistent return of motif traces silhouette of unity, more a rhythm than a configuration

EU p. 24 motif [of “path] preferable to “figure” or “metaphor” > retains sense of movement w/out rhetorical presuppositions [unlike “metaphor”]

MORALITY

GT p. 64 mediating desire, measuring morality, mediocrity: who gives themselves the right of right measure? paradoxical hubris of measure [thoughtless to laugh at this position]

p. 74n hard to draw line btwn moral duty and moralizing discourse on subject of moral duty [teaching ethics], as well as ethos of science and morality in general

p. 148 perversity can always secretly corrupt the “donner raison à lautre”: ratio, logos, is on your side [re: “Counterfeit Money”], what counts, can be counted, you took maximum pleasure

——link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

p. 156 gift is a stranger to morality

FK p. 50 in order to act morally you must act as if God doesn’t care or exist

——acc. Kant, the idea of morality must be Christian, the only “moral” faith

BL p. 191 for Kant, pure morality has no history

pp. 193-94 origin of morality, via. Freud, an elevation, purification from the stink of law’s history

POO p. 15 a higher responsibility, a more intractable (intraitable) moral exigency, uneven as it may be, [Nietzsche’s Aussermoralischen Sinn]; p. 133n “pure morality” go beyond duty, beyond duty as debt, duty w/out debt, a silent break w/culture and language

p. 16 affirmation of excess always spurs a counter-moralism

p. 141n for Kant, the idea of moral perfection, which reason formulates apriori and connects, inseparably, to free will > the “true original which lies in reason”

POOF p. 278 [sometimes friendship linked to political], sometimes in name of morality that friendship is removed from criteria of politics > doù la surenchère sans fin dont nous avons tenté de formaliser la loi

PP p. 74 question of writing as a question of morality

OS p. 62n political resistance often highly “moral” alibi [re: Heidegger] for another resistance: for philosophical resistance, denegation of the text, refusal to read

P p. 35 that Kant takes common sense for granted [in Critique] ensures complicity of moral discourse, empirical culturalism [Nietzsche on Kant’s common sense]

pp. 114-15 Kant: moral pleases universally & positively, “morally good in the idea of highest finality—benevolence, purity, strength, equanimity”

GSP p. 161 for Husserl, a confusion of value, and all types of idealities sheltered beneath category “historical”: w/ some precautions [Derrida’s], Husserl considers Weltanschauung a “provisional morality” > system of anticipation that precedes an absolute science

DPi p. 195 for Kant, Christianity is only intrinsically moral religion

Gi p. 25 for Heidegger, falling, alienation (Entfremdung), and downfall (Abzturz) not those of “moralizing critique”

REST p. 319 nous devrons, à supposer quil faille jamais devoir

WAP p. 125 Cousin: to teach is not a natural right, the professor of philosophy is a functionary of the moral order

AFR p. 134 need or desire? 1) frivolity comes to need through desire, desire opens direction of object, produces supplying (suppléante) sign, is thin, slight, inconstant 2) need is frivolous, need w/out desire is blind, no object, identical to itself, tautological, autistic: in such a case, desire would moralize need, subject it to law

IW pp. 263-64 [vis-à-vis Cohen] Judeo-Protestant Platonism or world logocentrism made spiritual families possible, genealogy w/out limit, general economy (oikonomia, oikos as the law itself) > spiritual mondialisation: logos, spirit, idealism as moral conscience of philosophy & science

p. 266-67 for Cohen, Gewissen (Protestantism) completed form of Platonic idealism, put our trust “only in the work of one’s own conscience (allein die eigene Arbeit des Gewissens)”: liberates & burdens religious thought, emancipation & oppression at same time > pure internal responsibility

——conscience must institute itself, a self-instituting decision w/ no external guarantee from institutions of this world > thus Luther’s Doppelsinn of this Glaube: anti-, archi-institutional

p. 267 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] Protestantism makes faith come alive to its authenticity, new relation of religion to truth, no longer as correspondence (like science, objective knowledge) but as truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit), authenticity, most intimate Gewissen: [the Church?] internalizes what contests it

p. 275 re: Cohen’s Judeo-Kantian spirit, at deepest foundation of all morality, God’s law founds right and state, makes possible juridical feeling > analogy made to Kant’s feeling of respect: Kant states new Verbindungslinie btwn ethics & religion (gathers together soul & spirit)

LI p. 39 metaphysical premises (fundamentally moralistic) of performative, speech act, discursive events underlie hermeneutics of Ricoeur, archaeology of Foucault

p. 122 [Searle] not overtly moralistic, but definition reproduces under guise of description of ideal: given ethical conditions of a given ethics

——for Searle, “realization” signifies “actualization” or “fulfillment”: “serious/literal” are exemplary qualities of idealized realization of intention, what language ought to do

p. 157n Derrida’s incorrigible naïveté: confidence in ethics of discussion (in morality, if not in moralism)

***NOY p. 240 promise of memory, memory of promise, before all psychē, all morality

E p. 13 Hegel critiques Kant’s 3rd Critique for staying at the level of “you must” > he very well evinces the moral order that sustains the aesthetic one

p. 14 for Kant, the purpose-lessness (le sans-fin) of the experience of beauty leads us inside ourselves, there’s an interiorizing suppléance, a slurping (suçotement), by which we find our moral destination w/in, consume w/in what we can’t consume outside; this inside purpose, teleology, is moral and analogously relates to natural harmony

p. 15 for Kant, “meditation on a disinterested pleasure…provokes a moral interest in the beautiful” > interest taken in disinterestedness

***——[re: disinterested pleasure] a moral revenue drawn from a natural production w/out interest to us; one takes wealth w/out interest, the singular moral surplus value of sansstill, the trace (Spur) of a purpose in nature is what makes our stock in moral value rise

p. 18 for Kant, poetry’s privilege is not just in the interiorizing structure of (mouth to ear) hearing oneself speak, but in sincerity, faithful adequation [its truth]; these values are not immediately moral > morality itself derives its value from full presence/full speech

EW p. 286 a limited, calculable responsibility, the becoming-right of morality, is the dream of every good conscience or that of petty, grand inquisitors

BSi p. 34 television: the monstration immediately a moral demonstration

OG p. 18 (30) Rousseau: conscience is voice of soul, passions voice of body [Platonic]

p. 20 (33-34) transcendental signified: resource of sign, makes difference btwn signans/signatum absolute & irreducible > it is la voix sentend: conscience, auto-affection (spontaneity, ideality, universality, non-mondain of substance)

pp. 33-4 (51-2) moralism, preaching, in Saussure/Plato—casting writing, figuration, to the exterior > maléfique, sin (péché) (traitorous contamination)

p. 139 (201-02) ethics of speech: delusion of presence mastered

——lure of ethics of speech resembles a hunter’s stratagem, term of falconry > to recognize writing in speech is to begin to think the lure (leurre)

p. 140 (202) arche-writing: nonethical (violent) opening of ethics, origin of morality & immorality; no ethics w/out other, detour, simulation, differance, absence, writing

pp. 155-56 for Rousseau, auto-eroticism (preference for sign) as protection from mortal expenditure; use of dangerous supplement morally redeemable > hurts only me

p. 179 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] history also protects/resists abyss of evil > “moral love” (which is immoral, acc. Rousseau) becomes modesty (true morality of women)

p. 342n Nietzsche & Rousseau share same opinion of women (degradation of culture), and of genealogy of morals as servitude to slave—so how could Nietzsche have hated him so much?

p. 206 (294) for Rousseau, aesthetics passes through sign (semiology) not sensation, art is moral & ethnological [nonresponse to Western music can’t mean West Indians have different nerves!]

p. 295 (416) should (devrait) is the mode and tense (temps) of the teleological/eschatological anticipation that surveils Rousseau’s discourse

EU p. 180 metaphysics of morals deals w/ freedom not nature, rights & duty, to possess metaphysics is a duty > everyone has this metaphysics and thus this duty—a Faktum

for Kant, metaphysics: a priori system of knowledge by simple concepts

MOUTH [fixerup]

LOBL p. ~128 in one’s most mournful glory: “turn oneself into a mouthful,” swallow oneself so as to be close to oneself, absolute knowledge [this is from GLAS]

SPOM p. 33 good conscience loses chance of abyssal desert, “desert in desert,” chaotic desert as open mouth, coming of other (messianic: ineffaceable mark of Marx’s legacy) [see p. 209]

POOF p. 213 vocative version [re: “O my friends…”], the “wrong” one, a self-contradiction that torments very act of enunciation, gaping-mouthed clamour (clameur à bouche bée) > the dative version is a neutral report

T p. xviii(n) tympanum, Dionysianism, Ariadne’s Thread, labyrinth: by means of the breach (fellure) of philosophical identity, which amounts to addressing the truth to itself in an envelope, to hearing it speak inside without opening its mouth or showing its teeth, the bloodiness of a disseminated writing separates the lips, violates the embouchure of philosophy, contact w/ another code, a unique event, unreadable as such, inaudible, btwn earth & sea, w/out signature

F p. xxxvii mouth’s empty cavity: 1) place for shouts, sobs, “deferred filling,” 2) place to call mother 3) then, via introj. or auto-affection, “phonic self-filling”

——1st paradigm of introjection: fill the mouths void w/ words [Abraham] > language substituted as a figure of presence w/in a community of empty mouths

p. xxxviii introj. as idealization, incorp. refuses metaphor of substitutive supplement, refuses introj.; incorp. fantasy takes introj.’s oral metaphor literally: vomits into inside, into pocket of cyst

OTO OTO pp. 35-6 the umbilicus has you by the ear, the ear is “taking notes,” the master a mouth (ear, mouth: both invaginated, involuted orifices) > the umbilical cord of State (dead father, cold monster) education, like a leash, commands us to write—that’s uncanny

PS PS p. 186 for Artaud, organ is place of loss: its center always an orifice, always functions as embouchure

DST DST p. 230 caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

D pp. 297-98 “square mouth” —square horizontality of page, cadre, frame—squared opening

+R p. 164 angle, biting (mordant) into the border

TN p. 20 Nancy’s distinction btwn orality and buccality, the latter a more “primitive” figure of the mouth, before speech?

p. 25 Nancy: “the incommensurable extension of thinking is the opening of the mouth” > mouth as union of soul/body; Nancy accords decisive authority to “quasi” in Descartes’ “quasi permixtio

pp. 28-9 mouth before speaking, before orality, wouldn’t this be the mother’s lips, giving ex-

p. 29 Nancy: mouth is neither substance nor figure

pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

p. 35 Nancy: faceless mouth, structure of a mask

pp. 36-7 for Nancy, cogito neither point nor space, Nancy’s altercation w/ Descartes occurs btwn improbable pineal gland & a mouth from before speech > an opening anoral & already touching

p. 113 laughter, especially a peal or burst, is like a syncope, even if it shakes up whole body—it’s a thing of the mouth

ATM p. 154 for Levinas, logos is not secondary/instrumental, it remains indispensable as fold (pli) that bends (se plie) to the gift, as the tongue (langue) of my mouth when I tear bread from it to give it to the other > it is also my body

pp. 174-75 for Levinas, to make passage to other, there can’t be an absolute erasure, withdrawal must appear, “He,” only there in seriasure, a series of hiatuses (mouth agape), enlaced erasures

E p. 13 analogy of God and poet proceeds from and returns to logos, source as mouth and outlet (embouchure)

p. 16 Kant’s exemplorality, exemplary orality, the mouth—os as absolute of every analogon: mouth is the measure of taste, of good art, it’s also the measure of bad taste (consumptive taste): one expressive (emissive) the other vomitive (emitic) > 2 means of entering/leaving the mouth

——if pure taste demands non-consumption, wouldn’t disgust (rejection) be origin of pure taste?

p. 17 for Kant, the mouth (from which comes the highest form of expression) is self-affecting

p. 19 for Kant, hearing is closest to freedom and spontaneity, one must use term hearing-oneself-speak (le sentendre-parler) because the structure is auto-affective; the mute thus do not have reason, the mouth (indissociable from ear) is not simply an analogy of expression: it is the ground of analogy, regulates analogy, it is logos itself [necessary]

pp. 20-1 [re: internal, exemplorality of mouth’s auto-affection] what is not regulated by exemplorality, what is its bord ou le débord absolu? > the border which traces limit/frame of its parergon? the border that doesn’t enter into this framed, hierarchized, regulated theory? what is excluded & what gives form to exemplorality proceeding from this exclusion? [can’t be named]

pp. 23-5 what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of identification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

w/in logocentric system (w/in the name), one simply can’t name what’s outside it, to say it would be to eat it—or, what is no longer absolutely different—to vomit it

EW p. 280 link the question of “who” to the question of “sacrifice,” phallogocentrism as a schema of carnivorous virility

——carno-phallogocentrism: a heterotautology as a priori synthesis, i.e. “speculative idealism,” “becoming-subject of substance,” “absolute knowledge,” “speculative Good Friday” > idealizing interiorization of phallus and its necessity of its passage through the mouth

***AD p. 113 engaged by promise while hearing silence it bears at heart of call—figure of hiatus, mouth open to speak/eat

BSi p. 23 sovereignty, devoro, voraz, vorator, devour w/ teeth, rush to bite > kill or mourn the other?

——devouring and vociferation (voice exteriorizes what is eaten, what is interiorized) > listening, obeying the sovereign voice through donkey’s ears [sovereign devours, like beast, to speak as sovereign to stupid beast]

p. 65 double carry (portée) of mouth (human) & maw (animal): voci-ferates (carry the voice) & devours (voracious carry)

SPEC p. 334 [Freud’s mouth cancer and surgery] mouth eating itself, speaking through what it eats

p. 388 transference, ersatz, prosthesis, at the mouth, Freud’s surgeries, cigar: les pas de plus et les plus de pas [?]

FV pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

MURMUR

VP p. 30 non-expressive signs want to say (veulent dire) (bedeuten) only insofar as one can make them say (on peut leur faire dire) what was murmuring in them

MONL p. 47 someone in Derrida flatters himself to understand a domineering murmur beyond grammar, bow to a more hidden rule, last will of language entrusted only to me [see p. 49], last heir of French language: play the role of hero-martyr-pioneer-outlaw-legislator [Nietzsche]

PAS PAS p. (102) when I say viens, I scream (hurle) and hold back (retiens) a murmur no one can hear

POOF pp. 26-7 “O my friends, there is no friend” as eloquent sigh (btwn established fact & the judgment of the sentence) > testament reaches us through unindicated channels, w/ meaning still to be deciphered [Aristotle’s rumormur]

p. 77 we murmur to ourselves, whisper the virtual borderless fiction

p. 176 origin of a rumor is always unknown

p. 190n even Aristotle’s idea that a friend is ‘one soul in 2 bodies’ is a report of something said

pp. 216-17 Derrida now stresses that the sentence could never be independent of all determinable contexts, but that it’s ability to be contextualized demands that it can give way to another context > thus, everyone who uttered Aristotle’s rumored sentence affirmed its displacement/detachment from a unique context, willing or reluctantly, they said the plus dun of the addressee (for example, a feminine ‘one’): the sentence can’t be signed w/out marking this destinerrancy

——in such a way, Aristotle’s sentence was never neutral, always a project of friendship/enmity, & always a project of the corresponding political community (this is irrepressible)

pp. 257-58 for Kant, friendship is rare, the rarity of keeping a secret, a black swan > [Derrida seems to hint that Kant is getting personal here: Kant murmurs a confession]

PPHS p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

SW p. 343 “I continue to murmur, under the protection of hypothesis”

CIN p. 39 Plato murmuring in enclosure of pharmacy, a perfumed murmur

SPEC pp. 325-26 Derrida explains that a certain passage [on Freud’s indifference to whether Ernst invented game or not] is okay to extract, appears dissociable, a parasite from its immediate context, resonates like sound from elsewhere—murmur

p. 364 [Derrida’s associative talent, hears :] whispering—correspondence—Mother/PP

MUST

GT p. 62 re: Mauss’ The Gift, a mass of prescriptive (ethical, moral, juridical) “il faut”: one must opt for give, for noble expenditure, etc.

POR p. 8 (136) in French, Leibniz’s reddere rationem is rendre raison de quelque chose, does that mean reason is owed? it gives rise to circulation?

——“must be rendered”: principle of reason as duty, debt, law, command, imperative

MPM p. 35 il faut: one must follow the trace, remember that which did not exist, the law [Being and law], only there in the aporia of mourning and prosopopoeia: 1) success fails: other becomes part of us, bear him in us, like a future 2) failure succeeds: aborted interorization, respect for other as other, other remains alone, outside us, in his death > schema makes true mourning impossible

A p. 64 irreducible prescriptivity in mode of phenomenological attestation (Bezeugung) > one can and must testify to it

VM p. 103 for Levinas, can only, must only, speak to Other; must use the vocative (never accusative which would objectify Other), bursting forth, very raising up of speech

PAS PAS p. (94) must be able to reject the gift, vomir ce qui tappelle à dire viens, forget in order to reject the poison, to not guard the gift

S p. 94 promise (Versprechen) announces, salutes, what has already taken place “before” (this is the temporality of the coming of the event, Ereignis or Geschehen), it is the dissymmetry of a yes before opposition of yes and no, before question, language always revient à de la promesse

——acc. Heidegger, there’s a “must” a “we must think” of the promise, thought as fidelity to promise > must hear & obey

ROP p. 5 [here] analytic concern merges w/ hermeneutic drive, w/ principle of reason (reddere rationem): render sense at all cost (à tout prix), il faut rendre: fidelity, debt, duty, to restitute sense of sense > even if hidden, verborgene Sinn

p. 14 “one must” as Factum or Fatum (prevents us w/out prohibiting us from going beyond), or “one must” as duty (prohibits going beyond, leaves presumption of sense undecided)

p. 36 law of antinomy, can only endured in its tension (Kant’s antinomies the fated outcome of analysis), paradox of a double “one must”: one can only endure double bind in passion

——double “one must” is against philosophy of life, against desire for decontamination, where pure life = pure death

ATIA p. 43 Cain’s shame, like a second original sin, he needs to hide his nakedness, his crime, he feels excessively culpable > but, isn’t all wrongdoing excessive, le défaut devant leil faut

DIF DIF pp. 6-7 differance must be superseded, not considered arkhē of chain, thus not theological

p. 27 to know there’s nothing kerygmatic [not a master-name] about differance, we must perceive its decapita(liza)tion > must put into question the name of the name

RGE pp. 257-58 Bataille: only way for negativity to reveal what we are is to see ourselves dead, this is comedy! must live w/ impression of truly dying, difficult because necessity of spectacle/representation, nothing less animal than fiction of death > emphasis on simulacrum disrupts Hegel

REST p. 271 in “I owe you the truth in painting,” emphasis should be placed on the owe (doit), the debt, il doit, “he must/should/owes/ought”: vérité sans vérité de la vérité

p. 319 nous devrons, à supposer quil faille jamais devoir

WAP p. 50 il faudrait (imperative appears to be dictated, though “I [Derrida]” dictate it) [re: useless desire to skirt/avoid reading Kant]

p. 68 try to find a discourse w/out an “il faut,” especially a hidden one

PJP p. 163 le parjure forgot to remember the duty of memory (infinite at every instant), memory must be an ethical obligation [I did not think that I had to not forget]

***PSSS p. 257 imperative will always be the question of principle, the principle, of sovereign prince, princedom

HST p. 361 one must (il faut) welcome w/out “one must” (sans il faut) [is this must an imperative of deconstruction? or a must w/in figures of deconstruction? difference? differance?]

***LI p. 122 il la faut, an absolute must: “all or nothing” of conceptual language (“it must” translates the faithfulness of my love for philosophy)

TN p. 298 a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

ATM p. 171 what to make of a signature [Levinas’] when “il aura obligé,” when Il signs in his place?

——how does one hear “one must” in Derrida’s polysemic “loeuvre dE.L. aura obligé

E p. 13 Hegel critiques Kant’s 3rd Critique for staying at the level of “you must” > he very well evinces the moral order that sustains the aesthetic one

MYTHOLOGY

KH p. 91 double exclusion (neither this nor that), participation (both this & that), can we transport this logic, para-logic from one set to another

——displacement from type of existent thing to type of discourse via metonymy (sensible/intelligible > mythos/logos)

p. 100 speculative dialectics inscribes mythic thought in a teleological perspective

——sublates mythemes into philosophemes

——philosophy becomes serious when it awakes from its mythological slumber

——silhouette of a “logic,” impossible to formalize, is this “bastard” logos [outside logic of noncontradiction] mythos? [re: khōra]

pp. 100-01 mytheme, acc. Hegel, will have been a prephilosopheme promised to a dialectical Aufhebung

pp. 101-02 acc. Hegel, Plato uses myth because he’s impotent, a ludico-mythological drift (dérive), Aristotle Hegel’s guarantor of seriousness

——even if Plato is a master for using myth, myth remains subordinate to philosophical theme

p. 102 Aristotle: “those who philosophize w/ recourse to myth are not worth treating seriously”

p. 110 acc. Hegel, nothing serious, only mythology in introductions

pp. 112-13 Plato’s play of the probable myth (ton eikota mython), take pleasure w/out remorse, getts ahead of Aristotle (on seriousness), and turns myth into rigor (seriousness of play)

——myth an image of the image of sensory becoming

p. 113 khōra as myth w/in myth, inscribed for a moment, while having a bearing on the place of inscription, oneiric, bastard reading, heterogenous to philosopho-mytheme which orders myth to its philosophical telos

pp. 114-15 in Timaeus, Greeks who have no writing (unlike Egyptians), need myth (destined to perpetual childhood) > memory of city, its salvation, entrusted to the writing of the other [who is the master here?]

p. 124 one telling to the next, author gets farther & farther away: mythic saying resembles a discourse w/out a legitimate father, orphan, bastard, distinguished from philosophy, in Phaedrus, which must have a father to answer for it

FL p. 260 Benjamin grafted language of Marxist revolution onto messianism [see p. 263]: both announcing new historical epoch & beginning of a true history void of myth

BL pp. 198-99 quasi-event of the murder of father, event w/out event, resembles fiction, myth, fable > real, effective guilt; question of belief & historical referent—irremediably fissured

——dead father more powerful than living one

SPOM p. 113 there’s no nationalism, nationality, that’s not religious or mythological

PP p. 68-9 Socrates give[s] myths a send off (envoyer promener les mythes), les saluer, dismisses them, cette belle résolution du khairein [Phaedrus (230a) Socrates says goodbye to myths, because he does not even know himself], khairein in name of truth, self-knowledge, autoscopy, autognosis

——Derrida treats this send off, in a dialogue w/ 2 rigorously original myths [cicada, Theuth], as a welcoming of myths > both myths invented after question of writing

p. 74 writing linked to myth, both contra knowledge (sought w/in oneself)

p. 75 writing as repeating w/out knowing (through a myth [?])

p. 85 organization of Theuth myth conforms to powerful constraints of “Greek language” and beyond

p. 86 the Platonic traits, mythological figures re: origin of writing > opens relation btwn mythemes & philosophemes in western logos: a history, or History, constituted by philosophical difference btwn mythos and logos

VP p. 52 if punctuality of instant is a myth, a spatial or mechanical metaphor, an inherited metaphysical concept, if presence of presence isn’t simple, all of Husserl’s logic is threatened

FSW p. 203 differance as non-originary origin, erases myth of origin, determined outside teleological/eschatological horizon [horizon key word here]

PPHS p. 72 origin, inaugural imaginary limit, myth of transcendental signified, archeology before trace and difference

F p. xxvii no-place proper to “original” event, “hypothetical zero hour,” creates cryptomythical system

mythic founding event is only possible in secrecy—so it can ‘take place’

WM p. 213 white mythology [vis-à-vis Anatole France]: metaphysics, culture of West, erased w/in itself fabulous scene that produced it, this scene remains active—inscribed in white ink; white man takes his own mythology, his own logos, the mythos of his idiom, for universal Reason

POS pp. 52-3 Derrida never identified writing w/ myth, what interested him was how philosophy excluded writing to keep myth exterior to scientific rationality > deconstruction attempts to break up opposition btwn logos and mythos

ATIA p. 130 Lacan designates castration complex as Freud’s scientific (nonmythological) original sin (being subjected to the signifier, a nonmastery that gives human mastery over animals)

PF p. xxiii quotations, suspend word [“United States”] in epokhē of epoch, a fabulous act of nomination, fabula (like provocation) recounts/deciphers a history, the phantasm of an accredited myth, myth by force of law, “enforced” myth

D p. 304 “primitive” mythical unity always reconstituted retrospectively dans laprès-coupure > the decision, le coup (shot, throw, blow) parts the seed as it projects it (partage la semence en la projetant)

LI p. 103 as though an auxiliary/parasite could not supplant, as if “parasite” is a simple addition

——inner purity & exterior supplement—this is myth itself (mythology of a logos)

OG p. 37 (55) deconstruction does not make writing innocent but shows why this violence does not befall (survient) an innocent language: violence is originary > wherever there’s the sense of a right side: mythological effect of return (retour)

pp. 92-3 no law w/out possibility of trace, what is lost in thought of trace (complicity of origins, arche-writing) is the myth of the simplicity of origin

p. 109 (159) proper name has always been original myth of transparent legibility present under obliteration

p. 167 (238) origin/nature as myth of addition, supplementarity annulled by being purely additive > myth of the effacement of the trace

***p. 336n Lévi-Strauss: proper names are a quanta of signification below which all people do is point > this zero degree of language, pointing, “sensible-certitude”: a myth effaced by play of difference

p. 244 (346) Rousseau tries to describe a language not yet corrupted by articulation, supplementarity, convention > time of that language: mythic limit btwn déjà and pas-encore

MYSTAGOGUE

ATAP p. 68 via Kant, mystagogy (pretension): when name philosophy becomes pseudonym, cryptonym, homonym, philosophy w/out Bedeutung, w/out guarantee of its value

p. 69 agogic function of leader, il Duce, Führer, mystagogue, jealously protects unveiling of secret: elite beings, distinguished subjects [Donald Trump]

p. 70 [vis-à-vis Kant] mystagogue believes himself to have grace, genius, intuition outside school; pretension is mimicry of a tone (not tone itself)

pp. 71-2 perversion of voice of reason: mix voice of reason w/ voice of oracle (2 voices of other in us), a hermetic, hermeneutic seduction > oracular parasitizes voice of reason, elevates the voice, raises the tone > for Kant, this is Verstimmen (to be deranged, delirious), désaccordement of cords/voices [tone] in head: vision w/out concept turned impatiently toward most “crypted” secret > poetico-metaphorical overabundance

pp. 72-3 acc. Kant, mystagogues confuse Geheimnis of practical reason w/ mystery of vision/contact > nothing more auto-affective than voice of moral law, not contaminated by feeling/illumination (touch/sight)

p. 74 numerology, Plato’s amazement w/ geometric figures, illumination, Pythagorean mysticism, vision—all belong to apocalyptic world, crypto-politics, -poetics, [for Kant] perversion of philosophy > matter of veil & castration [that is, who will unveil? who speaks w/out mastery?]

p. 75 acc. Kant, mystagogues anticipate, approach, smell out, are men of imminence & the trace, new Platonists, abuse metaphors & figurative expressions (bildlichen Ausdrücken) > they bring into play the phantom & the veil

——mystagogues aren’t not true philosophers, resort to poetic schemas

p. 80 Kant: exalted vision, death of all philosophy

p. 90 distinguishing deconstruction from simple progressive demystification [à la style of Lumières]? or why has deconstruction taken on an apocalyptic tone, multiplied distinctions btwn closure & end? I intended to analyze a genre rather than practice it, an ironic non-belonging

——Glas’ columns constantly shaken by apocalyptic agitations, laughs at apocalypse (mixing John of Gospel w/ Genet [GLAS p. 198])

MYSTICISM

HASD p. 46 Eckhart privileges intellect over will: will only seeks good—intellect sees naked God

——“every creature is full of God and is a book”

p. 47 Eckhart: “the intellects who know how to close their eyes” [Derrida?]

p. 50 for Dionysius, theologians who penetrate “secret infinity” leave no trace

p. 68n Eckhart’s “new adjunct writings” [highest adjunct, adjunct to God]

p. 53 for Eckhart, eye is a sieve, filter, sees what isn’t—no text, no predication w/out it

p. 69n Eckhart: “the nature of love is that it transforms man into the thing he loves”

RGE p. 272 Bataille’s not a new mystic: no presence, no interiority > the impossible

IW p. 270 for Cohen, Spinoza was a mystic w/out difference [?] [for Heidegger too?]

HST p. 376 Huysmans: Jesus as first example of mystical substitution, the substitution (suppléance) of him who owes nothing for him who owes everything

TN p. 12 for Freud, mysticism: self-perception outside ego—the id (Ich, Es) > or is it realm outside I and id

NOY pp. 232-33 de Certeau: knowledge’s procedure is essentially a “no,” mystic postulate advances a limitless “yes”

WOG p. 36 beyond of being: Jewish/Christian revelations, apophatic theologies/mysticisms, Levinas’ beyond ontology, Heidegger’s proposed theology w/ no Being or his kreuzweise Durchstreichung

OG p. 80 (119-20) hyperbolic admiration of Chinese & Hieroglyphics serves domesticating purpose > complicity btwn rationalism & mysticism

MYSTIC WRITING PAD MACHINE

FSW p. 200 Derrida describes Freud’s development from Project to “Note on Mystic Writing-Pad” > Wunderblock, a solution to problematic of breaching (metaphorics of written trace)

pp. 206, 329-30n Freud describes [to Fliess] uncontainable delight in creating a machine that could almost run of itself

——2 series of metaphors, text and machine, do not appear at same time in Freud [pp. 220-21 two series of metaphors: perceptual apparatus, origin of memory]

——metaphor of writing appropriates problems of psychic apparatus in structure & psychic text in fabric

p. 215 Freud’s machine is still an optical one in Traumdeutung

p. 217 two systems necessary in single machine: surface freshness, depth of retention

p. 330n Freud: memory renews by itself its means to action (unlike photograph)

p. 220 nonspsychical system (machine metaphor) of psychical [like Heidegger’s nontechnology of technology?]

p. 221 when origin of memory and perceptual system are metaphorically united: “perceptual apparatus” must be writing machine

p. 223 [Freud describes Mystic Pad]

p. 224 Mystic Pad depth w/out bottom, stratification of surfaces, whose interior is a similarly exposed surface, perfectly superficial exteriority open to incision of scratch

p. 225 most interesting analogy of Mystic Pad is time, a discontinuous time, time as spacing, withdrawal of perception, periodic non-excitability > interruption/restoration of contact

——very structure of Freud’s Mystic Pad is the time of writing

p. 226 two hands needed to operate Freud’s Mystic Pad

p. 227 via Freud’s frustration w/ analogy of Mystic Pad, machine is dead, is death, does not run of itself > representation is dead, death is (only) representation

pp. 227-28 Freud’s Writing Pad (machine) can’t run of itself (like living memory of Plato), a dead complexity w/out depth, multiplicity of layered surfaces

——“life as depth belongs only to the wax of psychical memory,” Plato’s mnemic writing

p. 228 instead of machine being a pure absence of spontaneity, its resemblance to psychical apparatus bears witness to finitude of mnemic spontaneity thus supplemented

——machine and thus representation is death and finitude w/in psyche, idea of finitude derived from movement of supplementarity

T p. xxv like w/ Mystic Pad, question of writing machine should upset (devrait fair basculer) space of proper body dans lentraînement sans limite des machines de machines et donc de machines à main coupée

O p. 8(n) protocol of preface destroys future anterior > a gluing (kollon), praefatio, prae-fari, protokollon as formula, pharmacopoeia, begins (law of dissemination) doubled by a “facing,” divides/undoes inaugural pretention of first page: neither depth, nor surface, in or for itself, un bloc magique

N + 1

FK p. 66 religion & reason develop in tandem, their common resource: testimonial pledge of every performative; same source divides itself, possibility of two, n +1

p. 100 n + 1 incalculably engenders all supplements: crypt

H p. 81 “at this very moment”: antinomy of laws in the plural and absolutely singular law

——there are 2 plurals, different at same time: 1) multiplicity, plural laws 2) One + a multiplicity, One + n [plus dun]

——One + n, the antinomic addition, adds conditional laws to unconditional law of hospitality

***SW p. 344 unlike veil, tallith is the difference of the event, irreducible reference to the One, the One + n > cannot be or become (like every veil) a figure, symbol, because of the uniqueness of its reference, the untranslatable carry of this ference (which one cannot/must not get rid of)

NAKED

ATIA p. 1 naked words, words from the heart, starting from Genesis

p. 4 nudity as the proper of man, animals naked w/out knowing they are

p. 5 there is no nudity in “nature,” only the affect, sentiment, experience of existing in nakedness > animal not naked because naked

——contretemps of 2 nudities w/out nudity: 1) animal in non-nudity because nude 2) man in nudity so no longer nude

——if “dressing oneself,” clothing, is proper to man, it arrives w/ all the others: speech, reason, logos, history, laughing, mourning, burial, gift, the concept of the concept

pp. 11-2 nudity as passivity, involuntary exhibition in face-to-face: the passion of the animal, my passion of the animal (other)

p. 29 to think the war we find ourselves waging [against animals] is not only a duty, no one can escape it: thinking, perhaps, begins when animal looks at us and we are naked before it

p. 57 “the animot is more naked than the human, who is more naked than the animot > this law governing nudity never resists placing woman/child on side of animal

p. 60 wouldn’t hetero-narcissism of sexual coupling give animals the right to modesty/shame, sensitivity to nakedness?

p. 61 there is a certain jouissance (anguish) when an animal looks at Derrida naked

Derrida would prefer not to appear naked before an animal

p. 73 for Descartes, human is different from animal because he can think extension, the intelligible body (of wax), the naked wax that can’t be touched, animal only senses the sensible nonnaked wax > man can undress the wax [have you ever tried to do that?]

p. 107 Levinas’ nudity doesn’t concern itself w/ sexual difference, w/ animal

REST pp. 296-302 classically, the “thing” is informed matter, Heidegger asks whether this matter/form couple was secretly constituted around thing as work or product (being-product rather than being-thing) > re: Überfall of matter/form couple, has it fallen on the being-thing or being-product? blosse Ding is thing divested of its being-product: what we must think is the Rest

——if clothing for Kant is parergonal, and if what is proper to representation is the “nude,” what do we make of these “old shoes w/ laces”? > a “pure” supplement? parergon w/out ergon?

AD p. 111 for Pascal, strip “I” of everything attributed to it, make it naked, bare; for Levinas, nudity is infinitely exposed vulnerability—skin

FV pp. 414-15 Stoff (incest w/ mother, murder of father), all else (i.e. tragic destiny) is secondary > the analytic deciphering: denuding (mise à nu) of this Stoff beneath secondary disguises: naked truth, truth as nakedness, meaning behind the formal disguises

——exhibiting, undressing (déshabillage), unveiling (dévoilement): acrobatics of metaphor of truth, metaphor of metaphor, truth of truth > when Freud intends to denude original Stoff: text coordinated à sa vérité nue, mais aussi à la vérité comme nudité

pp. 415-16 Schreber: we all (women included) like naked women

——for Freud, dreams of nakedness don’t exhibit penis or absence of penis but absence of phallus, absence of attribute supplementing a possible fault, absence of colossal double > following chain is indicated: truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame [Schreber]

pp. 417-18 for Freud, dream recasts [Stoff] in Einkleidung (garment, disguising, falsifying), the emperor is the dreamer, the imposter is the dream

——Freud pays no attention to a fold in the text [Emperors], literary narrative is a secondary elaboration, thus an Einkleidung > since Andersens’ text has the text as its theme, it puts Freud’s text [interpretation] onstage

p. 418 if dream of nakedness is a dream of shame, nakedness is not natural: its truth is in shame

——hidden theme of Emperors… is the hidden theme, text as its theme, text as veil, movement of alētheia

(proper) NAME (mark of a singularity)

KH p. 89-90 khōra as a name that announces the Other of the name, not logos, not mythos, neither this nor that, both this & that: “not lying when I say this” is that telling the truth?

——participates (while being excluded) in the intelligible in an aporetic way

p. 91 as if a name should only be given to whom (or what) deserves it, calls for it

p. 94 w/ no essence, how could khōra be beyond its name? it anachronizes being, and it is like nothing, there beyond its name

p. 97 risk of feminizing khōra, a female proper name?

——khōra must keep its impropriety, having nothing of its own, this is what we must keep for it

p. 98 difference btwn calling it/her (elle) in the same manner & calling it/her by the same name [khōra], difference btwn appellation (discourse) & name? is Timaeus an example of this difference or exemplary?

p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

——is Socrates someone, something, play of proper names more abyssal than ever, “who are you, Khōra?

GT p. 10 w/ gift, perhaps we will put the name of the name in question

p. 81 language as a phenomenon of gift-countergift, of giving-taking, of exchange, all difficulties of nomination/writing are difficulties of self-naming, self writing (se nommer, sécrire)

——donner reviendrait à prendre et prendre à donner; this would fold itself over on language/writing beyond logocentric closure

p. 92 title = proper name of narrative

pp. 170-71 Icarus racing toward sun [via Baudelaire], sinking (sombre) not toward the bottom (fond) but toward abyss; unable to give his name, how could he ever claim he knows how to give? has no sepulture thus no proper name > the whole story? all of history?

***R p. 89 [quoted in POOF] deconstruction guides us endlessly, orders us to engage, enjoins us to inherit a stance of survival coming through tired features (is this done in name of democracy?)

——abandoning inheritance/heritage of the name, in the name of the name, thereby betraying the heritage in the name of the heritage

FK p. 46 Islam is not Islamism, latter operates in name of former > thus, question of the name

——does proper name belong to system of knowledge—its untranslatability, its iterability (technē)?

FL p. 259 [re: Zur Kritik der Gewalt] nomination as originary destination of name (for Benjamin), the gift or the call of presence in the name, but how is the thought of the name articulated with haunting and the logic of the specter?

AF p. 77 Derrida trembles when Yerushalmi declares “only in Israel” [is there future, is there past], logic of election, question of proper name, exemplarity > place of all violences

——if it is just to remember to guard and gather archive, it’s just as just to remember the others, tout autre est tout autre [invaginates]

MC p. 346 just because we don’t know proper name of the other, we still know something of him or her

p. 359 Derrida demonstrates the untranslatability of proper name via Pierre, has no meaning by itself, and compares this to numeral 7

p. 360 privilege of literature: its proper name is a place of chance

p. 373 not that all fiction, all inscription of proper names has literary dimension, but they arise in a place where limits are never real, never immobile, never solidonly the effects of contextual isolation > pragrammatological (intersection of pragmatics & grammatology)

H p. 23 a proper name is never purely individual

p. 25 foreigner vs. barbarian (absolutely other does not have a name or family name)

pp. 27-9 question posed to the foreigner: “what is your name?”

——what about unquestioning hospitality? more just, more loving to question or not to question? question of hospitality as question of question

p. anne 28 “thought is in essence a force of mastery…breaking up the unknown to possess it, shed light on it, name it”

p. 137 technological prostheses, whose refinements are unlimited in principle > still give fantasy of auto-nomy, auto-affection: is there hospitality w/out this, w/out auto-affection, the privileged figure of hearing oneself speak?

——proper name in its pure possibility: it’s to you yourself, I say: “come,” “enter”

LOBL p. 126 btwn the call & the resurrection, there’s no time > absolute event, not effect of a cause, the cause, causa, la Chose, first name itself

SPOM p. xiv man’s life always more than a paradigm, other than a symbol > a proper name (see p. 220 on man) [one should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure? martydom]

p. 19 the proper of a proper name will always remain to come

POO pp. 10-1 responsibility not in ones own name but arises in structure of supplementarity: in my name as the name of the other > singularity quakes in exemplary equivocality of this “as”

p. 13 “what returns to your name, to the secret of your name, is the ability to disappear in your name,” that is, not to return to itself, which is the condition of the gift (i.e. the name) of all expansion of self, of all auctoritas

BL p. 187 no such thing as literary essence, name literature destined to remain improper: has something to do w/ drama of name, law of name, name of law

p. 207 text of philosophy, science, or history, a text of knowledge or information, would not abandon a name to a state of not-knowing—not intentionally [see p. 209]

MPM p. 8 name must appeal to law in some way

p. 18 “America is deconstruction” > no, we learn from deconstruction to suspend hasty attributions of proper names

p. 47 apostrophe to naked name, magical incantation, “Lazarus, arise!” > “tropological spectrum” forbids this magic, and yet power/structure of name makes possible such magic, not only the desire but experience of hallucination

p. 48 the essence of the proper name prevents “true mourning”

——the dead can no longer answer the call of the name, only in memory

p. 49 defect, default of name is its immense power: name already survives him, does not wait for death

——memory name of something preserves an essential & necessary relation w/ possibility of name

p. 50 “in memory of” both proper name and common noun (nom et nom), death reveals a proper name could always lend itself to repetition (in absence of bearer) becoming a common noun

p. 54 any nominal function is “in memory of”

p. 116 primary gesture of deconstruction: to wonder at “curious belief” that all words are proper names

p. 150 une parole donnée au nom de lautre—act of memory, act of faith > or simply an act, impossible act, only act worthy of the name: promise has meaning only w/ death of other, when friend is no longer there > promise not made, but as trace of future it can be renewed

A p. 74 death always the name of a secret, signs irreplaceable singularity, puts forth common name of the proper name w/out name, always a shibboleth > language about death long history of a secret society, hidden religion of the awaiting, a universal Marrano

p. 77 that which lives w/ out a name, we’ll give an added name (surnom) [which a name always is]: Marrano (crypto-judaic, crypto-X), believe if you want to the Marranos have come to an end

pp. 78-9 death is figure of the aporia in which “death” and death can replace (metonymy that carries name beyond name, beyond name of name) all that is possible as impossible: love, gift, other, testimony

EM p. 133 (161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

VM p. 82 can the other of the Greek be named non-Greek? pensée pour laquelle le tout du logos grec est déjà survenu (erupted), humus apaisé non pas sur un sol, mais autour dun volcan plus anicen

***p. 129 “other” is the name, the unthinkable unity of light and night > “phenomenon supposes original contamination by the sign”

p. 137 for Heidegger, Logos “is the Logos of no one” > anonymous as possibility of name and responsibility

p. 147 acc. Levinas, nonviolent language would not use “to be,” would not predicate, predication as 1st violence > only proper nouns: pure invocation, adoration [Derrida can’t see possibility of giving in Levinas’ vision, sees only slavery]

p. 149 God another name of Being (name because nonconcept)? > opening of the horizon not in the horizon

P p. 23 both Heidegger & Hegel subordinate all art to speech, poem, the said, nomination

PAS PAS p. (39) via Blanchot, she recognized herself in her (son, [sound]) name, in her nothingness

***p. (42) play (w/out play) of the w/out (sans) disarticulates every identity, every contradiction > ever since the “the name of death” or nonidentity of double in the name

p. (52) what i would like to give you: Viens w/out language overhang (sans aucun langage de surplomb), w/out anything that could name it, designate it from a third place

p. (64) le surgissement, calling someone to his own proper name in water > analyze baptism from this gift of the name

p. (73) the one who says “I” depends by his name, in his identity, on terrifyingly ancient event of another viens, le même pourtant > the drowned (noyé) as the one who says “I”

p. (74) the call of death precedes me, it is death and the word (mort/mot) that’re called in the viens > I call myself dead, marcher in my name > w/out name before viens

p. (81) she/it has no place, only what comes before place, what places itself before the place of every proper name (the Thing, pronoun, prénom)

p. (87) [on not citing his sources] the worst méconaissance of Blanchot’s text, hand over incommensurable in it to the market, the hierarchy, the dominant effects tied to name & law, but [other voice] there’s always benefits of mastery for sovereign renunciation, it’s gonna happen, il faut en rendre compte, the gift itself never forgets itself, nor the forgetting

***p. (88) can one love anything other than the name? that which still lets self omit itself, so it can represent itself

p. (91) Blanchot’s example of how speaking negates the existent of which it speaks: ‘This woman!’ > Hölderlin, Mallarmé, all poets, felt act of naming is marvelous/disquieting

——Blanchot: ideal negation, deferred assassination that is language, my language does not kill anyone (woman can always die, her death announced, already present in my language)

p. (92) cette femme, not yours, but the name for you, not a part of you, doesn’t possess you, addresses you > [she responds?] my name is unique, and you hide it, forget it

——Blanchot come is said so that elle can cry out its name

——if being is another name for forgetting, places forgetting in a crypt, forgets forgetting, in naming forgetting one makes it disappear under its name [(un)names], vs. pas sous le nom doubli > le reste sans reste de cet effacement qui ne sefface plus, voilà ce quil y a peut-être, par chance, mais qui nest pas ou qui est pas

pp. (99-100) in a moment of extreme, precipitous virtuosity, where o (mort, fors, faux, faut, zéro, mot) resonates everywhere and nom turns to mon, Derrida asks himself if his policing overzealousness [to unmask the absence of the name, le pas-de-nom] deciphers identities [maur/chot, m’: o], wants to catch everything in a dragnet (filet)

p. (100) structure of name, text, signature complicates premises when one precipitates oneself toward the guarantee of filiation [does jealousy overdetermine?]

p. (103) death, the other name of viens (both only reach the other)

——must forget the question of your self, of your uniqueness, and love viens, the unique, not a name, not an impersonal infinitive

p. (104) name is no more its infinitely divisible elements than it is dispersed in them like foam in anonymous sea [Kant’s simple/composite]

——friendship gives anonymity in the name, if it is possible, it hands over (livre) le nom sans nom

pp. (104-05) if there was one [name], the signature, the anagrammatic, would lose name in infinite measure of its keeping [absolute guard], so > plus de nom (visible name might hide tout autre name)

***p. (105) double band is structure of name said to be proper, anonymity is the effect, whether by monumentalization (sauf, the unscathed) or effacement (seeds, dispersion); gift of name is corrupted in advance dans le pas-de-nom [plus-de-nom] > what takes place in and beyond language: leaves the fold of this folding back

——[re: Blanchot] name we know him by can serve as a hiding place (cache), throw readers off track into complacency of police investigation > thus plus de nom

p. (106) I call to you to protect you against the nameless

——you want to lose your name, and w/ tout autre calculus, you don’t want to get out of it [vigilance]

——Derrida’s ideal to drown in true sea of Blanchot’s text, to have loved it as the original first name

OH pp. 5-6 hope, fear, trembling, when a name might mask the absence of a face [re: “subject” of Europe”]

p. 35 responsibility: making a chance of the memory of a name, of the idiomatic limit > an opening of identity to its future

——all names designate a negative limit & a chance

VP pp. 12-3 strange unity of life in Husserl: 1) biological life 2) concept of psychē is life as self-relation > the pre-transcendental becomes the ultra-transcendental, Derrida says maybe concept of life calls for another name

p. 66 we can only deconstruct plunged in inherited concepts, groping toward unnameable

S p. 10 is Geist the name (beyond any other name) Heidegger gives to the unquestioned possibility of the question?

pp. 52-3 Heidegger suggests we draw a line through rock to think animal’s relation to it

——erasure of the name, name of rock, erasure of possibility to name rock, as such, to access being-rock

p. 71 acc. Heidegger (via Schelling), Geist never Spiritus, but it is pneuma, but really it is flame; only German can name spirit, not even Greek

——to name spirit is to offer for thinking, German only language in which spirit comes to name itself

POOF p. 6 the question who or what is the friend? a protestation in name of the friend, in name of the name: resists reduction to dominant concept of political, ethical, ontophenomenological > a political allure that is not so political

p. 38 for Nietzsche, mediocre (lookalike) caricatures [i.e. those w/ “democratic sensibilities”], the worst enemy of what they resemble, usurpers of the name

pp. 65-6 following Nietzsche beyond Eros? if love is always a lust for new possession, we must acquiesce to principle of ruin at heart of utterly new > would this leave open the chance to accord w/ the “love whose just name would be friendship” [?]—just once, it would happen, friendship as the name for this impossible event [only once btwn 2]

——but how could there be a right name for such an event, for any event? how could you convince the partner of such rightness at the moment of the act?

p. 72 Blake’s “Do be my Enemy for Friendships sake,” hatred as last fidelity to specter of lost friendship? if declaring (referencing/respecting) a name means war, love, friendship, friend/enemy haunts every naming

——friendship–enemy btwn logic of unconscious & logic of lie: these 2 logics can’t help but haunt each other, et de partager même le concept de cette hantise qui travaille le langage de notres temps

showed friend/enemy passing into each other: still, the individual ‘Nietzsche’ not the only witness

p. 80 what Nietzsche augurs exceeds the name Nietzsche

p. 87 Schmitt’s use of Latin & Greek (hostis/inimicus, polémios/ekhthrós), as a search for the ‘right name’ (question always that of the ‘right name,’ as Nietzsche would say)

pp. 186-87 Augustine’s abyssal calculation, after death of his friend [Confessions IV], his close reading of Aristotle’s friends are ‘one soul in bodies twain’: survivre, ou non, au nom de lautre?

survive for yourself or person you’re mourning? question of gift, donner au nom de lautre, a narcissism that only occurs in name of other

pp. 228-29 one always takes a stand re: friendship > Derrida utters “O my friend…” in my own name > power of the name to survive bearer of the name: il y va donc du nom porté [borne], du port [bearing] ou du support [basis] du nom et du rapport [relation] au nom, la portée [range] du nom

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

pp. 250-52 a grammar beyond grammar of response, friendship a privileged locus for this reflection: 1) on répond de soi [for self]: subject, agency of ‘proper name’ 2) on répond d'abord à lautre [to]: more originary than other two, ‘insistence’ of Other, dissymmetrical anteriority that marks time as structure of responsibility 3) répondre devant [before]: marks, right on idiom, passage to institutional agency of alterity, no longer singular but universal, before the law, agency authorized

——agency called ‘proper name’ can’t be reduced to registered name, to patronymic or social reference (its determining manifestation) > would Heidegger’s pre-Socratic phília be capable of doing w/out proper name, insofar as it is older than subjectivity?

——Montaigne loved his friend La Boétie before he met him, loved him in his name

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

p. 288 Derrida has not substituted name Nietzsche for Zarathustra: les choses sont déjà assez imprenables et inappropriables avec chacun deux

p. 290 great canonical meditations on friendship (Cicero, Montaigne, Blanchot) all belong to experience of mourning > through the irreplaceable of the named, they always advance in testimonial order to confide/refuse death of unique to a universalizable discourse > simultaneously found/destabilize all oppositions, opens to abyss, se fracture

p. 291 though Montaigne infinitizes friendship, he ensures mediation of solder (soudure) in the name of the brother (and the exclusion of woman) > via Montaigne, name ensures ‘fraternal solder’: owing to name, friendship begins prior to friendship, friendship survives friendship—friendship always begins by surviving

p. 292 via Montaigne, time of name [“inexplicable force of destiny”?] bestows force of approach, power of proximity or ‘union’ that defies discourse: the name against discourse (before/after), name as force, affection, mediation (these nameless concepts, w/out common names)

——the 2 names: 1) very structure of testimonial survival stance, a certain spectrality, name survives a priori beyond presence 2) this general structure is enframed (arraisonné) in certain history, chance of filiation, inherited name, that of renown (again, woman excluded)

PPHS p. 94n Hegel: “we think in names” [magic?] ex: “lion” [Hegel contradicts privilege of sign?]

p. 96 irreducible privilege accorded to the name in Hegel: name as simple, not decomposed, plain idea (simple sign of exact idea)

——acc. Hegel, thanks to name we can do w/out image & sensory existence [hieroglyph]

p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

SH p. 14 meridian binds (“das Verbindende,” both binds and connects), provokes, at noon, the encounter [shortest shadow], example of law > “a date would be the gnomon [nom, shadow, not mine] of these meridians”

p. 17 date always bound up w/ a proper name > gives us to think an idiom, each time, barely translatable [Derrida is also referring to his French phrasing]

p. 35 date is a witness, but one can bless date w/out knowing to “what” or for “whom” one bears witness, always possible there’ll no longer be a witness for this witness

——affinity btwn date, name, ash

p. 39 name partakes in this destiny of ash along w/ date, not empirical, is part of its readability

p. 43 trace or ash: these names stand for other names, a date’s destiny is that of every proper name: is there any other desire than dating, commemorating?

p. 53 effacement of date or name inside the ring: origin of philosophy, hermeneutics, poetics, their sendoff [envois]

pp. 53-5 Jew as poet, as “he” w/ unpronounceable name, as witness to the universal through absolute singularity, by virtue of and in name of the other

p. 57 no worse loss than death of name (still, a date remains) > mourning, interiorization of other in Erinnerung, the preserving of other in sepulcher/epitaph, is denied us; words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts > incinerated beyond of date, words lost w/out sepulcher

p. 60 anyone who experiences circumcision (body cut, shibboleth, blessing, purification) is a Jew

——displace literality of belonging if, w/ Judaism, nothing properly belongs, anyone or no one may be a Jew, Jew: no one’s name, the only one, no one's circumcision

pp. 64-5 the one who awaits his name, awaits its bestowal by circumcision, draws whole poem toward him in absolute dissymmetry

p. 68 because one can make use of shibboleth, it can be turned against oneself, the circumcised are proscribed, held at border, excluded, reduced to ashes, in the mere name

——how to guard against double edge of shibboleth? w/ “living Nothing in the heart,” perhaps

——circumcision of word is not dated in history, has no age, but calls forth date, opens word to other, of all that calls itself (the name, blessing of name, yes & no) > it sets turning the ring

***F pp. xxviii-xxix writing not essentially verbal or phonetic, body signs even before any “proper” name > no difference btwn verbal behavior of patient & paramecium faced w/ obstacle

p. xxix ultimate object still remains, even as “proper” name or body—a text to be deciphered

p. xlv Wolf Man calls himself by unpspeakable name Thing (tieret), gives himself no name > entire body of a proper name always shattered (morcelé) by the topoi, la Chose est un morceau de symbole

——every “word” that says Thing in word-thing > several subjects, places, instances; Wolf Man inhabits forbidden desire to call himself by glorious word, can’t not break seal in signing

p. xlvii analyst can only decrypt secret seal of [other, patient’s] name w/ his own name > works on his own name

p. xlvii proper name: multiple economy of places, instances & safes (fors)

p. xlviii cryptonomy: crack (la ligne de brisure) of a symbol, upright column of name (colonne érigée dun nom), blank voice of a scruple [see p. xiii], always extends beyond the self

FWT pp. 5-6 [re: responsibility as experience of inheritance] a double before (devant), to come before as in debt and before as in what is to come, always anachronism: devancer in the name of what came before, and devancer the name itself! [la devance, “owingness”]

——to invent one’s name, sign otherwise, in the name of the name passed down, if that’s possible

WM p. 188n in Cratylus, Socrates oscillates [?] first nomination excludes mimēsis, words can’t, mimelike, resemble the form of a thing; later, right name can be taken for image of thing in its “truth”

p. 233 for Aristotle, onoma can be both verbs & nouns, anything that has phōnē sēmantikē, anything that has intelligible meaning outside syntax, not a syncategorem

p. 236 Fontanier: prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs not tied to substantive idea, just ways of seeing

——Aristotle: noun as element of metaphor, first semantic unity, smallest signifying element, composite phōnē sēmantikē, each of its elements are insignificant (asēmos) w/out meaning; noun is different from verb only in atemporality

pp. 236-37 Aristotle’s definition of noun, the element of metaphor, is a theory of the name, articulated w/ ontology > value of metaphor systematically chained to values of discourse, voice, meaning, resemblance, or to logos, phōnē sēmantikē, sēmainein, onoma, mimēsis, homoiosis

p. 243 for Aristotle, proper name is nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, father of all figures > everything turns around it, towards it > metaphor as substitution of proper names w/ fixed meaning & referent

pp. 247-48 via Aristotle, univocity (one meaning per noun) is telos (essence) of language, there is only finite polysemia: a nonmasterable dissemination (an irreducible polysemia) is not even a polysemia, it belongs to what is outside language, and thus outside humanity

——no philosophy has renounced Aristotelian ideal that a noun, to be proper, must have one single sense, telos of language must be able to master and analyze polysemia w/ no remainder

p. 248n for Aristotle, poet (man of metaphor) is btwn sophist and philosopher: multiplies meaning, not for sake of deception, but to return to identity of meaning; philosopher finds truth of meaning, beyond signs and names

DS p. 183 in phrase Inter Platonem et Mallarmatum, use of names not real references but convenient indicators

p. 188n in Cratylus, Socrates oscillates [?] first nomination excludes mimēsis, words can’t, mimelike, resemble the form of a thing; later, right name can be taken for image of thing in its “truth”

p. 208 for Mallarmé, ideality of idea, metaphysical name, is necessary to mark non-being, nonpresent, marks w/out breaking glass, alludes to epekeina tēs ousias: a hymen (closeness & veil) btwn Plato’s sun & Mallarmé’s lustre

p. 220 Derrida not using hymen like Hegel used Aufhebung, Urteil (contradictory layers of signification, depth); what counts for hymen is form or syntactical praxis that (de)composes it

***——the word hymen could be lost, and its function would remain: we’ve been making believe everything can be traced to this name [see GOD p. 116], simply possesses a certain economic condensation, accumulation

——through “hymen” one marks what entre already marks, could replace w/ “identity,” “marriage,” “crime,” “difference”

p. 229 necessity of folding (page of the hymen) not a secondary procedure, no smooth fold, hymen doesn’t simply adopt some fold > fold, in the lining which, of itself, the hymen was, at once its outside and its inside, no proper name, doesn’t exist: hymen, already torn, in the fold

p. 263n Mallarmé: “ashes-total-gold- (cendres-or-total-),” “dispersal goldenly consumed,” or devalued, mined out, plus de nom

POS pp. 66-7 we need to determine otherwise, the effects of ideality, meaning, reference > a “new” concept (first constituting itself) possesses “localizable effervescence in the work of nomination,” effect borrows its characteristics from opposition cause/effect & essence/appearance, w/out being reduced to them > this “fringe of irreducibility” should be analyzed

p. 71 name does not name punctual simplicity of a concept, but a system of predicates defining a concept, conceptual structure centered around given predicate [re: paleonomy]

ROP pp. 47-8 Derrida laments/jokes about the erasure of his name from the Lacan colloquium, but a name comes only to erase itself, besides

OTO p. 7 Nietzsche put his name on the line, staged signatures, made an immense bio-graphical paraph > [Derrida mentions this not to guarantee him a profit, return]

——name’s genius still there to make us forget his death

——to be dead, no return can come to the bearer of the name

——only the name can inherit, so the name is always a dead man’s name

——Nietzsche’s name has poisoned milk in it, its legacy, mixed up in advance w/ worst of our times, and not by accident

p. 7 masks return a constant yield of protection, a surplus value as the ruse of life, ruse incurs losses once surplus value “does not return again to the living, but to and in the name of names, the community of masks” ——[cf. above]: “nothing ever comes back to the living”

pp. 8-9 Nietzsche never knows if anyone will honor the inordinate credit he grants himself in his name, & in the name of the other; autobiography as secret contract (annulus), encrypted credit account: for Nietzsche, his life, the “I-live,” is perhaps mere prejudice (Vorurteil)

p. 9 [Nietzsche’s] life can only be verified after or during arrêt de mort > when the bearer of the name, whom, in our prejudice, we call living, will have died

——if life returns, it will return to the name, not to the living, “in the name of the living as a name of the dead”

p. 11 Dionysus vs. Crucified, name of versus, countername, suffices to pluralize (in a singular fashion) homonymic mask & proper name, to lead all threads of name astray in labyrinth (ear)

pp. 12-3 autobiographical récit, tells himself his life, affirms EROS, gratitude for gift (gift: establishment of my own credit w/ this name): EROS signs or seals > before such signature, my life may be mere prejudice

ATIA p. 6 proper names can serve as metonymies for events difficult to date

p. 9 Derrida’s cat, he’s certain it has an existence that refuses to be conceptualized (rebelle à tout concept) > we know the animal is mortal because it has a name, which must survive itself

pp. 16-7 God created man, to watch man name the animals, to watch him (Ish w/out Ishah) dominate, domesticate, train them [Genesis] (before the fall)

p. 18 staring at his cat, Derrida wonders if this is the same abyss, same vertigo, as when God waited for Adam to name the animals, this awful tale of Genesis, who was born first, before the names? who has remained the despot?

pp. 18-20 in avowing his desire to avoid appropriative projection before animal’s gaze, to avoid tradition [Benjamin, Heidegger] that assigns deep sadness (Traurigkeit) to animal’s Benommenheit (inability to respond to name it’s given, inability to experience being “as such”)

——for Benjamin, animal/nature not sad because mute but mute because sad: not the sadness of passivity, of not being able to name, but of receiving ones name > a foreshadowing of mourning

——every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

p. 21 to not be ashamed of shame: time when Adam called animals’ names before the fall [to think of his shame of shame before his cat, Derrida must call upon this other time]

p. 42 giving a name (one could say too hastily): sacrificing the living to God

p. 48 mot in lanimot should bring us to the word named noun (nommé nom), the one the animal is deprived of: think the absence of the word or name as something other than privation

PS p. 176 Artaud’s unpower (impouvoir): inspiration itself, force dun vide, tourbillon du souffle dun souffleur qui aspire vers lui et me dérobe of what I thought I could say in my own name > unpower, not absence but radical irresponsibility of speech: total & original loss of existence itself (consciousness as unconsciousness)

pp. 177-78 the “I” who hears becomes the “I” who speaks, stealing speech form the “I” who thinks he speaks and is heard in his own name: sintroduisant dans le nom de celui qui parle, cette différence nest rien, elle est le furtif: la structure du dérobement instantané et originaire sans lequel aucune parole ne trouverait son souffle [w/out Artaud’s valuation, this sentence affirms differance]

p. 181 God is proper name of what deprives us of our own nature, our own birth

p. 326n (with remarkable/ambiguous exception of Hegel) God is Death: infinite life, life w/out difference > w/in life God-Death names finitude, difference w/in life > mais l'autre nom de la même chose ne veut pas dire la même chose que le premier nom, il n'en est pas synonyme et c'est toute l'histoire

DIF DIF p. 25 trace & difference cannot appear as such, sheltered (sabrite)/dissimulated in names (received in metaphysical text)

pp. 26-7 [Derrida argues for new relation to unnameable, different from Heidegger’s] “no name” for differance is not ineffable Being which no name could approach (i.e. God), it is play which makes possible nominal effects, the chains of substitutions of names

——difference will never be a unique word, master name

p. 27 to know there’s nothing kerygmatic [not a master-name] about differance, we must perceive its decapita(liza)tion > must put into question the name of the name

——there will be no unique name: must think this w/out nostalgia, hors du myth of pure mom/dad language, must affirm like Nietzsche met laffirmation en jeu, dans un rire et un pas de la danse

O p. 45 business (laffaire) of old name, of onymism in general, of false identity of mark, which dissemination must disturb (doit perturber) at the root [re: “Mallarmé,” guise of homonymy]

WAP pp. 18-9 thing or concept “philosophy,” its title, always unequal to the responsibility that, in its name, carries beyond its name

TB p. 109 proper name untranslatable: does not belong like the other words, to the system of language > but its call makes language possible [compare to SIGNATURE]

pp. 118-19 at edge of the language, from this edge to the other of proper name: debt contracts the trait (to-be-translated from one language to the other) of relation of living subject to his name

DPi p. 112 Blanchot on putting to death by nomination, annihilating power of names: to say ‘this woman’ gives me the being deprived of being [Blanchot has replaced ‘flower’ w/ ‘woman’]

pp. 252-53 can only condemn a person/subject answerable to his or her name to death > genocide not sensu stricto DP, can’t DP a language (though languages are killed)

Gi pp. 10-1 justification of terminological choice Dasein—a predetermination only it can command > brutal, decisive declaration of name (Heidegger proceeds by decree)

p. 25 put in quotes because it is as much about the name as what it names [“Geschlecht”]

PIO p. 5 invention is not natural, though often related to origin, genius, generation > thus question of son, signature & name

p. 413n sponge-towel (serviette-éponge), emblematic story of my name as story of the other, blazon (mise en abyme) of “impossible subject,” fable, another way to make history

RM p. 58 Derrida has regularly questioned (w/ insistence that might be judged tiresome) the “privilege of the name,” opposing its primacy w/ attention to syntactic motif

pp. 73-4 trait of recoupe (btwn Dichten/Denken) belongs to neither, not a common trait, concept, metaphor > if trait could be something, we might call it the unique seal of their alliance, but it’s never fully originary nor, as a path-breaking (frayage), is it fully derivative: makes way for naming thus not nameable, il na pas dapprochant en tant que tel

p. 76 performative of Heidegger’s writing of Aufriss (entame) > decree to name what’s still unknown under its name > Aufriss calls to us

EJQB p. 69 nemein: common root of division, naming, nomadism > nomadic Jew struck by infinity & the letter in the desert

p. 70 only that which is written gives me existence by naming me (things come into existence & lose existence by being named) > sacrifice of existence to the word (Hegel), but also consecration of existence by word: one must write, not simply be written, in order to have a name

p. 72 Breton: “the name must germinate, otherwise it is false”

PSSS p. 256 these revenants must haunt our debates [Joshua Jung, Moses Freud] > cruel destiny of a proper name

D p. 364 no (trade) mark ever gets registered (se dépose) w/out certain lacking of names and #s, this lack provokes over-production, surplus value [then registering of mark?]

EL p. 197 for Scholem, essence of language is either sacred or it is not > it consists of names, elle revient à nommer, or it returns/amounts to nothing, returns to no one

pp. 198-99 try as best one can to do an internal reading (stay as close to letter as possible) > but simple event of name breaches supposed interiority of text (pure internal reading impossible)

pp. 213-14 for Scholem, Sprache ist Namen, being of language resides in name, not in substantive but nominal, in power of naming (verbs were once names) > Derrida (via an internal reading) adds: must be a spectral haunting, there is a specter because there’s language, language can haunt because names haunt (neither present/absent) our sentences, language summons (convoque)—category of spectral revenant (not a flower of rhetoric) figures a beyond oppositional ontologic or dialectic of presence/absence

——a dynamis, enveloped virtuality, a power of language, quasi-autonomous [that of the name]

——magical power of name: revelation and encrypting (crypte), hides abyss w/in it > to open a name is to find an abyss, abyss as thing itself

——[vis-à-vis Scholem] prayer invokes spirits, the name is more powerful and transcendent than we are > but, to secularize sacred language, we play w/ ghosts [from spirit to ghost]

——Beschwörung: invocation of spirits (Geistern)

p. 215 the 2 abysses (of life, of death) (each one en abîme in other): 1) loss of names/signification 2) the abyss into which one falls, revenge for not realizing language/names are abyssal

HST p. 400 last vertigo/breath: forgiving in the name of the other: is this only forgiving the other in one’s/his place (à sa place) in substitution, or forgiving the other one’s/his name, i.e. what survives of him, pardonner au nom de lautre as (to) his first fault?

+R pp. 158-59 what is detached from my signature, da, a piece (morceau) of the other’s name, one of the most obsessive motifs in Glas

C p. 188 Derrida means not to touch anything, leave the thing alone, alone w/ you, leave the thing to “the nameless crypt of its mutism” > it knows (how) to keep quiet

p. 195 Derrida will have to change formulas constantly, abandon them like waste products, leftovers of supper interrupted in full enjoyment by an entombment, after declarations which have nothing in common with the thing itself: this is my body, this my name

pp. 204-05 when there’s # in the title: corrupts the authority of the name, voice, phonetic writing

p. 218 bananas [re: Titus-Carmel’s The Great Cultu] would be copies of copies w/out example, phantasmata, if force of ductus did not carry the remainder beyond any phantasy, beyond the signature,

pp. 231-32 who signs the theft? Cartouche as great robber: this is my cartouche, I stole it, I am it, this is the body of my name > Cartouche left an institution: commonizing of proper name

——what if the name itself were what is at stake in the theft?

p. 235 Titus-Carmel spends a year caressing the name in his pocket (Derrida imagines), it’s the name of the other, murder & reparation > carnivorous/sarcophagous name, proper name in other’s language (nomination one can neither choose nor appropriate)

LI p. 33 can a proper name or a signature be translated?

p. 36 Derrida introduces Sarl (société à responsabilité limitée), wrong to find his discourse polemical > desires & phantasms at stake in proper name, signature, copyright

p. 37 we are nothing more than prête-noms, “borrowed names,” “fronts” (Woody Allen): masks, substitutes for a clandestine subject

p. 57 differance removes from itself what was written “in its name,” removes the proper name: changes itself into more or less anonymous multiplicity

p. 83 [re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

TN p. 298 a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

NOY p. 233 de Certeau: “yes” (Ja) and the Separated (Ja, or Jahvé), yes brings together No-Name of Other and Yes of the Volition

ATM p. 148 for Levinas, sincerity or rectitude: the right of the gift (not derived from a jurisdiction transcendent to the gift itself), to go right to the unique, what his name will have uniquely named

——gift of other, debt w/out contract, demands: at the same time, indefinitely equivalent substitution (anonymity) and singularity (rather, absolute uniqueness of proper name)

pp. 171-72 the taking place in another place of Levinas’s oeuvre is an extravagant topic, another thinking of the name, a thinking that is tout autre because open to the name of the other (u-topic only for those who believe they know ce qui a lieu et ce qui tient lieu)

p. 172 how to cite when Levinas places the whole language (French & Western) btwn quotation marks? at same time “he” is in quotation marks: the nameless signatory w/out authorial signature, “he” who undersigns every work, met en oeuvre tout ouvrage

pp. 185-86 Derrida’s fault/violence against Levinas’ work can only wound Him [i.e. not EL] in his body, He/Il that preseals everything that carries a name > Derrida compares his fault to that of erasing God’s name from a book (a fault that is buried, mourned [not annihilated])

——acc. Levinas, man, monotheistic man, has a unique relation to the ab-solute retrait of the revealed Name

pp. 186-87 can one analogize the fault against God’s name w/ fault against any Name? only if analogy functions btwn absolute heterogeneities [?] [theonymic cemetery]

E p. 25 w/in logocentric system (w/in the name), one simply can’t name what’s outside it, to say it would be to eat it—or, what is no longer absolutely different—to vomit it

***AD p. 120 to say à-Dieu to the face: call the name by name

CIN pp. 16-7 Derrida gives Cinder a proper name, is she the signatory of this text? [cf. KH p. 111]

p. 17 “se donnant à elle-même, se donnant comme son propre nom, lart consumé du secret: de lexhibition savoir se garder [to give to itself, give to itself as its proper name, consummate art of secret: the exhibition of knowing how to guard oneself] [compare to God’s fiery consumption]

***p. 21 nothing will have taken place but the place, there are cinders, there is place (il y a lieu) > this untranslatable, like a hidden proper name, carries everything away toward prescribed limit, recognition, debt, obligation > place (proper name) for giving, rendering, celebrating, loving, friendship, dissemination…

p. 53 cinder obviously a figure, but because word “cinder,” via the name, is supposed to name the thing (not the word), it names one thing in place of another, metonymy when cinder is separated, names one thing while figuring another from which il ne rest rien de figurable en elle

BSi p. 20 analogy [re: beast and sovereign] announces (like a black cloud) the historical (actual & virtual) violences, disasters we won’t (already don’t) have a name for

pp. 160-61 bêtise as becoming “what” of “who”—monument, stone, becoming-thing of proper name

p. 214 [vis-à-vis Fontaine] the lion’s sovereignty: 1) his name, Sire 2) common right—like others 3) courage, right to take 4) fear he inspires

——sovereign is the only one to name himself: ipse, to himself, to his title, to his name, to his might > majestas (from magnus, major), highness, grandeur, dignity, Kant’s Würde

OG p. 26 (41) non-phonetic hieroglyph (Leibniz, Chinese) menaces history/life of spirit because menaces substantiality, breaks the noun (nom) apart > describes relations not appellations

p. 89 proper name becomes appellation (symbolic value [?]) only when inscribed w/in figuration > proper-ness of name does not escape spacing

***p. 102 (150-51) common names of proper names (Rousseau, Condillac, Lévi-Strauss): genesis, origin, nature, culture, sign, speech, writing

pp. 106-07 (156) irreducibility of metaphor: irremediable absence of proper name (in ellipsis of originary writing)

p. 108 (158-59) graphein as originary effacement of proper name, there is “subject” the moment obliteration of proper is produced (dawn of language) > universal a priori

how one moves from this a priori to empirical facts can’t be answered, no general answer to a question of this form [no explanation of bridge, passage]

pp. 109 (159-61) a prohibition of proper names is derivative to arche-writing > prohibition only possible because of proper names’ originary erasure, because they belong to a system of differences that condition play of interdict and its transgression [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]

——proper name has always been original myth of transparent legibility present under obliteration

——nonprohibition of proper name, consciousness, when name is called proper > attempt to restitute the irremediable impropriety of proper names

pp. 109-10 (161) [vis-à-vis Lévi-Strauss] ethnocentrism of “society w/out writing,” an innocent, nonviolent society > but, wherever proper names are obliterated, there’s writing

p. 110 (162) death, violence, impossibility of pure point, “point vocative,” death of absolutely proper naming (the other as pure other) is death of pure idiom

p. 112 (164-65) complex layering of 3 violences re: proper names: 1) expropriation, repetition, déjà dédoublée, arche-writing, to give name it’s forbidden to pronounce, to name what’s never present, the unique [fire in CIN, Glas] 2) secret, protective, reparatory, “moral,” conceal names 3) the scene of proper names, reassuring seal of self-identity, refers to #1 and #2, empirical consciousness, common concept of violence, revealing name by effraction: evil, war, rape (system of moral law & transgression) [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]

***p. 336n Lévi-Strauss: proper names are a quanta of signification below which all people do is point > this zero degree of language, pointing, “sensible-certitude”: a myth effaced by play of difference

p. 279 (395-96) acc. Rousseau, absolutely literal (propre) is at origin, the proper name, one sign per thing, one represented per passion

——proper names born in tandem w/ verbs (infinitive present) > degradation in their separation

***CIR p. 119 nongrammatical syntax that remains to be invented to speak name of God

pp. 120-21 circumcision, 1st event to write itself on my body, exemplary counterscar we have to read w/out seeing > outside of language, time of a proper name, the rest is literature

SPEC pp. 260-61(n) Indra–Varuna (Abraham–Isaac-like) interlace their names w/out revenir sur eux-mêmes (not a ring) > cannot close, so enclose each other > always a [double signature]

p. 302 woman perpetuates race by risking the name: analytic “movement” as genealogy of son-in-law, Judaic law

p. 327 [re: Ernst’s fort/da] double sending away (renvoi): whether father required to stay or go, mother is desired: “exclusive possession” [Freud & Ernst distance themselves from name of father, for Freud it is the name of the son-in-law]

p. 332 classically [?]: art preserves proper name, science forgets proper name > what then is psychoanalysis?

——payer la science de son proper nom, science of his [Freud’s] proper name (propre nom) inseparable from nom propre: speculation, pay in advance the charges for a return to sender: reste à savoir (it remains to be had/seen/known)

p. 333 fort:da: leads autobiographical specularity into an autothanatography that’s in advance expropriated into heterography

——usteron proteron, “preceding falsehood” of generations, when figure w/out figure, name w/out name, of the mother returns: this is the logic of obsequence (Glas) > la mère enterre tous les siens

p. 334 does Freud want survival of psychoanalysis in his name? does its structure require it?

p. 345 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] you carry (vous portez) his name, until the end of time you will formulate theory carrying his name > ruse infinie (more tricky than itself)

p. 360 proper name arrives only to erase itself

pp. 400-01 PP (the master) is not master > pleasure, the great speculator, calculates w/ effects of aphrodisiac stricture (Socrates wanted nothing to do with proper name of Aphrodite)

——quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

NANCY/EXACT

TN pp. 7-8 rigor is de rigueur; “exact”: the probity of Nancy’s signature

p. 12 Nancy’s partes extra partes, everything outside another outside; p. 14 fold of becoming-inside of the first outside, nothing but surfaces & outsides w/out insides: superficies of surfaces are limits, exposed to a touch that can only leave them intact, untouchable > irreducible disseminal divisibility

pp. 13-15 Nancy on Psyche: abandoned of her pose, radical solitude, alone in knowing nothing, alone for not knowing her extension

p. 15 Psyche surrounded by exactitude of thinking men

p. 20 Nancy’s distinction btwn orality and buccality, the latter a more “primitive” figure of the mouth, before speech?

p. 26 Nancy is the thinker of exorbitant and exactitude

pp. 26-7 ex-; exscribed, Geworfenheit; conditions “sense of world,” ex-sistence

pp. 28-9 mouth before speaking, before orality, wouldn’t this be the mother’s lips, giving ex-

p. 29 Nancy: mouth is neither substance nor figure

p. 30 Nancy’s 4 figures: 1) form of extension 2) fashioned 3) as trope 4) as visage (face)

p. 35 Nancy: faceless mouth, structure of a mask

——for Nancy, excès de la façon (fashioning) sur lessence, et que lune supplée lautre, at origin of feeling oneself touch oneself; spectral revenant, prosthesis at heart of (self-)feeling > revenant, btwn life/death, dictates impossible mourning, sans fin—life itself [re: spacing irreducible to extensio]; p. 321n shouldn’t this spacing (what I call differance/trace) be linked to Heidegger’s tension of distancing (Gespanntheit) rather than Descartes’ extensio or even Freud’s Ausdehnung

pp. 36-7 for Nancy, cogito neither point nor space, Nancy’s altercation w/ Descartes occurs btwn improbable pineal gland & a mouth from before speech > an opening anoral & already touching

p. 37 Nancy’s Logodaedalus bursts w/ laughter of thought

p. 46 Nancy tries to resist any idealism or subjectivism, even a thought of finitude where touch is never raw, always preceded by “desire,” “drive,” or even “my body” [Freud, Kant] > his insistence on touch as motif makes it a post-deconstructive, irredentist realism

——for Nancy, the Thing touches itself when one touches nothing: exact hyperbole (Nancy’s writing) engulfs, exscribes itself (sex-crit), sabîme (sinks)

p. 56 Nancy: ex-, ambivalent effects of all narcissism

p. 60 Nancy’s virtuosity w/ word touch (master of language) > or is this simply a symptom of a haunting obsession, a dread, w/in language itself?

p. 73 Nancy remains an exacting, rigorous, philosopher where limits tremble (impossible, undecidable), trembles w/out trembling, submits to trembling

p. 74 Nancy: “la pensée pèse exactement le poids du sens” (Derrida points out transitive/intransitive double meaning of pèse)

pp. 97-8 Nancy’s heart transplant, lintrus, is not the quasi-transcendental strangeness that refers to all our “I’s,” and yet… [the 2 strangenesses keep making signs toward one another]

p. 116 touch does not come as easily to Derrida as it does to Nancy—isn’t Nancy’s [every] origin “appropriable”?

——Derrida not more idealist, history of touch is idealistic—“cannot bring myself to believe in it very much”

p. 119 Nancy writes partes extra partes obsessively to break w/ immediacy of touch, challenge law of intuition at heart of contact

p. 127 w/ each blow, at every blow, Nancy dodges continuistic tradition while insisting on tactile

pp. 128-29 so Nancy partagerait (would shares out and part) the senses, touching too; he does this by adding definite article “le” to toucher, then declaring there’s no “the touch”; Derrida compares this to propre, proche, même; then asks how we could write w/out them, without making believe we believe? asking the other to believe > le temps dune rature qui viendra signer lacte de foi partagée et partager (diviser, inquiéter, morceler) lacte de foi, la foi même?

p. 138 to follow the history of touch, follow the hand as a sample (échantillon), more or less well sewn, following like un fil conducteur, follow the turns of the hand, and especially its finger > see what it circumscribes, and what it lets slip away (laisse échapper)

——Derrida tells Nancy [humorously?] to not let this megalovirus [touch] contaminate you, stop using these words > leave it to the ancestors

pp. 162-63 for Husserl, fingers that touch (not signal, not show) deem contact the experience of presence, which is full, immediate, direct (Nancy’s syncope interrupts)

p. 195 Nancy, partage—parting, sharing, spacing, syncope, irreducible partition, gives “it” a chance menacée, heartbeat’s the other’s beat (le même battementde lautre, du coeur de lautre)

——syncope is this partage of spacing

pp. 198-99 Merleau-Ponty’s “it is a non-coincidence I coincide w/ here” can only be upset by thinking cum otherwise, w/ Nancy: “the other turns out to be the other of the w/

——law of parting/sharing at heart of con-tact: “inoperative community”

p. 200 Nancy: Heidegger and Husserl as 2 “styles of the essentiality of the w/”

——touching w/out touching, touching in passing the touchable > “time to space itself,” “espace du passage qui fait donc partage [spacing-time], the time needed for touching [co-existence as w/, as other]

p. 218 Nancy’s partager: 1) affinity, crossings, “tangency” 2) a partitioning, un autre départ: this alterity of bodies follows the line partly of the technical & partly of a beyond Christianity

p. 222 Nancy: “created body” is a tautology [what else but body is created?], body is the coming into presence as being this screen [no depth]

***p. 223 la ligne de partage [Derrida’s playing w/ dividing line] btwn Nancy’s corpus on touch and the other ones

——Nancy’s technē deconstructs system of ends: always “technē of the next one (du prochain)”

p. 226 Nancy: space of bodies not acquainted w/ Death (space abolished) (being-toward-death) but knows each body as a dead one, sharing out for us the extension of his/her “ci-gît (here lies)”

p. 267 Nancy’s necessary, great neologism: expeausition

p. 269 Nancy on Enlightenment to come: never renounce thought, philosophy, knowledge > Nancy never renounces pertinence, he is so resolute, even at heart of ecstasy, of sacrifice

p. 271 Nancy, spending like a madman: ontologizes everything that comes down to “touching,” jusquà la ruine, les ressources, le crédit, le capital et les intérêts du transcendental-ontologique > reduces them [all resources/capital figures of touch] to monetary simulacrum

pp. 273-74 Nancy’s Lintrus: technical & metaphysical adventure

pp. 284-85 Nancy’s corpus as dissemination and body

p. 293 Redlichkeit (probity), exactitude can be a virtue (relation of a “who” to a “whom”), not just objective measure (a “what”)

——exigo, ex-ago: to push, finish, require (exiger), on time [punctual]

p. 304 [re: Nancy’s “touch freedom!”] hyperbole, exact exaggeration, overbid in the impossible

p. 307 ‘hyper,’ surenchère of Nancy

p. 309 singularity [never assured] doit être couru comme une chance ou un risque: Nancy’s a bettor, thinker of the bet (pari), a desperate bettor, never stops staking, committing (dengager), calculating w/ exactitude hyperbolic odds (gages): not counting on gains (bénéfice) of an “argument du pari” [Pascal] or any salut

p. 372n Hegel critiques Kant’s Härte > Nancy’s hardness is resolution, courage, severity, inflexibility

NARCISSISM

GOD pp. 145,148 secret secret of forgiveness: to remain secret, and to become self-forgiveness (via specular identification), and in the ambiguity of se pardonner, to be deprived of sense in this narcissistic reflexivity

——to ask forgiveness is to identify with the other, auto-affect, hetero-affect

LOBL p. ~174 ex. of Derrida’s “radiant narcissism”

SPOM p. 122 “very concept of narcissism” explicit theme of deconstruction

POOF p. 3 Cicero sees friend as narcissistic projection of ideal image [?] (ecstasy toward future): our own ideal image (sameness/other)

p. 24 find friend w/in oneself (Echo before Narcissus), the other in oneself, would ruin in advance what it makes possible: narcissism & self-exemplarity [however, wouldn’t change testamentary structure Derrida is discussing]

pp. 178-79 Montaigne’s audacious/uncontestable description of friend, via Aristotle, qua one soul (singularity) in 2 bodies (duplicity): philía most devoted to other becomes friendship of self, philautia (narcissism), a correspondence (convenance, oikeiótēs), all division is driven out, neither friend can give to each other > this is the communal/communist consequence: communism dreaming in secret of the secret, communism which doesn’t count, no further than to ‘one,’ so not even to ‘one’

pp. 186-88 [1st] Augustine’s abyssal calculation, after death of his friend [Confessions IV], his close reading of Aristotle’s friends are ‘one soul in bodies twain’: survivre, ou non, au nom de lautre?

survive for yourself or person you’re mourning? question of gift, donner au nom de lautre, a narcissism that only occurs in name of other

pp. 276-77 the 3rd witnesses a law that interrupts vertigo of singularity (a dual narcissism), 3rd opens up & keeps from closing the question of secrecy > Nietzsche: for the hermit, the friend is always 3rd person (keeps the other 2 [w/in oneself] from sinking to the depths)

MPM p. 21 the being “in us” of other in bereaved memory, not resurrection of other himself, can’t be included in narcissistic fantasy of subjectivity closed in on itself > other so marks narcissistic structure that being “in us” becomes coming of the other

p. 32 narcissism (as speculation) too paradoxical, too cunning, to provide final word > instead, speculation whose ruses, mimes, strategies relinquish autonomy

——Freud & de Man on narcissism [scholarly banality: they both say Narcissus is an allegory]

FWT p. 50 Freud’s 3 narcissistic wounds [inflicted on man’ ego]: Copernicus, Darwin, Freud

pp. 159-60 successful mourning is failed mourning, is unfaithful: denies alterity of dead other, of death as other, “narcissizes” the dead other > same goes for integration of immigrant/foreigner

——faithfulness prescribes impossibility of mourning at once [St. Augustine’s “I live on for my friend” in POOF]

ATIA p. 60 wouldn’t hetero-narcissism of sexual coupling give animals the right to modesty/shame, sensitivity to nakedness?

p. 69 to confess the narcissism of confession is to admit that guilt, the lie, perjury are lodged in heart of promise, in veracity itself, in naked/intransitive simplicity of “I am”

O pp. 44-5(n) preface as father assuring/assisting his work, his son, idealizing, mastering his seed, auto-, homo-, re-insemination, btwn father & son alone > narcissism as law, on par w/ law, figure of Platonic boētheia (coming to aid of speech, helping logos): even better if just father, preface useless

REST p. 380 annexing narcissism to fetishism, we’d never be finished, 4 forms of rendering: 1) render oneself in painting 2) render something to oneself, se payer 3) to go somewhere (se rendre quelque part) 4) given in to someone (se rendre à quelquun), surrender

PIO p. 4 does the child (son) invent himself specularly though parent’s narcissism > or is he an absolute invention (this being the truest response to parent’s desire): where truth is thought beyond any inheritance?

p. 9 even if metonymy of other w/in ourselves already constituted our relation to living other, [actual?] death brings relation into a more abundant light (un plus de lumière) > makes the breaking of the mirror more necessary (difficult): at instant of death, limit of narcissistic reappropriation is terribly sharp > must no longer be concerned w/ other in ourselvesyet, that’s all we can be concerned w/ > narcissistic wound enlarges (saccroît) for want of being (ne plus pouvoir être) narcissistic, no longer appeased in that Erinnerung we call work of mourning

TN p. 56 Nancy: ex-, ambivalent effects of all narcissism

p. 291 all-powerful logic of narcissism: not as experience of gaze but as painfully ironic discourse of confession that mimics appropriable of unappropriable

pp. 306-07 eyes meet, infinitely, mouths in contact [unsatisfied w/ insipid figures, however interesting/necessary], thought begins, jusquà labîme, plunging Narcissus into abyss: makes day or night possible > day and night themselves promising each other, au point du jour

BSi p. 281 narcissism of autopsy occurs after narcissistic hunt, capture > this setup mediated by institutions

OG p. 337n Rousseau: philosophy/reason introduces self-love, philosophy permits man to speak in secret—“‘perish if you will, I’m secure’”

CIR p. 201 Latin uum mimes fluid I desire to keep, desire as what is kept, keeping not object but continuum of desire; narcissistic self-involvement: libido returns upon itself at moment of loss (approximative, false jargon)

SPEC p. 340 exemplary narcissistic wound [for Freud]: jealousy over birth of new baby, proof of infidelity of object of child's affection, undoes (défait) the bind (lien) (Bindung) to parent of opposite sex

——demi-deuil: irreducible category, no gradations

p. 365 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] malignant tumors also “narcissistic,” unleash themselves w/out concern for other cells, for the rights of authors or of succession

NARRATIVE

KH pp. 100-01 mytheme, acc. Hegel, will have been a prephilosopheme promised to a dialectical Aufhebung > teleological future anterior resembles narrative while marking end of narrative fiction

pp. 116-17 each narrative content (fable, legend, myth, fiction) becomes in turn a different tale, each tale a receptacle, harboring/lodging (hypodokhè), the most insistent determination of khōra

but there is no tale of her, a secret w/out secret remains forever impenetrable à son sujet

——structure of inclusion in Timaeus: included [2nd] fiction, the theme of the prior fiction, which is its [the 2nd fiction’s] including form, its [the 2nd fiction’s] receptacle > mythopoetic string of events [see p. 121 each fiction as content given form in receptacle of another]

GT p. 92 title = proper name of narrative

pp. 102-105 whole economy of narrative [“Counterfeit Money”] proceeds from a remainder, change returned, return of an unproductive expenditure [capitalizes?]

p. 120 through a movement of transference, narrator has affected fabric of relation itself

pp. 121-22 one usually believes narrative does not recount itself but an object outside of it; [Derrida considers that]what happens happens to the narrator, as if the narrative condition were the cause of the recounted thing, as if the narrative produced the event it was supposed to report

——narrative gives possibility of impossibility of story as story of gift or forgiveness

p. 122 condition of knowing, desire to know (ēpistemē, historia rerum gestarum) [which Derrida relates to the possibility of narration], gives rise to history itself (res gestae, Geschehen, Geschichte)

——do Heidegger and Hegel argue the reverse? [history gives rise to narration?]

p. 145 Derrida effectively reminds us that the characters are before the law in the same way as narration and textual dissemination [literature in general]

p. 152 readability of text structured by unreadability of secret, narrator in situation analogous to reader; crypt gives to be read, eternally unreadable

p. 154, time of story given to the narrator, oriented toward him, not w/out interest

pp. 169-70 Baudelaire inscribes a naturalization in institution called literature, narrator occupies place of nature; via simulacrum, narrative resembles birth of literature

MONL p. 19 narrative: space of relation

LOBL p. 85 narrative of an event, event of narrative, narrative as the structure of an event

p. 87 demand (mean English “demand”: request, order, petition) for a narrative [see p. 98 law]

p. 104 Blanchot’s narrative vs. narratorial voice

p. 105 all organized narration, a matter for the police, narrative voice surpasses police investigation, if possible

p. 110 the Il (who says “I”) donne la mort, he, the narrator (I), kills

pp. 133 terribleness of la chose, not only ineffable, unnarratable: it’s interdictory, it forbids telling/seeing

pp. 136-37 survivre delays at once life & death, line of least sure sur-, no clear-cut opposition, living on like differance, beyond identity & difference > tele-phone, tele-gram only 2 modes of this teleography in which trace, grapheme, does come secondarily but marks telic structure a priori

——narrator is always away (at a distance, tele-)

p. 163 narrative affect of bottomless sorrow is allied w/ strange, insignificant coldness: mourning beyond measure

BL p. 186 narrativity determines each atom of the text

p. 187 paradox, enigma before-the-law > ainigma, a relation, story, fable

p. 190 Kant: typology, symbolic presentation of moral good (beauty, a symbol of morality), respect for law which only appears in law > “as if” in maxim: reconciles practical reason w/ historical teleology (narrative), w/ possibility of unlimited progress

p. 191 law should never give rise to story > law of law: to be invested w/ categorical authority, law must have no history, genesis, no possible derivation

p. 202 time: resolution of non-resolution—brings story into being and sustains it, only appears after law of delay, advance of law, anachrony of relation

p. 206 the narrative “I” frightens the law

MPM p. 3 Derrida, lover of memory, never knew how to tell a story, never received gift (doron) of Mnemosyne, the wax imprint, an eidolon [Derrida has a relation to memory beyond the imprint?]: keeps the memory loses the narrative

p. 13 deconstruction grows strong by accumulating forces that try to repress it, w/out being able to totalize them, “like those surplus values from which a victim of aggression always profits” > here, totalization is what an account, story and narrative are denied

S p. 12 epochality is the hidden teleology of the narrative order

p. 130n pre-originary pledge of “yes,” wordless word of language, an event where memory comes before any souvenir, where faith defeats any narrative, la gage engage dans la langue

VP p. 74 phenomenological reduction requires temporalization and is limited by it; phenomenological reduction is a scene

F p. xxvi the Thing is encrypted by crypt (for du Moi, self’s safe) not w/in (dans) it; crypted structure of ultimate referent [Thing] means double articulation (history, story) coalesces all these genres: myth, poem, novel, drama, translation > the narrated event never appears

P pp. 141-42 distance from colossal, to be colossal (not too far, not too close), aesthetic maximum w/out losing itself in mathematical infinite > relation of body to stone

——distance required by the sublime opens up perception to space of narrative? divergence btwn apprehension/comprehension? doesn’t it call itself, w/ narrative voice: the colossal?

POS p. 55-6 Derrida mocks the doctors of scientific genealogy or ideological filiation re: Heidegger’s thought [Faye for one] > what’s lacking in the “problematic of the narrative” is reflection on what makes the theses unnarratable

ROP p. 24 Bartleby as figure of death, as secret of literature, makes narrator (man of law) talk

ATIA p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

TB p. 104 Babel as metaphor of metaphor, narrative of narrative, translation of translation: not only structure hollowing itself out like that, but does so in its own way > its idiom would have to be saved

PIO pp. 9-10 allegory as structure of event in “Fable”: brought into sequential order, narrative form, then [?] it reaches out to other [Paul de Man]

pp. 12-3 for de Man, irony is structure of instant: “climaxes in…single brief moment of a final pointe” (“a synchronic structure”); allegory (other face of irony) unfolds in diachronic of narrative

PJP pp. 177-79 the 3 meanings of Le Parjure, each haunts each other, raises the # of titles (3+n): 1) the novel itself [“Counterfeit Money”], narrator betrays truth confided in him 2) betrayal, unfulfilled promise of hero of novel 3) the legal perjury, le parjure committed by le parjure

——Miller: “storytelling” (lying/narration), memory as precarious support of narrative continuity

pp. 182-83 tragedy of testimonial narration > encrypt while unveiling

p. 183 anacoluthon gives rise to fictions or perhaps undecidable lie, perjury, that never can be excluded on part of narrator, author

p. 184 narrator as facteur de la vérité

p. 189 anacoluthic substitution of subject, replacement of acolyte—motor, motivation, dramatic emotion of narrative

——generalized anacoluthon would make narrator an acolyte of his “character” or “friend”

——identificatory substitution would harbor the betrayal, perjury, at heart of every narration, confession, “relation,” rapport

——[identificatory substitution] wreaks havoc w/ veracity while being its condition

——narrator, unconscious subject, smuggles, yes, yes, the contrary into the narrative (denegative form [“I am not Chalier”] > yet another disavowal at heart of avowal)

pp. 191-92 narrative of a disappearance: signature gets erased moment it enters literature [like question in EJQB]

pp. 196, 300n when narrator claims to be quoting: makes the other say

C p. 215 retrace one’s steps, narrative (récit), series, funeral procession/palindrome, revenir: le revenu de lusure, le revenant, lhôte, ghost, guest [both in English] > le coffin comme hôtel de passe (whore-hotel)

p. 245 order of narrative, whose trap has been situated by logic of cartouche

——unity of a period (of a detour) is indeterminable: each article presents perforated cards that transform the other > tombe, in the snare (dans le lacs)

TN p. 7 storytelling as failure, renunciation

p. 131 to continually tell a story, start again, stems (tient) from impossible alliance of contact & syncope

——always writing a story, tangent touches line/surface w/out intersection, a tangent touches one point, point is nothing, a limit w/out depth or surface, untouchable even as a figure

LG p. 246 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] I bring forth to light (donne le jour) precisely the law as the right-to-sight (droit de voir), this law has “me” at its/her disposal? > the “I” sans “I” of narrative voice does not take place, engenders the lawmen [panoptic demand: synopsis]

p. 249 non-place, hypertopological mobility of narrative voice

p. 250 [re: Blanchot] for the law to see her day is her madness—what she loves madly like glory > he, the author, brings forth light of day to a mother who can’t say “I”

BSi p. 289 narrative/representation structural to sovereignty, its force, its dynamis and its energeia (virtual & actual power) > sovereignty draws all its power from simulacrum-, fiction-, representation-effect > mystification of representation constituted by the simulacrum of a true transfer of sovereignty

ATAP p. 92 general narrator at moment of signature calls itself the witness (martyrōn, testimonium)

SPEC p. 301 every [?] vacancy, enigma, calls for narrative

FV p. 427 “Seminar” treats only content (narrated face) of Poe’s Purloined Letter, not narration itself

pp. 429-30 Lacan neutralizes 4th character, the general narrator, thus neutralizes narrating operation

p. 431 inscriber/inscribing function not to be confused w/ author > Lacan excludes textual fiction, indicates a general narrative w/in neutralized or naturalized frame, thus overlooks the frame

p. 488 mise en abyme of narration [re: Poe]

——reading [for narrator of Purloined…], treasure w/out price

——[re: Poe’s Purloined…] no neutralization possible when public corporation (société anonyme) of capital & desire inaugurates narration

pp. 490-92 the fancy (fantastique) of an identification btwn 2 doubled doubles, the narrator inside what he narrates, makes [Lacan’s] triangular logic very limited play w/in the play

NATIONALISM

FK pp. 5-6n [in Anidjar’s introduction] Hegel on Islam, no nationalism like Judaism [?] (lacks particularity); Islam has a universalism, Judaism doesn’t > Christianity has both

SPOM p. 113 there’s no nationalism, nationality, that’s not religious or mythological

OH pp. 47-8 nationalism always a philosopheme, justifies itself in name of a privilege in the memory of the universal, of the transcendental, of the ontological > no one is more universal than the one that is we; cosmopolitanism & nationalism have always gotten on together

FWT p. 22 risk of nationalism and communitarianism [re: limits to solidarity] must be reevaluated at every moment

p. 25 the nationalism of republican “universalism” protesting against “democratic” communitarianism almost always voiced by strongest community [Black Lives Matter]

p. 93 nationalism always state-nationalism today: a zealous, jealous, vindictive vindication of nation as a sovereign state

p. 97 technology [telephone, Internet, stock market] dissociates political field from territorial & national field > new concept of political is being forged

POOF p. 91 in every racism, nationalism, there’s a discourse on birth & nature, on genealogy (a phantasm on the genealogical phúsis)

pp. 237-38 what will be put into question re: fraternity is the exemplarist strategy (ethnocentrism, patriotism, nationalism), alleged universalism of nation, homeland: our homeland gives passage to homeland of all mankind

p. 264 via Hugo, fraternity is universal in first being French, ‘sublimated France’: ‘natural law,’ ‘generosity,’ the brother

Gii p. 29 paradoxical/regular association of nationalism w/ cosmopolitanism, w/ humanism

p. 34 profound link btwn Europocentric universalism, humanism & nationalism

IW pp. 279-80 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] “unheard-of” singularity of Jewish nation: its birth belongs to (God’s) Law, not to nature > inscribed in a history that began before it was born (though it was already its own)—history of this nation: supernatural, transhistorical, prehistoric

p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——truth of nationality is German idealism; the German spirit is the spirit of humanity

——Cohen suspects a narcissistic infatuation in Fichte’s national ego, mirror of a certain psyché, but also room for any other self in this national self, cosmopolitan logic, national self as “We”

p. 285 re: Heidegger & Cohen’s nationalist call to duty: let’s not imprudently bring these 2 gestures together, but not forget common web of a tradition

p. 288 Cohen’s discourse about nationalism a discourse on sublime, sublimity of spiritual forms hand in hand w/ mathematization of rhythm: sources of feeling, originality of German music

p. 292 exemplarism (center of our reflection on nationality): our Beispiel (example) must be followed as a model (Vorbild) to recognize our Vormacht (hegemony, preeminence): if Beispiel is exemplary, not indifferent case in series, then this statement is a tautology

——exemplary as a pre-model, a pre-formative model, an ideal

p. 293 via Renan, brutal unity of nation requires active, selective forgetting, one can’t tolerate something at origin of nation: act of originary violence, unavowable curse

p. 294 national forgetting as remembering a future promise (promise structurally involves forgetting, essential indifference to past)

p. 295 “desire to live together,” performative engagements, promises, inscribe necessity of forgetting in memory itself

p. 296 soldier’s conscience: national development serves universal justice

p. 298 Cohen defends war, ideal of state culminates in confederation of states

pp. 324-25n exemplarity (rather than paradigm): when “nation” declares itself, by virtue of its singularity, to be charged w/ exemplary testimony, universal message [e.g. Germans, Jews]

PJP p. 179 untranslatable [re: Le Parjure] resists passage across frontiers of a nation

EL pp. 204-05 Scholem describes a move from national, exoteric [straightforward] Messianism to cryptographic, esoteric, elitist, apocalypticism accentuated by Jews losing their nation: the cryptic veil becomes “its very phenomenality, its state and its efficacy”

HST p. 373 Massignon: Abraham’s hospitality as a sign announcing the gathering of all nations

AD p. 69 absolute past: “word of God” —will have taken place before taking place, older than Sinai—truth of messianic exceeds national identity; p. 142n absolute “lateness”: older yes

p. 117 not just Israel: all nationalisms think their exemplary

p. 118 Levinas trying to delimit a faith in election safe from (à labri de) all “nationalist” temptation

CF pp. 11-2 juridical tradition remains ‘mean-minded,’ restrictive, because under control of demographico-economic interests (Nation-State regulating asylum)

pp. 40-1 ‘national reconciliation’ can appear honorable [re: crimes against humanity], but forgiveness not therapy of reconciliation

pp. 51-2 sovereignty of human metaphysically aligned w/ sovereignty of Nation, though often appeal to human rights aspires to limit powers of Nation-States

p. 57 all Nation-States founded in violence, all culture a type of colonialism > foundation scripted into State order to hide itself, sublimation/celebration of beginning as amnesia

p. 58 international law still depends too much on sovereign & powerful Nation-States

BSi pp. 70-1 international rights & crimes against humanity invoke a sovereignty of man himself (ipse, ipsissimus) above/beyond/before Nation-State sovereignty (Schmitt sees this as Entpolitisierung, humanity not a political concept)

p. 72 Schmitt: “concept of humanity” useful instrument of ideological expansion; Proudhon: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat

p. 73 for Schmitt, what’s terrifying (schrecklich) about a Nation’s pretentious appeal to “humanity” is how such a nation treats its enemy as hors la loi, hors lhumanité—treats them like beasts

p. 74 Schmitt doesn’t like hypocrisy of humanistic allegation/alibi > unehrliche Fiktion (dishonest fiction) of total depoliticization, peace w/out States

NATURAL RIGHT

WAP pp. 32-3 natural right claims to found its prescription on observation > a performative, a “must,” turns into an “is,” a description: limit btwn essence, possibility, having-to-be, btwn natural/positive law is surreptitiously crossed

——[natural law legitimates itself by denying its performativity]

p. 39 declaration of a right hides performative under constative > “convention” always assumes a philosophy: community never given but constituted by the right

NATURE

GT p. 66 anthropologists returning to the good inheritance of primitive societies—nature

p. 48 gift of language said to be natural, maternal

p. 97 a “true” corpus is still, perhaps, counterfeit money, may be ghost or spirit, spirit of body & of capital (title, heading, is capital), no problem of canon if this institution were natural

p. 126 in “Counterfeit Money,” wealth, fortune, is natural, as if nature had decided this belonging to social class

p. 128 Derrida links pheuin, phusis to donation, thus bringing nature & production together [sometimes opposed]; fortune (fate, chance, fors, luck, fortuity) and necessity are allied

p. 166n Baudelaire: one must always return to de Sade, to natural man, to explain evil

p. 169 natural debt, debt w/out debt > infinite debt

——true, authentic money, nature’s gift of a present

pp. 169-70 Baudelaire inscribes a naturalization in institution called literature, narrator occupies place of nature; via simulacrum, narrative resembles birth of literature

——no nature, only effects of nature, nature reconstituted after the fact on basis of simulacrum (i.e. literature), nature lends rather than gives, extends credit

SPOM p. 55 via Marx, in Timon of Athens [see pp. 96-7 Marx’s play]: Timon’s trust in money (simulacrum, ghost), an oath, a giving credit, to that which is unworthy of oath; not convention society, or law > cult of money as nature, prostitution, thus constant perjury, simulacrum, greed

p. 195 the commodity objectifies by naturalizing

pp. 196-97 phantasmagoria of a commerce btwn market things makes socius seem natural, labor objectified in things, while denaturalizing thing become commodity

HERP p. 212 for Heidgeger, phusis: instituting institution, originary upsurging of force, power, or violence, of the Gewalten des Waltenden

POOF p. 91 in every racism, nationalism, there’s a discourse on birth & nature, on genealogy (a phantasm on the genealogical phúsis)

***p. 99 necessity in Menexenus, everything decided where decision does not take place, where always-already taken place: at birth, day before birth, eugenic/noble birth > this makes noble, makes political, ties phúsis to nómos, ontology to oath (ties what is to what must be), obligatory process of a natural law: a synthetic a priori necessity

pp. 99-100 identification qua fraternization, bond btwn 2 necessities (ties): embedding of an ‘it is necessary’ in the filiation of what is, obligation to the natural [p. 102 isonomy from isogony]

p. 159 de-naturalization of fraternal authority (its de-construction), preference given to democratic fraternization > this is all possible, along w/ demand of a democracy to-come, because fraternity was never natural, never a fact [God is dead because God was always dead?]

p. 191n for Montaigne, the alliance/election of perfect friendship functions like a seam (couture), it solders > solder & seam a vocabulary of artifice, so the question [of POOF]: why does the natural schema [re: friendship] remain [in the figure of one body?]?

pp. 242-43 via Heidegger, philía as opening, accord, in essential relation w/ phúsis as covering up, dissimulation of self > phúsis qua philía: lune, comme lautre, garde ce rapport à la fois généreux et jaloux à elle-mêmeelle aime à se cacher, krúptesthai phileîn > le retrait de la pudeur [decency] donne ici le mouvement même: gives the gift (donne le don), accords phúsis and philía

Derrida now links phúsis to phúein (grow, sprout, mature) [an offshoot of phúsis?], links that to genealogical fraternity > no doubt there’s Greek autochthonism in Heideggerian thought

p. 264 via Hugo, fraternity is universal in first being French, ‘sublimated France’: ‘natural law,’ ‘generosity,’ the brother

MSUB J p. 166 Artaud’s neologism innée, where nature collides w/ its contrary, “suffering of the pre-natal,” appears as monstrosity

——“nature” conceals even the source of its interdiction > Artaud wants to tear apart veil of birth and reveal “naked nature”

A p. 42 there is no culture of death itself or properly dying, dying neither entirely natural nor cultural

pp. 43-4 difference of animal/human, biological life/culture is the relation to death as such, true border would be there

PP p. 105 (119) written traces don’t belong to phusis, not alive, or belong to Heraclitean phusis, in which truth takes shelter in its crypt (à sabriter en sa crypte) > “cryptogram” is a pleonasm

OH p. 27 identification is always cultural never natural, always has a capital form, advanced point, capitalizing reserve

p. 89 everydayness as a category of social rhythm is not natural (that is, universal)

PPHS p. 90 acc. Hegel, when ideality appears in nature: spirit hides itself outside itself in sensory matter

pp. 91-2 Hegel: light is original ideality—nature becoming subjective

F p. xiv crypt: hides as it holds, its grounds not natural; physis tends to encrypt (itself) > cest quelle se déborde pour enfermer, naturellement, son autre, tous ses autres

p. xxviii quasi-naturality of artificial mechanism

FWT pp. 39-40 [Derrida prefers not to get trapped btwn naturalism/constructivism] differance btwn psyché & genetico-biological laws > always something of a familial bond around birth, impossible to erase “birth,” a certain geneticism, perhaps birth is question of future, of arrival

p. 42 birth always familial but will come to seem less “natural” [re: “rented belly” (utero in affitto)]

WM p. 237 for Aristotle, only man can mimic [cf. ATIA p. 35 (still prowling around)], mimēsis is tied to possibility of meaning/truth: “the power of truth, as the unveiling of nature (physis) by mimēsis, congenitally belongs to the physics of man, to anthropophysics”; physis includes its own exteriority, its double, says itself, gathers itself

pp. 244-45 acc. Aristotle (onomatism, doctrine of simple names), metaphor, like mimēsis, must come back (revient) to physis, to its truth and its presence: nature finds itself, its proper analogy, nature gives itself in metaphor, thus metaphor is a natural gift, a characteristic of genius > geniuses have more nature, more generosity, more seed; Derrida asks whether everything can be taken from me except the power to replace? can physis sow itself?

p. 251 sun structures metaphorical space of philosophy, represents what is natural in philosophical language, makes possible oppositions (appearing/disappearing, visible/invisible, present/absent)

——when metaphysics opposes formal/artificial language to a natural one, “natural” leads us back to physis as solar system, to a history of relationship earth/sun in system of perception

pp. 264-65(n) for Bachelard, the hidden (fire) is what demands metaphors, Derrida explains how this conceptualization, despite fact that Bachelard appeals to syntax, “a poetic mind is a syntax of metaphors,” still amounts to metaphor of the same > here, all metaphors have a semantic focal point, the hidden fire as life, nature

DS p. 192 priority of art over nature still privileges order 1 then 2, the preference, the precedence (pré-séance) of the imitated

p. 193 mimesis commanded by process of truth 1) mimēsis presents thing itself, the physis that produces itself, it is the movement of phusis (which prefers the crypt), is linked to mnēmē, which unveils, un-forgets 2) or mimēsis sets up homoiōsis or adaequatio btwn 2 terms, a face-to-face, imtator/imitated, faithful imitation will efface itself by restoring freedom of true presence

P p. 25 for Hegel, telos of beauty is found in art not nature; for Hegel, there’s almost no natural beauty, and it is inferior to beauty produced by mind

p. 117 acc. Kant, though we cannot determine empirical laws of nature, we must act as if an understanding (not our own) gave them unity [regulative idea?]

pp. 127-28 beauty & sublime: please by themselves, independent of judgment of senses & determinate judgments, pretension to universal validity on side of pleasure (not knowledge), both reflexive judgments > beautiful (finite) requires parergon, presence of limit gives form to beautiful, this bordered edging not only externally limited but called in by hollowing of lacunary quality w/in the work (ergon) > colossal/sublime excludes parergon, not ergon, usually nature, “w/out limit”

ATIA p. 5 there is no nudity in “nature,” only the affect, sentiment, experience of existing in nakedness > animal not naked because naked

p. 83 the abyss of autos, ipseity, autokinesis: we must surrender (get) to the heart of the abyss btwn law of nature (reaction) & law of freedom (response & responsibility)

O p. 44 book as Logos, Model, nature, book of life, absolute adequation of presence

pp. 52-3 if nature is the book, how could there be both, don’t we have to decide btwn is and and, or find a mute conjunction to think book/nature together (cum) as set?

——sense of fulfillment by way of copula (is) means nature is incomplete, needs a book to complete itself: closure of library articulates itself and turns on this hinge (gond): logic, rather graphics, of supplement

***p. 53 “dissemination, soliciting physis as mimesis, places philosophy on stage and its book at stake (en jeu)”

SW p. 354 philosophy of nature, for the child I still am, was naivety itself, but also time of infinite apprenticeship, culture made up acc. fiction, the autobiography of lure (Dichtung und Wahrheit), beginning to write a novel of sericulture

RGE p. 273 traditional culture wishes to be taken as natural element of discourse

REST pp. 272-73 pathos of “call of the earth” of Feldweg, Holzwege, in ‘35-6, the peasant-proxy of Heidegger, not foreign to what made Goldstein march to New York

p. 368 peasant & artisanal “ideology” in painting, concern for truth in painting

——Heidegger’s “projection” there in the choice of model [Van Gogh’s painting] rather than in its analysis [i.e. Van Gogh shared this ideology, and did paint peasants]

HLP p. 62 “the earth, she, doesn’t lie” (earthly, feminine, naturalism)

WAP p. 69 by naturalizing [the classroom] one neutralizes, conceals (dissimule), an active machinery, the structures, constraints, forms, settings (cadres), the parergonal, by which the dominating mastery, not neutral at all, centers itself: il n'y a pas de place neutre ou naturelle dans lenseignement

***p. 121 use natural to “inculcate” precisely what one wishes to exempt from criticism

p. 122 natural truth is also national: Descartes is France

EJQB p. 71 if nature refuses the leap (saut), Scripture will never be nature: proceeds by leaps alone

——to write: courage to lose one’s life, to die away from nature

p. 73 metaphor (animality of letter): primary & infinite equivocality of signifier as life > psychic subversion of inert literality (i.e. nature) or of speech returned to nature

AFR pp. 37-8 good metaphysics, extreme formalization, language of calculus, must reconstitute “metaphysics's prelinguistic and natural base,” it will have been natural & mute > thus, 2 good metaphysics (form, nature): good metaphysics = physics

p. 134 but don’t forget: in human order, w/ language, commerce, and supplementary deflection, the 2nd is 1st (metaphysics as humanism) > the need to desire (does not belong to nature)

EL p. 200 what if there were no third language, no metalinguistic referee, no language in general, no [originary] neutral language? > what if the dialectico-transcendental hypothesis is already a positivist naturalization/neutralization of the supernatural?

C p. 194 little princeps coffin is not given, not a prior given that would be natural, autochthonous: “models,” examples, referents (usually are)

p. 222 [vis-à-vis Freud] father inferred from a sentence, declaration, judgment: “this is the father,” says the cartouche, paternity never touched, unnatural (different matter for maternity)

LI p. 102 iterability displaces dividing-line btwn opposition nature/convention

TN pp. 68, 328n do but do not touch > this is not a formula, contact sans contact is madness! somnambulist reproduction of paradoxical formulas is always possible [Heidegger, Intro…] > tact discredits every opposition (esp. nature/culture) because if law is a commandment that interrupts continuity w/ “nature,” it already occurs with touch, well before man, before distinction btwn beings/living [touch as animal life itself—Aristotle]

E p. 4 for Kant, nature speaks to us through its beautiful forms, one can read the “ciphered language (Chiffreschrift),” nature’s signature as art productions

——even if this stance is opposed to Hegel [only art is beautiful], analogy btwn art and nature always provides a principle of reconciliation

p. 10 w/ the figure of the innate genius, nature produces the arts, is freedom itself

p. 13 Kant’s genius poet doesn’t need to know what he is writing, nature dictates what he writes, divine production > hierarchical analogy: society of logos, sociology of genius, a logoarchy

——nature dictates to the poet and is the product

——discursive metaphors (i.e. nature says, dictates, prescribes) that function as analogies of analogy > in such cases, nature is properly logos (toward which one must always return)

***p. 15 [re: disinterested pleasure] a moral revenue drawn from a natural production w/out interest to us; one takes wealth w/out interest, the singular moral surplus value of sansstill, the trace (Spur) of a purpose in nature is what makes our stock in moral value rise

——the without of pure detachment is a language nature speaks to us, “she who loves to encrypt herself and record her signature on things”

BSi p. 30 Hobbes: natural right, war of all against all, applies to animals and men

p. 323 Heidegger against science: the face nature turns toward man’s technical mastery might simply conceal her essence

IF p. 307 via Flaubert, nature only a moment of the idea (Hegel, religion)

UWC pp. 210-13 “as if”: 1) imagination, utopia 2) Kant’s “as if (als ob)” from Critique of Judgment, points to finality of nature, is neither order of nature nor order of freedom [agent of deconstructive ferment] 3) oeuvres dart, discursive idealities that define disciplines called Humanities, a subtle displacement of Kant’s idea: art is art not nature, it is free from all constraint/rules as if it were a product of nature

NATURE in OF GRAMMATOLOGY

OG p. 16 (28) [quotes re: book of Nature]

pp. 17-8 (29-30) natural writing (breath) pneumatological not grammatological

——interior holy voice of faith; natural law, native unity of voice & writing is prescriptive, commandment > good writing comprehended as that which had to be comprehended

pp. 35-6 (53) for Saussure, true, natural bond is that of sound & signified (not visible image of writing)

p. 45 (66) for Hegel & Saussure, “symbols”: the only natural signs, only signs that escape semiology as grammatology

pp. 41-2 (60-2) writing: absence of signatory/referent, a “fixité” different from speech’s, a monstrosity, écart naturel dans la nature > must contain it like a leper

p. 103 (152) physis “others”: art, technology, law, institution, society, immotivation, arbitrariness, etc.

pp. 133-34 Rousseau & Lévi-Strauss on books piling, filled w/ lies; book of nature: look, don’t read

pp. 144-46 (207-10) Rousseau advocates a kind of natural supplement w/ culture, a suppléance, habit, pedagogy, as necessary and insufficient to reconstitute wholeness of mother nature

——childhood first call for suppléance, first manifestation of deficiency, pedagogy crudely shows the paradox of supplement

p. 151 (216-17) slow place of pedagogy, Nature takes her time, outpaced by immediacy of dangerous supplement which burns the halting points (brûle les étapes), consumes lénergie sans retour

p. 167 (238) origin/nature as myth of addition, supplementarity annulled by being purely additive > myth of the effacement of the trace

p. 186 (264-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] cet être-dans-la-nature a donc le mode dêtre étrange du supplément: lêtre-dans makes classical logic tremble

pp. 185-86 (263-64) nature as limit concept—impossible equilibrium btwn reserve & desire, imagination breaks equilibrium, desire must leave its reserve; acc. Rousseau, ethics: to come closest to this limit

p. 197 (282) via Rousseau, exceed nature, then return to it, imitate it, but keep a minimal (almost nil) difference > nature as ailleurs, archeo-teleologic, alibi (elsewhere in space), in illo tempore (elsewhere in time)

p. 198 (283) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] in an archeoteleological concept of nature [eg. identification of word & song, avant et afin]: modification becomes one w/ substance it modifies: (nature & its other, archeology & eschatology, substance & mode, origin & genesis) > this logic wreaks havoc on juridical/methodological point of view, annuls difference btwn structural/genetic point of view

pp. 233-34 (332-33) natural immediacy is à la fois origine et fin, in the double sense of birth & death, unfinished sketch and finished perfection (esquisse inachevée et perfection finie) [how Rousseau’s contradiction is only apparent, how his law of concept of nature constrains natural law]

——mute sign is sign of liberty when it is immediate, no detour, no anonymity (the expresser and expressed are properly present), mute sign is sign of slavery when re-presentative mediacy invades system (abyss of circulation sans fin, no one there for anyone, not even himself) > presuming speech opened this abyss, Rousseau tempted to return to archeological moment of sign w/out speech

pp. 256-58 (363-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] teleology as external—passage from state of nature to state of language (from one structure to another) explained by catastrophic archaeology (catastrophe of dangerous supplementarity)

——is the catastrophe that splits nature still natural?

p. 259 (366) passage from nature to society can’t be described by alternative genesis/structure; advent of supplementarity as natural catastrophe neither in nor out of nature [Aristotle]: nonrational origin of reason

pp. 259-60 (367) for Rousseau, what never should have arrived, did [i.e. the supplement]; for Plato, for all onto-theology, meaning put out of play (le sens est mis hors jeu) in condemnation of art > Rousseau does not affirm (play/game of) writing but resigns himself to it

——society born by accident to repair the accidental catastrophe (Fall) [birth of supplement] of nature

NECESSARY [fixerup]

SPOM p. 92 must/should (devoir) > “necessary’s” 2 forms

POOF p. 42 language of madness, forced by most rigorous & profound necessity to say the insane, impossible, absurd, undecidable—to the disdain of philosophical good conscience (wants to hold out in shade of the Enlightenment): every “X without X” [i.e. “community w/out community”]

pp. 81-2 compulsive droning of political “realism” that would refuse to read all the warnings & pleas of disjunction > what does it mean that, henceforth, ineluctable voice of necessity (its most responsible voice) resounds in this way [in disjunction, what has reality become?]?

***p. 99 necessity in Menexenus, everything decided where decision does not take place, where always-already taken place: at birth, day before birth, eugenic/noble birth > this makes noble, makes political, ties phúsis to nómos, ontology to oath (ties what is to what must be), obligatory process of a natural law: a synthetic a priori necessity

pp. 99-100 identification qua fraternization, bond btwn 2 necessities (ties): embedding of an ‘it is necessary’ in the filiation of what is, obligation to the natural [p. 102 isonomy from isogony]

p. 221 [re: history-w/out-history of amitié] necessity of ‘zigzag’: history not linear succession, not continuous accumulation of paradigms, but series of ruptures that intersect their own trajectories before turning back along other ones > all new configurations, once they open, must repeat same archaic motif of day before yesterday—how else could they speak their language?

pp. 208 about to venture on a decision re: omega ω in “O my friends…”, Derrida makes it clear that the guard-rails of a philological coup de théâtre will not efface the archive constructed on an error [p. 225n Agamben helped Derrida w/ all this]

——the improbable omega ω has a canonical authority protected by great names, the wager of this mistake, like a capital w/ bottomless surplus-value

pp. 216-17 Derrida now stresses that the sentence could never be independent of all determinable contexts, but that it’s ability to be contextualized demands that it can give way to another context > thus, everyone who uttered Aristotle’s rumored sentence affirmed its displacement/detachment from a unique context, willing or reluctantly, they said the plus dun of the addressee (for example, a feminine ‘one’): the sentence can’t be signed w/out marking this destinerrancy

——in such a way, Aristotle’s sentence was never neutral, always a project of friendship/enmity, & always a project of the corresponding political community (this is irrepressible)

pp. 218-19 we can’t exclude fact that when someone speaks they strive not to be understood, diabolical figure of death drive > so can the accord of hyperbolic lovence be possible, hoping to be understood beyond all dialectics, haunting (failure) must leave an imprint on the body it seems to threaten, merging indissociably, it’s impossible not to aspire to this haunting [a necessity]: instant of decision remains heterogenous, undecidable, crucial experience of perhaps

pp. 228-29 one always takes a stand re: friendship > Derrida utters “O my friend…” in my own name > power of the name to survive bearer of the name: il y va donc du nom porté [borne], du port [bearing] ou du support [basis] du nom et du rapport [relation] au nom, la portée [range] du nom

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

pp. 288-89 there are specters on both sides of us (past & future), the phantom friends we lost, the arrival of the Superman > ‘it is necessary to love’ = specters, they are to be loved

——disjunction of spectral distance marks past/future w/ non-reappropriable alterity [p. 307n cf. Düttmann, “What is Called love in…”]

p. 295 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

p. 297 Blanchot no longer has affinity w/ one Nietzsche (there is always plus dun): friendship is not a gift or promise, it’s the outside drawing near in its separateness/inaccessibility—pure desire is the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance, to die in common through separation

——the common becomes the pole end of a call > question regarding the ‘common’ should bring on a vertigo that asks ‘what is to be done?’ what’s to be done, politically, w/ this vertigo & its necessity?

EM p. 131 if Heidegger has radically deconstructed domination of metaphysics by the present, by leading us to think presence of the present, this thinking can only be metaphorized, and can’t simply decide to escape a profound necessity, language it deconstructs

VM pp. 111-12 why does Levinas return to categories he rejected? Derrida’s not denouncing incoherence [w/ this question], he’s wondering about meaning of necessity, necessity of lodging oneself w/in traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it—does this imposed necessity cache-t-elle quelque ressource indestructible et imprévisible du logos grec? quelque puissance illimitée denveloppement dans laquelle celui qui voudrait le repousser serait toujours déjà surpris?

PP pp. 95-6 to put word “voluntarily” in quotation marks designates, content to remain within the closure of oppositions, “submission” to the necessities of a given “language”

p. 104 (118) excess, displacement of series, nest pas une simple sortie hors de la série (ce geste tombe sous une catégorie de la série), a folding back (repli), a re-mark, cannot name it with a single concept w/out being off the mark (sans le manquer): it is a real and necessary challenge that writes itself, and we must begin by reading it

p. 158 dictum pronounces itself against itself as soon as it finds its way into writing, “contradiction” as relation-to-self of diction chasing itself away by hunting its trap (scription); not a contingent contradiction [confirmed by Platonism in Rousseau, Saussure]

S p. 10 acc. Heidegger, essence of technology is not technological; Derrida: what if it is? what is this desire for rigorous non-contamination? > envisage fatal necessity of a contamination

——“contamination by technology of the thinkable essence of technology”

FSW p. 197 logo-phonocentrism is necessary and necessarily finite [Derrida’s faith?] > history of the possibility of symbolism

TC p. 238 Artaud’s cruelty as necessity and rigor

p. 248 what is tragic is not impossibility but necessity of repetition

p. 250 to think closure of representation is to think tragic: not as representation of fate, but the fate of representation, its necessity

T p. xix logic of event, structures of expropriation: timbre (tympanum), style and signature > same obliterating division of the proper, make every event possible, necessary, unfindable

F p. xxvii just because there is a necessary fictionalization of “original event” does not make verification gratuitous, one cannot reorder the story, nor the internal necessity of translations

FWT pp. 3-4 heir must respond to double injunction: reaffirm what comes “before us,” necessary (il faut) to appropriate a past fundamentally inappropriable, reaffirm, relaunch otherwise, keep alive

——reaffirmation which continues & interrupts: one’s own decision as that of the other: signature against signature

pp. 123-24 [the bridge] unconditionality comes, il faut imposes itself on us, unconditionally, announces future, then I try to think thought, the experience of the condition, the exposure to a limit (however unstable) btwn conditional and unconditional

p. 165 Derrida pursues necessity of hyper-atheological discourse, while ceaselessly meditating on Abrahamic culture w/out trying to destroy/disqualify it

DS p. 3 displacement forms a system, undecidable resource sets system in motion: necessity of “blank spaces”

POS p. 105n “we must have truth (il faut)”—deconstruction not a discourse against truth and science

P pp. 32-3 in Hegel & Heidegger, an “it is necessary (il faut)” re: hermeneutic circle of art > must start w/ work of art, but how can you recognize it as art if you don’t already know what art is?: not a vicious circle, but an engagement of thought, circular feast, experience of limit, closure, resistance, humility > pas de cercle: le désir par cette répétition fidèle du cercle, daccéder à lencore infranchi, le désir dun nouveau pas > lien sans liens, franchir le cercle sans saffranchir de sa loi, pas sans pas

SP p. 39 déjà, nom de ce qui sefface ou davance se soustrait, laissant néanmoins une marque, une signature soustraite dans cela même don il se retire [Derrida talking about “himself”]

p. 137 were the key to the secret of a text “btwn me and myself,” I will still die > relation to event of text as structurally posthumous necessity > text remains open, offered, undecipherable

DIF DIF p. 25 Heidegger: usage (Brauch) has left a trace (Spur) in to khreon (necessity), quickly forgotten in destiny of Being, usage conjoins the dis- (Der Brauch fügt das Un-) > doesn’t dis of differance refer us beyond history of Being, beyond our language, beyond anything that can be named in it?

RGE p. 262 via Bataille, we must find a speech which maintains silence, necessity of the impossible: to say in language (of servility) that which isn’t servile > silence (among all words) “most perverse, most poetic”

TB p. 109 translation: its necessity as impossibility

Gii p. 49 hand speaks by way of “necessity,” chreon, usage, Brauch [?] > if the chreōn allows one to think the present in its presence, if der Brauch is “the gathering”—then, before all technology, surgery, le main ny est pas pour rien

REST pp. 263-64 [re: les question de la démarche embarrassée (boîteuse ou louche?)] i.e. “Who is walking?” “On whose feet?” > idiomatic figures of questions seem necessary; “necessary: it’s an attribute,” still vague > better to say question-idioms the form of which is very fitting, clinging (collant) (tightly/flexibly) to figure or body of what you here wish to turn into an object (feet)

p. 264 marche almost same word as mark, margins, also Pas > necessity of walking, lowest degree, most subjective or underlying level of culture/institution: pair of shoes

p. 291 Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, lhymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

DST DST p. 197 désistance (2 typical experiences) is ineluctable: 1) il faut que cela arrive: in this case, the “I,” the free subject, anticipates/precedes, is constituted w/out or before, the ineluctable event that happens to me 2) constitutive desistance of subject: something began before me, I am late, a subject marked in advance by a pre-impression, imprint—deconstitution (“I” am not the supporting basis of this imprint): still, ineluctable not genetic programs or historical determination—those would be supplemental, late determinations of ineluctable

p. 198 necessity of rhythm: necessity of a scansion that comes to fold & unfold thought

pp. 204 fidelity to the ineluctable, this terrifying form, the already there before me, that which lends itself to all figures and schemas; could there be fidelity w/out the faith called for in this dissymmetry [Levinas]?

——fidelity to the very thing that you who besiege me (qui massiégez si nécessairement) couldn’t, did not, avoid (est-ce que cela revient au même?)

——Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger never avoided anything? > how does one dare write such a sentence?

——it is possible not to avoid anything: 1) never pass up a question, a possibility, a truth, never miss a fold, a twist 2) mistakes, weaknesses, misapprehensions, inhibitions, the worst

p. 208 how could a thinker of finitude, Heidegger, never avoid anything (ne jamais rien éviter)?

p. 220 Lacoue-Labarthe (w/ rigor & prudence) follows folds of what can no longer be called scene, period, history—a deportation whose measurelessness (démesure) seems to defy hope of judgment/justice > and yet, there’s an il faut, there’s philosophy & its law

p. 225 un autre indécidable, the gap/hiatus in an undecidable derived from dialectical calculation/contraction, arrhythmic caesura as respiration of rhythm (this necessity awaits us) [pas, heartbeat] [Derrida here wonders if double bind is too dialectical, thus the other undecidable]

PF p. xxvii reaffirm the “it is necessary” of “w/out alibi”

pp. xxvii-xxviii “it is necessary” of w/out alibi: 1) not sovereign exception 2) not untouched pure presence of trace as referral 3) not invincible transcendental/ontological structure

——“it is necessary” of w/out alibi must proceed from an alterity exceeding circle of same/self, doesn’t take on duty to reclose economic circle of exchange [remains to be thought]

p. xxxiii injunction “it is necessary” of future-to-come can receive indifferently names “event” and “other” > irreducible to calculation, program, project, subject, object, anticipation

TR p. 134 deceit/theft of singular I by universal I, just injustice, ineluctable subterfuge/substitution

***PSSS p. 271 it is necessary to cultivate (it is necessary for an “it is necessary” to take shape: ethical/juridical/political obligation) an economy of detour & difference: strategy, path, pathbreaking, road, even a method > “indirect” way of combatting cruelty drive

LI pp. 47-8 absence of receiver from sender is possible not necessary, but this possibility is a must, is a structural necessity > possibility of an absence always inscribed, necessarily inscribed as possibility

pp. 48-9 structural & essential, iterability is at work in all facts, each mark divided or multiplied in advance > a more powerful “logic”—graphics of iterability undercuts classical opposition of fact & principle (le droit), factual & possible (virtual), necessity & possibility

TN p. 72 Nancy thinks necessity of undecidables re: thought/weight > there will be identical/analogous necessity re: subject of touching

E p. 285 trace, iterability, mark, differance (possibilities or necessities) are themselves not only human

AD p. 31 ineluctability (this is necessary) of the 3rd is law of question > question of a question, addressed to the other, from the other: the other of the other > a question that is certainly not first (comes after the yes of/to the other), though nothing precedes it

p. 35 the possibility of offering hospitality to the worst is necessary so good hospitality has a chance: yes of the other, yes to the other > impossibility of programming a limit btwn pervertibility/perversion is necessary

LG p. 237 there is only content w/out edge, w/out boundary, w/out frame, there is only edge w/out content: interminable inocclusive invagination (inenarrable, unarrestable, insatiable) > terrible for those who require order in the name of the law

OG pp. 7-8 (17) privilege of phonè necessary moment of economy (of “life,” of “history,” of “être comme rapport à soi”), not historical contingency: not a choice that could have been avoided

pp. 30-1 (46) factum of phonetic writing commands our entire culture/science, not one fact among others > still, does not respond to a necessity of an absolute/universal essence

p. 61 (89-90) transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased, arche-trace must comply w/ this necessity & erasure (contradictory and not acceptable in logic of identity), it is the disappearance of origin, and also the origin of origin, so to wrench (arracher) trace from classical scheme that would demand it comes after originary nontrace (that would make of it an empirical mark), we must speak of originary trace or arche-trace > but if all begins w/ trace, there’s no originary trace

——Derrida discusses the importance of appealing to the transcendental, the necessity of a pathway, ce parcours doit laisser dans le texte un sillage > no transcendental pathway (glossematics) would be naive objectivism; ultra-transcendental would leave no sillage, be pre-critical > these 2 end up resembling each other [this leads to deconstructive logic of trace]

p. 157 (225-26) Rousseau looks for a supplement to take complete possession of his heart (remplit mon coeur) > a substitute for mother (another girl)

——this sequence of supplements announces necessity of an infinite chain of substitutes: immediacy is derived > that’s what’s inconceivable to reason

pp. 294-95 (416) [necessity of writing] to think writing as accidental, as chance, is to ignore lappel de suppléance and to think evil as exterior, therefore effaceable addition

***UWC pp. 234-35 this thinking of impossible possible is not a thinking of necessity but a thinking of the dangerous “perhaps” > force of event always stronger than performative

——necessary to dissociate unconditional independence (of thought, deconstruction, Humanities, justice) from any phantasm of indivisible sovereignty (mastery)

EU p. 110 since founding responsibility occurs by acts/performance, interrogation of philosophy no longer simply belongs to philosophical setting, question inseparable from act of foundation > foundation of new university law is necessary: to say it’s necessary is to say one has to take [a new kind of] responsibility for it [Nietzsche] [what’s beyond philosophy in philosophy]

***p. 116 but there’s always Necessity (w/ capital of a proper noun) > Necessity says one must always yield, always go (se rendre) where it calls: even if it means never arriving

***p. 217 [re: CIPH] “the necessity of these conclusions should be capable of imposing itself on the basis of other premises” [see baby daddy in other works] > mission, envoi, “aim (finalité)”

SPEC p. 384 w/out borrowing, nothing begins, il ny a pas de fonds propre, there’s no transference of fund, lemprunt rapporte, produces surplus value, is the prime mover of every investment > on commence ainsi par spéculer, en pariant sur une valeur à produire comme à partir de rien: all these “metaphors” confirm, as metaphors, the necessity of what they state

p. 363 Freud wonders if calling death immanent & proper to life functions as a great narrative poem, a poetics of proper as reconciliation? consolation? (make it more bearable as Anankē)

pp. 402-03 s’il faut se rendre à ce quil faut echaîner strictement [if it’s necessary to submit to what must follow strictly] re: le mot de maîtrise, going beyond oppositional logic—is there mastery?

NEGATIVITY (NEGATIVE)

GOD p. 66 instant of decision is madness; like gift & “gift of death,” instant irreducible to presence, act of giving death, sacrifice, suspends labor of negative, labor itself, perhaps even work of mourning

GT p. 34 looking for “noon,” origin w/out shadow, w/out dialectical negativity, not any madness: sleepwalk in the vicinity of the impossible

R p. 57 heterogenous vs. negation

SPOM p. 235n the supplement of an internal-external fold, in abyssal fashion, marks the closure or principle of ruin of a philosophy of life, and of subjectivity: si on intégrait à la vie de cette subjectivité vivante le travail de la négativité ou de lobjectivité, les phénomènes ou plutôt les non-phénomènes de la mort, etc., pourquoi sobstiner encore à appeler cela vie?

HASD p. 7 [in absolutely singular logic] “God” names that without which one could not account for any negativity: grammatical or logical negation, illness, evil and neurosis

——instead of reducing religion to symptom [in this logic], the symptom would be a negative manifestation of God

p. 25 a dénégation prior to Freudian context, secret of denial, a negativity that de-negates itself, gives no chance to dialectic

pp. 53-4 we can read What is Metaphysics? as a treatise on negativity, establishes basis for negative discourse and negation in experience of nothing

MPM pp. 57-8 de Man talks failure & negative, Derrida says failure of memory is not failure and negativity a power > creates discontinuity & distance

A p. 19 choice of negative form (aporia) to designate a duty announces affirmation by avoiding good conscience at all costs

——the 2 forms of good conscience [1) grimace of indulgent vulgarity 2) subjective certainty] incompatible w/ absolute risk of every promise, engagement, responsibility

p. 20 we can never say these are the conditions of inexhaustible singularity of event, must speak in negative form (w/out X no Y) [Derrida against present or presentation of “this is that”]

WM pp. 211-12 absolute usure of sign in negative words (ab-solute, in-finite, in-tangible, non-Being) > negative dissolves finite determination, suspends apparent metaphoricity by breaking tie that binds (lattache qui retient) them to meaning of particular being, to totality of what is

——how does this negativity relate to Aufhebung, unity of loss & profit?

VM p. 94 for Levinas, concrete (nonformal) tautology or false (finite) heterology [compare to “false infinite”], along w/ the negative (work, history, etc.), never has a relation w/ other > no negativity in metaphysical transcendence

p. 129 Hegel recognized negativity, anxiety or war in infinite absolute, as movement of absolute’s own history, whose horizon is a final pacification in which alterity would be absolutely encapsulated (résumée), if not lifted up (levée), in parousia

p. 144 w/ “epochs,” being-history, Heidegger permits reemergence of thought of eschatology: “Being itself…is in itself eschatological”; eschatology different from messianic eschatology in that w/ former war is not an accident that overcomes Being, war not even negative, war is Being itself

OH p. 35 all names designate a negative limit & a chance

pp. 80-1 double constraint, performative contradiction, undecidable (typical, recurring form & inexhaustible singularization) > conditions for duty can only take negative form, once you hear “these are the conditions,” you are being deluded

PPHS p. 88 authority of voice: coordinated w/ entire Hegelian system: its archeology, teleology, eschatology, its will to parousia > process of sign is an Aufhebung, negativity

——Hegel: negativity of intelligence, Aufhebung of sign relieves/promotes beyond natural, sensual, spatial

OS pp. 41-2 space becomes concrete by retaining/restoring negative w/in itself, by negating itself

——1st negative determination of space is the POINT (the place that does not take place), it then negates itself in relation the LINE > als sich aufhebend, point is the line, the Being-spatial of point > then comes the PLANE (surface) > each next stage only made of the negated prior stage, i.e. line made of negated points

——each stage of Aufhebung is time, the point spatializes or spaces itself

p. 43 Hegel: negativity posited for-itself is time

——acc. Hegel, negation of negation as punctuality is time, time relève space

——point & time thought in circularity together (Aufhebung, speculative negativity, only possible by means of infinite correlation or reflection) > time is spacing, space is time > thus for Aristotle, stigmē, punctuality, determines nowness (nun, jetzt)

p. 45n Hegel: Notion is in and for itself absolute (total) negativity and freedom

p. 51 [re: ousia as presence] Hegel makes Aristotle’s nonpresence of time explicit by calling it negativity

P P pp. 32-3 Derrida’s pas in Hegel/Heidegger’s circle of art, get across (franchir) circle w/out getting free (saffranchir) of its law, pas sans pas: circular closure as one that remains open (suffers neither lack nor negativity)

p. 95 what is beautiful is dissemination, pure cut w/out negativity; negativity is significant; adherence always connotes division, lack, negativity; beauty is not a signifier; the signifier: accounts for everything except beauty > a non-sterilized cut from fecundation: la semence serre

p. 112 Kant never asks whether the beauty of man stems from possibility of morcellement (breakup) sans négativité

p. 129 “negative pleasure” of sublime, respect, admiration, is different from “positive pleasure” of beautiful, and unique from beauty’s negativity (the work of of mourning in beauty), which was already singular, a negativity w/out negativity, sans sans sans, sans of pure cut, sans fin of finality

POS POS p. 86 dissemination is play of castration w/out metaphysical/romantic pathos of negativity > dissemination “is” angle of play of castration

p. 95 Derrida does not apply spacing to negate that which is ‘present,’ this would remain logic of Hegelian Aufhebung, Derrida’s nonpresence not found in opposition presence/absence

O O p. 12 for Hegel, exteriority of negative still belongs to process of truth—must leave its trace upon it

CHM CHM p. 308n no history except of rationality/meaning: reappropriation of negativity—or forgets it (same thing) > history of truth, history of economy of negative: negativity not positive truth is the nonhistorical capital of history

——think an ahistoricality, negativity so negative it wouldn’t be negative > affirm negativity in silence [negative dialectics?]: access nonclassical dissociation btwn thought & language

RGE RGE pp. 256-57 that there must be meaning, that nothing must be definitely lost in death, that Hegel refers to death as “abstract negativity” > Bataille finds all this laughable

p. 259 acc. Bataille, blind spot in Hegel: une dépense, a radical negativity, sans réserve, sovereign operation, point of nonreserve

——Hegel’s precipitation toward seriousness of meaning (security of knowledge) blinded him to absolute expenditure laid bare under rubric of negativity > which is why he was right, and wrong for being so, for triumphing over the negative

——negativity has only been in fabric of meaning: Bataille’s sovereign operation nether positive nor negative

——Bataille’s negative w/out reserve, in an instant, not even negative since not convertible to positive truth

——w/ Hegel, negative is reassuring other surface of the positive

——Kant & Hegel revealed most permanent philosophical determinations of negativity (truth, history, meaning, time, ideality) > their revolution: taking negative seriously, giving meaning to its labor

——Bataille must mark his text (must mark the point of no-return of destruction, linstance dune dépense sans reservenot negativity), and he does, so as not to return to positive, pre-Kantian MOP [MOFP] [Žižek thinks otherwise, calls Bataille pre-Kantian]

***p. 260 by interpreting negativity as labor, by betting for discourse/meaning/history, Hegel bet against play, chance, blinded himself to what made his own bet possible > each stage through spirit (each suspension of play) was a phase of play: play includes work of meaning (meaning of work) not in terms of knowledge but in terms of inscription: meaning inscribed in meaningless play

p. 274 discursive knowledge is neutral, neutrality has a negative essence (ne-uter), negative side of transgression

Gi Gi p. 15 neutralization, at once effect of negativity [sexual division into 2] and the erasure to which thinking submits this negativity so originary positivity can appear

——sexual difference as the 2, a negativity, even an asexuality > (is this interpretation, Derrida asks, too violent?)

p. 20 to interpret as negative forces [re: Heidegger’s essential properties of Dasein]: precipitate interpretation, dialecticize

pp. 23-4 complexity of the negative in Heidegger, negativity can be a dissimulation/disfiguration of original phenomenon, which is not negative: Uneigentlichkeit is not a mistake/sin

DST DST p. 196 perhaps désister marks nothing negative, perhaps dé- does not determine -ister (-ester, ist, est: exist, subsist, consist), but dislodges it radically (this aradical root -ister) [cf. LI p. 159n]

p. 199 ne pas ne pas: redoubles movement of negation through syntactical formation

——not do something that consists in not doing: ineluctable, unavoidable > sur-négation

——neither work of dialectic nor unconscious denegation [neither Hegel nor Freud]

p. 214 ester: “to appear, present oneself in court” [p. 319n Kahn’s translation of Heidegger] > désistance, a rupture, heterogeneity w/ respect to Wesen, estance, not Abwesen (absence), Unwesen (disorder), Entwesen (inessentiality): dé, not negative, marks nonbelonging to family of ester

p. 323n play of de- might belong to hyperbologic, belongs to and escapes its own series: “gift of mimesis,” “gift of impropriety,” not negative (dialecticizable)

——organizes/disorganizes what it appears to determine

HLP pp. 67-8 though Marxist concept of ideology remains a negative topology, is fundamentally obscure, has theoretical limitations, it is very valuable, marks site/place beyond truth/lie structure

HST p. 394 Levinas: “I” does not endow itself w/ this [temporal] alterity: impossibility of dialectical time is impossibility of saving oneself by oneself (alone)

——classical thesis of time (monad, event of negation) lacked thought of forgiveness (until Bergson & Heidegger)

p. 395 Levinas: freedom is not negating oneself but having one’s being pardoned by alterity of the other—dialogue w/ other, not silent dialogue w/ our soul, frees us

ATM pp. 155-56 Levinas negotiates his negotiation w/ the unnegotiable in a way where he negotiates the negotiation (he reties the thread, weaves his interruptions of the same), to give the other a chance [Derrida refers to a double negation here], reprend dans sa toile lhistoire de toutes ses ruptures

E pp. 21-2 Derrida compares the work of mourning to the sublime, both allow negative pleasures to be reappropriated by economic calculation

——logo-phonocentric system doesn’t exclude a negative, negative is its business, it’s work, it excludes what can’t be digested, represented, eaten, irreducible heterogeneity: vomit

EU p. 71 for Schelling, philosopher develops negative condition: consciousness of inanity of all finite knowledge > ability to translate, re-translate, the real to the ideal can be acquired—can be cultivated in a Bildung and become untransformable habitus, unalterable organ

SPEC p. 401 w/ Causa, lAutre Choseno opposition btwn pleasure & unpleasure, w/in & beyond, life & death: graphics of strictural supplement not oppositional, knowns no negation, no lack; in graphics, desire is sanssans,” is of a “sans sans sans”

NEGATIVE THEOLOGY (NT)

KH p. 96 es gibt always implicated in negative theology (in its Christian history?); what there is, there, is not; p. 97 there is khōra, but the khōra does not exist [importance of article]

MONL p. 71 [Derrida’s quilting point?] passage points = places of transcendence, absolute elsewhere in eyes of Greco-Latino-Christian philosophy & yet inside it > epekeina tes ousias, khōra, negative theology, Freud, Artaud, Blanchot, Levinas, Eckhart

R p. 8 is Derrida’s definition of democracy just apophatic, negative theology? or is it rigorous?

p. 82 khōra or spacing before any reappropriation by a theologico-political history or revelation, even before negative theology (which is fundamentally linked to Christianity)

FK p. 48 via negativa prescribes esoteric insularity of desert

p. 57 desert of desert can’t be reduced to via negativa of Graeco-Judaeo-Christian tradition

POO p. 24 “the apophatic is not here necessarily dependent on negative theology, even if it makes it possible”

SPOM p. 5 what spirit & specter have in common, one doesn’t know if it exists, doesn’t belong to knowledge, almost unnameable thing qui nous regarde

p. 217 “absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous (es spukt),” unnameable, neutral power > this, which we have said nothing determinable urgently returns, insists, gives one to think, irresistible anguish, like that of future and death, doesn’t stem from but produces automatism of repetition alongside principle of reason > tout autre est tout autre

——nous faisant régulièrement parler depuis le lieu où nous ne voulons rien dire, où nous savons clairement ce que nous ne voulons pas dire mais ne savons pas ce que nous voudrions dire, comme si cela n'était plus ni de l'ordre du savoir ni de l'ordre du vouloir ou du vouloir-dire

HASD p. 4 every predicative language is inadequate to the essence of God

——X (text, writing, trace, differance, hymen, supplement, pharmakon, parergon) : not subject to Aufhebung, dialectic, neither concept nor name > lends itself to a series of names, calls for another syntax, exceeds order and structure of predicative discourse [has induced accusation against Derrida of repeating procedures of negative theology]

pp. 5-6 three attacks on negative theology [deconstruction?]: 1) you prefer to negate, nihilistic 2) speak only to experience speech > in trace of quasi-tautology > (but, to speak for nothing is not to speak to no one) 3) becoming-theological of all discourse, God’s name as hyperbolic effect of negativity, every negative sentence haunted by God [Lacan’s names-of-the-father]

p. 9 differance and trace don’t arise from Being, from presence, even less from [negative theology’s] hyperessentiality

p. 10 Dionysius the Areopagite [Pseudo-Dionysus], ecstasy, divine darkness, ascent—unveiling of unknowable

***p. 11 [difference btwn deconstruction & negative theology] apophatic movement cannot contain w/in itself the principle of its interruption, can only indefinitely defer encounter w/ limit

p. 19 negative theology—secret societies > accusations against deconstruction are similar

pp. 23-4 negative theology as a “we read better,” we don’t anthropomorphize, only we know how to disentagle sacred symbols

pp. 24-5 Dionysius’ 2 modes [esoteric/exoteric] of transmission: 1) unspeakable, prohibited, inaccessible (aporreton) secret, “symbolic and initiatory” 2) philosophic, demonstrative (apodeiktiken), capable of being shown

——doesn’t discourse of Dionysius & Derrida keep to place where these 2 modes cross? such place cannot be an indivisible point > 2 languages bear the silence of the other, secret must and must not allow itself to be divulged

——these two modes (esoteric/exoteric) secondary to their crossing (symploke) [contretemps?]

p. 27 figuration and places (lieux-dits) of rhetoric, topos, constitute concern of apophatic procedures

p. 28 [in Christian apophatics of Dionysus] cause, gift of gift, order and promise are the same

pp. 30-1 a negative theology & its ghosts in a tradition neither Christian nor Greek? i.e. what of Jewish, Islamic negative theology? question resonates in internal desert, certain void

p. 31 the 2 paradigms of Greek “negative theology”: epekeina tes ousias of Republic, khora of Timaeus

——epekeina tes ousias as excess beyond Being, inauguration of Good > has more affinity with Christian apophases [Dionysus] than khora

Derrida introduces 3 paradigms of apophasis, admitting that this architectural model [paradigms] surrounds a resonant space of which nothing, almost nothing, will ever be said

p. 32 epekeina tes ousias, beyond beingness of Being, hyperbolism—sur, hyper > negativity serves the hyper movement that produces, attracts, guides it

pp. 32-3 Being must be created by what exceeds the border, the Good, intelligible sun, something that far surpasses (hyperekhontos) [Republic 509b], excess of God, light is in Good’s image

——light produced by sun is son of the Good (neither visible, nor sight or vision), excess itself described by what it exceeds, even negative discourse retains ontology, does not interrupt analogical continuity [btwn perceptible/intelligible sun, the Good and that to which it gives birth, allusion to triton genos, i.e. khora]

p. 34 Plato’s use of “third species” as analogical mediation, concerns Being, epekeina tes ousias, and khora > khora also constitutes a third species (triton genos), isn't intelligible paradigm

pp. 35-6 khōra as metaphor—woman (1st strategy); khōra as negative theology (2nd strategy): Derrida favors 2nd strategy because it calls attention to possibility beyond metaphor

p. 37 radically nonhuman, atheological, khōra is not the es of giving (es gibt), before all subjectivity, doesn’t create/produce, not even an event [avoid anthropo-, theomorphic schemas]

p. 41 evil is even more negatively theologized than good in Pseudo-Dionysus

p. 44 [re: negative theology] a politics of initiation or teaching, multiplication of voices, veil dissimulates & renders attractive at same time [Augustine: God is powerful w/out power]

——[re: Meister Eckhart’s apophatic strategies] do we see nakedness of God or do we hear the voice of Mesister Eckhart himself?

pp. 48-9 contrary to khora, Christian apophasis is initiated by event of revelation which is also a promise, Jerusalem as place of event, place is event

——this event prescribes a good & accurate apophasis: comment ne pas dire

p. 53 to remain on threshold of that which connects name of God w/ name of Place [Jewish, Islamic tradition]: most consistent apophasis possible?

——Christianity did not cease to be Greek [both are apophatic, only Christianity is evental?]

EM EM p. 131 Being is nothing, not a being, cannot be said, cannot say itself, except in ontic metaphor

VM VM p. 116 Levinas gave up his best weapon: disdain of discourse (negative theology), does not give himself the right to speak in language resigned to its own failure

——negative theology knew itself failed and finite, inferior to logos, to God’s understanding, never sought God face to face

——how Levinas differs from negative theology > possibility of metaphysics is possibility of speech, metaphysical responsibility is responsibility for language, “thought consists in speaking”

p. 146 when Being goes beyond the ontic this is not negative theology, nor negative ontology

PAS PAS p. (81) Blanchot’s tutoieing (viens) breaks w/ indiscreet familiarity, not negative theology, but describes its law, its jurisdiction, its perversion > can say toi w/out tutoieing [& reverse]

POS p. 43 Derrida’s undecidables, unities of simulacrum, “false” verbal properties that can’t be included in philosophical binary, but still inhabit it, resisting, disorganizing, w/out ever constituting a 3rd term, a solution: hymen, gram, incision, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, margin

DIF DIF p. 6 detours, locutions, syntax used to describe differance will resemble negative theology to the point of being indistinguishable > but there’s no superessentiality beyond

RGE p. 271 negative theology: still reserved, perhaps, a “superessentiality,” an indestructible meaning? > touching on limits & greatest audacities of discourse in Western thought

WOG p. 36 beyond of being: Jewish/Christian revelations, apophatic theologies/mysticisms, Levinas’ beyond ontology, Heidegger’s proposed theology w/ no Being or his kreuzweise Durchstreichung

BSi p. 168 from apophantics to apophatics: trying to describe bêtise [vertigo]

CIR p. 44 horrible expression I win, I like neither the word nor the thing, thus my indefinite referral (so-called negative theology, play w/ names of God)

NEUTRAL

KH pp. 120-21 “Platonism” not only neutralizes Plato’s texts, inhibiting forces that continue to maintain a certain disorder (parasitism, ventriloquism, clandestinity, tone of denial), “Platonism” command whole history of this neutralization, a philosophy would always be “Platonic”

LOBL p. 106 [Derrida does always affirm the word neutral, but here he seems to affirm Blanchot’s neutral] a neutral beyond dialectical contradiction and opposition

p. 115 undecidable, neuter, death is the undecidable itself

POOF p. viii democracy—fraternization (brothers kill father): inclusion of women as sister, as a case of the brother [this neutralization an example of whole of political education]

p. 296 Zarathustra always called us, supposing it teleiopoetically, under neutral, non-dialecticizable law of pas and ‘X w/out X’

p. 298 this friendship announced would have nothing to do w/ community: so that each X without X, unceasing neutralization of one predicate by another (relation w/out relation, community w/out community, partage sans partage), would call on significations altogether different from part shared or held in common

BL p. 207 law beyond sexual & grammatical gender, neutral

OOG p. 119 new reduction (epochē) developed in Crisis cannot be a forgetting or negating, a subtraction or devaluation of what it de-sediments or neutralizes

MSUB J p. 168 subjectile, btwn 2 places, the subject become a gisant, spread out, stretched out, inert, neutral (ci-gît) [see C p. 234 ci-gît, “here lies,” cf. F p. 26]

EM p. 116 (137-38) purportedly neutral “metaphysics” [of Sartre] affirms Heidegger’s assessment that every humanism remains ontotheological [unity of man & God]

VM p. 89-90 Levinas describes es gibt as neutral unity of existence

pp. 96, 314n Kant and Levinas both have immediate respect for other, but Levinas does not pass through neutral element of universal, nor through respect for law

p. 97 for Levinas neutral thought of Being neutralizes Other as being; materialism is not primarily sensualism, but primacy of the neutral [primacy > archia > chief > neutral]

p. 99 for Hegel, sight is neutral, does not consume; for Levinas, sight is not neutral, desires, but, like Hegel, doesn’t consume

p. 122 phenomenological neutralization neither before nor after ethics and anything that exists [Aristotle’s “neither of nor against nature”]

p. 132 for Husserl (transcendental phenomenology), “subjective a priori” only way to check totalitarianism of the neutral, impersonal “absolute Logic”: eschatology w/out dialogue [re: why finitude?] [revelation through faulty teletype]

PAS PAS pp. (50-1) Blanchot unleashes what Witz contains or denies, a transparent, neutral, impassive surface of language of writing, beyond/before les lignes de rupture ou de front (psychoanalysis, literature, philosophy, political practice/thought)

p. (65) Blanchot’s neutral must pass through very form of what it neutralizes

***p. (75) neutralization of sexual difference by calling her elle (anonymous, improper name), the de-distancing of viens instructs le pas de différence sexuelle; she is on the other side of the faux pas of the il that does not accompany me: neuter of affirmation, alliance, yes, yes, annulus of récit

p. (85) sans remarks same X w/out annulling it, springless spring (ce ressort sans ressort), this re-trait leaves everything intact (sauf, indemne) in appearance [absolute heterogenous neutrality w/out negation], at the same time it has abducted, erased, absolute rapidity of dispossession (dérapage)

p. (86) Blanchot neutralizes all the words of order of our modernity: meaning, language, discourse, writing

VP p. 11 Husserl neutralizes totality of world to phenomenon through transcendental reduction, thus arises the nothing that distinguishes parallels [trans. psychology from trans. phenom.]

p. 47 for Husserl, imagination neutralizes memory, it is a non-“positing” representation, keeps w/in itself primary reference to an originary presentation; pure ideality to which neutralization provides access is not fictional, thus Husserl’s beef w/ Hume and his fascination w/ Hume

DS p. 207n deconstruction’s ceaseless dissymmetry (i.e. what Hyppolite calls Mallarmé’s “materialism of the idea”) works alongside possibility of deconstruction’s neutralizing moment, the “logic of the hymen” is neither negatively neutral, nor neutral at all

POS pp. 26-7 gram as differance neutralizes phonologistic propensity of “sign,” liberates “graphic substance” > gram not an element, interwoven w/ traces of other elements of chain/system

p. 41 general strategy of deconstruction, its “general economy,” must avoid simply neutralizing binary oppositions & simply residing in closed field of oppositions

OTO p. 17 alliance in which Nietzsche seals/forges his signatures, and simulates them: demonic neutrality of midday delivered from the negative and from dialectic

PS p. 171 for Blanchot, Artaud’s “unpower” is “essential to thought” > [Blanchot risks neutralization by making Artaud exemplary]

FS p. 5 in structuralism, content (living energy of meaning) is neutralized by form > they’ll say this is the author’s responsibility before the critic’s

p. 24 Claudel, Proust (structuralists): neutralize surprises of nonsimultaneity, thus time becomes eternal, atemporal

CHM p. 55 if language is the break w/ madness, the closer and closer language gets to it, it’ll be separated only by “transparent sheet” (of which Joyce speaks) > this diaphaneity: “language, meaning, possibility, and elementary discretion of a nothing that neutralizes everything”

——thus, Foucault’s book a gesture of protection & internment

p. 60 phenomenological reduction as neutralizing, normalizing, straitjacketing (thematic of living present, profound reassurance of certainty of meaning)

***RGE p. 274 Bataille’s sovereignty not neutral even if it neutralizes all oppositions of classical logic

——discursive knowledge is neutral, neutrality has a negative essence (ne-uter), negative side of transgression

***Gi pp. 11-2 Dasein more neutral than Mensch?; Daseins neutrality as neutralization/subtraction of everything but naked trait of this relation to self, to the Being of its being

pp. 11-2 Dasein’s neutrality as a certain sexlessness (Geschlechtsoloigkeit), sexual difference privileged anthropological trait to be neutralized; Heidegger: “Dasein is neither of the two sexes”

——belonging to “two sexes” as first ontic concretion

——re: Dasein, the precipitation or acceleration to neutralize man’s sexuality, and to do so first, cannot be neutral

p. 14 sexless neutrality of Dasein does not desexualize, there’s a potency, a positivity > it’s the binarity (sexual duality) that’s neutralized in Daseins Geschlechtslosigkeit (sexlessness)

——pre-differential, or rather pre-dual, sexuality > not necessarily homogenous, undifferentiated

p. 15 neutralization, at once effect of negativity [sexual division into 2] and the erasure to which thinking submits this negativity so originary positivity can appear

——sexual difference as the 2, a negativity, even an asexuality > (is this interpretation, Derrida asks, too violent?)

p. 17 what if neutralization (which doesn’t happen by itself) were a violent operation?

p. 18 inner supplementary frontier splits lexicon again: both dis-, and zer- have neutral, nonnegative sense

p. 21 “transcendental dispersion” belongs to essence of Dasein in its neutrality

pp. 22-3 isn’t Heidegger repeating traditional philosophemes w/ new rigor, beginning w/ a neutralization, denying a negativity?

p. 25 dispersion marked twice (same could be said for neutral): general structure of Dasein & mode of inauthenticity

WAP p. 69 by naturalizing [the classroom] one neutralizes, conceals (dissimule), an active machinery, the structures, constraints, forms, settings (cadres), the parergonal, by which the dominating mastery, not neutral at all, centers itself: il n'y a pas de place neutre ou naturelle dans lenseignement

PSSS p. 276 “I can,” “I may,” mastery of performative, dominates/neutralizes (in order of “symbolic,” symbolically) the event it produces

***p. 278 wherever there is law & performative, event has been neutralized, reappropriated by performative force or symbolic order

EL p. 200 what if there were no third language, no metalinguistic referee, no language in general, no [originary] neutral language? > what if the dialectico-transcendental hypothesis is already a positivist naturalization/neutralization of the supernatural?

LI p. 136 speaking is never neutral, must determine a context > thus always political: political as nonnatural relation to others (a definition which would apply to animals as well, i.e. man is not the only political animal)

TN p. 64 [is Christianity the only idealizing anesthesia, neutralization, universalism—or one case?]

***pp. 83-4 to avoid neutralizing sexual difference(s) [in the name of the neutral] should one favor dissymmetry & presumed sexual identity of the signatory?

AD p. 140n enormous task: to think Blanchot’s neuter—given Levinas’ non-neutralization

LG p. 243 Blanchot’s doubly affirmative neutrality: “(or…or)?”

BSi p. 205 Valéry [in Monsieur Teste] tries to neutralize/master Unheimlichkeit [see BSi pp. 200-01 in

CAP(ITAL)

]

OG p. 93 [vis-à-vis Heidegger] thought of trace, perfectly neutral name, never has weight in system, blank part of text: what we already know we haven’t done

p. 188 (267) Rousseau’s neutral origin of ethico-political conceptuality [is this so different than Hobbes? i.e. no injustice w/out law]

ATAP p. 66 relever of tone, dream of philosophy: make tonal difference inaudible, neutrality of tone, affect works (over) concept as contraband

FV p. 488 [re: Poe’s Purloined…] no neutralization possible when public corporation (société anonyme) of capital & desire inaugurates narration

WBH p. 194 classical ruse of neutralization/neuterization (of sexual marks): “I think” is neither man nor woman, but we can verify that it’s already man

p. 199 gift beyond sexual duality > Heidegger’s attempt to neutralize sexual opposition and not sexual difference, liberating field of sexuality for very different sexuality, more multiple: no more sexes, one sex for each time, each gift, a sexual difference for each gift

CHOR p. 104 Heidegger insists that Dasein is neuter, it is neutral, neither of the 2 sexes, but not indifferent, not annulling negativity—an originary positivity, Mächtigkeit des Wesens

NEW ENLIGHTENMENT (NEW INTERNATIONAL) (see UWC)

***MONL p. 57 vision of the New International w/ every word

SPOM p. 35 the “communism” we will nickname new International: l'alliance d'un rejoindre sans conjoint, sans organisation, sans parti, sans nation, sans État, sans propriété > w/out effacing heterogeneity of the other, sans blesser la dis-jointure [see POOF pp. 54-5]

p. 105 subtitle of SPOM: “the New International” (not necessarily ant-statist)

pp. 106-07 “New International”: untimely link, w/out title, w/out name, contract, w/out party, w/out national community…friendship of an alliance w/out institution

p. 113 New International belongs only to anonymity, New Enlightenment for the century to come

p. 221 watch over a future in memory, this time, of an impure “impure impure history of ghosts”

——“intellectual” of tomorrow, “scholar” of future should learn justice from the ghost, should learn to speak to the ghost (if even in the other w/in oneself)

POR p. 5 (132) for Aristotle, human distinguished from animals who have hard, dry eyes (tōn sklerophtalmōn), who alway see

——Derrida wants to cultivate a new university Enlightenment, but also insists University must not be a scleropthalmic animal [must go dark, blink]

p. 16 (148) [re: CIPH] new responsibility of community of thought w/out secured frontier btwn basic & end-oriented research (entre recherche fondamentale et recherche finalisée) > rethink community, institution, and all ruses, tâche infinie, de la raison finalisante > paths by which apparently disinterested research can by reinvested by all sorts of programs

p. 17 (150) strategic rhythm of new [professorial?] responsibility: multiple sites (lieux), rhythm of blinking eye (dun battement de paupières), play one risk off other, la clôture contre labîme, labîme contre la clôture [hard eye (of reason) has no rhythm, no heart beat, no arrêt of sur-vie]

p. 19 (153) protocols of vigilance for new Aufklärung: beware the abysses and gorges, but also the bridges & barriers, beware of opening university to bottomless outside or closing it in on itself so that it is available to any interest, or becomes useless > beware of ends, university w/out ends?

EM p. 113 (134) national philosophical identity accommodates a nonidentity

FWT p. 95 Derrida’s new International to fight 10 wounds of new world order: unemployment, exclusion of exiles, economic wars, arms trade, ethnic conflict (based on soil & blood), power of phantom states in form of mafias and drug cartels

p. 96 there’s necessity for secondary effects of program (programmatic economy & strategy), but in the first/last instance, what is to be done is invented/inaugurated, must come w/out program

——New International must seek unheard of figures [I cannot define this forms], not opposed to existence of parties, but “Party” form is no longer the major form of political struggle

p. 97 “new International” an engagement btwn men, btwn living beings (w/ “animals”!), btwn living & dead, and those not yet born

——some citizen identity is necessary, but categorical imperative exceeds responsibility of citizen as such

POOF p. 42 no enlightenment, for us, except the one to come (to be thought) [i.e. “community w/out community]

PSSS p. 265 political force of psychoanalysis remains at odds w/ res publica, or even democracy of sovereignist concept (nation-statist), and at odds w/ publicity of its own institutionalization

p. 270 cruel mutation of cruelty: a technical, scientific, juridical, economic, ethical, political, and terrorist policing mutation of our age

——must think a mutation of cruelty, more pscyhoanlaytico; new historical figures of an ageless cruelty, older than man

——think limit/horizon of psychoanalysis (yet to be thought)

pp. 273-74 an outside psychoanalysis (ethics, politics) should account for psychoanalytic knowledge while maintaining heterogeneity of the leap [account for knowledge w/out seeking program]

pp. 276-77 a task w/out horizon for a new psychoanalytic Enlightenment: will calculate w/ the inflexible unconditionality of the unconditional [think POOF, counting event of friendship]

LI pp. 127-28 margin, parasite, iterability belong w/out belonging to the class of concepts of which they must render an accounting—to theoretical space they organize in a “quasi”-transcendental manner: something happens by or to set theory > all this must be rendered (rendre compte et raison) by us enlightened modern thinkers, right?

p. 141 absence of univocal definitions not “obscurantist” but a new, very new Aufklärung

p. 159n pragrammatology to come

TN p. 269 Nancy on Enlightenment to come: never renounce thought, philosophy, knowledge > Nancy never renounces pertinence, he is so resolute, even at heart of ecstasy, of sacrifice

WOG pp. 21-2 “one must never give up on analysing and explaining the resemblances, the ‘common genre,’ the analogies and commonalities” [re: society, history, politics]

——exploring these resemblances one task of Enlightenment of our time, even if not most important or urgent, even if our categories for configuration are radically insufficient > we must take account as well the fractures & anachronisms of resemblance: truth of homology best imposed by going through differences that blur one’s vision

EU p. 92 Derrida continues to believe in the interest in light re: university, a task that remains for us given-to (donné-à), to what I don’t know (one might have once said: to doing or thinking)

pp. 100-01 interpretation of poem, philosopheme, theologeme always proposes an institutional model, consolidating an existing one or constituting a new one: calls for politics of community of interpreters > every text/element of corpus bequeathes/reproduces several injunctions

——every text opens/closes, double bind, undecidability, an overdetermination that can’t be mastered

pp. 168-73 [structure of matrix of philosophical discipline] is a “nondialectizable” contradiction, divided law, double law, double bind, antinomy: the fights/debates we’re talking about always oppose different philosophies

——Husserl’s transcendental community of “we” in face of “crisis” & Heidegger’s call of Being comprises, pre-comprehends, us—so we begin w/ them & otherwise:

*1st commandment: 2 ends: the cheap end, the Kantian end

*2nd commandment: local, ubiquity

*3rd commandment: teach, not teach

*6th commandment: time requirements, and “single blow (tout à coup)”

*7th commandment: place, non-place

***p. 173 only livable community (for Derrida, this is a faith in spirit of philosophy w/out dogma, murder, idiotic polemic, hateful distortion) wouldn’t shun/deny double law [i.e. a teacher must initiate/train a student while effacing him/herself in name of autodidactic tradition]

p. 193 we need subtle, differentiated work that doesn’t give in to any intimidation

***——Derrida mistrusts reactionism against media, says there are not enough media, that the risk w/ media is that it is too monolithic, concentrated, violently uniform

p. 201 new philosophical objects, light, permeable, mobile: dispersion, new philosophical “formations”

pp. 202-03 [CIPH] no preinterpretation, “thinking” as what questions philosophy > indeterminate opening (experimental incursions in unexplored areas)

NIETZSCHE

KH p. 148n Heidegger: chaos, khaos, khaine, signifies the yawning, a split in two, close connection to aletheia, abyss which opens

——for Nietzsche, Chaos prevents a humanization (Vermenschung) of existence in its totality

GOD p. 23 genealogy’s axiom: history never effaces what it buries (enfouit), keeps (garde) secret of what it encrypts, the secret of the secret, cest une histoire secrète du secret gardé; genealogy is also an economy

p. 114 Nietzsche’s diagnosis of cruelty is also aimed at economy, speculation, commercial trafficking in institution of morality & justice, & that which exceeds economy as exchange, le commerce du re-merciement [wage, profit of infinite]

——and Christianity’s self-destruction of justice by means of grace

p. 116 how can/does Nietzsche believe in the history of the creditor? btwn credit & faith

R pp. 3-4 [Marie-Louis Mallet’s orchestration of Cerisy conference a kind of hidden mastery] magic & magisterial wand of a great conductor [Rousseau’s wand]

p. 66 voyoucracy, corrupting power of street, not anarchic disorder, but structured disorder, secret society, seducer [hidden master, Versucher]

p. 68 Benjamin’s great criminal

FK pp. 50-51 via Kant’s moral law, Christianity can only answer its moral calling in death of God far beyond figures of the Passion

H p. anne 20 w/out the experience, no ear to listen ~ [annihilation of trace?]

AF p. 49 discussing Yerushalmi, Derrida emphasizes essential modality “perhaps” for another reason than Nietzsche’s [courage of future philosopher to say perhaps] [elsewhere Derrida certainly emphasizes Nietzsche’s perhaps]

SPOM p. 143 Marx’s revolutionary injunction “let the dead bury the dead”, the imperative of an “active forgetting,” as Nietzsche would put it

BL pp. 193-94 the height of the human, 2 legs, is what creates repression; turning away is an upward movement, purification, turns away from that which stinks: the history of the law [Derrida says we haven’t paid much attention to hairs inside nose]

MPM pp. 128-29 for de Man, Rousseau & Nietzsche both derive transcendental-referent from possibility of making promises [think futurity] [Derrida’s distress over loving both]

pp. 134-35 de Man: Nietzsche anticipated difference btwn constative/performative in deconstructive gesture, thought of undecidable: deconstruction of illusion that episteme (truth) could be replaced w/doxa (persuasion) [anti-relativism]

EM p. 135 Nietzsche: if there is style it must be plural [perhaps we need a change of “style”]

pp. 135-36 Nietzsche’s übermensch “burns his text and erases the traces of his steps,” a laughter bursting beyond metaphysics

p. 136 (163-64) is Nietzsche the last metaphysician as Heidegger reads him? or is Heidegger the last sleeping shudder (le dernier sursaut ensommeillé) of the higher man?

VM p. 139 Nietzsche and Renan reduce Heidegger’s Being to a metaphor by referring to its etymological association w/ respiration [Derrida doubles down on Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche did not think Being? must find Being in Nietzsche via other roads]

S p. 73 Heidegger saves Nietzsche’s text (from accusation of biologism, zoologism, racism [?]) by damning it: still metaphysics of absolute subjectity like Hegel: Nietzsche’s absolute subjectity that of body, impulsions, affects; Hegel’s that of the willing that knows itself

p. 74 is a metaphysics of race less serious than a naturalism or biologism of race? [re: Nietzsche’s “blonde beast”]

POOF p. 28 the all too of Human All Too Human, a rolling wave, a trembling, enveloped violence of a welling up wave falling back on itself, “when the excess of the beyond itself folds back into immanence,” turning around, coming to perhaps

p. 30 perhaps as non-dialectical passage from one to other that Aristotle can’t think, unable to endure contamination coming from what is beyond both antithetical values > Nietzsche: “Glaube an die Gegensatze der Werthe (faith in antithetical values)”

p. 33 following, not following Nietzsche: paradox of any fidelity

pp. 34-5 how Nietzsche’s call to “new philosophers” asks them to come in the future & implies they have already arrived

p. 36 philosophers of the future will be at once its [the fundamentally other] figure & responsibility

p. 38 for Nietzsche, the lookalike caricatures are the worst enemy of what they resemble, i.e. those w/ “democratic sensibility” > Nietzsche responds in name of hyperbole of democracy to unlock, open, this worst repression

p. 40 Nietzsche against the levellers (Nivellirer), those who blame all misery on existing society [they are unfree, no solitude, ludicrously superficial]

——at each instant discourse [Nietzsche’s] carried to its limit, on the edge of silence: transports itself beyond itself, hyperbolic, infinite build-up (surenchère), swept away by perhaps that undecides meaning in each decisive moment

p. 41 Derrida countersigns Nietzsche [re: arrivant thinkers, new philosophers], extends the duty to countersign again, to us, to me, to you, teleiopoetically: friendship w/out friendship of friends of solitude

pp. 41-2 Nietzsche: today we even need to be scarecrows, insofar as we are jealous friends of our most midday/midnight solitude > “friends of solitude” even called to be conjurers

pp. 55-6 Nietzsche’s silence (among friends), imperative/enigma of sense of decency (pudeur) [Why I am a Destiny]: an erasure w/out erasure, everything is possible in this silence > silence as interruption that substitutes testimony for know-how, faith for the test, the perhaps for certainty, other for same, friendship for calculation: different way of thinking among

——no silence among friends w/out laughter, which bares its teeth like death, doing evil & laughing at evil (not laughing it away) among friends

pp. 59-60 Nietzsche’s dissimulation (sage acts the fool), for friendship’s sake be an enemy, knowing how to lie to divert wicked lucidity, dissimulate in order to preserve: feigning to be precisely what he is, he loves them enough not to want to do them all the evil he wants for them

p. 61 Nietzsche refers to his friends as brothers (all of Zarathustra read through this figural alignment) > addressees lay down law of genre, so their coming virtues are virile ones

pp. 61-2 the 3 ways to see virtue in Nietzsche: 1) deliberate perversion of heritage 2) restoration of meaning perverted by heritage 3) hyperbolic surenchère (more Greek than Greek, more Judeo-Christian than Judeo-Christian) > Nietzsche never discredits virtue

p. 62 closure & deconstruction (divine microscope) in Nietzsche as he walks down, through, the gauntlet of Christian virtue > must not hesitate to take path of Christian virtue

p. 63 once Nietzsche goes beyond Greek friendship, can we find unity in Greek culture anymore? > when he says, “in honor of friendship,” he knows (better than anyone) he is speaking Greek

pp. 63, 79-80 [refracting the Aristotlean idea that one must love lovence, that it’s more worthwhile (vaut mieux) to love than to be loved, Derrida continually uses phrase “who better (mieux)” re: Nietzsche, as if extending an ambiguous friendship to him]

pp. 63-4 Derrida reads Nietzsche [re: GS 61] as advocating acceptance of gift & dependency, elevating logic of gift above self-sufficiency of a subject [Greek philosopher who refuses King’s donation], a logic that reorients friendship, calling friendship back to irreducibility of other—but perhaps this installs an irresponsible freedom, madness (friend–enemy), the worst?

——temptation to match Nietzsche’s gesture, call he seems to be making for another justice, one that breaks w/ equivalence of right & vengeance: what’re political consequences for democracy?

p. 79 [continuing w/ indefensible bibliophilic discretion] Nietzsche marks a mutation in the political, who better than he marked our history as a history of political linked to love, friend, enemy via Jew, Greek, Christian > binding/unbinding of this link; p. 80 who better than he showed friend/enemy passing into each other: still, the individual ‘Nietzsche’ not the only witness

p. 80 Nietzsche’s overturning, [via dangerous perhaps], brought off in ‘field’ w/out limit, w/out assured, reassuring, ground—all the more finite for this very fact: a world that no longer holds together, one that resembles chaotic madness, disorder, randomness

——what Nietzsche augurs exceeds the name Nietzsche

pp. 80-1 we tremble in time of Nietzsche’s mutation, we belong (w/out belonging) to this tremor, absolute dislocation, borderless disjoining; we emit warnings, like searchlights w/out coast, mad, impossible pleas: recurrent syntagms of “X without X” (harbor invisible in their very light) > are these watchmen [Bataille, Blanchot, Nancy] guiding us toward another destination [?]

p. 284 the gift is that which gives friendship in Nietzsche > and yet, friendship still means freedom, equality, fraternity in Nietzsche

pp. 285-86 quoting Matthew, Derrida asks whether there isn't still profit of a sublime economy, economy beyond economy, in Nietzsche? or does the absolute gift (advising against love of one’s neighbor) break the ruse of this sublime economy? like Kant, isn’t there still best exchange rate for virtue?

p. 286 Nietzsche’s gift must also belong to a finite world > how to think dissymmetry of gift w/out exchange, infinite disproportion, from vantage point of terrestrial finitude? under its horizon w/out horizon [see p. 263] > infinitization itself is suspected of being an economic ruse, perverse seduction, stratagem, of loving one’s neighbor

——Nietzsche: you must understand how to be a sponge if you want to be loved by overflowing hearts > Nietzsche: in your friend you should love the Superman as your principle

pp. 286-87 Nietzsche’s friend of most distant belongs to finite earth (not world of Christian hinterworld) > friend’s finitude infinitizes the gift he gives [infinite differance is finite] : a friend who doesn’t give you the world (a finite one), gives you nothing [this is neither Greek nor Christian]

p. 287 Nietzsche’s Superman: awaited because he is origin/cause of man, Ursache, this friend promised via messianico-teleiopeotic perhaps, immemorially past > this friendship to come would still be too human, still deserves name ‘friendship’ [anthropological, humanist character of friendship is situated/delimited here, friendship of proximity/presence]

p. 288 Derrida has not substituted name Nietzsche for Zarathustra: les choses sont déjà assez imprenables et inappropriables avec chacun deux

p. 289 Nietzsche’s abyssal altercation w/ Christian fraternity, that we’re tasked to relate ancient & new history (fraternity in Christianity, in Arabo-islamic culture too) > no justification in the shortcoming, the obliged shirking, of this task: nevertheless we believe in the seriousness of the obligation

——Derrida has insisted that the indefinite recoils (replis) in Zarathustra’s strategy must contain one fold or another that places history of brother in Bible & Koran beside Zarathustra (not in confrontation)

p. 293 event of Nietzsche, signatory & witness, cause & effect, of a few unprecedented ruptures/interruptions in place of friendship > yet, interruption/rupture not sufficient to account for where Nietzsche folds into Christianity

p. 297 Blanchot no longer has affinity w/ one Nietzsche (there is always plus dun): friendship is not a gift or promise

TC p. 245 interpretive in the Nietzschean sense [see On the Geneal… p. 77]

SH p. 14 meridian binds (Verbindende) at midday the encounter (shortest shadow?) “a date would be the gnomon (nom, shadow) of these meridians”

WM pp. 262-63(n) by placing metaphor en abyme, Nietzsche is responsible for the need to find a new distinction than that btwn metaphor and concept

——Nietzsche takes risk of continuity btwn metaphor & concept, describes metaphorical tissue of man as spider’s web, Derrida follows web, tissu, tisser, to weave, honey bees, Marx

DS p. 277 difference is the necessary interval, suspense btwn 2 outcomes, “lapse of time” btwn 2 shots, rolls, chances > a game of chance forever new, a play of fire forever young > fire & games (via Nietzsche, Heraclitus), play of luck w/ necessity: a hymen btwn chance & rule

POS pp. 9-10 Derrida is “above all” made possible by Heidegger’s ontological difference (the unthought difference btwn Being and beings), yet Nietzsche is “perhaps” a move beyond the ontotheology of Heidegger, toward a differance no longer in language of West

SP p. 57 mustn’t we reconcile Nietzsche’s apparently feminist propositions w/ his overwhelming corpus of “venomous (acharné) anti-feminism” > question still remains: de ce que je fais ici en ce moment

pp. 73-5 Heidegger’s 3 warnings on reading Nietzsche:

1. simply aestheticizing his work as philosopher-artist would corroborate current order of philosophy

2. do not confuse “heroic-boastful” style (pseudo-transgressive exuberance) for “grand style”

3. must read Nietzsche as unremitting interrogation of Western civilization

pp. 75-9 Heidegger’s 3 propositions related to these warnings:

1. there’s only been a philosopher before art, a gossiping woman, a sterile woman (not a männliche Mutter); acc. Nietzsche, the old aesthetic nothing but that of passive, receptive consumers

2. Nietzsche’s art would be “metaphysical in its most intimate intention”

3. Nietzsche deals (most frequently) w/ Plato by simple inversion (Umdrehung), standing Platonic propositions on their head

pp. 79-81 Heidegger oscillates btwn reading in Nietzsche a simple Umdrehung (inversion) of Plato or something other > neither a direct flipping, nor an an-archical erasure of hierarchy (which consolidates established order), but “a transformation of hierarchical structure itself”

p. 115 acc. Heidegger, Nietzsche belongs to metaphysics because his thought aimed to culminate it [Derrida asks whether belonging has one value, and, if so, would it carry belonging beyond itself]

p. 123 “steps of the dove (colombe),” which is the manner of the Übermensch, leads Derrida to “pun”: we could begin a discourse on Nietzsche’s columbarium (colombaire)

p. 139 never has been the style, the woman, the simulacrum, the sexual difference [un gai savoir]

OTO p. 7 Nietzsche put his name on the line, staged signatures, made an immense bio-graphical paraph > [Derrida mentions this not to guarantee him a profit, return]

——name’s genius still there to make us forget his death

——to be dead, no return can come to the bearer of the name

——only the name can inherit, so the name is always a dead man’s name

——Nietzsche’s name has poisoned milk in it, its legacy, mixed up in advance w/ worst of our times, and not by accident

p. 11 Dionysus vs. Crucified, name of versus, countername, suffices to pluralize (in a singular fashion) homonymic mask & proper name, to lead all threads of name astray in labyrinth (ear)

p. 13 cannot think nor hear Nietzsche’s name w/out reaffirmation of the hymen, alliance or wedding ring, eternal return

p. 15 Nietzsche said it all (more or less), the most mutually incompatible things, his contradicting duplicity: he said that he said them > all statements before & after are at once possible

——btwn his living mother and his dead father, this is Nietzsche’s chance

pp. 16-7 Nietzsche’s living mother/dead father, identity as double & neutral; “I know both, I am both” [“both” must be read as singular] > la vie la mort: the dead man the living feminine

p. 17 alliance in which Nietzsche seals/forges his signatures, and simulates them: demonic neutrality of midday delivered from the negative and from dialectic

——Nietzsche: “I have a subtler sense of smell for the signs of ascent and decline”

p. 20(n) institutions of “yes,” have need of ears: Nietzsche doesn’t expect the ears and hands for his truths today—my small ears no small interest to ladies, makes me a monster, anti-ass, Anti-Christ

pp. 21-2 for Nietzsche, culture (Bildung) begins when we know how to treat the living as living; Derrida discusses a pact, alliance, contract, a hymen w/ living language, w/ mother (tongue), against death (father): even good master of history (science of the father) trains for the sake of mother tongue, must know when to suppress ‘historical interest’ for culture to begin

p. 23n for Nietzsche, importance of vomit (Ekel), learning to vomit, so as to form one’s taste, one’s disgust; Derrida refers to Hamacher’s Pleroma, Hegel and Ekel

p 24n [re: signature w/out value, to which is juxtaposed untimely signature] Nietzsche: rights of genius have been democratized, everyone relieved of the labor to form oneself, of personal necessity of culture (Bildungsarbeit, Bildungsnot)

p. 25 Nietzsche: “I swore not to publish any book that doesn’t leave me w/ a conscience as clear as an angel’s”

p. 26 in the name of an old tradition, Nietzsche tells us to slow down, take all the time to read, at beginning of “On the Future of our Educational…”

pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

p. 28 Nietzsche: culture (Bildung) begins w/ obedience (Gehorsamkeit), subordination (Unterordnung), discipline (Zucht), not academic freedom

pp. 30-1 [re: fact that Nazis could ape Nietzsche’s text] if you refuse conscious, deliberate textual intentions, the perversion is made possible by structure of text itself (its “remaining”), otherwise it would be unreadable > nothing absolutely contingent about fact that Nazis effectively brandished his name [Derrida wary of close reading that would preserve Nietzsche’s intention]

p. 32 Nietzsche: politics will have merged entirely w/ a war of spirits

FWT p. 151 DP as impossible evaluation of debt (Nietzsche says some strong things on subject)

ATIA p. 35 Derrida sometimes sees Nietzsche take the horse’s head in his hands, calls it as a witness to his compassion

——Nietzsche tries to teach us to laugh again [in Ecce Homo], by plotting to let all his animals loose into philosophy, “reanimalizes” genealogy of the concept

p. 102 profound perversity w/in Kantian morality guided Nietzsche in his Geneal

p. 132 Nietzsche & Kafka realized better than anyone: Mother, Law, God, Animal > indissociable figures of the same Thing

p. 35 Nietzsche tries to teach us to laugh again [in Ecce Homo], by plotting to let all his animals loose into philosophy, “reanimalizes” genealogy of the concept

***p. 160 to “let” something “be” “as such,” you would have to “let be” in your absence, in your death [thus, for Heidegger, being-toward-death and “as such” constitutive of each other], but is this ever possible? can we let the being be? Nietzsche would say no, that the objective is always caught in the living, in life, in perspective > whatever the difference btwn animals, remains an “animal” relation

——Derrida’s strategy re: border(s) btwn animal/human: there is no pure and simple “as such”

FS p. 29 Nietzsche against Flaubert for believing in the work over the man (sedentary life), we would have to choose btwn writing and dance: dance of the pen? but we must hunch to write

DIF DIF pp. 17-9 before Heidegger purposely and radically questioned presence, Freud & Nietzsche did so, and, remarkably, they did so via motif of differance [remarkable :)]

——“isn’t all Nietzsche’s thought a critique of philosophy as an active indifference to difference, as the system of adiaphoristic reduction or repression?”: this doesn’t exclude that philosophy lives in/on differance

——if we were to think not the erasure of opposition but why each term must appear as differance of the other [long list of classical oppositions: i.e. physis/mimēsis] > we see announced sameness of differance and repetition in the eternal return

——differance as “active,” as Nietzsche’s incessant interpretation, system of figures not dominated by value of truth

p. 27 there will be no unique name: must think this w/out nostalgia, hors du myth of pure mom/dad language, must affirm like Nietzsche met laffirmation en jeu, dans un rire et un pas de la danse

SW p. 325 “what I admire most in Nietzsche is his lucidity about Paul”

DPi p. 142 for Nietzsche, hostility to life is inherent to life

pp. 150-51 Derrida: Nietzsche always interesting even if you don’t agree w/ him, he’s interesting because he sniffs out partie honteuse, modestly hidden or negated interest

p. 151 Nietzsche’s arche-genealogical question is the question of origin of law, of penal law as origin of calculation, rule of calculation > whence comes equivalence btwn injury/pain

PIO p. 414n de Man: Nietzsche anticipates speech act theory

HLP pp. 28-9 Nietzsche’s “History of an Error,” a fabulation about the fabulation of truth (Nietzsche proceeds as if a true story could be told about fabrication [?]) > coup de théâtre

p. 29 St. Paul, the privileged adversary of Nietzsche’s ferocity

WOG p. 25 Derrida’s Nietzsche different from Foucault’s & Deleuze's because of an insistent passage through Heidegger

p. 31(n) mediation through Nietzsche [re: Greeks] not constant—often ironic; PC very ironic about Nietzsche’s image of Socrates

p. 34 Derrida’s readings of Nietzsche often very ‘suspicious’ of him, also ironic, critical, ‘deconstructive’

BSi p. 3 Nietzsche’s supreme silence: a fearsome sovereign mistress

p. 176 nonknowledge of bête, spirit of seminar; the living in life itself outplays opposition btwn bêtise and its supposed contrary > Nietzsche one of most eloquent witnesses of this theme: both man & animal, both idiotic & cunning—no decidable limit

pp. 198-99 in Monsieur Teste, a Nietzschean kind of superman, infinitely cunning and infinitely bête solitary types: incalculable/hyperbolic arithmetic turns “who” into “what”

——quoi as coite from quietus (silence) [who > what: silencing]

pp. 256-59 Nietzsche’s superman, and the sovereign too, a hyperbolic, sublime, “higher than height,” more about excess than height, it’s the more than that counts, the surplus, absolutely more: could as well be a maximum of smallness, God as small (sovereign use of nanotechnology)

OG pp. 19-20 (31-33) Heidegger’s reading of Nietzschean demolition irrefutable if it remains confined to metaphysical edifice, entirely other if one accepts the deconstruction at hand > is Nietzsche captive or deconstructive?

——Nietzsche contributed great deal to liberating signifier from dependence on logos (in relation to truth, primary signified) > to save Nietzsche from Heidegger’s reading (N. remains simply w/in metaphysics), we need to understand how a step out of metaphysics must still utilize it in a certain way, perhaps we should offer Nietzsche up to Heidegger’s reading entirely

——text, reading, writing were originary for Nietzsche, Nietzsche has written what he has written

p. 24 (38-9) the hesitation of Heidegger & Nietzsche is not “incoherence,” it is the trembling of deconstruction: deconstruction does not destroy structures from the inside, must inhabit, inhabits most when one doesn’t suspect it > borrow all subversive strategies from old structure

p. 68 (99) “God’s death” & “return to finitude” belong to onto-theology they fight against > differance something other than finitude

p. 140 (202) it is necessary to rigorously suspend the ethical instance of violence to repeat the genealogy of morals [?]

p. 143 perhaps Heidegger couldn’t read in Nietzsche the attempt to think differance prior to being (aka presence) > being speaks nothing other than metaphysics: even if thinking its closure

p. 342n Nietzsche & Rousseau share same opinion of women (degradation of culture), and of genealogy of morals as servitude to slave—so how could Nietzsche have hated him so much?

pp. 286-87 (406) the epoch of truth, what Nietzsche calls abbreviation of signs [retreat of signifier?] [Derrida defends Nietzsche against reading that restores truth, fundamental ontology, in Nietzsche’s thought] [Heidegger’s reading?]

UWC p. 231 Nietzsche’s promising animal (the figure of man) is still to-come

CIR p. 133 word Sony reminds me of the dream in Turin, btwn Rousseau/Nietzsche > my two positive heroes

EU p. 114 too early or too late (trop tôt ou trop tard) [Nietzsche-like]—my anachrony

CHOR p. 94 there is a “reactive” feminism that even gains power today—that’s what Nietzsche mocks, and not woman or women [?]

NIETZSCHE & HEGEL

***TC pp. 246-47 history of thought, reduced to bloodless framework, conceptualizing itself since Hegel: to reject death as repetition affirms death as present expenditure w/out return, this schema lies in wait for (guette) Nietzsche’s repetition of affirmation > la dépense pure, la générosité absolue, offering unicity of present to death in order to make present appear als sich, already begins to want to maintain presence of present, has opened the book and memory, the thinking of Being as memory; to reject presence is to preserve its irreplaceable and mortal presence, that w/in it which can’t be repeated, to consume pure difference w/ pleasure [Hegel’s master]

——for Artaud, theater is obligatory focal point of this thought

TC pp. 246-47 [see NIETZSCHE & HEGEL on pure expenditure, death, repetition of affirmation, maintaining presence, consume pure difference w/ pleasure]

OTO p. 23n for Nietzsche, importance of vomit (Ekel), learning to vomit, so as to form one’s taste, one’s disgust; Derrida refers to Hamacher’s Pleroma, Hegel and Ekel

p. 33 Nietzsche exposes “academic freedom,” autonomous university, as ruse of State, a constraint more ferocious for disguising itself as laisser-faire [Hegel is accused here, too]

WAP p. 118 Hegel is Nietzsche’s “more or less principle adversary” in Ecce Homo [?]

RGE p. 267 acc. Heidegger, Hegel & Nietzsche confused voluntarism w/ essence of metaphysics

IW p. 272 Hegel’s philosophical antisemitism toward Kant (rather, anti-Judaism) reappears in Nietzsche’s contra Kant [?]

NIGHT WHERE ALL COWS ARE BLACK

SPOM p. 146 impossibility to discern specter from specter of specter, specter searching for content/effectivity (presence) > not NWACAB, but grey on grey because red on red

p. 171 Stirner brings forth concepts indeterminately, homogeneously, in “the dark element of a nocturnal obscurity,” what Marx calls a “Negroid state” (im negerhaften Zustande)

——an august ancestor [Derrida?] compared “Negroid state” to NWACAB above [if he’s referring to p. 146, he said the opposite?]

p. 172 “ Negroid form,” obscurantism, sorcery, enchantment, mysticism

VM p. 130 least violence is the avowal of violence (against nihilism); worst violence: nothingness, unimaginable night

NIHILISM (ATHEISM)

POR pp. 14-5 (147) irrationalism, nihilism, posture completely symmetrical to, thus dependent on principle of reason [Leibniz denounced extravagance of irrationalism]

——this is observed when those who defend principle of reason act w/out reason, w/ obscurantism and nihilism to defend reason

HASD p. 7 deconstruction: a “symptom” of modern/postmodern nihilism or last testimony of faith, martyrdom, in the present fin de siècle?

p. 55 acc. Heidegger, nihilism: not taking seriously thought of nothing

VM p. 130 least violence is the avowal of violence (against nihilism); worst violence: nothingness, unimaginable night

p. 149 for Heidegger, language’s dissimulation is the 1st violence, but also 1st defeat of nihilistic violence > 1st epiphany of Being

PAS PAS p. (80) “singular materiality” of pas goes beyond nihilist impasse, and “materialist theses”

POOF POOF p. 81 via Nietzsche, no longer any homes here, darkness falling on value of value, hence on the very desire for an axiomatic (a consistent, granted, presupposed system of values)

EL EL pp. 192-93 “logic,” “program,” “nihilism” in quotation marks—give these words a gripping resemblance to their opposite

LI LI p. 137 relativism, and everything sometimes associated w/ it (skepticism, empiricism, even nihilism), remains a philosophical position in contradiction w/ itself (Husserl showed this better than anyone)

p. 147 when a deconstructionist is dismissed as someone who has no regard for truth, and whose text therefore demands no rigor—deconstructionist is synonymous w/ skeptic-relativist-nihilist!

OG OG p. 323n (13n) theological prejudices even when atheist

IF IF p. 304 via Flaubert, the devil is no more an atheist than Spinoza > no one is less atheist than devil

NO CHOICE

KH p. 100 “according to Hegel…and we are thinking after Hegel and according to him, following his thought” [philosophy only becomes serious after sublating mythic form, i.e. when it becomes logical]

p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

GOD p. 51 has Christianity alone made possible an authentic responsibility, responsibility as history, and as history of Europe? there’s no choice here btwn a logical deduction & reference to the revelatory event [not simply affirmed as believer]

GT pp. 7-9 obsessing over circle encircling us, Heidegger [see OS] on circle, point, as vulgar time; time as circle: one of most powerful, ineluctable representations in history of metaphysics ——can’t exactly escape circle, it’s a feast for thinking, but gift as instant of effraction of circle

p. 100 et nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement que partir des textes, et des textes en tant qu’ils partent (quils se séparent, deux-mêmes et de leur origine, de nous) dès le départ [even if we wished to]

FK p. 94 impossible to deny the possibility of deconstruction [the opening of clôture]

***MONL p. 1 cannot challenge indisputable monolingualism in me, except by testifying to its omnipresence in me

OOG pp. 5-6 [quoted from “Form and Meaning”] no choice [undecidable] btwn 2 lines of thought but to reflect on circularity that makes one pass into the other, by repeating the circle, an elliptical change of site, producing a non-negative deficiency as ellipsis of form and meaning

FL pp. 231-32 [re: questions concerning deconstruction & justice] cannot answer “either/or,” “yes or no”

MC p. 372 pitting one fiction against the other (mania vs. Freud), do we really have a choice?

SPOM p. 25 is a day infinitely foreign to vengeance [w/out it], heterogeneous at its source, to come or more ancient than memory itself? impossible to decide, today: “the time is out of joint”

POOF pp. 158-59 if there’s a single thesis [in POOF], it’s that there’s no choice [no choice of double gesture]: 1) the political is phallogocentrism, virtue is virile, thus woman’s slow/painful access to citizenship: we must go beyond the political 2) keep the ‘old name’ & engage other struggles, ‘partisan’ ones

——de-naturalization of fraternal authority (its de-construction), preference given to democratic fraternization > this is all possible, along w/ demand of a democracy to-come, because fraternity was never natural, never a fact [God is dead because God was always dead?]

POO p. 8 the duplicity before the rule makes one tremble, an other who will seek to hold you back or push you into void, save you or lose you, supposing there ever a choice?

pp. 22-3 impossible to respond, impossible not to respond, double bind, 2 hands nailed down [no choice]

——brought to a halt [arrêt?] when faced w/ contradictory orders

MSUB J p. 169 neither/nor of subjectile (neither subservient nor dominating) situates place of a double constraint (both screen & projectile) > becomes unrepresentable

MPM pp. 37 no choice but to let other speak, cannot make other speak w/out other having already spoken > in trace, part greater/less than whole

A p. 81 we Marrano’s waiting each other with a secret we haven’t chosen

VM p. 80 community of question has an unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, because the impossible already happened [totality of beings, history of facts, etc.]

p. 82 that we are consigned to Greek element, a knowledge and confidence that is not comfortable, that torments us

——Heidegger says our thought has been desiccated, its return to Greek source, thought of Being, is a knowledge, security not in the world, possibility of our language & nexus of our world

p. 84 we will not choose btwn the opening and the totality, we will be incoherent, w/out systematically resigning to incoherence

pp. 111-12 why does Levinas return to categories he rejected? Derrida’s not denouncing incoherence [w/ this question], he’s wondering about meaning of necessity, necessity of lodging oneself w/in traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it—does this imposed necessity cache-t-elle quelque ressource indestructible et imprévisible du logos grec? quelque puissance illimitée denveloppement dans laquelle celui qui voudrait le repousser serait toujours déjà surpris?

pp. 112-13 inhabit metaphor’s ruins, shabiller des lambeaux de la tradition et des haillons du diable: by using tradition’s words, one can use [them] up (user), les frotter comme une vieille pièce de monnaie fruste et dévaluée, on peut dire que la vraie extériorité est la non-extérioritée sans être lintériorité, on peut écrire par ratures et ratures de ratures: crossing out writes, still writes in space

——“syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

——langage, fils de la terre et du soleil: écriture > one could never come across a language w/out rupture of space, no aerial or aquatic language, in which alterity would be more lost than ever > structure of inside-outside/day-night has no meaning in pure space [proscribed words], inhabits conceptuality itself

p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

——an economy of violence (economy irreducible to Levinas’ definition) that tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity

OH p. 28 we did not choose this responsibility of our heritage [it is from the other, the language of our language], nor the capitalizing memory we have of it

VP p. 87 w/in the metaphysics of presence, we believe in absolute knowledge as closure or the end of history, it has taken place, consciousness of self in infinity of parousia, this history’s closed

PAS PAS pp. (67-8) “terrifyingly ancient” time, absolute crypt, requires the récit (reciting, it can be a matter of nothing but that), ce récit [of viens], neither relation to the event nor event itself > pas dévénement, pas de concept

S p. 40 only choice is btwn the terrifying contaminations it assigns [re: subjectity of spirit]

SH p. 29 cipher can conceal secret, which it shelters in its readability, w/out the slightest hidden attention > there’s nothing it can do about it [why/who interpret(s) secret as a taunting gesture?]

pp. 39-40 via Celan, date/poem becoming no one’s, this possessive has 2 meanings that form a tragic alliance: 1) either date remains encrypted, finite survival, the survivors (readers, interpreters, guardians) of poem lose possession of it in spectral return 2) or nothing is encrypted, poem available to all, the other’s singularity is incinerated > there is no choice btwn this either/or, no contradiction, the madness, sense, chance of a poem

FWT p. 1 choosing one’s heritage

p. 3 we do not choose our inheritance, it violently elects us

p. 5 contradictory tasks set to us by inheritance: testimony to our finitude, which obliges us to inherit older, more powerful, more durable, and same finitude obliges one to choose, select, sacrifice, exclude

pp. 52-3 event worthy of the name absolutely surprises me, so I can’t not respond, exposed beyond all mastery, dare I say, happily vulnerable

***OS p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

the impossibility of the otherwise produces a trembling, a question of tout autre, think the tie btwn truth/presence, in a thought that doesn’t need to be true/present [no skeptical moment]

p. 39 “there is no chance that within the thematic of metaphysics anything might have budged” w/ respect to concept of time, from Aristotle to Hegel > founding concepts, entire system, substance, cause, etc. sufficed > one cannot interrupt, transgress, exceed “metaphysics” w/out acknowledging this powerful systematic truth

p. 62 must think play of submission & subtraction as formal rule to read history of metaphysics w/in opening of Heidegger’s breakthrough [re: categories such as desire, movement, time]

POS pp. 3-4 Derrida’s texts are entirely consumed by reading of other ones, and also only its own writing: we must conceive these contradictory ideas together [deconstruction of book]

p. 10 to become attune to a difference beyond that btwn Being and beings is not possible today, but we can show how it is in preparation

OTO p. 32 we will not decide through hermeneutic, exegetic interpretations, but will offer political interventions which politically rewrite the text and its destination: this is how it’s been since Hegel, the destinational structure of all post-Hegelian texts: Heideggerian left, Heideggerian right, Marxism left, Marxism right > the one can always be the double of the other

ATIA p. 29 to think the war we find ourselves waging [against animals] is not only a duty, no one can escape it: thinking, perhaps, begins when animal looks at us and we are naked before it

GSP p. 154 risk betraying philosophy by imposing a debate, a choice on it: “genesis & structure”

***p. 155 faithful comprehension [“true positivism”] of phenomenologist dispels shadow of a choice (might even say Husserl attuned to historicity of meaning, possibility of its becoming)

——is Husserl respectful of that which remains open w/in structure, even when one thinks the opening of structure as structural? [faithful comprehension meets no choice]

PS p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

——not critiquing Artaud from standpoint of metaphysics, Derrida reveals complicity: Artaud must enclose himself in closure of presence to denounce naive implications w/in difference

p. 328n we could not avoid the violence of the example the moment we proscribed it, but perhaps we can better understand the necessity of this incoherence

FS p. 20 our discourse irreducibly belongs to system of metaphysical oppositions

p. 28 not abandon ourselves to structural formalism: must attempt emancipation, but only as a dream, emancipation is impossible unless we forget our history [contra Nietzsche?]

CHM p. 35 [Derrida asks question about Foucault’s responsibility, the manner in which Foucault seems to return to innocence, end all complicity] doesn’t suffice to imprison the delegate, the psychiatrist, and in doing so the whole adventure of Western reason (acc. Foucault, capture & objectification of madness): wouldn’t Foucault’s proceedings, verdict, reiterate the crime?

——if the Order is as powerful as Foucault says it is: infinite, universal complicity of those who understand “this language”

p. 36 unsurpassable, unique, imperial grandeur of order of reason (Hegelian law) leaves us only recourse to strategies and strategies

——archaeology against reason can’t be written: concept of “history” has always been a rational one > writing that exceeds, by questioning them, values of “origin,” “reason,” “history” couldn’t be contained w/in metaphysical closure of an archaeology

RGE p. 261 there’s only one discourse, it is significative, no getting around Hegel here

REST pp. 263-64 [re: les question de la démarche embarrassée (boîteuse ou louche?)] i.e. “Who is walking?” “On whose feet?” > idiomatic figures of questions seem necessary; “necessary: it’s an attribute,” still vague > better to say question-idioms the form of which is very fitting, clinging (collant) (tightly/flexibly) to figure or body of what you here wish to turn into an object (feet)

***pp. 325-26 if police there is (and isn’t there always?) > Derrida polices too [?], “close reading,” counterpolices [?] oldest, most dogmatic, sinisterly authoritarian programs, massive meidatizing machines: pre-text of perception, of bare hands (mains nue), of real history, of living speech (vous enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte)

p. 327 as in fetishism trial, everything is a business & economy of detail, of la détaille (de-tailing/unsizing), you can’t do w/out detail

p. 382 don’t have to render anything: just bet on the trap like others swear (jurent) on a Bible > il y aura eu à parier, ça donne à rendre, a remmettre [there will be something to bet, it gives…]

if faudrait rendreencore, donc, en se séparant, et même en laissant tomber [even in letting the matter drop, we’d render (something?)] [can’t tell the difference btwn imperative & no choice]

RM p. 56 Derrida’s “disconcerting (déroutante) tactic” to use usure doubly, not wily, manipulative or triumphant perversity: “corresponds to intractable structure in which we are limited & carried away in advance”

WAP p. 63 must struggle w/ (sarchaner) and submit to Kantian tradition, & critique/overvalue its “object,” reinstitute it by deconstructing its genealogy

——le présent discours [Derrida’s] ne saurait échapper totalement à la loi de cet espace [Kant’s], même s'il tente au moins de laisser filtrer une autre lueur (another glimmer), ou plus précisément de se laisser infiltrer (let itself be infiltrated) par une lueur qui déjà vient d'ailleurs et passe par tant de lézardes (so many cracks)

p. 69 not neutral, every institution calls for or at least implies a taking sides (prise de parti)

***pp. 104-05 il ny a pas le choix, a political theme: every monolingualism restores mastery

——unity of language always vested and manipulated simulacrum, a positivist dogma and, à la fois, a phenomenon that can be found nowhere > so: play, graft between languages, w/in the languages in language, thus we can struggle against colonizing principle

EJQB p. 65 Jabes: “what difference is there btwn choosing and being chosen when we can do nothing but submit to the choice?”

D p. 290 Soller’s Numbers is exemplary re: the reader, cette fois enfin, the text shows (montrée) that a reader cannot choose his/her place in a text > does so by composing surfaces retournées & par une mise en scène matérielle exacte

p. 357 in scratching (gratter) on this textual matter, your recognize description of a painting, reframed, broken into, placed in another quadrilateral, w/ one side fractured: you are painting, writing while reading: tout le tissu verbal y est pris, et vous avec

LI p. 62 [vis-à-vis iterability altering, contaminating] no choice but to mean to say something other than what we mean to say: accident is never an accident

p. 117 differance, iterability—not entirely words or concepts, must take classical discourse into account, accept logic of “all or nothing” > when one no longer does (via differance, mark, supplement…), must rigorously, pedagogically, explain why one changes the rules

TN pp. 166-67 “principle of principles” gives us no choice [?]: commands us to begin w/ “us,” that is, w/ most proper, proximate Ego; this “man,” this “we” comes before most radical phenomenological reduction, the one that suspends the world

***OG pp. 7-8 (17) privilege of phonè necessary moment of economy (of “life,” of “history,” of “être comme rapport à soi”), not historical contingency: not a choice that could have been avoided

p. 50 (73) to think play radically must follow Husserl and Heidegger to the end, conserve legibility of their thought, must know le jeu du monde before attempting to understand all forms of play in the world > play, as absence of transcendental signified, not a play in the world

***p. 62 (91) that nonpresentation is as “originary” as presentation for Husserl is why thought of trace can no more break w/ than be reduced to transcendental phenomenology: no choice (choix) here, to make it seem like there is, is to confuse very different levels, paths, styles

——in the deconstruction of arche, one doesn’t proceed by choice (élection)

pp. 70-1 (102-03) one can only justify the choice of word trace w/in une topique, it’s an historical calculation & strategy: a # of givens belonging to our discourse have imposed this choice on Derrida > Levinas—trace as absolute past, Heidegger—undermining ontology as presence/full speech, Nietzsche & Freud—Spur, and use of [trace?] in biology > all make enigmatic: propre, proche, presence

ATAP p. 82 every apocalyptic eschatology promised in name of light, we are heirs to these Lumières, cannot & must not forgo the Aufklärung; must keep enough apocalyptic desire (clarity, revelation) to deconstruct apocalyptic discourse

EU p. 83 response: initial form & minimal requirement of responsibility > structure of call to responsibility so anterior to any positive response—nonresponse a priori assumes responsibility

NOCTURNAL

FK pp. 55-56 desert, nocturnal light, before “link” of religare (man to man & man to god), condition of link, most anarchivable, the holding back, Verhaltenheit, responsibility of repetition in wager (gage) of decision or affirmation (re-legare), a fiduciary “link” before all positive religion, prior to opposition btwn sacred/profane: “messianic,” or “chora”

OOG p. 137 Husserl writes about the forever nocturnal source of the light itself?

p. 146n Husserl: philosophy’s innate Reason was previously in state of nocturnal obscurity

H p. 117 “no fixed address” of death, no phenomenal exteriority, interiority of the heart, nocturnal secret (a suffering both intimate & infinite)

p. anne 2 nocturnal doesn’t belong to memory

p. anne 40 threshold of the night, clarity belongs to night (Patocka)… p. 50 it is out of the night that “what obsesses” can come to be spoken

SPOM p. 171 Stirner brings forth concepts indeterminately, homogeneously, in “the dark element of a nocturnal obscurity,” what Marx calls a “Negroid state” (im negerhaften Zustande)

MPM p. 21 when we know our friend to be gone forever: terrifying lucidity, in light of incinerating blaze where nothingness appears

——we remain in disbelief itself, we will never believe in death or immortality

p. 37 allegorical metonymy—where part stand for whole and for more than whole it exceeds

——parts of memory that seem greater & older than us: manifests in open but nocturnal space of agora, plus de lumière [Nietzsche’s not bright but open horizon]

VM p. 86 Plato’s Good as light of light? necessarily nocturnal source of light? heart of light is black

p. 92 Borges: “perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors,” light, for example, but what an example! which language can escape metaphor of light? [not night]

pp. 106-07 for Levinas, asymmetry, non-light, commandment are violence and injustice only in relation to finite things, Levinas’ infinite God avoids a world of pure/worst violence, of immorality itself, by being infinite, does not rage war of single, naked finite man

p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

p. 129 “other” is the name, the unthinkable unity of light and night > “phenomenon supposes original contamination by the sign”

p. 130 least violence is the avowal of violence (against nihilism); worst violence: nothingness, unimaginable night

PAS PAS p. (45) Blanchot: “oh night…you become a delicious passivity”

p. (48) risk of interruption is run, programmed in the night, by the récit

PPHS p. 77n Hegel reassembles the feminine law (singularity, sepulcher, night, the divine) around the pit and the pyramid (feminine law only effective in the underworld not on earth)

SH p. 51 ash calls to night, night calls to ash

ROP p. 11 Freud sutures the unfathomable navel, omphalos, mit dem Unerkannten (unknown, “unknowable”), navel not a provisional limit, but a night, ab-solute unknown, attaché au lieu dont il part et dont il garde la marque de naissance > not only the gap (la béance), as Lacan reads this navel

***SW p. 350 [BEAUTIFUL PASSAGE, as if they all aren’t] could a “theory of fetishism” ever measure up to infinite tenderness of “my own tallith” (as if such phrase preceded ipseity, “I”)? stranger to all maudlin, effusion, pathos—to all “Passion” > yet, compassion w/out limit: absolute delay of verdict that is/was/will make itself arrive w/out luminous vision (glory) > belongs to the night, my white tallith, absolute night

——tallith not incommensurable w/ fetish, but a generalized not restricted fetishism (Glas); theory of fetish no longer merely a theory at moment of verdict

TB p. 131 translation makes nocturnal intimacy of core emerge [jealousy]

DPi pp. 6-8(n) Plato’s Laws (907d–909d, 951d–e): nocturnal council, priests (tōn hiereōn, literally a hierarchy), a syllogos (place where one discusses together) [not a synagogue: place where one goes together] w/ minister of education, guardian of law, only those in great syllogos can visit prisoner > soteriological function of sōphronistērion (save soul)

——Plato describes 3 types of prisons or houses of correction

pp. 57-8 anesthetize DP (follows rhythm of nighttime up until dawn) like nocturnal council (dawn, fascination, theater, coldness of machine)

RGE p. 266 sovereignty, the putting at stake, the space of writing, absolute in night of secret: “continuum of sovereign communication has as its milieu this night of secret difference” > one would understand nothing if one thought there’s a contradiction btwn these 2 requisites

HLP p. 28 fabulous, phantasma, return of some specter: apparition of specter, vision of phantom, phenomenon of the revenant

——fable & phantasm do not belong to true or false

——irreducible species of simulacrum, penumbral light [cf. FK p. 55 desert as nocturnal light]

of a virtuality, neither being nor nothingness (no ontology/mimetology could account for it)

EJQB p. 71 language is the rupture w/ totality itself (there is an essential lapse, not the nocturnal memory of all language) [letter is the separation/limit]

PJP pp. 198-99 [re: Henri Thomas’ novel] a couple men united as one, “a single idiot,” brothers before impassible, inaccessible woman (the other, only one who decides, only guardian, only survivor, keeps watch at end of night, “w/out saying a word”)

TN pp. 1-2 a question about the day came of me, to me, w/out invitation, before the day, “she” watches over day, pre-phenomenological, trans-phenomenological: “quand nos yeux se touchent, fait-il jour ou fait-il nuit?”

——Derrida determined to show limitless patience ready for infinite, time of experience itself

p. 4 Aristotle on the aporia of touch, touch is adēlon: obscure, secret, nocturnal

pp. 306-07 eyes meet, infinitely, mouths in contact [unsatisfied w/ insipid figures, however interesting/necessary], thought begins, jusquà labîme, plunging Narcissus into abyss: makes day or night possible > day and night themselves promising each other, au point du jour

CF pp. 48-9 the impossibility of finding a language where the crime could be understood > forgiveness plunged lucidly into night of unintelligible (non-conscious or unconscious)

NOMINALISM [fixerup]

DPi p. 234 unbelieving, atheistic, skeptical, nominalist > a stranger to everything

IF p. 308 nominalism normally doubled by a certain empiricism (coded argument)

NON-SYNONOMOUS SYNONOMS

HERP p. 183 where Derrida is beyond Heidegger’s aim (propos) [acc. Derrida]: in the non synonymy of dissemblance, heterogeneity, disproportion, incommensurability, nonexchange, excess of every measure/symmetry > democracy to-come

***HASD p. 4 X (text, writing, trace, differance, hymen, supplement, pharmakon, parergon) : not subject to Aufhebung, dialectic, neither concept nor name > lends itself to a series of names, calls for another syntax, exceeds order and structure of predicative discourse [has induced accusation against Derrida of repeating procedures of negative theology]

A pp. 78-9 death is figure of the aporia in which “death” and death can replace (metonymy that carries name beyond name, beyond name of name) all that is possible as impossible: love, gift, other, testimony

DS p. 221 what holds for “hymen” holds for pharmakon, supplément, différance > double, contradictory, undecidable value derived from their syntax > alternative btwn internal/external inoperative > simply dealing w/ greater/lesser syntactical units & w/ economic differences in condensation > but don’t reduce these to the same, there’s a serial law in these points of indefinite pivoting, mark spots that can’t be mastered > funny they all have to do w/ writing

POS p. 14 risk meaning nothing, start to play (i.e. archi-trace, archi-writing, reserve, brisure, articulation, supplement, differance; there will be others) [Derrida as prophet of himself]

p. 40 gram, reserve, incision, trace, spacing, blank, supplement, margin, pharmakon—a list w/ no taxonomical closure, not a lexicon: not atoms but focal points (foyers), crucibles of economic condensation, sites of passage: spread out through text, each in a different way

——sens blanc, sang blanc, sans blanc, cent blancs, semblant

——gathering Derrida’s work into a “sheaf,” historic/systematic crossroads, is structural impossibility of limiting network of differance, not a master-word, always finds itself in others

p. 43 Derrida’s undecidables, unities of simulacrum, “false” verbal properties that can’t be included in philosophical binary, but still inhabit it, resisting, disorganizing, w/out ever constituting a 3rd term, a solution: hymen, gram, incision, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, margin

p. 46 DS re-marks a nerve, fold, angle, doubled fold of undecidable, a mark marks both marked and the mark, re-marked site of mark, can’t be counted on list of themes—hollow is the relief: hymen, fold, square, blank, margin, supernumber, column, air, chandelier

ROP p. 26 the 20 or so other names that, w/out being synonyms, belong to the same chain

pp. 29-30 deconstruction announces status w/out status of nonfinite # of names/quasi-concepts: the thinking of writing called for this, but it’s better thematized and formalized in theory of double bind, stricture of double band, and especially non-ontological remaining

p. 30 double bind at work on examples of all undecidable figures (hymen, pharmakon…), carry predicates incompatible btwn themselves, in their very btwn, interlacing, sumplukē, chiasmatic invagination > but each one, in its sumplukē, makes up a single trace [?]

ATIA p. 12 animal as tout autre, as tout autre est tout autre, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal, secret

PS p. 326n (with remarkable/ambiguous exception of Hegel) God is Death: infinite life, life w/out difference > w/in life God-Death names finitude, difference w/in life > mais l'autre nom de la même chose ne veut pas dire la même chose que le premier nom, il n'en est pas synonyme et c'est toute l’histoire

DIF DIF pp. 6-7 differance must be superseded, not considered arkhē of chain, thus not theological

——chain in which differance lends itself to nonsynonymous substitutions: reserve, arch-writing, archi-trace, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, margin-mark-march

O p. 25 [nonsynonymous synonyms] > never enclosed in finite taxonomy > no lexicon as such, can’t be pinned to a point, marks of dissemination, undecidable acc. 2 of binary opposition, not sublatable into 3 of speculative dialectics > displaced along angle of certain re-folding

——“broach/breach (entamer),” “differance,” “gramme,” “trace,” “hymen,” “de-limitation,” “pharmakon,” “supplement,” “mark-march-margin”

SW p. 338 “all my nicknames, I have so many” [re: tallith]

RGE p. 274 Bataille changes names [extremity of the possible becomes meditation] > none of the concepts satisfies the demand

REST p. 291 Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, lhymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

AFR p. 120 Condillac: “excess, difference, remainder then are words which signify precisely the same thing: but in using them the mental aspects are not the same…” [how not to be frivolous]

PSSS p. 276 numerous figures of the impossible: hospitality, forgiveness, gift—above all [?] the “perhaps,” the “what if,” the unpredictability of event

***HST p. 358 tears, work of mourning, as process of hospitality > also, the culture of smile, welcoming of a promise [example of “as” logic, a rethinking conditioned by difference in same]

pp. 380-81 forgiveness granted to other—supreme gift of hospitality > host too must ask forgiveness, welcoming must be infinite, one can never give enough to surprise of visitor, messianic surprise: host, always lacking, at fault, unprepared

p. 386 must welcome the infinite (for Levinas, that’s 1st hospitality), forgive beyond me, what is not mine to forgive [forgiving in my name but only in the name of the other]: must think substitution from limit-experiences (decision, gift, forgiveness), from possible-impossible, the impossible of the possible

LI p. 75 wolves of undecidability (pharmakon, gift, supplement, hymen)

p. 100 or, or rather, even parentheses, i.e. “citation (iterability)” > not genus/species, not identity, classical logic fractured in its code, parasitic contamination entame all these relations, which is why words have to be qualified, supplemented by others

——[re: citationality (iterability)] parentheses do not mark synonyms/identification > iterability marks citationality in its possibility, its “graphematic root”

p. 103 parasitic structure: writing, graft, mark, marche, margin, differance, undecidable, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, parergon

p. 155n [nonsynonomous synonyms]: certain functional analogy, yet remain singular/irreducible to one another, as do the textual chains from which they’re inseparable: each marked w/ iterablility that seems to belong to their series

TN pp. 179-80 intruder on inside, constitutively haunted by some hetero-affection related to spacing, a host, a parasite, pharmakon, ghost: [each of these figures] habite en revenant tout for intérieur (inhabit one’s heart of hearts as a ghost)

p. 288 Derrida’s “if there is any (sil y en a)” vs. Nancy’s “there is no ‘the’” > two irreducibly different deconstructions (one turns to a conditional, the other to a negative modality)

——sil y en a: pure & unconditional in so many forms (event, invention, gift, forgiving, witnessing, hospitality, and so on)

AD pp. 22-3 hospitality, welcome of face, attention: this series of metonymies are all the same only where they withdraw, like the other, from theme—each welcomes (says “yes” to) the other

pp. 45-6 welcome is a quasi-synonym of hospitality: copula that brings them together binds phenomena of unbinding (déliasion) (infinite separation of any hospitality worth its name)

BSi pp. 168-70 bêtise not exactly stupidity, foolishness, imbecility, idiotic, Dummheit, Kleinigkeit, etc. [example of nonsynonymous synonym]

——still, difference btwn these words can only be marked in context, which doesn’t imply an absolute relativity of context: bêtise can’t mean anything at all, not an idealized, objective, “free” ideality > translation problems occur in same language, same cultural code

pp. 312-13 trousse (case, kit), trousseau (bunch of keys) > the etymology of these words includes everything Derrida’s been working on in BS [how Derrida can open up to “everything”—elsewhere, again]

EU pp. 222-23 [re: nonsynonymous synonyms] all these indices should be multiplied

SPEC pp. 308-09 curtain (rideau): canvases, veils, hymens, umbrellas > Derrida neither has time nor taste (goût) to show how they accord to same law (accomplished by itself or done w/out)

NOON

GT pp. 34-5 looking for “noon,” origin w/out shadow, w/out dialectical negativity, not any madness: sleepwalk in the vicinity of the impossible

p. 116 reason for non-forgiveness [re: “Counterfeit Money”] convokes a whole philosophy whose high noon (sun w/out shadow) is very elliptical

OTO p. 14 noon of life is an instantly vanishing limit, the instant Nietzsche says, “yes, yes, I and I who recite my life to myself”

p. 17 alliance in which Nietzsche seals/forges his signatures, and simulates them: demonic neutrality of midday delivered from the negative and from dialectic

CIN p. 24 pure burning light: no sign of passage, pure consuming destruction, noon w/out contrary

NORMALIZE [fixerup]

***MC p. 370 ever since Plato [repression of Democritus, a large symptom?], an organization of the throw: subject/object > repress chance, repress the mark, protect “normality,” isolate a solid context (stereotomy)

***OOG p. 52 Husserl: “if science, w/ radical responsibility, has reached decisions they can impress on life habitual norms as volitional bents…from w/in which individual decisions ought…to confine themselves”

p. 80 when horizon becomes structure and essence: horizon normalizes, creates norms

p. 143 for Husserl, subjectivity “normed” in the Present, “fastened” to a “higher subjectivity,” higher sense investigation

PAS PAS pp. (43-4) each pas transgresses the pas [contamination of adverb/noun]; violence of this dislocation, sur une scène tout autre, occurs, increases, when it appears not to displace anything in discursivity, consciousness, in unscathed, assured normality of language [alters subterraneanly]

GSP p. 165 in late Husserl, [quasi-Hegelian teleological reason] movement of meaning can only be a norm/value not essence

CHM pp. 53-4 all discourse, philosophy, must escape madness in fact/principle if it is to have intelligible meaning (discourse must carry normality w/in itself) > not a defect linked to determined historical structure but essential universal necessity > the meaning of meaning

p. 60 phenomenological reduction as neutralizing, normalizing, straitjacketing (thematic of living present, profound reassurance of certainty of meaning)

REST p. 269 for Ferenczi, deviations (écarts) w/out essential norm [re: individual variants vs. universal symbols], supplements, overgarments, rain shoes, vaginas, sheath-effect

pp. 332-33 Heidegger & Shapiro bound themselves together to law of normal usage, the pair, ligatured worrying dismemberment in order to limit it: pair inhibits “fetishizing” movement, represses diabolical (i.e. a double, duplicity, w/out a pair)—pair rivets (rive) things to “normal” use

HLP p. 65 w/out meta-interpretive norm not only difficult to define lie, fundamentally irreparable

LI pp. 91-93 determination of “positive” values, the “standard (propre),” the non-parasitic, the literal is dogmatic: restricted interpretation of common sense never submitted to discussion

——that which is “logically dependent” on the dogma is called pathology or decline (déchéance); for Derrida, this dogmatism is what psychoanalysis would call denial (dénégation)

pp. 150-51 norms, stability, always provisional, finite; must account for stability as well as rules, norms, contractual possibilities that depend on it > to account for a certain stability, one that isn’t eternal, takes into account historicity, nonnaturalness of ethics, politics, institutionality

CF p. 35 inherit a heritage w/ a double & contradictory injunction: reinvent memory w/out norm or criteria

LG pp. 240-41 [after Derrida describes the double chiasmatic invagination of La folie du Jour] are all these transgressions permitted by [publishing] law, à lintérieur de cet espace normé (normed space)? > but in La folie du jour “in whole and in part, the whole is a part (tout et partie , tout est partie)”

OG pp. 4-5 (14) rigorous investigation beyond closure of knowledge, take positivity of science to its limits—monstrous, breaks absolutely w/ normality > faithful to lavenir (for which there is yet no exergue [chapter title: exergue])

SPEC p. 363 index of original normality [at this point of Beyond…] is the “primitive,” not child: primitives don’t face death [?], anxiety about death has no proper content

——death is the analogon of castration > castration not incompatible w/ thesis of death drive if one refers to syntaxic articulation of athesis: Derrida’s pointing to “it” at this moment

NOSTALGIA

***GT p. 7 oikonomia would always follow the path of Ulysses, return home to part chosen, destiny commanded (moira), the being-next-to-self of the Idea in absolute knowledge as odyssean, nostalgia of reappropriation

H p. 87 two sources of sighs, two nostalgias, their dead ones and their language > return home, or exiles find home in language

HERP p. 190 to strive to recall—nostalgia; Aristotle, metaphysics: reactive nostalgia, a mourning for originary philein, semideafness that hears but not the originary gathering of logos

pp. 190-91 philosophy “stand[s] in the tensing of this nostalgic tension,” Suchen, orexis, search, quest, investigation is tension of a desire

p. 201 philein, love, gathers Kampf, polemos, Auseinandersetzung in the memory of a lost homology

S p. 80 via Heidegger’s course on Schelling, spirit is only proper if it is close to itself, desire for gathering, a nostalgia, a Sehnsucht, where Sucht, etymologically, isn’t research but evil, evil inscribed in desire > evil as the desire to go out of oneself in order to return to oneself (motif, movement, trajectory of fire, not circle, of return)

——Heidegger: “in spirit there reigns the nostalgia for its own essence”

F p. xxi incorp. never finishes anything off (inaccessible introj.); “nostalgic vocation” of incorp.

FWT pp. 4-5 contradictory/uncomfortable double injunction: mad for absolute past, past whose (im)measure that of bottomless memory, while dreading nostalgia, fixation, cult of remembrance: nothing seems desirable save in this injunction > leave life in life & make it live again [this “heir]

POOF p. 281 Nietzsche’s hermit too attracted to the depths, nostalgic for elevation—dreams of a friend to gain altitude > friend’s nostalgia: wish to believe in other, wishing in vain to believe in ourselves > Derrida links this nostalgia to the Heideggerian nostalgia at origin of philosophical philía: elle nourrit [fires?] donc lenvie à légard de lautre comme de nous-mêmes, we envy each other, love as the attempt to leap beyond this envy

ROP p. 2 Derrida loves French word résistance, loaded w/ pathos of his nostalgia, dreams of bombing in the ‘40s > secret of inconsolable nostalgia resists analysis, kinda like navel of dream

ATIA p. 146 Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts begins by describing philosophy, metaphysics, homesickness and melancholy as forms of nostalgia

FS p. 28 Apollonian ecstasy cannot embrace force, movement which displaces lines, nor force as desire for itself, nor writing > fallen Dionysianism, melancholy, nostalgia

EU pp. 86-7 nostalgia for Friedrich Wilhelm’s reprimand of Kant, a time of common code, minimum translatability > know to whom one is addressing, know where to situate power

——being-ill (mal-être) more serious than malaise or crisis, im-pertinence of codes (productive instruments of decidability, guarantees of a problematic) can go hand in hand w/ greatest power, source of being-ill—those who feel good about this situation are hiding something

NOT YET

OS pp. 39-40 nun, often translated as instant, functions in Greek like “now (maintenant)” > nun is form in which time cannot not be given, yet nun is not, is both no longer (nest plus) & not yet (nest pas encore), a no-thing (ne-ant), doesn’t participate in presence

FL p. 292 no longer heard, not yet heard: what is the difference?

OG p. 244 (346) Rousseau tries to describe a language not yet corrupted by articulation, supplementarity, convention > time of that language: mythic limit btwn déjà and pas-encore

NUMBER (INNUMERABLE)

GOD pp. 85-86 sacrifice of Isaac is an abomination, it is criminal, unforgivable; today society not only participates in incalculable sacrifices (starving children, wars), it organizes it

R pp. 23-24 for Aristotle, democracy: equality according to number, not worth, which makes democracy a freedom founded on equality, as opposed to being governed and govern in turn

p. 34 perverse autoimmunity of democracy due to double couple: “freedom and equality” and “equality acc. #, equality acc. worth” > in the name of one couple, both couples destroyed

pp. 48-9 democracy’s antinomy: equality introduces measure and calculation, freedom is unconditional, heterogeneous to calculation and measure > incalculable, incommensurable, unconditional equality [?]

p. 53 technique, “technical measure of equality” is not a mishap, chance for incommensurable, technique before calculating technique [?] [POOF]

pp. 75-7 acc. Statesmen of Plato, Politics of Aristotle, democracy, government of greatest #, is only best when laws are broken, exact reverse of Monarchy

SPOM p. 173 Marx feigns to count ghosts, they are innumberable, and there is but one ghost (already too many, i.e. supplements), it is # itself, the arch-specter as father as capital or Plato’s good

——“arithmetical desire” finds its spur, its origin, in the fact that ghosts are innumerable

p. 193 there is always more than one commodity, more than one spirit, # belongs to the movement of the commodity

MC p. 345 to speak: multiply, enumerate my chances, theme of #s in dim light of indetermination

p. 359 Derrida demonstrates the untranslatability of proper name via Pierre, has no meaning by itself, and compares this to numeral 7

p. 373 last chance: moment when 2 dice come to a standstill & one counts up the results > incalcuable/innumerable

POOF p. x count, number, calculate: acc. Aristotle, friends must be small in #, what’s small?

——democracy counts votes & subjects, but doesn’t/shouldn’t count ordinary singularities: no numerus clausus for arrivants

***p. 3 (19) small in # doesn’t characterize friends, it counts those we are speaking of, cites the exemplary, naming the rare illuminates, projects name’s renown beyond death

pp. 19-21 via Aristotle, one must choose & prefer friends (election & selection), it takes time > for Aristotle, those who don’t have friends count friends among things (prágmata), possessions, the malevolent place friends in field of calculable hypothesis > yet, the choice of friends, that their # must be small, reintroduces #, calculation, into multiplicity of incalculable singularities: a certain aristocracy in arithmetic of the choice

***p. 21 (39) via Aristotle, in economy of time, even in the instant, plenitude of enérgeia linked to #: friendship must count but resists enumeration, quantification (# isn’t forbidden but the numerous, the crowd, is) > for a finite being, test of friendship is an endurance of arithmetic

p. 101 question of # will arise again w/ grammatical choice & reading decision

p. 102 relation btwn friendship/democracy, approbation of greatest #? deployment of countable unity, of ‘one more’ subject > the 2 presumed calculable #s of democracy (from perspective of conventional/nominalist hesitation): 1) form of decision, greatest # of people 2) possibility of this decision: birth—the equivocal double equality (isonomy founded on isogony)

p. 106 a deconstructive thought of # and equality, power of universalization beyond State & nation, the account taken (la prise en compte) of anonymous/irreducible singularities, indifferently different [Schelling?], indifferent to particular difference, to the raging quest for identity corrupting the most indestructible desires of the idiom [democracy’s?]

A pp. 71-2 greater and greater orientation toward death, for Heidegger, the incalculable nonmeasure [of truth], signifies possibility of measureless impossibility of existence

PAS PAS p. (108) Blanchot: prophets birth tongues, and feel desires they can’t support—before the immensity

S pp. 59-60 [Heidegger appeals to depth (Tiefe) positively, sees destitution (Entmachtung) of spirit/world as a flattening, where dimension has become extension & number]

PPHS p. 106 Hegel: number is pure thought of thought’s externalization, in number sense is brought closest to thought > thoughtlessness, indifference, number remains sensuous

OS p. 59 Aristotle differentiates numbering # [actual #] from that which can be numbered (horse, man, time), time thus not a mathematical being

SP p. 123 on following Nietzsche outside speculum, the hermeneutic circle > immeasurable, save for the the steps of a dove (quau pas de colombe) [these are the steps of the Übermensch]

GSP p. 157-58 Husserl refuses to believe #s/math fall from heaven, pure Platonic idealism, but also refuses, when subjectifying math, to explain #s via “psychologism”: 1) distinguishes # from concept, psychological artifact 2) math irreducible to psychological temporality 3) designates an intentional dimension of objectivity, which no psychological genesis could institute [Frege would call this possibility a bloodless specter (blutloses Gespenst)?]

O pp. 21-2n Hegel: math has for its Stoffe dead space & lifeless numerical unit

Gii p. 302n Heidegger: 2 hands clutch in haste, utilitarian violence (want #, quantity), don’t have patience of 1—the essential is not #, it’s the right time (die rechte Zeit)

D p. 344 atheism in Kabbalah, belief only in # [?] > Numbers a cabal/cabala where blanks only provisionally filled in

p. 350 Numbers, as #s, have no meaning; p. 362 Numbers indecipherable, facade inscriptions

pp. 362-63 Numbers undecipherable because numerable and innumerable: 1) something in the # surpasses mere # or cipher 2) everything in them is not ciphered (they’re innumerable), something that’s not anything > circle of the squaring

——innumerable as force, blows up (or out of) all frames, & it works through it (taken into account) from the inside [Kant’s mathematical sublime?]

pp. 363-64 because innumerable beyond/short of what can be read by machine: excess & lack (defect)

p. 364 relation to innumerable, absence of traces—unnameable, relation to my death

——each angle of square belongs to totality of surface, but multiplies it by folding back on itself, fractures it [the surface]—leaving room for supplementary attending (dassistance) surface

——same w/ supernumerary (surnombre) (column of words): is part of the numeral and belongs (appartient) to very milieu it exceeds

p. 365 the unique (that which is not repeated—thus, has no unity), the inummerable, call it the present, is thus apeiron, the unlimited, the crowd, the imperfect

C p. 193 revenant—127 times, what of the remains is being put into figures (chiffré) in this way?

pp. 204-05 when there’s # in the title: corrupts the authority of the name, voice, phonetic writing

p. 208 Pythagorean tetractys: 1+ 2 + 3 + 4 = 10 (I talked about it too much in Dissemination)

p. 209 Derrida refers to the modesty of stopping at 127, of saying “that’s enough” > then, because (even if unconsciously) the # is prime, he finds in 127, a proud arrogance (superbe morgue)

p. 220 out-of-series: inhabits w/out residing, haunts, apparition of visitor is innumerable (throws arithmosophists off the trail)

LI pp. 108-09n [re: neologism texter] signature, événement quon texte: process of iteration, like surnombre [of Dissemination], marks pluralization that fractures the event, the unique, while causing it to occur (arriver)

TN p. 24 the move from body extension to extension of psyche/thinking is incommensurable > a place (lieu) neither of objective space nor extension: place (lieu) as spacing before space

NOY p. 238 thought of history of Being affected by internal epochē, divides, suspends the yes: will is not identical to itself (along w/ many other things) > yes as the incalculable, the promise: [quasi-, fable of] “giving reason,” “giving an account,” the countability of the innumerable yesses

p. 240 yes, (already but always) faithful countersignature, can’t be counted: it always sends itself off in number (il senvoie toujours en nombre)

CIN p. 41 plurality of cinders, innumerable lurks (couvait) beneath the cinder

BSi pp. 198-99 in Monsieur Teste, a Nietzschean kind of superman, infinitely cunning and infinitely bête solitary types: incalculable/hyperbolic arithmetic turns “who” into “what” [see pp. 200-01 in

CAP(ITAL)

]

——quoi as coite from quietus (silence) [who > what: silencing]turns who’s into what’s

SPEC p. 354 detour expanding immeasurably: Umweg of 1st Chapter [re: Freud’s Beyond…] secondary to absolute/unconditional Umweg > pas de détour always leads back to death, not a question of going (aller) but of coming back (revenir)—this is the passage

CHOR pp. 107-08 certain dissymmetry is law of sexual difference & relation to other (Derrida says this in opposition to violence of “democratic” platitudes), dissymmetry as inordinate, excessive, goes beyond coded marks, beyond grammar & spelling of sexuality

p. 108 in dreaming of saving the chance [of deconstructing sexuality], Derrida would like to believe in multiplicity of sexually marked voices, desire for sexuality w/out # can protect us, like a dream, from an implacable destiny that immures us (everything in life) in #2

——if merciless closure [of the 2] would arrest desire at wall of opposition, there would never be but 2 > tragedy would leave this strange sense, a contingent one, that we must affirm & learn to love instead of dreaming of innumerable: but doesn’t dream prove what is dreamt of?

OATH (

GOD p. 156 literature as inheritance of promise of betrayal, w/ the forswearing [Kafka’s Letter to Father] that haunts this oath?

MONL p. 25 declare under oath: “I have only one language and it is not mine”

R pp. 4-5 fidelity to come, to the to-come, to the future, always trembling, risky, is held in friendship, friendship of thought: yes, there is friendship to (be) thought: oui, il y a de lamitié à penser > we are guests to this snaking oath (serment) [D.H. Lawrence], in name of democracy

FK pp. 64-5 oath, sworn faith (foi jurée), pledge to God as witness: creates the unproducible, cannot not produce God as already there [déjà]

p. 67 religio: promise, promises itself, already promised, the response to untranslatibility of religio is religio: to swear (Benveniste)

H p. 107 Oedipus finds himself bound by an oath to which he is asymmetrically committed, committed before the god; when Theseus invokes the oath, everyone is hostage to the dead man

p. 121 from Oedipus at Colonus: oath (Orkos) hears everything

SPOM p. 34 “time is out of joint” at the moment there is an injunction to swear

pp. 49-50 the word conjuration produces a forever errant surplus value, by “capitalizing two orders of semantic value” [?]: 1) secret oath meant to silence 2) magical incantation used to evoke

p. 55 via Marx, in Timon of Athens [see pp. 96-7 Marx’s play]: Timon’s trust in money (simulacrum, ghost), an oath, a giving credit, to that which is unworthy of oath; not convention society, or law > cult of money as nature, prostitution, thus constant perjury, simulacrum, greed

pp. 62-3 privilege figure of conjuration (Verschwörung, Beschwörung) for another reason [not just fear]: swearing, taking an oath, committing oneself in performative, secret fashion

p. 135 [re: Eighteenth Brumaire: “conjure up spirits of past”] convoking (beschwören) spirits as specters, le geste dune conjuration positive, celle qui jure pour appeler et non pour refouler

p. 207 jurer ou conjurer: the chance of thinking and its limit? the gift of its finitude? [nous gageons ici que la pensée ne vient jamais à bout de la pulsion conjuratoire]

p. 233n Shakespeare was a great thinker and poet of the oath

POOF p. 16 act of faith (reliability of oath) must belong to what is incalcuable in decision [a passivity beyond enérgeia, stability (bébaios) of act in Aristotle’s lover over beloved]: break w/ calculable is ordained by structure of confidence or of credence as faith

——Aristotle’s bébaios [re: friendship] (temporal, becoming-intemporal, omnitemporal), stable & reliable, marks, covers over in marking, passage (through time) btwn 2 heterogenous orders: 1) assured calculable reliability 2) act of faith [unyoked there’s difference]

p. 94 in Menexenus, must summon dead to be responsible before them, the dead are made to be born again: oath of this co-engagement thus resembles a fraternal conjuration

p. 98 Benveniste’s etymology of phílos, its relation to home, hospitality & oath, but in Homer phílos has vague possessive quality (‘his knees,’ ‘his son’)

***p. 99 necessity in Menexenus, everything decided where decision does not take place, where always-already taken place: at birth, day before birth, eugenic/noble birth > this makes noble, makes political, ties phúsis to nómos, ontology to oath (ties what is to what must be), obligatory process of a natural law: a synthetic a priori necessity

p. 100 as long as brothers remain faithful to memory of their fathers (specters of their fathers of noble birth), they are bound by testamentary tie (recalls their truth, truth qua political truth), a monumental memory that inaugurates truth as much as it recalls it

p. 149 [Derrida speaking to himself in parentheses] is one every born a brother? isn’t there always an oath? a memory? the brother is always a foster brother? would the sister than be a case of fraternity? [Schwurbrüderschaft]

FWT p. 193 heritage of circumcision precedes speech, oath, contract

SW pp. 349-50 [to read the corpus that has known, from operation of other, how to undo itself from veiling/unveiling] you have to write, sign in turn, countersign in writing, something else, in another language, w/out betraying injection/call of first seal

——can’t prove it happened, only swear that it did: perjury must remain possible (a duty that must be respected)

DPi p. 149 for Nietzsche, at all solemn festivals, there comes back (nachwirkt) a remainder of fear that presided over all acts of memory, promises, oaths, engagements

pp. 251-52 secret: what if I deconstructed the “seminar” by telling you I won’t tell you the truth even if I know it? > blow to deconstructed pieces the idea of the seminar that’s obliged by oath to speak all possible truth

HLP p. 35 lying as making him believe [dimension of credit/faith irreducible], bad faith of liar, betrayal of implicit sworn faith, surprising the good faith of his addressee

TR p. 87 swearing, oaths, acts of faith: jurer, conjurer, abjurer > these events ought to [from MOP perspective] resist mechanization, but don’t

——in the beginning, there will have been the act & the word: the act of swearing

p. 88 [re: “to swear”] délire names extraordinary coincidence of irrationality of machine (beyond my control) & absolute sincerity (authentic innocence of my intentions)

——coincidence of infinite guilt & certainty in absolute, virgin, intact innocence> btwn infinite guilt & absence of guilty conscience

——protest of accusatory innocence: forgive me this my virtue [ask forgiveness for feeling innocent]

pp. 89-90 Rousseau abjures Protestantism (freer, more intentionalist, more spiritual), he converts mechanically to more mechanical, ritualistic Catholicism

p. 90 confession: 1) confession of sin 2) profession of faith (oath)

p. 140 oath not to betray, more important than truth to be revealed (beginning of Rousseau’s Confessions)

PJP p. 166 every lie is a perjury, every perjury implies a lie, betrays a promise or implicit oath (“I owe you the truth”)

p. 173 davoir perjuré en jurant: 2 moments of perjury envelop each other; was the promise not to lie, the swearing, truthful?

——the 2 moments are rigorously distinct & strangely indiscernible: difference of times inscribed under law, contract, this law is the Law itself (annuls the difference, sublates into fidelity of oath)

——structural signification of oath, Law itself, origin of Law: commit to not be affected by time

——but the perjurer can always plead the discontinuity of time

p. 174 oath, sworn faith, and the Law force psycho-phenomenology of self to lie [not 2 sequential moments, but perjured in advance]; which is madder: psyche, logos, ego—or the oath?

EL p. 223 God’s voice sealed, on reserve in sacred language, like a signature, the oath of the covenant or faith tying us to God: content of this hidden speech will take form again, meaning will take on form in manifestation, to hear & to say will renew the covenant

——sacred language: “con-juration" itself (conjuration btwn God & us)

LI p. 45 Derrida swears his good faith (raises his hand above the typewriter)

AD pp. 33-4 violence of pure face to face (hospitable welcome, narcissistic closing [renfermement]): in double bind w/ the 3rd (protects against vertigo of ethical violence while violating its purity)

——pure face to face as oath (serment) before the letter, debt before every contract or loan (emprunt), must perjure itself in bind w/ 3rd: in operation of justice can no longer distinguish btwn fidelity of oath & perjury of false witness

——justice as law begins w/ perjury > violates; sigh of just man: “Quai-je à faire avec la justice?”

BSi p. 107 oath of brothers after founding criminality [killing baby daddy], trace of primitive crime remains ineffaceable in egalitarian, compassional, communitarian fraternity

p. 166 if I swear that I know what I mean when I injure someone [w/ bêtise], I perjure myself > bêtise always perspectival

OG p. 262 (371) Rousseau: cradle of nations, first fires of love born at water wells; p. 267 “well of oath” in Genesis XXI

UWC p. 222 what we call “professions” tend to be nonmercenary arts, imply testimonial commitment, responsibility under oath (freely declared): physician, lawyer, professor

OBJE CTS

POR p. 9 (139) for Heidegger, principle of reason accompanied by interpretation of essence of beings as objects, an object present as representation (Vorstellung)

p. 10 (139) principle of reason (Satz vom Grund) tells us to protect [dominant] relation of ob-ject before a subject that says “I”, and is assured of presence

——Heidegger’s caricature of principle of reason: hard, unblinking eyes (dominating, raping)

GT p. 24 subject and object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of the gift; subject as such never gives or receives a gift

VM pp. 84-5 imperialism of theoria bothers Levinas: especially phenomenology’s infusion w/ light, way it predetermined Being as object

OOG p. 64 for phenomenology, senses of sense is determined as object, available for regard or gaze, final category of everything can appear, that can be for pure consciousness

——objects join all regions to consciousness, the Ur-region

VP pp. 64-5 the complicity of idealization and the voice are unfailing: brings monstration [?] to completion; unity of phonē and technē, voice as technical mastery of the object, via objectivity of object > the ideal object can be repeated, to infinity, while remaining the same

——le pré de l’objet présent maintenant-devant est un contre (Gegenwart, Gegenstand) à la fois au sens du tout-contre de la proximité et de l’encontre de lop-posé

p. 72n for Husserl, object is relative, subject is absolute

GSP p. 159 neither structure (which isolates objective significations in their static originality) nor genesis (which effects abusive transitions from one region to the other) clarifies Husserl’s problem: foundation of objectivity

p. 163 noema: the “as such” > does not borrow its materiality from consciousness, an object (but not real) > nonappurtenance to any region, anarchy of noema > root of all objectivity

——wouldn’t this nonreality disrupt the inclination toward regionality of phenomenological method?

WAP p. 64-5 working w/ Bourdieu’s idea of objectification, Derrida sees an infinite task: “objectifiable” is not objectifiable: always exceeds scene of visibility

——achievement of “complete objectification” would ensure sociology’s absolute hegemony, i.e. absolute knowledge

pp. 65-6 what if truth of objectivity no longer took the form of an object?

AFR p. 43 how can Locke carve out a trail while repeating an earlier rupture? he applied a general law to particular domain

——by preceding analogically, he discovered an unknown > invention by analogy (or analysis): new “objects” created by transposing, proportioning, analyzing

TN p. 343n [which objectifies? the idea of the object or the sensing of the object?]

OBLIGATION

HASD p. 3 singular anteriority of the obligation: “knowing you have to before the first word”; is an obligation before the first word possible?

OBSESSION (

GT p. 18 beyond a mode of Being, language before linguistics [our obsession here, in GT]

H p. anne 110 what doesn’t belong to you, highest risk. what you do not possess is what obsesses you

SPOM p. 3 hantise: obsession, haunting, untimely

p. 132 Marx was obsessed (obsédé) by ghosts, he harassed (harcelait) the obsession

p. 181 unheimlich: word of irreducible haunting or obsession

MPM p. 20 Baudelaire links mourning and obsession

P (I) p. (11) la force de hantise [that drives Derrida to Blanchot or Blanchot to Blanchot], injunction of a truth w/out truth, toujours au-delà de la fascination dont on parle à leur sujet > fascination de la loi, ce qui semble inimaginable, ou inconcevable, sinon impensable

PAS PAS p. (91) faire trembler dabord (trembling, first approach): denial of fear, frightens more, a fascination, la moindre possibilité de sarriver, in trembling one renounces mastery, use, domination, one does not know how to sign its effects > pas dinsistance distances itself on first approach

S p. 29 Heidegger’s doubling of “spirit” by use of quotation marks affects it w/ obsessive specter, he doesn’t shelter “spirit,” a hospitality w/ reservations, quotations call for another word unless they re-call the other under the same

p. 62 that a spirit is force and is not force, has and does not have force, is a relation to double, a relation to haunting; Entmachtung (destitution) is inevitable (fatale), since ghost of spirit is never perceived

POOF p. 72 friendship–enemy btwn logic of unconscious & logic of lie: these 2 logics can’t help but haunt each other, et de partager même le concept de cette hantise qui travaille le langage de notres temps

DS p. 202 haunted by ghost or grafted onto arborescence of another text

ATIA p. 37 Derrida’s very early dream, obsession, before his bestiary [his texts], of an absolute hospitality (to so many animots), infinite appropriation—constituting everything thought or written w/in a zoosphere

p. 39 Heidegger’s animal-machine, crossing-out, a figure of evil, resembles the virus that obsesses “everything I write,” quasi-animal, knows how to erase traces

FS pp. 3-4 Derrida links structuralist obsession w/ an anxiety (inquiétude) about (sur) language, an anxiety of (du) language and in (dans) language itself

DST DST p. 316n obsessionality, re: writing, no longer clinical category

——Bataille: what forces me to write is the fear of going mad

p. 203 question of obsession, of obsidionality, of exposure on all sides, arises w/ figure of a besieged (assiégée) power

——this figure is impregnable because it has no single site, single figure

——it harasses (harcèle) out of (depuis) sa désistance all the others in turn

traps everywhere, double bind and hyperbologic leave no way out (aucun issue)

——must know all this to begin to think

——double bind (as ending parentheses): can’t close one front w/out opening another on another side

——thus Lacoue-Labarthe’s “style,” ethos, multiplying parentheses, rhythm of warnings, which don’t protect anyone > warning stands watch so no one will fail to expose oneself

p. 210 hantise (obsessive fear), the way in which philosophy is haunted, visited, inhabited by madness > there is a domesticity of “philosophical madness”

p. 221 Lacoue-Labarthe: traversed from the beginning by discourse of others, “subject” does not incur a simple Spaltung (splitting) > the latter, w/ its oppositional logic (absence/position), creates obsession w/ appropriation dominating analysis of mimesis, & also its economic, political bearing

p. 229 for Lacoue-Labarthe [?], anyone linked to edge of madness (au bord de la folie), the autobiographical (allobiographical) adventure, and its doubles, and the other, and death, is concerned w/ rhythm (the musical obsession) (Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Rousseau, Reik, Mallarmé)

D p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

pp. 336-37 obsessive desire to escape due to structure of the text, obsession always textual

——textuality is obsidional: undecidable process of opening/closing—no letup (sans cesse)

p. 352 splayed square, triangle open on 4th side, loosens obsidionality of triangle and circle, whose ternary rhythm (Trinity, Oedipus, Dialectics) governs metaphysics

+R pp. 158-59 what is detached from my signature, da, a piece (morceau) of the other’s name, one of the most obsessive motifs in Glas

C p. 191 it’s difficult to resist obsidional invasion (investissement) > 2 desires of coffin deal (traitent) w/ each other for the dead man:

1. to lie in it, to make it yours, to steal it, give birth in it, calm one’s terror of alterity

2. to let it be the other’s

AD p. 56 for Levinas, the hôte is a hostage insofar as he’s a subject obsessed (thus besieged), persecuted, put into question in the place where he takes place—in election

p. 57 hostage: 1) a hôte given/received as a substitute pledge (gage) in places of power, at disposal of sovereign, hospitality w/out property, “accusation by everyone” 2) obsidium, obsidatus—condition of being captive/hostage, a state of siege, “persecuting obsession,” “responsibility for everyone” > acc. both lineages there’s a token of proof (gage) of substitution

p. 110 exceeding and obsessing the political/juridical: beyond law in the law > everything face exceeds marks demand for justice as law (law of justice must bend to itself)

OG p. 270 (381) obsessive pressure of writing from where it’s held in check, such is the history of metaphysics > obstinate effort to cancel writing : threatens presence, proper, parole

CIR p. 234 I don’t have a fantasy of eradication/expropriation but a virtual, mimicked trance, painful pleasure of obsessive ideo-motor drive

EU p. 124 my obstinacy is great, compulsive, forced me to take les voies les plus détournées

OEDIPUS

MONL p. 13 power this ‘alien’ [Oedipus] holds over ‘aliens’: innermost secret, sepulture, in exchange for salvation of city, which he refuses his daughters (refuses them a just ‘work of mourning’)

H p. 79 the father-son, the son as father

p. 93 Oedipus gives the most poisoned gift, the deprivation of mourning, gives the mourning of mourning, no time of mourning, a respite of infinite time [for Freud, Oedipus’ gift is society]

p. 97 Oedipus conducts his own funeral in secret

p. 101 delay and haste, halting and hastening, rhythm of Oedipus’ journey

p. 103 [Oedipus’ dying words] “last time I see lightless light,” Oedipus weeps for tangible light

pp. 103-105 [on Oedipus’ final mourning] he’s deprived of something in secrecy [of light?], an encrypting of encrypting, in the crypt the address is cryptic

p. 105 Oedipus is twice encrypted, 1st in dying, 2nd in hiding his death > by demanding he be kept dead, he announces a piece of blackmail

p. 107 Theseus, with Oedipus’ burial secret, becomes a retained hostage, a detained addressee

——everyone is hostage to the dead man (Oedipus)

p. 115 Antigone says that Oedipus desired his fate

p. 119 Oedipus first man (Hegel), last man (Nietzsche)

PP PP p. 131n Oedipus as pharmakos [Derrida distances himself form psychoanalysis]

p. 146 le père est, le père est (le fils perdu), writing, father is not, suspends question “what is?” which is always “what is the father?”

PPHS PPHS p. 99 Oedipus solves Sphinx’s riddle, beyond hieroglyph > enlightenment, even history

FWT FWT p. 35 fixed model of oedipal theory in Lacan & Freud > stable father, irreplaceable mother; transformation of family would transform psychoanalysis

DS DS p. 186n le double parricide [Plato’s]: Homer (for mimetic poetry), Parmenides (for neglecting mimesis > his logos, the “paternal thesis” would prohibit doubling)

SW SW p. 331 hand of Oedipus, eye-surgeon, son/inheritor of another eye-surgeon

TR TR p. 91 in reference to de Man’s Oedipal analysis of Rousseau, Derrida notes, parenthetically, there are more refined Oedipal schemas

——is not every footnote a little Oedipal? a symptomatic swelling, a swollen foot (hindering text’s step-by-step advance)?

LI LI p. 94 to have a general theory of speech act theory: masterpiece of metaphysical-oedipal rhetoric

BSi BSi pp. 109-10 is Derrida just widening the parameters of “fellow”? no, the monstrously other binds me to the nonliving & inscribes concept of death in life > do we find a comparable obligation to the dead in murder of primal father [Freud]?

p. 245 moral law already there before murder of father because it actualizes after remorse for the murder (not after the murder itself) [i.e. moral law born of remorse, already there]

pp. 303-04 Lacan: Oedipus story, a less cretinizing (abêtissant) version of Original Sin > Derrida wonders [coyly] whether everything in BS deals w/ castration

SPEC SPEC p. 265 Freud: “super-ego is the heir of the Oedipus complex and represents the ethical standards of mankind”

pp. 340-41 all the interlacings of fort:da, tout ce qui senvoi in graphics of repetition that dislocates summary “triangle” > le trait oedipien nest quune rection pour le fil conducteur de la bobine [Oedipus most narrowly restricted effects of above repetition’s graphics]

——as if one were pulling this nebulous matrix, w/ disseminations w/out return, by only one of its string (fils), where matricial mother would be only what she is > for what it means to write oedipally, cf. Glas, which concerns itself w/ only strings/sons (fils), with gash (balafre) and demi-deuil in affectations of proper surname

ONE TIME (ONCE)

POOF pp. 65-6 following Nietzsche beyond Eros? if love is always a lust for new possession, we must acquiesce to principle of ruin at heart of utterly new > would this leave open the chance to accord w/ the “love whose just name would be friendship” [?]—just once, it would happen, friendship as the name for this impossible event [only once btwn 2]

——but how could there be a right name for such an event, for any event? how could you convince the partner of such rightness at the moment of the act?

SH p. 3 the resistance thought of “once” gives one to think, let’s let ourselves be approached by this offering

pp. 3-4 circumcision only once, at the same time “first & last,” ring, seal of alliance, anniversary of archeology/eschatology > ring traces, carves the “unwiederholbar (unrepeatable)”

——“one time” in English, but “one turn,” “una vez,” “una volta,” in vicissitudes of latinity

p. 8 the only one: singularity, solitude, secrecy of encounter, but exportable, deportable, repeatable

p. 19 conventional forms of dating (charts, coded signs, spatiotemporal plottings, clocks, calendar) assign, consign, absolute singularity, must mark themselves off from themselves, a fatally equivocal power that enunciates the possibility of recurrence > not absolute recurrence (i.e. of the one time of circumcision/birth) but spectral recurrence of that which never will return

p. 52 no “absolute poem,” but date (beyond calendar/clocks), madness of “when,” unthinkable Einmal (once), terrifying ambiguity of shibboleth > sign of belonging (alliance), threat of discrimination (war)

P p. 93 paradox of 3rd Critique: singularities must give rise to universalizable judgments > Kant’s free beauty: self-subsisting, always beautiful once

SW p. 338 tallith (not a veil) recalls me to the “only once” of circumcision

pp. 342-43 tallith as trace of date, event of singularity, not lifting, unfolding of veil—“even if one translates this gift of the Law as Revelation, the figure of the veil,” the taking-place of the event counts more than the “intuition & movement of vision”

***pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

RGE pp. 263-64 Bataille’s sliding occurs at point, place in pattern, where old word, because of placement, slides—making entire discourse slide > violent, strategic twisting (imprinted upon language), inflects old corpus: relates its syntax to a major silence, to the privileged moment of the sovereign operation > “even if it took place only once”

PIO p. 6 for something to be a first time must also be a last time > archaeology & eschatology

acknowledge each other in irony of one & only instant

TR p. 118 when it’s a matter of structure of text, concept of historicity not regulated by teleological process but by the event, by singularity of “one time only”

——via de Man, time is not enough to make history, not the essential predicate of concept of history

pp. 130-31 only once of instant caught in amber coffin (mosquito sucking blood)

+R p. 177 Benjamin: secularization causes indeterminacy of “once only (Einmaligkeit),” once-only of phenomena replaced by once-only of artistic operation (never w/out remainder)

LI p. 62 vices [turns] that interest me: time & place of the other time, the other time in (stead of) the first time, at once

ATM p. 153 re: Levinas, “astriction to giving” complicates quoted utterance “here I am,” what is said only once, what exceeds not the saying but the said in language

pp. 167-68 via Levinas, interruptions unbound “together,” in the “same” sériature, in dia-synchrony, a serial one time of “several times” that took place only once: the ob-ligation, ligature of religion opens

ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE

MPM p. 58 what if ontological difference is translated into rhetoric of memory? or vice versa?

p. 60 present-ness of present introduces ontological difference

OS pp. 65-6 difference btwn Being/beings, Heidegger’s discourse of trace > if difference (is) (itself) trace (neither presence nor absence): trace of trace has disappeared in the forgetting of the difference btwn Being/beings [forgetting of Being as annihilation of trace]

p. 67 differance as a difference older than Being itself, a still more unthought difference than difference of Being/beings > leads to a writing that exceeds all dialectics, w/out history, cause, absence, presence, archia, telos

POS pp. 9-10 Derrida is “above all” made possible by Heidegger’s ontological difference (the unthought difference btwn Being and beings), yet Nietzsche is “perhaps” a move beyond the ontotheology of Heidegger, toward a differance no longer in language of West

——to become attune to a difference beyond that btwn Being and beings is not possible today, but we can show how it is in preparation

ATIA p. 160 restructuring (pluralizing/varying) “as such” in relation to animal would upset whole framework of Heideggerian discourse, the ontological difference

DIF DIF p. 21 it’s domination of beings (Being as presence or beingness) that differance solicits, questions, makes tremble in entirety: question emerges where ontological difference is broached (souvre)

p. 22 differance (is) older than ontological difference: outside epochality of Being (outside epoch): no depth to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put to play

——is this why Heraclitean play of hen diapheron heautōi, the one differing from itself, in difference w/ itself, is lost like a trace when diapherein is determined as ontological difference?

p. 23 Heidegger: when the essence of presencing unnoticeably becomes something present, the distinction btwn presencing and what is present (Anwesen und Anwesendem) is forgotten

p. 24 forgetting of ontological difference: disappearance of trace of trace > Heidegger: even the early trace (die frühe Spur) is obliterated when presence is in the position of the highest

p. 25 trace & difference cannot appear as such, sheltered (sabrite)/dissimulated in names (received in metaphysical text)

Gi p. 8 will not be a question of heights, thinking difference not up to it [in contrast to Nietzsche?]

——for Heidegger, sexual difference did not rise to height of ontological difference? > ontic predicate

Gii p. 45 Heideggerian hand like alētheia (concealment/disclosure [Verbergung/Entbergung]: double movement)

REST p. 334 what looks like a process of fetishization in Heidegger (uselessness of product at work in work) is, to Heidegger, a strange process of alētheia

DST DST p. 216 désistance: mimesis or its double, cela même quelle double et abîme (what it doubles & engulfs)— alētheia

pp. 218-19 for Heidegger, opposition btwn inadequate/adequate circumscribed by alētheias withdrawal—yet, Lacoue-Labarthe’s mimesis haunts alētheia w/ unstable homoiōsis

abyss of pre-originary mimesis, “precedes” truth, introduces desire for homoiōsis > Derrida explains how, w/ this thinking, Lacoue-Labarthe dislocates Heidegger’s epochal history

WOG p. 37 hen diapheron heautôi (Heraclitus) is Greek heritage Derrida is most faithful to, tries to think this “one differing from itself” alongside (“improbably”) the khōra > the very event of the même, the soi-même: under this sign, Derrida contrasted differance to ontological difference [cf. D p. 22]

CHOR p. 105 very obscure area, passage btwn ontological difference & sexual difference not punctuated by polarities (originary/derived, ontological/ontic…)

ONTOLOGY

KH p. 99 excess of khōra not ontological

***SPOM p. 202 introduce haunting into every construction of a concept, beginning w/ being and time; ontology opposes hauntology in a movement of exorcism, ontology is a conjuration

p. 213 “good Marxism” must adjust the value of Marx’s ‘helpful’ theory of autonomization and automatization of ideality, but he still exorcises “the spectral simulacrum in an ontology”

pp. 231-32n deconstruction w/ & beyond Marxism > decons. doesn’t just radicalize, it questions the root & its presumed unity, the radical’s complicity w/ ontology

POOF pp. 241-42 [offering quasi-summary of HERP] moment that originary [Heraclitean] phileîn (accord, favour, solicitude Gunst) becomes jealous, nostalgic tension ‘determined by Eros [órexis]’: the step to philosophy, prepared by sophistry [Plato, Socrates] > is the strange voice of the friend, an ontological call [prior to subject, consciousness, even to Mitsein? see p. 243], interior & w/out, the “what is…?” of philosophy [?]

——as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

EM p. 126 reading of text Dasein is a hermeneutics > if one looks closely, phenomenological opposition “implicit/explicit” permits Heidegger to avoid vicious circle (posing question of Being on basis of ontological predetermination)

PP p. 126-27 Socrates turns poison into salvation by way of logos, gives hemlock an ontological effect: initiates one into contemplation of eidos and immortality of the soul

VM p. 96 for Levinas, when 3rd term [party] is light of Being (which is not being nor non-being while same and other are) > theoretical relation is ontology

——for Levinas, Western philosophy has been an ontology where Reason receives only what it gives itself

p. 137 [Derrida defending Heidegger] Being is not even ontology or first philosophy in the sense of rank or excellence, because it is not the truly existent existent; Levinas: “Ontology, as first philosophy, is a philosophy of power”

p. 146 “ontological” anticipation, transcendence toward Being, helps us understand God, even as ether in which dissonance resonates > inhabits & founds language, Mitsein, all Being-together

S pp. 55-6 though Derrida sees a “humanist teleology” in the hierarchization of man to animal (found in the negation imposed on animal w/ weltarm), one which requires not one ontology but the very possibility of the onto-logical, he isn’t criticizing it (it does denounce biologism, racism, and naturalism) > can we escape this program? can we transform it by “reconnoitering it right down to its most tortuous ruses and most subtle resources”?

DS p. 185 truth of the book is decidable, the book w/in the soul can be true, psychic writing must appear before tribunal of ontology & dialectics [re: Plato]

pp. 191-92 never has anteriority of 1st (simple) over 2nd (double) been displaced by a metaphysical system, double de-presents, il le multiplie par suite, le double vient après le simple, the flesh & blood, limage survient à la réalité > this is ontology

***p. 235 the category of the imaginary: constructed out of ontological interpretation of mimēsis

p. 236 chain “fiction,” “hymen,” “spacious,” gets caught in, while disrupting, ontological machine (dislocating oppositions)

POS p. 75 Democrites’ rhythmos as writing & rhythm, a materialism before Marx [?], repressed, silenced, ontologized by Plato

OS pp. 31-2(n) Heidegger’s question of Being seeks to destroy vulgar concept of time by repeating and interrogating it > that Being is ousia, parousia, Anwesenheit w/ regard to idea of time as Gegenwart (the present)

——vulgar time as gegenwärtigen Besitze (always present possession), the having (Habe) of Being, its permanent presence

SP pp. 103-05 no truth in itself of sexual difference in itself, homme/femme en soi > but, ontology w/ its verification of identity, w/ its arraisonnement, shelters (recèle) undecidability of sexual difference

ATIA pp. 67-8 Valéry’s snake utters the first word (of Verb): “ME,” this “I am that I am,” first impurity, contamination of being, ontological creation, autobiographogenesis, becomes words of seducer > promise to breach purity of nothingness w/ performative

——I am HE,” auto-zoo-theo-morphic > snake as God, divinity diminished by fires of Seducer

EJQB p. 78 to write: to confuse ontology & grammar

HST pp. 391-92 for Levinas, threshold of solitude constitutes request for forgiveness, constitutes being-myself—a kind of ego cogito as an asking forgiveness from the other (a leap), as the very temporalizing of “I” [morality/psychology as ontology: the being in “being forgiven”]

——Levinas breaks w/ ontology itself: in name of ethics, metaphysics, 1st philosophy

WOG p. 25 ontology could not be more Greek, toward which Derrida has had only questions, reservations, and interminable parentheses

OG p. [re: Being as transcendental signified] psychoanalysis presents best chance of breakthrough (percée) w/ concept-words of ontology

p. 313 (442) originary supplement can’t be thought classically—no ontology can think it

ONTOTHEOLOGY

GOD p. 125 God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, not the God of philosophers of ontotheology, but one who interrupts & retracts his order

FK p. 100 ontotheology destroys & institutes religion when it suspends sacrifice & prayer

HERP p. 215 acc. to Heidegger, Derrida speculates, if God of ontotheology can’t be addressed by prayer or sacrifice, God beyond ontotheology would be a God to which it was possible & necessary to sacrifice

HASD p. 25 onto-theological, metaphysical presuppositions sustain psychoanalytic theorems

p. 55 theology vs. onto-theology or theiology [Aristotle’s 1st philosophy] (Offenbarung vs. Offenbarkeit)

A A pp. 45-6 no escaping ontologico-juridico-transcendental tradition [method], except w/ death, aporia, unique exclusion from system, “life death” no longer falls under case of what it makes possible

p. 80 Being and Time repeats all motifs of onto-theology it denies [see pp. 54-5 Judeo-Christian theology]

EM EM p. 116 (137-38) Sartre’s “metaphysical,” distinguished from phenomenological ontology which described essential specificity of regions, a purportedly neutral/undetermined unity of Being in-itself and Being for-itself > nothing other than unity of man and God: project of becoming God as the project constituting human-reality (atheism changes nothing)

——Sartre verifies Heidegger’s assessment “every humanism remains metaphysical,” ontotheological [see p. 118 (140n)]

p. 121 (144) nous: assures proximity to itself of central being for which circular reappropriation is produced; nous: unity of absolute knowledge and anthropology, God & man, of onto-theo-teleology and humanism

——“lêtreet la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et lhumanisme

VM VM pp. 317-18n Heidegger stops using Endlichkeit, it was never Christian-theological but idea of finite Being is ontotheological

—— thought that seeks to go to its very end in its language, the end envisaged under name of finitude, should abandon words & themes of finite/infinite & everything they govern > this is the impossible of beyond metaphysics which confirms necessity for this incommensurable overflow to take support from metaphysics

——Heidegger realized this in making difference [btwn Being & existent] fundamental

FWT FWT p. 145 Derrida wants to think the onto-theological-political through DP

p. 147 what welds philosophy as ontology (in its hegemonic tradition) to political theology of DP, & to idea of “proper to man”: 1) Plato’s care for death (epimeleia tou thanatou) 2) Kant’s dignity (Würde), man as end in himself, inscribes DP w/in his law 3) Hegel’s struggle for recognition 4) Heidegger’s being-toward-death of Dasein

——DP, like death itself, what’s “proper to man” > DP, at risk of shocking, always answered deeply “humanist” pleas

p. 148 DP the keystone, prosthetic artifact, weld, cement that keeps onto-theological upright, and all its dualities (physis/tekhnè, physis/nomos, physis/thesis)

p. 151 given that DP revolves around equivalence of an eye for an eye, question of DP is not only about political onto-theology of sovereignty, but principle of reason as calculability

WM WM p. 266 dominant metaphor, major signified of ontotheleogy: circle of the heliotrope

OS OS pp. 52-3n all anticipation of the meaning of time: onto-theo-teleology; time suppressed the moment one asks the question of its meaning, when one relates it to presence, truth, essence; Hegel: “time is that which erases time” > time, existence of circle, hides from itself its own totality

POS POS pp. 9-10 Derrida is “above all” made possible by Heidegger’s ontological difference (the unthought difference btwn Being and beings), yet Nietzsche is “perhaps” a move beyond the ontotheology of Heidegger, toward a differance no longer in language of West

p. 14 to risk meaning nothing is to start to play, enter play of differance which prevents any word, any concept, from summarizing or governing from a theological presence, centralizing the movement and spacing of differences

p. 52 hasn’t Derrida demonstrated that trace is neither ground, foundation, origin, can’t provide for manifest/disguised ontotheology? [still, he receives such criticisms]

DIF DIF p. 6 differance is not, neither existence nor essence: inscribes & exceeds ontotheology w/out return

p. 16 to delimit closure of metaphysics (absolute privilege that is consciousness as meaning in self-presence) one must solicit the value of presence (this ontotheological determination)

O p. 25 dissemination displaces 3 of ontotheology along angle of a certain refolding (re-ploiement)p. 45 MOP as effacement or sublimation of seminal differance, restance of outwork gets internalized, domesticated into ontotheology of great book

pp. 46-7 Hegel’s philosophical encyclopedia, last of its kind in history to deserve the name > encyclopedia is thoroughly theological in essence/origin (despite the so-called atheistic one)

WAP p. 72 deconstruction had to recognize internal destructuration of phallogocentric onto-theology, otherwise would have repeated classical logic

p. 73 onto-theological, phallogocentric principles of metaphysics guided by question “what is?” subordinates all fields to onto-encyclopedic instant: leads to unity of philosophical university

PIO p. 46 tout autre not any figures of ontotheological configuration (subject, consciousness, unconscious, self, man or woman)

PF p. xix to think divisibility of trait of sovereignty deconstructs a certain fable, certain “as if,” of the political onto-theology of sovereignty

p. xxxiv how to think durable hardness, invincibility, of an onto-theologico-political phantasm: i.e. sovereignty?

PSSS pp. 243-44 all which resists psychoanalysis in the mondialisation of today, e.g. psycho-pharmacological medicine, positivist science, but mainly an archaic onto-theological metaphysics of sovereignty, individual or state (freedom, consciousness, intention, ego, will), barely scratched or thought or deconstructed by psychoanalysis—is this psychoanalysis’ own autoimmunity? its resistance?

LI p. 83 [re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

——the rest of the trace, its remains (restance), neither present nor absent

p. 134 deconstruction of onto-theological humanism (of Heidegger too) > iterability of mark beyond all human speech acts

TN p. 185 connection btwn “self-touching” of “human body” [flesh] and body of Christian ontotheology, its eucharistic ecstasy par excellence [Nancy too?]

BSi pp. 47-50 [vis-à-vis Balibar] Bodin, Hobbes—political sovereignty as mimesis of God (the sovereign sovereign): ontotheology of phrase “marks of sovereignty”

pp. 300-02 liberty & sovereignty (its limitless “I can”) are indissociable, double bind in 2 senses: 1) double injunction 2) duplicity in very concept of binding, obligation, bind, bond: stricture rather than structure, stricture that limits liberty along w/ sovereignty or sovereignty along w/ liberty

——double bind [#1 above]: deconstruct ontotheology of sovereignty w/out questioning liberty in name of which we put this deconstruction to work: think liberty differently, w/in distribution of a divisible sovereignty > think unconditional w/out indivisible sovereignty

OG p. 12 Hegel privileges sound (speech, voice), because it is a hearing of an interior vibration

——voice, phonè, sentendre-parler, saffecte lui-même (hearing-oneself-speak, affecting oneself), ideality

——phonocentrism se confond (merges) w/ onto-theology, produces these subdeterminations of presence: sight as eidos, substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as point (stigmè) of now (nun), consciousness, cogito, subjectivity, co-presence of other & self…

——signs of onto-theology/logocentrism in Heidegger perhaps means that we can’t even leave the closure we can outline (dessiner), movements of belonging/not belonging too subtle to decide

pp. 13-4 (25) that a signified must be able to “take place” in its pure intelligibility (absolute logos): the theology of the sign (perhaps this epoch, whose closure we’ve outlined, will never end)

***p. 23 ontotheology, the system functioning as effacing of difference

p. 68 (99) “God’s death” & “return to finitude” belong to onto-theology they fight against > differance something other than finitude

p. 76 (112) the becoming-legible of nonoccidental language decentered theological prejudice

p. 106 (156) ontotheology of logos (par excellence w/ Hegel): powerless, oneiric effort to master absence by reducing the metaphor w/in absolute parousia of sense/meaning (sens)

pp. 259-60 (367) for Rousseau, what never should have arrived, did [i.e. the supplement]; for Plato, for all onto-theology, meaning put out of play (le sens est mis hors jeu) in condemnation of art > Rousseau does not affirm (play/game of) writing but resigns himself to it

pp. 282-83 theory of sensible origin of ideas (attention > imagination > pictogram), Cartesian critique of Leibnizian rationalism: no intact theological, metaphysical base

——sensible origin coincides w/ concept of sign as original sin > if experience is relation w/ plenitude, sign always a sign of the fall [Husserl, Hegel, ontotheology]

——model of Fall (Platonic or Judeo-Christian) can only be stated w/in common closure

EU pp. 75-6 for Schelling, ethics (raised to a point beyond determination) makes us similar to God, onto-theological translation w/out rupture > a risk of totalizing absolutization of State (which Kant would deem dangerous)

pp. 212-13 ontological-encyclopedic hegemony/structure, univerticality, tends to immobilize all recognized borders > all-powerful & powerless (destiny of philosophy subjected to State power)

——CIPH will outline different topology: horizontal, transversal, heterogenous > experiment

pp. 221-22 thought of sendoff (envoi), dispensation or gift of being: one of most powerful/singular attempts to think history/structure of onto-theology: Shickung, Schicksal, Gabe, “es gibt Sein,” “es gibt Zeit” do not seem to belong w/in onto-theological philosophemes

OPEN [fixerup]

GT p. 156 interruption opens space of absolute heterogeneity—infinite secret

***R p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature > this undecidability [“I continue to believe”] only radical possibility of letting/thinking what comes about by arriving of whoever arrives

FL p. 256 rigorously distinguish “to-come” from future, which loses openness, loses coming of other, w/out which there’s no justice, la justice reste à venir, elle a à venir, elle est à-venir

p. 257 madness of justice: the incalculable and giving idea of justice is close to the bad, the worst, can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation > assurance against the worst will only suture the opening

OOG p. 117 for Husserl, “horizon is always virtually present in every experience; for it is at once the unity and incompletion, the anticipated unity in every incompletion” > keeps infinite openness in tact, converting critical philosophy’s state of possibility into concrete infinite potentiality

p. 127 spirit’s radical freedom: theoretical attitude (which the philosopher inaugurates), opens horizon of knowledge as a pre-having beyond finitude

SPOM pp. 91-2 injunction, pledge, “necessary” promise “il faut lavenir” marks any opening to the event and conditions interest (not indifference) to anything whatsoever, to all content, no desire w/out it

HERP p. 182 philein—to accord oneself to logos (Sprache, legein, which is already engaged, opened), co-respond, correspondence (not first w/ some subject)

p. 202 via Heidegger, opening of 2 maintains the entre-deux, no community gathering (pas de rassemblement communautaire) if there are not 2, but no 2 w/out opposition (Gegensatz)

pp. 202-03 Heidegger [on Bildung]: community of struggle (Kampfgemeinschaft) a struggle that holds opposition open, permits resolute self-examination [only the “few”] [see p. 190]

POOF p. 22 wound opens w/ necessity to count one’s friends, democracy’s 2 irreducible laws: 1) respect for irreducible singularity or alterity 2) calculation of majorities, representable subjects, all equal

——mais là où tout autre est également tout autre > political desire borne by this disjunction, bears chance of future of democracy, divided virtue, inadequate to itself, chaos opening in silence

——no virtue, w/out the tragedy of # w/out #, perhaps more unthinkable than tragedy

p. 29 dangerous perhaps > open heart [not programmed]

pp. 50-1 Nietzsche’s hospitality for mad arrivants, fool already on premises, a guest who would have preceded his host, sheer madness of inverting friend/enemy > requests only that they open the doors of their hearts to him

p. 242 via Heidegger, philía as opening, accord, in essential relation w/ phúsis as covering up, dissimulation of self > phúsis qua philía: lune, comme lautre, garde ce rapport à la fois généreux et jaloux à elle-mêmeelle aime à se cacher, krúptesthai phileîn > le retrait de la pudeur [decency] donne ici le mouvement même: gives the gift (donne le don), accords phúsis and philía

HASD p. 23 to doubt divine promise, transgress the injunction [of hyperessential, negative theological God], would be to see an opening (closing in on itself) of literariness, lawless law of fiction

VM p. 83 Levinas’ messianic eschatology never directly mentioned, an opening of opening, beyond all category, concepts, resists philosophemes, space or hollow in naked experience

OH p. 35 responsibility: making a chance of the memory of a name, of the idiomatic limit > an opening of identity to its future

PAS PAS p. (47) the other of language: the maddest referential opening

FSW p. 198 differance, pre-opening of ontic-ontological distinction, & of all the differences which furrow (sillonnant) Freudian conceptuality

SH p. 61 figure of absolute future: monstrosity—Elijah, guest, other [re: word to be circumcised opened like a door to “who” would come] like a wound? yes and no [cf. F p. xiv]

WM p. 239 since, for Aristotle, mimēsis is not identity but gives us to see in action what is not to be seen in action, only in its resembling double, its mimēma, Derrida wants to leave open this energetic absence, this enigmatic division, the interval which makes scenes and tells tales

DS p. 202 relation of one text to another, open & closed, at the same time > necessary that each organism only refer to itself as determinate

pp. 203-04 out of sight (a perte de vue): hymen & dissemination > une entaille y est marquée, qui ouvre encore sur un autre texte et pratique une autre lecture, lanalyse en serait infinie

p. 226 surprise in writing, supplement, baffling economy of seduction: entre un silence

pp. 234-35 supplement in Mallarmé (not unilateral movement, like in Rousseau, which loses warmth of spoken word): cest lexcès dun signifiant qui, en son dedans, supplée lespace et répète louverture

GSP p. 155 is Husserl respectful of that which remains open w/in structure, even when one thinks the opening of structure as structural? [faithful comprehension meets no choice]

pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

PS p. 186 for Artaud, organ is place of loss: its center always an orifice, always functions as embouchure

FS p. 26 structuralist totality promises infidelity to telos, but: structures must permit totality to open, overflow itself, totality thus takes on meaning by anticipating telos > an opening which liberates genesis and time but risks stifling force under futural becoming of teleological form

TB pp. 121-22 Benjamin uses metaphor of amphora, ammetaphor, to describe contact btwn languages; metamphora adjoins along broken line (not infinite/straight line): Derrida compares to Heidegger, Rilke, Hölderlin’s urn (re: word/thing) > amphora is one w/ itself while its openness forbids its totality, always giving/receiving [open square]

RGE pp. 260-61 in doubling lordship (la maîtrise), sovereignty doesn’t remove itself from dialectics or its synthesis like an independent morsel (une pièce) > such an abstract negation would consolidate ontologics > sovereignty not simply a caesura or interruption but an opening, irruption: sovereignty inscribes dialectical synthesis, provides economy of reason w/ its unlimiting boundaries of non-sense, makes it function in sacrifice of meaning (du sens)

REST pp. 265-66 when shoes no longer have strict relation avec un sujet porteur ou porté—they’re the lightened, anonymous, voided support (but so much the heavier abandoned à son inertie opaque) “of an absent subject whose name haunts the open form”

——never completely open, the shoe maintains a form, that of the foot > describes external surface or envelope of what is called a “form” [Derrida quotes from Littré, where “form” is wood in shape (figure) of foot, then he links figure to face—Shapiro sees Van Gogh’s in “his” shoes]

PIO pp. 27-8 status of invention via politics of patent, programming of patented inventions (even integrating margin of chance)—are programmed inventions still inventions? still open to future?

p. 45 other as the uninvented, in invention, must let other come, not make the other: deconstructive invention as opening, uncloseting, destabilizing foreclusionary structures

TR p. 134 cut: wounding, opening, chance of a respiration

AFR p. 33 Condillac replaces a metaphysics of essences/causes (the hidden) w/ metaphysics of phenomena & relation (the open)

p. 95 for Condillac, time secures moment when object goes missing from perception, moment perception is absent from itself > moment space of signs opens, w/ function of imagination [time as that which absents perception?]

D p. 295 open system: repetition of ruptures

p. 299 by a folding-back (reploiement) or internal angle of surface: face (frons scaenae) contemplates itself as unconditioned opening of appearance, but explains itself as surface-effect, as conditioned [by square apparatus]

p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

p. 302 laughter: the cut, display teeth

pp. 313-14 the opening, as presence, is not noticed as opening—we’re fascinated, glued to what presents itself: we’re unable to see presence as such, visibility of visible > never present themselves

p. 336 opening paradoxically wrought as a thing that closes (squares of cubes)

p. 366 limits of square/cube—indefinitely specular unfolding/refolding: not limits at all > opening of its own inscription—tout autre, la même, another geometry to come [EROS]

PPT p. 11 trait never appears, never itself—contracts in its retreat? marks the difference of form/content of the appearing

——lentame of the origin: opens, w/ trace, w/out initiating anything

LI pp. 137-38 that trace de-limits what it limits is why the finiteness of a context has an indefinite opening—never secure, simple > in this openness of erasure: political responsibility (where irreducible violence communicates w/ an essential nonviolence) > only the irresponsible (to be polemical) will object, those for whom things are always calculable, clear, programmable, decipherable

p. 152 unconditionality independent of every determinate context, even determination of context as such > announces itself only in opening of context

pp. 152-53 though nothing exists outside context, limit of frame/border of context always entails nonclosure: outside penetrates, thus determines, inside

TN pp. 32-3 for Nancy, [re: “extreme contraction” that turns opening into auto-affection] “I” owes as much to the contract, to gathered stroke or trait of this contraction, as to the opening itself (what’s called a mouth) > a gathering in an interruption (“syncope,” “convulsion,” “spasm”), cut that opens & shuts the mouth

p. 350n how could [Husserl’s] identical coincidence open up to anything else?

p. 221 cet espacement fait lépreuve du non-contact comme la condition ou lexpérience même du contact, lexpérience même du même à jamais ouverte (forever open)et par lautre espacée” [hiatus of noncontact at heart of contact]

p. 283 for there to be a good heart: possibility of bad heart must remain forever open, i.e. tout autre > good heart must be ready for the other, for treachery, for perjury (inevitable-impossible vow of abstinence, tactile’s fate); is this how we can translate Kant’s “evil heart”?

NOY pp. 231-32 when thought and the word (la parole) given in writing merge (se confond) at the heart of the same time (au coeur du même temps); chance encounter in singularity of “graph,” coincidence of the cut (la coupure) and the opening (louverture)

ATM p. 165 opening of interruption is never pure

E p. 14 analogy of God and poet proceeds from and returns to logos, source as mouth and outlet (embouchure)

AD p. 26 Levinas’ open door calls for the opening of an exteriority or of a transcendence of the idea of infinity > idea comes through the door: the door passed through is reason in teaching

pp. 52-4 discretion of face, not unveiling/revelation but an opening before the opening, not an opening to phenomenality, not Heidegger’s Erschliessung, Erschlossenheit, Offenheit

LG p. 229 all texts left open, eternally remarkable—possibility of becoming literature

OG pp. 4-5 (14) we can merely glimpse the closure, not the end, of a historico-metaphysical epoch (3000 years) whose ouverture de champ produces its own dislocation, denounces its own limits

p. 60 (88) arche-writing at work in graphic and nongraphic expression, pattern uniting form & substance, all content & expression > opens temporalization, relationship w/ other & language

p. 140 (202) arche-writing: nonethical (violent) opening of ethics, origin of morality & immorality; no ethics w/out other, detour, simulation, differance, absence, writing

p. 298 (421) “labîme, cest le creux qui peut rester ouvert entre la défaillance de la nature et le retard du supplément” [abyss as delay, hollow, open]

p. 312 (440) writing/double opens desire and re-gardent la jouissance—Rousseau searches for un salut (haven) dans lécriture

EU p. 123 philosophy finds itself inscribed w/in space it can’t order, opens to an other not even its other > in a tympanum as little Hegelian as possible

pp. 202-03 [CIPH] no preinterpretation, “thinking” as what questions philosophy > indeterminate opening (experimental incursions in unexplored areas)

pp. 218-19 “thinking” proceeds to limits of these unavoidable words of legitimation: art, science, philosophy, technique, practice, law, etc.

——permanent opening: never suture w/ assurance (tranquility) of doctrine or dogma

FV p. 428 when Lacan sees “triads,” he misses a scene, there’s always supplement of square > square’s opening complicates the calculations

pp. 442-43 letter found “in” the text which escapes, from 4th side, eyes of Dupin/analyst [letter not found in sealed interior of Poe’s tale, not assignable lack, definable hole]

——the text The Purloined Letter: the open, the very open, letter that is fiction

OPPOSITIONS (DUALTIES)

R p. 109 autoimmunity, cruelty itself, autoinfection of all autoaffectivity, the self, ipse, autos finds itself infected (once it needs event, time, other) precedes or anticipates oppositions btwn physis & its others (tekhnē, nomos, thesis) > life-death

AF p. 1 forever forgetting that when physis opposes thesis, tekhnē, nomos, these principles are not 1 or 2, they’re always more than 1 & more or less than 2 > all would be simple if opposition held

MPM pp. 138-39 the undecidable that resists non-dialectizable oppositions will bear name, maintain rhetorical relation w/ opposition, will have figure of opposition, be figurable, will always let itself by parasited by figure of opposition [thus staging of promise as act or position]

A p. 18 decision concerns choice btwn relation w/ a wholly non-opposable other (an other that’s not its other) and an other who is its other (can be opposed in a couple) > the former relation is that of aporia, not a crossing of border but a double concept of the border

p. 20 paradox of aporia: multiple figures of aporia do not oppose figures to each other, “instead installs the haunting of the one in the other”

——2 versions of aporia’s nonpassage: 1) impermeable, only opens via shibboleth, closed borders (i.e. during war) 2) impasse of no limit, limit too porous, no opposition btwn 2 sides

EM p. 127 (152) for Heidegger, motif of proximity caught in opposition which unceasingly regulates his discourse: in proximity of ontic, ontological Dasein is that which is farthest

pp. 132-33 (158-60) [here Derrida shows limits of Heidegger’s deconstruction?] prevalence given to phenomenological metaphor (phainesthai, shining, lighting, clearing, Lichtung) opens to space of presence, presence of space, opposition near & far > thought prior to opposition space & time, opening of a spacing which belongs to neither, dislocates while producing presence of the present

PP p. 85 list of oppositions Plato adheres to in Theuth myth: speech/writing, life/death, father/son, master/servant, first/second, legitimate son/orphan-bastard, soul/body, inside/outside, good/evil, seriousness/play, day/night, sun/moon, etc.

pp. 92-3 Thoth supplants and supplements (en le suppléant) its other (father, sun, life, speech, origin or orient); at same time Thoth takes shape from very thing it resists and substitutes for

——Thoth opposes itself, passes into its other > messenger-god is truly god of absolute passage btwn opposites: god of non-identity (if he had identity: coincidentia oppositorum)

pp. 95-6 to put word “voluntarily” in quotation marks designates, content to remain within the closure of oppositions, “submission” to the necessities of a given “language”

p. 103 (117) to be in opposition, each term must be external to the other (good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, inside/outside) which means one of the oppositions must be matrix of all possible oppositions, thus Plato tries to dominate writing

p. 111 (126) opposition btwn mnēmē and hypomnēsis institutes all oppositions of Platonism, the boundary line is major decision of philosophy, maintains, institutes itself, contains its fond advers

p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

p. 129 in shadows of Plato’s pharmacy [like a crypt, cave], prior to oppositions (conscious/unconscious, freedom/constraint, voluntary/involuntary), where “language” is not pertinent

p. 160 “Plato’s metaphors” [re: khōra]? passage beyond all “Platonic” oppositions, toward aporia of originary inscription

VM p. 88 fantasy [Levinas’?] of a philosophy where contradiction of concepts subsides in displacement of concepts, a philosophy enveloped in its fundamental concepts

p. 91 Levinas calls the community of Platonic light, logic of noncontradiction, “formal logic”

PAS PAS pp. (31-2) Blanchot’s folding displaces typical opposition, hierarchy, value of value

p. (41) Blanchot: “at the highest point of contradiction, I was this illegitimate dead person”

p. (43) Blanchot: instead of contradiction “I am, I am not,” rubbing (usant) against each other like stones, I write, “I think, therefore I am not”

F p. xviii how to treat introj./incorp.: rigorous dissociation even if purity of dissociation remains theoretical: dissociation as excluding inclusion of one safe in another (dun for dans lautre)

FWT pp. 11-2 Derrida feels closer to Lacan than Foucault, he’s more daring a “deconstructor” > Foucault’s passage btwn epistemes neglects long sequences (hardens into oppositions)

p. 22 political choices as gradations and not clearly defined oppositions: not I am this or that > but, I am this and that, I am this rather than that

p. 148 DP the keystone, prosthetic artifact, weld, cement that keeps onto-theological upright, and all its dualities (physis/tekhnè, physis/nomos, physis/thesis)

POOF p. 85 Schmitt’s political difference assumes opposition, a determined opposition: friend/enemy > should it erase itself: no politics

WM pp. 228-29 oppositions (physis/tekhnē, physis/nomos, sensible/intelligible, space/time, etc.) are made possible by “tropic” movements which do not make up a “proper” language; these metaphors, tropologies, obey the law of supplementarity (btwn concept and field)

p. 251 sun structures metaphorical space of philosophy, represents what is natural in philosophical language, makes possible oppositions (appearing/disappearing, visible/invisible, present/absent)

p. 256n in response to Fontanier’s new “proper sense,” a violent catachresis, btwn figurative and primitive sense, Derrida says: when the middle is not a passageway of mediation btwn oppositions, the opposition is not pertinent > consequences are boundless

DS p. 206 in Mallarmé’s writings dyad exists: there are mimes & ghosts, a difference w/out reference: a ghost that is the ghost of no flesh w/out death, birth, presence, past (preserved differential structure of mimesthai w/out Platonic metaphysical reappropriations)

p. 236 chain “fiction,” “hymen,” “spacious,” gets caught in, while disrupting, ontological machine (dislocating oppositions)

p. 224 simple opposition btwn activity & passivity (btwn all -er/-ed concepts) becomes too formally weak to encompass graphics of hymen, its spider web, the play of its eyelids

p. 281n opposition btwn metaphor & metonymy is purely semantic—deconstructed by superficial, profound, that is abyssal operation of verification (glass, hymen, verse)

P p. 22 oppositions of art (meaning/form, inside/outside, content/container, signifier/signified)

p. 65 Kant’s conceptual scheme: rational/formal/logical vs. irrational/matter/illogical

POS p. 9 differance common root of oppositional concepts, as common root, is also element of the same (distinguished from the identical [Heidegger]) in which oppositions are announced

p. 29 all conceptual oppositions subordinate movement of differance to an antecedent presence of meaning, a “transcendental signified”

p. 41 general strategy of deconstruction, its “general economy,” must avoid simply neutralizing binary oppositions & simply residing in closed field of oppositions

pp. 41-2 double writing, double gesture, double science, a writing in/of itself multiple [Derrida explains that the phase of overturning the hierarchy of an opposition is necessary, politically necessary, there are risks of rushing to neutralization, but to remain w/in this phase isn’t enough]

p. 43 Derrida’s undecidables, unities of simulacrum, “false” verbal properties that can’t be included in philosophical binary, but still inhabit it, resisting, disorganizing, w/out ever constituting a 3rd term, a solution: hymen, gram, incision, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, margin

p. 66 insistence that matter, via Bataille’s general economy, is absolute exterior of opposition, is necessary, is related to essential strategy of “materialism,” yet “materialism” must avoid becoming a new “idealism,” adopting naive relation to referent or signified

pp. 71-5 Houdebine asks if a Marxist contradiction can be in strategic excess of metaphysical dualities, Derrida doesn’t believe Marxist text is homogenous enough to liberate these concepts definitively, advocates reading, analyzing sediment of “old names,” reading “Greek materialists”

p. 101n differance can’t be subsumed by logical contradiction > differance (process of differentiation) permits heterogenous modes of contradiction

——“undecidable” not Hegelian contradiction, but, in rigorously Freudian sense, the unconscious of philosophical contradiction, which ignores contradiction, to extent that it belongs to speech, consciousness, discourse, presence, truth

SP pp. 149-51n “moment sexual difference is determined as an opposition, the image of each term is inverted into the other” > the 2 X’s à la fois subject/predicate, their copula a mirror: man wants ideal man in woman, woman ideal woman in man > homosexual effacement à linfini

ATIA p. 62 the animort? pluralizing animal, renouncing unification of concept, so it can’t be opposed to anything identifiable (man, the dead)

p. 136 subtle & fragile distinctions affect all solid oppositions

p. 156 the differential of animot, animals, should complicate oppositional structure: either have “as such” or don’t (has or doesn’t have world)

FS p. 20 our discourse irreducibly belongs to system of metaphysical oppositions

DIF DIF pp. 16-7 system of differance no longer tolerates oppositions passive/active, indeterminate/determinate, cause/effect > consciousness as “effect” or “determination” w/in system of differance: strategically, one continues to operate acc. lexicon one is de-limiting

O p. 4 idealist, spiritualist, phoncentrist: first and foremost logocentric (traditional, hierarchical opposition btwn speech & writing)

***p. 6 direction or chain of the “metaphysical” can’t be opposed by concept, rather by process of textual labor, the movement of differance, which cannot be relevédisorganizes opposition

pp. 23-4n Mao, profoundly influenced by Hegel, discusses how the itemization of a pharmacy does not push one to think over problems (problem: a contradiction in a thing)

pp. 24-5 dissemination sets up a pharmacy, can’t count by 1’s, 2’s, 3’s — everything starts w/ dyad (not conflictual, hierarchical, dual oppositions)

——the 3 is no longer ideality of speculative solution, but the “effect” of a strategic re-mark > referring name of 1 of the 2 terms [in dual opposition] to absolute outside of opposition (marked once again in exposé of differance)

——two/four & the “closure of metaphysics” no longer take, never could take, the form of circular line enclosing a field, finite culture of binary oppositions

Gii p. 41 Heidegger’s essential propositions re: ape’s lack of hand, an empirico-dogmatic hapax, supposedly nonmetaphysical humanism > when animality is enclosed in its organico-biological programs: absolute oppositional limit which erases differences, homogenizes

p. 60 Heidegger employs idiomatic untranslatability of opposition btwn geistig/geistlich to withdraw Gedicht (“site”) of Trakl from Platonic tradition, w/ its opposition aisthēton/noeton (“sensible” material/“intelligible” spirituality), and from Christian opposition spiritual/temporal

REST p. 284 acc. Heidegger, oppositional pairs as Überfall, injure the thing in the thing: hypokeimonon (underneath) or hypostasis/symbebekota (on top) [which becomes in Latin: subjectum (substantia)/accidens], aisthēton/noēton (sensible/intelligible), hylē/eidos-morphē (matter/form-figure)

p. 340 logic of detachment as cut (opposition, leads to suturing-sublation, maintains problematic of castration truth) vs. logic of detachment as stricture (is tout autre, interlacing of differance of [or as] stricture, no suture, haunting, neither empty nor full, largument-de-la-gaine, can’t accommodate the couple, ces coupes oppositionelles, the ghost leases, le, la, les double(s) band-)

PIO p. 39 the government’s aleatory margin (for invention) remains homogenous w/ calculation (programmed invention) > w/in order of the calculable: no absolute surprise, order of the same

——but Derrida will not oppose deconstruction (not passivity), the invention of the other, to government’s program: because opposition belongs to regimen of the same

WAP p. 133 those who think reading is immediately to do, and those who think reading is not to do, not even to write: both caught in oppositional conceptual guardrails (garde-fous)

AFR p. 95 understanding vs. will > another matrical opposition

pp. 108-09 to introduce (not saturate, not intrude [sintroduire]): seduce the text (not the reader), surprise it close to its content > a rigorous “abyss”

——follow lines, grafts, borders, ribs: analyze its machine of oppositions, its program, and what breaches the program, defeats its teleology, undecides its circle: suspend text on one of its nervures après-coupées (cut-after-the-fact-ribs)

D p. 315 don’t dispel the uncertainty: whether mirror is classical stage or generalized space in which old theater is inscribed?

——all oppositions sont détraquées (thrown out of whack) by “avoir-lieu” of mirror: each term takes over (capte) the other & excludes itself from itself

EL p. 223 for Scholem, separation of form/content (Inhalt/Gestalt) only takes place via degradation, contamination of language > all oppositions are bourgeois mediations [Benjamin]

HST p. 362 madness of concept of hospitality: Messiah as hôte; visitation not invitation (not dialectical opposition) > invitation prepares for visitations

***pp. 362-63 “the entire contradiction” more than a dialectical one: each concept hospitable to an other that never was “its other” (dialectical contradiction): autodeconstruction in every concept undoes the grip, the violence of taking, Begriff, capture, comprendre, cum-capio

the difference btwn extending hospitality to one’s chosen other (integratable immigrants), and a tout autre (absolute surprise, madness of the concept of hospitality, atopos)

PPT p. 11 in [classical] discourses on painting, trait always determined as opposition-slash > what happens before difference becomes opposition? becoming always been a concept of determinate opposition

LI p. 34 Sarl’s serene dogmatism re: intention/origin of utterance/signature: confidence in distinguishing oppositions, i.e. “parasite” from “nonparasite,” etc.

pp. 48-9 structural & essential, iterability is at work in all facts, each mark divided or multiplied in advance > a more powerful “logic”—graphics of iterability undercuts classical opposition of fact & principle (le droit), factual & possible (virtual), necessity & possibility

——iterability disrupts presence, unity of ego in sender, du maintenant-écrivain (grasping w/ 1 hand his ballpoint pen) > stigmè of every mark already split

p. 53 permanence depends on dialectical opposition of presence/absence > differential structure of iteration escapes this logic

p. 71 the way oppositions impose non-neutral hierarchies (classical logic) > eg. speech act theory’s demand for the “serious, literal, strict”

p. 93 speech act theory’s hierarchical axiology: set up value oppositions & subordinate these values to each other (normal/abnormal, parasite/nonparasite, fulfilled/void, serious/nonserious, literal/nonliteral, briefly: positive/negative, ideal/nonideal)

———Plato, Rousseau, Descartes, Husserl: good before evil, simple before complex, positive before negative, pure before impure, essential before accidental, imitated before imitation (not one metaphysical gesture among others—the metaphysical exigency)

p. 96 logic of parasitism not one of distinction or opposition, neither same as nor different from what it parasites: possibility of fiction cannot be derived

p. 123 Derrida shares w/ Searle demand for oppositional logic though does not elicit same consequences from it

pp. 126-27 point is to overturn, complicate, binary opposition and value of distinction attached to it

p. 127 concept of iterability brings into the open what is disturbing or menacing the consistency of binary & hierarchical oppositions

p. 156n difference btwn differences & oppositions: deconstruction foreign to rhetoricism (possible logocentrism) > not a leveling or assimilation: deconstruction endeavors to refine differences

E pp. 4-5 proportional analogy btwn oppositions dissolves them, but first the oppositions must be produced, and there’s [almost?] always a regular hierarchy

p. 12 no oppositional logic seems fitted to disassociate its themes

BSi p. 154 for Schelling, there’s distinction btwn being (Wesen) as Grund & being as existence > must be Wesen prior to any ground: Urgrund or Ungrund that would not be oppositional, absolute indifference

OG p. 9 (19-20) if cybernetics ousts metaphysical concepts soul, life, value, choice & memory, it must conserve notion of writing, trace, grammè, graphemeuntil its own historico-metaphysical character is exposed [cybernetic program will be the field of writing]

——grammè (or grapheme), not human or nonhuman, not simple, can’t be defined w/in oppositions of metaphysics

pp. 32-3 (49-50) how Saussure’s concept of the arbitrary strictly divides the uncertain frontiers btwn ideographic, pictographic, & phonetic scripts > arbitrariness appeals to opposition physis/nomos, physis/techné, whose ultimate function is perhaps to derive historicity

pp. 33-34 (50-51) but this science [deconstructive grammatology?]: where opening of “image” conditions “reality” can’t maintain classical scientific grid: external/internal, image/reality, representation/presence

***pp. 46-8 (68-70) Derrida calls instituted trace “unmotivated” (immotivée), asks that the word “institution” not be so quickly interpreted w/in classical oppositions; “unmotivated” deconstructs Saussure’s arbitrary, thinks its possibility en-deçà de (short of) lopposition dérivée btwn nature/convention, symbol/sign > becoming-unmotivated of trace requires synthesis where le tout autre sannonce comme tel: not more natural than cultural

p. 315 (443-44) death (not present) travels w/in speech as trace, reserve, differance, supplement; not the simple exteriority of death to life, evil to good, signifier to signified [that would be MOP] (reversing these oppositions confirms metaphysics their rooted in)

EU p. 73 Kant of Critique of Judgment takes himself beyond oppositions, tries to think the living & art

pp. 74-5 Schelling against Kant’s separation of Wissen and Handeln (action); there is “but one world,” no world in itself; philosophy is ethics > duality of languages not annulled but derived from result of reflection

——Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties constructed on “untranslatable multiplicity of languages,” dissociations of a discursive type: performative/constative, public/private, spirit/letter etc.

SPEC pp. 282-83 reality principle as courier, lieutenant, of PP, disciplining disciple, defers enjoyment, the waystation (relais) of a differance (Aufschub), auf dem langen Umwege zur Lust, as if RP produces a socius, institution, contract of discipline

——when master (PP) submits to the work of the secondary (RP), “submits” to its own lieutenant, addresses to himself simulated engagement via detour of institutional telecommunication—il s’envoie, il s’écrit, PP déchaine en lui lautre absolu > alterity more irreducible than alterity of opposition

p. 376 to speculate: not only going beyond a given oppositional limit but the very notion of limit as front btwn two opposed terms—eg. the identifiable terms where every term terminates: life/death [Derrida’s eschatology?]

pp. 402-03 s’il faut se rendre à ce quil faut echaîner strictement [if it’s necessary to submit to what must follow strictly] re: le mot de maîtrise, going beyond oppositional logic—is there mastery?

p. 408 beyond opposition, differance & rhythm

CHOR p. 100 “positional”: difference determined as opposition, whether or not dialectically

p. 105 very obscure area, passage btwn ontological difference & sexual difference not punctuated by polarities (originary/derived, ontological/ontic…)

p. 108 if this merciless closure [of sexual duality, of the 2] would arrest desire at wall of opposition, tragedy would leave this strange sense, a contingent one, that we must affirm and learn to love instead of dreaming of innumerable: but doesn’t dream prove what is dreamt of

ORIGIN

MONL p. 64 prosthesis of origin: prior-to-the-first time of pre-originary language, must be invented

AF pp. 92-93 nearly ecstatic instant Freud dreams of [re: Studies on Hysteria]: origin speaking by itself, arkhē appears in the nude, w/out archive, anamnēsis w/out hypomnēsis

OOG p. 128 for Husserl, aprioriness is not a concern, it is the institutive infinitization

HERP p. 202 irreducible, nonformalizable equivocation in Heidegger’s use of “(non)originary”

p. 210 acc. Heidegger, originary strife projects what is not yet heard

POOF p. 34 to wonder how something could be born from its antithesis, whether truth is born of error, one must be mad in eyes of ‘metaphysicians of all ages’ > one must go mad asking about an impossible genesis, one that contradicts its very origin, an anti-genesis [Derrida on Nietzsche]

MPM p. 41n de Man treats all historicism, periodization, narrative of origin as fables, fictions

VP p. 45 tradition assured to infinity > transmission and reactivation of origin; this is a valuation, an ethico-theoretical act, reawakening originary decision of philosophy as Platonic form

SPOM p. 103 it has always been acceleration itself [beyond the norms of speed that have until now informed human culture] that dislocates, dislocation no less arch-originary than archaism it dislodges

p. 202 “mystical character” of commodity is inscribed before being inscribed, traced before being written letter for letter, everything begins before it begins > but Marx wants to know the instant the ghost comes on stage—this is a manner of exorcism

VM p. 141 Being makes search for an archia tremble, its priority is not an archia

S pp. 107-08 origin as hétérogène à lorigine: 1) originarily heterogenous 2) heterogenous to what is called the origin, other than the origin 3) heterogenous and or insofar as at the origin: because and although (bien que) at the same time—is logical form of tension that makes this thought vibrate; p. 109 is this just the spirit of Christianity?

FSW p. 203 differance as non-originary origin, erases myth of origin, determined outside teleological/eschatological horizon [horizon key word here]

p. 212 labor of writing erases distinction btwn origin of world and Being-in-the-World

TC p. 248 Artaud: spirit of beginnings, which is the Christian spirit, has not ceased to make me commit idiocies

PPHS p. 72 origin, inaugural imaginary limit, myth of transcendental signified, archeology before trace and difference

SH p. 58 poetry, literature, art, experience of the mask, an intense familiarity w/ ineluctable originarity of specter = ineluctable loss of origin > spectral errancy of words not an accident

F p. xxvii no-place proper to “original” event, “hypothetical zero hour,” creates cryptomythical system [see p. xxxiii “u-topian,” “u-chronological”]

POS p. 53 how the “fall,” abasement (of writing) only functions via thought of origin

GSP p. 164 the attempt parallelism makes to overcome invisible difference is not innocent: for Husserl, the nothing of a parallelism prevents transcendental phenomenology & phenomenological psychology from coming together, this nothing permits transcendental reduction: permits origin of world to appear

TB p. 119 classic circle always begins to turn once one asks about origin of languages/society

p. 126 if axiom “there is no translation of translation” were broken, one would touch, and one must not, the untouchable of the untouchable (that which guarantees originality to the original)

p. 130 Rousseau, Husserl & Benjamin seek origin even while dismissing historical/natural one [?]

——Benjamin: “concept of origin (Abstammugsbegriff) remains indispensable” [re: affinity of languages]

DST DST p. 200 great task of translator, his agony, aporias, madness: proceed from initial strangeness, the gap opened by idiom of original text [original text?????]

p. 213 if one no longer denounces mimesis as fallen, [contra Plato], can’t call it originary: being originary incompatible w/ mimesis

D p. 304 “primitive” mythical unity always reconstituted retrospectively dans laprès-coupure > the decision, le coup (shot, throw, blow) parts the seed as it projects it (partage la semence en la projetant)

LI p. 62 vices [turns] that interest me: time & place of the other time, the other time in (stead of) the first time, at once

TN p. 186 Merleau-Ponty’s originary here, origin of world, an “I can”

WOG p. 28 deconstruction at work in the ‘origin,’ already from the ‘origin’ itself—upon deconstruction of the origin

OG p. 61 (90) transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased, arche-trace must comply w/ this necessity & erasure (contradictory and not acceptable in logic of identity), it is the disappearance of origin, and also the origin of origin, so to wrench (arracher) trace from classical scheme that would demand it comes after originary nontrace (that would make of it an empirical mark), we must speak of originary trace or arche-trace > but if all begins w/ trace, there’s no originary trace

pp. 74-5 (110) question of origin at first merges w/ essence [re: what is writing?] > though writing is thoroughly historical, surprising [?] that scientific study of writing has always taken form of a history of writing

pp. 92-3 no law w/out possibility of trace, what is lost in thought of trace (complicity of origins, arche-writing) is the myth of the simplicity of origin

p. 167 (238) origin/nature as myth of addition, supplementarity annulled by being purely additive > myth of the effacement of the trace

p. 229 (326) Rousseau declares what he wishes to say: writing/articulation are post-originary malady; he describes what he does not wish to say: articulation (space of writing) at origin of language

——what he describes takes place for better or worse, annuls eschatology & teleology just as differance (originary articulation) annuls archeology

p. 233 (332) natural immediacy is à la fois origine et fin, in the double sense of birth & death, unfinished sketch and finished perfection (esquisse inachevée et perfection finie) [how Rousseau’s contradiction is only apparent, how his law of concept of nature constrains natural law]

pp. 242-43 (345) complexity of zero degree, origin, nothing but a point in the system of supplementarity? [despite what he declares, nothing Rousseau writes authorizes simple origin]

——history of language as history du supplément dorigine

p. 256 (363) [in Rousseau’s archeo-teleology] origin & end are inertia

pp. 256-58 (363-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] teleology as external—passage from state of nature to state of language (from one structure to another) explained by catastrophic archaeology (catastrophe of dangerous supplementarity)

——is the catastrophe that splits nature still natural?

p. 267 for Rousseau, birth of society not a passage but a pure, fictive, unstable point > post-originary degradation analogous to pre-originary repetition

——if culture is broached w/in its point of origin—no linear order > morrow = eve of festival

p. 277 (392) for Rousseau, though poet lacks objective truth of object, he comes closer to authenticity/literalness than rhetor/writer > poet speaks from origin of his passionate speech

SPEC p. 321 an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (dun après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

p. 370 [fort:da is a narrative] no thesis, only hypothesis, origin is speculative because the object cannot be the object of a thesis

ORIGINAL SIN

GOD pp. 50-1 to think responsibility w/in criteria of salvation, the Good as infinite love, the gift of death, requires event of Christianity (sin, gift of infinite love linked to experience of death), or makes Christianity possible

p. 93 a look, God’s look, God’s gaze, that cannot be exchanged, situates original sin, is the essence of responsibility

ATIA p. 43 Cain’s shame, like a second original sin, he needs to hide his nakedness, his crime, he feels excessively culpable > but, isn’t all wrongdoing excessive, le défaut devant leil faut

pp. 43-4 God sets a trap for Cain, God as hunter, don’t fall prey to sin lurking there, a lure, a temptation [Derrida’s prowling and lurking]

p. 130 Lacan designates castration complex as Freud’s scientific (nonmythological) original sin (being subjected to the signifier, a nonmastery that gives human mastery over animals)

PS pp. 184-85 man as the scato-theological being (this is the essence of guilt), capable of being soiled by the work and thieving God > God is a sin agains the unnameable Divine

FL p. 286 for Benjamin, original sin is when language serves only as means, becomes idle chatter (Geschwätz) [before “bourgeois,” language pure manifestation?]

A p. 77 Heidegger dissociates Verfallen from original sin, but still needs distinction btwn authentic/inauthentic > death as “possibility of impossibility” can mean Eigentlichkeit inhabited by Enteignis

FS p. 21 movement as sin, not yet desired form, final aim [re: structuralism]

CHM p. 52 [prior to evil genius] epistemological deficiency of madness, this error in the senses, could translate madness into sin [Foucault cheerfully demonstrates this path]

Gi pp. 23-4 complexity of the negative in Heidegger, negativity can be a dissimulation/disfiguration of original phenomenon, which is not negative: Uneigentlichkeit is not a mistake/sin

TR p. 120 if theft is to be a sin, it must be done for the crime itself, not for use value (to eat) but for exchange, fetish value (certain uselessness)

HST p. 388 congenital perjury of justice: original sin before original sin

BSi pp. 303-04 Lacan: Oedipus story, a less cretinizing (abêtissant) version of Original Sin > Derrida wonders [coyly] whether everything in BS deals w/ castration

OG pp. 33-5 (51-2) moralism, preaching, in Saussure/Plato—casting writing, figuration, to the exterior > maléfique, sin (péché) (traitorous contamination)

——dehors dans le dedans, archetypal violence, sin, interrupts natural rapport of soul w/ itself, writing, exterior, as body, as clothing

——writing (mask, perversion, disguise, debauchery) must be exorcised (that is, conjurer) by the good word (bonne parole)

p. 35 (53) for Malebranche, original sin is distraction, inattention, is nothing, temptation of ease [MOP in attentiveness]

UWC p. 223 original sin > introduction of work, expiation would be the end of work

ORPHAN

KH p. 124 one telling to the next, author gets farther & farther away: mythic saying resembles a discourse w/out a legitimate father, orphan, bastard, distinguished from philosophy, in Phaedrus, which must have a father to answer for it

PP p. 145n orphan, for Plato, is always model of persecuted creature

OTHERing

GOD p. 5 infinite alterity of Other

p. 68 as soon as I enter into relation w/ absolute other, my singularity enters into relation w/ his on level of obligation & duty, but this binds me to sacrifice, and there are infinite others

p. 69 betrayal as leaving out the other others

p. 74 Bartleby and Abraham speak in tongues: language of the Other

pp. 82-116 [Chapter title: tout autre est tout autre]

GT p. 137 beggars (in their exteriority) can represent absolute demand of the Other, inextuingishable appeal, unquenchable thirst for the gift

MONL p. 58 necessity of other in language, always re-marked: one more first time, historical and singular, determines & phenomenalizes itself by bringing it back to itself

***p. 62 there are 2 others: 1) language of the other as promised sentence 2) language of other as that of master or colonist; both have unsettling resemblances kept secret, held in reserve

FK p. 55 link to the other precedes all community

SPOM p. 32 beyond morality, beyond juridicism, beyond right, w/out calculable insurance against evil > only way to do justice to other as other

HERP p. 210 polemos forms the unity, “in the conflict with the other the world comes about (In der Aus-einandersetzung wird Welt)”

MPM p. 22 we cannot save the dead from death or include dead in narcissistic fantasy; the bereaved memory: first coming of the Other

p. 33 possibility of death of the other in-forms any relation to other & finitude of memory

p. 35 failure to interiorize the other succeeds in respecting the other as other

pp. 37 no choice but to let other speak, cannot make other speak w/out other having already spoken—in trace, part greater/less than whole

p. 38 other as other: “non-totalizable trace inadequate to itself and the same”

MSUB J p. 171 everything is singular each time and each time analogical: a figuration of the other

A p. 18 decision concerns choice btwn relation w/ a wholly non-opposable other (an other that’s not its other) and an other who is its other (can be opposed in a couple) > the former relation is that of aporia, not a crossing of border but a double concept of the border

p. 76 if death is possibility of impossible for Heidegger, Dasein never has relation to death as such, only to perishing, to death of the other (who is not the other), death of other in “me” only death named in syntagm “my death” > thus sattendre, sattendre lun lautre, sattendre soi-même à la mort

SEC p. 315 iter (from itara, other, in Sanskrit) > everything that links otherness to repetition

PP p. 112 (127) philosophy determines itself and its other at the same time

VM p. 89 via Levinas, Eleatic Stranger, disciple of Parmenides, avait dû lui donner raison pour avoir raison de lui: pliant le non-être à être [other only in contrast to Being]

p. 91 acc. Levinas, no time, no history, w/out absolute alterity of each instant

p. 95 Levinas’ eschatology as encounter (rencontre) w/ unforeseeably other seems infinitely hopeless, awaiting nothing; Levinas even calls it renunciation [madness?]

——for Levinas, encounter w/ other, separation, rupture (brisure) of “formal logic”

p. 97 for Levinas, neutral thought of Being neutralizes Other as a being

p. 103 for Levinas, can only, must only, speak to Other; must use the vocative (never accusative which would objectify Other), bursting forth, very raising up of speech

pp. 104-05 [Derrida on philology of other > autrui (substantive that’s not a noun), autre, heteron, alter-huic > what does autre mean before Greek heteron? before Judeo-Christian autrui?]

——Other is disorder of our conceptuality, autrui is undeclinable [cf. S p. 88 Heidegger on decline (Untergang)]

p. 124 via Husserl, system of 2 alterities: alterity of body (perception) required for emergence of radical, transcendental alterity: cannot experience from Other’s perspective

p. 126 other cannot be absolutely exterior to the same w/out ceasing to be other, in which case though, it is no longer infinitely other [Kant’s 4th antinomy] [Parmenidean virtuosity]

p. 129 “other” is the name, the unthinkable unity of light and night > “phenomenon supposes original contamination by the sign”

——if other is called trace it can only be metaphorical, for it must be made to appear

p. 131 for Levinas, tragedy of ego, riveted to its own being > even in transcendence toward, venturing toward, the Other

p. 138 Being conditions respect for the other, as what it is: other > w/out Being’s “laisser-être” (of ethical commandment, freedom) violence to such a degree it couldn’t appear or be named

PAS PAS p. (67) every revolution needs to take account of Blanchot’s forgetting, forgetting w/out forgetting, a forgetting beyond the protection of repression, a forgetting that describes the whole history of dissimulation > pas dautre

p. (68) chance and necessity de la langue, la nécessité, la chance, marque encore la chance, the risk: que lautre de la langue se passe dans le pas au-delà de la langue, not its other but the other sans elle (language)

p. (85) sans lets come back what is dissimulated as tout autre and can only be dissimulated

VP p. 34 indicative language (another name of the relation to death) is process of death at work in signs > as soon as other appears, it can no longer be erased; so Husserl must suspend relation to other

T pp. x-xi philosophy has always thought its other, that which limits it; does to think the other solely mean relever, to control the other? or does the limit/passage always reserve one more coup; to think the proper of the other, the other as such is to miss it, to miss the missing of the other [on manque (de) le manquer]: examine the relevance of the limit

PPHS p. 73 Hegel: idea is in full possession of itself while it is [its] other

F p. xxxiii via Abraham, in deciphering poem, “translator” has written one: poetic translation or psychoanalytic interpretation [re: “ghost”] > clears path for other w/out unilateral privilege

p. xxxviii other—atopique > means they can never tell you how they want to be eaten

FWT p. 51 instead of determinism of “subject,” of “freedom,” Derrida advocates resistance of singularity, event, site of other > exposed to what comes, never reduced to rules, calculation

ROP p. 21 paralysis gives movement w/ regard to its other [this is in reference to impossibility of psychoanalysis’ auto-interpretation] (in PAS, paralysis distinguished from logic of analysis)

ATIA p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

p. 131 Levinas’ 3rd party, an other of the other, in contrast to Lacan’s “there is no Other of the Other” > but, for both of them, what about the animal-other?

FS p. 27 Hegel demonstrated that explication of a phenomenon by a force is tautology; yet, one must consider this w/in language’s inability to emerge from itself, not solely w/in thought of force

——force is the other of language [by articulating it, becomes a phenomenon]

DIF DIF p. 26n differance not a process of propriation, neither “species” of genus Being nor Ereignis (nor ontological difference): neither appropriation (position), nor expropriation (negation)—it is other

REST p. 261 what is a pair in this case? a catastrophic question [?], the other is the catastrophe [?], the other is kept at a distance

***p. 338 the other one [the other lowness], always the supplement of lowness (le bas) [re: political insults in Heidegger/Shapiro’s correspondence]

DST DST p. 227 Lacoue-Labarthe: figural is never one, it is the Other, and there is no unity or stability of the figural, imago has no fixity, no proper being

PIO p. 45 other as the uninvented, in invention, must let other come, not make the other: deconstructive invention as opening, uncloseting, destabilizing foreclusionary structures

——beyond the possible invention, invention of the other that would come while miming/repeating economy of same

——to invent the other is impossible, thus it’s the only invention: the invention that invents us

——the other is always another origin of the world, and we are to be invented > beyond being

p. 46 sole concern of invention of the other (the coming of invention): allow adventure or event of tout autre to come > future-to-come

——power of closure ensured by economy of the same, not to be rejected, criticized, combatted > economic circle of invention reappropriates what it sets in motion, the differance of the other (which can’t be reduced to meaning, truth, existence)

pp. 46-7 the other is not the new, never inventible

——“the call of the other is a call to come, and that happens only in multiple voices”

PF p. xxxiii injunction “it is necessary” of future-to-come can receive indifferently names “event” and “other” > irreducible to calculation, program, project, subject, object, anticipation

——to take other in w/out lodging chez soi is one formula for the possibility of the impossible

PSSS p. 241 Derrida evokes a beyond the death drive, beyond pleasure/reality principle, beyond drive for sovereign mastery, beyond cruelty—beyond the “mythology of drives” > the undecidable in psychoanalysis, the impossible other

HST p. 386 forgiveness, hospitality, gift, affix condition of impossibility to the other: gift as most unforgivable

TN pp. 198-99 Merleau-Ponty’s “it is a non-coincidence I coincide w/ here” can only be upset by thinking cum otherwise, w/ Nancy: “the other turns out to be the other of the w/

——law of parting/sharing at heart of con-tact: “inoperative community”

ATM p. 160 there must be a series of Levinas’ même moment if writing of dislocation of the Same toward the Relation [to the Other] is to have a chance, a hold (prise)

——the Relation to the Other is not a phenomenal monstration, and is not readable w/in the uncertainty of rigorous limits of a lexicon, language, semiotics, logic, etc.

AD p. 96 for Levinas, forgetting the other would attest to its absolute truth

BSi p. 234 for Celan, letting the other speak what in the other is most other: let time speak

pp. 238-39 “after you”: my first address to other as other

OG p. 232 (330-31) Rousseau’s 2 ways (moyens) pour agir sur les sens de lautre (to act on the senses of others): le mouvement et la voix

——movement is immediate by touch or mediated by gesture

pp. 277-78 (392-93) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] absolute fear as original encounter w/ other as other, 1st passion, la face derreur de la pitié

EU p. 123 philosophy finds itself inscribed w/in space it can’t order, opens to an other not even its other > in a tympanum as little Hegelian as possible

OTHER HEADING

OH p. 15 heading of the other: first condition of an identity that is not an egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other, not even anti-heading or decapitation

p. 17 responsibility for the other heading—European?

p. 29 double bind, injunction divides us > guardians of a European idea that cares for what is other than it, the other heading, the heading of the other

p. 31 call to betray a certain order of capital is taking place now, in an act of memory faithful to the other heading

PS p. 174 Artaud howls under headings: existence, flesh, life, theater, cruelty > promising an art prior to madness & work

O p. 20 effect of dissemination: lose one’s head, not know where it is

OEUVRE

GOD p. 157 literature, place of secrets w/out secrecy, all these crypts w/out depth, no other basis than abyss of call or address; only law: singularity of event called the work (loeuvre)

***MC p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

——this large, stereotomic margin of play is perhaps largest of all (during certain history) but not infinite [?] [see also Christianity/Capitalism not infinite]

BL p. 215 work, opus, does not belong to field, transforms it

MSUB J p. 170 motion of motif, w/out totalization, subjectilian wall: “of this dissociation in the body of which there will always be marked the singularity of the event made work”

P p. 80 reserve, savings, stock: self-protection of the work (ergon), binding (Verbindung) of energy, condition for “mastery” of pleasure-principle

PS p. 169 [madness (outside of work) as clinical; work as critical]

p. 174 Artaud howls under headings: existence, flesh, life, theater, cruelty > promising an art prior to madness & work

p. 175 Artaud’s resistance to clinical/critical exegeses: protest itself against exemplification itself > destroy history of dualist metaphysics, render doctor/critic helpless: art w/out works, language w/out trace

p. 182 for Artaud, God is false value of initial worth of what is born: this false value becomes Value, for it doubled what never existed > the work (excrement) repeats this theft, steals another part of me [dispossessing my nonexistent ur-value prior to exiting the Orifice]

——for Artaud, “the metaphor of myself is my dispossession w/in language” > this by way of the counterfeiter, God–Satan, who isn’t a creator, but the subject of all [dispossessing] oeuvres

——work as shit, we shit the glue of minds, pure body doesn’t shit

p. 183 [proper: man close to himself; abject: the work]

——like excrement, like turd, a metaphor of the penis, the work should stand up

p. 184 Derrida shows in Nietzsche & Hölderlin an equation btwn dancing, standing upright, and the work itself

——but, unlike Artaud, they treat erection metaphorically, it doesn’t exile itself into the work, expatriate itself to sovereignty of speech/writing, uprightness of letter, the tip of the pen

——does Nietzsche question relation of grammatical security & uprightness of letter?

——Heidegger foretells this relationship: Greeks interpret language visually, as grammata, in writing language comes to stand (paradoxically, this confirms disdain of writing in Phaedrus)

——Artaud wanted to destroy [this] metaphor: the standing upright as metaphorical erection in written work

pp. 184-85 man as the scato-theological being (this is the essence of guilt), capable of being soiled by the work and thieving God > God is a sin agains the unnameable Divine

p. 193 madness as reduction of work (loeuvre) and difference, inalienable life; other madness: metaphysics that lives w/in difference (alienation) > madness is the work or the absence of it

FS pp. 4-5 structuralism & literary criticism (structuralist in essence/destiny), lapse of attention paid to force (the tension of force itself) > even take revenge on force by declaring separation the condition of the work

p. 8 for Blanchot, pure absence, the excess of everything—possibility of writing (absence of everything in which presence is announced) > makes one work

p. 14 [for deconstruction] history of the work is not only its past, it is the impossibility of the text ever being present > legitimating intention keeps to internal truth, avoids thinking a subjective origin that is not simply psychological/mental

pp. 22-3 Proust’s aesthetic/critical method not outside the work, but heart of its creation > the end of the book engenders its beginning (Derrida compares Proust to Hegel)

p. 29 Nietzsche against Flaubert for believing in the work over the man (sedentary life), we would have to choose btwn writing and dance: dance of the pen? but we must hunch to write

TB p. 117 vis-à-vis Benjamin, if structure of the work is “sur-vival,” a strange debt that doesn’t bind anyone to anyone: debt not engaged w/ subject-author but to formal law in immanence of original text

REST pp. 258-59 what revenue, what surplus value is unleashed, what ghost step (pas de revenant) still comes to haunt the shoe’s in their painting truth (the annulment of their use-value, their out-of-service dereliction)? [revenue & revenant]

p. 283 Van Gogh’s shoes are out of work because they’re in a work (désoeuvrés en tant quouevre), in the invisible ether of being painted

——Van Gogh’s shoes incur the detachment of metonymy, diplomatic representation, an emissary of being for work, so not at work, etc. (same goes for neck & feet)

pp. 296-302 classically, the “thing” is informed matter, Heidegger asks whether this matter/form couple was secretly constituted around thing as work or product (being-product rather than being-thing) > re: Überfall of matter/form couple, has it fallen on the being-thing or being-product? blosse Ding is thing divested of its being-product: what we must think is the Rest

if clothing for Kant is parergonal, and if what is proper to representation is the “nude,” what do we make of these “old shoes w/ laces”? > a “pure” supplement? parergon w/out ergon?

p. 297 Heidegger’s schema (in barely displaced Kantian sense): hybrid, mediation, double-belonging, double articulation > product (Zeug) situated btwn thing & work of art (Werk always that of art in this context), intermediary place (Zwischenstellung), inter-posture (Lacoue-Labarthe), inter-stela

p. 298 in Heidegger’s Origin both product and work of art produced (hervorgebracht) by hand of man, art resembles thing in its self-sufficient presence, product is more than half thing, less than half work of art

——work like shoe-picture exhibits what something lacks in order to be a work, exhibits—in shoes—its lack of itself

p. 304 hors-d’oeuvres in the oeuvre, hors-d’oeuvres as oeuvre

p. 334 what looks like a process of fetishization in Heidegger (uselessness of product at work in work) is, to Heidegger, a strange process of alētheia

p. 341 acc. Heidegger, there’s uselessness in what a painting represents/frames and uselessness in that the painting represents/frames, uselessness due to product’s (shoes’) detachment from milieu by the artifice of its reattachment: the line of the frame > useless in that it’s a work

PIO p. 13 event (also loeuvre) calls for new statutes/conventions that could record, account for, such events (neither speech act theory nor literary theory [formalist or hermeneutic variety] can account for such event)

RM pp. 77-8 always plus dune language in the language: the capture of the crossing (croisement) that allies Ziehen and Reissen, this capture (à la fois violent/faithful, laissant sauf) affects the captor, abduction (captation), translation, into other’s language [French retrait, English re-tracing] > all this already at work (à loeuvre) in the other’s languages, these dealings make for a work (fait oeuvre)

p. 78 from “Origin of the Work of Art,” Zug zum Werk (attraction toward the work), work as sumballein, allegoreuein, nonwithdrawal of truth as truth, Un-verborgenheit > truth as originary combat (Urstreit) > a combat that’s an attraction of reciprocal belonging, a Grundriss

***PF p. 283n a work worthy of the name always opens a virtual university, appeals to a new universal knowledge capable of “reading” it, countersigning it, assuring its tradition

TR p. 75 “loeuvre has a virtual future only by surviving or cutting itself off from its presumed responsible signatory”

p. 86 “sooner or later,” patience of virtual that stretches time beyond death: promises survival of work, and also survival by the work as self-justification

——passion of [Rousseau’s] faith seals virtual time of work, une oeuvre that will operate by itself, beyond its signatory (w/out [Rousseau’s] living assistance [machine])

p. 87 the work that operates by itself, in quasi-machine like fashion: secret affinity btwn grace & machine, heart & automatism of marionette; re: Rousseau, excusing machine, writing machine

——machine kills time & redeems fault > grace will operate “sooner or later” by the work of the work at work (in machinelike fashion)

p. 101 [re: Confessions] loeuvre generates/capitalizes a sort of interest (won’t be so bold as to say surplus value) of guilt: overproduces shame that is archived (not effaced)

p. 102 de Man: never enough guilt to match text-machine’s infinite power to excuse

——guilt in the act of writing, excuse doesn’t merely accuses: carries out the verdict

p. 103 not only accusation & judgment in confession, there’s the executioner (carrying out of the sentence): sentence endured in pleasure of writing, ambiguous enjoyment at heart of terrible, severe jubilation of inscription: one steps up to cashier right away to collect interest on a capital that will assume value only “sooner or later,” after my death, in my absence

p. 133 oeuvre as trace implies structure of sur-vival, what cuts the oeuvre off from the operation, cut assures archival independence, quasi-machinelike autonomy: iterability, power of repetition

——machine is cut as well as cutting re: living present of life, living body > machine as much effect as cause of cut

——machine structurally resembles causa sui, figure of God, question of technical as question of theological: Bergson’s “machine for making gods”

——forgiveness & excuse only possible where there’s quasi-machinelike survival of oeuvre

p. 134 oeuvre: (name of) trace of event or institution of this event itself?

——cut: wounding, opening, chance of a respiration

***——re: oeuvre as trace of its ambiguity, as if quasi-machine were already operating even before being produced in the world, in the vivid experience of living present

——forgiveness’ automaticity

AFR p. 53 Condillac’s corpus vulnerable, open, to violent self-serving operations [e.g. de Biran], innocently called lapses in reading: dissolving alternative opposition [btwn genesis/calculus] because unable to find literal rule of its [system’s working] statement

+R p. 167 force of trait (disjointed forms a work): systasis of powerful ligatures holds, binds, disjecta membra, ladder is a scaffold, a synonym of POTENCE, garroted, bound (pillars, columns, frames, capitals)

C C p. 221 the topology of the cartouche: parergon (the hors-doeuvres supplement in the work)

TN TN pp. ix-x what does privileging one sense exclude, what do the senses exclude? risk losing what the work (loeuvre) claims to opens up (prétend donner accès)?

ATM ATM p. 171 what to make of a signature [Levinas’] when “il aura obligé,” when Il signs in his place?

——how does one hear “one must” in Derrida’s polysemic “loeuvre dE.L. aura obligé

p. 172 how to cite when Levinas places the whole language (French & Western) btwn quotation marks? at same time “he” is in quotation marks: the nameless signatory w/out authorial signature, “he” who undersigns every work, met en oeuvre tout ouvrage

——[Levinas’ work] a fabrication of quotation marks crocheting a text w/out edge (bordure): seriality irreducibly knots a text to a language

——[vis-à-vis Levinas] one can no longer think oeuvre in technical or productive order of operation (poiein, facere, agere, tun, wirken, erzeugen)

pp. 177-78 Levinas: the other can always dispossess me of my work

p. 178 if a work signifies expenditure (dépense) or pure loss (perte) in a game, it would still be determined by economy

——Levinas plays a game that’s not a game, the gratuity of his work, what he still calls liturgy > “it is ethics itself”

BSi BSi p. 250 exergue (ex-ergon)—like parergon, out of work that puts to work > but like capital too: makes work happen, comes at head (inscribe date)

UWC UWC pp. 216-17 work of a worker (travailleur) must be recognized as craft/trade/profession in market (a semantics rooted in socio-ideological history dating back to Christian Middle Ages) > when is there an oeuvre? professor’s authority not based on production of oeuvre

pp. 217-18 not every travail an event in itself, doesn’t always produce an oeuvre, not every performative (always authorized by an institutional “as if”) produces oeuvre

pp. 219-20 Kant sees philosophy (in university) neither as performative nor as producing oeuvre, but professor of philosophy has total freedom > speaks publicly, but only inside university

p. 225 techno-scientific virtualization of work, the putting-into-common, any “community” [Aristotle’s city] > mutation of taking place of event, of oeuvrethat which arrives

p. 233 end of certain figure of professor gives rise to other strategies of “as if,” singular oeuvres > Derrida believes in certain necessity of professoriat

——mise en oeuvre (the putting to work), at least to the performative putting to work of “as if”

SPEC SPEC p. 343 “literary fiction” in fort:da, fait-oeuvre in abyss of these repetitions, fairies, demons, unheimlich repetitions, what is most gripping (saisissant) and ungraspable (insaisissable) about Beyond…, for Freud too, who believed he could affix the seal of the Freuds to it [Beyond…] while hearing voices

OVERFLOW

AF p. 62 archival technē overflows singularity of event, i.e. the answering machine that outlives its moment of recording, the ghost speaks

LOBL pp. 133-34 terribleness of la chose, not only ineffable, unnarratable: it’s interdictory, it forbids telling/seeing

——interdiction violated by itself, sets in motion a single pas, overflows impossible récit, that which forbids happens [French? arriver?]

VM p. 98 for Levinas, ethics, morality, is first philosophy; though Plato and Descartes thought the overflowing of infinity, only Levinas thought infinity as the face

p. 120 Idea in Kantian sense [Husserl] as infinite overflowing of horizon, never equal to intuition of an object, even God’s intuition [?]

——wasn’t it Husserl who showed us that vision, perception were inadequate, the infinite overflowing of horizons? did he really reduce this inadequation to condition of available objects?

p. 318n thought that seeks to go to its very end in its language, the end envisaged under name of finitude, should abandon words & themes of finite/infinite & everything they govern > this is the impossible of beyond metaphysics which confirms necessity for this incommensurable overflow to take support from metaphysics

——Heidegger realized this in making difference [btwn Being & existent] fundamental

PP p. 140 (160) knowledge, epistēmē, antidote: remaining measured against hubris, cet entraînment démesuré qui emporte lêtre dans le simulacre, le masque et la fête

p. 152 (175) pharmakon is liquid (opposites pass more easily btwn each other), water [see Laws on protecting water], everything in sperm which overflows wastefully (se dépense sans réserve) [living speech: non-diverted seminal potency]

POO p. 17 exemplarity: “example itself, as such, overflows its singularity as much as its identity”

POOF p. 33 that which is empty resembles that which overflows: plus de sens, desert mirage effect

T pp. xiii-xiv exteriority & alterity (by themselves) do not surprise philosophy > the overflow is [philosophy’s] object

p. xxiv a limitrophic violence imprinted by new types > 1) overflows and cracks (déborde et fait craquer), count in margins more or less than what’s said/read, déferlement qui tient à la structure de la marque [same word as limit, marche, marge] 2) luxate the pretensions to univocal rigidity [vanne ouverte à une double entente ne formant plus un seul système]

P p. 75 frame overflowed on 2 borders by what it overflows: it travaille [labors, gives, plays, see TN.] indeed; Kant is undoing the labor of the frame; the structurally bordered origin of surplus value creaks and cracks like wood, never fully exposed

p. 125 an object is “prodigious,” monstrous (not colossal), when, by size, it annihilates & reduces to nothing the end which constitutes its concept, exceeds the final limit, overflows end & concept

——colossal is almost too (presque trop) large for presentation: singular originality w/out edging (bordure) or simple overspill (débordement) > how can we think of this “almost too,” this incised in excess

OTO p. 16 [via Nietzsche] mother, who is living on, outlive me long enough to bury me, living on is the name of the mother, “this survival is my life whose shores she overflows”

GSP p. 167 Telos/Vorhaben > infinite theoretical anticipation & infinite practical task: Kantian Idea as project of phenom.? makes it possible by overflowing its system (as its end?) > doesn’t enclose genesis of Being & meaning—is structurally genesis itself: origin/becoming, birth of history

CHM p. 57 doubt & Cartesian Cogito punctuated by “unprecedented” excess, overflows totality (beings, factual history, determined meanings)

——to place w/in determined historical structure risks dulling point itself (doing violence)

REST pp. 321-22 I meant “escape (évasion)” by overflowing pictorial limit, framed representation, visible immediacy (if any such thing exists, in the picture) w/ collar flared (au col évasé), half-inside out > isn’t this overflowing the discursive operation, from its very first word? or is its internal reason in pictorial structure? > question of structure of this limit, of being-in or being-out, question of supplement of parergon—once “escape” takes off (prendre son appel sur) from impoverished descriptive trait: no longer concerns a painting

pp. 344-45 [re: the interlaced correspondence]: interminable overflowing of whole, la surenchère en plus-value de la correspondance débordante (subordante), occurs btwn general element (discourse, writing, painting) & particular determinate element > element worth more than whole, and whole plays the part [metonymy/synechdoche no longer what they are]

——what’s essential for Heidegger is making the overflowing appear by “earth,” “shoes,” “world” > il faudrait les ressaisir à linstant où le hors-dusage détaché (relativement déstricturé) donne lieu, a sort of abyssal surplus value, une surenchère sans fond > we can speak of conditions of fetishization of product/work, surplus value forms a truth-effect, useless gives way to speculative exploitation, more than useful (plus quutile): useful for grasping usefulness of useful—call for adherence [cf. pp. 339-41 double/triple uselessness (work, product, useless for grasping usefulness)]

——when the detached calls for reattachment: a discourse is sketched, maneuver to call for adherence

PIO pp. 21-2 shouldn’t an inaugural invention deny/overflow environment of reception (which shouldn’t be able to welcome an authentic invention)? thus producing a disordering mechanism for every status assignable to it? isn’t an invention spontaneously deconstructive?

RM p. 50 metaphor withdraws, it gets by w/out everything, withdraws at instant it overflows every limit, marking w/ supplementary trait one more turn, re-turn, re-tracing or retreat (re-trait)

ATM p. 144 no utterance ever cut from all context, context never annulled w/out remainder: one negotiates w/ les effets de bord, incl. nonnegotiable, that which overflows (déborde) all context

——what is said inside (dedans) can infinitely overflow all context, at a stroke (dun coup)

p. 148 [re: giving to EL w/out restitution] excess that overflows language sets it into motion at moment of traversing it > this traversal is not transgression (passage of a sharply dividing limit) > metaphor of overflowing no longer fits—too linear [?]

LG pp. 227-28 trait that marks membership (lappartenance) divides > boundary (bordure) of set comes to form by invagination—an internal pocket larger than the whole

——consequences of this division & overflowing (débordement) as singular as they are limitless (quillimitables)

p. 231 genre-clause (clause de genre): clin doeil, écluse (floodgate), clôture qui sexclut de ce quelle inclut, déclasse ce quelle permet de classer > unfigurable figure of clusion, forme sans forme, neither sees day nor brings itself to light

p. 235 edge (bord), borderline (ligne de bordure), overflowing (débordement) do not arise w/out a fold—which figure of folding? [the answer: double chiasmatic invagination]

OG p. 7 (16) writing as “signifier of the signifier” no longer means accidental doubling, fallen (déchue) secondarity, but overflows, goes beyond extension of language > comprehends language

——signified always already (toujours déjà) functions as signifier: effacing = overflowing

——secondarity of writing effects all signifieds

——advent of writing, advent of a play which effaces all those abris du hors-jeu (out-of-bounds shelters [transcendental signifieds]) that surveil field of language > destroying the concept sign

FS pp. 12-3 attempt-to-write, moment of overflow (can’t be understand via voluntarism): when

play of meaning overflows signification, which is always enveloped by limits of nature, life, soul

SPEC pp. 290-91 death drive: être à loeuvre déjà (in PP), ça se sera écrit en silence—in speculative overflow

p. 348 PP loses mastery w/ flooding (Überschwemmung), no longer seeks pleasure, just binding

p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

FV p. 414 what happens when a text that psychoanalysis deciphers inscribes w/in itself a scene of deciphering? when it says more about itself than the deciphering? [Freud often acknowledges this debt]

——débordement (not mastery of author), energetic squaring-off (carrure énergique)

p. 419 literature that puts truth on stage, can it be read by psychoanalysis? abyssal structure, this space overflowed by powers of simulacrum

pp. 490-92 [re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

PAINTING

POOF p. 172 suitability (covenance) of the enemy, lodged w/in oikeiéotēs, my own projection, an exemplarity more real/resistant than my own shadow, my truth in painting > proof in the fact that I can address him, call to him, he becomes origin/destination of call [to the point of madness]

DS pp. 188-89 painting & writing: inscriptions written inside the outside > portrait of innermost logos, book

p. 189 painting as ornament [see Tympans margin]

——logos, faithful image of eidos > painting is a painting of a painting

p. 190 only metaphors of painting and writing are linked to psyche > in “reality,” literally, acc. Plato, writing & painting deal in copies, copies of copies, incapable of intuition of thing itself

PPT pp. 5-7 the 4 ways to interpret “truth in painting” : 1) restitution: truth itself restored, in person, w/out mask or veil > truth of truth 2) representation: adequation (not unveiling)—relief of original’s effigy 3) truth solely as painting can show it 4) the truth of painting itself

p. 9 one dreams of a painting w/out debt, w/out truth, a painting that would still not give up painting

+R p. 179 picture, film, hieroglyph: projection speeded up to limit of instantaneity: gestus of interruption, suspense of breaching force, holding metonymic fragments, seized by death

PAIR

REST p. 260 the pair (of shoes) might not come back to anyone: disappoint desire to reattribute surplus value > might have been made to “remain” there, defying the tribute

——desire for attribution is a desire for appropriation (in matters of art, & everywhere else)

p. 261 what is a pair in this case? a catastrophic question [?], the other is the catastrophe [?], the other is kept at a distance

p. 263 Heidegger & Shapiro, a pairing-together in difference of opinion, lénigme dun ajustement complémentaire des deux côtés, one edge to the other (dun bord à lautre)

p. 264 marche almost same word as mark, margins, also Pas > necessity of walking, lowest degree, must subjective or underlying level of culture/institution: pair of shoes

——DS turns around points of ballerina, “la syntaxe du point et du pas” > each pair referring to some other, signifying too the operation of signifying

p. 265 diabolical 2 right shoes, 2 left—don’t make a pair, ça louche ou ça boîte (inquiétante, menaçante)

p. 278 what if, and Derrida sees it too, they’re 2 left shoes, a double that fudges (brouille) both “pair & identity” à la fois—paralyzes directionality, fait loucher vers le diable

——Derrida’s hypothesis: the unpaired can show parity w/ greater force, like the useless can show utility

pp. 281-82 [re: Shapiro/Heidegger correspondence] reciprocal legitimation, effects of a common code, mutual desire for truth: the 2 parts of the pair (identity & difference, total identity in concept or formal semantics, difference and non-overlap in directionality of traits)

——if there is a pair > a contract is possible, can look for subject, can hope (symbol of the symbolon)

p. 284 pas works (marche) badly w/out a pair

——Heidegger, oppositional pairs as Überfall, injure the thing in the thing: hypokeimonon (underneath) or hypostasis/symbebekota (on top) [which becomes in Latin: subjectum (substantia)/accidens], aisthēton/noēton (sensible/intelligible), hylē/eidos-morphē (matter/form-figure)

p. 326 pair: a doubling that is a narrowing (resserrant), plus strict, plus étroit

pp. 332-33 Heidegger & Shapiro bound themselves together to law of normal usage, the pair, ligatured worrying dismemberment in order to limit it: pair inhibits “fetishizing” movement, represses diabolical (i.e. a double, duplicity, w/out a pair)—pair rivets (rive) things to “normal” use

p. 360 Derrida sees 5 ways a pair can be detached (won’t tell us yet) [does he tell us at the end of essay, in relation to various spectral effects?]

p. 373 pour aller, aller ensemble, ou aller-à > the 2 shoes must make a pair (aller à doesn’t mean se rendre à)

pp. 373-74 the unpairing of the shoes, as soon as they’re no longer going anywhere [Derrida gives a spectrum of possible specterings]

pp. 375-76 bet comes back to a comparing (un pari revient toujours à comparer)

——has to be a difference to permit it: but a pair is a fixed difference, fixed bet not a bet?, bet so as not to bet, plus de pari, pas de pari > bet on pair: limit absolute wager (pari)

——this fixed orientation toward difference presupposes difference, sublates it, concerns Kant’s whole transcendental aesthetic

——betting on the pair, plus/pas de pari, trap always works in interlace (la piège marche toujours dans lentrelacs): soit quil fasse marcher, laisse marcher ou quil paralyse [p. 373 only the pair can go]

——avoir fait marcher la destin, provoked someone to make an impossible bet: Van Gogh’s coup, genius of his unevenness (son impair)

——bet on pair to limit absolute wager [cf. pp. 301-02 Derrida doesn’t limit absolute wager?], which limits & tightens itself (se resserre) to point of self-strangulation, tying itself so as not to absolve itself > the cunning twist (le retors) of le pari absolu: must never exclude disparate or absolute unneveness (limpair)

——disparate: that which opens up fort: da of shoe size (pointure), possibility of dis-pairing, play of dis/appearing > double, Doppelgänger, not pair (unadaptable to walking [à la marche])

p. 377 the de-paired (le dépareillé), the disparate, helps us better to think the pair’s repair (à sa réparation), à panser (bandage), à bander là où le-la-les double(s) band- [cf. P p. 88]

——haunting which works (travaille) the unpaired (thus the pair) irreducible to all the mimetologism (I don’t say the mimesis)

EU pp. 110-12 opposition right/left a conflict btwn several strategies of political mochlos [a wooden beam, bref ce sur quoi lon sappuie pour forcer et déplacer]: serious discourses have more to do w/ levers than w/ ends > specular walking on 2 feet, Van Gogh’s pair of shoes: a university will have to walk on 2 feet, left & right

PALEONYM

EM pp. 126-27 (151) Dasein serves as exemplary text to read Being, lhomme reste le lien ou le fil conducteur paléonymique that ties analytic of Dasein to totality of metaphysical tradition

——“on voit donc que le Dasein, sil nest pas lhomme, nest pourtant pas autre chose que lhomme

SEC p. 329 deconstruction overturns (renversement), displaces, by means of double writing, double science, double gesture; field of oppositions that it criticizes [sic] can also be nondiscursive

——logic of paleonymy, provisional conservation of old name, while liberating, “grafting,” excluded, subordinated predicates (resistances, remainders of dominant force)

VM p. 112 inhabit metaphor’s ruins, shabiller des lambeaux de la tradition et des haillons du diable: by using tradition’s words, one can use [them] up (user), les frotter comme une vieille pièce de monnaie fruste et dévaluée, on peut dire que la vraie extériorité est la non-extérioritée sans être lintériorité, on peut écrire par ratures et ratures de ratures: crossing out writes, still writes in space

S p. 108 [re: Gespräch btwn Heidegger & Trakl] the circle via death, via decline, via West that returns to most originary not analogous to circles/revolutions in Marx and Hegel, so “circle, decline, West,” in Heidegger, are paleonyms, receive quotation marks to lead us elsewhere

OH pp. 30-1 Europe: paleonymic appellation

p. 82 paleonyms: “identity,” “culture,” “Europe,” “capital” > take them very seriously, cautiously, lightly, only in quotation marks

VP p. 66 we can only deconstruct plunged in inherited concepts, groping toward unnameable

p. 88 what “begins” “beyond” absolute knowledge: unheard-of thoughts, sought across the memory of old signs

PAS PAS p. (67) science is a dissimulation of tout autre, philosophy also > Blanchot keeps “old name” to attempt to give an account of this

p. (85) formulation of sans is impossible; sheltered (abrité) by paleonym w/out relation to it, invests paleonym w/ tout autre > sanstrace de pas

PPHS p. 81 “why?” still metaphysical name of question asking about the metaphysical system which links sign to [concept-truth-presence-archeology-teleology]

F pp. xxxi-xxxii via Abraham’s “radical semantic change that psychoanalysis introduced into language,” beneath paleonymy of inherited concepts, working w/ remnants [i.e. beneath “pleasure” we find pain]: to bring intending non-presence into phenomenology

POOF p. 87 Schmitt’s use of Latin & Greek (hostis/inimicus, polémios/ekhthrós), as a search for the ‘right name’ (question always that of the ‘right name,’ as Nietzsche would say)

WM p. 211 “we are unwitting metaphysicians in proportion to the usure of our words”

P p. 92 [Kant on paleonym]: use Latin—shelter in hermetic vault to avoid fashion, vulgarity

POS p. 10 Heidegger recognized that economically/strategically he had to borrow language of metaphysics, as one always must do at moment one deconstructs this language

p. 59 re: concept “history,” must use double gesture: can’t strike name from vocabulary, must overturn traditional concept & mark interval, so that interval is not simply reappropriated

p. 71 the strategy of paleonomy, of using old name, refers to play of stratagem not hierarchical organization of means & ends: 1) extract predicative trait held in reserve 2) extend, graft, extracted trait, as a lever of intervention, transforming previous organization [writing]

——Derrida’s texts belong neither to “philosophical” nor “literary” register, communicate w/ other texts that can be called “philosophical” or “literary” acc. a kind of paleonomy

O pp. 3-4 paleonymy (keep old word for determined time?): question goes beyond signifier’s simple exteriority to its concept, beyond a fore-knowledge of paleonymic strategy: escape or destroy word in question (i.e. “literature,” “philosophical discourse”) [?]

p. 4 structure of double mark (caught [pris], both seized [emprunté] & entangled [enfermé], in binary opposition)

——one of the terms retains old name to destroy opposition to which it no longer quite belongs

——repetition w/out identity, one mark inside, the other outside deconstructed system: double reading, double writing, double science: structure itself is worked in turn

pp. 3-6 [summary] must face risk of “old name,” not simply declare freedom of signifier (autonomy of meaning) or go outside (which affirms homogeny of closure, which doesn’t exist) > no concept, no name, no signifier can escape this structure

pp. 11-2 for Hegel, necessity of preface belongs to Bildung, external necessity of concept’s self-presentation, must take time into account as the existence (Dasein) of concept [legibility]

p. 18(n) why introduction, for Hegel, is necessary, whereas preface is not: opens a particular philosophical science > Hegel touches on paleonymy

p. 45 business (laffaire) of old name, of onymism in general, of false identity of mark, which dissemination must disturb (doit perturber) at the root [re: “Mallarmé,” guise of homonymy]

***SW p. 346 “not in a hurry”: I am against those who prescribe the veil, against those who forbid it (same w/ circumcision) > people don’t realize any longer that the scholarly, secular, democratic belong to cultures of tallith & veil: contamination is everywhere

RGE p. 260 since Hegel’s [all] logic is an interpretation, is submitted to an interpretive decision, it can be interpreted against him > reinterpretation: simulated repetition of Hegelian discourse

——minute displacement disjoints articulations, trembling spreads out—old shell cracks

pp. 263-64 Bataille’s sliding occurs at point, place in pattern, where old word, because of placement, slides—making entire discourse slide > violent, strategic twisting (imprinted upon language), inflects old corpus: relates its syntax to a major silence, to the privileged moment of the sovereign operation > “even if it took place only once”

p. 266-67 opposition of continuous & discontinuous constantly displaced from Hegel to Bataille > for Bataille, continuum of sovereign communication in night of secret difference; for Hegel, conciliate desire for recognition (breaking of secrecy) w/ discontinuity, negativity

——displacement does not transform nucleus of predicates (all the attributes of sovereignty are those of lordship)

p. 268 Bataille carried away in his calculable sliding > concepts become nonconcepts, unthinkable, untenable

——phenomenological epochē a reduction carried out au nom et en vue du sens> Bataille proposes epochē of epoch of meaning

——inscription of relation btwn discourse & sovereign operation: “scientific” > a science made to tremble in absolute nonknowledge, “science” only in a transgressed closure—avec un non-savoir absolu sur le sans-fond duquel senlèvent la chance ou le pari de sens, de lhistoire et des horizons de savoir absolu

p. 270 Bataille’s writing relates all philosophemes (semantemes) to sovereign operation, à la consumation sans retour de la totalité du sens—acknowledges the rule that constitutes what it will deconstitute

p. 272 Bataille keeps [guards] traditional names but they’re struck (affecte) w/ the differences btwn major/minor, archaic/classic [see pp. 337-08n], only way w/in discourse to mark that which separates discourse from its excess

——this stratagem, the sovereign operation, play w/ syntax, does not subordinate itself to an anticipated discourse

***p. 277 a text [Bataille’s] that traces, in silence, structure of the eye [illumination] > in contriving/weaving (tramer) “labsolu déchirement,” absolutely rends (déchire) its own tissue—once more “solid” and servile de se donner encore à lire

TR p. 73 event-machine: change very name of what we call “thought” (now a homonym, paleonym)

EL p. 220 [seemingly in vein of deconstruction] Scholem maneuvered, compromised, negotiated w/ significations (concepts/words) he radically contested—while having to use them

LI p. 55“classical concept” as target: a tortuous, complex strategy > exploit target against itself by discovering it to be “basis” of an operation directed against itself, or discovering “in it” the cryptic reserve of something utterly different

p. 130 to ignore or pretend to take no account of a tradition, to rest blindly in it, repeat its most problematic gestures

TN p. 138 Derrida tells Nancy [humorously?] to not let this megalovirus [touch] contaminate you, stop using these words > leave it to the ancestors

AD p. 26 receiving beyond capacity of “I” > dissymmetrical disproportion marks law of hospitality

——Levinas, surprisingly, calls reason this hospitable receptivity (reorients philosophical tradition, which thinks sensibility as passive opposition to reason)

WOG p. 23n on the use of Greek words [in Foucault, Heidegger, Kuhn, Holton]: 1) new concept not in everyday language 2) new archeological discovery: restoration 3) authority of rare words

OG pp. 23-4 (38) differance can only be thought by passing through the ontico-ontological difference, a determination that gets erased by differance: this trick of writing (tour décriture) is irreducible [historial question]

p. 24 (38-9) the hesitation of Heidegger & Nietzsche is not “incoherence,” it is the trembling of deconstruction: deconstruction does not destroy structures from the inside, must inhabit, inhabits most when one doesn’t suspect it > borrow all subversive strategies from old structure

——that deconstruction falls prey (emportée) to its own work is what another person can’t help pointing out w/ zeal (we should be able to formalize this exercise)

***pp. 56-57 (82-83) Derrida uses word writing in relation to the vulgar concept of writing, which, historically, would have been impossible w/out dissimulation of arche-writing

p. 60 (88) concept of experience belongs to metaphysics, can only use it [deconstructively] sous rature, “experience” always a relationship w/ presence [cf. Nietzsche’s On the Genea… Preface 1]

——still, must exhaust concept experience so as not to fall prey to “empiricism” and “naive” critiques of experience [i.e. for thinkers appealing to experience, must look for experience outside their theoretical system]

pp. 70-1 (102-03) one can only justify the choice of word trace w/in une topique, it’s an historical calculation & strategy: a # of givens belonging to our discourse have imposed this choice on Derrida > Levinas—trace as absolute past, Heidegger—undermining ontology as presence/full speech, Nietzsche & Freud—Spur, and use of [trace?] in biology > all make enigmatic: propre, proche, presence

p. 93 (142) unnameable movement of différence-même, I’ve strategically nicknamed (surnommé) trace, reserve, differance > could be called writing only w/in historical closure, w/in limits of science & philosophy

p. 99 (148) “Hegel,” “Rousseau,” “Leibniz,” “Descartes” neither identities nor causes > name of problems > so long as closure limits our discourse: we will not have other concepts

p. 314 (443) impossibility of designating supplement escapes metaphysics by a hairsbreadth (par une pointe), “elle doit pour le reste puiser ses ressources dans la logique quelle déconstruit

EU p. 231 [re: CIPH] reactualizing categories said to be classical by adjusting them to new objects

SPEC p. 267 when French Heideggerians translate Abbauen as “to deconstruct,” or when Marx’s aufgelöst is translated as deconstructed: pass off the already-there (déjà-là) of a word as the anteriority of a concept > w/ Marx, “deconstruction” would be limited to “intellectual critique” of superstructures

PARADIGM/WITHOUT EXAMPLE

REST p. 297 Heidegger uses example of shoes to guide his analysis [mentioned before Van Gogh’s picture], a paradigm of thing as “product” > paradigm, a very noble philosophical tradition dating back to Plato, shoes’re the exemplary example of the intermediate place (Zwischenstellung), btwn the mere thing & the work [Lacoue-Labarthe’s inter-posture]

C p. 186 theory of coffins, series w/out model, w/out example (procession in double band fascinates, can’t see there’s no example) > obsequence of this cortege in singular lineage

p. 187 the “without example” and the pas of [don’t forget a single one] pas un seul [re: series of coffins]

p. 188 w/out example because series will have posed singular problem of initiality

p. 189 remainder itself, in its structure as remainder, will have been w/out (w/out example, w/out precedent)

p. 191 w/out example, one has to get into it

p. 194 w/out-example ejects the paradigm > still exhibits it in some way: raises it up (surélève) on rostrum of its catafalque, ex cathedra (in the pulpit it stays silent)

p. 194 little princeps coffin is not given, not a prior given that would be natural, autochthonous: “models,” examples, referents (usually are)

pp. 194-95 withdrawal of paradigm, not the origin, a fac-simile of a model, it is produced, reduced, seduced acc. [idiomatic] ductus of Titus-Carmel

p. 195 paradigm most often designates an artificial model that already proceeds from a technē: artifact constructed in the past anterior > fac-simile origin of future anterior of model

——paradigm will have always been there, as if since always, posed (a theme, then a thesis), exposed, deposed, reproduced

pp. 195-96 excess zeal, the little one (paradigm) built like a crypt [Lacan’s objet a?], jealously keeps its secret at moment of greatest exhibition

——hermetically closed (portable temples called hermes): mute beneath its altuglassed transparency, seduces, attracts the dead man, makes him come back and more: fors in that casket

p. 196 paradeiknymi: to show to one side, analogy, assign, tribute, distribute

——paradeigmatizō: to propose as a model, to blame, hound someone so to dishonor him; paradeigmatismos: an infamous punishment to make an example > (hi)story of coffin, the condemned example: an (exemplary) sentencing of the example: damned paradigm—to death!

pp. 196-97 Derrida tries to preserve what he invests in word paradigm, a word that’s too much used, worn down (usé), on all sides—thus irreplaceable > what he invests in the word is assaulted by investments of other, from capital (interest & usury): its measure accumulates in surplus value

p. 198 paradigm does not show a coffin, it shows itself in its coffin, Titus-Carmel does the paradigm down, to death > works at mourning w/out example: learns to go w/out (se passer)

——Titus-Carmel cadaverizes paradigm, hounds effigy of paradigm, feigning the feigning of it in a series of simulated reproductions, he reduces it, transforms it into tiny piece of waste

p. 208 coffin, as the odd, as the remainder, remains entire, divisible only by itself [prime: 127], as long as you deduct one—the paradigm coffin: belongs w/out belonging to series it makes possible > inscribes itself in series, leaves on it mark of its own subtraction

——transcendental mors, fors, exceptional piece; (fait) band à part (has a hard-on, keeps aloof)

p. 213 colossal raising (surélévation): essential 1st manipulation > allows T.-C. to raise himself above object, it starts by being bigger than him since he approaches it w/ intention to get into it [coffin], until it is diminished enough so he can handle it

pp. 216-17 Titus-Carmel not like demiurge in Timaeus, who contemplates an unproduced, precedent paradigm, program of its forms: T-C deprives paradigm of its imperious transcendence, risks raising himself up as father’s father, ancestor of himself > but, in killing the paradigm, he kills his product, and thus his paternity: broken lineage: plus de famille, no command (stick [in English]), w/out archy or hierarchy (Khōra and its link to the bastard [?]) [baby daddy]

——paradigm as revenge: le mort se venge, “model” is always le revenant rêvé: haunting does not befall it, but takes the first step (la hantise ne lui survient pas, elle donne le premier pas)

p. 217 for Plato, model/copy : “father/offspring”

p. 218 bananas [re: Titus-Carmel’s The Great Cultu] would be copies of copies w/out example, phantasmata, if force of ductus did not carry the remainder beyond any phantasy, beyond the signature, proper name, nameable [cf. pp. 220-21 also beyond hierarchy]

——ductus’ [?] contingency accounts for ideality of model, which always rises, fermentation of spirt (Geist), above an organic decomposition

pp. 218-19 paradox of paradigm: deposed from its privilege moment it’s built, inscribed in a series, an out-of-series cartouche > remains heterogenous by virtue of its relief

p. 220 primordial place of “father” (presumed paradigm) depends on cartouche-performance—takes w/ one hand what it gives w/ the other (torturous surgery)

pp. 220-21 production of paradigm via cartouche introduces necessary (fatal) perversion that cartouche alone performs > paradigm must have been preceded by its following: phantasmatics of a contingent remaining (beyond hierarchy, beyond phantasy)

p. 222 parergon of the paragon [paradigm] (pharmakon, bastardy)

——[vis-à-vis Freud] father inferred from a sentence, declaration, judgment: “this is the father,” says the cartouche, paternity never touched, unnatural (different matter for maternity)

——as soon as cartouche doesn’t lay down law, pretending to recite the truth > cartouche as simulacrum transforms paradigm into paradigm effect (w/out destroying it, always something of it)

p. 223 T.-C. outplayed the eidos of the model, played a trick, exemplarily, on paradigm in general, finished it off, reduces it to shrunken head of a little chief (tête réduite dun petit chef)

p. 224 royal weaver of paradigm in Plato’s Statesman

p. 229 feu (sur) le paradigme [TN. fire on the paradigm, late paradigm], fuit, il-fût > suicide paradigm, retrac(t)ing by blowing itself up

p. 246 intraitable: lombilic de ce coffin > I think of the supper and the 13th at the table [Judas?]

MONL p. 11 Aristotle’s model: the “most” this, the “best” that: paradigmatic example

PARADISE

BSi p. 302 if double bind (implacable contradiction) ever lifted (that’s impossible, how could anyone wish for it?) > paradise; can only dream of paradise (absolute felicity and inescapable catastrophe)

——Persian paradeisos: an animal farm [a mystical zoo?]

OG pp. 77-8 (113-16) Leibniz & Descartes on universal language: must we discover true philosophy before developing the language? for Descartes, we would have to wait, & such language would only arise in paradise; Leibniz disagrees, envisions calculation and Reason merging, raisonner et calculer sera la même chose > a teleology in progress

EU p. 42 [in truth, since Descartes sees universal language as impossible] humans are btwn paradise of absolutely natural language & romance of universal transparency: this fall is history

——romance of universal language cannot tell a true story [i.e. is not history]

PARASITE

KH pp. 120-21 “Platonism” not only neutralizes Plato’s texts, inhibiting forces that continue to maintain a certain disorder (parasitism, ventriloquism, clandestinity, tone of denial), “Platonism” command whole history of this neutralization, a philosophy would always be “Platonic”

GOD p. 138 father accuses literary writing of parasitism, the son should have worked instead of written [pharmakon, meteor]

MPM 138-39 the undecidable that resists non-dialectizable oppositions will bear name, maintain rhetorical relation w/ opposition, will have figure of opposition, be figurable, will always let itself by parasited by figure of opposition [thus staging of promise as act or position]

p. 140 Heidegger protects agains abyssal risk of parasitic contamination, of an an-oppositional differance, thus risk and gravity of saying, “essence of technology is not foreign to technology”

MC p. 349 [Nietzsche’s etymologizing in On Genealogy] méchance (mean, bad, low): bad luck; malchance: Austin’s “infelicity,” parasite (breach of contract) [the clinic, those who fell (ill)]

H pp. 59, 61 guest or parasite? a guest who is wrong, illegitimate

***A pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (narrivent quà seffacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

SEC p. 324 writing has always been treated as a parasite

——insufficiency of speech act theory > parasitism and citationality not considered ordinary: “non-serious,” “non-ordinary,” sea change, etiolation

p. 325 general possibility of “parasite”: 1) trap (piège), failure (échec), abyss outside/in front of language, ditch (fossé), place of external perdition, which language can avoid, sheltered by (à labri de) its essence or telos? 2) or is this risk, internal and positive condition of its possibility, this outside its inside?

PP p. 102 how can supplementary parasite be excluded by maintaining boundary or triangle?

p. 128 pharmakon, letter installing itself inside living organism (logos-zōōn), robbing it of nourishment; “logic” tries to keep the parasite outside, the outside out

PAS PAS p. (52) the other pas haunts or parasitizes, a transgressive passivity, not activity nor labor

F p. xvi crypt is a parasite inclusion/internalization, an inside heterogenous to inside of Self, an outcast in domain of introjection w/in which it violently takes its place, le for cryptique entretiens dans la répétition the mortal conflict it is impotent to resolve

ROP pp. 42-3 to say “we” when all alone, after the death of the other, is a common phenomena of destinerrance, of the letter’s never returning, une dérive interne, to which we have to return

——“we” modality of with, with the other, as guest, host, or parasite, we is always said by a single person, taking advantage, the one signs for the other (at the home of; apud, avuec, avoc, apud hoc)

p. 100 all identities (madness, reason, history) in history of madness would be divided from w/in, threatened in advance by parasitism, like a computer virus (though w/out any antivirus)

PS p. 186 acc. Artaud, membering is dismembering; structure always structure of expropriation; “every organ is a parasite” of the body, the body has no need of organs; Heart: “dirtiest means that any being could have invented to pump life inside me” > Artaud as fearful of articulated body as articulated language

PIO pp. 15-6 specularization paralyzes “Fable” (seems to freeze text)—undecidability of whether fabulous discourse makes it out of itself or is the very misfortune (malheurs) of the [possibility of the] mirror, infelicity of constative/performative (way they parasite each other)

TR p. 74 for Austin, a machine could never achieve a performative, intervenes in performative event as a parasite, as extrinsic, accidental

PPT pp. 7-8 essential parasitizing opens every system to its outside, divides unity of the line (trait) purported to mark the system’s edges

——trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

LI p. 44 Derrida’s going to be as serious, as normal, as he can, and reduce parasitism: “you can take my word for it”

p. 45 Derrida intentionally including in his debate w/ Sarl the contingent, artificial, external (18 letters, blows)—even the amount of ink in typewriter ribbon: why not? (fringes, frames, parasites)

——surface of the paper, part of our calculation?

pp. 73-5 unconscious as giant/great Parasite > not as lateral, virtual potential of consciousness

pp. 75-6 “primary masochism” [a wolf of undecidability] poisons, how can one identify the intention, the speaker, the effect once border btwn pleasure/pain is upset?

——thus the limited responsibility of Sarl, vulnerable to parasitisms, the “conscious ego” cannot incorporate and does its best to exclude [despite Derrida’s vehemence, substituting Sarl for Searle demonstrates his uncanny generosity—he will not accuse a subject]

pp. 77-8 Sarl incorporates the parasite—retains the object w/in itself as something excluded > psychoanalytic incorporation delegitimizes Sarl’s claim of foreign body, impossible to assimilate, must be rejected

p. 82 la hantise of the graft, herein no different from the parasite > never simply alien to and separable from the body it already haunts

p. 84 did Derrida make seriousness of philosophical discourse skid towards literary play [parasitizing Descartes’ title in SEC]? unless seriousness were already the para-site of such play

p. 89 parasitism does not need theater or literature to appear

——a promise that can’t be reiterated would not be a promise > thus the possibility of a parasite

p. 90 parasite can never be excluded from body “proper” > “an owner” calls it parasite (jealously defending his oikos) > whatever violently “takes place” always something of a parasite, offered hospitality, a place, by host: never quite taking place is part of parasite’s success as an event

pp. 90-1 in speech act theory, the parasite is secondary, it is “logically dependent” on a nonparasitical onto-logical order; this logic enables its exclusion

p. 96 logic of parasitism not one of distinction or opposition, neither same as nor different from what it parasites: possibility of fiction cannot be derived

pp. 96-97 pharmakoi, people on welfare, spies, effects of unconscious

pp. 98-9 not conflating parasitism & citationality but identifying possibility they have in common [i.e. iterability] (use of or that signifies neither equivalence, dissociation, nor opposition)

——parasitism susceptible to parasitism of citation; citation can always be parasited by parasite

——parasite parasites the limits that guarantee purity of rules/intentions: this has import for law, politics, ethics, economics

pp. 99-100 another parasitic/fictional structure can always be added, “supplément de code” > everything becomes possible against the language-police

——never be able to de-limit object-fiction/object-parasite except by another counter-fiction

p. 101 translation: case of parasitic feedback

p. 103 parasitic structure: writing, graft, mark, marche, margin, differance, undecidable, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, parergon

——as though an auxiliary/parasite could not supplant, as if “parasite” is a simple addition

——inner purity & exterior supplement—this is myth itself (mythology of a logos)

pp. 127-28 margin, parasite, iterability belong w/out belonging to the class of concepts of which they must render an accounting—to theoretical space they organize in a “quasi”-transcendental manner: something happens by or to set theory > all this must be rendered (rendre compte et raison) by us enlightened modern thinkers, right?

pp. 135-36 theoretical duty is thus always “ethical-political duty” > highly political nature of status of parasite: politics of immigration > what’s “foreign” touches all social institutions—everything

TN pp. 179-80 intruder on inside, constitutively haunted by some hetero-affection related to spacing, a host, a parasite, pharmakon, ghost: [each of these figures] habite en revenant tout for intérieur (inhabit one’s heart of hearts as a ghost)

LG p. 227 law of law of genre: principle of contamination, parasitical economy, participation w/out belonging

OG p. 54 (79) what is “after”? is the “after” always parasitic? what is a parasite? do we really learn to write and read “after” we learn to speak?

ATAP pp. 71-2 perversion of voice of reason: mix voice of reason w/ voice of oracle (2 voices of other in us), a hermetic, hermeneutic seduction > oracular parasitizes voice of reason, elevates the voice, raises the tone > for Kant, this is Verstimmen (to be deranged, delirious), désaccordement of cords/voices [tone] in head: vision w/out concept turned impatiently toward most “crypted” secret > poetico-metaphorical overabundance

CIR pp. 306-08 nervous, worried, hunted, literature (beast playing dead, melding w/ foliage), delivering to world impregnable inedible simulacrum, the theory of the parasite virus, terrorizing others w/ instability he carries everywhere, one book open in the other

EU p. 95 university as a child of metaphysics & tehnē > once this offspring exceeds places assigned to it, becomes invasive margin: university “idea” reigns everywhere

——parasite everywhere there’s language, public, publishing > to wish to control/exclude parasites is a misunderstanding of speech acts

p. 109 [re: politico-juridical system of university] Derrida beyond [?] political right/left, on the side of a tireless parasite [passe et repasse la limite] seeking conflict or perpetual peace in a university that has from its birth (dès sa naissance) en mal (been wanting) dapocalypse et deschatologie

SPEC pp. 325-26 Derrida explains that a certain passage [on Freud’s indifference to whether Ernst invented game or not] is okay to extract, appears dissociable, a parasite from its immediate context, resonates like sound from elsewhere—murmur

PARENTHESIS

LI p. 100 or, or rather, even parentheses, i.e. “citation (iterability)” > not genus/species, not identity, classical logic fractured in its code, parasitic contamination entame all these relations, which is why words have to be qualified, supplemented by others

——[re: citationality (iterability)] parentheses do not mark synonyms/identification > iterability marks citationality in its possibility, its “graphematic root”

PARERGON

P pp. 53-4 philosophy always against parergon, parerga (Plato’s Laws, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics); Kant on color, ornament

——parergon: il est dabord làbord (on board, the border), bord as plank, hylē, wood, bordel

p. 55 parergon is philosophical quasi-concept if it can be transported (intact, deformed) to other fields: in Kant’s Religion w/in… “General Remark” is a parergon of parergon: text is framed (cadrée), squared up (quadrillée) [also surveillance], by 4 topics (effects of grace, of miracles, of mysteries, of means of grace), they are parerga of religion, not integral but touching the integral

pp. 55-6 reason’s impotence: couldn’t satisfy moral need to think religion through reason alone, had to rely on extra, parergon, supplementary work, Nebengeschäfte

corresponding damage to each parergon of Religion: 1) for grace, fanaticism 2) for miracles, superstition 3) for insight into supernatural, illuminism 4) for means of grace, thaumaturgy

pp. 57-8 for Kant, garments as parergon, but where do garments start? G-string? what does art have to do w/ this? [REST p. 307 G-string again, this time as lace, stricture? limit?]

p. 58 parergon (exceptional, strange, extraordinary)

pp. 59-60 parergon not simply exterior, surplus, but riveted to lack in interior of ergon, ergons lack is lack of a parergon

p. 61 Kant’s 3 examples of parergon: garment, column, frame [see pp. 57-61]

——parergon stands out (se détache), not like work, which also stands out > parergon stands out against 2 grounds (fonds) [work, background], as that which merges (se fond), effaces itself; frame’s thickness as margin not figure—or figure that comes away of its own accord (senlève delle même)

p. 63 where is the heart of the Critique?—[can only latch onto hinges (brisures), to parergons] > is Derrida taking unfair advantage of subchapters, but what is the proper text?

——where does internal/external limit of parergon begin & end

p. 64 Kant’s divides parergon in 2: 1) the proper, formal beauty 2) pathology, gilded frame (goldene Rahmen) (perversion, degradation, sensory)

p. 67 what if Überfall had structure of parergon: violent superimposition that falls on thing, enslaves it, “insults” the thing? but what if…

p. 75 position: opposition: frame [re: bad (adornment) and good (formal) parergon]

***pp. 80-1 le se-protéger-de-oeuvre (ergon), énergie captée, bordée, condition for mastery of PP, self-protection of energeia > energeia not as pure, total presence (prime mover), but as (par)ergon against what’s lacking in it, lack not as a substantial emptiness, but as impossibility of arresting differance in its contour, in a pose, of localizing lack, like metaphysics does, in its proper place: castration as truth > whether parergon borders (works against) free energy or essential lack, the 2 determinations sont le même (métaphysique)

p. 97 Derrida exploits Kant’s example of frame to ask whether parergon constitutes place/structure of free-wandering beauty (nothing prohibits the right to exploit the example)

pp. 97-100 [Derrida makes his move] Kant assigns free beauty to framing-foliation, signifying nothing > having to be interrupted, sans-theme & sans-text relate to end as nonrelation, finality w/out end, but this sans must be marked, the trace [?] > parergon: place/structure of free beauty?

pp. 127-28 beauty & sublime: please by themselves, independent of judgment of senses & determinate judgments, pretension to universal validity on side of pleasure (not knowledge), both reflexive judgments > beautiful (finite) requires parergon, presence of limit gives form to beautiful, this bordered edging not only externally limited but called in by hollowing of lacunary quality w/in the work (ergon) > colossal/sublime excludes parergon, not ergon, usually nature, “w/out limit”

p. 135 deconstruction can pose questions from inside Kant’s discourse, questions can be parergonal (posed there w/out being posed there)

REST p. 271 the extrinsic always intervenes—like parergon

pp. 301-02 that all of a sudden the motifs of Heidegger’s Überfall in REST link up w/ Kant’s parergon in P [cf. P pp. 66-7] is prescribed in all rigor by flexibility of chance, wager, which could have left the place [the link?] empty [edge of frame, place of signature]

p. 302 what’s in REST is now added to P in parergonal fashion, as an outside assigned in the inside, yet irreducible

——if clothing for Kant is parergonal, and if what is proper to representation is the “nude,” what do we make of these “old shoes w/ laces”? > a “pure” supplement? parergon w/out ergon?

pp. 321-22 I meant “escape (évasion)” by overflowing pictorial limit, framed representation, visible immediacy (if any such thing exists, in the picture) w/ collar flared (au col évasé), half-inside out > isn’t this overflowing the discursive operation, from its very first word? or is its internal reason in pictorial structure? > question of structure of this limit, of being-in or being-out, question of supplement of parergon—once “escape” takes off (prendre son appel sur) from impoverished descriptive trait: no longer concerns a painting

p. 343 law of parergon comprehends everything w/out comprehending (perverts all links btwn part & whole) vs. the obviousness of a framed painting detached in course of reattachment, in process of (un-re-)stricturation [law of parergon vs. that of (un-re-)stricture?]

p. 368 identification, like attribution, has supplementary/parergonal structure > because demand for reattachment is insatiable, unsatisfied, always making a higher bid, always starts out again

TR p. 93 it [re: Rousseau’s Confessions] precedes acc. substitution of one border for another: in this parergonal composition, in game of interlocking frames, we find mark of 2 limits: 1) crossing from Protestantism to Catholicism 2) [2x last word] last word of the other, last word of self

PPT p. 9 parergon of this book are ringed together by a circle [parergon are the classic ideas of art, those of Kant, Hegel, & in another respect, those of Heidegger]

C p. 221 the topology of the cartouche: parergon (the hors-doeuvres supplement in the work)

p. 222 parergon (paragon) (pharmakon, bastardy)

p. 231 coffin’s mutism: always a box in a box, some supplementary cartridge, a parergon > hors la boîte, fors la boîte: necessity to steal coffin (each time, differently) inscribed right on the “thing,” right on the cartouche [congenital perjury of justice]

E p. 25 question “what is?”: offers a paregoric parergon, constructs framework to capture energy of unassimilable, it softens, remedies, w/ speech, consoles, exhorts w/ the word

BSi p. 250 exergue (ex-ergon)—like parergon, out of work that puts to work > but like capital too: makes work happen, comes at head (inscribe date)

SPEC pp. 272-73 Freud’s empirical, biographical excuse for speculation [in Beyond…, recurrence of malignant disease] doesn’t get us far > because of parergonal supplement: autobiography becomes heterothanatographical, bioscroiser lautre, se croiser avec lautre

FV p. 432 Lacan is missing [re: Purloined…] an elaboration of frame, signature, parergon; this lack permits scene of signifier to be reconstituted into a signified (inevitable process in logic of sign)

PARIS, FRANCE, FRENCH

OH p. 50 Paris invented “freedom of thought,” no matter what the English say

POOF p. 268n via Leroux, fraternity links freedom & equality OR fraternity appears first as origin/principle > Christianity as an ‘infinite enlargement’ of [gentle] fraternity, still deploys a Greek memory: these 2 memories efficiently coupled in ideal instant of French Revolution

pp. 238-39 for Michelet, fraternity is another name for friendship, national singularity gives example of universal friendship, the boundless generosity (exemplary universalism) of Michelet’s andro-gallo-fraternocentrism

pp. 263-64 yes this book is French, but it’s not written only in French, that would claim for French exemplary privilege of translation for all other idioms [i.e. Montaigne, Hugo, etc. on fraternity & humanity] > instead, this books sets itself up to work and be worked relentlessly (s’acharne lui-même), au sens de la chasse, là où acharner revient à disposer un leurre de chair, close to the thing called France

p. 264 via Hugo, fraternity is universal in first being French, ‘sublimated France’: ‘natural law,’ ‘generosity,’ the brother

p. 265 Hugo: in the future, Paris will be the capital of what will be called Europe, which will be called Humanitydefinitive nation, what a majestic vision!

MONL p. 43 sea is lacking there [that is, in Paris, which lacks distancing of being-elsewhere, compared to Algeria]

WAP p. 122 natural truth is also national: Descartes is France

EU p. 7 [bibliography on French language]

p. 9 monarchy protects language: history of French literature, culture of publishing, king offers commissions

p. 10 extension of French language as good method for political expansion

p. 11 need to bring more clarity to the understanding of a language is both a juridical & philosophical pursuit (policing too)

pp. 11-2 given back to mother (liberated) to be better subjected to father [re: decree of Villers-Coterêts: justice would henceforth be carried out in French (not Latin)]

pp. 15-6 the 3 convulsions (crispations) of French becoming State language: 1) Descartes 2) French Revolution 3) techno-scientific [3 phases, but completely problematized]

p. 18 [vis-à-vis Descartes] link drawn btwn using vulgar language and “facility” for women

p. 25 booksellers prefer Descartes in French

PARO PAROLE SOUFFLÉE

SPOM p. 195 secret of commodity form is substitution (quid pro quo), but one w/ ruse, perverse intervention of souffleur, parole soufflée > abnormal play of mirrors [men no longer recognize in the substitution made by commodity the social character of their own labor], commodity turns men into specters, vampires > can’t see their reflection, “but who is not so deprived?” Derrida adds

PS p. 175 Artaud did not want speech (parole) spirited away (soufflé) from his body > for speech to be stolen (dérobée), it must be a possession

——Artaud establishes link btwn essence of theft & origin of discourse: theft of speech as possibility of theft, theft would constitute structure of the example as such

p. 176 Artaud wanted to soufflé the machinery of the souffleur (prompter) in theater > destroy (in same blow) economy of classical art, linspiration (poetic), & metaphysics, religion, aesthetics supporting them, faire voler en éclats la structure du vol

——we will follow Artaud’s intention (restore Danger by reawakening theater of cruelty, un monde où la structure du dérobement noffrît plus aucun abri) > with exception dun glissement calculé

——Artaud’s unpower (impouvoir): inspiration itself, force dun vide, tourbillon du souffle dun souffleur qui aspire vers lui et me dérobe of what I thought I could say in my own name > unpower, not absence but radical irresponsibility of speech: total & original loss of existence itself (consciousness as unconsciousness) [Nietzsche Geneal…]

——jai rapports à moi dans léther dune parole qui mest toujours soufflée

p. 177 for Artaud, furtiveness is quality of dispossession > empties speech before “I” have it: furtive, in Latin, is the manner of a thief, who must act quickly

pp. 177-78 the “I” who hears becomes the “I” who speaks, stealing speech form the “I” who thinks he speaks and is heard in his own name: sintroduisant dans le nom de celui qui parle, cette différence nest rien, elle est le furtif: la structure du dérobement instantané et originaire sans lequel aucune parole ne trouverait son souffle [w/out Artaud’s valuation, this sentence affirms differance]

——it is by way of metaphysics that this elusion which hides its history, its meaning, is understood as rapt or rape (comme vol ou viol)

p. 178 [reading as theft] because its forethought cannot be predicted, the act of reading perforates act of speaking & writing > through this hole, perforation, I escape myself

——acc. Artaud, letter is always stolen, because always open, never leads from subject to subject; autonomy of signifier as letter’s historicity, my vouloir-dire is submissive

***p. 180 death as structure of all theft, we do not die alone, the other strips us of ourselves

p. 181 for Artaud, thief > great invisible Other, furtive persecutor doubles me everywhere: God

p. 189 to have words whispered (soufflé) from the outside, like taking commands

pp. 189-90 se laisser ainsi souffler la parole, cest, comme lécrire lui-même, larchi-phénomène de la réserve: abandon de soi au furtif, discrétion, séparation et en même temps accumulation, capitalisation, mise en sécurité aussi dans la décision déléguée ou différée > laisser la parole au furtif, cest se rassurer [tranquilize? give courage? reassure] dans la différance, cest-à-dire dans léconomie

pp. 190-92 in order to achieve mastery over breath, & avoid capricious inspiration, theater of cruelty must use nonphonetic writing (hieroglyph, pasigraphy, mathematical formalism, Freud’s unconscious writing [?]) > universal grammar of cruelty: shouts, gestures, onomatopoeias

pp. 192-93 for Artaud, furtive differance slipped in btwn 2 forms of writing, placing life outside the work, and making its origin (flesh) the epigraph, the breathless (essoufflé) sarcophagus of my discourse > only through writing made flesh, theatrical hieroglyphic, could double be destroyed

pp. 193-94 to call differance the furtive is to apply a metaphysics that produces this quality

p. 195 Artaud: this hole of the hollow btwn 2 bellows of force/which were not (ce trou de creux entre deux soufflets de force/qui nétaient pas)

DST DST p. 230 caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

PARTAGER

POOF p. 219 w/out possibility (which must be neither living nor dead) of perjury, radical evil, absolute crime—no responsibility, freedom, decision > “I love you” (promise, prayer) can’t hope to prove anything at all, must remain unilateral/dissymmetrical, no mutuality/agreement can reduce the disproportion, the very condition of sharing (partage)

SH p. 15 partage (imparting, division): remarked at point of departure, address to other

p. 34 [meanings of partager]

F pp. xviii-xix crypt must always incorporate more than one, plus dun: cryptophore’s secret must be shared (partagé) w/ a “third,” that’s what makes a secret a secret

PF pp. xix-xx to think divisibility of trait of sovereignty deconstructs a certain fable, certain “as if,” of the political onto-theology of sovereignty:

1. sovereignty can resist international capital

2. deconstruct sovereignty while acknowledging all rights of subject founded on concept

3. sovereignty seems exceptional, indivisible, but ‘trait of sovereignty’ divides like any frontier > frontier limit se partageant: divides by sharing itself, shares itself by dividing

TN pp. 128-29 so Nancy partagerait (would shares out and part) the senses, touching too; he does this by adding definite article “le” to toucher, then declaring there’s no “the touch”; Derrida compares this to propre, proche, même; then asks how we could write w/out them, without making believe we believe? asking the other to believe > le temps dune rature qui viendra signer lacte de foi partagée et partager (diviser, inquiéter, morceler) lacte de foi, la foi même?

p. 226 Nancy: space of bodies not acquainted w/ Death (space abolished) (being-toward-death) but knows each body as a dead one, sharing out for us the extension of his/her “ci-gît (here lies)”

p. 218 Nancy’s partager: 1) affinity, crossings, “tangency” 2) a partitioning, un autre départ: this alterity of bodies follows the line partly of the technical & partly of a beyond Christianity

PARTISAN [fixerup]

DPi p. 172 how to distinguish enemy from abroad charged w/ political crimes from public enemy charged under common law?

PAS pacenots

KH pp. 125-26 backwards steps (retours en arrière), rhythm of Timaeus, go beyond, under philosophical logos, normal couple, to a third, a bastard, hybrid, orphan (khōra) > necessary but not true

GT p. 133 Aristotle differentiates tukhē from automaton (chance from human finality), offers example of creditor going to market & getting his debt paid back: pas de don, pas de pardon, everything happens en marchant

H pp. anne 54-6 step beyond border, threshold, because inability to mark a stable territory provokes thought

LOBL p. 128 all interdictions of pas, its double bind and invagination, make it possible to read the unreadability of impossible event, (the after-life of resurrection) of this “news”

pp. 133-34 terribleness of la chose, not only ineffable, unnarratable: it’s interdictory, it forbids telling/seeing

——interdiction violated by itself, sets in motion a single pas, overflows impossible récit, that which forbids happens [French? arriver?]

p. 146 performance w/out presence, takes place placelessly, the “-less” or “without,” and the pas, w/out pas, w/out negativity of pas

p. 172 [re: Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort] everything took place as if narrator desired that the 2 women resembled each other > in accordance w/ hymen (pas w/out him)

AF pp. 97-9 the archaic impression Freud seeks almost no longer an archive, confuses itself w/ a footstep that leaves its still living mark on surface, place of origin, when step still one w/ subjectile

——instant when imprint yet to be abandoned by pressure of impression, pure auto-affection, indistinction btwn touching/touched, active/passive, an archive that would confuse itself w/ arkhē

Freud dreams irreplaceable place, the very ash, condition of singularity, idiom, secret, testimony, trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate > absolutely safe location

——holds, right on the ash, pressure of Gradiva’s so singular step

SPOM p. 189 commodity turns, it changes place, il y a là un pas, its allure belongs to specter/mutant

POOF p. 296 Zarathustra always called us, supposing it teleiopoetically, under neutral, non-dialecticizable law of pas and ‘X w/out X’

HERP pp. 191-92 for Heidegger, philosophy seeks after, comes later than harmony, this delay eroticizes philosophical search, tension of Eros; Heraclitus & Parmenides not philosophers, no straining, no erotic pas, in accord, Einklang, homology w/ logos

HASD pp. 60-1[re: Heidegger’s “if I had to write theology”] pas décriture, cette passe ou cette esquive: quasi-transcendental recourse of writing, abyss of denial

A p. 7 pas [belongs to French?] involves the line that terminates all determination, peras (end, limit) not telos, puts us on path beyond, on other side, peraō eis khoran (penetrate into place, country)

p. 8 “coming to pass” of event doesn’t have the movement of passing, traversing, or transiting, a coming without pas, impossible passage, prohibited passage, indeed nonpassage

——il y va dun certain pas

p. 23 aporia: not even the non-pas but the deprivation of pas (a-pas)

p. 24 in crossing a border, one changes/exchanges death (on change le mort, on change de mort), one passes from figure of death as trespass (passage of line, transgression of border, pas au-delà) to another figure of border btwn life and death

p. 76 non-access to death where access is only to the threshold, pas, approach to border

PAS PAS p. (25) la démarche dun pas: the dis(approach) of a no/pace

p. (28) pas, like “Viens,” nothing dialectical, not divided by negation or denegation of self, because never present to itself, close to itself: pas de réappropriation [see p. (47)]

p. (29) forgetting is another name for pas, affecting without return the being of “is”

p. (34) pas does not find itself in (dans) a labyrinth [topos], it carries itself along like a labyrinth, has the structure of a labyrinth

——Blanchot’s strange rhythm of near and fear, of pas, ce démarche, imprints itself on (à) our discourse, chooses words

pp. (34-5) double pas never arresting itself in dialectical negativity of its proceeding nor in the march of a method, the trope of standing-upright [see p. 48]

p. (35) pas-à-pas is a metaphor for de-distancing; pas is immediately singularly multiple

pp. (38-9) eau, element where she no longer can find a foothold, also element of “sovereign time,” illusion du sans-pas, of the absence of space, when ses pas have left her, her movement is always entry, penetration [see HYMEN]

p. (41) [summary of adverbial and substantive reversals in phrase: pas au-delà] adverb pas easily becomes name

——pas as annulment and preservation of beyond, not a negation of negation, not an interiorization (negation of negation is an effect of pas, a pas)

pp. (43-4) each pas transgresses the pas [contamination of adverb/noun]; violence of this dislocation, sur une scène tout autre, occurs, increases, when it appears not to displace anything in discursivity, consciousness, in unscathed, assured normality of language [alters subterraneanly]

pp. (46-47) faux-pas (faut pas) scrambles (brouiller) syntax and semantics, prediscursive graphemes, “pa

p. (47) phrase pas-au-delà accumulates indirection of language too quickly, so it marks the excess

p. (48) when one gives up rendering account (on sinterdit de rendre compte) of the multiple meanings of pas, one gives up that which takes logic, dialectics, sense toward a coming of the event

pp. (49-50) Blanchot: passivity is never passive enough, must talk about infinite passivity, beyond all formulations [passivité, passion, passé, pas]

p. (51) two pas’ do not touch in the same (must not, need not, that’s how it works et que ça saute); that’s how marks are left (by Blanchot); marking time, pas marks pas

p. (52) le pas de plus, the other pas, haunts or parasitizes, a transgressive passivity, not activity nor labor

p. (53) Blanchot: passage, a thickness w/ its own laws and requirements

——le pas sans pas ne sarrête pas à une simple pensée de limen

p. (54) toujours deux pas, selon le retour éternel de la transgression passive et de laffirmation répétée (laffirmation sauvage), double instantaneous interminable preterition, une limite singulière entre la garde et la perte, entre le souvenir aussi et loubli > EROS, simulacre de cercle [ring vs. circle]

p. (55) [compare description of pas here (not a word, a cry?) to glas]

p. (67) every revolution needs to take account of Blanchot’s forgetting, forgetting w/out forgetting, a forgetting beyond the protection of repression, a forgetting that describes the whole history of dissimulation > pas dautre

pp. (67-8) “terrifyingly ancient” time, absolute crypt, requires the récit (reciting, it can be a matter of nothing but that), ce récit [of viens], neither relation to the event nor event itself > pas dévénement, pas de concept

pp. (72-3) double pas, before, beyond all time, resounds in viens, stairway scene, un pas de marche, w/out figure that disappears in it, w/out representation, w/out truth, w/out visibility

p. (77) pas deranges order of time and discourse it is a part of [like deconstruction?]

p. (85) double pas, its absolute heterogeneity, deprives of nothing save its identity to self, which prevents distancing from self > double pas, absolute rarefaction w/out the least lack

p. (92) if being is another name for forgetting, places forgetting in a crypt, forgets forgetting, in naming forgetting one makes it disappear under its name [(un)names], vs. pas sous le nom doubli > le reste sans reste de cet effacement qui ne sefface plus, voilà ce quil y a peut-être, par chance, mais qui nest pas ou qui est pas

S p. 66 silent play of quotation marks [re: spirit], Anführungsstriche, Anführungszeichen, “the hand calculates very fast,” Anführen, to conduct, dupe, brainwash, silent contrivances, fort/da, what shows or hides changes everything, and when one puts away after exhibiting, this is mise au pas (bringing to heel)

SH p. 31 untranslatability connected w/ difficult passage (no pasarán), aporia, that isolates one poetic language from another (& multiplicity w/in language) > also ce pas impossible

F p. xxviii steps “to the fore” [in English]

DS p. 242 syntax of point and pas

***p. 271 Mallarmé: all method is a fiction” > point de méthode—still a marching order (marche à suivre) > la dissémination dans le repli de lhymen, pas de méthode pour elle > [no circle-path to first step]

P pp. 32-3 in Hegel & Heidegger, an “it is necessary (il faut)” re: hermeneutic circle of art > must start w/ work of art, but how can you recognize it as art if you don’t already know what art is?: not a vicious circle, but an engagement of thought, circular feast, experience of limit, closure, resistance, humility > pas de cercle: le désir par cette répétition fidèle du cercle, daccéder à lencore infranchi, le désir dun nouveau pas > lien sans liens, franchir le cercle sans saffranchir de sa loi, pas sans pas

p. 134 for Kant & Hegel, pas crossing line finite/infinite interrupts symbolic beauty > Judaism as historical figure of sublime irruption: ban on representation (Kant), Hebraic poetry (Hegel)

p. 144 pas-sans-de-lune-à-lautre

SP p. 123 on following Nietzsche outside speculum, the hermeneutic circle > immeasurable, save for the the steps of a dove (quau pas de colombe) [these are the steps of the Übermensch]

OTO pp. 18-9 Nietzsche’s “I am a Doppelgänger”: a contradiction of “double” beyond negativity of dialectical opposition, Blanchot’s Pas au-delà, a single pas, beyond opposition life/death

p. 19 autobiography’s signature written in step not beyond, Nietzsche’s one foot beyond life: differance, allo-, thanatography of autobiography

O p. 16 in thus remaining [outside of oppositions, i.e. sensible/intelligible], does a preface exist? son espacement (préface à une relecture) sécarte au lieu de la khōra > remarkable limen of the text: what can be read of dissemination > limen: mark, march, margin, mise en marche: citation

TB p. 133 sacred text is transferability making its translation untranslatable

——sacred text (absolute text): pas de sens (not poverty of meaning, but no meaning that would be itself) > sacred text surrenders itself to translation; commands right away the translation it refuses

Gii p. 58 to ask about paths (odoi) of Heidegger, his step (pas) and rhythm, his Hand-werk of writing—questions beyond method (doutre-méthode)

REST pp. 258-59 what revenue, what surplus value is unleashed, what ghost step (pas de revenant) still comes to haunt the shoe’s in their painting truth (the annulment of their use-value, their out-of-service dereliction)? [revenue & revenant]

——are they (the shoes) haunted by some ghost or la revenance itself

p. 262 no hasty step here, la précipitation du pas, unavoidable w/ Van Gogh’s shoes? [p. 265 pas de préciptitation]

p. 264 marche almost same word as mark, margins, also Pas > necessity of walking, lowest degree, must subjective or underlying level of culture/institution: pair of shoes

——DS turns around points of ballerina, “la syntaxe du point et du pas” > each pair referring to some other, signifying too the operation of signifying

p. 265 shoes: what are they worth? what does their surplus (or minus-) value signal toward? en quel sens (qui? quoi?) font-elles marcher?

p. 284 the pas de contact (pas de sujet) of Van Gogh’s shoes, a detachment whose reattachment is sought in its fundamental surface, the sole, or the fundamental subjectivity of the ground

——pas de contact, rhythmically, makes marche, pas is not present nor absent

pas works (marche) badly w/out a pair

p. 285 Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art intends to lead beyond, or to, eve of constitution of the subjectum, a Schritt zurück (backward step) on road of thought [?]

pp. 293 Heidegger missed the detachability of the step, the possibility of the digressive

pp. 375-76 bet comes back to a comparing (un pari revient toujours à comparer)

——has to be a difference to permit it: but a pair is a fixed difference, fixed bet not a bet?, bet so as not to bet, plus de pari, pas de pari > bet on pair: limit absolute wager (pari)

p. 380 “to suicide” someone —make him come back (le faire revenir) as a ghost (fantôme) or make him stay (le faire rester) as a ghost, où il est, en somme assez bien enterré, ne disposant plus que de ses pas? > pas de revenant, pas de nom [don’t let the dead bury the dead]

DST DST p. 199 ne pas ne pas: redoubles movement of negation through syntactical formation

——not do something that consists in not doing: ineluctable, unavoidable > sur-négation

——neither work of dialectic nor unconscious denegation [neither Hegel nor Freud]

RM p. 80 retrait is plural, singularly plural [Nancy] in itself, divides itself, gathers up in withdrawal of withdrawal > elsewhere, Derrida called this pas

PF p. xvii paralysis arrests: negative symptom of aporia > whereas aporia is possibility of impossible, of “play,” very condition of pas, experience of frayage, marche, via rupta [elsewhere Derrida deconstructs becoming route?], decision, event, coming of other: writing & desire

WAP p. 80 chaque pas est toujours piégé, defending philosophy, destroying philosophy, using fragmentary, aphoristic, elliptical language > each can serve most violent didacticism

+R p. 169 double ladder, erected, riveted, shackled, never arrives > steps: symbolic of sexual act

C p. 187 the “without example” and the pas of [don’t forget a single one] pas un seul [re: series of coffins]

p. 215 retrace one’s steps, narrative (récit), series, funeral procession/palindrome, revenir: le revenu de lusure, le revenant, lhôte, ghost, guest [both in English] > le coffin comme hôtel de passe (whore-hotel)

p. 217 paradigm as revenge: le mort se venge, “model” is always le revenant rêvé: haunting does not befall it, but takes the first step (la hantise ne lui survient pas, elle donne le premier pas)

ATM p. 154 passage beyond language requires language, or requires text as a place for the trace of a step (pas) that passes beyond language, not (present) elsewhere [not classical]

BSi pp. 2-4 à pas de loup (wolf), à pas de colombe (dove) (silent commands order world); wolf, war (hunting), dove, order, peace > both silent

***p. 5 [re: its double meaning, pas de loup] pas’ savage, stealthy intrusion, an adverb haunts a noun

pp. 278-79 the pas of “who knows” and “perhaps” suspends order, authority—not in name of obscurantist propaganda

EU pp. 115-16 Derrida’s 1st thesis title: The Ideality of the Literary Object > Derrida tells Hyppolite: if I saw where I was going, I wouldn’t take another step

——Derrida also knows enough about where he’s going to think, w/ terror, things aren’t going so well there, would be better not to go there at all

SPEC p. 260 logic of au-delà, pas au-delà: overflows logic of position, not a substitute/replacement/opposition to/for position, opening another relation, rapport sans rapport, frees itself at a stroke (coup), neither pas nor coup is indivisible

p. 269 death impels (pousse) the pas décriture: but de la vie, but sans but, stratégie sans finalité du vivant > Nietzsche’s no conservation, and life a rare genus of that which is dead

pp. 293-94 [re: Freud’s “speculative” writing] démarche of this writing, advancing w/out advancing, time of a detour, pas de thèse repeats itself: PP will not let anything be done w/out it, except repetition itself

p. 296 repetition, reproductivity, works w/out saying anything, like death drive, not even “form,” w/out thesis, de-monstration makes its proof (preuve) sans montrer > de-monstration folds into everything it makes explicit, pas de démonstration remains (reste) in this restance

pp. 336-37 same step (pas) [Freud’s step beyond PP] gives & suspends movement, es gibt, exemplary movement of paralysis [Derrida repeating too, cf. FSW, PAS] [démarche]

p. 338 “la paralyse: le pas au-delà du PP sera resté interdit

p. 339 translation of hervortreten [from Freud’s Beyond…] as “emerge” or “se manifester” loses the implication “to step forward”

p. 354 detour expanding immeasurably: Umweg of 1st Chapter [re: Freud’s Beyond…] secondary to absolute/unconditional Umweg > pas de détour always leads back to death, not a question of going (aller) but of coming back (revenir)—this is the passage

p. 355 [vis-à-vis Freud] pas de plus > deux temps of drive: 1) conserves 2) insures path to death, pas de mort, organism arrives by its own (internal) step at death (eigenen Todesweg): senvoyer the message of one’s own death

p. 361 to guard one’s fashion, one’s rhythm, what counts is less telos than rhythm of differance, speed of the step: Zauderrythmus (differential rhythm)

p. 362 everything in Freud’s Beyond…: “zurück

pp. 362-63 pas de satisfaction; ego drive—death logic; sex drive: 2 germs seek immortality

p. 364 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] will steps forward (pas de plus) permit themselves to be counted?

p. 384 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] passage btwn transference & speculation > speculative transference orients, destines, calculates most original & most passive “first step” on very threshold of perception: desire for concept of perception belongs to destiny of this calculation

p. 388 transference, ersatz, prosthesis, at the mouth, Freud’s surgeries, cigar: les pas de plus et les plus de pas [?]

pp. 388-89 death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

p. 397 pas de PP btwn 2 functions (Binden, general return to Nirvana)

pp. 405-06 fort:da, pleasure is a kind of rhythm [Nietzsche], SPEC will have played fort:da of Nietzsche, the limping (boitement) of unterwegs, a step forward for nothing, only rhythm

p. 407 poem of limping consoles for too slow step of science

pp. 408-09 for Nietzsche, pain is not in opposition to pleasure, will to suffer constitutes very aspiration of will to power [?] > would beyond the PP, for Nietzsche, be affirmation of life rather than return to inorganic [?]

——Nietzsche [Will To Power (699)]: one does not react to pain, it causes one to take a step

CHOR p. 97 how can one breathe w/out punctuation, w/out multiplicities of rhythm, steps, how can one dance?

PASSAGE

MONL p. 71 [Derrida’s quilting point?] passage points = places of transcendence, absolute elsewhere in eyes of Greco-Latino-Christian philosophy & yet inside it > epekeina tes ousias, khōra, negative theology, Freud, Artaud, Blanchot, Levinas, Eckhart

FL p. 282 from instituting violence to preserving law/contract [modern democracies] > passage from presence to representation, acc to Benjamin a Verfall, forgetting of originary violence in this differance [Derrida doesn’t see this as accidental?]

AF pp. 68-9 Derrida calls the 3 difference modalities [in Yerushalmi’s appeal to Freud] of same affirmation of future: doors, i.e. passage to “to come,” dreaming of Benjamin’s “narrow door” for passage of Messiah “at each second”

OOG p. 149 for Husserl, absolute is passage (historicity as passage of Speech, primordial Logos toward polar Telos)

——every return to the origin, an audacious move toward the origin (circulation, anticipation)

——Husserl’s method: bring [passage] to consciousness, Selbstbesinnung, Verantwortung, avoid risk of inauthenticity, loss of Speech, light

——Absolute is Passage, is dangerous, lAbsolu dun Danger, for if light of sense is only through passage, light can be lost along the way (inauthenticity)

MPM pp. 10-1 if memory maneuvers btwn law and Being, can one think the being and law of memory? these questions move through transference & translation, above abyss; require impossible passageways: “the fragile resistance of a span” [hymen?]

POOF p. 30 perhaps as non-dialectical passage from one to other that Aristotle can’t think, unable to endure contamination coming from what is beyond both antithetical values > Nietzsche: “Glaube an die Gegensatze der Werthe (faith in antithetical values)”

MSUB J p. 166 under the words (mots), hors sens, when you let attraction of words, motifs, motets [anthems] play under the meaning, you draw, sing, rather than speaking, you write the unwritable > this passage also convokes multiplicity of voices in a “motel,” rhythm, vibration

A pp. 11-2 aporia, experience of what’s fascinating in the nonpassage: “not knowing where to go,” paralyzed by separation

p. 15 experience means traversal without line, without indivisible line, passage, rite of passage, can it ever concern surpassing an aporia? can there be an experience of the aporia as such?

pp. 30-31 re: Heidegger’s Verenden, the coming to an end that all living things share, Derrida prefers translation “perishing,” “périr” to “arrêt de vie” because retains per of passage to limit, pereo, perire, crosses line, though losing sense of corrupting, ending in ver of verenden

EM p. 121 (144) nous: assures proximity to itself of central being for which circular reappropriation is produced; nous: unity of absolute knowledge and anthropology, God & man, of onto-theo-teleology and humanism

——“lêtreet la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et lhumanisme

VM p. 130 infinitist dogmatism in pre-Kantian style does not pose question of responsibility of finite philosopher, overlooks irreducibility of history (infinite passage through violence)

p. 134 phenomenology, passageway to essentiality, would be impossible w/out anticipation [presupposition, metaphysical decision] of Being not exhausted by reality

PP pp. 71-2 difficulty of translating pharmakon (“remedy,” “drug,” “recipe,” “philter”) w/in Greek itself > violent transference of a nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme is problem of very passage into philosophy

pp. 92-3 Thoth supplants and supplements (en le suppléant) its other (father, sun, life, speech, origin or orient); at same time Thoth takes shape from very thing it resists and substitutes for

——Thoth opposes itself, passes into its other > messenger-god is truly god of absolute passage btwn opposites: god of non-identity (if he had identity: coincidentia oppositorum)

p. 122 [anamnesic] dialectic as antidoteness of antidote, passage btwn human & divine, before their division, also dialectic as science of sumplokē [see p. 67], art of weaving (tissage), if there are 2 sorts of texture

p. 160 “Plato’s metaphors” [re: khōra]? passage beyond all “Platonic” oppositions, toward aporia of originary inscription

p. 167 transmission of dialectical mastery of pharmaka from father to son disrupted by family scene that constitutes & undermines passage btwn pharmacy & house

PAS PAS p. (38) female voice asks: why her? why is this movement entrusted to the figure of she? Derrida responds by saying, we need to learn infinite patience, be immobilized endlessly in each passage

pp. (40-1) “Go (Va)” says the same thing as viens, moves away at same pas, towards a place w/out passage, toward a living (vivre) qui vautpeut-être même mourir

p. (53) Blanchot: passage, a thickness w/ its own laws and requirements

——le pas sans pas ne sarrête pas à une simple pensée de limen

***p. (84) [list of Blanchot’s many sans constructions] X sans X forms the trace or the pas of the toute autre that acts on itself there (sy agit) > degree o (eau); il reste un reste sans reste de ce passage (il y apasrien, un texte, un récit, déjà)

VP p. 9 phenomenology (MOP in form of ideality) is also a philosophy of life, death is an empirical and extrinsic accident, everything is light, living light, blazes open passage to reduction

T pp. x-xi philosophy has always thought its other, that which limits it; does to think the other solely mean relever, to control the other? or does the limit/passage always reserve one more coup; to think the proper of the other, the other as such is to miss it, to miss the missing of the other [on manque (de) le manquer]: examine the relevance of the limit

p. xvi play of limit/passage [re: Being as relevant movement of reappropriation], no question answer but displace concept of limit, limit of concept (can’t just create new limit)

PPHS p. 71 when Being is presence, sign can only be a transition, lieu de passage, (provisional) bridge btwn 2 moments of full presence, the bridge can be relevé

SH p. 24 aporia: barred passage (no pasarán) [pp. 25-8 when no pasarán was a shibboleth]

p. 31 untranslatability connected w/ difficult passage (no pasarán), aporia, that isolates one poetic language from another (& multiplicity w/in language) > also ce pas impossible

p. 34 shibboleth secures passage from one to other in difference, w/in sameness > ambiguities of French partage

WM p. 256n in response to Fontanier’s new “proper sense,” a violent catachresis, btwn figurative and primitive sense, Derrida says: when the middle is not a passageway of mediation btwn oppositions, the opposition is not pertinent > consequences are boundless

POS p. 40 gram, reserve, incision, trace, spacing, blank, supplement, margin, pharmakon—a list w/ no taxonomical closure, not a lexicon: not atoms but focal points (foyers), crucibles of economic condensation, sites of passage: spread out through text, each in a different way

P p. 121 [about to discuss the column & the colossal]: “I will take my stand (me tiendrai) in this passage”

p. 128 re: sublime, arrest of outpouring (épanchement) at floodgate (vanne), pressed on limit, pleasure gushes after arrest, inhibition, suspension (Hemmung), an arresting that makes flow > for a blink of an eye passage is closed, stricture absolute, then barrage, linondation

OTO p. 11 Dionysus vs. Crucified, name of versus, countername, suffices to pluralize (in a singular fashion) homonymic mask & proper name, to lead all threads of name astray in labyrinth (ear): proceed, then, by seeking out the edges, inner walls, the passages

OS p. 34 Heidegger does not investigate hidden passageway (le passage dissimulé) that makes problem of presence communicate w/ the problem of the written trace

ROP p. 28 for Hegel, Kant relies on formal logic re: a priori synthetic principles, doesn’t produce passage of this “simple unity of self-consciousness into these determinations and differences”

FS p. 11 God imprints secondarity on every navigation of the human: 1) passage of deferred reciprocity btwn reading & writing? 2) absolute witness who’s already read what you will write: third party as transparency of meaning? [circular logos]

DPi p. 157 via Nietzsche, Christianity (pretends to) open hyperbolic passage at limit of spiritualization, reversing the order of things (creditor offers himself in sacrifice)

***pp. 221-22 DP speaks in 3rd person present (can’t say: “I am no more”), copula signifies instantaneous passage from being to nothingness (“he is no more”): stigmē, Most High, Last Judgment, God’s verdict (always instant of death of a 3rd party, never me, you, us)

REST p. 321 ask question of frame by way of figure/trajectory of lace: a stricture by alternate and reversible passage from inside to outside, under and over

p. 339 edge (bordure) less simple when turned inside out [invaginated?], not simple at all w/ the lace & the hemmed holes (trous bordés), the eyelets comme lieu de passage [figure of decapitation too]

DST DST p. 215 Heidegger & Levinas so close, so heterogenous: passage for a thinking translation

PIO p. 41 status of imagination shifts in/after Kant, rehabilitation of productive imagination from Kant to Schelling to Hegel

——does Kant’s Einbildungskraft (like produktive Vermögen, which Schelling & Hegel distinguish from reproductive Imagination) liberate philosophical inventiveness from subjection to theological rule (finding what’s already there)? I think not: it remains a passage [to the same] [not interruption]

EJQB p. 70 to be a poet is to know how to have speech, let it speak alone, which it can do only in its written form

——to leave writing: be there only to provide its passageway (laisser le passage)

AFR p. 72 passage (continuity and/or rupture) from one operation to an other always amounts to difference, quantity, of force > via analogy, this quantity of force is always that of connection

IW p. 280 passage, path of letter, path toward law (path & leap): a step beyond in the path-less (im Weglosen) [Rosenzweig and Kafka’s Vor dem Gesetz]

PJP p. 179 untranslatable [re: Le Parjure] resists passage across frontiers of a nation

D p. 295 passage toward other, se resserrer (fitting itself) into the angles btwn the surfaces, dans lentre-surface [inter(sur)face] > articulation of one surface sur lautre (dun temps sur lautre)

p. 325 “I” that attends its own incessant, violent reinscription, a pure passageway for operations of substitution, a mere function or ghost

p. 340 Sollers: column of penis, faeces, baby—solid, each stimulate a membranous passage

pp. 351-52 column is not, passage of dissemination, “phallic” significance of column is a semic effect, reflection on 4th surface (described center, represented mastery of dissemination); “is”—procures calm, consciousness of ideal mastery > operation of 4th surface

——column has no being, belongs to no one

TN p. 325n spasm & distension: passage that confirms gap btwn extension and spacing

p. 180 there would be auto-affection “effects,” but their analysis can’t escape hetero-affection that makes them possible, keeps haunting them

——constitution of body proper would thus assume passage outside through “technē of bodies,” spacing, death, nonliving, other, mourning > everything the “solipsistic” tries to keep out (maintenir au-dehors)

p. 200 touching w/out touching, touching in passing the touchable > “time to space itself,” “espace du passage qui fait donc partage [spacing-time], the time needed for touching [co-existence as w/, as other]

pp. 260-61 how to go from unfigurable to figurable (God to man’s hand) > question of passage, figural transfer—but one answer: passage, like Incarnation, Passion, Transubstantiation, mediation btwn infinite immediate & finite medium, btwn infinite & singular finite—is logos fashioned into flesh, the Son, the Hand of the Merciful Father [heterotautology]

ATM p. 154 passage beyond language requires language, or requires text as a place for the trace of a step (pas) that passes beyond language, not (present) elsewhere [not classical]

pp. 174-75 for Levinas, to make passage to other, there can’t be an absolute erasure, withdrawal must appear, “He,” only there in seriasure, a series of hiatuses (mouth agape), enlaced erasures

E p. 11 poetic gift is an add-on (un en-plus), given as a power to give by God so that, via the poet, this supplementary surplus value can return to the infinite source, the poet breaks from the circular economy, that is the passage to the infinite: passage of infinity btwn gift/debt

——[re: economimesis unfolding to infinity] “Kantism” passes into “Hegelianism”

AD p. 31 the “without question” at the birth of “first question” (the question is the 3rd): passage (w/out transition) from ethical responsibility to political, juridical, philosophical responsibility (the move out of immediacy)

p. 46 for Levinas, separation as “metaphysics,” an experience of hospitality, irruption of finite in infinite, the passage meta ta physika passes through hospitality of finite threshold that opens to infinity

p. 147n in the passage beyond totality (epekeina tēs ousias), we find Levinas’ strained and precarious filiation w/ Heidegger > unlike Levinas, Heidegger does not give in to “politism” of, nor fascination w/, a (supposedly Hegelian) totality

WOG p. 35 undecidability: condition and necessary passage for the decision

CIN p. 24 pure burning light: no sign of passage, pure consuming destruction, noon w/out contrary

OG p. 61 (89-90) Derrida discusses the importance of appealing to the transcendental, the necessity of a pathway, ce parcours doit laisser dans le texte un sillage > no transcendental pathway (glossematics) would be naive objectivism; ultra-transcendental would leave no sillage, be pre-critical > these 2 end up resembling each other [this leads to deconstructive logic of trace]

p. 62 (91) unity of arche-trace’s double passage through form and imprint (empreinte) [re: path from Saussure to Hjelmslev, from phonic substance to formalism]

pp. 256-58 (363-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] teleology as external—passage from state of nature to state of language (from one structure to another) explained by catastrophic archaeology (catastrophe of dangerous supplementarity)

pp. 262-63 (371-72) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] no opposition applied to passage btwn state of nature & state of society, to becoming-present of presence (a lasting passage like the present in Reveries): a supplementarity, festival (fête), w/out jeu; moment of festival: pure continuity > society formed morrow of festival (indifference of pleasure & desire): de la danse à la loi

pp. 279-80 (396-97) neume, epoch of natural languages: fête autour du point deau, temps de lIsle de Saint-Pierre [?]: limage fixant ce qui ne fut quun point de pur passagela limite toujours déjà franchie, rèpere absolu

EU p. 40 Descartes’ counter-proposal [to Hardy]: arcanum of “true science” > method, artificial intelligence, translating machine (could be taught in very little time): universality as principle of order, as path, passage, odos

SPEC p. 354 detour expanding immeasurably: Umweg of 1st Chapter [re: Freud’s Beyond…] secondary to absolute/unconditional Umweg > pas de détour always leads back to death, not a question of going (aller) but of coming back (revenir)—this is the passage

pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

CHOR p. 105 very obscure area, passage btwn ontological difference & sexual difference not punctuated by polarities (originary/derived, ontological/ontic…)

PASSION (MARTYR)

MONL p. 27 body of the martyr, body of language and writing, marks as scars, Derrida a Franco-Maghrebian martyr

——mark, re-mark, experience of language, what gives rise to articulation btwn ontological universality & testimonial singularity of martyred existence > universal destiny assigns us to a single language which cannot be appropriated

p. 47 someone in Derrida flatters himself to understand a domineering murmur beyond grammar, bow to a more hidden rule, last will of language entrusted only to me [see p. 49], last heir of French language: play the role of hero-martyr-pioneer-outlaw-legislator [Nietzsche]

GOD pp. 80-81 can a secret be transmitted? (yes & no); we do not understand, w/ Kierkegaard, Abraham’s decision; we share w/ Abraham what can’t be shared [highest passion, faith], a secret we know nothing about, neither him nor us > an incessant repetition of the absolute beginning

POO p. 4 the analyst vs. the critic, participant in ritual vs. one who assumes an “objectifying” position (even if he is “close to passivity, if not passion” )

——he makes choices, judgments, and noncritique ends up participating in critique.

p. 16 my passion would be non “pathological” in the Kantian sense

p. 22 impossible to respond, impossible not to respond, double bind, 2 hands nailed down [no choice]

p. 23 of what does verification consist, when nothing happens w/out some sacrifice? would this be a testimony neither witness, attestation, nor testament could exhaust?

p. 28 no passion w/out secret, no secret w/out passion > passion in place of secret

p. 31 [Derrida’s passion?]: the absolute solitude of a passion without martyrdom

p 141n passion is always a matter of example

SPOM p. xiv man’s life always more than a paradigm, other than a symbol > a proper name (see p. 220 on man) [one should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure? martydom]

POOF pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe quà l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

HASD p. 7 deconstruction: a “symptom” of modern/postmodern nihilism or last testimony of faith, martyrdom, in the present fin de siècle?

A p. 3 jealousy: primitive passion for the proper, for proper possibility re: one’s existence

p. 19 experience of aporia: passion, endurance, resistance, remainder

PAS PAS pp. (49-50) Blanchot: passivity is never passive enough, must talk about infinite passivity, beyond all formulations [passivité, passion, passé, pas]

p. (108) Blanchot: prophets birth tongues, and feel desires they can’t support—before the immensity

SH p. 52 crypt occurs, is poet’s passion (not action)

——a date fascinates, but is not made to fascinate, crypt occurs wherever singular incision marks language (not the work of hermetic poet anxious to seduce w/ ciphers)

FWT pp. 112-13 incalculable inner multiplicity is Derrida’s torment, his work, travail, his tripalium, passion, labor, also that which makes him work > I do not believe this division/nonidentity to oneself is exemplarily Jewish, but who would dare say it isn’t?

——“I” am working around a dehiscence, division (more than 1, 2, 3, beyond all arithmetic, calculability)

ROP p. 36 law of antinomy, can only endured in its tension (Kant’s antinomies the fated outcome of analysis), paradox of a double “one must”: one can only endure double bind in passion

***p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

ATIA pp. 11-2 nudity as passivity, involuntary exhibition in face-to-face: the passion of the animal, my passion of the animal (other)

p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

***SW p. 350 [BEAUTIFUL PASSAGE, as if they all aren’t] could a “theory of fetishism” ever measure up to infinite tenderness of “my own tallith” (as if such phrase preceded ipseity, “I”)? stranger to all maudlin, effusion, pathos—to all “Passion” > yet, compassion w/out limit: absolute delay of verdict that is/was/will make itself arrive w/out luminous vision (glory) > belongs to the night, my white tallith, absolute night

——tallith not incommensurable w/ fetish, but a generalized not restricted fetishism (Glas); theory of fetish no longer merely a theory at moment of verdict

DPi p. 60 logic of fascination best argument against punishment as exemplarity: bad example risks becoming fascinating martyr, hero, the good example [Genet] (perversion of the imitation of Christ)

pp. 83-4 Schmitt: “Sovereign is he who decides on (über) the exception” > ambiguity of über: does sovereign decide in an exceptional situation or on what must be considered an exceptional situation? given the context, Derrida thinks the sovereign decides on what is an exceptional situation > affirming/ proving he is sovereign

——for Schmitt, only by limit concept of exception can we think purity of decision, the exception “thinks the general w/ intense passion”

p. 137 great ambiguity of Christianity: confluence of human blood [re: guillotine] and blood of Christ’s Passion

CHM p. 62 vouloir-dire-lhyperbole not antagonistic to silence but its condition, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

TR p. 86 passion of [Rousseau’s] faith seals virtual time of work, une oeuvre that will operate by itself, beyond its signatory (w/out [Rousseau’s] living assistance [machine])

EJQB p. 64 Judaism as the birth/passion of writing

p. 66 wisdom of poet culminates its freedom in passion of translating obedience to the law of the word into autonomy > w/out which, and if passion becomes subjection, poet is mad

D p. 350 polysemy multiplies w/in horizon of final parousia, temporary detours of lived passion, a signifying martyrdom of truth past or truth to come [thus, dissemination not polysemy]

EL pp. 195-96 imminent, eschatological boiling of a language as volcano: the passion of a sacred language suffering

TN pp. 260-61 how to go from unfigurable to figurable (God to man’s hand) > question of passage, figural transfer—but one answer: passage, like Incarnation, Passion, Transubstantiation, mediation btwn infinite immediate & finite medium, btwn infinite & singular finite—is logos fashioned into flesh, the Son, the Hand of the Merciful Father [heterotautology]

OG p. 18 (30) Rousseau: conscience is voice of soul, passions voice of body [Platonic]

pp. 245-46 (349) [excluded 3rd defied by supplement] incompatibles brought together [Freud’s dream interpretation] [double bind]: Rousseau affirms both that which constructs via articulation (passion, language, society, man) & that which is canceled by it (accent, life, energy, passion) [passion both prior to supplement & supplemental] > Rousseau dissociates these contradictions while allowing an intact purity (une pureté inentameé) to both negative & positive

——Rousseau says what he doesn’t wish to say: graphics of supplementarity is not comprised in any dialectic (a concept governed by horizon of presence, eschatological parousia, parole pleine)

CIR pp. 142-43 my absolute knowledge: writing promised unto death, writing that must come to an end > any reader (addressee) becoming the uncircumcised [son] to be confessed—line thrown to girl-martyrs [wondering why they’re reading Derrida]

p. 305 happens only to me (the whole of this circumfession): hubris of the prophet, whose undecipherable letter arrives only at himself, who understands it no better than anyone else

SPEC p. 372 Plato accuses Aristophanes in Apology, Alicibiades defends Socrates in Symposium; Plato is behind Socrates, or in front, as a lawyer: here is the martyr, he’s innocent, he’s judging you

PASSIVITY

FL p. 255 the just decision (rend time, defy dialectics) as madness, via Kierkegaard, madness because hyper-active and suffered, retains something passive

LOBL p. 167 the passivity of “letting” is different from the passivity of couples and pairs (e.g. pair active/passive)

POO p. 4 the analyst vs. the critic, participant in ritual vs. one who assumes an “objectifying” position (even if he is “close to passivity, if not passion” )

OOG p. 99 w/ sedimented sense, first danger is passivity [for more of Husserl on passivity follow footnotes at bottom of page (p. 99n)]

A p. 16 nonpassive endurance of aporia: condition of responsibility, neither dialectizable contradiction like Hegel, Marx, nor transcendental illusion like Kant

PAS PAS p. (21) eternal ring, passivity of nonpower, strength in reception, restarts alliance w/out debt, gift w/out credit

p. (35) immediately transgressive nature of pas in passivity enables passivity to surmount itself, to affirm

——Blanchot: to sleep in a passivity exactly like death, madness therefore

p. (45) Blanchot: “oh night…you become a delicious passivity”

pp. (49-50) Blanchot: passivity is never passive enough, must talk about infinite passivity, beyond all formulations [passivité, passion, passé, pas]

p. (52) the other pas haunts or parasitizes, a transgressive passivity, not activity nor labor

POOF pp. 68-9 a passive decision, responsibility outside of knowledge, outside of subjective decisionism, occurs from the heartbeat of the other (blood arriving), which makes an exception for/of me > opens autonomy on to itself, matches decision to the gift, figure of the heartbeat: [passive decision doesn’t contradict sovereign decision, sovereign becomes guest, other?] [Derrida beyond Levinas]

FWT pp. 4-5 leave life in life & make it live again, “let live,” laisser, most beautiful, hazardous thing, like giving up, giving over the gift, forgiveness > deconstruction never w/out this love, pays homage to those it takes on, sen prendre

p. 53 must be a leap from knowledge to decision, doesn’t take place w/out other, “passive” decision, decision of other, this doesn’t exonerate me [Derrida can prove this rationally, in the name of reason to come] > still necessary to know as much as possible before deciding

DS p. 225 simple opposition btwn activity & passivity becomes too formally weak to encompass graphics of hymen, its spider web, the play of its eyelids

SP p. 77 Hegel on passivity of clittoral pleasure (de la jouissance clitoridienne)

ATIA pp. 11-2 nudity as passivity, involuntary exhibition in face-to-face: the passion of the animal, my passion of the animal (other)

pp. 27-8 Bentham’s “can they suffer?” no longer question’s animality in relation to power, dynamis, hexis, habitus re: logos; suffering: “can they not be able?” > a power w/out power, possibility of the impossible, a passivity > mortality resides there, as radical means to contemplate our finitude alongside animals, the finitude of life: sharing this nonpower, vulnerability, anguish

pp. 28-9 war of pity (denying animal’s suffering/avowing it), thinking begins when the animal looks at us and we are naked

GSP pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

PS p. 178 acc. Artaud, letter is always stolen, because always open, never leads from subject to subject; autonomy of signifier as letter’s historicity, my vouloir-dire is submissive

SW p. 320 veil as “sa laisse (lead, leash, let)” > tears skin, touches, punctures, pulls, doesn’t just veil gaze; voilà, every word counts

***p. 350 [BEAUTIFUL PASSAGE, as if they all aren’t] could a “theory of fetishism” ever measure up to infinite tenderness of “my own tallith” (as if such phrase preceded ipseity, “I”)? stranger to all maudlin, effusion, pathos—to all “Passion” > yet, compassion w/out limit: absolute delay of verdict that is/was/will make itself arrive w/out luminous vision (glory) > belongs to the night, my white tallith, absolute night

——tallith not incommensurable w/ fetish, but a generalized not restricted fetishism (Glas); theory of fetish no longer merely a theory at moment of verdict

PF p. xxxiii passivity of resistance resists thought because it does the most, the impossible as heart of possible, makes the most happen

——impossible marks the limit of the possible or a power, the limit of an “I can”

——passivity marks all unconditional pure events (gift, forgiveness, hospitality, death), marks and thus doubly limits most active, productive performativity

p. xxxiv performativity exceeded by event (exposed to passivity)

pp. xxxiv-xxxv not exonerated by decision of the other in me (passive decision): don’t give in to alibi of the other (ultimate creditor whose debt remains mine to discharge, God)

WAP p. 63 must struggle w/ (sarchaner) and submit to Kantian tradition, & critique/overvalue its “object,” reinstitute it by deconstructing its genealogy

——le présent discours [Derrida’s] ne saurait échapper totalement à la loi de cet espace [Kant’s], même s'il tente au moins de laisser filtrer une autre lueur (another glimmer), ou plus précisément de se laisser infiltrer (let itself be infiltrated) par une lueur qui déjà vient d'ailleurs et passe par tant de lézardes (so many cracks)

TN p. 274 touch as self-touchingle toucher plus tout autre sens (dizzy rhetoric), very form of space & time & will (essence of will) (from Descartes to Kant or even to Nietzsche)

——to will is to will to touch, strange tautology, bends/folds oneself back into fold of passive-active auto-affection > this affect, that inflects/conjugates passive activity of will: desire

ATM p. 170 Levinas: in the just war waged against war, trembling, relaxed virility w/out cowardice—passivity more passive than any passivity

pp. 173-74 for “passivity more passive than…” not to turn into its opposite: skin must be torn away and its adherence must be kept beneath the cut (a tearing away that limits itself)

p. 175 “passivity more passive than…”: hear it as most provocative thought today, not a transgression, it was first of all provoked

EW p. 263 even in the most marked transcendental idealism (Husserl’s), alter-ego leads back to a pre-egological and pre-subjectivist zone (transcendental passive genesis of time and other)

AD p. 83 for Levinas, “substitution,” absolute passivity, “possibility of the impossible” that’s not Heidegger’s death, but the condition of the hostage, responsibility before/beyond death— impossibility of “slipping away (se dérober)”

OG p. 66-7 (97) that the “imprint” is irreducible means speech is passive in relation to an absolute past that can never be fully mastered, brought to presence > this passivity of speech is also a relation to the future, but not via anticipation [which would be a mastering of passivity]

p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

——becoming-space of time & becoming-time of space mark dead time w/in presence of living present > dead time is at work, les blancs take on importance > limit of phenomenology

p. 235-36 (335) via Rousseau, speech excites attention, the visible exacts it (la parole excite lattention, le visible lexige)—is that because the ear, always open, is more passive than sight?

p. 240 (341-42) the violent penetration of speech, passivity, reception obliged, interiorization, “sentendre-parler”—passion: Rousseau suspects speech’s violence, the complicity of voice & heart

pp. 290-91 (410-11) from Kant to Husserl: Kantian revolution of pure passivity re: pure sensibility—still a linear, geometric, transcendental aesthetic; Husserl’s transcendental kinesthetic blurs lines btwn passive/active, puts all objective space in parentheses > but still living present

SPEC p. 384 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] passage btwn transference & speculation > speculative transference orients, destines, calculates most original & most passive “first step” on very threshold of perception: desire for concept of perception belongs to destiny of this calculation

P (P) p. xiv if the question corresponds to a demand from the other, elle se laisse déjà précéder par une étrange affirmation > pour veiller sur elle [to guard this affirmation], peut-être faut-il dabord se rendre à la veille de la question

PAUL DE MAN

MPM p. xviii de Man led one to think the very possibility of reading

p. 19 de Man’s affirmation of memory, an alliance or ring more ancient, secret, resistant than familial or strategic alliances it makes possible, but is never reduced to

p. 31 de Manian criticism/deconstruction always analysis of “resistances” and symptoms they produce [i.e. “resistance to theory” in literary studies]

pp. 52-3 “original materialism” in de Man > matter w/out presence, w/out substance

p. 70 [de Man’s materialism: “neglected corners”?]

TR p. 100 de Man’s “history” not temporal but deals w/ “event,” “power,” which is like Derrida’s always finite (therefore selective) archive

——destined to virtuality of “sooner or later,” archive produces the event no less than it records, consigns it [archive figures a place & an instance of power]

pp. 105-06 de Man assumes excuse & forgiveness are the same [?], and that it is easy to say “I forgive you,” he only analyses the one excusing him/herself (not the victim who forgives)

p. 113 [did de Man introduce Derrida to Speech Act Theory?]

p. 117 violence of de Man cutting out “déjà vieux” from Rousseau’s text

PJP p. 171 university professors poisoned by the impotence of resentment [re: de Man Affair]

p. 187 no relation btwn “Chalier affair” [from Le Parjure] and “de Man affair”—but all relations are possible btwn them

PERCEPTION

VP p. 51n for Husserl, perception and symbolic representation, the phenomenological difference, is unbridgeable

——for Husserl, sensible, corporeal thing is a “sign for itself”; isn’t that the same as not being a sign? present to itself w/out indicative detour?

p. 55 for Husserl, primary memory and primary anticipation are non-presences, non-perceptions, required for presence of perceived present [retentional memory is perception?]

p. 89 there has never been perception

FSW p. 221 when origin of memory and perceptual system are metaphorically united: “perceptual apparatus” must be writing machine

p. 225 most interesting analogy of Mystic Pad is time, a discontinuous time, time as spacing, withdrawal of perception, periodic non-excitability > interruption/restoration of contact

p. 226 if there were only perception, pure permeability of breaching, there would be no breaches (frayages), no legible writing, but pure perception does not exist: nous ne sommes écrits quen écrivants, par linstance en nous qui toujours déjà surveille la perception, quelle soit interne ou externe

we must be several in order to write, even to “perceive”

F p. xxxix cryptonomy is not purely verbal, but perception, like all mute pictures, falls under laws of cipher

DS p. 207 Mallarmé is more patient, subtle, discreet, efficient, does not suppress the double (make it dialectical, bringing us back to presence, to perception of the thing itself)

p. 210 “center of presence” supposed to offer itself to perception/intuition (no perception when perpetual allusion/representation)

P p. 49 via disinterest, nothing less aesthetic (sensory) than Kant’s aesthetic object

OS p. 50n Heidegger: Kant’s transcendental aesthetic can’t perceive something actually present (Anwesenden), to perceive something Gegenwärtigen, one couldn’t intuit a single now (Jetzt), since each now has essentially continuous extension in just passing and just coming (in sein Soeben und Sogleich)

p. 65 trace is its own erasure, belongs to trace to erase itself, eludes what would maintain it in presence, neither perceptible nor imperceptible

CHM pp. 308-09n no error in perception for Descartes, only in will of judgment [like Aristotle]

Gii p. 50 Heidegger avoids reference to mirror of hands found in Kant [since Dasein only has a single hand], play of right & left > this difference can only be sensible

AFR p. 95 for Condillac, time secures moment when object goes missing from perception, moment perception is absent from itself > moment space of signs opens, w/ function of imagination [time as that which absents perception?]

p. 107 Condillac: no philosopher has ever said sensations are innate

——for Condillac, error & obscurity only in judgment not perception

p. 132 for Condillac, repetition and absence of perceptual present to itself: gap or deviation of time > opens representative vection [desire] w/in sign & idea: suppléance as representation

SPEC p. 346-47 neither permanent traces nor resistance in [Freud’s] Perception-Consciousness (free circulation of energy w/out obstacle or binding), permanent trace supposes frayage (Bahnung) and an overcome resistance

pp. 380-83 [Freud divided] Freud translating translation into scientific theory: 1) “trans-” inhabit origin on (dès) its very threshold 2) perception as prior to its translation

p. 384 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] passage btwn transference & speculation > speculative transference orients, destines, calculates most original & most passive “first step” on very threshold of perception: desire for concept of perception belongs to destiny of this calculation

PERHAPS

GOD p. 131 future of a perhaps in literature, a secret that perhaps might not be one

GT p. 35 perhaps, mode of gift, (atopic, utopic) madness of desire to give the impossible, this madness would also be a forgetting, to forget the gift [secret of death]

p. 95 this is perhaps counterfeit money: this perhaps is the intentional dimension[?], the credit, the act of faith that structures all money

FL p. 257 perhaps justice: the experience of absolute alterity, unpresentable, the chance of the event and the condition of history

AF p. 49 discussing Yerushalmi, Derrida emphasizes essential modality “perhaps” for another reason than Nietzsche’s [courage of future philosopher to say perhaps] [elsewhere Derrida certainly emphasizes Nietzsche’s perhaps]

SPOM p. 42 deconstruction links an affirmation to the experience of the impossible, radical experience of perhaps

POOF p. 28 the all too of Human All Too Human, a rolling wave, a trembling, enveloped violence of a welling up wave falling back on itself, “when the excess of the beyond itself folds back into immanence,” turning around, coming to perhaps [cf. S pp. 93-4 Die Sprache verspricht sich]

pp. 28-9 dangerous perhaps that promises in the present what will come

p. 29 dangerous perhaps > open heart [not programmed]

——perhaps as arrivant, arrivant of perhaps: at last the thought of perhaps (will come) > prevails over impossible, possibilization of possible impossible: undecidable and therefore decisive

p. 46n German proverb: “perhaps is practically a lie (eine halbe Luge)”

pp. 29-30 the unstable (inconstant), at the crossroads of chance & necessity, as necessary as the stable (bébaios), and already indispensable to Plato or Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship

——English perhaps linked more directly to chance (hap, perchance), to what may happen

p. 30 perhaps as non-dialectical passage from one to other that Aristotle can’t think, unable to endure contamination coming from what is beyond both antithetical values > Nietzsche: “Glaube an die Gegensatze der Werthe (faith in antithetical values)”

p. 38 perhaps will never be abolished [?] > perhaps makes possible all determining orders that depend on questioning (research, knowledge, science, philosophy, logic, law, politics, language) > perhaps ‘before’ Zusage (acquiescence) that engages, comes ‘before,’ the question

p. 40 at each instant discourse [Nietzsche’s] carried to its limit, on the edge of silence: transports itself beyond itself, hyperbolic, infinite build-up (surenchère)

——perhaps spreads disquiet, never ‘enough to say,’ never ‘enough to silence’ > perhaps arrives to undecide meaning at each decisive moment

p. 42 the risk of the perhaps and its already, we’ve undergone it, we have it in memory: ce déjà [Derrida]du peut-être

pp. 42-3 already of perhaps paradoxical force of teleiopoetic propulsion: makes arrivant come by withdrawing, produces an event > teleiopoesis also defines a structure of political allocution, a politics of friendship, a ‘great politics’

p. 50 ‘perhaps,’ announcement of 1st act, 1st scene: only chance granted to the future, chance of chance

p. 66 instant of perhaps friendship: causes no ripple in calm waters of semantics

***p. 67 to open in an instant to chance, improbable alliance in thought of the perhaps, another way to address oneself to the possible, w/out stability, not ontology, theology, representation or philosophical consciousness > to experience the perhaps friendship, would be a new meaning of experience, one would have to change politics

——aporia that all change must endure (that of perhaps) > w/out suspense marking a perhaps, there would neither be event nor decision; w/out suspending perhaps while keeping its living possibility in living memory, nothing would take place, nothing would be decided

p. 68 no event not followed/preceded by its own perhaps, no event is as unique, singular and irreplaceable as the decision [?] > isn’t the eventness of an event excluded by a decision?

pp. 75-6 Nietzsche’s [?] virtual ‘perhaps,’ hypothesis w/out borders: in the process of exhausting the flesh of our events, uttermost live of our lives > no, not in the process of exhausting us, presence of such a process too reassuring, on verge of success: an absolute virtuality from which no event could escape, all becomes simply possible

p. 80 Nietzsche’s overturning, [via dangerous perhaps], brought off in ‘field’ w/out limit, w/out assured, reassuring, ground—all the more finite for this very fact: a world that no longer holds together, one that resembles chaotic madness, disorder, randomness

p. 100 “truth, freedom, necessity, and equality come together in the politics of fraternity”

——isn’t there no chance for a perhaps here? for an absolute housebreak or hospitality, an arrivance? > Greek fraternity founded on a perhaps that brought about its own forgetting, the forgetting of the perhaps [Heidegger’s forgetting of Being]

pp. 128-29 Derrida links logic of Schmitt’s decisionism to Nietzsche’s teleiopoetic, quasi-messianic perhaps: its actual/effective unveiling need only be possible for it to occur > thus, decisionism is haunted by law of spectrality

p. 150 friendship of the perhaps: perhaps ‘prior’ to the question, prior even to affirmation that opens it up, before question takes form (friend–enemy as figure of brother), an exclamation mark before a question mark

p. 218 one must resist the temptation to keep (garder) its chance, never let it become program, never a grounding on virtue of perhaps

pp. 218-19 we can’t exclude fact that when someone speaks they strive not to be understood, diabolical figure of death drive > so can the accord of hyperbolic lovence be possible, hoping to be understood beyond all dialectics, haunting (failure) must leave an imprint on the body it seems to threaten, merging indissociably, it’s impossible not to aspire to this haunting [a necessity]: instant of decision remains heterogenous, undecidable, crucial experience of perhaps

p. 244 is Heidegger’s Zusage (prior to the question) that agency of phileîn which is not yet the eroticized tension of philosophy?

——Derrida proposes to think a perhaps ‘prior’ to Zusage, arche-originary pledge preceding all questioning, a friendship that could never thrive in gathering (Versammlung), that which accords phília to phúsis to lógos

DS p. 270 there is perhaps a text

SW p. 322 verdict neither torn nor lifted cloth > if veil is neither torn nor lifted is it still not hung btwn holy & holy of holies? > who knows? we must dare the “perhaps”: “the fulgurating nearness of this day depends/tends” toward who or what I know not yet

HLP p. 293n maintain regime of perhaps [re: the possibility of an absolute lie, televisual effect] to avoid effacing, again, history of lie into a history of truth

TR p. 141 Rousseau’s wager, incalculability of absolute perhaps in which contradiction btwn exemplarity & “without example” can survive

LI p. 83 [re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

BSi p. 270 in Celan, “perhaps’s” withdraw poem from dimension/authority of knowledge

pp. 272-73 poetic revolution (beyond sovereignty [?]), revolution in revolution—minuscule dethroning of majesty exceeds knowledge > signed by repetition of “perhaps’s,” “who knows”

pp. 278-79 the pas of “who knows” and “perhaps” suspends order, authority—not in name of obscurantist propaganda

p. 279 “perhaps,” “who knows,” as link, separating hyphen btwn beast & sovereign, inviting us, w/out ordering us, to go over the limit of knowledge

UWC pp. 234-37 [perhaps, “if,” event] not horizon of power, of “I can,” irruption that punctures horizon, interrupts performative organization of “as if,” “as such” > “as” name of true problem/target of deconstruction: authority of “as” founds/justifies every ontology, phenomenology, knowledge, science

——this thinking of impossible possible is not a thinking of necessity but a thinking of the dangerous “perhaps” > force of event always stronger than performative

p. 236 sovereign mastery of interior (proper power) ([indivisible] border of inside/outside) vs. divisible limit (because divisible, it has a history) > the divisible limit is the limit of the impossible, the “perhaps,” the “if”

PERIODIZATION/EPOCHALITY [fixerup]

POO p. 27 taste for secret histories, secret like khōra, outside all periodization, all epochalization

SPOM p. 26 only “our time,” the epoch, doesn’t happen in anachrony [?], especially when “things aren’t going well” > but, w/ other, isn’t this disjuncture the very possibility for the good, the just, to be announced, possibility of the other?

——how to distinguish btwn the disjuncture of the unjust and the disjuncture that opens up the infinite asymmetry of the relation to the other, the place for justice?

pp. 241-42n though each period, “epoch” as its own hauntological media, and one can explain (to a certain point) a text’s [Marx’s, Stirner’s] historical singularity, one must not fail to reinscribe it in a much “larger spectrological sequence” [see p. 233n where “revisionism” is used to accuse anyone who wants to rethink history]

POOF p. 82 [even if Nietzsche announces, calls for, texts by Bataille, Nancy, Blanchot, reading these texts as symptom-effects remains crude] reading not simply limited by reading in the language that the symptom-effect speaks [follow other traces] > otherwise, “reality” and “history” one distinguishes would remain undetermined & imaginary: i.e. the discourse of those ‘realistic’ champions of historical referent & actuality (effectivité)

pp. 142-43 [per usual] Derrida will not accept Schmitt’s periodization of the partisan: “telluric autochthony is already a reactive response to a delocalization and to a form of tele-technology” > what Schmitt said of the partisan could have been said of most classical combatant

***——not simply a problem of periodization: at stake are relations btwn history of the political & the structure of theoretical concepts which one claims to articulate upon it

pp. 185-86 does Montaigne (via túkhē [see 192n re: Cicero], exceptionality of friendship) add rupture of infinite to Greek philía? a reassuring principle would periodize, overdetermine, oppose Christian fraternity to Greek fraternity > Derrida won’t have it: the discrepancies of culture aren’t negligible but they are that of a generative graft, cultural body (so old & new) begins w/ prosthesis > no proper body w/out graft: endless politically consequences of this law—now more than ever, endlessly

p. 188 that Augustine also reveals an infinitization of friendship using Aristotle suggests the untimely in each presumed model of friendship [disfiguring customary periodizations]

p. 221 [re: history-w/out-history of amitié] necessity of ‘zigzag’: history not linear succession, not continuous accumulation of paradigms, but series of ruptures that intersect their own trajectories before turning back along other ones > all new configurations, once they open, must repeat same archaic motif of day before yesterday—how else could they speak their language?

p. 278 history is neither a continuous evolution nor a simple succession of discontinuous figures

***p. 284 if we find in Nietzsche a play of the Gospels against Aristotelian virtue, while Aristotelian heritage is reimplemented: enough to discourage a reassuring historical scansion, must think up different ways of doing history, that which defies tranquility of historian is a strategy of friendship, a war for friendship: lamitié, voilà lenjeu de ces stratagèmes sans fin

p. 289 Nietzsche’s abyssal altercation w/ Christian fraternity, that we’re tasked to relate ancient & new history (fraternity in Christianity, in Arabo-islamic culture too) > no justification in the shortcoming, the obliged shirking, of this task: nevertheless we believe in the seriousness of the obligation

——Derrida has insisted that the indefinite recoils (replis) in Zarathustra’s strategy must contain one fold or another that places history of brother in Bible & Koran beside Zarathustra (not in confrontation)

MPM p. 41n de Man treats all historicism, periodization, narrative of origin as fables, fictions

p. 121 de Man against periodization—form of dramatizing non-historical arguments [see ROP p. 114 only speak in terms of age through citation]

VM pp. 144-45 Heidegger calls original dissimulation of Being beneath the existent, prior to any error in judgment, erring (Irren), every epoch is in an epoch of erring

S p. 8 why not stand firm and interrogate prescription and proscription? [re: phrase axiomatics of Destruktion, which Heidegger would have refused], axiomatics only suspect in epochal schema

p. 12 epochality is the hidden teleology of the narrative order

FWT pp. 11-2 Derrida feels closer to Lacan than Foucault, he’s more daring a “deconstructor” > Foucault’s passage btwn epistemes neglects long sequences (hardens into oppositions)

POS p. 24 “I do not believe” in decisive ruptures, unequivocal “epistemological break[s]”, breaks are always reinscribed in old cloth that must be undone interminably

ROP p. 77 where else but on border do questions of topology get asked, and why else than that the border is not indivisible? risky for historian to assign taking place of event to a borderline

pp. 87-9 “perpetual threat” (Foucault’s term) as shadow of haunting, threatens logic of historical ages, neither present nor absent, positive nor negative, inside nor outside; “announcing” [in its futural spectrality] poses similar problems for the historian as haunting

pp. 109-10 identity (of epoch) fissures, is divided (partagée) the moment a couple [Freud/Nietzsche] is split, even more so when the decoupling occurs in self-identity of some individual (i.e. Freud), historians have trouble with self-difference, cette différence à soi

p. 113 Foucault pulls back from (admits impasses of) epistēmē > mais seul ceux qui travaillent, seuls ceux qui prennent des risques en travaillant rencontrent des difficultés > responsibility dans lépreuve de laporie

FS p. 3-4 Derrida links structuralist obsession w/ an anxiety (inquiétude) about (sur) language, an anxiety of (du) language and in (dans) language itself

——yet, to dream of reducing this link to a sign of the times is to dream of violence: the sign is more or less, something other than a sign of an epoch

DIF DIF p. 22 differance (is) older than ontological difference: outside epochality of Being (outside epoch): no depth to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put to play

CHM p. 40 Derrida’s problem w/ writing history of decision: risk construing division as event subsequent to unity of original presence > confirms metaphysics in its fundamental operation

p. 42 if dissension re: madness dates from Socrates, Foucault’s historical description poses banal/inevitable problems of periodization & of geographical, political, ethnological limitation

DST DST p. 198 “singularity” not novelty, which is too bound up w/ periodization, or, in the best cases, w/ Heideggerian epochal structures

——Derrida’s reservation re: history of Being & its epochs, also re: “configuration”: presupposes too much consistency, too much identifiable collectedness in the figure

p. 220 Lacoue-Labarthe (w/ rigor & prudence) follows folds of what can no longer be called scene, period, history, sequence—a deportation whose measurelessness (démesure) seems to defy hope of judgment/justice > and yet, there’s an il faut, there’s philosophy & its law

WAP p. 122-23 Derrida applies Heidegger’s thought of epochality to the philosophical “age”: from Descartes to Hegel truth is certitude, reassuring foundation of subjectivity > but, Derrida also wonders how this will shed light on regional determinants (political, ideological), and whether this systematic perspective puts to the test or a takes distance from the situation

AFR pp. 62-3 Condillac resists opposition btwn continuist/discontinuist, evolutionist/epigeneticist histories (deconstructs them almost by itself) > double gesture: generates a new science & theory of general conditions for upsurge of a theory [new science]

pp. 65-6 Condillac: genius can only prosper when language is not defective, when it’s easy/convenient, when a language has fixed principles—this is an epocha of great men

TN pp. 96-8 periodization: no cutting, indivisible limit, no simple instant or agency btwn a before and an after (impossible to prove): to find the premises of aftereffects it suffices to sharpen (daiguiser) one’s reading [there’s a past from before the markable beginning]

pp. 216-17 [beyond Foucault] mouvance (trend) of thinking, not path or line (neo-Heideggerian[?]), structurally open unlike epistēmē, “paradigm,” which hypothesize historical space w/in strictly determinable contour > I read texts profitably and make unfair selections

p. 269 lexicon of touch risks being ruined by abusive spending (dépense absuive) > an eschatological, postwar inflation (desperate call for new “era,” “provenance”) > apocalyptic symptomatology of “deconstruction of Christianity”: all we speak is “touching”

WOG p. 22 w/in apparent unity of epoch, abyssal dissynchronies promise completely other filiations

p. 23 Derrida never considered Heidegger’s ‘epoch’ legitimate

BSi p. 51 political philosophers [i.e. Hobbes] show periodized political agenda > while adapting to broader historical sequences

p. 332 we are all grateful for Foucault and Agamben’s confusions/contradictions [re: biopolitics and periodization], they compel us to reconsider a way of thinking and doing history

pp. 333-34 call into question periodization not to reduce eventness or singularity, singularity makes it all the more irreducible and confusing

——give up linear history of epistēmēs (which Foucault and Agamben adhere to in spite of themselves), give up alternative of simultaneously synchronic and linear diachronic

——motifs of the passage of what passes and comes to pass (passe et se passe) in history has no solid foundation, no indivisible line > requires a rethinking figure of threshold, requires greater vigilance to our irrepressible desire for single, solid threshold

——perhaps there never is any such threshold, perhaps that’s why we remain on it, why we risk staying on it forever

OG pp. lxxxix-lxxxx (8) epoch [of Rousseau] preserves a legibility which disturbs time of line, line of time

pp. 13-4 (25) that a signified must be able to “take place” in its pure intelligibility (absolute logos): the theology of the sign (perhaps this epoch, whose closure we’ve outlined, will never end)

p. 14 “epoch,” “closure of epoch,” “historical genealogy,” must be understood differently and be removed of all relativism

pp. 101-02 (149-50) [riffing on racine, radical] question of genealogy exceeds discourse (living, conscious representation of text), exceeds possibilities at present given for its elaboration, takes on meaning only in finite configuration (history of metaphysics); text has radical root system [rhizome], always has several epochs in it, to which reading must resign itself

——to say text is nothing but system of roots contradicts concept of system, pattern of root

p. 286 (405) phonic auto-affection permits the epoch of man, epoch not of history but as history: greatest possible mastery, liberty, self-presence of life

——[in spite of Hegel’s follies, Derrida here affirms that concept of history is a concept of philosophy, that history is the history of philosophy]

pp. 286-87 (406) the epoch of truth, what Nietzsche calls abbreviation of signs [retreat of signifier?] [Derrida defends Nietzsche against reading that restores truth, fundamental ontology, in Nietzsche’s thought] [Heidegger’s reading?]

EU p. 43 we will not conduct ourselves toward ligne surplombante to dominate totality of an epoch or historical territory [re: using Kant to think university]

——find exemplary indications w/out isolating external considerations

pp. 109-10 question of droit du droit not juridical, event of foundation never comprehended w/in logic it founds > foundation of a university not a university event (only the anniversary of the foundation would be), foundation of reason isn’t legal, isn’t rational: only w/in epoch of law can one distinguish btwn legal/illegal conflicts

pp. 117-18 [Derrida’s move] from phenomenology to a language that couldn’t be submitted to the epochē (to the epoch) [list of interests: wills, testaments, archives, etc.]

PERJURY

POOF pp. 184-85 via Montaigne, law of secrecy placed above law of city, apolitical drive of friendship divides virtue or reason > double bind: 1) sovereign fraternity of secrecy btwn 2 w/out perjury 2) political secrecy of brotherhood begins w/ the 3rd, opens to perjury

p. 219 w/out possibility (which must be neither living nor dead) of perjury, radical evil, absolute crime—no responsibility, freedom, decision > “I love you” (promise, prayer) can’t hope to prove anything at all, must remain unilateral/dissymmetrical, no mutuality/agreement can reduce the disproportion, the very condition of sharing (partage)

p. 273 from w/in fraternization, greatest crime is betrayal of humanity (fall short of virtue of fraternity), the supreme perjury: fratricide as radical evil, only the brother can be betrayed

SW pp. 349-50 [to read the corpus that has known, from operation of other, how to undo itself from veiling/unveiling] you have to write, sign in turn, countersign in writing, something else, in another language, w/out betraying injection/call of first seal

——can’t prove it happened, only swear that it did: perjury must remain possible (a duty that must be respected)

PF p. xxvi alibi tells the story of a lying, every lie is first of all a perjury

——perjurer can always give alibi: I was elsewhere, I wasn’t thinking (his finitude as alibi)

TR pp. 110-11 touching on equivocation btwn constative (revealed truth) & performative (the excuse): originary or preoriginary synthesis w/out which there’d be no trace, inscription, body, materiality > it’s why we’re always asking for forgiveness in ambiguous, perjuring mode

——one can always bear false witness in equivocation of const./perform., no one will be able to theoretically prove someone has lied > lie remains improbable [in mode of confession], even where, in another mode, one is certain of it

——beg to be believed where perjury always possible, precisely unverifiable

p. 115 [re: Poe, Lacan] purloined letter not a free/undetermined signifier, at the very least signifies perjury, betrayal of a sworn faith

pp. 125-26 violence of “I”: irreducibly singular, yet nothing more universal, anonymous

——w/ reference to unjust justice [phrase Derrida admits having stolen from de Man], where the law suspends reference right as it requires it, where chacun, “each one,” is appropriated (always theft/deceit) in utterance “I” > all justice begins in perjury

p. 126 since every “I” is an “I”——tout autre est tout autre as the same: (the) I can betray w/out least appearance becoming manifest > substitution “I” for “I”: root of perjury

PJP p. 163 le parjure forgot to remember the duty of memory (infinite at every instant), memory must be an ethical obligation [I did not think that I had to not forget]

——can one commit perjury “w/out thinking about it”?

——one cannot expect a finite subject to think/remember, at every instant, all ethical obligations he should answer > inhuman, indecent [Mount Moriah of GOD]

p. 164 the perjurer’s excuse: I was other (different commitments)

——can “we” disavow, perjure, forget?

p. 166 every lie is a perjury, every perjury implies a lie, betrays a promise or implicit oath (“I owe you the truth”)

——more than 1 voice in 1 voice, dispersion, threatens concept of perjury, threatens identity, threatens concept “I”; Schlegel’s “permanent parabasis of irony”

pp. 166-67 Derrida considers anacoluthon the most productive figure, a general formalization of Miller’s “polylogology”: multiplicity of voices, more than 1 voice in 1 voice, trace of perjury gets lost, leads us astray > this dispersion threatens concept, identity, identity of “I”

p. 168 “invention” hesitates undecidably btwn creative and revelatory invention > perhaps btwn fiction/truth, lying/veracity, perjury/fidelity

p. 170 genus <> species : lie <> perjury

p. 172 faux témoignage, contrefaçon; perhaps I have already lied by promising veracity (veracity not truth) > Western social contract capitalizes this perhaps in the act of perjury

——lie concerned w/ veracity not truth; already perjured by promising to tell the truth

p. 173 davoir perjuré en jurant: 2 moments of perjury envelop each other; was the promise not to lie, the swearing, truthful?

——the 2 moments are rigorously distinct & strangely indiscernible: difference of times inscribed under law, contract, this law is the Law itself (annuls the difference, sublates into fidelity of oath)

——structural signification of oath, Law itself, origin of Law: commit to not be affected by time

——but the perjurer can always plead the discontinuity of time

——ultimate resource/fatality of the anacoluthon: multiplicity of times, instants, interruption time inscribes in “me” > the perjurer can always ask to be excused

p. 174 oath, sworn faith, and the Law force psycho-phenomenology of self to lie [not 2 sequential moments, but perjured in advance]; which is madder: psyche, logos, ego—or the oath?

pp. 177-79 the 3 meanings of Le Parjure, each haunts each other, raises the # of titles (3+n): 1) the novel itself [“Counterfeit Money”], narrator betrays truth confided in him 2) betrayal, unfulfilled promise of hero of novel 3) the legal perjury, le parjure committed by le parjure

p. 183 anacoluthon gives rise to fictions or perhaps undecidable lie, perjury, that never can be excluded on part of narrator, author

p. 189 anacoluthic substitution of subject, replacement of acolyte—motor, motivation, dramatic emotion of narrative

p. 194 rapport (analogies of this rapport)—obscure alchemy that precipitates an “us”—in the shelter of/from (à labri de) some sober & inevitable perjury: we guard ourselves form perjury we inhabit

p. 198 ultimate signature (last pages of book) says something of debt that remains unpaid > no scene of perjury w/out forgiveness

——forgive me, we say to us

p. 199 Bill Clinton’s perjury first private (infidelity), then public (“what ‘is’ is”)

p. 201 marriage, machine of death, madness of alliance in Christian marriage: at center of question of perjury & forgiveness > ***Christianity marries everything

***HST p. 388 the 3rd intrudes when 2 absolutes exchange place; the 3rd, question of justice, immediately betrays other’s finite-infinite singularity > thus: congenital perjury of justice

TN p. 47 in the beginning there’s abstinence: et le toucher parjure sans retard, unforgivably

p. 67 untouchable before vow of abstinence [cf. OG p. 109 spacing prior to prohibition of names]? a vow of abstinence requires promise of touch > touch haunting abstinence itself, intensifying transgression: unforgivable perjury at heart of interdict

——touching remains limitrophe > an inhibition constitutes its appetite: it eats w/out eating what it comes to cultivate, elevate, educate, dresser (train), trephein

p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 283 for there to be a good heart: possibility of bad heart must remain forever open, i.e. tout autre > good heart must be ready for the other, for treachery, for perjury (inevitable-impossible vow of abstinence, tactile’s fate); is this how we can translate Kant’s “evil heart”?

p. 295 Nancy’s “transgression” close to Derrida’s “originary perjury as inevitable as it is unforgivable”

AD pp. 33-4, 137-38n violence of pure face to face (hospitable welcome, narcissistic closing [renfermement]): in double bind w/ the 3rd (protects against vertigo of ethical violence while violating its purity)

——pure face to face as oath (serment) before the letter, debt before every contract or loan (emprunt), must perjure itself in bind w/ 3rd: in operation of justice can no longer distinguish btwn fidelity of oath & perjury of false witness

——justice as law begins w/ perjury > violates; sigh of just man: “Quai-je à faire avec la justice?”

p. 34 state, politics, ontology all betray/exceed ethics in opening it [?]: quasi-transcendental, originary, pre-originary perjury > possibility of radical perversion, haunting of its possibility, also condition of Good, Justice, Love, Faith, perfectibility

BSi p. 88 know-how of fox, cunning, know-how to trick, perjure, dissimulate, not make known

p. 89 for Machiavelli, fox is closest to truth of man and man’s fidelity: knows who to lie, commit perjury, has sense/culture of snare [for Machiavelli, lion is too bête]

p. 90 le savoir-faire sans faire-savoir (know-how w/out making known)

p. 166 if I swear that I know what I mean when I injure someone [w/ bêtise], I perjure myself > bêtise always perspectival

CIR pp. 30-34 beyond G.’s program, G.’s generative grammar: surprise salvation of a backfire, something in the past withdrawn (if not content at least in the sap of the idiom) from effusion of the signature > obliging G., the other, “forgetting me on pretext of understanding me”

——nonsuturable, nonsaturable singularity of event: a perjury in G.’s machine

p. 101 I perjure like I breathe, whose multitude runs in the tears

PERVERSION [fixerup]

GOD p. 150 story of flood, of Noah, hesitate forever btwn justice & perversion: God won’t forgive himself for the fault in man, for man’s desire, regrets his creation

GT p. 148 perversity can always secretly corrupt the “donner raison à lautre”: ratio, logos, is on your side [re: “Counterfeit Money”], what counts, can be counted, you took maximum pleasure

——link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

R p. 34 perverse autoimmunity of democracy due to double couple: “freedom and equality” and “equality acc. #, equality acc. worth” > in the name of one couple, both couples destroyed

H p. 25 irreducible pervertibility in law of hospitality: the law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right, w/ law or justice as rights [see p. 65 state perverts]

p. 79 pervertibility (corruptibility) of hospitality—that it must actualize in laws

p.135 absolute and conditioned hospitality must pervert each other (capacity for perversion irreducible) [see p. 147]

FL p. 257 madness of justice: the incalcuable and giving idea of justice is close to the bad, the worst, can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation > assurance against the worst will only suture the opening

MPM pp. 93-4 de Man’s texts on promise pervert tranquil assurance of what we call “performative” > too much of promise is irremediable disturbance/perversion, is also a trap, also renders promise possible (indestructible), and comical

PP pp. 144-45 (166-67) democracy is like writing, Plato’s trial against democracy similar to that against pharmakon: excess, anarchy, orgy, flea market, fair, bazaar (pantopōlion); errant democratic man has no substance, not perverse in regular way, like signifier freed (affranchi) from logos

pp. 149-50 pharmakon: perversion, makeup, masks

PAS PAS p. (77) [Blanchot displaces logic of disavowal & denial] pas-de-dénégation doesn’t mean apotropaic can ever be suspended, it is a “double chute,il garde la chute contre elle-même > perverts up to the limit perversion and its other

——those who think denial is a simple gesture are more sheltered (plus abrités) than others

p. (81) Blanchot’s tutoieing (viens) breaks w/ indiscreet familiarity, not negative theology, but describes its law, its jurisdiction, its perversion > can say toi w/out tutoieing [& reverse]

——for Blanchot, theological discourse is the most perverse

FWT p. 27 Derrida uses word “perversion” to describe racism, anti-Semitism, domestic violence, political corruption [not the most deconstructive usage of word]

pp. 82-3 communism was perverted, Nazism was plan itself as perversion, accomplished

p. 108 Derrida’s wares are more perverse, contraband, than his father’s (sees his father as exemplary figure of the victim, of “sacrifice,” voûté); perhaps Derrida is avenging his father by introducing disorder into “commerce,” whose trial he would be organizing

DS p. 216 play of hymen: vicious & sacred; nothing more perverse than rending penetration that leaves virgin womb in tact

P p. 64 Kant’s divides parergon in 2: 1) the proper, formal beauty 2) pathology, gilded frame (goldene Rahmen) (perversion, degradation, sensory)

ATIA p. 7 if you suspect me of perversion [re: “it really was a little black pussycat”], it’s always a possibility

SW p. 349 know of no more perverse & unjust misprision: [that it will only be in a French to come that this corpus here can be read]

DPi p. 15 Rousseau “presumes” nobody premeditates himself getting hanged, oh really? really? > if no one dreamed of getting hanged: no murders or DP [p. 16 death drive and DP]

p. 31 Genet reveals/betrays a Christian perversity: sacred, religious element in DP

p. 58 theater of cruelty, scopic drive, fascinatio, enchantment that chains spectator to spectacle (fascio, to tense, tie, attach, fasciola is a bandage wrapping [bandelette]) > what links voyeur-spectator to fascinum, charm, enchantment, virile sex

——to executioner: “so, you got a hard-on! (tu bandes!)” (link to erection at moment of decapitation)

p. 59 all fascination: virtual involvement w/ perversity/perversion

p. 60 logic of fascination best argument against punishment as exemplarity: bad example risks becoming fascinating martyr, hero, the good example [Genet] (perversion of the imitation of Christ)

p. 94n DP seduces, vanity beyond death, those fascinated by it can take maximum pleasure from (jouir de) it

RGE p. 262 via Bataille, we must find a speech which maintains silence, necessity of the impossible: to say in language (of servility) that which isn’t servile > silence (among all words) “most perverse, most poetic”

PIO p. 19 tain prohibits transparency & authorizes invention of mirror, is a trace of language

——tain (btwn 2 lines) is language itself [“word”] (associates/dissociates forever: Eros/Psyche) [tain like hymen?]: an unbearable violence, a perversion that obeys law of language

PSSS pp. 257-58 death drive, origin of all cruelty—from sadism to primary masochism > this death drive sends reality/pleasure principles into crisis

TN p. 2 bénédiction au bord du pire, comme toujours > only beneficence if perversion is possible

p. 275 philosophers, meddlers who can’t keep their hands off anything, insatiable polymorphous perversity, imperious encyclopedism

AD p. 34 state, politics, ontology all betray/exceed ethics in opening it [?]: quasi-transcendental, originary, pre-originary perjury > possibility of radical perversion, haunting of its possibility, also condition of Good, Justice, Love, Faith, perfectibility

p. 35 spectral “possibility” of pervertibility [of Levinas’ face-to-face] not liminal pervertibility but impossibility of determining [programming] a limit btwn perversion/pervertibility

p. 43 Klossowski’s host [re: novel Roberte ce Soir] becomes guest of his guest because the woman is there—in this instance, possibility of pevertibility linked to sexual difference

CF pp. 22-3 improve law of hospitality, do so btwn unconditional and conditional: pure unconditional law in danger of piety, irresponsibility, no potency, no form > the unconditional can be perverted at any moment

OG p. 17 (30) acc. Rousseau, perverse, artful writing exiled in exteriority of body

p. 35 (52) one must exorcise (that is, conjurer) writing (mask, perversion, disguise, debauchery) w/ the good word (bonne parole)

pp. 36-8 (56-7) writing as “trap,” pathology (blind), idolatry; for Saussure, Leibniz’s fixed language would be like a hen hatching a duck’s egg > “la perversion de lartifice engendre des monstres

p. 153 (221) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] masturbation, contingent evil, model of perversion: summon absent beauties, one corrupts oneself by oneself (on s’altère soi-même) [see SUPPLEMENT (ROUSSEAU’S DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENT]

p. 175 (250) for Rousseau, amorous passion perversion of natural pity—limits our attachment to a single person

p. 185 (263) for Rousseau, virtuality (innateness) of pity—imagination (which activates reserve of pity) perverts itself, is subject of perversion > imagination awakens pity & transgresses it

pp. 296-97 (418-20) for Rousseau, perversity of sacralizing the representer/signifier

——sovereignty as presence/jouissance of present > liberty when signifier suspended & power rendered to the represented/signified; sovereignty not the same as drawing up laws

SPEC pp. 367-68 turning sadistic drive into death drive, sadism reappropriated into our service, turned toward us (implied: against Jung) > masochism as primary—operates otherwise than supplementary/derivative turn [from sadism?]

p. 368 masochism as primary—otherwise than supplementary/derivative turn [from sadism?]

p. 404 Laplanche & Pontalis compare Bemächtigung (power, possession, domination) to Bewältigung (violent exercise of power) > the “posts” are always posts of power (i.e. dynamics of sadism are dynamics of power)

——Freud asks how sadism can be deduced from Eros if it tends to destroy the object

pp. 404-05 auto-heterology of drive for postal power, more originary than, independent of, PP > the only one to permit definition of death drive, an original sadism

——beyond the pleasure principle—power: that is, les postes [erection, position & delay]

PHALLOGOCENTRISM

GT p. 81 language as a phenomenon of gift-countergift, of giving-taking, of exchange, all difficulties of nomination/writing are difficulties of self-naming, self writing (se nommer, sécrire)

——donner reviendrait à prendre et prendre à donner; this would fold itself over on language/writing beyond logocentric closure

MONL p. 70 phallogocentrism, Western metaphysics > not a single homogenous thing

R p. 17 democratic sovereignty replaces theogonic politics with something just as phallocentric, phallo-paterno-filio-fraterno-ipsocentric (ipsocratic, though tautological, because ipseity already implies force)

T p. xxv how to put one’s hands on tympanum so it can escape from hands of philosopher, so he can no longer recognize his phallogocentrism [play w/ mains, maintenant, maintain], no longer rediscover himself, no longer able to say: I will have anticipated it w/ absolute knowledge

FWT pp. 67-9 [summary of “carno-phallogocentrism”]

POOF pp. 155-59 from afar, from on high, the political is an inhabited desert w/ not a woman in sight, are sisters just species of genus brother [‘Dear Brother Jacqueline’]? is she the absolute partisan, absolute enemy of the theory of the absolute enemy? > Schmitt’s phallogocentric neutralization of sexual difference, a sealing away (sous scellés), a house arrest, vigilance of the frightened watchman (de guetteur apeuré): the political is genderless

——if there’s a single thesis [in POOF], it’s that there’s no choice [no choice of double gesture]: 1) the political is phallogocentrism, virtue is virile, thus woman’s slow/painful access to citizenship: we must go beyond the political 2) keep the ‘old name’ & engage other struggles, ‘partisan’ ones

——de-naturalization of fraternal authority (its de-construction), preference given to democratic fraternization > this is all possible, along w/ demand of a democracy to-come, because fraternity was never natural, never a fact [God is dead because God was always dead?]

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

p. 263 jusquici [up until now], for several 1000 years, le temps d'un clin d'œil [the twinkling of an eye], tremors have been registered, archived, by the archons of the same family [phallogocentric fraternization]

p. 278 the 2 major questions of deconstruction: 1) history of concepts & so-called ‘textual’ hegemony 2) phallogocentrism (here qua phratrocentrism)

ROP p. 66 being-for-death linked to phallocentered signifier in Lacan

p. 69 what happens when you apply chiasmatic invagination of borders to analysis? to its phallogocentrism (mastery)? > can psychoanalysis belong to anyone, anymore?

SP pp. 59-61 [re: truth-castration as man’s affair, and woman’s suspension of it] [English translation seems horrible] Derrida is asking that we take off the head (décapitonner) of Lacan’s discourse, w/ its truth speaking, castration & phallocentrism > by deploying metaphorics of veil

ATIA p. 104 Derrida spoke of carnophallogocentrism to name sacrificial scene

O pp. 48-9n la logique (est) de ce qui revient au père (mortplus que jamais) comme à la loi et au logos: la relève elle même > elle est vraie et elle constitue la vérité du logocentrisme > signifier sublated in process of meaning > [Derrida links Freud’s “only one” libido (masculine) to the rightness of reason]

——Derrida not disputing la raison elle-même, the one (masculine) libido—“why not?” > to stand on head [call for feminine libido?] would put back/leave in place truth of phallocentric dialectic

p. 49n same denial at work in Greater Logic when preface is placed in parentheses as when psychoanalytic phallocentrism places anatomy in parentheses?

SW p. 336 for Freud (the Freud of Penismangel and pseudo-discovery of weaving), mother = matter = materia = Madeira = Holz = hylē

pp. 350-51 theory (beyond theory) of fetishism at moment of verdict, w/ whole history engaged in it (Freud, Exodus, St. Paul, the en abyme of un ver à soie), thought of the event w/out revealed/unveiled truth, w/out phallogocentrism, w/out greco-judeo-paulino-islamo-freud-heidggeriano-lacanian [no christiano!] veil, w/out (un)veiling of phallus

***DPi p. 23 but will history/horizon resist deconstruction of scaffolding of these scaffolds? scaffolding as construction/architecture to be deconstructed, the speculation, calculation, market (speculative idealism) that provides its supports; deconstruction of carno-phallogocentrism always deconstruction of DP’s historical scaffolding > history as scaffolding of this scaffold

WAP p. 72 deconstruction had to recognize internal destructuration of phallogocentric onto-theology, otherwise would have reproduced classical logic

p. 73 onto-theological, phallogocentric principles of metaphysics guided by question “what is?” subordinates all fields to onto-encyclopedic instant: leads to unity of philosophical university

PSSS p. 267 Freud: “paternal nucleus” hidden behind every divine figure

TN pp. 92-3 the invincible stratagems of Levinas’ caress: a paternal, virile, fraternal, phallocentric filiation > an avowedly shameful confession (movements as irreproachable as they are guilty)

EW p. 280 link the question of “who” to the question of “sacrifice,” phallogocentrism as a schema of carnivorous virility

——carno-phallogocentrism: a heterotautology as a priori synthesis, i.e. “speculative idealism,” “becoming-subject of substance,” “absolute knowledge,” “speculative Good Friday” > idealizing interiorization of phallus and its necessity of its passage through the mouth

EU p. 124 phallocentrism & logocentrism (essentially indissociable) wherever I could spot them > everywhere, even where unnoticed

FV p. 474n classical [mis]treatment of animal [eg. in Lacan] condenses system’s greatest obscurity: obscurantist resistance in history of (humanist/phallogocentric) metaphysics

p. 477 point de capiton safeguards indivisible, living, non-fragmentary integrity of phallus

p. 478n Lacan integrates Freudian phallocentrism w/ phonocentric Saussurian semio-linguistics

pp. 478-79 voice guards against the phallus becoming divisible, being reduced to part object, voice as ideal guardianship of partial/divisible object: mors disséminable (ce qui tombe)

p. 479 systemic & historical link btwn idealization, relève (Aufhebung), and the voice > Lacan’s elevation of signifier

p. 480 Lacan: “the phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance”

——Lacan reversed Hegel: not ideal signified but ideal signifier

pp. 480-82 all phallogocentrism articulated based on (individual, perceptual, cultural, historical) situation where phallus is mother’s desire (to the extent she doesn’t have it) > though phallus isn’t the organ, it mostly symbolizes the penis > thus, phallogocentrism as androcentrism & woman as absolute Other

***p. 481n [re: psychoanalysis] institution built on male child’s experience > at stage of genital organization, there’s only maleness (antithesis isn’t femaleness but being castrated): phallogocentrism is no accident/error, its old, enormous root must be accounted for [described] > but, its description is a “participant” when it induces a practice, ethics, institution, a politics that insures truth of a tradition

pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

p. 483tn one reason, male libido, altus, at the bottom of things—highest truth

WBH pp. 190-91 insidiously reproduce the old model (fundamentally phallogocentric) in modern University > would women’s studies become another cell in university beehive [?]

CHOR p. 96 “phallogocentrism,” complicity of Western metaphysics w/ notion of male firstness > mistakes/anchorings of Western rationality assuage hermeneutic anxiety

p. 103 phallogocentrism, “patrix,” is insurance against return of that which is feared as most agonizing risk

PHALLUs

FK p. 83 machine-like & faith as one and the same possibility, machine-like & sacrosancity (heilig, holy, safe, unscathed, free, “swollen”) of the phallic effect: phallus as phainesthai, phenomenon (day of phallus) & also phantasm, fetish, specter, its double: colossal automaticity [phallic in bold 2x]

pp. 83-4 phallus, the marionette, virtuality of virtuality, distinct from penis: parade fetish, the healthy, the automatic sur-viving, faith in most living as dead

——matrix of unlimited, general fetishization of Thing itself > read the unscathed as spontaneity of erection or pregnancy [phallus must swell in vitality]

p. 84n [via Benveniste, via etymology, Derrida links power, vitality to swelling, to womb]

***p. 86 machine, mechanics, reproduces the dead in the living; the marionette, the dead machine, automation acc. phallic effect

p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

OH pp. 24-5 Europe: representation or figure of a universal idea; has confused its face, figure, w/ a point, a phallus; the idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, eidos, archē, telos, the idea of beginning, commanding, cap, captain, towards an accomplished end

pp. 52-3 word “avant-garde” [see pp. 25, 48-50]: capitalizes on figurehead, phallic point, advanced initiative of guarding, anticipating to conserve, thus “avant-garde position”

WM p. 222n Freud on phallic nature of the dress tie, mocks the custom

DS p. 178 what ruins the “pious capital letter,” the aplomb of the heading: the blanks, ordered return of white spaces, measure & order of dissemination, law of spacing, rhythmos, invisible fleuron, tailpiece

p. 237 Mallarmé’s i: a slash that never cuts its wing, penna (feather pen), needles and scratches; hymen fastens down, crinkles and folds this i [m/f]

p. 238 idée: i’s & dé (dice) [phallus-mark & chance]

p. 276n infinite unfolding of aviary, of fan > ailes, elle, l, illi (lit)

p. 284n [Derrida comes back to i] reads little point as a decapitation right next to castrated pike > capital I (disseminates unity of meaning), ego, ice, échoplus-je > (I + Dé)irisation

P p. 126 if we’re in a hurry, we’ll conclude the colossal is the phallus, which doubles the corpse; Derrida jokes: don’t hurry when it’s a matter of erection, let the thing happen

POS p. 105n paraphrasing Freud, speaking of present/absent penis (the same thing), we must recognize truth as “normal prototype of the fetish”

p. 86 dissemination puts at stake (play) castration’s position as transcendental signifier/signified (phallus, transcendental signifier, as correlate to primary signified, mother’s desire)

ROP p. 64 in EN, in interminable conversation w/ Lacan, Derrida thinks contingency, singularity, event, tukhē, which is also a thinking of death, whose signifier would be the phallus

SP p. 129 umbrella’s symbolic figure: hermaphroditic spur of a phallus (modestly folded dans ses voiles) > aggressive/apotropaic à la fois threatening/threatened

ATIA p. 61 is all “hiding of oneself” modesty? is there modesty not directed toward genitalia? the metonymy has been arrested/concentrated on phallic region

O pp. 40-1n [Derrida links stone to the phallus and then to Freud’s Das Medusenhaupt, what if the phallus has no center?]

p. 52 [in field of dissemination] formalism no longer fails (néchoue) before empirical richness [like in Hegel?] but before une queue, dont le se-mordre [self-bite] nest ni spéculaire ni symbolique

SW pp. 335-36 if tekhnē never broke radically w/ physis—why reserve this animal naturality to woman? > woman weaves like a body secreting its own textile, like a worm, a worm w/out worm, a worm concerned to hide her non-being

——what if the fantasy (the arm) and truth (the unveiled) are on same side, same rib (du côté de la même côte) (man woman) [deconstruction of sexual difference] > extricate before opposing absence to presence [Freud’s penis envy]: of the Thing (Phallus, Penis, Cause) behind Veil

pp. 350-51 culpable edging of phallus, edges of the cut, support the veil, hold it like a roof, canvas—this theoretical toilet of the phallus is the concept > phallus is the concept: can’t oppose it, nor a “sexual theory”: unless you do something different, the way you set the sail (Benjamin)

REST pp. 267-68 for Freud, the shoe always a “form” of prosthesis, but always as a penis (woman’s penis too)? but Ferenczi recognizes in it the vagina

——for Freud, certain symbols cannot be masculine & feminine at same time, but bisexual symbolization remains archaic, irrepressible tendency going back to child ignorant of sexual difference

WAP p. 81 as a didactic technique, teaching becomes organon of repetition, teaching as history of the sign > teaching body lives from belief in transcendental signified, which comes back to life, more and better, w/ authority of transcendental phallus (signifier of signifiers)

D p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

p. 341 text occupies place before “me,” announces me to myself—une tour de guet (watchtower) planted inside me > like a “transparent column,” pure outside: driven into that which tries to close in on itself > imagine you swallowed a cylindrical mirror, tower of Babel, bottomless plurality, not negative…also phallic [p. 342 in Zohar: “great, ungraspable columns of air”]

p. 342 column is nothing, no meaning in itself, a hollow phallus > guarantees innumerable passage of dissemination and playful displacement of margins

pp. 351-52 column is not, passage of dissemination, “phallic” significance of column is a semic effect, reflection on 4th surface (described center, represented mastery of dissemination); “is”—procures calm, consciousness of ideal mastery > operation of 4th surface

——column has no being, belongs to no one

+R p. 157 bait (amorce) for Christic phallus (Ichthys): track, graph or trace (Ichnos) of a voiceless bit (mors), Derrida translates title of Adami’s picture [on Glas] as Ich [I’m exhibiting Ichas an other]

p. 159 each letter [re: Adami’s drawing] has the same arched, slightly in-curved rigidity, supple flexion of an erect phallus—fish btwn life/death

p. 161 fishing picture, record of a hunt: 2 death drives cross in an X (double diagonal): 1) pushes, attracts, holds down—descending column 2) the other, just as sublime, raises up, asphyxia of the phallus—ascending column

TN p. 308 Nancy: epopteia, sight accomplished, consummation of Mystery of Sense Certainty, phallic & cephalic

BSi pp. 200-01 Valéry wagers on CAP: le cap Pensée; the high point (comble) of internal politics, a multipli-city of selves, when the excess that exceeds un-counts the other & outside > jealousy is always the hight point that completes me, supplements me because receives, welcomes, no longer chases out other in me: one only ever jealous of oneself, the selfsame > explains all the loves and wars (which take place btwn the same, the others as the same): as soon as there’s a double capitalized phallic erection (CAP, standing, being on a cape) here called Thought

pp. 201-02 the World Trade Center as image of Valéry’s double capitalized phallic erection (jealous of themselves) > double turn makes one think of double tower (tour)

p. 212 “excellently eminent and excellently phallic erection of sovereign highness”

pp. 220-21 sexual difference, 2 marionettes—those afraid of “it’s not so simple,” afraid of sexual difference, of equivocality of living being: of the subtle difference, or blurred difference, btwn sponte sua, autonomy, and reactive automaticity

——phallic figure haunted by virgin girl

——quasi-mechanical, automatic reaction of phallic erection

p. 222 phallus as marionette avant la lettre: simulacrum, prosthetic, automatic machine—is the phallus human at all? > phallic erection is a machine but also the attribute of sovereignty

p. 223 [in some cultures] women break their hymen on wooden phallus (simulacrum of phallus)

——ithyphallic: hardness, straight, rigid, standing phallus

pp. 224-25 for Derrida, hypothesis that bêtise always threatens imperturbable ithyphallus is the essential ithyphallic bêtise > ithyphallus’ hyperbolical desire is nil/empty of thought, this void pushes, pulses, compulses, makes one think of a drive that is absolutely bête, never gives up anything, absolute stranger to all thought

——priapism is infinite ithyphallism, foreign to finitude of erection (finitude makes erection possible) > thus, is detumescence castration?

p. 256 if phallus is proper to sovereign, is it proper to man?

ATAP pp. 76-7 from Kant to Freud, no sexual difference (pas de différence) in castration or emasculation (Entmannung) [either one has male genital or one is castrated], only the masculine!

——castration [of reason], a metaphor/simulacrum, concerns phallus (not penis/clitoris); Bemächtigungstrieb

SPEC p. 310 [Ernst’s fort/da] collective unity [of toys] is apparatus of game that can dislocate itself > word for things in this theory of set is Zeug, which is also penis: supplementary complex that can reassemble parents

FV pp. 415-16 for Freud, dreams of nakedness don’t exhibit penis or absence of penis but absence of phallus, absence of attribute supplementing a possible fault, absence of colossal double > following chain is indicated: truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame [Schreber]

pp. 440-42 circular itinerary, Dupin & analyst find letter where they expect it: Queen wants letter-fetish brought back to her, exchanges one fetish for another w/out spending—because there’s equivalence here (assurance of return): circle of restricted economy, stricture of the ring

——castration-truth is that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring): brings signifier, fetish, phallus, letter back into their oikos, familiar dwelling, proper place

p. 444 dissemination threatens law of signifier & castration as contract of truth, dissemination entame unity of signifier, i.e. the phallus

pp. 463-64 the 2 truths lean on, support each other (sétaient): 1) adequation, circular return, garde et regarde, circuit of pact, control, guardianship (la garde) of the phallus as guardianship of the lack 2) veiling-unveiling as structure of lack, a proper place: les contours étant-la place du manque à être

p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

p. 477 point de capiton safeguards indivisible, living, non-fragmentary integrity of phallus

pp. 478-79 voice guards against the phallus becoming divisible, being reduced to part object, voice as ideal guardianship of partial/divisible object: mors disséminable (ce qui tombe)

p. 480 Lacan: “the phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance”

——Lacan reversed Hegel: not ideal signified but ideal signifier

pp. 480-82 all phallogocentrism articulated based on (individual, perceptual, cultural, historical) situation where phallus is mother’s desire (to the extent she doesn’t have it) > though phallus isn’t the organ, it mostly symbolizes the penis > thus, phallogocentrism as androcentrism & woman as absolute Other

***p. 481n [re: psychoanalysis] institution built on male child’s experience > at stage of genital organization, there’s only maleness (antithesis isn’t femaleness but being castrated): phallogocentrism is no accident/error, its old, enormous root must be accounted for [described] > but, its description is a “participant” when it induces a practice, ethics, institution, a politics that insures truth of a tradition

pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

pp. 485-86n when letter isn’t allergic to partition, linguistic unit (le sème) “phallus” wanders, begins by disseminating, not even disseminating itself

***CHOR p. 96 some can’t see beyond end of phallic forms in SP (bisexual complication of style, spur, umbrella): those people do not read the syntax and punctuation of a given sentence, arresting the text in a position, settling on a thesis, meaning or truth

PHANTASM

GT p. 161(n) the Good, in Republic, takes on features of father and of Capital, [Derrida’s fn references Dissemination, on bad faith of fraudulent merchandise, tampering w/ money, & on political economy] whereas Baudelaire is interested in copy of copy, phantasm

MONL p. 23 master does not have exclusive possession of anything, only possesses, usurps unnaturally, rapes, colonizes through “unnatural process of politico-phantasmatic constructions”

p. 26 The inability to reduce spectral phantasmaticity does not alleviate political and historical terror

p. 65 entirely other prior-to-the-first language, zone outside law, degree zero-minus-one of writing, leaves a phantomatical map

SPOM p. 131 communism as monstrous realization, animist incorporation of emancipatory eschatology > couldn’t have been an ideological phantasm because it was inspired by the critique of ideology

p. 184 Marx & Saint Max, heirs to Platonic tradition, associate image w/ specter, idol w/ phantasm, phantasma, eidola (Phaedo, Timaeus): living-dead, figures of dead souls > survival and return of living-dead as essence of the idol

PP p. 168 “at once (à la fois):” identity is doubled as its simulacrum, phantasm, at once (identity of presence, presence of its identity, doubled as soon as it appears)

VP p. 13 the voice simulates the “keeping watch (la garde)” over presence, and that the history of spoken language as archive of this simulation prevents us from considering [its contradiction], prevents us from describing this simulation, the infinite complexity of its structure as phantasm

DS pp. 206-07 acc. Plato, phantasma is simulacrum as copy of a copy > no longer refers to any ontology or dialectic [but one cannot escape mimetologism in one fell swoop]

DPi pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

PF p. xxxiv how to think durable hardness, invincibility, of an onto-theologico-political phantasm: i.e. sovereignty?

p. xxxiv noema as phantasm

HLP p. 28 fabulous, phantasma, return of some specter: apparition of specter, vision of phantom, phenomenon of the revenant

——fable & phantasm do not belong to true or false

——irreducible species of simulacrum, penumbral light [cf. FK p. 55 desert as nocturnal light]

of a virtuality, neither being nor nothingness (no ontology/mimetology could account for it)

IW p. 325n Derrida is calling “psyche” the psychic space of a “fantasmatic impulse” (love, hate, madness, projection, rejection etc.), & that which acts like une psyché, a large pivoting mirror

TN p. 52 being unimaginable gives rise to phantasms, allegories, figures, metonymies: technics > no overcoming (surmonté) this mourning w/out mourning [of autobiography] by any "work of mourning”

pp. 112-13 phone sex: phantasm of ecstatic pleasure promises pleasure (through phainesthai)

ATAP p. 91 [quoted from GLAS p. 198 (222)] absolute knowledge as phantasm of absolute self-having (savoir absolu), to be(come) (être-devenir), in a word, bander (bind, bandage, hard-on), son propre mors [Nietzsche’s “become hard”] [cf. CIN pp. 56-8 swallow another to speak his/her commands]

PHARMAKON/POISON

GT pp. 35-6 how could one desire a gift that is non-ambivalent? a gift that would not be pharmakon, poison, that would be good? how does one desire forgetting

***p. 69n poisoned gifts of intellectual legacies, poison that never fails to call forth a counter-poison presented in guise of counter-gift

p. 81 question of the “come” of the “come back” will invaginate, efface, all borders, will redouble endlessly ambivalence of gift as good or bad, gift or poison (Gift-gift)

pp. 116-17 Mallarmé links aesthetics w/ political economy via alchemy: alchemy as precursor to political economy, “null stone, dreaming of gold, once called philosophical [elixir]…foreshadows, in finance, the future credit, preceding capital or reducing it to the humility of money!”

p. 161(n) the Good, in Republic, takes on features of father and of Capital, [Derrida’s fn references Dissemination, on bad faith of fraudulent merchandise, tampering w/ money, & on political economy] whereas Baudelaire is interested in copy of copy, phantasm

pp. 134-35 social function of beggar, madman: “the pocket of an indispensable internal exclusion,” like structure of pharmakos, incorporation w/out introjection (assimilation), an identity by exclusion, keeps outside w/in, lexception faite (fors) dune clôture ou dun clivage intérieur

A p. 43 no culture, no medicine [pharmakon] w/out horizon of death

MC p. 376 [conclusion] “perhaps…I [am] under the influence of some drug” referring to pharmakon

MPM p. 71 we must remember the power of forgetting (what tradition calls “bad”: pharmakon, sign, figure of allegory) as opposed to forgetting in the sense of interior “recollection”

PP p. 70 “through her games, Pharmacia has dragged down to death a virginal purity and an unpenetrated interior”

——pharmakon is antisubstance, resists any philosopheme, exceeds its bounds as nonidentity: inexhaustible adversity of funds of philosophy, infinite absence of what founds philosophy

——pharmakon seduces, makes one stray from habit, path, laws

p. 71 only hidden letters can get Socrates moving > an undeferred logos, w/out detour of signifier foreign to it, “were that possible,” would not seduce anyone

pp. 71-2 difficulty of translating pharmakon (“remedy,” “drug,” “recipe,” “philter”) w/in Greek itself > violent transference of a nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme is problem of very passage into philosophy

pp. 88-9 Theuth accused of introducing difference into language, not pluralizing languages (our belief, these two problems are inseparable)

——for Theuth to become god of creative word, a historical displacement, violent subversion is required [is this what Derrida is doing?]

p. 91 pharmakon of writing is hypomnēsis (re-memoration) not mnēmē (living, knowing memory)

p. 97 (110) pharmakon as remedy, transparent rationality of science, excludes its magic character

pp. 99-100 (113) hubris—pharmakon used for excess pleasure & pain, pharmakon hateful because artificial, drugs make illness worse, writing makes memory worse

pp. 101-02 (115) [Plato’s puritanical auto-immunity] illness as allergy to alien element, “normal” disease defends itself; God cannot have an allergic reaction > perfection and immortality: no relation to outside; but how can we exclude the parasitic supplement, pharmakon?

***pp. 103-04 what if pharmakon, writing, produced/opened up possibility of dualities that it itself cannot be comprehended by, leaving only its ghost to a logic seeking to govern it, folds one beyond logic, ghost leaves nothing (since truth, living flesh and reality are ghosts too, now)

pp. 104-05 (119) writing not inscribed in wax of soul in intaglio, pharmakons power that it can transmit even if the inscriber is dead

p. 105 (120) writing as pharmakon sows forgetfulness, separates memory and truth, lēthē: increase nonknowledge, death, nontruth; men of writing are fake men of knowledge

pp. 113-15(n) (129-31) for Isocrates, for Alcidamas, for Gorgias, logos is a living thing, while sickly speech and pharmakon writing cannot bend or flex [p. 136 inalterable], breathless impotence

p. 117 (133) in Gorgias’ analogy “logos/soul : pharmakon/body,” the name of the relation is the same as one of its terms, logos: this comprehension an act of domination and decision

p. 118 (135) Socrates’ viper bite, Socratic pharmakon like venom [quotes Meno (torpedo fish)]

p. 119 (136) Socratic irony doesn’t bring pharmakon in contact with transparent logos, but reverses its powers, retourne la surface, reveals impropriety of pharmakon, that it can always turn against itself

p. 123 dialectical inversion of pharmakon or dangerous supplement makes death à la fois acceptable and null > immortality of soul, acts like antibody, dissipates its terrifying fantasy, le pharmarkon inverti, qui met en fuite tous les épouvantails: origin of epistēmē, opening to truth as possibility of repetition, submission of “greed for life (epithumein zēn)” to law (king, father, chief, capital)

p. 126 (144) pharmakon is aneidetic, not-simple substance of difference btwn eidos/other

p. 126-27 Socrates turns poison into salvation by way of logos, gives hemlock an ontological effect: initiates one into contemplation of eidos and immortality of the soul

p. 124 eidos, truth, law, epistēmē, dialectics, philosophy: names of the pharmakon that must oppose to pharmakon of Sophists, the bewitching fear of death

——Socrates must listen to the Laws like they’re a phonic spell

p. 125 temperance, the best pharmakon, the capital cure, when a pharmakon is remedy not drug

p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

***pp. 127-28 pharmakon, forever in reserve, no fundamental profundity or locality; it infinitely promises itself and vanishes into a labyrinth

p. 128 pharmakon, older than either of the opposites, “caught (pris)” by philosophy, by “Platonism” > constituted as a mixture of two pure, heterogenous terms

pp. 130-133 pharmakos as scapegoat

p. 139 (160) mimesis is magical, is like the pharmakon, witchcraft; Plato: if imitation imitates perfectly it is no longer imitation

p. 152 (175) pharmakon is liquid (opposites pass more easily btwn each other), water [see Laws on protecting water], everything in sperm which overflows wastefully (se dépense sans réserve) [living speech: non-diverted seminal potency]

p. 167 transmission of dialectical mastery of pharmaka from father to son disrupted by family scene that constitutes & undermines passage btwn pharmacy & house

p. 170 pharmakon means coup, stroke of fate (un coup du sort), dice-throw (le coup de théâtre), le coup double, un coup pour rien, un coup tiré, un coup de force, un coup monté

PAS PAS p. (93) forgetting must guard itself (se guarder) to preserve the gift, so the gift can give, the bank (berge) and contamination poison the gift

p. (94) must be able to reject the gift, vomir ce qui tappelle à dire viens, forget in order to reject the poison, to not guard the gift

SP p. 99 hymen’s graphic, that of the pharmakon, inscribes castration’s effects w/in itself, w/out being reduced to it

ATIA p. 40 [quoting PP] contours of anthropos determined by zoopharmaceutical ambivalence [re: the demonic as bestiary] > Socrates is compared to gadfly, his pharmakon like torpedo fish, but he’s still an “autobiographic animal”

O p. 8(n) protocol of preface destroys future anterior > a gluing (kollon), praefatio, prae-fari, protokollon as formula, pharmacopoeia, begins (law of dissemination) doubled by a “facing,” divides/undoes inaugural pretention of first page: neither depth, nor surface, in or for itself, un bloc magique

pp. 23-4n Mao, profoundly influenced by Hegel, discusses how the itemization of a pharmacy does not push one to think over problems (problem: a contradiction in a thing)

TB p. 105 God: name of the origin of tongues (lips, langues), name of father > God also sows confusion among his sons, poisons his gift (Gift-gift)

Gii p. 43 in Benveniste, “Exchange & Gift,” which Derrida referenced in GT, nothing less assured than distinction btwn giving/taking: bad & good gift (gift/Gift or pharmakon)

HLP p. 69 history of frank lie: Greek thematic of pseudos, of eidōlon, of phantasma, of rhetoric, of sophistics, of political useful lie [Republic]—curative, preventative lie of pharmakon [holy lie]

D p. 316 the inside of text will always have been outside it; reciprocal contamination of body proper, violent expatriation, poison affirmed—mercury in its tain

——to try to resist removal of textual member from context—maintain boundary line btwn inside/outside of context > classical limits: remain protected against writing poison

p. 327 “I” as surface vacant of itself: foments (prepares a poison) cruel dispossession > reaches simulacrum point: où il peut à la fois teindre le tissu (stains the tissue) et feindre to tell you truth about it

——a summons, provocation, face-to-face [w/ what?]

LI pp. 75-6 “primary masochism” [a wolf of undecidability] poisons, how can one identify the intention, the speaker, the effect once border btwn pleasure/pain is upset?

——thus the limited responsibility of Sarl, vulnerable to parasitisms, the “conscious ego” cannot incorporate and does its best to exclude [despite Derrida’s vehemence, substituting Sarl for Searle demonstrates his uncanny generosity—he will not accuse a subject]

pp. 96-97 pharmakoi, people on welfare, spies, effects of unconscious

CIN p. 43 essence of cinder (its cinder itself): the insistent pharmakon of a plural body (doesn’t belong to itself) in which the retreat of fire disguises itself > if there is cinder, fire remains in retreat

p. 46 “language poisons for us the most secret of our secrets…one must even sacrifice one’s own sacrifice to it”

OG p. 292 (413) writing as painting is evil and remedy, pharmakon, zoographeme betrays being & speech, freezes (fige) them > writing as representation (painting) of la bête chassée: capture et meurtre magiques

——that writing carries death, Rousseau would agree w/out reservation

pp. 297, 352n (420, 420n) Rousseau admits necessity of representation while deploring it [needs to be laws in spite of their evil] > the logic of representation: restores what it takes away: “draw from disease itself its own remedy”

PHENOMENOLOGY

OOG p. 27 math-object the exemplary object of phenomenology

p. 40 ideal objects, absolutely constitutive > marks a transcendental prehistory; p. 41 re: geometrical concept, history can only be empirical (i.e. Kant); p. 43 re: sense & value of what we cognize, phenomenology is indifferent to heritage.

p. 47 indissociability, rigorously determinable phenomenological sense: from static reduction to historical one.

p. 56 when investigating origins of geometry, decidability is reduced, along w/ each determined factual stage of history > to indicate the pure openness and unity of an infinite horizon [Derrida refers to undecidablity of truth not bound by “true” or “false”]

p. 64 for phenomenology, senses of sense is determined as object, available for regard or gaze, final category of everything can appear, that can be for pure consciousness

——objects join all regions to consciousness, the Ur-region

***p. 86 a method that confuses itself with the source, so source goes unquestioned

p. 100 original presentive intuition: both an activity & passivity

p. 138 phenomenology stretched btwn finitizing consciousness of its principle & infinitizing consciousness of its final institutions: the Endstiftung indefinitely deferred in its content but evident in its regulative value

——no phenomenology of Idea, it is the possibility of evidence and openness of “seeing” itself

[see Husserl quote on p. 139]

p. 141 phenomenology: starts from a lived anticipation [Idea in Kantian sense would be operative not thematic] as radical responsibility absent in Kant

——phenomenological determination of Idea radically impossible: Logos can’t be given in philosophy of seeing, but (like all Speech) can only be understood in visible > Endstiftung of phenomenology (its ultimate legitimation) never directly measures up to phenomenology

——the Endstiftung can be announced in a concrete phenomenological evidence

p. 148 phenomenological attitude, attention for the “future of a truth which is always already announced”

p. 152 “access to Being and Being’s arrival must always already be contracted [stricture] or drawn together when phenomenology begins by claiming the right to speak (droit à parole)” > prescribing historicity for Being avoids simple misfortune of delay: phenomenology alone can open absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History, as auto-temporalization of Living Present

——delay is thus philosophical absolute, and absolute origin in general

***p. 153 impossibility of resting in simple maintenance [nowness] of a Living Present, the absolutely absolute origin always other in its self-identity, Absolute is present only in being deferred-delayed (différant), this impotence is given in a primordial and pure consciousness of Difference, a difference that announces its form with apriori security > gives all factual profusion

——thus Difference as Thought as pure certainty > transcendental: “such a certainty never had to learn that Thought would always be to come”

***SPOM p. 167 via Marx, all phenomenology is phenomenology of spirit, cannot hide its Christian vocation

p. 169 phenomenological ego is a specter, phanesthai is the possibility of the specter, brings death, gives death, works at mourning [see pp. 237-38n Husserl’s noeme, irréellité]

p. 188 phenomenological good sense “may perhaps be valid” for use-value, or only for use-value, phenomenology of good sense, of perception (at work in Marx), of Enlightenment, has nothing mysterious about it, use-value as the proper of man

A p. 56 Heidegger’s methodologically rigorous choice to start from “this side” [phenomenology] goes hand in hand w/ what prevails, the pré-férance of pre-archic originarity of proper, eigentlich

p. 64 irreducible prescriptivity in mode of phenomenological attestation (Bezeugung) > one can and must testify to it

EM pp. 125-26 (150-51) for Heidegger, exemplary being is “phenomenological,” governed by principle of principles, i.e. presence and presence in self-presence, manifested in being we are, such proximity determines factum

p. 134 (161-62) Derrida’s attention to system and structure, la réduction du sens, neither restores classical motifs nor erases them > rather, determining possibility du sens on basis of “formal” organization which in itself has no sens: a critique [sic] of phenomenologies (Husserl, Hegel), which aspire for une réduction au sens

VM pp. 84-5 imperialism of theoria bothers Levinas: especially phenomenology’s infusion w/ light, way it predetermined Being as object

p. 105 acc. Levinas, Husserl misunderstands Descartes’ 3rd meditation, places infinite entirely w/in subjectivity, so phenomenology cannot account for ethics

***p. 118 metaphysics unable to escape its ancestry in light, always supposes phenomenology in its critique of phenomenology [re: Levinas]

p. 118 Levinas (tries to) take(s) phenomenology beyond its noetico-noematical structure

p. 120 Idea in Kantian sense [Husserl] as infinite overflowing of horizon, never equal to intuition of an object, even God’s intuition [?]

——in phenomenology there’s no constitution of horizons only horizons of constitution

pp. 120-21 if infinity of Husserlian horizon has form of indefinite opening, doesn’t this keep it from totalization, from immediate present? is not intentionality respect itself? eternal irreducibility of other to same > w/out phenomenon of other as other no respect, respect supposes phenomenality, and ethics, phenomenology

p. 121 phenomenology neutralizes political commandments, foreign to all hierarchies, opened to infinity # of evident-truths

p. 134 phenomenology, passageway to essentiality, would be impossible w/out anticipation [presupposition, metaphysical decision] of Being not exhausted by reality

p. 135 is phenomenology really different from Platonic, metaphysical, idealism? Husserl would say yes, Plato hypostasized idea by not understanding it as noema

VP VP p. 4 phenomenology’s “principle of all principles” > evidentness, present or presence of originary intuition

p. 5 resource of phenomenological critique is the metaphysical project itself, wanting to restore philosophia protē; even though Husserl says phenomenology “excludes all metaphysical adventure, all speculative excess”

p. 8 last court of appeal for phenomenology is “consciousness,” possibility of the self-presence of the present in the living present

p. 9 phenomenology (MOP in form of ideality) is also a philosophy of life, death is an empirical and extrinsic accident, everything is light, living light, blazes open passage to reduction

p. 18 rigorous distinction btwn indication and expression (which are intimately associated) is only possible through juridical and phenomenological means: the analysis occurs in hiatus btwn fact & right, essence & existence, reality and intentional function

p. 22 phenomenology at once the reduction of naïve ontology and the continuation of a metaphysics of presence

p. 23 why phenomenology belongs to metaphysics: exteriority of indication in relation to expression

p. 37 to understand phenomenology must be vigilant to difference btwn imagination of word and (imagined) word > way to emphasize non-reality of presence, transcendental experience

p. 45n Being as non-reality, non-existence, Ideal > this pre-determination is the first word of phenomenology

p. 51 “principle of principles” > non-signification, absence and uselessness of sign in originary intuition

p. 74 phenomenological reduction requires temporalization and is limited by it; phenomenological reduction is a scene

F F p. xxx phenomenology’s method: intentional analysis, phenomenological reduction, discounting constituted theses, return to actual constituting operations [Abraham sought passageway through phenomenology toward psychoanalysis]

——phenomenology’s content: intersubjectivity, time, iteration, teleology, the original hulé

POS POS p. 5 juridically decisive for Derrida to pose question of privilege of voice in Western metaphysics, represented in its most critical, vigilant form: Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology

ATIA ATIA pp. 86-7 properly phenomenological logic of “I am” means there is only “I think” > breath, life are secondary: “I breathe, therefore I am” concludes nothing > indubitability of existence depends on thought (not being-in-life)

GSP GSP p. 155. via Husserl, phenomenologists are true positivists, metaphysicians and empirical sciences commit sin of explanationism

——phenomenologist as “true positivist”: self-effacing before originality, primordiality of meanings > faithful comprehension of phenomenologist dispels shadow of a choice (might even say Husserl attuned to historicity of meaning, possibility of its becoming)

—— certain atemporal fixedness in phenomenological ideal objectivity as concerns subjective becoming (Logical Investigations)

p. 156 the way Husserl moves from fixed (Ideas I) to genetic constitutions w/out breaking phenomenological continuity > unearthed “structural a prioris” of genesis itself

p. 157 phenomenology born from attempt & failure to reconcile structure (comprehensive description of totality) w/ genesis (search for origin of structure) [?]

p. 159 neither structure, which isolates objective signification, nor genesis which effects abusive transitions from one region to the other, clarifies Husserl’s problem: foundation of objectivity

p. 159 to point to prior circumscription of natural regions (domains of objectivity) in utilization of notions genesis and structure can only be derived from phenomenological critique > thus it is always rightfully primary

p. 161 radicalization of presuppositions history & psychology made phenomenology necessary

p. 164 the attempt parallelism makes to overcome invisible difference is not innocent: for Husserl, the nothing of a parallelism prevents transcendental phenomenology & phenomenological psychology from coming together, this nothing permits transcendental reduction: permits origin of world to appear

p. 165 genetic description of ego prescribes task of a universal genetic phenomenology (a eidos of historicity) for Husserl, this is not a series of ruptures, revolutions, that tear open a previous finitude to lay bear a hidden infinity, giving voice to dynamis of silence > the ruptures are always already indicated [Telos] [Derrida wonders if this a metaphysical affirmation in a phenemonology]

p. 167 Telos/Vorhaben > infinite theoretical anticipation & infinite practical task: Kantian Idea as project of phenom.? makes it possible by overflowing its system (as its end?) > doesn’t enclose genesis of Being & meaning—is structurally genesis itself: origin/becoming, birth of history

pp. 167-68 to ask about meaning of structure or genesis, is to ask what precedes phenomenological reduction, to ask about possibility of question itself— ask about its [phenomenology’s] own death

p. 323n Husserl: phenomenology of ego’s self-constitution coincides w/ phenomenology as a whole

FS FS p. 28 philosophy, twilight of forces, “sun-splashed” morning of images, forms, phenomena

RGE RGE p. 271 phenomenology of mind (phenomenology in general) correspond to restricted economy, restricted to commercial values, “science dealing w/ utilization of wealth”: circuit of reproductive consumption, limited to established value of objects and their circulation

——absolute production and destruction of value escapes phenomenology as restricted economy

AFR AFR p. 33 Condillac, replaces a metaphysics of essences (the hidden) w/ metaphysics of phenomena (the open)

LI LI p. 58 plenitude of intentional meaning (vouloir-dire), meaningfulness, consciousness, presence, originary intuition > all organize phenomenology [what Derrida is questioning]

TN TN p. 166 pure psychology parallels pure transcendental phenomenology

pp. 166-67 “principle of principles” gives us no choice [?]: commands us to begin w/ “us,” that is, w/ most proper, proximate Ego; this “man,” this “we” comes before most radical phenomenological reduction, the one that suspends the world

p. 167 teleological hierarchy, axiological scale: phenomenology begins w/ man

——Husserl: man filled w/ soul through & through

pp. 171-72 German mit translated as en même temps > temporal coincidence gives intuitive plenitude (immediacy of time can’t be thematized—only argued by paralipsis [?])

p. 172 Husserl: “originally” not used here in temporal-causal sense but refers to “a primal group of Objects constituted directly in intuition (direkt anschaulich)”

p. 173 phenomenology finds greatest resistance where extension, place, localization are at issue > nous abordons ainsi une zone de spatialité, extension of the psyche

pp. 173-75 for Husserl, duplicity of sensible impression/apprehension occurs via a certain necessary exteriority, an outside as “real quality of a thing” (it partakes even in illusions)

——if foreign outside, space of material thing, slips btwn touching/touched, i.e. the heterogeneity of spacing > won’t a hand touching itself experience this detour?

p. 226 Nancy: phenomenology touches/exceeds its own limit in Cartesian Meditations > pré-donation of the alter-ego”

p. 357n acc. Franck, “analytics of incarnation” “overflows” phenomenology

AD AD p. 61 “ethics beyond the political”: interruption of self (in phenomenology, by phenomenology itself), phenomenology surprises, suspends itself > paradoxical reverting to “ethics beyond the political”

OG OG p. 62 (91) that nonpresentation is as “originary” as presentation for Husserl is why thought of trace cannot break nor be reduced to transcendental phenomenology: no choice (élection) here, to make it seem like there is, is to confuse very different levels, paths, styles

p. 67 (98) is phenomenological time (dialectic of protention/retention) still mundane? still linear?

EU EU p. 117 Husserlian phenomenology, incomparable rigor—not Sartre, not Merleau-Ponty

PHILOSOPHERS

TN p. 275 philosophers, meddlers who can’t keep their hands off anything, insatiable polymorphous perversity, imperious encyclopedism

p. 369n Bergson: all philosophers see one point, a contact more than vision

——Nancy might add, the point is not a point (indivisible), but the point, punctuality, is divisible, a touchable limit, spacing forever

POR p. 6 (135) un ubiquiste, a “ubiquitist,” “professor au large,” back from sea

PHILOSOPHY

KH pp. 119-20 Platonism, which still can be referred to, would refer to the misprision, the thesis torn out by artifice from written fiction of “Plato,” and, under the name of philosophy, a certain force of thetic abstraction in his texts recommends one to do so

p. 120 “Platonism” a necessary effect of Plato’s texts has dominated (in name of philosophy) by way of arbitrary violence (making the law) other motifs at work in the text

——turns back against the text, w/ a violent reversion that’s always interested & interesting [says same thing about Nietzsche]

pp. 120-21 “Platonism” not only neutralizes Plato’s texts, inhibiting forces that continue to maintain a certain disorder (parasitism, ventriloquism, clandestinity, tone of denial), “Platonism” command whole history of this neutralization, a philosophy would always be “Platonic”

GT pp. 116-17 Mallarmé links aesthetics w/ political economy via alchemy: alchemy as precursor to political economy, “null stone, dreaming of gold, once called philosophical…foreshadows, in finance, the future credit, preceding capital or reducing it to the humility of money!”

R p. 41 history of philosophy not pro-democratic

SPOM p. 43 how “death of philosophy” induces an excess that keeps philosophy living-on

p. 44 ends of philosophy, Blanchot: accomplishment of absolute knowledge, its theoretical suppression linked to its practical realization, the nihilist movement in which all values are engulfed, culmination of metaphysics as precursor sign of something else

POO p. 144n identifiable institutions stabilize, arrest turbulence, master, order, to be able to make decisions, to be able > literature is exemplary in the face of this, it always does something other, something other than itself: for example: philosophy (literature & philosophy)

***HERP p. 179 acc. Heidegger, philosophy addresses itself to us as a summons, we respond, in a correspondence (Entsprechen), lend an ear, w/ that toward which philosophy is underway (unterwegs)

p. 181 a philein not yet philia, which philosophy (too young, too late) has no authority to question, because [philosophy] is born like an event coming over philein

——caught in ring of circle once questioning philosophy, engaged by Greek tongue > acc. Heidegger, obscurely, authoritatively, Greek tongue alone is logos

p. 189 for Heidegger, Heraclitus and poets [?] experience lovence (aimance), before philosophy, love w/out strife before Eros, desire, or, at least, a jealous tension

p. 190 to strive to recall—nostalgia; Aristotle, metaphysics: reactive nostalgia, a mourning for originary philein, semideafness that hears but not the originary gathering of logos

pp. 190-91 philosophy “stand[s] in the tensing of this nostalgic tension,” Suchen, orexis, search, quest, investigation is tension of a desire

pp. 191-92 for Heidegger, philosophy seeks after, comes later than harmony, this delay eroticizes philosophical search, tension of Eros; Heraclitus & Parmenides not philosophers, no straining, no erotic pas, in accord, Einklang, homology w/ logos

POOF p. 240 question “What is (tí estin) friendship?” & “Who is the friend (either sex)?” is nothing but the question “What is philosophy?”

pp. 241-42 [offering quasi-summary of HERP] moment that originary [Heraclitean] phileîn (accord, favour, solicitude Gunst) becomes jealous, nostalgic tension ‘determined by Eros [órexis]’: the step to philosophy, prepared by sophistry [Plato, Socrates] > is the strange voice of the friend, an ontological call [prior to subject, consciousness, even to Mitsein? see p. 243], interior & w/out, the “what is…?” of philosophy [?]

——as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

p. 244 is Heidegger’s Zusage (prior to the question) that agency of phileîn which is not yet the eroticized tension of philosophy?

BL p. 207 text of philosophy, science, or history, a text of knowledge or information, would not abandon a name to a state of not-knowing—not intentionally [see p. 209]

MPM p. 136 de Man: “deconstruction of metaphysics” is impossible because in being rhetorical (btwn trope & persuasion) it is literary (doesn’t resolve relation btwn literature & philosophy)

EM pp. 111-12 possibility of international philosophical colloquium must take place in a medium > universality of philosophical discourse, linked to group of languages & “cultures”

p. 113 (133) interest in universality of anthropos a sign of West’s attempt to interiorize, master what’s different from it, leffet de cette différence dun tout autre ordre, where philosophical colloquium has no meaning, this other space neither barren, nor desert-like

p. 114 (134) if the orders let us do it [philosophize], they’re not troubled by it

PP p. 70 pharmakon: antisubstance, resists any philosopheme, exceeding bounds as nonidentity: inexhaustible adversity of funds of philosophy, infinite absence of what founds philosophy

pp. 71-2 difficulty of translating pharmakon (“remedy,” “drug,” “recipe,” “philter”) w/in Greek itself > violent transference of a nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme is problem of very passage into philosophy

p. 111 (126) opposition btwn mnēmē and hypomnēsis institutes all oppositions of Platonism, the boundary line is major decision of philosophy, maintains, institutes itself, contains its fond advers

p. 112 (127) philosophy determines itself and its other at the same time

VM p. 79 philosophy’s wellspring (ressource) is its death, nonphilosophy, because of its death it has a future, the future has a future

p. 81 difference btwn philosophy as power/adventure of question itself & philosophy as determined event/turning point (tournant) w/in this adventure [difference btwn Nietzsche & Heidegger?]

p. 82 that we are consigned to Greek element, a knowledge and confidence that is not comfortable, that torments us > Husserl’s crisis, a covering up of a transcendental motif beginning to accomplish Greek aim in Descartes & Kant: philosophy as science

p. 118 can a method be borrowed like a tool? method always shelters, anticipates the being which one encounters > this is why, since Plato, decision of philosophy has always seen itself as a science

p. 131 btwn original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, in which violence returned against violence, in which original finitude appears, in which other is respected w/in, by, the same

question of philosophy: why finitude? why must I think transcendental through ego, ipseity?

——philosophy can only let itself be questioned

PAS PAS p. (31) to think “starting from (à partir de)” Blanchot departs from the reassuring line of thought of philosophy, thinks tout autre

pp. (48-9) event (de-distance of near) (Eriegnis, Entfernung, Enteignis) “before” which philosophy and its pas au déla (thought) are trying to close themselves

S p. 42 acc. Heidegger, Missdeutung of philosophy, as figure of spirit: it is supposed to procure systems, world-pictures (Weltbild), map of world (Weltkarte), be the functionary of fundamental

T pp. x-xi philosophy has always thought its other, that which limits it; does to think the other solely mean relever, to control the other? or does the limit/passage always reserve one more coup; to think the proper of the other, the other as such is to miss it, to miss the missing of the other [on manque (de) le manquer]: examine the relevance of the limit

p. xvi if there are margins, is there still a philosophy? the philosophy?

SH p. 48 philosophy finds itself in vicinity of poetic, of literature, the blurred border (no place, utopia) btwn empirical (contingency of the outer) and necessary (necessity of inner) > indecision of this limit most provokes thought [Derrida attacks the idea that philosophy loses itself there]

FWT p. 18 rigorously, “philosophy” exists nowhere other than in Greece, yet it tends toward liberating itself from this cultural limitation, will toward deracination [Husserl, Heidegger]

——the universal of philosophy (neither relativism nor nationalism) not a given, an essence, but an infinite process of universalization > in the name of European filiation we are liberating ourselves from Eurocentrism/ethnocentrism

POS p. 71 Derrida’s texts belong neither to “philosophical” nor “literary” register, communicate w/ other texts that can be called “philosophical” or “literary” acc. a kind of paleonomy

P p. 27 when philosophy views itself as a work of art, it is represented on the model of one of its parts, so is philosophy then just a part of art? [living organism, biological metaphor]

ATIA pp. 40-1 the animal in the general singular, neutralization, castration, of the sex of the animal > the philosopheme itself, constitutes philosophy [no philosopher has every protested on principle]

p. 53 in Phaedrus, a comparison of the singing cicada w/ the philosophizing man: as a man I am a cicada

p. 146 Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts begins by describing philosophy, metaphysics, homesickness and melancholy as forms of nostalgia

GSP p. 159 “a certain structuralism has always been philosophy’s most spontaneous gesture”

FS p. 28 philosophy as twilight of forces, “sun-splashed (ensoleillé)” morning of images, forms, phenomena > matin des idées et des idoles, où le relief des forces devient repos, aplatit sa profondeur dans la lumière et s'étend dans lhorizontalité

O pp. 26-7 le détour dune écriture dont one ne revient pas, dissemination: this question calls for restaging of arithmos, “counting” as “bad procedure,” and rereading the rhythmos of Democritus, which philosophy has never been able to reckon w/ (naura pu compter) > philosophy accounts for itself by rising out of, and then circulating w/in its speculative necessity, the [envelope of writing]

p. 47 for Hegel, philosophy is unique, must produce object & method out of its own interiority

DPi p. 24 daimon (for Socrates) silent before law: philosophy finds its place in this silence of the daimon at moment of condemnation

CHM p. 62 philosophy as this giant confession: attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole (to define it as such is to confess) > I philosophize only in terror, but in confessed terror of going mad

——confession is simultaneously: oblivion/unveiling, protection/exposure > economy

DST DST p. 210 hantise (obsessive fear), the way in which philosophy is haunted, visited, inhabited by madness > there is a domesticity of “philosophical madness”

RM p. 57 closure is not a circular limit (bordering homogenous field), but a more twisted (plus retorse) structure, another figure: “invaginated” (there is never “the” metaphysical”)

——representation of a linear & circular closure surrounding a homogenous space is a self-representation of philosophy in its onto-encyclopedic logic

AFR p. 40 philosophy is historical for Condillac: it always comes after cognition, after a scientific discovery; his philosophical method can only be established après coupor stroke (coup) of genius

p. 62 for Condillac, philosopher forms new combination of ideas re: combination of ideas

pp. 126-27 Condillac against frivolous obscurantism, erudition, against philosophers (inventors of prose) who did not “witness[ ]…impressions they caused” (unlike poets, orators), nor did they find rule of their discourse in “live interchange” > frivolous style is that of the written

TN p. 52 Nancy: philosophy as work of mourning, work of representation, incorporation, profits from death (jouir de la mort), philosophy doesn’t know true mourning (w/out limits: ashes & tears)

p. 103 for Nancy, touching the limit > moment of decision

——philosophy, literally, has never touched anything > inversely, all one ever does is touch a limit (destiny of this figurality) [hymen]; to touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a border, an outline

pp. 103-04 touch untouchable-touchable surface/border/limit on exposing edge of an abyss

——philosophy will have “touched” something 2x: limit & unfoundable abyss beneath/beyond it

——there can only be a figure of touch, one only touches by way of figure > the object, the touchable thing, the "thing itself,” is the untouchable (gives itself, opens only in history of figure)

p. 120 philosophy—idealization, intuitionism as philosophy itself, where seeing the blind spot, a point, is touching it > fullness of immediate presence: actuality of what se donne en acte, energetically, effectively: hapto-tropologic metaphysics comes to its plenitude, pleroma

p. 292 Novalis: only authentic philosophical act is suicide > first kiss and suicide [?]

AD p. 31 philosophy, whose status is governed and whose signature is legitimated by the question

OG p. 337n Rousseau: philosophy/reason introduces self-love, philosophy permits man to speak in secret—“‘perish if you will, I’m secure’”

p. 287 if philosophy is the invention of prose, the becoming-prose of the world, poet excluded more from writing than from city

WAP p. 16 philosophy has no horizon, if horizon means a limit, a line that encircles or delimits a perspective (interdisciplinarity: more horizontal identities than ever)

pp. 16-7 philosophy, by right, must claim to be justified, at every moment (thus rupture), to put into question every “presupposition” (incl. those of “philosophy”) > vertical self-institution

——not every community will be philosophical that practices skepsis, epochē, doubt, irony questioning, but no philosophy w/out reexamining in every possible fashion

p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

——double bind of philosophical commitment or pledge (droit, if a philosopheme, also submitted to law of double bind: unstable, deconstructible, it precedes itself, calls for indestructible responsibility)

——indestructible responsibility (because always revived in anxious raising of stakes [relancée dans une surenchère inquiète]) makes good conscience impossible

——philosophical determination of indestructible responsibility, concepts of its axiomatics (will, subject, “I” w/ free will, property, self-presence of intention), can always be deconstructed

——name “philosophy” submitted to a torsion that folds it back toward excessive, unbounded (débordant), inexhaustible place (lieu)

pp. 18-9 thing or concept “philosophy,” its title, always unequal to the responsibility that, in its name, carries beyond its name

p. 25 philosopher, disturbing thinker, always accused of impiety because takes uncertainty, chance, tukhē seriously; Cicero claims Theophrastus said: “fortune is queen of the world”

pp. 29-30 philosophy as most economical practice of natural language [?]: must know its virtual folds, potentialities, rhetorical effects

p. 32 philosophy does not completely belong to culture

p. 40 la philosophie se tient sous cette loi qui veut que le droit à la philosophie ne s'arrête jamais, never give up on irony, skepsis, epochē, or doubt (when facing any philosopheme)

p. 40-1 how dominant philosophical culture tends to censor other philosophical discourses or other discourses that exceed philosophico-juridico-political machinery

——irresponsibility to state can be demanded by philosophy’s responsibility to its own law (to thinking) > gives itself right or privilege to go on questioning w/out trusting limit inside/outside

pp. 100-02 Derrida does not multiply remarks on structure of reference, article of title, value of contextuality [i.e. minutiae, syntax] to divert from urgency, but to determine it by exposing 2 alibis of philosophy: 1) imperialist self-confidence of philosophy: exists in its self-critique, is the paideia of self-critique, always in crisis, critical instance of judging, self-repetition via krinein 2) [see p. 107 nationalization of “teaching”?]

——these are alibis because philosophy, and via deconstruction, has exceeded this schema, a “crisis of crisis”

p. 101 philosophy is ontology, its paideia is an encyclopedia

p. 142 Hegel: the contents of philosophy are the same as religion [form is different]

pp. 175-76 interest in/of philosophy not a frightened fetishism, if it exists: an affirmation that knows no limits

——support for philosophy will exceed organization mobilizing it

WOG p. 35 undecidability found a certain privilege in ‘Greek’ words, in philosophy, on [sur?] its borders, that is, beyond its confines [pharmakon, hymen, parergon]

ATAP p. 77 acc. Kant, philosopher and shopkeeper write in prose

EU p. 166 to feel despair, there must be a basic fund of philosophical reaffirmation, necessity of link btwn reaffirmation of philosophy & a kind of deconstructive writing [reflux]

pp. 202-03 [CIPH] no preinterpretation, “thinking” as what questions philosophy > indeterminate opening (experimental incursions in unexplored areas)

SPEC p. 345 no theses in science or literature (athetic), every thesis is philosophical

PHILOSOPHY AND LAW (JURIDICAL)

EM p. 112 absence of philosophical colloquiums [in certain parts of world] not due to overt prohibition from politico-ideological jurisdiction, in which case the issue already meaningful

p. 114 (134) if the orders let us do it [philosophize], they’re not troubled by it

LOBL p. 88 literary studies in university don’t adequately explore problematic of judicial framing & jurisdiction of frames

VP p. 18 rigorous distinction btwn indication and expression (which are intimately associated) is only possible through juridical and phenomenological means: the analysis occurs in hiatus btwn fact & right, essence & existence, reality and intentional function

OS p. 39 pleasure one takes in repetition ultimately cannot appear before tribunal of any law > the limit of such a tribunal—philosophy—is in question here

GSP p. 159 to point to prior circumscription of natural regions (domains of objectivity) in utilization of notions genesis and structure can only be derived from phenomenological critique > thus it is always rightfully primary

O pp. 48-9n la logique (est) de ce qui revient au père (mortplus que jamais) comme à la loi et au logos: la relève elle même > elle est vraie et elle constitue la vérité du logocentrisme > signifier sublated in process of meaning > [Derrida links Freud’s “only one” libido (masculine) to the rightness of reason]

WAP pp. 11-2 CIPH aspires to legitimate the illegitimate, to give right—to the null, denied forbidden, invisible? (what a strange rule from an institution!)

p. 28 Socrates speaks from innate, natural demon (Diogenes Laertius), thus he can say that Lysias’s apology is too juridical, not philosophical enough—by what right?

pp. 30-1 Derrida not interested in “changing” philosophy for the sake of it, but in order to improve its chances, its rights, or the rights it gives

p. 37 state power (pouvoir) should be able to ensure a citizen’s power (pouvoir) doesn’t remain formal > passage btwn 2 “powers” is possible through language (ability to speak/write), through universal principles, through philosophical training > philosophical competence is inscribed in the circle and it is the condition of the circle, it is the becoming effective of right, right to (droit à)

p. 40 la philosophie se tient sous cette loi qui veut que le droit à la philosophie ne s'arrête jamais, never give up on irony, skepsis, epochē, or doubt (when facing any philosopheme)

p. 54, isn’t Kant just like Plato, yes, they both powerfully organized network of conceptual delimitations/oppositions, but Kant declared philosophy the essential project of delimitation: pensée de la limite comme position de la limite > foundation/legitimation of judgment thereby

philosophy legitimates its legitimating position: juridico-politico-philosophical

p. 200n hegemony of juridical requires an erasure or re-trait of the “properly juridical” > the properly juridical would no longer be strictly juridical; Nancy calls “how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” properly juridical (bringing to the surface by doubling verification, foundation, interpretation: la doublure ou le doublement)

——ever since OG, Derrida has put in question (pyramidal, synoptical) hierarchy that, in the name of the question quid juris [?], subordinates sciences & regional ontologies to an absolute logic

pp. 55-6 invitation (Aufforderung) to tribunal of reason would be a repetition of old task; Nancy on Critique: philosophy pronounces law on law

——philosophy, via critique of pure reason, becomes guardian of tribunal of reason: this new institution (w/ element of Romanism, Latinity) is a response to an old invitation (“self-knowledge”) > tribunal of reason whose power/violence (Gewalt) guaranteed by no other law than its own (Kafka, Benjamin), absolute autonomy, independent even of state

——tribunal of reason as the Critique itself, the Critique would be its discourse: philosophical reading is a trial, author is judge/judged, the addressee (reader’s reason) court of final appeal

pp. 58-60 hyperjuridicism of philosophy, question of quid juris, right to judge the judge, the right of right, the justice of justice [cf. FL]

***p. 60 hyperbole (in pre-Kantian form: epekeina tes ousias): an excess beyond all disciplines, beyond circle of knowledge, encyclopedia; yet, as a symbol (symbolic order) it masters, overhangs (surplombe) entirety of what is > brings together & constitutes what it exceeds, makes appear by authorizing itself

——when you authorize yourself to pose the question quid juris: one makes appear (faire comparaître), comme devant un tribunal qui fait venir ou prévenir (le prévenu autant que le témoin), la totalité pré-venue ou pré-sumée, pré-sommée, du champ encyclopédique : paideia, skholē, training, Bildung, universitas;

p. 61 even a philosopher like Heidegger, who speaks against totality, is in the tradition of quid juris, says something about hyperbolic, hyper-symbolic relation that connects whole to what is beyond it, and thus permits one to speak about it > philosopher authorizes himself to speak du tout, de tout

hypersymbolic deposes what it posits, destructs by constructing: it thus authorizes University outside walls of institution, by metonymy or allegory

——nonknowledge re: hypersymbolic > philosopher’s “I do not know,” authorizes him to know about everything > gives himself the right of incompetence

p. 62 la puissance impuissante de l'Université moderne comme lieu essentiellement philosophique, sa force vitale et sa précarité déconstructible, sa mort continue, terminable interminable > power(lessness) in posture quid juris

LI p. 69 classically, fact has been opposed to essence (or principle) > le procès juridico-théorique that leads to an essential definition

——Derrida does not ignore the profound/classical necessity of theoretical-methodological idealizations that isolates “serious literal speech” [Donald Trump]

pp. 134-36 theoretician of right (droit), the legislator (inventor or first signatory of a constitution), and executive power can come together in a single person/apparatus (dispositif) > structures of “performativity”: describe law w/out insisting on its application, eliciting respect for the law…

——theoretical duty is thus always “ethical-political duty” > highly political nature of status of parasite: politics of immigration > what’s “foreign” touches all social institutions—everything

——every institution designed to enforce the law is a police (i.e. the Academy), doesn’t have to be physical, can be “spiritual,” can be more noble

EU p. 6 Derrida examining constitution of legal & philosophical subject tout court, starting from imposition of language > 1539, century before Discourse on Method, a royal decree to speak in French

p. 11 need to bring more clarity to the understanding of a language is both a juridical & philosophical pursuit (policing too)

——decree re: move from Latin to French: no more alibi of ignorance to law, no more ambiguity or uncertainty before French laws written so clearly

p. 13 relation of linguistic subjugation [forced to share language] to the clearing/controlling of borders, roads, routes, regions, territories [see p. 8 method (odos)] > power of spacing, body of writing, to clear a path (language here is neither secondary nor primary)

p. 17 cogito as je pense gives speech & law to French legal subject [invites tourism?]

pp. 17-8 the 3 orders (not equally divided, nor can they be discussed apart) that impacted Descartes’ decision to write in French: 1) reinforce establishing of French Law 2) pedagogical facilitation (for women) 3) link btwn philosophical system & some language

p. 41 Descartes’ universal language would help men’s judgments, romance becomes the land of “true science,” where philosophy would have undivided dominion, it would be law, where order & path become method

pp. 56-7 [vis-à-vis Kant] philosopher: teaches w/out teaching anything, teaches an action, not a content > philosopher is not an artist but a legislator of reason (has essential relation to law/right) [Nietzsche-like?]

p. 90 Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties: a dictionary or grammar, powerful effort to formalize Western university (which is finished, marked by finitude)

——formal law: pure legitimation, reason as court of final appeal > pure ethico-juridical instance, tautology, pure practical reason, decision of pure egological subject

p. 105 Kant’s “heroic” effort to mark off juridical borders btwn 2 classes of [university] faculties > freedom of judgment, philosophy, the unconditioned condition w/out which there is no university

p. 110 since founding responsibility occurs by acts/performance, interrogation of philosophy no longer simply belongs to philosophical setting, question inseparable from act of foundation > foundation of new university law is necessary: to say it’s necessary is to say one has to take [a new kind of] responsibility for it [Nietzsche] [what’s beyond philosophy in philosophy]

pp. 198-99 disturbances in theology, law, medicine are calling for philosophy [Kant] > return of philosophy often takes form of new configuration of ethico-juridical problems

PHILOSOPHY AS AN INSTITUTION (ACADEMIA, UNIVERSITY)

POR p. 13 (144) philosophy department no longer unavailable to utilitarian purposes as Kant envisioned > today, via military budget [?], what is produced by philosophy can always be used > if even to keep the masters busy: ideological bonus of luxury for society that can afford it

pp. 17-18 (151-52) theoretico-political hierarchy w/ philosopher at top found in Kant, Schelling, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and in Aristotle’s Metaphysics > all agree that essential feature of academic responsibility must not be professional education

p. 18 (151) according to Kant, the core/heart of the University is in the philosophy department

——(152-53) for Aristotle, theoretician leader possessing logos knows how to teach, how to lead, how to command

——[re: desiring to remove the university] anarchy risks reproducing hierarchy

***GT p. 69n poisoned gifts of intellectual legacies, poison that never fails to call forth a counter-poison presented in guise of counter-gift

***WAP (P) pp. 1-2 philosophy clings (tient) to the privilege it exposes

p. 3 the 3 meanings of du droit à la philosophie, the 4th: can we go right to philosophy, do we need training; adverbial “right” enriches & overdetermines other meanings [?]

p. 7 question “what is…?”: privilege of philosophy, philosophy gives this privilege to itself

pp. 7-8 the 2 dominant figures of philosophy:

1. essence: history, origin, event, necessary, etymon, experience of language on basis of truth of being or question of being > figure of Heideggerian “destruction”

2. function: speech act, pragmatism what we do w/ it, du parti qu'on en tire, du parti qu'on en prend ou du parti qu'on y prend, in political practices; this more nominalist figure denounces originalism

——but, nominalist pragmatics must give itself a rule davance, this rule, always a concept of philosophy that demands one presuppose a sense or essence

——and originary thought must come forth through contracts, functions, history > must presuppose performative moment of social/institutional “function”

p. 9 “philosophy must remain open to all interdisciplinarities w/out losing itself in them”

——taking place where it does not take place

p. 10 the erection of institution “betrays” fragility of foundation: institution instituted against deconstructibility, it signals the ground as a symptom would (reveals/deceives it)

pp. 11-2 CIPH aspires to legitimate the illegitimate, to give right—to the null, denied forbidden, invisible? (what a strange rule from an institution!)

pp. 12-3 CIPH—community of the question [?]: 1) answer to question 2) experience of question 3) thinking of “yes” before question, before philosophy, a yes w/ content only of the other, to whom a trace is addressed in the dark: this deconstructive thinking can/must lead to philosophy (to which it doesn’t belong); pledge of/before philosophy: space open & closed by pledge

——“thinking is faithful to an affirmation whose responsibility places it before philosophy”

***p. 13 institution & philosophy: “here less than ever is thinking opposed to science, technique, calculation, and strategy”

p. 14 philosophy can be interpreted and is in no way natural

——“forbidden (interdit)” as one mode of nonexistence of philosophy

——CIPH show locate w/in institutions, in their margins, what every other institution can’t & doesn't want (ne vpeut pas) to legitimate

p. 15 CIPH wants its unicity to come from the exorbitant? the exorbitant is immediately contaminated or compromised (selects using the most reassuring norms)

p. 16 philosophy has no horizon, if horizon means a limit, a line that encircles or delimits a perspective (interdisciplinarity: more horizontal identities than ever)

pp. 16-7 philosophy, by right, must claim to be justified, at every moment (thus rupture), to put into question every “presupposition” (incl. those of “philosophy”) > vertical self-institution

——not every community will be philosophical that practices skepsis, epochē, doubt, irony questioning, but no philosophy w/out reexamining in every possible fashion

p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

——double bind of philosophical commitment or pledge (droit, if a philosopheme, also submitted to law of double bind: unstable, deconstructible, it precedes itself, calls for indestructible responsibility)

——indestructible responsibility (because always revived in anxious raising of stakes [relancée dans une surenchère inquiète]) makes good conscience impossible

——philosophical determination of indestructible responsibility, concepts of its axiomatics (will, subject, “I” w/ free will, property, self-presence of intention), can always be deconstructed

——name “philosophy” submitted to a torsion that folds it back toward excessive, unbounded (débordant), inexhaustible place (lieu)

pp. 18-9 thing or concept “philosophy,” its title, always unequal to the responsibility that, in its name, carries beyond its name

p. 20 right to philosophy: time of a translation of “thinking” [Derrida directs a questioning glance at Heidegger, to claim “thought” is in excess of philosophy justified only as strategy]

pp. 20-21 CIPH quasi-founded; self-foundation (auto-fondation) (eminently philosophical concept): is anything ever self-founded?

——could there still be autonomy w/out self-foundation?

p. 22 autos of legitimate/legitimating self-founding can never become institutional reality, not a future reality, but this structure of promise is not nothing: is still to come (reste à venir)

pp. 27-8 acc. logocentrism, only philosophy could defend itself since it has right to speak of rights; Derrida is cautious here: must find patient, singular, unresolved attention before the question of fighting for philosophy—in a thought beyond philosophy?

p. 28 what if to go “right to philosophy” one must pass through a language, subcodes, overdeterminations, what if this is the very process of philosophy?

——even if you could bypass all institutions, academic apparatuses, media structures, language is indispensable for minimal practice of philosophy

p. 30 concern of GREPH, of CIPH, is also democracy to come

pp. 30-1 Derrida not interested in “changing” philosophy for the sake of it, but in order to improve its chances, its rights, or the rights it gives

p. 37 state power (pouvoir) should be able to ensure a citizen’s power (pouvoir) doesn’t remain formal > passage btwn 2 “powers” is possible through language (ability to speak/write), through universal principles, through philosophical training > philosophical competence is inscribed in the circle and it is the condition of the circle, it is the becoming effective of right, right to (droit à)

p. 39 philosophy needn’t be confused w/ a specialized discipline, though some fear if it isn’t, other contents (moral, social, political ideology) will occupy it insidiously and dogmatically

p. 51 Kant’s discourse as a pedagogy, professor in a state University—professional right of philosophy: legitimacy of its objective constraint (the very definition of right acc. Kant)

p. 52 the way “Kant” possibilizes [new discourse/pedagogy], while being destined to this [modern] turn, informs European “culture,” i.e. “colonization”: philosopher as judge/truth teller

pp. 52-3 Derrida lists Kant’s famous oppositions as an efficient discursive machinery, even the “internal” difficulties, the schema, the Critique of Judgment, became canonical too

——Hegel, Heidegger, the great répétiteurs (drill coaches) of Kant

——“deconstruction is an institutional practice for which the concept of institution remains a problem” > not a critiquing or discrediting, a following of the graphics of iterability > philosophy & most vigilant practice of deconstruction share same responsibility: struggle to recognize right to philosophy & extension of philosophical teaching/research

——“to think this is a contradiction…is to understand as little about deconstruction as about philosophy”

p. 54 [method] yes, every philosophy has proceeded by system of conceptual delimitations/oppositions (like Kant), the study of this analogy is necessary program > but also so as to discover where the analogy finds its limit, the originality of Kant’s site

pp. 54-6 Kantian discourse: thinking of limit as position of the limit, the juridico-politico philosophical legitimation of judgment in view of these limits

——philosophy, via critique of pure reason, becomes guardian of tribunal of reason: this new institution (w/ element of Romanism, Latinity) is a response to an old invitation (“self-knowledge”) > tribunal of reason whose power/violence (Gewalt) guaranteed by no other law than its own (Kafka, Benjamin), absolute autonomy, independent even of state

——tribunal of reason as the Critique itself, the Critique would be its discourse: philosophical reading is a trial, author is judge/judged, the addressee (reader’s reason) court of final appeal

p. 61 philosopher authorizes himself to speak about everything, the hyper-symbolic relation of the whole to what lies beyond it > hypersymbolic deposes what it posits, destructs by constructing: it thus authorizes University outside walls of institution, by metonymy or allegory

p. 62 la puissance impuissante de l'Université moderne comme lieu essentiellement philosophique, sa force vitale et sa précarité déconstructible, sa mort continue, terminable interminable > power(lessness) in posture quid juris

WAP (PEG) pp. 175-76 interest in/of philosophy not a frightened fetishism, if it exists: an affirmation that knows no limits

——support for philosophy will exceed organization mobilizing it

pp. 177-78 defense of philosophy re: philosophy’s affirmation of itself [?]

——Derrida not sure if philosophy, like in 1789, can affirm itself on the basis of self-foundation

p. 182 the very selective protecting filters controlling philosophy today are a machinery largely homogenous w/ the machinery of yesterday

pp. 182-83 [baby daddy] [Derrida advocates a training in techno-politics of media, warns against an insularity that would use technology solely as a defense against it, thereby merely assisting in the very proliferation it’s “exorcising”]

p. 183 Derrida defends competence, practiced or trained vigilance (less competence in University? or out?) > less competence inside University less competence there’ll be out of it

***p. 184 profound complementarity btwn repression of philosophy in institution & frantic overexploitation outside it: 1) petty, reactive philosophical powers: uptight, ossified academicism, still clutching to control levers 2) theme park, amnesic, gossipy stereotypes outside institution

——one must combat joyously, w/out accusation, w/out procès (putting on trial), w/out nostalgia, w/ uncompromising (intraitable) gaiety

AFR p. 60 simplifying criticism of Condillac, history of reading Condillac, linked to formation of University & its models of philosophical teaching

——for undergrads, Condillac’s thought limited to statue’s petrified hardheadedness, evanescence of rose’s scent

p. 60n Condillac: new philosophy must clothe itself in scholastic rags, “can we presume the professors will renounce what they think they know in order to learn what they do not know?”

——here Condillac represents history as history of the university

IW p. 288 not enough to be a stranger to the University by profession to be outside of it

***PF p. 283n a work worthy of the name always opens a virtual university, appeals to a new universal knowledge capable of “reading” it, countersigning it, assuring its tradition

LI p. 111 Limited Inc: violence of discussions in “Academic World”

p. 112 academia—experimental micromodel of political (incapable of being maintained w/in)

——to believe intellectual field is nonviolent, apolitical, is an artifice of untenable denial, scanty analysis & voracious interest

p. 113 “Politeness and politics” could have been subtitle of Limited Inc

——Derrida worked to make legible (philosophical, political, ethical) axiomatics hidden under code of academic discourse > brutality of both politeness & impoliteness

***pp. 157-58 rant against non-reading pedants, dogmatists, full of fear, right to confuse everything in authoritarian manner

p. 159n repressive police on border btwn alleged academic freedom, press, & state power > a kind of academic “interpol”

ATAP p. 70 [vis-à-vis Kant] mystagogue believes himself to have grace, genius, intuition outside school; pretension is mimicry of a tone (not tone itself)

pp. 70-1 Kant’s University tribunal or police of metaphysical integrity

UWC pp. 202-03 university professes the truth (its commitment to the truth) while discussing truth's status (truth as adequation, revelation, as object of theoretico-constative discourses or as poetico-performative events)

pp. 219-20 Kant sees philosophy (in university) neither as performative nor as producing oeuvre, but professor of philosophy has total freedom > speaks publicly, but only inside university

p. 229 in 12th & 13th century, scholarly life became craft/trade (negotia scholaria): salary & glory articulated economic functioning & professional conscience

WBH pp. 190-91 insidiously reproduce the old model (fundamentally phallogocentric) in modern University > would women’s studies become another cell in university beehive [?]

p. 191 the more proofs women’s studies brings to masculine directors of university (masculine, whether man or woman), the more women’s studies is legitimized by power of university, more it risks repressing fundamental question that must be posed

p. 192 as members of a university, we are all guardians of Law, and also naive in front of text, in front of Law [like both characters in Kafka’s “Before the Law”]; p. 193 Law in Kafka’s story neither male nor female

——1) positive/optimistic deconstruction: not submit to law 2) pessimistic deconstruction (more conscious of law of Law): radically deconstruct old model of university, not to open a field w/out law but new relation to Law, rediscover the Law—yet, no longer bored [?]

PHILOSOPHY AS AN INSTITUTION (UNIVERSITY) CIPH, GREPH [fixerup]

EU p. 121 Derrida believes in indestructibility of ordered procedures of legitimation, titles, diplomas

——universitas has essential tie w/ logocentric, onto-encyclopedic system

p. 125 GREPH: urgent, ineluctable task in places we occupy, can’t deny we belong, we’re inscribed

p. 126 GREPH’s activities can’t be separated from larger scene

——political involvement w/ GREPH, publications, even the gesture I make today: make possible involvements/responsibilities in the same struggle (même lutte)

pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

——provocation to think brings together in same instant desire for memory & exposure to future

p. 167 [re: philosophical institutions vis-à-vis GREPH] profound political mutation, a change of government wouldn’t be enough

p. 190 philosophy professors resemble each other less any other teacher

p. 193 we need subtle, differentiated work that doesn’t give in to any intimidation

***——Derrida mistrusts reactionism against media, says there are not enough media, that the risk w/ media is that it is too monolithic, concentrated, violently uniform

p. 201 new philosophical objects, light, permeable, mobile: dispersion, new philosophical “formations”

pp. 196-97 philosophy departments after “end of metaphysics” > return to philosophy not a “return of the repressed”

p. 198 increased demand for philosophy outside the institution

pp. 198-99 disturbances in theology, law, medicine are calling for philosophy [Kant] > return of philosophy often takes form of new configuration of ethico-juridical problems

p. 200 philosophy’s new relation w/ techno-scientific reason: coextensive immediacy w/ encyclopedia

pp. 202-03 [CIPH] no preinterpretation, “thinking” as what questions philosophy > indeterminate opening (experimental incursions in unexplored areas)

p. 205 [on CIPH’s potential]

p. 206 interference of knowledge or “interscience” [Einstein]: prepare or let oneself be surprised > new information & communicative technology, new objects arising on transversal paths

——privilege accorded to inter-ferences [see p. 207]: transference in every sense of the word

——we know how inhospitable research establishment can be to themes/questions that exceed/disorganize general program > theoretic-institutional mobility must be accepted today

pp. 207-09 calling for competences that aren’t only theoretical: a know-how, the capacity for performance, that avoids classical institutional calculation > CIPH will encourage “research training,” develop technical competence (database, telematics, “artificial intelligence”) & a new kind of “philosophical” reflection [baby daddy]

p. 209 beyond interdisciplinarity

pp. 210-12 [CIPH] external/internal limitrophes > give them a place and opportunity worthy of them: lexploration aux limites, singular, out-of-ordinary (insolite) incursions, limitrophic or aleatory

pp. 212-13 ontological-encyclopedic hegemony/structure, univerticality, tends to immobilize all recognized borders > all-powerful & powerless (destiny of philosophy subjected to State power)

——CIPH will outline different topology: horizontal, transversal, heterogenous > experiment

p. 214 branch out to Africa, Asia, Latin America > avoid Eurocentrism

pp. 216-17 [re: CIPH] not a system (ontological ordering), not a doctrine (linked to discourses, pedagogical institutions), not a program (prescriptive, end-oriented [finalisée]) > but not empirical/rhapsodic: a “thinking” of pedagogy, each research group, each “program,” will never renounce precise specificity, autonomy, internal necessity

***p. 217 “the necessity of these conclusions should be capable of imposing itself on the basis of other premises” [see baby daddy in other works] > mission, envoi, “aim (finalité)”

pp. 218-19 “thinking” proceeds to limits of these unavoidable words of legitimation: art, science, philosophy, technique, practice, law, etc.

——permanent opening: never suture w/ assurance (tranquility) of doctrine or dogma

pp. 220-21 “title,” “category,” “regulating idea,” “problematic,” “working hypothesis,” words to be used as general translation for debates, transversal communications

——style of university: pathbreaking, trailblazing (frayage, fléchage)

——destination not thesis/theme or category > what happens to question “what is?” when it’s measured against destination? > strategic force of this question, “lever,” even polemological: new military-industrial complex strategies should be included/welcomed by CIPH

pp. 221-22 thought of sendoff (envoi), dispensation or gift of being: one of most powerful/singular attempts to think history/structure of onto-theology: Shickung, Schicksal, Gabe, “es gibt Sein,” “es gibt Zeit” do not seem to belong w/in onto-theological philosophemes

p. 222 differance as sendoff, tele- and trans-ference

pp. 222-23 [re: nonsynonymous synonyms] all these indices should be multiplied

——Derrida declares limits in order to lift/distance/disappropriate them [Rousseau describes doesn’t declare]

p. 223 [re: CIPH] against pyramidal hierarchy [height?], for horizontality

——CIPH should question motifs of “depth,” “foundation,” “reason (Grund),” distinguish between “basic (fondamentale)” and “end-oriented (finalisée)” research [see p. 227]

pp. 223-24 “as if” structure—characterizes every philosophical, scientific institution worthy of the name

p. 224 Derrida will now introduce points of order as a broad introduction, a four-year “translation” > points of order or points of pause (points dorgue): rhythms, pauses, insistences

p. 225 [CIPH] “basic,” “fundamental” research should cease being ashamed of itself [due to pressure from sciences, especially social sciences], research the “basic” around series gift/destination w/out returning to hegemonic structure > a “scheme” that never becomes “program” or obligatory “theme”

pp. 226-27 end and ends, limits, borders: always topoi of vigilant reflection for CIPH > CIPH shouldn’t treat its destination, legitimation, secondarily > who wouldn’t want CIPH to one day have richness and vitality we foresee, new apparatus, obligating many other instances to reckon w/ it

——most ruthless critique still produced in name of a system of legitimation—one can at most deny this, it’s the most common thing in the world today

pp. 227-30 [Derrida offers an example of what “fundamental” research of Heidegger might look like]

p. 230 Derrida suggests necessity of homogenous translations of Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger

p. 231 [re: CIPH] reactualizing categories said to be classical by adjusting them to new objects

p. 232 implication/engagement as something other than epistemological “philosophical decisions,” possibility of opening, orienting new scientific spaces

***pp. 232-40 [points of pause for CIPH] general deontology (access to birth control), call for interpretation, taking sides, psychoanalysis, law (eloquence in favor of human rights, though necessary, is not philosophy), police (self-guided missiles, problems of sendoff) language: all destinal significations that transmit, emit…linguistics, semiotics, intersemiotic functionings (speech & gesture, art w/ multiple inscriptions), is thought of language opened/inhibited by philosophy?, pragmatism > telecommunicatons not one mode of technology among others (spacing of destination), new techniques, data banks—book, computer science, poietics: theory & performative

p. 241 translation: transferential, diagonal, transversal, interscientific research

pp. 243-44 continental quasi-incommunicability reconstituted w/in each country > international college, CIPH, should transform this “babelization”: philosophicaltranscontinentality

p. 249 analyses and interpretation (of these conflictual fields) calls for action

PHILOSOPHY AS AN INSTITUTION (ACADEMIA, UNIVERSITY) via KANT

EU p. 43 Descartes never a teaching philosopher, a professor, never civil servant in State university

p. 44 question of censorship btwn Reason & university: censorship as institution, censorship outside the institution

pp. 44-5 Derrida will situate like an emblem Kant’s division of theologian in single person (first image des lignes de partage, des dissociations intérieures qui sillonnent the territory sur lequel nous nous engageons): theologian as scholar or theologian as censor (ecclesiastic)

——moral law, object of the greatest respect (der grössten Achtung), adoration addressed to Supreme Cause (Ursache) > thus Kant explains legitimacy/necessity of censorship

——guardian of truth of all faculties > philosopher

p. 46 acc. Kant, censorship: “a critique that has power,” doesn’t simply reduce to absolute silence but limits range of addressees—if there’s not unlimited public discourse, there’s censorship

——university always censured & censoring: place & machinery of its application may have changed

p. 47 “current institutions”: university & para-university, publishing, the press, the media, new systems of archiving, etc.

pp. 47-8 self-censoring of institution: what is “legitimacy” of concept of legitimacy?

p. 48 highest form of pure reason—pure practical reason, pure laws of practical reason should constrain in a respect given freely

——since finitude of man degrades moral law’s sublimity, respect for it (form of censorship) must be posed from outside, by “coercive laws” > thus, there would be no university w/out principle of evil in man [Derrida remarks that this statement isn’t false, but is formulated too quickly]

pp. 48-9 acc Kant, censorship: a critique that has force (Gewalt) at its disposal > since 17th century, censorship was always matter of church, theological-political power: grant/refuse imprimatur, decide on professional qualifications, seize/prohibit books

——Kant’s politics always re: State reason as a censoring reason > pure force does not censor [?]

——every critique of censorship is a critique of judgment, censorship is a judgment, proposes laws, tribunal, code > censere, to evaluate (réputer), compute, count—ratio, “census,” “cens,” is enumeration of citizens

p. 50 acc. Kant, philosophy says, does not do > pure reason thus exempt from censorship, speaks w/in university not outside

——no censorship w/out raison donnée, censorship never presents itself as brutal, mute repression; acc. Kant, censorship always enacts itself in the name of another discourse, never against private discourses, thus restricting instances of translation, contraband, substitution, disguise [?]

pp. 52-3 acc. Kant, censorship justified by evil > who or what faculty can speak meaning & truth of censorship? of evil? the philosopher!

pp. 53-4 for Kant, the historical element of Offenbarung is a theological matter, its rational element is philosophical (i.e. historical religion vs. rational religion)

p. 55 philosopher: circumscribed place & non-place of panoptical ubiquity

——the philosopher, a becoming-faculty of reason (w/ Kant)> a teaching subject: competent subject, civil servant, spreading a doctrine

——Kant: “one does not learn philosophy, one can only learn to philosophize” (one can teach pure reason but one can never learn it [?])

pp. 56-7 [vis-à-vis Kant] philosopher: teaches w/out teaching anything, teaches an action, not a content > philosopher is not an artist but a legislator of reason (has essential relation to law/right) [Nietzsche-like?]

p. 57 Kant’s bio-architectural idea of the university, a living organism: architectonics as organic scientificity, bio-technological > this harmony (btwn State power & Faculty of Philosophy), as regulative idea, inspires Kant’s politics of university

pp. 57-8 Kant’s architectonics (of Reason) as internal principle, organic whole or organic purposiveness (finalité), one sets out from a purpose (on part de la fin), as in every organic totality > organic “metaphor” in Critique of Pure Reason presages the 3rd Critique

——if one does not set out from architectonic principle, one only achieves “technical” unity, “know-how”

pp. 58-9 [vis-à-vis Kant] university’s today w/out central purpose, not architectonic but technical finalisation; for Heidegger, both reason (on same side as modern technics) & something Beyond-the-Reason-Principle can be reoriented toward technical [hollow] end

p. 59 [re: Kant’s University] monogram, un germe (Keim), an elliptic, enveloped signature—completes itself, pre-destined form

pp. 60-1 for Kant, historical imitation, mnemotechnics, not inventive production of reason [Leibnizian motif: sees reason as ahistorical]

——for Kant, math as “construction” of concepts, recourse to pure sensibility (pure receptivity of the given) > math only rational science that can be learned [i.e. philosophy is rational but can’t be learned]

pp. 61-3 philosophy as an idea of a possible science never given in concreto, one finds oneself on the path (trouver en chemin) toward it

——never in possession of it, inaccessible, essence of philosophy excludes teaching, essence of philosophizing demands it

——double bind that knots around sublime body of “teacher of philosophizing” [i.e. philosophy eludes teaching, philosophizing requires it]: teacher haunts the scene, doesn’t dominate, or dominates like a ghost > one might say he fascinates/seduces if these connotations weren’t too closely tied to imagination/sensibility: for reason should break the charm [of sensibility?]

——there’s no philosopher, nor philosophy > saying “Here I am, a philosopher,” arrogant braggart who doesn’t understand difference btwn ideal type & individual example

——philosopher nowhere, idea of his legislation found everywhere > Schelling took this to mean: shouldn’t reserve a place for philosopher in university

——metaphysics as the teacher’s mistress (maîtresse du maître), as censor > for a teacher, a finite being, no lifting of censorship, only strategic calculation: censorship against censorship, debate of the best censorship [the idea of philosopher’s legislation found everywhere in man’s reason], censorship of reason: [Derrida asks vis-à-vis Schelling] is this strategy an art?

p. 69 Schelling, Nietzsche, Heidegger against ends, professionalization of philosophy

p. 72 acc. Schelling, Kant makes philosophy finite [but Derrida says there are 2x2 Kants]

pp. 74-5 Schelling against Kant’s separation of Wissen and Handeln (action); there is “but one world,” no world in itself; philosophy is ethics > duality of languages not annulled but derived from result of reflection

——Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties constructed on “untranslatable multiplicity of languages,” dissociations of a discursive type: performative/constative, public/private, spirit/letter etc.

pp. 76-7 Kant’s (not unconditional) liberalism would caution against crossing certain limits, so as to avoid total absolutization of State

——for Schelling, State is philosophy/action > standpoint of Ur-wissen

p. 85 [vis-à-vis Kant] university as an “artificial (künstliche) institution” guaranteed by analogy: industry, trustee, collective

——for Kant, that scholars alone can judge other scholars, a tautology: essence of knowledge as knowledge of knowledge

pp. 86-7 nostalgia for Friedrich Wilhelm’s reprimand of Kant, a time of common code, minimum translatability > know to whom one is addressing, know where to situate power

——being-ill (mal-être) more serious than malaise or crisis, im-pertinence of codes (productive instruments of decidability, guarantees of a problematic) can go hand in hand w/ greatest power, source of being-ill—those who feel good about this situation are hiding something

p. 90 Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties: a dictionary or grammar, powerful effort to formalize Western university (which is finished, marked by finitude)

——formal law: pure legitimation, reason as court of final appeal > pure ethico-juridical instance, tautology, pure practical reason, decision of pure egological subject

pp. 92-3 locate untranslatable nodes in Kant’s The Conflict…, that which doesn’t reach us, remains outside usage of our era > but, rather than simply take inventory of what no longer is, or of certain contradictions—treat the un-translatable experience in excess of dialectical rationality: as a signal that university [since its origin] can’t comprehend [translate] itself in purity of its inside

pp. 93-4 for Kant, parasite could be contained to a margin of university > today, university is what has become its margin

p. 94 State or trans-State capitalist powers, re: storage of information in data banks > once library no longer ideal type of archive: university no longer “guardian” or “trustee” of knowledge (this centralizing representation once constituted mission of university itself)

p. 95 university as a child of metaphysics & tehnē > once this offspring exceeds places assigned to it, becomes invasive margin: university “idea” reigns everywhere

——parasite everywhere there’s language, public, publishing > to wish to control/exclude parasites is a misunderstanding of speech acts

pp. 95-6 [vis-à-vis Kant] the “lettered,” die Litteraten (Studirte): businessmen of knowledge, technicians of learning, administrators of archivization, journalists [represent the State, not educated by Faculty of Philosophy]

p. 97 Kant’s total censorship [of philosopher] avoids most odious tyranny: respectful, responsible service to truth, stripped of all coercive power?

——Kant at once safeguards (garantissant) most totalitarian of social forms & gives place to intransigently liberal resistance

pp. 97-8 to ensure philosophy’s power-to-think-and-judge, Kant draws linear/indivisible border in language (language: that which opens passage to all parasites/simulacrum): [the professor utters only constative], university has no executive power, professor speaks w/out action, does not speak publicly > Kant makes information technology [that which escapes university] philosophy’s most faithful representative—but only as a reserved, intra-university, quasi-private language [before the law of this apparent paradox ultimate responsibility should be taken today]

p. 99 fields of publishing, archiving, mediatization have expanded as strikingly as have overcoding & hyper-formalization of language > where does publication begin? [via Kant, publication of knowledge, not knowledge itself, is submitted to authority]

p. 100 performativity (where knowledge & power are no longer distinguished) produces/transforms situation in which it speaks [i.e. the founding of a graduate school] > the performative does not exist

——[re: performativity of university] dream of studying every intersecting, dia- and synchronic code in class evaluations, jury reports > concept of university legible in every sentence

pp. 100-01 interpretation of poem, philosopheme, theologeme always proposes an institutional model, consolidating an existing one or constituting a new one: calls for politics of community of interpreters > every text/element of corpus bequeathes/reproduces several injunctions

p. 103 for Kant, the “higher” faculties are Theology, Law, Medicine (because closer to government power) > philosophy is lower, though his ideal enacts a reversal

p. 104 via Kant, government must arrest its own power in face of freedom (Montesquieu) > philosophy as absolute freedom but can’t give orders (who could be trained to inspect this?)

p. 105 Kant’s “heroic” effort to mark off juridical borders btwn 2 classes of [university] faculties > freedom of judgment, philosophy, the unconditioned condition w/out which there is no university

PHILOSOPHY AS AN INSTITUTION (UNIVERSITY, POPULAR) via KANT

EU p. 176 [re: Kant’s attempts to popularize philosophy] “popular” philosophy still inaccessible

p. 177 obscurity of philosophy & the need to make it popular—posed re: question of right (droit)

p. 178 for Kant, thinking of supersensible can never become popular, reason as such places popular on side of sensible, not accessible to the people as such, who require the results [still not empirical?] of the metaphysics of pure rights > the people are “unwitting metaphysicians,” those w/ “healthy reason” can learn to know by way of conclusions w/out the principle

——teach concrete results to those w/ “a healthy reason” at their disposal

p. 179 acc. Kant, all pedagogy gives conclusions w/out principle: place of passage, access to results of a thought elaborated

——relation btwn critique & metaphysics [in Kant]: socio-pedagogic scenography, also determined thinking on right to philosophy

p. 180 metaphysics of morals deals w/ freedom not nature, rights & duty, to possess metaphysics is a duty > everyone has this metaphysics and thus this duty—a Faktum

for Kant, metaphysics: a priori system of knowledge by simple concepts

pp. 180-1 indicate (zeigen) consequences of metaphysics of morals in anthropological discourse > principles of metaphysics of morals cannot be founded (gegründet) on anthropology, though they must be applicable to anthropology

——practical philosophy includes metaphysics of morals & moral anthropology

p. 181 for Kant, the 3 places of pedagogy: 1) return to principles, coming to consciousness of metaphysics 2) theoretical instruction, indicate relation btwn moral principles & anthropological consequences 3) moral education in field of moral anthropology, conditions of application

p. 182 for Kant, pedagogy, discipline of philosophy, not purely philosophical

PHILOSOPHY AS NATURAL

WAP pp. 23-4 right to philosophy as straight ahead, as a natural instinct, no one is forbidden access to it [Plato, Descartes, Kant], impervious to any attack on it by its supplements (institutions); “proper to philosophy to say what’s proper to it”

pp. 26-7 Derrida exposes 2 variants of presupposition “right to philosophy is natural”: 1) a techno-semiotic formalism where language serves only to reach to universalism; 2) the naturalism of certain idioms (Greek, German) which refuses to think iterability, translation (w/in single language itself)

p. 28 Socrates speaks from innate, natural demon (Diogenes Laertius), thus he can say that Lysias’s apology is too juridical, not philosophical enough—by what right?

p. 113 to not advance a philosophical training/teaching due to suspicion of “progressivity” gives credence to a mystifying argument (mystifying and w/out future)

PHONOCENTRISM [fixerup]

DIF DIF pp. 4-5 [re: differance] that pyramidal silence btwn “e” and “a” can only function in phonetic writing reminds us there’s no pure phonetic writing (functions by admitting nonphonetic “signs”: punctuation, spacing)

——differance that establishes phonemes is inaudible

PLATO / PLATONISM

KH p. 106 Derrida less concerned w/ art of Plato [re: mises en abyme of khōra and politics] but in a constraint, a programme, the being-programme of the programme, the being-logical of logic: Plato apprehends them as such, though in a dream, put en abyme

***p. 119 btwn text & theme, structure w/out an indivisible origin > theater of irony, w/out end, w/out bottom [abyss]; to isolate a theme, “philosophy-of-Plato,” would be to violently misrecognize, deny textual scene, questions of topology in general

pp. 119-20 Platonism, which still can be referred to, would refer to the misprision, the thesis torn out by artifice from written fiction of “Plato,” and, under the name of philosophy, a certain force of thetic abstraction in his texts recommends one to do so

p. 120 “Platonism” a necessary effect of Plato’s texts has dominated (in name of philosophy) by way of arbitrary violence (making the law) other motifs at work in the text

——turns back against the text, w/ a violent reversion that’s always interested & interesting [says same thing about Nietzsche]

pp. 120-21 “Platonism” not only neutralizes Plato’s texts, inhibiting forces that continue to maintain a certain disorder (parasitism, ventriloquism, clandestinity, tone of denial), “Platonism” command whole history of this neutralization, a philosophy would always be “Platonic”

——what is shown, hidden, won, lost in Plato, w/ Plato?

p. 127 Plato never qualified khōra as matter (hylè) like Aristotle did

GOD p. 8 Platonism > Christianity (exteriority, accessible – interiority, inaccessible)

PLAY

KH pp. 101-02 acc. Hegel, Plato uses myth because he’s impotent, a ludico-mythological drift (dérive), Aristotle Hegel’s guarantor of seriousness

GT pp. 12-3 circular ring of “giving back (rendre),” circulation of debt not just that of things but values or symbols that are involved there (qui sy engagent en-gage) [TN footnote on engager & its evocation of pledge]

R p. 25 undecidability, play, in the interpretation of the democratic

BL p. 215 plus de loi et plus de littérature

EM p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (lespace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being)

p. 134 (161) prescription of the end of man, prescribed since always, has done nothing but “modulate equivocality of the end, in the play of telos and death”

——dans la lecture de ce jeu: le fin de lhomme est la pensée de lêtre, lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre, la fin de lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre > lhomme est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-a-dire la fin de son propre > lêtre est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-à-dire la fin de son propre

PP p. 89 pure play of traces [see POOF pp. 75-7] , supplements w/out transcendental signified, no absolutely external reference, on and on infinitely, is not w/out its own violence

p. 93 Thoth puts play into play, repeats in play of supplement, his propriety or property is impropriety, inappropriateness, floating indetermination allows for substitution and play

p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

p. 150 good-writing is serious (spoudē), pharmakon, ephemeral produce is a game (paidia)

pp. 155 (179) Plato moves dividing line btwn presence and trace (ikhnos) to dialectical trace and nondialectical trace: good play and bad play

pp. 156-57 no as such where writing or play are concerned, they cannot be classically affirmed (since they have no essence) w/out being negated, le jeu et la graphie vont sans cesse disparaissant

pp. 156-58 does Plato give play a chance, to take play seriously is to relieve it of its playfulness; Plato says (in Laws 803b-e) our life should be spent in play (sacrifice, song and dance), play perfectly [telos?]

——play always lost when seeks salvation in games (see OG)

VM p. 107 Derrida beyond Levinas: war played out btwn face and finite world w/out a face, isn’t this the difference in which absence-presence of God plays? wouldn’t this play precede God, permit us to think his essence?

pp. 126-27 how could there be “play of the Same” if alterity were not already in the same?

PAS PAS pp. (104-05) if there was one [name], the signature, the anagrammatic, would lose name in infinite measure of its keeping [absolute guard], so > plus de nom (visible name might hide tout autre name)

T p. xxviii intro to differance, cites, repercusses its rhythm w/out measure, incision conduite par une main aveugle pour navoir jamais vu que le part-et-dautre dun tissu > to weave (tramer) doesn’t play le jeu denchaînement, il joue lenchaînement, trouer, traverser, works on both sides (le part-et-dautre), leaves ear canal open, sous le coup dun enchaînement simulé, non-echo

FWT p. 112 “I” am working around a dehiscence, division (more than 1, 2, 3, beyond all arithmetic, calculability)

DS p. 252 blank as polysemic totality of whiteness plus the fanlike form of text (spaced-out splitting of whole), plus the writing site (hymen), no longer determinate signifier or signifier at all

p. 258 tropological structure circulates infinitely, always w/ supplement of an extra turn: plus dmetaphor; (what’s metonymy w/out the whole)

***p. 274 plus de: glottal/grotto effect; two w/ no one, always one extra or one too few

P p. 79 Kant: examples are wheelchairs (Gängelwagen) [roulettes] of judgment, those who don’t have enough Mutterwitz, the sick, need these wheelchairs, prostheses that replace nothing

——Hegel: there is play in examples, they play, Beispielen

——Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

p. 81 only a practice of theoretical fiction can work (against) the frame, (make or let it) play (it) (against) itself

p. 104 conceptual determination of end limits free play (of imagination): sans opens play w/in beauty

——one must choose btwn not seeing beauty & seeing the end

POS p. 14 to risk meaning nothing is to start to play, enter play of differance which prevents any word, any concept, from summarizing or governing from a theological presence, centralizing the movement and spacing of differences

p. 86 dissemination is play of castration w/out metaphysical/romantic pathos of negativity > dissemination “is” angle of play of castration

FS pp. 12-3 attempt-to-write, moment of overflow (can’t be understand via voluntarism): when play of meaning overflows signification, which is always enveloped by limits of nature, life, soul

***DIF p. 7 play: unity of chance & necessity in calculations w/out end (beyond opposition philosophical-logical/empirical-logical) (on eve of philosophy and beyond it)

p. 22 differance (is) older than ontological difference: outside epochality of Being (outside epoch): no depth to bottomless chessboard on which Being is put to play

——is this why Heraclitean play of hen diapheron heautōi, the one differing from itself, in difference w/ itself, is lost like a trace when diapherein is determined as ontological difference?

pp. 26-7 [Derrida argues for new relation to unnameable, different from Heidegger’s] “no name” for differance is not ineffable Being which no name could approach (i.e. God), it is play which makes possible nominal effects, the chains of substitutions of names

p. 27 there will be no unique name: must think this w/out nostalgia, hors du myth of pure mom/dad language, must affirm like Nietzsche met laffirmation en jeu, dans un rire et un pas de la danse

RGE p. 260 by interpreting negativity as labor, by betting for discourse/meaning/history, Hegel bet against play, chance, blinded himself to what made his own bet possible > each stage through spirit (each suspension of play) was a phase of play: play includes work of meaning (meaning of work) not in terms of knowledge but in terms of inscription: meaning inscribed in meaningless play

p. 262 Bataille wanted to denounce servility/labor of meaning by engaging in major play, not minor (which would still give meaning to the absence of meaning)

p. 263 Bataille’s communication, only btwn beings who have put the being w/in themselves at stake (mis en jeu) > “placé à la limite de la mort, du néant

p. 272 this stratagem, the sovereign operation, play w/ syntax, does not subordinate itself to an anticipated discourse

p. 274 Bataille’s sovereignty is not neutral even if it neutralizes all oppositions of classical logic

——affirmation of play outside meaning: potlach of signs that burns, consumes, wastes words in gay affirmation of death: a sacrifice & a challenge

——sovereign operation, like all transgressions, must conserve/confirm what it exceeds

RM pp. 49-50 [cf. Pas] the dérive or dérapage (skidding) as un certain jeu de lancre in surrounding waters (parages): Derrida can only stop engines (machines) of this floating vehicle [my discourse on metaphor], which would still abandon it to its unforeseeable dérive [more metaphorico]

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, since “as such” is no longer in control, the exhibited functions of text are not montrée but montée (not displayed but put in play, not staged but engaged…)

p. 302 pure present: la plénitude inentamée, la continuité vierge de la non-coupure (not yet having been written, à la veille du jeu)

p. 345 whiteness of virgin paper, blankness of transparent column, air > more than neutrality of some medium, uncovers space of play, play of space

PPT p. 10 [re: REST (4th essay in The Truth in Painting)] the 4th time, jentrelace tous ces fils à travers un polylogue à n+1 voix, qui se trouve être de femme [cf. PAS, SW for feminine voice]

C p. 189 get down to it (sy mettre), commit oneself, donner du gage (give proof, evidence, wager) > get in the coffin, spread out: à chaque coup for the first and last time, always the first and last

LI p. 84 did Derrida make seriousness of philosophical discourse skid towards literary play [parasitizing Descartes’ title in SEC]? unless seriousness were already the para-site of such play

pp. 115-16 no “completeness” where freeplay is concerned > freeplay an inadequate translation of jeu (& network connected to it): “freeplay” [in deconstruction] greatly overestimated in U.S.

ATM pp. 187-88 “je donne, je joue lingratitude contre la jalousie,” if God is exempt from jealousy (no desire for possession) must he not guard this exemption jealously, and in so doing lose himself? > ellipse de jalousie: le sans-jalousie se garde jalousement, autrement dit se perd, se-garde-se-perd: plus de jalousie [seriasure always a jealous, series of traits & retraits, beyond the face]

E p. 5 for Kant, difference btwn free, liberal art and mercenary art is the difference btwn play/work

OG p. 50 (73) play as absence of transcendental signified; that is, the deconstruction of ontothelogy and MOP; this secousse de cet ébranlement, working in metaphysics from the start t

——for Plato (Phaedrus 277e), play, childishness, paidia of writing opposed to adult gravity (spoudè) of speech

——to think play radically must follow Husserl and Heidegger to the end, conserve legibility of their thought, must know le jeu du monde before attempting to understand all forms of play in the world > play, as absence of transcendental signified, not a play in the world

p. 57 (84) unity of sound & meaning (sens): reassuring closing (fermeture) of play

p. 59 (87) desire to restrict (lier) le jeu is irresistible

p. 167 (237) masturbation & writing totally indistinguishable inasmuch as each puts into play (met en jeu) the presence of the present, the life of the living

***pp. 244-45 (347-48) supplementarity is nothing, not absence, presence, not essence/substance of man: it’s the opening of play (jeu) btwn presence/absence, dislocation of proper of man, the impossibility and thus the desire for proximity to self (pure presence)

——approach to limits (madness, divinity, childhood, animality, etc.) feared as threat of death & desired as life w/out differance: truth-value of these limit concepts only has meaning w/in closure of game (clôture du jeu), they belong to an epoch of supplementarity

p. 307 (433) for Rousseau, fête w/out object, sans masques, sans dépense, sans sacrifice: no play if play is exchange of presence/absence, chance & absolute risk > fête represses relation to death

SPEC p. 388 transference, ersatz, prosthesis, at the mouth, Freud’s surgeries, cigar: les pas de plus et les plus de pas [?]

PLED GE

FK p. 100 no alliance of 2 [faith & religion], plus dun at once more than 2: iterability, division at source > supplement introduces incalculable in heart of calculable; pure faith = pure madness

***R p. 75 plus dun, divisibility of God, announces democracy

p. 77 [Nietzsche-like?] [Derrida by way of Aristotle by way of Plato] the “just more than one,” a god among men, not a part of a whole or calculable series; law, calculability, would betray justice for those who are the law > fable of sovereignty returns

p.168 Sovereign One, higher than height, incommensurable, sovereign One is a One that can’t be counted, plus dun or plus quun

FL pp. 247-49 task of historical and interpretive memory is at heart of deconstruction, decons. is pledged, engaged (gageé, engagée) by demand for infinite justice, denouncing theoretical limits, where good conscience stops dogmatically, & denouncing concrete injustices

AF p. 1 forever forgetting that when physis opposes thesis, tekhnē, nomos, these principles are not 1 or 2, they’re always more than 1 & more or less than 2 > all would be simple if opposition held

SPOM p. xx commitment of justice, to whom? to life (natural life, life of spirit) of living being > that this is irrefutable carries justice beyond present life, non pas vers la mort mais vers une sur-vie, where life & death are traces of traces

——alors il y a de l’esprit, des esprits, et il faut compter avec eux > le plus d’un

p. 2 plus dun: the horde, crowd, population of ghosts, and also the less than one (moins d’un) of pure and simple dispersion

p. 18 we are inheritors of plus dune parole and an injunction (singular) that is disjointed

p. 24 “one never inherits without coming to terms with [sexpliquer avec (battling with)] some specter, and therefore with more than one specter, with the fault and the injunction of plus dun” p. 95 deconstruction never been (non) Marxist, faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism > il y en a plus d’un et ils son hétérogènes [this can never be repeated too often (on ne le répétera jamais assez)]

HERP HERP p. 182 philein—to accord oneself to logos (Sprache, legein, which is already engaged, opened), co-respond, correspondence (not first w/ some subject)

MPM p. 15 deconstruction: plus dune langue

p. 37 allegorical metonymy—where part stand for whole and for more than whole it exceeds

——parts of memory that seem greater & older than us: manifests in open but nocturnal space of agora, plus de lumière [Nietzsche’s not bright but open horizon]

POOF p. 1 contretemps, 2x, plus dun, 2 moments at the same time [my friends, no friend]

p. 33 that which is empty resembles that which overflows: plus de sens, desert mirage effect

pp. 214-15 that either address [re: omega ω] is addressed to someone will always expose utterance to undecidability because address to ‘someone’ presupposes the impossible: 1) neutral gender 2) ‘only one’ someone > for one person to receive a mark once, the mark must multiply, its iterability affirms plus dun (which allows & limits calculability), the 3rd party is there > there is never one, one is always more than one (w/ or w/out consent)

pp. 216-17 Derrida now stresses that the sentence could never be independent of all determinable contexts, but that it’s ability to be contextualized demands that it can give way to another context > thus, everyone who uttered Aristotle’s rumored sentence affirmed its displacement/detachment from a unique context, willing or reluctantly, they said the plus dun of the addressee (for example, a feminine ‘one’): the sentence can’t be signed w/out marking this destinerrancy

——in such a way, Aristotle’s sentence was never neutral, always a project of friendship/enmity, & always a project of the corresponding political community (this is irrepressible)

p. 269n an instance of ‘More than one’ in Heidegger [?]

pp. 259 a few oddities that don’t surprise Kant: 1) no secrets in nature, secrets only there where there’s engagement, promise—and no one has the infinite intelligence to know for certain what the secret is 2) the impossible & necessary arithmetic returns: friendship as n + 1, plus dun, there’s always one more than the 2 friends, a 3rd, so how can the secret be kept? 3) merely moral friendship is not just ideal, the event of friendship happens, the black swan

p. 276 is there a worse jealousy than jealousy of self? is there any other? jealous of one’s very own brother: qui est le plus d’un, le supplément de l’un en trop? [the friend, says Nietzsche’s hermit]

p. 297 Blanchot no longer has affinity w/ one Nietzsche (there is always plus dun): friendship is not a gift or promise

p. 305 Derrida confessing: he has more than one ‘brother,’ of more than one sex, and he loves having more than one (uniquely bound, each time, by a conjuration & so many unuttered oaths)

S S pp. 129-30n before the question, the question mark, language is already there, we have already said yes to it, given a pledge, acquiesced (Zusage,which also means promise, is for Heidegger a commitment of language toward language)

p. 130n before the word is the wordless word “yes,” a pre-originary pledge that precedes any engagement in language and action > no erasure is possible for such a pledge (memory before any souvenir), where faith defeats any narrative, la gage engage dans la langue

p. 134n parole is engaged in langue, it has already done so, an address always going back to an older event: Die Sprache west als dieser Zuspruch (“Language is active as this promise)

p. 135n re: “Das Wesen der Sprache: Die Sprache des Wesens”—colon erases copula, allows question to be exceeded by pledge (consent to the address, en-gage), “is” would relaunch the question

SH p. 11 “Geheimnis der Begegnung (the secrecy of encounter)” > otherness & solitude (poem, singularity) conjoined in one & same date: chance, plus dun at once, that which seals event

F p. xviii fantasy (incorp.): maintains topoi, conservative, “narcissistic” finality vs. reality (multiplicity of crypt, plus dun): changes place (pervert’s names-of-the-father?)

pp. xviii-xix crypt must always incorporate more than one, plus dun: cryptophore’s secret must be shared (partagé) w/ a “third,” that’s what makes a secret a secret

ATIA ATIA pp. 49-51 autobiographical animal, the general singulars “I” and “animal,” before ego cogito both living, both auto-affective, both moving > “I” speaks to “engage nudity w/out shame,” untenable pledge > bring in a mirror (une psyché), is the animal caught there too? or my primary mirror?

p. 56 “I,” the autos, ipseity, as a promise, guarantee (gage) or undertaking (engagement), of discourse on auto-biographical method, sign/manifestation of life in presence, even if from an animal, machine, living or dead > “I am dead” in some way implied in every cogito ergo sum

WAP pp. 12-3 CIPH—community of the question [?]: 1) answer to question 2) experience of question 3) thinking of “yes” before question, before philosophy, a yes w/ content only of the other, to whom a trace is addressed in the dark: this deconstructive thinking can/must lead to philosophy (to which it doesn’t belong); pledge of/before philosophy: space open & closed by pledge

——“thinking is faithful to an affirmation whose responsibility places it before philosophy”

SW p. 349 I do not foresee the future thus promised, I foretell it

——the gage of my foretelling destines: calls to make come, beyond any truth of ontological revelation

——it destines itself to those men & women who will know how to read, of course—knowing how to read (voilà, the circle) only on basis of gage given > reading finally what you have to read

DPi p. 247 can’t share DP, must die one by one, though someone always more than one in dying [can’t be calculated] > 2 people seeking DP together, this would be more sacred than marriage

Gii p. 29 Geschlecht as idiom, a “we” that can hear Fichte’s address (not necessarily the Germans)

——organic community in nonnatural, spiritual sense

——“we” announces itself to itself from infinity of a telos of freedom/spirituality > engages, allies, promises itself acc. to circle of this infinite will

HST pp. 416-17 Derrida using logic of substitution to complicate “what,” thing, “who,” person > “one +”—its substitute can always be what one calls a “what”

TN p. 309 singularity [never assured] doit être couru comme une chance ou un risque: Nancy’s a bettor, thinker of the bet (pari), a desperate bettor, never stops staking, committing (dengager), calculating w/ exactitude hyperbolic odds (gages): not counting on gains (bénéfice) of an “argument du pari” [Pascal] or any salut

NOY p. 236 yes: the engagement, the promise to come to language

AD pp. 120-22 à-Dieu, so close to silence, also related to death, eipimeleia thanatou, Sein zum Tode

——le-plus-de-sens à linfinià lheure de la mort [the (no) more-sense to infinity…at the hour of death]

PLUS PLUS DUN (one more, no more)

H p. 81 the great law of hospitality, of the singular, is One + n, vs. the law of plurality, which is a law of differentiation, multiplicity, distribution

HASD p. 20 plus dêtre: beyond and more than being (hyper, beyond)

SP p. 139 plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

O p. 43 dissemination: doesn’t simply place plural in effervescence > il sagite de la contradiction sans fin, marked by undecidable syntax of plus

REST pp. 375-76 bet comes back to a comparing (un pari revient toujours à comparer)

——has to be a difference to permit it: but a pair is a fixed difference, fixed bet not a bet?, bet so as not to bet, plus de pari, pas de pari > bet on pair: limit absolute wager (pari)

TR p. 101 plus de faute [no more fault, more fault] > vicious circle of excusing & being guilty

——guilt as inscription that is ineffaceable, inexorable, inexonerable

+R p. 159 plus dair, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature > each letter, bit or piece of word (mors ou morceau de mot) written w/ 2 hands, twice two hands, on each page

BSi p. 334 abyss not a bottom or bottomless depth of hidden base > if there is abyss, there’s plus dun sol, plus dun seul seuil, plus dun seul seul [(no) more (than one) solid, single threshold, single single]

PLURAL/MULTIPLE

H p. 81 “at this very moment”: antinomy of laws in the plural and absolutely singular law

——there are 2 plurals, different at same time: 1) multiplicity, plural laws 2) One + a multiplicity, One + n [plus dun]

——One + n, the antinomic addition, adds conditional laws to unconditional law of hospitality

SPOM p. 109 “we” will not please Marxists, insisting on the spirt of Marxism as spirits in the plural and in the sense of specter, allowing untimely specters to come back

HERP p. 165 “voice of the friend” > a kind of oneness that does not exclude plurality

p. 188 acc. Heidegger, dual hands, dual ears [ontic?], single hands, single ears [ontological: hear, give?] > passage from plural to singular is essential

MPM p. xxiv Mémoires: changes from singular to plural, ungenders

p. 104 the 2 masculine values (singular or plural) of mémoire always suppose spatial inscription whereas la mémoire, even pluralized, does not

EM p. 135 Nietzsche: if there is style it must be plural [perhaps we need a change of “style”]

PAS PAS p. (93) dissemination does not play w/ the multiple, plural, dispersion, the apart (épars), but with the unique, the unique and itself

FSW p. 226 we must be several in order to write, even to “perceive”

T p. xxii(n) margin, march, demarcation pass btwn denegation (plurality of modes) and deconstruction (systematic unity of a spiral)

WM p. 268 because metaphoric is plural from the start, it cannot escape syntax, it organizes its division w/in syntax, cannot be what it is except in erasing itself, indefinitely constructing its destruction

ROP p. 25 to pluralize offers an emergency exit (se donner une issue de secours), until the plural kills you [re: title “Resistances”]

SP p. 139 plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

OTO p. 11 Dionysus vs. Crucified, name of versus, countername, suffices to pluralize (in a singular fashion) homonymic mask & proper name, to lead all threads of name astray in labyrinth (ear)

ATIA p. 29 transgressal experience of limitrophy, trephō, trophē, trophos: to feed limit, train, nurse, make grow, thicken, fold, divide the line, multiply/increase limit’s figures [not efface the limit]

p. 62 the animort? pluralizing animal, renouncing unification of concept, so it can’t be opposed to anything identifiable (man, the dead)

O p. 43 dissemination: doesn’t simply place plural in effervescence > il sagite de la contradiction sans fin, marked by undecidable syntax of plus

TB p. 104 Babel, exemplary: myth of myth, translation of translation > tells need for figures, tropes, for translation inadequate to compensate for what multiplicity denies us

——multiplicity of idioms limits “true” translation & is a structural order, a coherence of construct: internal limit to formalization, incompleteness of constructure > up to a certain point justified to see there translation of a system in deconstruction

CHM p. 33 Cogitos (Descartes’ is neither first nor last Cogito)

Gi p. 19 Streuung (a dissemination, a multiplication, not a multiplicity), Zerstreuung the intensive determination of the former—how can it not be contaminated by negating fall in zer-?

pp. 19-20 Dasein always interacts w/ multiple objects, not because there are many but because of Daseins originary disseminal structure, its dispersion (Zerstreuung)

Gii p. 50 hands in plural already/still either organic or technical dispersion

——Heidegger avoids reference to mirror of hands found in Kant [since Dasein only has a single hand], play of right & left > this difference can only be sensible

——Heidegger always privileges gathering: only mentions hands (in the plural) to bring them together in prayer

PIO p. 47 “the call of the other is a call to come, and that happens only in multiple voices”

RM p. 66 re-trait of metaphor > gives rise to an abyssal generalization of metaphor > trait has internal multiplicity, la structure pliée-repliée dun re-trait > opens out the borders or invaginates them

p. 80 retrait is plural, singularly plural [Nancy] in itself, divides itself, gathers up in withdrawal of withdrawal > elsewhere, Derrida called this pas

WAP pp. 203-04n necessary to think of “Philosophies of Right,” given Hegel’s constant reformulating

EJQB p. 69 Nietzsche: the poet “hides deserts w/in him”

PJP p. 166 more than 1 voice in 1 voice, dispersion, threatens concept of perjury, threatens identity, threatens concept “I”; Schlegel’s “permanent parabasis of irony”

p. 177 the 3 meanings of title Le Parjure—internal interruption, intrinsic multiplicity

D p. 304 “primitive” mythical unity always reconstituted retrospectively dans laprès-coupure > the decision, le coup (shot, throw, blow) parts the seed as it projects it (partage la semence en la projetant)

——numerical multiplicity not death threat sneaking up on unified germ, it pathbreaks (fraye la voie) for “the” seed (semence), which advances/produces (itself) in plural: singular plural

——mathematicogenetic theory of groups: [if this were intended to mean anything] nothing prior to group (no originary unity prior to division)

p. 341 text occupies place before “me,” announces me to myself—une tour de guet (watchtower) planted inside me > like a “transparent column,” pure outside: driven into that which tries to close in on itself > imagine you swallowed a cylindrical mirror, tower of Babel, bottomless plurality, not negative…also phallic [p. 342 in Zohar: “great, ungraspable columns of air”]

p. 350 polysemy multiplies w/in horizon of final parousia, temporary detours of lived passion, a signifying martyrdom of truth past or truth to come [thus, dissemination not polysemy]

p. 351 polysemy forgets its horizon is framed: difference btwn discursive polysemy and textual dissemination is difference itself

+R p. 152 [Derrida on 2 hands] > to write one must be several

C p. 237 I am myself cartouche and cartouches(s) in the plural: “I” sign myself to death as soon as there’s the title, reduce myself to first heading, capital, shrunken head

LI pp. 108-09n [re: neologism texter] signature, événement quon texte: process of iteration, like surnombre [of Dissemination], marks pluralization that fractures the event, the unique, while causing it to occur (arriver)

p. 57 differance removes from itself what was written “in its name,” removes the proper name: changes itself into more or less anonymous multiplicity

TN p. 115 for Nancy, touching is very experience of “origin” as “plural singularity” > being w/ (cum or co-), community as co-tact > se toucher soi-même, se toucher l’un l’autre ou les uns les autres

——French grammar’s tolerance of reflexiveness in plural & singular: subject of book

p. 279 for Chrétian, Christ is one, common body, not a plurality of bodies > Chrétian & Nancy deal w/ a different “yes,” or a different provenance of same “yes,” addressed to “you”

p. 284 that which can’t be sublated, the dissemination of essence (of the One) > dissemination pluralizes any singularity that allows one to say “the” touch, “the” body

p. 287 Nancy’s “there is no ‘the’…” could deprive him of any conceptual determination, or hand over the discourse to irresponsible empiricism > Socrates has been teaching us this for years

AD p. 110 unicity (absolute, irrecusable singularity) of face is plural a priori via substitution

CIN p. 41 plurality of cinders, innumerable lurks (couvait) beneath the cinder

CIR p. 101 I perjure like I breathe, whose multitude runs in the tears

POEM

MONL p. 67 do I write in the promise of a sole poem, still unheard-of language? each time I speak or write, I promise

POOF pp. 166-67 via & beyond Schmitt, der geschwisterlichen Klang (the brotherly-sisterly sound), the obscure friendship of rhyme, insane linking (appariement) of a couple, sense is born in a pair > before being philosophical, friendship concerns gift of the poem, isn’t there always a politics of a rhyme? > the rhyme can also become a traffic signal (philautie of linkage) > nothing looks more like the traffic signals of one country than those of another: this is the law > everything begins w/ Echo: rhymes sign, in cadence they seal a belonging, an ‘open gate’ [?]

SH p. 8 example offers its example only on condition it holds for no other > every poem has its [irreplaceable] “January 20th

pp. 9-10 what happens to the poem: the date > the poem is “dated,” calls itself back to the date, but it speaks! to all the others who haven’t experienced/shared singularity thus dated

p. 10 poem is due its date, owes itself to its date as inmost concern, signature, owes itself to its secret, speaks of this date only insofar as it acquits itself

p. 13 via Celan, pure poem betrays meaning (absolute poem cannot exist)

p. 18 witnessing codes, disguises of poem at once essential & inessential [re: Szondi as intimate witness of one of Celan’s poems, he knew Celan passed through Berlin at this date], poem would speak to us nonetheless, beyond its dated singularity

p. 19 date: cut or incision poem bears in its body like a memory

p. 22 readability effaces the date, the very thing which it offers for reading, date must conceal w/in itself stigma of singularity if it is to last longer (lasting is the poem), only chance of spectral return, commemoration of date’s annihilation, kind of nothing or ash > ash awaits us

p. 28 a visa is a shibboleth, that determines a theme, meaning, a poem is too [is poem an unmastered secret?]—only to show the secret forever withdrawing

——shibboleth is the shibboleth for the right to the poem which calls itself a shibboleth, Shibboleth is its title

p. 31 untranslatability connected w/ difficult passage (no pasarán), aporia, that isolates one poetic language from another (& multiplicity w/in language) > also ce pas impossible

p. 32 every poem: one time alone its own language (especially when they’re many), shibboleth

p. 35 poem—destined to remain alone: always possible there won’t be a witness of the witness

——the poem, folded and refolded in simplicity of the singular, a certain repetition makes readability possible > it signifies: there is shibboleth > there is something not shown: crypt, cipher > it speaks, the address takes place, permitting alliances, anniversaries, returns, even if there is no subsistent trace, scarcely ash

p. 37 poem speaks beyond knowledge, this is its remnance, partakes in unimpartable

pp. 39-40 via Celan, date/poem becoming no one’s, this possessive has 2 meanings that form a tragic alliance: 1) either date remains encrypted, finite survival, the survivors (readers, interpreters, guardians) of poem lose possession of it in spectral return 2) or nothing is encrypted, poem available to all, the other’s singularity is incinerated > there is no choice btwn this either/or, no contradiction, the madness, sense, chance of a poem

p. 42 given of date leaves its trace in the poem, the trace of the date is the poem

p. 43 gift of the poem, and of the date: no dialectic > condition [of poem] made up of distress, hope, shi[f]t of tones, “Weschsel der Töne [Hölderlin]

p. 44 poem’s desire or gift, the date is born, in movement of blessing, toward ash

p. 49 poet is provoked, constituted, by the hour, its caesuras > poetic rhythm or spacing at heart of origin of meaning, meaning of language

p. 52 poem, in offering itself, risks losing its time and place to the holocaustic generality of recurrence and readability of concept, the anniversary repetition of unrepeatable

——no “absolute poem,” but date (beyond calendar/clocks), madness of “when,” unthinkable Einmal (once), terrifying ambiguity of shibboleth > sign of belonging (alliance), threat of discrimination (war)

pp. 52-3 poem is a hermeneutic event, it has philosophical implications which draw out the limits of hermeneutic acuity; limit of philosophy and formal poetics not to be renounced, not a failure: they recall the forgetting of the mark’s annulment by forgetting it (by supposing date)

p. 67 Jewish language, poetic language, this essence promises itself only in dis-identification (in the expropriation of the nothing, non-essence—[ashes?])

——how can German language receiver circumcision of poem’s date following the holocaust,

the solution, the ash of all? how can you bless these ashes in German? [re: Celan]

F F p. xxxiii via Abraham, in deciphering poem, “translator” has written one: poetic translation or psychoanalytic interpretation [re: “ghost”] > clears path for other w/out unilateral privilege

——Abraham: privileged patient, the poem, the work of art, not the artist

POS POS pp. 10-1 Heidegger’s phonologism, privileging of poem over literature

P P p. 23 both Heidegger & Hegel subordinate all art to speech, poem, the said, nomination

FS FS p. 302n Rousset: poem imitates hell, world in scattered pieces

RGE RGE p. 262 for Bataille, poetry is fallen, retains metaphors from “servile domain,” but is not subordinated because it leads from known to unknown, by way of inner ruination

——via Bataille, we must find a speech which maintains silence, necessity of the impossible: to say in language (of servility) that which isn’t servile > silence (among all words) “most perverse, most poetic”

Gii Gii p. 55 for Heidegger, Gedicht is silent source of written and spoken poems (Dichtungen)

——Ein Geschlecht shelters Grundton (fundamental note), from which Gedicht of poets keeps the secret (Geheimnis) silent (schweigt)

p. 57 Heidegger’s “security (Sicherheit)”: security of good polysemy of good poets > Derrida calls this dogmatic and Aristotelian (and contradictory to other Heideggerian motifs)

p. 56 for Heidegger, philosophy & science never attain the parallelism, the cutting/breaching (into one another), of thinking/philosophy (Denken) & poetry (Dichten)

p. 58 Gedicht: place toward which poems tend acc. to a “rhythm” > unspoken, unique Ort

Heidegger’s Wechselbezug (relation of reciprocity) btwn Erörterung (discussion, awakened literalness of word, situates proper place of Gedicht) and Erläuterung (clarification, elucidation of poems [Dichtungen] themselves) > (announce unique site (Ort) of Gedicht rather than show)

——is this Wechselbezug what is called the hermeneutic circle?

p. 61 the “situation (Erörterung)” of Gedicht needs recourse to idiom of Geschlecht (Geschlecht of idiom)? how to think Gedichts belonging, appropriation to a language, to a Geschlecht

EJQB EJQB p. 66 poem: promise of the desert [?]

p. 74 poem would be nothing w/out risk of being meaningless

BSi BSi p. 227 Celan’s 2 secrets of the poem: 1) signature, genesis of poem 2) the present that doesn’t present itself

p. 263 Celan: poem needs the other, reaches, searches, addresses the other

p. 270 in Celan, “perhaps’s” withdraw poem from dimension/authority of knowledge

p. 271 Celan: poem speaks in the cause of the strange, “vielleicht in eines ganz Anderen Sache

EU EU pp. 20-1 Descartes’ writing in French has an affinity w/ poem in that the latter implies an affirmation of belonging to the “proper” language of writer [?]

p. 68 for Schelling, poetry at heart of philosophy, poem is a philosopheme

SPEC SPEC p. 407 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] poem of limping consoles for too slow step of science

POET/POETRY

FK p. 54n Heidegger on Hölderlin: sacred of poetic only opens time of apparition of the gods, is divine, does not dream a god

HERP p. 164 Heidegger: unlike gods & poets, mortals hear like those who can’t hear (als nicht-hören-können), their understanding, das Überhören, the will-not-to-hear (Überhörenwollen)

p. 185 Heidegger’s 3 experiences of hearing: 1) immortal, Erhören (hear, answer a prayer) 2) deaf ear (Überhören) of mortals 3) poet hears the ist, before or at origin of philosophy

p. 186 for Heidegger, ear is poetic (dichtende), hears in advance what it causes to burst forth, elle donne elle-même à entendre ce quelle entend [a heart?]

p. 189 for Heidegger, Heraclitus and poets [?] experience lovence (aimance), before philosophy, love w/out strife before Eros, desire, or, at least, a jealous tension

p. 212 acc. Heidegger, when conflict stops, when one doesn’t hear the unheard, being is no longer kept, becomes an object, a spectacle, in the quelled visibility of objects facing us

——seeing a decay like that which occurs to hearing, suffers when polemos is quelled, sight degenerates into optics > creators (poets, thinkers, statesmen) are no longer tolerated [Nietzsche]

p. 213 Heidegger calls the fact of not hearing (überhören) the poet that announces future being of a people: a sacrifice

knowledge of what founds is intolerable, must be, structurally, repressed, excluded, ostracized from what it founds or institutes, must not belong to it (like Rousseau)

p. 215 for Heidegger, Hölderlin’s sacrifice, which Germans have not heard, is an exemplary sacrifice, but how to respond to someone who says “You do not hear the sacrificed poet”?

EM pp. 132-33n (159-60n) Heidegger: written form exerts wholesome pressure, present world crisis needs less philosophy, more thinking, less literature, we must liberate Dichtung from literature

VM p. 145 for Heidegger, the Site, not an empirical Here but always an Illic, for Jew & for Poet

S pp. 75-6 discusses relation of Geist in Hölderlin to Hegel and Schelling, can’t be identical to metaphysical usage, even if borrowed from philosophers

p. 78 spirit as a revenant, founds history as breath of something it cannot name, return to what is to-come in Hölderlin, the poet must preserve this experience in his Gemüt

p. 79 acc. Heidegger, thoughts of spirit inhabit soul of poet, they are home there, poet gives soul rather than life, insufflates the soul

pp. 79-80 following a limit in a way where division is almost impossible because it touches both sides of limit [re: limit btwn philosophemes and the sayings of Dichter]

p. 83 Heidegger’s Gespräch w/ Trakl: language speaks in speech, speaks about itself, refers to itself by deferring itself

pp. 84-8 Heidegger on Trakl, not to understand but to listen to the sound, a distinction btwn the Erörterung (situation, thought of site, Ort) of the poet and the Erläutung (elucidating reading) of the philosopher [Heidegger never indulges in commentary]

pp. 92-3 Heidegger’s distinguishes West of Trakl from that of Platonic-Christian West via thought of Versprechen [de Man’s Die Sprache verspricht sich]

pp. 110-11 Heidegger’s resurrection to come of Menschenschlag [a third blow?], blow which saves (rettet), hymn to archi-originary, yet-to-come event, what poet sings

p. 128n from saying (sagen) to poetic saying (Dichten) to Einklang (accord of consonance) to hymn (Gesang, also gathering) to praise, prior to question

PAS PAS p. (91) Blanchot’s example of how speaking negates the existent of which it speaks: ‘This woman!’ > Hölderlin, Mallarmé, all poets, felt act of naming is marvelous/disquieting

TC p. 238 poetry must become theater, acc. Artaud

PPHS p. 91 acc. Hegel, poetry, most relevant art (time & sound), must be spoken, not read (united to conceptual representation unlike music)

SH p. 49 poet is provoked, constituted, by the hour, its caesuras > poetic rhythm or spacing at heart of origin of meaning, meaning of language

p. 52 crypt occurs, is poet’s passion (not action)

pp. 53-5 Jew as poet, as “he” w/ unpronounceable name, as witness to the universal through absolute singularity, by virtue of and in name of the other

p. 58 poetry, literature, art, experience of the mask, an intense familiarity w/ ineluctable originarity of specter = ineluctable loss of origin > spectral errancy of words not an accident

F pp. xxviii [re: Abraham’s psychoanalysis] joy of breaking wall btwn rational & irrational, condition necessary for “scientific truth and poetic truth” to belong to “same essence”

——this poetic truth not gratuitous literary estheticism, nor unveiling presence > truth is “poetic” in that it writes a text on and in a text, hieroglyph on hieroglyph

WM p. 245 Diderot: women and poets reason mostly by comparisons

p. 248n for Aristotle, poet (man of metaphor) is btwn sophist and philosopher: multiplies meaning, not for sake of deception, but to return to identity of meaning; philosopher finds truth of meaning, beyond signs and names

DS p. 196n Mallarmé: “direct simplifying instinct,” “poet translates silence”

ATIA p. 14 only poets/prophets face address of the animal, not juridical, civil men

pp. 17-8 time before time has always made “me” dizzy: God’s exposure to surprise, when God does not know what will become, what will happen when the poet names living things; Derrida feels the same way, depuis le temps, before his cat: will it/God address me?

p. 145 Aristotle: “poets tell many a lie (polla pseudontai aoidoi)”

Gii p. 57 Heidegger’s “security (Sicherheit)”: security of good polysemy of good poets > Derrida calls this dogmatic and Aristotelian (and contradictory to other Heideggerian motifs)

DST DST p. 200 thinking of translation, experience of thinking itself, its most essential & risky passage, where experience of thinking is also poetic experience: privileged examples (in Lacoue-Labarthe): Gestell, mimesis, rhuthmos

RM pp. 71-2 neighborhood (voisinage, Nachbarschaft) of Dichten and Denken: vicus, veicus, which perhaps refers to oikos and Sanskrit veca

p. 74 entamées, les deux parallèles se coupent à linfini, se recoupent, sentaillent: each one [Denken and Dichten] signs in some way in the body of the other, the one in the place (au lieu) of the other: sign there the contract w/out contract of their neighborhood

EJQB p. 64 acc. Jabès, poetic discourse est entamé dans une blessure (takes root in a wound)

p. 65 [vis-à-vis Jabès] situation of Jew exemplary for situation of poet

p. 66 wisdom of poet culminates its freedom in passion of translating obedience to the law of the word into autonomy > w/out which, and if passion becomes subjection, poet is mad

——poet & Jew: born (not here) elsewhere, autochthons only of speech & writing, of Law: sons of the land to come

p. 67 autochthons of the Book (poet, Jew)

——poetry is to prophecy what idol is to truth

p. 69 Nietzsche: the poet “hides deserts w/in him”

***——poet or Jew: protects the desert that protects his speech (can speak only in desert), his writing (traced [sillonner] only in desert) > invents unfindable/unspecifiable pathway (un chemin introuvable et inassigné) > dont aucune résolution cartésienne ne peut nous assurer la droite ligne et lissue

p. 70 to be a poet is to know how to have speech, let it speak alone, which it can do only in its written form

——to leave writing: be there only to provide its passageway (laisser le passage)

E p. 11 poet/poetry at summit of Kant’s Fine-Arts’ hierarchy: gives more than it/he promises, submits to no exchange contract, breaks circular economy

p. 12 God furnishes the poet w/ his capital, gives him surplus value & means of giving surplus-value, God is a poet

——structure of economimesis has its analogon in the city: when poet isn’t writing, he’s just a man, must eat, receives subsidies from sun-king (sustaining labor force)

p. 13 Kant’s genius poet doesn’t need to know what he is writing, nature dictates what he writes, divine production > hierarchical analogy: society of logos, sociology of genius, a logoarchy

p. 14 analogy of God and poet proceeds from and returns to logos, source as mouth and outlet (embouchure)

pp. 17-8 poetry blows up finite limits of other arts, it presents the plenitude of thought (Gedankenfülle)

——for Kant, poetry’s privilege is not just in the interiorizing structure of (mouth to ear) hearing oneself speak, but in sincerity, faithful adequation [its truth]; these values are not immediately moral > morality itself derives its value from full presence/full speech

——for Kant, the “as if” of the poet (“as if” of nature) is better, sincerer, more loyal than the “as if” of the orator, who wears a mask, deceives, his “as if” is “machine-like”

p. 18 for Kant, poet gives more than he promises, gives the truth of truth, doesn’t deceive by admitting he’s at play

——poetic speech, beyond finite commerce (out of circulation), yet of infinite value: the universal analogical equivalent, the value of values; through poetry, work of mourning turns hetero-affection into auto-affection, producing maximum of disinterested pleasure

BSi p. 218 Celan: poetry a turning of breath (Atemwende)

p. 227 poetic signature: not essence but where poem is coming/going: frees itself, by art, from art

p. 230 sovereignty of poetry (dynamics of majesty/sovereignty), hyperbolic surenchère (Bataille’s sovereignty, Nietzsche’s superman)

p. 267 [vis-à-vis Celan] poetry as way, step, coming of event, arrival

pp. 272-73 poetic revolution (beyond sovereignty [?]), revolution in revolution—minuscule dethroning of majesty exceeds knowledge > signed by repetition of “perhaps’s,” “who knows”

OG p. 277 (392) for Rousseau, though poet lacks objective truth of object, he comes closer to authenticity/literalness than rhetor/writer > poet speaks from origin of his passionate speech

p. 287 if philosophy is the invention of prose, the becoming-prose of the world, poet excluded more from writing than from city

EU p. 31 Descartes: poesy, gift of mind, not fruit of study

p. 73 Schelling: philosophy becomes truly objective only in art > an art of generalized translation

——Schelling: both poetry/philosophy require self-produced original image (Bild) of world

FV pp. 467-68 Lacan’s highly classical interpretation of mimesis: Dichtung as detour toward truth, more truth in fiction, fiction manifests the truth [i.e. for Lacan, truth is not a fiction]

POINT(s)

R p. 100 sovereignty: silent and unavowable, betrays democracy, the stigmatic point of an indivisible instant

H p. 111 mourning is not allowed without a fixed (arrêté) place, monument, determinable topos, stopping point (arrêt) > promised w/out taking place, only possible mourning is an impossible one

BL p. 216 most difficult points [the question of Kafka]

HASD p. 57 for Heidegger, gathering of Geviert takes place in an indivisible topos, simplicity of point [of sword]: “the place (Ort) gathers toward itself at the greatest height and extremity”

A p. 15 border as limit (oros, Grenze, re: nun or Jetzt [now-point] Heidegger underlines) or border as tracing (grammē, Linie)

***p. 53 methodological urgency in being-toward-death: we can only start from here (len deça) (not Platonic, Christian), ontico-ontological priority of Dasein, “exemplary” point of departure (that we are hear to question & wait, expect each other)

VM p. 136 if Being is taken as unitary focal point of possibility of existence, predication, of copula > does not belong to realm of predication [I believe Derrida amends this stance later]

PP p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

PAS PAS p. (41) Blanchot: “at the highest point of contradiction, I was this illegitimate dead person”

VP p. 51 “sharp point of the instant”: identity of lived-experience present to itself

p. 52 if punctuality of instant is a myth, a spatial or mechanical metaphor, an inherited metaphysical concept, if presence of presence isn’t simple, all of Husserl’s logic is threatened

pp. 52-3 Heidegger claims that Husserl, in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, breaks from Aristotelian concept of time as “point,” “now,” stigmē; Derrida clarifies that Husserl admits that lived-experience, spread out in “now’s,” never have a punctual phase, while always referring them back to a “source-point,” like a comet’s tail

p. 54 Husserl’s punctual now, archi-form, Ur-form, not simple self-identity of present

p. 71 “source-point,” “originary impression” which produces temporalization, is auto-affection

OH pp. 24-5 Europe: representation or figure of a universal idea; has confused its face, figure, w/ a point, a phallus; the idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, eidos, archē, telos, the idea of beginning, commanding, cap, captain, towards an accomplished end

——advanced point is at once beginning and end, divided as beginning and end (Heidegger on Ort as point of spear, and fromm, Frömmigkeit, from promos, what leads, lavant-garde)

p. 27 identification is always cultural never natural, always has a capital form, advanced point, capitalizing reserve

p. 33 capital as cutting edge of progress (à la pointe du progrès), universalizing model, everyone joins at the head

pp. 52-3 word “avant-garde” [see pp. 25, 48-50]: capitalizes on figurehead, phallic point, advanced initiative of guarding, anticipating to conserve, thus “avant-garde position”

FSW p. 216 Freud: psychic locality corresponds to an Ort, where image comes into being, ideal point, no tangible component of microscope [Freud admits imperfection of this imagery]

p. 224 writing as trace survives scratch’s present, punctuality, stigmē

PPHS p. 80 Hegel: productive imagination as welding Mittelpunkt (site where opposites pass into one another) [Heidegger’s gathering Ort?]

SH p. 69n Baudelaire: “there is no point more piercing than that of the infinite”

p. 22 readability effaces the date, the very thing which it offers for reading, date must conceal w/in itself stigma of singularity if it is to last longer (lasting is the poem), only chance of spectral return, commemoration of date’s annihilation, kind of nothing or ash > ash awaits us

F p. xxxv “conservative” repression installs in the unconscious what the Self treats as an exquisite corpse, a “surrealism” of folded sentences loses its creases, the paper flattens out, and there is a spot (lieu) of pleasure disguised as pain, which the therapist must exhume

DS p. 211 dialectic is beginning and end of philosophy, Mallarmé marks it w/ his syntax at the point of its sterility [MOP] > a point that will be called, analogically, provisionally, undecidable

pp. 220-21 hymen in text (crime, sexual act, incest, suicide, simulacrum) inscribed at very tip (à la pointe) of indecision

p. 240 Mallarmé: “passing butterfly leaves a bit of sharp ingenuous nothing” —about to break through hymen

pp. 240-41 pirouette at one point—at “philosophical point,” at stigmē, here—already at another point (unties/divides along same line)

p. 242 syntax of point and pas

***p. 271 Mallarmé: all method is a fiction” > point de méthode—still a marching order (marche à suivre) > la dissémination dans le repli de lhymen, pas de méthode pour elle > [no circle-path to first step]

OS p. 36 Hegel: now [point] has tremendous right (ein ungeheures Recht), it is nothing as individual Now, as I pronounce it, the proudly exclusive now dissolves, flows away, falls into dust

——acc. Heidegger, [MOP] privilege of form of “now” and “point”

pp. 41-2 space becomes concrete by retaining/restoring negative w/in itself, by negating itself

——1st negative determination of space is the POINT (the place that does not take place), it then negates itself in relation the LINE > als sich aufhebend, point is the line, the Being-spatial of point > then comes the PLANE (surface) > each next stage only made of the negated prior stage, i.e. line made of negated points

——“always too late to ask the question of time” re: spatialization

——each stage of Aufhebung is time

p. 43 point & time thought in circularity together (Aufhebung, speculative negativity, only possible by means of infinite correlation or reflection) > time is spacing, space is time > thus for Aristotle, stigmē, punctuality, determines nowness (nun, jetzt)

p. 45 can’t extract thematic of Verfallen (re: time in Hegel & Heidegger) from ethicotheological orb, unless léchéance de lorbe redirected, in the void, toward un point de chute plus écarté (see DS)

p. 55 impossibility of one point being w/ another point w/out temporalization > w/ of spatial coexistence arises only out of w/ of temporalization

p. 56 for Aristotle, being-together [of nun and stigmē] not a determination of Being but very production of Being > ama as the pivot (cheville) (clavis), the key opening & closing metaphysics > this complicity so self-effacing as to barely be noticed, the common origin of space & time

p. 57 Aristotle: points like nows (cannot occur w/ other points, other nows)

pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

——this would be a gramme that erases its tracing in a circle, removes limit of point

p. 61 like “point: line,” now as limit (peras) is only time’s accident, time not thought on basis of now, thus mathematization of time has limits (always accidents/potentialities) [taken in all senses]

POS POS p. 42 double, interval, biphase, biface, bifurcated writing can only be marked in a grouped textual field, not in a punctual position, not w/ a single author

SP SP p. 39 fine point (of spur) cannot be honed (effiler) in single stroke (coup)

PS PS p. 172 Hölderlin, Mallarmé: inspiration is the pure point at which it is missing [quoted from Blanchot]

p. 194 Derrida on how the question he posed (like throwing a net around entire textual network) forced the substitution of discourse for the punctuality of the position

DIF DIF p. 12 use words for their strategic convenience to deconstruct at most decisive point

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

——point of ontotheological fusion reduces precipitation & after-affect (dehiscence btwn vouloir-dire & writing, anticipation & recapitulation) to sublatables [mouvement de tête]

p. 26 “la dissémination traitesur lit (doctors, reads, on bed)le point où le mouvement de la signification viendrait régulièrement lier le jeu de la trace en produisant ainsi lhistoire

——dissemination blows up (saute) security of point, arrested in name of the law: it is at the risk, to risk this blowup (to make this jump, faire sauter) that dissem. broaches/has been broached

***DPi pp. 221-22 DP speaks in 3rd person present (can’t say: “I am no more”), copula signifies instantaneous passage from being to nothingness (“he is no more”): stigmē, Most High, Last Judgment, God’s verdict (always instant of death of a 3rd party, never me, you, us)

pp. 237-39 unlike Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida asks question of DP before death > pre-comprehending indubitable separation of state of life from state of death calculated by other, by 3rd party, common sense: the point, blade of knife, instant of passing, stigmē of a point; how could we know this clear-cut, sharp limit?

——calculable credit granted to word “death” indexed to presuppositions in which “capital punishment” finds its place: where it’s indissociable from murder/suicide

TB p. 122 for Benjamin, fleeting (flüchtig), infinitely small point of contact where 2 bodies of text touch > movement of love: “pass into its own language the mode of intention of the original”

CHM p. 56 hyperbolical (mad) audacity of Cartesian Cogito (critical experience of which we may be too self-assured to experience): return to original point, zero point, where determined meaning & nonmeaning come together in their common origin

——(Foucault’s narration imbedded w/in impenetrable point of certainty, as are all projects of thinking totality by escaping it) > can only escape, w/in existence, in direction of infinity or nothingness, this margin of the possible: not human (as in anthropological factuality, but demonic/metaphysical), first awakens to itself in war w/ evil genius, resists him by reducing natural man w/in: nothing less reassuring than Cogito at its proper and inaugural moment

pp. 56-7 Cogito, exceeding totality of world like epekeina tes ousias (Glaucon: “Lord what demonic hyperbole (daimonias hyperboles)?” [banally translated as “marvelous transcendence”]

——this demonic hyperbole more excessive than hybris, passion > opens, founds, makes possible

p. 57 doubt & Cartesian Cogito punctuated by “unprecedented” excess, overflows totality (beings, factual history, determined meanings)

——to place w/in determined historical structure risks dulling point itself (doing violence)

RGE p. 253 for Bataille, laughter is extreme point of “experience,” makes Hegelian discourse dislocate itself > must know what one’s laughing at, a complicity w/out reserve

p. 263 Bataille: find words to reintroduce sovereign silence—at a point, interrupt articulated language

***p. 276 reactionary movement & revolutionary movement: too full of meaning (via Aufhebung), these contradictions lack pertinence, at a very determined point [Bataille’s sovereign point?]

——one understands nothing about strategy if one renounces any regulation of ascertaining nonpertinence (if one puts it in the hands of the left or the right)

Gii p. 60 Ort as point of spear (die Spitze des Speers), first & foremost has power of gathering

——“everything concurs and conveys toward the point,” site always a site of gathering

——acc. Heidegger, great poet resists forces of dissemination or dislocation, privilege granted to unicity, value of gathering (indivisibility [?])

REST p. 255 [epigraph] “POINTURE (Latin punctura), synonym for prick, blade that fixes page to be printed on tympan, hole which it makes in the paper

p. 261 interlacing of interruption points, a purely faked multiplicity [Derrida confessing about the multiple voices, the dialogue occurring in essay?], periods remain w/out destination, but they have authority in common [cf. ATM how do interruptions interlace?]

***p. 264 point does not bring foot in contact w/ a surface, doesn’t spread out on a surface (the soles, the ground)—surface is lower than the foot, goes lowest (Derrida’s never examined this)

pp. 267-68 from Van Gogh’s shoes to Freud’s show fetish to Bataille’s “Big Toe” > from market de la pointure (of sizes), rising/falling stocks, to speculation on Bataille [general economy]

p. 274 by owing the truth, one restitutes it, identifying as assigning points or proper size (pointure)

p. 304 how can we distinguish 2 textures of invisibility from each other, piercing (trouant) all this [the frame’s hole in the canvas, the painted shoes’ eyelets] w/ a single pointure?

——i.e. nails in painting, pointure (Klee paints his nails in Constructif-impressionnant)

p. 308 to make fit, at all costs, forcing things, violence, sharpen to a point: give in

——[Derrida’s countermeasure] detachment & détaille (TN. cutting into pieces, taking away the size or measure from something)

pp. 325-26 Derrida’s “close reading,” a policing, “if police there is (and isn’t there always),” played out via the size (pointure) of a comma, that which separates “pair” (of shoes) from “the product” > not a temporal interval but a syntactic fact

p. 357 fort/da not a relation of opposition, each notion offers an eyelet to be traversed by the other, to the figure or the pointure of the other (Heidegger’s playing w/ the bobbin)

p. 361 putting shoes on acc. to its own size (sa pointure)? unconscious of Shapiro/Heidegger puts something of his own (sien) in them? > no, à la pointure du fantôme (the ghost’s size), of the unconscious of the other, in the final account (tout compte fait)

p. 376 disparate: that which opens up fort: da of shoe size (pointure), possibility of dis-pairing, play of dis/appearing > double, Doppelgänger, not pair (unadaptable to walking [à la marche])

PIO PIO pp. 12-3 for de Man, irony is structure of instant: “climaxes in…single brief moment of a final pointe” (“a synchronic structure”); allegory (other face of irony) unfolds in diachronic of narrative

D D p. 295 Derrida’s text: re-marks passage [in Soller’s], repeats square by closing angle, opens another surface of writing to-come: play w/ cardo, hinge, cardinal points; remarque dangle: all lines broken

p. 344 contraction into a dot (point), to where everything is present but nothing exists, pleroma, Orphic explanation [?], “drama of God,” zimzum, God going out of himself takes place [can find this in Hegel] > repetition of absolute present or undifferentiated origin

EL EL pp. 203-04 secularize (desacralize): remove point, sting (Stachel), apocalyptic thorn of language > sting, this teleological aim (visée), institutes sacredness of language > this sacred language (Hebrew) would be nothing w/out magnetized pointer of apocalypse (cette pointe aimantée dapocalypse)

LI LI p. 49 iterability disrupts presence, unity of ego in sender, du maintenant-écrivain (grasping w/ 1 hand his ballpoint pen) > stigmè of every mark already split

TN TN p. 42 for Nancy, always about touching the limit, the extreme, tip, point, that which can’t be touched

p. 120 philosophy—idealization, intuitionism as philosophy itself, where seeing the blind spot, a point, is touching it > fullness of immediate presence: actuality of what se donne en acte, energetically, effectively: hapto-tropologic metaphysics comes to its plenitude, pleroma

p. 131 always writing a story, tangent touches line/surface w/out intersection, a tangent touches one point, point is nothing, a limit w/out depth or surface, untouchable even as a figure

p. 152 hierarchy/teleology [au sommet]: willing subject, quasi-sense that is touch (ultrasense), the hand [the whole hand, not just tip of an extremely pointy fingernail (ongle extrêmement aigu)]

p. 369n Bergson: all philosophers see one point, a contact more than vision

——Nancy might add, the point is not a point (indivisible), but the point, punctuality, is divisible, a touchable limit, spacing forever

p. 293 exigo, ex-ago: to push, finish, require (exiger), on time [punctual]

pp. 306-07 eyes meet, infinitely, mouths in contact [unsatisfied w/ insipid figures, however interesting/necessary], thought begins, jusquà labîme, plunging Narcissus into abyss: makes day or night possible > day and night themselves promising each other, au point du jour

BSi BSi p. 175 point dintraduisibilité (point of untranslatability, no untranslatability [at all]): no pure translation or untranslation (I can spend a page explaining what can’t be translated)

pp. 200-01 Valéry wagers on CAP: le cap Pensée; the high point (comble) of internal politics, a multipli-city of selves, when the excess that exceeds un-counts the other & outside > jealousy is always the hight point that completes me, supplements me because receives, welcomes, no longer chases out other in me: one only ever jealous of oneself, the selfsame > explains all the loves and wars (which take place btwn the same, the others as the same): as soon as there’s a double capitalized phallic erection (CAP, standing, being on a cape) here called Thought

pp. 259-60 division or parting of pinpoint (punctuality of now) in Celan

OG OG p. 85 simultaneity is still linear because it brings two absolute points of presence together

***p. 336n Lévi-Strauss: proper names are a quanta of signification below which all people do is point > this zero degree of language, pointing, “sensible-certitude”: a myth effaced by play of difference

p. 110 (162) death, violence, impossibility of pure point, “point vocative,” death of absolutely proper naming (the other as pure other) is death of pure idiom

p. 266 language couples prohibition & transgression endlessly, point of nonreplacement doesn’t exist > that which is elusive in our indestructible & mortal desire

pp. 279-80 (396-97) neume, epoch of natural languages: fête autour du point deau, temps de lIsle de Saint-Pierre [?]: limage fixant ce qui ne fut quun point de pur passagela limite toujours déjà franchie, rèpere absolu

POLEMIC [fixerup]

FWT p. 7 Derrida doesn’t want deconstruction to be used to denigrate, injure, diminish necessity of force of movement, and if it is necessary to do so in polemics, he regrets it in advance

DST DST p. 209 Lacoue-Labarthe is not panting, harried, he is hunting (traque) (polemos w/out polemics) the most powerful thoughts of our tradition

RM p. 54 RM not in a polemical spirit: it’s often because I subscribe to Ricouer’s propositions (whose text he can’t do justice) that I protest > they’re already there in what I wrote

LI p. 36 Derrida introduces Sarl (société à responsabilité limitée), wrong to find his discourse polemical > desires & phantasms at stake in proper name, signature, copyright

p. 41 Sarl’s loyalty & absence of simulation so rare in French-language polemics (a strategy that is artful, indirect)

p. 112 what symptoms can this polemical “scene” make legible?

p. 140 Derrida refuses insults, too much the norm, come all too easily

POLICE

FL p. 276 death penalty as right to law, testifies that law is a violence contrary to nature, something “rotten” at the heart of law; police are a more spectral version of death penalty

p. 277 police are the force of law, contamination of founding/preserving [force of law/Kafka’s Attendants, Foucault-like]

pp. 278-79 for Benjamin, iterability precludes great founders, initiators, lawmakers (or “great” poets for Heidegger), preserves law, thus police become figure of this iterability

——police, index of ghostly violence, exemplary figure, figures w/out limit, w/out face or figure, not simply in uniform, a formless (gestaltlos) violence, all-pervasive specter

p. 280 police becoming technologically autonomous (invade all homes)

——spirit as police hauntings, spirit as dictatorship

p. 281 via Benjamin, police violence of industrial democracies denies its own principle, democratic power would have no other name than police

H p. 67-71 Kant against lying, duty to speak truth comes from freedom & pure intentionality of subject, but it introduces police everywhere (in our internal cellphones, our emails, most secret faxes of our private lives)

——w/out right to lie > Kant subordinates rights of the home

LOBL p. 105 all organized narration, a matter for the police, narrative voice surpasses police investigation, if possible

A p. 11 border becomes a problem as soon as edge-line is threatened, a step crossing an indivisible line (customs, police, visa—all established upon institution of indivisibility or identity of line)

POOF pp. 166-67 via & beyond Schmitt, der geschwisterlichen Klang (the brotherly-sisterly sound), the obscure friendship of rhyme, insane linking (appariement) of a couple, sense is born in a pair > before being philosophical, friendship concerns gift of the poem, isn’t there always a politics of a rhyme? > the rhyme can also become a traffic signal (philautie of linkage) > nothing looks more like the traffic signals of one country than those of another: this is the law > everything begins w/ Echo: rhymes sign, in cadence they seal a belonging, an ‘open gate’ [?]

PAS PAS pp. (99-100) in a moment of extreme, precipitous virtuosity, where o (mort, fors, faux, faut, zéro, mot) resonates everywhere and nom turns to mon, Derrida asks himself if his policing overzealousness [to unmask the absence of the name, le pas-de-nom] deciphers identities [maur/chot, m’: o], wants to catch everything in a dragnet (filet)

p. (105) [re: Blanchot] name we know him by can serve as a hiding place (cache), throw readers off track into complacency of police investigation > thus plus de nom

SH pp. 32-3 tragic inversion of shibboleth, corruption of its differential value, from condition of alliance to discriminating limit, policing, normalization, methodical subjugation

p. 68 because one can make use of shibboleth, it can be turned against oneself, the circumcised are proscribed, held at border, excluded, reduced to ashes, in the mere name

DPi p. 48 w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

REST pp. 325-27 Derrida’s “close reading,” a policing, “if police there is (and isn’t there always),” played out via the size (pointure) of a comma, that which separates “pair” (of shoes) from “the product” > not a temporal interval but a syntactic fact

——he is operating against another police, another ideological arrangement

——the police who lock you outside the text (enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte): the pre-text of perception, of living speech, of bare hands (mains nue), of living creation, of real history, etc. (subject you to the oldest, most dogmatic, most sinisterly authoritarian of programs, the most massive mediatizing machines)

p. 331 comes down to a decision about the frame, a border (bordure) which is double in its trait: joins together what it splits (partage): “at stake are (il y va) all the interests caught up in the trial (procès) of this split (partage),” what separates external from internal > a police inquiry, inquiry into the police: police always more & other than what one might want to limit under this name

p. 363 police, Shapiro, Dupin, restitution

TR p. 104 police, prosecutors, torturers know jubilatory pleasure of handling confession machines

LI p. 52 associating non-present w/ restance adds spectacular blinking-effect to warning light: rhythm of blinking essential to mark

pp. 99-100 another parasitic/fictional structure can always be added, “supplément de code” > everything becomes possible against the language-police

——never be able to de-limit object-fiction/object-parasite except by another counter-fiction

p. 105 always police & tribunal there when a rule is invoked [re: context, event, signature], because conventions can be violated (in themselves and by fictionality that constitutes them)

p. 106 psychiatric expert in service of State & its police

pp. 132-33 every police (red light) is not repressive: law not necessarily tied to negativity, prohibition, repression

p. 135 every institution designed to enforce the law is a police (i.e. the Academy), doesn’t have to be physical, can be “spiritual,” can be more noble

pp. 138-39 a repressive police can only be opposed by another police, reference to a more just police

p. 159n repressive police on border btwn alleged academic freedom, press, & state power > a kind of academic “interpol”

CF p. 14 Benjamin’s police w/out borders—faceless, formless specter of its ghostly apparition extends endlessly

——Derrida not launching unjust, utopic discourse of suspicion against police, especially in their fight against drug-trafficking, terrorism, mafias

LG p. 232 brutal, mercilessly depleting selectivity—a certain police brutality an accomplice to concern for professional competence

OG p. 301 (426) writing of voice, une meilleure police (civil order [?]) > also a machine of death

ATAP pp. 70-1 Kant’s University tribunal or police of metaphysical integrity

p. 89 apocalypse a challenge to maintenance of order (la police) of destination, la police postale, to the monopoly of posts

EU p. 11 need to bring more clarity to the understanding of a language is both a juridical & philosophical pursuit (policing too)

——decree re: move from Latin to French: no more alibi of ignorance to law, no more ambiguity or uncertainty before French laws written so clearly

p. 221 destination not thesis/theme or category > what happens to question “what is?” when it’s measured against destination? > strategic force of this question, “lever,” even polemological: new military-industrial complex strategies should be included/welcomed by CIPH

POLITENESS [fixerup]

POO p. 7 duplicity in a ceremony, being-double, “hollows itself out in an infinite abyss:” one is neither friendly nor polite if one obeys the rules

——should not be polite or friendly out of duty (aus Pflicht), proposition ventured against Kant

p. 20 nonresponse as form of politeness, responsible form of vigilant exercise of responsibility > one cannot or one ought not to fail to respond (ought/can strangely co-implicated, perhaps)

SW pp. 323-24n complaint (of exhaustion) & accusation lodged against matrix of discourse of veil

——complain about myself to myself: immodesty, impudence > but veil makes modest

——complaint: give up all modesty, most elementary politeness

LI p. 113 “Politeness and politics” could have been subtitle of Limited Inc

——Derrida worked to make legible (philosophical, political, ethical) axiomatics hidden under code of academic discourse > brutality of both politeness & impoliteness

WOG p. 20n to be polite and not speak about yourself could be excuse for haughty detachment

POLITICAL ECONOMY

GT p. 28 most serious stake of political economy: certain social classes have more time than others; but time cannot be given, it is certainly not time that they possess

pp. 116-7 Mallarmé links aesthetics w/ political economy via alchemy: alchemy as precursor to political economy, “null stone, dreaming of gold, once called philosophical…foreshadows, in finance, the future credit, preceding capital or reducing it to the humility of money!”

DS pp. 172, 286 Mallarmé describes a genealogy from philosopher’s elixir to the null stone, the philosopher dreaming of gold, foreshadowing future credit—preceding capital; alchemy as the precursor to political economy (triumphing over aesthetics, the other pathway of our mind)

PIO p. 40 homogenization of civil & military tech, private or governmental programming (of sciences, of arts)—is homogenization itself > it’s at work before integration of aleatory other, an integration achieved in political economy, this modern invention, the mirror of Leibniz’s games of chance, “a new species of logic”: chance acquires meaning in an economic horizon

pp. 44-5 “our current lassitude results from the invention of the same & the possible, from the invention that is always possible”

E p. 2 Kant allies pure morality w/ empirical culturalism in critique of pure judgments of taste

——a politics (a political economy) acts upon his discourse

CF pp. 11-2 juridical tradition remains ‘mean-minded,’ restrictive, because under control of demographico-economic interests (Nation-State regulating asylum)

BSi p. 207 sovereign, highest, most eminent capital or capitalization, monopolizes force/violence—Gewalt—gives reason in advance to force through right

POLITICS / POLITICAL

KH pp. 103-04 khōra as abyss, mise en abyme, gaping hole, not exactly chaos or fright, but not Gaia, foundation, either > abyss in encyclopedic logic [of Timaeus], regulates all sites (lieux) on its edges (jobs in society, region, territory, country)

p. 104 mise en abyme of discourse on khōra, site of politics, politics of sites

pp. 117-18 Socrates’ desire to animate representation of political, of ideal State, by seeing it at war, in relation to death, outside of its graphical hallucination (immobility) which is the only way poets, & Sophists can speak of politics [zoographic fiction, see p. 123]

MONL p. 23 master does not have exclusive possession of anything, only possesses, usurps unnaturally, rapes, colonizes through “unnatural process of politico-phantasmatic constructions”

R p. 15 questions of politics must pass through desire and pleasure

FL pp. 257-58 politicization is interminable but not total, each advance in politics demands we rethink their calculation; this holds true for classical emancipatory ideal which cannot be maintained today w/out producing the worst complicities

p. 282 via Benjamin, politics of compromise: denegation of open violence [LOBL p. 145]

AF p. 4n no political power w/out control of archive, memory (patriarch)

SPOM p. xviii to learn-to-live w/ ghosts, in commerce w/out commerce of ghosts

——being-with specter a politics of memory, inheritance and generations

p. 124 via Marx, politicians are seers, visionaries, they form alliances to conjure away “specter of communism”; alliance signifies: death to the specter

POOF pp. ix-xi the 3 meanings of political crime: 1) assassinations that litter History 2) crime in which political being of politics is constituted [Schmitt, force of law] 3) crime that reduces politics to something else, crime against man qua political animal > w/in these crimes, infinite abysses of imputability, edges of juridical, techno-biological, are we sure we can distinguish btwn death & killing? btwn homicide & genocide? why should a question of # persist in these questions?

——as if nothing can be thought except btwn guilt, responsibility, compassion, testaments and specters (between these imputable crimes)

pp. 2-3 for Cicero, 2 types of friendship: ‘true & perfect’ vs. ‘vulgar & mediocre’ > friendship is rare, requires selection, classically associated w/ familiarity, proximity, oikeiótēs: such logic extends into all political models of res publica

p. 28 after Nietzsche’s upheaval of “O my friends…”—is this even politics anymore?

p. 91 for Plato, ideal state only occurs when philosopher (that is, justice) is bound to power > though this is out of reach, it must be described, because ideal gives meaning to every term/concept of political philosophy

pp. 94-5 the pledge (la parole donnée) before the living dead must recall the political principle: politeía forms men, it’s not a consequence of this aristocratic equalization > politics is that which forms men, regulates itself in its laws re: nature, eugenics, education

pp. 95-6 in Menexenus, birth from same mother, one mother, cause for political excellence

p. 196 if Montaigne’s disproportion of sovereign friendship is translated into the political, wouldn’t that endanger Aristotle’s principle of autarky, equality, mutuality [?] > but our question is always about political translation: is the political a universal translating machine?

MPM p. 143 via de Man, word “political” is allegorical, excessive “politicism” in deconstruction

p. 144 de Man: the incompatibility of grammar & meaning becomes explicit when linguistic structures are stated in political terms [on the grammar, historicity of law]

A p. 59 Heidegger’s existential analysis has no competence for dealing w/ political problems of burial, cult of the dead

——no politics of death properly speaking [p. 42 no culture either]

pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

EM p. 112 political concepts drawn from metaphysical reserves [re: fact that a prohibition of philosophical colloquium would prove its meaningfulness in said political framework]

VM p. 121 phenomenology neutralizes political commandments, foreign to all hierarchies, opened to infinity # of evident-truths

p. 141 a politics of “philosophy” or “metaphysics” w/out Heidegger’s thought of Being stuck in economy of violence btwn archia and an-archy

PAS PAS p. (80) political consequence of “materialist theses” marking time in, trampling (piétinent) on metaphysics

S p. 6 geistig and geistlich are modalities of Geist that bring privilege to the political

OH p. 40 new topology re: capital, no longer linked to polis, “quasi-political”

p. 41 ethics, politics, responsibility only begin in aporia of double injunction

p. 52 [summary of political responsibility today] denounce divergences btwn principle and the determined limits of their representation > task always urgent, infinite > identity instituted in responsibility as experience/experiment of the response

p. 100 “new censorship” combines concentration & fractionalization: accumulation & privatization > depoliticizes in every informing of a “fact”

p. 109 one day the day today (visibility of image, publicity of public) will not be the ratio essendi of the political

FWT p. 11 nothing serious in politics w/out “hairsplitting,” that sharpens, not intimidated by impatience of the media

p. 21 Derrida wants to dissociate political & territorial [re: communitarian/identitarian politics]

p. 97 technology [telephone, Internet, stock market] dissociates political field from territorial & national field > new concept of political is being forged

DPi p. 23 to think DP, must think history/horizon of sovereignty as hyphen in theologico-political

p. 87 Schmitt, significantly, says his theory is not a theory of state but a theory of the political, the founding of the constitution (Verfassungslehre) (theory of state presupposes theory of the political)

PIO p. 10 invent by producing new operational possibility (printing or nuclear weaponry) > politics of invention à la fois politics of culture & war

pp. 27-8 status of invention via politics of patent, programming of patented inventions (even integrating margin of chance)—are programmed inventions still inventions? still open to future?

p. 37 juridical mechanisms re: patenting inventions are also inventions

——Convention of Paris 1883: artist invents what cannot incur industrial exploitation

——Leibniz, modern politics of invention: master the aleatory

HLP pp. 65-6, 292n Arendt places man in his “singularity” outside of political, “unpolitical by nature”

PSSS p. 265 secrecy delimits political authority [re: institution of psychoanalysis]

TN p. 269 lexicon of touch risks being ruined by abusive spending (dépense absuive) > an eschatological, postwar inflation (desperate call for new “era,” “provenance”) > apocalyptic symptomatology of “deconstruction of Christianity”: all we speak is “touching”

EW p. 272 subject is also a principle of calculability, for the political, for the current concept of democracy

AD p. 61 “ethics beyond the political”: interruption of self (in phenomenology, by phenomenology itself), phenomenology surprises, suspends itself > paradoxical reverting to “ethics beyond the political”

p. 83 politics follows, comes “after,” an injunction that transcends politics [re: Levinas’ peace]

p. 99 Levinas’ border btwn ethical/political loses for good indivisible simplicity of a limit

CF p. 43 equivocality, heterogeneity, confusion btwn order of forgiveness & order of justice [juridical] > one can mimic scene of “immediacy,” quasi-automatic forgiveness, to escape justice

——forgiveness has nothing to do w/ [State] judgment or public/political sphere

***p. 55 a politics that would respect the secret (that which exceeds the political or is no longer in juridical domain): democracy to come

BSi p. 16 every law (contract, authority, credit) not necessarily political

pp. 25-26 man is btwn divine/animal as political animal—life outside politics either much worse or much better (acc. Aristotle)

——[how can politics rise above the natural while also being a monstrous, bestial fable?]

p. 26 political sovereignty as the fable of a monstrous animal is prosthetic, prostatic, prosthstatic: supplement that supplements nature by adding an artificial organ, here the state

p. 290 trap of sovereignty, trap of transfer of sovereignty > in all these fictions and simulacra blood flows, no less cruelly, irreversibly: beast & sovereign bleed, so do marionettes

——political revolution w/out poetic revolution of political > just a transfer of sovereignty

IF p. 304 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] Spinoza exposed illusion of figures in politics & religion

FV p. 449 politics of ostrich [see also pp. 436, 453]

p. 453 [proper] address of letter: law that binds King & Queen

——there are only ostriches, the more one presents one’s rear, the more one is master: can’t avoid being plucked (laisser plumer)

POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP

POOF p. vii POOF is preliminary rather than problematic

p. viii a friendship/politics ‘beyond the principle of fraternity’? > the political rarely announces itself w/out State enforcing schematic of filiation (stock, genus, species, sex, blood)

p. x count, number, calculate: acc. Aristotle, friends must be small in #, what’s small?

——democracy counts votes & subjects, but doesn’t/shouldn’t count ordinary singularities: no numerus clausus for arrivants

p. 3 familiarity (oikeiótēs, in Plato’s Lysis) (being-at-home, being-close-to oneself) links friendship w/ laws & logics of universalization, ethics, law, right, equality, equity, democracy

***——small in # doesn’t characterize friends, it counts those we are speaking of, cites the exemplary, naming the rare illuminates, projects name’s renown beyond death

count friends—madness looms (in every teleiopoetic event), plus de sens, empty resembles overflow

p. 6 the question who or what is the friend? a protestation in name of the friend, in name of the name: resists reduction to dominant concept of political, ethical, ontophenomenological > a political allure that is not so political

p. 7 when Aristotle, in Eudemian Ethics, declares it is more worthwhile re: friendship to love than to be loved, justice & politics are at stake

p. 8 via Aristotle, general opinion that the properly political creates most friendships possible

p. 12 via Aristotle, loving the dead (beyond death, beyond life), carries philía to limit of its possibility, also its ultimate resource: horizon is limit & absence of limit, loss of horizon on the horizon, ahorizontality of horizon > I feel myself [autology], before any contract, borne to love dead other

p. 13 the irreducible dissymmetry btwn hypothesis of shared friendship & idea that love can (must) survive the friend’s death—a doubling fold: friend bears our proper death, expropriates it, he bears my death & inherits it as the last survivor

***p. 21 (39) via Aristotle, in economy of time, even in the instant, plenitude of enérgeia linked to #: friendship must count but resists enumeration, quantification (# isn’t forbidden but the numerous, the crowd, is) > for a finite being, test of friendship is an endurance of arithmetic

——no belonging or friendly community w/out selection, w/out election

p. 22 wound opens w/ necessity to count one’s friends, democracy’s 2 irreducible laws: 1) respect for irreducible singularity or alterity 2) calculation of majorities, representable subjects, all equal

——mais là où tout autre est également tout autre > political desire borne by this disjunction, bears chance of future of democracy, divided virtue, inadequate to itself, chaos opening in silence

——no virtue, w/out the tragedy of # w/out #, perhaps more unthinkable than tragedy

p. 23 via Aristotle, how can we reconcile equality, stability, of friendship w/ the virtue of friendship? > virtue as that which doesn’t have reliability of the natural thing or a machine

pp. 27-8 Nietzsche’s upheaval (soulèvement), interruption of Aristotle’s “O my friends…”, a seismic wave, a revolution of the political (more discreet than revolutions known under the name): refuses “accepted propriety of its [“O my friends…”] paradox,” counter-testimony

p. 28 via Nietzsche’s fool, thought of friendship to come lends itself to madness

pp. 32-3 that there can only be friends w/ enemies, that when one desires enemies, we can only count friends—madness looms (in every teleiopoetic event), plus de sens, empty resembles overflow

***p. 35-6 Nietzsche’s new philosophers are friends of solitude (singularity), love cutting ties, uncompromising, w/out proximity, w/out presence, w/out resemblance: not a secret society—it’s exactly the classical concept of the secret they rebel against

pp. 35-7, 39 friends of solitude, jealous friends of solitude, jealous of his secret w/out secret, share what can’t be shared, jealous of ‘proper & profound solitude of midday-midnight’ [of singularity]: beyond good conscience, friendship w/ new philosophers

pp. 42-3 already of perhaps paradoxical force of teleiopoetic propulsion: makes arrivant come by withdrawing, produces an event > teleiopoesis also defines a structure of political allocution, a politics of friendship, a ‘great politics’

——politics of friendship, Nietzsche’s ‘great politics,’ different from politics of opinion (dogma)

***——friends of the perhaps are friends of truth: the friends of truth are w/out truth > impossible to be the truth, to be with the truth, to have it, can only be friends w/ it: incalculable equality of friends of solitude

***——not an abstaining from political, even if anchorite plays scarecrow, such a person overpoliticizes space of city

p. 49 responsibility to countersign ‘Friends, there are no friends’: its destiny rides on the event of a response that has come from its addressees

p. 52 Nietzsche’s benediction (Amen) “Shall we do this, friends, again?”

pp. 52-3 Nietzsche’s counterculture of knowing-how-to-keep-silent, the responsibility of silence, friendship preserved by silence (in secret)

pp. 53-4 via Nietzsche, keep silent about “truth” of friendship to protect, guarantee, the truth of friendship, resisting the abyss, the vertigo of friendship’s bottomless ground, the friendship that can’t resist the truth of its illusion, an asceticism, kenosis, speech would ruin friendship, speak in an elliptical way to avow > as though silence could not be spoken about elsewhere than in friendship

p. 54 the 2 ways to say to oneself (keeping silent) that solitude is irremediable & friendship impossible, 2 ways to (se) partager the impossible: 1) compassionate [see p. 57], negative, keep silent in secret 2) affirmative, attune/join 2 disjointed jouissances at heart of dissociation itself, an ecstasy w/out plenitude [Nietzsche: open horizon w/out light]: a communion darrachement infini [see p. 57 Nietzsche: “finer still to join in laughing”]

pp. 54-5 allied in “joint acquiescence to disjunction,” monadic alterities, the proper of the alter-ego is never accessible [see SPOM p. 35]

p. 55 how can you be together to bear witness to secrecy, singularity, separation? > testify where testimony remains impossible (Blanchot)

——Nietzsche dares to recommend distancing (in code excluding it), separation, in a language of friendship, family, politics, state: affinity through distance

pp. 63-4 Derrida reads Nietzsche [re: GS 61] as advocating acceptance of gift & dependency, elevating logic of gift above self-sufficiency of a subject [Greek philosopher who refuses King’s donation], a logic that reorients friendship, calling friendship back to irreducibility of other—but perhaps this installs an irresponsible freedom, madness (friend–enemy), the worst?

——temptation to match Nietzsche’s gesture, call he seems to be making for another justice, one that breaks w/ equivalence of right & vengeance: what’re political consequences for democracy?

pp. 65-6 following Nietzsche beyond Eros? if love is always a lust for new possession, we must acquiesce to principle of ruin at heart of utterly new > would this leave open the chance to accord w/ the “love whose just name would be friendship” [?]—just once, it would happen, friendship as the name for this impossible event [only once btwn 2]

——but how could there be a right name for such an event, for any event? how could you convince the partner of such rightness at the moment of the act?

***p. 67 to open in an instant to chance, improbable alliance in thought of the perhaps, another way to address oneself to the possible, w/out stability, not ontology, theology, representation or philosophical consciousness > to experience the perhaps friendship, would be a new meaning of experience, one would have to change politics

p. 77 “everything in the political question of friendship suspended on the secret of a name”

pp. 80-1 we tremble in time of Nietzsche’s mutation, we belong (w/out belonging) to this tremor, absolute dislocation, borderless disjoining; we emit warnings, like searchlights w/out coast, mad, impossible pleas: recurrent syntagms of “X without X” (harbor invisible in their very light) > are these watchmen [Bataille, Blanchot, Nancy] guiding us toward another destination [?]

p. 83 would politics of friendship be a crime w/in the political or crime against politics (as we know it)?

pp. 92-3 in Menexenus, solid friendship (reconciliation) based on actual kinship (suggéneia), on homogeneity, homophilia, solid/firm affinity (bébaion) stemming from birth, native community, syngenealogy: this is a phantasm, what Joyce calls in Ulysses, re: the father, a ‘legal fiction’

——eugenicism (eugéneia) as authochtony, proper birth, homage to earth & mother go hand in hand with fraternization: an equality of birth compatible w/ aristocracy

p. 94 friendship can never elude rhetoric of epitáphios, transfixed celebration of spectrality, at once fervent & caught in petrified cold of its inscription (funeral speech, testamentary fervor of heir)

pp. 100-01 tension btwn democracy & aristocracy to do w/ #, with the counting of friends

p. 102 relation btwn friendship/democracy, approbation of greatest #? deployment of countable unity, of ‘one more’ subject > the 2 presumed calculable #s of democracy (from perspective of conventional/nominalist hesitation): 1) form of decision, greatest # of people 2) possibility of this decision: birth—the equivocal double equality (isonomy founded on isogony)

pp. 104-05 genealogical deconstruction, deconstruction of the genealogical schema, deconstruct credit, doxa, eudoxia, right opinion, approbation given to filiation > live a politics, friendship, justice that begins where the beginning divides (no democracy w/out deconstruction, no deconstruction w/out democracy) > democracy is the autos of deconstructive self-delimitation, it unconditionally de-limits itself, de-limits where its conditional enclosure nourishes itself in land (sol) & blood [?]

——another thought of calculation & # (beyond autochthonous/homophilic rooting), another way of apprehending universality of singular (w/out dooming political to incalculable), depoliticization, but only of dominant concept of political

——saying, thematizing, formalizing in process of deconstruction: not neuter, not apolitical > these gestures are positions staked out in the process

p. 106 a deconstructive thought of # and equality, power of universalization beyond State & nation, the account taken (la prise en compte) of anonymous/irreducible singularities, indifferently different [Schelling?], indifferent to particular difference, to the raging quest for identity corrupting the most indestructible desires of the idiom [democracy’s?]

pp. 122-23 must endure undecidable triviality of crossroads btwn 3 hypotheses: 1) no friend w/out possibility of killing, establishing non-natural community 2) to love in friendship would precisely be the opposite of killing 3) love as step beyond the political, another politics of loving

pp. 144-45 partisan in cryptography, in unassignable ‘political’ status of psychoanalysis, in blurred borders btwn privacy/publicity, in cybercrime > politics of friendship should not be distinguishable from a meditation on secrecy

p. 146 friendship-philosophy, a concept indissociable w/in itself > we have been inspecting the political next to this hyphen

pp. 153-55, 169n in Lysis, existence of friend for sake of enemy (ekthrou éneka) is abandoned for hypothesis of desire (épithumia): friend is friend of what he desires, the oikeiéotēs, home, habitat, familiar, property, hómoion, the present, near, neighbor > friend: everything an economy can reconcile

——so, politics of friendship: w/out presence, w/out affinity, w/out analogy, aneconomic, truth & presence start to tremble

pp. 155-59 from afar, from on high, the political is an inhabited desert w/ not a woman in sight, are sisters just species of genus brother [‘Dear Brother Jacqueline’]? is she the absolute partisan, absolute enemy of the theory of the absolute enemy? > Schmitt’s phallogocentric neutralization of sexual difference, a sealing away (sous scellés), a house arrest, vigilance of the frightened watchman (de guetteur apeuré): the political is genderless

——if there’s a single thesis [in POOF], it’s that there’s no choice [no choice of double gesture]: 1) the political is phallogocentrism, virtue is virile, thus woman’s slow/painful access to citizenship: we must go beyond the political 2) keep the ‘old name’ & engage other struggles, ‘partisan’ ones

——de-naturalization of fraternal authority (its de-construction), preference given to democratic fraternization > this is all possible, along w/ demand of a democracy to-come, because fraternity was never natural, never a fact [God is dead because God was always dead?]

pp. 166-67 via & beyond Schmitt, der geschwisterlichen Klang (the brotherly-sisterly sound), the obscure friendship of rhyme, insane linking (appariement) of a couple, sense is born in a pair > before being philosophical, friendship concerns gift of the poem, isn’t there always a politics of a rhyme? > the rhyme can also become a traffic signal (philautie of linkage) > nothing looks more like the traffic signals of one country than those of another: this is the law > everything begins w/ Echo: rhymes sign, in cadence they seal a belonging, an ‘open gate’ [?]

pp. 177-78 if Aristotle says a friend is ‘one soul in two bodies,’ the friend has no home, no proper body, a visitor, traveller, guest, unheimlich (translated into Greek as atópos, mad?) > what would this say of the principle of convenance, which elsewhere defines political—in its bond to friendship [?]

pp. 178-79 Montaigne’s audacious/uncontestable description of friend, via Aristotle, qua one soul (singularity) in 2 bodies (duplicity): philía most devoted to other becomes friendship of self, philautia (narcissism), a correspondence (convenance, oikeiótēs), all division is driven out, neither friend can give to each other > this is the communal/communist consequence: communism dreaming in secret of the secret, communism which doesn’t count, no further than to ‘one,’ so not even to ‘one’

——to maintain indivisibility of friendship, must harbor the taste of death, division only affects bodies

p. 183 friendship beyond the law, justice, the political: is that the good (beyond being)? if so, should one judge/condemn one’s friend’s political faults?

p. 184 if, however, Montaigne believes that [true] friendship must possess reason & virtue [see pp. 192-93n], it could never be apolitical, because reason & virtue could never be private

pp. 184-85 via Montaigne, law of secrecy placed above law of city, apolitical drive of friendship divides virtue or reason > double bind: 1) sovereign fraternity of secrecy btwn 2 w/out perjury 2) political secrecy of brotherhood begins w/ the 3rd, opens to perjury

pp. 185-86 does Montaigne (via túkhē [see 192n re: Cicero], exceptionality of friendship) add rupture of infinite to Greek philía? a reassuring principle would periodize, overdetermine, oppose Christian fraternity to Greek fraternity > Derrida won’t have it: the discrepancies of culture aren’t negligible but they are that of a generative graft, cultural body (so old & new) begins w/ prosthesis > no proper body w/out graft: endless politically consequences of this law—now more than ever, endlessly

pp. 189-90 on difference btwn omega ω [w/out iota & spirit] in “O my friends…” and ᾠ [w/ both] [which, inconceivably, English translation failed to mark], vocative interjection or pronomial dative? > philological haunting, ω [w/out] as crypt w/ twin ghosts, the added spirit (aspiration) in memory or omission > do the friends remain motionless/indifferent in either case?

p. 191n for Montaigne, the alliance/election of perfect friendship functions like a seam (couture), it solders > solder & seam a vocabulary of artifice, so the question [of POOF]: why does the natural schema [re: friendship] remain [in the figure of one body?]?

p. 196 if Montaigne’s disproportion of sovereign friendship is translated into the political, wouldn’t that endanger Aristotle’s principle of autarky, equality, mutuality [?] > but our question is always about political translation: is the political a universal translating machine?

pp. 196-97 [quasi-thesis of POOF] a justice that cares for the humanity in the human (a principle of infinity) would destroy finite proportionality that ordains calculation of worth, in this way it resembles Montaigne’s friendship > it doesn’t, however, in the sense that Montaigne’s disproportion is extremely rare, inegalitarian heteronomy remains in tact: what if a certain equality could be saved in respect of dissymmetrical/heteronomic singularities > this equality would be at once calculable/incalculable, it would count on the calculable

pp. 197-98 for Aristotle, one can not be friends w/ a tool (órganon), friendship irreducible to technologization: requires philía, puskhé, ánthrōpos, díkaion, nómos, sunthékē (convention, contract), koinōnía (communal sharing) > it is thus, out of a relation of proportion, a tendential law, that friendship finds its destiny in democracy

pp. 198-99 Derrida wants to offer different aporias [hyper-aporetic] re: friendship than those Aristotle offered, knots of thought which perhaps promise something else, exceeding a lógos of friendship > a perhaps which may no longer be a mere working hypothesis [Derrida’s teleiopoetic force], another thought of decision, responsibility

p. 199 friendship is political if political comes down to creating the most friendships (Eudemian Ethics 1234b 22-3, Book III of Aristotle’s Politics), the good life as philía, as télos of pólis

p. 201 [re: Aristotle’s distinctions on friendship] let us be more precise, more just

pp. 200-03 plodding through Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics, Derrida discusses Aristotle’s 3 friendships (pleasure, use, virtue), friendship is political and yet the highest friendship (virtue) is not political (use)

——Aristotle’s 2 forms of justice: 1) numerical equality (katarithmón), brothers 2) proportional equality (katanalogían), father-son [cf. Aristotle’s Politics]

pp. 203-04 in Aristotle, honor saves friendship from calculation, from the market—still, it’s proportioned via hierarchy, a hierarchy as sacralization of the beginning, qua command (arkhé)

pp. 204-05 Aristotle continually analyses the ruses that allow one friendship to be smuggled into another: use into pleasure, wearing virtue’s mask > though ethical friendship is more beautiful, is bound by faith, beyond contract, legal friendship (political) is more necessary, more natural [?] [more grievances abound in the ethical?]

pp. 206-07 on reciprocity in friendship where there is an obvious incongruity, how do you judge being loved in return (antiphileîsthai)?

pp. 208 about to venture on a decision re: omega ω in “O my friends…”, Derrida makes it clear that the guard-rails of a philological coup de théâtre will not efface the archive constructed on an error [p. 225n Agamben helped Derrida w/ all this]

——the improbable omega ω has a canonical authority protected by great names, the wager of this mistake, like a capital w/ bottomless surplus-value

p. 209 the dative version of omega ω would produce the meaning: ‘too many friends means no friend’ > this is the recoil (repli) version, more modest, it does reopen the question of “how many?”

pp. 210-12 does the autarkic (self-sufficient) man need a friend? [Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, Plato’s Lysis] > rarity is the virtue of friendship [p. 225n rarity also among Christian monks]

——scarcity, rareness, is worth more—sometimes to the extreme > scarcity sets the price of true friendship [hyperbole, incommensurable]

pp. 211-12 the hyperbole of an extreme middle in Aristotle, moderation, proper measure: this applies to # of friends & ‘threshold of tolerance’ re: border btwn pólis and ethnos [immigration]

p. 213 vocative version, the “wrong” one, a self-contradiction that torments very act of enunciation, gaping-mouthed clamour (clameur à bouche bée) > the dative version is a neutral report

pp. 213-14 Derrida ties the chiasmus btwn the vocative & pronominal dative omega ω to the chiasmus btwn the constative & performative in general (‘speech act’ theory reduced to its rudiments): the call, the address, always overruns neutral observation, a minimum consensus (of friendship, of consent) is presupposed in the utterance [?]

pp. 214-15 that either address [re: omega ω] is addressed to someone will always expose utterance to undecidability because address to ‘someone’ presupposes the impossible: 1) neutral gender 2) ‘only one’ someone > for one person to receive a mark once, the mark must multiply, its iterability affirms plus dun (which allows & limits calculability), the 3rd party is there > there is never one, one is always more than one (w/ or w/out consent)

pp. 215-16 desire for one single friendship exposes possibility & impossibility of indivisible calculation: one time for all time(s) will never cease, immediately infinite in its finiteness, appears as such only in unceasing desire for repetition/multiplication [cf. Augustine in Confessions] > the subject, the ‘one’ friend is indivisible in its calculable identity, indivisible in its incalculable singularity, the one divides the other: it is here that the enemy is w/in the friend

pp. 216-17 Derrida now stresses that the sentence could never be independent of all determinable contexts, but that it’s ability to be contextualized demands that it can give way to another context > thus, everyone who uttered Aristotle’s rumored sentence affirmed its displacement/detachment from a unique context, willing or reluctantly, they said the plus dun of the addressee (for example, a feminine ‘one’): the sentence can’t be signed w/out marking this destinerrancy

——in such a way, Aristotle’s sentence was never neutral, always a project of friendship/enmity, & always a project of the corresponding political community (this is irrepressible)

***pp. 217-18 via name ‘Aristotle,’ doesn’t dream of an unusable friendship survive? beyond fatal syntheses or reconciliations of dialectics [the worst?] > this inflexible hyperbole of philía is not some indestructible, rigid, resistant solidity, sa vulnérabilité légère ne donnerait prise à aucun retournement [via dialectics]: a politics that would break from the old, tired, tiring, exhausted history: la belle tentation of the book you’re reading

——one must resist the temptation to keep (garder) its chance, never let it become program, never a grounding on virtue of perhaps

pp. 218-20 we can’t exclude fact that when someone speaks they strive not to be understood, diabolical figure of death drive > so can the accord of hyperbolic lovence be possible, hoping to be understood beyond all dialectics, haunting (failure) must leave an imprint on the body it seems to threaten, merging indissociably, it’s impossible not to aspire to this haunting [a necessity]: instant of decision remains heterogenous, undecidable, crucial experience of perhaps

irresponsible application of a program determines the undecidable (counts on assurance of intelligibility), depriving it of what would make it a sovereign, free decision

——w/out possibility (which must be neither living nor dead) of perjury, radical evil, absolute crime—no responsibility, freedom, decision > “I love you” (promise, prayer) can’t hope to prove anything at all, must remain unilateral/dissymmetrical, no mutuality/agreement can reduce the disproportion, the very condition of sharing (partage)

***——how this madness can negotiate w/ what it isn’t, translated & protected in good sense of ‘things,’ proofs, guarantees, symbols, concepts—in a politics: this is the whole of history

pp. 220-21 to declare love, declare friendship, one cannot know [overdetermine, calculate, program] the who

pp. 227-28 Quinet & Michelet: realize Christianity’s dogma (grace) in the Political world, brotherly equality, Fraternity, promise of Christianity: book of the People is yourself, myself (not women though)

pp. 228-29 one always takes a stand re: friendship > Derrida utters “O my friend…” in my own name > power of the name to survive bearer of the name: il y va donc du nom porté [borne], du port [bearing] ou du support [basis] du nom et du rapport [relation] au nom, la portée [range] du nom

pp. 230-31 read Aristotle’s discourse on philía as a discourse on language, difficulty of translation already w/in the Greek language: Freundschaft, amitié, friendship as frayage in thought of other/same

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

p. 233 once again referring to the ‘infinite’ Christianization of Greek fraternity, while reminding us that Greek phília carries w/in it the injunction of its infinitization, Derrida will privilege Christianiziation for the role it played in the theological-political graft that constructed political discourse of modern Europe

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

pp. 237-38 gravest of problems, not our intention to denounce fraternity: via Michelet, fraternity as ‘law beyond law,’ vision of universal/revolutionary fraternity [à la the Enlightenment], a hyperbole whose generosity can’t be opposed > [Derrida promising] a fraternity w/out fraternity (literal, strict, genealogical, masculine)

——what will be put into question re: fraternity is the exemplarist strategy (ethnocentrism, patriotism, nationalism), alleged universalism of nation, homeland: our homeland gives passage to homeland of all mankind

pp. 238-40 for Michelet, fraternity is another name for friendship, national singularity gives example of universal friendship, the boundless generosity (exemplary universalism) of Michelet’s andro-gallo-fraternocentrism

——fraternity always caught up in vertiginous process (mechanics) of hyperbolization: from the strict literal (‘natural’ fraternity) to the figurative literal (universal, infinite fraternity) > thus, [strictly] woman ‘does not yet know how to read’ fraternity, she is not included in the idiom, the singularity; but, [literally] she is like [the promise of] absolute fraternity, ‘more just than just,’ law beyond law

p. 240 question “What is (tí estin) friendship?” & “Who is the friend (either sex)?” is nothing but the question “What is philosophy?”

pp. 241-42 [offering quasi-summary of HERP] moment that originary [Heraclitean] phileîn (accord, favour, solicitude Gunst) becomes jealous, nostalgic tension ‘determined by Eros [órexis]’: the step to philosophy, prepared by sophistry [Plato, Socrates] > is the strange voice of the friend, an ontological call [prior to subject, consciousness, even to Mitsein? see p. 243], interior & w/out, the “what is…?” of philosophy [?]

——as always for Heidegger, the gathering of lógos prevails, even if it accords the tensions of a false note

——via Heidegger, philía as opening, accord, in essential relation w/ phúsis as covering up, dissimulation of self > phúsis qua philía: lune, comme lautre, garde ce rapport à la fois généreux et jaloux à elle-mêmeelle aime à se cacher, krúptesthai phileîn > le retrait de la pudeur [decency] donne ici le mouvement même: gives the gift (donne le don), accords phúsis and philía

pp. 242-43 Derrida now links phúsis to phúein (grow, sprout, mature) [an offshoot of phúsis?], links that to genealogical fraternity > no doubt there’s Greek autochthonism in Heideggerian thought

p. 243 hard to follow Heidegger’s epochal scansion of philía, yes, anachronistic to find subject/object in Aristotle, but how can he say there's no anthropological or psychological vantage point?

——acc. Heidegger, Christianity is an education of passions, even a psychology, a psychological subjectivity—all post-Aristotelian friendships are Christian, same goes for ‘politics’

p. 244 promise before friendships linked to ‘yes, yes’—beyond position > resituate the ‘concept of the political’

pp. 245-46 Schmitt: extreme possibility of war gives human life its specifically political tension > Schmitt: w/out this tension there might be interesting things, but no friend–enemy meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice life [the morality of this situation doesn’t matter, where there is the possibility of war, this is the phenomenon of the political]

——Schmitt: makes no sense to wage war for purely religious, moral, juristic, economic motives

p. 246 Schmitt deduces ontology of political from friend/enemy opposition, rather than dissymmetrical fact of enmity

p. 247 would Heidegger have deemed Schmitt’s depoliticization nihilist, the truth of politics carried out to its metaphysical completion? Schmitt as last great metaphysician of politics?

——Schmitt preserves metaphysical opposition while registering effacement of fundamental (onto-theological) distinctions [i.e. the Cold War, return of word “foe”],

p. 250 temporal torsion [O my friend, no friend, contretemps], dissymmetry envelops theoretical knowledge in performativity of prayer it could never exhaust, we return to question of the response

pp. 250-52 a grammar beyond grammar of response, friendship a privileged locus for this reflection: 1) on répond de soi [for self]: subject, agency of ‘proper name’ 2) on répond d'abord à lautre [to]: more originary than other two, ‘insistence’ of Other, dissymmetrical anteriority that marks time as structure of responsibility 3) répondre devant [before]: marks, right on idiom, passage to institutional agency of alterity, no longer singular but universal, before the law, agency authorized

——agency called ‘proper name’ can’t be reduced to registered name, to patronymic or social reference (its determining manifestation) > would Heidegger’s pre-Socratic phília be capable of doing w/out proper name, insofar as it is older than subjectivity?

——Montaigne loved his friend La Boétie before he met him, loved him in his name

pp. 252-56 via Kant, responsibility (response, speaking, time) of friendship linked to respect (distance, gaze, space) > Kant links highest friendship to ‘moral law,’ to distance, repulsion, links love to attraction—if it’s a duty to intend toward dignity of ‘sympathy’ & ‘communication (Mitteilung),’ ‘ardour’, excess, of love can break equality while maintaining reciprocity > there must be outward signs, (external) testaments of friendship [?]

——for Kant, friendship doesn’t produce happiness, the 2 feelings [in each person?] render mankind worthy of being happy

pp. 256-57 via Kant's suspicion of tenderness/gentleness in friendship, a catastrophic complication in natural law of attraction/repulsion, a rupture, love will tend toward the evil of reciprocal possession (fusion), love harbors hate w/in itself > friendship as sign/symptom of this possible perversion, and that which protects us from it: attraction must be against attraction, repulsion against repulsion

pp. 259 a few oddities that don’t surprise Kant: 1) no secrets in nature, secrets only there where there’s engagement, promise—and no one has the infinite intelligence to know for certain what the secret is 2) the impossible & necessary arithmetic returns: friendship as n + 1, plus dun, there’s always one more than the 2 friends, a 3rd, so how can the secret be kept? 3) merely moral friendship is not just ideal, the event of friendship happens, the black swan

pp. 259-60 for Kant, the black swan of moral friendship is a brother [for Juvenal, p. 258, black swan was a woman]: bond btwn 2 men w/ necessary supplementary complication of a 3rd man

pp. 260-62 Kant’s friend of man (not simply “one who loves man”), announces promise of cosmopolitanism, universal democracy, perpetual peace: inscribed in sensibility, but only in relation to purely rational Idea of equality (not only calculable measure, but also an obligation)

——Kant gives place to, configures, represents the friend of man: “all men are here represented as brothers under one universal father who wills the happiness of all” > father is not a man, not included in friendship he makes possible [via race, genealogy], can’t receive equal reciprocity

——Kant thus repeats the link btwn friendship & fraternity, he doesn’t confuse it w/ strict, literal, ‘natural,’ sensible fraternity [see p. 240] and yet he does not dispense w/ that sense either—repeats friendship’s indivisible link w/ virility of congeneric

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

p. 263 jusquici [up until now], for several 1000 years, le temps d'un clin d'œil [the twinkling of an eye], tremors have been registered, archived, by the archons of the same family [phallogocentric fraternization]

pp. 263-64 yes this book is French, but it’s not written only in French, that would claim for French exemplary privilege of translation for all other idioms [i.e. Montaigne, Hugo, etc. on fraternity & humanity] > instead, this books sets itself up to work and be worked relentlessly (s’acharne lui-même), au sens de la chasse, là où acharner revient à disposer un leurre de chair, close to the thing called France

p. 264 via Hugo, fraternity is universal in first being French, ‘sublimated France’: ‘natural law,’ ‘generosity,’ the brother

p. 271 fraternal friendship & ascension, height: Kant’s stellar sublimity of moral law, Nietzsche’s star friendship

pp. 272-73 Derrida explains how he does not want to exploit spectacular ‘news,’ that which screens out (fait écran) reflection [makes a screen of reflection], by projecting itself w/ pathetic, sensational, images of violence that are too easily mediatizable > yet, all these examples (immigration, globalization, new warfare) are in our mind & heart as Derrida strives to deconstruct fraternal link to friendship: how does humanitarian participate in fraternizing humanization?

p. 273 the question “what is a crime against humanity?” is pregnant w/ a future whose monstrosity ne porte pas de nom

——from w/in fraternization, greatest crime is betrayal of humanity (fall short of virtue of fraternity), the supreme perjury: fratricide as radical evil, only the brother can be betrayed

pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

——modesty would get woman to participate in universal fraternity (i.e. humanity), equalizes sexes by moralizing them: modest woman is a brother for man

——woman doesn’t become any less desirable! modesty belongs to history qua fraternization

p. 274 Kant explains that empty gestures, those of politesse, lead to genuine dispositions of soul > Derrida extrapolates: history of becoming-true of an illusion, une histoire qui se fait comme histoire qu'on se raconte: elle se fait alors qu'on la raconte, on se la raconte pour la faire [history made while story being told] > a trial (procès) of verification

——a good philosophical computer could convert Kant’s history of truth qua history of error into Hegelian software, then Nietzschean—il le fait déjà [Derrida], n'est-ce pas [baby daddy]

p. 275 for Kant, crime against humanity would be to disdain currency, to take counterfeit money for counterfeit [skeptic betrays mankind] > for Kant, virtue obligates that we turn counterfeit (small change) into gold, becoming-truth of the simulacrum, its verification, authentication [pp. 257-58 rare friend keeps secret, renounces possible public profit, that of circulating secret]

p. 276 is there a worse jealousy than jealousy of self? is there any other? jealous of one’s very own brother: qui est le plus d’un, le supplément de l’un en trop? [the friend, says Nietzsche’s hermit]

pp. 276-77 are the 2 models of friendship antagonistic to each other? do they imply one another as supplementary ruses?: 1) absolute singularity of other, double singularity of dual, narcissism, secret-private-invisible-illegible-apolitical 2) universality, the 3rd friend, forever keeps question of secrecy from closing, law that interrupts singularity, manifest-public-testimonial-political > the hegemonic schema or familial symbol btwn these 2 models is fraternal, excludes the feminine or heterosexuality

——the 3rd witnesses a law that interrupts vertigo of singularity (a dual narcissism), 3rd opens up & keeps from closing the question of secrecy > Nietzsche: for the hermit, the friend is always 3rd person (keeps the other 2 [w/in oneself] from sinking to the depths)

p. 278 [sometimes friendship linked to political], sometimes in name of morality that friendship is removed from criteria of politics > doù la surenchère sans fin dont nous avons tenté de formaliser la loi

——if friendship is above justice, it is as the most just: justice beyond justice

——the 2 dimensions of justice: 1) non-written 2) that codified by law

p. 279 friendship via figure of the brother, in the name of the brother (not the father): sublime figure of virile homosexuality [excludes woman, excludes relation btwn man & woman]

p. 281 the double exclusion of feminine related to tension btwn politicization & depoliticization of friendship (tension on the inside of the political itself)

——Nietzsche tells us 3x: “woman is not yet capable of friendship”

p. 282 Derrida deduces the political register of friendship in Nietzsche: to be able to honor enemy in friend, a sign of freedom, neither slaves nor tyrants know this freedom > woman is either slave or tyrant, knows only how to love, can’t respect enemy (honor what she doesn’t love); the political translation of Nietzsche’s axiom: friendship is freedom plus equality [the double bind]

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

***p. 284 if we find in Nietzsche a play of the Gospels against Aristotelian virtue, while Aristotelian heritage is reimplemented: enough to discourage a reassuring historical scansion, must think up different ways of doing history, that which defies tranquility of historian is a strategy of friendship, a war for friendship: lamitié, voilà lenjeu de ces stratagèmes sans fin

——the gift is that which gives friendship in Nietzsche > and yet, friendship still means freedom, equality, fraternity in Nietzsche

pp. 284-85 the 3 friendships in one, the same, those we must break (il faut en finir): 1) Aristotle’s 2) Christian fraternity 3) Enlightenment fraternity (sublated Christian fraternity)

p. 285 via Nietzsche, friendship is a thing of distance, a thing of the future: friends ready to hear will be ready when they have heard the teleiopetic word

——Nietzsche’s teleipoetic word accomplishes Gospel word in perverting it: promises spiritual fraternity, beyond milk & blood (owing to another blood, another eucharistic body [?])

pp. 285-86 quoting Matthew, Derrida asks whether there isn't still profit of a sublime economy, economy beyond economy, in Nietzsche? or does the absolute gift (advising against love of one’s neighbor) break the ruse of this sublime economy? like Kant, isn’t there still best exchange rate for virtue?

p. 286 Nietzsche’s gift must also belong to a finite world > how to think dissymmetry of gift w/out exchange, infinite disproportion, from vantage point of terrestrial finitude? under its horizon w/out horizon [see p. 263] > infinitization itself is suspected of being an economic ruse, perverse seduction, stratagem, of loving one’s neighbor

——Nietzsche: you must understand how to be a sponge if you want to be loved by overflowing hearts > Nietzsche: in your friend you should love the Superman as your principle

pp. 286-87 Nietzsche’s friend of most distant belongs to finite earth (not world of Christian hinterworld) > friend’s finitude infinitizes the gift he gives: a friend who doesn’t give you the world (a finite one), gives you nothing [this is neither Greek nor Christian]

p. 287 Nietzsche’s Superman: awaited because he is origin/cause of man, Ursache, this friend promised via messianico-teleiopeotic perhaps, immemorially past > this friendship to come would still be too human, still deserves name ‘friendship’ [anthropological, humanist character of friendship is situated/delimited here, friendship of proximity/presence]

pp. 288-89 there are specters on both sides of us (past & future), the phantom friends we lost, the arrival of the Superman > ‘it is necessary to love’ = specters, they are to be loved

——disjunction of spectral distance marks past/future w/ non-reappropriable alterity [p. 307n cf. Düttmann, “What is Called love in…”]

——Nietzsche: higher still than love of man is love of causes and of specters (Sachen und Gespenstern)

pp. 289-90 returning ghost [of Zarathustra?] who promises is a testament, a ‘this is my body’ offered again to brothers > no mourning but mourning of brother?

——deferred mourning as friendship, no possible introj./incorp. > no successful death w/out remainder, that would be the return of the father (what brothers don’t want!) > this is what brothers are conjuring: love of the father (a scene framed thus: w/out a woman)

p. 290 great canonical meditations on friendship (Cicero, Montaigne, Blanchot) all belong to experience of mourning > through the irreplaceable of the named, they always advance in testimonial order to confide/refuse death of unique to a universalizable discourse > simultaneously found/destabilize all oppositions, opens to abyss, se fracture

p. 291 though Montaigne infinitizes friendship, he ensures mediation of solder (soudure) in the name of the brother (and the exclusion of woman) > via Montaigne, name ensures ‘fraternal solder’: owing to name, friendship begins prior to friendship, friendship survives friendship—friendship always begins by surviving

p. 292 via Montaigne, time of name [“inexplicable force of destiny”?] bestows force of approach, power of proximity or ‘union’ that defies discourse: the name against discourse (before/after), name as force, affection, mediation (these nameless concepts, w/out common names)

——the 2 names: 1) very structure of testimonial survival stance, a certain spectrality, name survives a priori beyond presence 2) this general structure is enframed (arraisonné) in certain history, chance of filiation, inherited name, that of renown (again, woman excluded)

pp. 292-93 women don’t have no chance, they have less > hegemony always relation of forces, laws of structure are tendential, impossibility of sheer (plus ou simple) exclusion, account for return of repressed, etc.

p. 293 is it another event [than Christian, Greek friendship] when Nietzsche, Blanchot, call the friend by a name no longer the name of man?

——event of Nietzsche, signatory & witness, cause & effect, of a few unprecedented ruptures/interruptions in place of friendship > yet, interruption/rupture not sufficient to account for where Nietzsche folds into Christianity

——the whole text has thought of Blanchot & Bataille, the “community w/ community,” w/out wanting to capitalize around them all their original thoughts

p. 294 who is the friend? beyond ego, presence, subject, etc.? distancing itself from all determinations? beyond the brother who capitalizes everything? > this a political question—will there be loud protests (by militants of a dogmatic humanism) if to think & live gentle rigor of friendship would be the law of friendship qua an experience of ahumanity?

——Blanchot [re: friendship]: “the fundamental separation from out of which that which separates becomes relation”

pp. 295-96 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

——the hyperbole of this friendship seems to engage w/ greatest risk (re: inherited concept of friendship) when Nietzsche speaks of ‘w/out sharing,’ ‘w/out reciprocity’ > can one, then, still speak of equality & fraternity?

p. 296 for Blanchot, the disaster is that w/out which there would be no friendship, disaster at the heart of friendship

pp. 296-97 what does ‘common’ mean once friendship goes beyond all living community? when it comes to friends only in dying? > common becomes valueless for thinking friendship

p. 297 Blanchot no longer has affinity w/ one Nietzsche (there is always plus dun): friendship is not a gift or promise, it’s the outside drawing near in its separateness/inaccessibility—pure desire is the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance, to die in common through separation

——the common becomes the pole end of a call > question regarding the ‘common’ should bring on a vertigo that asks ‘what is to be done?’ what’s to be done, politically, w/ this vertigo & its necessity?

p. 298 if no appurtenance in friendship, why call this foreigner (absolute foreigner) my friend? no appeasing response to this question

——this friendship announced would have nothing to do w/ community: so that each X without X, unceasing neutralization of one predicate by another (relation w/out relation, community w/out community, partage sans partage), would call on significations altogether different from part shared or held in common

pp. 298-99 desire in lovence (friendship or love) engages me w/ a particular him or her, a singular ‘who,’ desire of the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance (nécessairement infranchissable), where a politics of lovence would no longer imply motifs of community, which always risks bringing a brother back > risk must still be assumed to keep question of ‘who’ from being politically enframed (arraisonner) by schema of l'être-commun

pp. 299-301 inheriting the Greek, no actual rupture is possible, a heritage is affirmed provided it’s ‘still capable of being enriched’ > painful torsion of Greek friend, scarcely readable, is already full of contradiction > inherit Greek friend by contradicting it at heart of its contradiction

——Blanchot: philía, Greek & Roman, remains model of what is excellent in human relations—pure reciprocity & unrequited generosity

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, is literature [linked to democracy, which has no unconditional virtue] the very thing which remains intolerable to the geopolitical process of a becoming-worldwide (mondialité)? > absolute theologization qua absolute politicization

——via Deguy, Aristotle overtook to ruin the capital letters of Platonism, the eídos of friendship, by calling the witness to the stand, an “actual” friend > Derrida will take sign of this ruin & no longer answer call to witness stand

p. 305 this book has said nothing against the brother, one can’t protest from inside of history of brothers: the history won’t be thought, recalled, by taking up this side

——Derrida confessing: he has more than one ‘brother,’ of more than one sex, and he loves having more than one (uniquely bound, each time, by a conjuration & so many unuttered oaths)

pp. 305-06 the question “what is meant when one says ‘brother’?”, and the infinite price of friendship, supposes an affirmation, a pledge of a testimony irreducible to proof or certitude > this pledge retranslated into hypothesis/question: is it possible to think/implement democracy, keeping old name ‘democracy,’ & faithful memory of democratic reason (& reason tout court), while uprooting it from all these figures that prescribe fraternal friendship

——democracy remains to come, this is its essence, indefinitely perfectible, always insufficient & future > even when there is democracy, it never exists

——when will we be ready for an experience of freedom & equality that’s capable of respectfully experiencing the friendship that would at last be just, just beyond law, measured against its measurelessness? > “O my democratic friends…”

OTO p. 32 Nietzsche: politics will have merged entirely w/ a war of spirits

POLYSEMIA

***LOBL p. ~ 91 from polysemia (economy) to dissemination; p. 93 from critical to deconstruction

POSITIONS

GT p. 67 equivalence of taken & given is posed, thematized; the exemplarity of God (Maru) giving as much as he takes; tribe restores, restitutes equilibrium by following example

——not through w/ this logic, one is never through w/ it

FL p. 272 foundation is a promise, ever positing pro-met even if promise is not kept, iterability inscribes the promise as guard in the most irruptive instant of foundation, inscribes the possibility of repetition at the heart of the originary, so there is no real distinction between preserving violence and founding, positing is always a call for preserving: differential contamination

SPOM p. 26 a justice beyond the economy of repression, not distributive, not calculable equality, outside of the economy of vengeance, incalculability of the gift and singularity, the an-economic ex-position to others

p. 66 position-taking re: Marx and tele-technics [indispensable & insufficient]

pp. 160-61 spectral effect, for Marx, a dialectical position (Setzung) of the ghostly body as body proper > where Stirner sees 1st moment as spectral and 2nd as successful, interiorization, subjectivation (plus de vie) Marx sees a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality (plus de mort)

HASD p. 21 homology btwn secret group (topography of social link) and the place of the secret (beyond all position)

MPM pp. 138-39 the undecidable that resists non-dialectizable oppositions will bear name, maintain rhetorical relation w/ opposition, will have figure of opposition, be figurable, will always let itself by parasited by figure of opposition [thus staging of promise as act or position]

OH pp. 52-3 word “avant-garde” [see pp. 25, 48-50]: capitalizes on figurehead, phallic point, advanced initiative of guarding, anticipating to conserve, thus “avant-garde position”

S pp. 15-6 Descartes’ cogito not exemplary precedent of existential analytic because sum is not questioned [leap rather than genealogy]; Descartes commits the thingification of the subject, positing (Ansatz) of subjectum or hypokeimenon, a substance or substratum

POS p. 42 double, interval, biphase, biface, bifurcated writing can only be marked in a grouped textual field, not in a punctual position, not w/ a single author

***pp. 59-60 there’s a general text, an overflow, everywhere a discourse and its order (essence, meaning, ideality, consciousness) is put back into position of mark in a chain that this authorizing discourse believes it governs (and it does [?])

p. 86 dissemination puts at stake (play) castration’s position as transcendental signifier/signified (phallus, transcendental signifier, as correlate to primary signified, mother’s desire)

pp. 93-6 nothing surprising to philosophy about taking positions, can’t we leave the question of position open; positions: scenes, acts, figures of dissemination; position-of-the-other, in Hegel, to pose oneself by oneself as other of the Idea, other than oneself—one’s finite determination

P p. 34 art: domesticated in this history of truth, onto-encyclopedic economy, the machinery of the pose (Setzung/Entgegensetzung)

ROP p. 32 no analytic position once resistance is not identifiable

pp. 40-1 “I’ve never much liked” theses, positions, position takings, positionings > for those waiting for my position, so they can decide, “good luck”

PS p. 194 Derrida on how the question he posed (like throwing a net around entire textual network) forced the substitution of discourse for the punctuality of the position

WAP p. 89 pose questions, pose or posit that which does not pose or posit itself, not-thetic? this alleged neutrality constructs teaching body > no question not constrained by a program

C p. 195 a paradigm that is posed as if always there (theme, then, thesis)

BSi p. 42 political contract, a prosthesis, nomos as thesis (opposed to physis), convention, positing

pp. 138-39 if bêtise is proper to man, autopositing the proper is stupidity itself

p. 183 pitiless lucidity of cogito, triumph of conscious self-positing self, the thesis of self always reflects itself as bêtise, bêtise always triumphs > Triumph of Life in bêtise

bêtise always on side of victor > bêtise must not find itself bête: that would be suicidal

pp. 306-07 bêtise as self-positing, positivism, positivity itself, across all 3 modes (question, affirmation, negation) > but affirmation, the “yes,’”is not to be reduced to positivity [?]

EU p. 65 challenge to translation of series Bild, bilden, Bildung (image, form, formation, culture); translation of Übersetzung loses positional dimension of setzen

SPEC pp. 259-60(n) instead of “logic”—issue is to rebind (relier), by means of analysis, notions of lien, stricture, desmos, question of life death to that of position (Setzung, thesis, theme) [this functions as a supplementary “judas” from Glas, re: an incision tattooed btwn pages 270/272]

p. 260 logic of au-delà, pas au-delà: overflows logic of position, not a substitute/replacement/opposition to/for position, opening another relation, rapport sans rapport, frees itself at a stroke (coup), neither pas nor coup is indivisible

——[re: Freud’s speculation, a logic beyond that of position] the “position’s” fall (chute) would cause bankruptcy, ruin, discredit: today I’ll speak of speculation, I’m betting I will

p. 394 the secondary (supplementary stricture) transforms freely mobile into immobile cathectic energy: posits, posts—here’s a thesis: immobilized cathexis is more tonic, tonicity related to effects of binding (elasticity & tension), thus binden as bander (erection): “bander: poster, liason: postale

FV p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

***p. 489 even when letter arrives, its capacity not to arrive torments it, affects “subject,” “character,” “position” [w/ divisibility]

CHOR p. 100 “positional”: difference determined as opposition, whether or not dialectically

POWER

POO p. 20 nonresponse as form of politeness, responsible form of vigilant exercise of responsibility > one cannot or one ought not to fail to respond (ought/can strangely co-implicated, perhaps)

FWT pp. 172-73 Derrida follows Freud’s breaches & openings, a reaffirmation of reason “w/out alibi,” goes against a certain historical concept of reason, can even provoke thought beyond “power,” “drive for power,” drive for sovereignty

ATIA pp. 92-3 Kant’s fundamental anthropocentrism, man possesses representation “I”: tautological, egological, autographical

——power of “I”: “I can I,” a divine injunction that empowers man (not simply speak I, but think I, be present as self, as I)

WAP p. 78 ideological or political constraint is the real program of power, all under its sway, in essence, reproduce said program, and ward off (repoussant) everything that would remove it

——somewhat Foucault-like vision of network of programs as profound machine, though the additional idea that this machine reinvests, reemploys, itself in each determined configuration

p. 79 [when quasi-systematic deconstruction differs from Foucault: no empirical light-headedness]

——deconstruction must not choose btwn long, barely mobile networks & short, quickly outdated ones > must display strange logic: multiple powers of oldest machine can always be reinvested/exploited in new situation

——liberalist/idealist dream of no power in pedagogy (even power outside or higher) would reinforce it

——powers in conflict > effects of differance

TR p. 135 [re: impossible conditions of possible] place of thought that ought to be devoted to virtualization of the event by the machine: exceeds classical determinations of possibility (dynamis, power, Möglichkeit), exceeds classical opposition possible/impossible

PF p. xxxiii impossible marks the limit of the possible or a power, the limit of an “I can”

PSSS pp. 240-41 death drive (Todestrieb), cruel drive of destruction, annihilation, but also cruelty in Bemächtigungstrieb (drive for power, sovereignty, mastery)

p. 258 mastery, sovereignty (Herrschaft, Bemächtigung), linked to a drive for power, possession, an “I can,” a performative power (Bemächtigungstrieb), via sworn faith (organizes Lacan’s symbolic), indissociable from Bewältigung (exercise of power, movement of appropriation)

LI p. 149 Derrida’s uneasiness about using words “force” and “power” [eg. Foucault’s micropowers]—he has 3 conditions for using them: 1) no power/force, only differences of power/force (like Nietzsche) 2) realize the greater force could be the “lesser” 3) account for fact that force/power quickly trapped in ruses of mastery

TN pp. 22-3 what embarrasses Derrida in word “generosity,” like “fraternity”: always refers to filiation, principle of “birth,” concerns “virility,” doesn’t include woman > if generosity is a capacity/force/power given at birth, can one still give?

p. 136 touching-power (pouvoir le toucher): 1) force of power, free, sovereign, potency 2) reserved virtuality, dunamis, capability

——touching has potential or power to touch personal pronoun “who” and definite article “what”

pp. 136-37 to be able to touch: birth of simul btwn us

pp. 149-50 de Biran, faculty of movement: “willing subject,” twinning (jumeler) the stem (souche): ego w/out ego before ego—1) touch as motor will 2) touch as pure sensibility > combines thinking of force w/ thinking of virtual [see TN p. 136]

p. 186 Merleau-Ponty’s originary here, origin of world, an “I can”

p. 298 what one doesn’t touch is part of what we call touch, and a part greater than the whole it designates; intangible (pas-pouvoir-toucher) [capacity], untouchable (ne-pas-devoir-toucher) [ethics]

ATM [vis-à-vis Levinas] one can no longer think oeuvre in technical or productive order of operation (poiein, facere, agere, tun, wirken, erzeugen)

AD pp. 137-38n for Levinas, will (its power) moves btwn betrayal/fidelity

CF p. 37 is forgiveness a faculty? a sovereign “I can,” a human power?

BSi p. 66 sovereign: he, himself, ipse; beast: she, tamed (mastered) > suspension of pendulum is double

——potsedere (possess), potest, possum (power, “I can”) > ipse (self & power) > Benveniste thinks etymological shift from power (despotēs) to himself (ipse) enfeebles, not Derrida

p. 68 Benveniste: dem-pot(i)-[skr.], “master of house,” power of oneself [ipse as sovereignty]

p. 279 knowledge no stranger to power, power no stranger to seeing, having, willing > autopsic/autoptic knowledge: take power over object of knowledge

p. 289 narrative/representation structural to sovereignty, its force, its dynamis and its energeia (virtual & actual power) > sovereignty draws all its power from simulacrum-, fiction-, representation-effect > mystification of representation constituted by the simulacrum of a true transfer of sovereignty

OG p. 187 (266) metaphysics rethinks/conceals supplementarity as accomplishment of dynamis/virtuality, substituting pure history for pure play > supplement permits & escapes this thought

UWC pp. 234-37 [perhaps, “if,” event] not horizon of power, of “I can,” irruption that punctures horizon, interrupts performative organization of “as if,” “as such” > “as” name of true problem/target of deconstruction: authority of “as” founds/justifies every ontology, phenomenology, knowledge, science

——[all the impossibles] gift, forgiveness, invention, justice, friendship, hospitality, etc. confirm thinking of impossible possible, possible as impossible, an impossible-possible that can’t be determined by metaphysical interpretation of possibility or virtuality

SPEC p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

PRAISE

SW p. 321 [calling Cixous’ Savoir irreplaceable] “nothing is more foreign to my concern than praise”

PRACTICAL (PRAXIS/THEORIA) (THEORY/PRACTICE)

SPOM p. 90 [Kojève] “practically,” the “grotesque signature of this sententious verdict”

POOF pp. 114-15 via Plato, no prâxis can correspond to indications contained in a léxis

since politics is essentially a prâxis, no politics can be adequate to purity of Schmitt’s concept re: enemy > politics as that which situates very place of a concept’s inadequation to itself [?]

GSP p. 167 Telos/Vorhaben > infinite theoretical anticipation & infinite practical task: Kantian Idea as project of phenom.? makes it possible by overflowing its system (as its end?) > doesn’t enclose genesis of Being & meaning—is structurally genesis itself: origin/becoming, birth of history

O p. 11 dissemination: generalizes theory/practice of graft w/out proper body, skew w/out straight line [?], bias w/out front [Nietzsche perspectivism?]

Gii p. 44 [Heidegger’s rethinking of praxis/theoria in relation to hand]

p. 45 in seminar on Parmenides, Heidegger translates pragma as Handlung, so pragmata present themselves as Zuhandenes, Vorhandenes, w/in reach of hand > only a man w/ speech & thus hands can pray, murder, greet, give thanks, make oaths, signal (Wink)

DST DST p. 323n deconstruction (as/via [?] supplementary ring [anneau]) sometimes a task (tâche), sometimes an event (in a “practical” situation) > Lacoue-Labarthe says deconstruction’s a word “not in the least ‘worn out (usé)’” [cf. REST p. 277 ring linked to Van Gogh’s trap?]

AFR p. 39 in Condillac, primacy of practical instinct invariable trait of new critical metaphysics: not philosophy of praxis but metaphysics of fact > general theory, de facto & de jure, presupposes scientific fact

p. 40 for Condillac, metaphysics, psychology, outside of usage, good use; Condillac: “I would call it psychology, if I knew any good work under this title”

pp. 96-8n for Condillac, theoretical knowledge can be remarked, noted, signed, thus he is critical of all unconscious perception (practical knowledge) > remarking remarked against unconsciousness in general [Condillac’s critique of Leibniz, who Condillac knew insufficiently]

p. 99 acc. Condillac, theoretical is only a supplying remark (remarque suppléante) of the practical

D p. 296 re: Soller’s Numbers, a praxis that doesn’t just produce (not governed by motif of truth whose very horizon it frames), a certain textual zero

CF p. 4 theoretical/critical reflection indissociable from practical initiations

PRAYER

HERP p. 215 acc. to Heidegger, Derrida speculates, if God of ontotheology can’t be addressed by prayer or sacrifice, God beyond ontotheology would be a God to which it was possible & necessary to sacrifice

HASD p. 5 prayer (invocation, apostrophe) precedes apophatic utterances, address to other as preamble or methodological threshold of experience

——the prayer can be mimicked, risk of mimicry inscribed in the structure of the mark

pp. 33-4 the laughter and breath [what divine hyperbole!] of theatrical rhetoric in Republic [re: epekeina tes ousias] becomes serious prayer in Christianity

p. 39 unique address of khora is not a prayer, a celebration, or an encomium, does not speak to You

p. 41 the 2 traits of experience of prayer: 1) address to other as other (i.e. God), discourse, language, not predicative 2) economium or the celebration (hymnein, úμνéω)

p. 42, 67n Derrida observes that encomium qualifies God, preserves irreducible relationship to attribution, determines prayer (umnein almost replaces word “to say”), distinguishing Christian prayer from all other prayer > denying this denies prayer from every non-Christian invocation

——[encomium—predicative, prayer—pre-predicative?] > both neither true nor false

pp. 48-9 prayer, quotation of prayer, & apostrophe weave same text > there is a text because of this repetition, this place is the event, future of what is promised, initiated, not motionless like khora

p. 62 did Dionysus distort or accomplish essence of prayer by quoting it, writing it for Timothy?

——sil y avait une expérience purement pure de la prière would one need a supplement? would a theology, a theiology, be possible w/out supplement?

POOF p. 219 w/out possibility (which must be neither living nor dead) of perjury, radical evil, absolute crime—no responsibility, freedom, decision > “I love you” (promise, prayer) can’t hope to prove anything at all, must remain unilateral/dissymmetrical, no mutuality/agreement can reduce the disproportion, the very condition of sharing (partage)

p. 235 “O my friends…” a call, a promise, a prayer (eukhé) [neither true nor false, Aristotle] > can’t give friendship, were friendship not still to come [Heideggerian ek-stasis] > in the name of friendship, “no friend” respectfully declares the perfect sovereign friendship impossible

——vous-mes-amis-soyez-mes-amis-et-bien-que-vous-ne-le-soyez-pas-encore-vous-lêtes-déjà-puisque-je-vous-appelle-ainsi: “O my friends…” has structure & temporality of messianic teleiopoesis

p. 250 temporal torsion [O my friend, no friend, contretemps], dissymmetry envelops theoretical knowledge in performativity of prayer it could never exhaust, we return to question of the response

SH p. 12 several singular events concentrated in same date, this concentration (Konzentration) a terrible word for memory, but also the gathering of soul, Kafka’s attention of prayer

p. 61 command (appeal, desire, supplication, prayer) [re: imperative beschneide das Wort]

OTO p. 14 btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

ATIA p. 157 Aristotle’s non-apophantic logos (neither enunciative nor declarative): euchē, prayer, entreaty, requesting; for Derrida, these would open breach in whole apparatus [of “as such”?]

SW p. 325 blessing of one who leaves w/out leaving an address

p. 328 culture of tallith, of shawl (not culture of veil): blessing and death

p. 340 to pray too late or à contretemps: to pray alone (“I always pray alone”); don’t keep prayer waiting, & it comes before everything, never lets itself be waited for

——prayer: before question, before “this is,” before dialogue, reply, knowledge, “neither true nor false”—even a Greek knew that [Aristotle]

——this don’t be late to prayer is how Derrida tries to calculate time of verdict awaiting him > but its evening is so internal to it, its “so late,” its “too late,” “I despair of ever effacing it, sero te amavi” [Augustine’s “late have I loved you”]

p. 343 when prayer replaces bloody sacrifice, tallith commemorates both privileged animal of sacrifice & (leaping w/ wing-beat to eschatological term of story) the sacrifice of sacrifice

RGE p. 337n writing of sovereignty neither true nor false [Aristotle’s prayer]

Gii p. 42 Heidegger: w/ man, 2 hands fold into 1, auto-affect each other: prayer (man is a sign) [see p. 50]

p. 50 Heidegger always privileges gathering: only mentions hands (in the plural) to bring them together in prayer

HLP p. 28 fabulous, phantasma, return of some specter: apparition of specter, vision of phantom, phenomenon of the revenant

——fable & phantasm do not belong to true or false

p. 37 prayer (doesn’t have a delimitable space w/in language), not in jurisdiction of the lie versus veracity, where performative depends on constative claims (reference to values of truth, reality)

EL p. 214 [vis-à-vis Scholem] prayer invokes spirits, the name is more powerful and transcendent than we are > but, to secularize sacred language, we play w/ ghosts [from spirit to ghost]

TN p. 2 bénédiction au bord du pire, comme toujours > only beneficence if perversion is possible

pp. 3-4 pray that you’ll outlive me, survivor guilt > the only reconciliation w/ death: not to see those I love die

NOY pp. 237-38 de Certeau: w/out object, the verb “to will” close to verb “to pray”

AD p. 13 Levinas’ “question-prayer” anterior to all dialogue

CIN p. 10 a desire, order, prayer or promise: “another voice, may it come soon now, again, another voice…”

EU p. 15 Montaigne [so important for French literary language] defends prayer in sacred language

PRECAPITALISM

OOG p. 123 [pregeometric world?]

***SPOM “a culture began before culture—and humanity, capitalization also,” a culture destined to survive them: exchange-value is exceeded by the gift, market equivalence arrests the dance (of the commodity) it seemed to initiate

VM p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

——an economy of violence (economy irreducible to Levinas’ definition) that tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity

PAS PAS p. (21) eternal ring, passivity of nonpower, strength in reception, restarts alliance w/out debt, gift w/out credit

pp. (52-3) (transgressive, completely passive) pas enacts a crossing of border that leaves border unscathed (indemne): bord sans bord, w/out any dialectical reappropriation

PRECIPITATION

GT p. 148 link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

H p. 101 delay and haste, halting and hastening, rhythm of Oedipus’ journey; p. 127 infinite speed contracted into an absolute halt or haste, precipitation because delay, instant of an instant that is canceled out > thus always late & precipitous re: hospitality

SPOM p. 27 a trajectory without heading, assurance, a trajectory of a precipitation which trembles, vibrates, orients, disorients: the question here addressed to us under the name justice

p. 174 larcharnement (ferocity, w/ chair, flesh) dun chasseur > set out the living lifeless body of a ghost (le corps vivant sans vie dun fantôme) to trick prey (pour tromper sa proie)

——Derrida has a feeling about this, and it’s projected into what he’s doing: “it is never possible to avoid this precipitation, since everyone reads, acts, writes with his or her ghosts, even when one goes after the ghosts of others”

MSUB J p. 170 to speak of the subjectile, we must speak by insertion and precipitation, acceleration of rhythmical projection [see MPM p. 62] and inscription of projectile, beyond “words and images”

MPM p. 62 [see p. 88n at what speed ought one to read?] motif of precipitousness in de Man, acceleration to win time, win time over, non-dialectical—not a particular rhythm—a rhythm w/out rhythm (incommensurable acceleration, infinite and null, touches the sublime)

p. 63 de Man on Baudelaire: write so fast, precipitously, don’t let the phantom escape > a resurrection, a “ghost” story, “Lazarus, arise!”

A p. 28 for Heidegger, precipitous concepts of death not only a speculative failure, they introduce empirical or techno-juridical confusions becoming more serious today

PAS PAS p. (36) Blanchot: she would only have precipitated through her death

OH p. x [Naas quotes from interview] precipitating contacts and articulations: dogmatism, confusion, opportunism [see POS p. 62]

p. 71 Derrida precipitates conclusion, which is movement of the head (chef)

POOF pp. 78-9 one might insist the world can’t wait for bibliophilic decision, “esoteric rarity,” and yet event is always absolutely urgent, cutting, conclusive, heartrending (déchirante)

P pp. 27-8 lemmatic precipitation, anticipatory conceptualizing, recourse to metaphor of circle, circle of circles, metaphor of organic whole [re: Hegel & philosophy as work of art]

pp. 30-1 wanting to avoid “repetition” at all costs, one can: rush toward false exit, empirical chit-chat (bavardage), spring-green impulsive avant-gardism (lavant-gardism printanier ou primesautier)

——who said it was necessary to avoid risk of “repetition”?

OS p. 39 w/out rigorous critical/deconstruction of MOP, the very necessary attention to differences, coupures, mutations, leaps becomes ensnarled (sencombre) in slogans, dogmatic stupidities, empiricist precipitation > and discourse “put in question” [takes you from behind]

PS p. 172 rush to essentiality, because there is nothing to say about the unique?

FS p. 11 no knowledge can keep writing from its essential precipitation toward meaning (which writing constitutes, which is writing’s future)

O pp. 43-4 Derrida includes long list of hasty breaks w/ idealism, precipitous leaps to the outside (i.e. expressivist practice of writing) > all of which would surely regress back

FWT p. 22 “I can understand the vital urgency of an identitarian reflex” [see WAP pp. 3-4]

WAP pp. 3-4 certains sont toujours impatients d’accéder-directement-aux-choses-mêmes-et-d'atteindre-sans-attendre-tout-droit-le-vrai-contenu-des-problèmes-urgents-et-graves-qui-se-posent-à-tous-etc. > demand not to be slow, self-indulgent, has a history, a hypocritical structure

p. 30 “classes”—goes too fast [instead, Derrida says: certain groups or social circles w/ their dialects and subcodes]

SW p. 324 where do I get the force/desire to precipitate the verdict w/out end, to the end of time, to precipitate imminence? > my texts have pocketed veils & sails of every sex and gender [French?] (which clothed my entire history): the whole history of our culture in a pocket

CHM p. 57 violence of rationalists: good sense never divides itself enough, always determined too quickly

pp. 58-60 Descartes interns his own hyperbole by temporalizing Cogito, certifying it through God (temporalizes the sharpest point, the instant), a hurried repatriation > God protects Descartes against madness of Cogito

Gi pp. 11-2 re: Dasein, the precipitation or acceleration to neutralize man’s sexuality, and to do so first, cannot be neutral

p. 20 to interpret as negative forces [re: Heidegger’s essential properties of Dasein]: precipitate interpretation, dialecticize

Gii p. 302n Heidegger: 2 hands clutch in haste, utilitarian violence (want #, quantity), don’t have patience of 1—the essential is not #, it’s the right time (die rechte Zeit)

REST p. 262 no hasty step here, la précipitation du pas, unavoidable w/ Van Gogh’s shoes? [p. 265 pas de préciptitation]

p. 287 a contract of “impulsive or precritical naïveté” [all contracts?]

PF p. xvi those who rush to confuse differance and alibi disavow that they are avoiding “thing itself,” which differance will never be; is differance a political alibi? an allegation destined to delay the deadline? no: w/out alibi is precisely a differance w/out alibi

***HLP p. 56 to hurry to produce an “effect of truth” w/out a certain conscientiousness: neither to lie, nor to error, nor Arendt’s self-deception

***LI p. 51 Derrida believes his insistence [re: a passage in SEC] should have prevented all haste & confusion [i.e. Sarl’s]

OG p. 123 (180) Lévi-Strauss’ ethnocentrism betrayed by haste of translation, satisfaction w/ domestic equivalents

——the foreigner has often been called stammerer or mute

UWC p. 237 [the event, the unconditional] matter of the sense of sense [meaning of meaning?] > up to you now, up to others—signatories are also addressees

——take your time, but be quick: don’t know what awaits you

SPEC p. 298 Freud’s haste, urgency, to solve the problem of beyond the PP is something other, of another order: not the demonstrative declaration or manifest argument [like Rousseau in OG]

FV p. 462 to designate the works of “young” Lacan: academics who hurry to cut to the quick that which doesn’t bear partition

CHOR p. 103 I am going too quickly, I’m schematizing excessively: Heidegger begins by denying all forms of security, all sedimented presuppositions of classical ontology

PREFACE

KH p. 110 acc. Hegel, nothing serious, only mythology in introductions

DS p. 190 mimēsis imitates a mnēmē (a past present) > “hope,” anamnesis (future as past present due to return), the preface, the anterior future (future perfect) arrange things

O p. 7 preface announces what will already have been written > Derrida claims preface presages a general practice of deconstruction, strange strategy w/out finality, cette défaillance organisatrice of telos or eschaton, which reinscribes restricted economy in general economy——[is this because the preface is an essential and ludicrous operation attempting to cancel out all displacement?]

pre of preface: reduces future to form of manifest presence

p. 8(n) protocol of preface destroys future anterior > a gluing (kollon), praefatio, prae-fari, protokollon as formula, pharmacopoeia, begins (law of dissemination) doubled by a “facing,” divides/undoes inaugural pretention of first page: neither depth, nor surface, in or for itself, un bloc magique

p. 9 essence of philosophical duty: do w/out preface

p. 10 preface as gossipy, chit-chat

p. 11 preface as excrement of philosophical essentiality? that which falls away (la tombée) > can we account for preface differently?

——graft w/out body, bias w/out front, skew w/out line

pp. 11-2 for Hegel, necessity of preface belongs to Bildung, external necessity of concept’s self-presentation, must take time into account as the existence (Dasein) of concept [legibility]

p. 12 preface needed where there’s spacing btwn concept & being-there, concept & existence, thought & time

p. 13 time as time of preface, space as space of preface > preface: entire location & duration of book

——preface like math, formality exterior to concept [Derrida is the greatest mathematician]

——double topography, double face, overwritten erasure of Hegel’s preface [undeclared double mark?]

——for Hegel, preface has some affinity w/ math: a machine devoid of meaning or life

p. 14n Hegel: proof of science/logic solely in necessity of emergency (Hervorbringung), a räsonierende (ratiocinative, discursive) manner produces historical knowledge

p. 15 in Hegelian concept of method, self-presentation of concept (lêtre auprès de soi du logos absolu) is true pre-face, essential pre-dicate of all writing

p. 15 acc. to Hegel’s logic of method, preface would either already be part of whole, those not unique, or it would escape the whole and be nothing, be hollow

pp. 15-6 why is the critique of formalism, of math, explained precisely in the preface? what is this third term? these fallen, dead signs? that can’t be inside philosophy nor in margins of book

——in thus remaining [outside of oppositions, i.e. sensible/intelligible], does a preface exist? son espacement (préface à une relecture) sécarte au lieu de la khōra > remarkable limen of the text: what can be read of dissemination > limen: mark, march, margin, mise en marche: citation

p. 18(n) why introduction, for Hegel, is necessary, whereas preface is not: opens a particular philosophical science > Hegel touches on paleonymy

p. 27n boredom w/ preface, impatience, preface as criticism or play-acting, opening up labyrinth of supplementary digression [Tale of Tub, marginal trap of La Nouvelle Héloise]

pp. 32-3 Marx avoids formal anticipation in his preface to Capital [?] asserts difference in form btwn Darstellungsweise (method of presentation) and Forschungsweise (method of inquiry)

p. 38 preface can only be a discourse on method, a set of formal rules, after forging of irruptive track of a method that constructs itself w/ no predetermined itinerary [artifice of preface]

p. 43(n) only extra text, unceasing preface [?]

pp. 44-5(n) acc. X (chiasmus) (thematic diagram of dissemination), semen [preface] just as likely to get lost as seminal differance as it is to be reappropriated by sublimity of father

——preface as father assuring/assisting his work, his son, idealizing, mastering his seed, auto-, homo-, re-insemination, btwn father & son alone > narcissism as law, on par w/ law, figure of Platonic boētheia (coming to aid of speech, helping logos): even better if just father, preface useless

p. 44 preface’s (double inscription’s) semantic envelopment in Book (representative of ontotheology, absolute knowledge) > restance (left-overness) of its textual exteriority should not be confused w/ Book’s physical thickness

p. 56 beneath form of its protocolic block, preface is everywhere, it’s bigger than the book

p. 58 preface—external seal, final kick (coup final), kick-off (coup denvoi)

p. 59 [no prelude for all the coups]

POS p. 110n “I read while writing: slowly, taking pleasure in long prefaces to each term”

FV pp. 486n everyone drops (laisser tomber) [the text] like they do the preface

PREORGINARY SYNTHESIS (Derrida bringing together instead of Dividing)

TR pp. 110-11 touching on equivocation btwn constative (revealed truth) & performative (the excuse): originary or preoriginary synthesis w/out which there’d be no trace, inscription, body, materiality > it’s why we’re always asking for forgiveness in ambiguous, perjuring mode

p. 113 there is the archived event and the archiving event (as inscription): these can be indissociable, contemporary, but not the same thing (structurally)

FK p. 94n multiplicity of divine [via Serge Margel] commands us to return to unitary pre-comprehension, horizon of meaning, even if this horizon must be abandoned

OTO pp. 29-30 how can reactive degeneration [Nazism] exploit same utterances, rallying cries, of active forces [Übermensch]—nor did this specular ruse elude Nietzsche: is there a “programming machine”? marrying the 2 forces (family resemblances) in a set, as life (does) death? but no regional power could set limit on such a set > no ordinary “machine,” there’s “life” in it > plays w/ opposition life/death > is there a practical rewriting of the program, which would no longer be part of it? if so, would not be produced in books

ATIA p. 135 Derrida substituted trace for signifier to ensure that erasure and inscription could be included in the same structure

HLP p. 61 opposition veracity/lie homogenous w/ testimonial problematic, not w/ epistemological one of true/false or of proof

WAP p. 123 if historian of philosophy finds amalgamation unrefined, it’s because refinement of historian is “crude”—blinding “him” to mechanisms that must be analyzed [re: negligible difference btwn Descartes, Fénelon, Bossuet, re: massive effects in teaching]

p. 147 acc. Hegel, Jew is kindisch (childish) not kindlich (childlike) like Christian because docile, submissive to heteronomy of their God [shows profound homology btwn Hegel’s pedagogical theory and entire philosophical teleology]

p. 159 [re: repression of philosophy in school] separateness of two “ministries” is here a deceptive fiction

IW p. 251 Husserl’s/Scheler’s militant patriotism belongs to same configuration as Hermann Cohen’s

p. 285 re: Heidegger & Cohen’s nationalist call to duty: let’s not imprudently bring these 2 gestures together, but not forget common web of a tradition

LI pp. 98-9 not conflating parasitism & citationality but identifying possibility they have in common [i.e. iterability] (use of or that signifies neither equivalence, dissociation, nor opposition)

——parasitism susceptible to parasitism of citation; citation can always be parasited by parasite

——citationality not confused w/ iterability but traced back to it

TN p. 72 Nancy thinks necessity of undecidables re: thought/weight > there will be identical/analogous necessity re: subject of touching

WOG pp. 21-2 “one must never give up on analysing and explaining the resemblances, the ‘common genre,’ the analogies and commonalities” [re: society, history, politics]

——exploring these resemblances one task of Enlightenment of our time, even if not most important or urgent, even if our categories for configuration are radically insufficient > we must take account as well the fractures & anachronisms of resemblance: truth of homology best imposed by going through differences that blur one’s vision

BSi pp. 14-6 clear signs of culture in animals, even incest taboos [political animal]; re: opposition man/animal > don’t rush to analogize, to resemblance: multiply attention to differences

***pp. 180-81 “I do not wish to homogenize things and erase differences,” but no criteria to conclude that man alone is exposed to bêtise, no criteria to exclude the animal

OG pp. 62-3 (91-2) the (pure) trace is differance, is the condition of sensible plenitude, an originary synthesis not preceded by absolute simplicity, w/out originary trace retaining other in the same, meaning could not appear

pp. 84-5 how to think possibility of techné, of machine, w/out becoming technicist, teleological? it’s impossible [?] > recapture unity of body & language, tool & thought, w/out thinking they’re unity in a system where they’re opposed, w/out succumbing to confusionism; Leroi-Gourhan’s pluri-dimensional “mythogram”—beyond linearity & simultaneity (simultaneity still linear because it brings two absolute points of presence together)

p. 167 (237) masturbation (“sexual” auto-affection) & writing totally indistinguishable inasmuch as each puts into play (met en jeu) the presence of the present, the life of the living [still, this totality is severely articulated and differentiated]

——logocentric longing par excellence is to distinguish the two

pp. 279-80 (396-97) neume, epoch of natural languages: fête autour du point deau, temps de lIsle de Saint-Pierre [?]: limage fixant ce qui ne fut quun point de pur passagela limite toujours déjà franchie, rèpere absolu

PRESENCE

GOD p. 63 Abraham’s “Here I am” requires that he renounces family loyalties

GT pp. 159-60n Heidegger on gift, Heidegger discovers an etymology of khreon that links it to hand, to reaching for, also links it to logos > Derrida wonders about credit cards, coded signatures

——also to khreon as presencing of what is present (das Anwesen des Anwesenden)

p. 169 true, authentic money, nature’s gift of a present

OOG p. 86 living present reduces, without negation, all alterity: “the Living Present constitutes the other as other in itself and the same as the same in the other”

pp. 109-11 the Living Present > most responsible security of every phenom. reduction: “in the ultimate juridical instant (instance) is announced the most radical unity of the world”

p. 136 “again and again” places math in infinite task > grounded by Living Present: primordial Absolute in an indefinite protention, animated and unified by Idea (in the Kantian Sense)

p. 137 the Living Present: indefinite Maintenance of double enveloping (protention, retention)

p. 143 movement of primordial temporalization (protention, retention) was, as every dialectic wants, a dialectic in to nondialectical (the Living Present, universal form of all consciousness)

——subjectivity “normed” in the Present, “fastened” to a “higher subjectivity,” higher sense investigation

p. 150 in going out from self to self of the Absolute of Living Present present, intentionality is the root of historicity, historicity is sense

p. 152 “access to Being and Being’s arrival must always already be contracted [stricture] or drawn together when phenomenology begins by claiming the right to speak (droit à parole)” > prescribing historicity for Being avoids simple misfortune of delay: phenomenology alone can open absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History, as auto-temporalization of Living Present

——delay is thus philosophical absolute, and absolute origin in general

FK p. 70 unscathed as the present

H p. 69 publicity, pure morality = law, presence

FL p. 253 the undecidable remains caught, lodged, as a ghost, an essential ghost, in every decision, every event, the ghostliness deconstructs from within all assurance of presence

p. 259 [re: Zur Kritik der Gewalt] nomination as originary destination of name (for Benjamin), the gift or the call of presence in the name, but how is the thought of the name articulated with haunting and the logic of the specter?

p. 269 when people talk about “our time,” “our present” in the future anterior, they don’t know what they are saying > it’s precisely in this nonknowledge that the eventness of the event consists, what’s naively called its presence

SPOM p. xviii “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present”

p. 10 what is effective/present about a ghost is its virtuality, ineffectivity

pp. 61-2 “to be present” not un mot desprit, but le mot de lesprit > the first verbal body

p. 87 those who oppose simulacrum to presence can’t think event

p. 167 Cartesian cogito, Kantian “I think,” phenomenological ego cogito: “a real presence is promised here to a Eucharistic Narcissus” > living being visited by its own apparition

HERP p. 182 acc. Aristotle, there must be presence in act of friendship > can exhaust itself in non-address, immediate non-hailing (non-interpellation) [does Heidegger agree? see p. 176]

MPM p. 60 memory of present divides the instant? inscribes difference in presence of present?

——difference btwn simple present and presence of present is never present > arises only for memory

A p. 20 we can never say these are the conditions of inexhaustible singularity of event, must speak in negative form (w/out X no Y) [Derrida against present or presentation of “this is that”]

SEC p. 313 though representation supplements presence, the general assumption [Condillac] is that writing repairs > a continuous, homogenous modification of presence in representation

——for Condillac, trace means “to express,” “to represent,” “to recall,” “to make present”

p. 317 a written sign can break with its context (set of presences which organize moment of inscription), still be legible, can always be lifted from interlocking chain, grafted into other chains

p. 325 general possibility of “parasite”: 1) trap (piège), failure (échec), abyss outside/in front of language, ditch (fossé), place of external perdition, which language can avoid, sheltered by (à labri de) its essence or telos? 2) or is this risk, internal and positive condition of its possibility, this outside its inside?

——Austin makes us accept as ordinary a teleological and ethical determination > univocality of statement, self presence of total context, transparency of intentions, presence of meaning—absolute singular oneness of speech act

EM pp. 125-26 (150-51) for Heidegger, exemplary being is “phenomenological,” governed by principle of principles, i.e. presence and presence in self-presence, manifested in being we are, such proximity determines factum

pp. 131-33 (157-60) if Heidegger has radically deconstructed domination of metaphysics by the present, by leading us to think presence of the present, this thinking can only be metaphorized, and can’t simply decide to escape a profound necessity, language it deconstructs

——[here Derrida shows limits of Heidegger’s deconstruction?] prevalence given to phenomenological metaphor (phainesthai, shining, lighting, clearing, Lichtung) opens to space of presence, presence of space, opposition near & far > thought prior to opposition space & time, opening of a spacing which belongs to neither, dislocates while producing presence of the present p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (lespace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being), “an alternative always suspended over its ‘own proper’ abysm”: it is the text of dissemination

p. 132n (159n) Derrida on privilege of spoken language in Heidegger [I’ll study it elsewhere?] leads back to Being as presence, Anwesenheit > but, is also erased when Heidegger announces a Wesen that wouldn’t be Anwesen (see OS [?])

PP p. 63 text is forever imperceptible, its laws and rules [legibility?] are not “harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret,” but can never be booked (se livrent) in the present

p. 69 an inscription, Delphikon gramma [Phaedrus (229d)], anything but oracle > the imperative of self-knowledge not dictated by self-presence, hermeneutics assigns intuition

p. 112 for Plato, only truth as presence of the present is discriminative > discrimination become so subtle it separates nothing, the same from itself (this movement is only possible within structure of ambiguity and reversibility of pharmakon)

p. 166 if truth is presence to eidos, would it not be absolute blindness? death?

p. 168 “at once (à la fois):” identity is doubled as its simulacrum, phantasm, at once (identity of presence, presence of its identity, doubled as soon as it appears)

——differance at once condition of possibility and impossibility of truth, disappearance of any originary presence

VM p. 132 egological life has “living present” as irreducible absolutely universal form, permits other presents in the form of memory or anticipation;

p. 133 “living present” : originally and forever violent, freeing of absolute alterity in absolute same > if other can only be respected/dissimulated by the same, then time is violence, living present originally marked by death > “presence as violence is the meaning of finitude, meaning of meaning as history”

p. 134 present as absolute form of experience: pre-comprehending anticipation of Being as time, the ens of praes-ens > if Being has always been determined by philosophy as presence, the question of Being posed on basis of transcendental horizon of time > first tremor of philosophical security, of self-confident presence

OH p. 81 every time Europe, politics, responsibility, decision is reduced to what they must exceed (order of the present, of presentation [knowledge, certainty, judgment in the form “this is that”]), we have the very presentable face of good conscience

VP p. 6 the ideality of ideality, living-present, self-presence of transcendental life; presence always the form, to infinity, through which an infinite diversity of contents will be produced > concrete ideality of “living present” justifies opposition btwn form and content ultimately and radically

——the security of presence is founded on the non-empirical, the sign, the non-foundation, exposing this removes this security

p. 7 Husserl determines logos on basis of logic, giving logicity the normalcy of logos telos, the telos of being as presence; this requires distinction btwn pure logic or “pure logical grammar” and pure grammar [logic before language]

p. 8 last court of appeal for phenomenology is “consciousness,” possibility of the self-presence of the present in the living present

——“ideality is the salvation or mastery of presence in repetition” (this is why Husserl claims intuition is not reell), not a presence of anything that exists in the world, in correlation w/ ideal acts of repetition [idealization secured by a certain relation of “existent” to his death]

p. 31 non-self-presence of living present: relation to others, self-relation of temporalization

p. 41 no need for communication in the psychical act, no need to indicate psychical acts, it is psyche; Husserl: “acts are lived by us in the very instant.”

***p. 46 presence as universal form of all existence, transgression of all empirical, and first of all mine, but even beyond my death, this present still is, must be to be universal; if the possibility of the sign is this relation to death: erasure of sign is dissimulation of this relation to death

p. 50 Husserl: presence lived experientially im selben Augenblick; Derrida: present as self-presence is as indivisible as a blink of an eye

p. 51 “sharp point of the instant”: identity of lived-experience present to itself

p. 53 via Husserl, Greek metaphysics of presence becomes “modern” metaphysics of presence as self-consciousness, metaphysics of idea as representation (Vorstellung)

p. 55 for Husserl, primary memory and primary anticipation are non-presences, non-perceptions, required for presence of perceived present [retentional memory is perception?]

p. 56 for Husserl, non-presence does not dissimulate, surprise, presence, it allows the ever reborn virginity of presence

p. 58 ideality of the form of presence can be repeated to infinity as return of the same, but retained in a finite movement

p. 67 presence to itself of animating act, this intimacy of life to itself is why we say speech is alive, we hear our voice, thus the deaf are dumb

p. 76 the more the signifier is ideal, more it augments potency of repetition of presence, the more it protects, preserves, reserves and capitalizes on sense

p. 85 presence is the matrix of sense, ideality, objectivity, truth, intuition, perception and expression > because these are all determined as ideality they are all deferred to infinity

FSW p. 198 acc. Heidegger, Hegel and Descartes conceive self-presence w/in opposition of consciousness to unconsciousness

p. 212 Nachtrag (postscript, appendix, codicil) > present is only a call for a footnote

——Freud’s theme that there is no purity to living present, formidable for metaphysics, found in a conceptual scheme unequal to the thing itself

p. 230 unerasable trace, not a trace, full-presence, son of God, sign of parousia, not a seed, not a mortal germ

WM p. 268 one true metaphor (no more true metaphor): but assured legibility of the proper [presence disappearing in its own radiance, hidden source of light]

OS pp. 32-3(n) chain of interdependent concepts (ousia, parousia, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart, gegenwärtigen, Vorhandenheit) deposited only at beginning/end of Sein un Zeit > who better than Heidegger to think of problem of translation re: these terms

p. 37 Heidegger: Hegel’s jetzt as boundary (Grenze), ‘absolute this (das absolute Dieses); Aristotle’s nun as stigmē, tode ti > both circular (Kreislauf, sphaira)

p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

pp. 45-6 acc. Hegel, think present as eternity, eternity as another name of the presence of the present (eternal, Idea, Spirit, True, neither inside nor outside time)

pp. 50-1 Aristotle repeats aporia of Zeno’s argument re: time, says it clarifies nothing, but does not deconstruct it > time’s nonbeing pre-comprehended as nonpresence in relation to determination of being as present

p. 53n for Hegel, time erases time, Tilgen (to erase) is also an Aufhebung: given that time is pure exterior self, parousia is end of time

p. 62 acc. Aristotle, being in act, energy, is not time but eternal presence: eternal beings (ta aei onta) are not in time

pp. 64-5 almost impossible to distinguish Heidegger’s Anwesenheit from Gegenwärtigkeit: sometimes it is a more original presence, other times it questions Greco-Western philosophical closure; perhaps we need to make thought tremble w/ a Wesen not yet Anwesen

***pp. 66(n) presence, instead of being what sign signifies, is the trace of the trace (trace of the erasure of the trace)—Heidegger: distinction Being/beings left its trace as presence

POS p. 8 what defers presence (its trace, its sign, its representation) is basis of its announcement or desire

SP p. 39 [it is impossible, and the English translation, I believe, fails to convey this, to tell whether the spur protects against presence or the threat to presence]

PS p. 193 self-presence, Artaud’s “WE KNOW IT WAS WE WHO WERE SPEAKING > magic identification

——madness as much inalienation [presence?] as alienation

p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

——not critiquing Artaud from standpoint of metaphysics, Derrida reveals complicity: Artaud must enclose himself in closure of presence to denounce naive implications w/in difference

——self-presence, unity, self-identity, proper: most profound and permanent ambition of Western metaphysics [?]

DIF DIF p. 13 differance constitutes present in interval, constitutes present by dividing it > everything thus thought on basis of the present, in our metaphysical language, would also be divided (subject, substance, being, etc.)

p. 16 privilege granted to consciousness, to the “living present”: power to synthesize traces, to constantly reassemble them

p. 17 before Heidegger purposely and radically questioned presence, Freud & Nietzsche did so, and, remarkably, they did so via motif of differance [remarkable :)]

p. 23 Heidegger: when the essence of presencing unnoticeably becomes something present, the distinction btwn presencing and what is present (Anwesen und Anwesendem) is forgotten

p. 24 because trace is a simulacrum of presence, erasure belongs to structure of the trace, it has no site > erasures on both sides of trace

***——inversion of metaphysical concepts: the present becomes trace of trace, sign of sign, mark of erasure > present is a trace & a trace of erasure of trace

***O p. 5 modes of presence: meaning, essence, objective or subjective existence, form (i.e. appearance, content, substance), sensible/intelligible presence

***DPi p. 255-56 “my life” passes by way of the heart of the other, can only prefer living to dead, living present, where it “receives its life from the heart of the other” > “my life” depends on (tient au) the heart of the other

Gii p. 49 hand speaks by way of “necessity,” chreon, usage, Brauch [?] > if the chreōn allows one to think the present in its presence, if der Brauch is “the gathering”—then, before all technology, surgery, le main ny est pas pour rien

***TR p. 134 re: oeuvre as trace of its ambiguity, as if quasi-machine were already operating even before being produced in the world, in the vivid experience of living present

D p. 302 pure present: la plénitude inentamée, la continuité vierge de la non-coupure (not yet having been written, à la veille du jeu)

——present can only present itself by relating back to itself [folding back on itself], (com)plying with itself (en se pliant à soi) dans langle, along la brisure: a “crack (faille)” created by a joint, hinge

p. 303 possibility (potency) of present is its own limit, inner fold, impossibility—its impotence (btwn presence/castration) > same goes for “history,” “form”: language of metaphysics

——“present” only marked in citation, storytelling, fiction

pp. 303-04 life & presence as privileged examples [of folding back onto their own limit, folding back in their very triggering] > inscribes difference in heart of life

p. 307 nothing says present better, it seems, than il y a; but what is present is a scission, il y a cette coupure, what is present & at work is a “recoil (recul),” possibility of its triggering

——opening of presence, “dead surface,” 4th surface, plunged by its “history” into limitless time that is neither “present” nor a “history”

p. 308 presence as product, tombe déjà comme un effet, sous le coup (under the sway) dune structure machinée qui ne se livre (gives itself away) pas au présent

pp. 313-14 the opening, as presence, is not noticed as opening—we’re fascinated, glued to what presents itself: we’re unable to see presence as such, visibility of visible > never present themselves

p. 314 once ether (presence of present) has been called to mind: plupresent not merely presence but deformation irreducible to any form (presence, first matter in the last instance)

p. 344 contraction into a dot (point), to where everything is present but nothing exists, pleroma, Orphic explanation [?], “drama of God,” zimzum, God going out of himself takes place [can find this in Hegel] > repetition of absolute present or undifferentiated origin

p. 351 form, another name for presence

LI p. 52 “permanence” and “substance” are, by essence, “presences”

p. 59 [from SEC] structural unconsciousness, absence of intending actual utterance, prohibits any saturation of context (total presence)

p. 116 “self-presence” as desire/need is not simply a linguistic superstition Derrida keeps alive to win an argument, it is indestructible, “immortal”—also death, mortifère (death bearing) > is not “pure realization of self presence” also death?

p. 129 repeatability of same ensures that full presence of a singularity, in being repeated, references something else, thus rending the full presence it announces

——this something else is why iteration is different from simple repetition

TN pp. 162-63 for Husserl, fingers that touch (not signal, not show) deem contact the experience of presence, which is full, immediate, direct (Nancy’s syncope interrupts)

p. 201 Heidegger: thesis that all cognition aims at intuition has temporal meaning that all cognition aims at making present

***OG pp. 7-8 (17) privilege of phonè necessary moment of economy (of “life,” of “history,” of “être comme rapport à soi”), not historical contingency: not a choice that could have been avoided

——writing as secondary, as technique: a translator of a full speech present to itself, its signified, its other [w/in system that privileges phonè]

p. 12 Hegel privileges sound (speech, voice), because it is a hearing of an interior vibration

——voice, phonè, sentendre-parler, saffecte lui-même (hearing-oneself-speak, affecting oneself), ideality

——phonocentrism se confond (merges) w/ onto-theology, produces these subdeterminations of presence: sight as eidos, substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as point (stigmè) of now (nun), consciousness, cogito, subjectivity, co-presence of other & self…

p. 17 Rousseau’s sensible cogito as another model of presence (self-presence), carries in itself inscription of divine law

p. 107 (156-57) Rousseau: figurative language initiates and proper meaning is discovered last > eschatology of proper (self-presence, self-proximity, own-ness)

p. 140 (202) silence as much a myth of full presence [as full speech]

pp. 153-54 (221) restitution of presence by language: symbolic/immediate, se passe de passer par le monde: touching is touched, jouissance not deferred: auto-affection se donne pour autarcie pure, it does not wait (nattend pas) > but, auto-affection pure speculation, present delivered is chimera, the no longer deferred is absolutely deferred: acc. Rousseau, sign/image/representation sont des illusions qui donnent le change (sidetrack us) [differance w/out delay]

p. 166 (237) privation of presence is condition of experience, that is, of presence

pp. 309-12 (436-39) MOP in Rousseau appears wherever fatality of supplement seems to limit it, he is more interested in presence of the present, essence as presence, as life, as self-presence, energeai, as re-birth (permits all repetitions/returns of origin)—no memory, no anticipation, no souvenir, no distinction, point deau, an unimaginable pleasure, the sleeping imagination [Rousseau’s beautiful depiction in Reveries]

——for Derrida, there’s an interior doubling of presence, a constitution/frustration of jouissance, a call & trace that Rousseau tries to elude

FV pp. 464-65 [phonematic limitation of letter, phonē spared divisibility] voice: spontaneous self-presence one can retain (garder) w/out paper, w/out envelope, always available (disponible) > Lacan’s not attentive to writing w/in the voice, before the letter

——sheltered (à labri) from disseminating threat/power in OG, agency of Lacan’s letter is the relève of writing in system of speech

p. 469 for Lacan, analyst links truth to power of speech: power of communication as a contract btwn 2 present things

PRESUPPOSITION [fixerup]

VM p. 134 phenomenology, passageway to essentiality, would be impossible w/out anticipation [presupposition, metaphysical decision] of Being not exhausted by reality

p. 151 Nicholas of Cusa: God is absolute presupposition itself, of all things

VP p. 4 Husserl insists on the absence of all presuppositions (Voraussetzungslosigkeit) whether metaphysical, psychological or from natural sciences: does this not all still dissimulate a metaphysical presupposition?

——starting point in “Fatkum” of language not a presupposition so long as we’re attentive to contingency of example

FWT p. 12 Derrida looks for price to be paid when theoretical progress is made [re: Foucault] via presupposition > makes it possible to accelerate and to absorb shock of acceleration (break)

POS p. 19 “everyday language” neither innocent nor neutral, language of Western metaphysics, carries w/ it considerable presuppositions

p. 23 communication: transmission of identity of signified object from one subject (presupposes subject) to another: A communicates B to C

P p. 63 fundamental presupposition in Critique: aesthetic judgment must bear upon intrinsic beauty, know difference btwn extrinsic/intrinsic

ROP p. 28 immanence of presupposition (Voraussetzung) constantly required in Hegelian dialectic

SP p. 37 Derrida’s debt to other readings (of Nietzsche) should be presupposed in its totality

GSP p. 161 radicalization of presuppositions history & psychology made phenomenology necessary

O p. 29n acc. Feuerbach, Hegel’s exposition was supposed to have presupposed nothing, to leave no residue, empty & drain us completely

WAP pp. 16-7 philosophy, by right, must claim to be justified, at every moment (thus rupture), to put into question every “presupposition” (incl. those of “philosophy”) > vertical self-institution

p. 17 “presupposition,” word Derrida uses to determine implication of implicit

Gi p. 22 being-with does not arise from factical connection, a species-like unification (gattungshafte Zusammenstreben) “metaphysically presupposes” dissemination of Dasein, thus Mitsein

REST p. 326 pre-text as a pretext to bash on w/ must hackneyed, crude, and tired discourses (pour asséner le discourse le plus éculé, le plus fruste, le plus fatigué)

LI p. 85 Austin’s strategy of exclusion fraught w/ metaphysical presuppositions [re: nonserious, parasite]

p. 93 Derrida cannot accept distinction btwn strategical decision & metaphysical presupposition: every strategy has a decision concerning metaphysics > the more confident, implicit, the more its order and calm reigns over methodological technicity

p. 138 deconstruction aims to analyze & if possible transform network of presuppositions of any legitimacy

EW p. 271 Da of Dasein singularizes itself w/out being reducible to any categories of human subjectivity (self, rational being, consciousness, person), because it is presupposed by all of these

BSi p. 106 Derrida one of the few who smiles at machine of presuppositions to be deconstructed in “law,” “freedom,” “institution,” “culture”

CHOR p. 103 I am going too quickly, I’m schematizing excessively: Heidegger begins by denying all forms of security, all sedimented presuppositions of classical ontology

PRIMAL SCENE

LOBL p. 90 scene of visibility: a primal scene > that which enables us to see should remain invisible, black, blinding [Plato]

PRISON

DPi p. 6 Platos Laws (907d-909d) [3 types of impiety (asebia) each divided in 2: atheism, those who believe gods are negligent, those who believe gods can be bribed] > three types of prisons, houses of corrections (i.e. nocturnal assembly)

p. 7 prison, sōphronistērion (place of wising up)

PRIVILEGE

FL p. 293 preserve the sovereign: absolute privilege

AF p. 3 documents in archive inhabit rare place, place of election, law & singularity intersect in privilege

OH pp. 47-8 nationalism always a philosopheme, justifies itself in name of a privilege in the memory of the universal, of the transcendental, of the ontological > no one is more universal than the one that is we; cosmopolitanism & nationalism have always gotten on together

p. 121n privilege is by definition a delicateness in danger > danger comes from foreigner

S p. 18 how else but by confirming it a priori and circularly can Heidegger question Daseins privilege (Vorrang) re: the question?

F p. xxxiii via Abraham, in deciphering poem, “translator” has written one: poetic translation or psychoanalytic interpretation [re: “ghost”] > clears path for other w/out unilateral privilege

FWT p. 81 interest in Hamlet, privilege given to father/son, masculine installation of sexual difference > privilege of power, power of privilege, privilege of law as authority of father

POOF pp. 229-30 Derrida discusses his own personal responsibility re: the privileged discourses on friendship he has chosen to discuss > he’s not submitting to their authority, he’s thinking about forces or procedures that have placed them in the major position

——will it be possible to (re)turn or go elsewhere, beyond/below this potential of maximum signification, of irradiation? [does this question reinstate conceptual machinery of dúnamis and enérgeia?]

p. 233 dominant structures silence others, covering over or destroying the archive > but traditions are never homogenous

DS pp. 251-52 tropic twist of fan (éventail) (wings, plumes) inscribes very movement of structure of fan-as-text (surplus-mark, margin of meaning), spacing, fold, hymen btwn all meaning-effects > this supplementary valence/mark neither metaphor nor metonymy, no transcendental privilege

OS p. 36 acc. Heidegger, [MOP] privilege of form of “now” and “point”

p. 40 [via Heidegger] Beings are what is (must not be affected by time): privilege of 3rd person indicative (is, estin), as present participle becomes noun > same for consciousness

POS p. 106-07n spacing as not only the space, but an operation, production, genetic (generative): spacing ensures no overlap of any two concepts, no privileging of a concept

FS p. 20 if we appear to oppose one series (structuralism), it’s not to redeem force but to show & shake naive privilege of other series: produce force of dislocation: fissuring system—delimit it

DIF DIF p. 16 privilege granted to consciousness, to the “living present”: power to synthesize traces, to constantly reassemble them

p. 16 absolute privilege: ether [closure] of metaphysics > form or epoch of presence: consciousness as meaning in self-presence

WAP p. 1 privilege of title, capital, capital letter, folded up (repliée): capitalizes its meanings in its folds: able to dispense w/ sentence, w/ making itself explicit > we should begin by decapitalizing (employ/deploy significations)

——privilege from its unicity, its place > its privilege is legal & authorized

——keeps quiet while making us think it has a lot to say

****pp. 1-2 philosophy clings (tient) to the privilege it exposes

p. 29 for there to be philosophy, translation would already have to occur w/in privileged language itself [a unique competency]

pp. 29-30 philosophy as most economical practice of natural language [?]: must know its virtual folds, potentialities, rhetorical effects

p. 40-1 how dominant philosophical culture tends to censor other philosophical discourses or other discourses that exceed philosophico-juridico-political machinery

——irresponsibility to state can be demanded by philosophy’s responsibility to its own law (to thinking) > gives itself right or privilege to go on questioning w/out trusting limit inside/outside

***pp. 48-50 drawing one’s authority from oneself, and thus from Kant; Kant’s heritage has been tattooed in, privileged inscription of an absolute privilege, quasi-naturalized right in its training, a norm, a program > Kant authorizes/authenticates dignity of “great” philosophy (even if it’s speaking against him) [to ignore Kant would be to succumb to Kant]

p. 52 singular “history” (the only privilege there is) [re: Kant’s pedagogical discourse]

p. 54, isn’t Kant just like Plato, yes, they both powerfully organized network of conceptual delimitations/oppositions, but Kant declared philosophy the essential project of delimitation: pensée de la limite comme position de la limite > foundation/legitimation of judgment thereby

philosophy legitimates its legitimating position: juridico-politico-philosophical

p. 200n coincidence: singularity of a chance and a justification, another kind of privilege

DPi p. 59 Badinter: courthouse theater, a privileged spectacle, is a failed incarnation

CHM p. 42 if exclusion of madness is fundamental structure of historicity, the origin of history, then Foucault’s example [re: “classical” moment] is a sample (échantillon) not a model

——or could he show it to be a unique exclusion, exemplary, an example revelatory by privilege?

RGE p. 255 servile condition of mastery & entire history it makes possible > absolute privilege given to slave, truth of the master is the slave: deferred pleasure, limited stakes, delaying disappearance of thing (labor) > the condition of history/meaning/philosophy/discourse

Gi pp. 11-2 Dasein’s neutrality as a certain sexlessness (Geschlechtsoloigkeit), sexual difference privileged anthropological trait to be neutralized; Heidegger: “Dasein is neither of the two sexes”

IW p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——Cohen suspects a narcissistic infatuation in Fichte’s national ego, mirror of a certain psyché, but also room for any other self in this national self, cosmopolitan logic, national self as “We”

TN p. 243 anthropocentric privilege fails to consider: 1) ultimate reduction of world 2) anything that’s not “human flesh,” i.e. technical prostheses 3) historicity that produces-human-beings-and-technics 4) that privileging human frees path toward Christian body

PROBLEM [fixerup]

SPOM p. 207 critical problematization as apotropaic shielding, battle against ghosts, fears them as it fears itself (problema, shield, armor, rampart) [see p. 175 problema]

POO p. 10 capitale (head on), problema (ob-subject, promontory cap, armor; excuse given to excuse oneself of blame)

——innocent witness (testis), third (terstis), actor-participant, problematic (used as shield, supplement, “cover”) child, assume responsibility for another, passing oneself off as another [passion of Ulysses the oblique, Philoctetus]

p. 137n cap as “front,” problem as diverted responsibility

p. 13 Philoctetus: the child is the problem [shield], always, that is the truth

POOF p. vii POOF is preliminary rather than problematic

HASD p. 23 signs, figures, symbols, “shields” against the many

A pp. 11-12 every border is problematic in sense of problēma (projection, dissimulation, shield, prosthesis put forth to represent, replace, shelter, hide something unavowable)

——border becomes a problem as soon as edge-line is threatened, a step crossing an indivisible line (customs, police, visa—all established upon institution of indivisible)

——Derrida puts problēma in tension with aporia

pp. 62-3 Heidegger suggests diagnosis of problematic closures, they forget essence of Dasein, lock Dasein into ontological determination that is not its own, that of Vorhandensein

SEC p. 310 certain concept of writing will perhaps transform the problematic

PP p. 122 what species of protection (amuntērion) is the dialectic? counter-poison that’s not antidote [?] > acc. Plato’s Stranger, 2 forms of artificial (poiein, protection), of the 2nd form: 1) antidote either human or divine 2) problēmata (shield, fence), either armaments or fences, fences (clôtures, phragmata) can be screens (alexētēria) or protections, finally garments, art of weaving: problematic space of protection

——[anamnesic] dialectic as antidoteness of antidote, passage btwn human & divine, before their division, also dialectic as science of sumplokē [see p. 67], art of weaving (tissage), if there are 2 sorts of texture

ROP p. 115 history of uses of a word [re: Foucault] is neither essentialist nor nominalist, it is a history of problematizations, to analyze all problematic intersections also calls for problematization of its own problematization > avec sa vigilance réflexive et le souci de se penser dans sa rigoureuse spécificité > which must itself question itself w/ same care that it methodically prescribes

O pp. 23-4n Mao, profoundly influenced by Hegel, discusses how the itemization of a pharmacy does not push one to think over problems (problem: a contradiction in a thing)

PIO p. 22 there can be no problematics of deconstruction [this after wondering whether deconstruction can be inventive in itself]

PROGRAM (connect to CONTEXT)

KH pp. 98-99 entire discourse on khōra, every yet-to-come history of interpretations, included in advance, this X receives all, teleologically programs history of hermeneutics[?], is that a history?

p. 106 Derrida less concerned w/ art of Plato [re: mises en abyme of khōra and politics] but in a constraint, a programme, the being-programme of the programme, the being-logical of logic: Plato apprehends them as such, though in a dream, put en abyme

p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

GT pp. 122-23 the foreseeable, programmed, conditioned, expected, counted on, necessary cannot be a gift or event

——event, gift, must be structured by aleatory, remaining unforeseeable w/out being kept so

FK p. 83 technical, automatic, machine-like [the possibility of faith, its very chance], a chance that entails risk of radical evil, otherwise it would simply be pure know-how, pure knowledge, annulment of future, programme, proof, predictability, providence

POR p. 16 (148) new responsibility of community of thought w/out secured frontier btwn basic & end-oriented research (entre recherche fondamentale et recherche finalisée) > rethink community, institution, and all ruses, tâche infinie, de la raison finalisante > paths by which apparently disinterested research can by reinvested by all sorts of programs

p. 19 (153) “thinking” requires both principle of reason and what’s beyond it, both archē and an-archy > decision [of thought] always risks the worst, to claim to erase the risk by institutional program is to create a barricade against a future

A p. 19 to protect decision or responsibility by knowledge, theoretical assurance, is to transform this experience into deployment of program

——but, should not abandon programs, they are the guardrail of a responsibility to whose calling they remain radically heterogenous

PP p. 73 pharmakon is but a formula learned by heart, dead, rigid knowledge shut up (enfermé) in biblia, foreign to living knowledge and dialectic

PAS PAS p. (48) risk of interruption is run, programmed in the night, by the récit

POOF p. 29 program, a possible that is only possible (non-impossible), w/out perhaps, process w/out event [no future]

p. 218 one must resist the temptation to keep (garder) its chance, never let it become program, never a grounding on virtue of perhaps

p. 219 irresponsible application of a program determines the undecidable (counts on assurance of intelligibility), depriving it of what would make it a sovereign, free decision [?]

OH p. 13 we must not forget programs that do not forget us [re: Eurocentrism, anti-Eurocentrism]

p. 41 when a certain knowledge opens up path in advance—decision is already made: irresponsibly, w/ good conscience, one applies the program

p. 45 following program—application of know-how > ethics & politics become a technology, no longer order of practical reason or decision, begins to be irresponsible

SH p. 20 [Derrida comes very close here to a dialectic of program/event?]

F p. xxxi Torok and Abraham’s method, goes beyond anticipations of a program: introduced an essential déportment (unruliness) [re: “transphenomenology,” relay, conversion]

p. xxv foreign style of Abraham and Torok avoids reassuring programs (this foreignness is attached to the Thing they’re occupied w/)

***p. xxxv [how the program (market, rates) is inevitable but as a place to exhume]

FWT pp. 6-7 despite its “subversion,” Derrida also sees price structuralism had to pay, its somnambulism, naiveté, the sterilizing, precipitous, dogmatic elements of its program

p. 96 there’s necessity for secondary effects of program (programmatic economy & strategy), but in the first/last instance, what is to be done is invented/inaugurated, must come w/out program

——New International must seek unheard of figures [I cannot define this forms], not opposed to existence of parties, but “Party” form is no longer the major form of political struggle

DS p. 285 roll die in hymen, write, seminal spurt: hasard selon le programme génétique > limited to 6 surfaces [each guarding chance]

***ROP p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

p. 113 only those who work undergo the aporia, only ones who ever think, take responsibility, everyone else applies a program

OTO pp. 4-5 discourse on life/death occurs btwn logos and gramme, analogy & program, program & reproduction (since life is on the line, the trait [splitting of line] relating graphical to logical, also working btwn biological & biographical, thanatological & thanatographical)

pp. 29-30 how can reactive degeneration [Nazism] exploit same utterances, rallying cries, of active forces [Übermensch]—nor did this specular ruse elude Nietzsche: is there a “programming machine”? marrying the 2 forces (family resemblances) in a set, as life (does) death? but no regional power could set limit on such a set > no ordinary “machine,” there’s “life” in it > plays w/ opposition life/death > is there a practical rewriting of the program, which would no longer be part of it? if so, would not be produced in books

ATIA p. 1 one should try not to repeat oneself, it gives appearance of training (dressage), of following a program

p. 84 question of response, question of question, where response to question would remain unprogrammable > abyss of “what is a response?”

p. 87 from Descartes to Heidegger, nonresponse: mechanicity of programming, deficiency, lack

PS p. 328n Nietzsche: “I hate the reading idlers. / He who knoweth the reader, doeth nothing more for the reader. Another century of readers—and spirit itself will stink.”

O p. 49(n) re: writing, Hegel does not think exteriority, repetitive autonomy of remainder > writing becomes pro-gramme, pre-scription, pre-text, the simple empirical husk (déchet) of concept

——for Derrida, this husk is coextensive w/ whole life of discourse

p. 50(n) logos spermatikos, philosophy of the seed, romanticism, myth of semantic depth, genetic pro-gram [quoting from OG]

p. 52 dissemination also explains itself, “the apparatus explains itself,” constitutes itself into a program (heterogeneity, absolute exteriority of seed), but one that is not formalizable, infinity of its code, sa rupture, not saturated w/ self-presence: “it is attached (tient), so to speak, to the incessant falling of a supplement to the code

WAP p. 78 ideological or political constraint is the real program of power, all under its sway, in essence, reproduce said program, and ward off (repoussant) everything that would remove it

——somewhat Foucault-like vision of network of programs as profound machine, though the additional idea that this machine reinvests, reemploys, itself in each determined configuration

p. 89 pose questions, pose or posit that which does not pose or posit itself, not-thetic? this alleged neutrality constructs teaching body > no question not constrained by a program

Gi p. 8 Derrida wonders about a reading machine (one must think of programming the machine & know how to do it) that would snare (gibier), hunt down, sexual difference in Heidegger

Gii p. 41 Heidegger’s essential propositions re: ape’s lack of hand, an empirico-dogmatic hapax, supposedly nonmetaphysical humanism > when animality is enclosed in its organico-biological programs: absolute oppositional limit which erases differences, homogenizes

***REST pp. 325-26 if police there is (and isn’t there always?) > Derrida polices too [?], “close reading,” counterpolices [?] oldest, most dogmatic, sinisterly authoritarian programs, massive meidatizing machines: pre-text of perception, of bare hands (mains nue), of real history, of living speech (vous enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte)

DST DST p. 197 désistance (2 typical experiences) is ineluctable: 1) il faut que cela arrive: in this case, the “I,” the free subject, anticipates/precedes, is constituted w/out or before, the ineluctable event that happens to me 2) constitutive desistance of subject: something began before me, I am late, a subject marked in advance by a pre-impression, imprint—deconstitution (“I” am not the supporting basis of this imprint): still, ineluctable not genetic programs or historical determination—those would be supplemental, late determinations of ineluctable

PIO pp. 27-8 status of invention via politics of patent, programming of patented inventions (even integrating margin of chance)—are programmed inventions still inventions? still open to future?

p. 39 the government’s aleatory margin (for invention) remains homogenous w/ calculation (programmed invention) > w/in order of the calculable: no absolute surprise, order of the same

——but Derrida will not oppose deconstruction (not passivity), the invention of the other, to government’s program: because opposition belongs to regimen of the same

pp. 42-3 Schelling’s invention, re: philosopher as an inventor of forms, still limited as invention of the same in guise of supplement of invention: man’s invention supplements God’s ideality: man as psyche of God, as supplying the lack in his revelation

——here, invention caught in infinite amortization, rationalistic humanism, carries out God’s program; human invention as desire of/for God

TR p. 134 formidable effects of machinelike automaticity: an a priori, programmed “I apologize” > automatic forgiveness self-destructs w/out delay (faster than “Mission Impossible” tapes), loses its meaning, its memory, annihilates its own archive

AD pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (lentretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech

——w/out silence, w/out non-response: simply unfold (dérouler) knowledge in a program > nothing would make us more irresponsible, nothing more totalitarian

EF pp. 53-54 when not insoluble, when I know what to do (program), no decision or responsibility

——an abyss remains and must remain

BSi pp. 140-41 anthropocentered, humanistic logic: sovereignty of Law, freedom, responsibility (response) opposed to animal fixity, program, imaginary, hard-wired, coded reaction

p. 288 as soon as there is absolute knowledge, everything prescribed for Sun King as a program [the king, the historian, the reader—who isn’t manipulated by history like a marionette?]

OG p. 9 (19-20) if cybernetics ousts metaphysical concepts soul, life, value, choice & memory, it must conserve notion of writing, trace, grammè, graphemeuntil its own historico-metaphysical character is exposed [cybernetic program will be the field of writing]

***p. 84 Leroi-Gourhan invokes notion of program, not a recourse to differentiating man from animal but understood in cybernetic sense (only intelligible via possibility of trace): far beyond “intentional consciousness,” makes grammè appear as such > a “liberation of memory” (reading machines, electronic card indexes) that enlarges differance and possibility of putting in reserve: constitutes/effaces conscious subjectivity, its logos, and its theological attributes [baby daddy]

CIR pp. 30-34 beyond G.’s program, G.’s generative grammar: surprise salvation of a backfire, something in the past withdrawn (if not content at least in the sap of the idiom) from effusion of the signature > obliging G., the other, “forgetting me on pretext of understanding me”

——nonsuturable, nonsaturable singularity of event: a perjury in G.’s machine

pp. 248-50 on each date, a drop of blood, one date enough to leave geologic program behind

EU p. 206 [CIPH] we know how inhospitable research establishment can be to themes/questions that exceed/disorganize general program > theoretic-institutional mobility must be accepted today

pp. 216-17 [re: CIPH] not a system (ontological ordering), not a doctrine (linked to discourses, pedagogical institutions), not a program (prescriptive, end-oriented [finalisée]) > but not empirical/rhapsodic: a “thinking” of pedagogy, each research group, each “program,” will never renounce precise specificity, autonomy, internal necessity

WBH p. 195 there’re many undecidables, one undecidability acts as a program, programming or unprogramming a program

p. 201 gift not even subversive, is something else > subversion is a program, programmed destruction of certain conditions (relies on given conditions)

PROJECTION

REST pp. 366-67 “projection” belongs to system of adequate subject-object relations or of truth (unveiling, adequation) > no longer stands up in unconscious or remainder-structure

PROSTHESIS (GRAFT) [fixerup]

MONL pp. 50-2 Derrida on his relation to French language; the secret, a tattoo, blood mixed w/ ink, love by setting on fire, graft, mark, let come to itself in itself

p. 64 prosthesis of origin: prior-to-the-first time of pre-originary language must be invented

FK p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

***p. 91 growing disproportion btwn knowledge &. know-how (use of artifacts/protheses of which one is totally ignorant)

H p. 47 hospitality & email (prosthetic apparatuses)

p. 137 technological prostheses, whose refinements are unlimited in principle > still give fantasy of auto-nomy, auto-affection: is there hospitality w/out this, w/out auto-affection, the privileged figure of hearing oneself speak?

***AF pp. 16-7 the prosthetic, hypomnesic techniques of archive not only place for storing, but also determine structure of the archivable content in its very coming into existence, in its relationship to the future

p. 19 Freud’s 2 systems (Ucs & Pcs), 3 points of view (topic, dynamic, economic): that Freud integrates necessity of outside > prosthesis of the inside

p. 25 the proper of the archive, its instant—certain hypomnesic, prosthetic experience of technical substrate [Derrida had this thought while tinkling on his Macintosh computer]

SPOM p. 177 figures of death: differance of technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins in language, before language

***p. 191-92 capital contradiction, at origin of capital: induces the “pragmatic” double constraint of all injunctions [see POO p. 143n difference btwn “use” & “mention”]

——table dances spontaneously, autonomously, but it moves others too

——not just contradiction of sensuous non-sensuous in same Thing, but contradiction of automatic autonomy (spontaneity) > on stage of market, table (commodity) is a prosthesis of itself

POOF pp. 141-42 in history of partisan Schmitt details, there’s a move away from autochthony (1st partisans were nationalists), & a study of tele-technology (new speeds, new relations to space)

——tele-technical prosthetic automotion breaks w/ autochthony, cuts telluric roots of 1st guerilla wars

pp. 185-86 does Montaigne (via túkhē [see 192n re: Cicero], exceptionality of friendship) add rupture of infinite to Greek philía? a reassuring principle would periodize, overdetermine, oppose Christian fraternity to Greek fraternity > Derrida won’t have it: the discrepancies of culture aren’t negligible but they are that of a generative graft, cultural body (so old & new) begins w/ prosthesis > no proper body w/out graft: endless politically consequences of this law—now more than ever, endlessly

p. 191n for Montaigne, the alliance/election of perfect friendship functions like a seam (couture), it solders > solder & seam a vocabulary of artifice, so the question [of POOF]: why does the natural schema [re: friendship] remain [in the figure of one body?]?

p. 233 once again referring to the ‘infinite’ Christianization of Greek fraternity, while reminding us that Greek phília carries w/in it the injunction of its infinitization, Derrida will privilege Christianiziation for the role it played in the theological-political graft that constructed political discourse of modern Europe

SEC p. 317 a written sign can break with its context (set of presences which organize moment of inscription), still be legible, can always be lifted from interlocking chain, grafted into other chains ——no context, no code can enclose it > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

p. 329 logic of paleonymy, provisional conservation of old name, while liberating, “grafting,” excluded, subordinated predicates (resistances, remainders of dominant force

T p. xxviii tympanum punctures itself (se crève), grafts itself > resists concepts of machine or nature, de coupure ou de corps, resists metaphysics of castration

F p. xiii question of crypt (singular not general) precedes philosophical questions re: Thing, Thinking > false, “artificial” unconscious (new metaphorical terrain): graft in heart of the organ

DS p. 202 [Mimique] haunted by ghost or grafted onto arborescence of another text

pp. 202-03 graft/graph (both from graphion, writing implement, stylus) — bridge graft; capital title as scion/graft (can’t tell whether its present or absent anymore)

p. 203n Bachelard: we love the graft, graft gives matter to flower, Art is grafted nature

p. 205 interminable network of Pierrot’s (mimes), already remarked as grafting inside Mallarmé’s text, which thus no longer has an inside

p. 234 [re: Mallarmé] to write the word insertion (to place w/in, to graft) is to quote the practice of spacing (same goes for writing antre ouvert)

——certain mimic inscribes a graft in one corner, holding antre open

p. 283n [re: Les Mots anglais] French grafted onto English—born of an “indissoluble hymen”

POS p. 71 the strategy of paleonomy, of using old name, refers to play of stratagem not hierarchical organization of means & ends: 1) extract predicative trait held in reserve 2) extend, graft, extracted trait, as a lever of intervention, transforming previous organization [writing]

SP pp. 131-33 remainder: no proper itinerary, no center, could mean nothing, no end to parodying play w/ meaning, grafted beyond any contextual body or finite code

pp. 135-39 Derrida exposes cryptic structure of writing by “confessing” to it “directly,” re: Nietzsche’s forgetting the umbrella; one could never heed the cryptic warning, what if the “limits of will to mean” are exactly what Nietzsche meant w/ this phrase, an intentional graft

O p. 11 preface as excrement of philosophical essentiality? that which falls away (la tombée) > can we account for preface differently?

——dissemination: generalizes theory/practice of graft w/out proper body, skew w/out straight line [?], bias w/out front [Nietzsche perspectivism?]

REST pp. 267-68 for Freud, the shoe always a “form” of prosthesis, but always as a penis (woman’s penis too)? but Ferenczi recognizes in it the vagina

——fetish generation is syntactical, meaning it never designates a detachable whole: a relatively detachable part of an always divisible ensemble

p. 312 Shapiro treats shoes as reproduction of real shoes, misses that, for Heidegger, shoes don’t relate to given subjectum, or given world, he won’t be able to avoid the bridge, doesn’t know shoes’re already prosthetic—précipitée dans labîme, la sphinge, dès linstant où lenflure (turgidity)

——that the shoes can always be someone else’s: “to be in someone’s shoes [in English]”

D p. 304 each germ is its own term—finds its term w/in itself as its own internal limit, faisant angle avec sa proper mort [tracing, grafting, semen already swarming (essaimée)]

p. 347 all these grafts, this is (est) that, this means that [forever]

p. 355 to write means to graft (same word), each grafted text radiates toward the site of its removal, sy régénèrent dans la répétition, à la bordure dun surjet (overcast seam)

——discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

PPT pp. 7-8 trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

LI pp. 80-1 “le vert est ou” [Husserl] could be grafted w/ meaning: an example of agrammaticality

——a graft is always possible

p. 82 la hantise of the graft, herein no different from the parasite > never simply alien to and separable from the body it already haunts

TN p. 19 death introduces drive of expropriation, but is still more tolerable than prosthesis, metonymic substitute, technical survival [lintrus] (complicates incarnation even more)

p. 35 for Nancy, excès de la façon (fashioning) sur lessence, et que lune supplée lautre, at origin of feeling oneself touch oneself; spectral revenant, prosthesis at heart of (self-)feeling > revenant, btwn life/death, dictates impossible mourning, sans fin—life itself [re: spacing irreducible to extensio]; p. 321n shouldn’t this spacing (what I call differance/trace) be linked to Heidegger’s tension of distancing (Gespanntheit) rather than Descartes’ extensio or even Freud’s Ausdehnung

p. 52 being unimaginable gives rise to phantasms, allegories, figures, metonymies: technics > no overcoming (surmonté) this mourning w/out mourning [of autobiography] by any "work of mourning”

p. 204 aristocracy of one sense, or democracy of all: these battles due to tropological displacements, originary prosthetic possibilities; prosthetics never wait, Nancy’s “technē of bodies”

p. 221 singularity takes place and takes place of (a lieu et tient lieu), inscribing technical prosthetics onto singularity of event itself, because of this spacing: takes place, lévénement dune venue

pp. 229-30 differance btwn 2 surfaces: condition of contact & originarily spaced opening that calls for technical prosthetics (makes it possible w/out delay)

p. 305 the selfsame (même) heart exappropriates instant touched by other, no possible reappropriation (absolute mourning)

——apparently, women respond better to heart grafts [?]

E p. 20 for Kant, sight is most noble sense, but hearing is least replaceable, most allergic to prosthesis, tolerates substitution badly, almost succeeds in resisting vicariousness: this is why the mute will never know concepts, they cannot access the universal signs

pp. 23-5 what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of identification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

BSi p. 26 political sovereignty as the fable of a monstrous animal is prosthetic, prostatic, prosthstatic: supplement that supplements nature by adding an artificial organ, here the state

pp. 26-7 for Hobbes, man as artist mimics art of God [cf. E Kant-like?]; Leviathan is artificial, thus sovereignty a human artifact, monster prosthetic made in lab, and not indivisible, absolute, as Hobbes argues (commentary > interpretation: consequences beyond explicit intention)

p. 28 Hobbes: “Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul” > soul as principle of life, vitality, vivacity

——state, a robot, an animal monster, giant prosthesis designed to amplify

——animal-machine, living-machine, machine of death: serving the living > prosthstate, and yet vitalist in that it mimics the body > civil war [like Schmitt?] death of the State

p. 29 prosthstatic sovereignty presupposes right of man over beasts

p. 31 for Freud, thanks to technology, mastery over nature, man has become a “prosthetic God”

p. 42 political contract, a prosthesis, nomos as thesis (opposed to physis), convention, positing

——thus provisional, historical, always deconstructible > declared immortal because not

p. 70 sovereign state as Leviathan, as animal-machine, as prosthstatics > beast et (est) sovereign coupled across a copula: affinity through analogy, proportion, reciprocal fascination—or grafting

p. 189 in Kleist’s “On the Marionette Theater,” consciousness that passes through infinity becomes pure unconsciousness, that of a god or mannequin, grace of prosthesis

SPEC p. 388 transference, ersatz, prosthesis, at the mouth, Freud’s surgeries, cigar: les pas de plus et les plus de pas [?]

PROTEST

MONL p. 51 make something happen to language, something so intimate it would no longer be in the position to protest without having to protest: speak in HIS language

PPHS pp. 107-08 [Hegel on calculation and machine] a “living,” “thinking,” “speaking” protest against repetition

FWT p. 25 the nationalism of republican “universalism” protesting against “democratic” communitarianism almost always voiced by strongest community [Black Lives Matter]

POOF p. 6 the question who or what is the friend? a protestation in name of the friend, in name of the name: resists reduction to dominant concept of political, ethical, ontophenomenological > a political allure that is not so political

p. 305 this book has said nothing against the brother, one can’t protest from inside of history of brothers: the history won’t be thought, recalled, by taking up this side

PS p. 175 Artaud’s resistance to clinical/critical exegeses: protest itself against exemplification itself > destroy history of dualist metaphysics, render doctor/critic helpless: art w/out works, language w/out trace

SW pp. 322-23 I am so fatigued from knowing truth, that history of the veil—that truth: too old for me, too old like me (however young I remain) > you don’t know the “fatigue” I’m talking about (dreaming of writing in Spanish, forgotten ancestral language)

——infinite weariness of tropes, what do you expect, I want to end it all (protest, attestation, testament, manifesto against the shroud) > no longer write around/in/under folds of truth

DPi p. 71 however powerless, in U.S. you find most vigilant & best informed forces of protest [re: abolitionism?]

pp. 129-30 abolitionists as eternalists fearing death, full of guilt [suspicion of a Nietzschean/Baudelairean cast], the evil of finitude, fallible finitude > for Baudelaire, these fearful men confess w/symptom of their abolitionism, an infinite protest against mortality

p. 257 protest in the name of my heart when I fight (en me battant), so that heart of the other will continue to beat (battre)—in me, before me, after me, w/out me: invested by responsibility

Gii pp. 32, 39 Heidegger’s question of technology presented as protest, barely disguised condemnation of professionalization of University studies during Nazi regime

p. 39 Heidegger’s Hand-werk, an artisanal protest against hand’s defacement in industrial automation of modern mechanization

RM p. 54 RM not in a polemical spirit: it’s often because I subscribe to Ricouer’s propositions (whose text he can’t do justice) that I protest > they’re already there in what I wrote

TR p. 88 protest of accusatory innocence: forgive me this my virtue [ask forgiveness for feeling innocent]

AD pp. 94-5 for Levinas, paternal “fecundity” (not feminine alterity anymore) opens infinite discontinuous time: protest against egoist protestation of subjectivity (that of Kierkegaard, Rosenzweig) > true anarchy, paternal: only effective protestation against “tyranny of the State”

PROVISIONAL

GSP p. 165 for Husserl, limits of genetic description of the ego itself (i.e. passivity/activity), are provisional, not definitive

DIF DIF p. 9 classically, sign is treated as deferred presence, as differance of temporization > sign is thus provisional, secondary > Derrida questioning this logic: to think originary differance, one would have to recognize origin, archi-, telos, eskhaton have always denoted presence: ousia, parousia

pp. 26-7 differance not provisional, also not a master name

WAP p. 122 Cartesian doubt is provisional, methodical, not skeptical doubt

D p. 344 atheism in Kabbalah, belief only in # [?] > Numbers a cabal/cabala where blanks only provisionally filled in

LI p. 128 “ideal concept” (i.e. rigorous concept) vs. pragmatic concept (empirically useful, provisionally convenient, constructed w/out rigor)

SPEC pp. 384-85 to describe structural necessity of borrowing as provisional/external fatality is classical logic [Freud often does this]: suspense is provisional, notes/coins must be guaranteed in final judgment

PROVOCATION

PF p. 281n provocatio, Imperial Roman Law, to make an appeal to the law (lex, btwn legere and ligare [typo? should be legare?]), link to lecture (reading), legacy, allegation, alibi

p. xxiii quotations, suspend word [“United States”] in epokhē of epoch, a fabulous act of nomination, fabula (like provocation) recounts/deciphers a history, the phantasm of an accredited myth, myth by force of law, “enforced” myth

PROXIMITY

H p. anne 88 “madness in the relationship to the mother,” the very possibility of madness; p. 92 “the essence of madness must be related to the essence of hospitality, in the area of this uncontrollable outburst toward the one who is closest,” mother tongue as metaphor for “being-at-home in the other”

p. anne 94 [from mother to violence] eruption of violence which borrows its madness from mother, substituted for proximity, from hospitality to hostility > terrorism, hostage wars

LOBL p. ~128 in one’s most mournful glory: “turn oneself into a mouthful,” swallow oneself so as to be close to oneself, absolute knowledge [this is from GLAS]

SPOM p. 175 le longtemps, cest le temps de cette chasse à l’éloignement (hunt for distance, a hunt w/ distance > pray & lure): distance hunt can only hallucinate, desire, defer proximity: lure & prey

p. 217 “absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous (es spukt),” unnameable, neutral power > this, which we have said nothing determinable urgently returns, insists, gives one to think, irresistible anguish

HERP p. 165 friend has no face, no figure, no sex, at a distance neither absolutely infinite, nor absolute proximity (null) of an ownness (propriété) [see p. 70]

p. 178 Dasein (Daseins ear) is beside what is heard [see What Poets are For?], carries beside itself (bei sich) the voice of the friend > all depends on semantics of bei, beside, auprès de: neither very close nor infinitely distant

HASD p. 46 height & proximity are topological

EM p. 124 (148) though Dasein not simply man of metaphysics, everything in Letter on Humanism and beyond returns to “proper of man,” guided by concept of proximity

pp. 125-26 (150-51) for Heidegger, exemplary being is “phenomenological,” governed by principle of principles, i.e. presence and presence in self-presence, manifested in being we are, such proximity determines factum

p. 127 (152) for Heidegger, motif of proximity caught in opposition which unceasingly regulates his discourse: in proximity of ontic, ontological Dasein is that which is farthest

——(152-53) before/after Heidegger’s Kehre > space of proximity and distance to Being

p. 128 Da of Dasein signifies near as much as far

pp. 128-29 (154) Heidegger: what is near to man is nameless, once close to Being, man will not need to speak much

p. 130 (156) for Heidegger, restoration of essence of dignity, of proximity to Being, is done for Being and honor of Dasein, not for civilization or culture

——Derrida explains reason for Heidegger’s “metaphorics of proximity”: “the ontological distance from Dasein to what Dasein is as ek-sistence and to the Da of Sein, the distance that first was given as ontic proximity, must be reduced by the thinking of the truth of Being”

p. 131n (157-58n) predominance of ontological proximity, man dwells in nearness, lighting of the Da, dwells as ek-sisting (ecstatic dwelling in nearness of Being, contrasts existentia, existence)

p. 133 (160) for Heidegger, “le proche, cest le propre; le propre, cest le plus proche (prope, proprius), lhomme est le proper de lêtre, qui de tout près lui parle à loreille

——(161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

PAS PAS p. (25) the proximity of the near is not near, is not proper > tu vs. vous (which is closer?)

p. (30) “quand il la tient, il touche cette force dapproche qui rassemble la proximité, et, dans cette proximité, tout le lointain et tout le dehors

p. (31) force of approach defined “à-partir-deléloignement du proche, gathering proximity and distance in an inclusion w/out interiority

p. (32) the disjoint of near and present, a fissure w/out limits, a fissure that keeps near and present together, maintains w/out maintaining, the singular syntax of sans [and pas too?]

p. (33) the thing can appear near only to what anticipates what the near and proximity are there

——there is no identity btwn the opposition of near and far

VP p. 19 for Husserl, Bedeutung can be expressed w/out communication, can occur outside entanglement w/ indication, in the “solitary life of the soul,” when the outside is suspended, an interiority, self-proximity, an ownness (Eigenheit) > this paradox is phenomenology

pp. 49-50 Husserl’s absolute proximity ensures consciousness is not just the fiction of talking to oneself

p. 64 le pré de l’objet présent maintenant-devant est un contre (Gegenwart, Gegenstand) à la fois au sens du tout-contre de la proximité et de l’encontre de lop-posé

***pp. 70-1 [commentary > interpretation] auto-affection as voice assumes a pure difference dividing self-presence, makes reduction of world, space, impossible; yet, must pass through reduction “in order to recapture difference in closest proximity to itself”: in closest proximity to movement of differance

——movement of differance produces transcendental subject

FSW p. 219 Freud: proximity in dream reveals unthought connection like a & b in “ab”

PPHS p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

DS p. 244 [re: specificity of genres] to join mime & dancer (they should be allied but not confused), two attitudes jealous of their respective silences: this is to confront too much difference! (too close proximity)

POS p. 22 voice is consciousness itself when phonē is signifying substance > signifier and signified unite, signifier erases itself, exteriority of signifier reduced by spontaneous proximity

OS pp. 63-4(n) in analytic of Dasein, relation of fall to proper, authenticity, enigmatic proximity (identity w/ itself of the questioning), concept of finitude

POOF p. 3 familiarity (oikeiótēs, in Plato’s Lysis) (being-at-home, being-close-to oneself) links friendship w/ laws & logics of universalization, ethics, law, right, equality, equity, democracy

p. 65 Nietzsche contesting Christian revolution of love: neighbor’s proximity as the ruse of proper & appropriation

pp. 223-23 aprosēgoría (non-address, silence, non-allocution) undoes many a friendship, Aristotle believes friendship requires proximity > Derrida wonders what he would have made of the telephone

SP pp. 49-51 Heidegger’s Entfernung, de-ferment, distantiation of distance, veiled enigma of proximation, distance itself constituted by destruction (Ent-)

ATIA p. 10 proximity to the animal, being-huddled-together (être-serré), pressu, près, après, acc. stronger/weaker stricture, which always remains pressing

O p. 15 in Hegelian concept of method, self-presentation of concept (lêtre auprès de soi du logos absolu) is true pre-face, essential pre-dicate of all writing

RM p. 70 proximity of near is not near or proper [via “Letter on Humanism”]

D p. 331 one’s undifferentiated proximity to oneself: another name for death > the space of property: “dead surface”

HST p. 383 Levinas: ultimate proximity—to survive as a guilty one

p. 402 stranger is a digression that risks corrupting proximity to self of the proper

TN p. 95 touch gives nearness/proximity more than sight/hearing > proximity, proper, present

——one thinks first of all, and too much, of hands: take the gift (“Tiens!”), comprehension, prehension, captation, a plea (prière) > “tender extending” becomes violence itself: “Take that!”

ATM p. 144 you hear me: at a distance, which doesn’t forbid, on the contrary, proximity

p. 168 Levinas: proximity as responsibility for the Other, and responsibility for the Other as substitution

OG p. 11 Aristotle’s phono-logocentrism: voice, spoken symbols, immediately proximate to the universal language of mental experience (pathēmata tes psychēs), closest to the thing, the signified

SPEC pp. 263-64 Freud’s avoidance of philosophy [of Nietzsche] (already in place like a counterfeiter) is inevitable (closest avoided in inevitable itself) > that the da be fort even before a judgment of denegation vienne y apposer la spécificité de son sceau

p. 323 autobiographics of Beyond…, of word beyond [common name], imprints a prescription on fort:da, an overlapping (rapporté) by means of which proximity distances itself en abyme (Ent-fernung)

POSSESSION / PROPERTY / PROPER

KH pp.146-47n the opposition btwn proper & figurative, relevance of rhetorical code [use of metaphor for that which defies metaphor] meets a limit w/ khōra

p. 97 risk of feminizing khōra, a female proper name?

——khōra must keep its impropriety, having nothing of its own, this is what we must keep for it

p. 99 khōra possesses all she receives but not as properties

p. 105 guardians of city have nothing of their own just like khōra? the city takes all measures so no parent can recognize their own (child) > a site where law of proper no longer has meaning

GT p. 48 logic of gift under the regime of to have, to be?give what one possess or what one doesn’t possess?

p. 155 avoir raison: man of reason/account

MONL p. 2 language will never be mine.

p. 17 possession and language

p. 23 master does not have exclusive possession of anything, only possesses, usurps unnaturally, rapes, colonizes through “unnatural process of politico-phantasmatic constructions”

pp. 22-3 monolingual solipsism never belonging, property, power of mastery, pure “ipseity” (hospitality or hostility)

p. 24 no absolute appropriation/reappropriation because no natural property of language, only appropriative madness, jealousy without appropriation [see p. 63]

R p. 37 democracy defined by lack of the proper and the selfsame (affirms and defies the proper)

FK p. 81 religion appropriates indemnification of all “proper,” all property: the letter, blood and soil, family, nation.

p. 88 w/ Kant, self-sacrifice sacrifices most proper in service of most proper

H p. 51 inviolable immunity (the home) remains the condition of hospitality

p. 61 “what constitutes a space of controlled and circumscribed property is just what opens it to intrusion,” monad of a home has to have windows, has to let in

p. 89 language gives the fantasy of property

AF p. 25 the proper of the archive, its instant—certain hypomnesic, prosthetic experience of technical substrate [Derrida had this thought while tinkling on his Macintosh computer]

SPOM p. 51 money, spectralizing disincarnation, not lifeless body, but life w/out individual property, general property of money deprives all personal property (Eigentümlichkeit) of difference

——Shakespeare understood this phantomalization of property > Marx: little connection btwn money, general form of property, and personal peculiarity (persönlichen Eigentümlichkeit)

p. 112 exappropriation is the radical contradiction of all “capital,” property and appropriation, as well as ideas that depend on it: i.e. free subjectivity: “servitude binds (itself) to appropriation” > lexappropriation ne justifie aucune chaîne

pp. 142-43 when Marx describes anachronistic dislocation (“there the words (Phrase) went beyond the content (Inhalt); here the content goes beyond the words”), he believes in the proper content, appropriate content

pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

***——that’s not all: specificity of process can still capitalize spectralization > the first ghost effect (autonomized spirit) can be incorporated, negated, integrated as one’s own human body

p. 165 to be done with ghost, to have it, to identify it, to situate it, see it, possess w/out being possessed, but to possess a specter, is that not to be possessed? [Stirner and Marx disagree over best way to put ghosts to death, same end—different means?] [Die Besessenen]

p. 188 phenomenological good sense “may perhaps be valid” for use-value, or only for use-value, phenomenology of good sense, of perception (at work in Marx), of Enlightenment, has nothing mysterious about it, use-value as the proper of man

HERP p. 165 friend has no face, no figure, no sex, at a distance neither absolutely infinite, nor absolute proximity (null) of an ownness (propriété) [see p. 70]

pp. 194-95 “philia ist das Gönne der Gunst,” philia is the other’s proper, gift to the other of what is to the other its own proper

MSUB J p. 166 “the property of a theme is what an expropriation has deprived us, and it is as if we had been deprived of our own memory, distanced from our own birth”

A p. 3 proper of our existence belongs as much to us as we belong to it [double possession]

—— via Seneca & Diderot, one would guard jealously one’s time above all else; to “master” “my life” > know difference btwn giving one’s time & wasting one’s time

——jealousy: primitive passion for the proper, for proper possibility re: one’s existence

p. 56 Heidegger’s methodologically rigorous choice to start from “this side” [phenomenology] goes hand in hand w/ what prevails, the pré-férance of pre-archic originarity of proper, eigentlich

p. 63 “if being-possible is the being proper to Dasein, then the existential analysis of the death of Dasein will have to make of this possibility its theme”

p. 66 for Heidegger, death—stand before (steht bevor) oneself, await, precede oneself as before a mirror, as before the future, “in its ownmost potentiality for being” [see p. 78]

p. 77 Heidegger dissociates Verfallen from original sin, but still needs distinction btwn authentic/inauthentic > death as “possibility of impossibility” can mean Eigentlichkeit inhabited by Enteignis

EM p. 124 if we give up we-men (nous-hommes) in relation to metaphysical determinations (i.e. zōon logon ekhon, etc.), the proper of man remains inseparable from the question or truth of Being (this makes Heidegger’s Kehre even less pertinent)

p. 124 (148) though Dasein not simply man of metaphysics, everything in Letter on Humanism and beyond returns to “proper of man,” guided by concept of proximity

p. (155n) proper (eigen, eigentlich), Ereignen, Ereignis, house, oikos, oikēsis

p. 133 (160) for Heidegger, “le proche, cest le propre; le propre, cest le plus proche (prope, proprius), lhomme est le proper de lêtre, qui de tout près lui parle à loreille

——(161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

p. 134 (161) prescription of the end of man, prescribed since always, has done nothing but “modulate equivocality of the end, in the play of telos and death”

——dans la lecture de ce jeu: le fin de lhomme est la pensée de lêtre, lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre, la fin de lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre > lhomme est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-a-dire la fin de son propre > lêtre est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-à-dire la fin de son propre

SEC pp. 309-10, 314 Derrida will differentiate writing from a concept of communication which would treat the nonsemantic (gestures, tremors, shocks) as proper or primitive meaning

PP p. 93 mimicry of Thoth prevents dialectics, an ironic doubling preventing fulfillment or eschatological reappropriation, he is never present, he invented play, his propriety is impropriety

p. 170 pharmakon is possession and the cure for possession

VM p. 90 Levinas: “to possess, to know, to grasp are all synonyms of power”

pp. 91-2 acc. Levinas, to see, know, have and will “unfold only within the oppressive and luminous identity of the same” (fundamental categories of ontology/phenomenology)

p. 119 in this language, our only language, how can we not repeat Hegelianism > this language coming into absolute possession of itself?

VP p. 59 proper (Eigenheit) as monad fissured in what we call time

OH p. 73 whether hospitable or xenophobic, self-affirmation of identity always claims to be responding to call of universality, an inscription of universal in singular, unique testimony to human essence and to what’s proper to man

T p. xix resistance to deconstruction: infinite mastery > assurance of Being & interiorization of every limit as being, as its own proper

POOF pp. 2-3 for Cicero, 2 types of friendship: ‘true & perfect’ vs. ‘vulgar & mediocre’ > friendship is rare, requires selection, classically associated w/ familiarity, proximity, oikeiótēs: such logic extends into all political models of res publica

pp. 64-5 Nietzsche on ‘love’ denounces the right to property, love of thy neighbor as desire for more possessions, ‘love’ is the cupidity of possessing > ‘love btwn the sexes’ is egotism itself, jealousy that tends only toward possession (Besitzen)

——Nietzsche contesting Christian revolution of love: neighbor’s proximity as the ruse of proper & appropriation

——Nietzsche advocates another love, a love more loving than love, whose ‘just name’ would be friendship

pp. 65-6 following Nietzsche beyond Eros? if love is always a lust for new possession, we must acquiesce to principle of ruin at heart of utterly new > would this leave open the chance to accord w/ the “love whose just name would be friendship” [?]—just once, it would happen, friendship as the name for this impossible event [only once btwn 2]

p. 98 Benveniste’s etymology of phílos, its relation to home, hospitality & oath, but in Homer phílos has vague possessive quality (‘his knees,’ ‘his son’)

p. 172 suitability (covenance) of the enemy, lodged w/in oikeiéotēs, my own projection, an exemplarity more real/resistant than my own shadow, my truth in painting > proof in the fact that I can address him, call to him, he becomes origin/destination of call [to the point of madness]

pp. 256-57 via Kant's suspicion of tenderness/gentleness in friendship, a catastrophic complication in natural law of attraction/repulsion, a rupture, love will tend toward the evil of reciprocal possession (fusion), love harbors hate w/in itself > friendship as sign/symptom of this possible perversion, and that which protects us from it: attraction must be against attraction, repulsion against repulsion

p. 298 if no appurtenance in friendship, why call this foreigner (absolute foreigner) my friend? no appeasing response to this question

PPHS p. 73 Hegel: idea is in full possession of itself while it is [its] other

p. 77 possession of pit > gives forth its property, produces light

FWT p. 66 “proper of man”: none of the traits believed to be man’s alone are man’s alone > either an animal possesses them, or man does not possess them as surely as is believed

p. 78 work is always work of mourning, internalizes, appropriating idealization

p. 147 what welds philosophy as ontology (in its hegemonic tradition) to political theology of DP, & to idea of “proper to man”: 1) Plato’s care for death (epimeleia tou thanatou) 2) Kant’s dignity (Würde), man as end in himself, inscribes DP w/in his law 3) Hegel’s struggle for recognition 4) Heidegger’s being-toward-death of Dasein

——DP, like death itself, what’s “proper to man” > DP, at risk of shocking, always answered deeply “humanist” pleas

WM p. 216-17n Marx against etymologism (like Rousseau, Leibniz, Plato), rails against Stirner, who refutes communist abolition of property via etymology: essential “having” in Eigentum (property)

p. 247 Derrida distinguishes btwn Aristotle's kurion and idion, both generally translated as proper > generally, properness is exterior to form (metaphorical or not) of discourse, but not the case w/ kurion and idion [a properness of language]; accident is not proper to a thing’s essence

pp. 247-48 no philosophy has renounced Aristotelian ideal that a noun, to be proper, must have one single sense, telos of language must be able to master and analyze polysemia w/ no remainder

p. 249(n) dividing essence from proper permits the play of metaphor, doesn’t involve thing itself in play of substitutions, metaphor is mediate, abstract, medium of quasi-synonymy

——antikatēgoreisthai: reciprocal substitution of two predicates related to identical concrete subject

——first example of antikatēgoreisthai is grammar, i.e. what is proper to man is grammar, ability to read & write > belongs to chain of what’s proper to man: logos, phōnē sēmantikē, mimēsis, metaphora

p. 268 one true metaphor (no more true metaphor): but assured legibility of the proper [presence disappearing in its own radiance, hidden source of light]

DS p. 275 Mallarmé: plus jeplumeplume jeplume jet [jai]

OS pp. 31-2(n) Heidegger’s question of Being seeks to destroy vulgar concept of time by repeating and interrogating it > that Being is ousia, parousia, Anwesenheit w/ regard to idea of time as Gegenwart (the present)

——vulgar time as gegenwärtigen Besitze (always present possession), the having (Habe) of Being, its permanent presence

pp. 63-4(n) in analytic of Dasein, relation of fall to proper, authenticity, enigmatic proximity (identity w/ itself of the questioning), concept of finitude

ROP p. 69 what happens when you apply chiasmatic invagination of borders to analysis? to its phallogocentrism (mastery)? > can psychoanalysis belong to anyone, anymore?

SP pp. 109-13 Nietzsche’s analysis of sexual difference, “eternal war btwn sexes,” based on propriation, where woman takes shape acc. formalized law > woman is woman because she gives herself to a man who takes possession, or la femme en se donnant se donne-pour, simule et sassure ainsi la mâtrise possessive: if opposition give/take, possess/possessed, is a “transcendental snare” produced by hymen’s graphics, process of propriation would escape dialectics and ontological decidability

——can no long ask “what is property?” > because propriation, a sexual operation, before which we didn’t know sexuality [?], is undecidable, more powerful than ti esti, than veil of truth, meaning of being, it organized all ontological statements > lhistoire (de la) vérité (est) un procès de propriation

a singular limit, limit of being itself, not derivative of question of being, but also not available to investigation > onto-hermeneutic limitation shows chaque fois que surgit la question du propre in restricted fields (economy, linguistics, rhetoric, psychoanalysis, politics)

***pp. 115-19 Heidegger’s abyssal structure of the proper, at once superficial & bottomless (since not fundamental), the proper founders, passes into the other

p. 117 once there’s valuation (valorisation) of the proper, it can never be interrupted, a permanency that is valuation itself > its necessity must be interrogated sans cesse [re: Heidegger]

pp. 153-57n [Nietzsche quote, love as possession]

pp. 119-21 (das Eigentum des Ab-grundes) the proper-ty of the abyss, the abyss of proper-ty, the reorganization of metaphysics around more powerful question of propriation, question of event (Ereignis) uprooted from ontology, where proper is proper to no one, to nothing: is this what Nietzsche’s woman is, style’s form: the no-where, gift as woman’s essential predicate, appears in undecidable oscillation btwn give/take, se donner/se donner-pour > price/value of pharmakon

ATIA p. 5 if “dressing oneself,” clothing, is proper to man, it arrives w/ all the others: speech, reason, logos, history, laughing, mourning, burial, gift, the concept of the concept

p. 14 disavowal of being seen by the animal [Derrida believes it has happened to Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger, Kant] > jealous of, anxious about, what is proper to man

p. 20 the 2 falls of man, Prometheus/Adam, narrate (infinite) superiority over the animal: man’s property is unconditional & sacrificial

——even in the superiority of the proper of man, his property is to have nothing proper to him

***p. 44-5 comparing Genesis w/ Greek myths [re: fault, nakedness] as two symptomatic translations, whose internal necessities partially overlap re: the proper of man [default in propriety]: technics, sociality, emergence out of nature, knowledge, historicity [?], subjectivity, subjugating superiority over animal

***PS p. 183 metaphysical determination of madness as disease of alienation had to be contemporary w/ proprius [Latin era] > proper subject, absolutely close to himself

——Artaud wants absolute restoration of proper to eve prior to all dissociation

p. 194 self-presence, unity, self-identity, proper: most profound and permanent ambition of Western metaphysics [?]

p. 325n Artaud sometimes writes like Marx of 1844 Manuscripts: alienation & property

SW p. 314 no chance of savoir (belonging to oneself) > you’ll end up in imminence > un-veiling still movement of veil: a disappearing, drawing aside, to let something be seen, let be, to let

DPi p. 120 for Hugo, inviolability of human life—an inalienable property > right of property over one’s own life no less sacred than patrimonial right of family (domicile as right of property)

RGE p. 262 Bataille: “keep in one hand what the other gives” (to possess ruins is not to possess nothing)

——Derrida: that’s still Hegelian

Gii p. 36 hand is monstrosité (monstrasity), proper characteristic of man as the being of monstration

——“can’t talk about hand w/out talking about technology” [Derrida has just recalled photographs of Heidegger’s hands, way the hands seem deliberately staged, overflow the frame]

p. 46 Heidegger: man does not have hands, the hand has essence of man w/in it [p. 50 it is the hand that has man]

REST p. 260 the pair (of shoes) might not come back to anyone: disappoint desire to reattribute surplus value > might have been made to “remain” there, defying the tribute

——desire for attribution is a desire for appropriation (in matters of art, & everywhere else)

p. 261 restitution: reestablishes in rights or property by placing subject upright again, “the erect body”

p. 303 a certain type of strict commentary on Heidegger, a restitution of him, becomes obscene, his language is no longer recognizable > thinking otherwise means thinking otherwise than he who attempts to think the remainder “properly”—that is, otherwise than properly

DST DST p. 221 Lacoue-Labarthe: traversed from the beginning by discourse of others, “subject” does not incur a simple Spaltung (splitting) > the latter, w/ its oppositional logic (absence/position), creates obsession w/ appropriation dominating analysis of mimesis, & also its economic, political bearing

PIO p. 3 btwn 17th-19th centuries, in the positive notion of rights, only form & composition display invention/originality—not content, “things,” thematics or meaning

p. 36 universality (ideal objectivity, unlimited recurrence) in invention blurs signature of invention: name of individual (singular empirical entity) is associated w/ invention in inessential, extrinsic, accidental, aleatory way > this gives rise to enormous problem of property rights

TR pp. 125-26 violence of “I”: irreducibly singular, yet nothing more universal, anonymous

——w/ reference to unjust justice [phrase Derrida admits having stolen from de Man], where the law suspends reference right as it requires it, where chacun, “each one,” is appropriated (always theft/deceit) in utterance “I” > all justice begins in perjury

p. 126 since every “I” is an “I”——tout autre est tout autre as the same: (the) I can betray w/out least appearance becoming manifest > substitution “I” for “I”: root of perjury

——“sapproprier en secret ce mot chacun”

p. 128 Rousseau’s “I was as if,” the theft of the “I”: one cannot steal a “what” w/out stealing, even raping, a “who,” a woman, child, man

p. 154 materiality: useful name for that which resists appropriation

——de Man: nothing legitimate about property, but rhetoric of property confers illusion of legitimacy

p. 159 event is radically inappropriable, radically resistant to logic of proper

AFR p. 78 [re: Condillac’s ambiguity of 2 imaginations] major strategic operation of mastery is to control ambiguity & risks, the strategy is almost mastery itself

——mastery, if there is any, does not exist: it must possess what is not, never itself

pp. 111-12 for Condillac, arbitrariness of sign makes commerce freer and more extensive: commerce rescues man from relation to present object only > thus, the proper, property of sign, is system of the arbitrary; Condillac: “until commerce, natural signs are not at all properly signs”

PSSS p. 258 mastery, sovereignty (Herrschaft, Bemächtigung), linked to a drive for power, possession, an “I can,” a performative power (Bemächtigungstrieb), via sworn faith (organizes Lacan’s symbolic), indissociable from Bewältigung (exercise of power, movement of appropriation)

D p. 328 authority & property still remain, but as pretensions of attending discourse, dead surface effects

p. 331 one’s undifferentiated proximity to oneself: another name for death > the space of property: “dead surface”

HST p. 402 stranger is a digression that risks corrupting proximity to self of the proper

C p. 202 one cannot get to it in one go (dun coup): multiplication shows that that which touches on the series is outside the series in the series > the remainder remains cut off, a mors, a turd, really beautiful

p. 203 a turd one would like to make one’s own (sapproprier)—until the end > until is interminable

p. 211 do the impossible: make mourning ones mourning (faire du deuil son deuil)

LI p. 76 economics that accounts for iterability, which questions traditional philosophy of oikos, of propre > can’t be separate from economy of Unconscious, of graphematics of undecidables

p. 90 parasite can never be excluded from body “proper” > “an owner” calls it parasite (jealously defending his oikos) > whatever violently “takes place” always something of a parasite, offered hospitality, a place, by host: never quite taking place is part of parasite’s success as an event

p. 94 to have a general theory of speech act theory: masterpiece of metaphysical-oedipal rhetoric

p. 141 deconstructions are movements of “exappropriation” > is a system (i.e. university) that appropriates it (i.e. deconstructive style) modified by this appropriation?

TN pp. 94-5 w/out playing on words, never: il faudrait donc entendre et tendre tendrement ces motstender, tend, extend > “Tiens!”: “Take (Prends)!” (tender it, à tendre on sous-entend) is not “I give you (je te donne)” (obscene phrase: assumed certainty, expected recognition)

——“Tiens!”: that the other grasp or seize, keep what one extends to him, giving to “touch”

p. 95 touch gives nearness/proximity more than sight/hearing > proximity, proper, present

——one thinks first of all, and too much, of hands: take the gift (“Tiens!”), comprehension, prehension, captation, a plea (prière) > “tender extending” becomes violence itself: “Take that!”

p. 109 would figure of limit have to be tangible? isn’t the tangible the very contamination of the proper, of contamination itself, of contact/contagion/impurification?

——touch more proper (Berkeley, Aristotle, Husserl, Maine de Biran)

pp. 339-40n proper, ipseity, proche, “same” are all deconstructible [but try to speak w/out them!], beyond their pedagogical and rhetorical necessity, what do they ever mean? the law that hatches irresistible desire of appropriation (“my body,” “here”) destines it to expropriation > this desire handed over to promise of expropriation [Derrida is deconstructing Nancy’s “properly”]

ATM pp. 187-88 “je donne, je joue lingratitude contre la jalousie,” if God is exempt from jealousy (no desire for possession) must he not guard this exemption jealously, and in so doing lose himself? > ellipse de jalousie: le sans-jalousie se garde jalousement, autrement dit se perd, se-garde-se-perd: plus de jalousie [seriasure always a jealous, series of traits & retraits, beyond the face]

EW p. 269 via “logic” of trace or differance, re-appropriation produces the opposite of what it aims for, thus ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man

BSi p. 56 what is proper to man isn’t > look closer

p. 66 sovereign: he, himself, ipse; beast: she, tamed (mastered) > suspension of pendulum is double

——potsedere (possess), potest, possum (power, “I can”) > ipse (self & power) > Benveniste thinks etymological shift from power (despotēs) to himself (ipse) enfeebles, not Derrida

pp. 70-1 international rights & crimes against humanity invoke a sovereignty of man himself (ipse, ipsissimus) above/beyond/before Nation-State sovereignty (Schmitt sees this as Entpolitisierung, humanity not a political concept)

p. 98 what is proper to man throws certain [Nation-State] sovereignty into crisis

pp. 138-39 if bêtise is proper to man, autopositing the proper is stupidity itself

p. 167 accusation of bête deprives the accused, like animal, of all that is proper to man (language, reason, logos, sense of death, technique, history, convention, culture, laughter, tears, work)

p. 256 if phallus is proper to sovereign, is it proper to man?

pp. 263-64 Heidegger’s problem w/ zōon logon ekhon, it’s “zoological,” late-on-the-scene, does not question the essence of life

p. 266 Heidegger doesn’t say “there’s nothing proper to man,” but that the property of what is appropriated is strange, unfamiliar to interior of home

p. 279 knowledge no stranger to power, power no stranger to seeing, having, willing > autopsic/autoptic knowledge: take power over object of knowledge

OG p. 26 (41) absolute knowledge effaces writing in logos, it is the retrieval (résumption) of trace in parousia, the metaphysics of the proper, reappropriation of difference

p. 109 (160-61) nonprohibition of proper name as consciousness which restitutes or discovers irremediable impropriety of proper names

p. 157 (225-26) Rousseau looks for a supplement to take complete possession of his heart (remplit mon coeur) > a substitute for mother (another girl)

——this sequence of supplements announces necessity of an infinite chain of substitutes: immediacy is derived > that’s what’s inconceivable to reason

p. 181 acc. Rousseau, “moral love” not biology but power of imagination > all depravity of culture related to possession of women (movement of preference/difference)

***p. 244 (347) supplementarity is nothing, not absence, presence, not essence/substance of man: it’s the opening of play (jeu) btwn presence/absence, dislocation of proper of man, the impossibility and thus the desire for proximity to self (pure presence)

p. 279 (395-96) acc. Rousseau, absolutely literal (propre) is at origin, the proper name, one sign per thing, one represented per passion

——proper names born in tandem w/ verbs (infinitive present) > degradation in their separation

p. 295 (416-17) for Rousseau, in writing the worst is simultaneously the best: total alienation is total reappropriation of presence to itself > Rousseau: “plus de force pour conserver ce quon a

pp. 296-97 (418-20) acc. Rousseau, return to inalienable immediacy of self-possession (jouissance de soi), unrepresentable sovereignty—the end of written law > there is a social contract before writing, but always threatened by letter

ATAP p. 91 [quoted from GLAS p. 198 (222)] absolute knowledge as phantasm of absolute self-having (savoir absolu), to be(come) (être-devenir), in a word, bander (bind, bandage, hard-on), son propre mors [Nietzsche’s “become hard”] [cf. CIN pp. 56-8 swallow another to speak his/her commands]

EU p. 61 never in possession of it, inaccessible, essence of philosophy excludes teaching, essence of philosophizing demands it

SPEC p. 327 [re: Ernst’s fort/da] double sending away (renvoi): whether father required to stay or go, mother is desired: “exclusive possession” [Freud & Ernst distance themselves from name of father, for Freud it is the name of the son-in-law]

——mother (woman) easier to possess/preserve when dead [?]—jealousy appeased

p. 335 exclusive possession: dance/trance

p. 355 [vis-à-vis Freud] pas de plus > deux temps of drive: 1) conserves 2) insures path to death, pas de mort, organism arrives by its own (internal) step at death (eigenen Todesweg): senvoyer the message of one’s own death

p. 356 partial drive: assists in death, return closest to oneself as if to one’s origin, senvoyer > in the pas de détour, organism guards against the other stealing death from it: to be the facteur of its death

——[Freud’s death drive] autoteleguiding, suicide deferred, wishes to sound its own glas, wishes the impossible > most driven drive is drive of the proper, drive to reappropriate oneself, stronger than life & death

pp. 356-57 but S is never P, since heterology is involved, there’s force & thus legacy, sending, envoi: the proper is not the proper

p. 357 in both Freud & Heidegger, life death no longer opposed in the proper [both interpret death as proper? unlike Levinas & Derrida]

p. 358 why would Dasein, “our own,” have to constitute itself as démarcheur [stockbroker, bad step]?

——let me die properly: where death is my inheritance

p. 359 analytic of Da-sein (analytic of distance, proximity)—not so foreign to analysis of fort/da > economy of death, law of proper, auto-affection of fort:da, “eigenen Todesweg des Organismus

p. 363 Freud wonders if calling death immanent & proper to life functions as a great narrative poem, a poetics of proper as reconciliation? consolation? (make it more bearable as Anankē)

p. 393 PP as quasi-proper, figure of mastery, exappropriation structures PP, proper produced as autothanatography

FV p. 422 for Lacan, letter is held—never possessed

pp. 437-38 Derrida on Lacan: circulation, acquitting of a debt, a proper place [not naive, empirical topology], detour from [woman’s] hole to itself permits signified to return to its origin—indivisible locality, signifier must never be lost, divided, fragmented

pp. 452-53 Dupin’s feminization: possess the letter [?] > letter has one place, occupied by all those who possess it

p. 461 Bonaparte falls back onto dogmatic imprudence (appeal to author’s unconscious), Lacan falls back, w/ incomparable philosophical vigilance, onto Truth > [both Bonaparte & Lacan] castration of mother as ultimate meaning & proper site of letter: “real intersubjectivity,” “solution in broad daylight”—proper as relation to lack itself, in proper place/body

p. 462n circulation, always circulation of truth: toward truth, cause & effect of circle, causa sui, proper course (trajet) and destiny of letter > truth as cause (Ursache)

p. 472 Lacan’s authentic: “appel propre du vide

——for Lacan, ideal process of analysis: “realization” of full speech as assumption of desire (of castration)

pp. 472-73 [vis-à-vis Lacan] present speech, anamnesis, irreplaceable properness, inalienable singularity > disqualification of recording or repetition in the name of the act of living (present speech): a well known program

pp. 474-75 full speech, contracts only w/ itself, system of truth > Lacan not proposing crude readjustment [i.e. American psychology] but rarity à la Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit

CHOR p. 89 [quoted from SP] that which will not be pinned down by truth, is, in truth, feminine, but this should not be mistaken for woman’s femininity, nor female sexuality, by dogmatic philosopher, impotent artist, or inexperienced seducer still hoping to capture

p. 92 specular reversal of masculine “subjectivity” (even in its most self-critical form, when most jealous of itself and its “proper” objects) represents only one phase of feminism?

p. 106 hymen does not exist, anything constituting value of existence is foreign to “hymen,” so how could one then attribute existence of hymen properly to woman? (same goes for invagination)

POSTAL

GOD p. 91 angel, postman, prophet, intermediary by which I hear God

***GT p. 170 secret of literature has no depth, no interiority, spread on the surface of the page, non-psychological structure, not subjective though responsible for most radical effects of subjectivity, a post card, a bank note, a “letter of credit” [see LOBL p. ~101, &

SUBJECTILE

]

***OOG p. 50 Husserl’s Rückfrage (return inquiry, question en retour) has a postal reference, return inquiry asked on basis of a first posting, already readable document offering possibility to ask about final intention, which is mediacy itself, openness to a general telecommunication

p. 52 return inquiry [tautology]: geometry’s development is a history only because it is a history> ground of unity is the world (not finite totality of sentient beings), but infinite totality of possible experiences in space

LOBL p. 137 postponement

AF p. 17 psychoanalysis formed in time of postal delay

VM p. 107 we are God arrived too early, forever late in relation to the already-there of Being

ROP pp. 24-5 pourquoi mon explication avec lanalyse [psychoanalysis] a toujours eu ce goût de mort en poste restante qui ma poussé à rôder sans fin dans les parages de Beyond the Pleasure Principle [?]

p. 33 Glas and The Post Card, books on bind (Band), nexum, desmos, stricture, “unsolvable-postal effect”

PIO p. 416n to call all invention that of mark/trace (rather than language), btwn culture & nature: man/animal opposition [cf. Bergson on p. 418n] no longer accredited, privileges the postal, movement of envoi, differance

ATAP p. 75 Nietzsche’s I have forgotten my umbrella at once totally open & hermetic, “as secret and superficial as the apocalypse of the postcard it announces and protects against”

——apocalypse as dream of raising (aufheben) veil of Isis

p. 89-90 apocalypse on both sides of censorship: 1) nothing less conservative than apocalyptic genre, escapes all postal regulations (where censorship is strong, apocalyptic writings increase) 2) state censors by denouncing as false, mystagogic, obscure, apocalyptic

——apocalypse a challenge to maintenance of order (la police) of destination, la police postale, to the monopoly of posts

PF p. xxi countersignature: confirmation of an agreement & a wholly other signature: counterforce [re: Peggy Kamuf’s collection, Derrida’s texts have returned to him transformed]

TR p. 79 reader as judge, the addressee who decides on reception/address of post card, signature left to the responsibility of the other, reader signs at moment of arrival at destination, rather than at the origin, at moment of reading rather than of writing

p. 98 the 2 meanings of arriver: 1) event that happens to someone 2) message that arrives—or doesn’t arrive at destination, or at some unforeseeable addressee > this singular instability plays w/ its own automatism, never spontaneously interrupted [?] [privileged access to machine effect]

SPEC p. 324 postal relay (relais) makes it possible for letter not to arrive, divides structure of letter from outset (dentrée), neither relay nor analysis if letter were indivisible & always arrived

——the a fortiori of the a priori

p. 355 race to death, exhausts couriers, witnesses, relays, from post to post

p. 356 partial drive: assists in death, return closest to oneself as if to one’s origin, senvoyer > in the pas de détour, organism guards against the other stealing death from it: to be the facteur of its death

pp. 383 garde-fou has disappeared en chemin, all speculative transferences are of the party (partie); transference: as transpose, translate, network of correspondences, traffic, postal, railway, sorting

pp. 393-95 function of binding (not machinelike regularity [?]), function of stricture as original as the X about which we can only know once banded, once represented by representatives

——to bind is to supplement/substitute, thus represent, Ersatz in place of what stricture inhibits/forbids, to bind is also to detach, detaches a representative, sends it on a mission, a missive liberated to fulfill destiny of what it represents: a post effect, de facteur préposé à lacheminement

the secondary (supplementary stricture) transforms freely mobile into immobile cathectic energy: posits, posts—here’s a thesis: immobilized cathexis is more tonic, tonicity related to effects of binding (elasticity & tension), thus binden as bander (erection): “bander: poster, liason: postale

p. 403 Bemächtigungstrieb, drive not reduced to other drives, takes place in others, quasi-transcendental privilege, donner, prendre, envoyer, destiner, transcendental tautology

——drive to dominate: drivenness of drive

p. 404 Laplanche & Pontalis compare Bemächtigung (power, possession, domination) to Bewältigung (violent exercise of power) > the “posts” are always posts of power (i.e. dynamics of sadism are dynamics of power)

——Freud asks how sadism can be deduced from Eros if it tends to destroy the object

pp. 404-05 auto-heterology of drive for postal power, more originary than, independent of, PP > the only one to permit definition of death drive, an original sadism

——beyond the pleasure principle—power: that is, les postes [erection, position & delay]

p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

POSTCOLONIAL

POOF pp. 211-12 the hyperbole of an extreme middle in Aristotle, moderation, proper measure: this applies to # of friends & ‘threshold of tolerance’ re: border btwn pólis and ethnos

OH pp. 48-9 Europe advances itself as heading for universal essence of man > to advance oneself: to name oneself, rush out ahead, in front, anticipate, launch, stick one’s neck out, to love or to violate, to love to violate, to colonize, colonize itself

WAP p. 52 the way “Kant” possibilizes [new discourse/pedagogy], while being destined to this [modern] turn, informs European “culture,” i.e. “colonization”: philosopher as judge/truth teller

pp. 102-03 history of decolonization & deconstruction, double bind of reappropriating & refusal > how to do something other than overturn (renverser) and (thus) reappropriate?

——to identity historical concatenation of deconstruction & decolonization is to use a conceptual resource of history no longer self-evident

p. 103 philosophy, deconstruction of philosophy, and decolonization are interminable, pushed to its extreme limit, where it is interminable, decolonization cannot import, interiorize, model of another State or even the style of their deconstruction (model/reality of their crisis), for there is no one deconstruction

——there are only singular, idiomatic, heterogenous styles, strategies of deconstruction unique to each situation > essential to account for this irreducible heterogeneity

***pp. 104-05 il ny a pas le choix, a political theme: every monolingualism restores mastery

——unity of language always vested and manipulated simulacrum, a positivist dogma and, à la fois, a phenomenon that can be found nowhere > so: play, graft between languages, w/in the languages in language, thus we can struggle against colonizing principle

p. 108 crisis of crisis [beyond nationalistic alibi] lies there where we can’t trust unity of “properly European” or “properly African”

***p. 135 overturning (renversement) authorized hierarchy not enough, not enough to canonize minor texts or devalue major texts

PROMISE

KH pp. 100-01 mytheme, acc. Hegel, will have been a prephilosopheme promised to a dialectical Aufhebung

GOD p. 30 time of the promise of Christianity defines both experience of mysterium tremendum, and the double repression that institutes it

——for Potaçka, radically, [contra Heidegger] Christian promise will only be fulfilled when Europe is freed from Greek & Roman memory

p. 126 Abraham sacrifices promise (Isaac) to the covenant w/ God [?]

MONL p. 22 threatening & threatened promise, monolingualism & tautology, impossibility of metalanguage, but there are effects of metalanguage: at the horizon, spectral, infinitely desirable, allows the mirage of another language to tremble

p. 66 promise is not nothing, not a non-event

p. 67 fatal precipitation of promise dissociated from will, intention, meaning-to-say [vouloir-dire], heralds uniqueness of language to came, “there is…” implies “it doesn’t exist”

——do I write in the promise of a sole poem, still unheard-of language? each time I speak or write, I promise

p. 68 promise [of which I speak], promises the impossible, possibility of all speech, yields no messianic, eschatological content [saves nothing]; yet resembles messianism, soteriology [addressed to totally other, finite mortal, w/out hope], structural opening: messianism w/out messianicity

p. 73 “I finally know how not to distinguish between promise and terror”

p. 95 for Heidegger, Zusage primary to question, the most irreducible in thought

GT pp. 73-4n event as “first time,” classical question, but event, gift, can’t give evidence of itself, only promise itself

R p. 82 democracy, inheritance of a promise

——threat in the promise itself

p. 86 structure of a promise: the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now

FK p. 67 religio: promise, promises itself, already promised, the response to untranslatibility of religio is religio: to swear (Benveniste)

p. 83 no to-come w/out iterability, w/out heritage & possibility of repeating, w/out messianic memory and promise, messiancity more originary than all messianism, opens the worst

FL p. 272 foundation is a promise, ever positing pro-met even if promise is not kept, iterability inscribes the promise as guard in the most irruptive instant of foundation, inscribes the possibility of repetition at the heart of the originary, so there is no real distinction between preserving violence and founding, positing is always a call for preserving: differential contamination

LOBL p. 155 essential irresponsibility of promise or response: crime of hymen > repeats itself endlessly, takes place w/out taking place [writing/reading]

AF p. 36 to know what archive means, we will only know in time to come: question of the future itself, of a response, promise, a responsibility for tomorrow (spectral messianicity at work in archive)

SPOM p. 81 la démocratie à venir: son idée comme événement dune injonction gagée qui commande de faire venir cela même qui ne se présentera jamais dans la forme de la présence pleine, cest louverture de cet écart entre une promesse infinie

p. 111-12 promise must promise to be kept (dêtre tenue), not to remain “spiritual” or “abstract” but to produce events, effective forms of action

p. 113 form of the promise is unique, total, uneffaceable

p. 204 ghost is there [re: de-limitation of critique] in the opening of the promise, before its first apparition, from the first it will have come second, deux fois à la fois, itérabilité originaire, virtualité irréductible de cet espace et de ce temps

HERP p. 181 a philein [promise?] not yet philia, which philosophy (too young, too late) has no authority to question, because [philosophy] is born like an event coming over philein

HASD p. 14 from the moment I open my mouth, I have already promised at least to say: it is necessary to be silent > speak of the promise w/in the promise, as necessary as it is impossible: inscribes us by its trace in language—before language

p. 24 [re: negative theology] since promise is also an order, allegorical veil becomes political shield, solid barrier of a social division, a shibboleth

p. 28 [in Christian apophatics of Dionysus] cause, gift of gift, order and promise are the same

p. 30 order or promise, injunction commits (me) to sign, in a rigorously asymmetrical manner, to reappropriate for myself and restore the symmetry

——to deny, elude responsibility, it’s still necessary that I countersign it

pp. 48-9 contrary to khora, Christian apophasis is initiated by event of revelation which is also a promise, Jerusalem as place of event, place is event

——prayer, quotation of prayer, & apostrophe weave same text > there is a text because of this repetition, this place is the event, future of what is promised, initiated, not motionless like khora

MPM p. 47 promise: not expectation or anticipation but commitment

***p. 93 there is a promise & the thought of the promise (most important thought, most difficult and disconcerting); promise is always excessive

pp. 93-4 de Man’s texts on promise pervert tranquil assurance of what we call “performative” > too much of promise is irremediable disturbance/perversion, is also a trap, also renders promise possible (indestructible), and comical

p. 95 singular aporia that divides the act, can’t be mastered, commits us before any active commitment on our part, impossibility of promise, uncontrollable > faktum, “older”

pp. 96-7 de Man “parodies” Die Sprache spricht w/ Die Sprache versprichtlanguage promises (itself), no originary Sprechen modalized into promise [would Heidegger protest?] [see S p. 93-4]

p. 96 via de Man, Heidegger rarely laughs and would probably be against irony as a pose of subjective mastery, never feels the exhilaration of a promise

p. 98 promise is impossible but inevitable

p. 99 for De Man, we all write, like Rousseau, w/in the “misleading” of the Versprechen, which nevertheless “conveys the promise of its own truth”

——every reading engaged in a promise w/in scene of a signature/writing

——apparent contradiction btwn act of reading and unreadability in the act > versprechen, promise at origin of history

——every reading is writing (but we must demonstrate it, following structure of promise)

p. 100 de Man: promise is “metafigural”, an allegory of a figure “which relapses into the figure it deconstructs”

p. 101 the sich, “se,” “itself,” deconstructs itself in the very act of the promise, aporetic event

——the sich is “promised to the effacement it promises itself” [auto-deconstruction]

p. 111 [if Socrates is the most original thinker then the promise’s indestructibility is forsaken?]

p. 135 auto-deconstruction where auto-, self can’t be reflected/totalized/gathered/recollected only written and caught in trap of promise

pp. 138-39 staging (mise) of promise is a committed positing (position) > the undecidable that resists non-dialectizable oppositions will bear name, maintain rhetorical relation w/ opposition, will have figure of opposition, be figurable, will always let itself by parasited by figure of opposition

p. 145 disjunction of memory & promise is the law, the text of law, the law of text

p. 147 there is no gift except on aporetic condition of no present, gift is only a promise, promised memory

p. 148 to lose one’s language in a foreign place is the terrible chance of the promise

p. 149 love, friendship, memory (moment two impossible promises are involved: “to what,” “to whom” are we destined) pledged beyond death, beyond what we call, without knowing what we speak, death; it involves, from the 1st moment, in reverse, the other is dead in us

p. 150 promise only to a mortal, on the condition of death

——une parole donnée au nom de lautre—act of memory, act of faith > or simply an act, impossible act, only act worthy of the name: promise has meaning only w/ death of other, when friend is no longer there > promise not made, but as trace of future it can be renewed

***PP pp. 127-28 pharmakon, forever in reserve, no fundamental profundity or locality; it infinitely promises itself and vanishes into a labyrinth

OH p. 78 democracy to-come not a Kantian regulative idea, not a certain future, but democracy that has structure of promise > memory of that which carries the to-come here and now

POOF pp. 28-9 dangerous perhaps that promises in the present what will come

p. 150 friendship of the perhaps: perhaps ‘prior’ to the question, prior even to affirmation that opens it up, before question takes form (friend–enemy as figure of brother), an exclamation mark before a question mark

p. 244 is Heidegger’s Zusage (prior to the question) that agency of phileîn which is not yet the eroticized tension of philosophy?

——Derrida proposes to think a perhaps ‘prior’ to Zusage, arche-originary pledge preceding all questioning, a friendship that could never thrive in gathering (Versammlung), that which accords phília to phúsis to lógos

S pp. 92-3 Heidegger’s distinguishes West of Trakl from that of Platonic-Christian West via thought of Versprechen [de Man’s Die Sprache verspricht sich]

p. 94 would Heidegger approve of Derrida’s attempt to make Versprechen other than a modality or modification of Sprache?

promise (Versprechen) announces, salutes, what has already taken place “before” (this is the temporality of the coming of the event, Ereignis or Geschehen), it is the dissymmetry of a yes before opposition of yes and no, before question, language always revient à de la promesse

——promise as the promise of the day before the day before

——acc. Heidegger, there’s a “must” a “we must think” of the promise, thought as fidelity to promise > must hear & obey

pp. 129-30n before the question, the question mark, language is already there, we have already said yes to it, given a pledge, acquiesced (Zusage,which also means promise, is for Heidegger a commitment of language toward language)

p. 107 most matutinal in Frühe, of promise, an other birth, other essence, hétérogène à lorigine, foreign to Christianity w/out being opposed to it, even more radically foreign to Platonic metaphysics

p. 111 wouldn’t Jews, Moslem, Christians respond to Heidegger’s retrait, flame and fire-writing in promise? [messianic echoes]

FWT p. 130 common possibilities of literature & democracy: 1) historicity (literature has acts, birthplaces, legacies; democracy defines itself by promising itself, by and in its historicity, its future-to-come) 2) power, credit of fiction [Montaigne/Pascal understood connection btwn right & fiction]

ROP p. 69 even though the promise can be a threat, Derrida prefers to prefer the promise

ATIA p. 3 for Nietzsche, man as promising animal, can be disciplined > for all time and what remains, man in passage toward surrendering to promise of the animal at unease w/ itself

p. 166n if Zusage (language “before,” w/out question) is before the possibility of response, then wouldn’t Zusage be something the animal is not deprived of?

p. 67 “I am he who will be”: a promise that breaches the purity of nothingness w/ a performative

p. 69 to confess the narcissism of confession is to admit that guilt, the lie, perjury are lodged in heart of promise, in veracity itself, in naked/intransitive simplicity of “I am”

SW pp. 341-42 the 2 categorical imperatives of tallith/prayer: don’t be late, must be living skin: untenability of these imperatives the very possibility of the promise

***TB p. 123 promise of reconciliation (even if unfulfillable) is a rare & notable event: kingdom is never reached, is untouchable > but the commitment takes place, bequeaths its record

p. 132 less revelation than promise: “infinite rebirth (Aufleben) of languages”

HLP p. 290n Kant: permit lying, destroy very possibility of promises

TR p. 155 Derrida disputes (in “Avances”) speech act theorists’ distinction btwn threat & promise

IW p. 294 national forgetting as remembering a future promise (promise structurally involves forgetting, essential indifference to past)

p. 295 “desire to live together,” performative engagements, promises, inscribe necessity of forgetting in memory itself

PSSS p. 248 promise as threat—intolerable ambiguity for Speech Act Theory [promise en souffrance]

LI pp. 74-5 acc. speech act theory, a promise is defective if it is a threat or warning > threat vs. promise (do to vs. do for)

pp. 86-9 possibility (can occur) vs. eventuality (the fact that such events do occur); for Austin, “can be quoted” is a possibility of a speech event, but one he excludes from his sense of purified eventuality > this exclusion/purification as a theoretical fiction; for Derrida, possibility as “standard [propre?]” demands no exclusion of eventuality: a promise must be iterable

——a promise that can’t be reiterated would not be a promise > thus the possibility of a parasite

TN p. 80 promise comprised of threat: automatic deconstruction of classical definition

p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 225 [Nancy beautifully describes minimally deferred contact, promise of contact in reading]

***NOY p. 240 promise of memory, memory of promise, before all psychē, all morality

——the “second” yes, doit arriver comme un renouvellement absolu, the structural “forgetting” of fidelity

——“grâce à la menace de cet oubli [the cutting off, the becoming unique, the divisibility contre laquelle une signature se tend] la mémoire de la promesse, la promesse même peut franchir son premier pas, à savoir le second

——forgetting repetition in the promise so that “yes” is absolutely inaugural and “free”

AD p. 105 [re: a return to Jerusalem] a promise remains, its possibility remains effective, but ethics demands the effectivity be effectuated: an ineffectual promise betrays its promise [?]—is realization of promise already politics? which politics?

***p. 113 engaged by promise while hearing silence it bears at heart of call—figure of hiatus, mouth open to speak/eat

p. 118-19 structural messianicity, an irrecusable and threatening promise, eschatology w/out teleology, from every determinate messianism

CIN p. 10 a desire, order, prayer or promise: “another voice, may it come soon now, again, another voice…”

ATAP pp. 81-2 if eschatological question always surprises us, response to it is impossible: [eschatology?] an appeal promising & responding before the question

p. 82 every apocalyptic eschatology promised in name of light, we are heirs to these Lumières, cannot & must not forgo the Aufklärung; must keep enough apocalyptic desire (clarity, revelation) to deconstruct apocalyptic discourse

UWC p. 231 Nietzsche’s promising animal (the figure of man) is still to-come

WBH p. 201 promise in every speech act, promise not simply performative

PROSTITUTION

SPOM pp. 53-5 prostitutes of money

p. 150 the other center of the Middle East (whore of Babylon)

p. 193 there is always more than one commodity, more than one spirit, number belongs to the movement of the commodity (Baudelaire/Benjamin’s prostitute)

p. 203 commodity is a born cynic, effaces differences, the cynic prostitutes itself, ready to exchange body and soul, original prostitution

PP p. 154 prostitution and transgression of law [keeps logos and soul separate?]

SP p. 57 divergence w/in truth elevated in quotation marks > the machination, cry, flight and pinch of a hooker (machination, cri, vol et pinces dune grue) [grue: hooker or crane]

C p. 215 retrace one’s steps, narrative (récit), series, funeral procession/palindrome, revenir: le revenu de lusure, le revenant, lhôte, ghost, guest [both in English] > le coffin comme hôtel de passe (whore-hotel)

ATAP p. 80 West dominated by powerful program of ends: Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx (trying to forget differences btwn Hegel & Marx perhaps another eschatology of Marxism): end of Oedipus, of class struggle, of God, of history, of religions, of Christianity & morals (ça, the most serious naiveté), of subject, of man, of earth, of literature: in blood, fire, earthquake, napalm descending sky by helicopters, like prostitutes—the nuclear thunder & the great whoring

p. 85 prostitution as confusion of tongues or tones [?] > Babel: mother of whores

PSYCHE

GOD pp. 15-17 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

AF p. 15 does the psyche transform w/ technological advancements or does it find itself better represented?

HERP p. 195 for Heidegger, anthropology & psychology depend on metaphysics of subjectivity, interpretation of man as subject; thus, psychology did not exist for Greeks, and Christianity (w/ its new relation to philein) is 1st stage in formation of passions for subject/psychology

POOF p. 13 friendship can’t survive its act but can survive its object, it can love the inanimate, it lives, becomes psychic, from w/in resource of survival: the beloved might be dead > re: Aristotle on mother, not needing to be known also means not needing to know if what you love is there

pp. 16-7 hexis, contretemporal habitus: yoke-effect (leffet de joug), binds 2x in same time: duration & omnitemporality, marks/hides in masking—another name for psukhé > hexis insufficient for friendship, remains a simulacrum

——analogy btwn spirit (nous) & animal body inscribes in living body habitus of this contretemps

p. 270n Heidegger: in accomplishment of metaphysics, metaphysics becomes ‘psychology,’ psychology & anthropology are last word of metaphysics—psychology & technics go hand in hand

VP pp. 12-3 strange unity of life in Husserl: 1) biological life 2) concept of psychē is life as self-relation > the pre-transcendental becomes the ultra-transcendental, Derrida says maybe concept of life calls for another name

FSW p. 199 our reading will let metaphoric investment “invade the entirety of the psyche”

p. 201 memory is essence of psyche for Freud; differential forces [à la Nietzsche] become psychē and mnēmē

p. 205 Freud persists in accounting for psyche in terms of spacing, topography of traces, map of breaches

p. 206 for Freud, metaphor of writing appropriates problems of psychic apparatus in structure & psychic text in fabric

p. 220 nonspsychical system (machine metaphor) of psychical (like Heidegger’s nontechnology of technology)

FWT pp. 39-40 [Derrida prefers not to get trapped btwn naturalism/constructivism] differance btwn psyché & genetico-biological laws > always something of a familial bond around birth, impossible to erase “birth,” a certain geneticism, perhaps birth is question of future, of arrival

DS p. 190 only metaphors of painting and writing are linked to psyche > in “reality,” literally, acc. Plato, writing & painting deal in copies, copies of copies, incapable of intuition of thing itself

POS pp. 22-3 semiology inscribed w/in psychologism: reduce everything exterior about signifier, all that’s left is psyche, the phonetic sign imposes itself as “pattern” for all signs

——Saussure: “linguistic sign is therefore a two-sided psychic entity”

——psychologism inscribed/prescribed w/in concept of sign itself

OS p. 49(n) time compared by Aristotle to movement and chance, w/out being either one of them, time can only occur en tēi psukhēi > time’s analogy: what is traced (le tracé) as line, grammē

p. 49n time, for Kant, brings difference together: only in time can opposed predicates meet in same object

——for Kant, inner intuition of time gives us no shape, so we make up for this via analogy: time is a line progressing to infinity > but where parts of line are simultaneous, parts of time are successive

ATIA pp. 49-51 autobiographical animal, the general singulars “I” and “animal,” before ego cogito both living, both auto-affective, both moving > “I” speaks to “engage nudity w/out shame,” untenable pledge > bring in a mirror (une psyché), is the animal caught there too? or my primary mirror?

PIO pp. 19-20 igitur or donc [re: “Fable”] speaks for a psyche, to it/her, before it/her, on subject of psyche, which has become pivoting speculum that relates the same to the other

p. 20 is the psyche an invention?

pp. 42-3 Schelling’s invention, re: philosopher as an inventor of forms, still limited as invention of the same in guise of supplement of invention: man’s invention supplements God’s ideality: man as psyche of God, as supplying the lack in his revelation

——here, invention caught in infinite amortization, rationalistic humanism, carries out God’s program; human invention as desire of/for God

p. 44 supplementarity introduces (into structure of psyche) the fabulous repetition, a crossing of chance & necessity, bending performative rules while respecting them: allows other to come, or announce’s its coming, in dehiscence’s opening > deconstruction

IW p. 325n Derrida is calling “psyche” the psychic space of a “fantasmatic impulse” (love, hate, madness, projection, rejection etc.), & that which acts like une psyché, a large pivoting mirror

pp. 254-55 if, for Cohen, race is reducible to biologico-naturalist schema, racism not of issue re: Jew & the German, they relate through psyche, artificially, nonnaturally: alliance of religious & philosophical

p. 256 psyche as “artificial” reflection, structure of interpretation/institution [?]

p. 265 German-Jewish psyche, as a psyché always does, keeps watch over (garde) the spirit

p. 271 Ibn Ezra, first to doubt Moses wrote 5 books (acc. to Spinoza), says: human reason is mediator btwn God/Man, there is thus reconciliation (Versöhnung) btwn God/Man, and a redemption of man’s sins > for Cohen, in Judaism, redemption presupposes human psyche [pp. 271-72 Cohen’s Judeo-Protestantism, but how does he explain Jewish duty, commandments?]

——Jewish concept of soul, immediate relation w/ God, no mediator

pp. 275-76 Kant, Jew, German: co-substantial reciprocity, their socius (alliance, spiritual symbiosis, psyche) is very socius that makes subjectum a moral being, a freedom, a person

p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——truth of nationality is German idealism; the German spirit is the spirit of humanity

——Cohen suspects a narcissistic infatuation in Fichte’s national ego, mirror of a certain psyché, but also room for any other self in this national self, cosmopolitan logic, national self as “We”

p. 286 music as highest, most ideal art, its structure is pure breath, spiritus and psyche

TN p. 11 Freud: “Psyche ist ausgedehnt, weiss nichts davon (Psyche is extended, knows nothing about it)”

p. 12 to say Psyche, essence, is extended [Freud], would raise (se lever) Descartes from his tomb

——aphorisms interest us because elliptical, testamentary: keep silence sur son lit de mort

pp. 13-15 Nancy on Psyche: abandoned of her pose, radical solitude, alone in knowing nothing, alone for not knowing her extension

p. 15 Psyche surrounded by exactitude of thinking men

p. 16 Psyche the untouchable, and not only for others

p. 17 incarnation of Psyche is “posthumous”—what does this do to psych-ology (life of living)?

p. 18 Psyche as life, breath: mourning life itself

p. 19 Aristotle’s Psyche is pure life of living, Nancy’s Psyche is a dead woman

p. 24 the move from body extension to extension of psyche/thinking is incommensurable > a place (lieu) neither of objective space nor extension: place (lieu) as spacing before space

p. 25 Nancy: “the incommensurable extension of thinking is the opening of the mouth” > mouth as union of soul/body; Nancy accords decisive authority to “quasi” in Descartes’ “quasi permixtio

p. 26 the “common” incommensurability of thought, which allows “psyche is extended,” is the “quasi permixtio” of body and soul

p. 43 for Freud, the spatiality of space, exteriority, is a projection of an internal, psychical extension

p. 48 Freud/Aristotle both interested in Psyche

p. 49 Psyche as Mary, beautiful for being neither dead nor alive: surviving

p. 50 absolute mourning of Psyche (life itself) > mourning mourning, mourning w/out work of mourning

p. 51 following Nancy’s interpretation of The Death of the Virgin, [Life comme une Morte] a “tôt” announcing an apocalypse (an end not a future) > night of nonknowledge, every desire gathers momentum, Psyche ex-posed to other, surrendered but all too soon denied to the other’s eyes

pp. 51-2 for Psyche, for a psyche altogether exposed to outside & other, there’s no autobiography: mourning autobiography (not just any mourning)

p. 64 corps-corpse > when Freud lays Psyche on couch is he referring to the Christian body? to say Psyche is “extended,” is to say she remains tangible (against Kant, Descartes)

p. 71 Nancy moves from Psyche is extended to body weighs (i.e. thinks) [penser, peser]

p. 165 Husserl leads us back to purely psychic ego (Descartes) > not necessarily human

p. 166 pure psychology parallels pure transcendental phenomenology

p. 173 phenomenology finds greatest resistance where extension, place, localization are at issue > nous abordons ainsi une zone de spatialité, extension of the psyche

***NOY p. 240 promise of memory, memory of promise, before all psychē, all morality

PSYCHOANALYSIS

GT p. 109 [via psychoanalysis] circulation of auto-affective fantasmatics [imaginative incorporation] can disregard overflow of luxury or recognize in it an essential economic function

AF p. 17 psychoanalysis formed in the time of postal delay

p. 27 psychoanalysis is not a depth psychology

p. 34 archivology (interdisciplinary science of archive) risks being paralyzed in preliminary aporia: 1) treat psychoanalysis as general science of the archive 2) place itself under the critical authority of psychoanalysis (disputing it while integrating its logic)

p. 36 can one presuppose closure, identity of psychoanalytic corpus?

p. 48 acc. Yerushalmi, psychoanalysis would be Judaism w/out God

MC p. 344 “psychoanalysis,” “literature”—proper names that point to historical, singular events or series of events; p. 345 it is not certain such “worlds” exist

p. 364 what happens when a science implicates the subject itself of the science, i.e. psychoanalysis?

p. 365 paranoia? superstition? science? all restore meaning to random signs

p. 375 deliberate self-limitation gives psychoanalysis a chance of being a science

HASD p. 25 onto-theological, metaphysical presuppositions sustain psychoanalytic theorems

PP p. 131n Oedipus as pharmakos [Derrida’s distances himself from psychoanalysis]

S p. 2 avoidance, denegation, categories of psychoanalysis, inadequate when it comes to questions of Being

FSW p. 197 why Derrida won’t utilize Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts

pp. 230-31 thought of trace fecundated by psychoanalysis: 1) study writing in a psychopathology of everyday life 2) a history of writing 3) a psychoanalysis of literature respectful of originality of the literary signifier (not yet begun) 4) problematize boundaries, psychoanalytic graphology (i.e. Melanie Klein)

F pp. xxviii [re: Abraham’s psychoanalysis] joy of breaking wall btwn rational & irrational, condition necessary for “scientific truth and poetic truth” to belong to “same essence”

——this poetic truth not gratuitous literary estheticism, nor unveiling presence > truth is “poetic” in that it writes a text on and in a text, hieroglyph on hieroglyph h

pp. xxxi-xxxii via Abraham’s “radical semantic change that psychoanalysis introduced into language,” beneath paleonymy of inherited concepts, working w/ remnants [i.e. beneath “pleasure” we find pain]: to bring intending non-presence into phenomenology

p. xxxiii via Abraham, in deciphering poem, “translator” has written one: poetic translation or psychoanalytic interpretation [re: “ghost”] > clears path for other w/out unilateral privilege

FWT p. 35 fixed model of oedipal theory in Lacan & Freud > stable father, irreplaceable mother; transformation of family would transform psychoanalysis

——psychoanalysis always wanted to be a psychoanalysis of families

p. 37 psychoanalysis: terribly overdetermined

pp. 122-23 law integrates possibility of psychoanalysis, can you convict someone who is only showing symptoms of racism?

p. 168 “secret” space of psychoanalysis calls for law of other

pp. 167-68 “friends of psychoanalysis”—affirm necessity of psychoanalysis’ future-to-come > consider whether psychoanalysis has yet to take place “up until now” > such a vigilant “friend” affirms, says “yes,” to its “secret” space, which calls for another ethics, law, rigor

p. 173 psychoanalytic aim > not to seek refuge in a theological/humanist alibi > Derrida seduced by psychoanalysis’ audacity of thought, its courage, signing theoretical “fictions” in name of a knowledge w/out alibi (thus, the most “positive” knowledge”)

——[re: psychoanalysis’ method, teaching?] debt of all theoretical (juridical, ethical & political) positing to a performative power structured by a fiction, by figural invention: “the convention that guarantees every performative inscribes within itself the credit that is conferred upon a fiction”

pp. 173-4 Freud’s machines & Lacan’s are substantialized—differance erases/displaces their borders

pp. 178-79 how we proceed as if psychoanalysis never happened, as if we still believed in sovereign authority of ego, speak the language of “autonomy”

p. 180 the charters that govern psychoanalysis are not psychoanalytical

POOF p. 280 we shall laugh interminably at Ferenczi’s letter to Freud [Ferenczi treats Freud like a father–god], we shall also take it seriously [see p. 279 for a swift recap of all questions in POOF, now associated, via this letter, w/ psychoanalysis]

——psychoanalysis would have happened in event of non-event [?]

POS pp. 83-4 Derrida fractures hermetic closure that shelters question of writing from psychoanalysis, blinding psychoanalytic discourse from the textual scene

ROP p. 5 [here] analytic concern merges w/ hermeneutic drive, w/ principle of reason (reddere rationem): render sense at all cost (à tout prix), il faut rendre: fidelity, debt, duty, to restitute sense of sense > even if hidden, verborgene Sinn

p. 16 psychoanalysis is in principle nonhypnotic, affirms right to resistance to hypnosis (and said resistance’s insurmountability)

pp. 16-7 violence of psychoanalysis, actively counters forces of resistance

——violence of psychoanalysis: turn resister into “collaborator” (Freud’s words), or then deprive patient’s defenses of all value

p. 21 paralysis gives movement w/ regard to its other [this is in reference to impossibility of psychoanalysis’ auto-interpretation] (in PAS, paralysis distinguished from logic of analysis)

pp. 24-5 pourquoi mon explication avec lanalyse [psychoanalysis] a toujours eu ce goût de mort en poste restante qui ma poussé à rôder sans fin dans les parages de Beyond the Pleasure Principle [?]

p. 32 repetition compulsion (advocatus diaboli of death drive) as resource & limit (à la fois) of psychoanalysis > analytic position set going endlessly, w/out Aufhebung, in paradox of Bindung and Erlöschung (solution, extinction): no analytic position when resistance is unidentifiable

p. 34 analysis is interminable because there is no indivisible/simple element

p. 36 double bind (preferable to double contrainte), is the call to analysis: one can never fully analyze it, one can only untie one of its knots by making the other tighter: stricture

p. 44 ash, stepping beyond psychoanalysis, radical destruction of archive, destroys capitalizing reserve, the guarding of repression

p. 69 what happens when you apply chiasmatic invagination of borders to analysis? to its phallogocentrism (mastery)? > can psychoanalysis belong to anyone, anymore?

pp. 86 death drive (repetition compulsion, fort/da), Evil Genius of Freud, the devil’s advocate, limping devil: by way of which psychoanalysis finds its speculative power & its greatest resistance

pp. 101-02 for Foucault, psychoanalysis oscillates on both sides of dividing line, in two places, two times, at same time (but he does not think these two times w/ structural possibility of event)

O p. 49n same denial at work in Greater Logic when preface is placed in parentheses as when psychoanalytic phallocentrism places anatomy in parentheses?

PSSS p. 239 Derrida doesn’t [:)] draw link btwn non-bloody cruelty & the Jewish joke about analyst who chose his profession because he didn’t like sight of blood [doesn’t want to reopen history of Judaism & potential universality of psychoanalysis]

——psychoanalysis allows to think: the suffering for the pleasure of it (just to, just for), the worst cruelty, suffer to suffer, making/letting oneself suffer

p. 240 possibility of a drive of cruelty is reduced/excluded by theological, genetic, physicalist, cognitivist, metaphysical discourses

——“psychoanalysis” turned toward what is most proper to psychical cruelty, w/out alibi

——psychoanalysis as another name for “w/out alibi”: questions radical evil or an even worse evil > only psychoanalytic revolution up to task of taking account of grammatical syntax, reflexivity: [“I you we made I you we suffer”]

p. 241 Derrida evokes a beyond the death drive, beyond pleasure/reality principle, beyond drive for sovereign mastery, beyond cruelty—beyond the “mythology of drives” > the undecidable in psychoanalysis, the impossible other

p. 242 cruelty & sovereignty (very obscure things) pose a resistance to psychoanalysis, just as psychoanalysis resists them > this border (inside/outside) of psychoanalysis bears weight of our questions: historical, ethical, juridical, political

pp. 243-44 all which resists psychoanalysis in the mondialisation of today, e.g. psycho-pharmacological medicine, positivist science, but mainly an archaic onto-theological metaphysics of sovereignty, individual or state (freedom, consciousness, intention, ego, will), barely scratched or thought or deconstructed by psychoanalysis—is this psychoanalysis’ own autoimmunity? its resistance?

pp. 244-45 psychoanalysis has failed to think, change axioms, of ethical, political, juridical sovereignty, where most cruel/traumatic events take place today; also, psych. has failed to think unprecedented juridical performatives: Human Rights, DP, international penal system, laws against cruel & unusual punishment…

p. 245 psychoanalysis will be left behind if it doesn’t analyze mutation of subject of the subject, citizen subject

pp. 245-46 psychoanalysis has failed to say anything original about mondialisation, tele-technic virtuality—has resisted, in autoimmune fashion, changing, thinking through, fundamental axioms of ethics, law, politics > must be a revolution re: concepts cruelty, sovereignty, resistance

pp. 248-49 grievances (complaints, demands) of psychoanalysis: internal (problem of its institutionalization & dispersion) and external (relations to state, society, mondialisation) > what is proper not proper to psychoanalysis re: these borders, who addresses the grievance to whom?

——psychoanalysis’ native culture: European, Graeco-Abrahamic, liberal-bourgeois

***p. 250 if psychoanalysis taught us one thing: beware autonomy, supposed freedom, alleged spontaneity

p. 253 each psychoanalytic session, a micro-revolution, enfranchisement of regained spontaneity, freedom of speech, image/music of States General

p. 255 will theater of psychoanalysis always be royal family, patriarchal, heterosexual? will it always treat sexual difference as binary opposition?

——resistance of Arabo-Islamic culture, East Asia, to psychoanalysis (Judeo-Christian Greek?)

p. 260 psychoanalysis is ineradicable, its revolution is irreversible—yet, like civilization, it’s mortal

p. 261 psychoanalysis only “science” that intrinsically involves the proper name of its founder, a transferential filiation it claims to be able to analyze

p. 262 psychoanalysis hasn’t yet treated DP, sovereignty in general, it needs to > otherwise, double resistance both of world to psychoanalysis & that of psychoanalysis to itself as to the world

p. 265 political force of psychoanalysis remains at odds w/ res publica, or even democracy of sovereignist concept (nation-statist), and at odds w/ publicity of its own institutionalization

——secrecy delimits political authority [re: institution of psychoanalysis]

***p. 279 psychoanalysis only possible approach, w/out alibi, to all virtual translations btwn the cruelties of a suffering “for the pleasure of it” [?] [I you we cruel-suffer]

+R p. 181 picking out enlarged detail: indissociable demonstration of cinematographic & psychoanalytical technique > one & the same mutation [via Benjamin?]

TN pp. 44-5 transcendental psychoanalytic aesthetic (Kant may be a precursor) > how to have an apriori form of external sense, an already extended sense [?], a touch w/out empirical contact, sensibility touching nothing

ATM pp. 183-84 while discussing Levinas’ and [a certain] psychoanalysis’ secondarization of the woman, Derrida hypothesizes [?] that this complicit gesture gathers around one fundamental design: their relation to me, to the other as woman

BSi p. 101 more than one psychoanalysis, heterogenous

pp. 102-03 Lacan’s “return” to Freud [proclaimed loyalty to psychoanalytic tradition] both helps us & forbids us from thinking

p. 143 acc. Deleuze, psychoanalytic bêtise privileges depth of fantasy over planar affect, becoming-assemblage

OG p. 21 [re: Being as transcendental signified] psychoanalysis presents best chance of breakthrough (percée) w/ concept-words of ontology

p. 88 Melanie Klein and psychoanalysis pays close attention to investments of writing, avoids derivation from theoretical formal ontology

pp. 339-40n [re: certain interpretation of Rousseau] Derrida wonders if the singularity of each substitution [for Rousseau’s mother] loses significance, each cleavage blurred, when a totalitarian psychoanalysis of existentialist or phenomenological nature claims diffuse, total, sexuality

pp. 158-60 doubling commentary is not psychoanalytic reading, not psychobiographical, where symptom is perfectly extrinsic, contingent, to text, where there’s an appeal to transcendental signified

pp. 160-61 though Derrida is w/in history of psychoanalysis, he does not locate all the structures to which Rousseau’s text belongs, all that is not unique to it [like psychoanalysis would], all that could be inhabited rather than produced by writing > the encompassing already-thereness of language/culture

SPEC p. 302 woman perpetuates race by risking the name: analytic “movement” as genealogy of son-in-law

p. 303 autobiography of Freud as living description of his own writing, as if grandson were dictating to Freud what he had to set down on paper > not just tautological mirror, autobiography of the writing posits/deposits simultaneously—the psychoanalytic movement, elle performe et parie sur ce qui donna la chance [to psychoanalysis] > now Derrida: “je parie" that this double fort/da cooperates in initiating psychoanalysis

p. 316 Ernst doesn’t have la chose before him [fort/da], like it’s before Eurydice or the analyst

p. 334 does Freud want survival of psychoanalysis in his name? does its structure require it?

p. 366 monistic risk: in duel w/ Jung, Freud preferred dualism > whatever one says about Jung, Freudian dogmatism has been adopted blindly, inherited in this dark affair

——alternative of dualism/monism belongs to much more simplistic framework than that of differential stricture in athetic reading of Beyond

FV p. 414 what happens when a text that psychoanalysis deciphers inscribes w/in itself a scene of deciphering? when it says more about itself than the deciphering? [Freud often acknowledges this debt]

——débordement (not mastery of author), energetic squaring-off (carrure énergique)

p. 416 [re: Benveniste on Aristotle’s categories (see p. 416n), Freud referring to The Emperors New Clothes] example of illustrative jubilation, treats element of its “scientific” discourse as marvelous paradigm there to be found, happily available (disponible) for instructing discourse

p. 418 Freud’s discourse: no more fiction than science

p. 419 literature that puts truth on stage, can it be read by psychoanalysis? abyssal structure, this space overflowed by powers of simulacrum

p. 420 in France, “literary criticism” marked by psychoanalysis has not asked question of the text

pp. 426-27 even Freud [thus not Lacan] indicates, in Das Unheimliche, literary fiction’s resistance to general law of psychoanalytic knowledge

p. 452 analyst has seen what no one else has: place of the thing btwn the legs

p. 469 for Lacan, analyst links truth to power of speech: power of communication as a contract btwn 2 present things

p. 472 Lacan’s authentic: “appel propre du vide

——for Lacan, ideal process of analysis: “realization” of full speech as assumption of desire (of castration)

p. 477n Lacan: when patient can speak to you (analyst) about himself [sic]—analysis is over

——by way of Lacan, Freud tells us very literally Heidegger’s What is Metaphysics?

p. 483 certain psychoanalytic interpretations (invisible framing: frame w/in frame) vs. scene of writing w/ ruined (abîmé) limits

pp. 493n, 494 Dupin as the biggest dupe [not the master/analyst of truth, like Lacan believes], He-addresses-her-the-Queen-the-address-dupes-her (Il-ladresse-la-Reine-ladresse-la-dupe)

——Dupin, real dupe, duped by truth

PUBLIC OPINION (SOCIAL MEDIA/PUBLISHING/TELEVISION)

GT pp. 159-60n Heidegger on gift, Heidegger discovers an etymology of khreon that links it to hand, to reaching for, also links it to logos > Derrida wonders about credit cards, coded signatures

FK p. 43 evil as the deracination of the abstract > lead to machine, tele-technology, cyberspace

***pp. 47-8 [Derrida’s liberalism?] unreserved taste for democratic public space, lights of Enlightenment, emancipation from religious dogmatism, thus the attempt to try to think religion w/in limits of reason alone, an epoché that “gives a chance to a political event” [see “Sauf le nom”], belongs to history of democracy

H p. 47 hospitality & email (prosthetic apparatuses)

p. 49 threshold, between familial and non-familial; email is or is not private?

p. 51 state violates the inviolable, the home

p. 53 state techniques, like private spying & blackmail, threaten interiority of home, ipseity, integrity, cause purifying reactions, feeling of resentment [but???]

p. 67-71 Kant against lying, duty to speak truth comes from freedom & pure intentionality of subject, but it introduces police everywhere (in our internal cellphones, our emails, most secret faxes of our private lives)

——w/out right to lie > Kant subordinates rights of the home

p. anne 114 crypt, vault [voute] has a relation to casting spells [envoutement]; pp. 124-26 having a spell cast is enclosure beneath a vault—dematerialization of Internet end of spell? no, there’s spell, encrypting in techno-communication

FL p. 280 police becoming technologically autonomous (invade all homes)

SPOM p. 63 frontier btwn public & private constantly being displaced because the spacing of the public (techno-tele-discursvity, -iconcity) is neither living nor dead: it spectralizes > less and less assured identity of political

pp. 99-100 when politicians become nothing but characters of media’s representation, marionettes, TV actors

p. 100 regiments of ghosts [the 10 plagues of “new world order” pp. 100-04] have returned camouflaged by archaic symptoms of paramilitary and of postmodern excess of arms (information technology, panoptical surveillance via satellite, nuclear threat)

——borders blackened btwn civil & international war, worn down beyond wear (noircissons encore le tableau de cette usure au-delà de lusure)

p. 103 it has always been acceleration itself [beyond the norms of speed that have until now informed human culture] that dislocates, dislocation no less arch-originary than archaism it dislodges

POR p. 14 (146) for Heidegger, principle of reason depends on delivery (Zustellung) of atomic energy > all Stellen (Vorstellen, Nachstellen…) characterize information tactics of modern technology

——information most economic, clearest, fastest, instructs men about safeguarding (Sicherstellung) their needs, ta khreai > computers, data banks, constructed on basis of this calculable language: all this, via Heidegger, assures man’s mastery over earth [Derrida can’t elaborate on this point]

HERP p. 190 acc. Heidegger, sophists, media, liberalism, commerce, the majority forget, don’t hear logos, philein, Sein, this forgetting leads to aggression (Zugriff)

***p. 212 Verfall into optics, spectacle, noise > poets, thinkers not tolerated

OH p. 37 “capillarities” (new media, techno-scientific powers): centralizing pulsions don’t always go through states anymore

pp. 42-3 anti-democratic to shut off telephone, telephone blurs lines between public and private, the prefiguration and imperious prescription of the ruin of totalitarianism; the telephone inaugurates the formation of public opinion [and soon the videophone]

pp. 54-5 demand for “transparency,” “consensus,” common sense, intelligibility in new university space via publishing enterprises [new order, dogma]

p. 85 if public opinion wasn’t ephemeral, if it could take place, it would enable transparent discussion

p. 87 public opinion > ubiquity of a specter

p. 88 newspaper facilitates recognition of public opinion

p. 89 everydayness as a category of social rhythm is not natural (that is, universal)

p. 91 paradigmatic moment of public opinion’s inside/outside relation to parliamentary democracy: Petition of Grievances (Cahiers de Doléances)

p. 93 language (mark) threatens rigor of public/private distinction

p. 96 “public” space & Aufklärung, Kant

p. 97 speak seriously of the press in the press? only in contraband

p. 100 “new censorship” combines concentration & fractionalization, accumulation & privatization > de-politicizes every informing of a “fact,” no information escapes

pp. 101-02 the way “cultural press” dogmatizes, culture determined by whoever monopolizes decision to bring to daylight; quasi-private, “difficult,” “obscure” works excluded from the scene

——that which is not mass-produced is unreadable

p. 104 samizdat: Russian for self-edition, the means of distributing work prohibited by censorship

——Kafka, Joyce, Proust, Nietzsche were saved by a handful of readers—but what readers! [re: possible oversight of great media machines of today]

p. 107 press brings light of day to its publicity, (se) donner…(pour) le jour, gives daylight to day itself > right of response hardly exists

FWT p. 11 nothing serious in politics w/out “hairsplitting,” sharpening analyses, w/out being intimidated by impatience of media

p. 26 double-edged sword of “political correctness,” two-sided trap > thus, high-risk debate

p. 81 Hamlet also machine of repression in politics, spectrality governs problematic of mourning & technics, media, virtual reality > general logic of spectrality

p. 97 technology [telephone, Internet, stock market] dissociates political field from territorial & national field > new concept of political is being forged

p. 127 literature transforms/displaces status of public space, affects w/ irreducible novelty > transforms public space w/in, amidst, like “new technologies” of communication/reproduction

——literature is the [an-]institution of absolute candor & freedom, under no positive law, mutation in concept of responsibility

p. 159 agrees/disagrees w/ Foucault’s claim death is less visible > spectral logic invades everything: work of mourning, technē of image; visibility is deferred, perhaps, transformation of visible field > never have things been as “visible” in global space as they are today

POOF pp. 272-73 Derrida explains how he does not want to exploit spectacular ‘news,’ that which screens out (fait écran) reflection [makes a screen of reflection], by projecting itself w/ pathetic, sensational, images of violence that are too easily mediatizable > yet, all these examples (immigration, globalization, new warfare) are in our mind & heart as Derrida strives to deconstruct fraternal link to friendship: how does humanitarian participate in fraternizing humanization?

P p. 110 in Kant, sans of free beauty compressed/oriented by regulatory idea of maximal consensus among men [universal?]

ROP p. 40 [techno-psychoanalytical] new techniques of archive (tape recorder, etc.), together w/ ideas re: inscription, erasure, blank, memory storage, threaten concept of history > the way in which history is written has not systematically come to terms w/ all this

OTO pp. 33-4 Nietzsche’s critique of journalism always linked to critique of cultural machinery of State and educational apparatus [Derrida reads this as striking re: media today] > Nietzsche’s critique would make “ideology” critique appear as symptomatic, degenerative, as new subjection to Hegelian State (but, there are many Marxist views of State, and one would also…)

pp. 34-5 your ears grow into ass-ears (inverted cripple) when you think you are free, autonomous, w/ respect to the State > all ears for the phonograph dog, you’re a high-fidelity receiver

***WAP p. 23 “public opinion” demands immediate intelligibility: specter of a readership projected or constituted before appealing to it

p. 68 link btwn authority, selecting, collecting (rassemblement), titles, names and figures & publishing > publishing machine

DPi pp. 54-5 should a representative form his own opinion or reproduce constituents’ opinion?

p. 56 new public space of mondialisation (so unequal, heterogenous)

p. 186 Hugo [and Marx?]: during French Commune, government was obeying the rumblings (rumeurs) of the public square

p. 252 rant against philosophical mediocrity as the culture mafia [only alternative to news of executions]

p. 264 how printing press, secularization, can spread the sacred law not just desacralize

CHM p. 41 current & popular language always lags longer than it should behind its subversion by science & philosophy

REST pp. 275-76 everything on trial (tout chose en procès), publicized [re: Shapiro], the proximate cause is a trap: a double that doesn’t make a pair, makes a trap, can’t put one’s feet in them, Christic shade of bait [sole? proper subject? Van Gogh’s surrender?], Christ’s flesh is bait for the Devil (Muscipula Diaboli); in PAS, another type of trap > la paralyse

***pp. 325-26 if police there is (and isn’t there always?) > Derrida polices too [?], “close reading,” counterpolices [?] oldest, most dogmatic, sinisterly authoritarian programs, massive meidatizing machines: pre-text of perception, of bare hands (mains nue), of real history, of living speech (vous enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte)

PIO pp. 43-4 invention, invenire (advent of future-to-come) comes back to the same as soon as it receives a status legitimized by an institution: what is being invented are institutions > for this to happen invention must be possible: this statutory economy of public invention does not break the psyché, does not go beyond the mirror

HLP p. 54 shame of an intellectual thinking he/she has to write for newspapers

——New York newspapers lying about me for months at a time

p. 56 must keep the lies of [social media] in proportion

p. 63 Hitler used “old Machiavellian technique”: tell truth knowing the uninitiated will not take him seriously, “conspiracy in broad daylight,” “society w/ a secret”

p. 63 for Koyré, any secret threatens res publica: politeia as absolute phenomenality, thus required transparency/illumination of public space

——germ of totalitarianism w/ democratic face: [everything must be illuminated]

p. 292n “live” broadcast replaces “thing-itself” [power of “propaganda image”: mutation that affects substitutive status of substitute] [think Trump]

p. 293n lying w/ images, “facts” structured by simulacrum/virtual, “live television,” by means of selective/interpretive performativity, destroys even reference to the alterity of what it replaces: produces indubitable “truth effect” > absolute lie can survive w/out anyone knowing [evil genius]

——maintain regime of perhaps [re: the possibility of an absolute lie, televisual effect] to avoid effacing, again, history of lie into a history of truth

p. 70 one cannot think the lie itself w/out taking into account its survival to infinity, its radical perversion, and its technical mutations in simulacrum or iconic substitutes

WAP p. 134 the force that dominates classification & hierarchization enjoins us to read what it is interested in, and renders inaccessible what it can’t read (holds true for discourse of educator, evaluatory procedures: grading, juries, so-called supervisory committees)

AFR p. 128n repetitive structure of knowing gives rise to archeological interpretation of frivolous & to a metaphysics of plagiarism [Derrida quotes Condillac on plagiarism]

PJP p. 194 most vulgar forms of media violence—link btwn television, University, & “American law” [Trump]

PSSS p. 256 [re: psychoanalysis] everything remains to be done, dissensus must remain a fortunate fate

p. 265 political force of psychoanalysis remains at odds w/ res publica, or even democracy of sovereignist concept (nation-statist), and at odds w/ publicity of its own institutionalization

EL p. 198 blind sorcerers of secularization conceal abyss (in them abyss is sealed), but au fond de ce sans-fond, the abyss cannot be dominated, tamed

LI p. 154 call for maximal development of a press that is freer and more rigorous in exercise of its duties

p. 159n repressive police on border btwn alleged academic freedom, press, & state power > a kind of academic “interpol”

TN p. 17 publishing: risk exposure to so many metonymies

pp. 112-13 phone sex: phantasm of ecstatic pleasure promises pleasure (through phainesthai)

p. 301 “facts of the day” [i.e. computer, cybersex], artefactual haunts and works through technics & desire (and work in general)—same labor, same pleasure, same torture, tripalium

LG pp. 240-41 [after Derrida describes the double chiasmatic invagination of La folie du Jour] are all these transgressions permitted by [publishing] law, à lintérieur de cet espace normé (normed space)? > but in La folie du jour “in whole and in part, the whole is a part (tout et partie , tout est partie)”

BSi p. 34 television: the monstration immediately a moral demonstration

pp. 35-6 fabular dimension of political not just sayings or writings but actions > death & suffering inscribed in affabulatory score (on Television): put living beings on stage to accredit interpretation of narrative, to faire savoir, like Augustine’s making truth, veritatem faciare

pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

——TV shows beyond auto-, hetero- censorship

p. 216 deciding actors [political leaders] consecrated by election of their erection to status of marionette in the puppet show [in English]

pp. 284-85 Derrida mocks the circus of modern political actors > kissing babies: pâté de campagne

OG p. 221 (315) Rousseau’s 3 needs of man: 1) conservation 2) bien-être: sexual appetites 3) public opinion

EU p. 5 Latin, then American English: privileged media of philosophical or techno-scientific communication

p. 9 monarchy protects language: history of French literature, culture of publishing, king offers commissions

p. 47 “current institutions”: university & para-university, publishing, the press, the media, new systems of archiving, etc.

p. 95 university as a child of metaphysics & tehnē > once this offspring exceeds places assigned to it, becomes invasive margin: university “idea” reigns everywhere

——parasite everywhere there’s language, public, publishing > to wish to control/exclude parasites is a misunderstanding of speech acts

pp. 95-6 [vis-à-vis Kant] the “lettered,” die Litteraten (Studirte): businessmen of knowledge, technicians of learning, administrators of archivization, journalists [represent the State, not educated by Faculty of Philosophy]

pp. 97-8 to ensure philosophy’s power-to-think-and-judge, Kant draws linear/indivisible border in language (language: that which opens passage to all parasites/simulacrum): [the professor utters only constative], university has no executive power, professor speaks w/out action, does not speak publicly > Kant makes information technology [that which escapes university] philosophy’s most faithful representative—but only as a reserved, intra-university, quasi-private language [before the law of this apparent paradox ultimate responsibility should be taken today]

p. 99 fields of publishing, archiving, mediatization have expanded as strikingly as have overcoding & hyper-formalization of language > where does publication begin? [via Kant, publication of knowledge, not knowledge itself, is submitted to authority]

p. 100 [re: performativity of university] dream of studying every intersecting, dia- and synchronic code in class evaluations, jury reports > concept of university legible in every sentence

p. 114 journalistic representation, some of most pressing/serious/obscure responsibilities facing an intellectual today

***p. 193 Derrida mistrusts reactionism against media, says there are not enough media, that the risk w/ media is that it is too monolithic, concentrated, violently uniform

***p. 200 philosophy’s new relation w/ techno-scientific reason: coextensive immediacy w/ encyclopedia

SPEC p. 320 fort/da: scene of writing that Freud’s playing, plays itself, plays him

——detour of the télé, an entire chaine (network) [play w/ Television]

QUADRILATERAL (SQUARE)

GT p. 22 the es gibt plays (spielt), play of 4’s as play of gift, manifests the unity of time’s 3 dimensions, la donne de ce jeu [relance], & la doña, la femme qui nous a requis depuis lexergue [Derrida then mentions a fine book, Finas’ Donne, which interlaces all these themes]

pp. 150-51 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

——literature as place of non-place of frame, triptych w/ dislocated frame, 3 + or – excluded 4th, all positions exchangeable to infinite, an ex-propriation that forbids a return to self, most powerful or interesting speculation

——readers are at once debtors & creditors, like the narrator, we are the beggar, the 3rd party excluded from the secret of the dual scene

AF p. 91 Freud’s outbidding, 3+1 prosthesis

HASD p. 57 for Heidegger, gathering of Geviert takes place in an indivisible topos, simplicity of point [of sword]: “the place (Ort) gathers toward itself at the greatest height and extremity”

EM p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (lespace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being), “an alternative always suspended over its ‘own proper’ abysm”: it is the text of dissemination

S p. 2 a modality of “avoiding” like using quotation marks or a non-negative crossed-shape crossing out (kreuzweise Durchstreichung); p. 52 the crossing out here symbolizes the fourfold

pp. 7-13 Derrida follows 4 threads in Of Spirit: 1) question of question 2) technological contamination 3) animality/humanism 4) epochality as narrative thread

T pp. xxvii-xxviii the 4 bands of the tympanum, what can’t be read in its “luminous triangle” or oculus

FWT p. 112 “I” am working around a dehiscence, division (more than 1, 2, 3, beyond all arithmetic, calculability)

DS p. 234 Mallarmé’s book is a block composed of sheets of paper—its “cubic perfection” is open, impossibility of closure, dehiscence as “internal” theater, practice of spacing put in play

p. 265 writing en abyme, abyss will never have glint (léclat) of phenomenon > becomes white or black, lun et/ou lautre au carré de lécriture

p. 281 glassed-in library, open tombs [Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Z…]

P p. 55 parergon is philosophical quasi-concept if it can be transported (intact, deformed) to other fields: in Kant’s Religion w/in… “General Remark” is a parergon of parergon: text is framed (cadrée), squared up (quadrillée) [also surveillance], by 4 topics (effects of grace, of miracles, of mysteries, of means of grace), they are parerga of religion, not integral but touching the integral

pp. 68-71 the 4 moments of analytic of beautiful, its frame > 3 + 1, where 3 faculties are united by 4th

pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

pp. 77-8 not all frames are square

POS p. 40 gathering Derrida’s work into a “sheaf,” historic/systematic crossroads, is structural impossibility of limiting network of differance, not a master-word, always finds itself in others

p. 42 interval as écart, carré, carrure, carte, charte, quatre

***p. 70 X as chiasm [btwn philosophy & literature?]: a fork (crossroads, quadrifurcum, grid, trellis, key) > more unequal at one point than other: figure of double gesture, intersection

OS p. 45 can’t extract thematic of Verfallen (re: time in Hegel & Heidegger) from ethicotheological orb, unless léchéance de lorbe redirected, in the void, toward un point de chute plus écarté (see DS)

ROP p. 27 a third path that breaks symbolic, dialectical pact (authority of the 3), that would not be a third path: the square as that which most radically resists, un dernier carré

p. 34 Lacan uses trinitarian figures to give firm consistency to a resistance supérieurement organisée > letter always arrives; here proceeds division btwn 3 & 4, btwn resistance bound up in repression & disseminal remaining, no longer belonging to economy of repression

p. 37 going from 3rd to 4th, or from 2 to endless & bottomless divisibility [Mephistophelic word]

O p. 25 two/four & the “closure of metaphysics” no longer take, never could take, the form of circular line enclosing a field, finite culture of binary oppositions

***pp. 25-6 [nonsynonymous synonyms] add a supplementary 4th term, the more or the less, opening of square (not a cross, not closed square) > often associated w/ castration, this 4 of dissemination: an outside of castration (fall w/ no return, no restricted economy), a triangle open on its 4th side, splayed square (carré écarté) loosens up circle/triangle, de-limits them, re-cites them

p. 39n [squares in Maldoror]

p. 41 [quoting Sollers] in theater of Numbers, Platonic moment inhabits (w/out occupying it entirely) the 4th surface [?]

WAP p. 3 the 3 meanings of du droit à la philosophie, the 4th: can we go right to philosophy, do we need training; adverbial “right” enriches & overdetermines other meanings [?]

SW p. 341 tallith: 4 corners of living skin

TB pp. 121-22 Benjamin uses metaphor of amphora, ammetaphor, to describe contact btwn languages; metamphora adjoins along broken line (not infinite/straight line): Derrida compares to Heidegger, Rilke, Hölderlin’s urn (re: word/thing) > amphora is one w/ itself while its openness forbids its totality, always giving/receiving [open square]

DPi p. 63 [guillotine as square w/out opening] [Name of Father—stitch, blade]

REST p. 279 the 4th party always remains in exclusion [Van Gogh?]

p. 371 square: Heidegger, Goldstein, Shapiro, Van Gogh

DST DST p. 226 Lacoue-Labarthe demonstrates how Oedipal triangle is open to mythic quartet or Lacan’s “quaternary system” > mediation of 4th element, imaginary death, as constitutive [?] [fixerup]

PJP pp. 177-79 the 3 meanings of Le Parjure, each haunts each other, raises the # of titles (3+n): 1) the novel itself [“Counterfeit Money”], narrator betrays truth confided in him 2) betrayal, unfulfilled promise of hero of novel 3) the legal perjury, le parjure committed by le parjure

D pp. 289, 358-59 liminary question, Medusa, stone, flange, pierre dangle et dattente (cornerstone, toothing stone) > other enumeration, squarely written, remains in reserve, undecipherable

p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, only 1/ 4 surfaces donnant lieu to moment of visibility, de la présence en vis-à-vis (face-to-face), counting out the phenomenon > surface is mounted (montée)

p. 295 Derrida’s text on Soller’s: re-mark passage, repeat square by closing angle, opening another surface of writing to-come: play w/ cardo, hinge, cardinal points; remarque dangle: all lines broken

p. 297 structural transcendental illusion, one surface of Soller’s square opens to “classical representative scene” > this is a necessity, no nonplace left out, so no pure origin can stand guard over stage as if derived from intactness of absolute opening: any attempt to return to lintimité indemne et propre played out in illusion > nothing takes place but place

pp. 297-98 “square mouth” —square horizontality of page, cadre, frame—squared opening

p. 307 opening of presence, “dead surface,” 4th surface, plunged by its “history” into limitless time that is neither “present” nor a “history”

p. 312 Soller’s open square: open side, air, mirror, veil

p. 323 figure of quadrangle complicated by strange mirror [imparfait de double fond], mirror as echo that precedes origin it seems to answer > “echo” is an “incision” (X nétant constitués quen retour)

p. 324 re: Soller’s Numbers, Plato’s cave contained in an incommensurably, imprévisiblement, more complicated machine

p. 336 opening paradoxically wrought as a thing that closes (squares of cubes)

p. 349 empty square leaves way open for intersection of meanings, proliferates

p. 351 “horizon”-value (pure infinite opening for presentation of present and experience of meaning) is, suddenly, framed (encadrée)—it is a part, and suddenly parts (fait partie, la voici partie)

——transformations of meaning hinge on certain squaring of text, obligatory passage through open surface, detour through empty square, around the column of fire

——semantic order entangled in seminal, that which was never itself, never comes back to itself; semantic, as a moment of desire, signifies reappropriation of seed w/in presence > the seminal’s dream of death: seed wanting to keep itself

p. 352 present indicative of “to be” is the tense of the great parenthesis and of the 4th surface > which means its predominance is properly quartered (écartelée)

——splayed square, triangle open on 4th side, loosens obsidionality of triangle and circle, whose ternary rhythm (Trinity, Oedipus, Dialectics) governs metaphysics

pp. 353-55 Heidegger’s Geviert, “est” tried to say what is beyond narcissism, se prend (captured) in the mirror: Being confines itself to its rature (crossing-out) comme quadrature (criss-crossing)

p. 355 Heidegger: “radiantly, the ring joins the 4, everywhere open to the riddle of their presence”

p. 357 in scratching (gratter) on this textual matter, your recognize description of a painting, reframed, broken into, placed in another quadrilateral, w/ one side fractured: you are painting, writing while reading: tout le tissu verbal y est pris, et vous avec

***p. 358 au bord (du vertige), alert to the border itself, infinite depths were also bottomless, perfectly superficial, cube w/out depth

pp. 362-63 Numbers undecipherable because numerable and innumerable: 1) something in the # surpasses mere # or cipher 2) everything in them is not ciphered (they’re innumerable), something that’s not anything > circle of the squaring

p. 364 each angle of square belongs to totality of surface, but multiplies it by folding back on itself, fractures it [the surface]—leaving room for supplementary attending (dassistance) surface

——same w/ supernumerary (surnombre) (column of words): is part of the numeral and belongs (appartient) to very milieu it exceeds

p. 366 limits of square/cube—indefinitely specular unfolding/refolding: not limits at all > opening of its own inscription—tout autre, la même, another geometry to come [EROS]

PPT p. 10 [re: REST (4th essay in The Truth in Painting)] the 4th time, jentrelace tous ces fils à travers un polylogue à n+1 voix, qui se trouve être de femme [cf. PAS, SW for feminine voice]

+R p. 157 Adami’s Glas: double column, double bind (bound by fastener called a spiral)—codicarium? quaternarium?; Glas takes its call from scarcely articulable gl

C p. 208 Pythagorean tetractys: 1+ 2 + 3 + 4 = 10 [Derrida refers to his “talking about it too much” in Dissemination, apparently I didn’t listen, take note]

ATAP pp. 91-2 in “Envois” of PC, the 2 can’t go beyond 4 [?] [4 horsemen]

CIR p. 110 the 4 PaRDeS “in my blood”: 1) literality denuded 2) crypt, secret, word 3) morality, pulpit eloquence 4) profound, cabbalistic [p. 232 there are at least 4 rabbis] [p. 274 the 4 breaths relaying each other]

FV p. 413tn Derrida’s 3 or 4 statements playing on the French se trouve, at beginning of FV, inaugurates theme of move from 3 to 4

p. 414 what happens when a text that psychoanalysis deciphers inscribes w/in itself a scene of deciphering? when it says more about itself than the deciphering? [Freud often acknowledges this debt]

——débordement (not mastery of author), energetic squaring-off (carrure énergique)

p. 428 Lacan analyzes displacement of signifier as signified, as recounted object of a short story

——when Lacan sees “triads,” he misses a scene, there’s always supplement of square > square’s opening complicates the calculations

pp. 429-30 Lacan neutralizes 4th character, the general narrator, thus neutralizes narrating operation

p. 436 Lacan’s exclusion of 4th, exclusion of scene of writing, of 3rd + or – 1: a demand for truth > must take account of remainder in operation of writing, not just narrated content (signifier, the written, letter)

——“ce qui se laisse toujours presque (feint) de soi-même (se) mettre de côté, a lécart, comme le quart” [that which (feigns) to put itself aside, apart, as the 4th]

pp. 442-43 letter found “in” the text which escapes, from 4th side, eyes of Dupin/analyst [letter not found in sealed interior of Poe’s tale, not assignable lack, definable hole]

——the text The Purloined Letter: the open, the very open, letter that is fiction

p. 443 at moment Dupin/Lacan finds letter [by drawing triangles/circles], moment it returns to its proper course, acc. desire of Queen, they no longer see the map itself: la carte that the “text” is, deviation of the four (lécart du quatre) w/ no promise of topos or truth

pp. 444-45 via Bonaparte, internal necessity of reading other texts by Poe > when Bonaparte names crossroads (carrefour), quadrifurcum named absentmindedly, omitted like a frame

pp. 490-92 the fancy (fantastique) of an identification btwn 2 doubled doubles, the narrator inside what he narrates, makes [Lacan’s] triangular logic very limited play w/in the play

——[re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

——double, Unheimlichkeit, doesn’t belong to triad, triangle carried into a labyrinth of doubles, w/out original, fac-similes

p. 494 [4s] four kings, ministers, prefects of police, queens, etc.

QUASI

BL pp. 198-99 quasi-event of the murder of father, event w/out event, resembles fiction, myth, fable > real, effective guilt; question of belief & historical referent—irremediably fissured

——dead father more powerful than living one

SPOM p. 180 if every specter is distinguished from spirit by a quasi-incarnation, an incorporation, then Christ is most spectral of specters

p. 212 figure of absolute hospitality: strange, familiar, inhospitable > quasi-transcendental “messianism,” materialism w/out substance, materialism of the khōra for a despairing “messianism,” a curious taste of death, a foretaste (avant-goût), curious of what it conjures

HASD pp. 46-7 via Eckhart, like adverb quasi (quasi stella matutina), we are beside the verb that is the truth; Eckhart: “may the Father, the Verbum…help us remain adverbs of this Verbum”

——quasi > “as (als)”

p. 60 Heidegger w/ and w/out word “être” wrote a theology w/ and w/out God, left a trace no longer his own, mais qui reste quasiment la sienne > 3 adverbs: pas, sans, quasiment

A p. 15 undecidable quasi-concepts, so many aporetic places or dislocations: double bind, double band

PAS PAS pp. (95-6) the event adrift (en dérive) abducts (enlève) its simple past from an indefinite background of habitus or repetition, fond sans fond [quasi-now or récit]

OH p. 40 new topology re: capital, no longer linked to polis, “quasi-political”

F p. xxviii quasi-naturality of artificial mechanism

pp. xl-xli wolf, Wolkenkratzer (skyscraper), Grateloup (scrapewolf), sounds gr, kr, skr: quasi-synonyms, quasi-homonyms w/out privileging either signifier or signified (linguistic “motivations”?)

DS p. 215n “event” (historical event, if you wish) has form of a repetition, the mark (readable because doubled) of a quasi-tearing (quasi-déchirure), a dehiscence [etymology of dehiscence follows]

p. 222(n) “btwn” re-marks its semantic void, becomes quasi-categorem, marks opening btwn syntax/semantics > its meaning: possibility of syntax, spacing [Spinoza, “btwns” in Hebrew]

P p. 55 parergon is philosophical quasi-concept if it can be transported (intact, deformed) to other fields

p. 94 beautiful this—beautiful for itself; envy, jealousy at work in our affect: because of quasi-narcissistic independence of beautiful

ROP pp. 29-30 deconstruction announces status w/out status of nonfinite # of names/quasi-concepts: the thinking of writing called for this, but it’s better thematized and formalized in theory of double bind, stricture of double band, and especially non-ontological remaining

pp. 31-2 iterability as condition/constitution of identity, ideality, of all concepts, but also (double bind) that which resists hierarchical and binary oppositions, a quasi-concept, inconceivable concept > not confusion, approximation, but “reaffirmed exigency of analysis”

p. 79 quasi-transcendental (formal) law of seriality (when condition is part of the series) creates aporias not to be avoided—the very chance to think [hors-série]

ATIA p. 14 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas, Descartes, all men, all belong to quasi-epochal category: never been seen (naked) by an animal, never imagine animal could address them > Derrida believes they all have, must decipher symptom of this disavowal

p. 39 Heidegger’s animal-machine, crossing-out, a figure of evil, resembles the virus that obsesses “everything I write,” quasi-animal, knows how to erase traces

WAP p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

SW p. 314 waiting for a quasi-resurrection, in view of a first/last time, that has nothing to do w/ unveiling (w/ truth)

DPi p. 33 [in Genet] Christlike ascension/elevation after the gallows, quasi-ressurection

***pp. 153-54 unheimlich concept of belief: the believer (Glaübiger) who affects to believe is divided in belief, fiction of this simulacrum belongs to belief: skepsis, ēpokhē as believing itself > all economy traffics in act of faith: believing w/out believing, belief haunted by non-belief > quasi-hypnotic, quasi-hallucinatory, spectral, unconscious

——believing (like cruelty) has no contrary, thus is its own contrary

RM pp. 64-6 quasi-metaphor of Being, since it is nothing, since its as obliterates its as such

——metaphysics as tropics, corresponds to an essential withdrawal of Being > Being, the metaphor of metaphor (quasi-metaphor), overload of a supplementary trait, fold: re-trait

p. 67 word re-trait designates quasi-catachrestic violence, abuse I impose on language, hopefully justified by necessity of good, economic formalization

***TR p. 134 re: oeuvre as trace of its ambiguity, as if quasi-machine were already operating even before being produced in the world, in the vivid experience of living present

p. 135 what is terrifying: what cuts me off from my own initiative [?] > automaticity discuplates & threatens “me”—quasi-excuses, ghosts of excuses, quasi-faults, spectral silhouettes of pardons: “as if” of this quasi, limitless risk of becoming simulacrum, virtuality

C p. 237 play of supplement can go on ad infinitum, or almost [?]

LI p. 54 blinking, quasi-concept of “remainder” (repetition as differance)

p. 119 repeatability of both (identificatory) iterability & (altering) iterability > necessity of thinking rule & event, concept & singularity, at once

——iterability thus a concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, & hence the concept, hence all distinction > marks the limit of idealization/conceptualization: “concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to nonconcept

pp. 127-28 margin, parasite, iterability belong w/out belonging to the class of concepts of which they must render an accounting—to theoretical space they organize in a “quasi”-transcendental manner: something happens by or to set theory > all this must be rendered (rendre compte et raison) by us enlightened modern thinkers, right?

TN p. 25 Nancy: “the incommensurable extension of thinking is the opening of the mouth” > mouth as union of soul/body; Nancy accords decisive authority to “quasi” in Descartes’ “quasi permixtio

p. 26 mouth, eyes: bordered openings, ces lieux quasiment sans lieu

the “common” incommensurability of thought, which allows “psyche is extended,” is the “quasi permixtio” of body and soul

——the quasi, the “as if”

pp. 97-8 Nancy’s heart transplant, lintrus, is not the quasi-transcendental strangeness that refers to all our “I’s,” and yet… [the 2 strangenesses keep making signs toward one another]

p. 152 hierarchy/teleology [au sommet]: willing subject, quasi-sense that is touch (ultrasense), the hand [the whole hand, not just tip of an extremely pointy fingernail (ongle extrêmement aigu)]

pp. 275-76 touch is quasi-transcendental-ontologization, quasi because touchable of touch gives itself over as untouchable (se donne comme intouchable)—figuring, fictionalizing itself

p. 287 via Nancy, there is no “the” technical is an exemplary example, plus quun exemple, gives privileged access to all “there is no ‘the’…”’s > le vertige quasi transcendantal

——it’s because there’s some technical (which there is not) that one can infinitely repeat examples that deconstruct very properness/unity itself of all essences, “beings”

NOY p. 234 quasi-transcendental or ontological structure of yes prescribes double destiny, a destiny of duplicity?

pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

AD p. 34 state, politics, ontology all betray/exceed ethics in opening it [?]: quasi-transcendental, originary, pre-originary perjury > possibility of radical perversion, haunting of its possibility, also condition of Good, Justice, Love, Faith, perfectibility

BSi p. 151 transcategorial—“qui transcendit omne genus”: does not belong to series or table > is bêtise a transcategorial category, a quasi-transcendental?

p. 170 Avital calls stupidity a quasi-concept: so unstable, subject to variability, plasticity—not secure

p. 171 Derrida stresses “quasi” because it relates to a feint or an “as if”

SPEC p. 393 PP as quasi-proper, figure of mastery, exappropriation structures PP, proper produced as autothanatography

p. 401 quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

QUESTION

GT p. 22 can one ask these questions (i.e. what is a gift?) w/out anticipating a thought?

R p. 7 turn and return (vicious circle) of each time: the torture of being put in question or to the question

——turning of the question, double question, question of question, like being locked in a circular machine that does not work or turn just right [Olivia]

FK p. 59 khōra is nothing but not nothing in which anxiety of Dasein would still be open to question of Being > immemoriality of a desert

MONL p. 95 for Heidegger, Zusage primary to question, the most irreducible in thought

H p. 5 unbearable question, parricide question, threatens dogmatism of paternal logos

pp. 27-9 question posed to the foreigner: “what is your name?”

——what about unquestioning hospitality? more just, more loving to question or not to question? question of hospitality as question of question

p. anne 140 hyperbole always comes first of all as a question

OOG pp. 150-52(n) to pass from question “how” to question “why” (“why is there any historical factuality?”) we must exhaust question of historicity’s sense and historicity as sense > the “why,” the ontological question, owes its seriousness to a phenomenological certainty, arises only out of a teleological affirmation, i.e. out of freedom

SPOM pp. xviii-xix questions of the future, “whither?” “where tomorrow?” arrives, proceeds from (provient de) the future, it “exceeds any presence as presence to itself”

p. 36 deconstruction not taste for void or destruction when aimed at philosophical responses that totalize, deny possibility of the question > but following ethical/political imperative, appeal of thought, injunction itself

POOF p. 38 perhaps will never be abolished [?] > perhaps makes possible all determining orders that depend on questioning (research, knowledge, science, philosophy, logic, law, politics, language) > perhaps ‘before’ Zusage (acquiescence) that engages, comes ‘before,’ the question

p. 87 Schmitt’s use of Latin & Greek (hostis/inimicus, polémios/ekhthrós), as a search for the ‘right name’ (question always that of the ‘right name,’ as Nietzsche would say)

pp. 149-50 via Schmitt, if enemy must be my brother & [Däubler's] Der Feind ist unser eigne Frage als Gestalt, the brother enemy is the questioning form of the question, which resembles the friend > a complaint, a crime, aggression, traumatism, war: when called into question by the question

p. 150 easy to show that the history of the question is one of polemical violence, of arms techniques (doesn’t mean we need to disarm it)

——friendship of the perhaps: perhaps ‘prior’ to the question, prior even to affirmation that opens it up, before question takes form (friend–enemy as figure of brother), an exclamation mark before a question mark

pp. 161-62 who can be my enemy? who is the non-I? who questions me? who can I recognize as my enemy? I am not theologian, I’m a jurist [who more than Schmitt could smile at this distinction], the jurist must recognize the enemy [?], redialecticzes the conditions of the question [via Hegelian exercise]: “the brother reveals himself as my enemy,” “fraternal kiss (den Bruderkuss)”

pp. 162-63 question itself is an act of war, like recognition in Hegel, a calling into question, on se la pose depuis leffraction ou linfraction de lautre > another step in the night: an enemy can only call into question he who calls himself into question > if I am my own enemy, doesn’t this call into question everything Schmitt has said?

p. 244 is Heidegger’s Zusage (prior to the question) that agency of phileîn which is not yet the eroticized tension of philosophy?

——Derrida proposes to think a perhaps ‘prior’ to Zusage, arche-originary pledge preceding all questioning, a friendship that could never thrive in gathering (Versammlung), that which accords phília to phúsis to lógos

pp. 305-06 the question “what is meant when one says ‘brother’?”, and the infinite price of friendship, supposes an affirmation, a pledge of a testimony irreducible to proof or certitude > this pledge retranslated into hypothesis/question: is it possible to think/implement democracy, keeping old name ‘democracy,’ & faithful memory of democratic reason (& reason tout court), while uprooting it from all these figures that prescribe fraternal friendship

POO p. 11 when Derrida says one should not approach experience of responsibility in a thetic way, to argue that this “do not do it” has a shortcoming, that it should appear before moral tribunal, misses its demonstrative rigor > strict rigor sheltered from all questioning [cf. GLAS pp. 50-1]

p. 16 “What is?” what is responsibility, ethicity of ethics, morality of morality? urgent, unanswerable questions

HERP p. 181 a philein not yet philia, which philosophy (too young, too late) has no authority to question, because [philosophy] is born like an event coming over philein

caught in ring of circle once questioning philosophy, engaged by Greek tongue > acc. Heidegger, obscurely, authoritatively, Greek tongue alone is logos

p. 193 Being and Time (book of the friend?): before & after the philosophical Eros of the question: the question of the question [see p. 201] (most & least erotic book)

p. 201 moment of question as struggle, moment of Eros when philosophy becomes a question tensed/plunged into mourning, jealous/inquisitive about being?

HASD p. 16 the posing of every question is perhaps secondary, follows as the first, reactive response, the undeniable provocation, linévitable dénégation de lindéniable provocation

MPM p. 37 uncontrollable necessity, nonsubjectivizable law of thought beyond interiorization, beyond un-mourning thought mourning > can we accept it? affirm it? can no longer become a question

A p. 56 in Being and Time, Heidegger leaves questions re: undecidable (i.e. death) unanswered in order to decide on the undecidable [decides on use of phenomenological method]

EM p. 125 (149) Heidegger’s formal structure of question: Gefragte (what is asked about); Erfragte (what will be found out); Befragte (that which is interrogated) (see S p. 17)

——for Heidegger, exemplary interrogated (Befragte) being [man] constitutes privileged text for a reading of meaning of Being

p. 126 (150) nous, qui sommes, proches de nous-même, nous nous interrogeons sur le sens de lêtre

VM p. 79 community of questions: unrelentingly ask questions, despite diaspora of institutes, despite publications & techniques that follow, accumulating themselves like capital or poverty

p. 80 community of question, community of initiative, decision, has an unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, because the impossible already happened [totality of beings, history of facts, etc.]

——pure memory of question liberates an incomparable instruction: the discipline of the question, does not belong to the ethical domain, but authorizes every law, question is before maieutics, irony, epochē, doubt

——every answer to the question, every law, dissimulates the question, (confirme et enferme) > the question is always enclosed, purity of question only found through difference of a hermeneutical effort

p. 81 difference btwn philosophy as power/adventure of question itself & philosophy as determined event/turning point (tournant) w/in this adventure [difference btwn Nietzsche & Heidegger?]

p. 82 can the other of the Greek be named non-Greek? pensée pour laquelle le tout du logos grec est déjà survenu (erupted), humus apaisé non pas sur un sol, mais autour dun volcan plus anicen

p. 132 for Husserl (transcendental phenomenology), “subjective a priori” only way to check totalitarianism of the neutral, impersonal “absolute Logic”: eschatology w/out dialogue [re: why finitude?] [revelation through faulty teletype]

p. 133 origin of question why finitude? why why? transcendental archi-factuality as violence? > naked, silent opening of question escapes phenomenology, permits appearance of history as such: it is the call (to) (of) an eschatology that dissimulates its own opening

——opening of question, inversion of transcendental dissymmetry, put to philosophy as logos, finitude, history, violence: interpellation of Greek by non-Greek, strange community of silent question > la phénoménologie et leschatologie peuvent interminablement entamer le dialogue, s’entamer en lui, sappeler lune lautre au silence

question can be stated only by being forgotten in language of Greeks

p. 134 if Being has always been determined by philosophy as presence, the question of Being posed on basis of transcendental horizon of time > first tremor (ébranlement) of philosophical security, of self-confident presence

p. 150 question about Being not only introduces question about existent-God, it supposes God as possibility of its question, answer w/in its question > God implied in every question about God, precedes every “method” > content of thought of God is that of a being about which no question could be asked (except by being asked by it)

OH p. 25 Heidegger on Ort as point of spear, and when he says questioning is piety of thinking, he recalls that fromm, Frömmigkeit, comes from promos, what leads, lavant-garde

S p. 117n Heidegger: “Denn das Fragen ist die Frömmigkeit des Denkens (for questioning is the piety of thought)”

p. 9 is the guarding, the call, of the question still the question? the question remains protected from that which is not a question, the un-thought, non-negative, un-gedacht

p. 10 is Geist the name Heidegger gives to the unquestioned possibility of the question?

p. 18 how else but by confirming it a priori and circularly can Heidegger question Daseins privilege (Vorrang) re: the question?

p. 43 spiritual duction as possibility of question, Vor-fragen, freedom of spirit comes before, in front, anticipates

——Vor-fragen of Führung, spirit, freedom of spirit, an Ursprung, leap, allows question to not solely reflect back on itself: why? why? why? > spirit = already questioning conduction

pp. 43-4 what seems in service of determinate politics [nazism] in Rectorship Address, w/ spirit awakening from Vor-fragen of Führung, could be a following of the will-to-know

pp. 129-30n before the question, the question mark, language is already there, we have already said yes to it, given a pledge, acquiesced (Zusage,which also means promise, is for Heidegger a commitment of language toward language)

p. 131n Heidegger’s Kehre? from question to Zusage?: remove remnant of Aufklärung which still slumbered in privilege of the question? [Derrida is not having it]

p. 135n re: “Das Wesen der Sprache: Die Sprache des Wesens”—colon erases copula, allows question to be exceeded by pledge (consent to the address, en-gage), “is” would relaunch the question

VP p. 88 differance thought prior to or from presence tells us to interrogate presence w/in closure of knowledge > it must also be thought otherwise: dans louverture dune question inouïe nouvrant ni sur un savoir ni sur un non-savoir comme savoir à venir, approaching that on basis of which sa clôture announces/decides itself: openness of this question doesn’t belong to system of vouloir-dire

PPHS p. 81 “why this relation between sign and truth?” a question which brings us to external border of the closure of metaphysics [from “what does?” to “why?”]

——“why” no longer marks question of “en-vue-de-quoi,” re: telos/eskhaton of signification, nor is it a question of origin

——“why?” still metaphysical name of question asking about the metaphysical system which links sign to [concept-truth-presence-archeology-teleology]

FWT pp. 62-3 question of animality, limit upon which all great questions are asked

P (P) p. xiv if the question corresponds to a demand from the other, elle se laisse déjà précéder par une étrange affirmation > pour veiller sur elle [to guard this affirmation], peut-être faut-il dabord se rendre à la veille de la question

OS pp. 49-50 if Aristotle conceived time in a way not dominated by presence, did Heidegger arrest this possibility in Sein und Zeit, did Kant just make explicit the evaded question [section title] in Physics IV? such making explicit keeps to (se tient) the system de l’éludé

pp. 63-4(n) in analytic of Dasein, relation of fall to proper, authenticity, enigmatic proximity (identity w/ itself of the questioning), concept of finitude

ATIA p. 10 Derrida’s shame before the cat, wanting to dress himself, chaser (himself out of the room), hunting/following the animal, hunting/following himself in the face-to-face w/ the animal > madness: no longer knowing (how) to respond to question: “who am I (following)?”

p. 84 question of response, question of question, where response to question would remain unprogrammable > abyss of “what is a response?”

p. 113 Derrida points out that a certain profound humanism [that of the Old Testament?] privileged the question of the animal as that of the infinitely other

——this silent appeal that calls from the outside, whose trace can only be disavowed w/ so many wounds, symptoms

p. 166n if Zusage (language “before,” w/out question) is before the possibility of response, then wouldn’t Zusage be something the animal is not deprived of?

GSP pp. 167-68 to ask about meaning of structure or genesis, is to ask what precedes phenomenological reduction, to ask about possibility of question itself— ask about its [phenomenology’s] own death

DIF DIF p. 21 it’s domination of beings (Being as presence or beingness) that differance solicits, questions, makes tremble in entirety: question emerges where ontological difference is broached (souvre)

SW p. 340 prayer: before question, before “this is,” before dialogue, reply, knowledge, “neither true nor false”—even a Greek knew that [Aristotle]

***DPi p. 167 questioning as cruelty, initiates torture, threatens to causes subject to lose his/her head

pp. 236-37 we've asked “what is an exception?” “what is cruelty?” “blood?” “man?” “proper to man?” “to humanitarian?” > neither rhetorical nor answerable, these questions showed “the vertigo or the abyss of their own impossibility” > nor did they simply recreate dizziness of hermeneutic circle (which they also did) which accumulates meaning, supposes pre-comprehension [link to imagining the phone call, imminence of verdict]

——these questions turn on themselves, pretend to know what they’re taking about moment they seem to be asking about it

WAP p. 89 pose questions, pose or posit that which does not pose or posit itself, not-thetic? this alleged neutrality constructs teaching body > no question not constrained by a program

EJQB p. 67 God lets silence interrupt his voice and his signs, lets Tables be broken: letting us [Derrida identifying w/ Jews?] be interrogated

p. 68 that which was impossible for classical rationalists: to proceed w/in duplicity of God’s questionability > God is not truthful: accede to virtue of lie

p. 76 question w/in unity of book welcomes all contradictions, affirmations, questions > a logic like no other

——does not this anxiety [in the book], this war, rest on silence of nonquestion?

——is not the writing of the question, the first violence re: the question, a first response and repose, lerrance (wandering) as history, first crisis, first forgetting, the dissimulation of lerrance?

——nonquestion, act of faith, unpenetrated certainty that Being is a Grammar, world is in all its parts a cryptogram [this nonquestion not yet a dogma]

p. 78 books are always books of life, or of afterlife > written questions addressed to literature are forgotten, drained, by literature (mortifications, ruses of life, life negating itself in literature to survive): writing would die of pure vigilance to question (and also simple erasure of question)

——absolute interrogation (of God) will never belong to the book

——literature, perhaps: dreamlike displacement of the question

PSSS p. 260 the who and the what of what arrives, the arrivant, the event, makes outdated in advance the question about it that always comes too late

LI p. 86 fundamental deconstructive questions necessitated by graphematics of iterability

TN pp. 1-2 a question about the day came of me, to me, w/out invitation, before the day, “she” watches over day, pre-phenomenological, trans-phenomenological: “quand nos yeux se touchent, fait-il jour ou fait-il nuit?”

——Derrida determined to show limitless patience ready for infinite, time of experience itself

NOY p. 233 yes resounds (résonne) in question, always prior to, before, beyond any possible question

EW p. 274 vigil or beyond of question is anything but precritical

AD p. 13 Levinas’ “question-prayer” anterior to all dialogue

p. 31 ineluctability (this is necessary) of the 3rd is law of question > question of a question, addressed to the other, from the other: the other of the other > a question that is certainly not first (comes after the yes of/to the other), though nothing precedes it

——philosophy, whose status is governed and whose signature is legitimated by the question

——the “without question” at the birth of “first question” (the question is the 3rd): passage (w/out transition) from ethical responsibility to political, juridical, philosophical responsibility (the move out of immediacy)

p. 106 questions of eschatological hospitality not posed (posent) in repose of place, they put one to the test (mettent à lépreuve) of an interrogation that endures sans repos

BSi p. 264 for Heidegger, in the questioning essence of man, man comes to himself as “who” not “what” (ipseity [Selbst] before any “I,” individual, we or community)

pp. 305-07 for Heidegger, Den Eigensinnigen ist Leben nur Leben, for the stubborn, for those with one thing in mind, life is only, merely, life > stubborn bêtise that doesn’t ask any questions

OG pp. 20-2 (34-6) the word “being” as Urwort (mot originaire) ensures “lêtre-mot” to all other words [Lacan’s name-of-the-father]

——does Heidegger transgress logocentrism of phonè by questioning being? or does the question precomprehend the word being? deconstructive breakthrough (percée) no longer circumscribed in ontic/ontological [?]

p. 31 (47) form of question can predestine the response [re: Saussure]

p. 292 no one, certainly not the father, is there when one questions [baby daddy]

ATAP pp. 81-2 if eschatological question always surprises us, response to it is impossible: [eschatology?] an appeal promising & responding before the question

UWC p. 204 right to deconstruction as unconditional right to ask questions—even re: the authority of the question, the interrogative form

EU p. 110 since founding responsibility occurs by acts/performance, interrogation of philosophy no longer simply belongs to philosophical setting, question inseparable from act of foundation > foundation of new university law is necessary: to say it’s necessary is to say one has to take [a new kind of] responsibility for it [Nietzsche] [what’s beyond philosophy in philosophy]

QUOTATION MARKS (citation)

GT p. 100 “we are no longer credulous enough to believe that we are setting out from things themselves by avoiding ‘texts’ simply by avoiding quotation or the appearance of ‘commentary’”

pp. 128-30 playing w/ fors, fortuna, ferre (fer, ferre; in Greek, pherô) which means to bear, & fero, “I report,” counterfeit money carries us to heart of question of reference & difference,

——dematerialization of money [late capitalism], can one quote money? fors, fortuna: Baudelaire reserves status of absolute exception for money (not the gift)

LOBL p. 86 how could we make a genre work w/out referring to it quotationally?

——quotation interrupts very belonging to which it is a necessary condition

p. 99 impossible to tell which border forms the other, each comprehends the other by not comprehending the other > which one quotes the other?

p. 104 [extensive description] yes of event, yes of iteration, quotes, cites, in accordance w/ strange ring outside of presence, sur-vives

HASD p. 44 [Derrida, speaking about Meister Eckhart’s apophatic strategies, the aporias of politics of doctrine, also speaks of his own] “the voice of an utterance can conceal another, which it then appears to quote without quoting it, presenting itself as another form, namely as a quotation of the other” [see p. 47]

p. 62 did Dionysus distort or accomplish essence of prayer by quoting it, writing it for Timothy?

p. 66n most “autobiographical” [attach as many quotation marks around this word as possible] to leave out Jew & Arab, which Derrida has never been able to speak about [see p. 58]

MPM pp. 51-2 fidelity requires that one quote, let other speak, and that one not restrict oneself to quoting > double law of Mnemosyne or common law of double source Mnemosyne/Lethe

A p. 1 disquieting phrases need to be sheltered behind paternity [re: “limits of truth” in quotes]

p. 22 quotation marks: name words or names

PP pp. 95-6 to put word “voluntarily” in quotation marks designates, content to remain within the closure of oppositions, “submission” to the necessities of a given “language”

OH p. 82 paleonyms: “identity,” “culture,” “Europe,” “capital” > take them very seriously, cautiously, lightly, only in quotation marks

S p. 23 putting “spirit” in quotation marks preserves and withdraws something of Latin-Cartesian meaning

p. 29 Heidegger’s doubling of “spirit” by use of quotation marks affects it w/ obsessive specter, he doesn’t shelter “spirit,” a hospitality w/ reservations, quotations call for another word unless they re-call the other under the same

p. 31 beautiful description of the guard-like theatrical nature of quotation marks, and when they are relieved from “Geist” has spirit itself or spirit’s ghost (spectre) come on stage?

p. 66 silent play of quotation marks [re: spirit], Anführungsstriche, Anführungszeichen, “the hand calculates very fast,” Anführen, to conduct, dupe, brainwash, silent contrivances, fort/da, what shows or hides changes everything, and when one puts away after exhibiting, this is mise au pas (bringing to heel)

pp. 66-7 Derrida stresses theater of Heidegger’s removal (w/out remarking) of quotation marks from “spirit”

p. 108 [re: Gespräch btwn Heidegger & Trakl] the circle via death, via decline, via West that returns to most originary not analogous to circles/revolutions in Marx and Hegel, so “circle, decline, West,” in Heidegger, are paleonyms, receive quotation marks to lead us elsewhere

POOF p. ix grief—grievance (complaint), “O my friends”—orphaned quotation [baby daddy]

p. 44 Nietzsche puts “truth” in quotation marks, certain type of democrat would never dare to

DS p. 197n [re: one of Mallarmé’s sentences] sentence in quotation marks is a simulacrum of a citation, an illustrious rule, a law of unknown origin

p. 234 [re: Mallarmé] to write the word insertion (to place w/in, to graft) is to quote the practice of spacing (same goes for writing antre ouvert)

——to write that such a movement [practice of spacing, antre ouvert, insertion] plays along a structure of supplementarity, surplus, vicariousness, is, literally, to quote

ROP p. 115 when Foucault puts “sexuality” in quotation marks, we’re thus dealing w/ history of the word

SP p. 57 divergence w/in truth elevated in quotation marks > the machination, cry, flight and pinch of a hooker (machination, cri, vol et pinces dune grue) [grue: hooker or crane]

ATIA p. 52 every response to “who am I?” is only something I can answer, auto-biography, but it’s also quotation, an aping, miming [idiom & inheritance]

O pp. 3-4 paleonymy (keep old word for determined time?): question goes beyond signifier’s simple exteriority to its concept, beyond a fore-knowledge of paleonymic strategy: escape or destroy word in question (i.e. “literature,” “philosophical discourse”) [?]

SW p. 336 quoting is not reading

TB p. 133 translation: task of pure limit, an infinite labor to rejoin (doesn’t exclude gradations, virtuality, interval & in-btwn) > can one quote a signature?

DPi p. 270 Derrida violently extracts a quote (w/out attributing it)—to theatricalize: so as to let you see and hear it [re: “to espouse at the cost of his or her life”]

Gi p. 17 “sexuality” mentioned not used when in quotations: quotation marks as a warning, an accusation

p. 25 put in quotes because it is as much about the name as what it names [“Geschlecht”]

DST DST p. 206 quotation marks: vigilant circumspection, insurance against all risks [in this case Lacoue-Labarthe continually exposes himself to these risks]

PIO p. 12 inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

PF p. xxiii quotations, suspend word [“United States”] in epokhē of epoch, a fabulous act of nomination, fabula (like provocation) recounts/deciphers a history, the phantasm of an accredited myth, myth by force of law, “enforced” myth

p. xxvi parentheses, italics, quotes: alibis [?]

TR p. 76 quotation marks as performativity, instituting new concept/contract w/ word

PJP p. 179 the suspension of metonymy, quotation, interruption, quasi anacoluthic change of subject > interruption in the obvious: shadow at heart of light

pp. 196, 300n when narrator claims to be quoting: makes the other say

D p. 346 before being milieu of work/production, as a breakthrough, air is “air”: a “quotation,” empty medium of text as generalized quotation

EL pp. 192-93 “logic,” “program,” “nihilism” in quotation marks—give these words a gripping resemblance to their opposite

+R p. 166 quotation [Adami] cut out of Glas: outbidding speculating to infinity

LI p. 53 “concept” of remainder not a sure thing (de tout repos), concept in quotes because remainder deconstructs the logic upon which the concept of the “concept” depends

TN p. 31 one must always, as a duty, imperative, reconstitute the ample, tight webbing (le tissu ample et serré) of a quotation—though it’s impossible

p. 220 [re: Nancy quote] violently excerpted: reread everything around it [few pages later: need to read on]

p. 304 quotation marks (guillemets): touching word as if w/ tweezers (pincettes), as if it were contaminated in advance > “touch”

ATM p. 153 re: Levinas, “astriction to giving” complicates quoted utterance “here I am,” what is said only once, what exceeds not the saying but the said in language

p. 154 [vis-à-vis Levinas] interdictory language is interdicted but continues speaking, can’t help itself, can only continue strangely interrupting itself > essential function of a quotation: quoting the uncitable accuses language, (sur)rendered to a gift language can’t open up on its own

p. 172 how to cite when Levinas places the whole language (French & Western) btwn quotation marks? at same time “he” is in quotation marks: the nameless signatory w/out authorial signature, “he” who undersigns every work, met en oeuvre tout ouvrage

——[Levinas’ work] a fabrication of quotation marks crocheting a text w/out edge (bordure): seriality irreducibly knots a text to a language

——infinite law of quotation marks suspends all reference, work enclosed in a borderless context it gives to itself (se donne à elle-même), while making absolute reference to command of tout autre

WOG p. 40 quotation marks around “Greeks,” “me,” “we others,” around every autos, something other than playful coquettishness or simulacrum of signature

ATAP p. 66 quoting title, a genre, genre making fun of a genre [re: Kant’s “Of an Overlordly Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy”]

p. 92 John Patmos’ double bind: “do not seal the words of the inspiration of this book” > must disobey in order to obey: problem of translation re: quotation marks (“I, Yéshoua”)

CIR p. 196 G.’s countersigning attestation, daring to kill the quotation marks, w/out quoting me, calling me back to a moment when I didn’t yet know what circumcision means [?]

pp. 197-98 intolerable foreclosure when I write: the already known, loved, that can’t be quoted; gather myself in circle of cum, circus of circum, before the constituting witness I’m always fleeing

pp. 287-88 pronounce an atrociously tragic sentence, make its quotation marks appear, abandoning it to anonymity, putting forward an analysis > for more drama, who more than the other is vulnerable to analysis?

FV pp. 494-95 signer dispossessed [re: The Purloined…], signature in quotations: ce reste est encore de la littérature

RACISM

GOD p. 98 [how does one read Matthew’s assertion that if you are evil, your body is full of darkness?]

S p. 74 is a metaphysics of race less serious than a naturalism or biologism of race? [re: Nietzsche’s “blonde beast”]

p. 121n Husserl shows signs of the worst w/ his racism against Eskimos, Papuans, Indians [spirit not an accidental ornament for Husserl’s thought]

FWT p. 28 general ethics of vigilance re: signals of phallocentrism, racism seems necessary, its caricature is in the minority, in those cases conservatives have a right to complain

p. 69 major feature of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism: assign inferior status so to exclude him/her from the human, place him/her in world of animality

pp. 122-23 can you prosecute someone who is only showing symptoms of racism? can one judge a symptom?

WM p. 213 white mythology [vis-à-vis Anatole France]: metaphysics, culture of West, erased w/in itself fabulous scene that produced it, this scene remains active—inscribed in white ink; white man takes his own mythology, his own logos, the mythos of his idiom, for universal Reason

DS pp. 257-58 each “full” white thing in Mallarmé (snow, swan, paper, virginity) is trope of “empty” white space, constellation of “blanks,” there everywhere, reproduced in spacings > la disséminaton des blancs (nous ne dirons pas de la blancheur)

POOF p. 91 in every racism, nationalism, there’s a discourse on birth & nature, on genealogy (a phantasm on the genealogical phúsis)

PIO p. 414n racism, in strict sense, is very recent invention in spite of its ancient roots

——racism is an invention of the other, one that excludes it, tightening circle of same

IW pp. 254-55 if, for Cohen, race is reducible to biologico-naturalist schema, racism not of issue re: Jew & the German, they relate through psyche, artificially, nonnaturally: alliance of religious & philosophical

RADICAL(ize)

SPOM pp. 231-32n deconstruction w/ & beyond Marxism > decons. doesn’t just radicalize, it questions the root & its presumed unity, the radical’s complicity w/ ontology [see WAP p. 153]

DST DST p. 196 perhaps désister marks nothing negative, perhaps dé- does not determine -ister (-ester, ist, est: exist, subsist, consist), but dislodges it radically (this aradical root -ister) [cf. LI p. 159n]

LI pp. 92-3 the non-simple “two-fold root” divides, guts, (philosophical) radicality: makes possible & limits at same time

OG pp. 101-02 (149-50) [riffing on racine, radical] question of genealogy exceeds discourse (living, conscious representation of text), exceeds possibilities at present given for its elaboration, takes on meaning only in finite configuration (history of metaphysics); text has radical root system [rhizome], always has several epochs in it, to which reading must resign itself

——to say text is nothing but system of roots contradicts concept of system, pattern of root

RARE

***TB p. 123 promise of reconciliation (even if unfulfillable) is a rare & notable event: kingdom is never reached, is untouchable > but the commitment takes place, bequeaths its record

PIO pp. 2-3 friendship w/ de Man, cloudless (sans ombre): rarest, most precious rays of light (traits de lumière)

BSi p. 106 Derrida one of the few who smiles at machine of presuppositions to be deconstructed in “law,” “freedom,” “institution,” “culture”

READING

GOD p. 131 reader of literature hypnotized, paralyzed before suspended perplexity, before secret path of secret, exposed and concealed, jealously guarded: who says what to whom? who asks forgiveness?

p. 140 fabled reader (deciphers) vs. infinite reader (reads in the secret the avowal of literature)

p. 156 singularity is sealed & betrayed by inheritance that confirms, reads, translates the covenant

——literature inherits from Abraham, betrays him

GT p. 94 reader is not deceived [like narrator], experiences a secret w/out depth, a secret w/out secret

p. 152 readability of text structured by unreadability of secret, narrator in situation analogous to reader; crypt gives to be read, eternally unreadable

MONL p. 62 political decision in writing & reading: inscribe undecidable (chance, terror) in ipseity of host, avoid temptation to make prior-to-the-first-language a language of the master (new master)

p. 73 still readable secrets of unreadability

FL p. 271[re: unreadable readability of law] new interpretative readings as revolutions, found something new & remain unreadable re: norms of reading > something of the general strike in every new reading [see SPOM pp. 218-219, POR p. 4]

——Derrida hesitates to call the readability of violence Lacan’s symbolic order

LOBL p. 116 decision [btwn 2 syntaxes of Larrêt de mort] becomes unreadable, but it does not arrest reading, it starts reading, writing and translation again [desire?]

p. 117 unreadability is absolute

REASON

GT p. 31 even if gift is a simulacrum, il faut (one must) rendre compte (render an account) of the possibility of this simulacrum, and render account of desire to render account > can’t be done w/out principle of reason (principium reddendae rationis)

——which law obligates one to answer for, to account for, a gift that calls one beyond all responsibility?

p. 35 the alogos, madness, of rendering account (logos) of the atopos (the gift), desire to think the impossible, to desire, to desire to give the impossible: madness as given & desired forgetting

p. 76 one must render account of law that dissolves the gift in an Aufklarung of relational logic, that privileges, like Lévi-Strauss, the logic of exchange

p. 77 the mapped-out signified of structuralism, a complementarity w/out supplement that conditions “exercise of symbolic thinking” > this is the rationality of the principle of reason

p. 148 perversity can always secretly corrupt the “donner raison à lautre”: ratio, logos, is on your side [re: “Counterfeit Money”], what counts, can be counted, you took maximum pleasure

——link btwn morality & calculation of pleasure equivocates good intentions, precipitates gift towards its end, is its very apocalypse [Hamacher], truth of gift > end of gift

pp. 155-56 several meanings of vous avez raison: 1) animal rationale (logon ekhon) 2) know how to count, account, principle of reason, we are men of knowledge, good narrators 3) our calculation has prevailed, we have controlled (arraisonné) (the other) by reasoning

R p. 85 Derrida refuses to give up on a certain “interest of reason”

FK pp. 65-66 reason & religion: 2 parts of tribunal of faith

p. 66 religion & reason develop in tandem, their common resource: testimonial pledge of every performative; same source divides itself, possibility of two, n +1

p. 80 the “lights” and Enlightenment of tele-technoscientific critique and reason suppose trustworthiness

p. 99 pure attestation indispensable to science, philosophy, religion; it can gather or scatter itself, trust in the pledge (gage) of the other unites 1) belief in other 2) sacralization of presence-absence 3) sanctification of law > divides in various ways

POO p. 141n for Kant, the idea of moral perfection, which reason formulates apriori and connects, inseparably, to free will > the “true original which lies in reason”

OOG p. 146n Husserl: philosophy’s innate Reason was previously in state of nocturnal obscurity

POR p. 7 (135-36) Leibniz’s 2 principles of reason: 1) principle of non-contradition 2) principle of rendering reason: for any true proposition, reason can be rendered (Omnis veritatis reddi ratio potest)

pp. 8 (136) in French, Leibniz’s reddere rationem is rendre raison de quelque chose, does that mean reason is owed? it gives rise to circulation? [from ratio of principium reddendae rationis to reason as faculty]

——“must be rendered”: principle of reason as duty, debt, law, command, imperative

——(137) one of Heidegger’s most insistent questions: how did the incubation of reason [starting w/ Aristotle’s “roots,” “principles,” “causes”] take until the 17th Century to become the principle of reason?

p. 9 (137-39) is the reason for reason rational? (Pierce says you can’t demand a reason for reason)

——who is more faithful to reason’s call? who has a “keener ear”? the one who questions it, or the one who doesn’t want to hear any questions about it

——for Heidegger, principle of reason accompanied by interpretation of essence of beings as objects, an object present as representation (Vorstellung)

p. 10 (139) principle of reason (Satz vom Grund) tells us to protect [dominant] relation of ob-ject before a subject that says “I”, and is assured of presence

——Heidegger’s caricature of principle of reason: hard, unblinking eyes (dominating, raping)

p. 12 (142) vis-à-vis Heidegger, one can longer distinguish btwn technology, science, theory and rationality, principle of reason cannot be separated from idea of technology [techno-science]

p. 14 (146) for Heidegger, principle of reason depends on delivery (Zustellung) of atomic energy > all Stellen (Vorstellen, Nachstellen…) characterize information tactics of modern technology

——information most economic, clearest, fastest, instructs men about safeguarding (Sicherstellung) their needs, ta khreai > computers, data banks, constructed on basis of this calculable language: all this, via Heidegger, assures man’s mastery over earth [Derrida can’t elaborate on this point]

——Derrida’s topic: reawaken responsibility, in university or in face of university, by heeding other demands of the principle of reason

pp. 14-5 (147) irrationalism, nihilism, posture completely symmetrical to, thus dependent on principle of reason [Leibniz denounced extravagance of irrationalism]

——this is observed when those who defend principle of reason act w/out reason, w/ obscurantism and nihilism to defend reason

p. 16 (148) reason only one species of thought

——new responsibility of community of thought w/out secured frontier btwn basic & end-oriented research (entre recherche fondamentale et recherche finalisée) > rethink community, institution, and all ruses, tâche infinie, de la raison finalisante > paths by which apparently disinterested research can by reinvested by all sorts of programs

EM EM p. 122 (146) for Hegel, Husserl: reason is history, and there is no history but of reason

p. 122n (145-46n) man’s specificity, as rational animal, announces itself to itself, as an infinite end

——in spite of Kant’s critique of anthropology, man is sole example of rational being

PP PP p. 97 (110) pharmakon as remedy, transparent rationality of science, excludes its magic character

VM VM p. 96 for Levinas, Western philosophy has been an ontology where Reason receives only what it gives itself

OH OH p. 75 for Husserl, the European philosopher committed to universal reason is functionary of mankind

PPHS PPHS p. 80 Hegel: reason makes truth out of imagination’s indifference

T T p. xii is there any ruse not belonging to reason which will prevent philosophy from borrowing its categories from logos of other, affecting itself w/out delay [see POOF p. 1]?

FWT FWT p. 53 must be a leap from knowledge to decision, doesn’t take place w/out other, “passive” decision, decision of other, this doesn’t exonerate me [Derrida can prove this rationally, in the name of reason to come] > still necessary to know as much as possible before deciding

pp. 89-90 Derrida is for abolition of DP, for reasons of principle [via Kant] / reasons of heart (stripped of sentimentality, allied w/ “reasons of principle”)

p. 151 given that DP revolves around equivalence of an eye for an eye, question of DP is not only about political onto-theology of sovereignty, but principle of reason as calculability

pp. 172-73 Derrida follows Freud’s breaches & openings, a reaffirmation of reason “w/out alibi,” goes against a certain historical concept of reason, can even provoke thought beyond “power,” “drive for power,” drive for sovereignty

POOF POOF pp. 175-76 w/out enemy, Nietzsche’s fool, Schmitt in his prison cell, one can no longer utter cogito ergo sum, there’s no evil genius, no absolute hostility > “I” loses reference, objectivity

——is reason the friend of the enemy? philosophy at stake in Nietzsche’s address [‘O my ene…’]

p. 184 if, however, Montaigne believes that [true] friendship must possess reason & virtue [see pp. 192-93n], it could never be apolitical, because reason & virtue could never be private

pp. 305-06 the question “what is meant when one says ‘brother’?”, and the infinite price of friendship, supposes an affirmation, a pledge of a testimony irreducible to proof or certitude > this pledge retranslated into hypothesis/question: is it possible to think/implement democracy, keeping old name ‘democracy,’ & faithful memory of democratic reason (& reason tout court), while uprooting it from all these figures that prescribe fraternal friendship

WM WM p. 213 white mythology [vis-à-vis Anatole France]: metaphysics, culture of West, erased w/in itself fabulous scene that produced it, this scene remains active—inscribed in white ink; white man takes his own mythology, his own logos, the mythos of his idiom, for universal Reason

pp. 248-9 acc. Aristotle, he who says nothing, who reasons about nothing, is a vegetable (a reed)

pp. 256-57 Fontanier on why we say light of reason and light of day

POS POS pp. 52-3 Derrida never identified writing w/ myth, what interested him was how philosophy excluded writing to keep myth exterior to scientific rationality > deconstruction attempts to break up opposition btwn logos and mythos

P P pp. 37-8 object of 3rd Critique? affect (Gefühl)? pleasure/unpleasure? desire? 1st Critique cuts itself off from interests of desire, excludes desire’s reason, reasons’s desire, desire for reason

p. 41 desire of reason, desire for the fundamental: desire to go to the bythos

pp. 55-6 reason’s impotence: couldn’t satisfy moral need to think religion through reason alone, had to rely on extra, parergon, supplementary work, Nebengeschäfte

p. 138 w/ sublime, everything that is compared to it is small > here, Kant throws a bridge, the bridge like the symbol throws itself [by way of reason?], btwn unpresentable and presentation > the whole world can be made small in relation to sublime magnitude

ROP ROP p. 5 [here] analytic concern merges w/ hermeneutic drive, w/ principle of reason (reddere rationem): render sense at all cost (à tout prix), il faut rendre: fidelity, debt, duty, to restitute sense of sense > even if hidden, verborgene Sinn

p. 35 Aufklärung, lépoque des Lumières: render reason by breaking things down to the simple

pp. 62-3 Derrida agrees w/ Lacan that there is one libido (as Freud first argued), it is the question of reason, principle of reason > d'un trait tiré de la raison ou d'une traite tirée [check drawn] sur la raison

p. 71 can there be a witness to madness, a third that provides reason w/out objectifying? w/out examining (arraisonner)? [Nietzsche’s no accusation, GS 276] témoigner, est-ce voir? est-ce rendre raison?

pp. 99-100 how to think Foucault’s contradictions? Freud on one side then the other of the maddening dividing line? isn’t being right (avoir raison) & wrong part of the history of madness?

——Evil Genius on side of madness, & on side of exclusion-reappropriation (confinement)

O O p. 49n Derrida not disputing la raison elle-même, the one (masculine) libido—“why not?” > to stand on head [call for feminine libido?] would put back/leave in place truth of phallocentric dialectic

DPi DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

—— w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

CHM CHM p. 33 madness can only be spoken about by that “other form of madness” that allows men “not to be mad,” i.e in relation to reason? [Foucault via Pascal]

p. 36 “no Trojan horse unconquerable by reason,” the best spokesman of the mad are those who betray them best

——unsurpassable, unique, imperial grandeur of order of reason (Hegelian law) leaves us only recourse to strategies and strategies

——archaeology against reason can’t be written: concept of “history” has always been a rational one > writing that exceeds, by questioning them, values of “origin,” “reason,” “history” couldn’t be contained w/in metaphysical closure of an archaeology

p. 38 acc. Foucault, reason shelters itself against madness—becomes a barrier to it > Foucault seeks the origin of this protectionism

p. 41 classical reason a doctrine of tradition, the tradition of logos (is there another tradition?)

p. 43 no praise (éloge), by essence, except of reason

pp. 54, 309n work, reason, discourse starts w/ appeal to “as such,” to meaning of Being [before determination of existence/essence] (thus, madness: silence, nonmeaning, absent in work)

RGE RGE p. 252 slumber of reason, ruse of reason, slumber in the form of reason, vigilance of Hegelian logos (engenders monsters then puts them to sleep) > la raison veille sur un sommeil profond auquel elle est intéressée

——the other dawn (awake from slumber of reason—which anticipated all figures of its beyond, all forms & resources of its exterior—except, perhaps, laughter)

p. 255 Hegel’s master/slave an economy of life [vs. economy of death]

——ruse of life, ruse of reason

——Bataille: the excess is outside reason

PIO PIO p. 23 institutional structure of invention requires [?] neutralizing stamp of reason [verb used here: arraisonner]

pp. 34-6 both Descartes & Leibniz demonstrate 2 meanings of word “invention” in phrase “invention of truth”—when pursuing a universal language: both speak of a universal characteristic, both think about a new machinery to be forged and found

——Leibniz, however, believes the invention of this language does not depend on human perfection of “true philosophy,” the language itself can lead us towards such perfection, the invention thus preceding knowledge/science, until, at last: to reason = to calculate

p. 36 Leibniz’s version of universal language confers productive facilitation, even if inaugural adventure is kept under teleological surveillance by fundamental analyticism

WAP WAP p. 56 philosophy, via critique of pure reason [Kant], becomes guardian of tribunal of reason: this new institution (w/ element of Romanism, Latinity) is a response to an old invitation (“self-knowledge”) > tribunal of reason whose power/violence (Gewalt) guaranteed by no other law than its own (Kafka, Benjamin), absolute autonomy, independent even of state

Gii Gii p. 43 Heidegger: work of hand, thought, man’s hardest & simplest work

——hand gives & gives itself: animal rationale can only take, grasp [anti-Hegel, whose concept is the graspable] [Derrida refers to GT, where giving & taking are problematized]

AFR AFR pp. 57-8(n) de Biran's criticism of Condillac’s arbitrary also a criticism of rationalism, of alchemism (reduction to the gold of abstract, simple, fundamental element [ego]), of idealism

p. 91 Condillac extends Locke’s statement that false connections of ideas makes madness/folly: true connection of ideas makes reason

p. 98 for Condillac, btwn reason/instinct only a difference in degree: reason is instinct

IW IW p. 261 Cohen: eidoslogos, concept (logos) is verified through idea & its rendering of accounts

p. 262 for Cohen, Reformation placed German spirit at center of world history (in den Mittelpunkt der Weltgeshichte)

——faithful heir of Platonic hypotheticism: cult of doubt, suspicion of dogma, culture of interpretation, free interpretation (free from institutional authority)

——slogan (Schlagwort) of Reformation: to give account (logon didonai) & justify

pp. 269-70 Cohen thinks of Maimonides as medieval Jewish-Protestantism (founds religion on great, rigorous rationalism)

NOY NOY p. 238 thought of history of Being affected by internal epochē, divides, suspends the yes: will is not identical to itself (along w/ many other things) > yes as the incalculable, the promise: [quasi-, fable of] “giving reason,” “giving an account,” the countability of the innumerable yesses

AD AD p. 26 receiving beyond capacity of “I” > dissymmetrical disproportion marks law of hospitality

——Levinas, surprisingly, calls reason this hospitable receptivity (reorients philosophical tradition, which thinks sensibility as passive opposition to reason)

——Levinas’ open door calls for the opening of an exteriority or of a transcendence of the idea of infinity > idea comes through the door: the door passed through is reason in teaching

BSi BSi p. 14 an analogy [re: beast & sovereign] is always a reason, a logos, a calculus > a relation of production in which identity and difference co-exist

p. 208 avoir raison des autres: “to prevail over” the others

p. 213 appeal to reason, a reason that is not one, as fact of name and force of the stronger

p. 319 logos or legein as gathering (more originary than logos as reason/logic) still deploys force/violence, a Durchwalten of physis > physis as Gewalt: deployment of sovereignty, of force [of logos] (no dissolving into void), in the highest acuity of its (sovereign) tension (Spannung)

OG OG pp. 77-8 (113-16) Leibniz & Descartes on universal language: must we discover true philosophy before developing the language? for Descartes, we would have to wait, & such language would only arise in paradise; Leibniz disagrees, envisions calculation and Reason merging, raisonner et calculer sera la même chose > a teleology in progress

p. 149 (214) reason can’t think (and thus constituted by) this double infringement: there’s a lack in Nature and because of that very fact something is added to it, the supplement as image & representation of nature, image neither in nor out [Aristotle’s “neither for nor against”]

p. 157 (226) [re: Rousseau] sequence of supplements announces necessity of an infinite chain of substitutes: immediacy is derived > that’s what’s inconceivable to reason

p. 180 acc. Rousseau, God gave man reason and woman modesty to supplement (a lack = an excess), restrain, guide natural inclinations, & God gave a bonus (praemium) too, a recompense, reward [for correct usage of supplement], a supplement to the supplement [Christianity]

p. 211 for Rousseau, the rational privileging of harmonics over melody is a fault of the heart not reason [i.e. the heart moves toward reason]

p. 259 (366) passage from nature to society can’t be described by alternative genesis/structure; advent of supplementarity as natural catastrophe neither in nor out of nature [Aristotle]: nonrational origin of reason

ATAP ATAP pp. 71-2 perversion of voice of reason: mix voice of reason w/ voice of oracle (2 voices of other in us), a hermetic, hermeneutic seduction > oracular parasitizes voice of reason, elevates the voice, raises the tone > for Kant, this is Verstimmen (to be deranged, delirious), désaccordement of cords/voices [tone] in head: vision w/out concept turned impatientaly toward most “crypted” secret > poetico-metaphorical overabundance

EU EU p. 49 every critique of censorship is a critique of judgment, censorship is a judgment, proposes laws, tribunal, code > censere, to evaluate (réputer), compute, count—ratio, “census,” “cens,” is enumeration of citizens

p. 50 acc. Kant, philosophy says, does not do > pure reason thus exempt from censorship, speaks w/in university not outside

——no censorship w/out raison donnée, censorship never presents itself as brutal, mute repression; acc. Kant, censorship always enacts itself in the name of another discourse, never against private discourses, thus restricting instances of translation, contraband, substitution, disguise [?]

p. 52 Kant rationalizes necessity of censorship, constructs a schema of pure a priori rationality to justify a state of fact (fact of the State [like Hegel?])

pp. 60-1 for Kant, historical imitation, mnemotechnics, not inventive production of reason [Leibnizian motif: sees reason as ahistorical]

p. 90 formal law: pure legitimation, reason as court of final appeal > pure ethico-juridical instance, tautology, pure practical reason, decision of pure egological subject

pp. 109-10 question of droit du droit not juridical, event of foundation never comprehended w/in logic it founds > foundation of a university not a university event (only the anniversary of the foundation would be), foundation of reason isn’t legal, isn’t rational: only w/in epoch of law can one distinguish btwn legal/illegal conflicts

FV FV pp. 482-83 depth is height, flows out (débouche) toward the high, precisely the mouth (bouche) in which is “incarnated” the Nous, Logos, phallic signifier > reason is reason itself, aura raison, logic of kettle (a check [traite] drawn from reason): there is only one libido, it is masculine in nature

p. 483tn one reason, male libido, altus, at the bottom of things—highest truth

CHOR CHOR p. 96 “phallogocentrism,” complicity of Western metaphysics w/ notion of male firstness > mistakes/anchorings of Western rationality assuage hermeneutic anxiety

RECOGNITION

SPOM p. 79 Fukuyama’s “good news” recognition differentiated from a perverted recognition (Hitler, Stalin) which he calls “megalothymia”

RGE p. 266-67 opposition of continuous & discontinuous constantly displaced from Hegel to Bataille > for Bataille, continuum of sovereign communication in night of secret difference; for Hegel, conciliate desire for recognition (breaking of secrecy) w/ discontinuity, negativity

——displacement does not transform nucleus of predicates (all the attributes of sovereignty are those of lordship)

FV p. 475 acc. Lacan, the [full] speech which constitutes/forms the subject is forbidden to him > it speaks everywhere it can be read in his Being [this antinomy is very antinomy of the meaning Freud gave to unconscious]: true speech always operates through mediation of another subject, it is open to chain w/out end re: speeches in which dialectic of recognition is concretely realized in human community [?]

RECONCILIATION

LOBL p. 118 infinite violence [of what’s strictly called] “double bind,” double invagination, double obligation, double demand > sans arrêt and arrêt de mort, no reconciliation

HERP p. 209 how is Heidegger’s monology, this belonging-to-one-another of Speech [shiz produced by polemos must gather, join up, ally, couple] different from speculative proposition [Hegel]? both synthesize an autoheterology, a heterotautology—too big of a question? [see p. 214 reconciliation in Heidegger btwn friend & enemy]

POOF pp. 153-55, 169n in Lysis, existence of friend for sake of enemy (ekthrou éneka) is abandoned for hypothesis of desire (épithumia): friend is friend of what he desires, the oikeiéotēs, home, habitat, familiar, property, hómoion, the present, near, neighbor > friend: everything an economy can reconcile

p. 165 ‘all men are brothers’: a responsibility, that is always, of course, exemplary (claim to universalism) > reconciles double imperative: brother (face & mirror, original & copy, one & other) is always exemplary & that is why there’s war

VM p. 153 Hegel’s speculative logic: living logic which reconciles formal tautology and empirical heterology [after having thought prophetic discourse in preface to Phenom…]

DIF DIF p. 16 privilege granted to consciousness, to the “living present”: power to synthesize traces, to constantly reassemble them

DPi pp. 175-78 Marx rails against purported reconciliation in phrase fraternité, a class calculation, as is the abolition of DP

TB p. 123 promise of reconciliation (even if unfulfillable) is a rare & notable event: kingdom is never reached, is untouchable > but the commitment takes place, bequeaths its record

HST p. 379 [re: Massignon’s, Kahil’s Badaliya] St. Paul: “while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his son” > a sacred deposit, mystical substitution, hostage as disappropriation

p. 385 unforgivable as worst of the worst: resists any historical reconciliation

p. 397 the definition of (a) today, sursis de vie, reconciliation in the impossible > great forgiveness as test/ordeal of unforgivable [re: 2 enemy Jews comically forgiving each other]

TN pp. 3-4 pray that you’ll outlive me, survivor guilt > the only reconciliation w/ death: not to see those I love die

E p. 4 for Kant, nature speaks to us through its beautiful forms, one can read the “ciphered language (Chiffreschrift),” nature’s signature as art productions

——even if this stance is opposed to Hegel [only art is beautiful], analogy btwn art and nature always provides a principle of reconciliation

CF pp. 31-2 forgiveness not pure when aimed at reconciliation, determined finalities, at reestablishing normality by a work of mourning

p. 34 for Hegel, all is forgivable except crime against spirit, against reconciling power of forgiveness

p. 36 traditionally, forgiveness must have a meaning: salvation, reconciliation, redemption, atonement

pp. 40-1 ‘national reconciliation’ can appear honorable [re: crimes against humanity], but forgiveness not therapy of reconciliation

p. 42 forgiveness must engage 2 singularities: the guilty (perpetrator) & victim

——amnesty, reconciliation, reparation when 3rd intervenes (no longer pure forgiveness)

p. 50 must forgiveness saturate the abyss (suture, reconcile)? but who could object to imperative of reconciliation? amnesties, work of mourning—political strategy, psycho-therapeutic economy

CIN pp. 56-8 [quoting from PC] Derrida telling “you” [his love?] to eat all his ashes, to approach him by slowly advancing toward death, an absolute reconciliation

OG p. 255 (360) impossible to describe continuity, passage, from inarticulate to articulate, pure nature to culture, plenitude to play of supplementarity > Rousseau attempts to reconcile (concilier) the 2 times after describing the birth, the being-born, of supplement

SPEC p. 363 Freud wonders if calling death immanent & proper to life functions as a great narrative poem, a poetics of proper as reconciliation? consolation? (make it more bearable as Anankē)

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

——death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

FV p. 476n Lacan advocates reconciliation (Versohnung), re: reintegration [of letter?]

REFLECTION

POR p. 19 (154) reflect on reflection, seize inaudible in sort of poetic telephony, “hear” hearing > this time of reflection is heterogeneous to what it reflects, gives time, chance of event

POOF p. xi faire appel, prendre appel [to appeal, take one’s mark] > the impetus for declaring “O my friends…”, rassemblerait un corps fléchi (stooping), d'abord plié sur lui-même dans une réflexion préparatoire: before leap, w/out horizon, beyond any form of trial [gathering & event?]

p. 28 the all too of Human All Too Human, a rolling wave, a trembling, enveloped violence of a welling up wave falling back on itself, “when the excess of the beyond itself folds back into immanence,” turning around, coming to perhaps

pp. 250-52 a grammar beyond grammar of response, friendship a privileged locus for this reflection: 1) on répond de soi [for self]: subject, agency of ‘proper name’ 2) on répond d'abord à lautre [to]: more originary than other two, ‘insistence’ of Other, dissymmetrical anteriority that marks time as structure of responsibility 3) répondre devant [before]: marks, right on idiom, passage to institutional agency of alterity, no longer singular but universal, before the law, agency authorized

pp. 272-73 Derrida explains how he does not want to exploit spectacular ‘news,’ that which screens out (fait écran) reflection [makes a screen of reflection], by projecting itself w/ pathetic, sensational, images of violence that are too easily mediatizable > yet, all these examples (immigration, globalization, new warfare) are in our mind & heart as Derrida strives to deconstruct fraternal link to friendship: how does humanitarian participate in fraternizing humanization?

VP p. 58 w/ ideal and pure freedom of re-presentation and reflection (essence of every lived-experience), Husserl thinks presence as constituted by fold of the return

w/out possibility of non-identity to itself of originary presence, how could every lived-experience be capable of re-presentation and reflection?

WM p. 262n TN. Bass gives a good account of mettre en abyme alongside abîmer: the former an endless reflection (heraldic term, escutcheon and on), the latter the ruination or plunging into abyss > “figurative of ruination”: when distinction btwn reflected/reflecting falls apart

GSP p. 156 Husserl’s “transcendental experience,” designates field of reflection > for Kant, this project would have derived from teratology [study of monsters/abnormalities]

***FS p. 17 “metaphor is never innocent” > orients research, fixes results: when spatial model is hit upon, critical reflection can rest w/in it

PIO p. 7 reflexive structure that does not produce presence but follows a trace, “self-reflexivity” of de Man [Gasché’s interp. of Derrida?]

EJQB p. 68 separation of life & thought: infinite anchoritism (writing as moment of Desert, Judaic experience as reflection)

EU pp. 74-5 Schelling against Kant’s separation of Wissen and Handeln (action); there is “but one world,” no world in itself; philosophy is ethics > duality of languages not annulled but derived from result of reflection

RELATION

MONL p. 19 narrative: space of relation

R p. 88 justice w/ disjointure: out of joint, interruption of relation, unbinding > infinite secret of the other, threatens a communitarian idea of justice

FK p. 99 socius as the secret of testimonial experience, a certain faith, address/relation to tout autre, that is, socius as non-relationship of absolute interruption: Levinas, Blanchot

BL p. 202 time: resolution of non-resolution—brings story into being and sustains it, only appears after law of delay, advance of law, anachrony of relation

POOF p. 294 Blanchot [re: friendship]: “the fundamental separation from out of which that which separates becomes relation”

LOBL pp. 164-65 double hymen w/ each woman; each woman double, death mask, cast, ghost, body at once living & dead, of other > utterly other “in relation to” one another: each one is the other

GT p. 120 through a movement of transference, narrator has affected fabric of relation itself

PP p. 159 Plato uses letter, alphabet, for pedagogical ends > never thematizes law of difference made apparent, the irreducibility of structure & relation, of proportionality, w/in analogy

PJP p. 187 no relation btwn “Chalier affair” [from Le Parjure] and “de Man affair”—but all relations are possible btwn them

LI p. 117 thought, relation to other, “experience” of differance

SPEC p. 260 logic of au-delà, pas au-delà: overflows logic of position, not a substitute/replacement/opposition to/for position, opening another relation, rapport sans rapport, frees itself at a stroke (coup), neither pas nor coup is indivisible

RELATIVISM

FWT p. 18 the universal of philosophy (neither relativism nor nationalism) not a given, an essence, but an infinite process of universalization > in the name of European filiation we are liberating ourselves from Eurocentrism/ethnocentrism

p. 24 for some one in a hurry, it may look like I’m siding w/ relativism, communitarianism > necessary to take context into account in most refined way possible w/out yielding to relativism

pp. 98-9 there is one principle, but put into effect w/in singularity of context/moment, it will produce different decisions > nothing relativistic or opportunistic in this

GSP p. 160 acc. Husserl, Dilthey’s Weltanschauungsphilosophie is a structural historicism, doesn’t avoid relativism or skepticism: confuses truth of facts w/ truths of reason [Leibniz’s terms]

LI p. 137 relativism, and everything sometimes associated w/ it (skepticism, empiricism, even nihilism), remains a philosophical position in contradiction w/ itself (Husserl showed this better than anyone)

CF pp. 56-7 infinite distress (night) of deciding w/out necessary infinite deliberation, the responsibility of concrete situations, the “contextual,” never sure of the justice of one’s decision——the future will give us no more knowledge, it will be determined by that choice

——but ‘contextual’ differences, difficulties, occur in name of the unconditional, never empiricist, relativist, pragmatist resignation [urgency]

RELEVER

EM pp. 120-21 (143) Hegel’s Phenomenology as truth of soul, the relevé of anthropology, of man

p. 121 (143) Aufheben is relever: at the same time > déplacer, élever, remplacer et promouvoir

p. 121 (144) phenomenology as relève of anthropology, no longer but still a science of man

——in all structures described in Phenomlhomme y reste en son relief, equivocal relation to relief (relevance) marque sans doute la fin de lhomme, man past, but also achievement of man > cest la fin de lhomme fini, end of finitude of man, unity of infinite and finite

——“la relève ou la relevance de lhomme est son télos ou son eskhaton”

p. 121n (144n) the relevance accomplished in Hegelian metaphysics persists wherever metaphysics, our language, maintains its authority, even in pre-Hegelian systems (i.e. in Kant, figure of finitude organizes capacity to know from emergence of anthropological limit)

PPHS p. 88 authority of voice: coordinated w/ entire Hegelian system: its archeology, teleology, eschatology, its will to parousia > process of sign is an Aufhebung, negativity

——Hegel: negativity of intelligence, Aufhebung of sign relieves/promotes beyond natural, sensual, spatial

p. 89 acc. Hegel, relève of space is time, time is truer than space: what space will have meant is time [future anterior], sensory intution of sign relevé in passage of time

p. 91 acc. Hegel, poetry, most relevant art (time & sound), must be spoken, not read (united to conceptual representation unlike music)

p. 107 for Hegel, machine works as a negation w/out relève, thus Hegel could never think a machine that could work! that which doesn’t work in service of meaning: pure loss

T pp. x-xi philosophy has always thought its other, that which limits it; does to think the other solely mean relever, to control the other? or does the limit/passage always reserve one more coup; to think the proper of the other, the other as such is to miss it, to miss the missing of the other [on manque (de) le manquer]: examine the relevance of the limit

pp. xvi Being, understood as [philosophy’s] proper, assures w/out let up (sans relâche) the relevant of reappropriation, the law of its proper weave (tissu), the economy of its representation

WM p. 225 Hegel: metaphorical element in use of word disappears, words becomes literal, word carried over from sensuous to spiritual [i.e. Fassen, begreifen]: relevé into a spiritual meaning

p. 258 la métaphysiquerelève de la métaphore [chapter title]

OS p. 43n TN. re- vs auf- in relève/aufhebt

p. 46n Derrida doesn’t think Heidegger considers relever in his reading of Hegel’s concept of time

POS pp. 40-1 if there’s a definition of differance, it’s the limit, interruption, destruction of Hegel’s relève, wherever it is

p. 106n differential substitution of writing, remainder, death, phallus, excrement, infant, semen, or everything in this not subject to relève

P p. 37 economize on the abyss: 1) textual art of reprise, sépargner la chute en tissant et repliant à linfini le tissu, multiply patches (pièces) 2) abyssal operation (formalize rules, constrain logic, reappropriate): work toward rèleve & that in it which regularly reproduces collapse

O p. 6 direction or chain of the “metaphysical” can’t be opposed by concept, rather by process of textual labor, the movement of differance, which cannot be relevédisorganizes opposition

pp. 6-7n differance inscribes contradictions, is the critical limit of idealizing powers of la relève (Aufgehoben), which reduces contradictions to homogeneity of single model

SW p. 318 the remaining intact or tearing of the veil is the same: lune se garde de lautre > 2 liftings (deux relèves), you want to have finished w/ the veil: to have finished w/ oneself, that’s the veil

C pp. 218-19 paradox of paradigm: deposed from its privilege moment it’s built, inscribed in a series, an out-of-series cartouche > remains heterogenous by virtue of its relief

TN p. 2 do eyes touch like lips? what is contact if it intervenes? a sealed interruption, or the continual, negating upheaval (relevante) of the interval—the death of btwn?

p. 261 spacing & “distance” are thought by Chrétian [by Christian theology of flesh], reduced to phenomenology of finitude, que le toucher spirituel (infini, immédiat, etc.) aura commencé par élever et relever [differance serving to close closure]

ATAP p. 65 lever/relever all senses (meanings) pressing around Hebrew gala, in front of columns/colossi of Greece, in front of the galactic, the milky ways that fascinate me

p. 66 relever of tone, dream of philosophy: make tonal difference inaudible, neutrality of tone, affect works (over) concept as contraband

SPEC p. 395 no relève of PP [re: Freud’s Beyond…]—not Hegelian [since PP always master?] > in fact, function of PP, (postal) binding, determines interpretation of Aufhebung

FV pp. 462-63 Lacan’s emphasis on logos as phonē, writing relevé by voice, phonetic fact is only a fact w/in limits of “phonetic” systems of writing (beyond relation of de facto to de jure, Derrida interested in Lacan’s implied equivalence btwn symbolic articulation & phonematicity)

pp. 464-65 [phonematic limitation of letter, phonē spared divisibility] voice: spontaneous self-presence one can retain (garder) w/out paper, w/out envelope, always available (disponible) > Lacan’s not attentive to writing w/in the voice, before the letter

——sheltered (à labri) from disseminating threat/power in OG, agency of Lacan’s letter is the relève of writing in system of speech

p. 479 systemic & historical link btwn idealization, relève (Aufhebung), and the voice > Lacan’s elevation of signifier

p. 480 Lacan: “the phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance”

——Lacan reversed Hegel: not ideal signified but ideal signifier

RELIGION

GOD p. 84 is Levinas’ face god or human? unable to differentiate infinite alterity of God from that of human > Levinas & Kierkegaard can’t find limit btwn religious & ethical

R p. 9 [re: Greek word democracy] heirs, legatees, the legacy & the allegation (play btwn legare & legere), “sending or putting off (renvoi) gestures toward the past of an inheritance only by remaining to come,” for democracy

FK p. 43 “religion” involved in reacting antagonistically, re-affirmatively outbidding itself > in this place knowledge & faith bound to each other by band of their opposition

p. 46 light, phenomenology of religion, possibility more originary than manifestation > light there in discourse of philosophy, revelation, enlightenment [war of light]

***pp. 47-8 [Derrida’s liberalism?] unreserved taste for democratic public space, lights of Enlightenment, emancipation from religious dogmatism, thus the attempt to try to think religion w/in limits of reason alone, an epoché that “gives a chance to a political event” [see “Sauf le nom”], belongs to history of democracy

pp. 54-55 revealability (Offenbarkeit), revelation (Offenbarung), which is first? former prior to all religion, or revelation the origin of light, the very invisibility of visibility?

p. 55 before “link” or religare (man to god), desert (nocturnal light) as the most anarchivable, the holding back, Verhaltenheit, responsibility of repetition in wager (gage) of decision or affirmation (re-legare), a fiduciary “link” before all positive religion: “messianic,” or “chora”

p. 57 desert of desert: where foundation loses very trace of itself in the desert, and religion can only begin again [quasi-automatically, machine-like, spontaneously]

p. 61 unscathed—thing itself of religion?

——one would not be speaking of religion if speaking in its name [surprising variety of what can be spoken in name of religion]: sacrosanct—presence; credit—belief.

p. 62 technology & religion: “ether of religion has always been hospitable to a certain spectral virtuality” [return of virtual from OOG]

p. 66 religion & reason develop in tandem, their common resource: testimonial pledge of every performative; same source divides itself, possibility of two, n +1

pp. 66-67 hyper-imperialist appropriation (Anglo-American remains Latin), in mondialatinization no semantic cell can remain alien, “heilig,” safe & sound > word “religion” calmly applied to all that which has always been foreign to it, same goes for “cult,” “faith,” “belief,” “sacred,” “saved”

p. 67 religio: promise, promises itself, already promised, the response to untranslatibility of religio is religio: to swear (Benveniste)

p. 68 temptation of knowledge: to believe not only in what one knows one knows but to know, have faith, in what knowledge is

——the scholar’s (Benveniste’s) scruple, assurance and also hesitation, between the proper meaning and its other > quasi-automatic, machine-like, also religious: restraint of response

p. 70 the 2 experiences of religion: 1) belief, credit (to acquiesce, to be touched, w/out the sacred) 2) unscathed/sacredness (be present to the saved w/out acquiescing to the testimony of the other) [see p. 93]

p. 71 religion always prescribes response and responsibility; a way to think will and freedom w/out autonomy

pp. 71-4, 73n the 2 etymologies of religion: religare (from ligare, to tie, bind) & relegere (from legere, harvest, gather)

——Christians invented false etymology w/ ligare, link

——re- complicates/frustrates concern for true etymological source

p. 72 the secret: reticence btwn two experiences of religion (btwn credit & unscathed) [see p. 70]

pp. 73-4 the 2 definitions of religio: piety, shame, patience, respect (bring together) vs. obligation, debt > Christians linked religion via ligare to the link, ligature, obligation, debt

p. 81 no incompatibility btwn “return of religious” and rationality, which is to say, the tele-techno-capitalistic-scientific fiduciarity in all its mediatic/globalizing [mondial?] dimensions

——religion appropriates indemnification of all “proper,” all property: the letter, blood and soil, family, nation

p. 83 technical, automatic, machine-like [the possibility of faith, its very chance], a chance that entails risk of radical evil, otherwise it would simply be pure know-how, pure knowledge, annulment of future, programme, proof, predictability, providence

pp. 85-86 holding-back, restraint, inhibition, modesty: universal structure of religiosity, the mystical immunity of the secret

p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

——these dimensions of self-sacrificial supplementarity, the auto-co-immunity, com-mon auto-immunity, keep community alive, open to something other, more than itself (a spectralizing messiancity beyond all messianism)

——Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

——religious bond btwn value of life, its absolute “dignity,” and the theological machine, the “machine for making gods” [Bergson]

p. 88 religion as ellipsis of sacrifice, Heidegger sees ontotheology as free from sacrifice & prayer, but Derrida sees double bind, religion excluding & requiring sacrifice, indemnification of unscathed, auto-immunization & sacrifice of sacrifice

——sacrifice: price to pay for not injuring tout autre, violence of sacrifice in name of non-violence; w/ Kant, self-sacrifice sacrifices most proper in service of most proper

——in our “war of religion” 2 violences: 1) hypersophistication of military tele-technology 2) “new archaic violence,” counters the first & everything it represents, revenge

p. 90 knowledge & faith, technoscience & religion, alliance of calculable and incalculable

p. 93 “contemporary” movements (ecologists, humanists…) search for salvation in new alliance btwn tele-technoscientific & 2 sources of religion: 1) heilig, unscathed 2) faith, belief

——[axiom of 2 sources, also 2 experiences]

pp. 93-94 pure originary possibility of religion can always critique historically determined necessity, though the former can be both universal or particular (i.e. specific originary event)

——one can’t deny that possibility deconstructs the necessity, given figure or logic of denial (dénégation) > place where reason, science, philosophy, thought retain same resource as religion

p. 96 that which acquiesces prior to all questioning of spirit: trust/faith, Faktum, comprehension of “is” or “be” > [Heidegger’s last god?] this faith does not constitute a religion but is it untouched by religiosity? [see p. 67]

***p. 98 the everydayness of credit/faith: “believe what I say as one believes in a miracle” science, philosophy, religion: pure attestation

p. 99 pure attestation indispensable to science, philosophy, religion; it can gather or scatter itself, trust in the pledge (gage) of the other unites 1) belief in other 2) sacralization of presence-absence 3) sanctification of law > divides in various ways

p. 100 possibility of radical evil destroys and institutes the religious, ontotheology does the same when it suspends sacrifice & prayer

——the worst violence: alliance of two in pure madness of faith; or One + n, all its supplements, makes violence of itself, does violence to itself, keeps itself from the other: “religion” indemnifies itself w/out assignable end

SPOM p. 51 theologizing fetishization of money linked to ideology to religion (to idol or fetish)

——religion, not one ideology among others for Marx

pp. 207-08 for Marx, via reference to religious world, ideology’s incorporation in apparatuses endow them not only w/ autonomy but automaticity

PAS PAS p. (31) knowledge guards, Blanchot keeps this guard and folds it, refolds it, re-employs it, what do we know then?

SH p. 40 religion before religion: blessing of dates, names, ashes

FWT p. 144 DP: alliance btwn sovereignty of State & religious message (but is State ever not deeply in alliance w/ the religious?)

——Socrates, Christ, Joan of Arc, Al-Hallaj are paradigmatic cases, but religious authority, via accusation (profanation/violation of sacred), always decides on DP in exemplary way

pp. 164-65 forgive the unforgivable, the impossible: accomplish a gesture no longer measured by human immanence > origin of religion related to this possibility

——there is transcendence in idea of forgiveness

P p. 55 parergon is philosophical quasi-concept if it can be transported (intact, deformed) to other fields: in Kant’s Religion w/in… “General Remark” is a parergon of parergon: text is framed (cadrée), squared up (quadrillée) [also surveillance], by 4 topics (effects of grace, of miracles, of mysteries, of means of grace), they are parerga of religion, not integral but touching the integral

pp. 55-6 reason’s impotence: couldn’t satisfy moral need to think religion through reason alone, had to rely on extra, parergon, supplementary work, Nebengeschäfte

corresponding damage to each parergon of Religion: 1) for grace, fanaticism 2) for miracles, superstition 3) for insight into supernatural, illuminism 4) for means of grace, thaumaturgy

ATIA pp. 47-8 Bellerophon’s modesty, shame before the immodest women saves the city, this immunizing drive, Heidegger’s Verhaltenheit, restraint, is the origin of the religious, of the immune, sacred (heilig), holy, separate (kadosh) [it also can be perverted: auto-immunity; virtual, analogical relation btwn auto-biography & auto-immunity]

DPi p. 149 religions: Systeme der Gausamkeit, festivals, theater of cruelty, are serious, there is no laughter, one suffers & causes suffering to take pleasure > cruelty not one part among others: it is the essence of life, life makes itself suffer to keep itself in memory, an interpretation of sacrificiality

——at all solemn festivals, there comes back (nachwirkt) a remainder of fear that presided over all acts of memory, promises, oaths, engagements

pp. 257-58 DP masters future through machines, or purports to, deprives me of my own finitude, exonerates me of my experience of finitude > thus the seductive fascination it exerts on side of condemning power and side of condemned > fascinated by power of calculation, end of finitude, end of of anxiety, protects against irruption of other > all this decidability remains phantasms > origin of phantasms in general—and perhaps of religion

p. 276 religion as anesthetic for death & DP

pp. 278-79 for Montaigne, there’s always something worth more than life, exceeding life, force of an opining (to say yes), belief, a force of force, a force of act of faith that says yes > this, acc. Montaigne, is the essence of religion: acceptance of sacrificial death & DP in shadow of a sur-viving supposedly worth more than life > religion grants the surviving of survival

REST p. 382 don’t have to render anything: just bet on the trap like others swear (jurent) on a Bible > il y aura eu à parier, ça donne à rendre, a remmettre [there will be something to bet, it gives…]

if faudrait rendreencore, donc, en se séparant, et même en laissant tomber [even in letting the matter drop, we’d render (something?)]

HLP p. 58 sacred veracity, the Heiligkeit of the safe, sound, healthy, saintly, lindemnealways links religious to ethical

TR p. 133 machine structurally resembles causa sui, figure of God, question of technical as question of theological: Bergson’s “machine for making gods”

IW p. 267 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] Protestantism makes faith come alive to its authenticity, new relation of religion to truth, no longer as correspondence (like science, objective knowledge) but as truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit), authenticity, most intimate Gewissen: [the Church?] internalizes what contests it

pp. 269-70 Cohen thinks of Maimonides as medieval Jewish-Protestantism (founds religion on great, rigorous rationalism)

TN p. 55 flesh (sarx), Nancy’s Corpus is sarcastic, having it out w/ flesh, flesh of Christ

——Christianity a religion of blood > beyond point where any religion begins w/ experience of blood

p. 330n touchable-untouchable, untouchable right on/at (reste à même) the touchable, could only be announced if before any religion, cult, prohibition

ATM pp. 167-68 no edges in this interruptive series [Levinas’], in this incomparable stricture, but tapering points (establishing continuity at a distance [?]) > binding & unbinding, the lace (lacet) of obligation is in place (not a trap): an ob-ligation that un-binds, opens up religion in this very unbinding

——interruptions unbound “together,” in the “same” sériature, in dia-synchrony, a serial one time of “several times” that took place only once

p. 168 “lace of obligation holds language…prevents it from falling apart in passing through eyelets of a texture [reappropriation?]: alternatively inside and outside, below and above, before and beyond”

p. 178 Levinas plays a game that’s not a game, the gratuity of his work, what he still calls liturgy > “it is ethics itself”

p. 186 acc. Levinas, man, monotheistic man, has a unique relation to the ab-solute retrait of the revealed Name

AD p. 28 welcome is not a secondary modification of col-ligere, which is “linked” to origin of religion, the “relation w/out relation” > what Levinas refers to as “religion,” the “ultimate structure”

p. 81 Levinas: city never this side of the Religious

p. 123 [other translation] Levinas: “to seek a translation that the properly religious surplus of truth already presupposes

CF p. 32 mondialatinisation, Roman Christianity overdetermines all language of law, politics, even ‘return of the religious’—no secularization interrupts it, on the contrary!

IF p. 304 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] Spinoza exposed illusion of figures in politics & religion

REMAINDER/REMAINS/REMNANT

GOD p. 157 properly phenomenological virtue of literature: puts thesis or arrest in quotations (parentheses) > literature’s relation to non-literary, religious remainder (Abrahamic moment), betrays in double sense of word: unfaithful to its history at moment it uncovers that history’s secret, reveals its “truth” (i.e. its [literature’s] own filiation) > literature must ask forgiveness for this double betrayal

GT p. 4 The remainder is what you can give (the all is what is taken, the whole of her desire)

pp. 102-105 whole economy of narrative [“Counterfeit Money”] proceeds from a remainder, change returned, return of an unproductive expenditure [capitalizes?]

p. 106 “Purloined Letter” & “Counterfeit Money” proceed from surplus-value of remnant or a superfluity of revenue (income or inheritance)

R p. 91 since Glas, the remaining [restance] withdraws from ontological dependence, no present of essence or existence [fixerup]

MONL p. 67 [gift] remains only on this condition: still remaining to be given

LOBL p. 81 starting point: “no meaning can be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation” > structure of remnant/iteration (I have said this many other ways)

p. 116 arrêt arrests itself, stands, stays unstable, remains on arête of itself, it a-rests (for) itself, no consciousness, perception, no watchfulness can gather this remnance, no “I”, hence ghosts, fantasies, epochal pause

p. ~118 translation leaves behind an untranslated remnant, illegitimately, because it arrests the movement of the everyday possibility of literature and parasitism [see SPOM p. 135 translation causes ghost to drop into oblivion] [re: double syntax of arrêt de mort]

——dream of a translation w/out remnants: a metalanguage, a guarantee

SEC p. 329 logic of paleonymy, provisional conservation of old name, while liberating, “grafting,” excluded, subordinated predicates (resistances, remainders of dominant force)

POO p. 31 if simulacrum bears witness to a possibility that exceeds it, exceeding remains, il (est) le reste, il le rest

AF p. 68 one cannot objectivize the archive [call on its names, employ it, make it gain in auctoritas] w/out remainder, archive produces more archive, never closed, opens to the future

A p. 19 experience of aporia: passion, endurance, resistance, remainder

PAS PAS p. (84) [list of Blanchot’s many sans constructions] X sans X forms the trace or the pas of the toute autre that acts on itself there (sy agit) > degree o (eau); il reste un reste sans reste de ce passage (il y apasrien, un texte, un récit, déjà)

p. (92) if being is another name for forgetting, places forgetting in a crypt, forgets forgetting, in naming forgetting one makes it disappear under its name [(un)names], vs. pas sous le nom doubli > le reste sans reste de cet effacement qui ne sefface plus, voilà ce quil y a peut-être, par chance, mais qui nest pas ou qui est pas

SH p. 37 poem speaks beyond knowledge, this is its remnance, partakes in unimpartable

F pp. xxxi-xxxii via Abraham’s “radical semantic change that psychoanalysis introduced into language,” beneath paleonymy of inherited concepts, working w/ remnants [i.e. beneath “pleasure” we find pain]: to bring intending non-presence into phenomenology

***POS p. 68 writing structurally carries w/in itself (counts-discounts) its own erasure, while marking what remains of this erasure

P p. 66 Heidegger on how blosse Ding is only a remainder (not properly determined in itself), a concept formed alongside, w/in, Christian creationism, matter/form, & concept of Überfall

ROP pp. 9-10 the poleros (politics, polemos, eros, seduction) of analysis, ends in an abyss, where resistance to psychoanalytic Lösung, in the name of truth, can only be a disavowal > to analyze, to say to other: prefer, take, love my solution, you will be in truth if you do not resist my solution

——Derrida proposes an other resistance, that of the remainder, thus a restanalysis

p. 26 entangled necessities: 1) resistance [to analysis] as double bind, other or outside at heart of internal auto-affective tension > it provokes analysis and dialectic to infinity, in order to resist both absolutely 2) resistance as la restance du reste, resists because la reste nest ou neste pas

pp. 29-30 deconstruction announces status w/out status of nonfinite # of names/quasi-concepts: the thinking of writing called for this, but it’s better thematized and formalized in theory of double bind, stricture of double band, and especially non-ontological remaining

p. 34 la restance disséminale, hyperbolythique, destined (vouée) to chance, to ash, à un oubli radical, trace w/out trace: secret w/out depth, lieu, nom, destination, lysis w/out measure/return/anagogy

SP pp. 131-33 remainder: no proper itinerary, no center, could mean nothing, no end to parodying play w/ meaning, grafted beyond any contextual body or finite code

O p. 9 residue of writing remains anterior/exterior to content it announces

p. 44 preface’s (double inscription’s) semantic envelopment in Book (representative of ontotheology, absolute knowledge) > restance (left-overness) of its textual exteriority should not be confused w/ Book’s physical thickness

p. 49(n) re: writing, Hegel does not think exteriority, repetitive autonomy of remainder > writing becomes pro-gramme, pre-scription, pre-text, the simple empirical husk (déchet) of concept

——for Derrida, this husk is coextensive w/ whole life of discourse

DPi p pp. 207-08 Hugo’s abolitionism: disappearance of social order of past (priest, executioner, king), but order remains, what counts is what remains, the reste, of the turning, of the Christian Aufhebung

Hugo: cross will be substituted for the gallows”

REST p. 260 the pair (of shoes) might not come back to anyone: disappoint desire to reattribute surplus value > might have been made to “remain” there, defying the tribute

——desire for attribution is a desire for appropriation (in matters of art, & everywhere else)

p. 300 Heidegger: naked thing (blosse Ding) is a sort of product (Zeug), one divested of its being-product, its usefulness (Dienlichkeit)

——being-thing, a remainder (Rest) not determined in itself

p. 302 Heidegger’s subtraction of the product-work to get to the naked thing will not restitute the “remainder” to us as a “naked” thing: must “think” remainder otherwise

p. 303 a certain type of strict commentary on Heidegger, a restitution of him, becomes obscene, his language is no longer recognizable > thinking otherwise means thinking otherwise than he who attempts to think the remainder “properly”—that is, otherwise than properly

p. 305 remainder, instance of letting fall, this lowness: is it the foot?

——Van Gogh’s scene: “make oneself a present of the remainder (Glas)”

pp. 366-67 “projection” belongs to system of adequate subject-object relations or of truth (unveiling, adequation) > no longer stands up in unconscious or remainder-structure

p. 382 “useless hermeticism [Artaud]” of crypted remainder, secret already legible, separation already in the word, the letter, the pair > opening of secret

PF p. xxxii concept w/out concept of resistance, brought in line (after twists/turns) w/ desistance, especially restance (restance in Glas: being “nothing,” w/out substance, upsets ontological question “What is it?”—older than distinction btwn “who” and “what”)

——res(is)ts > what remains to be thought resists thought, in advance, remains in advance

p. xxxiii only know what thought means by way of what resists/remains to be thought, thought remains to be thought

PPT p. 4 remainders (leipsomena), remains—untranslatable

+R p. 177 Benjamin: secularization causes indeterminacy of “once only (Einmaligkeit),” once-only of phenomena replaced by once-only of artistic operation (never w/out remainder)

C p. 189 remainder itself, in its structure as remainder, will have been w/out (w/out example, w/out precedent)

p. 193 revenant—127 times, what of the remains is being put into figures (chiffré) in this way?

p. 201 analogy belongs to order of contingent > appeals neither to model nor example (i.e. both Sade & Titus-Carmel ration the remainder, stage a work & jouissance re: remainder [excrement]) [Derrida is “randomly” comparing Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins to Sade’s 120 days]

p. 202 one cannot get to it in one go (dun coup): multiplication shows that that which touches on the series is outside the series in the series > the remainder remains cut off, a mors, a turd, really beautiful

p. 203 a turd one would like to make one’s own (sapproprier)—until the end > until is interminable

p. 208 the odd is indivisible, remainder remains entire

p. 218 bananas [re: Titus-Carmel’s The Great Cultu] would be copies of copies w/out example, phantasmata, if force of ductus did not carry the remainder beyond any phantasy, beyond the signature, proper name, nameable [cf. pp. 220-21 also beyond hierarchy]

p. 230 remainder is neither produced nor reproduced/represented [in Titus-Carmel’s coffins], classical thought re: remainder reduced to ashes > yet we retain at least more than one monumental proof (at least 127) of this historical operation

***p. 246 send oneself [TN. senvoyer, “get landed w/,” “make it w/”] the remainder, that’s (the) desire, and its impossibility

LI p. 51 SEC doesn’t concern permanence but non-present remains

p. 52 restance as remainder: if it’s not a perfect translation, no single word out of context can by itself translate a word perfectly

——associating non-present w/ restance adds spectacular blinking-effect to warning light: rhythm of blinking essential to mark

——remainder, not that of signifier any more than that of signified, of the “token,” of “type,” of form or content

p. 53 remainder (nothing in common w/ scripta manent) bound up w/ minimal possibility of re-mark & w/ structure of iterability

——structure of iteration implies both identity (minimum of idealization) and difference (minimum of remainder)

——iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori > differential btwn & w/in elements

——“concept” of remainder not a sure thing (de tout repos), concept in quotes because remainder deconstructs the logic upon which the concept of the “concept” depends

p. 54 structure of remainder, implying alteration, renders all absolute permanence impossible

——blinking, quasi-concept of “remainder” (repetition as differance)

p. 83 [re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

——the rest of the trace, its remains (restance), neither present nor absent

ATM p. 144 no utterance ever cut from all context, context never annulled w/out remainder: one negotiates w/ les effets de bord, incl. nonnegotiable, that which overflows (déborde) all context

E p. 23 if mourning always consists in biting off the bit (le mors), a remainder, a corpse, the disgusting can only be vomited

WOG p. 26 the remainder (of all ontology) and the contamination btwn tout autre and its regular reappropriation (economic redialectization) haunts all Derrida’s essays on the Greeks

p. 27 the non-discursive remainder, the resistance of the pharmakon, exceeds (is not only) the simulacrum or phantasm—whose repetition disorganizes dialectic

CIN p. 17 cinders: ce qui garde pour ne plus même garder, dooming (vouant) remnant (le reste) to dissolution

p. 19 “lincinéré nest plus rien fors la cendre [innermost cinder furnace], un reste qui se doit de ne plus rester, ce lieu de rien qui soit, un lieu pur se chiffrât-il [marked out]” > there are cinders, what takes place in letting a place occur

p. 21 dissemination expresses in “il y a là cendre” what is destined by the fire to dispersion w/out return, pyrificiation of what doesn’t remain, and returns to no one

——cinder remains, cinder there is, nonbeing, nonpresence

p. 55 cinder & smoke (fumée): smoke gets lost w/out perceptible remainder, spirited away, sublimates; cinder falls (tombe), lets go, heavy, more material because it fritters away its word: it is very divisible

cinder, nothing that can be in the world, remains beyond everything that is (konis epekeina tēs ousias), giving itself (es gibt ashes)—it’s nothing

SPEC pp. 261-62 Beyond… is a-thetic, no (final) judgment (instance), indefinite suspension re: life death > death drive appears/disappears while telling stories, making scenes: myths, fables (literary)

——Derrida will distinguish restance from instance (judgment)

p. 296 repetition, reproductivity, works w/out saying anything, like death drive, not even “form,” w/out thesis, de-monstration makes its proof (preuve) sans montrer > de-monstration folds into everything it makes explicit, pas de démonstration remains (reste) in this restance

p. 304 the unanalyzed remainder of an unconscious remains [re: Freud’s autobiographical, writing], Derrida: “je parie” that it will be transmitted blindly by all who “return to Freud”: remainder that works the scene is illegible—i.e. restance, yet the only urgency of what reste à faire

p. 376 is Freud’s discourse’s restance statutory?

FV pp. 442-43 letter found “in” the text which escapes, from 4th side, eyes of Dupin/analyst [letter not found in sealed interior of Poe’s tale, not assignable lack, definable hole]

——the text The Purloined Letter: the open, the very open, letter that is fiction

p. 487 [profiting from remnant] by means of a remnant of paternal inheritance, one the debtors left out of account, Dupin draws revenue, surplus-value of a capital that works by itself, calculating (rigorous economy) > Dupin can pay for a sole luxury [Dupin’s desire to read]: cuts across restricted economy like gift w/out return

pp. 494-95 signer dispossessed [re: The Purloined…], signature in quotations: ce reste est encore de la littérature

REPETITION

FK p. 71 origin of repetition: division of the same

p. 83 no to-come w/out iterability, w/out heritage & possibility of repeating, w/out messianic memory and promise, messiancity more originary than all messianism, opens the worst

AF p. 79 if repetition is in the heart of future to-come, so is total annihilation of death drive

p. 90 archive always holds a problem for translation, it is repeatable and idiomatic

SPOM p. 11 question of repetition, specter is always a revenant, can’t control its comings and goings > commence par revenir

p. 95 deconstruction never been (non) Marxist, faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism > il y en a plus d’un et ils son hétérogènes [this can never be repeated too often (on ne le répétera jamais assez)]

p. 217 “absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous (es spukt),” unnameable, neutral power > this, which we have said nothing determinable urgently returns, insists, gives one to think, irresistible anguish, like that of future and death, doesn’t stem from but produces automatism of repetition alongside principle of reason > tout autre est tout autre

——nous faisant régulièrement parler depuis le lieu où nous ne voulons rien dire, où nous savons clairement ce que nous ne voulons pas dire mais ne savons pas ce que nous voudrions dire, comme si cela n'était plus ni de l'ordre du savoir ni de l'ordre du vouloir ou du vouloir-dire

HASD pp. 48-9 prayer, quotation of prayer, & apostrophe weave same text > there is a text because of this repetition, this place is the event, future of what is promised, initiated, not motionless like khora

MPM p. 60 de Man on Baudelaire: représentation du présent [re: memory of present] combines incompatibility of repetitive & instantaneous pattern (tension); Baudelaire faithful to seduction of the present; for him, memory applies more to present that past

POOF p. 65 future is not just the new, but the work of the arch-ancient, repetition

pp. 215-16 desire for one single friendship exposes possibility & impossibility of indivisible calculation: one time for all time(s) will never cease, immediately infinite in its finiteness, appears as such only in unceasing desire for repetition/multiplication [cf. Augustine in Confessions] > the subject, the ‘one’ friend is indivisible in its calculable identity, indivisible in its incalculable singularity, the one divides the other: it is here that the enemy is w/in the friend

SEC p. 315 iter (from itara, other, in Sanskrit) > everything that links otherness to repetition

p. 317 no context, no code can enclose written syntagma > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

PP p. 75 writing as repeating w/out knowing (through a myth [?])

p. 93 Thoth puts play into play, repeats in play of supplement, his propriety or property is impropriety, inappropriateness, floating indetermination allows for substitution and play

——Thoth, god of resurrection, interested in death as a repetition of life, life as a rehearsal for death

p. 109 (125) once there’s a supplement, there’s a supplement of a supplement (this is its structure); Plato fears this fatal entrainment, though it’s linked to eidos as possibility of repetition of same

p. 111 (126-27) Plato’s eidos: repetition w/ no error

pp. 121-22 (138-39) in Laws judge must introject, internalize the letter, grammata [tou Dephikou grammatos], into his soul; anamnesic dialectics, repetition of eidos, self-knowledge, self-mastery > a forgetting of childhood, exorcism of child, teaches child to speak

p. 135 (155) writing can only repeat its own hollowness, subject already knows signifieds, gives them to writing on consignment

pp. 135-36 writing stripped of its path-breaking force, pure repetition, dead repetition, tautological, hollow, repetition of death > writing is not living repetition of the living

p. 138 (158) God true father of the bed, the clinical eidos, carpenter, demiurge, repeats eidos, painter does not generate anything, imitates

p. 168 no repetition possible w/out graphics of supplementarity, supplies for lack of full unity, being enough the same and enough the other to replace by addition (en ajoutant)

pp. 168-69 two tautologies, repetitions: 1) life coming back to itself: eidos, logos, mnēmē, phōnē, requires dialectics, didactics 2) life going out of itself beyond return, unreserved spending, irreducible excess, play of supplement [can’t think these apart from one another]

VP p. xviii [see Aquinas’ 2nd way] repetition comes first and last (no unified origin, no final end)

p. 8 “ideality is the salvation or mastery of presence in repetition” (this is why Husserl claims intuition is not reell), not a presence of anything that exists in the world, in correlation w/ ideal acts of repetition [idealization secured by a certain relation of “existent” to his death]

p. 43 maintenance btwn reality and representation, presence and repetition, an obstinate desire to remain secured, assured, constituted in the face of repetition

p. 44 against Husserl, we make Vorstellung depend on repetition, and presentation (Gegenwärtigung) depend on re-presentation, we derive presence-of-the-present form repetition (not the reverse)

p. 45 absolute ideality is correlate of a possibility of indefinite repetition of the same > being for Husserl is ideality as repetition

——tradition assured to infinity > transmission and reactivation of origin; this is a valuation, an ethico-theoretical act, reawakening originary decision of philosophy as Platonic form

pp. 64-5 the complicity of idealization and the voice are unfailing: brings monstration [?] to completion; unity of phonē and technē, voice as technical mastery of the object, via objectivity of object > the ideal object can be repeated, to infinity, while remaining the same

p. 76 the more the signifier is ideal, more it augments potency of repetition of presence, the more it protects, preserves, reserves and capitalizes on sense

PAS PAS p. (58) repetition of yes, yes, allies one yes to other, refolds the other, gives sens to a singularity that should have none > viens never arrives because of this repetition

p. (75) vigilance (jalousie) links (enchaînant) affirmation to its repetition, bond (lien) w/out pact, w/out debt

pp. (95-6) the event adrift (en dérive) abducts (enlève) its simple past from an indefinite background of habitus or repetition, fond sans fond [quasi-now of récit]

S pp. 111-13 performing as Heidegger, Derrida affirms [?] Heidegger’s rigorous repetition [not hollow], which crosses path of tout autre [re: attempt to move beyond Christianity]

FSW pp. 213-14 “repetition”—death as power, lack of power—institutes translatability, makes possible “language,” transforms absolute idiom into a limit toujours déjà transgressed (pure idiom is not language, becomes so only through repetition), repetition divides point of departure of first time; however, to only look at effect of repetition, at translation, obvious distinction btwn force & meaning, effaces intensity of death drive

p. 226 traces produce space of their inscription by acceding to period of their erasure, traces constituted by double force of repetition & erasure, of legibility & illegibility

PPHS pp. 107-08 [Hegel on calculation and machine] a “living,” “thinking,” “speaking” protest against repetition

TC p. 245 Artaud wants to do away w/ repetition, but a repetition more in the vein of what Derrida would call calculable: dialectic, God, Being; for Artaud, God’s death (Jesus) imposed difference and repetition in life > menacing life

p. 246 dialectics as economy of repetition, economy of truth, movement by which expenditure is reappropriated into presence [Being and dialectics? eternal repetition]

p. 249 idea of impossible theater of cruelty [Master Morality], w/out representation, which begins in repetition, doesn’t help regulate theatrical practice but helps conceive of its origin, limit, horizon of its death > Western theater encompassed w/in its own possibility, but repetition steals its center

——affirmation must be penetrated in repeating itself > murder of father is endless, repeated indefinitely [murder of father: presence representing itself, i.e. a sign, a repetition]

SH p. 16 date repeats its unrepeatability: divides in repeating, enciphers, encrypts itself, effaces to become readable, unreadable in its readability

F p. xvi crypt is a parasite inclusion/internalization, an inside heterogenous to inside of Self, an outcast in domain of introjection w/in which it violently takes its place, le for cryptique entretiens dans la répétition the mortal conflict it is impotent to resolve

DS p. 188 specularity of eidos > logos—speech < mirroring [repetition ordered by resemblance (homoiōsis), doubling as duplication]

***p. 215n “event” (historical event, if you wish) has form of a repetition, the mark (readable because doubled) of a quasi-tearing (quasi-déchirure), a dehiscence [etymology of dehiscence follows]

p. 220n Derrida always returning to Freud’s Das Unheimliche (1919)—double, repetition, blurring of borders btwn “imagination” & “reality,” “symbol” & “thing it symbolizes”

pp. 234-35 supplement in Mallarmé (not unilateral movement, like in Rousseau, which loses warmth of spoken word): cest lexcès dun signifiant qui, en son dedans, supplée lespace et répète louverture

p. 238 “re-presentation” [Derrida via Mallarmé]: less concerned with setting forth things, the image of things, than setting up a machine > repetition-toward-itself of text as re-folding

p. 265 hymen is not a phenomenon—it folds itself back into the antre, which is an abyss

——mark upon mark, text w/in text, margin in mark (endless repeat): an abyss

——writing en abyme, abyss will never have glint (léclat) of phenomenon > becomes white or black, lun et/ou lautre au carré de lécriture

POS p. 87 dissemination via death drive links new concept of repetition to value of mimesis

P pp. 30-1 wanting to avoid “repetition” at all costs, one can: rush toward false exit, empirical chit-chat (bavardage), spring-green impulsive avant-gardism (lavant-gardism printanier ou primesautier)

——who said it was necessary to avoid risk of “repetition”?

OS p. 39 pleasure one takes in repetition ultimately cannot appear before tribunal of any law > the limit of such a tribunal—philosophy—is in question here

ROP pp. 22-5 death drive and repetition compulsion (Wiederholungszwang), hyperbolic resistance of nonresistance, “resistance of the unconscious,” thwarts working through, une résistance qui n’a pas de sens (death drive), nest pas une résistance > [does this concept present analysis itself? is it the structure of analysis? does it fold over? upset the meaning of the series?]

ATIA p. 1 one should try not to repeat oneself, it gives appearance of training (dressage), of following a program

p. 24 we’ll have to move continuously along the coming & going btwn the oldest & what is coming > the “again (de nouveau)” and “anew (à nouveau)” of repetition

Gii pp. 61-2 savage second blow of sexual difference, its Verwesung, vs. originary, tender sexual difference > Heidegger claims this schema is not Christian/Platonic, but it has no other content and even no other language than Platonism/Christianity > its archi-matinal origin, ultra-Western horizon, constituted by hollow of a repetition, same for Verfall, Ruf, Sorge in structure of Dasein

DST DST p. 223 rhythm: spaced repetition of a percussion, inscriptive force (insensible) of a spacing > doesn’t belong to visible/audible figuration—still structures them (rhythmotypical, typorhythmic)

PIO pp. 20-1 “Fable” has status of invention, from double position of author/reader, signatory/countersignatory, insofar as it proposes a machine, tekhnē, a self-quoting invention, a printing matrix > process w/out beginning or end, an exergue as impossible as it is necessary

RM p. 75 via Ereignis, re- of retrait no accident, no accident occurring to trait, does not appear, no proper, structurally in withdrawal: gap, trace, border, traction, effraction, differentiality

p. 76 repetition of incision stated violently in Riss, Ent-Ziehung, Ent-fernung, and in the Enteignen (rectraction of propriety) that hollows out every Ereignis

AFR p. 59 both Condillac and de Biran take repetition for granted, rule of indecision never comes to conception (au concept), a limit which is the concept not a concept: thus, Condillac finds contradiction in activity/passivity, de Biran duplicity in Condillac’s “hesitation”

p. 73 innovation as revelation, analysis as analogical process, energy connecting present to absent > concept of force as force of repetition (retracing, supplying)

——Derrida sees here a silent explosion in text or fission in each concept (Condillac, elsewhere, denounces obscurantist force of “metaphor” [hence analogical value])

p. 128n repetitive structure of knowing gives rise to archeological interpretation of frivolous & to a metaphysics of plagiarism [Derrida quotes Condillac on plagiarism]

p. 131 for Condillac, there is no difference in general, only of degrees > this proposition comes to unfold (déplier) all concepts of rupture/repetition, this unfolding is time’s

p. 132 for Condillac, repetition and absence of perceptual present to itself: gap or deviation of time > opens representative vection [desire] w/in sign & idea: suppléance as representation

D p. 295 open system: repetition of ruptures

p. 355 to write means to graft (same word), each grafted text radiates toward the site of its removal, sy régénèrent dans la répétition, à la bordure dun surjet (overcast seam)

——discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

p. 365 the unique (that which is not repeated—thus, has no unity), the inummerable, call it the present, is thus apeiron, the unlimited, the crowd, the imperfect

——only that which can be repeated in its identity can have unity

NOY pp. 238-39 quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——an analytic must return to structures, whereas yes can only be fictive, fabulous—given over to adverbial dimension of a “quasi”

p. 240 forgetting repetition in the promise so that “yes” is absolutely inaugural and “free”

EL pp. 208-09 return, repetition, revenance, the re- in language, as language insofar as it inaugurates possibility of revenge in language

LI p. 44 logical force of iter: ties repetition to alterity

p. 48 “I repeat…it can never be repeated too often”: absence of receiver from sender, structural necessity that makes writing possible

p. 52 phenomenon of repeatability is condition of possibility of survival of text [not vice versa]

p. 53 coupure intervenes moment there’s a mark, its positive condition of emergence, it is iterability itself, that which is remarkable in mark, re- of repeated, re- of repeating, condition/effect of iterability, merges w/it, cuts across (recoupe) iterability, cutting the cut/break in remark

p. 54 blinking, quasi-concept of “remainder” (repetition as differance)

pp. 56-7 unity of signifying form due to its iterability, possibility of being repeated in absence of a determinate signified

p. 119 repeatability of both (identificatory) iterability & (altering) iterability > necessity of thinking rule & event, concept & singularity, at once

——iterability thus a concept that renders possible the silhouette of ideality, & hence the concept, hence all distinction > marks the limit of idealization/conceptualization: “concept” or quasiconcept of concept in its conceptualizable relation to nonconcept

ATM pp. 188-89 inconsolable slowness of gift, as if necessary to delay the endless falling due (échéance) of repetition

WOG p. 27 the non-discursive remainder, the resistance of the pharmakon, exceeds (is not only) the simulacrum or phantasm—whose repetition disorganizes dialectic

OG pp. 97-8 (146) internal modification of phonocentrism (or logocentrism): Descartes’ cogito interiorizes ideality of eidos & substantiality of ousia; thereafter, objectivity takes form of representation, idea becomes modification of self-present substance, power of repetition in eidos/ousia acquires absolute independence, a substance in relation w/ itself, res cogitans, consciousness—auto-affection, lumière naturelle > surmounts the Evil Genius (Malin Génie)

***p. 165-66 (236) auto-affection, universal structure of experience, being capable of being affected by other, capable of symbolizing, another name for “life,” the as-for-itself or for-itself: subjectivity—gains in its mastery of the other to the extent that its power of repetition idealizes itself (s’idéalise) > the external, the signifier, becomes my spontaneity, and escapes me less and less

p. 278 (393-94) for Rousseau, fear induces magnification that makes man speak [cf. 351n Vico]; [repetition of instrumental fear: aidez-moi (Northern need)] anguish & repetition

SPEC pp. 293-94 [re: Freud’s “speculative” writing] démarche of this writing, advancing w/out advancing, time of a detour, pas de thèse repeats itself: PP will not let anything be done w/out it, except repetition itself

——Wiederholungszwang (repetition compulsion) put in communication w/ death drive

p. 296 repetition, reproductivity, works w/out saying anything, like death drive, not even “form,” w/out thesis, de-monstration makes its proof (preuve) sans montrer > de-monstration folds into everything it makes explicit, pas de démonstration remains (reste) in this restance

p. 301 [re: fort/da]: selbstgeschaffene (self-invented) game, spontaneity, auto-production, self-engendering of repetition itself, hetero-tautology (definition of Hegelian speculative): gives time, there is time

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

***p. 340 repetition as reproduction, reproduction of life-death, wiedererleben, poses no problem [to Freud] as long as satisfaction is found elsewhere [i.e. nothing beyond PP]

——all the interlacings of fort:da, tout ce qui senvoi in graphics of repetition that dislocates summary “triangle” > le trait oedipien nest quune rection pour le fil conducteur de la bobine [Oedipus most narrowly restricted effects of above repetition’s graphics]

p. 343 “literary fiction” in fort:da, fait-oeuvre in abyss of these repetitions, fairies, demons, unheimlich repetitions, what is most gripping (saisissant) and ungraspable (insaisissable) about Beyond…, for Freud too, who believed he could affix the seal of the Freuds to it [Beyond…] while hearing voices

pp. 343-44 déclencheur (trigger-effect) of the déchaînement, unbinding, destricturation > repetition compulsion & death drive unbind from all contracture

p. 351 tendency to stricturing (binding, mastering) foreshadows PP w/out being it, everything en différance de stricture > repetition itself > but there never is repetition itself > allure of this more or less tightened lace

pp. 351-52 repetition secondary in classical logic, “original” in general deconstruction

p. 352 Ab-bauen [sometimes translated as “to deconstruct,” cf. p. 267]: repetition haunts the PP

——Plato’s pharmacy [also PP]: “one repetition repeats the other” > there is no “sometimes…sometimes”

——2 repetitions (2 logics) as constitutive duplicity, double bind

——if there’s any chance of reading illegible text as illegible: must take incalculable double bind (bande) of PP into account

——normal repetition: idealizing interiorization, mastery (Hegel, Husserl)

p. 353 for Freud, adults should tend toward novelty > compulsively repetitive demand is beyond the PP, adult acts like child

——thus far in Beyond… [chapter 3?], differential stricture of repetition has not demanded a word about death

p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

FV p. 422(n) Lacan translates Wiederholungszwang as “repetition automatism,” the pre-eminence of signifier over signified > consequence: “literary” text does w/out reference to author [Derrida implies that Lacan takes, at times, his distrust of psychobiography too far in other direction: formalist neutralization of effects of signature]

p. 458 psychoanalysis [Freud, Bonaparte] justifies crushing monotony of monosemic truth under heading Wiederholungszwang [i.e. Freud declaring sun another sublimated symbol of father]

p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

pp. 472-73 [vis-à-vis Lacan] present speech, anamnesis, irreplaceable properness, inalienable singularity > disqualification of recording or repetition in the name of the act of living (present speech): a well known program

WBH p. 203 to receive a gift, in Nietzschean sense, is to say, “I want to begin again,” not a reproduction: “yes” of gift must be repeatable from the start

REPRESENTATION

FL p. 282 from instituting violence to preserving law/contract [modern democracies] > passage from presence to representation, acc to Benjamin a Verfall, forgetting of originary violence in this differance [Derrida doesn’t see this as accidental?]

p. 290 for Benjamin, founding violence is represented in preserving violence

SPOM p. 215 for Marx, ghost is the autonomizing of a representation (Vorstellung) whose genesis and real grounding (reale Grundlage) has been forgotten

POR p. 9 (139) for Heidegger, principle of reason accompanied by interpretation of essence of beings as objects, an object present as representation (Vorstellung)

p. 10 (139) the re- of repraesentatio renders reasonable a presence encountered by the rendering present, to the subject of representation, the knowing self: when, essence of beings is objects, and object present is a representation to a subject

HASD pp. 17-8 [blurring lines btwn conscious/unconscious, man/animal] if animals can’t keep secrets, because they can’t represent as such, secret linked to Vorstellung, linked to lying, not presenting in speech that which one has an articulated representation, keep to oneself

p. 69n Heidegger: for Kant, what is becomes an object of representation

MPM p. 60 de Man on Baudelaire: représentation du présent [re: memory of present] combines incompatibility of repetitive & instantaneous pattern (tension); Baudelaire faithful to seduction of the present; for him, memory applies more to present that past

MSUB J p. 169 neither/nor of subjectile (neither subservient nor dominating) situates place of a double constraint (both screen & projectile) > becomes unrepresentable

SEC p. 313 though representation supplements presence, the general assumption [Condillac] is that writing repairs > a continuous, homogenous modification of presence in representation

p. 314 careful use of “ideological” in relation to Condillac: theory of sign as representation of idea, which represents a perceived thing; communication vehiculates a representation as ideal content (which will be called meaning); writing as species w/in genus of communication

PP p. 88 Thoth’s message is not, it represents absolutely creative moment of Horus (a second and secondary word)

p. 140 (161) bewitchment (lenvoûtement) > always effect of representation, capturing, captivating, the form of the other, par excellence his face, the vultus

VP p. 42 language is the impossibility of distinguishing representation from reality, which is why Husserl’s pure representation (Vorstellung) requires we pass through a neutralizaing representation (Vergegenwärtigung)

p. 44 system of differences (signifier/signified, representation/presence) are drawn into deconstruction when we assert that presence is made possible through re-presentation

——against Husserl, we make Vorstellung depend on repetition, and presentation (Gegenwärtigung) depend on re-presentation, we derive presence-of-the-present form repetition (not the reverse)

p. 49 discourse is self-representation; p. 49n representation has always wanted to say the repetition of presence

p. 53 via Husserl, Greek metaphysics of presence becomes “modern” metaphysics of presence as self-consciousness, metaphysics of idea as representation (Vorstellung)

p. 55 for Husserl, primary memory and primary anticipation are non-presences, non-perceptions, required for presence of perceived present [retentional memory is perception?]

p. 56 alterity as condition of Vorstellung

p. 58 w/ ideal and pure freedom of re-presentation and reflection (essence of every lived-experience), Husserl thinks presence as constituted by fold of the return

w/out possibility of non-identity to itself of originary presence, how could every lived-experience be capable of re-presentation and reflection?

***PAS p. (88) can one love anything other than the name? that which still lets self omit itself, so it can represent itself

FSW p. 227 via Freud’s frustration w/ analogy of Mystic Pad, machine is dead, is death, does not run of itself > representation is dead, death is (only) representation

TC pp. 232-50 [see

THEATER OF CRUELTY

]

pp. 235-36 for Artaud, irrepresentability of living presence is dissimulated by infinite chain of representations [representations, slaves, Nietzschean leveling, false depth]

p. 245 in The Social Contract and Letter to M. dAlembert, Rousseau suspects the “representer” when proposing that theatrical representations be replaced by public festivals

p. 249 affirmation must be penetrated in repeating itself > murder of father is endless, repeated indefinitely [murder of father: presence representing itself, i.e. a sign, a repetition]

p. 250 “to think the closure of representation is thus to think the cruel powers of death and play which permit presence to be born to itself, and pleasurably to consume [see NIETZSCHE & HEGEL] itself through the representation in which it eludes itself in its deferral”

——“to think the closure of representation is to think the tragic: not as representation of fate, but as the fate of representation, its gratuitous and baseless necessity” > fatal, that, in its closure: representation continues

PPHS p. 83 Vorstellung, delegate of and reference to the other, representative detour

DS p. 210 “center of presence” supposed to offer itself to perception/intuition (no perception when perpetual allusion/representation)

p. 238 “re-presentation” [Derrida via Mallarmé]: less concerned with setting forth things, the image of things, than setting up a machine > repetition-toward-itself of text as re-folding

POS p. 8 what defers presence (its trace, its sign, its representation) is basis of its announcement or desire

PS pp. 179-80 Artaud’s metaphysics of flesh [MOP?] determines Being as life, its integrity must be restored > a thought governed by anguish of dispossession, my body stolen by the other, by death (as theft): my death is represented

REST p. 303 Heidegger will say that Van Gogh’s shoes are not re-produced, re-presented

p. 312 Shapiro treats shoes as reproduction of real shoes, misses that, for Heidegger, shoes don’t relate to given subjectum, or given world, he won’t be able to avoid the bridge, doesn’t know shoes’re already prosthetic—précipitée dans labîme, la sphinge, dès linstant où lenflure (turgidity)

——that the shoes can always be someone else’s: “to be in someone’s shoes [in English]”

p. 320 if Heidegger is not referring to painted shoes w/in the limits of a frame, which can only be crossed in one direction (from outside to inside), then…

AFR pp. 130-31 via Condillac, need is system’s unique principle, desire is its representative vection: need changes into desiring representation in temporal dehiscence of comparison

p. 132 for Condillac, repetition and absence of perceptual present to itself: gap or deviation of time > opens representative vection [desire] w/in sign & idea: suppléance as representation

PPT p. 5 restitution vs. representation: 1) restitution: truth itself restored, in person, w/out mask or veil > truth of truth 2) representation: adequation (not unveiling)—relief of original’s effigy

LI p. 72 expressionist & representationalist description of language: intention adequate to, realizes, expression (dehiscence is there even before divide btwn intention/expression)

TN p. 52 Nancy: philosophy as work of mourning, work of representation, incorporation, profits from death (jouir de la mort), philosophy doesn’t know true mourning (w/out limits: ashes & tears)

OG pp. 153-54 (221) restitution of presence by language: symbolic/immediate, se passe de passer par le monde: touching is touched, jouissance not deferred: auto-affection se donne pour autarcie pure, it does not wait (nattend pas) > but, auto-affection pure speculation, present delivered is chimera, the no longer deferred is absolutely deferred: acc. Rousseau, sign/image/representation sont des illusions qui donnent le change (sidetrack us) [differance w/out delay]

p. 184 (261-62) image is death, it cannot represent & add representer to represented, thus presence of re-presented folded back on itself in the world, presence announces its dispossession w/in its own representer/death > subject: merely this movement of expropriation

pp. 202-03 [re: Rousseau] strange unrepresentable infinite movement of circles of degradation: each brings us back to a more secret nature (new loss w/ new defense): neither horizon nor abyss, one cannot represent this infinity > the relation of representation (spacing) to original presence

p. 292 (412) via Rousseau, from pure painting to allegorical painting: on transporte la chose dans son double (dans une idéalité) > representation always other

——original possibility of the image is the supplement

p. 292 (413) writing as painting is evil and remedy, pharmakon, zoographeme betrays being & speech, freezes (fige) them > writing as representation (painting) of la bête chassée: capture et meurtre magiques

——that writing carries death, Rousseau would agree w/out reservation

p. 296 (417-18) representation dispossesses, re-presents, wrenches presence from itself

——naiveté of MOP: to see representation as restorative

pp. 297, 352n (420, 420n) Rousseau admits necessity of representation while deploring it [needs to be laws in spite of their evil] > the logic of representation: restores what it takes away: “draw from disease itself its own remedy”

p. 304 (430) for Rousseau, theater worked by profound evil of representation (Darstellung—put there before), luxury, fine clothes, adornment (parure), dissipation

SPEC p. 270 [re: Freud’s Das Unheimliche] visitation of devil, apparition of “thing in itself,” over & above representative that’s supposed to supplement him, supplement of its “own supplement”: expands double-effects, upsets appeasing order of representation, duplicity w/out original > for Rousseau, diabolical brings fright to a climax

CHOR pp. 106, 465n invagination is always taken w/in syntax of expression “double chiasmatic invagination of borders,” doubly folded, redoubled, inversed: can we still recognize “representation of woman” in this movement?

——questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

REPRESSION

GOD pp. 10-11 [economy of the sacrifice] in turn toward new mystery, toward new structure of responsibility, prior one never eliminated, kept w/in oneself, mourned as crypt of a more ancient secret > is this repression, is this a kind of sacrificial Aufhebung?

p. 22 repression & incorporation: either 2 economies, or one economy w/ 2 systems in move from mysterium to secretum (possibility of keeping the secret)

p. 30 time of the promise of Christianity defines both experience of mysterium tremendum, and the double repression that institutes it

p. 115 via Nietzsche’s “genius of Christianity,” moralizing the mechanisms of debt via moral duty & bad conscience, a hyperbolized repression: sacrificial hubris

GT pp. 15-16 be careful, ethically vigilant re: gift w/out debt, there’s calculation & ruse (economy) even in the unconscious

——forgetting of gift must be far more radical than repression, which always consists of keeping by exchanging places, its operation is systematic or topological

BL pp. 193-94 the height of the human, 2 legs, is what creates repression; turning away is an upward movement, purification, turns away from that which stinks: the history of the law

AF p. 28 stakes of conceptual difference btwn Verdrängung and Unterdrückung not only nominal questions of translation, but they are accumulated there

p. 31 to not take account of the Freudian impression [resistance], one confirms, countersigns (archives) his theory of “repression”

p. 60 return of the repressed as triumph of life [re: Lou Andreas-Salomé’s reading in Moses], surviving of an excess of life which resists annihilation

p. 64 if Yerushalmi believes that archivization & repression [re: killing of Moses] are irreducible, Derrida insists we can archive what we repress, that repression is archivization, that we can archive otherwise [animals can sign themselves as hidden]

p. 66 repression dissimulates or encrypts the archives, archive of the virtual > virtuality removed from its oppositional coupling to actuality, effectivity, reality [re: full & effective actuality of an archived event]

POOF p. 38 for Nietzsche, the lookalike caricatures are the worst enemy of what they resemble, i.e. those w/ “democratic sensibility” > Nietzsche responds in name of hyperbole of democracy to unlock, open, this worst repression

PAS PAS p. (67) forgetting beyond all our categories of forgetting (beyond economy of repressions working toward protection)

FSW p. 196 acc. Freud, repression is not forgetting, not exclusion, an interior representation

p. 197 repression of writing, the writing interior to speech contained outside it, repression of that which threatens presence > mastering of absence

p. 221 anti-cathexis (Gegenbesetzung), “sole mechanism of primal repression”

p. 226 “primal repression” contradicts primary process, myth of maintenance > writing is unthinkable w/out repression

p. 230 for Freud, erasure of trace, as movement of pure auto-affection, temporalization, makes repression “itself” possible, escapes binarism and makes binarism possible on basis of nothing > useful to deconstruct logocentrism and to exercise at different levels of writing in general

F pp. 118-19n ghost effect (ghost that comes haunting from someone else’s crypt, heterocryptography) ≠ crypt effect (foreigner incorporated in crypt of Self) > la revenance nest pas un retour du refoulé

“ventriloquist” speaks from topography w/in self or from foreign/parental topography

p. xxxv very thing that provokes worst suffering must be kept alive, the outpouring of libido at the moment of loss is repressed, not in and of itself, but in relation w/ the dead

——“conservative” repression installs in the unconscious what the Self treats as an exquisite corpse, a “surrealism” of folded sentences loses its creases, the paper flattens out, and there is a spot (lieu) of pleasure disguised as pain, which the therapist must exhume

p. xxxv exquisite pleasure (nearing orgasm) disguised by repression as exquisite pain, le lieu where exquisite corpse has folded so much it appears flat > challenges us to exhume: “accuse-moi

pp. xxxv-xxxvi language inhabits crypt as “mots enterrés vifs,” words relieved of communicative function, marking, in a way, that le désir a été dune certaine manière satisfait, que la jouissance a eu lieu

——not hysterical repression, which works via prohibition (not foreign place, nor exclusion)

——Wolf Man’s crypt not melancholic crypt, doesn’t shelter his own object, but illegitimate object of another [his sister] > if cemetery guard lacks ownership of the tombs, at least he’s entitled to position, Wolf Man is in position of guard as proxy [pp. 199-20n position as guard has been mortgaged, Derrida haunted by this word, this “death pledge”]

FWT p. 81 Hamlet also machine of repression in politics, spectrality governs problematic of mourning & technics, media, virtual reality > general logic of spectrality

***POS p. 94 Houdebine says “no Aufhebung here,” Derrida responds: there is always Aufhebung, just as there is always repression, sublimation, idealization

ROP p. 34 Lacan uses trinitarian figures to give firm consistency to a resistance supérieurement organisée > letter always arrives; here proceeds division btwn 3 & 4, btwn resistance bound up in repression & disseminal remaining, no longer belonging to economy of repression

p. 44 ash, stepping beyond psychoanalysis, radical destruction of archive, destroys capitalizing reserve, the guarding of repression

——repression as mere topical displacement

ATIA p. 105 deconstruction works to open “betrayals of repressed human possibilities,” in the name of another history

LI p. 139 use of word repressive out of context lacks rigor

p. 150 always repression in stabilizing determination of a context, repression at origin of meaning, an irreducible violence > can’t say it’s “bad”

AD p. 95 given Levinas’ idea of paternal fecundity, he’s suspicious of psychoanalysis’ primal repression (for Levinas, it must be secondary)

OG p. 286 (405) forgetting & repression inadequate ideas to explain finitude & dissimulation > forgetting & repression both products of a philosophy (of meaning)

EU p. 51 Freud hasty to call repression psychological “censorship”

SPEC p. 287 the principle of the functioning of principles, which can only differentiate itself: this structure w/ one term or three-in-one-terms [reality, pleasure, differance] can be exposed w/out calling upon Repression

pp. 287-88 is Repression necessary? objective science can’t think qualitative or “subjective” affect, philosophy as phenomenological only thinks presence, psychoanalysis’ concept of Repression permits pleasure to be lived & perceived as unpleasure > but still, is Repression necessary?

pp. 289-90 Repression upsets logic implicit in all philosophy, pleasure that can’t be felt as such > “cannot be experienced as such”

RESENTMENT/GUILT

GOD p. 52 responsibility [via Potačka] must be guilt because responsibility is always unequal to itself: I will never be on the level of this infinite goodness > what gives my singularity, death & finitude, is what makes me unequal to the infinite goodness of the gift

p. 53 Heidegger doesn’t refer to infinite love to discuss primary guilt (Schuldigsein)

MONL p. 8 division, why one writes and how one dreams of writing: place of jealousy divided btwn vengeance and resentment.

FK p. 43 “religion” involved in reacting antagonistically, re-affirmatively outbidding itself > in this place knowledge & faith bound to each other by band of their opposition

p. 51 Heidegger’s responsible-guilty-indebted (Shuldigsein) supposedly pre-moral, not Christian

p. 66 one either responds to an address with absolute faith or reacts resentfully, impossible to tell which is the response, due to one contaminating the other

p. 81 reactivity of resentment opposes that which it hates in itself by excising it [auto-immunity]

H p. 53 state techniques, like private spying & blackmail, threaten interiority of home, ipseity, integrity, cause purifying reactions, feeling of resentment [but???]

BL pp. 198-99 quasi-event of the murder of father, event w/out event, resembles fiction, myth, fable > real, effective guilt; question of belief & historical referent—irremediably fissured

——dead father more powerful than living one

LOBL pp. ~114-15 is double affirmation same as Freud’s triumph? wouldn’t this risk negativity of mourning, economic resentment, melancholia in “yes, yes”? can this be avoided?

SPOM p. 68 reaction, reactionary, one interpretation of inheritance

POOF p. x “infinite abysses of imputability open on to mourning in the shadow of each and every event of death”

SH p. 10 poem is due its date, owes itself to its date as inmost concern, signature, owes itself to its secret, speaks of this date only insofar as it acquits itself

F p. xxi any judicial thought of the Thing [chose, causa (also, “thing” in Old English means “assembly”)] also thinks that the trial (procès) should not have taken place, did not have place > not an acquittal, but that the space of acquittal should never have been constituted > trauma and “contradictory” incorporation should never have taken place

p. xxxv exquisite pleasure (nearing orgasm) disguised by repression as exquisite pain, le lieu where exquisite corpse has folded so much it appears flat > challenges us to exhume: “accuse-moi

FWT pp. 150-51 deconstruction of DP makes untenable from w/in distinction btwn internal punishment (poena naturalis) & external (poena forensis): [Kant does Derrida’s work for him] since guilty should sign off on punishment, all executed punishment would be like a suicide > no law immune from interest, revenge, the sacrificial (for Kant, moral/judicial reason is sacrificial)

P p. 94 concepts stitch up (recoudre), furnish supplement of adherence [re: completes incomplete gadget]; still, there’s a chiasma, w/ free beauty, la coupure ny laisse aucune peau, aucun tissu dadhérence: law w/out concept, w/out debt, complete because incomplete

——une fleur belle est toujours en ce sens une fleur absolument coupable absolument absoute [sic], innocente

ATIA p. 43 Cain’s shame, like a second original sin, he needs to hide his nakedness, his crime, he feels excessively culpable > but, isn’t all wrongdoing excessive, le défaut devant leil faut

pp. 60-1 Derrida thinks about the virtual guilt of the animal in relation to “hiding of oneself,” sexual coupling, modesty/shame

PS pp. 184-85 man as the scato-theological being (this is the essence of guilt), capable of being soiled by the work and thieving God > God is a sin agains the unnameable Divine

DPi pp. 129-30, 132 Baudelaire: “abolishers of the death penalty—very interested parties no doubt”

p. 133 for Kant, DP inscribed in law (categorical imperative of penal law) in name of absolute, endless disinterestedness (is this a reactive moment of resentment?)

——DP defenders & abolitionists: war of resentment?

pp. 230-31 vengeance/justice? kill for a reason—you are agent of DP; kill for no reason—not even guilty

TB pp. 132-33 rhythm, twists & turns from abyss to abyss, deconstructs the tower > madness on both sides (interior/exterior limit) > impossible task: the infinite guilt absolves you immediately

PF p. xxvii alibi—plea for defense, has meaning only where there’s accusation, guilt, thus responsibility (judicial or penal, but first of all ethical or political)

——can there be a trace (and thus alibi) elsewhere than scene of culpa-responsi-bility, scene of debt, duty (Schuld, Schuldigsein)? an originary alibi that precedes juridico-ethico-political, but isn’t ontological neutrality?

——is the injunction to answer (answer to, answer for) inscribed right on the trace?

——does law, morality, politics determine through & through the thinking of trace/alibi? no

p. 282n resistance can be praised for fighting dogma, denounced as reactive/frightened disavowal

——rhetoric of defense becomes rhetoric of accusation

TR p. 88 [re: “to swear”] délire names extraordinary coincidence of irrationality of machine (beyond my control) & absolute sincerity (authentic innocence of my intentions)

——coincidence of infinite guilt & certainty in absolute, virgin, intact innocence> btwn infinite guilt & absence of guilty conscience

——protest of accusatory innocence: forgive me this my virtue [ask forgiveness for feeling innocent]

p. 101 plus de faute [no more fault, more fault] > vicious circle of excusing & being guilty

——guilt as inscription that is ineffaceable, inexorable, inexonerable

p. 101 [re: Confessions] loeuvre generates/capitalizes a sort of interest (won’t be so bold as to say surplus value) of guilt: overproduces shame that is archived (not effaced)

p. 102 de Man: never enough guilt to match text-machine’s infinite power to excuse

p. 104 confession is always more and/or less guilty (for addressor & addressee) in act of its inscription than the fault being confessed: that confession is never innocent is a first machine, undeniable program

WAP p. 70 re: coming “late” to think critically about teaching philosophy, Derrida explains he is not going to display histrionic guilt, as a matter of taste

PJP p. 171 university professors poisoned by the impotence of resentment [re: de Man Affair]

p. 187 anacoluthic catastrophe finds one of its privileged places in fold where the guilty accuses the witness, makes him bear responsibility for the offense

EL pp. 207-08 the vengeance of language (language as name of God) > a debt that leaves its signature in the language will be incurred by innocents, archiguilty, generations to come

——this is a logic that the cogito, practico-transcendental egology, cannot comprehend [i.e. cogito can’t comprehend language?]

HST p. 383 Levinas: ultimate proximity—to survive as a guilty one

LI p. 153 deniability in resentful attacks against deconstruction [de Man only a pretext], why is there so much fear, hate, denial of deconstruction? so much resentment?

p. 154 gesticulation of resentment always spectacular in its ignorance & cynicism

TN pp. 3-4 pray that you’ll outlive me, survivor guilt > the only reconciliation w/ death: not to see those I love die

BSi p. 209 [vis-à-vis Fontaine] that the sovereign’s [wolf’s] power (rage) is always an act of revenge, thus the beast [lamb] has originary guilt (ursprüngliche Schuldigsein): “si ce nest toi, cest donc ton frère

EU pp. 36-7 classic situation: Descartes’ resentment toward Hardy [universal language] tells us more about Descartes than what he claims to be discussing

——Descartes jealously insists on adding “true philosophy” to Hardy’s universal language [Descartes acts similarly w/ Augustine and St. Anselm] > stakes must be serious wherever there’s violent defamation, never forget this

SPEC p. 262 what is the child’s debt in a play w/out debt? on what w/out debt does play speculate in secret? what is the place of such a secret? [re: Freud’s debt to Nietzsche]

p. 263 if one’s [intellectual] debt is always another’s, one is acquitted & guilty in advance? comment spéculer sur la dette dun autre à soi revenant (amounting to, coming back to oneself)?

pp. 264-65 Nietzsche dared to link debt to the unconscious, a debt to that which one feels in advance acquitted, the debt of another that comes back to torment you

p. 264n [Derrida will link Nietzsche’s debt to Heidegger’s Schuldigsein elsewhere]

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

p. 339 “il senvoieet la poste fait suivre, elle ne donne ni ne demande jamais dacquit définitif pour le solde du mandat” [sends himself w/out acquittance to meet the balance]

RESISTANCE

H p. 7 diamacheteon, heated combat, carry war into logoi, arguments, discourse [see SPOM p. xvii sexpliquer avec la mort, auseinanderstzen, argue, battle, come to grips w/ death]

p. 71 hospitality’s infinite idea should resist the law itself

AF p. 31 to not take account of the Freudian impression [resistance], one confirms, countersigns (archives) his theory of “repression”

POOF p. 9 for Aristotle, “one loves only by declaring that one loves,” science, knowledge, self-consciousness in the lover, this is incontestable: “one cannot bear witness against it without being party to it” [Derrida does have objections]

MPM p. 31 de Manian criticism/deconstruction always analysis of “resistances” and symptoms they produce [i.e. “resistance to theory” in literary studies]

SH p. 3 the resistance thought of “once” gives one to think, let’s let ourselves be approached by this offering

T p. xix resistance to deconstruction: infinite mastery > assurance of Being & interiorization of every limit as being, as its own proper

F p. xix crypt: pocket of resistance

FWT p. 99 singularity resists, remains, sometimes it even resists being assigned to “subjectivity”

OS p. 62n political resistance often highly “moral” alibi [re: Heidegger] for another resistance: for philosophical resistance, denegation of the text, refusal to read

ROP p. 1 faudrait-il résister? et d'abord à l'analyse? must analyze this “il faut

p. 2 Derrida loves French word résistance, loaded w/ pathos of his nostalgia, dreams of bombing in the ‘40s > secret of inconsolable nostalgia resists analysis, kinda like navel of dream

p. 4 a meaning that exceeds but doesn’t resist analysis: Freud’s verborgene Sinn

p. 8 Freud says he’s responsible for the Lösung (analysis, solution, medication) but not the resistance of the patient, patient alone is responsible for his/her resistance

p. 9 sträuben (to stand on end, to resist), recalcitrant to treatment

pp. 9-10 the poleros (politics, polemos, eros, seduction) of analysis, ends in an abyss, where resistance to psychoanalytic Lösung, in the name of truth, can only be a disavowal > to analyze, to say to other: prefer, take, love my solution, you will be in truth if you do not resist my solution

——Derrida proposes an other resistance, that of the remainder, thus a restanalysis

p. 16 is resistance (Widerstände) to analysis something that later one can interpret (Enlightenment logic, progressivism), or is it an unanalyzable darkness (fatalistic pessimism), or is it heterogenous to interpretation [resistance as the very wish of a dream]

——psychoanalysis is in principle nonhypnotic, affirms right to resistance to hypnosis (and said resistance’s insurmountability)

p. 17 it is thus the trace that resists analysis

——violence of psychoanalysis: turn resister into “collaborator” (Freud’s words), or then deprive patient’s defenses of all value

pp. 18-9 royal weaver (le tisserand royal) of Platonic dialectic (then Aristotle, Hegel, Kant), belongs to order of ideational consciousness, cannot intervene to remove resistance of any sort

p. 20 if there is not one resistance to psychoanalysis, then there is no “la psychanalyse” > more than one psychoanalysis, resistance, for noncontingent, nonaccidental reasons

pp. 21-2 Freud’s 5 resistances in “Inhibition, Symptom, Anxiety,” one of which is the ego benefiting from the illness > Derrida finds such behavior so commonplace, he wonders by what confused concept of illness this could be an interesting singularity

pp. 22-5 death drive and repetition compulsion (Wiederholungszwang), hyperbolic resistance of nonresistance, “resistance of the unconscious,” thwarts working through, une résistance qui n’a pas de sens (death drive), nest pas une résistance > [does this concept present analysis itself? is it the structure of analysis? does it fold over? upset the meaning of the series?]

pp. 23-5 death drive and repetition compulsion, hyperbolic resistance, as analytic, as the urge to speak, to analyze

——Beyond the Pleasure Principle as site of psychoanalysis’ own resistance to itself

pp. 24-5 pourquoi mon explication avec lanalyse [psychoanalysis] a toujours eu ce goût de mort en poste restante qui ma poussé à rôder sans fin dans les parages de Beyond the Pleasure Principle [?]

p. 25 to pluralize offers an emergency exit (se donner une issue de secours), until the plural kills you [re: title “Resistances”]

p. 26 entangled necessities: 1) resistance [to analysis] as double bind, other or outside at heart of internal auto-affective tension > it provokes analysis and dialectic to infinity, in order to resist both absolutely 2) resistance as la restance du reste, resists because la reste nest ou neste pas

p. 27 a third path that breaks symbolic, dialectical pact (authority of the 3), that would not be a third path: the square as that which most radically resists, un dernier carré

p. 32 no analytic position once resistance is not identifiable

p. 34 Lacan uses trinitarian figures to give firm consistency to a resistance supérieurement organisée > letter always arrives; here proceeds division btwn 3 & 4, btwn resistance bound up in repression & la restance disséminale, no longer belonging to economy of repression

pp. 86 death drive (repetition compulsion, fort/da), Evil Genius of Freud, the devil’s advocate, limping devil: by way of which psychoanalysis finds its speculative power & its greatest resistance

DST DST p. 208 resistance indicates sensitive point (lieu sensible) in a reading > point (point) of incomprehension that organizes it

p. 322n resistance to désistance is desire for assistance, paternal assistance, Oedipal help

unavoidable resistance to désistance as nonpathological inhibition, no rhythm w/out it, can say the same about the double bind (see p. 228 return to father, subject to law as inhibition, defense) [a safeguarding, a filiation, a subjectivity compelled by the caesura?]

PF p. xxiii [Kamuf on relation btwn resistance & response]

pp. xxix-xxx resistance: response, insistence

p. xxxii Kamuf (un)knots alibis of the concept around the major alibi: resistance

——concept w/out concept of resistance, brought in line (after twists/turns) w/ desistance, especially restance (restance in Glas: being “nothing,” w/out substance, upsets ontological question “What is it?”—older than distinction btwn “who” and “what”)

——res(is)ts > what remains to be thought resists thought, in advance, remains in advance

p. xxxiii only know what thought means by way of what resists/remains to be thought, thought remains to be thought

p. xxxiii passivity of resistance resists thought because it does the most, the impossible as heart of possible, makes the most happen

p. 282n resistance can be praised for fighting dogma, denounced as reactive/frightened disavowal

——rhetoric of defense becomes rhetoric of accusation

HLP p. 64 Derrida likes U.S. phrase “civil disobedience” (Thoreau), that respectable tradition where raison détat does not dispense last word in ethics

——resist positive laws (not all laws), laws that betray their own foundation

——Marrano: right to secrecy as right to resistance beyond order of political (or theologico-political in general)

TR p. 151 resistance of letter (force of resistance w/out material substance) affects body: dissociative, dismembering, disseminating [materiality w/out matter, formality w/out form]

PSSS pp. 245-46 psychoanalysis has failed to say anything original about mondialisation, tele-technic virtuality—has resisted, in autoimmune fashion, changing, thinking through, fundamental axioms of ethics, law, politics > must be a revolution re: concepts cruelty, sovereignty, resistance

TN p. 139 self-relation, “sefforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force sarrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

objectivity of being(s): 1) exposed before a gaze 2) opposes a resistance to touch > does the hand (being-before-the-hand) reconcile these two positional values of objectivity?

pp. 151-52 via de Biran, sense of “I” comes from hand: rough, too heavy resistance > he would know nothing about himself, if he did not experience resistance

UWC p. 204 university w/out conditions does not, in fact, exist > still, in principle, it remains ultimate place of critical resistance to dogmatism, unjust appropriation

——right to deconstruction as unconditional right to ask questions—even re: the authority of the question, the interrogative form

pp. 204-05 unconditional university, resistance to indivisible sovereignty, to nation-state, to economic, media, ideological, cultural, religious powers > all that limit democracy to-come

pp. 207-08 deconstruction has privileged place in Humanities, place of irredentist resistance > principle of civil disobedience, dissidence in name of law above laws, justice of thought

p. 208 thought: that which commands resistance

——deconstruct all determined figures sovereignty has taken throughout history

——university w/out conditions as a promise, pledge, a profession of faith

EU p. 23 violence comes from both sides, each term of opposition marked by other side (not simply passage btwn 2 poles): law/nonlaw, writing/speech, death/life, paternal/maternal language): always 2 forces of frayage and resistance: each bearing life/death at once

p. 97 Kant at once safeguards (garantissant) most totalitarian of social forms & gives place to intransigently liberal resistance

SPEC p. 339 “transference (Übertragung)” attempts to reduce “resistances” of patient, only displaces resistance, operates a resistance, as a resistance > no legacy (legs) w/out transference > inheritance of transference, legs, legation, delegation, differance of transference

WBH p. 196 resistance opposed to deconstruction same as one opposed to woman’s studies, “something sexual at stake in the resistance to deconstruction,” deconstruction successful in U.S. among homosexuals, feminists

RESPONSE

GOD p. 71 can only respond to the one, to the other, by sacrificing the one to the other > will never be able to justify this sacrifice, will always be held in secret

FK p. 66 one either responds to an address with absolute faith or reacts resentfully, impossible to tell which is the response, due to one contaminating the other

p. 68 the scholar’s (Benveniste’s) scruple, assurance and also hesitation, between the proper meaning and its other > quasi-automatic, machine-like, also religious: restraint of response

p. 71 religion always prescribes response and responsibility; a way to think will and freedom w/out autonomy

H p. 131 question of foreigner, question of response and responsibility

LOBL p. 155 essential irresponsibility of promise or response: crime of hymen > repeats itself endlessly, takes place w/out taking place [writing/reading]

POO p. 15 “is it possible to make a decision on the subject of ‘responding’ and of ‘responsiveness’?”

p. 17 one must always be free to not respond

pp. 21-2 the 4 risks of non-response:

1. non response risks ingratitude

2. silence, protection, “insolent weapon and most deadly irony,” absolutely elliptical, shelters, makes one safe from objection, undermines responsibility, very essence of socius

3. to justify nonresponse out of duty > nothing more immoral or impolite

4. the worst nonresponse, to respond inadequately and feign performative morality, modesty, sincerity

pp. 22-3 impossible to respond, impossible not to respond, double bind, 2 hands nailed down [no choice]

——brought to a halt [arrêt?] when faced w/ contradictory orders

p. 27 secret is absolute nonresponse

pp. 28-9 literature’s authorization to say everything acknowledges right to absolute nonresponse

——this nonresponse is hyperbolic condition of democracy (democracy to-come) contradicts historically limited democracy where calculable subject has to tell truth, has to reveal secret before the law (doctors, confession, psychoanalyst, lawyer, national defense)

p. 31 no responsiveness [in English], is that death [Levinas says so]? death dealt? I see no reason not to call that life, existence, trace [w/out being the contrary]

OOG p. 149 for Husserl, speech is historical because it is always already a response, responsibility means shouldering a word one hears spoken > look after the advance of sense

VM p. 103 affinity btwn Blanchot & Levinas re: hollow space (creux) of finitude in which messianic eschatology resonates, w/in expectation (attente), response, cette réponse sappelle encore attente, bien sûr, mais cette attente ne se fait plus attendre pour Levinas

OH p. 107 press brings light of day to its publicity, (se) donner…(pour) le jour, gives daylight to day itself > right of response hardly exists

p. 122-23n Valéry: freedom is always a response

POOF p. 49 responsibility to countersign ‘Friends, there are no friends’: its destiny rides on the event of a response that has come from its addressees

p. 70 Derrida assumes responsibility for speaking rightly, justly, up to the point where he is no longer responsible: that is, the point from which all responsibility is announced [the response no longer belongs to me]

pp. 250-52 a grammar beyond grammar of response, friendship a privileged locus for this reflection: 1) on répond de soi [for self]: subject, agency of ‘proper name’ 2) on répond d'abord à lautre [to]: more originary than other two, ‘insistence’ of Other, dissymmetrical anteriority that marks time as structure of responsibility 3) répondre devant [before]: marks, right on idiom, passage to institutional agency of alterity, no longer singular but universal, before the law, agency authorized

p. 250 temporal torsion [O my friend, no friend, contretemps], dissymmetry envelops theoretical knowledge in performativity of prayer it could never exhaust, we return to question of the response

PAS PAS p. (54) simulacrum of circle, EROS, the double pas, he/it that says viens inaugurates it by responding déjà

FWT pp. 52-3 event worthy of the name absolutely surprises me, so I can’t not respond, exposed beyond all mastery, dare I say, happily vulnerable

p. 65 acc. Descartes, animal is reaction w/out response (& Kant, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger)

ATIA p. 33 the question of whether animals can respond also concerns whether they can erase (seffacer), can they lie, pretend, cover their own tracks

p. 166n if Zusage (language “before,” w/out question) is before the possibility of response, then wouldn’t Zusage be something the animal is not deprived of?

p. 52 every response to “who am I?” is only something I can answer, auto-biography, but it’s also quotation, an aping, miming [idiom & inheritance]

——Lacanian animals, like Socrates’ writing (painting), do not respond (majestic silence, always replying the same)

p. 84 for Descartes, animal can respond to a call/order/sign of its name but not a question

——question of response, question of question, where response to question would remain unprogrammable > abyss of “what is a response?”

p. 85 Porphyry, in his ethics on vegetarianism, uses word Upakouō to claim animals do respond, even though they are silent

p. 87 from Descartes to Heidegger, nonresponse: mechanicity of programming, deficiency, lack

p. 111 responsibility of one who says “here I am” is Levinas’ first inspiration for his “first philosophy”; it is autodeictic, autobiographical: 1) exposing oneself before the law 2) ability to respond to an appeal or command of the other

——death, for Levinas, the moment the other no longer responds (different from animal nonresponse)

***p. 112 all thinkers who demand response to be human don’t think iterability essential to every response: which adds an automatic, mechanical reaction to the most alive, authentic, responsible

pp. 124-25 presupposed absence of response in animal, that it is only capable of reaction: identifies animal w/ machine [Derrida not erasing this distinction, but doubts its purity]

p. 125 Derrida has problem w/ fact that Lacan’s ethics, the subject, founded on distinction btwn reaction/response > destiny of iterability: automaticity of reaction in every response (p. 126 a pure, indivisible line)

p. 126 Derrida affirms Lacan’s “the subject receives even the message he emits [from the Other]” as a way to inscribe reaction/response in all vicissitudes of the living

DST DST p. 221 no matter how “free” or deconstructed the response, one cannot reduce the delay (retard): an event, a law, a call are already there (others are there, for/before whom one must answer); “response inaugurates nothing if it does not come after

PF p. xxiii [Kamuf on relation btwn resistance & response]

pp. xxix-xxx resistance: response, insistence

p. 283n mustn’t a response respond beside the point, mustn’t it surprise? > justement et juste à côté de la question: not by program but by aporia

***WAP p. 66 pursue demand (exigence) for responsibility interrogating w/out renouncing classical norms: sans limite, exercising “droit de réponse” at least as “question en retour” re: link btwn response & responsibility

——this knowledge, ce quon peut et ce quon doit en faire

EJQB p. 76 is not the writing of the question, the first violence re: the question, a first response and repose, lerrance (wandering) as history, first crisis, first forgetting, the dissimulation of lerrance?

PJP p. 167 essential finitude of discontinuous anamnesis inscribes ellipses/eclipses in identity of subject

——undecided btwn provocative irony, disarming sincerity: one responds both responsibly & irresponsibly

HST p. 393 Levinas: response to the hope for the present is the very expression of the“I,” exigency to redeem instant of despair; hope for present as a primary fact in mystery of time

***p. 400 abyss of non-response to aporetic question: condition of responsibility

AD pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (lentretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech [see

CALL AND RESPONSE

]

BSi pp. 55-6 non-response of animal as ultimate difference from man (Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan, Descartes, Hobbes)

***p. 57 sovereign as God does not (need to) respond [Levinas’ death] > sovereignty expropriates ecstasy of irresponsibility: bestiality, divinity, death (each dogmatically designated as unresponsive)

pp. 178-79 if very meaning of lexicon of bêtise, being-bête, is not absolutely translatable (abyss of translation), one cannot reserve bêtise for man as sovereign & free > if meaning is linked to relation of forces, distinction btwn reaction/response loses its rigor and decidability [must revise everything]

OG p. 31 (47) form of question can predestine the response [re: Saussure]

ATAP pp. 81-2 if eschatological question always surprises us, response to it is impossible: [eschatology?] an appeal promising & responding before the question

EU p. 83 response: initial form & minimal requirement of responsibility > structure of call to responsibility so anterior to any positive response—nonresponse a priori assumes responsibility

p. 91 Derrida discusses how one can dissolve value of responsibility by relativizing/secondarizing subjectivity, consciousness, or intentionality > in such cases, one doesn’t question link btwn responsibility & freedom of subject—one keeps axiomatics in tact [Lacan, psychoanalysis?]

——more interesting, perhaps impossible, think responsibility as linterpellation requiring response, beyond juridico-egological form, encore à venir, plusjeune” (younger, still to come)

WBH p. 199 gift determines, produces identity of giver & receiver, gives itself the right to determine, always a strike of force, irruption

p. 200 receiver as determining factor of gift, one who responds, performativity of text produces receiver w/out pre-existing [him/her/it]

RESPONSIBILITY

GOD p. 4 demonic (esoteric, secret, sacred, lines blurred btwn human & animal) vs. responsibility [Nietzsche’s ressentiment?]

p. 6 European history gets lost in details, doesn’t think abyss at heart of history that prevents totalization, misunderstands link btwn historicity & responsibility

p. 8 gift of death, marriage of responsibility & faith, history depends on this excessive beginning > new experience of death

——via Patočka, 2 heterogenous secrets: 1) secret of historicity 2) secret of orgiastic mystery which history of responsibility has to break w/

p. 9 via Patočka, history of responsible, built on heritage and patrimony of secrecy, begins w/ Plato’s break from orgiastic mystery, continues w/ Christianity’s mysterium tremendum > a tremor in figures of death as figures of gift, or as gifts of death

pp. 10-11 [economy of the sacrifice] in turn toward new mystery, toward new structure of responsibility, prior one never eliminated, kept w/in oneself, mourned as crypt of a more ancient secret > is this repression, is this a kind of sacrificial Aufhebung?

p. 13 Patoçka: Plato’s novel idea is will to leave womb of Earth Mother, follow path of “pure light,” subordinate (podřídit) orgiastic entirely to responsibility

p.14 Plato’s responsibility, or discipline, press one secret to work in service of another, put the demonic secret of Eros to work in this new hierarchy

p. 22 demonic irresponsibility

p. 23 acc. Patoçka, “new flood of orgiastic” is forever imminent, an abdication of responsibility

pp. 26-8 responsibility, aporia btwn choice and heresy (hairesis as choice, election), a type of secrecy that keeps responsibility apart (tient la responsabilité à lécart) and in secret, the very thing responsibility insists on

p. 46 for Heidegger, it is in being-toward-death, in promise of death, that one is given sameness of self, Jemeinigkeit, that one hears the call (Ruf), and responsibility comes into play

***p. 48 dying of or for the other, the most ancient, institutes responsibility as giving oneself death, se-donner-le-mort ou offrir sa mort, cest-à-dire sa vie > ethical dimension of sacrifice

pp. 51-52 accession to responsibility through experience of irreplaceability, which is given through apprehension of death

——this responsibility must be guilt because responsibility is always unequal to itself: I will never be on the level of this infinite goodness > what gives my singularity, death & finitude, is what makes me unequal to the infinite goodness of the gift

——2 contradictory moments of responsibility: 1) to answer for what one does and gives as an irreplaceable singularity 2) efface the origin of what one gives

pp. 56-57 trembling in mysterium tremendum? gift of infinite love, dissymmetry btwn gaze of God, and me not seeing what looks at me (gift and endurance of death in irreplaceable) > disproportion btwn infinite gift & my finitude > responsibility: salvation, sin, culpability, sacrifice

p. 62 aporia of responsibility: always risks not managing to accede to concept of responsibility in process of forming it; for Kierkegaard, the ethical is a temptation that would make Abraham irresponsible

——ethical must sometimes be refused in name of responsibility that doesn’t calculate, that keeps its secret, that tyrannically [Nietzsche], jealously refuses violence of accounts and justifications, declining autobiography that is auto-justification: egodicée

pp. 67-8 secrecy essential to sacrificial responsibility, absolute, infinite, duty in name of God as tout autre, who must remain transcendent, hidden, secret, jealous of love, commands he gives

——absolute duty denounces all duties, responsibilities of human law [i.e. general ethics]

p. 71 orders of responsibility in sacrificial war of religions of Book and beyond: ethico-political, theologico-political, secret/public, profane/sacred

p. 76 does system of sacrificial responsibility & double “gift of death” require exclusion (sacrifice) of woman? [re: absence of women in Isaac & Abraham story and “Bartleby the Scrivener”]

pp. 78-80 a decision is always secret, always secret in instant of its performance; Abraham’s decision is absolutely responsible: answers for itself before the absolute other

p. 93 a look, God’s look, God’s gaze, that cannot be exchanged, situates original sin, is the essence of responsibility [p. 91 not Kantian autonomy, freedom]

GT p. 31 which law obligates one to answer for, to account for, a gift that calls one beyond all responsibility?

R p. 49 aporia: condition of possibility and impossibility, of responsibility

p. 42 Levinas placed responsibility before and above “difficult freedom”

p. 81 I have used “democracy to come” irresponsibly, leaving a reserve of excessive responsibility

MONL p. 25 neither lack nor alienation, alienation without alienation > origin of our responsibility, structures peculiar property of language

H p. 131 question of foreigner, question of response and responsibility

LOBL p. 155 essential irresponsibility of promise or response: crime of hymen > repeats itself endlessly, takes place w/out taking place [writing/reading]

POO p. 10 capitale (head on), problema (ob-subject, promontory cap, armor; excuse given to excuse oneself of blame), p. 137n cap as “front,” problem as diverted responsibility

pp. 10-1 responsibility not in ones own name but arises in structure of supplementarity: in my name as the name of the other > singularity quakes in exemplary equivocality of this “as”

p. 11 when Derrida says one should not approach experience of responsibility in a thetic way, to argue that this “do not do it” has a shortcoming, that it should appear before moral tribunal, misses its demonstrative rigor > strict rigor sheltered from all questioning [cf. GLAS pp. 50-1]

p. 15 a higher responsibility, a more intractable (intraitable) moral exigency, uneven as it may be, [Nietzsche’s Aussermoralischen Sinn]; p. 133n “pure morality” go beyond duty, beyond duty as debt, duty w/out debt, a silent break w/culture and language

p. 16 “What is?” what is responsibility, ethicity of ethics, morality of morality? urgent, unanswerable questions

p. 20 nonresponse as form of politeness, responsible form of vigilant exercise of responsibility > one cannot or one ought not to fail to respond (ought/can strangely co-implicated, perhaps)

OOG p. 52 Husserl: “if science, w/ radical responsibility, has reached decisions they can impress on life habitual norms as volitional bents…from w/in which individual decisions ought…to confine themselves”

p. 141 phenomenology: starts from a lived anticipation [Idea in Kantian sense would be operative not thematic] as radical responsibility absent in Kant

p. 149 for Husserl, speech is historical because it is always already a response, responsibility means shouldering a word one hears spoken > look after the advance of sense

FL pp. 248-49 responsibility before memory is responsibility before the very concept of responsibility that regulates the justness of our behavior

——responsibility abandons and denies itself in dogmatic slumber

FK p. 51 Heidegger’s responsible-guilty-indebted (Shuldigsein) supposedly pre-moral, not Christian

p. 55 “responsibility of repetition in the wager (gage) of decision or of affirmation (re-legere) which links up with itself to link with the other” [desert, messianic, khōra]

p. 71 religion always prescribes response and responsibility; a way to think will and freedom w/out autonomy

AF p. 36 to know what archive means, we will only know in time to come: question of the future itself, of a response, promise, a responsibility for tomorrow (spectral messianicity at work in archive)

SPOM p. xiv “infinite responsibility, therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good conscience”

p. xviii no justice w/out principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, devant les fantômes de ceux qui ne sont pas encore nés ou qui sont déjà morts > possibility provided by “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present”

p. 24 when one arrives after the crime [essence of the tragic] one still bears responsibility if only in a self-confession that confesses the other (se confesser en confessant lautre)

p. 64 I accepted address (invitation) “so as not to flee from a responsibility”

POR p. 20 (154-55) keep the memory and the chance, desire for memory and exposure to the future, fidelity of a guardian faithful enough to keep the chance of a future > the singular responsibility of what he does not have and of what is not yet

HASD p. 16 how to defer and assume responsibility for a promise?

p. 30 no responsibility w/out prior coming (prévenance) of trace, or if autonomy were first and absolute [?]

——order or promise, injunction commits (me), rigorously asymmetrical manner > to deny, elude responsibility, it’s still necessary that I countersign it

MPM p. 34 we came to ourselves through the memory of possible mourning; inconsolable [infinitely responsible] before finitude of memory: [want memory to be infinite?]

POOF p. 36 philosophers of the future will be at once its [the fundamentally other] figure & responsibility

p. 37 Nietzsche’s teleiopoesis, a messianic structure, we establish ourselves as heralds & precursors [of ‘community of those w/out community’?], Nietzsche sometimes says “I” and sometimes “we”: singular responsibility is always double [contretemps], doubled, disseminated: double as infinitely divided responsibility

——[ethics of EROS?] double infinite responsibility: “an intertwining of temporal ekstases; a friendship to come of time w/ itself where we meet again the interlacing of the same and the tout autre (‘Grundlich-Anderes’)”

p. 70 Derrida assumes responsibility for speaking rightly, justly, up to the point where he is no longer responsible: that is, the point from which all responsibility is announced [the response no longer belongs to me]

pp. 81-2 compulsive droning of political “realism” that would refuse to read all the warnings & pleas of disjunction > what does it mean that, henceforth, ineluctable voice of necessity (its most responsible voice) resounds in this way [in disjunction, what has reality become?]?

p. 165 ‘all men are brothers’: a responsibility, that is always, of course, exemplary (claim to universalism) > reconciles double imperative: brother (face & mirror, original & copy, one & other) is always exemplary & that is why there’s war

p. 229 Derrida discusses his own personal responsibility re: the privileged discourses on friendship he has chosen to discuss > he’s not submitting to their authority, he’s thinking about forces or procedures that have placed them in the major position

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

pp. 250-52 a grammar beyond grammar of response, friendship a privileged locus for this reflection: 1) on répond de soi [for self]: subject, agency of ‘proper name’ 2) on répond d'abord à lautre [to]: more originary than other two, ‘insistence’ of Other, dissymmetrical anteriority that marks time as structure of responsibility 3) répondre devant [before]: marks, right on idiom, passage to institutional agency of alterity, no longer singular but universal, before the law, agency authorized

pp. 252-56 via Kant, responsibility (response, speaking, time) of friendship linked to respect (distance, gaze, space) > Kant links highest friendship to ‘moral law,’ to distance, repulsion, links love to attraction—if it’s a duty to intend toward dignity of ‘sympathy’ & ‘communication (Mitteilung),’ ‘ardour’, excess, of love can break equality while maintaining reciprocity > there must be outward signs, (external) testaments of friendship [?]

A p. 16 most general/indeterminate form of double single duty: responsible decision must obey an “it is necessary” that owes nothing, owes nothing in order to be a duty, duty w/out debt, thus w/out duty

——nonpassive endurance of aporia: condition of responsibility, neither dialectizable contradiction like Hegel, Marx, nor transcendental illusion like Kant

p. 19 to protect decision or responsibility by knowledge, theoretical assurance, is to transform this experience into deployment of program

——but, should not abandon programs, they are the guardrail of a responsibility to whose calling they remain radically heterogenous

SEC p. 316 to write is to produce a mark that is a kind of machine, legible in scribe’s absence (this drifting of absolute responsibility, this orphaned writing > what Plato condemns in Phaedrus)

VM p. 80 community of question, unbreachable (inentamable) responsibility, impossible has already occurred [beings, history] > there’s a history of the question, pure memory of pure question makes possible all inheritance, announces an injunction, discipline: question must be maintained

p. 130 infinitist dogmatism in pre-Kantian style does not pose question of responsibility of finite philosopher, overlooks irreducibility of history (infinite passage through violence)

p. 137 for Heidegger, Logos “is the Logos of no one” > anonymous as possibility of name and responsibility (see also pp. 140-141 on Being and responsibililty)

S pp. 67-8 Derrida asks Heidegger: how can we move from resignation to responsibility? Heidegger responds by calling it back to care of Being, the question and language

OH p. 28 we did not choose this responsibility of our heritage [it is from the other, the language of our language], nor the capitalizing memory we have of it

p. 35 responsibility: making a chance of the memory of a name, of the idiomatic limit > an opening of identity to its future

p. 41 ethics, politics, responsibility only begin in aporia of double injunction

p. 44 alliance of capital and a-capital (the other of capital): this seems impossible, it is, such is the nature of all responsibility

p. 52 [summary of political responsibility today] denounce divergences btwn principle and the determined limits of their representation > task always urgent, infinite > identity instituted in responsibility as experience/experiment of the response

p. 70 via Valéry, people who read are responsible for, respond before, turn memory into “solid value,” create an absolute surplus value, increase of universal capital, “world’s wealth” increases

p. 95 doesn’t a democrat have the responsibility to analyze unrelentingly democracy's historical determinations?

FWT pp. 5-6 [re: responsibility as experience of inheritance] a double before (devant), to come before as in debt and before as in what is to come, always anachronism: devancer in the name of what came before, and devancer the name itself! [la devance, “owingness”]

——to invent one’s name, sign otherwise, in the name of the name passed down, if that’s possible

p. 52 what comes?: what calls upon & overwhelms my responsibility, responsibility before my freedom, freedom w/out autonomy

p. 83 revolution, interruption: only event worthy of the name (all responsibility: revolutionary)

p. 127 literature is the [an-]institution of absolute candor & freedom, under no positive law, mutation in concept of responsibility

***p. 193 there is a universal “structure” of heteronomic election: I am the only one called to do this or that, irreplaceable in the place of decision, in obligation to respond “I am here,” this election of each gives to all responsibility worthy of the name, if there is any, its chance/condition > also, Derrida is very suspicious of “doctrine” of election, & binding this universal to Judaism

p. 176 “Questions of Responsibility” (series of lectures for a decade or more): hospitality, secret, forgiveness, testimony, now DP

——Freud helps us question tranquil assurances of responsibility

ROP p. 113 Foucault pulls back from (admits impasses of) epistēmē > mais seul ceux qui travaillent, seuls ceux qui prennent des risques en travaillant rencontrent des difficultés > responsibility dans lépreuve de laporie

ATIA p. 83 the abyss of autos, ipseity, autokinesis: we must surrender (get) to the heart of the abyss btwn law of nature (reaction) & law of freedom (response & responsibility)

p. 111 responsibility of one who says “here I am” is Levinas’ first inspiration for his “first philosophy”; it is autodeictic, autobiographical: 1) exposing oneself before the law 2) ability to respond to an appeal or command of the other

p. 126 Derrida affirms Lacan’s “the subject receives even the message he emits [from the Other]” as a way to inscribe reaction/responsibility in all vicissitudes of the living

FS p. 9 writing, not a determined pathos, an empirical state of writer, but responsibility of angustia: [Derrida is privileging a power of equivocality over creativity of classical God, anguish connoting a narrowing, a loss of breath, a restriction, constraint, and thus the anguish of choice]

O p. 6 first effect of dissemination: individuality & responsibility no longer predominate [Nietzschean irresponsibility?]

DPi p. 119 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] literature “expresses w/out expressing,” “this death w/out death” defines horizon w/out horizon of responsibility w/out responsibility of writer

p. 257 protest in the name of my heart when I fight (en me battant), so that heart of the other will continue to beat (battre)—in me, before me, after me, w/out me: invested by responsibility

DST DST pp. 220-21 désistance: one of the most demanding thoughts of responsibility > that the traditional categories don’t suffice places irresponsibility rather on the side of these categories: how can one assume responsibility in désistance, the responsibility of désistance itself?

***HLP p. 56 to hurry to produce an “effect of truth” w/out a certain conscientiousness: neither to lie, nor to error, nor Arendt’s self-deception

***WAP p. 66 pursue demand (exigence) for responsibility interrogating w/out renouncing classical norms: sans limite, exercising “droit de réponse” at least as “question en retour” re: link btwn response & responsibility

——this knowledge, ce quon peut et ce quon doit en faire

PF p. xxvii alibi—plea for defense, has meaning only where there’s accusation, guilt, thus responsibility (judicial or penal, but first of all ethical or political)

——can there be a trace (and thus alibi) elsewhere than scene of culpa-responsi-bility, scene of debt, duty (Schuld, Schuldigsein)? an originary alibi that precedes juridico-ethico-political, but isn’t ontological neutrality?

pp. xxx-xxxi w/out alibi might look like irresponsibility

——but to go from alibi to alibi, not knowing where one is going, to only have alibis, is to be w/out alibi: not proud, not innocent, a blatant offense, flagrante delicto, of irresponsibility

TR p. 297n Rousseau’s interest in justice of inheritance/reading: responsible countersignature

IW p. 266 for Cohen, Gewissen (Protestantism) completed form of Platonic idealism, put our trust “only in the work of one’s own conscience (allein die eigene Arbeit des Gewissens)”: liberates & burdens religious thought, emancipation & oppression at same time > pure internal responsibility

PJP p. 167 essential finitude of discontinuous anamnesis inscribes ellipses/eclipses in identity of subject

——undecided btwn provocative irony, disarming sincerity: one responds both responsibly & irresponsibly

p. 171 quasi “presence” of [de Man’s] spectral vigilance, gaze, we’re being observed internally by him > does not limit our freedom, sharpens our responsibility

EL p. 218 responsibility on edge of double possibility, undecidability of das Geschlecht des Übergangs (generation of transition), entre-deux, “mi-lieu,” edge of abyss is same as above abyss [Derrida links to Heidegger’s anxiety, abyss, responsibility, Entschlossenheit (resoluteness)]

p. 219 [re: “we” of apocalyptic speech] responsibility is ineluctable, finds sign of its freedom in this fatality > not Kantian practical universality, formalizable obligation: does not replace itself, delegate itself

p. 222 question of decision & responsibility (that of our generation) returns (revient) to us out of (depuis) undecidable bottom, which is, au fond, undecidable

HST pp. 390-91 responsibility before freedom as paradox of freedom: responsibility before the other in order to be free; no doubt one must be free to sin, to ask forgiveness

***p. 400 abyss of non-response to aporetic question: condition of responsibility

LI pp. 137-38 that trace de-limits what it limits is why the finiteness of a context has an indefinite opening—never secure, simple > in this openness of erasure: political responsibility (where irreducible violence communicates w/ an essential nonviolence) > only the irresponsible (to be polemical) will object, those for whom things are always calculable, clear, programmable, decipherable

pp. 152-53 unconditionality defines injunction that prescribes deconstruction: let another language, other thoughts, make their way

——Derrida hesitates to characterize all this in Kantian terms (though unconditionality intentionally recalls Kant’s CI) because those philosophemes call for deconstructive questions: he experiences a new responsibility, which he respects enough never to compromise

ATM p. 158 when Levinas says responsibility is “probably” the essence of language: must allow language freedom to betray its own essence [ethical] so that it can surrender (se rendre) to it

p. 168 Levinas: proximity as responsibility for the Other, and responsibility for the Other as substitution

p. 173 Levinas has not only withdrawn dissymmetrical responsibility from circle (of pact, debt, synchronic reciprocity, recognition) but also from annular alliance, from the rounds (tour), whatever makes the rounds of a finger, of a sex or sexual organ [?]

EW p. 268 in relation to “yes,” Zusage presupposed in every question, one must seek (post-deconstructive) responsibility of the subject

pp. 272-73 no responsibility that’s not excessive, must be incalculable, otherwise reducible to program, calculation, causality, or, at best, “hypothetical imperative”

p. 276 origin of call comes from nowhere, an origin that’s not yet a divine or human “subject” institutes responsibility at root of ulterior ones (moral, juridical, political)

p. 278 do we have a responsibility to the living? “no” > because the question is asked through canonized or hegemonic discourse of Western Metaphysics (even Heidegger & Levinas)

p. 286 surplus of responsibility would never authorize any silence [re: Auschwitz]

AD p. 6 for Levinas, death is experience for the survivor of “without-response” > not, first of all, annihilation, non-being, nothingness: survivor’s guilt as guilt w/out fault/debt, as entrusted responsibility

——it is the murderer who identifies death w/ nothingness (Cain)

p. 7 Levinas: “responsibility for the other,” “responsibility of the hostage,” an experience of substitution & sacrifice

p. 83 for Levinas, “substitution,” absolute passivity, “possibility of the impossible” that’s not Heidegger’s death, but the condition of the hostage, responsibility before/beyond death— impossibility of “slipping away (se dérober)”

p. 148n Levinas: responsibility w/out concern for reciprocity—commitment from ‘profound past’ of immemorial

BSi pp. 308-09 question of responsibility is a question of threshold, from which one passes from reaction to response, same threshold as liberty, indivisible limen btwn beast & sovereign [these humanistic figurations of the threshold are being deconstructed]

EU p. 83 response: initial form & minimal requirement of responsibility > structure of call to responsibility so anterior to any positive response—nonresponse a priori assumes responsibility

p. 88 Heidegger’s move beyond responsibility for a determinate knowledge or power: must first answer to being, for the call of being—must think this coresponsibility

p. 91 Derrida discusses how one can dissolve value of responsibility by relativizing/secondarizing subjectivity, consciousness, or intentionality > in such cases, one doesn’t question link btwn responsibility & freedom of subject—one keeps axiomatics in tact [Lacan, psychoanalysis?]

——more interesting, perhaps impossible, think responsibility as linterpellation requiring response, beyond juridico-egological form, encore à venir, plusjeune” (younger, still to come)

p. 110 since founding responsibility occurs by acts/performance, interrogation of philosophy no longer simply belongs to philosophical setting, question inseparable from act of foundation > foundation of new university law is necessary: to say it’s necessary is to say one has to take [a new kind of] responsibility for it [Nietzsche] [what’s beyond philosophy in philosophy]

SPEC pp. 378-79 Freud’s “to let develop” [re: Aristophanes’ speech] mortgages irresponsibility, no engagement, epokhē of judgment, speaks from no-place [Lacan takes Beyond… too seriously?]

RESTITUTION

GT p. 12 gift annulled each time there is restitution or countergift

p. 14 temporalization of time (memory, present, anticipation, pro, re-tention, imminence of future, “ecstases”) destroys the gift via keeping (la garde), restitution, comprehending in advance

p. 40 demand of gift/countergift, circulatory differance, requirement of restitution “at term,” delayed “due date,” thing itself demands gift & restitution

RESURRECTION [fixerup]

LOBL p. 117 suspension as resurrection

p. 126 btwn the call & the resurrection, there’s no time > absolute event, not effect of a cause, the cause, causa, la Chose, first name itself

p. 127 je marrête > “same interdiction encrypts the resurrection at the moment when he sees the terrible Chose

MPM p. 58 for de Man, memory of traces of a past never present, which always remain to come—from the future, this promise of resurrection of anterior past, is a formal element, place where fictions & figures are elaborated

p. 63 de Man on Baudelaire: write so fast, precipitously, don’t let the phantom escape > a resurrection, a “ghost” story, “Lazarus, arise!”

PP p. 93 Thoth, god of resurrection, interested in death as a repetition of life, life as a rehearsal for death

SW p. 312 grand masters of discourse about resurrection: Saint Paul, Saint Augustine

——Derrida interested in a return to life that’s not a resurrection, voyage w/out return

p. 314 waiting for a quasi-resurrection, in view of a first/last time, that has nothing to do w/ unveiling (w/ truth)

pp. 351-52 Derrida dreams of interruption of dream, a resurrection, at the ends of the verdict, that’s not a miracle but reality of the real, ordinary reality rendered beyond fantasy, hallucination > a verdict that never stopped suspending its moratorium, stretching out its imminence

p. 352 what luck, this verdict, feared chance, “enjoyment” here nicknamed resurrection, there will be for me worse than death > price to pay for extraordinarily ordinary life toward which I would like to turn w/out conversion > such enjoyment worth more than life itself [?]

DPi p. 33 [in Genet] Christlike ascension/elevation after the gallows, quasi-ressurection

pp. 33-4 bandalettes (bandages) on body signify death, condemnation of death, and when untied they signal that dead has risen, resuscitated, insurrectioned, insuressuscité

pp. 34-5 time of bandages: when body not found—when Jesus is not dead but not yet elevated, resuscitated > the lodging made ready for literature: ascension w/out ascension, elevation w/out elevation, immanence w/out immanence, imminent yet unaccomplished resurrection

——moment before noli me tangere [p. 35n unique moment, since Jesus is generally a touching Jesus], moment where mourning can’t set to work, there’s no corpse > when Mary and Antigone weep over absence of burial

p. 37 instant of bandages, Christ’s being-there w/out being-there: this Dasein that is not a Da-sein, this Fort/Da-sein of Christ who’s dead but not dead, mort vivant

p. 117 Blanchot’s right to death: right to give it, giving it to oneself (en se la donnant), inflicting DP; right to accede to death (not natural) by exceeding natural life > both the right that gives birth to literature and the law that gives birth to the law itself: literature thinks this right of/to right

pp. 117-19 Derrida believes in correctness of interpreting Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to Death” as a terrorist, terrorizing thinking of literature > but: 1) literary language is contradictory 2) death is a principle of salvation/resurrection 3) dying becomes an impossibility

p. 123 Jesus says to Lazarus: veni foras

p. 213 gallows erected “on Christendom” was founded on Christendom, betrayed it, put its spirit to death, which must be resurrected

HST pp. 391-92 for Levinas, resurrection/survival becomes miracle of each instant, where an “I” calls out for forgiveness (salvation, redemption, Messiah), every instant

p. 393 Levinas: future (avenir) as a resurrection of the present; “next instant” is an annulment of commitment to existence made in the instant; the “I’s” death in the empty interval: condition of new birth

——at moment where everything is lost, everything is possible

——Levinas: response to the hope for the present is the very expression of the“I,” exigency to redeem instant of despair; hope for present as a primary fact in mystery of work of time

——Levinas: hope is a hope for the present itself, “its martyrdom doesn’t slip into the past, leaving us w/ a right to wages”

p. 397 the definition of (a) today, sursis de vie, reconciliation in the impossible > great forgiveness as test/ordeal of unforgivable [re: 2 enemy Jews comically forgiving each other]

IF pp. 314-15 [Flaubert will not “divert the least thing” from Art] still philosophical to seek truth (idea) of idea as a primal scene of negativity/resentment in art, scene of guilt-ridden indebtedness to idea

p. 317 Flaubert: “acharne-toi sur une idée! ces femmes-là au moins ne meurent pas et ne trompent pas!”; Goethe: “beyond the graves, onward!”

REVELATION

GOD pp. 49-50 “gift of death,” Christian (Potačka), non-Christian (Heidegger, Levinas)? isn’t Christianity already the nondogmatic doublet of dogma, where revelation of event or event of revelation is unnecessary, the possibility of religion w/out religion

***p. 83 the speculative requires a heterotautological position (Hegel, revealed religion that is precisely Christian) [G], always risks meaning nothing, speculates on every secret [re: tout autre est tout autre]

FK p. 46 wherever arché of light commands, possibility more originary than manifestation > light there in discourse of philosophy, revelation, also, via Enlightenment, opposed to religion

p. 49 a “reflecting faith” acts; a “dogmatic faith” seeks revelation

pp. 54-55 revealability (Offenbarkeit), revelation (Offenbarung), which is first? former prior to all religion, or revelation the origin of light, the very invisibility of visibility?

p. 58 khōra exterior to all historical revelation, all anthropo-theological experience

p. 59 khōra, secret, desert of the desert (last desert, before the first), neither a threshold nor a mourning, btwn event and possibility, or virtuality of the event, not the desert of revelation

——a khōra w/out faith or law, an utterly faceless other

AF p. 80 question of revelation (Offenbarung) or revealability (Offenbarkeit): does the event make the archivization possible? or vice versa? besides, the after-the-fact, the trace, Nachträglichkeit, disturbs the logic of the these two theses

***LOBL ***LOBL p. 108 sur, “on”, the entire enigma of “supplementary logic” [cf. GLAS p. 81r “sur” vs. “dans”]

——survival & revenance, living on & returning from the dead: goes beyond life and death, supplementing each w/ sudden surge, a reprieve

p. 138 living on as phantom revenance (one who lives on is always a ghost), this is re-markable

POOF POOF p. 3 via Cicero, the friend as exemplary, illuminates, brings hope beyond death, elle la promet à la revenance testamentaire d'un plus-dé vie, d'un survivre qui restera ici l'un de nos thèmes

BL p. 191 all stories on law tell of its revelation

HASD pp. 48-9 contrary to khora, Christian apophasis is initiated by event of revelation which is also a promise, Jerusalem as place of event, place is event

p. 55 theology vs. onto-theology or theiology [Aristotle’s 1st philosophy] (Offenbarung vs. Offenbarkeit)

pp. 58-9 Heidegger privileges, by way of Luther, the revelation of Offenbarkeit, a revelation that occurs in the dimension of Being, over the religious Offenbarung

[dimension as difference]

WM WM p. 257 philosophical language, system of catachreses, “forced metaphors,” reveal original “ideas,” truth, by a twisting return toward already-there of meaning > revelation, unveiling

DS DS p. 261 “sure revelation of meaning” > hymen w/out fold, marriage w/out difference

FS FS p. 27 darkness (self-concealment) /light (self-revelation) founding metaphor of Western philosophy as metaphysics: photology

SW SW pp. 342-43 tallith as trace of date, event of singularity, not lifting, unfolding of veil—“even if one translates this gift of the Law as Revelation, the figure of the veil,” the taking-place of the event counts more than the “intuition & movement of vision”

p. 349 I do not foresee the future thus promised, I foretell it

——the gage of my foretelling destines: calls to make come, beyond any truth of ontological revelation

TB TB p. 132 less revelation than promise: “infinite rebirth (Aufleben) of languages”

PIO PIO pp. 33-4 for Descartes, Lebiniz, in Logic of Port-Royal: truth we find is not nature of thing itself but nature of our relation to thing itself

——“inventors of truth” are producers of propositions not sources of revelation, no one has ever invented anything > only truth as a proposition (connection of subject to predicate)

pp. 42-3 Schelling’s invention, re: philosopher as an inventor of forms, still limited as invention of the same in guise of supplement of invention: man’s invention supplements God’s ideality: man as psyche of God, as supplying the lack in his revelation

——here, invention caught in infinite amortization, rationalistic humanism, carries out God’s program; human invention as desire of/for God

TR TR p. 140 oath not to betray, more important than truth to be revealed (beginning of Rousseau’s Confessions)

p. 146 “I beseech you” not to “annihilate” [re: Confessions]: performative eve, arche-peformative before performative, younger & older, support & archive of confession

——its subjectile, very body of event, archival and auto-deictic body

——revelation of truth nothing w/out saving body of inscriptions

WAP p. 73 people haven’t noticed how often the dead return

AFR p. 73 innovation as revelation, analysis as analogical process, energy connecting present to absent > concept of force as force of repetition (retracing, supplying)

——Derrida sees here a silent explosion in text or fission in each concept (Condillac, elsewhere, denounces obscurantist force of “metaphor” [hence analogical value])

TN p. 35 for Nancy, excès de la façon (fashioning) sur lessence, et que lune supplée lautre, at origin of feeling oneself touch oneself; spectral revenant, prosthesis at heart of (self-)feeling > revenant, btwn life/death, dictates impossible mourning, sans fin—life itself [re: spacing irreducible to extensio]; p. 321n shouldn’t this spacing (what I call differance/trace) be linked to Heidegger’s tension of distancing (Gespanntheit) rather than Descartes’ extensio or even Freud’s Ausdehnung

***pp. 179-80 intruder on inside, constitutively haunted by some hetero-affection related to spacing, a host, a parasite, pharmakon, ghost: [each of these figures] habite en revenant tout for intérieur (inhabit one’s heart of hearts as a ghost)

AD pp. 52-4 discretion of face, not unveiling/revelation but an opening before the opening, not an opening to phenomenality, not Heidegger’s Erschliessung, Erschlossenheit, Offenheit

CIN p. 8 a voice does not betray a text: if it did, it would in the sense that betrayal is a revelation

EU pp. 53-4 for Kant, the historical element of Offenbarung is a theological matter, its rational element is philosophical (i.e. historical religion vs. rational religion)

p. 80 for Schelling, man is tasked w/ supplementing, complementing, the world’s manifestation (eine Ergänzung der Welterscheinung) > develop God’s revelation, which is lacking: this is called translation, it is the destination of the university

REVE REVENANT

MONL p. 58 necessity of other in language, always re-marked: one more first time, historical and singular, determines & phenomenalizes itself by bringing it back to itself

S S p. 40 Geist is always haunted by its Geist, a ghost is always the other’s ventriloquist; metaphysics always returns in the sense of a revenant, Geist is the most fatal figure of revenance: the double which can never be separated from the single

SPOM SPOM pp. 4-5 as soon as one no longer distinguishes spirit from specter, the former assumes a body, incarnates itself, as spirit, in specter > specter an instant of flesh and phenomenality, apparition

——flesh disappears in the apparition, dans la venue même du revenant ou le retour du spectre

p. 11 question of repetition, specter is always a revenant, can’t control its comings and goings > commence par revenir

p. 36 memories don’t recognize borders btwn ghosts of different generations, revenants pass through walls

p. 57 speculation (the hoarder) is always fascinated, bewitched by the specter, devoted in his alchemy to haunting or return of revenants

p. 125 spectacularizing speculation, theatricalization of speech, no shut-eye > so intent to watch the return (à guetter la retour) [on imaginary screen]

p. 166 “I am” = “I am haunted,” Ego = ghost; Es Spukt (translation misses impersonal, quasi-anonymity of German), “it spooks,” “it ghosts,” it specters,” ego inhabited by its own specter

——“es spukt” in Freud’s “Das Unheimliche,” production of figure the revenant (der Spuk)

pp. 178-83 in German Ideology, Marx’s 10 ghosts (revenants, Gespenst), ils se suppléent pour passer tour à tour lun dans lautre, chacun figurant un tour de lautre: 1) God 2) Das Wesen 3) vanity of world 4) die guten und bösen Wesen 5) das Wesen und sein Reich 6) beings 7) Man-God, Christ 8) man 9) spirit of the people (Volksgeist) 10) everything (“Alles in ein Spuk zu verwandeln), thus, we must stop counting

***p. 220 ghosts and mortals can put the dead to rest, the dead cannot, it is impossible “and they must not do so,” this impossibility, the dead putting dead to rest [p. 31 “do not reduce testimony to knowledge”?], can take place, it is the ruin or the absolute ashes, it is total presence, absolute evil, Derrida exorcises, not to chase but to grant ghosts the right to return (faire droit), revenant

MPM MPM p. 64 ghosts always pass quickly, infinite speed, presence w/out present that in coming back only haunts > the ghost, le re-venant, the survivor, figure or fiction, presence w/out presence, instant w/out duration, not nothing

A A p. 35 border of absolute arrivant keeps one from discriminating btwn figures of arrivant > the dead, the revenant (the ghost, he or she that returns)

pp. 60-1 Heidegger not interested in revenant or mourning—just death itself, not its figures or experiences of demise (Ableben)

p. 61 for Derrida, in contrast to Heidegger [Freud & Levinas too?], mourning, revenance, spectrality, living-on, surviving: non-derivable categories or non-reducible derivations

pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

SH SH p. 19 conventional forms of dating (charts, coded signs, spatiotemporal plottings, clocks, calendar) assign, consign, absolute singularity, must mark themselves off from themselves, a fatally equivocal power that enunciates the possibility of recurrence > not absolute recurrence (i.e. of the one time of circumcision/birth) but spectral recurrence of that which never will return

p. 50 uniqueness of every hour has its sister, its own, the same, its other revenant

F F pp. 118-19n ghost effect (ghost that comes haunting from someone else’s crypt, heterocryptography) ≠ crypt effect (foreigner incorporated in crypt of Self) > la revenance nest pas un retour du refoulé

“ventroliquist” speaks from topography w/in self or from foreign/parental topography

FWT FWT p. 81 Marx’s critique of ideology is a critique of the revenant > reproduces panic fear of spectrality, pursues, distances himself from, chases (away) the ghost

***pp. 159, 230-31n revenant different from specter/ghost (latter have horizons, are visible, come into light); revenant—think event & haunting together; revenant “almost” merges w/ trace itself

P P p. 26 art forms only one of the circles in the great circle of Geist, revenant (circle of art, circle of religion, circle of philosophy)

DPi pp. 4-5 Socrates’ death: katēgoria (accusation), a theological one: he introduced new demons (hetera de daimonia kaina), daimonia sometimes gods but also lesser ones, revenants

p. 174 Hugo: “what baleful revenants”

REST pp. 258-59 what revenue, what surplus value is unleashed, what ghost step (pas de revenant) still comes to haunt the shoe’s in their painting truth (the annulment of their use-value, their out-of-service dereliction)? [revenue & revenant]

——are they (the shoes) haunted by some ghost or la revenance itself

p. 360 Shapiro’s restitution brings a ghost back alive to a dead man, mais revenant, revenant vivant au mort: dès lors vivant, lui-même revenant, who is himself then a ghost returning, “personal object” coming back to the ghost (revenant au revenant)

——sacrifice in memory of another dead man, who [Goldstein] remains stony, like his name, mais revient aussi, comme un revenant, grâce au don de ce revenant [dead bury the dead?]

pp. 363-34 shoe, like letter, does not always arrive at its destination: condition of revenance [Derrida replaces “letter” w/ “shoe,” quoting a passage from FV]

p. 373 once there is ghost (fantôme) or double as revenant, logic of identification is not easily appeased > ghost of Van Gogh: genitive translates the malaise, Unheimlichkeit, all by itself

p. 380 “to suicide” someone —make him come back (le faire revenir) as a ghost (fantôme) or make him stay (le faire rester) as a ghost, où il est, en somme assez bien enterré, ne disposant plus que de ses pas? > pas de revenant, pas de nom [don’t let the dead bury the dead]

HLP p. 28 fabulous, phantasma, return of some specter: apparition of specter, vision of phantom, phenomenon of the revenant

——fable & phantasm do not belong to true or false

——irreducible species of simulacrum, penumbral light [cf. FK p. 55 desert as nocturnal light]

of a virtuality, neither being nor nothingness (no ontology/mimetology could account for it)

PSSS p. 256 these revenants must haunt our debates [Joshua Jung, Moses Freud] > cruel destiny of a proper name

EL p. 191 [re: Scholem’s letter] a revenant proclaims terrifying return of a ghost

p. 195 for Scholem, not only a loss of sacred language but its revenance in form of revenge

pp. 208-09 return, repetition, revenance, the re- in language, as language insofar as it inaugurates possibility of revenge in language

pp. 213-14 for Scholem, Sprache ist Namen, being of language resides in name, not in substantive but nominal, in power of naming (verbs were once names) > Derrida (via an internal reading) adds: must be a spectral haunting, there is a specter because there’s language, language can haunt because names haunt (neither present/absent) our sentences, language summons (convoque)—category of spectral revenant (not a flower of rhetoric) figures a beyond oppositional ontologic or dialectic of presence/absence

——a dynamis, enveloped virtuality, a power of language, quasi-autonomous [that of the name]

p. 223 sacred language: “con-juration" itself (btwn God & us)

HST p. 359 Tupinamba give tearful welcome: stranger hailed as revenant; hôte as ghost (spirit or revenant, holy spirit)

PPT p. 10 when one unlaces (or considers the lacing), one looks for revenue (return or investment) or revenant that comes back

C p. 193 revenant—127 times, what of the remains is being put into figures (chiffré) in this way?

SPEC p. 263 if one’s [intellectual, re: Freud’s debt to Nietzsche] debt is always another’s, one is acquitted and guilty in advance? comment spéculer sur la dette dun autre à soi revenant (amounting to, coming back to oneself)?

pp. 268-69 Freud’s speculation does not construct itself by itself like Hegel’s: however concerned w/ revenants, ne revient pas sur lui-même

p. 293 PP always revient to itself, haunted by tout autre, retour never “acquits” speculation of PP

——PP cannot be contradicted (contredit); Freud confirms PP in its absolute sovereignty

p. 295 Freud his own grandson? put PP in question—Freud makes hypothesis of beyond [the PP] come back (revenir) only to dismiss (congédier) it again, that which comes back (revient) hasn’t truly come back (revenu) > only passed by in specter of its presence

p. 312 [grandson & son want each other to understand] but we know what a tautology can bring back by gushing over (peut faire revenir en dégorgeant)

pp. 313-14 for Freud, in game of fort/da, the greatest pleasure is the re-turn (re-venir), Wiederkommen: yet, again becoming revenant, [spool] must be thrown away again > [Freud, the game] speculates on the return (retour): au départ de ce qui se doit de revenir

pp. 317-18 what binds (lie) game to itself is re- of return, the returned or the returning (le revenu ou le revenant), revenance orders entire teleology, can be handed over to PP

p. 318 reappearance as a moment of the couple disappearance/reappearance, return to itself of return: greatest pleasure

p. 341 demon, revenance which repeats its entrance, revient w/out having been called by PP > like Socrates’ demon, which made everyone write, this automaton produces effects of ventriloquism, w/out origin, emission, addressee, tele w/out telos

p. 342 demon doesn’t obey master PP, visitation not confined to neurosis, Freud insists on apparent passivity of persons visited

p. 353 demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

p. 354 detour expanding immeasurably: Umweg of 1st Chapter [re: Freud’s Beyond…] secondary to absolute/unconditional Umweg > pas de détour always leads back to death, not a question of going (aller) but of coming back (revenir)—this is the passage

p. 379 speculation as advocatus diaboli, devil revient

p. 380 no one demands to know what devil thinks dans son for intérieur, Freud can think the devil w/out putting himself on the devil’s side (no written promise/contract w/ devil)

REVENGE/REACTION

GOD pp. 101-2 turning the cheek suspends economy of revenge, tit for tat (un prêté pour un rendu), blow for blow

pp. 104-09 the 2 economies of salary [Christianity]: retribution (exchange), and love of foreigner; latter an interruption, an exceeding of the economy of the community, of Schmitt’s strict politics, interrupts self-consciousness, inaugurates exchange

MONL p. 8 Division why one writes and how one dreams of writing. Place of jealousy, divided btwn vengeance and resentment.

p. 23 terror inside language; p. 24 nothing but jealousy unleashed, “[language] takes its revenge at the heart of the law”

FK pp. 88-9 in our “war of religion” 2 violences: 1) hypersophistication of military tele-technology 2) “new archaic violence,” counters the first & everything it represents, revenge

——in name of Islam, in name of “religion,” desperate (auto-immune) gesture, attacks blood of its own body

SPOM p. 23 “[Hamlet] curses his mission: to do justice to a de-mission of time, he swears against a destiny that leads him to do justice for a fault, a fault of time and the times, by rectifying an address, a movement of correction, reparation, restitution, vengeance, revenge, punishment”

——“time is out of joint” when the inheritor can redress wrongs only by seeking revenge

p. 25 Hamlet complains that the law stems from vengeance before Nietzsche, before Heidegger, before Benjamin

——is a day infinitely foreign to vengeance [w/out it], heterogeneous at its source, to come or more ancient than memory itself? impossible to decide, today: “the time is out of joint”

——“time is out of joint” when inheritor can redress wrongs only by seeking revenge

p. 27 “how does the concern w/ what there is to be (qu’il y a à être) [Heidegger] intersect, in order perhaps to exceed it, with the logic of vengeance or right?”

p. 30 the tragedy of Hamlet cannot be understood if story is reduced to an economy of vengeance, all the hesitations to take revenge, the deliberations, the non-automaticity of the calculations: the neurosis, if you like

——Heidegger especially wants to wrest gift away from spirit of revenge, where people equate the just (das Gerechte) w/ the avenged (das Gerächte)

HASD p. 16 the posing of every question is perhaps secondary, follows as the first, reactive response, the undeniable provocation, linévitable dénégation de lindéniable provocation

FWT p. 93 nationalism always state-nationalism today: a zealous, jealous, vindictive vindication of nation as a sovereign state

p. 108 Derrida’s wares are more perverse, contraband, than his father’s (sees his father as exemplary figure of the victim, of “sacrifice,” voûté); perhaps Derrida is avenging his father by introducing disorder into “commerce,” whose trial he would be organizing

p. 111 specular countersignature, re: communitarianism of oppressed, reactive self-defense, too symmetrical of a response [Derrida couldn’t tolerate being “integrated” into Jewish school]

p 229n Levinas justifies lex talionis > a “message of universalism,” not a reveling in revenge, seeks only justice

pp. 150-51 Kant tries to eliminate revenge, all interest, from DP (from pure, immune law), but, for Derrida, this is impossible (at least acc. Kant’s logic); interiorizing lex talionis means I inflict this punishment on myself, guilty party executes the verdict himself

POOF p. 64 temptation to match Nietzsche’s gesture, call he seems to be making for another justice, one that breaks w/ equivalence of right & vengeance: what’re political consequences for democracy?

——what would an equality be that no longer calculates? exceeding all reappropriation of the proper

ATIA p. 8 question of animal: what does it mean to respond? how is a response different from a reaction?

FS pp. 4-5 structuralism & literary criticism (structuralist in essence/destiny), lapse of attention paid to force (the tension of force itself) > even take revenge on force by declaring separation the condition of the work

DPi p. 141 both abolitionists & Kant speak of price, value, dignity above Marketpries

——acc. Kant, absolute crime = DP, in sense that both are beyond value, thus not driven by interest of vengeance > but impersonal principle of jus talionis

pp. 230-31 vengeance/justice? kill for a reason—you are agent of DP; kill for no reason—not even guilty

p. 261 damnum, via Benveniste, money given w/out return, given for nothing > excess of compelled expenditure pays more than is due, marks double law of homogeneity/proportionality btwn damage/punishment & their incalculable heterogeneity: the condemned/damned pays what he owes and does something tout autre, infinitely more than acquit himself of calculable debt: there is economy/aneconomy > “unless it is a matter of reimbursement (indemnification) and interest as the incalculable surplus value of capital”

WAP pp. 113-14 maintain unity of philosophy against seductive tropisms of human sciences w/out accepting reactive obscurantism of slogan “the unity and specificity of the discipline”

***p. 184 profound complementarity btwn repression of philosophy in institution & frantic overexploitation outside it: 1) petty, reactive philosophical powers: uptight, ossified academicism, still clutching to control levers 2) theme park, amnesic, gossipy stereotypes outside institution

——one must combat joyously, w/out accusation, w/out procès (putting on trial), w/out nostalgia, w/ uncompromising (intraitable) gaiety

EL p. 194 revenge or return of the sacred in face of “politicolinguistic” profanation

p. 195 for Scholem, not only a loss of sacred language but its revenance in form of revenge

pp. 207-08 the vengeance of language (language as name of God) > a debt that leaves its signature in the language will be incurred by innocents, archiguilty, generations to come

——this is a logic that the cogito, practico-transcendental egology, cannot comprehend [i.e. cogito can’t comprehend language?]

——Hegel on unboundedness in dynamic of vengeance [?]

pp. 208-09 return, repetition, revenance, the re- in language, as language insofar as it inaugurates possibility of revenge in language

pp. 209-10 the false cadaver will avenge itself its carnival disguises, its cadaverous instrumentality

p. 211 for Scholem, for language to avenge itself against secularization: 1) it must be someone, bear the name of someone, remain attached to its creator 2) no iterability at source: technology is secondary or evil, can only befall (survenir) it [this exteriorizing of contamination is similar to Christian idealism, a spiritual interiorization separated from body, time, letter, carnal signifier]

p. 215 the 2 abysses (of life, of death) (each one en abîme in other): 1) loss of names/signification 2) the abyss into which one falls, revenge for not realizing language/names are abyssal

p. 216 God speaks out—very fire of vindictive jealousy

pp. 218, 227 for Heidegger & Scholem, when a “sign” regains its sacredness, history takes revenge [?]

C p. 217 paradigm as revenge: le mort se venge, “model” is always le revenant rêvé: haunting does not befall it, but takes the first step (la hantise ne lui survient pas, elle donne le premier pas)

BSi p. 209 [vis-à-vis Fontaine] that the sovereign’s [wolf’s] power (rage) is always an act of revenge, thus the beast [lamb] has originary guilt (ursprüngliche Schuldigsein): “si ce nest toi, cest donc ton frère

REVOLUTION

GOD pp. 9-10 anabasis, or “conversion,” the turns in the history of secrecy, history of revolutions, history as revolution

R p. 109 annulment of time announced in date, revolution, volt of the ring (anneau), il faut le temps, default, failure, collapse [autos needing other, event, time, heteronomy]

FL p. 249 anguishing moment of suspense [who will claim to be just by economizing on anguish?], interval of spacing, in which revolutions take place [cf. GLAS p. 207]

pp. 269-270 via Benjamin, terrifying moments of suffering, crime, torture: “mystical” epochē, moment of suspense, instance of nonlaw, founding or revolutionary violence, a pure performative act that wouldn’t have to respond to anyone, interrupts

p. 270 “felicitous performative speech act” as successful revolution

p. 271 new readings = revolutions (though he does remind everyone their on 5th avenue)

pp. 274-75 figure of revolutionary instant, exceptional decision, which metaphorizes an anterior law, is also a contamination > effaces, blurs distinction btwn foundation/preservation

p. 281 “revolutionary” = “reactionary” when it means return to the past of a purer origin, world seen as decay

LOBL LOBL p. 123 the minute of living-on has the syntax of a revolution

AF AF p. 7 archive at once institutive & conservative [see FL], revolutionary & traditional, an eco-nomic archive: keeps, puts in reserve, saves, but in unnatural fashion (forcing obedience to law)

SPOM SPOM p. 135 “anxiety in the face of the ghost is properly revolutionary”

p. 137 pre-inheritance, mother, on the basis of which one inherits; for Marx, 2 types of forgetting of pre-inheritance: 1) revolutionary 2) bourgeois

p. 139 time of Revolution never takes place in the present

p. 143 Marx’s revolutionary injunction “let the dead bury the dead”, the imperative of an “active forgetting,” as Nietzsche would put it

p. 144 acc. Marx, in social revolution of 19th century, anachronism will not be erased in plenitude, parousia, presence to itself of present, time still “out of joint” but properly so: no credit, no borrowed figures > [excess of untimely dis-identification that can never exist?]

——[Derrida asks about poetic difference of social revolution]

p. 147 via Marx, btwn revolution & counter-revolution, not only specters and conjurations, but simulacra of simulacra: specular reflection endlessly sends simulacrum away (defers to abyss encounter w/ living body, w/ revolution itself)

p. 205 does Marx’s exorcism sign and seal the whole logic of Capital? however virtual, preparatory > is this conjuration ceremony, vital surviving oath, injunction, what puts Capital in motion, and part of the revolutionary promise?

p. 211 (messianic is always revolutionary, has to be)

MPM MPM p. 68 [re: de Man’s “Reply…”] tells us more about institutions and strategies of reading than “all the pious recitations or bits of revolutionary bravura which only revolve in place”

PAS PAS p. (67) every revolution needs to take account of Blanchot’s forgetting, forgetting w/out forgetting, a forgetting beyond the protection of repression, a forgetting that describes the whole history of dissimulation > pas dautre

TC pp. 244-45 Artaud is against Verfremdungseffekt (alienation effect) which reaffirms Western ideal of art, nonparticipation of specterar > festival must be political act, act of revolution is theatrical

SH p. 38 ideality carries forgetting in its memory, the memory of forgetting itself, the truth of forgetting > reference to singular event annulled in ring’s annulation, the date’s turning-about, una volta, volte-face, revolt, revolution

F p. xxxii revolution, irruption, cannot be reduced to rigorously defined strategy, nor can it protect itself from pseudo-revolutionary catchwords, mystification, obscurantism

FWT p. 83 revolution, interruption, radical caesura in ordinary course of History > revolution only event worthy of the name (all responsibility: revolutionary)

PS p. 328n Artaud against surrealists bowing down to communists > wants real revolution

DPi p. 113(n) for Blanchot, literature is revolutionary on the side of death; for Hugo, on the side of life

——Blanchot: “any writer who, by the very fact of writing, is not induced to think: I am the revolution, only freedom makes me write, is not really writing”

p. 214 Hugo: revolution does not get rid of DP

RGE p. 337n via Bataille, consumption of [general economy’s?] excess of energy by a determined class is not the destructive consuming of meaning, it’s the significative reappropriation of surplus value w/in restricted economy > if sovereignty is absolutely revolutionary, revolution w/in restricted economy (reorganization of world of work, redistribution of values w/in space of meaning) is still a necessary phase w/in strategy of general economy

AFR p. 85 for Condillac, Descartes’ success: taught us his method of self-reflection so it could be perpetuated [methodological operation as revolutionary operation]

PSSS p. 246 always more than one revolution in a revolution

p. 253 each psychoanalytic session, a micro-revolution, enfranchisement of regained spontaneity, freedom of speech, image/music of States General

p. 260 the who and the what of what arrives, the arrivant, the event, makes outdated in advance the question about it [event/revolution] that always comes too late

EL p. 224 every political revolution: a return to speaking essence of sacred language [?] > this return marks moment of judgment, instance of a court (Gericht, the last judgment [Das jüngste Gericht]) w/ apocalyptic value

+R pp. 151-52 acc. Benjamin [theory of revolution], never stock up on apparatus w/out transforming its very structure, twisting it, betraying, attracting it out of its element

LI p. 141 in deconstructive practice, opposition conservative/revolutionary no longer pertinent

CF p. 39 the excessive, mad, hyperbolic forgiveness, surprises like a revolution: to forgive not only the guilty one but the fault itself, where both are evil, irreversibly, repeatably

——this mad forgiveness heterogenous to politics, ordinary juridical practice > otherwise, calculated transaction, negotiations, hypothetical imperatives

BSi pp. 272-73 poetic revolution (beyond sovereignty [?]), revolution in revolution—minuscule dethroning of majesty exceeds knowledge > signed by repetition of “perhaps’s,” “who knows”

p. 282 French Revolution inaugurates new form (sovereignty of people, international model) of same fundamental structure of sovereignty (knowing-power, knowing-how-to-see): walls destroyed, but architectural model not deconstructed

p. 290 political revolution w/out poetic one > transfer of sovereignty

EU p. 122 the political doesn’t only take conventional left/right axis: revolutionary often gets along w/ reproductive force of authority (institutional symbolism) > what is most unacceptable then is that which upsets these norms, entrenched contracts, in the very form of work, teaching, writing

WBH p. 201 gift not even subversive, is something else > subversion is a program, programmed destruction of certain conditions (relies on given conditions)

RHETORIC

SPOM p. 64 [re: dominant discourse on Marxism] the triumphal stage of work of mourning, maniac, jubilatory, animistic magic, rhythm of cadenced march [“Marx is dead,” long live capitalism]

p. 186 dismissing something as mere rhetoric doesn’t explain away its effect

RHYTHM [fixerup]

KH pp. 125-26 backwards steps (retours en arrière), rhythm of Timaeus, go beyond, under philosophical logos, normal couple, to a third, a bastard, hybrid, orphan (khōra) > necessary but not true

GT p. 114 Derrida “apologizes” for long detour, explains that it marks the step of 2 men in “Counterfeit Money,” rhythm of every incalculable scene of the gift

MONL p. 48 I try to impart a tone, rhythm

H p. 101 delay and haste, halting and hastening, rhythm of Oedipus’ journey

LOBL p. 115 the suspensive arrêt arrests the decisive arrêt and vice versa, the arrêt de mort arrests the arrêt de mort, arrhythmic pulsation of title [Blanchot’s] before it scatters like sand, in stopping (sarrêtant) (as arrêt), it gives movement, sets in motion [prime mover]

p. 121 death sentence, instant as elusive as last grain of sand in hourglass, death as result of dissemination of rhythm of life w/ no coup darrêt, unbordered/unbounded arrhythmy on beach that’s continuation of a sea: her pulse “scattered like sand”

SPOM p. 133 “frequency counts”: experience of the ghost as a rhythm, insistence

p. 140 Marx is not just pointing, “he’s taking the pulse of history,” “listening to a revolutionary frequency”

POOF pp. 166-67 via & beyond Schmitt, der geschwisterlichen Klang (the brotherly-sisterly sound), the obscure friendship of rhyme, insane linking (appariement) of a couple, sense is born in a pair > before being philosophical, friendship concerns gift of the poem, isn’t there always a politics of a rhyme? > the rhyme can also become a traffic signal (philautie of linkage) > nothing looks more like the traffic signals of one country than those of another: this is the law > everything begins w/ Echo: rhymes sign, in cadence they seal a belonging, an ‘open gate’ [?]

POR p. 17 (150) strategic rhythm of new [professorial?] responsibility: multiple sites (lieux), rhythm of blinking eye (dun battement de paupières), play one risk off other, la clôture contre labîme, labîme contre la clôture [hard eye (of reason) has no rhythm, no heart beat, no arrêt of sur-vie]

MPM p. 62 [see p. 88n at what speed ought one to read?] motif of precipitousness in de Man, acceleration to win time, win time over, non-dialectical—not a particular rhythm—a rhythm w/out rhythm (incommensurable acceleration, infinite and null, touches the sublime)

MSUB J p. 166 under the words (mots), hors sens, when you let attraction of words, motifs, motets [anthems] play under the meaning, you draw, sing, rather than speaking, you write the unwritable > this passage also convokes multiplicity of voices in a “motel,” rhythm, vibration

p. 170 to speak of the subjectile, we must speak by insertion and precipitation, acceleration of rhythmical projection [see MPM p. 62] and inscription of projectile, beyond “words and images”

PAS PAS p. (34) Blanchot’s strange rhythm of near and fear, of pas, ce démarche, imprints itself on (à) our discourse, chooses words

p. (97) the inner rhythm of sauf (contamination), always altered, always unscathed, “jai tout, sauf” > “sauf que je voudrais en être débarrassé

FSW p. 225 most interesting analogy of Mystic Pad is time, discontinuous time, time as spacing, withdrawal of perception, periodic non-excitability > interruption/restoration of contact

T p. xxviii intro to differance, cites, repercusses its rhythm w/out measure, incision conduite par une main aveugle pour navoir jamais vu que le part-et-dautre dun tissu > to weave (tramer) doesn’t play le jeu denchaînement, il joue lenchaînement, trouer, traverser, works on both sides (le part-et-dautre), leaves ear canal open, sous le coup dun enchaînement simulé, non-echo

SH p. 49 poet is provoked, constituted, by the hour, its caesuras > poetic rhythm or spacing at heart of origin of meaning, meaning of language

DS p. 178 what ruins the “pious capital letter,” the aplomb of the heading: the blanks, ordered return of white spaces, measure & order of dissemination, law of spacing, rhythmos, invisible fleuron

p. 210 temporal dislocation in hymen baffles decidability of different terms: is there even time, tenses, temporal differences, when there’s no central present/referent?

——rhythm as hymen (Dream?), “center of vibratory suspense”: soir, noir, noire, miroir, ivoire

p. 261 hymen: not truth of unveiling: no alētheia, only wink of hymen: rhythmic fall, regular (w)inclined cadence (une cadence inclinée)

——hymen, one of those “beneficent figures” engendered by “the opposition btwn the closed and the open”: i.e. the fan, the book, the dancer

p. 277 rhyme, general law of textual effects: folding together of identity & difference

pp. 279-80(n) [quoting Mallarmé] rhythm, literary game par excellence: mimic suspense/laughter—rhythmic cadence, or case, all the falls, the silent fall of pen

P p. 26 Hegel’s ternary rhythm—what he calls a “ring”—encircles, links to other rings: in science of beautiful, mind presupposes, anticipates itself > philosophy of art: circle in circle of circles

POS p. 75 Democrites’ rhythmos as writing & rhythm, a materialism before Marx [?], repressed, silenced, ontologized by Plato

ROP pp. 29-30 double bind drives deconstruction in rhythmic compulsion to track desire for origin, and to raise its stakes, la pousse à une surenchère > interminable drama of analysis, il fallait faire droit to the law deconstructed, w/ une affirmation donatrice unknown to yet driving analysis

SP p. 49 not only keep your distance from woman, game of seduction, but woman as non-figure, non-identity, distance’s very chasm, interval’s cadence, distance itself [which can’t be said]

p. 101 regular, rhythmic blindness takes place in Nietzsche’s text, he’s lost there too > il y a de la perte, dès quil y a hymen

O pp. 26-7 le détour dune écriture dont one ne revient pas, dissemination: this question calls for restaging of arithmos, “counting” as “bad procedure,” and rereading the rhythmos of Democritus, which philosophy has never been able to reckon w/ (naura pu compter) > philosophy accounts for itself by rising out of, and then circulating w/in its speculative necessity, the [envelope of writing]

p. 58 “la dissémination (se) produit (dans) cela : coupe de plaisir” > il rythme et le plaisir et la répétition selon une coupe multiple > il [text, literature, the beyond of the whole] imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

DPi pp. 57-8 anesthetize DP (follows rhythm of nighttime up until dawn) like nocturnal council (dawn, fascination, theater, coldness of machine)

TB pp. 132-33 rhythm, twists & turns from abyss to abyss, deconstructs the tower > madness on both sides (interior/exterior limit) > impossible task: the infinite guilt absolves you immediately

Gii p. 58 to ask about paths (odoi) of Heidegger, his step (pas) and rhythm, his Hand-werk of writing—questions beyond method (doutre-méthode)

——Gedicht: place toward which poems tend acc. to a “rhythm” > unspoken, unique Ort

REST p. 284 the pas de contact (pas de sujet) of Van Gogh’s shoes, a detachment whose reattachment is sought in its fundamental surface, the sole, or the fundamental subjectivity of the ground

——pas de contact, rhythmically, makes marche, pas is not present nor absent

pas works (marche) badly w/out a pair

DST DST p. 198 necessity of rhythm: necessity of a scansion that comes to fold & unfold thought

p. 200 thinking of translation, experience of thinking itself, its most essential & risky passage, where experience of thinking is also poetic experience: privileged examples (in Lacoue-Labarthe): Gestell, mimesis, rhuthmos

p. 201 insistent return of motif traces silhouette of unity, more a rhythm than a configuration

p. 203 thus Lacoue-Labarthe’s “style,” ethos, multiplying parentheses, rhythm of warnings, which don’t protect anyone > warning stands watch so no one will fail to expose oneself

p. 222 in the beginning was rhythm, said von Bülow, no simple beginning; Lacoue-Labarthe: “différence-à-soi répétée du Même” > no rhythm w/out repetition, spacing, caesura

——we are constituted by this rhythm, (de-)constituted by marks of this “caesuraed” stamp, rhythmotypy as divided idiom in us of désistance > no subject w/out signature of this rhythm

——rhythm: to think désistance as it is written

p. 223 rhythm: spaced repetition of a percussion, inscriptive force (insensible) of a spacing > doesn’t belong to visible/audible figuration—still structures them (rhythmotypical, typorhythmic)

——Nietzsche: to mistake rhythm of the sentence, to mistake the very meaning of the sentence

p. 224 though Heidegger recalled that Georgiades translated rhuthmos as Gepräge (imprint, seal, type, character), this didn’t prevent him from bringing typos back to ontotypology & subject back to epoch of subjectity

——Hölderlin: all is rhythm (Rhythmus), destiny of man a single celestial rhythm

——Mallarmé: every soul is a rhythmic knot

***p. 225 Derrida says that no dialectic can overcome (ne saurait venir à bout) double constraint, double law, that of knot & caesura, obligation & cut (i.e. rhythm) > but then wonders if double bind is too dialectical, so he thinks of an arrythmic gap, hiatus, caesura, another undecidable

——un autre indécidable, the gap/hiatus in an undecidable derived from dialectical calculation/contraction, arrhythmic caesura as respiration of rhythm (this necessity awaits us) [pas, heartbeat]

p. 229 for Lacoue-Labarthe [?], anyone linked to edge of madness (au bord de la folie), the autobiographical (allobiographical) adventure, and its doubles, and the other, and death, is concerned w/ rhythm (the musical obsession) (Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Rousseau, Reik, Mallarmé)

p. 230 no rhythm w/out caesura > antirhythmic [Hölderlin], arrhythmic

——interrupts alternation, constraint of opposition, even double bind [cf. p. 225]

——Lacoue-Labarthe: caesura is empty moment, intrusion of prophetic word (Tiresias)

——caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

p. 322n unavoidable resistance to désistance as nonpathological inhibition, no rhythm w/out it, can say the same about the double bind (see p. 228 return to father, subject to law as inhibition, defense) [a safeguarding, a filiation, a subjectivity compelled by the caesura?]

IW p. 246 Rosenzweig associates abyss w/ volcanic fire (eruption), convulsive tremor marking rhythm of flow of lava—tempo of discontinuous rhetoric

D p. 301 Sollers: “we are dancing on a volcano”

p. 326 “I”: passing passageway for permutation, repercussive percussion, full force of writing > dun coup, triggers (déclenche) tale & keeps (maintient) it in progress

——simulacrum [of “I”] as a force, le simulacre de lassistance: chambre obscure: feigns to transform the imperfect into present: impossible > et vous entraîne dans un nouveau vertige

p. 331 [re: melody in Numbers] in all senses of word, it’s a cadence you must follow

p. 332 authorless voice, phonic tracing no ideal signified could stamp [sa frappe sensible] sans reste, all representative outcroppings (affleurements) subjected to rhythm of a numerous pounding

p. 352 splayed square, triangle open on 4th side, loosens obsidionality of triangle and circle, whose ternary rhythm (Trinity, Oedipus, Dialectics) governs metaphysics

+R p. 160 survival movement, arrêt de mort, final trance, sursaut cambré tenu au mors: says “I” (am dead) or hoc est corpus meum > dominant fish, one that bites best, takes from sea a body of scaly writing, homogenous w/ signatory’s initials

——death dance in fish’s tail (queue) > rhythmos: cadence of writing, undulation of waves

C p. 201 arithmetic compulsion and la narration comptable in Sade’s 120 Days, part of the fun > its regular cadence, rhythmic operation: to excrete excrement, swallow it, en escompter la jouissance

LI p. 52 associating non-present w/ restance adds spectacular blinking-effect to warning light: rhythm of blinking essential to mark

TN p. 70 syncope of heartbeat gives rhythm to pulse or haptical compulsion: the cum of con-tact, a link where disconnection remains at work

p. 290 you, metronome of my heteronomy, you resist my dreams of a reappropriating movement of self-presence, self-consciousness, absolute knowledge, which is why I love you, so painfully, at heart of pleasure itself

——you break me from dialectic (which does not exclude it)

SPEC p. 361 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] to guard one’s fashion, one’s rhythm, what counts is less telos than rhythm of differance, speed of the step: Zauderrythmus (differential rhythm)

p. 362 exappropriating—no circle (family, economy)

pp. 405-06 fort:da, pleasure is a kind of rhythm [Nietzsche], SPEC will have played fort:da of Nietzsche, the limping (boitement) of unterwegs, a step forward for nothing, only rhythm

p. 407 poem of limping consoles for too slow step of science

——death drive doesn’t work in silence (like in French translation), but goes unnoticed (unauffällig), has to do w/ time (link to Kant, Aristotle)—thus rhythm: do feelings of tension exist to distinguish btwn bound/unbound energy or do they exist in relation to absolute magnitude?

p. 408 beyond opposition, differance & rhythm

CHOR p. 97 how can one breathe w/out punctuation, w/out multiplicities of rhythm, steps, how can one dance?

RIGHT (JURIDICAL) [fixerup]

GT p. 64 mediating desire, measuring morality, mediocrity: who gives themselves the right of right measure? paradoxical hubris of measure [thoughtless to laugh at this position]

FWT p. 130 common possibilities of literature & democracy: 1) historicity (literature has acts, birthplaces, legacies; democracy defines itself by promising itself, by and in its historicity, its future-to-come) 2) power, credit of fiction [Montaigne/Pascal understood connection btwn right & fiction]

p. 178 Europe exports: 1) norms, advancements, language [re: consolidation of rights, laws, to sovereignty of subject] 2) its auto-hetero-deconstructive capacity or auto-immunity

OS p. 36 Hegel: now [point] has tremendous right (ein ungeheures Recht), it is nothing as individual Now, as I pronounce it, the proudly exclusive now dissolves, flows away, falls into dust

p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

the impossibility of the otherwise produces a trembling, a question of tout autre, think the tie btwn truth/presence, in a thought that doesn’t need to be true/present [no skeptical moment]

ROP p. 16 psychoanalysis is in principle nonhypnotic, affirms right to resistance to hypnosis (and said resistance’s insurmountability)

WAP p. 18 fidelity to an absolute quasi-contract w/ no history: not irresponsibility, but more imperative one, right not to have to appear before (account to) this or that regime (of appearing)

——double bind of philosophical commitment or pledge (droit, if a philosopheme, also submitted to law of double bind: unstable, deconstructible, it precedes itself, calls for indestructible responsibility)

p. 31 in lexic of justification, as it immediately intersects w/ opposition form/content, we must recognize inevitable topos in every problematic of right

p. 33 “Declaration of the Rights of Man” implies a knowledge of language and an instruction > these two “competencies” folded onto one another, envelop each other

p. 36 “the right to teaching assumes the knowledge and teaching of right” [fold, invagination]

p. 37 state power (pouvoir) should be able to ensure a citizen’s power (pouvoir) doesn’t remain formal > passage btwn 2 “powers” is possible through language (ability to speak/write), through universal principles, through philosophical training > philosophical competence is inscribed in the circle and it is the condition of the circle, it is the becoming effective of right, right to (droit à)

p. 38 though we cannot defend philosophy’s right to exist, it exists wherever there is a “right to”

p. 39 declaration of a right hides performative under constative > “convention” always assumes a philosophy: community never given but constituted by the right

pp. 47-8 Kant links mathematics’ apriori w/ concept of right

DPi p. 59 Badinter: courthouse theater, a privileged spectacle, is a failed incarnation

p. 86 since sovereign has right to suspend law, he authorizes absolute maintenance of DP: this performative power cannot be juridical: to create law (droit) don’t need the law (droit) > a-legal

p. 117 Blanchot’s right to death: right to give it, giving it to oneself (en se la donnant), inflicting DP; right to accede to death (not natural) by exceeding natural life > both the right that gives birth to literature and the law that gives birth to the law itself: literature thinks this right of/to right

pp. 178-79 Marx, as he does so often, by reducing juridical/judicial phenomena so quickly/brutally to ideological & superstructural effects of class struggle, doesn’t take into account relative autonomy, duration, efficacy of the juridical

PIO p. 37 juridical mechanisms re: patenting inventions are also inventions

PSSS p. 251 Kant (said this better than anyone): no right w/out coercion

——juridical decision approaches ideal of justice to extent that the community has at its disposal force of constraint to command respect for its ideal

p. 266 all the worst cruelties and terrors coincide w/ invention of human rights: Paris Commune, French Revolution, Shoah…

p. 270 for Freud, force against force, deferred economy of force: makes right (passage from violence to law)

ATM p. 148 for Levinas, sincerity or rectitude: the right of the gift (not derived from a jurisdiction transcendent to the gift itself), to go right to the unique, what his name will have uniquely named

EL p. 224 every political revolution: a return to speaking essence of sacred language [?] > this return marks moment of judgment, instance of a court (Gericht, the last judgment [Das jüngste Gericht]) w/ apocalyptic value

EW p. 273 subject and Dasein (still tied to a relation to self, reserved for man alone) constitute identity in name of a particular kinds of rights, a certain juridico-political calculation; deconstruction calls for different rights, more exacting articulation of rights, more responsibility

pp. 280-81 full rights given to other (women, vegetarians [?]) has only occurred recently, at very moment when subject began to be deconstructed

p. 286 a limited, calculable responsibility, the becoming-right of morality, is the dream of every good conscience or that of petty, grand inquisitors

CF pp. 11-2 juridical tradition remains ‘mean-minded,’ restrictive, because under control of demographico-economic interests (Nation-State regulating asylum)

p. 22 for Kant, perpetual peace depends on State sovereignty and the always public nature of the juridical [thus Derrida’s unconditionality w/out sovereignty]

pp. 45-6 right of grace, order of law above law (right beyond right): monarch’s divine right to pardon transcends/neutralizes the law > this [sovereign exception] has been reappropriated into republican heritage

p. 43 equivocality, heterogeneity, confusion btwn order of forgiveness & order of justice [juridical] > one can mimic scene of “immediacy,” quasi-automatic forgiveness, to escape justice

——forgiveness has nothing to do w/ [State] judgment or public/political sphere

BSi p. 207 sovereign, highest, most eminent capital or capitalization, monopolizes force/violence—Gewalt—gives reason in advance to force through right

OG p. 75 (110-11) trace is nothing, exceeds question “what is?” > no longer sheltered in grammatological knowledge: no longer assurance of opposition fait/droit > no pure fait

UWC p. 231 powerful juridical performatives shape modern history of humanity of man: “human rights,” “crimes against humanity”

EU pp. 109-10 question of droit du droit not juridical, event of foundation never comprehended w/in logic it founds > foundation of a university not a university event (only the anniversary of the foundation would be), foundation of reason isn’t legal, isn’t rational: only w/in epoch of law can one distinguish btwn legal/illegal conflicts

p. 177 [via Kant] obscurity of philosophy & the need to make it popular—posed re: question of right (droit)

p. 235 classical eloquence in favor of human rights, though necessary, does not take the place of philosophical thought

WBH p. 199 gift determines, produces identity of giver & receiver, gives itself the right to determine, always a strike of force, irruption

RIGOR (also, ETHICS OF READING, DISCUSSION)

GT p. 48 what is the consensus on the basis of which an implicit linguistic contract permits us to understand one another, to credit each other when we speak of gift? what if we renounced this question for a play without postulate/prescription, a certain concept of dissemination?

pp. 148-49 not probing soul of literary character, merely analyzing semantic and intentional possibility of utterances, such as they are readable on surface itself

MC p. 373 not that all fiction, all inscription of proper names has literary dimension, but they arise in a place where limits are never real, never immobile, never solidonly the effects of contextual isolation > pragrammatological (intersection of pragmatics & grammatology)

POO p. 11 when Derrida says one should not approach experience of responsibility in a thetic way, to argue that this “do not do it” has a shortcoming, that it should appear before moral tribunal, misses its demonstrative rigor > strict rigor sheltered from all questioning [cf. GLAS pp. 50-1]

SPOM p. 149 [re: Marx] despite highly differentiated historical, strategic, tactical context, there are invariables beyond these limits, constancy, consistency of discursive layers > structural heterogeneity does not divide different types of discourse, but is at work w/in each one

POOF p. 201 [re: Aristotle’s distinctions on friendship] let us be more precise, more just

pp. 213-14 Derrida ties the chiasmus btwn the vocative & pronominal dative omega ω to the chiasmus btwn the constative & performative in general (‘speech act’ theory reduced to its rudiments): the call, the address, always overruns neutral observation, a minimum consensus (of friendship, of consent) is presupposed in the utterance [?]

pp. 236-37 avowal of incommensurable friendship, memory in the call, the absolute past, minimal community [of the unavowable one], the hope in the complaint > is incommensurable friendship beyond fraternity? or a fraternity that no longer excludes anyone [i.e. not an economic, androcentric, genealogical, ethnocentric fraternity]?

p. 244 is the voice of the friend in Heidegger, that which rings out withdrawn from metaphysical subjectivity, a minimal ‘community,’ friendship prior to friendship & enmity?

p. 294 who is the friend? beyond ego, presence, subject, etc.? distancing itself from all determinations? beyond the brother who capitalizes everything? > this a political question—will there be loud protests (by militants of a dogmatic humanism) if to think & live gentle rigor of friendship would be the law of friendship qua an experience of ahumanity?

p. 295 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

p. 301 Blanchot [on Foucault’s death]: “the intellectual friendship that his death, so painful to me, today allows me to declare to him, as (tandis que) I recall the words attributed by Diogenes Laertes to Aristotle: ‘Oh my friends, there is no friend’” > incredible audacity of this tandis que, and the singular use of the colon, an act of punctuation that unfurls a veil of mourning—will one have ever punctuated w/ more rigor?

HERP p. 167 reading Heidegger on Tragen, “with the seriousness it calls for”

p. 197 advisable to decelerate, if one wants to read and think what one claims to judge

p. 200 rigor in Heidegger

PAS PAS p. (34) rarefaction: strict and rigorous law: that the infinitely other can approach by distancing, and distance by approaching

p. (45) Blanchot’s text unchains law of absolute discretion, w/ intractable rigor, which it violates on its own scene w/ measureless obscenity; the only impossible discretion that would surprise his indiscretion > to remain in friendship under the law of the other: the sole sign of friendship, erased in advance

p. (59) from Blanchot, Derrida learns rigor of word gently (doucement)

A p. 79 fundamentalist dimension not tenable—can’t claim coherence or rigorous specificity

TC p. 238 Artaud’s cruelty as necessity and rigor

POS p. 44 Husserl’s “subtle nuances,” Marx’s “micrology”

ROP p. 57 to identify someone w/ what they get paid for is not to read

p. 74 “one must” begin by listening to the canon, speaking the language of the patient, necessity of finding surface of manifest meaning > avant de et pour déstabiliser

ATIA p. 142 for Heidegger, animal cannot experience world “as such” [explains this w/ breadth of rigor Derrida finds incomparable]

GSP p. 162 exactitude of math vs. rigor of eidetic descriptive science (inexact or “anexact”) > phenomenology cannot be closed: infinite idea (in the Kantian sense) keeps open > this idea is the production of exactitude [essences of phenomena possibility of closure?]

O p. 54 excess of writing not improv., throw of dice does not contradict rigorous necessity of “formal assemblage”: unity of chance & rule, program and its leftovers or extra (son reste ou de son surplus)

WAP p. 45 Kant: formal metaphysics can never speak popular language, popularity is out of the question, scholastic precision must be insisted upon (its results, however, can be illuminating)

RGE p. 253 Bataille took Hegel seriously: understood internal rigor of system—couldn’t pull one part out

——rigorous effect of trembling to which Bataille submits Hegel’s concepts

Gi pp. 22-3 isn’t Heidegger repeating traditional philosophemes w/ new rigor, beginning w/ a neutralization, denying a negativity?

PF p. 282n rigor as “supple”

IW pp. 259-61 for Cohen, Plato overprivileged vision, intuition, in determination of eidos > Cohen links German idealism to Plato’s neglected concept hypotheton: idea as hypothesis, that’s truly German, infinite task, rigorous science > idea (not as Being but as hypothesis)

——Cohen: this method of idea linked to Plato’s logon didonai (Rechenschaftsablegung)

EL pp. 198-99 try as best one can to do an internal reading (stay as close to letter as possible) > but simple event of name breaches supposed interiority of text (pure internal reading impossible)

p. 204 beyond internal reading: read other texts by Scholem

LI p. 44 Derrida’s relation to reader: neither has the means nor desire to consult the reader re: interruption of reading, but haven’t I imparted reason on him & good faith? > forever in doubt

p. 95 to avoid the pretended speech act in the general theory is not rigorous

pp. 116-17 every concept, every philosophical concept, that lays claim to any rigor, always implies alternative “all or nothing” —even concept “difference of degree” (simple empiricism), concept of relativity, determined acc. “all or nothing”: difference of degree or nondifference of degree

——it is impossible/illegitimate to form philosophical concept outside logic “all or nothing”

p. 117 differance, iterability—not entirely words or concepts, must take classical discourse into account, accept logic of “all or nothing” > when one no longer does (via differance, mark, supplement…), must rigorously, pedagogically, explain why one changes the rules

——where the rigorous no longer depends on a binary logic: a more powerful discourse reinscribes “illusory” of “ideal purity” into a thought of its possibility

***p. 122 il la faut, an absolute must: “all or nothing” of conceptual language (“it must” translates the faithfulness of my love for philosophy)

p. 123 Derrida shares w/ Searle demand for oppositional logic though does not elicit same consequences from it

p. 124 w/out rigorous “all or nothing,” speech acts would collapse more rapidly

p. 125 Derrida, as a classical philosopher (which, it is true, he remains as well), doesn’t see a big difference btwn “just a little serious” and “not serious at all”

p. 126 unless a distinction is rigorous, not a distinction at all

pp. 126-27 point is to overturn, complicate, binary opposition and value of distinction attached to it

p. 127 concept of iterability brings into the open what is disturbing or menacing the consistency of binary & hierarchical oppositions

p. 128 “ideal concept” (i.e. rigorous concept) vs. pragmatic concept (empirically useful, provisionally convenient, constructed w/out rigor)

p. 131 reconstitution of context can never be perfect but is a regulative ideal of an ethics of reading: recalling of a context never neutral, innocent, transparent, disinterested

p. 157n Derrida’s incorrigible naïveté: confidence in ethics of discussion (in morality, if not in moralism)

——the “mis-“ of misunderstanding/misinterpreting is not inevitable [re: Habermas’ reading of Derrida] but a structural possibility that must be taken into account at all times

p. 139 use of word repressive out of context lacks rigor

pp. 143-47 “doubling commentary” in OG [a phrase Derrida now deems imprecise] requires intelligibility, indispensability of guardrail, stabilization of meaning > “minimal” deciphering of “first” pertinent/competent access to structures that are relatively stable

——very strong probability of intelligibility of a text is result of stabilized solidity of numerous contracts; minimal consensus > community requires this (discusses this)

——but, what interests Derrida the most, what has always seemed the most rigorous, the double of the “doubling commentary,” is the strictest possible determinations of the figures of play, undecidability, of différantial conditions

p. 146 there is a “right track (bonne voie),” a better way in reading

——feeble to say that deconstruction is not rigorous because doesn’t believe in truth/stability: value of truth never contested, only reinscribed in more powerful, larger contexts

——w/in relatively stable interpretive contexts, should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion/consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, pedagogy

——when a deconstructionist is dismissed as someone who has no regard for truth, and whose text therefore demands no rigor—deconstructionist is synonymous w/ skeptic-relativist-nihilist!

p. 147 the play of differance makes “guardrails,” “doubling commentary,” possible & necessary; “doubling commentary”: a reading that is interpretive, inventive, or “productive”

——that socio-institutional conditions are unstable is true source of an anxiety that “deconstruction” merely reveals > “de-” of deconstruction not demolition of what is constructing itself but what remains to be thought beyond constructivist/destructionist scheme—literacy is at stake [i.e. must be able to read this instability]

p. 159n pragrammatology to come

pp. 150-51 norms, stability, always provisional, finite; must account for stability as well as rules, norms, contractual possibilities that depend on it > to account for a certain stability, one that isn’t eternal, takes into account historicity, nonnaturalness of ethics, politics, institutionality

p. 151 Derrida’s pragrammatology also entails deontological rules of discussion [he accounts for contextual stability, contractual possibilities, while aware context is not absolutely solid]

——proof that contexts are not solid, firm, entirely closed: all this discussion & disagreement

p. 152 “double writing”: irreducible divisibility, “quasi-transcendental,” must partition itself along 2 sides of a limit and respect the rules (to certain extent) of what it deconstructs

——without this tension, contradiction, could anything be done? change?

TN pp. 7-8 rigor is de rigueur; “exact”: the probity of Nancy’s signature

p. 169 for Husserl, rigorous philosopher avoids everyday language w/ its as and as ifs (gleichsam) > he should recall us to evidence itself

p. 220 [re: Nancy quote] violently excerpted: reread everything around it [few pages later: need to read on]

ATM p. 160 there must be a series of Levinas’ même moment if writing of dislocation of the Same toward the Relation [to the Other] is to have a chance, a hold (prise)

——“chance” because: even if obligated, one is not constrained to read what's given to be read

E p. 2 once inserted into another network, the “same” philosopheme is no longer the same > inversely, “unique and original (inédits)” philosophemes, if there are any, once they enter network of inherited philosophemes, they’re affected over their whole surface and under every angle > the very project of rigorous criteria for judging philosophical specificity, which we are nowhere near disposing of, belongs to a set of conditions (un ensemble)—that remains to be thought

OG p. lxxxix (7) reading should free itself from classical categories of history: history of literature, history of philosophy, history of ideas

pp. 4-5 (14) rigorous investigation beyond closure of knowledge, take positivity of science to its limits—monstrous, breaks absolutely w/ normality > faithful to lavenir (for which there is yet no exergue [chapter title: exergue])

pp. 101-02 (149-50) [riffing on racine, radical] question of genealogy exceeds discourse (living, conscious representation of text), exceeds possibilities at present given for its elaboration, takes on meaning only in finite configuration (history of metaphysics); text has radical root system [rhizome], always has several epochs in it, to which reading must resign itself

——to say text is nothing but system of roots contradicts concept of system, pattern of root pp. 149-50 (214-15) [re: Rousseau] draw out a signification the presumed future reading can’t dispense w/ (faire léconomie) > can’t prejudge the discipline of a future reading, thus far no model of reading can measure up to the text (a text more legible than has been thus far thought)

pp. 157-60 doubling commentary: writing that’s a reading, read where writer is surprised [re: surprising resources of Rousseau’s supplement], can’t command his own language > no transcendental signified: il ny a pas de hors-texte

follow the guiding line (le fil conducteur) of the dangerous supplement, chains of differential references, the real never supervenes > impossible to separate signifier from signified

——what opens meaning & language is writing as disappearance of natural presence

——not psychoanalytic reading, not psychobiographical, where symptom is perfectly extrinsic, contingent, to text, where there’s an appeal to transcendental signified

——[doubling commentary] read philosophy, even if you find its project fails, knowing it seeks to efface itself in the face of the signified content that it transports and teaches [this thought is beyond critique?]; all traditional criticism must be adhered to but only as a guardrail (garde-fou) > only protects, never opens a reading

pp. 160-61 minimal readability of French Literature: a language already there, somewhat our own > same for network of significations marked by psychoanalytic theory (even if we’ll never master it)

EU p. 117 Husserlian phenomenology, incomparable rigor—not Sartre, not Merleau-Ponty

(ANNIVERSARY) RING

GT pp. 12-3 circular ring of “giving back (rendre),” circulation of debt not just that of things but values or symbols that are involved there (qui sy engagent en-gage) [TN footnote on engager & its evocation of pledge]

R p. 109 annulment of time announced in date, revolution, volt of the ring (anneau), il faut le temps, default, failure, collapse [autos needing other, event, time, heteronomy]

H p. 135 economy of circle [vs. ring?]

HERP p. 181 caught in ring of circle once questioning philosophy, engaged by Greek tongue > acc. Heidegger, obscurely, authoritatively, Greek tongue alone is logos

MPM p. 19 de Man’s affirmation of memory, an alliance or ring more ancient, secret, resistant than familial or strategic alliances it makes possible, but is never reduced to

PAS PAS p. (21) eternal ring, passivity of nonpower, strength in reception, restarts alliance w/out debt, gift w/out credit

S p. 89 the becoming-crepuscular (Dämmerung) is not a decline (Untergang), it shields the year, the course of the sun [Jahr, march (ier, ienai, gehen), translates race or course of sun]

SH pp. 3-4 circumcision only once, at the same time “first & last,” ring, seal of alliance, anniversary of archeology/eschatology > ring traces, carves the “unwiederholbar (unrepeatable)”

——“one time” in English, but “one turn,” “una vez,” “una volta,” in vicissitudes of latinity

pp. 19-20 anniversary ring—seal > date: spectral return of that which will never return

p. 21 ring, sign of belonging itself, condition of return > cipher of seal, imprint of ring, counts more than content of message, what matters is mark of belonging, manifested alliance

p. 27 date is a future anterior, the slightest indetermination increases the chances (of a future anterior), gives time one assigns to anniversaries to come

p. 34 pledge, complementary object divide in 2 to seal alliance > moment of engagement, signature, contract, ring

p. 35 the poem, folded and refolded in simplicity of the singular, a certain repetition makes readability possible > it signifies: there is shibboleth > there is something not shown: crypt, cipher > it speaks, the address takes place, permitting alliances, anniversaries, returns, even if there is no subsistent trace, scarcely ash

p. 38 ring’s condition & fate of all archival recording > date marks itself, becomes readable, by freeing itself from singularity it recalls, its body becomes ideal, coded

——ideality carries forgetting in its memory, the memory of forgetting itself, the truth of forgetting > reference to singular event annulled in ring’s annulation, the date’s turning-about, una volta, volte-face, revolt, revolution

p. 52 poem, in offering itself, risks losing its time and place to the holocaustic generality of recurrence and readability of concept, the anniversary repetition of unrepeatable

p. 53 effacement of date or name inside the ring: origin of philosophy, hermeneutics, poetics, their sendoff [envois]

p. 68 circumcision of word is not dated in history, has no age, but calls forth date, opens word to other, of all that calls itself (the name, blessing of name, yes & no) > it sets turning the ring

——how to guard against double edge of shibboleth? w/ “living Nothing in the heart,” perhaps [St. Paul’s too literal, Derrida’s exorcism, from circle to ring]

P p. 26 Hegel’s ternary rhythm—what he calls a “ring”—encircles, links to other rings: in science of beautiful, mind presupposes, anticipates itself > philosophy of art: circle in circle of circles

OTO p. 11 anniversary, birthday, an annulus, moment when year annuls itself and begins anew, forms a ring w/ itself

pp. 12-3 autobiographical récit, tells himself his life, affirms EROS, gratitude for gift (gift: establishment of my own credit w/ this name): EROS signs or seals > before such signature, my life may be mere prejudice (reaffirmation of the hymen, alliance or wedding ring, eternal return, “yes, yes” to shadowless gift of high noon)

p. 14 it is life, as the living feminine, that must return eternally, selectively > life allied to herself by nuptial annulus, wedding ring

——btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

REST p. 277 Van Gogh left a trap, lacet (snare) [at bottom right corner of picture, cf. p. 258] > cette boucle étrange, une sorte de noeud esquissé, untied shoes, forms an open circle, pincers or key ring, a leash (laisse), as though taking the place of his signature [cf. DST 323n ring linked to deconstruction]

pp. 350-56 Heidegger’s Verlässlichkeit (reliability, solidity), [what Heidegger restitutes from Van Gogh’s painting?], anterior to opposition useful/sacred, comes from earth/world, from trait, the Ring required for a hymen per fidem, makes commitment possible, fidelity that predates everything

p. 356 Heidegger’s Geborgenheit associates hidden, crypted secret w/ being-in-safety: what one must hold in reserve, conceal, to live > tightening of originary ring > effect of Verlässlichkeit

DST DST p. 216 [in reference to method found in Lacoue-Labarthe] supplementary loop (boucle), tempted to call it a ring (anneau), voire bague (band), a certain circulation takes on value of prescription: obligation, injunction, alliance > detour & return path > inside and outside path of epochality

p. 219 haunted by mimesis: loop or supplementary torsion, the ring both one more and one less in epochal chain, dissimulates itself [disorganizes/interrupts Heideggerian deconstruction?]

p. 323n deconstruction (as/via [?] supplementary ring [anneau]) sometimes a task (tâche), sometimes an event (in a “practical” situation) > Lacoue-Labarthe says deconstruction’s a word “not in the least ‘worn out (usé)’” [cf. REST p. 277 ring linked to Van Gogh’s trap?]

ATM p. 173 Levinas has not only withdrawn dissymmetrical responsibility from circle (of pact, debt, synchronic reciprocity, recognition) but also from annular alliance, from the rounds (tour), whatever makes the rounds of a finger, of a sex or sexual organ [?]

D p. 355 Heidegger: “radiantly, the ring joins the 4, everywhere open to the riddle of their presence”

LG p. 238 une autre bouche ou une autre boucle invaginante—double chiasmatic invagination of edges

***CIR p. 153 blood mixed w/ saliva, w/ sperm, fellatio, make all the readers drool; p. 158 autofellocircumcision; p. 218 ejaculating into bloody mouth of circumcising mother > exultant alliance, her legs open, breasts btwn my legs, both laughing, passing skin from mouth to mouth like a ring

p. 255 in search of Saint Foreskin, gram of “lost part of self,” has the form of a Ring [objet a?]

pp. 297-98 all my tears (of love), prayers, bleeding like overflow of murders I carry w/in myself, knowing not whether I committed them or not, against the other or against me

——spare the sister, she, the password, our lifelong secret, inside of the ring

SPEC pp. 260-61(n) Indra–Varuna (Abraham–Isaac-like) interlace their names w/out revenir sur eux-mêmes (not a ring) > cannot close, so enclose each other > always a [double signature]

pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

RISK

H p. anne 34 Derrida risks a discourse where nothing is planned, risks misunderstanding

POR p. 19 (153) “thinking” requires both principle of reason and what’s beyond it, both archē and an-archy > decision [of thought] always risks the worst, to claim to erase the risk by institutional program is to create a barricade against a future

MPM p. 140 Heidegger protects agains abyssal risk of parasitic contamination, of an an-oppositional differance, thus risk and gravity of saying, “essence of technology is not foreign to technology”

VM p. 63 text “run[s] the risk of being definitively lost, who will ever know of such disappearances?”

PAS PAS p. (23) Blanchot’s viens, not a command, the price to pay, risk, to think hors la langue

SH p. 52 poem, in offering itself, risks losing its time and place to the holocaustic generality of recurrence and readability of concept

FWT p. 8 heritage not only a double injunction or reaffirmation but a choice, filtering, heir not only receives but is one who risks choosing

p. 76 risk decision by enduring undecidable: 2 contradictory imperatives

p. 165 one should never want to avoid getting caught in a tight spot [re: “Christian” landscape of deconstruction]

POOF p. 42 the risk of the perhaps and its already, we’ve undergone it, we have it in memory: ce déjà [Derrida]du peut-être

pp. 295-96 the hyperbole of this friendship seems to engage w/ greatest risk (re: inherited concept of friendship) when Nietzsche speaks of ‘w/out sharing,’ ‘w/out reciprocity’ > can one,

then, still speak of equality & fraternity?

pp. 298-99 desire in lovence (friendship or love) engages me w/ a particular him or her, a singular ‘who,’ desire of the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance (nécessairement infranchissable), where a politics of lovence would no longer imply motifs of community, which always risks bringing a brother back > risk must still be assumed to keep question of ‘who’ from being politically enframed (arraisonner) by schema of l'être-commun

POS pp. 68-9 if one does not develop a systematic strategy of deconstruction, textual irruptions risk falling into excess, into empirical experiments, or into classical metaphysics > but certain risks must be run [re: problematic first re: his own writing on “history of philosophy”]

P pp. 30-1 wanting to avoid “repetition” at all costs, one can: rush toward false exit, empirical chit-chat (bavardage), spring-green impulsive avant-gardism (lavant-gardism printanier ou primesautier)

——who said it was necessary to avoid risk of “repetition”?

ROP p. 113 Foucault pulls back from (admits impasses of) epistēmē > mais seul ceux qui travaillent, seuls ceux qui prennent des risques en travaillant rencontrent des difficultés > responsibility dans lépreuve de laporie

GSP p. 166 in writing, sign can always “empty” itself, may never be reactivated, risks remaining forever closed & mute

PS p. 190 Western theater is decadent because it has broken away from Danger: Artaud, like Nietzsche, but via theater, wants to return us to Danger as Becoming

FS p. 11 writing is inaugural > dangerous, anguishing

O p. 26 dissemination blows up (saute) security of point, arrested in name of the law: it is at the risk, to risk this blowup (to make this jump, faire sauter) that dissem. broaches/has been broached

RGE p. 255 servile condition of mastery & entire history it makes possible > absolute privilege given to slave, truth of the master is the slave: deferred pleasure, limited stakes, delaying disappearance of thing (labor) > the condition of history/meaning/philosophy/discourse

——Hegel’s master/slave an economy of life [vs. economy of death]

——rush headlong into death to risk absolute loss of meaning [Aufhebung cancels this risk]

***p. 257 figure of experience that mimes through sacrifice the risk of absolute death, the feint through which the risk can be lived; philosophy can’t think this simulacrum, Bataille can only say it, feign to say it, in the Hegelian logos > ce rire qui se confond, dans le simulacre, avec louverture du sacré

p. 263 in order to save what does not want to be saved (silence, play, absolute risk), must redouble language, must have recourse to strategies, ruses, simulacra, masks

——Bataille’s communication, only btwn beings who have put the being w/in themselves at stake (mis en jeu) > “placé à la limite de la mort, du néant

DST DST p. 200 thinking of translation, experience of thinking itself, its most essential & risky passage, where experience of thinking is also poetic experience: privileged examples (in Lacoue-Labarthe): Gestell, mimesis, rhuthmos

p. 206 quotation marks: vigilant circumspection, insurance against all risks [in this case Lacoue-Labarthe continually exposes himself to these risks]

EJQB p. 74 poem would be nothing w/out risk of being meaningless

AFR p. 78 [re: Condillac’s ambiguity of 2 imaginations] major strategic operation of mastery is to control ambiguity & risks, the strategy is almost mastery itself

——mastery, if there is any, does not exist: it must possess what is not, never itself

TN p. 309 singularity [never assured] doit être couru comme une chance ou un risque: Nancy’s a bettor, thinker of the bet (pari), a desperate bettor, never stops staking, committing (dengager), calculating w/ exactitude hyperbolic odds (gages): not counting on gains (bénéfice) of an “argument du pari” [Pascal] or any salut

——greatest risk, try to know to “whom,” not about “what,” you’re talking

ATM p. 167 for Levinas, in search of God uncontaminated by Being, contact is a priori contamination > graver yet: risk of contamination that surfaces before contact, in necessity of tying interruptions together (insistence of ruptures)

——contamination is no longer a risk but a fate that must be assumed [from risk to fate]

SPEC p. 302 woman perpetuates race by risking the name: analytic “movement” as genealogy of son-in-law, Judaic law

CHOR p. 103 phallogocentrism, “patrix,” is insurance against return of that which is feared as most agonizing risk

ROGUE/COUNTERFEITER

GOD pp. 111-12 Baudelaire: to repudiate efforts of a preceding society, Christian and philosophic, is to commit suicide [St. Augustine et al. “see” only plastic] [Derrida compares this essay, “The Pagan School,” to “Counterfeit Money,” calls the former less rusé]

GT pp. 128-9 counterfeit money: heart of questions of reference and difference

pp.149-150 counterfeiter justifies both sides, leaves the circle, mastery of reappropriation

p. 152n Poe: counterfeit the presence of night (non-truth): secret survives in their artificitality

p. 150 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

pp. 153-54 as long as money counts, produces effects, as long as it assures finite possibilities of decision & judgment, it is simply not different from money it counterfeits > a more powerful but not infinitely powerful [?] inscription of effects of reference on truth, convention, dispositifs

——opposition of conventional to natural is discredited, or, more rigorously, it is limited in its indispensable credit, in the speculation it will always have to authorize

p. 158 chremastics vs. economy: 1) chremastics, ovular or seminal capital, “bad infinite” of money, no limit 2) economy, oikos, care for home, hearth, limited to necessary goods

——limit gets blurred once there’s monetary sign, or simply sign, once there’s differance & credit, family no longer contained > this originary ruin is chance of hospitality—like counterfeit money, chance for gift itself [Aristotle looks for balanced limit, not Derrida]

R p. 19 roué trickster deserves the wheel, respects nothing, sort of a voyou

pp. 20-21 roué qualifies one who turns a trick, the voyou (rogue) w/ his leading astray (dévoiement), debauchery, worklessness, always a seduction, licentious, libertine [always men, sexual difference]

——democracy always associated w/ this figure, w/ taking too many libertine, liberalism, “everything is allowed,” announces a beheading of monarchical sovereignty

p. 21 Jews wore the rouelle (little red & white wheel, ancestor to yellow star)

***p. 65 democracy must be public, phenomenal, something of the Enlightenment, but also it must give rights to the secret, society of the secret (voyoucracy)

p. 66 voyoucracy, corrupting power of street, not anarchic disorder, but structured disorder, secret society, seducer

p. 67 voyoute, extremely rare word, artificial, a bit tomboyish, free & master of her own like man, air of liberated feminist—but voyou is always a man if not a ladies’ man

pp. 67-8 voyou-cracy a counterconcept of sovereignty like we find in Bataille

p. 69 voyou—counterfeit

pp. 93-94 rogue unlike voyou [in French] can be animal, a creature incapable of mingling w/ the herd

p. 102 the rogue that therefore I am: (ab)using time

POOF p. 275 for Kant, crime against humanity would be to disdain currency, to take counterfeit money for counterfeit [skeptic betrays mankind] > for Kant, virtue obligates that we turn counterfeit (small change) into gold, becoming-truth of the simulacrum, its verification, authentication [pp. 257-58 rare friend keeps secret, renounces possible public profit, that of circulating secret]

PS p. 182 for Artaud, “the metaphor of myself is my dispossession w/in language” > this by way of the counterfeiter, God–Satan, who isn’t a creator, but the subject of all [dispossessing] oeuvres

LI p. 32 dispatch should have been signed, which I do, and counterfeit, here, where? [Remark at end of SEC, also see GT]

CIN p. 33 [Derrida on his own “counterfeiter’s forgery,” on his ability to lie, or not be certain what he knows, but what does he know or lie about w/ such indeterminate phrases?]

BSi p. 19 “rogue (voyou, Schurke) state”—U.S.’s hypocritical rhetorical stratagem (Chomsky)

pp. 63-4 Rousseau confesses: I lived like a werewolf (loup-garou) (outlaw, savage) because I read

p. 98 for Rousseau, outlaw is “w/out faith or law”

ATAP p. 91 destinerrance: bastard apocalyptic filiation

CIR pp. 103-04 I’m a dying counterfeiter, lie permanently to everyone, will never reveal full grain of transgressions we’re dying to know, archive [SA on temptation of curiosity, knowledge]; skizzolatry in notebook, colonize and cultivate hell, escarre as sponge; SA accuses/praises God for being monster mother, infinite sea containing finite sponge [this is prior to SA’s conversion]

SPEC p. 263 Nietzsche achieved findings of psychoanalysis w/out pain, using counterfeit coins? Freud’s évitement, avertissement

pp. 263-64 Freud’s avoidance of philosophy [of Nietzsche] (already in place like a counterfeiter) is inevitable (closest avoided in inevitable itself) > that the da be fort even before a judgment of denegation vienne y apposer la spécificité de son sceau

p. 266 for Freud, one can inherit conceptual simulacra, counterfeit money [Nietzsche, Schopenhauer], but it is lacking in guaranteed value of psychoanalysis > Freud’s rationalization, his naive self-assurance re: counterfeit money, a scene of intolerable inheritance

FV p. 490 Poe: “the sable divinity would not herself dwell with us always; but we could counterfeit her presence”

ROSENZWEIG & COHEN & SCHOLEM

IW p. 245 Rosenzweig sees Cohen as a philosopher-teacher who reminds us of the abyssal risk of thought or existence

pp. 245-46 Rosenzweig’s encomium to Cohen: a philosopher who had to philosophize, not a tightrope walker [Nietzsche reference?]

p. 248 Rosenzweig in reference to Cohen’s overflowing, volcanic, teaching habits: “nothing more Jewish than this lack of transition”

p. 251 Husserl’s/Scheler’s militant patriotism belongs to same configuration as Hermann Cohen’s

pp. 273-74 Cohen’s vision of German-Jew is a psycho-spiritual truth not yet incarnate in historical effectivity [to explain factual antisemitism in Germany, in America too]

p. 285 re: Heidegger & Cohen’s nationalist call to duty: let’s not imprudently bring these 2 gestures together, but not forget common web of a tradition

p. 287 Rosenzweig speaks of Cohen breaking free from Hegel (by returning to Kant): math [which guides Cohen here] generates its elements not from empty nothing of 1 and universal 0, but determinate nothing of differential, a particular nothing [Derrida adds: Heidegger too]

EL p. 192 Scholem against extinguishing category genius, Derrida adds: secularizing rationalization that flattens, levels out, resistance of any singularity/exception [Nietzsche-like]

p. 193 Scholem over-imprints (surimprime) an “unheimlich” debate w/ Rosenzweig by mentioning the latter’s disease

pp. 194-95 for Rosenzweig, Zionism is a linguistic evil: turns a language of names into one of political information

p. 197 does Scholem want shibboleth to get out of abyss (the improbable border, the desert) or to rush into it & be engulfed by it (pour sy engouffrer)?

——for Scholem, essence of language is either sacred or it is not > it consists of names, elle revient à nommer, or it returns/amounts to nothing, returns to no one

p. 205 apocalyptic knowledge, to the side of gnostic knowledge [Merkabah (throne-word of God)] betrayed by being written—Scholem accused of such betrayal by living cabbalists

ROUSSEAU

KH p. 149n in On the Social Contract, a form of fiction, war serves to throw light on limits of social contract [and Rousseau's’ fabulous text as well]

MPM pp. 128-29 for de Man, Rousseau & Nietzsche both derive transcendental-referent from possibility of making promises [think futurity] [Derrida’s distress over loving both]

TC p. 245 in The Social Contract and Letter to M. dAlembert, Rousseau suspects the “representer” when proposing that theatrical representations be replaced by public festivals

T p. xxviii academic vulgarity of modern Rousseauism

DS pp. 234-35 supplement in Mallarmé (not unilateral movement, like in Rousseau, which loses warmth of spoken word): cest lexcès dun signifiant qui, en son dedans, supplée lespace et répète louverture

DST DST p. 209 de Man’s “no blind spot (tache aveugle)” in Rousseau made Derrida impatient > but impatience should incite one to take one’s time, impatience is never justified

TR pp. 131-32 Rousseau: “this is the only portrait of a man, drawn precisely from nature and in all its truth”

pp. 140-41 Rousseau’s scene of virtual “sooner or later” remains fundamentally Christian

p. 141 Rousseau’s appeal to others, appeal to future, belongs to same time, same moment, as “myself alone”

——Rousseau’s wager, incalculability of absolute perhaps in which contradiction btwn exemplarity & “without example” can survive

AFR p. 117(n) reference to Rousseau’s objection to Condillac in 2nd Discourse: Rousseau denounces [turns of Condillac’s] circle only to step into it more quickly

LI p. 82 Rousseau: masturbation & writing are harmful

OG p. 98 (147) Descartes drove out sign, Hegel reappropriates sensible sign to movement of Idea, but only Rousseau dealt directly w/ reduction of writing

p. 99 (147) Leibniz’s pasigraphy, non-European scripts, inspired a breach which Rousseau sought to fill w/ the voice > a battle is declared, “Hegelianism” en sera la plus belle cicatrice

p. 105 (154) for Lévi-Strauss, Rousseau founder/prophet of anthropology; Rousseau identified possibility of totemism in pity & metaphoricity

p. 337n Rousseau: philosophy/reason introduces self-love, philosophy permits man to speak in secret—“‘perish if you will, I’m secure’”

p. 118 for Rousseau, the sensible cogito, interior voice, never lies

p. 131 re: Lévi-Strauss, Rousseau would have shuddered to hear a self-proclaimed disciple describe law as follows… [when everyone can read, “ignorance of law is no defence”]

pp. 141-42 (204-05) Rousseau tries to recuperate living speech through older writing? writing promises a reappropriation of that of which speech allowed itself to be dispossessed

——writing as hiding, solitude, when full speech seems impossible

p. 143 (205-06) Rousseau’s sacrifice: never began to live until he looked upon himself as a dead man, until he affirmed writing [death in life, differance] > aiming at a symbolic reappropriation of presence that differance will have breached/broached

pp. 173-74 (247-48) Rousseau contra Hobbes: pity/compassion is a natural law (beasts have it too), mother’s law, law of the (soft) voice, pity “takes the place of” instituted law, supplements law [though it works the other way around too]; mother’s law, written in our hearts by God > natural writing, writing of heart—not reason, before reason: writing (of reason) is w/out pity, transgresses law of voice, a perverse passion

p. 342n Nietzsche & Rousseau share same opinion of women (degradation of culture), and of genealogy of morals as servitude to slave—so how could Nietzsche have hated him so much?

p. 189 (268) Rousseau’s inflection of Hobbes: during barbaric times state of war reigned, but men rarely met, earth at peace [neutral origin of ethico-political conceptuality]

pp. 193-94 [Derrida’s conclusion re: dating Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin]

p. 253 (358) Rousseau of Essay describes the presque society, subtle passage from origin to genesis; in Discourse he lays out a radical virgin origin > these 2 “origins” complement each other

p. 351n Rousseau & Descartes [Aristotle too]: our senses never deceive us, only our judgments

CIR p. 133 word Sony reminds me of the dream in Turin, btwn Rousseau/Nietzsche > my two positive heroes

RUINS

FL p. 278 what else can one love but ruins? one loves a monument in the ghost or silhouette of its ruins? its finitude

SACRED LANGUAGE

VM p. 102 Levinas: “to love the Torah more than God” is “protection against the madness of a direct contact with the Sacred”

TB p. 132 [vis-à-vis Benjamin] sacred text is sacred in that it announces its transferability

p. 133 sacred text is transferability making its translation untranslatable

——sacred text (absolute text): pas de sens (not poverty of meaning, but no meaning that would be itself) > sacred text surrenders itself to translation; commands right away the translation it refuses

EL p. 194 revenge or return of the sacred in face of “politicolinguistic” profanation

p. 195 for Scholem, not only a loss of sacred language but its revenance in form of revenge

pp. 195-96 imminent, eschatological boiling of a language as volcano: the passion of a sacred language suffering

p. 196 jealous, revengeful God of fire (Spinoza’s fright before jealousy of this God) [p. 203 Spinoza’s own fright repeats one he attributes to Hebrews who flee fire in divine word & who thus construct political plan Theological-Political Treatise describes]

p. 197 for Scholem, essence of language is either sacred or it is not > it consists of names, elle revient à nommer, or it returns/amounts to nothing, returns to no one

p. 198 blind sorcerers of secularization conceal abyss (in them abyss is sealed), but au fond de ce sans-fond, the abyss cannot be dominated, tamed

p. 199 for Spinoza, sacred is neither in the name (word) nor the signified (thing) but in the intention that brings them together

p. 201 Scholem seems to say that there’s is only sacred language (at bottom of abyss)

——even if secularization is impossible, its symptom is still grave

——for Scholem, secularized = pulling out language’s apocalyptic thorn; but secularization does not take place, a surface effect, language still sacred in its abyssal interior

pp. 201-02 secular is a epiphenomenon, surface (rhetorical) effect, a façon de parler

——secular is surface effect, produces the surface on which we sleepwalk, we believe in the surface, but there is only abyss > speak sacred language even in denying it (avoid speaking it) [Heidegger]

p. 203 Scholem’s equivocal use of word apocalypse, fascination w/ abyss : indecision that he can’t, doesn’t want, to master > apocalypse should be guarded (saved), and we should guard against it

pp. 203-04 secularize (desacralize): remove point, sting (Stachel), apocalyptic thorn of language > sting, this teleological aim (visée), institutes sacredness of language > this sacred language (Hebrew) would be nothing w/out magnetized pointer of apocalypse (cette pointe aimantée dapocalypse)

pp. 207-08 the vengeance of language (language as name of God) > a debt that leaves its signature in the language will be incurred by innocents, archiguilty, generations to come

——this is a logic that the cogito, practico-transcendental egology, cannot comprehend [i.e. cogito can’t comprehend language?]

pp. 208-09 return, repetition, revenance, the re- in language, as language insofar as it inaugurates possibility of revenge in language

pp. 209-10 the turn to everyday sacredness (secular Hebrew): miraculous manna but also profanatory jouissance > sorcerers: sinister masquerade, quasi Esperanto or Valapük, living dead in a shoddy resurrection used for commerce > evacuation & perversion of meaning

——the false cadaver will avenge itself its carnival disguises, its cadaverous instrumentality

p. 211 for Scholem, for language to avenge itself against secularization: 1) it must be someone, bear the name of someone, remain attached to its creator 2) no iterability at source: technology is secondary or evil, can only befall (survenir) it [this exteriorizing of contamination is similar to Christian idealism, a spiritual interiorization separated from body, time, letter, carnal signifier]

p. 212 iconoclasm & idolatry at same time (if that’s possible): turn infinite value into a commercial one (both use & exchange)

——w/in “logic” of fetishism, no one ones who’s doing the fetishizing: Scholem or those he accuses? (via Enlightenment tradition prepared by Spinoza, it would be Scholem)

pp. 212-13 prophesying about modern Israel, Scholem sees risk of commercializing the sacred [?]

pp. 213-14 for Scholem, Sprache ist Namen, being of language resides in name, not in substantive but nominal, in power of naming (verbs were once names) > Derrida (via an internal reading) adds: must be a spectral haunting, there is a specter because there’s language, language can haunt because names haunt (neither present/absent) our sentences, language summons (convoque)—category of spectral revenant (not a flower of rhetoric) figures a beyond oppositional ontologic or dialectic of presence/absence

——a dynamis, enveloped virtuality, a power of language, quasi-autonomous [that of the name]

——magical power of name: revelation and encrypting (crypte), hides abyss w/in it > to open a name is to find an abyss, abyss as thing itself

——[vis-à-vis Scholem] prayer invokes spirits, the name is more powerful and transcendent than we are > but, to secularize sacred language, we play w/ ghosts [from spirit to ghost]

——Beschwörung: invoking names, invoking spirits

p. 215 the 2 abysses (of life, of death) (each one en abîme in other): 1) loss of names/signification 2) the abyss into which one falls, revenge for not realizing language/names are abyssal

——sacré, sacrifice vs. heilig, Opfer

living dead language is sur-viving, “hyperliving” > sacred language [?]

——la folie sacrée, la sacrée folie (sacred madness, damned madness) of Scholem: he doesn’t believe it possible to sacrifice (kill) sacred language—but he fears/desires it: fright before the possibility of the impossible

p. 216 God speaks out—very fire of vindictive jealousy

——tautological & contradictory logic (speaks of the event of an impossible, makes of impossible the condition of possibility): secularization allows us to speak of a secularization that doesn’t take place

p. 217 secularization as a sacrifice of language, destruction of sacred language as experience of sacred language (perhaps most unheimlich experience), but also sacrifice of sacrifice: self-destruction of sacrificial function/operation (which presupposes sacredness)

——experience of the edge (bord) [sacrifice?], abyss btwn 2 places: sacred & non-sacred

——sacrifice: 1) destroy sacred 2) pay homage or give death to sacred

——Scholem’s nothing (secularization) occurs, not fortuitously analogous to Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik: nothingness, nothingness of language, announces “essence of what it threatens and causes to recoil in totality”

p. 219 “we” of covenant, not secularized “communal subject,” countersigns by responding to commitment already taken: autobiographicity of “we” assigned by call resonating from sacred language > in sacrificial instant, one hears imminence of God’s voice’s return

p. 223 God’s voice sealed, on reserve in sacred language, like a signature, the oath of the covenant or faith tying us to God: content of this hidden speech will take form again, meaning will take on form in manifestation, to hear & to say will renew the covenant

——sacred language: “con-juration" itself (conjuration btwn God & us)

p. 224 every political revolution: a return to speaking essence of sacred language [?] > this return marks moment of judgment, instance of a court (Gericht, the last judgment [Das jüngste Gericht]) w/ apocalyptic value

pp. 225-26 Stéphane Mosès: virtual explosion of nondeterminate meaning, fulfilled eschatology, day when ‘ancient names & seals’ emerge anew into light of day, ‘return of the repressed’

EU p. 15 Montaigne [so important for French literary language] defends prayer in sacred language

SACRIFICE [definition, philosophy of life required]

GOD GOD p. 8 [another secret] Christian mysterium tremendum, fear and trembling before sacrificial gift, person being paralyzed, in its singularity, by the gaze of God

pp. 10-11 [economy of the sacrifice] in turn toward new mystery, toward new structure of responsibility, prior one never eliminated, kept w/in oneself, mourned as crypt of a more ancient secret > is this repression, is this a kind of sacrificial Aufhebung?

***p. 32 contamination btwn: 1) renouncing oneself, denying the gift, as the generosity of the gift that must withdraw itself (se retirer), se cacher, sacrifice itself in order to give 2) repression that transforms gift into economy of sacrifice

——a heterogenous trembling that apprehends, gives oneself death in a new way

p. 43 for Heidegger, that death remains “mine” is possibility of sacrifice: go to death for another (fur einen Anderen in den Tod gehen) [only gift of self]

***p. 48 dying of or for the other, the most ancient, institutes responsibility as giving oneself death, se-donner-le-mort ou offrir sa mort, cest-à-dire sa vie > ethical dimension of sacrifice

pp. 56-57 trembling in mysterium tremendum? gift of infinite love, dissymmetry btwn gaze of God, and me not seeing what looks at me (gift and endurance of death in irreplaceable) > disproportion btwn infinite gift & my finitude > responsibility: salvation, sin, culpability, sacrifice

p. 64 for Kierkegaard [contra Hegel], universal duty is a dereliction of absolute duty, a sacrifice or duty that reaches beyond debt & duty > the “gift of death”

pp. 67-8 secrecy essential to sacrificial responsibility, absolute, infinite, duty in name of God as tout autre, who must remain transcendent, hidden, secret, jealous of love, commands he gives

——absolute duty denounces all duties, responsibilities of human law [i.e. general ethics]

p. 68 as soon as I enter into relation w/ absolute other, my singularity enters into relation w/ his on level of obligation & duty, but this binds me to sacrifice, and there are infinite others

pp. 70-71 Dome of Rock, House of Lord in Jerusalem, place of dispute btwn monotheistic faiths

of transcendent God, absolute other; they fight over it w/ fire & blood (now, more than ever)

——interpretations, reading, tradition of Isaac’s sacrifice have become sites of holocaustic sacrifice

——orders of responsibility in sacrificial war of religions of Book and beyond: ethico-political, theologico-political, secret/public, profane/sacred

——can only respond to the one, to the other, by sacrificing the one to the other > will never be able to justify this sacrifice, will always be held in secret

p. 76 does system of sacrificial responsibility & double “gift of death” require exclusion (sacrifice) of woman? [re: absence of women in Isaac & Abraham story and “Bartleby the Scrivener”]

pp. 85-86 sacrifice of Isaac is an abomination, it is criminal, unforgivable; today society not only participates in incalculable sacrifices (starving children, wars), it organizes them

pp. 94-95 economy of sacrifice (Christian reward) vs. sacrifice of economy (absolute sacrifice of Abraham, responsibility)

p. 97 Jesus teaches in Matthew, “you can count on the heavenly economy if you sacrifice the earthly one”

p. 101 commerce is reciprocal and finite exchange of wages, merchandise, reward; Christ’s economy of sacrifice as dissymmetry, but still payment, wages, merces

p. 106 the 2 economies: 1) calculation, Judaic 2) dissymetric economy of sacrifice, “beyond the totality of the calculable as a finite totality of the same,” renunciation of merchandise, still relies on giving back (rendre), on yield, profit, but only father who sees in secret [can calculate]

pp. 108-09 secret market of secrecy, “Christianity’s stroke of genius,” says Nietzsche, merchandise, give credit to the infinite [denounce all calculation & still yield surplus-value]

——no “exterior” critique to Christianity, to its worldwide event > demystifying it justifies proto-Christianity to come

——Christianity’s being-self is constituted in the hyperbole of this market (the profit of sacrifice)

p. 115 via Nietzsche’s “genius of Christianity,” moralizing the mechanisms of debt via moral duty & bad conscience, a hyperbolized repression: sacrificial hubris

p. 126 Abraham sacrifices promise (Isaac) to the covenant w/ God [?]

p. 129 double secret: 1) God’s call to make the greatest sacrifice 2) reason or sense of the demand for the sacrifice

——Abraham held to secrecy because the secret remains secret from him

p. 154 literature desacralizes the world like Abraham’s sacrifice [in the name of a secret w/out content]

GT GT p. 112 annihilation of a remainder, as ashes sometimes testify, can play role of memory, of offering, of sacrifice

***p. 137 sacrifice (always distinguished from pure gift) expects a surplus-value or at least an amortization, a protection

FK FK pp. 78-9 from kenotic horizon of death of God to rights of human life (anthropological re-immanentization): an Abraham who would refuse to sacrifice his son and no longer envisage what was always madness [Pope speaks only of a certain “death of God”]

p. 86 auto-immunity of religion: btwn sacrifice and respect for life

p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

——these dimensions of self-sacrificial supplementarity, the auto-co-immunity, com-mon auto-immunity, keep community alive, open to something other, more than itself (a spectralizing messiancity beyond all messianism)

——Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

p. 88 religion as ellipsis of sacrifice, Heidegger sees ontotheology as free from sacrifice & prayer, but Derrida sees double bind, religion excluding & requiring sacrifice, indemnification of unscathed, auto-immunization & sacrifice of sacrifice

——sacrifice: price to pay for not injuring tout autre, violence of sacrifice in name of non-violence; w/ Kant, self-sacrifice sacrifices most proper in service of most proper

p. 100 ontotheology destroys & institutes religion when it suspends sacrifice & prayer

FL FL p. 246 we adult white male Europeans, carnivorous and capable of sacrifice

p. 288 for Benjamin, mythological violence of law sacrifices the living, whereas divine violence sacrifices life to save the living (destructive)

POO POO p. 16 sacrifice and sacrificial at heart of Kant’s morality

p. 23 of what does verification consist, when nothing happens w/out some sacrifice? would this be a testimony neither witness, attestation, nor testament could exhaust?

HERP HERP p. 213 Heidegger calls the fact of not hearing (überhören) the poet that announces future being of a people: a sacrifice

knowledge of what founds is intolerable, must be, structurally, repressed, excluded, ostracized from what it founds or institutes, must not belong to it (like Rousseau)

p. 215 acc. to Heidegger, Derrida speculates, if God of ontotheology can’t be addressed by prayer or sacrifice, God beyond ontotheology would be a God to which it was possible & necessary to sacrifice

——translation risks separation, also a war & a sacrifice, several events of sacrifice

——for Heidegger, Hölderlin’s sacrifice, which Germans have not heard, is an exemplary sacrifice, but how to respond to someone who says “You do not hear the sacrificed poet”?

p. 216 Derrida would have called this reading “le sacrifice de Heidegger,” Heideggers sacrifice, the sacrifice of Heidegger: “A bon entendeur, salut: let the hearer beware!”

A A pp. 43-4 “culture of death”—a tautology? each culture treats death differently, w/ different partitions, culture of death = history of death (cult of ancestors, rituals of mourning/sacrifice)

PP PP p. 120 [re: Socrates renouncing pleasure for truth] one must be careful, in symptamotological manner of Nietzsche, to diagnose the economy, linvestissement et le bénéfice différé sous le signe du pur renoncement, sous la mise du sacrifice désintéressé

pp. 130-34 expulsion, sacrifice, exorcism of pharmakos played out on boundary line btwn inside/outside, expulsion of evil or madness to restore sōphrosunē

SH SH p. 50 there is a holocaust (all-consuming) for every date: “every hour counts its holocaust”

TC TC p. 243 Artaud: consciousness gives to every act of life it’s blood-red color, its cruel nuance, life is always someone else’s death

FWT FWT p. 93 is Bataille’s sovereignty still theologico-political like Hegel’s mastery? > both are sacrificial

p. 136 anonymous [death] machines, purifying neutralization of DP, ensure nothing is visible, no blood > what is called for: history/economy of blood, of sacrificial theatricality it channels [Nietzsche]

p. 141 Catholics in favor of DP (Juan Donoso Cortès, Aquinas), DP and history of blood sacrifice?p. 142 DP conceived of as heart of all criminal law, all moral law (Kant) > its condition or transcendental

pp. 150-51 deconstruction of DP makes untenable from w/in distinction btwn internal punishment (poena naturalis) & external (poena forensis): [Kant does Derrida’s work for him] since guilty should sign off on punishment, all executed punishment would be like a suicide > no law immune from interest, revenge, the sacrificial (for Kant, moral/judicial reason is sacrificial)

POOF POOF pp. 245-46 Schmitt: extreme possibility of war gives human life its specifically political tension > Schmitt: w/out this tension there might be interesting things, but no friend–enemy meaningful antithesis whereby men could be required to sacrifice life [the morality of this situation doesn’t matter, where there is the possibility of war, this is the phenomenon of the political]

P P pp. 130-31 “pleasing-oneself-in” of sublime suspends play, elevates to seriousness, nur negativ, relates to moral law, both presuppose violence done to senses, w/ sublime violence done by imagination, not reason > imagination mutilates itself, conceals itself, binds, robs itself: sacrificial violence gains by losing > organizes expropriation w/in calculation > imagination organizes theft of its own freedom, feels sacrifice/theft at same time as the Ursache to which it submits [see GOD]

ROP ROP p. 120n stricture can take figure of sacrifice, everything btwn sacrifice and nonsacrifice, unless suspended btwn sacrifice that knots (noue) & sacrifice that cuts (tranche), the 2 great experiences of Abraham & Isaac > idiom of resistance, resistance of idiom, in distant word “sacrifice”

ATIA ATIA p. 20 the 2 falls of man, Prometheus/Adam, narrate (infinite) superiority over the animal: man’s property is unconditional & sacrificial

p. 30 animals in Old Testament sacrifice their sacrifice, consent to sacrifice, forgive themselves [?]

p. 42 giving a name (one could say too hastily): sacrificing the living to God

p. 54 the animality of the absolute father, killed/sacrificed to bring equality to brothers

pp. 90-91 anthropocentric prejudices of the cogito in Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas > all these thinkers reaffirm the necessity of sacrifice (not specifically of animals, but as a ground of the human)

——this is made explicit & thematic (footnote says: “I don’t have time, take my word”)

p. 90 required singularity of animal in cogito, re: Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas; what each maintains of Descartes (despite nuance) > each reaffirms necessity of sacrifice

p. 91 Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas all make explicit fundamental place of sacrifice; for Descartes, its inexplicit: animal-machine not sacrificed animal > but Descartes’ cogito has its Christian heritage: interest in Eucharist, a relation to Augustine’s cogito (despite denials)

***pp. 91-2 single embrace of Kant, Descartes, Levinas, Lacan, Heidegger, like chasing, hunting, trying to take hold of cuttlefish, touch the animal in a way where it will expel its ink (encre), its anchor, in this case, w/ these folks, the ink as the ability to do the “I,” before autoreference; (in the name of autobiography) Derrida confides the animalist “vision” he has of what he does, what he writes > his “sole concern” is to not sacrifice to it any difference, fold, opening to-come

p. 100-01 for Kant [via Adorno], animals have no teleology (so always a means), they have no dignity (Würde), that is, no priceless internal value, so always a price, always belong to sensible world that must be sacrificed; Adorno sees in this a hatred towards animals, a Kant avec Sade

——in Kant, sacrificial cruelty more serious, terrible, when it comes to animals, less serious [?] re: sacrificing sensibility to moral reason

p. 101 beneath its mechanistic indifference, Cartesianism belongs to Judeo-Christian-Islamic sacrificial war against animal

pp. 101-02 anthropocentric sacrificial tradition as Epipromethean-Islamic-Judaic-Christian

p. 104 Derrida spoke of carnophallogocentrism to name sacrificial scene

p. 112 principle of life (torat haïm) never prevented animal sacrifice in Judaism

***pp. 112-13 before fall, before institution of nakedness, Adam was a vegetarian, Cain too was a vegetarian: God’s preference in Abel, the beginning of historicity, goes against his original commandment, now he prefers sacrifice

p. 113 Descartes, Kant, Levinas disavow, foreclose, sacrifice, humiliate lanimot [see p. 89] > disavowal of foreclosure

p. 132 divinanimality, quasi-transcendental referent, sacrificed/disavowed foundation of what it founds: justice, symbolic, human order [brings Levinas & Lacan close] > difficulty of uttering discourse of transcendence/mastery e: animal in the name of God/Law

WAP WAP pp. 4-5 institution of title/work can be incarnated by people, even single person: but this incarnation guaranteed by some institution > institution guards, guarantees title, thus already holds title; origin of power to entitle/accredit can never be phenomenalized; this not merely circle makes us rethink “repression,” “suppression,” “sacrifice”

SW SW p. 343 when prayer replaces bloody sacrifice, tallith commemorates both privileged animal of sacrifice & (leaping w/ wing-beat to eschatological term of story) the sacrifice of sacrifice

***DPi ***DPi p. 116 Blanchot repeats core argument of right-wing philosopheme found in Kant, Hegel: man’s dignity is to risk life in law > right as right of literature & right of death as right of DP

——human law implies: something worth more than life, life must be liable to be sacrificed (not sacred [?]), sacrifice raises, raises itself above egoism, above anxiety of individual life

pp. 127-28 for Kant, CI, eye for an eye, talionic law, surpasses value of life and all price: no law will ever be founded on unconditional love of life (life for life’s sake)—on the absolute refusal of any sacrifice of life

p. 140-41 does one [i.e. Nietzsche, Baudelaire] have right to find interest in a discourse that claims to be beyond it? > [Kant’s disinterest raises itself above the living, sacrifices the living]

p. 149 religions: Systeme der Gausamkeit, festivals, theater of cruelty, are serious, there is no laughter, one suffers & causes suffering to take pleasure > cruelty not one part among others: it is the essence of life, life makes itself suffer to keep itself in memory, an interpretation of sacrificiality

——at all solemn festivals, there comes back (nachwirkt) a remainder of fear that presided over all acts of memory, promises, oaths, engagements

p. 157 via Nietzsche, Christianity (pretends to) open hyperbolic passage at limit of spiritualization, reversing the order of things (creditor offers himself in sacrifice)

pp. 278-79 for Montaigne, there’s always something worth more than life, exceeding life, force of an opining (to say yes), belief, a force of force, a force of act of faith that says yes > this, acc. Montaigne, is the essence of religion: acceptance of sacrificial death & DP in shadow of a sur-viving supposedly worth more than life > religion grants the surviving of survival

RGE RGE p. 257 le comique absolu, cest langoisse devant la dépense à fonds perdus, devant le sacrifice absolu du sens: sans retour et sans réserve

——figure of experience that mimes through sacrifice the risk of absolute death, the feint through which the risk can be lived; philosophy can’t think this simulacrum, Bataille can only say it, feign to say it, in the Hegelian logos > ce rire qui se confond, dans le simulacre, avec louverture du sacré

——Bataille: man who sacrifices vs. sage who surrenders to knowledge

——acc. Bataille, to be indifferent to comedy of Aufhebung (like Hegel was)—to blind oneself to experience of sacred, to heedless sacrifice of presence & meaning

p. 274 Bataille’s sovereignty is not neutral even if it neutralizes all oppositions of classical logic

——affirmation of play outside meaning: potlach of signs that burns, consumes, wastes words in gay affirmation of death: a sacrifice & a challenge

——sovereign operation, like all transgressions, must conserve/confirm what it exceeds

REST REST p. 360 Shapiro’s restitution brings a ghost back alive to a dead man, mais revenant, revenant vivant au mort: dès lors vivant, lui-même revenant, who is himself then a ghost returning, “personal object” coming back to the ghost (revenant au revenant)

——sacrifice in memory of another dead man, who [Goldstein] remains stony, like his name, mais revient aussi, comme un revenant, grâce au don de ce revenant

HLP HLP p. 33 ethics of veracity always a sacral ethics of sacrifice [cf. p. 289n]

EJQB EJQB p. 70 only that which is written gives me existence by naming me (things come into existence & lose existence by being named) > sacrifice of existence to the word (Hegel), but also consecration of existence by word: one must write, not simply be written, in order to have a name

PJP PJP p. 200 sacrifice of Isaac: sort of rupture w/ marriage, infidelity to Sarah [marriage as Christian madness]

EL EL p. 200 what if there were no third language, no metalinguistic referee, no language in general, no [originary] neutral language? > what if the dialectico-transcendental hypothesis is already a positivist naturalization/neutralization of the supernatural?

p. 215 sacré, sacrifice vs. heilig, Opfer

p. 217 secularization as a sacrifice of language, destruction of sacred language as experience of sacred language (perhaps most unheimlich experience), but also sacrifice of sacrifice: self-destruction of sacrificial function/operation (which presupposes sacredness)

——sacrifice: 1) destroy sacred 2) pay homage or give death to sacred

p. 219 “we” of covenant, not secularized “communal subject,” countersigns by responding to commitment already taken: autobiographicity of “we” assigned by call resonating from sacred language > in sacrificial instant, one hears imminence of God’s voice’s return

HST HST p. 411 grave substitution (one worthy of name), life for another, or life for something (contaminate logic of who w/ what, ethics w/ arithmetic, arithméthique) > (fetishism is only a figure of this)

——one for the other: 1) prosthetic sense: in place of 2) dative sense: sacrifice for the other 3) ontophenomenological sense: being, appearing “for the other” > all 3 inter-cross

p. 416 “in/at the place of (à la place de, au lieu de, en lieu et place de),” “for (pour)” indicating substitution & gift: entering economy of gift/sacrifice to exceed it > [lieu-tenants]

p. 417 Abrahamic substitution not a homogenous, identical (cloning) replacement but that of exception, election > implicates (engage) each singularity in responsibility to give, to sacrifice themselves as pledge (comme gage) > still, not a free, voluntary act: there’s grace, a certain passivity

TN TN p. 367n Pascal: true sacrifice must be spiritual—the flesh that doesn’t perish [circumcision of heart]

p. 269 Nancy on Enlightenment to come: never renounce thought, philosophy, knowledge > Nancy never renounces pertinence, he is so resolute, even at heart of ecstasy, of sacrifice

E E pp. 21-2 though sublimity works against our senses, the sacrifice (Aufopferung) of the sublime keeps a power in view, sublime can dawn in art: attains a power greater than what was sacrificed

——economic calculation allows sublime to be swallowed

***EW ***EW pp. 278-79 in Western metaphysics, incl. Heidegger and Levinas, there’s a sacrificial structure, a place left open for noncriminal putting to death: executions of ingestion, incorporation, or introjection of the corpse > where does “symbolic” begin and end?

——Heidegger and Levinas’ discourses remain profound humanisms to the extent that they do not sacrifice sacrifice

p. 280 link the question of “who” to the question of “sacrifice,” phallogocentrism as a schema of carnivorous virility

——carno-phallogocentrism: a heterotautology as a priori synthesis, i.e. “speculative idealism,” “becoming-subject of substance,” “absolute knowledge,” “speculative Good Friday” > idealizing interiorization of phallus and its necessity of its passage through the mouth

p. 283 Derrida links denegation of murder, in the putting to death of the animal, to the violent institution of the “who” as subject

AD AD p. 7 Levinas: “responsibility for the other,” “responsibility of the hostage,” an experience of substitution & sacrifice

p. 58 Levinas: no nominative form of self in Latin, the irreducibility of sacrifice, law of accusative in welcome

CIN CIN p. 19 no cinder w/out fire, that is what is owed (se doit) to fire, [yet, if possible] w/out shadow of sacrifice, at noon, w/out debt, w/out Phoenix, au lieu daucun placement, place solely of incineration

p. 25 best paradigm for trace not the trail of the hunt, le frayage, wake in sea, nor love of step (pas) for its imprint, but the cinder (what remains w/out remaining from holocaust, from the all-burning [du brûle-tout]) > no longer makes a trace, or traces only by losing trace quelle reste à peine

[see CIN pp. 24-30 in FIRE on holocaust gift]

OG OG p. 142 (205) [early who/what] sacrifice the I am present for what I am, what Im worth: renounce my present life to achieve myself in ideality/truth > writing is the phenomenon of this battle (replaces presence by value)

p. 143 (205-06) Rousseau’s sacrifice: never began to live until he looked upon himself as a dead man, until he affirmed writing [death in life, differance] > aiming at a symbolic reappropriation of presence that differance will have breached/broached

SACRIFICE OF SACRIFICE [fixerup]

ATIA p. 30 animals in Old Testament sacrifice their sacrifice, consent to sacrifice, forgive themselves [?]

SW p. 343 when prayer replaces bloody sacrifice, tallith commemorates both privileged animal of sacrifice & (leaping w/ wing-beat to eschatological term of story) the sacrifice of sacrifice

EL p. 217 secularization as a sacrifice of language, destruction of sacred language as experience of sacred language (perhaps most unheimlich experience), but also sacrifice of sacrifice: self-destruction of sacrificial function/operation (which presupposes sacredness)

TN p. 262 Derrida tempted to let himself be tempted to think, to desire, the least venial, least expiable temptation: substitution w/out sacrifice > would the neutral spacing (the khōra) offer hospitality to this substitution of substitution or detain it forever as a hostage?

EW pp. 278-79 in Western metaphysics, incl. Heidegger and Levinas, there’s a sacrificial structure, a place left open for noncriminal putting to death: executions of ingestion, incorporation, or introjection of the corpse > where does “symbolic” begin and end?

——Heidegger and Levinas’ discourses remain profound humanisms to the extent that they do not sacrifice sacrifice

AD pp. 150-51n though Levinas calls substitution of being-host (being-hostage) a sacrificial experience (approach as sacrifice), Derrida wonders if substitution comes “before” sacrifice

OG p. 307 (433) for Rousseau, fête w/out object, sans masques, sans dépense, sans sacrifice: no play if play is exchange of presence/absence, chance & absolute risk > fête represses relation to death

p. 314 (443) [beyond good & evil] no more evil (mal) in substitution once one sees it’s a substitution of a substitute

CIN p. 19 no cinder w/out fire, that is what is owed (se doit) to fire, [yet, if possible] w/out shadow of sacrifice, at noon, w/out debt, w/out Phoenix, au lieu daucun placement, place solely of incineration

p. 46 “language poisons for us the most secret of our secrets…one must even sacrifice one’s own sacrifice to it”

SAME

HERP p. 209 [re: Heidegger] what assures homology of to auton, the reversible tautology btwn polemos and philein, what gathers tautology w/ itself, is logos > “philology,” tautology is otology

p. 214 an originary enmity in Heidegger, Feindschaft, gives a reconciliation btwn friendship & enmity, a reconciliation carried in the same ordeal (épreuve), in non-identical-sameness

PP p. 127 same that is not identical, common element or medium of any possible dissociation

p. 168 no repetition possible w/out graphics of supplementarity, supplies for lack of full unity, being enough the same and enough the other to replace by addition (en ajoutant)

p. 169 pharmakon is the same because it has no identity, the same (is) as supplement, in differance, in writing

VM pp. 91-2 acc. Levinas, to see, know, have and will “unfold only within the oppressive and luminous identity of the same” (fundamental categories of ontology/phenomenology)

p. 94 for Levinas, history a blinding to the other, laborious procession of the same

——Derrida stresses that one will not be able to follow Levinas [in Totality and Infinity] if one is not convinced by equation ego = same, or by idea that rebellion against same is purely intelligible

——for Levinas, classical dissymmetry of same and other feigns overturning while remaining the same, impassive beneath an algebraic substitution

p. 95 acc. Levinas, concepts anticipate a horizon w/in which alterity is amortized as soon as it is announced—because foreseen, horizon always horizon of the same

——for Levinas, infinitely-other cannot be thought on basis of the same

pp. 108-09 God’s face commands while hiding, more and less a face than all faces, face neither face of God nor figure of man but their resemblance, a resemblance thought w/out the Same

p. 109 w/out using these terms, Levinas warns against confusing idem (same) w/ ipse (ego), identity w/ ipseity > this happens immediately w/ Greek and German: autos, selbst

p. 112 why must Levinas obliterate notion of spatiality re: the other, w/out erasing it, w/out making it illegible? > must he state infinity’s excess in language of the Same [inside-outside]?

p. 119 if, as Levinas says, same is violent, finite totality, then it would be more other than the other (an other totality), it would not be the same, it could not be posed w/out becoming other than itself (this is war) (“war there is”)

pp. 126-27 how could there be “play of the Same” if alterity were not already in the same?

p. 129 infinitely other & infinitely same, if they have meaning for a finite being, is the same

p. 131 btwn original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, in which violence returned against violence, in which original finitude appears, in which other is respected w/in, by, the same

p. 317n for Heidegger, same is not a category, it is not the identical, not negation of difference

p. 149 thought of Being is thought of other before homogenous identity of concept, before asphyxiation of the same?

PAS PAS p. (51) two pas’ do not touch in the same (must not, need not, that’s how it works et que ça saute); that’s how marks are left (by Blanchot); marking time, pas marks pas

VP p. 8 telos, Kant’s regulative idea, a guard against threat of losing presence > indefinite repetition of the same

p. 44 same remains the same only through ideality

p. 45 absolute ideality is correlate of a possibility of indefinite repetition of the same > being for Husserl is ideality as repetition

p. 58 ideality of the form of presence can be repeated to infinity as return of the same, but retained in a finite movement

p. 59 differance in auto-affection = identity of identity and non-identity in the same of the instant

pp. 64-5 the complicity of idealization and the voice are unfailing: brings monstration [?] to completion; unity of phonē and technē, voice as technical mastery of the object, via objectivity of object > the ideal object can be repeated, to infinity, while remaining the same

p. 71 auto-affection produces the same in difference w/ itself, same as non-identical

FSW p. 198 differance & identity, differance in economy of the same

SH p. 12 tout autre as the same

p. 34 shibboleth secures passage from one to other in difference, w/in sameness > ambiguities of French partage

FWT p. 40 differance is at once: the same (living being, but deferred, supplemented by technology, prosthesis) and the other (absolutely heterogenous, wholly other, death, irreducible, untranslatable); ——differance can both interrupt laws and introduce economy of new configuration into living being, it can both be reinscribed in economy of the same and opened to excess of tout autre

***POOF p. 4 Cicero combines the meanings of exemplum (copy, reproduction, duplicate) and exemplar (portrait, single original) to describe the hope friendship provides beyond death: Cicero stresses sameness, ideal double, as condition of survival

pp. 92-3 in Menexenus, solid friendship (reconciliation) based on actual kinship (suggéneia), on homogeneity, homophilia, solid/firm affinity (bébaion) stemming from birth, native community, syngenealogy: this is a phantasm, what Joyce calls in Ulysses, re: the father, a ‘legal fiction’

——eugenicism (eugéneia) as authochtony, proper birth, homage to earth & mother go hand in hand with fraternization: an equality of birth compatible w/ aristocracy

OS p. 55 the now, presence in the act of the present: limpossibilité de coexister avec soi: avec soi, cest-à-dire, avec un autre soi, un autre maintenant, un autre même, un double

——this impossibility contradicts itself, time is name for possibility of impossible, this impossible possibility: alterity & identity of the now maintained in a differentiated element of a certain same

POS p. 9 differance common root of oppositional concepts, as common root, is also element of the same (distinguished from the identical [Heidegger]) in which oppositions are announced

***Gii p. 52 Heidegger’s unity [re: Geschlecht], not identity, but preserves the simplicity of the same—even in the form of the fold

PIO pp. 19-20 igitur or donc [re: “Fable”] speaks for a psyche, to it/her, before it/her, on subject of psyche, which has become pivoting speculum that relates the same to the other

p. 39 the government’s aleatory margin (for invention) remains homogenous w/ calculation (programmed invention) > w/in order of the calculable: no absolute surprise, order of the same

——but Derrida will not oppose deconstruction (not passivity), the invention of the other, to government’s program: because opposition belongs to regimen of the same

LI p. 129 repeatability of same ensures that full presence of a singularity, in being repeated, references something else, thus rending the full presence it announces

——this something else is where iteration is different from simple repetition

ATM p. 148 every present remains w/in the economic sphere of the same

p. 150 how can Levinas inscribe le tout autre in language of being, of the present, w/in its syntax, lexicon, under its law? > or: cette langue nest pas d’elle-même déliée, opens to tout autre?

——doing so in a way, where the fault (la faute) [see p. 149 Derrida’s fault, failing], which consists in inscribing tout autre in empire of same, alters the same enough to absolve it of itself

AD pp. 17-8 Levinas proposes a teaching via welcoming that gives/receives something else, not ruse of master who feigns effacement behind figure of midwife

——maieutics, stuck in the same, teaches me nothing, only what is already in myself: même, egomet ipse, medisme, pouvoir savoir, property, gathers in itself (rassemble en lui-même) capacity & knowing

WOG p. 37 hen diapheron heautôi (Heraclitus) is Greek heritage Derrida is most faithful to, tries to think this “one differing from itself” alongside (“improbably”) the khōra > the very event of the même, the soi-même: under this sign, Derrida contrasted differance to ontological difference [cf. D p. 22]

OG pp. 65-6 (96) writing of difference, fabric (tissu) of trace, permits difference btwn space & time to be articulated in unity of “same” proper body, permits graphic chain to be adapted to a spoken chain > difference is articulation

p. 166 (237) auto-affection constitutes the same (auto) as it divides the same

EU pp. 66-7 for Schelling, thinking as Einbildungskraft, as post-Kantian originary unity > all differences translations of same > post-critical, critique of critique

SARL/DERRIDA

MPM pp. 17-8 Derrida on how professional philosophers (Searle, Danto) concerned w/ progress of deconstruction indict philosophical naïveté of poor literary scholar

REST pp. 279-80 the trap: in this lace a sort of check payable to bearer that everyone jumps to fill in, w/ his name or w/ the name of a SARL (Heidegger for the pastoral, Shapiro for the city nomad)

LI p. 29 Searle seems so familiar

pp. 30-1 if Searle had spoken the obviously true, why the copyright? > the copyright engenders suspicion, divides the seal: Searle’s seal is stolen in advance

pp. 108n sec (signature, event, context) as Dry, “take my word” [cf. p. 40 aussi sec, at once]

——how can Sarl take something not serious so seriously?

p. 31 having almost “dictated” Searle’s reply, I deserve part of the copyright

p. 34 this other hand, marked by Derrida’s false-start, dictated Reply to 3 + n authors [?]

——Sarl’s serene dogmatism re: intention/origin of utterance/signature: confidence in distinguishing oppositions, i.e. “parasite” from “nonparasite,” etc.

p. 35 where does pleasure Derrida takes in repetition, prolonging this “confrontation,” come from?

——the confrontation btwn Austin & Derrida confirmed and developed in Sarl’s process of withdrawing it

p. 36 Searle & Derrida have common heritage

——Derrida introduces Sarl (société à responsabilité limitée), wrong to find his discourse polemical > desires & phantasms at stake in proper name, signature, copyright

——Sarl’s “never quite takes place” [the gayest thing Sarl has ever written] lets Derrida’s foot in the door

p. 37 Derrida is light-hearted, gay (almost gleeful), about confrontation w/ Sarl

p. 39 Derrida likes excessively prolonging the pleasure of the threshold (limen) [?]

p. 40 Sarl delivers conclusion before giving demonstration, putting reader in proper state of mind, aiming to produce certain effects [doesn’t Derrida do that sometimes?]

p. 40 suspicious whenever Sarl needs to say “obviously”

p. 41 Sarl’s loyalty & absence of simulation so rare in French-language polemics (a strategy that is artful, indirect)

pp. 41-2 Sarl understood SEC or was touched by it (found something pertinent)

p. 42 Searle as only rightful son to commit parricide (a logic found in Sophist); Searle’s indebted/mortgaged signature > auto-authorized descendant

p. 44 Derrida’s going to be as serious, as normal, as he can, and reduce parasitism: “you can take my word for it”

p. 44 Sarl refers only to passages in SEC deemed “the most important” > Derrida will not return the favor

p. 45 Derrida intentionally including in his debate w/ Sarl the contingent, artificial, external (18 letters, blows) even the amount of ink in typewriter ribbon: why not? (fringes, frames, parasites)

——surface of the paper, part of our calculation?

——Derrida swears his good faith (raises his hand above the typewriter)

p. 46 [HAHA] Sarl did not mention signature, context or event in his Reply to SEC

——Searle explains [to Derrida] that from standpoint of iterability no difference btwn speech & writing > Derrida responds: it is so “clear,” I am so “aware,” argument was indispensable to SEC

pp. 47, 51, 55, 101 “discourse from/to Sec” or “it reapplies (ça rapplique)”: inverted form of objection; “it reapplies” > a fascinating allergy: mechanism where one does not read the arguments in SEC one tries to use against it

p. 50 Sarl’s fear of missing the most important

***p. 51 Derrida believes his insistence [re: a passage in SEC] should have prevented all haste & confusion [i.e. Sarl’s]

p. 52 Derrida is sticking to internal reading [refraining from referring to his other texts]

p. 55 Derrida extracts certain predicates that can be extended to every mark [thus, emphasis on graphematic predicate is not “genuine,” Sarl is right: there’s nothing especially graphematic about separation of sign from signified]

p. 58 value of act: used so generally, analyzed so little in speech act theory

p. 60 trying to prove Derrida’s point again, Sarl argues that the misstated [by Derrida] difference [re: intentionality] btwn writing/speech can be eliminated by observing role of the context of the utterance in each case > isn’t this a surprising proposition, even for a speech act theorist?

pp. 64, 67 [re: his text] overdetermined, snail’s pace, abusing everyone’s patience, his too: I promised not to leave illusions implicit [?] (as few as possible)

pp. 66-7 Sarl accuses Derrida of mechanistic, pre-Saussurian, substantialist, expressionist, pre-critical psychologism > Derrida thinks there’s something behind utterance

——since Sarl does so hoping to show what’s behind Derrida’s obscure words, the illusion is his own

pp. 68-70 paradox of Sarl using an idealizing, analogical method: abstraction, idealization (always process of objectification)

——but, Speech Act Theory concerns ordinary, natural language > leaving an unformalizable residue in all metaphorical, analogical formalizations

——Searle uses metaphor, analogy, fringes, right when attempting to restrict them

p. 71 the way oppositions impose non-neutral hierarchies (classical logic) > eg. speech act theory’s demand for the “serious, literal, strict”

——speech act theory should (to escape traditional logic) assert right of its own speech acts to be non-serious

p. 73 Sarl believes that Derrida believes “intentions must all be conscious”: is this a contre-pied (follow wrong tracks), a fake out?

pp. 75-6 “primary masochism” [a wolf of undecidability] poisons, how can one identify the intention, the speaker, the effect once border btwn pleasure/pain is upset?

——thus the limited responsibility of Sarl, vulnerable to parasitisms, the “conscious ego” cannot incorporate and does its best to exclude [despite Derrida’s vehemence, substituting Sarl for Searle demonstrates his uncanny generosity—he will not accuse a subject]

pp. 80-1 “le vert est ou” [Husserl] could be grafted w/ meaning: an example of agrammaticality

——a graft is always possible

p. 81 Sarl’s anger at confusion btwn use/mention, his appeal to good & evil, due to fact that use/mention are always susceptible to confusion

p. 84 Limited Inc as internal regulation by which capitalist system seeks to limit concentration and decision-making power: to protect itself from its own crisis (psychoanalysis’ incorporation)

p. 86 Sarl gravely falsifies matters > infected by Sarl’s style, first time I accuse anyone of deception

p. 101 Derrida imagines himself on trial for quoting all of Sarl’s Reply

p. 104 outside SEC still forms part of its implicit context [Derrida breaks his promise: quotes from Disseminations]

p. 106 Derrida gives Searle imaginary advice were he to enter the White House pretending to be Jimmy Carter: you were playing all by yourself, you alone form a company [Donald Trump]

p. 113 Searle’s inability to read Derrida: exemplary & symptomatic

——Derrida admits his aggression, trying to think about Searle’s brutality

——“Politeness and politics” could have been subtitle of Limited Inc

——Derrida worked to make legible (philosophical, political, ethical) axiomatics hidden under code of academic discourse > brutality of both politeness & impoliteness

——reread Limited Inc.: it’s overdetermined, extremely intricate

SAUSSURE

PP p. 162 Plato and Saussure turning to grammatical “metaphor”

p. 163 [Saussurian moment about relationality of letters in Plato’s Philebus] > “none of us could get to know one of the collection all by itself”

VP pp. 39-40(n) how Saussure makes a quasi-Husserlian move when declaring that the expressive value of “signifier” only happens in its “acoustic image” > sound as prior to phoneme

PPHS pp. 75-6 Saussure places semiology under jurisdiction of psychology [repeats Aristotle’s logo-phonocentrism]

WM pp. 217-19 for Saussure, value in language, which allows exchange btwn words, allows metaphor, requires 1) dissimilar exchange 2) similar comparison

——value, gold, eye, sun carried along in same tropic movement

POS pp. 18-22, 98n the inventions and conventions of Saussure: the arbitrary, the non-phonic vs. the privilege of thought-sound, the teleologization of the arbitrary [similar concepts to Hegel’s, see PPHS]

——signifier/signified as sensible/intelligible or signans/signatum (concept), Saussure does not avoid this common, Medieval, stoical trope

——Saussure resigns himself to using word “sign”

p. 25 [Saussure’s phono-logocentrism, his take on writing]

p. 36 it is possible to use Saussure’s formalist and differential motif to criticize his phonologism, psychologism, & exclusion of writing

p. 52 Saussure’s text has a layer of phono-logocentrism, but this is not the total picture

DIF DIF p. 10 Saussure, the thinker who made the arbitrary & differential character of sign inseparable, at very foundation of general semiology

p. 15 if Saussure’s opposition speech/language is rigorous, differance would be play of differences w/in language & relation of speech/language, the detour, the silent promise I must make to speak (but differance forbids this essential dissociation: archi-writing before the letter)

AFR pp. 111-12 for Condillac, arbitrariness of sign makes commerce freer and more extensive: commerce rescues man from relation to present object only > thus, the proper, property of sign, is system of the arbitrary; Condillac: “until commerce, natural signs are not at all properly signs”

OG p. 29 (44) Saussure serves as a particular (privileged) example that doesn’t interfere (nentame pas) w/ generality of Derrida’s argument (must take this into account)

p. 32 (49) Sausurre’s 2 systems of writing: ideographic, phonetic

pp. 32-3 (49-50) how Saussure’s concept of the arbitrary strictly divides the uncertain frontiers btwn ideographic, pictographic, & phonetic scripts > arbitrariness appeals to opposition physis/nomos, physis/techné, whose ultimate function is perhaps to derive historicity

p. 33 (50-1) Plato exteriorizes writing as “image” similar to Saussure but has more subtle theory of image/painting

pp. 33-4 (51-2) moralism, preaching, in Saussure/Plato—casting writing, figuration, to the exterior > maléfique, sin (péché) (traitorous contamination)

p. 40 (59-60) for Saussure & Husserl, teleology of phonetic writing makes the crisis of nonphonetic writing psychological errors, these nonintutionisms exile from sense; for Husserl, unlike Saussure, empty formalism part of his teleology > dialectical use of negativity should force us to rethink crisis (crisis not a mere accident)

p. 42 (62-3) [Saussure would have to privilege hearing over sight]

pp. 43-4 (64) Saussure opens field of grammatology when he’s not talking about writing: so that what was chased off, proscribed to outside, never ceased to haunt language

p. 44 (65) Saussure’s arbitrary sign functions w/in interior natural sound

——[Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure] if “writing” signifies inscription & the durability of the sign, then the very idea of institution (hence the arbitrariness of the sign) is unthinkable outside writing, unthinkable outside horizon itself, outside world as space of inscription > opening to spatial distribution of signs (regulated play) [overturn opposition physis/nomos]

pp. 44-5 (66-7) Saussure (Freud would say) contradicts himself to bring about a satisfactory decision: arbitrary convention btwn grapheme & phoneme requires that writing is not an “image” or “figuration,” and yet Saussure requires latter determinations to exteriorize writing

——for Hegel & Saussure, “symbols”: the only natural signs, only signs that escape semiology as grammatology

——Saussure chasse lécriture dans les ténèbres extérieures du langage [contesting his theory re: arbitrariness of sign]

***pp. 46-8 (68-70) Derrida calls instituted trace “unmotivated” (immotivée), asks that the word “institution” not be so quickly interpreted w/in classical oppositions; “unmotivated” deconstructs Saussure’s arbitrary, thinks its possibility en-deçà de (short of) lopposition dérivée btwn nature/convention, symbol/sign > becoming-unmotivated of trace requires synthesis where le tout autre sannonce comme tel: not more natural than cultural

pp. 48, 51 (70, 74) substitute grammatology for semiology, le devenir-immotivé du symbole [via Pierce]: no more pertinence of synchronic/diachronic, and semiology no longer mastered by exemplary linguistic sign (master-sign)

p. 51 (75) Barthes’ important reversal: semiology part of linguistics

pp. 326-27n, 52 (76-7, 76-7n) [Derrida offers many instances where Saussure studies writing to draw conclusions] [Saussure’s “innocent” didactic analogy of speech & writing]

pp. 52-3 (77) oppose Saussure to himself, not via arbitrary but via difference arbitrariness requires: here, Saussure must privilege difference over phonic essence, excluding that which [i.e. sound] enabled him to exclude writing > Saussure then uses writing as example of this difference

pp. 53-4 (78-9) Saussure’s reduction of phonic substance removes/opposes form from/to substance (Jakobson critiques glossematics [Hjelmslev] for similar misstep)

——radical dissimilarity of graphic/phonic excludes derivation [leads to formal truth?]

——what is “after”? is the “after” always parasitic? what is a parasite? do we really learn to write and read “after” we learn to speak?

p. 57 (83) Saussure separates form from phonic substance—leads to glossematics (formality)

p. 63 (92-3) for Saussure, signifier: sound-image, not real sound but psychic impression (what Husserl would call hylè/morphé structure, distinct from all mundane reality); for Saussure, signified: not thing but “concept” or, better yet, lidéalité du sens

p. 120 via Lévi-Strauss, Saussurianism exposed as ethnocentrism thinking itself anti-ethnocentric

p. 329n Derrida is not concerned w/ Sausurre’s intentions, nor the very thought itself, instead interested in a text which has influenced readings, borrowings, etc.

pp. 228-29 (325) Saussure’s contradiction of his phonologist thesis: power of articulation, not spoken language, unique to man > as condition of speech, does articulation remain a-phasic?

FV p. 478n Lacan integrates Freudian phallocentrism w/ phonocentric Saussurian semio-linguistics

SAVE [fixerup] (

GOD p. 48 adieu: 1) salutation, hello, “I can see you” 2) a goodbye 3) à-dieu, relation to God, every relation to other would be à-dieu

pp. 50-1 to think responsibility w/in criteria of salvation, the Good as infinite love, the gift of death, requires event of Christianity, or makes Christianity possible

MONL p. 13 power this ‘alien’ [Oedipus] holds over ‘aliens’: innermost secret, sepulture, in exchange for salvation of city, which he refuses his daughters (refuses them a just ‘work of mourning’)

R pp. 75-6 both Plato & Aristotle maintain political turn toward or salutation of One God, where arkhē has at his disposal tekhnē, for Plato not utopia, prayer, but very difficult

p. 112 Heidegger: “only a God can save us (Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten)”; Derrida observes communication in Heidegger btwn retten (to save), das Heilen (the Unscathed, the safe, the sound), and das Freie (free, also, save, preserve, immunity) > in tact, untouched, purify

pp. 112-14 salut: safe, salvation, welcome, farewell; salut: retten, heilen, grüssen > btwn salvation and salute to the other

p. 114 only a God w/out sovereignty can save us? nothing is less sure, that is why we are talking, and what we are talking about [also re: democracy]; “democracy to come—salut!”

AF p. 99 Freud dreams irreplaceable place, the very ash, condition of singularity, idiom, secret, testimony, trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate > absolutely safe location

HERP pp. 190, 202 Heidegger on “the few” [poets, philosophers…] the few who tried to save sofon from (contre) the Sophists, from men of marketplace, “to save and protect (retten und schützen)”

PP p. 68-9 Socrates give[s] myths a send off (envoyer promener les mythes), les saluer, dismisses them, cette belle résolution du khairein [Phaedrus (230a) Socrates says goodbye to myths, because he does not even know himself], khairein in name of truth, self-knowledge, autoscopy, autognosis

——Derrida treats this send off, in a dialogue w/ 2 rigorously original myths [cicada, Theuth], as a welcoming of myths > both myths invented after question of writing

p. 126 Socrates turns pharmakon, hemlock, through logos, into salvation, deliverance

PAS PAS p. (22) Blanchot’s récit as new thought of citation acc. EROS, repetition of yes that begins by doubling itself, récit unscathed, unique force of a viens that never reproduces itself: vienssauf

p. (66) Viens, at the same time unique and copy (exemplaire), Blanchot’s récits as exemplary citations, their unique power is that the unscathed possibility of unique (le sauf) remains in reserve from which “I would emerge” to say, to one of them,“Viens

p. (77) to save those drowning, lui donnant plutôt la parole, le sauf

p. (79) what does sauf mean? save them from an outside not even proper to them? sauf: secret (dérobé), powerful word, language fascinates starting form it > like sans, pas: crumbles, precludes the set from understanding itself: “rien sauf le dehors” > sauvetage project part of writing project

——assimilating interiority of mastery can also be terrible thus compulsion toward outside could be defense > sauf le dehors, tout sauf le dehors

p. (85) sans remarks same X w/out annulling it, springless spring (ce ressort sans ressort), this re-trait leaves everything intact (sauf, indemne) in appearance [absolute heterogenous neutrality w/out negation], at the same time it has abducted, erased, absolute rapidity of dispossession (dérapage)

p. (97) the inner rhythm of sauf (contamination), always altered, always unscathed, “jai tout, sauf” > “sauf que je voudrais en être débarrassé

S p. 94 promise (Versprechen) announces, salutes, what has already taken place “before” (this is the temporality of the coming of the event, Ereignis or Geschehen), it is the dissymmetry of a yes before opposition of yes and no, before question, language always revient à de la promesse

——acc. Heidegger, there’s a “must” a “we must think” of the promise, thought as fidelity to promise > must hear & obey

pp. 110-11 Heidegger’s resurrection to come of Menschenschlag [a third blow?], blow which saves (rettet), hymn to archi-originary, yet-to-come event, what poet sings

F pp. xi-xlviii [see

FORS

]

FWT p. 4 [re: contradictory reaffirmation] passive reception, decision to say “yes,” then selection, interpretation, thus transformation: not to leave safe the very thing one respects before all else > not to leave safe: to save it, perhaps, yet again, w/out illusion of final salvation

PS p. 183 for Artaud, soteriology will be the eschatology of one’s proper body: “state…of my body…will make the Last Judgment” [when body is upright w/out detritus, w/out the work]

DPi p. 241 depth of desire of deconstruction: deconstruct death, perhaps > but it is not enough to deconstruct death to ensure salvation [Derrida’s multiple angels speaking to him]

TB p. 104 Babel as metaphor of metaphor, narrative of narrative, translation of translation: not only structure hollowing itself out like that, but does so in its own way > its idiom would have to be saved

RGE p. 263 in order to save what does not want to be saved (silence, play, absolute risk), must redouble language, must have recourse to strategies, ruses, simulacra, masks

RM pp. 77-8 always plus dune language in the language: the capture of the crossing (croisement) that allies Ziehen and Reissen, this capture (à la fois violent/faithful, laissant sauf) affects the captor, abduction (captation), translation, into other’s language [French retrait, English re-tracing] > all this already at work (à loeuvre) in the other’s languages, these dealings make for a work (fait oeuvre)

PSSS p. 243 “it’s not going well,” a redemptive concern—necessity to save: salutary, sanitary, immunitary concern > also, a gesture of war: militant saves by routing a resistance: French Revolution’s terror, Comité de Salut Public

pp. 259-60 who’s to say our republic is still not monarchical, that instead of a paregicide, the king’s neck was saved, erected by decapitation; never know if States General, at moment of first convocation, condemned or saved king’s head > both gestures indissociable

——condemning/saving inscribe in concepts sovereignty & cruelty an ambiguity as unrelievable as autoimmunity itself: in any paregicide, any Oedipus, any totem + taboo, any republican or democratic installation of brothers, no way to know whether paregicide took place or not, took place w/out taking place, before any question about it [see HYMEN]

TN p. 100 Gospel as a general haptics, flesh that is touching–touched > “le salut sauve en touchant, et le sauveur, à savoir le touchant, est aussi touché: sauvé, sauf, indemnetouché par la grâce” > touching, purify, heal, save, extend hand [heal blindness by touching eyes = touch before sight]

——Jesus in pity (misertus/splagchnistheis)—he was moved, touched, his bleeding heart moves him to touch

p. 101 origin of fetishism [?], desire to touch what touches Jesus’ body (garments), touching w/out touching > made safe, immune, by faith of what touch signifies (not by touch itself)

p. 104 history of untouchable: immune, sound, safe, “saufle toucher

p. 107 Derrida poking fun at himself, how he’s abstaining from touching Nancy, claiming touch is impossible–prohibited, and we love to call this loving—abstaining, like the Messiah

p. 220 [more on (im)possibility of deconstructing Christianity] salvation from Christianity is a Christian value: Bataille’s hyperbolic mask, what he sometimes called his “hyper-Christianity”

p. 309 singularity [never assured] doit être couru comme une chance ou un risque: Nancy’s a bettor, thinker of the bet (pari), a desperate bettor, never stops staking, committing (dengager), calculating w/ exactitude hyperbolic odds (gages): not counting on gains (bénéfice) of an “argument du pari” [Pascal] or any salut

p. 310 “consentement exaspéré,” un salut exespéré (ex-hoped for salvation), un salut juste à venir (a just salut to come, a salut just on its way…), un salut sans salvation, worthy of the name

AD p. 107 for Levinas, religious salvation (vertical), human dwelling (horizontal)

OG p. 312 (440) writing/double opens desire and re-gardent la jouissance—Rousseau searches for un salut (haven) dans lécriture

SCHELLING (UNIVERSITY)

EU pp. 66-7 for Schelling, thinking as Einbildungskraft, as post-Kantian originary unity > all differences translations of same > post-critical, critique of critique

p. 67 originary unity precedes opposition sensible/intelligible, math resembles philosophy, math belongs to world of reflected image > analogical translation btwn philosophy/math assured by symbol (Bild) > symbolicity developed in play of Abbildung, Einbildung

p. 68 for Schelling, poetry at heart of philosophy, poem is a philosopheme

——for Schelling, reason & imagination one & same thing in Einbildungskraft (not Latinate Imagination, which is false fantasy) > one in the real [imagination, art], one in the ideal [reason would have to be ideal] > intertranslatability of rational & fantastic only amazing from standpoint of understanding [Hegel makes analogous move]

p. 69 In-Eins-Bildung (uni-formation) > paradox: concept of fundamental translatability linked poetically to a natural language [German] that resists translation

——but this confirms Schelling’s thesis: uni-forme sans uniformiser > preserves universal & particular in imprint it produces

——In-Eins-Bildung: disseminates in profusion, its emanation (Ausfluss) traverses world of phenomena via reason & imagination

——university must also be thought in logic of uni-formation > poetics of translation

——Schelling, Nietzsche, Heidegger against ends, professionalization of philosophy

p. 70 acc. Schelling, every “new” philosophy makes a new “step (pas)” in form, poetic originality, a provocation/challenge to translation

——Schelling’s originality: philosophy must possess formal originality (it’s a work of art)

——for Schelling, math is different from philosophy: the latter provokes/challenges translation, whereas math solves or annuls translation problems

——philosophers are capable of Wechsel der Formen [Derrida describes PC as Weschsel der Tönen], an Über-setzung that posits novelty while ensuring passage beyond differential particularity

pp. 70-1 [vis-à-vis Schelling] can philosophy be acquired? is it innate? a free gift (ein freies Geschenk)? an art requiring genius of natural language?

——even if gift, must possess w/ practice

——person w/out intuition can’t understand at all—no passageway

p. 71 for Schelling, philosopher develops negative condition: consciousness of inanity of all finite knowledge > ability to translate, re-translate, the real to the ideal can be acquired—can be cultivated in a Bildung and become untransformable habitus, unalterable organ

p. 72 acc. Schelling, Kant makes philosophy finite [but Derrida says there are 2x2 Kants]

p. 73 Schelling: philosophy becomes truly objective only in art > an art of generalized translation

——Schelling: both poetry/philosophy require self-produced original image (Bild) of world

pp. 73-4 [vis-à-vis Schelling] art can never be limited/programmed by State, there is no State culture > philosophy, which demands unconditional freedom, should reside in Faculty of Arts

p. 74 bureaucratic organization doesn’t provide for philosophy, has ceased being a free association in view of the arts (poetic translation)

p. 287n though CIPH is Schellingian as a place reserved for problematic of translation, it has an anti-Schellingian angle: State can recover all its power if uni-formation is blindly trusted

pp. 74-5 Schelling against Kant’s separation of Wissen and Handeln (action); there is “but one world,” no world in itself; philosophy is ethics > duality of languages not annulled but derived from result of reflection

——Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties constructed on “untranslatable multiplicity of languages,” dissociations of a discursive type: performative/constative, public/private, spirit/letter etc.

pp. 75-6 for Schelling, ethics (raised to a point beyond determination) makes us similar to God, onto-theological translation w/out rupture > a risk of totalizing absolutization of State (which Kant would deem dangerous)

pp. 76-7 Kant’s (not unconditional) liberalism would caution against crossing certain limits, so as to avoid total absolutization of State

——for Schelling, State is philosophy/action > standpoint of Ur-wissen

p. 77 Schelling’s unity of ideal & real in originary knowledge: speak w/out trope, no metaphor (also nothing but metaphor): a generalized rhetoric [generalized fetishism] or translatology

——[re: use of word “translation” to refer to “transposition, transfer, transport” in a sense not strictly linguistic] for Schelling, language is a living phenomenon; Novalis, Goethe: nature an author to be translated w/ skill of a philologist

——Schelling: “nature is like some very ancient author whose message is written in hieroglyphics on colossal pages” [geologic?]

p. 79 for Schelling, individuals, who are finite, must translate > if mind could simply be infinite, there’d be no need to translate > “originary knowledge” can become “real" in an individual, only in der Gattung (in the genus), i.e. in historical institutions > history: becoming-real of idea

***pp. 79-80 Schelling describes damage of professionalization, he issues imperative that universities give instruction in methods/aims of academic study, as a whole & in particular

——for Schelling, those whose thought isn’t regulated by living and buzzing communion w/ divine [w/ community] are like sexless bees (geschlechtslose Bienen) > depositing inorganic excrement outside hive—proof of their platitudes

p. 80 for Schelling, man is tasked w/ supplementing, complementing, the world’s manifestation (eine Ergänzung der Welterscheinung) > develop God’s revelation, which is lacking: this is called translation, it is the destination of the university

SCHEMA

REST p. 297 Heidegger’s schema (in barely displaced Kantian sense): hybrid, mediation, double-belonging, double articulation > product (Zeug) situated btwn thing & work of art (Werk always that of art in this context), intermediary place (Zwischenstellung), inter-posture (Lacoue-Labarthe), inter-stela

SCHREBER

GOD p. 131 every text consigned to public space can become a literary object [Schreber]

F p. xxvi re: Schreber’s documents, original must be marked by fiction; p. xxviii “work of art”; p. xxxiii Abraham: privileged patient, the poem, the work of art, not the artist

POS pp. 83-4 Derrida fractures hermetic closure that shelters question of writing from psychoanalysis, blinding psychoanalytic discourse from the textual scene

PS p. 170 to protect meaning against psychomedical reduction, criticism (aesthetic, literary, philosophical) always creates an example, a case, same result as the reduction

——example as martyr, bearing witness

——for criticism to make a case (of meaning or value) read essence into example

p. 181 Artaud, very Schreberian > death through demiurge’s desire for body

p. 326n Artaud’s Nerve-Scales

CHM p. 43 no praise (éloge), by essence, except of reason [Freud could only have praised Schreber’s reason]

p. 54 if madness is the absence of a work, any philosopher/speaking subject can only evoke madness in language of fiction or fiction of language

***DST pp. 215-16 désistance brings to light anoia, not to be confused w/ madness though it can resemble it > double bind btwn 2 madnesses: 1) one of disintalling 2) one of reason, defensive stiffening (crispation) in assistance [Kafka], imitation, identification > madness against madness

SPEC p. 285 from whichever end (bout) [i.e. pleasure or reality], it is death, inscribed but non-inscribable in structure, in process of structure—stricture: death already (déjà) life death

FV p. 416 Schreber: we all (women included) like naked women

p. 458 psychoanalysis [Freud, Bonaparte] justifies crushing monotony of monosemic truth under heading Wiederholungszwang [i.e. Freud declaring sun another sublimated symbol of father]

SCIENCE

GT p. 74n hard to draw line btwn moral duty and moralizing discourse on subject of moral duty [teaching ethics], as well as btwn a scientific task, ethos of science, and morality in general

FK p. 99 pure attestation indispensable to science, philosophy, religion; it can gather or scatter itself, trust in the pledge (gage) of the other unites 1) belief in other 2) sacralization of presence-absence 3) sanctification of law > divides in various ways

AF p. 45 classically—science, philosophy, intrinsically independent of the singular archive of its history

——via Yerushalmi, but w/ a Jewish science, archive becomes a founding moment for science as such

p. 46 does science depend on something like a circumcision?

OOG p. 58 for Husserl, science is the “exemplary” of eidos, the infinite eidos opposed to the finitude of Weltanschauung

p. 75 science as ideal objectivity must reduce all language, the fact of language in general

p. 122 language as prescientific: language and intersubjectivity precede geometry, along w/ [fuzzy] corporeality of pregeometrical shapes, pure bodies w/ color, weight, hardness

MC p. 364 what happens when a science implicates the subject itself of the science, i.e. psychoanalysis?

p. 365 paranoia? superstition? science? all restore meaning to random signs

p. 375 deliberate self-limitation gives psychoanalysis a chance of being a science

SPOM pp. 40-1 Marx’s 3rd voice, according to Blanchot, is science, but a science that subverts, a science that calls science a radical transformation itself, always in play > Marx does not formulate this very much

p. 43 Blanchot: “the scientificity” of science always remains dependent on ideology

POR POR p. 12 (142) vis-à-vis Heidegger, one can longer distinguish btwn technology, science, theory and rationality, principle of reason cannot be separated from idea of technology [techno-science]

——(143) never before has science been tied so closely to military aims, military technology [Derrida refers to finalisation of research]

HERP HERP p. 198 avoid good conscience of ridicule when thinking about Nazi potential of Heidegger’s thoughts > no discourse can dissociate the scientific, the military, and labor

POOF POOF p. 9 for Aristotle, friendship linked to knowledge, science & self-consciousness held (tenue) in pledge, alliance, promise, performative chain [of friendship]

MPM MPM p. 106 no deconstruction w/out calling into question dissociation of thought and technology, no longer able to subscribe to Heidegger’s Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht (science does not think)

p. 151n for Heidegger, since science doesn’t think, thinking much watch over science, they cannot do so for themselves

***VM ***VM p. 118 can a method be borrowed like a tool? method always shelters, anticipates the being which one encounters > this is why, since Plato, decision of philosophy has always seen itself as a science

PP PP p. 97 (110) pharmakon as remedy, transparent rationality of science, excludes its magic character

OH OH p. 33 Husserl’s “crisis of European sciences” sought recovery of transcendental theme in Descartes

PAS PAS p. (67) science is a dissimulation of tout autre, philosophy also > Blanchot keeps “old name” to attempt to give an account of this

VP p. 45 for Husserl, the exact sciences procure ideal transparency and perfect univocity of language

F pp. xxviii [re: Abraham’s psychoanalysis] joy of breaking wall btwn rational & irrational, condition necessary for “scientific truth and poetic truth” to belong to “same essence”

——this poetic truth not gratuitous literary estheticism, nor unveiling presence > truth is “poetic” in that it writes a text on and in a text, hieroglyph on hieroglyph

FWT p. 48 most “free” thought always coming to terms w/ effects machine; deconstruction thinks hypercomplexity, historicity, of machine (along w/ event) better than scientific positivists

WM p. 259(n) Bachelard: science seduced by metaphors, creates ‘spaces of configuration’ more metaphorical than real

p. 260(n) Bachelard: even in the domain of exact sciences our imagination is a sublimation [advocates rigor as a psychoanalysis of intuition]

——field of science draws from nonscientific schema, and philosophy imports scientific schema as vast reservoir of metaphors

p. 261 in life sciences, which demand critique of teleological judgment, we take the metaphor for the concept, use of animistic or (technical, social, cultural) analogy [pp. 258-63 via Bachelard, use of metaphor in science]

P p. 25 acc. Hegel, natural/mathematical sciences [unlike aesthetics] need no introduction: their object is determined/given in advance, and the method it requires

p. 89 tulip is exemplary of the sans of the pure cut (sans of finality-sans-end)

***——“on this sans, that is not a lack, science has nothing to say”

pp. 89-91 nonknowledge is point of view whose irreducibility gives rise to the beautiful (purity of the trace of the sans) > Kant: no science of the beautiful, only critique

POS pp. 35-6 grammatology must ceaselessly deconstruct everything that ties concepts/norms of scientificity to ontotheology, phono-logocentrism, must transgress w/out falling back into prescientific empiricism, it must affirm wherever science exceeds logocentric closure > grammatology inscribes and delimits science, marks/loosens limit closing classical scientificity

——35 math always been model of science

ROP p. 75 Lacan returns to an unsurpassability of Descartes, brings Descartes close to Freud > [is this part of Foucault’ critique of psychoanalysis? re: subject (of science)]

OTO p. 6 painfully difficult for life to become object of science, would require a philosophy of life, a whole politics, which inscribes the bio-graphical w/in the bio-logical

——not the same for science of nonlife, of the dead, wins its claim to scientificity w/out delay: the co-implication btwn scientific object & the dead concerns desire to know

ATIA p. 60 Derrida scolds philosophers for not taking behaviorist analyses (so subtle, so rich) into account

pp. 146-47 Heidegger: Descartes’ desire to make philosophy an absolute science is in the spirit of absolute knowledge [but Heidegger remains Cartesian]

GSP p. 159 for [1st phase] phenomenology, all empiricism requires a prior [transcendental] regional circumscription of objectivity, not against all genetism, but certainly against skeptical “worldly genesis,” naturalism, causalism, positivism, science-of-facts (Tatsachenwissenschaft)

p. 161 for Husserl, a confusion of value, and all types of idealities sheltered beneath category “historical”: w/ some precautions [Derrida’s], Husserl considers Weltanschauung a “provisional morality” > system of anticipation that precedes an absolute science

O p. 11 Hegel: philosophy’s systematic exposition of itself as science, inner necessity of knowing [cf. Derrida’s double science]

p. 15 Spinoza critiques Descartes’ method like Hegel does all methods: cannot be external to the concept > if path of science is itself science: method no long preliminary

p. 19 acc. Hegel, logic has as its object the very concept of science

RGE p. 264 every science requires order, relatedness, difference btwn original & derivative

Gii p. 36 acc. Heidegger, sciences belong to essence of technology, not to technology—to its essence; technology remains plunged in a fog (noyée dans un brouillard) > we still do not think (science, no one, is responsible for this) > the most thought-provoking (das Bedenklichste): we still do not think

p. 40 the way scientists or thinkers talks about animality constitutes a decisive symptom of discourse’s essential axiomatics

p. 56 for Heidegger, philosophy & science never attain the parallelism, the cutting/breaching (into one another), of thinking/philosophy (Denken) & poetry (Dichten)

REST p. 378 thinking of nothingness is alien to science > deals only w/ existents

PIO p. 35 Leibniz believes the invention of a universal language does not depend on human perfection of “true philosophy,” the language itself can lead us towards such perfection, the invention thus preceding knowledge/science, until, at last: to reason = to calculate

p. 36 Leibniz’s version of universal language confers productive facilitation, even if inaugural adventure is kept under teleological surveillance by fundamental analyticism

AFR p. 39 in Condillac, primacy of practical instinct invariable trait of new critical metaphysics: not philosophy of praxis but metaphysics of fact > general theory, de facto & de jure, presupposes scientific fact

pp. 64-5 genius finds what know one could find before, but various forms of finding (different origins of each science): find, discover, invent, come or light upon (rencontrer)

p. 100 Condillac: each science demands a particular language, each has ideas peculiar to it

p. 126n Condillac: the science Aristotle called ζητουμéνη (desired, sought after) is the general knowledge of soul on which all sciences depend (what science of happiness is to the arts), this science opens future, providence—so wise man is not stuck in present

LI p. 118 more “scientific” to accept that a scientific analogy inadequate for a theory of language

p. 120 structural idealism, not illusion: constitutes condition of a certain classical value called scientific truth > iterability that makes such truth possible renders it inaccessible (not illusory)

p. 136 science, objectivity (in which I firmly believe, in given situations) requires context (no matter how powerful, stabilized, or rooted in network of conventions)

E p. 8 for Kant, science is not art, has no beauty in it, because no pleasure can be taken in it

——yet, in his Introduction, he claims that in an immemorial past, pleasure could not be separated from knowledge, so the Witz (bon mot), the only scientific pleasure, carries this repressed past in it

BSi p. 137 Flaubert: science must treat men like mastodons & crocodiles

p. 323 Heidegger against science: the face nature turns toward man’s technical mastery might simply conceal her essence

OG pp. 3-4 (12) [idea of] science and its nonphonetic characters an example of break from logo-phonocentrism, also made possible w/in phono-logocentric system, w/in a certain concept of the sign

——has no meaning except within the age of logocentrism

pp. 4-5 (14) rigorous investigation beyond closure of knowledge, take positivity of science to its limits—monstrous, breaks absolutely w/ normality > faithful to lavenir (for which there is yet no exergue [chapter title: exergue])

pp. 27-8 (43) the science of writing born in period of world’s history, look for roots of scientificity, roots of historicity, thus science of possibility of science, history of history, a grammatics not logic?

pp. 30-1 (46) factum of phonetic writing commands our entire culture/science, not one fact among others > still, does not respond to a necessity of an absolute/universal essence

pp. 33-34 (50-51) but this science [deconstructive grammatology?]: where opening of “image” conditions “reality” can’t maintain classical scientific grid: external/internal, image/reality, representation/presence

p. 46 (67-8) science, asleep, uncritical re: tradition it inherits, this sleep the assured means of breaching (dentamer) the deconstruction of la plus grande totalité: epistémè, metaphysical logocentrism

——deconstruction clarifies dream rather than allowing itself to be clarified by it [?]

***pp. 56-7 (82-3) arche-writing can never be an object of science, it is that which cannot be reduced to a form of presence

p. 74 (109) grammatology’s condition of possibility, the solicitation of logocentrism, is condition of impossibility, risks destroying concept of science, exorbitant aim (visée) beyond savoir

p. 337n writing can’t be contained w/in a science—can’t have that ambition or modesty

pp. 128-29 if Lévi-Strauss believes that writing doesn’t achieve “disinterest” of science, then he is not a scientist, a well-known pattern… [truth as theoretically infinite transmissibility has historical possibility only w/ writing]

p. 130 (189) [re: Lévi-Strauss’ assessment of when science began] if writing is “necessary condition” of science, argument se trouve frappée dun lourd indice dapproximation empirique

pp. 287-88 (407) writing in furrows (sillons), via rupta: if space were simply geometric, ideal, writing never would have broken from boustrophedon (turning of ox, left-right-right-left)

——space of geometric objectivity an ideal (object) produced/signified at moment of writing

EU pp. 32-3 Descartes: universal mathematics, most necessary & easiest science, most universal science (unrestricted to particular subject matter), others sciences are branches of math

pp. 223-24 “as if” structure—characterizes every philosophical, scientific institution worthy of the name

SPEC p. 332 classically [?]: art preserves proper name, science forgets proper name > what then is psychoanalysis?

——payer la science de son proper nom, science of his [Freud’s] proper name (propre nom) inseparable from nom propre: speculation, pay in advance the charges for a return to sender: reste à savoir (it remains to be had/seen/known)

p. 345 no theses in science or literature (athetic), every thesis is philosophical

p. 367 for Freud, the “cause,” must be one w/ cause of science—best chance of survival, rings, alliance

p. 381 scientific intuition requires minimum of speculation in language’s irreducible metaphoricity

pp. 381-82 speculation as provisional floating, distances from intuition, impartiality, science, psychology of depths

pp. 380-83 [Freud divided] Freud translating translation into scientific theory: 1) “trans-” inhabit origin on (dès) its very threshold 2) perception as prior to its translation

p. 407 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] poem of limping consoles for too slow step of science

SEA

MONL p. 43 sea is lacking there [that is, in Paris, which lacks distancing of being-elsewhere, compared to Algeria]

LOBL p. 81 approaching edge of a text, lose sight of text and its outside, regular submerging of shore

pp. ~82-3 pose question of bord, bord de mer, question of borderline preceding the determination of all dividing lines I just mentioned [i.e. the general bord before the contextual one?]

p. 121 death sentence, instant as elusive as last grain of sand in hourglass, death as result of dissemination of rhythm of life w/ no coup darrêt, unbordered/unbounded arrhythmy on beach that’s continuation of a sea: her pulse “scattered like sand”

POR p. 6 (135) un ubiquiste, a “ubiquitist,” “professor au large,” back from sea

PAS PAS p. (88) at the indistinct edge of sea, viens said just once between us, desire to go out to sea

p. (100) acc. Derrida, all [?] Blanchot’s books concern fascinating ellipsis (lellipse fascinante) of what leaves the sea

p. (106) Derrida’s ideal to drown in true sea of Blanchot’s text, to have loved it as the original first name

SEAL (

KH p. 113 what Marx calls “Egyptian model” [fn refers to unpublished seminar on khōra & Marx, Hegel], ekmageion, print-bearer, imprint, seal

GOD pp. 55-56 another secret, another seal (supplementary seal), comes to overlay (sceller) the unlivable experience, another concealment (cèlement) to the tremor > afraid of the fear, tremble in form of not knowing: a double secret [trembling as supplementary seal?]

p. 131 reader of literature hypnotized, paralyzed before suspended perplexity, before secret path of secret, exposed and jealously sealed: who says what to whom? who asks forgiveness?

p.147 plea for forgiveness in inheritance of God’s retraction; God’s retraction, a double coming-back, covenant only sealed through repetition [Noah is twice forgiven], God goes back on himself; dissymmetrical contract of Covenant supposes double trait of this retreat (re-trait) (Entzug)

p. 156 singularity is sealed & betrayed by inheritance that confirms, reads, translates the covenant

——literature inherits from Abraham, betrays him

LOBL p. 104 [extensive description] yes of event, yes of iteration, quotes, cites, in accordance w/ strange ring outside of presence, sur-vives

——ring is sealed by arrêt de mort (syntax, almost untranslatable, is sealed in this French expression)

p. 147 commitment [wedding proposal] in irresponsibility of speech [Blanchot’s character proposes in Slavic not French], arrêt of commitment, commitment thus arrêté, both in one’s language & the other’s—the hymen > mother tongue does away w/ commitment & seals it

AF p. 58 key as seal of arkheion, “deferred obedience”

SPOM p. 21 [re: translation of “the time is out of joint”] each translation aggravates, seals the inaccessibility to other language

p. 205 does Marx’s exorcism sign and seal the whole logic of Capital? however virtual, preparatory > is this conjuration ceremony, vital surviving oath, injunction, what puts Capital in motion, and part of the revolutionary promise?

HERP p. 211 Heidegger’s 3 creative “Gewalten” of historial destiny: poet, thinker, statesman > their work as Schaffen carries seal or signature of originary polemos/Kampf

POOF p. 24 une archi-amitié sinscrirait à même le sceau du testament [not Ciceronian exemplar]

p. 30 Nietzsche: where metaphysicians have set their seal, perhaps it’s a ‘frog-perspective’

pp. 166-67 via & beyond Schmitt, der geschwisterlichen Klang (the brotherly-sisterly sound), the obscure friendship of rhyme, insane linking (appariement) of a couple, sense is born in a pair > before being philosophical, friendship concerns gift of the poem, isn’t there always a politics of a rhyme? > the rhyme can also become a traffic signal (philautie of linkage) > nothing looks more like the traffic signals of one country than those of another: this is the law > everything begins w/ Echo: rhymes sign, in cadence they seal a belonging, an ‘open gate’ [?]

HASD p. 50 seal: figures the figuration of the unfigurable itself, seal as imprint displaces typography of khora > khora—makes copies of paradigm; seal—valid for entire text of creation

——text of creation exists as typographic inscription of nonparticipation in participation

p. 51 Acc. Eckhart, imprint whole/identical, model will change based on wax (human) used [fixerup]

MPM pp. 19-20 affirmation (yes, yes) that seals alliance, via de Man > alliance not secret because occult but because it commits before and beyond anything else

p. 20 ”yes” commits w/ no content must repeat itself: yes yes, must bind itself to memory for memory, if anything’s to come from future [alliance btwn memory and seal of yes, yes]

pp. 38-9 all figures receive possibility from these paradoxical structures: 1) inclusion in set of a part greater than set 2) that which regulates our relation w/ other as other [not mourning in current sense], that the other is capable of dying (which is our “own” mortality too) conditions rhetoric of faithful memory, serves to seal an alliance & call us to an affirmation of the other

A p. 4 via Seneca, death (immanence of a disappearance) seals union of possible and impossible

p. 6 death w/out limit as limit to cross (pas)

SEC pp. 328-29 for Derrida, for a signature to function, to be legible, it must detach itself from present and singular intention of its production; its sameness alters its identity and singularity, dividing the seal [see LI pp. 30-31]

VM p. 112 inhabit metaphor’s ruins, shabiller des lambeaux de la tradition et des haillons du diable: by using tradition’s words, one can use [them] up (user), les frotter comme une vieille pièce de monnaie fruste et dévaluée, on peut dire que la vraie extériorité est la non-extérioritée sans être lintériorité, on peut écrire par ratures et ratures de ratures: crossing out writes, still writes in space

——“syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

PAS PAS p. (57) from where the right to interrupt? unjustifiable violence of interruption, nothing more servile, indiscreet, unspeakable than generalizing, appropriating the unique, breaking the seal of an absolute singularity [re: citing from Friendship, on single friendship btwn Bataille & Blanchot]

SH pp. 3-4 circumcision only once, at the same time “first & last,” ring, seal of alliance, anniversary of archeology/eschatology > ring traces, carves the “unwiederholbar (unrepeatable)”

——“one time” in English, but “one turn,” “una vez,” “una volta,” in vicissitudes of latinity

p. 11 “Geheimnis der Begegnung (the secrecy of encounter)” > otherness & solitude (poem, singularity) conjoined in one & same date: chance, plus dun at once, that which seals event

pp. 19-20 anniversary ring—seal > date: spectral return of that which will never return

p. 21 ring, sign of belonging itself, condition of return > cipher of seal, imprint of ring, counts more than content of message, what matters is mark of belonging, manifested alliance

p. series of proper names, signatures: face of a seal [fixerup]

p. 34 pledge, complementary object divide in 2 to seal alliance > moment of engagement, signature, contract, ring

F p. xxxix cryptophore, à manger le morceau (le mors) sans pouvoir le digérer, must constantly betray cipher that seals and conceals it > Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, truly cryptic story

p. xlv every “word” that says Thing in word-thing > several subjects, places, instances; Wolf Man inhabits forbidden desire to call himself by glorious word, can’t not break seal in signing

p. xlvii analyst can only decrypt secret seal of [other, patient’s] name w/ his own name > works on his own name, engaging his own desire

p. xlviii “in you, anonymous reader in this much-sealed case”

ROP p. 11 Freud sutures the unfathomable navel, omphalos, mit dem Unerkannten (unknown, “unknowable”), navel not a provisional limit, but a night, ab-solute unknown, attaché au lieu dont il part et dont il garde la marque de naissance > not only the gap (la béance), as Lacan reads this navel

OTO pp. 12-3 autobiographical récit, tells himself his life, affirms EROS, gratitude for gift (gift: establishment of my own credit w/ this name): EROS signs or seals > before such signature, my life may be mere prejudice (reaffirmation of the hymen, alliance or wedding ring, eternal return, “yes, yes” to shadowless gift of high noon)

p. 17 alliance in which Nietzsche seals/forges his signatures, and simulates them: demonic neutrality of midday delivered from the negative and from dialectic

O p. 58 preface—external seal, final kick (coup final), kick-off (coup denvoi)

SW pp. 349-50 [to read the corpus that has known, from operation of other, how to undo itself from veiling/unveiling] you have to write, sign in turn, countersign in writing, something else, in another language, w/out betraying injection/call of first seal

——can’t prove it happened, only swear that it did: perjury must remain possible (a duty that must be respected)

Gi p. 26 sexual difference not yet sexual duality? not yet, no longer, sealed by the 2? > “not yet” and “no longer” imply a submission to “the control and inspection of reason (quelque arraisonnement)”

DST DST p. 224 though Heidegger recalled that Georgiades translated rhuthmos as Gepräge (imprint, seal, type, character), this didn’t prevent him from bringing typos back to ontotypology & subject back to epoch of subjectity

TR p. 86 passion of [Rousseau’s] faith seals virtual time of work, une oeuvre that will operate by itself, beyond its signatory (w/out [Rousseau’s] living assistance [machine])

IW p. 261 acc. Cohen, Kant: holy of holies, innermost sanctum (die innerste Verwandschaft) of German spirit & Kant represents most intimate affinity w/ Judaism

——this kinship (Kant, German, Jew) is sealed in most intimate depth, most essential interiority, is sacredness itself, historical sacredness of spirit

D p. 325 “I” as ghost, as germ, term, that disseminates, a germ that carries w/in itself its own term, se faisant fort de sa mort > le sperme: ferme

C pp. 237-38 seal of crypt: contingent, “that’s enough” > Derrida left the seal in tact, truly, didn’t touch it

p. 242 la référence morcelée [TN. mort scellé(e)]

LI pp. 30-1 if Searle had spoken the obviously true, why the copyright? > the copyright engenders suspicion, divides the seal: Searle’s seal is stolen in advance

TN p. 2 do eyes touch like lips? what is contact if it intervenes? a sealed interruption, or the continual, negating upheaval (relevante) of the interval—the death of btwn?

ATM p. 166 [Levinas’ negotiation w/ interruption and reappropriation] is a style, an idiom that marks the negotiation w/ a singular and irreplaceable seal

pp. 185-86 Derrida’s fault/violence against Levinas’ work can only wound Him [i.e. not EL] in his body, He/Il that preseals everything that carries a name > Derrida compares his fault to that of erasing God’s name from a book (a fault that is buried, mourned [not annihilated])

OG p. 114 (167) that Lévi-Strauss will not be punished [for tricking girls into giving him names] gives to his fault an irremediable stamp (sceau)

p. 232 (331) “que la langage doive traverser lespace, soi tenu de sespacer, ce nest pas là un trait accidentel mais le sceau do son originela dispersion originelle laisse sa marque dans la langage

ATAP p. 92 John Patmos’ double bind: “do not seal the words of the inspiration of this book” > must disobey in order to obey: problem of translation re: quotation marks (“I, Yéshoua”)

p. 95 “do not seal”: i.e. do not close, do not sign

SPEC pp. 263-64 Freud’s avoidance of philosophy [of Nietzsche] (already in place like a counterfeiter) is inevitable (closest avoided in inevitable itself) > that the da be fort even before a judgment of denegation vienne y apposer la spécificité de son sceau

p. 343 “literary fiction” in fort:da, fait-oeuvre in abyss of these repetitions, fairies, demons, unheimlich repetitions, what is most gripping (saisissant) and ungraspable (insaisissable) about Beyond…, for Freud too, who believed he could affix the seal of the Freuds to it [Beyond…] while hearing voices

SECRET

KH p. 117 there is no tale of her [khōra], a secret w/out secret remains forever impenetrable à son sujet

GOD p. 4 demonic (esoteric, secret, sacred, lines blurred btwn human & animal) vs. responsibility [Nietzsche’s ressentiment?]

p. 8 via Patočka, 2 heterogenous secrets: 1) secret of historicity 2) secret of orgiastic mystery which history of responsibility has to break w/

——[another secret] Christian mysterium tremendum, fear and trembling before sacrificial gift, person being paralyzed, in its singularity, by the gaze of God

p. 9 via Patočka, history of responsible, built on heritage and patrimony of secrecy, begins w/ Plato’s break from orgiastic mystery, continues w/ Christianity’s mysterium tremendum > a tremor in figures of death as figures of gift, or as gifts of death

pp. 9-10 anabasis, or “conversion,” the turns in the history of secrecy, history of revolutions, history as revolution

pp. 10-11 [economy of the sacrifice] in turn toward new mystery, toward new structure of responsibility, prior one never eliminated, kept w/in oneself, mourned as crypt of a more ancient secret > is this repression, is this a kind of sacrificial Aufhebung?

p.14 Plato’s responsibility, or discipline, press one secret to work in service of another, put the demonic secret of Eros to work in this new hierarchy

pp. 15-17 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

p. 22 repression & incorporation: either 2 economies, or one economy w/ 2 systems in move from mysterium to secretum (possibility of keeping the secret)

——[secretum as history of truth, as cryptology, as a subjectification, separation from community of fusion]

p. 23 genealogy’s axiom: history never effaces what it buries (enfouit), keeps (garde) secret of what it encrypts, the secret of the secret, cest une histoire secrète du secret gardé; genealogy is also an economy

pp. 26-8 responsibility, aporia btwn choice and heresy (hairesis as choice, election), a type of secrecy that keeps responsibility apart (tient la responsabilitié à lécart) and in secret, the very thing responsibility insists on

p. 31 gift as gift w/out essence, can’t be seen in light of day, must be the secret, secrecy is the last word of the gift which is the last word of the secret

pp. 55-56 another secret, another seal (supplementary seal), comes to overlay (sceller) the unlivable experience, another concealment (cèlement) to the tremor > afraid of the fear, tremble in form of not knowing: a double secret

p. 60 by keeping the secret, Abraham betrays [generalized] ethics

p. 63 for Hegel, manifestation, unveiling, phenomenalization is given priority over secret: no final secret for philosophy, politics, ethics

pp. 67-8 secrecy essential to sacrificial responsibility, absolute, infinite, duty in name of God as tout autre, who must remain transcendent, hidden, secret, jealous of love, commands he gives

p. 71 can only respond to the one, to the other, by sacrificing the one to the other > will never be able to justify this sacrifice, will always be held in secret

pp. 78-80 a decision is always secret, always secret in instant of its performance; Abraham’s decision is absolutely responsible: answers for itself before the absolute other

***pp. 80-81 can a secret be transmitted? (yes & no); we do not understand, w/ Kierkegaard, Abraham’s decision; we share w/ Abraham what can’t be shared [highest passion, faith], a secret we know nothing about, neither him nor us > an incessant repetition of the absolute beginning

***p. 83 the speculative requires a heterotautological position (Hegel, revealed religion that is precisely Christian) [G], always risks meaning nothing, speculates on every secret [re: tout autre est tout autre]

pp. 88-91 the invisible (1: visible invisible 2: absolute invisible) vs. the secret

p. 92 secret of secrecy: we have no knowledge of it, and it is there for no one (et quil nest là pour personne), a secret doesn’t belong, never at home or in its place (chez soi)

——what’s the sense of saying “my” secret, if the secret can only be revealed au tout autre

Unheimlichkeit of Geheimnis, both Freud & Heidegger: beyond an axiomatic of the self or the chez soi as ego cogito

p. 98 Christianity, “seeing in secret,” God the Father restores economy interrupted by the dividing of heaven from earth

p. 106 the 2 economies: 1) calculation, Judaic 2) dissymetric economy of sacrifice, “beyond the totality of the calculable as a finite totality of the same,” renunciation of merchandise, still relies on giving back (rendre), on yield, profit, but only father who sees in secret [can calculate]

p. 108 God as the name of the possibility of keeping a secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior, a witness others cannot see, other than me, more intimate with me than myself, structure of invisible interiority, God calls me, I call myself God

pp. 108-09 secret market of secrecy, “Christianity’s stroke of genius,” says Nietzsche, merchandise, give credit to the infinite [denounce all calculation & still yield surplus-value]

p. 122 re: test God imposed on Abraham, where, all the way to hyperbole, “not meaning to say (de ne pas vouloir dire)” (keeping a secret) = not being able to mean (to say) (ne pas pouvoir vouloir dire)

pp.122-23 secret of secrecy, not a hiding something, as in not revealing the truth, but respecting absolute singularity, infinite separation of what binds me to the unique, to one as to the other, à lUn comme à lAutre)

p. 124n via Kierkegaard, generality of ethics is bloodless specter of faith; teleological suspension of ethics determined by Abraham’s silence; aesthetics cultivates secret, ethics punishes it

p. 126 instead of asking forgiveness for misdeed, I ask forgiveness for preferring you to the other other—unforgivable in forgiveness; Abraham prefers secret that binds him to God than secret that binds him to the other other [Isaac, family]

p. 128 Abraham’s silence, secrecy of unforgivable, decision, would have “to be forgiven by the one he obeyed”

p. 129 double secret: 1) God’s call to make the greatest sacrifice 2) reason or sense of the demand for the sacrifice

——Abraham held to secrecy because the secret remains secret from him

pp.132-33 “pardon for not meaning (to say),” secretless secret of literature, scene of forgiveness, its being “up in the air” keeps it secret, announces literature

p. 133 absolute secrecy, a secret to keep as a shared inheritance of a secret that can’t be shared, absolute dissymmetry

pp. 145,148 secret secret of forgiveness: to remain secret, and to become self-forgiveness (via specular identification), and in the ambiguity of se pardonner, to be deprived of sense in this narcissistic reflexivity

——to ask forgiveness is to identify with the other, auto-affect, hetero-affect

GT p. 35 perhaps, mode of gift, (atopic, utopic) madness of desire to give the impossible, this madness would also be a forgetting, to forget the gift [secret of death]

p. 94 reader is not deceived [like narrator], experiences a secret w/out depth, a secret w/out secret

p. 147 violence of gift: takes by surprise in such a way as to trap, indebt the receiver, place, hold in a process of circulation, but this violence irreducible whether it repeats or interrupts the circle

——or: a surprise surprising enough to be forgotten w/out delay, beyond Being, epekeina tes ousia: secret about which one cannot speak, but can no longer remain silent

pp. 150-51 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

——literature as place of non-place of frame, triptych w/ dislocated frame, 3 + or – excluded 4th, all positions exchangeable to infinite, an ex-propriation that forbids a return to self, most powerful or interesting speculation

——readers are at once debtors & creditors, like the narrator, we are the beggar, the 3rd party excluded from the secret of the dual scene

pp. 152-3 readability of text structured by unreadability of secret, narrator in situation analogous to reader; crypt gives to be read, eternally unreadable

——[no depth beyond literary phenomenon] inviolability of secret depends on essential superficiality, bare device of being-two-to-speak (lêtre-deux-à-parler), a secret beyond reserve of technique, thing, being, thing thought (same could be said for money)

p. 154 literature desacralizes the world like Abraham’s sacrifice [in the name of a secret w/out content]

p. 156 infinite secret btwn the 2 [re: “Counterfeit Money”], opening space of absolute heterogeneity, beyond everything they have said to each other, the reason they’ve given each other

***p. 170 secret of literature has no depth, no interiority, spread on the surface of the page, non-psychological structure, not subjective though responsible for most radical effects of subjectivity, a post card, a bank note, a “letter of credit” [see LOBL p. ~101, &

SUBJECTILE

]

MONL p. 13 power this ‘alien’ [Oedipus] holds over ‘aliens’: innermost secret, sepulture, in exchange for salvation of city, which he refuses his daughters (refuses them a just ‘work of mourning’)

p. 52 “incarnate archive of a liturgy whose secret no one will betray,” no one else could appropriate, even I, who is in on the secret

p. 62 there are 2 others: 1) language of the other as promised sentence 2) language of other as that of master or colonist; both have unsettling resemblances kept secret, held in reserve

p. 65 democracy must be public, phenomenal, something of the Enlightenment, but also it must give rights to the secret, society of the secret (voyoucracy)

p. 66 voyoucracy, corrupting power of street, not anarchic disorder, but structured disorder, secret society, seducer

p. 83 [quoted in KH] democratic double injunction (around edges of khōra): 1) all-inclusive 2) secret entrusted to those worthy of it > paradox of example, good example

p. 88 justice w/ disjointure: out of joint, interruption of relation, unbinding > infinite secret of the other, threatens a communitarian idea of justice [See SPOM p. 30 joining is a thinking of injunction] [heterogeneous inseparability of law & justice developed in FL, then SPOM in discussion w Heidegger's dikē (gathering, harmony, adjoining)]

***p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature > this undecidability [“I continue to believe”] only radical possibility of letting/thinking what comes about by arriving of whoever arrives

FK pp. 56-7 desert of the desert [outside set] [see SPOM p. 33]

p. 59 khōra, secret, desert of the desert (last desert, before the first), neither a threshold nor a mourning, btwn event and possibility, or virtuality of the event, not the desert of revelation

p. 60n Derrida thinks Justice in relation to a sundering (déliaison), an always-safe, always-to-be-saved possibility of secret of disassociation, rather than bringing-together (Versammlung) re: dikē

p. 72 the secret: reticence btwn two experiences of religion (btwn credit & unscathed) [see p. 70] pp. 85-86 holding-back, restraint (halte), inhibition, modesty: universal structure of religiosity, mystical immunity of the secret > not w/out intuitive violence, to that which remains unscathed

p. 99 socius as the secret of testimonial experience, a certain faith, address/relation to tout autre, that is, socius as non-relationship of absolute interruption: Levinas, Blanchot

H p. 39 Oedipus’ secret

p. 117 “no fixed address” of death, no phenomenal exteriority, interiority of the heart, nocturnal secret (a suffering both intimate & infinite)

AF p. 4 secret menaces the archive

p. 47 [re: Yerushalmi] monolinguist who says “we,” promises secrecy for a virtual response [re: Freud’s unknown conviction that psychoanalysis was a Jewish science], does Freud’s ghost murmur the secret in private [to Yerushalmi]?

p. 56 Yerushalmi would like be the first after Freud, alone in sharing a secret, an inheritor in lineage of arch-patriarchs [re: knowing Freud knew psychoanalysis was a Jewish science]

p. 99 Freud dreams irreplaceable place, the very ash, condition of singularity, idiom, secret, testimony, trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate > absolutely safe location

p. 100 no archive of the secret, by definition, it is the very ash of the archive (speculation begins there, belief too)

p. 101 [what did Freud keep of his] unconditional right to secrecy

LOBL p. 125 “the initial [re: J.] keeps (garde) the secret like a grave—jealously”

pp. ~175-6 Derrida did not keep his promise to consider translatability [see p. ~89], but keeps a secret

SPOM p. 18 one always inherits around a secret

p. 116 one cannot establish the state of a debt, do the balance sheet of an “exhaustive record,” one selects, performs, inheritance is kept secret, secret of a crime of its very author

p. 119 Hugo: anger (dragon) & secret (sphinx)

p. 184 the table, wood table, armed head to toe: origin of exchange-value, birth of capital, of mysticism and the secret [?]

pp. 186-87 the secret (Geheimnis) of the fetishism of the commodity, the “germ” of the money-form, une table tournante, example of an apparition

p. 195 secret of commodity form is substitution (quid pro quo), but one w/ ruse, perverse intervention of souffleur, parole soufflée > abnormal play of mirrors [men no longer recognize in the substitution made by commodity the social character of their own labor], commodity turns men into specters, vampires > can’t see their reflection, “but who is not so deprived?” Derrida adds

pp. 232-33n the 2 experiences of the secret: I tell you that I cannot tell you > my 1st crime and 1st confession, a confession w/out confession

p. 10 Heidegger’s Being as near to the secret [fixerup]

POO pp. 24-27 il y a là du secret [see CIN p. 13 il y la (là) cendres] > “let us [deconstructionists?] testify (témoignons) to a secret that is without content, without a content separable from its performative experience, from its performative tracing”

——not genius

——not a conscious misrepresentation, nor knowing an unconscious representation

——not phenomenalizable

——secret remains a mystery of passion

——secret is not mystical

——does not belong to truth as homoiosis (adequation), nor to truth as memory (Mnemosyne, alētheia)

——it is not the secret as the near, the intimate, the proper

——happens at every instant, is irreducible to the name which makes it secret, even when one makes the truth [Augustine] in its name (fait la verité à son sujet)

——possibility of homonymy and mimesis

——absolute nonresponse, can’t call to account, can’t grant indemnity

p. 27 “so many ruses, always, to draw it [the secret] into a process…but it never surrenders to it [a process]”

——the secret can never be reduced even when ethics try, one cannot help but respect it

——taste for secret histories, secret like khōra, outside all periodization, all epochalization

pp. 28-9 Derrida does not like literature for its own sake, for some pleasure, or aesthetic, but for the secret, the passion of the secret, the secret of the passion > in place of the secret only remainder remains, not even literature

——literature: right to say everything, w/out ever touching the secret

p. 29 call of secret impassions us

——calculable democratic subject must reveal secret

p. 30 one can lie, cheat, seduce by making use of the secret, one can use it to gain authority

——the simulacrum bears witness to the secret as solitude [see pp. 131-32n au secret (in the secret, isolated)]

p. 31 even if the secret makes social bonds possible it does not answer to them

p. 132n Poe [Purloined Letter] tells the secret twice, w/out same secret being penetrated, matter of trace, secret can be announced w/out being revealed or secret is manifest but still in need of translation

p. 143n distinction btwn “mention” & “use” still pragmatic, difference must not be thematized is the secret

BL p. 191 the inaccessible incites from its place of hiding

HASD pp. 17-8 [blurring lines btwn conscious/unconscious, man/animal] if animals can’t keep secrets, because they can’t represent as such, secret linked to Vorstellung, linked to lying, not presenting in speech that which one has an articulated representation, keep to oneself

——garder pour soi, voilà le pouvoir le plus incroyable et qui donne le plus à penser > must there not be dissimulation, multiplicity & difference from oneself, trace, for there to be keeping?

——can one ever say for certain: the secret has been kept?

p. 21 homology btwn secret group (topography of social link) and the place of the secret (beyond all position)

pp. 23-4 in topolitology of secret, figures or places of rhetoric are also political stratagems [Derrida & deconstruction?]

——since promise is also an order, allegorical veil becomes political shield, solid barrier of a social division, a shibboleth

pp. 24-5 Dionysius’ 2 modes [esoteric/exoteric] of transmission: 1) unspeakable, prohibited, inaccessible (aporreton) secret, “symbolic and initiatory” 2) philosophic, demonstrative (apodeiktiken), capable of being shown

——doesn’t discourse of Dionysius & Derrida keep to place where these 2 modes cross? such place cannot be an indivisible point > 2 languages bear the silence of the other, secret must and must not allow itself to be divulged

——a dénégation prior to Freudian context, secret of denial, a negativity that de-negates itself, gives no chance to dialectic

p. 26 there is no secret as such, I deny it, this is what I confide in secret to whoever allies himself to me, this is the secret of alliance

MPM pp. 19-20 affirmation (yes, yes) that seals alliance, via de Man > alliance not secret because occult but because it commits before and beyond anything else

MSUB J p. 159 subjectile’s secret should only be shared w/ the translator: that it is untranslatable

A p. 74 death always the name of a secret, signs irreplaceable singularity, puts forth common name of the proper name w/out name, always a shibboleth > language about death long history of a secret society, hidden religion of the awaiting, a universal Marrano

p. 77 that which lives w/ out a name, we’ll give an added name (surnom) [which a name always is]: Marrano (crypto-judaic, crypto-X), believe if you want to the Marranos have come to an end

p. 81 Marranos that we are, whether we know it or not, incessantly older & younger, untimely histories, still waiting for the other in a last word infinitely finished

——Marrano: anyone who remains faithful to a secret he hasn’t chosen

pp. 84-6n Kant assigns place of secret in practice of politics to philosophers in his vision of perpetual peace

SEC p. 315 no code of writing is structurally secret, can always be iterable for a 3rd party

PP PP p. 63 text is forever imperceptible, its laws and rules [legibility?] are not “harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret,” but can never be booked (se livrent) in the present

***VM ***VM p. 90 for Levinas, w/out primordial secret, w/out relationship to other in solitude, parricide is philosophy’s theatrical fiction

pp. 123-24 Husserl’s alter-ego, nonviolent respect of secret, of separation, we can only know the other through analogical appresentation > translates recognition of radical separation

PAS PAS p. (78) Blanchot: “more secret and more interior than speech of the innermost heart” > “the secret is w/out depth (sans profondeur)”

SH p. 10 poem is due its date, owes itself to its date as inmost concern, signature, owes itself to its secret, speaks of this date only insofar as it acquits itself

p. 11 “Geheimnis der Begegnung (the secrecy of encounter)” > otherness & solitude (poem, singularity) conjoined in one & same date: chance, plus dun at once, that which seals event

p. 29 cipher can conceal secret, which it shelters in its readability, w/out the slightest hidden attention > there’s nothing it can do about it [why/who interpret(s) secret as a taunting gesture?]

p. 52 a date fascinates, but is not made to fascinate, crypt occurs wherever singular incision marks language (not the work of hermetic poet anxious to seduce w/ ciphers)

POOF p. 35-6 Nietzsche’s new philosophers are friends of solitude (singularity), love cutting ties, uncompromising, w/out proximity, w/out presence, w/out resemblance: not a secret society—it’s exactly the classical concept of the secret they rebel against

pp. 52-3 Nietzsche’s counterculture of knowing-how-to-keep-silent, the responsibility of silence, friendship preserved by silence (in secret)

pp. 144-45 partisan in cryptography, in unassignable ‘political’ status of psychoanalysis, in blurred borders btwn privacy/publicity, in cybercrime > politics of friendship should not be distinguishable from a meditation on secrecy

pp. 184-85 via Montaigne, law of secrecy placed above law of city, apolitical drive of friendship divides virtue or reason > double bind: 1) sovereign fraternity of secrecy btwn 2 w/out perjury 2) political secrecy of brotherhood begins w/ the 3rd, opens to perjury

pp. 257-58 for Kant, friendship is rare, the rarity of keeping a secret, a black swan > [Derrida seems to hint that Kant is getting personal here: Kant murmurs a confession]

pp. 259 a few oddities that don’t surprise Kant: 1) no secrets in nature, secrets only there where there’s engagement, promise—and no one has the infinite intelligence to know for certain what the secret is 2) the impossible & necessary arithmetic returns: friendship as n + 1, plus dun, there’s always one more than the 2 friends, a 3rd, so how can the secret be kept? 3) merely moral friendship is not just ideal, the event of friendship happens, the black swan

pp. 276-77 the 3rd witnesses a law that interrupts vertigo of singularity (a dual narcissism), 3rd opens up & keeps from closing the question of secrecy > Nietzsche: for the hermit, the friend is always 3rd person (keeps the other 2 [w/in oneself] from sinking to the depths)

F pp. xviii-xix crypt must always incorporate more than one, plus dun: cryptophore’s secret must be shared (partagé) w/ a “third,” that’s what makes a secret a secret

p. xxvii mythic founding event is only possible in secrecy—so it can ‘take place’

DS p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

ROP pp. 92-5 via Foucault, doctor capitalizes/speculates on secret, capital of secret, the secrecy effect, technique of the secret, secret of secret: make one suppose knowledge and believe in the secret, attributes of Evil Genius attributed to doctor, he uses unreason, uses fiction/simulacrum

FS p. 6 to see structure more clearly, solicit it, threaten its supports: concentrate on its [structuralism’s] keystone (la clef de voûte) (possibility & fragility of its existence) > the secret place where structure is neither construction nor ruin but lability

SW p. 327 tallith as intimate secretion [see SERICULTURE], opened, given birth by divine word preceding it, & also separate, dissociated, dissolves bond, holds to secret

p. 353 silkworm secretes absolutely, a thing which would never be an object it would stand against

DPi pp. 251-52 secret: what if I deconstructed the “seminar” by telling you I won’t tell you the truth even if I know it? > blow to deconstructed pieces the idea of the seminar that’s obliged by oath to speak all possible truth

RGE p. 266 sovereignty, the putting at stake, the space of writing, absolute in night of secret: “continuum of sovereign communication has as its milieu this night of secret difference” > one would understand nothing if one thought there’s a contradiction btwn these 2 requisites

Gii p. 55 for Heidegger, Gedicht is silent source of written and spoken poems (Dichtungen)

——Ein Geschlecht shelters Grundton (fundamental note), from which Gedicht of poets keeps the secret (Geheimnis) silent (schweigt)

p. 61 the “situation (Erörterung)” of Gedicht needs recourse to idiom of Geschlecht (Geschlecht of idiom)? how to think Gedichts belonging, appropriation to a language, to a Geschlecht

REST p. 271 obviously secret: cipher remains secret because not concealed > encrypted in the ether of obviousness & truth [re: correspondence btwn Heidegger/Shapiro] [cf. p. 283 “invisible ether of this trivial self-evidence”: the shoes in the work are out of work because they are painted]

——when something is entrusted to the purveyor of truth, it is a secret for no one

p. 356 Heidegger’s Geborgenheit associates hidden, crypted secret w/ being-in-safety: what one must hold in reserve, conceal, to live > tightening of originary ring > effect of Verlässlichkeit

***p. 382 “useless hermeticism [Artaud]” of crypted remainder, secret already legible, separation already in the word, the letter, the pair > opening of secret

DST DST p. 201 inevitable impurity of secret of idiom

——secret: the w/out relation (sans-rapport) [compare to Lacan’s no sexual relation], the separation, the interruption

HLP p. 63 for Koyré, any secret threatens res publica: politeia as absolute phenomenality, thus required transparency/illumination of public space

——lead to totalitarianism w/ democratic face: [everything must be illuminated]

——Hitler used “old Machiavellian technique”: tell truth knowing the uninitiated will not take him seriously, “conspiracy in broad daylight,” “society w/ a secret”

p. 64 Marrano: right to secrecy as right to resistance beyond order of political (or theologico-political in general)

PSSS p. 265 secrecy delimits political authority [re: institution of psychoanalysis]

C p. 186 family resemblance removes none [of the 127 coffins] from itself, from the absolute secret, from definitive detachment that isolates/ab-solves outside series

p. 188 little princeps coffin has no relationship w/ family > and yet, in secret, in an immemorial past that was never present, he engendered this family

pp. 195-96 excess zeal, the little one (paradigm) built like a crypt [Lacan’s objet a?], jealously keeps its secret at moment of greatest exhibition

——hermetically closed (portable temples called hermes): mute beneath its altuglassed transparency, seduces, attracts the dead man, makes him come back and more: fors in that casket

AD p. 36 Levinas: welcoming, “understanding w/out words,” “expression in secret,” “feminine alterity”

***CF p. 55 a politics that would respect the secret (that which exceeds the political or is no longer in juridical domain): democracy to come

CIN p. 17 “se donnant à elle-même, se donnant comme son propre nom, lart consumé du secret: de lexhibition savoir se garder [to give to itself, give to itself as its proper name, consummate art of secret: the exhibition of knowing how to guard oneself] [compare to God’s fiery consumption]

***p. 21 nothing will have taken place but the place, there are cinders, there is place (il y a lieu) > this untranslatable, like a hidden proper name, carries everything away toward prescribed limit, recognition, debt, obligation > place (proper name) for giving, rendering, celebrating, loving, friendship, dissemination…

pp. 31-2 perhaps he [Derrida] (or she [la cinder]) knew what he set on fire, what he praised in the secret of the sentence “il y a là cendre,” but he may discover more in its unconscious, and he will die > then the phrase w/ its chance of surviving him will be more cinder than ever, and less—w/out anyone to say “I”

p. 33 [Derrida on his own “counterfeiter’s forgery,” on his ability to lie, or not be certain what he knows, but what does he know or lie about w/ such indeterminate phrases?]

p. 46 “language poisons for us the most secret of our secrets…one must even sacrifice one’s own sacrifice to it”

BSi p. 227 Celan’s 2 secrets of the poem: 1) signature, genesis of poem 2) the present that doesn’t present itself

pp. 261-62 unheimlich: 1) worrying aspect of foreignness as intimacy of one’s own home 2) says the essential bearing of Celan’s “Meridian” 3) associated w/ the foreigner 4) Geheimnis (the intimate, the folded back on itself, what has withdrawn in withdrawal, hidden inside of house and home), secret of encounter at most intimate heart of present

OG p. 69 (101-02) the horizontality of spacing, hollow of differance, discontinuity and discreteness (does not oppose it(self) like surface to depth), a hinge (brisure) marking impossibility of full speech

p. 112 (164-65) complex layering of 3 violences re: proper names: 1) expropriation, repetition, déjà dédoublée, arche-writing, to give name it’s forbidden to pronounce, to name what’s never present, the unique [fire in CIN, Glas] 2) secret, protective, reparatory, “moral,” conceal names 3) the scene of proper names, reassuring seal of self-identity, refers to #1 and #2, empirical consciousness, common concept of violence, revealing name by effraction: evil, war, rape (system of moral law & transgression) [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]

ATAP p. 69 agogic function of leader, il Duce, Führer, mystagogue, jealously protects unveiling of secret: elite beings, distinguished subjects [Donald Trump]

p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

CIR p. 76 secret I’m jealously seeking as last word of my jealousy, continually turning around it w/out knowing secret of my suffering

***p. 78 desire for literature is circumcision, text read does not suffice, has to be eaten, sucked; Derrida’s talking about conscious secrets: no one has yet said anything about the secret as known

p. 155-56 held to secrecy by those who know your secret, share w/ you the open secret, just as useless to make it know, blank sacrifices, son not bearing his name [Pierre]

pp. 207-08 no one will know from what secret I’m writing, that I say so changes nothing

p. 257 phantom or prophet charged w/ mission, heavily charged w/ secret unknown to him

pp. 297-98 all my tears (of love), prayers, bleeding like overflow of murders I carry w/in myself, knowing not whether I committed them or not, against the other or against me

——spare the sister, she, the password, our lifelong secret, inside of the ring

EU pp. 38-40 Descartes distrusts “arcanum” (secret) in Hardy, but Derrida sees this as trading one utopia for another > Descartes’ will be a philosophical romance [a philosophy w/out secret as a deeper secret?]

——Descartes’ counter-proposal [to Hardy]: arcanum of “true science” > method, artificial intelligence, translating machine (could be taught in very little time): universality as principle of order, as path, passage, odos

pp. 75-6 most post-Kantians (incl. Nietzsche [?]) claim to have already reached the inaccessible: to think finitude, you have already thought the infinite (this becomes definition of thinking)

——post-Kantians accuse Kant of founding “criticism” in denegation, more responsible to found thought in inaccessible

SPEC p. 262 what is the child’s debt in a play w/out debt? on what w/out debt does play speculate in secret? what is the place of such a secret? [re: Freud’s debt to Nietzsche]

p. 300 [re: Freud’s fort/da] law of oikos, open secret, family vacance (vacancy, vacation), secret for no one [everyone knows Freud is Ernst’s PP], domestico-familial, domestico-funerary

p. 342 document is ciphered, will remain secret if author dies before “his own (les siens),” all “his own” will be those who believe they can decipher the will (testament) of this code

pp. 347-48 Freud’s metaphor of the “vesicle,” protoplasmic bulb, amortizes excitations from outside world [and inside], protects, can be transferred to every corpus [i.e. text]: transference from one legatee to the other, like the simulacrum of secret

p. 369 whatever becomes too familiar can be suspected of jealously guarding a secret [re: Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium]

SEDIMENTATION (sedimentary, satzartig) see inheritance

OOG p. 48 historical reduction brings forth, institutes act concealed beneath “secondary passivities and infinite sedimentations”

p. 50 phenomenological reduction made possible by—appropriate de-sedimentation

——thanks to and despite the sedimentations, history restored to traditional diaphaneity

***p. 55 axiomatics (from which alone every ideal of exhaustive and exact deductivity can take its sense) presuppose a sedimentation of sense, a primordial evidence, a radical ground which is already past, thus axiomatics exiled by Husserl from the origins to which he wants to return

pp. 57-8 sedimentary retention [as habitus, occurs because living consciousness is finite] is general form of protention conceived as unique, universal form of Living Present

p. 94 for Husserl, all factual writings in which truth could be sedimented nothing but sensible “exemplars,” they could all be destroyed w/out overtaking the very sense of absolute ideality

p. 99 phenomenological Reaktivierung: must be fully responsible and conscious of sedimented sense I take up [first danger w/ sedimented sense is passivity]

——via Husserl, because senses deposited, stratified, also prescribed by an archi-tectonics, there’s a danger of passivity

pp. 99-100 “the equivocity of expression is the chosen field for sedimentary deposits,” sediment-ations obliterate sense only insofar as there are surfaces available for this [?]

——reactivation of sedimentation gives back to me originally presentive intuition, univocity

GSP p. 165 genetic description of ego prescribes task of a universal genetic phenomenology (a eidos of historicity) for Husserl, this is not a series of ruptures, revolutions, that tear open a previous finitude to lay bear a hidden infinity, giving voice to dynamis of silence > the ruptures are always already indicated [Telos] [as sedimentations?] [Derrida wonders if this a metaphysical affirmation in a phenemonology]

FS p. 27 when all value 1st constituted by theoretical subject, diaphanousness is supreme value, univocity > hence, difficulty in thinking genesis & mysterious failures called crises

——Husserl’s solution: forgetting is eidetically dictated, necessary, under rubric of “sedimentation” > for the development of truth

SEEING

GT p. 121 that which is there to see in the relation is w/held from sight

SELECTION

SPOM p. 18 injunction of inheritance “choose and decide from what you inherit,” this choice, like memory, the condition of finitude

p. 109 principle of selectivity guides & hierarchizes “spirits,” fatally excluding in turn, it will annihilate, by watching over some “en veillant (sur) ses ancetres” [dead bodies] and not others

***p. 114 no inheritance w/out call to responsibility, a reaffirmation of a debt, but a critical, selective one

HERP p. 177 as Dasein throws itself by anticipation toward death, it inherits & chooses, chooses the very possibility of inheritance

POOF pp. 2-3 for Cicero, 2 types of friendship: ‘true & perfect’ vs. ‘vulgar & mediocre’ > friendship is rare, requires selection, classically associated w/ familiarity, proximity, oikeiótēs: such logic extends into all political models of res publica

p. 11 for Aristotle, a friend chooses knowing rather than being known, counts, refers, prefers, chooses to love > irreducible difference btwn active/passive, cest elle qui compte et permet de compter

pp. 19-21 via Aristotle, one must choose & prefer friends (election & selection), it takes time > for Aristotle, those who don’t have friends count friends among things (prágmata), possessions, the malevolent place friends in field of calculable hypothesis > yet, the choice of friends, that their # must be small, reintroduces #, calculation, into multiplicity of incalculable singularities: a certain aristocracy in arithmetic of the choice

***p. 21 (39) via Aristotle, in economy of time, even in the instant, plenitude of enérgeia linked to #: friendship must count but resists enumeration, quantification (# isn’t forbidden but the numerous, the crowd, is) > for a finite being, test of friendship is an endurance of arithmetic

pp. 210-12 does the autarkic (self-sufficient) man need a friend? [Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, Plato’s Lysis] > rarity is the virtue of friendship [p. 225n rarity also among Christian monks]

——scarcity, rareness, is worth more—sometimes to the extreme > scarcity sets the price of true friendship [hyperbole, incommensurable]

HASD p. 22 Pseudo-Dionysus: the sacred and the select—recede from beings, from themselves to the hyperessentiality of beyond Being, God

FWT p. 4 [re: contradictory reaffirmation] passive reception, decision to say “yes,” then selection, interpretation, thus transformation: not to leave safe the very thing one respects before all else > not to leave safe: to save it, perhaps, yet again, w/out illusion of final salvation

p. 5 contradictory tasks set to us by inheritance: testimony to our finitude, which obliges us to inherit older, more powerful, more durable, and same finitude obliges one to choose, select, sacrifice, exclude

OTO p. 14 it is life, as the living feminine, that must return eternally, selectively > life allied to herself by nuptial annulus, wedding ring

pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

FS pp. 9-10, 304n doesn’t pure speech require inscription, isn’t it a privileged representation of inscription? just like Leibniz’s essence requires existence (pushes out toward world), power > act?

——God of Leibniz does not know the anguish of choice, only one book distributed through all books, God’s Will always chooses the “best”

——writing, not a determined pathos, an empirical state of writer, but responsibility of angustia: [Derrida is privileging a power of equivocality over creativity of classical God, anguish connoting a narrowing, a loss of breath, a restriction, constraint, and thus the anguish of choice]

——absence & haunting of divine sign (Jewish God) [cf. GOD], anguish of Hebraic ruah (pneuma), regulates modern books/criticism/aesthetics

WAP WAP p. 15 CIPH wants its unicity to come from the exorbitant? the exorbitant is immediately contaminated or compromised (selects using the most reassuring norms)

TR TR p. 100 de Man’s “history” not temporal but deals w/ “event,” “power,” which is like Derrida’s always finite (therefore selective) archive

PJP PJP p. 194 Derrida is unable to reconstitute whole weave in which he cuts/selects—do not judge richness of Le Parjure from shreds extracted from it, in supplemental betrayal, for needs of current demonstration

TN TN pp. 216-17 [beyond Foucault] mouvance (trend) of thinking, not path or line (neo-Heideggerian[?]), structurally open unlike epistēmē, “paradigm,” which hypothesize historical space w/in strictly determinable contour > I read texts profitably and make unfair selections

LG LG p. 232 brutal, mercilessly depleting selectivity—a certain police brutality an accomplice to concern for professional competence

CIR CIR p. 276 not interested in principle of selection but this idiom that makes or lets me write

SELF

GOD p. 92 Unheimlichkeit of Geheimnis, both Freud & Heidegger: beyond an axiomatic of the self or the chez soi as ego cogito

MONL p. 33 inscription of self in the forbidden language

R p. 12 turn, turn around the self, makes a totality

p. 51 Derrida considers the effectiveness of Nancy’s “measuring oneself against the nothing”: 1) avoids heroism, ecstasy by substantializing nothing in plenitude 2) retains problems of the self

p. 109 self finds itself infected as soon as soon as it (ipse) needs event, heteronomy

LOBL p. 169 pursue oneself by using one terror to avoid the other [neurosis?] [Abraham, more than one fidelity]

POO p. 13 “what returns to your name, to the secret of your name, is the ability to disappear in your name,” that is, not to return to itself, which is the condition of the gift (i.e. the name) of all expansion of self, of all auctoritas

MPM p. 33 light of self appears in relation to death of the other

p. 34 we come to ourselves through memory of possible mourning, knowledge older than ourselves, de Man might say: unreadability of mourning

——inconsolable [infinitely responsible] before finitude of memory: [want memory to be infinite?] possibility of impossible commands whole rhetoric of mourning, describes essence of memory > w/ dark light of this nothing (death of other) we learn other resists closure of our interiorizing memory [Freud’s “normal” “work of mourning” (ideally, quasi-literally devouring body/voice of other)]

——mimetic interiorization not just fictive, is origin of fiction, takes place in a body, makes place for body, soul, “ours” > death constitutes and makes manifests limits of me, us, obliged to harbor something greater than us w/in us

p. 50 “I” effaces its singularity as it designates it

pp. 55-56 Paul de Man translates Hegel’s “Ich kann nicht sagen was ich (nur) meine” as ‘I cannot say I’ > effacing of I, a priori functional forgetting > “Autobiography as De-facement”

p. 56 memory effaces remembrances—like “I” effaces itself [I forgets I at beginning of sentence]

p. 101 the sich, “se,” “itself,” deconstructs itself in the very act of the promise, aporetic event

——the sich is “promised to the effacement it promises itself” [auto-deconstruction]

p. 135 auto-deconstruction where auto-, self can’t be reflected/totalized/gathered/recollected only written and caught in trap of promise

POOF p. 24 find friend w/in oneself (Echo before Narcissus), the other in oneself, would ruin in advance what it makes possible: narcissism & self-exemplarity [however, wouldn’t change testamentary structure Derrida is discussing]

pp. 37-8 the to-come disjoins itself, disjoins the self that would yet join itself in this disjunction > to-come more ‘ancient,’ ‘older,’ than the present

PP pp. 121-22 (138-39) in Laws judge must introject, internalize the letter, grammata [tou Dephikou grammatos], into his soul; anamnesic dialectics, repetition of eidos, self-knowledge, self-mastery > a forgetting of childhood, exorcism of child, teaches child to speak

PAS PAS p. (73) Blanchot: dying separates us endlessly from ourselves

p. (85) double pas, its absolute heterogeneity, deprives of nothing save its identity to self, which prevents distancing from self > double pas, absolute rarefaction w/out the least lack

***p. (88) can one love anything other than the name? that which still lets self omit itself, so it can represent itself

A p. 66 for Heidegger, death—stand before (steht bevor) oneself, await, precede oneself as before a mirror, as before the future, “in its ownmost potentiality for being” [see p. 78]

SH p. 55 “you” may be addressed to the other as well as to myself, to oneself as other [“you” listening Sagi?]

F p. xix self does identify, to resist introjection: but only in “imaginary, occult” way; the “endocryptic identification” designed to keep topography intact and the place safe (le lieu sauf) are cryptofantasmatic, but the inclusion, divisions and partitions are real

p. xx [angular] partitions [w/in Self] of crypt: fractures into angular pieces, arranges (aménage) cavities, corridors, zigzag labyrinths, anfractuosities, craggy (escarpées) fortifications > effects of breakages (cassures); requires light in darkness to shine on inner partition of splintered symbol (intrasymbolic not cosymbolic): each fragment conscious to itself, unconscious to ‘non-cry

p. xxvi the Thing is encrypted by crypt (for du Moi, self’s safe) not w/in (dans) it; crypted structure of ultimate referent [Thing] means double articulation (history, story) coalesces all these genres: myth, poem, novel, drama, translation > the narrated event never appears

p. xxxv self: a cemetery guard (crypt is enclosed w/in self as excluded), self makes rounds (round & round) of crypt like he’s the proprietor, but he’s not, uses knowledge to keep visitors away

p. xlviii cryptonomy: crack (la ligne de brisure) of a symbol, upright column of name (colonne érigée dun nom), blank voice of a scruple [see p. xiii], always extends beyond the self

DIF DIF p. 22 Heraclitean play of hen diapheron heautōi, the one differing from itself, in difference w/ itself, is lost like a trace when diapherein is determined as ontological difference?

SW p. 349 in-self-out-of-self ipseity > putting-outside-self its being-in-self

DPi p. 251 to be happy w/ happiness is to believe in it: like every belief, a belief of the other in oneself [Derrida emphasizes painful equivocality of this expression]

***Gi pp. 11-2 Dasein more neutral than Mensch?; Daseins neutrality as neutralization/subtraction of everything but naked trait of this relation to self, to the Being of its being

PF p. xxii legere (choice, select, privilege)

HLP p. 67 classical lying: liar knows the truth, knows he is lying, the self excludes the self-lie (the other is other enough, an enemy to be deceived in his belief)

——unless we think the other w/in oneself, an ipseity more originary than ego, a divisible ipseity, oneself as enemy

HST p. 402 stranger is a digression that risks corrupting proximity to self of the proper > que veut dire létranger?

TN p. 34 se toucher toi, “Je se touche”; “tu” [in philosophical discourse] signs general/plural singularity of possible addressee, also signs possibility/need for “I” to address itself as an other > oneself: first & last other

p. 282 heart: condition of desire, the effraction of the other, of what can’t return to self

——diastole, absolute generosity, generosity more generous than generosity itself, orients us toward epekeina tēs ousisas, Plotinus’ One

p. 291 the “self” is as indispensable as you in se toucher toi, an “I” unable to touch itself couldn't se plier à ce qui le déplie absolument, au tout autre qui, comme tout autre, habite mon coeur en étranger > no anthropological limit here > “divine,” “animal,” & life all derivative of se toucher toi

AD p. 58 Levinas: no nominative form of self in Latin, the irreducibility of sacrifice, law of accusative in welcome

p. 61 “ethics beyond the political”: interruption of self (in phenomenology, by phenomenology itself), phenomenology surprises, suspends itself > paradoxical reverting to “ethics beyond the political”

p. 64 many interruptions of self re: Sinai (broken tablets, veiling/unveiling of Moses’ face, etc.) > Sinai still provocation to think passage btwn ethical, messianic, eschatological and the political (today when the foreigner, the displaced, the refugee incur cruelty w/out precedent)

BSi p. 183 pitiless lucidity of cogito, triumph of conscious self-positing self, the thesis of self always reflects itself as bêtise, bêtise always triumphs > Triumph of Life in bêtise

bêtise always on side of victor > bêtise must not find itself bête: that would be suicidal

CIR p. 123 disfiguration w/out respite of Augenblick reminds you that you don’t inhabit your face, you take place in more places than you should

SEMINAR

EM pp. 111-12 possibility of international philosophical colloquium must take place in a medium > universality of philosophical discourse, linked to group of languages & “cultures”

p. 112 absence of philosophical colloquiums [in certain parts of world] not due to overt prohibition from politico-ideological jurisdiction, in which case the issue already meaningful

——Derrida also notes disquieting fever for colloquium [symptom of tout autre?]

p. 113 (133) interest in universality of anthropos a sign of West’s attempt to interiorize, master what’s different from it, leffet de cette différence dun tout autre ordre, where philosophical colloquium has no meaning, this other space neither barren, nor desert-like

ROP p. 40 Derrida frustrated that at colloquia no one ever goes into detail, swept away by voice, do w/out minutiae of letter (the micrological displacements where I incorrigibly persist in hoping things get decided—at a given moment, that’s never given)

DPi p. 27 can only think DP outside real theater (place of worship, witness stand, courtroom, print or televised news)—in classroom

p. 76 seminar: knowledge is thing/mission/ethic of a seminar, not turn into militant activist cell

pp. 251-52 secret: what if I deconstructed the “seminar” by telling you I won’t tell you the truth even if I know it? > blow to deconstructed pieces the idea of the seminar: which is obliged by oath to speak all possible truth

BSi p. 24 a seminar as a fable?

p. 34 a seminar that teaches knowledge must be w/out fable

pp. 34-5 fable, for, fari, to speak, to say, fabula, something said > make so as to know: 1) bring knowledge to the other 2) give impression, effect, of knowledge, of knowing, simulacrum of knowing: a savoir-faire to “faire savoir where there is no knowing worthy of the name

p. 176 nonknowledge of bête > spirit of seminar

p. 277 an autopsy [the seminar too?], the becoming-what of the who?

pp. 308-10 logics of closure/enclosure, the threshold, le seuil interdit, question of responsibility (a question of threshold) throughout a decade of seminars [Derrida’s]

p. 336 certain indispensable schemata appear more clearly when you improvise

EU p. 102 every operation we (students, teachers, research community) pursue together: always institution at play, contract signed, image of ideal seminar constructed, a socius implied

SENSE AND SENSIBILITY

POR p. 4 (130) via Aristotle, sight is privileged sense re: knowledge, knowing for sake of knowing linked to sight as senseless sensation (sight privileged even when no praxis in view)

p. 4 (131) bees, Aristotle says they can’t learn because they can’t hear

AF p. 48 Freud’s 3 errors, the 1st: patriarchy marks triumph of reason/science over senses

OOG p. 149 for Husserl, speech is historical because it is always already a response, responsibility means shouldering a word one hears spoken > look after the advance of sense

p. 150 in going out from self to self of the Absolute of Living Present present, intentionality is the root of historicity, historicity is sense

SPOM p. 52 becoming-god of gold, at once ghost & idol, a god apprehended by senses

HERP p. 212 acc. Heidegger, when conflict stops, when one doesn’t hear the unheard, being is no longer kept, becomes an object, a spectacle, in the quelled visibility of objects facing us

——seeing a decay like that which occurs to hearing, suffers when polemos is quelled, sight degenerates into optics > creators (poets, thinkers, statesmen) are no longer tolerated [Nietzsche]

VM p. 100 for Hegel, hearing as ideal sense, immediate trembling of object, but also an ideal of contemplation, aesthetics [from trembling to idealism]

PPHS pp. 92-3 acc. Hegel, hearing more ideal than sight, double negation, i.e. sound (Ton)> inner vibration (inneren Erzitterns) of body, breath [trembling (of sound) prioritized by Hegel?]

TN pp. ix-x what does privileging one sense exclude, what do the senses exclude? risk losing what the work (loeuvre) claims to opens up (prétend donner accès)?

p. 6 acc. Aristotle, sense (only potential not actual): does not auto-affect itself w/out motion of an exterior object

pp. 26-7 ex-, exscribed, Geworfenheit; conditions “sense of world,” ex-sistence

p. 41 for Kant, touch is only immediate sense, founds other 2 objective senses: sight & hearing > hierarchical privilege of touch; touch occurs in fingers, fingertips [“haptocentric” tradition]

pp. 44-5 transcendental psychoanalytic aesthetic (Kant may be a precursor) > how to have an apriori form of external sense, an already extended sense [?], a touch w/out empirical contact, sensibility touching nothing

——transcendental ideality tied to empirical revision (one can thus understand & avoid Berkeley’s absolute idealism), pure intuition/sensibility maintains something of empiricism: extension (Ausdehnung) and figure (Gestalt), both of which are not sensation (impenetrability, color, hardness) [i.e. not animalistic]

p. 47 acc. Aristotle, touch: co-extensive w/ animal life, the genus of senses

——animals die w/ too much touch: an originary prohibition, reserve of touch holds life on the brink (au bord) of exaggeration, touching a question of life & death

——in the beginning there’s abstinence: et le toucher parjure sans retard, unforgivably

pp. 61-2 don’t have to wait until Hegel’s Pheno… before suffering wounds of sense-certainty

p. 62 waking from anesthesia, sense certainty becomes madness > Rimbaud: senses in disarray

p. 74 Nancy: “la pensée pèse exactement le poids du sens” (Derrida points out transitive/intransitive double meaning of pèse)

p. 332n Levinas, by way of Husserl, proposes the word sentance to describe an immediate iteration “whose sensation is the event itself”

p. 98 for Berkeley, infinite abyss btwn what we see and what we touch

***pp. 106-07 that we only have 5 senses, that each one is distinct: a praxis, way of being social, habit of some pretended ontophenomenological evidence

pp. 120-21 Phaedo, Republic: touch truth, relinquish sense

pp. 122-23 Bergson’s beautiful program: convergence of all the senses (still a hierarchy)

p. 135 touching upon the demande (plea) of touch: “comment toucher, sans y toucher, au sens du toucher?”

p. 140 Descartes’ stick of the blind: 6th sense

p. 142 for Maine de Biran, passive is to active as sensory is to motor

——touch as genus, touch as exceptional: mobile, motor activity as the essence of touch

p. 144 for Merleau-Ponty, “synaesthetic perception” is the rule: “co-existence of sentient & sensible” > a philosophy of immediate coincidence

p. 146 M-P: sensation a form of communion, eating bread [Eucharist]

pp. 146-49 acc. de Biran, touch as transcendental, “faculty of movement,” withdraws from order of sensibility: exemplary sense (comparing other “senses” to touch: more or less sense on both sides of analogy)

p. 147 de Biran: the mobility of the eye is why sight most closely related to touch [i.e. mobility]

p. 148 smell most passive sense: pure sensation

p. 170 for Husserl, “we” (who is this we?) immediately sense difference btwn sight/touch

pp. 170-71 sight is mediated even by a mirror

——for Husserl, where sight requires the technical [to see itself] (in sense of mediation and in sense of “intruder”), touch’s self-relation is immediate, spontaneous, direct, intuitive and acts w/out empathy or analogical appresentation

p. 171 for Husserl, when I touch myself w/ my finger: no haptical mirror-effect, no insinuation of alterity

p. 194 Nancy: no art of touch, touch is sense as threshold

p. 204 no optical intutitionism w/out haptocentrism, where smooth is blind, deaf, impassive > feel & taste, touch a bit of everything

——aristocracy of one sense, or democracy of all: these battles due to tropological displacements, originary prosthetic possibilities; prosthetics never wait, Nancy’s “technē of bodies”

pp. 206-07 Merleau-Ponty: visual experience is truer than tactical experience > yet, since M.-P. often uses “example of hand,” Derrida will follow a few of his lines (ses lignes) [i.e. lines of the hand] whose tracings brouille une statique des frontières that would stabilize “parallelism” or establish privilege

pp. 223-24 mechanical technique (esp. machines) as a simulacrum of “sensible”—does not feel itself feel, does not hierarchize the “5 senses”: opens place for metonymic substitution

p. 272 dissociate “sense” from truth (Husserl’s distinction btwn pure grammar and logical pure grammar [?])

p. 274 touch as self-touchingle toucher plus tout autre sens (dizzy rhetoric), very form of space & time & will (essence of will) (from Descartes to Kant or even to Nietzsche)

——to will is to will to touch, strange tautology, bends/folds oneself back into fold of passive-active auto-affection > this affect, that inflects/conjugates passive activity of will: desire

p. 275 copula in Nancy’s “le sens est le toucher” is suspended, cautiously, and also insistent, also it has a transitive, active movement: touch touching on touch itself: le sens (est), touches touch

p. 276 Nancy: writing is violent exhaustion of the discourse in which “all sense” is altered in exscribed body

——only touch means you’re touched: you’re not seen when you see

p. 285 Nancy: “touch” as limit of sense, and the limit of senses is to be taken in all senses, each of which breaks into (fait effraction) the other

——Nancy knows better than to capitalize “the” sense of touch w/ any semantic capital > none of the senses are assured, even if it can be quoted in the stock market

E p. 19 for Kant, touch, sight, and hearing relate us to objects, to the outside, whereas smell and taste do not

——hearing is privileged over sight due to its auto-affective freedom and spontaneity, but sight is the best sense for beauty because has the greatest remove from touch

p. 20 for Kant, sight is most noble sense, but hearing is least replaceable, most allergic to prosthesis, tolerates substitution badly, almost succeeds in resisting vicariousness: this is why the mute will never know concepts, they cannot access the universal signs

p. 21 the sublime sacrifices (Aufopferung) and spoliates our senses but in doing so attains a power greater than what was sacrificed

p. 23 Kant divides the senses into chemical–pleasure (sense, taste) and mechanical–perception (touch, sight, hearing)

OG p. 17 Rousseau’s sensible cogito as another model of presence (self-presence), carries in itself inscription of divine law

p. 118 for Rousseau, the sensible cogito, interior voice, never lies

p. 206 (294) for Rousseau, aesthetics passes through sign (semiology) not sensation, art is moral & ethnological [nonresponse to Western music can’t mean West Indians have different nerves!]

p. 232 (330-31) Rousseau’s 2 ways (moyens) pour agir sur les sens de lautre (to act on the senses of others): le mouvement et la voix

——movement is immediate by touch or mediated by gesture

pp. 235-36 (335) via Rousseau, one can more naturally shut one’s eyes (child at breast [?]) than close one’s ears > the demanding attention of speech

p. 351n Rousseau & Descartes [Aristotle too]: our senses never deceive us, only our judgments

EU pp. 60-1 for Kant, math as “construction” of concepts, recourse to pure sensibility (pure receptivity of the given) > math only rational science that can be learned [i.e. philosophy is rational but can’t be learned]

p. 178 for Kant, thinking of supersensible can never become popular, reason as such places popular on side of sensible, not accessible to the people as such, who require the results [still not empirical?] of the metaphysics of pure rights > the people are “unwitting metaphysicians,” those w/ “healthy reason” can learn to know by way of conclusions w/out the principle

SH p. 43 ellipsis, discontinuity, caesura, discretion cannot be sublated (aufgehoben) > no dialectic of sense-certainty can reassure the matter of archive’s safekeeping

SENSUOUS NON-SENSUOUS (See Margins p. 45)

SPOM p. 6 visor effect linked to everything we will say about specter in general > such is the difference btwn le spectre ou le revenant de lesprit, fut-ce de lesprit au sense de fantôme en general > supernatural, paradoxical phenomenology, ungraspable visibility of the invisible, the non-sensuous sensuous of Capital, intangibility of a proper body w/out flesh

pp. 183-84 via Feuerbach, Marx refers to 2 theologies: 1) ordinary: believes in ghosts of sensuous imagination 2) speculative: believes in ghosts of non-sensuous abstraction

——theology is “belief in ghosts,” belief in general as alliance of 2 theologies

p. 189 transcendence, super-, step beyond (über, epekeina) is made sensuous in its exceeding (excess) the sensuous body, non-sensuous becomes sensuous, one feels what is not felt, suffers where suffering does not take place, phantom limbs (the X marking any phenomenology of perception) [see Descartes’ Meditations on phantom limbs]

——commodity haunts the thing, its specter travaille la valeur dusage (at work in use-value), cette hantise se déplace comme la silhouette anonyme ou la figure dun figurante qui pourrait être le personnage capital

——it turns, it changes place, il y a là un pas, its allure belongs to specter/mutant

***p. 191-92 capital contradiction, at origin of capital: induces the “pragmatic” double constraint of all injunctions [see POO p. 143n difference btwn “use” & “mention”]

——table dances spontaneously, autonomously, but it moves others too

——not just contradiction of sensuous non-sensuous in same Thing, but contradiction of automatic autonomy (spontaneity) > on stage of market, table (commodity) is a prosthesis of itself

p. 194 sensuous non-sensuous is Hegel’s time, the possibility of any fetishization and idealization

OS pp. 44 Hegel credits Kant w/ discovering “non-sensuous sensuous” concept of time, “intuited becoming” in itself, w/out empirical sensory content [Copernican revolution]

pp. 48-9 [Kant & Aristotle treat time as pure form of sensibility (nonsensuous sensuous), because time does not belong to beings]

TN p. 16 can one figure an untouchable extension? difficult except for intelligible extension w/out body (Descartes, Kant) or insensible sensible (Hegel, Marx)

SERICULTURE

SW p. 317 sericulture, culture of silk: the incomparable patience it demands from sericultivator

pp. 334-35 for Freud, women discovered one technique, weaving (veiling), but really they just copied nature (pubic hair) > unveiled the means of veiling

——if tekhnē never broke radically w/ physis—why reserve this animal naturality to woman? > woman weaves like a body secreting its own textile, like a worm, a worm w/out worm, a worm concerned to hide her non-being

p. 327 tallith as intimate secretion, opened, given birth by divine word preceding it, & also separate, dissociated, dissolves bond, holds to secret

pp. 353-54 silkworm’s sex impossible to discern, the spitting outside oneself, secretion, of what will never leave it: female ejaculate, milk become thread, fantasy of penis (neither veil, nor web)

——“fainting to the bottom of oneself” > “burying oneself gloriously in the shadow at the bottom of the other” > “its work and its being toward death”

——Celan: “Aschenglorie (…) grub ich mich in dich und in dich > [I in you—love itself] love made itself make love next to watching dreaming child [too old, forbidden to be old, still young]

——absolute knowledge not man’s thing but that of sericulture [?] > silkworm comes back to itself in its odyssey, wraps itself in its own shroud, kind of absolute knowledge: beyond any coupling, any sexual difference or rather duality of the sexes > [Derrida’s bestiary starting up]

——philosophy of nature, for the child I still am, was naivety itself, but also time of infinite apprenticeship, culture made up acc. fiction, the autobiography of lure (Dichtung und Wahrheit), beginning to write a novel of sericulture

***pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

——all the v’s: ver, vert, vers, verre, vérité

SERIES

R p. 77 [Nietzsche-like?] [Derrida by way of Aristotle by way of Plato] the “just more than one,” a god among men, not a part of a whole or calculable series; law, calculability, would betray justice for those who are the law > fable of sovereignty returns

KH p. 91 double exclusion (neither this nor that), participation (both this & that), can we transport this logic, para-logic from one set to another

——displacement from type of existent thing to type of discourse via metonymy (sensible/intelligible > mythos/logos)

FL p. 297 serialization of unique: objectification

LOBL p. 130 [3 options re: relation btwn Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort and the Gospels] 1) Gospel as paradigm 2) récit as paradigm (of Gospel) 3) seriality w/out paradigm [cf. GLAS]

p. 162 “come”: single word, yet intertwined in series, inscribes its own effacement in middle of and on invaginated boundaries of récit, of these crypts, death or bridal chambers, hymen brings alliance & separation [after theft of key]

MPM p. 38 Gedächtnis calls itself beyond interiorizing memory (Erinnerung), beyond inclusion of part in whole, thinks itself as a “part” which is greater than “whole” > trace beyond mournful memory

pp. 38-9 all figures receive possibility from these paradoxical structures: 1) inclusion in set of a part greater than set 2) that which regulates our relation w/ other as other [not mourning in current sense], that the other is capable of dying (which is our “own” mortality too) conditions rhetoric of faithful memory, serves to seal an alliance & call us to an affirmation of the other

A pp. 45-6 no escaping ontologico-juridico-transcendental tradition [method], except w/ death, aporia, unique exclusion from system, “life death” no longer falls under case of what it makes possible

p. 60 pass from hostage to host/guest from host/guest to ghost in series: hostage, host, guest, ghost, holy ghost, Geist

VM p. 113 structure [inside-outside] has no meaning w/out included origin, inscribed eastern horizon which is neither w/in nor w/out space

PP p. 104 (118) excess, displacement of series, nest pas une simple sortie hors de la série (ce geste tombe sous une catégorie de la série), a folding back (repli), a re-mark, cannot name it with a single concept w/out being off the mark (sans le manquer): it is a real and necessary challenge that writes itself, and we must begin by reading it

FWT p. 142 DP either internal to criminal law, one punishment among others, or external, non-serial exemplarity, hyperbolic, foundation, condition, more/other than a penalty

DS pp. 253-54 supplementary “blank,” in marking itself, intervenes btwn all series, prevents semantic seriality from closing itself, cest encore lui qui libère des effets de série > makes us take agglomerates for substances

ROP p. 23 principle of series transcends meaning of the elements in the series which are given meaning by such a principle [in this case, Freud’s 5 resistances lose meaning in face of the hyperbolic resistance: repetition compulsion, Derrida’s use of formal logic]

p. 79 quasi-transcendental (formal) law of seriality (when condition is part of the series) creates aporias not to be avoided—the very chance to think [hors-série]

OTO pp. 29-30 how can reactive degeneration [Nazism] exploit same utterances, rallying cries, of active forces [Übermensch]—nor did this specular ruse elude Nietzsche: is there a “programming machine”? marrying the 2 forces (family resemblances) in a set, as life (does) death? but no regional power could set limit on such a set > no ordinary “machine,” there’s “life” in it > plays w/ opposition life/death > is there a practical rewriting of the program, which would no longer be part of it? if so, would not be produced in books

ATIA p. 132 divinanimality, quasi-transcendental referent, sacrificed/disavowed foundation of what it founds: justice, symbolic, human order [brings Levinas & Lacan close] > difficulty of uttering discourse of transcendence/mastery e: animal in the name of God/Law

GSP pp. 321-22n Husserl: foundation of math found in mathematical, logic in logical, ethics in ethical

p. 165 genetic description of ego prescribes task of a universal genetic phenomenology (a eidos of historicity) for Husserl, this is not a series of ruptures, revolutions, that tear open a previous finitude to lay bear a hidden infinity, giving voice to dynamis of silence > the ruptures are always already indicated [Telos] [Derrida wonders if this a metaphysical affirmation in a phenemonology]

O p. 54 if one is captive to formulas and absolute knowledge, can’t think anything outside the whole, not even its mimetic double

——if we can question and think about formula of absolute knowledge, the “part” then is bigger than the whole, strange subtraction of a remark, dissemination would then constitute the whole as a totality-effect

p. 56 literature is the exception in the whole and the exception to everything (lexception de tout) (subtraction w/out lack), part (pièce) which exists by itself [solitude], marks le tout autre

DST DST p. 323n play of de- might belong to hyperbologic, belongs to and escapes its own series: “gift of mimesis,” “gift of impropriety,” not negative (dialecticizable)

——organizes/disorganizes what it appears to determine

TR p. 124 series of deconstructions: deconstruction of deconstruction of figures

IW p. 247 Jew and German: “lack of transition,” a ruptivity, “and,” a continuity outside dialectical synthesis > disjunctive conjunction, aphoristic seriality

PJP p. 181 acolyte, anacolytic, anakolouthia, analytic figure: as much an analyst as a breach, interruption> a rupture in a set (contract), be it that of friendship, community, being-together

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, cette fois enfin, “cette fois enfin” not an accomplishment w/ single blow of the pen or the die (décriture ou de dés): nothing could be more foreign to eschatology (of or by way of literature) than Soller’s finite-infinite seriation (enchaînement) of numbers

p. 316 lélément enveloppe et se décompte (deducts itself) de ce quil enveloppe

p. 323 through mirror-effect (germinates/deforms), each sequence of text comprehends another > each part smaller than themselves & greater than the whole they reflect

HST pp. 408-09 substitution, cloning, series; where does human begin? abortion: subject hôte-hostage, clone w/out father?

pp. 419-20 simple, homogenous, calculation of cloning—but every unit is irreplaceable in its factual existence (Kant)—so to be ethical, must be conscious, must be auto-affected by this uniqueness? > for Derrida, displaced certainty btwn opposition arithmetic/ethical substitution

PPT p. 13 [re: uses of passe-partout] there could always be one use that could be taken out of the series and surround the rest, play among the others, one more turn

C p. 186 family resemblance removes none [of the 127 coffins] from itself, from the absolute secret, from definitive detachment that isolates/ab-solves outside series

——not one (pas un seul) must be forgotten if one wants to see or touch something of the group (genealogy or even reproduction feigned)

——theory of coffins, series w/out model, w/out example (procession in double band fascinates, can’t see there’s no example) > obsequence of this cortege in singular lineage

p. 188 w/out example because series will have posed singular problem of initiality

p. 198 Titus-Carmel cadaverizes paradigm, hounds effigy of paradigm, feigning the feigning of it in a series of simulated reproductions, he reduces it, transforms it into tiny piece of waste

p. 201 analogy, like the putting into series of series: must remain accidental

——analogy belongs to order of contingent > appeals neither to model nor example (i.e. both Sade & Titus-Carmel ration the remainder, stage a work & jouissance re: remainder [excrement]) [Derrida is “randomly” comparing Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins to Sade’s 120 days]

p. 202 one cannot get to it in one go (dun coup): multiplication shows that that which touches on the series is outside the series in the series > the remainder remains cut off, a mors, a turd, really beautiful

p. 203 a turd one would like to make one’s own (sapproprier)—until the end > until is interminable

p. 208 coffin, as the odd, as the remainder, remains entire, divisible only by itself [prime: 127], as long as you deduct one—the paradigm coffin: belongs w/out belonging to series it makes possible > inscribes itself in series, leaves on it mark of its own subtraction

——transcendental mors, fors, exceptional piece; (fait) band à part (has a hard-on, keeps aloof)

p. 210 the out-of-the-series [2 discarded coffins] has the same function as the out-of-the-series in the series [?]

p. 211 le Mhors-serie (I’m-out-of-series), Fors-series, the excluded necessary that marks the border of the Necessary itself: the necessary, the excepted, the contingent, sauf, fors

p. 215 retrace one’s steps, narrative (récit), series, funeral procession/palindrome, revenir: le revenu de lusure, le revenant, lhôte, ghost, guest [both in English] > le coffin comme hôtel de passe (whore-hotel)

pp. 218-19 paradox of paradigm: deposed from its privilege moment it’s built, inscribed in a series, an out-of-series cartouche > remains heterogenous by virtue of its relief

——simili-reproduction (in fine)

p. 220 out-of-series: inhabits w/out residing, haunts, apparition of visitor is innumerable (throws arithmosophists off the trail)

p. 229 series: boxing, unboxing (déboitement)

p. 236 principle of order is never untouchable [re: contingent dates of a series]

p. 240 hiatus of series scores out (rature), in serial interlacing, reference to the other (I have called this seriature [cf. ATM]), to the other’s other > simulacrum of reference, supplementary folds

p. 243 series as emblem of a seriature, serial interlace, supplementarity of interlacing allowing no respite to the typos > supplement transforms and detaches

pp. 246-47 class is not lacking, it’s at work (series, lineage, rank, hierarchy, etc.) > but what doesn’t come under (nen relève plus) class is perhaps fate (le sort) > no classification table for fate

LI p. 39 set of texts, ensemble, in Limited Inc debate, are a prise de partie, partial, always lacking the completeness of a set

p. 71 argument of principle concerns a structural limit, argument is of the same kind as the set-argument [re: speech act theory’s own differentiation of itself from other theories, & thus its reliance on the metaphorical: ruined analogical value btwn speech act theory and other theories]

p. 155n [nonsynonomous synonyms]: certain functional analogy, yet remain singular/irreducible to one another, as do the textual chains from which they’re inseparable: each marked w/ iterablility that seems to belong to their series

pp. 127-28 margin, parasite, iterability belong w/out belonging to the class of concepts of which they must render an accounting—to theoretical space they organize in a “quasi”-transcendental manner: something happens by or to set theory > all this must be rendered (rendre compte et raison) by us enlightened modern thinkers, right?

TN p. 289 [re: Nancy’s list of touchable bodies] finite series, symphonic “yes” of pleasure

NOY p. 236 yes belongs w/out belonging to whole it institutes and opens; it exceeds and punctures (troue) the language in which it remains immanent: first inhabitant of language, first to step out of its home (sortir de chez lui)

ATM pp. 143-45, 150 “he will have obligated (il aura obligé),” a phrase knotted up (se noue) in a certain way of tying (lier), a serial structure of a singular type > edges of the sentence in fog, belong to the night

p. 157 Levinas’ “en ce moment même” [of reappropriation] obligated by the second “en ce moment même” [of interruption] > forms a text w/ its own tear (déchirure), this “series” does not enclose the Other but opens itself up from out of irreducible difference—before any present moment

p. 160 there must be a series of Levinas’ même moment if writing of dislocation of the Same toward the Relation [to the Other] is to have a chance, a hold (prise)

pp. 164-65 if the State leaves a trace of interruptions too, how does Levinas’ tracing of them differ? it ties together interruptions btwn threads [i.e. doesn’t tie threads], a series out of series (hors-série) > series: hiatus must insist

——Levinas obligates w/out constraint, by way of nonphenomenality, to read the trace as trace, interruption as interruption (i.e. acc. as such no longer reappropriable as phenomenon of essence)

—— p. 165 since interruption is not a cut but logic of ab-solute de-stricturation, since it is reappropriable: to insist on the hiatus, the series is necessary > series has no single knot, but knots a multiplicity of retied knots (noeuds re-noués)

——opening of interruption is never pure

p. 165 series (file, sequence, lineage…), seira (chord, chain, lasso…), sero (interlace, braid…), eirō ties interlacing of lace, the symplokē of discourse & the link

pp. 167-68 interruptions unbound “together,” in the “same” sériature, in dia-synchrony, a serial one time of “several times” that took place only once: the ob-ligation, ligature of religion opens

p. 172 [Levinas’ work] a fabrication of quotation marks crocheting a text w/out edge: seriality irreducibly knots a text to a language

pp. 174-75 for Levinas, to make passage to other, there can’t be an absolute erasure, withdrawal must appear, “He,” only there in seriasure, a series of hiatuses (mouth agape), enlaced erasures

pp. 175-76 the future anteriority of Levinas’ seriasure [each interruption will be knotted w/ another] is an eschatology w/out [beyond/otherwise than] philosophical teleology, appealing to a past anterior to any past; this future anteriority is irreducible to ontology or Hegelian teleology [in spite of irreducible resemblance]

AD p. 131n Levinas: death as ex-ception, to seize and put outside the series

pp. 76, 80 Levinas’ “beyond-in (au-delà-dans)” of State of David [?], a sort of enclave inside and outside of itself (see p. 99 border btwn ethical & political has no indivisible simplicity), participates in politics while going beyond it > [deconstructive invagination]

——transcendence in immanence, the door as the bearing (porte que porte)

p. 85 beyond-in: non-dialectical enclosure of its [paix] own transcendence

LG p. 227 law of law of genre: principle of contamination, parasitical economy, participation w/out belonging

pp. 227-28 trait that marks membership (lappartenance) divides > boundary (bordure) of set comes to form by invagination—an internal pocket larger than the whole

——consequences of this division & overflowing (débordement) as singular as they are limitless (quillimitables)

p. 230 trait (supplementary & distinctive), re-mark of belonging doesn’t belong, this sans > a blink of the eye, w/out which nothing would come to light

pp. 230-31 genre [i.e. “novel”], singular topos, gathers together the corpus and keeps it from identifying w/ itself > designation [“novel”] does not take part in the corpus

——genre-clause (clause de genre): clin doeil, écluse (floodgate), clôture qui sexclut de ce quelle inclut, déclasse ce quelle permet de classer > unfigurable figure of clusion, forme sans forme, neither sees day nor brings itself to light

BSi p. 151 transcategorial—“qui transcendit omne genus”: does not belong to series or table > is bêtise a transcategorial category, a quasi-transcendental?

OG p. 60 (88) arche-writing at work in graphic and nongraphic expression, pattern uniting form & substance, all content & expression > opens temporalization, relationship w/ other & language

——arche-writing cannot be an object in a linguistic system or the “immanent” system itself [glossematics] > but, doesn’t have a real field elsewhere

pp. 250-51 (355) acc. Rousseau, God distributes dédommagements man receives—il est la dispense du supplément (God is the exemption from, dispensation of, the supplement) (presence: utopia)

ATAP p. 68 eschatology tells the eskhaton, end, extreme, limit, last of history, of genealogy, of a countable series

p. 90 distinguishing deconstruction from simple progressive demystification [à la style of Lumières]? or why has deconstruction taken on an apocalyptic tone, multiplied distinctions btwn closure & end? I intended to analyze a genre rather than practice it, an ironic non-belonging

EU p. 106 Kant’s strict separation of knowledge (truth) & power (action) distinguishes sets in excess of themselves, covering the whole of which they’re supposed to be only a part > whole forms poche invaginée in every part or subset (sous-ensemble): intestine division, folding partition inside space

SPEC p. 310 [Ernst’s fort/da] collective unity [of toys] is apparatus of game that can dislocate itself > word for things in this theory of set is Zeug, which is also penis: supplementary complex that can reassemble parents

p. 402 “set (ensemble)” of stricture, a unity that’s not subject/consciousness, begins by binding itself (se-lier) in differential relation w/ itself—it destines itself (se destine), which doesn’t mean: il arrive

SE TOUCHER TOI (KISSING EYES)

TN pp. 1-2 a question about the day came of me, to me, w/out invitation, before the day, “she” watches over day, pre-phenomenological, trans-phenomenological: “quand nos yeux se touchent, fait-il jour ou fait-il nuit?”

——Derrida determined to show limitless patience ready for infinite, time of experience itself

p. 23 very little use of “you” and apostrophe in philosophy

p. 34 se toucher toi, “Je se touche”; “tu” [in philosophical discourse] signs general/plural singularity of possible addressee, also signs possibility/need for “I” to address itself as an other > oneself: first & last other

p. 279 for Chrétian, Christ is one, common body, not a plurality of bodies > Chrétian & Nancy deal w/ a different “yes,” or a different provenance of same “yes,” addressed to “you”

p. 280 se toucher toi—unforgettable event, sans example, deprives us of all “for example,” an event from which one should re-partir, to prepare for another departure (autre départ)

p. 281 reflexivity of se toucher toi of 2 borders (bords) does not submit to logic of mirror, speculum

——eyes touch btwn 2 orients: invisible eye (touchable), seeing eye (untouchable)

pp. 281-82 dissymmetry of se toucher toi makes “you” the touchable (untouchable) pole of an apostrophizing address

p. 283 the heart of this other heart cannot be touched, does not touch itself, it self touches you; it is the heart insofar as mappartient à toi

for there to be a good heart: possibility of bad heart must remain forever open, i.e. tout autre > good heart must be ready for the other, for treachery, for perjury (inevitable-impossible vow of abstinence, tactile’s fate); is this how we can translate Kant’s “evil heart”?

p. 284 this other heart that self touches you, gives pleasure where pleasure’s made more intense by not returning to me, diastole w/out systole > the ecstatic & haptical sans of “sans revenir à soi

——you beat the heart, you interrupt circulation

p. 289 diastole w/out systole, interruption risks death at every moment, other heart se touche toi only to be exposed to death: toi es (t) aussi ma mort [at heart of a finite thinking]

p. 290 you, metronome of my heteronomy, you resist my dreams of a reappropriating movement of self-presence, self-consciousness, absolute knowledge, which is why I love you, so painfully, at heart of pleasure itself

——you break me from dialectic (which does not exclude it)

p. 291 the “self” is as indispensable as you in se toucher toi, an “I” unable to touch itself couldn't se plier à ce qui le déplie absolument, au tout autre qui, comme tout autre, habite mon coeur en étranger > no anthropological limit here > “divine,” “animal,” & life all derivative of se toucher toi

——w/out lépreuve of impossibility of auto-affection—no love

p. 292 auto-hetero-affection inaugurates all experience: speech, declaration of love

p. 293 to touch as tact, thanks to you, because of you, is to break (rompre) w/ immediacy wrongly associated w/ touch (in ontology, self-presence, transcendental idealism, body proper, etc.)

pp. 306-07 eyes meet, infinitely, mouths in contact [unsatisfied w/ insipid figures, however interesting/necessary], thought begins, jusquà labîme, plunging Narcissus into abyss: makes day or night possible > day and night themselves promising each other, au point du jour

SEXUAL DIFFERENCE

GOD pp. 45-46 in Levinas, Patoçka, and Heidegger, sexual difference no longer counts in face of death, sexual difference would be a being-up-until-death (un être-jusqu’à-la-mort)

p. 76 does system of sacrificial responsibility & double “gift of death” require exclusion (sacrifice) of woman? [re: absence of women in Isaac & Abraham story and “Bartleby the Scrivener”]

pp.132-33 the phrase [“pardon for not meaning (to say)…”] is “up in the air”: an appearance that comes from who knows where, contingency (touch, tact, contact), & pertinent (touching, tact, contact) > dwells suspended in air, even when it touches, meteoric [both sexes], suspended like Abraham’s knife over Isaac’s head [re: scene of literature, secrecy, forgiveness]

R pp. 20-21 roué qualifies one who turns a trick, the voyou (rogue) w/ his leading astray (dévoiement), debauchery, worklessness, always a seduction, licentious, libertine [always men, sexual difference]

——democracy always associated w/ this figure, w/ taking too many libertine, liberalism, “everything is allowed,” announces a beheading of monarchical sovereignty

p. 63 antinomy: democracy has wanted only men and also aspires to offer hospitality to excluded

FK pp. 83-4 phallus, the marionette, virtuality of virtuality, distinct from penis: parade fetish, the healthy, the automatic sur-viving, faith in most living as dead

——matrix of unlimited, general fetishization of Thing itself > read the unscathed as spontaneity of erection or pregnancy [phallus must swell in vitality]

p. 84n [via Benveniste, via etymology, Derrida links power, vitality to swelling, to womb]

BL p. 210 unanswered question re: sexual difference, question he said he must answer

A p. 27 for Heidegger, death cannot be enclosed w/in sexual borders (which crisscross cultural, linguistic, national, religious borders)

SPOM p. 171 for Marx, spectrality of everything, that of fathers, sons, brothers [?]

pp. 190-91 this indeterminate Thing [re: Marx’s table] is a Father-Mother, gives birth through its head, whole lineage of fantastic creatures

HERP p. 165 friend has no face, no figure, no sex, at a distance neither absolutely infinite, nor absolute proximity (null) of an ownness (propriété) [see p. 70]

p. 205 Heidegger thinks father as “Erzeuger,” one that produces, makes bloom, thinks king as “waltender Bewahrer,” guardian that governs, rules across, reigns over presence

MPM p. xxiv Mémoires: changes from singular to plural, ungenders

p. 104 the 2 masculine values (singular or plural) of mémoire always suppose spatial inscription whereas la mémoire, even pluralized, does not

POOF pp. 56-7 what chance does a feminine friend have on a stage where truth must always be veiled, prudent, where even the perhaps’ indecency might still ask truth, woman, to remain in veils

——Nietzsche’s veiled truth of decency > do veil & decency signify absence of courage?

PAS PAS p. (29) the place of him who calls out venez is also hers

p. (38) female voice asks: why her? why is this movement entrusted to the figure of she? Derrida responds by saying, we need to learn infinite patience, be immobilized endlessly in each passage

p. (56) why is it always the image of a woman? [Derrida ignores question?]

pp. (58-9) neither word nor syllable eau, o, could signify affection by which what departs from come relates to itself from the other: there was no water

——waters (parages), where every machine is stopped

p. (66) she is the pronoun of a nameless one [see p. (70) here, figure is a he]

p. (73) [doesn’t the man drown her? relying on his identity to be able to say viens? answer: I does not exist before viens] cette contrepartie, cette contre-allée

p. (74) elles are not women

***p. (75) neutralization of sexual difference by calling her elle (anonymous, improper name), the de-distancing of viens instructs le pas de différence sexuelle; she is on the other side of the faux pas of the il that does not accompany me: neuter of affirmation, alliance, yes, yes, annulus of récit

p. (76) she/it (elle) is not thought or word (parole), nor what what we dissimulate under these words as their terrifying evidence: their very dissimulation

——isn’t the thought of la paralyse a thought of the obscene Medusa? good for laughter too

p. (82) elles, neither subjects nor things, a visibility that can’t see itself

S pp. 104-06 from masculine spirit (that chases and hunts) to feminine soul (that guards and nourishes), the trait, re-trait (Riss from fire-writing), engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, soul bears the sadness

OH pp. 13-4 “cap” (caput, capitis), the head, extremity of the extreme, last legs, final moment (eschaton > telos); captain (not a woman); eschatology and teleology—that is man

FSW p. 214 is sexual deferral best example or essence of [trace’s] movement? false question > sexuality limited, unlimited, only through inversion, through the answer itself

FWT p. 81 interest in Hamlet, privilege given to father/son, masculine installation of sexual difference > privilege of power, power of privilege, privilege of law as authority of father

***pp. 120-21 logic of exemplarity leads to an abyss (figurality undermines the entire question) [re: those w/ self-hatred resembling Jews]

p. 193 circumcision: someone marked my destiny before I had a word to say > (true for women too, something preceded your Catholicism, Derrida tells E.R.)

DS p. 237 Mallarmé’s i: a slash that never cuts its wing, penna (feather pen), needles and scratches; hymen fastens down, tears, crinkles and folds the Crise de vers [m/f]

***p. 242 hymen as the double show, as the difference between the sexes, play of penna (bird, wing, feather, quill, beak, etc.), and process of metaphorical reproduction constantly being relaunched by gap, setting-aside, of being

——Mallarmé: dancer is not a woman, but a metaphor, “veil of generality” “belonging to no woman in particular”

p. 243 Mallarmé on example of the dancer: “through a kind of commerce whose secret her smile seems to pour forth, w/out delay she imparts to you, through the last veil that remains forever, the nudity of your own concepts, and silently proceeds to write your vision in the manner of a Sign, which she is”

——Mallarmé on “double game,” “perhaps the whole adventure of sexual difference!”: from birds to children, forever after, he and she

——re: “double game,” each pair referred to another pair, each proposing itself as an example w/ respect to the others

——following Mallarmé, though this [sexual?] difference opens up play of all writing, must still distinguish genres, trace effects of each genre, whose structure is original in each case

p. 244 distinct trait of each genre finds itself commanding the work, employs discrepancy in its very structure [will to power], what remains is to find genres communicating

p. 251 movement of fan, Mallarmé’s éventail, opens/closes (wings, pages, veils, sails, folds, plumes, scepters) [m/f]

p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

p. 266 hymen will have always disseminated: sperm

p. 267 a bo/lit [TN. abolishing: reading, sleeping]: la dissémination y écume assez le vol dune semence, perte blanche et vaine où le mât, pour qui le lit, sabîme en perdition de voile et denfant

p. 269 dissemination, fold of hymen, somber white of cave or womb, au noir sur blanc du ventre, lieu de son émission éparse et de ses hasards sans retours [scattered emissions, chances, w/out return]

pp. 273, 276n elle, aile, L: m/f; voile, milky way [sperm, milk] (voie lactée), m/f [see P p. 146] [see ATIA p. 36 feminine ejaculation as fantasy of penis, milk become thread, filament]

POS pp. 67, 106n in critique of interiority/subjectivity must be careful not to “objectify” reassuring outside, or to make heterogeneity of “matter” a new transcendental, whether it be that of the Law, or the (appeasing/cruel) Element of the mother (Freud on mother/matter relation)

——matter as differential substitution would have relationship w/ mother as much as it would w/ writing, remainder, death, phallus, excrement, semen, infant (everything not subject to rèleve)

P p. 146 glas et galactique du colossos, the bridge [tree?] over the abyss which threatens to swallow everything, interval btwn dynamic/mathematical sublime, on edge of which analytic of sublime is broached (sentame): whirlpool heaves/tears tree into la dissemence laiteuse (the question is the cipher writing on the surface of nature)

SP pp. 37-9 question of style, des voiles, laissons lélytre flotter entre masculin et féminin > our tongue [the French one] assures la jouissance [re: double gender of des voiles]

***p. 39 the sharp point, the prow of the boat, can protect (against that which always thrusts into view)

p. 53 “the exchange of stylistic blows (coup) or the thrust (coup) of a dagger confuses sexual identity”

***p. 63 because of castration’s undecidable contours, its topographical problems, and because only man decides his discourse on her/truth concerns her > la femme slips away (sesquivait)

pp. 63-5 for Nietzsche, since man alone believes in woman-truth, women feminists are men too, lay claim to truth > perd le style (gone the style)

p. 83 pratique stylet, pratique stylée, de quel genre? can’t be written w/out conjoined fabulation of woman/truth, entre la femme, in spite of the profundity that is modesty

p. 93 castratism of the Church, excision (Ausschneidung), hostile to life (lebensfeindlich): so, if woman is life (femina vita), Christianity hostile to woman > la castration est une opération de la femme contre la femme, non moins que de chaque sexe contre soi et contre lautre

pp. 149-51n “moment sexual difference is determined as an opposition, the image of each term is inverted into the other” > the 2 X’s à la fois subject/predicate, their copula a mirror: man wants ideal man in woman, woman ideal woman in man > homosexual effacement à linfini

pp. 95-7, p. 101 Nietzsche’s 3 “positions” on woman:

1. woman is figure of falsehood, man as phallus is truth ; man fears castrated woman

2. woman is the figure of truth, plays w/ truth as a fetish ; man fears castrating woman

3. woman as artist, Dionysiac, dissimulatrice, castration doesn’t take place; love affirming woman

pp. 103-05 no truth in itself of sexual difference in itself, homme/femme en soi > but, ontology w/ its verification of identity, w/ its arraisonnement, shelters (recèle) undecidability of sexual difference

pp. 109-11 Nietzsche’s analysis of sexual difference, “eternal war btwn sexes,” based on propriation, where woman takes shape acc. formalized law > woman is woman because she gives herself to a man who takes possession, or la femme en se donnant se donne-pour, simule et sassure ainsi la mâtrise possessive: if opposition give/take, possess/possessed, is a “transcendental snare” produced by hymen’s graphics, process of propriation would escape dialectics and ontological decidability

——can no long ask “what is property?” > because propriation, a sexual operation, before which we didn’t know sexuality [?], is undecidable, more powerful than ti esti, than veil of truth, meaning of being, it organized all ontological statements > lhistoire (de la) vérité (est) un procès de propriation

p. 121 no essence of es gibt, no essence of woman or sexual difference > can’t apprehend/oppose to gift of Being a determined gift (whether body, subject, sex—la femme naura donc pas été mon sujet)

p. 139 never has been the style, the woman, the simulacrum, the sexual difference [un gai savoir]

OTO pp. 16-7 Nietzsche’s living mother/dead father, identity as double & neutral; “I know both, I am both” [“both” must be read as singular] > la vie la mort: the dead man the living feminine

ATIA pp. 34-6 Derrida’s animals swarm, multiply, mobilize, the more he writes autobiographically, they also are welcomed “on the threshold of sexual difference” [cf. “Fourmis,” SW] > veils of modesty and truth: ambiguity of sexual experience at birth

p. 50 untenable pledge, to answer in my name, as “I,” engaged in nudity w/out shame, naked truth of his or her sexual difference, of all their sexual differences

p. 57 like everybody else [Rousseau, for sure], Freud said women are naturally more modest than men > but, modest/shame is so self-contradictory (aporetic): the most modest are the least

p. 58 takes Derrida awhile to say “I am a man,” though he does say it, he also says: I am a man who is also a woman [m/f]

***p. 60 it is exactly where there is sexual difference, that a hunting game of erotic modesty occurs, thus the order of law not limited to human, because inseparable from truth (inseparable from veil of modesty)

p. 107 Levinas’ nudity doesn’t concern itself w/ sexual difference, w/ animal

O p. 50n seminal differance: not only the seed, but the egg

SW pp. 335-36 if tekhnē never broke radically w/ physis—why reserve this animal naturality to woman? > woman weaves like a body secreting its own textile, like a worm, a worm w/out worm, a worm concerned to hide her non-being

——what if the fantasy (the arm) and truth (the unveiled) are on same side, same rib (du côté de la même côte) (man woman) [deconstruction of sexual difference] > extricate before opposing absence to presence [Freud’s penis envy]: of the Thing (Phallus, Penis, Cause) behind Veil

p. 345 St. Paul: Man is the glory of God / Woman is the glory of man

p. 346 “this very mild, this terrible Paul” > whose monstrous progeniture are our history/culture, he points to nature & tells us to judge for ourselves [re: woman wearing veils]

p. 353 silkworm’s sex impossible to discern, the spitting outside oneself, secretion, of what will never leave it: female ejaculate, milk, sperm, fantasy of penis (neither veil, nor web)

——milk become thread, this filament

pp. 353-54 absolute knowledge not man’s thing but that of sericulture [?] > silkworm comes back to itself in its odyssey, wraps itself in its own shroud, kind of absolute knowledge: beyond any coupling, any sexual difference or rather duality of the sexes > [Derrida’s bestiary starting up]

TB pp. 125-26 for Benjamin, best translation resembles a royal cape, clothes remain separate from body while also wedding it—not wedded to it

——folds of this cape, gown, protect king, it is like his scepter, visibility of law, but what counts (has power) is what’s under the cape (body of king) > don’t assume there’s a phallus underneath

——hermaphrodite: royal cape as wedding gown, king inseparable from royal couple, wedding King & Queen, around which translation quilts, sews, hems, embroiders, busies its tongue

DPi p. 227 re: “filiations,” it is very often difficult to separate familial dramaturgy, also that of sexual differences (man/woman, father/son, mother/son, brother/brother) in question of DP

REST p. 261 Van Gogh’s shoes either belong to female [Heidegger, peasant woman] or male [Shapiro, Van Gogh]

pp. 267-68 for Freud, the shoe always a “form” of prosthesis, but always as a penis (woman’s penis too)? but Ferenczi recognizes in it the vagina

——Derrida’s reading of Freud’s shoe fetish: shoe replaces that which is lacking not because of its form but because of its directional situation > syntax of a movement upwards

——Freud does not designate the fetish as a detachable whole: a relatively detachable part of an always divisible ensemble

——for Freud, certain symbols cannot be masculine & feminine at same time, but bisexual symbolization remains archaic, irrepressible tendency going back to child ignorant of sexual difference

——“according to the circumstances,” [Freud’s bisexuality of most dream-symbols] also occurs acc. syntax irreducible to semantic or “symbolic” substantiality

——shoe sometimes has convex form of foot (penis), sometimes concave form enveloping the foot (vagina) (like a glove turned inside out)

p. 269 for Ferenczi, deviations (écarts) w/out essential norm [re: individual variants vs. universal symbols], supplements, overgarments, rain shoes, vaginas, sheath-effect

pp. 278-79 via facility of symbolism, obvious bisexuality of 2 shoes, plural thing: left shoe more offered, undressed—inside-out passivity; right shoe more right/straight, narrow, strict, less open

p. 306 what is thematic attention? both Shapiro & Heidegger pay no attention to the sex of reattachment, graft of sex onto the shoes

p. 309 col de luterus (neck, collar of shoe, turned inside out)

pp. 334-35 compare two shoes (not a pair) to gaine in Glas, sheath (garment) > bisexuality of the double in 2 shoes > displace sexual decidability, opposition btwn fetish & thing (castration as truth of truth)

pp. 335-36 shoes sheath (gainent), to what profit, what sex? an undone stricture of laces, the girdle too, perhaps allows (donnerait) to be seen [Derrida quotes Balzac describing a naked, living, female foot protruding from a canvas—visitors médusés]

p. 336 argument of girdle (gaine): things are always played out on both levels (sur les deux tableaux)

p. 353 Verlässlichkeit > pre-originary gift (don) or abandon [Derrida scolds his interlocutor (“don’t play utilities”) for hurrying to recognizes schemas: “to/from THE-MOTHER for reliability]

PIO PIO p. 46 tout autre not any figures of ontotheological configuration (subject, consciousness, unconscious, self, man or woman)

WAP WAP p. 161 myth that all philosophy is impossible before “adolescence,” figure of 15-18 year old man, virgin yet fully grown: ripe for philosophy; the adult philosopher, as Callicles says in Gorgias: “unmanly & worthy of a beating”

PJP PJP pp. 198-99 [re: Henri Thomas’ novel] a couple men united as one, “a single idiot,” brothers before impassible, inaccessible woman (the other, only one who decides, only guardian, only survivor, keeps watch at end of night, “w/out saying a word”)

PSSS PSSS p. 255 will theater of psychoanalysis always be royal family, patriarchal, heterosexual? will it always treat sexual difference as binary opposition?

D D p. 322 fertility of mother-site (androgynous), M (male, mère), m/f, milk, milky way, mère, énumère

PPT PPT p. 10 [re: REST (4th essay in The Truth in Painting)] the 4th time, jentrelace tous ces fils à travers un polylogue à n+1 voix, qui se trouve être de femme [cf. PAS, SW for feminine voice]

C p. 187 casket engenders? father’s coffin w/ maternal belly? [il faudra que je renonce à ce type danalyse interminable]

pp. 230-31 [la cartouche is a cartridge] dissemination of cartouches/cartridges (en tous sens, en tout genre) never exhausts a total > no total of meaning and genres (masculine/feminine)

TN p. 70 Nancy does not directly analyze sexual difference [re: list of touches], which doesn’t mean it is not taken into account

p. 80 Levinas has the courage [?] to say man caresses the untouchable of the feminine (the caressed) [see POOF where Aristotle privileges the lover over the beloved]

——feminine as untouchable threat that threatens Levinas’ ethics [face]

***pp. 83-4 to avoid neutralizing sexual difference(s) [in the name of the neutral] should one favor dissymmetry & presumed sexual identity of the signatory?

p. 111 touch another sex, touch one’s limit, se toucher le sexe

p. 240 Franck’s caress is sexed > caress before shock/blow? [Heideggerian like double blow?]

p. 241 Derrida not sure one “flesh” can only be compared to another acc. sexuality, acc. “a” or “the” sexual difference

ATM p. 173 Levinas has not only withdrawn dissymmetrical responsibility from circle (of pact, debt, synchronic reciprocity, recognition) but also from annular alliance, from the rounds (tour), whatever makes the rounds of a finger, of a sex or sexual organ [?]

pp. 180-82 Levinas appeals to a tout autre which is sexually unmarked, thus making sexual difference secondary, and yet, this unsexed alterity is referred to as HE (IL) (Levinas: “the particularity of the feminine is secondary”)

***——Derrida: secondary status of sexual difference signifies secondary states of feminine

p. 183 wouldn’t the making-secondary of sexual alterity become a mastery of sexual difference and thus of femininity?

pp. 183-84 [re: Levinas] by making sexual difference secondary, by excluding the feminine, does She figure “the wholly other of this Saying of the wholly other,” thus under-signing the undersigned of the work [He?], that is, countersigning, not as a redoubling of the signature—but autrement que signer

while discussing Levinas’ and [a certain] psychoanalysis’ secondarization of the woman, Derrida hypothesizes [?] that this complicit gesture gathers around one fundamental design: their relation to me, to the other as woman

pp. 188-89 PLUS ASSEZ DE DIFFÉRENCE LÀ ENTRE ELLES ENTRE LINHUMÉE OU LES CENDRES DUN BRÛLE-TOUT

AD AD pp. 44-5 is Levinas’ feminine an androcentric hyperbole or a feminist manifesto? can one decide?

——feminine not empirical for Levinas, thought of welcome opens ethics, it’s marked by sexual difference (it will thus never again be neutralized) [v. different take from ATM?], this hospitality that precedes property can’t be appropriated

LG LG p. 243 Derrida includes very elusive, allusive reference to hymen [genre as gender], rapport sans rapport btwn masculine & feminine; genre (Gattung) and marriage in series gattieren, gatten, Gatte/Gattin

p. 244 [when Blanchot introduces sexual genre] sexual difference (aner, vir—sexual difference does not occur between a species and a genre)

p. 245 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] as long as I say “yes, yes,” I’m a woman and beautiful, man rendered other: secret and odd hymen > madness of sexual difference, mixing of genres

——transsexuality permits me, in a more than metaphorical & transferential way, to engender

CIN CIN p. 9 [re: taped readings of CIN] two voices yield to “another voice,” voice of signatory of text is figure of only one among others, not clear if this figure is masculine or woman

pp. 31-2 perhaps he [Derrida] (or she [la cinder]) knew what he set on fire, what he praised in the secret of the sentence “il y a là cendre,” but he may discover more in its unconscious, and he will die > then the phrase w/ its chance of surviving him will be more cinder than ever, and less—w/out anyone to say “I”

p. 43 no Phoenix, no monument, aucune érection qui tienneou tombe, the cinder w/out ascension, the cinders love me [cf. “proximity loves me” from PC], “they change sex, they re-cinder themselves, they androgynocide themselves”

BSi BSi p. 65 insist on the tongue (langue) and the genders it imposes on us [re: la bête et le souverain]

p. 161 bêtise as madness of definition, “S is P,” definite articles le or la, bêtise is defining as much as defined > the category is a signature of bêtise

pp. 220-21 sexual difference, 2 marionettes—those afraid of “it’s not so simple,” afraid of sexual difference, of equivocality of living being: of the subtle difference, or blurred difference, btwn sponte sua, autonomy, and reactive automaticity

——phallic figure haunted by virgin girl

OG OG p p. 111 (163-64) after describing how Lévi-Strauss bartered w/ some girls to find out everyone’s names, Derrida says “there is much to say about the fact that it is little girls…” w/out ever saying more [his method re: sexual difference?]

pp. 176-77 (251-52) Rousseau: woman’s commands are caresses, her threats are tears, she manages the commander

——women turn men into women, but the contest (partie) is not equal, perhaps most profound signification du jeu de la supplémentaire

ATAP ATAP pp. 76-7 from Kant to Freud, no sexual difference (pas de différence) in castration or emasculation (Entmannung) [either one has male genital or one is castrated], only the masculine!

——castration [of reason], a metaphor/simulacrum, concerns phallus (not penis/clitoris); Bemächtigungstrieb

IF IF p. 310 for Flaubert, women always mix something useful or pleasant w/ beauty (thus don’t experience it)

——Flaubert desires male sentences, taut, muscular

SPEC SPEC p. 402 [thinking the w/in & the beyond] PP’s mastery [re: Freud’s Beyond…] is no more sexual than metasexual (“proper”)

FV FV pp. 480-81 phallogocentrism determined by phallus as mother’s desire—she doesn’t have it

——phallus mostly symbolizes penis, thus phallogocentrism becomes androcentrism

***p. 481n [re: psychoanalysis] institution built on male child’s experience > at stage of genital organization, there’s only maleness (antithesis isn’t femaleness but being castrated): phallogocentrism is no accident/error, its old, enormous root must be accounted for [described] > but, its description is a “participant” when it induces a practice, ethics, institution, a politics that insures truth of a tradition

p. 483tn one reason, male libido, altus, at the bottom of things—highest truth

WBH WBH p. 192 as members of a university, we are all guardians of Law, and also naive in front of text, in front of Law [like both characters in Kafka’s “Before the Law”]; p. 193 Law in Kafka’s story neither male nor female

p. 194 classical ruse of neutralization/neuterization (of sexual marks): “I think” is neither man nor woman, but we can verify that it’s already man

pp. 194-95 to say woman is on side of undecidability has only meaning of strategical phase, the side of woman becomes the side from which you begin to dismantle structure > but, as soon as you reach first stage of deconstruction, opposition man/woman no longer pertinent

p. 198 if gift has assignable destination, is an exchange, it’s not a gift, if there is from man to woman (or woman to man) an assignable destination (re: object, discourse, jouissance, desire, subject), no longer a gift > gift must be absolutely unconscious & random to be given a chance

——opposition is 2, is man/woman, sexual difference can be an indefinite # of sexes > w/ the 2, the classical sense of sexual difference, gift is impossible, all you can call “gift” (love, jouissance) is forbidden by dual opposition

——gift possible not outside of sexuality but outside frame familiar to us > a sexuality completely out of the frame

p. 199 gift beyond sexual duality > Heidegger’s attempt to neutralize sexual opposition and not sexual difference, liberating field of sexuality for very different sexuality, more multiple: no more sexes, one sex for each time, each gift, a sexual difference for each gift

——gift determines, produces identity of giver & receiver, gives itself the right to determine, always a strike of force, irruption

p. 201 if signature, or all that amounts to it, can’t rely on ready determination (is performative), then you can’t rely on sexual opposition

***CHOR ***CHOR p. 96 some can’t see beyond end of phallic forms in SP (bisexual complication of style, spur, umbrella): those people do not read the syntax and punctuation of a given sentence, arresting the text in a position, settling on a thesis, meaning or truth

pp. 100-01 when sexual difference is determined by opposition, acc. Hegelian dialectics, destines sexual difference for truth—in order to erase/neutralize sexual difference [in masculine sex?]

p. 105 very obscure area, passage btwn ontological difference & sexual difference not punctuated by polarities (originary/derived, ontological/ontic…)

——“hymen,” “invagination,” part of Derrida’s attempt to re-sexualize philosophical/theoretical discourse, but these terms no longer simply designate figures of feminine body: what remains undecidable concerns [but not only] line of cleavage btwn 2 sexes

p. 106 hymen does not exist, anything constituting value of existence is foreign to “hymen,” so how could one then attribute existence of hymen properly to woman? (same goes for invagination)

pp. 106, 465n invagination is always taken w/in syntax of expression “double chiasmatic invagination of borders,” doubly folded, redoubled, inversed: can we still recognize “representation of woman” in this movement?

——questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

p. 107 no monological discourse, no mono-sexual discourse, necessity for a chorus, a choreographic text w/ polysexual signatures

pp. 107-08 certain dissymmetry is law of sexual difference & relation to other (Derrida says this in opposition to violence of “democratic” platitudes), dissymmetry as inordinate, excessive, goes beyond coded marks, beyond grammar & spelling of sexuality

p. 108 in dreaming of saving the chance [of deconstructing sexuality], Derrida would like to believe in multiplicity of sexually marked voices, desire for sexuality w/out # can protect us, like a dream, from an implacable destiny that immures us (everything in life) in #2

——if merciless closure [of the 2] would arrest desire at wall of opposition, there would never be but 2 > tragedy would leave this strange sense, a contingent one, that we must affirm & learn to love instead of dreaming of innumerable: but doesn’t dream prove what is dreamt of?

——desire to escape combinatory itself, to invent incalculable choreographies, would remaineven beyond exchange of sexes w/ considerably varied rhythms

SEXUAL DIFFERENCE as GESCHLECHT

Gi pp. 7-8 is it true that, acc. Heidegger, there’s no sexual difference in man— which is to say in woman?

p. 8 insofar as it is open to the question of Being, Dasein would not be sexiferous (sexifère) [?] [see p. 10]

——for Heidegger, sexual difference did not rise to height of ontological difference? > ontic predicate

——will not be a question of heights, thinking difference not up to it [in contrast to Nietzsche?]

——sexual difference has become the Kampfplatz of ethics & politics (haughty of Heidegger to say nothing?)

p. 9 one must invoke chance, aléa, destin before predicting (prédire) anything about “sexuality”

——the trace of Heidegger’s silence on sexuality doesn’t come from just anywhere, but Derrida won’t pin it down w/ a name (omission, foreclosure, unthought, repression, denial)

pp. 11-2 Dasein’s neutrality as a certain sexlessness (Geschlechtsoloigkeit), sexual difference privileged anthropological trait to be neutralized; Heidegger: “Dasein is neither of the two sexes”

——belonging to “two sexes” as first ontic concretion

——re: Dasein, the precipitation or acceleration to neutralize man’s sexuality, and to do so first, cannot be neutral

p. 14 sexless neutrality of Dasein does not desexualize, there’s a potency, a positivity > it’s the binarity (sexual duality) that’s neutralized in Daseins Geschlechtslosigkeit (sexlessness)

——pre-differential, or rather pre-dual, sexuality > not necessarily homogenous, undifferentiated

p. 15 neutralization, at once effect of negativity [sexual division into 2] and the erasure to which thinking submits this negativity so originary positivity can appear

——sexual difference as the 2, a negativity, even an asexuality > (is this interpretation, Derrida asks, too violent?)

p. 16 have we ever though sexuality outside wisdom, knowledge, metaphysics, philosophy of life, existence?

p. 16 if sexuality must be neutralized, why insist?

p. 17 what if “sexuality” marked most originary Selbstheit?

——what if neutralization (which doesn’t happen all by itself) were a violent operation?

——maybe une autre sexe, another Geschlecht, would inscribe itself in ipseity

p. 21 “transcendental dispersion” belongs to essence of Dasein in its neutrality

p. 18 Dasein must have body, bodiliness, prior to sexuality? Leiblichkeit draws Dasein into dispersion, thus into sexual difference? [see Gii pp. 38-9 Dasein as Leib]

pp. 17-8 translation problems not accidental or secondary, thinking of Geschlecht same as translation: French dis- translates (by means of transfer/displacement) German zer- (dissociation, distraction, dissemination, division, dispersion, Zerstreuung, Zerstreutheit, Zerstörung, Zersplitterung, Zerspaltung)

——inner supplementary frontier splits lexicon again: both dis- and zer- have neutral, nonnegative sense

p. 25 Geschlecht as inscription, stroke, imprint [Schlag]

p. 26 for Heidegger, no properly sexual predicate > none that doesn’t refer back to general structure of Dasein: inside/outside, dispersion & proximity, here & there, birth & death…

——sexual connotations can mark discourse, jusquà lenvahir, to the extent that they are homogenous w/ what every discourse implies

——sexual difference not yet sexual duality? not yet, no longer, sealed by the 2? > “not yet” and “no longer” imply a submission to “the control and inspection of reason (quelque arraisonnement)”

——how did difference get deposited in the 2?

——if one insists in consigning difference to dual opposition, how did multiplication get arrested in difference? in sexual difference?

Gii p. 28 Geschlecht: “sex,” “race,” “species,” “genus,” “gender,” “stock,” “family,” “generation,” “genealogy,” “community”

p. 29 Geschlecht as idiom, a “we” that can hear Fichte’s address (not necessarily the Germans)

——organic community in nonnatural, spiritual sense

——“we” announces itself to itself from infinity of a telos of freedom/spirituality > engages, allies, promises itself acc. to circle of this infinite will

p. 30 Geschlecht, in Fichte, is/inhabits living language of inspirited breath vs. dead language torn from its root

——acc. Fichte, children learn language as if signs for sensible things were arbitrary (willkürlich) > must reconstitute past development of national language

p. 31 for Fichte, “we” of Geschlecht, question of humanity (Menschlichkeit) (versus animality) > teleological essence of humanity announced par excellence in Deutschheit

p. 35 hand or gift > is this the site of sexual desire (Geschlecht in sexual difference)?

——Heidegger’s hand: holds, carries, welcomes, signs—presumably because man is a sign > (does Phenomenology of Spirit say anything different?)

——thinking of the hand, hand of thinking > thinking of human Geschlecht (not a humanism? or not a metaphysical, classical humanism?)

p. 50 w/ respect to Heidegger’s hand, does one make love w/ a hand or hands? Derrida imagines Heidegger’s protest: the hand that gives itself, promises, engages in oath already tells you everything about loving, caressing, desiring——“perhaps, but why not say it then?”

pp. 51-2 concern ourselves w/ Geschlecht of Geschlecht: a mark (de)composed, perhaps no longer a word, follow its translations, decomposition, disarticulatons, genealogy of its body unified on basis of or acc. the split (partage) of pieces of words > Geschlechts genealogical composition inseparable from decomposition of human Geschlecht

pp. 53-4 Schlag (blow, also race/species in figurative sense) & Geschlecht > Heidegger: our language calls the humanity that has received imprint of striking, or cast in this striking (Schlag), Geschlecht

das Zwiefache, double, dual duplicitous fold of sexual difference

——die Zwietracht der Geschlechter, duality of sexes as dissension, war, disagreement

pp. 59-60 [meanings of Geschlecht and Schlag (i.e. imprint of a coin)]

p. 61 the “situation (Erörterung)” of Gedicht needs recourse to idiom of Geschlecht (Geschlecht of idiom)? how to think Gedichts belonging, appropriation to a language, to a Geschlecht

pp. 61-2 savage second blow of sexual difference, its Verwesung, vs. originary, tender sexual difference > Heidegger claims this schema is not Christian/Platonic, but it has no other content and even no other language than Platonism/Christianity > its archi-matinal origin, ultra-Western horizon, constituted by hollow of a repetition, same for Verfall, Ruf, Sorge in structure of Dasein

EL p. 219 Geschlecht and Schlag (stamp, imprint) > “we” that undergoes relation to itself out of (depuis) menacing interpellation of Geschlecht by apocalyptic speech (parole)

ATAP p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

EU p. 80 for Schelling, those whose thought isn’t regulated by living and buzzing communion w/ divine [w/ community] are like sexless bees (geschlechtslose Bienen) > depositing inorganic excrement outside hive—proof of their platitudes

WBH p. 199 gift beyond sexual duality > Heidegger’s attempt to neutralize sexual opposition and not sexual difference, liberating field of sexuality for very different sexuality, more multiple: no more sexes, one sex for each time, each gift, a sexual difference for each gift

CHOR p. 104 Heidegger insists that Dasein is neuter, it is neutral, neither of the 2 sexes, but not indifferent, not annulling negativity—an originary positivity, Mächtigkeit des Wesens

p. 105 very obscure area, passage btwn ontological difference & sexual difference not punctuated by polarities (originary/derived, ontological/ontic…)

SHAME/MODESTY [fixerup]

R p. 4 Derrida speaking from the bottom of his heart: the excessive gift goes straight to his heart, to what he holds dear, to what holds him to life > any words of welcome (hospitality) too modest

FK pp. 85-86 holding-back, restraint (halte), inhibition, modesty: universal structure of religiosity, mystical immunity of the secret > not w/out intuitive violence, to that which remains unscathed

LOBL p ~123 my necessary immodesty

POOF pp. 55-6 Nietzsche’s silence (among friends), imperative/enigma of sense of decency (pudeur) [Why I am a Destiny]: an erasure w/out erasure, everything is possible in this silence > silence as interruption that substitutes testimony for know-how, faith for the test, the perhaps for certainty, other for same, friendship for calculation: different way of thinking among

——no silence among friends w/out laughter, which bares its teeth like death, doing evil & laughing at evil (not laughing it away) among friends

pp. 56-7 what chance does a feminine friend have on a stage where truth must always be veiled, prudent, where even the perhaps’ indecency might still ask truth, woman, to remain in veils

——Nietzsche’s veiled truth of decency > do veil & decency signify absence of courage?

p. 209 the dative version of omega ω would produce the meaning: ‘too many friends means no friend’ > this is the recoil (repli) version, more modest, it does reopen the question of “how many?”

p. 242 via Heidegger, philía as opening, accord, in essential relation w/ phúsis as covering up, dissimulation of self > phúsis qua philía: lune, comme lautre, garde ce rapport à la fois généreux et jaloux à elle-mêmeelle aime à se cacher, krúptesthai phileîn > le retrait de la pudeur [decency] donne ici le mouvement même: gives the gift (donne le don), accords phúsis and philía

pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

——modesty would get woman to participate in universal fraternity (i.e. humanity), equalizes sexes by moralizing them: modest woman is a brother for man

——woman doesn’t become any less desirable! modesty belongs to history qua fraternization

AF p. 89 “if I were doubly immodest”

POO p. 144n “the secret remains intact, my politeness [see S p. 8] unblemished, my reserve unbreached, my modesty more jealous than ever [see TB p. 124]” (respond w/out responding)

PAS PAS p. (77) logic of double band arrests laughter and shamelessness (limpudeur) when they shield themselves (se défendent) against anguish and affirmation > contamination btwn laughs and violations is inevitable

ROP p. 5 [everyone has analyzed “Dream of Irma’s Injection,” so, modest Derrida, will add nothing, only differance, the something other than sense itself in the interpretation]

p. 113-14 Derrida refers to his modest contribution re: a question for Foucault (doesn’t Foucault’s project belong too much to “the age of psychoanalysis”?)

SP pp. 51-3 Nietzsche: modesty of life, veils: “Yes, life is a woman!” [see p. 59 truth becomes profound by disguising of pudendum, by modest veil that falls over it]

p. 83 pratique stylet, pratique stylée, de quel genre? can’t be written w/out conjoined fabulation of woman/truth, entre la femme, in spite of the profundity that is modesty

ATIA p. 4 the shame of being ashamed, naked before his cat

p. 5 since there is no nudity in “nature,” we have to think shame and technicity together, as the same “subject” [clothing derives from technics: onuse&abuseofcleavage]

——man can never be naked once he has the sense of shame or modesty

p. 21 to not be ashamed of shame: time when Adam called animals’ names before the fall [to think of his shame of shame before his cat, Derrida must call upon this other time]

pp. 36-7 “why would a man be at the same time more and less modest than a woman?”

——sentiment of shame related to standing upright, rhythmic difference btwn erection/detumescence

p. 43 Cain’s shame, like a second original sin, he needs to hide his nakedness, his crime, he feels excessively culpable > but, isn’t all wrongdoing excessive, le défaut devant leil faut

pp. 47-8 Bellerophon’s modesty, shame before the immodest women saves the city, this immunizing drive, Heidegger’s Verhaltenheit, restraint, is the origin of the religious, of the immune, sacred (heilig), holy, separate (kadosh) [it also can be perverted: auto-immunity; virtual, analogical relation btwn auto-biography & auto-immunity]

pp. 49-51 autobiographical animal, the general singulars “I” and “animal,” before ego cogito both living, both auto-affective, both moving > “I” speaks to “engage nudity w/out shame,” untenable pledge > bring in a mirror (une psyché), is the animal caught there too? or my primary mirror?

p. 53 atuphos [not the wind blown by prideful Typhon] means to be modest

p. 57 like everybody else [Rousseau, for sure], Freud said women are naturally more modest than men > but, modest/shame is so self-contradictory (aporetic): the most modest are the least

***p. 60 it is exactly where there is sexual difference, that a hunting game of erotic modesty

occurs, thus the order of law not limited to human, because inseparable from truth (inseparable from veil of modesty)

——wouldn’t hetero-narcissism of sexual coupling give animals the right to modesty/shame, sensitivity to nakedness?

pp. 60-1 what right should be given to this double metonymy: 1) speak of modesty whenever there’s monstration/simulation/dissimulation 2) declare animal modesty exists

——is all “hiding of oneself” modesty? is there modesty not directed toward genitalia? the metonymy has been arrested/concentrated on phallic region

——modesty, for humans, concentrated on genitals, on phallus, Derrida hypothesizes that criterion here is of uprightness (droiture) as erection in process of hominization

SW pp. 323-24n complaint (of exhaustion) & accusation lodged against matrix of discourse of veil

——complain about myself to myself: immodesty, impudence > but veil makes modest

——complaint: give up all modesty, most elementary politeness

PIO p. 1 invention (new, original, unique) breaks w/ rhetoric of modesty (convention, etiquette, contract) > w/ all conditions of social interaction

——invention always presupposes some illegality, a breaking of the contract

WAP p. 117 as much modesty as coyness in my irony > still, seriousness of concept never absent

DPi pp. 150-51 Derrida: Nietzsche always interesting even if you don’t agree w/ him, he’s interesting because he sniffs out partie honteuse, modestly hidden or negated interest

p. 272 Kant: man of honor values honor more highly than life, willing to accept DP, but a scoundrel considers it better to live in shame then not at all

C p. 209 Derrida refers to the modesty of stopping at 127, of saying “that’s enough” > then, because (even if unconsciously) the # is prime, he finds in 127, a proud arrogance (superbe morgue)

p. 225 Derrida quotes himself from Glas: modesty is no longer in season (de mise) for a cartouche, at the point of death

TN p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 295 Nancy: [breast or heart?] the word for modesty w/out shame

p. 298 pudeur: elle déploie ses voiles à l'infini > must must not, because can can’t (confess/betray)

——la loi marque ainsi le sans dan le sens ou dans lexistence

a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

AD p. 12 Levinas conscious of immense responsibility w/ modesty of prophet

p. 40 acc. Levinas, feminine transcends light and phenomenology (Plato, Husserl), a “way of existing” in the “hiding” of modesty

BSi p. 150 for Deleuze, bêtise [ethical, quasi-juridical fault] at heart of philosophy > makes modest

OG p. 337n writing can’t be contained w/in a science—can’t have that ambition or modesty

p. 179 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] history also protects/resists abyss of evil > “moral love” (which is immoral, acc. Rousseau) becomes modesty (true morality of women)

p. 180 acc. Rousseau, God gave man reason and woman modesty to supplement (a lack = an excess), restrain, guide natural inclinations, & God gave a bonus (praemium) too, a recompense, reward [for correct usage of supplement], a supplement to the supplement [Christianity]

CIR pp. 301-02 dying of a shame in which I persevere all the more in that I have nothing to do w/ it

EU p. 65 Derrida’s going to add a “modest supplement” to Antoine Berman’s Lépreuve de létranger: supplementarity (itself) [dick]—problematic of onto-theology in certain concept of translation

FV pp. 415-16 for Freud, dreams of nakedness don’t exhibit penis or absence of penis but absence of phallus, absence of attribute supplementing a possible fault, absence of colossal double > following chain is indicated: truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame [Schreber]

p. 418 if dream of nakedness is a dream of shame, nakedness is not natural: its truth is in shame

——hidden theme of Emperors… is the hidden theme, text as its theme, text as veil, movement of alētheia

SHIBBOLETH

HASD p. 24 since promise is also an order, allegorical veil becomes political shield, solid barrier of a social division, a shibboleth

A pp. 8-9 one should avoid wasting time speaking in shibboleths, passwords, unless it gains you time

p. 9 shibboleth effect, untranslatability (essential incompleteness of translation), borders of untranslatability w/in original language itself

p. 20 the 2 versions of aporia’s nonpassage: 1) impermeable, only opens via shibboleth, closed borders (i.e. during war) 2) impasse of no limit, limit too porous, no opposition btwn 2 sides

p. 61 untranslatability of idiom can produce effects of shibboleth

p. 74 death always the name of a secret, signs irreplaceable singularity, puts forth common name of the proper name w/out name, always a shibboleth > language about death long history of a secret society, hidden religion of the awaiting, a universal Marrano

SH pp. 24-5 in shibboleth (river), there’s suspension of meaning, almost opposite of phenomenological “epokhe,” which preserves meaning > those who couldn’t pronounce “shi” marked themselves as unable to remark a mark thus coded

p. 27 date resembles shibboleth, gives ciphered access to secret configuration of places for memory

p. 28 a visa is a shibboleth, that determines a theme, meaning, a poem is too [is poem an unmastered secret?]—only to show the secret forever withdrawing

——shibboleth is the shibboleth for the right to the poem which calls itself a shibboleth, Shibboleth is its title

——no one meaning, from moment there’s a date & shibboleth

pp. 28-9 shibboleth must be at your disposal to inhabit a language > one must be capable of it, of marking > a discriminating wherewithal > to know how to do as to know who to mark difference

——shibboleth presupposes cultural alliance in the differential mark, a secret w/out secrecy, no meaning concealed in crypt

p. 29 ellipsis & caesura of discretion [Blanchot] inhabit the shibboleth (Joyce), it fascinates, seduces ——shibboleth as the cipher of the cipher: ciphered manifestation of the cipher, emerges from nonmeaning, and keeps itself in reserve

——cipher can conceal secret, which it shelters in its readability, w/out the slightest hidden attention > there’s nothing it can do about it [why/who interpret(s) secret as a taunting gesture?]

p. 31 Babel w/in a single language, shibboleth marks multiplicity in language, insignificant difference as condition of meaning

p. 32 shibboleth resists translation due to that w/in it that cuts nonsignifying difference in body, mark, written, oral

——shibboleth: river, ear of grain, olive twig

——from watch tower, sentinel of vigilance, one sees shibboleths value can, tragically, always be inverted

pp. 32-3 tragic inversion of shibboleth, corruption of its differential value, from condition of alliance to discriminating limit, policing, normalization, methodical subjugation

p. 34 shibboleth secures passage from one to other in difference, w/in sameness > ambiguities of French partage

pp. 71-2n [Freud’s use of shibboleth re: true psychoanalysts]

p. 35 the poem, folded and refolded in simplicity of the singular, a certain repetition makes readability possible > it signifies: there is shibboleth > there is something not shown: crypt, cipher > it speaks, the address takes place, permitting alliances, anniversaries, returns, even if there is no subsistent trace, scarcely ash

p. 43 unreadable is readable as unreadable, shibboleth transmitted to a few during finite time of incineration, heart to heart, mouth to ear, hand to hand, still universal by right (legible, coded, troped) > madness of fire: consumes a date from w/in > renders ash from 1st moment

p. 44 shibboleth: “I am ash”

p. 51-52 shibboleth: the indecipherability btwn constative & performative, the untrue truth of truth, ashes in truth

p. 52 no “absolute poem,” but date (beyond calendar/clocks), madness of “when,” unthinkable Einmal (once), terrifying ambiguity of shibboleth > sign of belonging (alliance), threat of discrimination (war)

p. 53 “this = shibboleth”? go, know, this deictic, here > must distinguish btwn “the” shibboleth and “a” shibboleth

p. 60 anyone who experiences circumcision (body cut, shibboleth, blessing, purification) is a Jew

——displace literality of belonging if, w/ Judaism, nothing properly belongs, anyone or no one may be a Jew, Jew: no one’s name, the only one, no one’s circumcision

p. 64 the proper of the body, a place of circumcision

——circumcision of the word: an event of the body (from shibboleth to sibboleth)

p. 68 because one can make use of shibboleth, it can be turned against oneself, the circumcised are proscribed, held at border, excluded, reduced to ashes, in the mere name

——how to guard against double edge of shibboleth? w/ “living Nothing in the heart,” perhaps

p. 69n every untranslatable space, pause, calls for and provokes translation > shibboleth merges completely w/ translation in its essential dimension

EL EL p. 197 does Scholem want shibboleth to get out of abyss (the improbable border, the desert) or to rush into it & be engulfed by it (pour sy engouffrer)?

AD AD p. 35 idiom, ambiguous chance, shibboleth of the threshold, preliminary chance of hospitality (i.e. French language)

——these chances accumulate places appropriate to the crypt (i.e. translating accueil and recueillement)

SIGN

MPM p. 67 de Man: “art leaves interiorization of past forever behind” > no dialectical passage from symbol to sign; art (like thought of thinking memory) linked to sign not symbol

MC pp. 350, 352 symptōma in Greek, first meant sinking, depression, then meant coincidence, event, finally meant sign, illness [finitude]

p. 360 Derrida says mark, trace rather than signifier, letter, word, or the generality of stoikheion—to extend mark beyond verbal sign, beyond human language (and beyond atomism) > thus he does not affirm “arbitrariness of sign” like Hegel, Saussure

SEC p. 314 careful use of “ideological” in relation to Condillac: theory of sign as representation of idea, which represents a perceived thing; communication vehiculates a representation as ideal content (which will be called meaning); writing as species w/in genus of communication

***pp. 316-17 take classical notion of writing, make it generalizable to all order of signs, and extend it even to experience of Being

pp. 318-19 Husserl on possibility of absence of referent: 1) “sky is blue” is understood w/ out presence of sky 2) absence of signified, possible crisis of meaning: a) manipulate symbols b) statements can have meaning w/out objective signification, i.e. “square circle” c) Sinnlosigkeit or agrammaticality, i.e. “green is or,” “abracadabra”

——Husserl uses above to rigorously dissociate sign or expression (Ausdruck) as signifying sign from a sign meaning something (bedeutsame Zeichen)

p. 320 Husserl’s interest is in purely logical grammar not pure grammar > “the green is or,” unacceptable in context determined by a will to know, still signifies an example of agrammaticality

——in French “le vert est ou” can become “le vert est où” or “le verre est où

p. 323 Austin doesn’t think everything covered under problematic heading “arbitrariness of the sign” [see OG for deconstruction of “arbitrary”]

VM p. 103 forever discreet, interrupting all historical totalities through its freedom of speech, face not “of this world”

——être derrière le signe qui est dans le monde, cest ensuite demeurer invisible au monde dans lépiphanie

VP p. 6 the security of presence is founded on the non-empirical, the sign, the non-foundation, exposing this removes this security

p. 21 if the sign preceded truth & essence, it makes no sense to discuss truth or essence of sign

p. 22 is sign not the sole thing which falls outside question “what is?” while producing this question

p. 39n place difference of “sign” in the heart of the “originary”

p. 42 for Husserl, a sign is never an event if event means an “empirical singularity” that happens only “once,” is irreplaceable and irreversible > purely idiomatic sign would not be a sign

pp. 43-4 since difference btwn reality and representation does not occur in the sign, that which sanctions the difference erases the sign

p. 44 two ways to erase sign, make it derivative: 1) simple presence before sign 2) trying to restore originality and non-derivation of sign w/in MOP

***p. 46 presence as universal form of all existence, transgression of all empirical, and first of all mine, but even beyond my death, this present still is, must be to be universal; if the possibility of the sign is this relation to death: erasure of sign is dissimulation of this relation to death

p. 48 if a sign is repetitive in structure, Husserl’s distinction btwn fictional usage and actual usage of sign is threatened

p. 51n for Husserl, sensible, corporeal thing is a “sign for itself”; isn’t that the same as not being a sign? present to itself w/out indicative detour?

p. 57 intimacy of non-presence and alterity w/ presence refutes argument about uselessness of sign in self-identity

PPHS p. 71 Hegel [Science of Logic]: sign, more precisely Sprache, fulfills spiritual function of middle (like water in nature)

——restriction of difference, another name for medium of spirit

——semiology at center not margins of Hegel’s Logic

——sign as site of transition, bridge, btwn 2 moments of full presence [then relever of the bridge]

——process of sign has a history, signification is history comprehended: btwn original presence & its circular reappropriation in final presence

p. 72 time of sign is time of referral, refers presence to itself, sign organizes its own provisionality

pp. 72-3 theory of sign on basis of being-present, authority of lêtre-en-vue: telos of reappropriation [see POOF p. 65], coordination of sign & light of parousia, speaking logos as close as possible to itself in concept & consciousness

p. 74 sign facilitates Idea coming back to itself, return to self-presence

——sign derives from a finite determination of spirit, subjective spirit > finite is a transition (Übergegen) and an emergence (Übersichhinausgehen) watched over by Aufhebung and negativity

p. 78 acc. Hegel, reproductive imagination (reproduktive Einbildungskraft) remains closed in on itself, self-identity of intelligence in passivity of impression [when simply received from pit]; productive imagination, the creation of signs, spirit as its own self-sprungness, but this sign is pure exteriorization of spirit, the scandalous idea of producing intuition

p. 79 concept of sign will be place where all contradictory characteristics (production, intuition) intersect > they are gathered in it, swallowed up within it (sy engouffrent), and, somehow, something beyond the sign (interior/exterior, spontaneous/receptive, intelligible/sensible, same/other) is affirmed beneath the contradictions, as the contradictions, resolved in the dialectic

p. 80 Hegel: productive imagination as welding Mittelpunkt; Derrida remarks that Hegel could now extend the sign’s field infinitely, but he restricts it (refers it to indifference of imagination) by a movement/structure of dialectics that comprehends it [by the cunning of reason]

——“is dialectics the resolution of the sign in the horizon of the nonsign, of the presence beyond the sign?”

pp. 80-81 for Hegel, sign is maintained only w/ sight set on truth

p. 82 via Hegel, sign as unity of signifying body and signified ideality: incarnation

p. 82(n) signifying intention (bedeuten) over body (signifier, from Cratylus, sēma/sōma (tomb/body), sign as tomb, prison) > Husserl, Saussure, Hegel

pp. 82-3(n) Derrida, through Hegel, describes tomb, family crypt (caveau), oikēsis, as the sign of death that capitalizes (thésaurise) on life by marking that life continues elsewhere, il la tient donc aussi à labri de la mort; at the heart of this monument, this sign of death, soul keeps itself alive, needs this works of death > the sign, “the height conserving in its depths the hegemony of the soul,” is the pyramid [later, Derrida will live through this tomb not, like Hegel, by negating it]

p. 83 sign, as monument-of-life-in-death, is the pyramid

——Hegel: the intuition (of sign), an image which has received (in sich empfangen hat) [like a woman receives in conceiving] as is soul and independent mental representation

pp. 83-84 Hegel: sign, pyramid in which foreign soul has been conveyed, put-on deposit (versetsten) > non-anachronistic arbitrariness of sign

p. 84 for Hegel, sign vs. symbol: symbol has identity w/ what it mimics, sign is foreign [relation of absolute alterity]

p. 86 despite symbol’s identity, sign’s arbitrariness is closer to independence, freedom of spirt than external, natural symbol [Saussure concurs in footnotes]

p. 87n Hegel: creative memory, mnēmosynē, freely bestows on sign a value that only has value conferred on it by spirit > [because sign is arbitrary, unlike symbol, it resonates w/ spirit, solely]

p. 88 authority of voice: coordinated w/ entire Hegelian system: its archeology, teleology, eschatology, its will to parousia > process of sign is an Aufhebung, negativity

p. 89 sign erases itself for Hegel, but unlike for Derrida, preserves signified ideality, through passageway of time

——for Hegel, signifying substance is sound, “substance of expression” [glossematicians], most proper to be produced as time itself, sound relève from naturalness, linked to spirit’s relation to itself, the voice

p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

F p. xlv every “word” that says Thing in word-thing > several subjects, places, instances; Wolf Man inhabits forbidden desire to call himself by glorious word, can’t not break seal in signing

DS p. 243 Mallarmé on example of the dancer: “through a kind of commerce whose secret her smile seems to pour forth, w/out delay she imparts to you, through the last veil that remains forever, the nudity of your own concepts, and silently proceeds to write your vision in the manner of a Sign, which she is”

pp. 261-62 hymen not even a signifier or sign [an event?], thus everything that comes from propagation-structure of hymen, i.e. text, is never truly made up of “signs” or “signifiers”

POS p. 8 the a of differance is a sign (signified/signifier): the mute intervention of a written sign found in all discourse

p. 99n a of differance, pyramid (A), tacit monument > for Hegel, body of sign compared to pyramid

p. 17 concept of sign as impediment & progress, has “logocentric & ethnocentric limits”

p. 19 Saussure resigns himself to using word “sign”

p. 20 semiological science will never cease to quest for “transcendental signified,” due to link btwn our language and history/system of metaphysics

pp. 21-2 concept of sign (signifier/signified) necessitates privileging phonic substance; phonē, given to consciousness, most intimately tied to thought of signified concept; linguistics, supposed to be just a part, becomes “pattern,” regulatory model for semiology: voice is consciousness itself

pp. 22-3 semiology inscribed w/in psychologism: reduce everything exterior about signifier, all that’s left is psyche, the phonetic sign imposes itself as “pattern” for all signs

——Saussure: “linguistic sign is therefore a two-sided psychic entity”

——psychologism inscribed/prescribed w/in concept of sign itself

pp. 26-7 gram as differance neutralizes phonologistic propensity of “sign,” liberates “graphic substance” > gram not an element, interwoven w/ traces of other elements of chain/system

ATIA p. 123 for Lacan, sign is still animal, it is the signifier that brings us to human subjectivity

FS pp. 3-4 Derrida links structuralist obsession w/ an anxiety (inquiétude) about (sur) language, an anxiety of (du) language and in (dans) language itself

——yet, to dream of reducing this link to a sign of the times is to dream of violence: the sign is more or less, something other than a sign of an epoch

DIF DIF p. 9 classically, sign is treated as deferred presence, as differance of temporization > sign is thus provisional, secondary > Derrida questioning this logic: to think originary differance, one would have to recognize origin, archi-, telos, eskhaton have always denoted presence: ousia, parousia

***p. 10 differance not included in concept of a sign, which has always meant representation of a presence

——Saussure, the thinker who made the arbitrary & differential character of sign inseparable, at very foundation of general semiology

CHM pp. 32-3 the hermeneut, the analyst, must first know language of patient, the immediate materiality of sign (move from sign to signified, obvious meaning to latent)

p. 33 if understood as a sign, does Descartes’ stated intention have the historical meaning assigned to it (by Foucault)? & is its meaning exhausted by its historicity?

Gii p. 35 [sign as gift?] Heidegger’s hand: holds, carries, welcomes, signs—presumably because man is a sign > (does Phenomenology of Spirit say anything different?)

——writing is hand-writing in its essence, makes word manifest, monstre; co-belonging of hand & speech: ability to produce monstres that disclose concealment [still a phono-logocentrism, but one where handwriting is immediately bound to speech]

p. 42 Heidegger: w/ man, 2 hands fold into 1, auto-affect each other: prayer (man is a sign)

p. 47 typewriter becomes signless, a-signifying (zeichenlos), it dissimulates, a movement of withdrawal, subtraction (entziehen) [loses the hand]

WAP p. 81 as a didactic technique, teaching becomes organon of repetition, teaching as history of the sign > teaching body lives from belief in transcendental signified, which comes back to life, more and better, w/ authority of transcendental phallus (signifier of signifiers)

REST p. 264 DS turns around points of ballerina, “la syntaxe du point et du pas” > each pair referring to some other, signifying too the operation of signifying

AFR p. 78n if there are 2 concepts of imagination, there are 2 concepts/values of sign: 1) instrument of control, mastery 2) condition/instrument of exercising

p. 84 Locke, acc. Condillac, missed the sign as principle of unfolding [sensible] germ, did not radically analyze germ/seed

pp. 91-2 after Condillac admits he had to take great detours, Derrida explains that the sign is the name of this detour, experience itself as detour, generation of suppléance to be retraced

p. 95 for Condillac, chain of signs is superstructural, & its principle is formal

——for Condillac, time secures moment when object goes missing from perception, moment perception is absent from itself > moment space of signs opens, w/ function of imagination [time as that which absents perception?]

p. 110 Condillac’s move from perception to imagination (and from one sign to another): on the march toward freedom, spontaneity of auto-affection > teleology: the complete sign, the true sign, is the instituted sign [after rupture, process magnetized toward greatest mastery possible]

——only arbitrary signs > sign’s active essence, its energy: freedom

pp. 111-12 for Condillac, arbitrariness of sign makes commerce freer and more extensive: commerce rescues man from relation to present object only > thus, the proper, property of sign, is system of the arbitrary; Condillac: “until commerce, natural signs are not at all properly signs”

pp. 118-19 frivolity (useless) is the congenital breach of sign (its entame, archē), since structure of sign’s deviation ensures frivolity has no origin, frivolity defies archeology, condemns it to frivolity: excessive relief, not even money or merchandise > sign’s disposability never presents itself

***pp. 112-13 though, acc. Condillac, articulated language as system of arbitrary signs is only 1 of 3 kinds of signs, once it proves the best example, exemplary, it draws, envelops in advance, everything which precedes it: upsets the symmetry to its own benefit [great example of exemplary]

p. 132 for Condillac, repetition and absence of perceptual present to itself: gap or deviation of time > opens representative vection [desire] w/in sign & idea: suppléance as representation

pp. 132-33 via Condillac, the sign’s vacancy (a frivolous one), suspension of its relation to object, intervenes before the sign: sign announced before sign

D p. 323 sign becomes what it is only through possibility of its reissue (sa réédition)

LI p. 66 Derrida suspicious of sign, of opposition signifier/signified

EL pp. 218, 227 for Heidegger & Scholem, when a “sign” regains its sacredness, history takes revenge [?]

OG pp. 3-4 (12) [idea of] science and its nonphonetic characters an example of break from logo-phonocentrism, also made possible w/in phono-logocentric system, w/in a certain concept of the sign

p. 6 (15) crisis also a symptom: inflation of language, of sign “language,” inflation of sign itself, inflation itself > language’s historico-metaphysical epoch must determine totality of its problematic horizon, exposing its finitude when no longer self-assured, guaranteed (bordé), by infinite signified (which seemed to exceed it)

p. 7 (16) writing as “signifier of the signifier” no longer means accidental doubling, fallen (déchue) secondarity, but overflows, goes beyond extension of language > comprehends language

——signified always already (toujours déjà) functions as signifier: effacing = overflowing

——secondarity of writing effects all signifieds

——advent of writing, advent of a play which effaces all those abris du hors-jeu (out-of-bounds shelters [transcendental signifieds]) that surveil field of language > destroying the concept sign

pp. 13-4 (25) that a signified must be able to “take place” in its pure intelligibility (absolute logos): the theology of the sign (perhaps this epoch, whose closure we’ve outlined, will never end)

p. 14 (26) w/out exteriority of signifier, there is no sign, together they keep an indestructible solidity, can’t just “move on to something else”

pp. 18-9 (31) to the question “what is the sign?” the answer has always been the signified, which is never contemporary, proximity to logos as phonèpresence: no relation to trace, signifier

——what if sign escapes the instituting question of philosophy: “what is (ti esti)…?” what if we can only think of the sign as (is) [crossed-out] and (thing) [crossed-out, fixerup]? [Heidegger’s crossing-out]

p. 324n (32n) at limit, if we try to claim the signifier is prior to the signified [reversing the classical structure], the whole concept of sign is destroyed

——to declare “primacy” of signifier w/in a logic that privileges the signified is absurd

p. 20 (33-34) transcendental signified: resource of sign, makes difference btwn signans/signatum absolute & irreducible > it is la voix sentend: conscience, auto-affection (spontaneity, ideality, universality, non-mondain of substance)

pp. 48-50 (70-2) Pierce’s sign w/ no final reference comes close to deconstruction, he complies w/ 2 incompatible exigencies w/out sacrificing one for the other > links symbol & sign, semiotics & logic: to think only in signs, is to ruin the notion of sign > the thing itself is a sign

pp. 48, 51 (70, 74) substitute grammatology for semiology, le devenir-immotivé du symbole [via Pierce]: no more pertinence of synchronic/diachronic, and semiology no longer mastered by exemplary linguistic sign (master-sign)

p. 98 (147) Descartes drove out sign, Hegel reappropriates sensible sign to movement of Idea, but only Rousseau dealt directly w/ reduction of writing

p. 206 (294) for Rousseau, aesthetics passes through sign (semiology) not sensation, art is moral & ethnological [nonresponse to Western music can’t mean West Indians have different nerves!]

pp. 256-58 (363-35) light movement, chiquenaude, le doigt qui incline un monde, most eloquent model of sign (divine action), la baguette > actualizes virtual faculties dormant in man [is this God’s touch? Derrida includes varying degrees: perhaps not, perhaps, probably, certainly]

p. 279 (395-96) acc. Rousseau, absolutely literal (propre) is at origin, the proper name, one sign per thing, one represented per passion

——proper names born in tandem w/ verbs (infinitive present) > degradation in their separation

EU p. 41 Derrida sees arbitrariness of sign in both Descartes’ vision of an absolutely natural language & in an artificial code

FV p. 432 Lacan is missing an elaboration of frame, signature, parergon > this lack permits scene of signifier to be reconstructed into a signified (inevitable process in logic of sign)

SIGNATURE

GOD p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

GT p. 171 a gift is not signed, does not calculate w/ a time that would do it justice

AF p. 5 signature is btwn proper name & what it invented

p. 51 (what Yerushalmi wants from Freud, dying Freud [see POOF Aristotle’s dying sage says “friends, no friends”]) last word, last will, ultimate signature, uneffaceable countersignature

FL p. 264 deconstruction is impossible possibility, [possible would make it calculable]; never applies itself to anything from the outside, auto-heterodeconstruction, open wound of such a signature

p. 277 for Benjamin, text & signature are specters which exhibits & archive their implosion, in ruins, [Derrida now affirms this “stance”] such is status of deconstructive text: cannot escape law it enunciates, ruins & contaminates itself [at once founding/preserving], becomes specter of itself

p. 292 when we sign, we speak in non-constative, prescriptive, evaluative manner [re: end of Benjamin’s essay]

BL pp. 214-15 that which makes literature possible is outside literature

——different periods of history of positive law give substance to literature, value of signatures [“authors”]

LOBL ~p. 143 p. how can a translation be signed?

SPOM p. 25 stroke of genius, signature of the Thing “Shakespeare”: authorizes each translation, makes them possible without ever being reducible to them [Derrida is playing w/ the out-of-jointness of each translation of “time is out of joint”]

HERP p. 211 Heidegger’s 3 creative “Gewalten” of historial destiny: poet, thinker, statesman > their work as Schaffen carries seal or signature of originary polemos/Kampf

POOF p. 2 not to sign, not to assume an account

p. 5 ridiculous fantasy/staging of death of friendship: friend signs your signature at your tomb > who never dreams such a scene?

p. 32 every instant begins at the end, address carries in its readability the signature of the addressee: it withdraws from space by penetrating it

MPM p. 25 tropology of memory in autobiographical discourse > discourse as epitaph, signature of its own epitaph (prosopopoeia)

pp. 28-9 all relation to others carries signature of memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave

p. 63 irony of using another signature to talk about yourself

——this allegorical story of signature includes theme of “Lazarus, arise!” a “ghost” story, resurrection

p. 85 “must one at each instant reinvent filiation?” is this a signature of faithful memory or betrayal, figure of simulacrum?

p. 87n when de Man quotes Mallarmé’s “this shallow calumniated stream called death” from “Tomb of Verlaine” (signatory of epitaph always writes on his own tomb), Derrida tells us genealogy of genitives cannot be broken by cenotaph or cremation: the tomb of Verlaine of Mallarmé of Paul de Man

p. 100 writing, as an event of signature, a signature which can only promise itself in the sense that its destination is barred, impasse of aporia

p. 125 [re: de Man, word “deconstruction” inscribing itself instead of being erased] “always already” erases singularity of event, which is erased in its turn before signature of this word [“deconstruction”] > signature asserts itself as history insofar as origin of its “taking-place” is unlocatable

p. 139 each deconstructive thinking constitutes a text which bears its rhetorical singularity (style of promise, figure of signature)

A p. 74 death signs irreplaceable singularity

SEC pp. 328-29 for Austin, signature is equal to verbal utterance coming from “I”, for signature to maintain itself: pure reproducibility of pure event

——for Derrida, for a signature to function, to be legible, it must detach itself from present and singular intention of its production; its sameness alters its identity and singularity, divides the seal

PAS PAS p. (40) Derrida approaches Blanchot slowly, makes the go and come of Blanchot’s pas resonate, not dominate the text, approach event of his unheard of signature, plunge it back into son eau

S p. 69 for Heidegger, signature of thought never individual, commits via community, people, in his or her own language; there are only some languages open to Being: German, Greek

T p. xix logic of event, structures of expropriation: timbre (tympanum), style and signature > same obliterating division of the proper, make every event possible, necessary, unfindable

SH pp. 10-1 poem is due its date, owes itself to its date as inmost concern, signature, owes itself to its secret, speaks of this date only insofar as it acquits itself > inscription breaks silence of pure singularity

pp. 14-5 dating amounts to signing; signature marks provenance of what is given (sent), destined (whether or not it arrives) > one signs a date from a given place

p. 17 date always bound up w/ a proper name > gives us to think an idiom, each time, barely translatable [Derrida is also referring to his French phrasing]

p. 34 signature not only recalls the vanished as vanished, the singular event, its ash > it gathers together a conjunction of singularities, a partaking in future of same date

——pledge, complementary object divide in 2 to seal alliance > moment of engagement, signature, contract, ring

p. 52 wherever signature enters idiom, leaving trace of incision (unique & iterable, cryptic & readable), there’s a date

F p. xlv every “word” that says Thing in word-thing > several subjects, places, instances; Wolf Man inhabits forbidden desire to call himself by glorious word, can’t not break seal in signing

FWT pp. 3-4 heir must respond to double injunction: reaffirm what comes “before us,” necessary (il faut) to appropriate a past fundamentally inappropriable, reaffirm, relaunch otherwise, keep alive

——reaffirmation which continues & interrupts: one’s own decision as that of the other: signature against signature

p. 6 to invent one’s name, sign otherwise, in the name of the name passed down, if that’s possible

ROP pp. 42-3 to say “we” when all alone, after the death of the other, is a common phenomena of destinerrance, of the letter’s never returning, une dérive interne, to which we have to return

——“we” modality of with, with the other, as guest, host, or parasite, we is always said by a single person, taking advantage, the one signs for the other (at the home of; apud, avuec, avoc, apud hoc)

p. 49 [Derrida excuses his gossiping on Lacan]he’s talking about tukhē, encounter, and what binds signature of event to theorem

pp. 42-3 to say “we” when all alone, after the death of the other, is a common phenomena of destinerrance, of the letter’s never returning, une dérive interne, to which we have to return

SP p. 39 déjà, nom de ce qui sefface ou davance se soustrait, laissant néanmoins une marque, une signature soustraite dans cela même don il se retire [Derrida talking about “himself”]

p. 123 signature as seing

p. 127 does one assume one’s own signature? formulation of such question disqualified by structure of the signature: (la signature/tombe)

pp. 161-63n la signature et le texte tombent lun hors de lautre, se sécrètent, se séparent, et sexcrètent, se forment de la coupure même qui les décapite, les échafaude en tronc sans tête, dès linstant de leur itérabilité > expropriative commencement marks everything erected w/ structure of etron [fecal matter]

OTO p. 8 F.N. already a pseudonym, be immeasurably wary when we think we’re reading Nietzsche’s signature or “autograph”

pp. 12-3 autobiographical récit, tells himself his life, affirms EROS, gratitude for gift (gift: establishment of my own credit w/ this name): EROS signs or seals > before such signature, my life may be mere prejudice

p. 14 it is life, as the living feminine, that must return eternally, selectively > life allied to herself by nuptial annulus, wedding ring

——btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

p. 19 autobiography’s signature written in step not beyond, Nietzsche’s one foot beyond life: differance, allo-, thanatography of autobiography

p 24n [re: signature w/out value, to which is juxtaposed untimely signature] Nietzsche: rights of genius have been democratized, everyone relieved of the labor to form oneself, of personal necessity of culture (Bildungsarbeit, Bildungsnot)

SW pp. 343-44 bookmark the fringes, they served once to accomplish a commandment, may another be accomplished w/ them [Kitsour…] > that’s what I’m doing, à contretemps, et signe et livre et date

***pp. 348-49 this irreducible reality of an event (outside discourse but not text)—is so unlike you? > but, it’s the signature, a hem, on the edge, forever heterogenous, a tear, overlap, remaining caught in poetic stitches—thus the effects of anticipated iterability

p. 349 signature (operation of poetic writing) must not be absolutely invulnerable: an “I” signs in the place of the wound (the other operates on us w/out knowing)—so virtual that it remains > bears bereaved memory of an unrefusable lesion > seems older than self: you may have forgotten it, but it carries on dictating all the blows of fate (as if we desired even the worst of them)

TB p. 113 untranslatability less to do w/ adequation than unique occurrence of a performative of force

p. 133 translation: task of pure limit, an infinite labor to rejoin (doesn’t exclude gradations, virtuality, interval & in-btwn) > can one quote a signature?

REST p. 277 Van Gogh left a trap, lacet (snare) [at bottom right corner of picture, cf. p. 258] > cette boucle étrange, une sorte de noeud esquissé, untied shoes, forms an open circle, pincers or key ring, a leash (laisse), as though taking the place of his signature

DST DST p. 202 imprint and caesura, sharp-edged signature (empreinte et césure, la signature aiguë), interrupts most powerful filiations > ineluctably: when tradition can’t secure what it repeats as its own traditionality (exemplarity, repetition, identification, imitation)

——signature interrupts, or rather marks w/ incision, the fold along which metaphysical ontomimetology is destined to divide, desist [ontomimetology in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, and more surreptitiously in Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan]

p. 222 we are constituted by this rhythm, (de-)constituted by marks of this “caesuraed” stamp, rhythmotypy as divided idiom in us of désistance > no subject w/out signature of this rhythm

PIO p. 4 Derrida’s discourse on invention, not inventive through & through: must sign exploiting rule-governed resources > all comes down to that signed innovation

p. 5 invention is not natural, though often related to origin, genius, generation > thus question of son, signature & name

***p. 36 universality (ideal objectivity, unlimited recurrence) in invention blurs signature of invention: name of individual (singular empirical entity) is associated w/ invention in inessential, extrinsic, accidental, aleatory way > this gives rise to enormous problem of property rights

***RM p. 72 for Heidegger, most grave and engraving signature of decision engages/allies 2 families in German language:

1. Ziehen (Zug, Bezug, Gezüge, durchziehen, entziehen)

2. Reissen (Riss, Aufriss, Umriss, Grundriss, etc.)

pp. 72-3 trait (that plural word): possibility of language, logos, lexis, inscription

p. 77 Heidegger’s nontautological fashion (like Sprache, Ereignis): trait treats or treats itself, traces the trait, retraces or re-treats the withdrawal > a strange contract that doesn’t precede, for once, its own signature (sa propre signature), and therefore carries it off (et donc l’emporte)

PF pp. xxi-xxii [re: Peggy Kamuf’s collection] invention: 1) discovery of what appeared already to be found there 2) making exist what’s not yet there: becomes public/readable at instant of irreplaceable signature that interrupts/displaces continuity of unveiling discovery

TR p. 75 “loeuvre has a virtual future only by surviving or cutting itself off from its presumed responsible signatory” [logic of machine in loeuvre]

IW p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

PJP pp. 191-92 narrative of a disappearance: signature gets erased moment it enters literature [like question in EJQB]

p. 198 ultimate signature (last pages of book) says something of debt that remains unpaid > no scene of perjury w/out forgiveness

——forgive me, we say to us

EL pp. 207-08 the vengeance of language (language as name of God) > a debt that leaves its signature in the language will be incurred by innocents, archiguilty, generations to come

——this is a logic that the cogito, practico-transcendental egology, cannot comprehend [i.e. cogito can’t comprehend language?]

p. 223 God’s voice sealed, on reserve in sacred language, like a signature, the oath of the covenant or faith tying us to God: content of this hidden speech will take form again, meaning will take on form in manifestation, to hear & to say will renew the covenant

——sacred language: “con-juration" itself (conjuration btwn God & us)

+R p. 156 Derrida yielded to Adami (hooked like a fish [hostage]), as if his angular signature was waiting for me [Derrida], a stupefying advance > it became Derrida's business, made him speak

pp. 158-59 what is detached from my signature, da, a piece (morceau) of the other’s name, one of the most obsessive motifs in Glas

p. 181 [re: Adami] detailing of extracts, fragments detachable as signatures (typewriter, pen case, umbrella, spectacles, etc.) > why de-tail [dé-tailler: cut out]?

C p. 218 bananas [re: Titus-Carmel’s The Great Cultu] would be copies of copies w/out example, phantasmata, if force of ductus did not carry the remainder beyond any phantasy, beyond the signature, proper name, nameable [cf. pp. 220-21 also beyond hierarchy]

p. 219 cartouche: puts itself to work, forms part of the work by inscribing (itself) (as) the title, signature, autobiographical performative of the signatory

p. 237 I am myself cartouche and cartouches(s) in the plural: “I” sign myself to death as soon as there’s the title, reduce myself to first heading, capital, shrunken head

——Cartouches, its singular performance (hapax, only once) simultaneously entitles & signs: I sign, therefore we sign cartouche(s) [m/f]

LI pp. 108-09n [re: neologism texter] signature, événement quon texte: process of iteration, like surnombre [of Dissemination], marks pluralization that fractures the event, the unique, while causing it to occur (arriver)

p. 32 dispatch should have been signed, which I do, and counterfeit, here, where? [Remark at end of SEC, also see GT]

——can a signature be cited? what are the consequences?

——signature is on the edge of the text (neither inside nor outside)

p. 33 can a proper name or a signature be translated?

p. 34 consequences of fact that signature is imitable, that I imitate it, are unlimited, unlimitable

p. 36 Derrida introduces Sarl (société à responsabilité limitée), wrong to find his discourse polemical > desires & phantasms at stake in proper name, signature, copyright

NOY p. 240 the “second” yes, doit arriver comme un renouvellement absolu, the structural “forgetting” of fidelity

——“grâce à la menace de cet oubli [the cutting off, the becoming unique, the divisibility contre laquelle une signature se tend] la mémoire de la promesse, la promesse même peut franchir son premier pas, à savoir le second

yes, (already but always) faithful countersignature, can’t be counted: it always sends itself off in number (il senvoie toujours en nombre)

ATM p. 171 what to make of a signature [Levinas’] when “il aura obligé,” when Il signs in his place?

——how does one hear “one must” in Derrida’s polysemic “loeuvre dE.L. aura obligé

p. 172 how to cite when Levinas places the whole language (French & Western) btwn quotation marks? at same time “he” is in quotation marks: the nameless signatory w/out authorial signature, “he” who undersigns every work, met en oeuvre tout ouvrage

——infinite law of quotation marks suspends all reference, work enclosed in a borderless context it gives to itself (se donne à elle-même), while making absolute reference to command of tout autre

E p. 7 why call them Fine-Arts (Beaux-Arts)? why not just call the product beautiful: because the product must still be implicated by its signature, beauty is ascribed to the passage btwn production/product; Fine-Arts: always of the frame & signature

***p. 15 [re: disinterested pleasure] a moral revenue drawn from a natural production w/out interest to us; one takes wealth w/out interest, the singular moral surplus value of sansstill, the trace (Spur) of a purpose in nature is what makes our stock in moral value rise

——the without of pure detachment is a language nature speaks to us, “she who loves to encrypt herself and record her signature on things”

CIN p. 9 [re: taped readings of CIN] two voices yield to “another voice,” voice of signatory of text is figure of only one among others, not clear if this figure is masculine or woman

pp. 16-7 Derrida gives Cinder a proper name, is she the signatory of this text?

pp. 23-5 why the phrase “il y a là cendre” doesn’t belong to him [Derrida] > cinder lent, given, to so many others, cinder remains virginal (the only thing he loves), in tact (intacte), the sentence doesn’t even say the cinder

BSi p. 227 poetic signature: not essence but where poem is coming/going: frees itself, by art, from art

OG pp. 41-2 (60-2) writing: absence of signatory/referent, a “fixité” different from speech’s, a monstrosity, écart naturel dans la nature > must contain it like a leper

ATAP p. 92 general narrator at moment of signature calls itself the witness (martyrōn, testimonium)

UWC p. 237 [the event, the unconditional] matter of the sense of sense [meaning of meaning?] > up to you now, up to others—signatories are also addressees

EU p. 59 [re: Kant’s University] monogram, un germe (Keim), an elliptic, enveloped signature—completes itself, pre-destined form

SPEC pp. 260-61(n) Indra–Varuna (Abraham–Isaac-like) interlace their names w/out revenir sur eux-mêmes (not a ring) > cannot close, so enclose each other > always a [double signature]

p. 274 the contractual institution that permits one to say “je-nous” > Freud’s signature engageant et représentant tous les tenants de la théorie: ça marche et fait marcher comme ça [is Derrida speaking about himself too?]

p. 305 one gives oneself one’s own movement, one inherits from oneself all the time

——sufficient provisions so ghost can always step up to the cashier (passer à la caisse); all that’s necessary is to pronounce a name guaranteeing a signature, one thinks

p. 319 greatest pleasure, play w/ the dummy (le mort), [Ernst, Freud] speaks to himself telephonically, make himself re-, acc. law of PP: signing, contracting w/ himself

p. 374 complex scene of signature in which inscription arrives only to erase itself

——Plato remains behind (derrière) Socrates’ signature

p. 386 Freud’s signature in form of “if I wish to,” a seal, “auto-critique” w/out pity > what more to say after that? [cf. SW after Derrida, nobody can discover something behind veil]

FV p. 422(n) Lacan translates Wiederholungszwang as “repetition automatism,” the pre-eminence of signifier over signified > consequence: “literary” text does w/out reference to author [Derrida implies that Lacan takes, at times, his distrust of psychobiography too far in other direction: formalist neutralization of effects of signature]

p. 432 Lacan is missing an elaboration of frame, signature, parergon > this lack permits scene of signifier to be reconstructed into a signified (inevitable process in logic of sign)

pp. 494-95 signer dispossessed [re: The Purloined…], signature in quotations: ce reste est encore de la littérature

WBH p. 191 women’s studies has uplifted from repression all sorts of forbidden feminine signatures

p. 197 Kafka’s “Before the Law” is the Law, his signature, or signature of the text, makes the law

p. 200 receiver as determining factor of gift, one who responds, performativity of text produces receiver w/out pre-existing [him/her/it]

——Declaration of Independence signed by God, signs American people into existence, they didn’t exist before it

——it is by the gift that Law is produced, the signature engenders sender, receiver, signer

p. 201 promise in every speech act, promise not simply performative

——if signature, or all that amounts to it, can’t rely on ready determination (is performative), then you can’t rely on sexual opposition n

CHOR p. 107 no monological discourse, no mono-sexual discourse, necessity for a chorus, a choreographic text w/ polysexual signatures

SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED

GT pp. 51-53 transcendental signified or signifier as general equivalent, “transcendental” makes possible every categorial determination, all givens (to be/to have, thing/person)

——Lacan’s “symbolic order” guards gift against dissemination, against itself

PP p. 88 Hermes, signifier-god, steals (dérobe) and steals away (se dérobe)

VP p. 76 the more the signifier is ideal, more it augments potency of repetition of presence, the more it protects, preserves, reserves and capitalizes on sense

FSW p. 209 via Freud, because there is no exhaustive and absolutely infallible code, the difference btwn signifier & signified is no longer radical [no big Other?]

p. 210 agreeing w/ Saussure that signifier/signified two sides of same paper, originary writing must still produce space & materiality of sheet itself

p. 230 a psychoanalysis respectful of literary signifier has not yet begun

PPHS p. 72 origin, inaugural imaginary limit, myth of transcendental signified, archeology before trace and difference

WM p. 221 for Pierre Louis, in Plato, metaphor plays role of pedagogical ornament, what matters is signified content, intention of truth [Derrida calls these paradoxical & traditional propositions]

p. 227(n) by saying every phonic enunciation is a metaphor, Nietzsche makes it seem that every signifier is a metaphor of the signified?

DS pp. 254-55 thematism leaves out formal, phonic, graphic “affinities,” ignores play that takes word apart > thematism gathers semes linked by meaning (or signified concept)

p. 261 trace, hymen: cut off from depending on any signified

pp. 261-62 hymen not even a signifier or sign [an event?], thus everything that comes from propagation-structure of hymen, i.e. text, is never truly made up of “signs” or “signifiers”

p. 268n neither castration nor dissemination can become originary, central signified, dissem. represents affirmation of this nonorigin, it entails, relaunches, “inscribes” castration

P p. 20 re: art, three ways of truth: 1) word (signifier) 2) concept (signified) 3) thing (referent)

p. 95 what is beautiful is dissemination, pure cut w/out negativity; negativity is significant; adherence always connotes division, lack, negativity; beauty is not a signifier; the signifier: accounts for everything except beauty > a non-sterilized cut from fecundation: la semence serre

POS pp. 19, 98n signifier/signified as sensible/intelligible or signans/signatum (concept), Saussure does not avoid this common, Medieval, stoical trope

p. 20 Saussure leaves open potential for “transcendental signified,” which would exceed chain of signs, no longer function as signifier

——signifier/signified neither radical nor absolute difference, still it functions, even indispensable w/in certain limits

——theme of transcendental signified took place w/in idea of pure, unequivocal translatability, where translation practices difference btwn signifier/signified; Derrida proposes, if difference btwn signifier/signified is never pure, calling translation transformation

p. 23 communication: transmission of identity of signified object from one subject (presupposes subject) to another: A communicates B to C

pp. 30-32 phenomenology’s concept of “meaning” appears wider (i.e. all experiences) than Sausurre’s, but it also claims that signifier is exteriorization (Äusserung) or expression (Ausdruck) of signified

——Husserl’s Bedeutung becomes pure signified, wouldn’t be in differential tissue of gram, trace, spacing

p. 82 signifier exceeding signified still maintains logocentrism (stuck in phase of overturning hierarchy, not beyond opposition)

p. 86 dissemination puts at stake (play) castration’s position as transcendental signifier/signified (phallus, transcendental signifier, as correlate to primary signified, mother’s desire)

ATIA p. 130 for Lacan, animal’s inability to be subject to “signifier,” inability to be evil (deceit)

p. 135 Derrida substituted trace for signifier to ensure that erasure and inscription could be included in the same structure

PS p. 178 acc. Artaud, letter is always stolen, because always open, never leads from subject to subject; autonomy of signifier as letter’s historicity, my vouloir-dire is submissive

O p. 5 writing situates every signified as a differential trace

——“transcendental signified” arrests writing [in structure of double mark this arrest can no longer occur, writing as possibility of living on, arrêt de mort]

p. 49(n) re: writing, Hegel does not think exteriority, repetitive autonomy of remainder > writing becomes pro-gramme, pre-scription, pre-text, the simple empirical husk (déchet) of concept

——for Derrida, this husk is coextensive w/ whole life of discourse

p. 49n signifier sublated in process of meaning (the signified) > Hegel’s dialectic

TR p. 81 “free signifier” ribbon like Lacan’s purloined letter: content is not important

p. 115 [re: Poe, Lacan] purloined letter not a free/undetermined signifier, at the very least signifies perjury, betrayal of a sworn faith

WAP p. 72 Derrida’s work tackled (sattaquait) the subordination of a signifying body to a transcendental signified or signifier, beyond an internal self-critique that maintains philosophy’s proper

p. 81 as a didactic technique, teaching becomes organon of repetition, teaching as history of the sign > teaching body lives from belief in transcendental signified, which comes back to life, more and better, w/ authority of transcendental phallus (signifier of signifiers)

EJQB p. 73 metaphor (animality of letter): primary & infinite equivocality of signifier as life > psychic subversion of inert literality (i.e. nature) or of speech returned to nature

LI p. 52 remainder, not that of signifier any more than that of signified, of the “token,” of “type,” of form or content

pp. 56-7 unity of signifying form due to its iterability, possibility of being repeated in absence of a determinate signified

p. 66 Derrida suspicious of sign, of opposition signifier/signified

EU p. 21 if an utterance is bound to a language that irreducibly forms signifying fabric of its presentation & its signified theme—translation would obliterate very heart of the “signified,” no longer simply altering ratio btwn signifier/signified

FV p. 422(n) Lacan translates Wiederholungszwang as “repetition automatism,” the pre-eminence of signifier over signified > consequence: “literary” text does w/out reference to author [Derrida implies that Lacan takes, at times, his distrust of psychobiography too far in other direction: formalist neutralization of effects of signature]

p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

p. 428 Lacan analyzes displacement of signifier as signified, as recounted object of a short story

p. 432 Lacan is missing an elaboration of frame, signature, parergon > this lack permits scene of signifier to be reconstructed into a signified (inevitable process in logic of sign)

p. 436 Lacan’s exclusion of 4th, exclusion of scene of writing, of 3rd + or – 1: a demand for truth > must take account of remainder in operation of writing, not just narrated content (signifier, the written, letter)

pp. 437-38 Derrida on Lacan: circulation, acquitting of a debt, a proper place [not naive, empirical topology], detour from [woman’s] hole to itself permits signified to return to its origin—indivisible locality, signifier must never be lost, divided, fragmented

pp. 440-42 circular itinerary, Dupin & analyst find letter where they expect it: Queen wants letter-fetish brought back to her, exchanges one fetish for another w/out spending—because there’s equivalence here (assurance of return): circle of restricted economy, stricture of the ring

——castration-truth is that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring): brings signifier, fetish, phallus, letter back into their oikos, familiar dwelling, proper place

p. 444 dissemination threatens law of signifier & castration as contract of truth, dissemination entame unity of signifier, i.e. the phallus

pp. 448-49 for Bonaparte, gold = penis > for Lacan, money = signifier “most destructive” of signification

p. 464 for signifier to be kept (pour que le signifiant se garde) in its letter—no partition (if divisible, always can be lost en route) > materiality—indivisibility—idealization—point de capiton (staples signifier to signified) [?]: Lacan determines letter (no matter what he says) at point of its meaning (ideality): letter escapes partition, movement [no wonder he calls this “materiality” “odd”]

p. 479 systemic & historical link btwn idealization, relève (Aufhebung), and the voice > Lacan’s elevation of signifier

p. 480 Lacan: “the phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance”

——Lacan reversed Hegel: not ideal signified but ideal signifier

SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED in OF GRAMMATOLGY

OG p. 7 (16) writing as “signifier of the signifier” no longer means accidental doubling, fallen (déchue) secondarity, but overflows, goes beyond extension of language > comprehends language

——signified always already (toujours déjà) functions as signifier: effacing = overflowing

——secondarity of writing effects all signifieds

——advent of writing, advent of a play which effaces all those abris du hors-jeu (out-of-bounds shelters [transcendental signifieds]) that surveil field of language > destroying the concept sign

***p. 8 (17) writing as secondary, as technique: a translator of a full speech present to itself, its signified, its other [w/in system that privileges phonè]

pp. 9-10 (20-1) ideality of math, graphie, already questions “signifiant sensible,” never been absolutely linked to a phonetic production

——cybernetics & mathematics extend possibility of “message,” its no longer the written translation of a language, the transporting of a signified whose integrity remains

p. 11 all signifiers, especially written ones, are derivative (to voice, mind, signified, thing itself)

p. 13 totality of metaphysics creates hierarchy of signifier/signified [signified is higher, not exterior like signifier] (Christian creationism, infinitism, both appropriating Greek conceptualism)

——signans (sensible), signatum (intelligible) [?]

pp. 13-4 (25) that a signified must be able to “take place” in its pure intelligibility (absolute logos): the theology of the sign (perhaps this epoch, whose closure we’ve outlined, will never end)

p. 14 (26) w/out exteriority of signifier, there is no sign, together they keep an indestructible solidity, can’t just “move on to something else”

pp. 14-5 (26-7) signified–immediate; signifier–mediate (exterior)

——writing as metaphoricity itself: a simulated immediacy; w/in logocentrism: bad writing is finite, artificial, sensible; good writing is infinite, soul-writing, Book of God (natural)

p. 18 (30-1) book as idea of totality, encyclopedia, requires external signified, is against writing and its aphoristic energy

——violence on both sides: logocentrism (book), deconstruction (text)

pp. 18-9 (31) to the question “what is the sign?” the answer has always been the signified, which is never contemporary, proximity to logos as phonèpresence: no relation to trace, signifier

——what if sign escapes the instituting question of philosophy: “what is (ti esti)…?” what if we can only think of the sign as (is) [crossed-out] and (thing) [crossed-out, fixerup]? [Heidegger’s crossing-out]

p. 324n (32n) at limit, if we try to claim the signifier is prior to the signified [reversing the classical structure], the whole concept of sign is destroyed

——to declare “primacy” of signifier w/in a logic that privileges the signified is absurd

p. 20 (33-34) transcendental signified: resource of sign, makes difference btwn signans/signatum absolute & irreducible > it is la voix sentend: conscience, auto-affection (spontaneity, ideality, universality, non-mondain of substance)

pp. 20-2 (34-6) the word “being” as Urwort (mot originaire) ensures “lêtre-mot” to all other words [Lacan’s name-of-the-father]

——does Heidegger transgress logocentrism of phonè by questioning being? or does the question precomprehend the word being? deconstructive breakthrough (percée) no longer circumscribed in ontic/ontological [?]

p. 31 (47) the word (vox): unity of signified/signifier (sense/sound, concept/voice)

pp. 35-6 (53) for Saussure, true, natural bond is that of sound & signified (not visible image of writing)

p. 50 (73) play as absence of transcendental signified; that is, the deconstruction of ontothelogy and MOP; this secousse de cet ébranlement, working in metaphysics from the start

p. 63 (92-3) for Saussure, signifier: sound-image, not real sound but psychic impression (what Husserl would call hylè/morphé structure, distinct from all mundane reality); for Saussure, signified: not thing but “concept” or, better yet, lidéalité du sens

p. 73 (106-08) writing as death & resource of signatum [sa mort, sa ressource] > immediate signatum [in MOP] is not considered trace but full presence

p. 324n to declare “primacy” of signifier w/in a logic that privileges the signified is absurd

pp. 88-9 impossibility of pure phoneticization, always already undermines mute signifier > distinction btwn phonetic/nonphonetic is legitimate & indispensable though derivative re: synergy & fundamental synesthesia

pp. 158-60 follow the guiding line (le fil conducteur) of the dangerous supplement, chains of differential references, the real never supervenes > impossible to separate signifier from signified

p. 166 (236) speech (voix): produces signifier that doesn’t fall (tomber) into the world/space [subject can idealize him or herself by suppressing differance as such, myth of consciousness]

p. 170 (242) la chose–referent; le sens (idée)–signified; le signe–signifier

p. 208 [if art is moralism prior to sensation, by way of sign], attention to signifier degrades art by separating signifier’s effectiveness from the signified it signifies; supplement signifies nothing

pp. 265-66 for Rousseau, mother is only signified whose replacement by its signifier he prescribes [aka incest taboo], the sanctified interdict > hinge (brisure) btwn nature/culture

p. 266 w/in play of supplementarity, signified always replaced w/ another signifier; prohibition of incest doesn’t escape play [deconstructing decisive institution of law, eg. Lacan]

pp. 275-76 (390-91) [vis-à-vis Rousseau’s distinction btwn literal/metaphor] if speech doesn’t pass through reference to object, instead producing sign via literalization of passion, literal expression remains a metaphor preceded by nothing, opening an exchange to the outside: no literal meaning precedes it, no rhetor watches over (surveille) it

p. 284 (402-03) [re: certain historical interpretation of writing, Condillac, Warburton] linear progress of writing (quantitative condensation) > from one unique sign for each thing (not even signification but presence) to less ornamental, more economical, more attention to signified

p. 285 (404) history of knowledge as desacralizaiton of signifier: history only conceivable btwn absolute pictograph & graphic expense reduced to presque rien

pp. 286-87 (406) the epoch of truth, what Nietzsche calls abbreviation of signs [retreat of signifier?] [Derrida defends Nietzsche against reading that restores truth, fundamental ontology, in Nietzsche’s thought] [Heidegger’s reading?]

***p. 296 (418) split of signifier/signified as naive critique of loss of presence [no matter which side of opposition is privileged]

pp. 296-97 (418-20) for Rousseau, perversity of sacralizing the representer/signifier

——sovereignty as presence/jouissance of present > liberty when signifier suspended & power rendered to the represented/signified; sovereignty not the same as drawing up laws

pp. 299-300 (423) age of labor, civil society, lhomme policé, money & phonetic writing—elle gagne en universalité: signifiers that are nonsignifying, circulation of arbitrary signs in phonetic writing, alphabet is commercial, a trader > anonymous supplement substituted for a thing

p. 300 (424-25) money/phonetic writing both substitute an anonymous supplement for the thing

——both open an aggression against the life they make circulate

pp. 300-01 (425-26) Rousseau’s 2 poles [of original mute writings]: pure pictograph, pure phonograph (presence to thing, presence to voice) [p. (428) “excès qui se touchent”] > signifier effaces itself for signified in both cases

p. 301 (426) writing of voice, une meilleure police (civil order [?]) > also a machine of death

p. 315 (443-44) death (not present) travels w/in speech as trace, reserve, differance, supplement; not the simple exteriority of death to life, evil to good, signifier to signified [that would be MOP] (reversing these oppositions confirms metaphysics their rooted in)

SILENCE

GOD p. 34 silence as condition of Gewissen, moral conscience

p. 74 “can one witness in silence”

p. 124n via Kierkegaard, generality of ethics is bloodless specter of faith; teleological suspension of ethics determined by Abraham’s silence; aesthetics cultivates secret, ethics punishes it

p. 128 Abraham’s silence, secrecy of unforgivable, decision, would have “to be forgiven by the one he obeyed”

GT p. 147 violence of gift: takes by surprise in such a way as to trap, indebt the receiver, place, hold in a process of circulation, but this violence irreducible whether it repeats or interrupts the circle

——or: a surprise surprising enough to be forgotten w/out delay, beyond Being, epekeina tes ousia: secret about which one cannot speak, but can no longer remain silent

R p. 100 sovereignty: silent and unavowable, betrays democracy, the stigmatic point of an indivisible instant

H p. 95 reticence: deliberate keeping quiet

p. 135 keeping silent a modality of possible speaking

AF p. 12 death drive is archive fever, not a principle, aneconomy, threatens every principality, every archontic primacy, every archival desire: its silent vocation > burn the archive, incite amnesia, ruin archive as accumulation and capitalization of memory

POO p. 15 a higher responsibility, a more intractable (intraitable) moral exigency, uneven as it may be, [Nietzsche’s Aussermoralischen Sinn]; p. 133n “pure morality” go beyond duty, beyond duty as debt, duty w/out debt, a silent break w/culture and language

HASD p. 15 “comment ne pas dire”: means 1) how to avoid speaking 2) how to avoid a certain meaning 3) how to speak 4) why speak? 5) it is necessary to speak

p. 52 where does order to remain silent take place? the place is Being, Being reduced to a threshold, outer sanctuary (parvis) of temple, sacred place

EM pp. 128-29 (154) Heidegger: what is near to man is nameless, once close to Being, man will not need to speak much

PP p. 136 from Phaedrus, writing is like painting, when you question it, responds w/ majestic silence > can’t answer for itself

VM p. 112 philosophy “think[s] the metaphor in the silent horizon of the non-metaphor: Being”

p. 117 for Levinas, silence as peace, as discourse being called outside itself, as its telos, as a future presence > finite silence is medium of violence

p. 133 origin of question why finitude? why why? transcendental archi-factuality as violence? > naked, silent opening of question escapes phenomenology, permits appearance of history as such: it is the call (to) (of) an eschatology that dissimulates its own opening

——opening of question, inversion of transcendental dissymmetry, put to philosophy as logos, finitude, history, violence: interpellation of Greek by non-Greek, strange community of silent question > la phénoménologie et leschatologie peuvent interminablement entamer le dialogue, s’entamer en lui, sappeler lune lautre au silence

question can be stated only by being forgotten in language of Greeks

p. 148 only in its silent origin before Being would language be nonviolent; the worst violence then silently cohabits the horizon of peace

VP pp. 59-60 phenomenological [absolute] “silence” of self-relation must exclude not only the other (indication) but also expressive language itself > agency of voice btwn these 2 exclusions

S p. 66 silent play of quotation marks [re: spirit], Anführungsstriche, Anführungszeichen, “the hand calculates very fast,” Anführen, to conduct, dupe, brainwash, silent contrivances, fort/da, what shows or hides changes everything, and when one puts away after exhibiting, this is mise au pas (bringing to heel)

PPHS p. 105 Hegel critiques mute writing, released from voice, thus he critiques mathematical symbolism, operations of formal understanding

——acc. Hegel, silence of writing, space of calculation, interrupts movement of Aufhebung, interiorization of past (Erinnerung), history of spirit

SH p. 11 inscription breaks silence of pure singularity

p. 40 Sichelschrift > cuts in coming around > another turning (not rounding), another trope, inscribes letters in cutting all around > circumcises words in silence?

POOF p. 40 perhaps spreads disquiet, never ‘enough to say,’ never ‘enough to silence’ > perhaps arrives to undecide meaning at each decisive moment

pp. 52-3 Nietzsche’s counterculture of knowing-how-to-keep-silent, the responsibility of silence, friendship preserved by silence (in secret)

pp. 53-4 via Nietzsche, keep silent about “truth” of friendship to protect, guarantee, the truth of friendship, resisting the abyss, the vertigo of friendship’s bottomless ground, the friendship that can’t resist the truth of its illusion, an asceticism, kenosis, speech would ruin friendship, speak in an elliptical way to avow > as though silence could not be spoken about elsewhere than in friendship

p. 54 silence in confession itself > not what the confession confesses, but what the confession itself means re: truth [a belief in truth?]

pp. 55-6 Nietzsche’s silence (among friends), imperative/enigma of sense of decency (pudeur) [Why I am a Destiny]: an erasure w/out erasure, everything is possible in this silence > silence as interruption that substitutes testimony for know-how, faith for the test, the perhaps for certainty, other for same, friendship for calculation: different way of thinking among

——no silence among friends w/out laughter, which bares its teeth like death, doing evil & laughing at evil (not laughing it away) among friends

p. 66 instant of perhaps friendship: causes no ripple in calm waters of semantics

pp. 223-23 aprosēgoría (non-address, silence, non-allocution) undoes many a friendship, Aristotle believes friendship requires proximity > Derrida wonders what he would have made of the telephone

F pp. xii-xiii je marrête ici, déjà (tombe en arrêt [vault to a stop]), setting on the “edge of the crypt” a voiceless word, a blank stone of a scruple [see p. xlviii], to engage others to it, of a crypt

p. xvii crypt, place of silence, where a foreign body is kept as a foreigner, the self mimes introj. while incorp. makes secret; introjection speaks, incorporation silent, or speaks to ward off

FWT p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

testify to what we can neither forget nor recall, a testimony w/out force of verdict or death sentence, to not write risks worst betrayal

DS p. 196n Mallarmé: “direct simplifying instinct,” “poet translates silence”

p. 226 surprise in writing, supplement, baffling economy of seduction: entre un silence

pp. 279-80(n) [quoting Mallarmé] rhythm, literary game par excellence: mimic suspense/laughter—rhythmic cadence, or case, all the falls, the silent fall of pen

ATIA p. 52 what is terrible (deinon) about writing (painting), for Socrates, is its majestic silence, it does not respond [animals too?]

GSP p. 163 to condemn oneself to silence is always possible [re: Husserl’s noematic configuration]

p. 165 genetic description of ego prescribes task of a universal genetic phenomenology (a eidos of historicity) for Husserl, this is not a series of ruptures, revolutions, that tear open a previous finitude to lay bear a hidden infinity, giving voice to dynamis of silence > the ruptures are always already indicated [Telos] [Derrida wonders if this a metaphysical affirmation in a phenemonology]

p. 166 in writing, sign can always “empty” itself, may never be reactivated, risks remaining forever closed & mute

DIF DIF pp. 4-5 that pyramidal silence btwn “e” and “a” can only function in phonetic writing reminds us there’s no pure phonetic writing (functions by admitting nonphonetic “signs”: punctuation, spacing)

p. 5 differance that establishes phonemes, lets them be heard (les donne à entendre), is inaudible

CHM pp. 35-6 there are 2 ways to totally disengage totality of historical language: 1) stay silent about silence 2) follow madman down road of his exile [rabbit hole]

p. 54 silence as madness: irreducible role of haunting language, outside and against which alone language can emerge: “against” designating 1) content from which form takes off by force 2) adversary against which I assure/reassure myself by force [jealous friends of solitude]

——like nonmeaning, silence is the work’s limit & profound resource

p. 59 for Descartes, thinking and saying what is clear & distinct is same thing—Derrida adds that, for St. Anselm, the insipiens, the insane man, couldn’t think because he couldn’t think what he said > madness as voluble silence that couldn’t think its own words

p. 62 vouloir-dire-lhyperbole not antagonistic to silence but its condition, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

p. 308n think an ahistoricality, negativity so negative it wouldn’t be negative > affirm negativity in silence [negative dialectics?]: access nonclassical dissociation btwn thought & language

RGE p. 262 via Bataille, we must find a speech which maintains silence, necessity of the impossible: to say in language (of servility) that which isn’t servile > silence (among all words) “most perverse, most poetic”

p. 263 in order to save what does not want to be saved (silence, play, absolute risk), must redouble language, must have recourse to strategies, ruses, simulacra, masks

——Bataille: find words to reintroduce sovereign silence—at a point, interrupt articulated language

Gi p. 9 to find sexual difference in Heidegger, seek contours of Heidegger’s silence (non-dit)

Gii p. 55 for Heidegger, Gedicht is silent source of written and spoken poems (Dichtungen)

——Ein Geschlecht shelters Grundton (fundamental note), from which Gedicht of poets keeps the secret (Geheimnis) silent (schweigt)

HLP p. 36 can never be done w/ silence, dissimulation, can never tell the whole truth

EJQB pp. 67-8 writing (originally) as secondary, hermetic: displaced on broken line btwn lost & poisoned speech [re: God’s silence, repentance, broken Tables]

——separation of life & thought: infinite anchoritism (writing as moment of Desert, Judaic experience as reflection)

AFR pp. 37-8 good metaphysics, extreme formalization, language of calculus, must reconstitute “metaphysics’s prelinguistic and natural base,” it will have been natural & mute > thus, 2 good metaphysics (form, nature): good metaphysics = physics

C p. 187 potencies of syllable “tu” [you, silent, killed]

p. 188 Derrida means not to touch anything, leave the thing alone, alone w/ you, leave the thing to “the nameless crypt of its mutism” > it knows (how) to keep quiet

pp. 195-96 excess zeal, the little one (paradigm) built like a crypt [Lacan’s objet a?], jealously keeps its secret at moment of greatest exhibition

——hermetically closed (portable temples called hermes): mute beneath its altuglassed transparency, seduces, attracts the dead man, makes him come back and more: fors in that casket

TN p. 12 aphorisms interest us because elliptical, testamentary: keep silence sur son lit de mort

***AD p. 113 engaged by promise while hearing silence it bears at heart of call—figure of hiatus, mouth open to speak/eat

p. 114 silence comes to us from abyss; (Kings 19:12-15) “sheer silence”

pp. 116-17 the instantaneous meantime of the decision (lentretemps instantané de la décision), contretemps, hiatus, or non-response, discontinues speech and is gift of speech

——w/out silence, w/out non-response: simply unfold (dérouler) knowledge in a program > nothing would make us more irresponsible, nothing more totalitarian

pp. 120-22 à-Dieu, so close to silence, also related to death, eipimeleia thanatou, Sein zum Tode

——le-plus-de-sens à linfinià lheure de la mort [the (no) more-sense to infinity…at the hour of death]

BSi pp. 2-4 à pas de loup (wolf), à pas de colombe (dove) (silent commands order world); wolf, war (hunting), dove, order, peace > both silent

p. 3 Nietzsche’s supreme silence: a fearsome sovereign mistress

pp. 198-99 in Monsieur Teste, a Nietzschean kind of superman, infinitely cunning and infinitely bête solitary types: incalculable/hyperbolic arithmetic turns “who” into “what”

——quoi as coite from quietus (silence) [who > what: silencing]

OG pp. 88-9 impossibility of pure phoneticization, always already undermines mute signifier > distinction btwn phonetic/nonphonetic is legitimate & indispensable though derivative re: synergy & fundamental synesthesia

p. 140 (202) silence as much a myth of full presence [as full speech]

p. 335n Freud: mutism in a dream represents death

CIR p. 274 I’ve been scared, me, in the evening, of the fear I inspire, fear of deathly silence that resounds at my every word

SPEC pp. 290-91 death drive: être à loeuvre déjà (in PP), ça se sera écrit en silence—in speculative overflow

p. 357 all these silences by which a trace works on a text, not indivisible simplicity of limes or marginal trait (S is P, “this has [not] been thought”)—rather: the non-thematized, implicit, mode of foreclosure, disavowal

SIMULACRUM [fixerup]

KH pp. 106-09 belonging of genos [true citizens, philosophers, politicians] to proper place guarantees truth of its logos & action, different to Sophists who have no place, wander

——Socrates speaks as true citizen while identifying w/ Sophist, feigns, simulacrum: tells you, you alone have place, gives you the floor > excludes himself by himself by giving back the word; no room for specialists of nonplace or simulacrum in the agora

p. 113 abyss of khōra doesn’t open all at once, fracture of abyss announced in muted, subterranean way, preparing, propagating simulacra & mises en abymes

GT p. 31 even if gift is a simulacrum, il faut (one must) rendre compte (render an account) of the possibility of this simulacrum, and render account of desire to render account > can’t be done w/out principle of reason (principium reddendae rationis)

p. 120 can one create an event, make a story, w/ a simulacrum, w/ counterfeit money? [Badiou]

pp. 169-70 Baudelaire inscribes a naturalization in institution called literature, narrator occupies place of nature; via simulacrum, narrative resembles birth of literature

——no nature, only effects of nature, nature reconstituted after the fact on basis of simulacrum (i.e. literature), nature lends rather than gives, extends credit

AF pp. 10-11 death drive destroys archives, anarchic, destroys its own trace, operates in silence

——leaves no monument/document of its own > as inheritance, leaves on its erotic simulacrum (erogenous color draws mask on skin): origin of beautiful > memories of death

p. 66 repression dissimulates or encrypts the archives, archive of the virtual > virtuality removed from its oppositional coupling to actuality, effectivity, reality [re: full & effective actuality of an archived event]

POO p. 31 if simulacrum bears witness to a possibility that exceeds it, exceeding remains, il (est) le reste, il le rest

SPOM p. 10 what is a ghost? what is effectivity/presence of a specter? > virtuality, ineffectivity, simulacrum? is there a there btwn thing itself & its simulacrum?

p. 55 via Marx, in Timon of Athens [see pp. 96-7 Marx’s play]: Timon’s trust in money (simulacrum, ghost), an oath, a giving credit, to that which is unworthy of oath; not convention society, or law > cult of money as nature, prostitution, thus constant perjury, simulacrum, greed

p. 87 those who oppose simulacrum to presence can’t think event

p. 138 how do you differentiate simulacrum from phantasm? Marx holds to distinction as he holds to life

p. 147 via Marx, btwn revolution & counter-revolution, not only specters and conjurations, but simulacra of simulacra: specular reflection endlessly sends simulacrum away (defers to abyss encounter w/ living body, w/ revolution itself)

POOF pp. 41-2 Nietzsche: today we even need to be scarecrows [p. 36 scarecrow, disquieting simulacrum, opposite of a decoy], insofar as we are jealous friends of our most midday/midnight solitude > “friends of solitude” even called to be conjurers

***p. 45 [re: friends of solitude] not an abstaining from political, even if anchorite plays scarecrow, such a person overpoliticizes space of city

pp. 59-60 Nietzsche’s dissimulation (sage acts the fool), for friendship’s sake be an enemy, knowing how to lie to divert wicked lucidity, dissimulate in order to preserve: feigning to be precisely what he is, he loves them enough not to want to do them all the evil he wants for them

p. 274 Kant explains that empty gestures, those of politesse, lead to genuine dispositions of soul > Derrida extrapolates: history of becoming-true of an illusion, une histoire qui se fait comme histoire qu'on se raconte: elle se fait alors qu'on la raconte, on se la raconte pour la faire [history made while story being told] > a trial (procès) of verification

——a good philosophical computer could convert Kant’s history of truth qua history of error into Hegelian software, then Nietzschean—il le fait déjà [Derrida], n'est-ce pas [baby daddy

p. 275 for Kant, crime against humanity would be to disdain currency, to take counterfeit money for counterfeit [skeptic betrays mankind] > for Kant, virtue obligates that we turn counterfeit (small change) into gold, becoming-truth of the simulacrum, its verification, authentication [pp. 257-58 rare friend keeps secret, renounces possible public profit, that of circulating secret]

MPM p. 85 “must one at each instant reinvent filiation?” is this a signature of faithful memory or betrayal, figure of simulacrum?

p. 153n de Man: sanity can only exist when we’re willing to function w/in conventions of duplicity & dissimulation

VM p. 89 Levinas seeks a second parricide, to murder the Greek father (who still holds us in his sway), a father Plato could only hallucinate murdering, “a hallucination within the hallucination that is already speech” > could a non-Greek succeed in doing what a Greek could never do? and do so by feigning to speak Greek, can one feign to speak a language?

p. 113 no one thought original equivocality of language more profoundly than Hegel, accommodated duplicity & difference w/in speculation

pp. 144-45 Heidegger calls original dissimulation of Being beneath the existent, prior to any error in judgment, erring (Irren), every epoch is in an epoch of erring

p. 149 for Heidegger, language’s dissimulation is the 1st violence, but also 1st defeat of nihilistic violence > 1st epiphany of Being

PP PP pp. 107-08 (122-23) on eve of Platonism, morning after Hegelianism, we cannot “overturn (renversées)” or “reject” philosophia, epistēmē in name of writing, we can displace, we can “mime absolute knowledge” > what philosophy would call simulacrum

p. 139n (159n) Plato condemns writing as phantasm, simulacrum

p. 149 soul-inscription, inscription of truth in soul, uses a metaphor [Plato admits it] that philosophy will never be able to do w/out, must borrow from simulacrum; metaphoricity is logic of contamination, contamination of logic

——good writing can only be described through metaphor of the bad

——false brother is an infidel, traitor, simulacrum; legitimate brother inscribes truth in your soul

PAS PAS p. (67) every revolution needs to take count of Blanchot’s forgetting, forgetting w/out forgetting, a forgetting beyond the protection of repression, a forgetting that describes the whole history of dissimulation

——science is a dissimulation of tout autre, philosophy also > Blanchot keeps “old name” to attempt to give an account of this

p. (76) she/it (elle) is not thought or word (parole), nor what what we dissimulate under these words as their terrifying evidence: their very dissimulation

p. (81) diabolism, double of sovereignty, its trap must take on all forms of sovereignty: méconnaissance and forgetting w/out remains; sovereign traps the devil, lui donnant ainsi raison, risks leaving him the last word

VP p. 46 presence as universal form of all existence, transgression of all empirical, and first of all mine, but even beyond my death, this present still is, must be to be universal; if the possibility of the sign is this relation to death, erasure of sign in metaphysics is dissimulation of this relation to death; I am only possible through my disappearance, death; I am originarily means I am mortal

DS p. 182n the hystera is supposed to be “behind” the hymen, but it exposes itself only through mimicry, transference & simulacrum

p. 197n [re: one of Mallarmé’s sentences] sentence in quotation marks is a simulacrum of a citation, an illustrious rule, a law of unknown origin

pp. 206-07 acc. Plato, phantasma is simulacrum as copy of a copy > no longer refers to any ontology or dialectic [but one cannot escape mimetologism in one fell swoop]

p. 207 Mallarmé’s simulacrum of Plato/Hegel separated from what it imitates w/ barely perceptible veil

p. 211 indefinite fold of word appearance (presence, simulacrum)

POS p. 69 Derrida’s theoretical theses inscribed in [his?] texts have “dissimulated the texts’ texture [those he’s writing about?]” (and inversely), “this is completely deliberate on my part”

pp. 84-6 dissemination situates the more or less that resists effect of subjectivity, appropriation > la dissémination figure ce qui ne revient pas au père, affirms endless substitution, does not overlook duplicity, simulacrum [like Lacan’s “symbolic”?]

——possibility for a mark to “disembed” itself, “unsew-it,”that which is no longer integrated in “symbolic” > violence & unconscious effects of simulacrum

OS p. 34 Heidegger does not investigate hidden passageway (le passage dissimulé) that makes problem of presence communicate w/ the problem of the written trace

ROP p. 78 hinge (la charnière), place where flesh is laid out as a lure for the falcon > as hinge, an opening & closing, du gond (cardo), pivot; as flesh, a possible simulacrum or lure (fort/da)

SP pp. 67-9 the double role of woman as truth’s recession, and as the nonbeliever in truth, she is like the Jew in her “delight in dissimulation,” affirmative power

——does Nietzsche refer to Jew because of the way circumcision marks simulation & castration?

p. 139 never has been the style, the woman, the simulacrum, the sexual difference [un gai savoir]

——plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

ATIA pp. 60-1 what right should be given to this double metonymy: 1) speak of modesty whenever there’s monstration/simulation/dissimulation 2) declare animal modesty exists

p. 74 for Descartes, the specter/ghost “conjured” by judgment is simulacrum of “real man,” spectral man as animal-machine, this animal-machine we’re trying to “flush out”

pp. 81-2 Descartes’ 2 criteria (he calls them “methods”) for differentiating authentic from mimetic simulacrum of automaton (still govern method of Lacan & Heidegger): 1) the inability to respond 2) a lack which is not the lack of man, the lacking of the lack of man

p. 131 for Lacan, move from animal to human (to speech, to truth, to symbolic order): abyssal concept of a feined feint or pretended pretense (not merely the figure or simple feint)

DIF DIF p. 24 because trace is a simulacrum of presence, erasure belongs to structure of the trace, it has no site > erasures on both sides of trace

p. 25 trace & difference cannot appear as such, sheltered (sabrite)/dissimulated in names (received in metaphysical text)

O p. 36 the 2 fictions: 1) when fiction is in service of meaning, truth is (truth of) fiction, it is low on a hierarchy, accessory to concept 2) fiction outside mimetologism affirms itself as simulacrum, disorganizes all oppositions to which teleology of book sought to violently subordinate it

p. 41 structure of feint > always an extra turn (un tour de plus)

RGE p. 256 Bataille’s “major” laughter laughs at a “minor” one—sovereign operation also needs life [?], simulates (as comedy) absolute risk: laugh at this simulacrum > pour se rapporter à soi dans la jouissance de soi > léclat du rire est ce presque rien où sombre absolument le sens

***p. 257 figure of experience that mimes through sacrifice the risk of absolute death, the feint through which the risk can be lived; philosophy can’t think this simulacrum, Bataille can only say it, feign to say it, in the Hegelian logos > ce rire qui se confond, dans le simulacre, avec louverture du sacré

pp. 257-58 Bataille: only way for negativity to reveal what we are is to see ourselves dead, this is comedy! must live w/ impression of truly dying, difficult because necessity of spectacle/representation, nothing less animal than fiction of death > emphasis on simulacrum disrupts Hegel

p. 260 since Hegel’s [all] logic is an interpretation, is submitted to an interpretive decision, it can be interpreted against him > reinterpretation: simulated repetition of Hegelian discourse

——minute displacement disjoints articulations, trembling spreads out—old shell cracks

p. 263 in order to save what does not want to be saved (silence, play, absolute risk), must redouble language, must have recourse to strategies, ruses, simulacra, masks

Gi pp. 23-4 complexity of the negative in Heidegger, negativity can be a dissimulation/disfiguration of original phenomenon, which is not negative: Uneigentlichkeit is not a mistake/sin

Gii p. 46 Heidegger: typewriter “tears (entreisst) writing from the essential realm of the hand” [MOP] > “typed” word only a copy (Abschrift)

——machine “degrades” word into means of commerce, offers the advantage, for those who enjoy degradation, of dissimulation > Heidegger: “typewriter makes everyone look the same”

D p. 294 [let’s mark in hollow, mute, invisible angle] statistical accumulation of “quotations,” [like constraints of that angle] accumulation as feigning to present the text > “this” text & all that touches it—still “that” text; generalized simulacrum: intertext of 2 fictions (btwn primary text & commentary) [Derrida will call D “this” text w/ a certain irony]

p. 297 structural transcendental illusion, one surface of Soller’s square opens to “classical representative scene” > this is a necessity, no nonplace left out, so no pure origin can stand guard over stage as if derived from intactness of absolute opening: any attempt to return to lintimité indemne et propre played out in illusion > nothing takes place but place

pp. 298-99 illusion of truth facing me, sans cesse par soi régénérée de mon visage, will have only been scene-effect of “dispositif”; cet appareil differentiated enough to include autarchic illusion of sovereign subject in its structure

p. 326 “I”: passing passageway for permutation, repercussive percussion, full force of writing > dun coup, triggers (déclenche) tale & keeps (maintient) it in progress

——simulacrum [of “I”] as a force, le simulacre de lassistance: chambre obscure: feigns to transform the imperfect into present: impossible > et vous entraîne dans un nouveau vertige

p. 327 “I” as surface vacant of itself: foments (prepares a poison) cruel dispossession > reaches simulacrum point: où il peut à la fois teindre le tissu (stains the tissue) et feindre to tell you truth about it

——a summons, provocation, face-to-face [w/ what?]

+R p. 163 into (over) the bargain (the market) (par-dessus le marché), not au-dessus (above) the market (the lure in which you would again let yourself be caught) > puts in play, or en abyme, the destructive simulacra of surplus value

***p. 179 simulacra of fetishes (fetishism generalized) because classical logics of fetishism opposes fetishized bit (mors) to thing itself (God, original referent, transcendental phallus)

C p. 198 Titus-Carmel cadaverizes paradigm, hounds effigy of paradigm, feigning the feigning of it in a series of simulated reproductions, he reduces it, transforms it into tiny piece of waste

pp. 218-19 paradox of paradigm: deposed from its privilege moment it’s built, inscribed in a series, an out-of-series cartouche > remains heterogenous by virtue of its relief

——simili-reproduction (in fine)

p. 222 as soon as cartouche doesn’t lay down law, pretending to recite the truth > cartouche as simulacrum transforms paradigm into paradigm effect (w/out destroying it, always something of it)

p. 225 [re: 127 coffins] box is not, it remains, (a) mise en boîte (put in a box, make fun of itself)

p. 240 hiatus of series scores out (rature), in serial interlacing, reference to the other (I have called this seriature [cf. ATM]), to the other’s other > simulacrum of reference, supplementary folds

LI p. 34 consequences of fact that signature is imitable, that I imitate it, are unlimited, unlimitable

p. 37 we are nothing more than prête-noms, “borrowed names,” “fronts” (Woody Allen): masks, substitutes for a clandestine subject

p. 90 as if the simulation of “real life” were not part of “real life”!

p. 95 to avoid the pretended speech act in the general theory is not rigorous

p. 105 Sarl’s 2 feints (double meaning of to pretend): 1) infelicitous ruse 2) a successful fiction (a good show)

TN pp. 223-24 mechanical technique (esp. machines) as a simulacrum of “sensible”—does not feel itself feel, does not hierarchize the “5 senses”: opens place for metonymic substitution

AD p. 98 the 2 ways State dissimulates the face: 1) bringing to light makes face’s invisibility invisible 2) effaces its unicity in generality > both of these are the same

WOG p. 23n simulacra do have power to produce events (do not always do so)

p. 24 sign of difference, like a simulacrum, non-dialectizable

——the ‘thoughts of difference’ Derrida shares in common w/ Deleuze & Foucault concern that which resists, like difference, analogy of a certain community/contemporaneity: figure or face of the mask, simulacrum or lure (leurre)—or whatever cannot be configured

p. 27 the non-discursive remainder, the resistance of the pharmakon, exceeds (is not only) the simulacrum or phantasm—whose repetition disorganizes dialectic

——simulacrum’s possibility retains the trace, but not a question of simply opposing being or the truth[?]

BSi p. 90n [Derrida disputes Lacan’s “animals cannot cross certain threshold of dissimulation”]

p. 171 Derrida stresses “quasi” because it relates to a feint or an “as if”

p. 289 narrative/representation structural to sovereignty, its force, its dynamis and its energeia (virtual & actual power) > sovereignty draws all its power from simulacrum-, fiction-, representation-effect > mystification of representation constituted by the simulacrum of a true transfer of sovereignty

p. 290 trap of sovereignty, trap of transfer of sovereignty > in all these fictions and simulacra blood flows, no less cruelly, irreversibly: beast & sovereign bleed, so do marionettes

OG pp. 36-7 (54-5) to think writing first, a perversion, dangerous promiscuity, origin ungraspable, the violence of forgetting, auxiliary meaning not living (not spontaneous); representation mingles (senlace) w/ what it represents; infinite reference (renvoi): le double dédouble ce quil redouble

p. 239 Rousseau: feigned misfortunes touch more than real ones, we cry at theater but not at other’s sufferings

p. 240 (341-42) dérobement of thing in speech > conceals what vision places before us: 1) interiorize thing in depth of heart 2) speech installs a fiction, a lie, we touch the simulacrum more than truth

p. 286 (405) forgetting & repression inadequate ideas to explain finitude and dissimulation

IF p. 311 Flaubert like Mallarmé: inscribed in locus of philosophical exhaustion, simulacrum of dialectic, both expose its limits & impossibility > simulacrum that discredits oppositions (both mimic Platonic-Hegelian Idea while emptying it of its metaphysical/dialectic content)

SPEC pp. 347-48 Freud’s metaphor of the “vesicle,” protoplasmic bulb, amortizes excitations from outside world [and inside], protects, can be transferred to every corpus [i.e. text]: transference from one legatee to the other, like the simulacrum of secret

FV p. 419 literature that puts truth on stage, can it be read by psychoanalysis? abyssal structure, this space overflowed by powers of simulacrum

pp. 459-61 Lacan forecloses the double w/out mercy, contains it in the imaginary > imaginary/symbolic duality controls Unheimlichkeit, the anguishing disarray (laffolement angoissant) (w/out hope of closure, reappropriation, or truth) provoked by references (renvois) from simulacrum to simulacrum, double to double

——analysand seeing his/her double: “uncontrollable anxiety” disrupts every verification of identity, obstacle for transference

pp. 490-92 [re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

——double, Unheimlichkeit, doesn’t belong to triad, triangle carried into a labyrinth of doubles, w/out original, fac-similes

SINGULARITY

SITE

KH p. 93 [re: inevitable anachronism, teleological retrospection, of translating khōra] Heidegger falls prey in spite of himself [see p. 147n Heidegger: Platonic philosophy prepared move from khōra and Ort (place, topos) to “space (Raum)” defined by extension (Ausdehnung)]

pp. 103-04 khōra as abyss, mise en abyme, gaping hole, not exactly chaos or fright, but not Gaia, foundation, either > abyss in encyclopedic logic [of Timaeus], regulates all sites (lieux) on its edges (jobs in society, region, territory, country)

p. 104 mise en abyme of discourse on khōra, site of politics, politics of sites

p. 105 guardians of city have nothing of their own just like khōra? and the city takes all measures so no parent can recognize their own (child) > a site where law of proper no longer has meaning

BL p. 191 the law itself is what is invisible in each law; silence, discontinuity, w/held site

HASD p. 54 Heidegger says Plato’s khora fell short of thinking the place (Ort), preparing the way for Cartesian space [Derrida thinks this statement is problematic & reductive]

——but 17 years later, Heidegger says, “[hē khōra] heisst der Ort,” and refers to Plato’s khōrismos as the difference of place (die verschiedene Ortung) btwn Being and beings

p. 57 for Heidegger, gathering of Geviert takes place in an indivisible topos, simplicity of point [of sword]: “the place (Ort) gathers toward itself at the greatest height and extremity”

POOF p. 166 Schmitt points out that in German speech & place rhyme: Wort und Ort

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

VM p. 82 Levinas makes us tremble, from the heart of the desert, a thought which makes us dream of dispossession and dismantling: depart from Greek site, perhaps every site

p. 112 deportation from its [logos’] own site toward the Site, toward spatial locality, is the metaphor congenital to philosophical logos > metaphor (before being rhetorical procedure) would be emergence of language itself

——inhabit metaphor’s ruins, shabiller des lambeaux de la tradition et des haillons du diable: by using tradition’s words, one can use [them] up (user), les frotter comme une vieille pièce de monnaie fruste et dévaluée, on peut dire que la vraie extériorité est la non-extérioritée sans être lintériorité, on peut écrire par ratures et ratures de ratures: crossing out writes, still writes in space

——“syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

p. 145 for Heidegger, site is not a given proximity, but, like for the Jew, a promised one

——[Derrida will not let Levinas reduce Heidegger’s interminable wandering to a new paganism of the site, it is not an empirical “nationalism,” nor is Hebraic nostalgia for Land]

——for Heidegger, the Site, not an empirical Here but always an Illic, for Jew & for Poet

S pp. 84-8 Heidegger on Trakl, not to understand but to listen to the sound, a distinction btwn the Erörterung (situation, thought of site, Ort) of the poet and the Erläutung (elucidating reading) of the philosopher [Heidegger never indulges in commentary]

pp. 106-07 acc. Heidegger, difference or duality inscribed by the trait (Riss) is not division, it is the gathering (Versammlung) of the place (Ort), the de-cease (Abgeschiedenheit), in the one (Ein), the soul Gemüt, Ein Geschlecht, none other than Geist [path-breaking (frayage) of trait]

FSW p. 216 Freud: psychic locality corresponds to an Ort, where image comes into being, ideal point, no tangible component of microscope [Freud admits imperfection of this imagery]

PPHS p. 80 Hegel: productive imagination as welding Mittelpunkt (site where opposites pass into one another) [Heidegger’s gathering Ort?]

SH p. 31 insignificance of language, can only take on meaning in relation to a place (border, house, threshold, site) > formation of alliances, codes, contracts

F p. xxxv exquisite pleasure (nearing orgasm) disguised by repression as exquisite pain, le lieu where exquisite corpse has folded so much it appears flat > challenges us to exhume: “accuse-moi

POS p. 40 gram, reserve, incision, trace, spacing, blank, supplement, margin, pharmakon—a list w/ no taxonomical closure, not a lexicon: not atoms but focal points (foyers), crucibles of economic condensation, sites of passage: spread out through text, each in a different way

p. 46 DS re-marks a nerve, fold, angle, doubled fold of undecidable, a mark marks both marked and the mark, re-marked site of mark, can’t be counted on list of themes—hollow is the relief: hymen, fold, square, blank, margin, supernumber, column, air, chandelier

DIF DIF p. 24 because trace is a simulacrum of presence, erasure belongs to structure of the trace, it has no site > erasures on both sides of trace

Gii p. 37 for Heidegger, thinking as work of cabinetmaker (Schreiner), a joiner, attune to hidden plenitude of wood’s essence as it enters inhabited site, Handwerk

p. 58 Gedicht: place toward which poems tend acc. to a “rhythm” > unspoken, unique Ort

p. 60 Ort as point of spear (die Spitze des Speers), first & foremost has power of gathering

——“everything concurs and conveys toward the point,” site always a site of gathering

——acc. Heidegger, great poet resists forces of dissemination or dislocation, privilege granted to unicity, value of gathering (indivisibility [?])

DST DST p. 205 Derrida has his doubts when Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger’s unthought (impensé) gathers in unity of single site, as if there were only one unthought for each “great” thought—as its secret law

pp. 318-19n Derrida wonders if Heidegger’s insistence on Ort, Erörterung, a unique site of gathering, leaves un-thought désistance or dislocation, which might be thought itself [this torments Derrida’s respect for Heidegger, along w/ Derrida’s insufficient concern re: authentic thought]

EJQB p. 66 site of freedom whose cult is not necessarily pagan, not an enclosure, ghetto, site of exclusion: when a Jew proclaims the Site, not a declaration of war, site is not empirical/national, it is immemorial, a future too, tradition as adventure > freedom granted to nonpagan Land only if separated from freedom by Desert of the Promise (Land keeping itself beyond proximity)

TN p. 24 the move from body extension to extension of psyche/thinking is incommensurable > a place (lieu) neither of objective space nor extension: place (lieu) as spacing before space

p. 173 phenomenology finds greatest resistance where extension, place, localization are at issue > nous abordons ainsi une zone de spatialité, extension of the psyche

AD pp. 4-5 Levinas’ meditation on ethics, on the transcendence of the holy over the sacred (paganism of roots, idolatry of place)

SLOW DOWN

HERP p. 197 advisable to decelerate, if one wants to read and think what one claims to judge

MSUB J p. 157 “let’s go slowly”; p. 164 “not to rush, seize”

***POOF p. 15 that the decision of a friend should be slow means it's not yet, it isn’t stable, it’s undecidable

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

MPM p. 62 [see p. 88n at what speed ought one to read?] motif of precipitousness in de Man, acceleration to win time, win time over, non-dialectical—not a particular rhythm—a rhythm w/out rhythm (incommensurable acceleration, infinite and null, touches the sublime)

p. 88n Pascal says don’t read too fast or slow—find a rhythm (accelerate toward rhythm)

PAS PAS p. (24) “I [Derrida]” would like you (tu) to slowly approach viens

***p. (26) Blanchot: when he says viens, she approaches slowly, a slowness most foreign to hesitation, in contrast to brevity of authoritarian invitation

p. (27) slowness: delays, accelerates, displaces time, keeps (guards) infinite distance of moments

p. (38) female voice asks: why her? why is this movement entrusted to the figure of she? Derrida responds by saying, we need to learn infinite patience, be immobilized endlessly in each passage

p. (40) Derrida approaches Blanchot slowly, makes the go and come of Blanchot’s pas resonate, not dominate the text, approach event of his unheard of signature, plunge it back into son eau

p. (54) Blanchot: “more slowly than any slowness, more suddenly than any surprise”

p. (55) an infinite patience that crosses the limit in one stroke, a forgetting that overflows all philosophical and psychoanalytic determinations w/out omitting their pertinence

p. (97) if I write slowly you can hear si jétais là (if/yes I was there) in three ways

FWT p. 74 deconstruction: slow/progressive approach—not attempting to destroy/discredit axiomatics of this (formal/juridical) solution [re: animal rights] > reconsider history of law/concept of right

POS p. 110n “I read while writing: slowly, taking pleasure in long prefaces to each term”

WM p. 209 from philosophy, rhetoric—to make flowers bloom, make them mount themselves, lapidary’s reckoning, patience

DS p. 207 Mallarmé is more patient, subtle, discreet, efficient, does not suppress the double (make it dialectical, bringing us back to presence, to perception of the thing itself)

P p. 126 if we’re in a hurry, we’ll conclude the colossal is the phallus, which doubles the corpse; Derrida jokes: don’t hurry when it’s a matter of erection, let the thing happen

p. 142 “we shall come back to it after moving slowly around its [the colossal’s] site”

OTO p. 26 in the name of an old tradition, Nietzsche tells us to slow down, take all the time to read, at beginning of “On the Future of our Educational…”

GSP p. 164 “let us pause for a moment at a second border problem”

WAP pp. 3-4 certains sont toujours impatients d’accéder-directement-aux-choses-mêmes-et-d'atteindre-sans-attendre-tout-droit-le-vrai-contenu-des-problèmes-urgents-et-graves-qui-se-posent-à-tous-etc. > demand not to be slow, self-indulgent, has a history, a hypocritical structure

SW p p. 317 sericulture, culture of silk: the incomparable patience it demands from sericultivator

***p. 346 “not in a hurry”: I am against those who prescribe the veil, against those who forbid it (same w/ circumcision) > people don’t realize any longer that the scholarly, secular, democratic belong to cultures of tallith & veil: contamination is everywhere

Gii p p. 302n Heidegger: 2 hands clutch in haste, utilitarian violence (want #, quantity), don’t have patience of 1—the essential is not #, it’s the right time (die rechte Zeit)

REST p. 262 no hasty step here, la précipitation du pas, unavoidable w/ Van Gogh’s shoes? [p. 265 pas de préciptitation]

p. 270 [slight difference from Bataille, not sliding?] nous piétinons, nous ne patinons même pas, nous pataugeons (floundering) w/ slightly indecent complacency

DST DST p. 209 de Man’s “no blind spot (tache aveugle)” in Rousseau made Derrida impatient > but impatience should incite one to take one’s time, impatience is never justified

PSSS p. 256 Derrida, advancing to a new theater of cruelty, wants to avoid alibis, will be very slow: prefers incorrigibly long [therapy] sessions

TN p. 175 pause for a moment (pour sarrêter un instant)

ATM pp. 188-89 inconsolable slowness of gift, as if necessary to delay the endless falling due (échéance) of repetition

AD p. 122 Levinas: patient awaiting of God, patience of excess, a waiting where nothing is awaited

EW p. 266 on the democracy to come, on its safeguarding against the worst: don’t expect a formula from Derrida—but a long, slow trajectory

***BSi pp. 75-6 repoliticization (another politicization not depoliticization), a slow and differentiated deconstruction occurs in the divisibility of sovereignty already happening

OG p. 151 (216-17) slow place of pedagogy, Nature takes her time, outpaced by immediacy of dangerous supplement which burns the halting points (brûle les étapes), consumes lénergie sans retour

UWC p. 237 [the event, the unconditional] matter of the sense of sense [meaning of meaning?] > up to you now, up to others—signatories are also addressees

——take your time, but be quick: don’t know what awaits you

SMELL

PPHS p. 93n Freud calls into question repression of smell [Nietzsche]

WM p. 227n Condillac: smell contributes least to knowledge of human mind

P p. 82 try to frame a perfume

OTO p. 17 Nietzsche: “I have a subtler sense of smell for the signs of ascent and decline”

***ATIA p. 55 the animal sniffing out traces (which are always traces of an other), seeking to escape/find: the inevitable animot > what happens when man stands up/represses smell?

TN p. 148 smell most passive sense: pure sensation

E p. 25 Kant: smell is, in a sense, taste at a distance, it is less sociable, more primed for disgust

SOCIAL/COMMODITY/COMMERCE/MARKET [fixerup] see COMMUNITY

GOD p. 101 commerce is reciprocal and finite exchange of wages, merchandise, reward; Christ’s economy of sacrifice as dissymmetry, but still payment, wages, merces

pp. 108-09 secret market of secrecy, “Christianity’s stroke of genius,” says Nietzsche, merchandise, give credit to the infinite [denounce all calculation & still yield surplus-value]

SPOM p. 102 inter-ethnic wars driven by “a primitive conceptual phantasm of community”

pp. 187-88 the commodity is blurred (embrouillé), tangled (embarrassant), aporetic, paralyzing, perhaps undecidable (ein sebr vertracktes Ding)

p. 190 specter is social, otherwise no desire, no love, no peace, no socius, no war

p. 193 there is always more than one commodity, more than one spirit, number belongs to the movement of the commodity

——socius binds men through the interest of time, apprehension of time related to commodity-specters, time comes from difference

p. 195 secret of commodity form is substitution (quid pro quo), but one w/ ruse, perverse intervention of souffleur, parole soufflée > abnormal play of mirrors [men no longer recognize in the substitution made by commodity the social character of their own labor], commodity turns men into specters, vampires > can’t see their reflection, “but who is not so deprived?” Derrida adds

——the commodity objectifies by naturalizing

p. 196 socialization—temporalization

pp. 196-97 phantasmagoria of a commerce btwn market things makes socius seem natural, labor objectified in things, while denaturalizing thing becomes commodity

p. 199 Marx doesn’t just show the phantomalization of the commodity-form but the phantomalization of the social bond

p. 202 “mystical character” of commodity is inscribed before being inscribed, traced before being written letter for letter, everything begins before it begins > but Marx wants to know the instant the ghost comes on stage—this is a manner of exorcism

p. 203 commodity is a born cynic, effaces differences, the cynic prostitutes itself, ready to exchange body and soul, original prostitution

p. 204 if commodity corrupts art [Derrida veering away from Marx], becoming-commodity attested to value it puts in danger > commodity put to work the principle of art

POOF pp. 296-97 what does ‘common’ mean once friendship goes beyond all living community? when it comes to friends only in dying? > common becomes valueless for thinking friendship

POO p. 21 [2nd type of nonresponse] silence, protection, “insolent weapon and most deadly irony,” absolutely elliptical, shelters one, makes safe from objection, undermines responsibility, very essence of socius

p. 31 even if the secret makes social bonds possible it does not answer to them

HERP p. 174 [no friend w/out ear, no ear w/out friend] Dasein opening to voice of other as friend > absolutely originary [possibility of ethics?]

——an originary sharing (partage), an originary belonging

——shared belonging, in difference, inscribed, like an originary socius, through the ear, hearing the other-friend, the friend

p. 190 acc. Heidegger, sophists, media, liberalism, commerce, the majority forget, don’t hear logos, philein, Sein, this forgetting leads to aggression (Zugriff) [see Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents]

***p. 212 Verfall into optics, spectacle, noise > poets, thinkers not tolerated

HASD p. 21 homology btwn secret group (topography of social link) and the place of the secret (beyond all position)

F p. xxxvii 1st paradigm of introjection: fill the mouths void w/ words [Abraham] > language substituted as a figure of presence w/in a community of empty mouths

pp. xxxiv-xxxv tombstone is “illicit,” marks extreme jouissance, attempt to break in [analyze] isn’t illegal, a market is organized around crypt, when introjection is thwarted > evaluates rates (taux) of pleasure (jouissance) & pain (forum or for, la place de marché, fur)

***——[how the program (market, rates) is inevitable but as a place to exhume]

FWT FWT p. 108 Derrida’s wares are more perverse, contraband, than his father’s (sees his father as exemplary figure of the victim, of “sacrifice,” voûté); perhaps Derrida is avenging his father by introducing disorder into “commerce,” whose trial he would be organizing

ATIA ATIA pp. 100-02 for Kant [via Adorno], animals have no teleology (so always a means), they have no dignity (Würde), that is, no priceless internal value, so always a price, always belong to sensible world that must be sacrificed; Adorno sees in this a hatred towards animals, a Kant avec Sade

AFR AFR pp. 100-01 Condillac’s theory of analogy (operation of remarking): supply a language’s defects > remarks anteriority in the fact, an anteriority (of the fact) that becomes lacking in itself > supply what is necessary, is missing (il faut), but [remark] also presents itself as surplus value, a superabundance, frivolous futility > makes all commerce possible (as value & sign)

pp. 111-12 for Condillac, arbitrariness of sign makes commerce freer and more extensive: commerce rescues man from relation to present object only > thus, the proper, property of sign, is system of the arbitrary; Condillac: “until commerce, natural signs are not at all properly signs”

p. 133 frivolous extension (leaves idea w/out thing, sign w/out idea) increases w/ progress itself, follows teleological movement > extends to limit of what it disintegrates: commerce, language, institution

IW IW pp. 275-76 Kant, Jew, German: co-substantial reciprocity, their socius (alliance, spiritual symbiosis, psyche) is very socius that makes subjectum a moral being, a freedom, a person

p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

EL pp. 209-10 the turn to everyday sacredness (secular Hebrew): miraculous manna but also profanatory jouissance > sorcerers: sinister masquerade, quasi Esperanto or Valapük, living dead in a shoddy resurrection used for commerce > evacuation & perversion of meaning

——the false cadaver will avenge itself its carnival disguises, its cadaverous instrumentality

p. 212 iconoclasm & idolatry at same time (if that’s possible): turn infinite value into a commercial one (both use & exchange)

——w/in “logic” of fetishism, no one ones who’s doing the fetishizing: Scholem or those he accuses? (via Enlightenment tradition prepared by Spinoza, it would be Scholem)

pp. 212-13 prophesying about modern Israel, Scholem sees risk of commercializing the sacred [?]

HST p. 393 Levinas: future (avenir) as a resurrection of the present; “next instant” is an annulment of commitment to existence made in the instant; the “I’s” death in the empty interval: condition of new birth

——at moment where everything is lost, everything is possible

——Levinas: hope is a hope for the present itself, “its martyrdom doesn’t slip into the past, leaving us w/ a right to wages”

p. 398 circular commerce: force someone to forgive you, to invite you

+ R p. 160 appeased commerce (regulated exchange of 2 elements)

p. 163 into (over) the bargain (the market) (par-dessus le marché), not au-dessus (above) the market (the lure in which you would again let yourself be caught) > puts in play, or en abyme, the destructive simulacra of surplus value

C p. 238 contingent can do w/out discourse, a masterpiece can’t do w/out a cartouche (on the market & in itself: if you insist on this distinction) > even when the cartouche remains, is defunct: pas de cartouche, plus de cartouche > what will have been able to do w/out it? never touched, aussi impassible et invulnérable quaux harcèlements du trait: cest peut-être quil était déjà dans la tombe, le cartouche

***OG pp. 148-49 (212-14) society as a furnace, man rummages the entrails (fouille les entrailles) of the earth, blindness to plants, nature, mother, moving from blindness to the supplement is the law, we can’t make supplement emerge from its shadow > we speak its reserve (nous en disons la réserve)

p. 290 (410) imposition of form via spacing, beyond classical model of causality, a new transcendental aesthetic guided by inscription: writing, as Rousseau intuited, linked to to nature of social space > inscription as habitation in general

***CIR pp. 62-3 pri, prendre, pris, prier, Proust; anger/irony at Proust’s Franco-Brittanic decorum (Joyce, Heidegger, Wittgenstein): work in which there are theories leaves its price tag > grimace of a good taste naive enough to think it can efface labor of theory: I write w/ price on display

***——“I am for an aristocracy w/out distinction, therefore w/out vulgarity, for a democracy of the compulsion to the highest price, you have to pay the price to read the price displayed”

SPEC p. 282 reality principle as courier, lieutenant, of PP, disciplining disciple, defers enjoyment, the waystation (relais) of a differance (Aufschub), auf dem langen Umwege zur Lust, as if RP produces a socius, institution, contract of discipline

p. 298 fort/da: argument of spool, not a story, not a myth > to give it a title is to accredit the deposit, the investiture

p. 332 payer la science de son proper nom, science of his [Freud’s] proper name (propre nom) inseparable from nom propre: speculation, pay in advance the charges for a return to sender: reste à savoir (it remains to be had/seen/known)

p. 365 State, multicellular society, socius, guarding life beyond death of any given subject, serves to reproduce & rejuvenate other cells

WBH p. 198 if gift has assignable destination, is an exchange, it’s not a gift, if there is from man to woman (or woman to man) an assignable destination (re: object, discourse, jouissance, desire, subject), no longer a gift > gift must be absolutely unconscious & random to be given a chance

SOCIALISM/LIBERALISM

GOD p. 37 acc. Patočka, individualism in technological civilization relies on misunderstanding of unique self, individualism is a role not a person; thus individualism becomes socialism, liberalism joins socialism, democracy totalitarianism; equality for all is equality of roles not persons [Derrida deconstructs this critique: it hearkens back to an originary authenticity]

R pp. 20-21 roué qualifies one who turns a trick, the voyou (rogue) w/ his leading astray (dévoiement), debauchery, worklessness, always a seduction, licentious, libertine [always men, sexual difference]

——democracy always associated w/ this figure, w/ taking too many libertine, liberalism, “everything is allowed,” announces a beheading of monarchical sovereignty

p. 24 freedom and equality are reconcilable, so to speak, only in a turning or alternating fashion, only in alternation, must assure a turning to come and a returning to origin: govern and governed, in turn

MONL p. 64 liberal policing

FL pp. 257-58 politicization is interminable but not total, each advance in politics demands we rethink their calculation; this holds true for classical emancipatory ideal which cannot be maintained today w/out producing the worst complicities

p. 269 when left and right look the same (founding violence)

p. 274 acc. to Benjamin, antimilitary pacifists fail to recognize law-preserving violence

p. 275 via Benjamin, the threat of the law (to itself and outwards) is neither intimidation nor dissuasion (as pacifists, anarchists or activists believe): it is threatening like fate is threatening

SPOM p. 72 evangelism, good news of alliance of liberal democracy and “free market”

BSi p. 298 Derrida on how zoos hide limits, interiorize, hollowed-out (en creux) limits [ditch instead of bars] > repressive violence w/ liberal, idealist, spiritualist grimace

FWT p. 25 the nationalism of republican “universalism” protesting against “democratic” communitarianism almost always voiced by strongest community [Black Lives Matter]

p. 26 double-edged sword of “political correctness,” two-sided trap > thus, high-risk debate

p. 28 general ethics of vigilance re: signals of phallocentrism, racism seems necessary, its caricature is in the minority, in those cases conservatives have a right to complain p. 111 specular countersignature, re: communitarianism of oppressed, reactive self-defense, too symmetrical of a response [Derrida couldn’t tolerate being “integrated” into Jewish school]

DPi p. 133 Derrida disagrees w/ Baudelaire’s take on abolitionists, but feels his suspicion is indefinitely necessary re: hypocrisy & symptomal ruses that agitates/animates defenders of just causes

EU pp. 76-7 Kant’s (not unconditional) liberalism would caution against crossing certain limits, so as to avoid total absolutization of State

——for Schelling, State is philosophy/action > standpoint of Ur-wissen

p. 97 Kant at once safeguards (garantissant) most totalitarian of social forms & gives place to intransigently liberal resistance

SOCIAL SCIENCES (HUMAN SCIENCES)

***POR p. 16 (149) social sciences steeped in Marxist, Weberian, neo-Weberian methodology, they are controlled by the spaces they claim to analyze——same goes for Marx and Freud, en tant quils sont normés par un projet de pratique scientifique et par le principe de raison > even when claiming to be revolutionary, they don’t trouble the “most conservative forces of a University”

EM p. 117 (139) question of humanism contemporary w/ spellbinding (fascinante) extension of “human sciences” w/in philosophical field

WAP pp. 106-07 ingenuity of human sciences (precritical) offers privileged ground for ideological reinvestments > double bind, the nodosité (knottiness) of the knot structure: precriticalness is often of a philosophical nature—and where is the State in all this?

pp. 110-11 not necessary, but “human sciences” can be uncritical discourses crammed w/ very particular ideological content: not antiphilosophy but a certain philosophy

pp. 113-14 maintain unity of philosophy against seductive tropisms of human sciences w/out accepting reactive obscurantism of slogan “the unity and specificity of the discipline”

OG p. 102 (151) phonologism: exclusion of writing, authority accorded to human sciences

SOCRATES [fixerup]

KH pp. 106-09 belonging of genos [true citizens, philosophers, politicians] to proper place guarantees truth of its logos & action, different to Sophists who have no place, wander

——Socrates speaks as true citizen while identifying w/ Sophist, feigns, simulacrum: tells you, you alone have place, gives you the floor > excludes himself by himself by giving back the word; no room for specialists of nonplace or simulacrum in the agora

p. 109 Socrates as khōra, 3rd genus, for he only resembles the genus of those w/ no place

——Heidegger: khōra prepares way for “Cartesian space”

***p. 110-11 Socrates effaces himself before those he addresses to receive all (pandekhēs), what kind of reception is this? Kantian intuitus derivativus or pure sensibility, the gift of hospitality?

——w/ Socrates still sense of debt, gift & counter-gift: he is ready to receive the discourses of which he becomes welcoming > khōra glimpse beyond debt?

p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

——is Socrates someone, something, play of proper names more abyssal than ever, “who are you, Khōra?

p. 115 oral maze inscribed in place which receives everything, Timaeus, addressed to “the one who, as we do, and before us [see p. 117], receives everything,” in this theory of receptions—Socrates

p. 117 (134) wouldn’t Socrates, acc. Gorgias, if logos is already a penetrating supplement [here, Derrida keeps the metaphor, interrupts the dominating decision] be a sorcerer, a pharmakeus

pp. 117-18 Socrates’ desire to animate representation of political, of ideal State, by seeing it at war, in relation to death, outside of its graphical hallucination (immobility) which is the only way poets, & Sophists can speak of politics [zoographic fiction, see p. 123]

p. 119 Socrates can’t go outside his mythomimeticographic dream

p. 123 Anselm? Gaunilon? Socrates? the greatest off all, must have been real

PP p. 118 (135) Socrates’ viper bite, Socratic pharmakon like venom [quotes Meno (torpedo fish)]

pp. 123-24 acc. Plato in Laws, Socrates never left the city, never crossed borders, kept his word in the city, under surveillance of mother tongue, didn’t leave it open to errancy, to writing

p. 126-27 Socrates turns poison into salvation by way of logos, gives hemlock an ontological effect: initiates one into contemplation of eidos and immortality of the soul

p. 137 Socrates knows well sculpture is an art of silence, son of sculptor, at first wanted to follow in his father’s footsteps (faire le métier de son père)

p. 154 as midwife, Socrates knows he will never be father, son, nor mother

***DPi pp. 4-5 Socrates’ death: katēgoria (accusation), a theological one: he introduced new demons (hetera de daimonia kaina), daimonia sometimes gods but also lesser ones, revenants

Gii p. 48 acc. Heidegger, Socrates is purest thinker of West, wrote nothing, placed himself in the draft—withdrawing movement, in Zug (pull) of withdrawal (des Entziehens)

H p. 13 Socrates has characteristics of a foreigner [see p. 19]

MPM pp. 111, 152n for Heidegger, Socrates is “purest thinker,” did nothing else but place himself in the draft, this is why he wrote nothing

FWT p. 10 ostracism of madness, acc. E.R., begins, for Derrida, not w/ Descartes but w/ Socrates’ victory over the pre-Socratics

OTO p. 18 Nietzsche: dialectic is a symptom of decadence, especially in Socrates

PSSS pp. 256-57 Derrida’s Socratic-like “I know nothing,” doesn’t know where to put his knowing nothing (who authorizes his questions?)

TN p. 287 Nancy’s “there is no ‘the’…” could deprive him of any conceptual determination, or hand over the discourse to irresponsible empiricism > Socrates has been teaching us this for years

AD pp. 17-8 Levinas proposes a teaching via welcoming that gives/receives something else, not ruse of master who feigns effacement behind figure of midwife

——maieutics, stuck in the same, teaches me nothing, only what is already in myself: même, egomet ipse, medisme, pouvoir savoir, property, gathers in itself (rassemble en lui-même) capacity & knowing

WOG p. 31(n) mediation through Nietzsche [re: Greeks] not constant—often ironic; PC very ironic about Nietzsche’s image of Socrates

SPEC p. 372 Plato accuses Aristophanes in Apology, Alicibiades defends Socrates in Symposium; Plato is behind Socrates, or in front, as a lawyer: here is the martyr, he’s innocent, he’s judging you

SOLI CIT

VM p. 152 nothing can so profoundly solicit Greek logos [& reawaken it to its mortality, its other] as irruption of tout-autre > Greek language offers hospitality to a thought which remains foreign to it [Jew/Christian in his home]

EM p. 133 (161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

——this trembling can only come from a certain outside—already requisite within the very structure that it solicits

WM pp. 220-21(n) as long as concept of metaphor is not solicited, traditonal method remains in tact [TN. Derrida uses solicit in the sense “to shake the whole”]

PS p. 183 Artaud solicits “this” metaphysics while seeking absolute restoration prior to all dissociation

FS p. 6 to see structure more clearly, solicit it, threaten its supports: concentrate on its [structuralism’s] keystone (la clef de voûte) (possibility & fragility of its existence) > the secret place where structure is neither construction nor ruin but lability

——solicit (sollus: whole; citare: put in motion)

DIF DIF p. 16 to delimit closure of metaphysics (absolute privilege that is consciousness as meaning in self-presence) one must solicit the value of presence (this ontotheological determination)

p. 21 Levinas’ trace solicits domination of beings (in this differance implies Levinas’ entire critique of classical ontology); solicit from sollicitare, to shake up

p. 21 it’s domination of beings (Being as presence or beingness) that differance solicits, questions, makes tremble in entirety: question emerges where ontological difference is broached (souvre)

O p. 53 “dissemination, soliciting physis as mimesis, places philosophy on stage and its book at stake (en jeu)”

D pp. 356-57 on Sollers' use of Chinese: solicitation of whole

OG p. 74 (109) grammatology’s condition of possibility, the solicitation of logocentrism, is condition of impossibility, risks destroying concept of science, exorbitant aim (visée) beyond savoir

p. 92 Pound’s interest in ideogram a form of soliciting logocentrism

p. 290 voice always already undone (sollicitée), marked in essence by spatiality

SOLITUDE

POOF pp. 35-7, 39 friends of solitude, jealous friends of solitude, jealous of his secret w/out secret, share what can’t be shared, jealous of ‘proper & profound solitude of midday-midnight’ [of singularity]: beyond good conscience, friendship w/ new philosophers

pp. 41-2 Nietzsche: today we even need to be scarecrows, insofar as we are jealous friends of our most midday/midnight solitude > “friends of solitude” even called to be conjurers

p. 54 the 2 ways to say to oneself (keeping silent) that solitude is irremediable & friendship impossible, 2 ways to (se) partager the impossible: 1) compassionate [see p. 57], negative, keep silent in secret 2) affirmative, attune/join 2 disjointed jouissances at heart of dissociation itself, an ecstasy w/out plenitude [Nietzsche: open horizon w/out light]: a communion darrachement infini [see p. 57 Nietzsche: “finer still to join in laughing”]

pp. 54-5 allied in “joint acquiescence to disjunction,” monadic alterities, the proper of the alter-ego is never accessible [see SPOM p. 35]

p. 78 Lysis [on friendship] ties proper name to common one (lysis): emancipation, unbinding, untangling, absolution, even solitude > knot undone & what it means to be solitary

SH p. 8 the only one: singularity, solitude, secrecy of encounter, but exportable, deportable, repeatable

DS p. 214 mime (Pierrot): solitary captive of threshold

O p. 56 literature is beyond of everything: author would have to disappear along w/ literature

——literature is the exception in the whole and the exception to everything (lexception de tout) (subtraction w/out lack), part (pièce) which exists by itself [solitude], marks le tout autre

DPi p. 52 acc. to certain logic found in Badinter, a comrade does not leave you alone: “solitude is treason”

CHM p. 54 silence as madness: irreducible role of haunting language, outside and against which alone language can emerge: “against” designating 1) content from which form takes off by force 2) adversary against which I assure/reassure myself by force [jealous friends of solitude]

TR pp. 110-11 a necessity of solitude, no intuition of alter ego felt by addresser & addressee [on either side of excuse/apology/forgiveness]

EJQB p. 71 letter (separation & limit), liberation of meaning from aphoristic solitude

p. 72 signifying absence/separation, letter lives as aphorism, it is solitude, articulates solitude: letter of law can’t be outside difference, can’t end interruption, distance, (non)relation to other

——animality of letter assumes forms of letter’s desire, anxiety, solitude [cf. p. 73 metaphor is this animality?]

HST pp. 391-92 for Levinas, threshold of solitude constitutes request for forgiveness, constitutes being-myself—a kind of ego cogito as an asking forgiveness from the other (a leap), as the very temporalizing of “I” [morality/psychology as ontology: the being in “being forgiven”]

——surviving, resurrection, as miracle of each instant (having to be forgiven—as survivor)

C p. 186 family resemblance removes none [of the 127 coffins] from itself, from the absolute secret, from definitive detachment that isolates/ab-solves outside series

TN pp. 13-15 Nancy on Psyche: abandoned of her pose, radical solitude, alone in knowing nothing, alone for not knowing her extension

p. 90 Levinas: lovers, dual solitude, excludes the third [triple solitude: each partner is solitary and so is the witness], the contrary of social relation > nothing attained, touched w/ caress

BSi pp. 198-99 in Monsieur Teste, a Nietzschean kind of superman, infinitely cunning and infinitely bête solitary types: incalculable/hyperbolic arithmetic turns “who” into “what”

——quoi as coite from quietus (silence) [who > what: silencing]

p. 233 Celan, like Heidegger, evokes an impulse or step that gathers more than one in it

——mitsprechen: mit as condition of solitude, speaking with or to: con-voke, co-loquate

OG p. 142 (204-05) writing as hiding, solitude, when full speech seems impossible

p. 153 (221) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] masturbation, contingent evil, model of perversion: summon absent beauties, one corrupts oneself by oneself (on s’altère soi-même)

ATAP p. 81 Nietzsche: my beloved voice deludes my solitude, obliges me to speak as if I were 2

EU p. 120 Derrida’s solitude considered well-deserved consequence of hermetic & unjustified reclusiveness [he does not think this is so]

——needed to transform rhetoric, staging, particular discursive procedures dominating university discourse

SON

PP p. 82 ekgonos, tokos, fiduciary operations, interest on a capital investment, return, revenue

PIO p. 4 Cicero opens his text on invention w/ question of the son as a question de ratione dicendi > scene of traditio, tradition, transfer, an allegory of metaphor

——does the child (son) invent himself specularly though parent’s narcissism > or is he an absolute invention (this being the truest response to parent’s desire): where truth is thought beyond any inheritance?

p. 5 to reinvent invention: required countersignature must be that of an other, a son no longer father’s invention, son must recognize invention as such, as if the heir were the sole judge, the legitimating authority > invention can never be private (can’t be countersigned by family)

LI p. 42 Searle as only rightful son to commit parricide (a logic found in Sophist); Searle’s indebted/mortgaged signature > auto-authorized descendant

SORCERY

H p. anne 114 crypt, vault [voute] has a relation to casting spells [envoutement]; pp. 124-26 having a spell cast is enclosure beneath a vault—dematerialization of Internet end of spell? no, there’s spell, encrypting in techno-communication

SPOM p. 57 exchange-value a properly spectral apparition if this figure did not prevent the proper

——speculation (the hoarder) is always fascinated, bewitched by the specter, devoted in his alchemy to haunting or return of revenants

p. 149 acc. Marx, parody > Louis Bonaparte > back-up ghost: fake magician > an inheritance that bequeaths, only, the alienation of self

p. 154 acc. Marx, to call forth spirit and dismiss ghosts is to phantomalize, bewitch oneself w/ spirit

p. 157 polemic, hunt, counter-sophism (Marx as paradoxical heir of Plato), how does the counter-sophist remain immune to sorcery, tricks of the sophist, since he must know them?

p. 159 Marx loves word “Eskamotage,” the theft of merchandise which makes the perceptible body disappear, “the escamoteur knows how to make inapparent,” height of his trick is to make disappear while producing “apparitions” [re: Stirner’s incorporation]

p. 171 Stirner brings forth concepts indeterminately, homogeneously, in “the dark element of a nocturnal obscurity,” what Marx calls a “Negroid state” (im negerhaften Zustande)

p. 172 Marx’s “Negroid form” refers to obscurantism, sorcery, enchantment, mysticism

MPM p. 47 apostrophe to naked name, magical incantation, “Lazarus, arise!” > “tropological spectrum” forbids this magic, and yet power/structure of name makes possible such magic, not only the desire but experience of hallucination

MSUB J p. 157 btwn sub and tile [the “-ject”]: persecuting evils, haunting the supports, substrata, substances > Artaud never stopped exorcising, conjuring the fiends (suppôts), succubi, sorcerers

EM p. 117 (139) question of humanism contemporary w/ spellbinding (fascinante) extension of “human sciences” w/in philosophical field

PP p. 73 writing is open to empiricism & chance, is a drug, governed by ways of magic

p. 90 Theuth as god-doctor-pharmacist-magician

p. 97 (110) Plato presents writing as occult, suspect, power, just like painting, optical illusions, techniques of mimēsis in general > his mistrust for mantic, magic, sorcerers is well known

——in Laws: punishment for anyone who helps a witch, buries a witch

——pharmakon as remedy, transparent rationality of science, excludes its magic character

pp. 115-16 Gorgias: two forms of witchcraft (goēteia): 1) errors of soul 2) deception of opinion

p. 117 (134) wouldn’t Socrates, acc. Gorgias, if logos is already a penetrating supplement [here, Derrida keeps the metaphor, interrupts the dominating decision] be a sorcerer, a pharmakeus

p. 120 (137) fear of death [child in us] (la crainte de la mort) gives occult medicine, sorcery (les envoûtements), its hold (donne prise) > le pharmakeus mise sur cette crainte

p. 124 eidos, truth, law, epistēmē, dialectics, philosophy: names of the pharmakon that must oppose to pharmakon of Sophists, the bewitching fear of death

——Socrates must listen to the Laws like they’re a phonic spell

p. 139 (160) mimesis is magical, is like the pharmakon, witchcraft; Plato: if imitation imitates perfectly it is no longer imitation

p. 140 (161) bewitchment (lenvoûtement) > always effect of representation, capturing, captivating, the form of the other, par excellence his face, the vultus

PAS PAS p. (31) Blanchot: “force of proximity that holds under the attraction (attrait)”

TC p. 240 speech’s rational transparency purloins the body in direction of meaning; glossopoeia (not yet discourse, not a shout); for Artaud, word is cadaver of psychic speech, wants to renew spellbinding unseparatedness of language/speech’s power > hieroglyphics

DS pp. 172, 286 Mallarmé describes a genealogy from philosopher’s elixir to the null stone, the philosopher dreaming of gold, foreshadowing future credit—preceding capital; alchemy as the precursor to political economy (triumphing over aesthetics, the other pathway of our mind)

ROP pp. 92-5 the doctor capitalizes on secret, the secrecy effect, the secret of the secret: make one suppose knowledge and believe in the secret [is this the same secret of the secret from GOD?], becomes the evil genius himself, unreason, uses fiction/simulacrum

PS p. 193 self-presence, Artaud’s “WE KNOW IT WAS WE WHO WERE SPEAKING > magic identification

DPi DPi p. 58 theater of cruelty, scopic drive, fascinatio, enchantment that chains spectator to spectacle (fascio, to tense, tie, attach, fasciola is a bandage wrapping [bandelette]) > what links voyeur-spectator to fascinum, charm, enchantment, virile sex

——to executioner: “so, you got a hard-on! (tu bandes!)” (link to erection at moment of decapitation)

EL p. 198 blind sorcerers of secularization conceal abyss (in them abyss is sealed), but au fond de ce sans-fond, the abyss cannot be dominated, tamed

pp. 209-10 the turn to everyday sacredness (secular Hebrew): miraculous manna but also profanatory jouissance > sorcerers: sinister masquerade, quasi Esperanto or Valapük, living dead in a shoddy resurrection used for commerce > evacuation & perversion of meaning

——the false cadaver will avenge itself its carnival disguises, its cadaverous instrumentality

OG p. 234 (333) for Rousseau, the wand (la baguette) that traces w/ so much pleasure does not fall outside the body (ne tombe pas hors du corps)

pp. 234-35 (334) le mouvement de la baguette este riche de tous les discours possible mais aucun discours ne peut le reproduire sans lappauvrir et le déformer—movement of the wand is a substitute (supplée) for all discourse that, at a greater distance, would substitute itself for it [how, for Rousseau, writing will correct speech if it doesn’t precede it]

p. 238 (339) Rousseau’s first allusion to writing (movement of magic wand [baguette], hieroglyph) holds itself out of reach of all distinction (all difference of need from passion)

——lorigine métaphorique de la parole ouvre un oeil au centre de la langue—visibility inscribed in the birth of voice is not purely perceptive, it signifies: writing is the eve of speech

pp. 256-58 (363-35) light movement, chiquenaude, le doigt qui incline un monde, most eloquent model of sign (divine action), la baguette > actualizes virtual faculties dormant in man [is this God’s touch? Derrida includes varying degrees: perhaps not, perhaps, probably, certainly]

p. 292 (413) writing as painting is evil and remedy, pharmakon, zoographeme betrays being & speech, freezes (fige) them > writing as representation (painting) of la bête chassée: capture et meurtre magiques

——that writing carries death, Rousseau would agree w/out reservation

SOVEREIGNTY [fixerup]

MONL p. 39 “sovereign establishment (mise en demeure souveraine) [sovereign summons]… disguised under alibis of ‘universal’ humanism”

PP p. 76 king, father, does not need to write, testifies to his sovereign independence

PAS PAS p. (81) diabolism, double of sovereignty, its trap must take on all forms of sovereignty: méconnaissance and forgetting w/out remains; sovereign traps the devil, lui donnant ainsi raison, risks leaving him the last word

R pp. 10-11 ipseity, autotely, self-relation, sovereign self-determination (gives itself its own law), self-representation, reappropriating and gathering of self in the simultaneity of an assemblage or assembly, being together, or “living together”

pp. 11-13 ipse and possession, property, power

pp. 13-4 de Tocqueville sees America as having a sovereignty that acts circularly by itself with no operator or sovereign divided-off from it, outside of it > “no authorities except w/in itself” [Rousseau’s Social Contract] p. 15 pure actuality of Aristotle’s Prime Mover

p. 17 democratic sovereignty replaces theogonic politics with something just as phallocentric, phallo-paterno-filio-fraterno-ipsocentric (ipsocratic, though tautological, because ipseity already implies force)

p. 17 by killing father Cronos (infinite order of time), Zeus wills out over time, touches the finitude of time, sovereignty as the instant of a decision, end to time and language

p. 77 [Nietzsche-like?] [Derrida by way of Aristotle by way of Plato] the “just more than one,” a god among men, not a part of a whole or calculable series; law, calculability, would betray justice for those who are the law > fable of sovereignty returns

p. 86 to-come: democracy does not exist, never present, not because deferred but because aporetic in its structure (force without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality, commensurability and incommensurability, heteronomy and autonomy, indivisible sovereignty and divisible or shared sovereignty, a despairing messianicity)

p. 100 sovereignty: silent and unavowable, betrays democracy, the stigmatic point of an indivisible instant

p. 101 Schmitt is right, a pure sovereignty (decisionist exceptionality) is indivisible or not at all > incompatible w/ universality & internationality that always calls for it

——pure sovereignty: ahistorical, event w/out historical temporal thickness [surface literature, see GT]

——to define pure sovereignty is to compromise its immunity, it doesn’t exist

p. 102 abuse of power [law of use] is constitutive of sovereignty itself

p. 114 only a God w/out sovereignty can save us? nothing is less sure, that is why we are talking, and what we are talking about [also re: democracy]

SPOM p. 8 helmet effect (authority) needs visor effect

——both mask and helmet share the (supreme sign of) power: looking w/out being seen

FSW p. 226 no sovereign solitude of author

FWT p. 69 arguments for human sovereignty, and the idealism that goes along w/ it > always contains an insult, a contempt for animals

pp. 91-2 sovereignty [God-King-People] still a theological concept

p. 92 indispensable dissociation btwn unconditionality (justice w/out power) & sovereignty (right, power, or potency)—that’s deconstruction: on the side of unconditionality, even when it seems impossible > but, sometimes (anti-)sovereigntist, examine each situation

p. 151 given that DP revolves around equivalence of an eye for an eye, question of DP is not only about political onto-theology of sovereignty, but principle of reason as calculability

pp. 172-73 Derrida follows Freud’s breaches & openings, a reaffirmation of reason “w/out alibi,” goes against a certain historical concept of reason, can even provoke thought beyond “power,” “drive for power,” drive for sovereignty

DPi p.1 DP: arrêtée par un arrêt de justice > an end decreed by the Other, a verdict > this is not the archetype of every decision [?], though it reminds us: sovereign decision always the Other’s

p. 2 no invisibility of DP: polis must see condemned one die > as a way for sovereign to best see itself > its sovereignty: il se voit

p. 3 stage lighting of DP, light of fire, never is sovereign more visible than when it makes itself voyante et voyeuse of execution > sovereign witnesses crime, witnesses itself, eye witness

p. 14 Rousseau: DP affirmed after chapter on sovereignty [this sequence is reversed in Derrida]

p. 23 to think DP, must think history/horizon of sovereignty as hyphen in theologico-political

p. 26 in theological-political structure of DP in 4 examples above: the sanhedrin, the Greek priests, the church must be only guardian/guarantor of word of God > DP against another political theology: in the name of transcendence against transcendence [p. 28 sovereignty against sovereignty]

p. 49 always telephone today linking, like an umbilical cord of life or death, place of execution to executive power of sovereign

p. 64 DP as Christian theater of sovereignty, mercy, right of pardon

p. 145 telephone: technics of transcendence, technics of teleferic relation to sovereignty of absent other, absent God

p. 146 vis-à-vis Nietzsche, sovereignty of music: Sprache des Willens—telephone exchanged w/ God: priest as musician

——if ascesis rejects body, telephonic language rises above, bringing the distant close to itself, the mediate immediate > the priest, mouthpiece for the in-itself of things speaks in language of metaphysics (er redete Metaphysik)

——still there is enjoyment on the “metaphysical line,” aesthetic renunciation renounces nothing

——telephony is metaphysics: religious, sacrificial, asceticism itself, priesthood itself

***p. 181 DP: divine weapon granted by sovereign God to sovereign monarch to fulfill providential law

PF pp. xix-xx to think divisibility of trait of sovereignty deconstructs a certain fable, certain “as if,” of the political onto-theology of sovereignty:

1. sovereignty can resist international capital

2. deconstruct sovereignty while acknowledging all rights of subject founded on concept

3. sovereignty seems exceptional, indivisible, but ‘trait of sovereignty’ divides like any frontier > frontier limit se partageant: divides by sharing itself, shares itself by dividing

p. xxxiv how to think durable hardness, invincibility, of an onto-theologico-political phantasm: i.e. sovereignty?

PSSS p. 242 cruelty & sovereignty (very obscure things) pose a resistance to psychoanalysis, just as psychoanalysis resists them > this border (inside/outside) of psychoanalysis bears weight of our questions: historical, ethical, juridical, political

pp. 243-44 all which resists psychoanalysis in the mondialisation of today, e.g. psycho-pharmacological medicine, positivist science, but mainly an archaic onto-theological metaphysics of sovereignty, individual or state (freedom, consciousness, intention, ego, will), barely scratched or thought or deconstructed by psychoanalysis—is this psychoanalysis’ own autoimmunity? its resistance?

p. 244 psychoanalysis has failed to think, change axioms, of ethical, political, juridical sovereignty, where most cruel/traumatic events take place today; also, psych. has failed to think unprecedented juridical performatives: Human Rights, Death Penalty, international penal system, laws against cruel & unusual punishment…

p. 245 psychoanalysis will be left behind if it doesn’t analyze mutation of subject of the subject, citizen subject

p. 257 imperative will always be the question of principle, the principle, of sovereign prince, princedom

p. 258 mastery, sovereignty (Herrschaft, Bemächtigung), linked to a drive for power, possession, an “I can,” a performative power (Bemächtigungstrieb), via sworn faith (organizes Lacan’s symbolic), indissociable from Bewältigung (exercise of power, movement of appropriation)

p. 260 condemning/saving inscribe in concepts sovereignty & cruelty an ambiguity as unrelievable as autoimmunity itself: in any paregicide, any Oedipus, any totem + taboo, any republican or democratic installation of brothers, no way to know whether paregicide took place or not, took place w/out taking place, before any question about it [see HYMEN]

TN p. 136 touching-power (pouvoir le toucher): 1) force of power, free, sovereign, potency 2) reserved virtuality, dunamis, capability

——touching has potential or power to touch personal pronoun “who” and definite article “what”

AD p. 18 via Benveniste, hosti-pet-s: links hospitality & ipseity, like 2 sovereign powers > “guest-master”

CF p. 37 is forgiveness a faculty? a sovereign “I can,” a human power?

pp. 51-2 sovereignty of human metaphysically aligned w/ sovereignty of Nation, though often appeal to human rights aspires to limit powers of Nation-States

——States remain jealous of their own sovereignty in limiting that of others [re: Gulf war]; for Arendt, sovereignty only imposed where it’s ‘possible,’ imposed on the weak by the strong

p. 58 odious sovereignty: “I forgive you”

p. 59 Jankélévitch/Arendt: one only forgives where one can judge/punish > supposes power, force, sovereignty

pp. 59-60 Derrida’s mad, not so mad, dream of forgiveness w/out power: unconditional but w/out sovereignty

BSi p. 16 minimal sovereignty: power to give, suspend, make law

pp. 20-1 Hobbes’ sovereignty breaks w/ Aristotle’s political animal [?]

p. 28 Hobbes: “Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul” > soul as principle of life, vitality, vivacity

——state, a robot, an animal monster, giant prosthesis designed to amplify

——animal-machine, living-machine, machine of death: serving the living > prosthstate, and yet vitalist in that it mimics the body > civil war [like Schmitt?] death of the State

pp. 39-40 for Hobbes, sovereignty causes fear & fear makes the sovereign

p. 40 for Hobbes, only crime where there’s sovereign power

p. 47 majestas, majestatem, akran exousian, kurian arkh[ē], kurion politeuma, segnioria, tismar shabat [see Bennington's footnote for #s of errors in Derrida’s transliterations]

pp. 47-50 [vis-à-vis Balibar] Bodin, Hobbes—political sovereignty as mimesis of God (the sovereign sovereign): ontotheology of phrase “marks of sovereignty”

pp. 50-2 Hobbes’ rage against the liars who appeal (to God) above the sovereign: 1) the lie of immediacy 2) partisans, civil disobedients: place a law above law 3) like the Jews, don’t accept sovereign as lieu-tenant of God > p. 53 [but!] acc. Hobbes, the sovereign mimics God, Christian incarnation; p. 54 lieutenant as suppléant for other along metonymic chain

***p. 57 sovereign as God does not (need to) respond [Levinas’ death] > sovereignty expropriates ecstasy of irresponsibility: bestiality, divinity, death (each dogmatically designated as unresponsive)

pp. 70-1 international rights & crimes against humanity invoke a sovereignty of man himself (ipse, ipsissimus) above/beyond/before Nation-State sovereignty (Schmitt sees this as Entpolitisierung, humanity not a political concept)

***pp. 75-6 repoliticization (another politicization not depoliticization), a slow and differentiated deconstruction occurs in the divisibility of sovereignty already happening

p. 98 what is proper to man throws certain [Nation-State] sovereignty into crisis

p. 138 sovereign, the arkhē, capital, chief, king, who can lose his head, go mad

p. 207 sovereign, highest, most eminent capital or capitalization, monopolizes force/violence—Gewalt—gives reason in advance to force through right

p. 209 [vis-à-vis Fontaine] that the sovereign’s [wolf’s] power (rage) is always an act of revenge, thus the beast [lamb] has originary guilt (ursprüngliche Schuldigsein): “si ce nest toi, cest donc ton frère

pp. 212, 215 erected marionettes, Sovereign in its Majesty, Most High—not merely a trope, [it’s sublimity is even practical]: surveillance (economic/military) strategy

——“excellently eminent and excellently phallic erection of sovereign highness”

p. 222 phallus as marionette avant la lettre: simulacrum, prosthetic, automatic machine—is the phallus human at all? > phallic erection is a machine but also the attribute of sovereignty

***pp. 244-45 reconstitute sovereignty by 1) transferring it to the other, i.e. no longer my sovereignty 2) or should the idea itself be contested?

p. 256 if phallus is proper to sovereign, is it proper to man?

pp. 256-59 Nietzsche’s superman, and the sovereign too, a hyperbolic, sublime, “higher than height,” more about excess than height, it’s the more than that counts, the surplus, absolutely more: could as well be a maximum of smallness, God as small (sovereign use of nanotechnology)

p. 282 French Revolution inaugurates new form (sovereignty of people, international model) of same fundamental structure of sovereignty (knowing-power, knowing-how-to-see): walls destroyed, but architectural model not deconstructed

p. 283 zoos profitable to knowledge and economy [physiocratic theory of economy]

——nomos of oikos: taming, training, the domus of the dominus > oikonomia also general condition of ipseity as sovereign mastery over beast

p. 289 narrative/representation structural to sovereignty, its force, its dynamis and its energeia (virtual & actual power) > sovereignty draws all its power from simulacrum-, fiction-, representation-effect > mystification of representation constituted by the simulacrum of a true transfer of sovereignty

p. 290 Bemächtigungstrieb: beyond other drives, beyond death drive, think sovereignty through drive, transference, inheritance, transmission, sovereignty itself is nothing, is excess, beyond everything

pp. 300-02 liberty & sovereignty (its limitless “I can”) are indissociable, double bind in 2 senses: 1) double injunction 2) duplicity in very concept of binding, obligation, bind, bond: stricture rather than structure, stricture that limits liberty along w/ sovereignty or sovereignty along w/ liberty

——double bind [#1 above]: deconstruct ontotheology of sovereignty w/out questioning liberty in name of which we put this deconstruction to work: think liberty differently, w/in distribution of a divisible sovereignty > think unconditional w/out indivisible sovereignty

pp. 310-11 supervised liberty is most common condition, and therefore supervised sovereignty > who would dare say we want to escape it?

p. 312 threshold as solid, indivisible, threshold as arkhē: commencement and commandment > archon, figure of sovereign himself

pp. 345-46 for Aristotle, autarkeia (self-sufficiency), sovereign, has an end in himself, is best > the end of everything

OG pp. 296-97 (418-20) for Rousseau, perversity of sacralizing the representer/signifier

——sovereignty as presence/jouissance of present > liberty when signifier suspended & power rendered to the represented/signified; sovereignty not the same as drawing up laws

——acc. Rousseau, return to inalienable immediacy of self-possession (jouissance de soi), unrepresentable sovereignty—the end of written law > there is a social contract before writing, but always threatened by letter

——for Rousseau, writing is origin of inequality

p. 298 (421) “labîme, cest le creux qui peut rester ouvert entre la défaillance de la nature et le retard du supplément” [abyss as delay, hollow, open]; pure law restores (gives back to people) liberty, gives back to presence its sovereignty [sutures abyss], pure law a supplement of supplement

p. 306 (432-33) Rousseau’s bonne fête > theater w/out representation, nothing to see since visibility entame la voix vivante; bonne fête: general will, sovereignty of social contract [signifier, la mort de la fête]

——no servility, effeminacy, sign, money, passivity

UWC p. 232 democracy dissociated from sovereignty of people (from nation-state, from citizenship) [?]

——“literature,” its link to performative force of “as if,” to the right to say everything (or not to say everything), which founds both democracy & unconditional sovereignty claimed by Humanities

***p. 235 necessary to dissociate unconditional independence (of thought, deconstruction, Humanities, justice) from any phantasm of indivisible sovereignty (mastery)

p. 236 sovereign mastery of interior > [indivisible] border of inside/outside vs. divisible limit, because divisible, it has a history > the divisible limit is the limit of the impossible, the perhaps

SPEC p. 295 pleasure principle cannot be contradicted (contredit); Freud confirms it in absolute sovereignty

SOVEREIGNTY (BATAILLE

R pp. 67-8 voyou-cracy a counterconcept of sovereignty like we find in Bataille

FWT p. 93 is Bataille’s sovereignty still theologico-political like Hegel’s mastery? > both are sacrificial

RGE p. 257 Bataille: man who sacrifices vs. sage who surrenders to knowledge

pp. 260-61 in doubling lordship (la maîtrise), sovereignty doesn’t remove itself from dialectics or its synthesis like an independent morsel (une pièce) > such an abstract negation would consolidate ontologics > sovereignty not simply a caesura or interruption but an opening, irruption: sovereignty inscribes dialectical synthesis, provides economy of reason w/ its unlimiting boundaries of non-sense, makes it function in sacrifice of meaning (du sens)

p. 263 difference btwn Bataille/Hegel (btwn 2 differences): Bataille evokes absolute difference that’s not in service of presence > continuum, communication, instant (concepts of Batailles’ sovereign operation) not identical [MOP] but mark/sharpen incision of difference

——Bataille: find words to reintroduce sovereign silence—at a point, interrupt articulated language

pp. 263-64 Bataille’s sliding occurs at point, place in pattern, where old word, because of placement, slides—making entire discourse slide > violent, strategic twisting (imprinted upon language), inflects old corpus: relates its syntax to a major silence, to the privileged moment of the sovereign operation > “even if it took place only once”

p. 264 science of sovereignty (if not impossible) > independent like lordship, puts itself at stake—but does not want to maintain itself, does not govern itself nor anything [no subordination]

p. 265 sovereignty fails when it alleges it kept the upper hand (no subordination)

——no identity, Nietzsche’s active forgetting, no interiority, renounce recognition

p. 266 writing as either mummy or as action of interruption [?]

——sovereignty, the putting at stake, the space of writing, absolute in night of secret: “continuum of sovereign communication has as its milieu this night of secret difference” > one would understand nothing if one thought there’s a contradiction btwn these 2 requisites

p. 336n Bataille: sovereignty must not seek anything

p. 267 Bataille’s writing, in its major instance [see p. 266 major/minor play, both unknown to master], doesn’t tolerate distinction form/content

p. 268 Bataille carried away in his calculable sliding > concepts become nonconcepts, unthinkable, untenable

——phenomenological epochē a reduction carried out au nom et en vue du sens> Bataille proposes epochē of epoch of meaning

——inscription of relation btwn discourse & sovereign operation: “scientific” > a science made to tremble in absolute nonknowledge, “science” only in a transgressed closure—avec un non-savoir absolu sur le sans-fond duquel senlèvent la chance ou le pari de sens, de lhistoire et des horizons de savoir absolu

p. 269 affirmative reduction of sense—not position of ‘non-sense,’ sovereignty is nonprinciple, nonfoundation

——conscientious concern for preliminaries is Hegelian (philosophical)

——Bataille’s sovereignty refuses to submit to preliminaries > method of getting to no method

——Hegel 1st to have demonstrated onotological unity of method & historicity, so sovereignty exceeds not only subject but history, not as ahistorical, but as superhistorical—takes its responsibilities from completion/closure of history

p. 270 Bataille’s writing relates all philosophemes (semantemes) to sovereign operation, à la consumation sans retour de la totalité du sens—acknowledges the rule that constitutes what it will deconstitute

——writing of sovereignty and general economy are similar: 1) both sciences 2) both relate objects to destruction, w/out reserve, of meaning > neither are sovereignty itself, “this loss,” but the “relation to the loss of meaning”

——sovereignty is impossible—therefore it is not, it is “this loss (perte)”

——general economy is not sovereignty itself, there is no sovereignty itself, la souveraineté dissout les valeurs de sens, de vérité, de saisie-de-la-chose-même

p. 337n writing of sovereignty neither true nor false [Aristotle’s prayer], neither truthful nor insincere

p. 272 Bataille keeps [guards] traditional names but they’re struck (affecte) w/ the differences btwn major/minor, archaic/classic [see pp. 337-08n], only way w/in discourse to mark that which separates discourse from its excess

——this stratagem, the sovereign operation, play w/ syntax, does not subordinate itself to an anticipated discourse

p. 273 sovereign writing: transgresses dialectic of mediacy/immediacy simultaneously > a chance, not technique, assures of nothing (no result, no profit)

p. 274 Bataille’s sovereignty is not neutral even if it neutralizes all oppositions of classical logic

——affirmation of play outside meaning: potlach of signs that burns, consumes, wastes words in gay affirmation of death: a sacrifice & a challenge

——sovereign operation, like all transgressions, must conserve/confirm what it exceeds

BSi p. 230 sovereignty of poetry (dynamics of majesty/sovereignty), hyperbolic surenchère (Bataille’s sovereignty, Nietzsche’s superman)

OG p. 307 (434) Derrida describes method where Rousseau’s fête is near to Artaud’s theater of cruelty or Bataille’s sovereignty > though Rousseau transforms dépense into presence

SOUL

MSUB J p. 162n Artaud: soul is a fiend (suppôt), the else which is going to come back

VP pp. 10-1 for Husserl, pure soul is Selbstobjektivierung of monad by and in itself, monadic ego can turn back toward itself in reduction

p. 29 the opposition of the soul and the body always depends on an interpretation of language

p. 48 for Husserl, actuality put on like an empirical piece of clothing, like a body on a soul

S pp. 21-2 Derrida proposes that analytic of Dasein could also be analytic of Gemüt (not Geist but still translated as esprit in one of the French translations)

p. 81 in Der Ister, Hölderlin calls to the fire, Jetzt komme, Feuer!, fire as what comes, call for to-come > acc. Heidegger, Hölderlin, the Beseeler, has been struck by God of light, gift of spirit as incineration, cremation, almost becoming ash [MOP & annihilation of trace]

pp. 104-06 from masculine spirit (that chases and hunts) to feminine soul (that guards and nourishes), the trait, re-trait (Riss from fire-writing), engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, soul bears the sadness

p. 127n Meister Eckhart: Augustine says Gemüt is like a receptacle (sloz) of spiritual images

PPHS p. 82(n) Derrida’s translation of Bedeutung as vouloir-dire [re: Husserl’s Logi…] is also valid for Hegel > Hegel accords to Bedeutung name & rank of soul (Seele)

SH p. 12 several singular events concentrated in same date, this concentration (Konzentration) a terrible word for memory, but also the gathering of soul, Kafka’s attention of prayer

DS pp. 184-85 book is a dialogue or dialectic, our soul resembles a book when we talk to ourselves, a false dialogue, w/out voice, deficient logos [compare to Husserl’s Bedeutung]

TN p. 19 knowledge of soul, acc. Aristotle, of the highest rank

p. 257 [via Chrétian] for Aristotle, hand is “organ of organs,” can become anything because it is nothing, like the soul, touch w/out organs > this feeds into a thinking of Christian flesh

BSi p. 28 Hobbes: “Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul” > soul as principle of life, vitality, vivacity

OG p. 18 (30) Rousseau: conscience is voice of soul, passions voice of body [Platonic]

SPACING

GT p. 122 [re: 2 characters in “Counterfeit Money”] espacement: ils séloignent du même pas, mais dun pas qui aussi doit être tout autre

pp. 124-25 khōra is compared to mother & nurse, not part of oppositional couple, 3rd genus, does not belong to “race of women (genos gynaikōn), mother w/out engendering, not an origin, a before signifying no temporal anteriority [intelligible/sensible looks like father/son couple]

——relation of interval, or the spacing to what is lodged in it to be received

R p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

pp. 44-5 in The Experience of Freedom, Nancy puts to use Heidegger’s Jemeinigkeit, as singularity of time, each time, as other time, also “ipseity of singularity”; Derrida has concerns this risks saving the “I can” of voluntary-conscious-intentional-deciding-I-myself, while acknowledging that Nancy divides it, ruins it, w/ interval or trace of a spacing [see p. 51]

p. 46 for Nancy, “freedom is that which spaces and singularizes,” sharing (partage) as spacing

p. 82 khōra or spacing before any reappropriation by a theologico-political history or revelation, even before negative theology (which is fundamentally linked to Christianity)

——democracy-to-come would be like khōra of political

FL p. 249 anguishing moment of suspense [who will claim to be just by economizing on anguish?], interval of spacing, in which revolutions take place [cf. GLAS p. 207]

SPOM p. 103 not only time “out of joint,” but space in time, spacing [re: ontopology, archaism]

pp. 161-62 Stirner advocates auto-affection of “I-Me,” where no ghosts can haunt, no spacing, no interstice > thinks this epokhē reduces, exorcises the ghost, Marx thinks it reduces to the ghost

p. 175 le longtemps, cest le temps de cette chasse à l’éloignement (hunt for distance, a hunt w/ distance > pray & lure): distance hunt can only hallucinate, desire, defer proximity: lure & prey

HASD pp. 34-6 khōra—“third species” > gives place, atemporality itself of spacing

p. 37 “spacing of khora introduces a dissociation or a difference in the proper meaning that it renders possible, thereby compelling tropic detours which are no longer rhetorical figures”

SEC p. 317 spacing of mark (possibility of extraction, grafting)—not negative or sublatable

p. 327 spacing, disruption of presence, writing

EM p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (lespace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being), “an alternative always suspended over its ‘own proper’ abysm”: it is the text of dissemination

pp. 132-33 (158-60) [here Derrida shows limits of Heidegger’s deconstruction?] prevalence given to phenomenological metaphor (phainesthai, shining, lighting, clearing, Lichtung) opens to space of presence, presence of space, opposition near & far > thought prior to opposition space & time, opening of a spacing which belongs to neither, dislocates while producing presence of the present

pp. 132-133 in Heidegger’s fourfold: near and far before presence, before opposition of space and time

VM p. 112 deportation from its [logos’] own site toward the Site, toward spatial locality, is the metaphor congenital to philosophical logos > metaphor (before being rhetorical procedure) would be emergence of language itself

pp. 112-13 inhabit metaphor’s ruins, shabiller des lambeaux de la tradition et des haillons du diable: by using tradition’s words, one can use [them] up (user), les frotter comme une vieille pièce de monnaie fruste et dévaluée, on peut dire que la vraie extériorité est la non-extérioritée sans être lintériorité, on peut écrire par ratures et ratures de ratures: crossing out writes, still writes in space

——“syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

——langage, fils de la terre et du soleil: écriture > one could never come across a language w/out rupture of space, no aerial or aquatic language, in which alterity would be more lost than ever > structure of inside-outside/day-night has no meaning in pure space [proscribed words], inhabits conceptuality itself

——structure [inside-outside] has no meaning w/out included origin, inscribed eastern horizon which is neither w/in nor w/out space

p. 115 in classical infinitism (Descartes) neutralization of space to liberate positive infinity, body: exteriority, zero point, origin of space, an origin which has no meaning w/out of, origin inseparable from genitivity, from space it engenders/orients, an inscribed origin, written, traced

p. 116 [by following Levinas closely] isn’t speech by its essence rooted in space?

PP p. 109 space of writing, space as writing, opens in violent movement of surrogation, difference btween mnēmē and hypomnēsis.

VP p. 73 temporalization of sense is “spacing,” spacing as openness to outside means no absolute interiority; “space” is in time > the pure exiting of time to the outside of itself

PAS PAS p. (69) Blanchot’s figures, room, sea, staircase, etc. are going to be effaced, figures san figure; not places in space, but they have a certain horizontality (thus the attribution of spatial horizon)

p. (80) is Blanchot’s diabolical démarche: 1) a mastery, which presumes to escape its own trap, believes the maze, the labyrinth, the staircase are a space w/ traps 2) or, very spacing of its pas?

p. (94) Blanchot: this laughter ran along border of space, w/out crossing it, seemed to be that space

S p. 24 acc. Heidegger, one must not say that the body alone has spatiality, this would be naive opinion (naïve Meinung) where spiritual being is transposed after the fact (nachträglich) into space

FSW p. 204 breaching concerns forces & locations, Freud has to reinvent the concept of spacing

pp. 204-05 Freud invents ω neurones btwn ϕ and Ψ to account for that which understands quality, temporality in spacing, that which perceives the period, the break

p. 205 when Freud renounces neurology & anatomical localizations, trace becomes gramme, and region of breaching, a ciphered spacing

p. 210 agreeing w/ Saussure that signifier/signified two sides of same paper, originary writing must still produce space & materiality of sheet itself

p. 217 fundamental property of writing is spacing: diastem (interval, interruption) & time becoming space, unfolding (not linear time) [see Nancy’s Corpus on diastole]

p. 219 pure words and pure things: “theoretical fictions”; words can be treated as things because of spacing, materiality of mark

p. 225 most interesting analogy of Mystic Pad is time, a discontinuous time, time as spacing, withdrawal of perception, periodic non-excitability > interruption/restoration of contact

p. 226 traces produce space of their inscription by acceding to period of their erasure, traces constituted by double force of repetition & erasure, of legibility & illegibility

T p. xxv like w/ Mystic Pad, question of writing machine should upset (devrait fair basculer) space of proper body dans lentraînement sans limite des machines de machines et donc de machines à main coupée

PPHS p. 105 Hegel against Leibniz, mathematics, Pythagoras, all perversions of philosophical model, must “pass through” spacing, exteriority & death (see “Preface” of Pheno…) [not remain]

SH p. 49 poet is provoked, constituted, by the hour, its caesuras > poetic rhythm or spacing at heart of origin of meaning, meaning of language

FWT pp. 52-3 no “free subject,” but certain space of freedom opened by event, spacing liberated, dis-engaged, before & for the pledge (le gage); “with the determinism you spoke of”—no future

DS p. 178 what ruins the “pious capital letter,” the aplomb of the heading: the blanks, ordered return of white spaces, measure & order of dissemination, law of spacing, rhythmos, invisible fleuron

p. 208 space of writing: “event” in which nothing happens—hymen, crime, suicide, spasm (laughter/pleasure): everything describes structure of text & effectuates its possibility > a lustre which is nothing beyond its own fragmented light

p. 222(n) “btwn” re-marks its semantic void, becomes quasi-categorem, marks opening btwn syntax/semantics > its meaning: possibility of syntax, spacing [Spinoza, “btwns” in Hebrew]

p. 234 inserting spacing into interiority does not allow inside to identify w/ itself, close upon itself

——Mallarmé’s book is a block composed of sheets of paper—its “cubic perfection” is open, impossibility of closure, dehiscence as “internal” theater, practice of spacing put in play

——[re: Mallarmé] to write the word insertion (to place w/in, to graft) is to quote the practice of spacing (same goes for writing antre ouvert)

pp. 234-35 supplement in Mallarmé (not unilateral movement, like in Rousseau, which loses warmth of spoken word): cest lexcès dun signifiant qui, en son dedans, supplée lespace et répète louverture

p. 236 “fiction,” “hymen,” “spacious” are caught in, while disrupting, ontological machine

pp. 257-58 each “full” white thing in Mallarmé (snow, swan, paper, virginity) is trope of “empty” white space, constellation of “blanks,” there everywhere, reproduced in spacings > la disséminaton des blancs (nous ne dirons pas de la blancheur)

——le pli (se) plie: son sens sespace dune double marque, au creux de laquelle un blanc se plie

POS p. 106-07n spacing as not only the space, but an operation, production, genetic (generative): spacing ensures no overlap of any two concepts, no privileging of a concept

p. 81 spacing indicates an irreducible alterity, is indissociable from concept alterity

***pp. 81-2 spacing operates in all fields but could never account for each particular difference [compare to Foucault]

p. 95 Derrida does not apply spacing to negate that which is ‘present,’ this would remain logic of Hegelian Aufhebung, Derrida’s nonpresence not found in opposition presence/absence

OS pp. 41-2 space becomes concrete by retaining/restoring negative w/in itself, by negating itself

——1st negative determination of space is the POINT (the place that does not take place), it then negates itself in relation the LINE > als sich aufhebend, point is the line, the Being-spatial of point > then comes the PLANE (surface) > each next stage only made of the negated prior stage, i.e. line made of negated points

——“always too late to ask the question of time” re: spatialization

——each stage of Aufhebung is time

p. 43 point & time thought in circularity together (Aufhebung, speculative negativity, only possible by means of infinite correlation or reflection) > time is spacing, space is time > thus for Aristotle, stigmē, punctuality, determines nowness (nun, jetzt)

O O p. 16 in thus remaining [outside of oppositions, i.e. sensible/intelligible], does a preface exist? son espacement (préface à une relecture) sécarte au lieu de la khōra > remarkable limen of the text: what can be read of dissemination > limen: mark, march, margin, mise en marche: citation

Gi Gi pp. 20-1 the spatial, spacing dispersion, origin of spacing first manifested in language > language determined by spatial meanings (Raumbedeutungen) [via Heidegger]

DST DST p. 222 in the beginning was rhythm, said von Bülow, no simple beginning; Lacoue-Labarthe: “différence-à-soi répétée du Même” > no rhythm w/out repetition, spacing, caesura

p. 223 rhythm: spaced repetition of a percussion, inscriptive force (insensible) of a spacing > doesn’t belong to visible/audible figuration—still structures them (rhythmotypical, typorhythmic)

AFR p. 132 the frivolous: (time of a) difference (of degree), spacing which ontology isn’t capable of, con-, de-struction are breached, line of disintegration (not straight/continuous/regular); philosophy deviates from itself, strikes itself w/ blows from outside > deconstruction is possible

D p. 345 whiteness of virgin paper, blankness of transparent column, air > more than neutrality of some medium, uncovers space of play, play of space

TN p. 24 the move from body extension to extension of psyche/thinking is incommensurable > a place (lieu) neither of objective space nor extension: place (lieu) as spacing before space

p. 25 Nancy: “the incommensurable extension of thinking is the opening of the mouth” > mouth as union of soul/body; Nancy accords decisive authority to “quasi” in Descartes’ “quasi permixtio

p. 35 for Nancy, excès de la façon (fashioning) sur lessence, et que lune supplée lautre, at origin of feeling oneself touch oneself; spectral revenant, prosthesis at heart of (self-)feeling > revenant, btwn life/death, dictates impossible mourning, sans fin—life itself [re: spacing irreducible to extensio]; p. 321n shouldn’t this spacing (what I call differance/trace) be linked to Heidegger’s tension of distancing (Gespanntheit) rather than Descartes’ extensio or even Freud’s Ausdehnung

p. 325n spasm & distension: passage that confirms gap btwn extension and spacing

p. 43 for Freud, the spatiality of space, exteriority, is a projection of an internal, psychical extension

p. 173 phenomenology finds greatest resistance where extension, place, localization are at issue > nous abordons ainsi une zone de spatialité, extension of the psyche

pp. 173-75 for Husserl, duplicity of sensible impression/apprehension occurs via a certain necessary exteriority, an outside as “real quality of a thing” (it partakes even in illusions)

——if foreign outside, space of material thing, slips btwn touching/touched, i.e. the heterogeneity of spacing > won’t a hand touching itself experience this detour?

pp. 179-80 intruder on inside, constitutively haunted by some hetero-affection related to spacing, a host, a parasite, pharmakon, ghost: [each of these figures] habite en revenant tout for intérieur (inhabit one’s heart of hearts as a ghost)

p. 195 Nancy, partage—parting, sharing, spacing, syncope, irreducible partition, gives “it” a chance menacée, heartbeat’s the other’s beat (le même battementde lautre, du coeur de lautre)

——syncope is this partage of spacing

p. 181 irreducible spacing: first word of any deconstruction

p. 200 touching w/out touching, touching in passing the touchable > “time to space itself,” “espace du passage qui fait donc partage [spacing-time], the time needed for touching [co-existence as w/, as other]

***p. 221 irreducible spacing: hiatus of noncontact at heart of contact

p. 221 cet espacement fait lépreuve du non-contact comme la condition ou lexpérience même du contact, lexpérience même du même à jamais ouverte (forever open)et par lautre espacée” [hiatus of noncontact at heart of contact]

——singularity takes place and takes place of (a lieu et tient lieu), inscribing technical prosthetics onto singularity of event itself, because of this spacing: takes place, lévénement dune venue

pp. 229-30 differance btwn 2 surfaces: condition of contact & originarily spaced opening that calls for technical prosthetics (makes it possible w/out delay)

EU p. 13 relation of linguistic subjugation [forced to share language] to the clearing/controlling of borders, roads, routes, regions, territories [see p. 8 method (odos)] > power of spacing, body of writing, to clear a path (language here is neither secondary nor primary)

SPACING in OF GRAMMATOLOGY

OG p. 44 (65) Saussure’s arbitrary sign functions w/in interior natural sound

——[Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure] if “writing” signifies inscription & the durability of the sign, then the very idea of institution (hence the arbitrariness of the sign) is unthinkable outside writing, unthinkable outside horizon itself, outside world as space of inscription > opening to spatial distribution of signs (regulated play) [overturn opposition physis/nomos]

p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

——becoming-space of time & becoming-time of space mark dead time w/in presence of living present > dead time is at work, les blancs take on importance > limit of phenomenology

p. 69 (100) spacing as writing is the becoming-absent, becoming-unconscious of the subject

p. 69 (101-02) the horizontality of spacing, hollow of differance, discontinuity and discreteness (does not oppose it(self) like surface to depth), a hinge (brisure) marking impossibility of full speech

p. 89 proper name becomes appellation (symbolic value [?]) only when inscribed w/in figuration > proper-ness of name does not escape spacing: parousia of voice, presence to self of logos w/in voice, absolute hearing-oneself-speak, is a function responding to an indestructible but relative necessity w/in system that encompasses it

pp. 107-08 (158) writing as possibility of road? violent spacing of nature, silva is savage, via rupta is written, form imposed on hylè

p. 201 (287) Rousseau: philosophy ensured separation of speech & music > Rousseau tries to efface the toujours-déjà of spacing by calling it a catastrophic event: the birth of philosophy out of Greek tragedy (the perfection of grammar of song)

p. 209 (297-98) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

——trait is spacing itself, marks figures, works on surface of painting & time of music

p. 229 (326) Rousseau declares what he wishes to say: writing/articulation are post-originary malady; he describes what he does not wish to say: articulation (space of writing) at origin of language

——what he describes takes place for better or worse, annuls eschatology & teleology just as differance (originary articulation) annuls archeology

p. 232 (331) le langage na pu surgir quà partir de la dispersion

——que le langage doive traverser lespace, soit tenu de sespacer, ce nest pas là un trait accidentel mais le sceau de son originela dispersion originelle laisse sa marque dans le langage: articulation (which seems to introduce difference as an institution) has for ground/space dispersion that is natural: space itself

p. 237 (337) Rousseau [sometimes] places hieroglyphic, passionate langue before speech, a writing that is proximate and present, he praises this savage writing—traces like the wand (baguette), un dessin dans lespace (writing)

p. 274 need as dispersion, as law of spacing, natural effect of needs separated man > culture the effect of an attempted reconciliation [need closer to nature, passion is purer language?]

——need explains eve of society and explains society’s extension, how it distributes/differentiates itself in space

p. 280 (397) for Rousseau, present is always the presence of a jouissance, jouissance always the welcoming of presence > language (anxious research of learning): the spacing btwn 2 jouissances

pp. 287-88 (407) writing in furrows (sillons), via rupta: if space were simply geometric, ideal, writing never would have broken from boustrophedon (turning of ox, left-right-right-left)

——space of geometric objectivity an ideal (object) produced/signified at moment of writing

***p. 288 (408) [extremely Nietzschean description of difference & hierarchy] [re: heterogeneous factors of space to which one and same “proper” body relates, re: boustrophedon]

p. 290 (410) imposition of form via spacing, beyond classical model of causality, a new transcendental aesthetic guided by inscription: writing, as Rousseau intuited, linked to to nature of social space > inscription as habitation in general

pp. 290-91 (410-11) from Kant to Husserl: Kantian revolution of pure passivity re: pure sensibility—still a linear, geometric, transcendental aesthetic; Husserl’s transcendental kinesthetic blurs lines btwn passive/active, puts all objective space in parentheses > but still living present

SPECIFICITY

H p. 75 as if laws of hospitality (all specificity) define the impossibility of hospitality

POR p. 16 (148) “orientation” is not bad in itself

LI p. 99 [from SEC] acc. Austin, relative purity (specificity) of each performative does not emerge in opposition to iteration or citationality but to other kinds of iteration constituted by general iterability > such iterations violate rigorous purity of every speech act (event of discourse)

SPEC pp. 263-64 Freud’s avoidance of philosophy [of Nietzsche] (already in place like a counterfeiter) is inevitable (closest avoided in inevitable itself) > that the da be fort even before a judgment of denegation vienne y apposer la spécificité de son sceau

SPECULAR (MIRROR)

GOD p. 137 [re: Kafka’s Letter to My Father] speaking for the father, spécularité sans fond, who has authority to forgive?: demanding as a surplus my innocence, which is yours because you identify w/ me

pp. 145,148 secret secret of forgiveness: to remain secret, and to become self-forgiveness (via specular identification) and in the ambiguity of se pardonner, to be deprived of sense in this narcissistic reflexivity

——to ask forgiveness is to identify with the other, auto-affect, hetero-affect

FL p. 298 Benjamin’s divine, bloodless violence cannot avoid making us shudder w/ its eery affinity to the final solution (resembles too closely to point of specular fascination) > Benjamin still too Heideggerian, too messianico-Marxist or archeo-eschatological [for Derrida]

LOBL pp. ~104-05 [literary] title is not its own telos, not self-mirroring, writing prevents reflecting representation from folding back on itself

SPOM p. 6 spectrality interrupts all specularity, de-synchronizes, calls us to anachrony

p. 147 [reverse of above?] via Marx, btwn revolution & counter-revolution, not only specters and conjurations, but simulacra of simulacra: specular reflection endlessly sends simulacrum away (defers to abyss encounter w/ living body, w/ revolution itself)

p. 175 specular circle: one chases after to chase away (on chasse pour chasser), one pursues (on pourchasse)

p. 195 secret of commodity form is substitution (quid pro quo), but one w/ ruse, perverse intervention of souffleur, parole soufflée > abnormal play of mirrors [men no longer recognize in the substitution made by commodity the social character of their own labor], commodity turns men into specters, vampires > can’t see their reflection, “but who is not so deprived?” Derrida adds

MPM p. 32 w/out ever crossing the mirror of a certain speculation > [keep friend “in us”?]

A p. 66 for Heidegger, death—stand before (steht bevor) oneself, await, precede oneself as before a mirror, as before the future, “in its ownmost potentiality for being” [see p. 78]

FWT p. 111 specular countersignature, re: communitarianism of oppressed, reactive self-defense, too symmetrical of a response [Derrida couldn’t tolerate being “integrated” into Jewish school]

DS p. 188 specularity of eidos > logos—speech < mirroring [repetition ordered by resemblance (homoiōsis), doubling as duplication]

SP pp. 149-51n “moment sexual difference is determined as an opposition, the image of each term is inverted into the other” > the 2 X’s à la fois subject/predicate, their copula a mirror: man wants ideal man in woman, woman ideal woman in man > homosexual effacement à linfini

ATIA pp. 59-60 where does mirror stage begin? not just in visibility, but in identifying a neighbor, a fellow (semblable), wherever there is sexual coupling?

p. 64 suis of Qui/Que suis-je? (both être and suivre) the little third party as copula, comes btwn subject and itself, worries it (sacharne), hounds it, to hunt itself in the mirror

pp. 82-3 for Descartes, animal judged as automaton, as spectacle, before specular subject—who doesn’t want to find himself reflected in image of animal

pp. 121-22 for Lacan, mirror (imaginary) is enough to bring an animal from solitary to gregarious form (which is not social); animal does not have unconscious, language, sometimes develops it through domestic transference [?]

***O p. 33 dissemination written on back, tain of mirror, not on its inverted specter

SW p. 329 [re: laser] this radiance requires two parallel mirrors perpendicular to cutting rays (like in nature, double mirror w/ 2 voices)

p. 332 braid of phonemes (verdict, voix, vouloir, le voir, la venue, etc.) is knotted out of sight, remains, like warp of text, untranslatable > language we inherit is never ours, which is why it can’t be translated: put it outside its self, no longer recognize its children/idiom [baby daddy]

CHM pp. 31-2 re: his relation to Foucault: interminable unhappiness (unhappy consciousness) of disciple > master might be absent

——must break the mirror, the glass, infinite speculation on master: start to speak

REST pp. 354-55 Verlässlichkeit laces and lets loose at same time, restitutes “profoundest” going-back behind the philosophemes of matter-form, subjectivity, law, etc., but also [restitutes] most naively archaic regression to trust, that which can let itself be had (se laisser prendre), can abandon itself to the primary/crudest trap, trap before all traps, to a lure constituted by mirror play of the world, its Spiegelspiel [Levinas-like critique? or affirmation of Duplicity?]

DST DST p. 315n Lacoue-Labarthe: subject in mirror is first of all subject in désistance, figure is never one, destabilizing division of figural (this muddles Lacan’s distinction btwn symbolic/imaginary)

p. 226 via Lacoue-Labarthe, Lacan’s theoreticism, which is inscribed in the ontology of the figure, Lacan’s recasting of Freud to the gaze, the specular > an ontomimetological interpretation of mimesis

PIO p. 4 does the child (son) invent himself specularly though parent’s narcissism > or is he an absolute invention (this being the truest response to parent’s desire): where truth is thought beyond any inheritance?

p. 9 no matter how outstretched (tendus) we are toward the other, everything we say or do remains w/in us: part of us wounded, conversing w/ ourselves in work of mourning, of Erinnerung

——even if metonymy of other w/in ourselves already constituted our relation to living other, [actual?] death brings relation into a more abundant light (un plus de lumière) > makes the breaking of the mirror more necessary (difficult): at instant of death, limit of narcissistic reappropriation is terribly sharp > must no longer be concerned w/ other in ourselvesyet, that’s all we can be concerned w/ > narcissistic wound enlarges (saccroît) for want of being (ne plus pouvoir être) narcissistic, no longer appeased in that Erinnerung we call work of mourning

pp. 15-6 specularization paralyzes “Fable” (seems to freeze text)—undecidability of whether fabulous discourse makes it out of itself or is the very misfortune (malheurs) of the [possibility of the] mirror, infelicity of constative/performative (way they parasite each other)

p. 17 mirror as predicament, necessary or fateful situation > caught in mirror’s fatal & fascinating trap

pp. 18-9 via Eros/Psyche myth, impossibility of seeing & touching oneself at same time: mourning, mirror, specularization

pp. 19-20 igitur or donc [re: “Fable”] speaks for a psyche, to it/her, before it/her, on subject of psyche, which has become pivoting speculum that relates the same to the other

IW p. 325n Derrida is calling “psyche” the psychic space of a “fantasmatic impulse” (love, hate, madness, projection, rejection etc.), & that which acts like une psyché, a large pivoting mirror

p. 265 German-Jewish psyche, as a psyché always does, keeps watch over (garde) the spirit

D p. 314 not enough to make air itself appear (call presence to mind), “air” is not a simple medium: opening carved out of it is a closed opening, false exit: a mirror—not any mirror, the tain of…

——once ether (presence of present) has been called to mind: plupresent not merely presence but deformation irreducible to any form (presence, first matter in the last instance)

p. 315 mirror takes place as something designed to be broken

——don’t dispel the uncertainty: whether mirror is classical stage or generalized space in which old theater is inscribed?

——all oppositions sont détraquées (thrown out of whack) by “avoir-lieu” of mirror: each term takes over (capte) the other & excludes itself from itself

p. 316 each part of mirror larger than whole (mirror smaller than itself): 4th surface paradigm of this relation

——the inside of text will always have been outside it; reciprocal contamination of body proper, violent expatriation, poison affirmed—mercury in its tain is a poison

——tout commence donc par la citation, dans les faux plis (creases) dun certain voile, of a certain mirror-like screen

p. 323 through mirror-effect (germinates/deforms), each sequence of text comprehends another > each part smaller than themselves & greater than the whole they reflect

——figure of quadrangle complicated by strange mirror [imparfait de double fond], mirror as echo that precedes origin it seems to answer > “echo” is an “incision” (X nétant constitués quen retour)

p. 353 can’t rest on copula, coupling is a mirror

pp. 353-55 Heidegger’s Geviert, “est” tried to say what is beyond narcissism, se prend (captured) in the mirror: Being confines itself to its rature (crossing-out) comme quadrature (criss-crossing)

p. 366 limits of square/cube—indefinitely specular unfolding/refolding: not limits at all > opening of its own inscription—tout autre, la même, another geometry to come [EROS]

C p. 243 a discourse on stricture: elles sont tendues pour (faire) bander le mors (bind the bit, get a hard-on), set a trap w/key and lock (serrure) > get up the ghost of a double bind, same lacing in other series, w/in, around two bodies skewered in mirror-image

TN pp. 170-71 sight is mediated even by a mirror

p. 281 reflexivity of se toucher toi of 2 borders (bords) does not submit to logic of mirror, speculum

——eyes touch btwn 2 orients: invisible eye (touchable), seeing eye (untouchable)

SPEC p. 322 specularity not simply reappropriation [re: fort/da]

CHOR p. 92 specular reversal of masculine “subjectivity” (even in its most self-critical form, when most jealous of itself and its “proper” objects) represents only one phase of feminism?

SPECULATE (FREUD)

***GOD p. 83 the speculative requires a heterotautological position (Hegel, revealed religion that is precisely Christian) [G], always risks meaning nothing, speculates on every secret [re: tout autre est tout autre]

GT pp. 150-51 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

——literature as place of non-place of frame, triptych w/ dislocated frame, 3 + or – excluded 4th, all positions exchangeable to infinite, an ex-propriation that forbids a return to self, most powerful or interesting speculation

——readers are at once debtors & creditors, like the narrator, we are the beggar, the 3rd party excluded from the secret of the dual scene

pp. 153-54 as long as money counts, produces effects, as long as it assures finite possibilities of decision & judgment, it is simply not different from money it counterfeits > a more powerful but not infinitely powerful [?] inscription of effects of reference on truth, convention, dispositifs

——opposition of conventional to natural is discredited, or, more rigorously, it is limited in its indispensable credit, in the speculation it will always have to authorize

p. 165n “freedom” in Kant’s speculative philosophy [?] can’t be demonstrated, it’s a “letter of credit for the moral law,” an assumption; also that (diabolical) evil can never be a motive

——faith/belief (act of faith/credit) given w/ monetary language, practical reason cannot be separated from chremastics as we interpreted it above

AF p. 100 no archive of the secret, by definition, it is the very ash of the archive (speculation begins there, belief too)

MPM p. 32 narcissism (as speculation) too paradoxical, too cunning, to provide final word > instead, speculation whose ruses, mimes, strategies relinquish autonomy

ROP pp. 86 death drive (repetition compulsion, fort/da), Evil Genius of Freud, the devil’s advocate, limping devil: by way of which psychoanalysis finds its speculative power & its greatest resistance

SPEC p. 260 [re: Freud’s speculation, a logic beyond that of position] the “position’s” fall (chute) would cause bankruptcy, ruin, discredit: today I’ll speak of speculation, I’m betting I will

p. 261 to account/read the athetic, Derrida unsatisfied w/ dérive (drifting), too continuous/homogenous movement, travels away w/out saccade > prefers double bind, des effondrements de bord, la rive se partage en son trait même

p. 262 what is the child’s debt in a play w/out debt? on what w/out debt does play speculate in secret? what is the place of such a secret? [re: Freud’s debt to Nietzsche]

p. 263 if one’s [intellectual] debt is always another’s, one is acquitted & guilty in advance? comment spéculer sur la dette dun autre à soi revenant (amounting to, coming back to oneself)?

p. 265 Freud’s speculation—philosophy?

pp. 268-69 Freud’s speculation does not construct itself by itself like Hegel’s: however concerned w/ revenants, ne revient pas sur lui-même

p. 269 Freud’s speculation, interminable detour (Umweg): quil décrit lui-même, écrit et désécrit, pas décriture [like Rousseau, Freud describes but doesn’t declare]

pp. 272-73 Freud’s empirical, biographical excuse for speculation [in Beyond…, recurrence of malignant disease] doesn’t get us far > because of parergonal supplement: autobiography becomes heterothanatographical, bioscroiser lautre, se croiser avec lautre

pp. 275-78 neither proof nor disproof of PP, belief in PP suspends belief in PP > the theory is mute about pleasure, only quantitative analysis > unpleasure as translation of pleasure

——Freud’s speculation aims neither for originality nor priority, the other’s other (philosophy) > aporia of translation imposed in question life death, pleasure–unpleasure, repetition

——strategy whose finality’s not clear, no known genre, it overflows, thus the hypothesis, the athesis of athesis > asking questions in the dark: Freud’s phosphorescent antennae

p. 279 [vis-à-vis Freud] must try most open, loosest (lockerste, plus lâche) hypothesis to describe pleasure–unpleasure, an inevitable sensation/question which nobody has said anything about: a quantitative economics [energetics] w/out knowledge of essence

p. 280 non-simplicity, indirectness > relation btwn pleasure/unpleasure not simple correlation of decrease/increase of (free) energy: inexhaustible reserve for speculation: not substantial riches, but supplementary angles

p. 281 Fechner’s “aesthetic indifference” btwn pleasure/unpleasure dropped by Freud > is this not like a free zone, agency of the “duty free” [in English], free exchange for speculation, a means to pass, as authorized contraband, an always ideal border (in both directions)?

p. 283 Freud repeats his arrest, pas de marche: speculative possibility of tout autre (than PP), inscribed in advance w/in it, “louvre dune scription de lautre à meme (overlaps) le principe

——la surface même du à même (overlap)” does not belong to itself—writing affects the very surface of its support > non-belonging unleashes speculation

pp. 283-84 Derrida corrupts (détourne) “properly Freudian” usage of speculation [i.e. a mode proper mode of research]: as production of surplus value, overflows, the given of the gift, oblique object of Freud’s discourse > Freud’s bias of procedure interests Derrida, the scene of what makes Freud write: faire faire, laisser faire, faire écrire, laisser écrire: the syntax of these operations not given [in Freud]

——detour, Umweg, breaks open the path (frayage) > Freud does not interrogate the graphics of the différant detour for itself (can it ever be for itself?)

pp. 290-91 death drive: être à loeuvre déjà (in PP), ça se sera écrit en silence—in speculative overflow

p. 292 Derrida examining what is irreducible to “speculation” in an economy of a scene of writing: scene of inheritance implicating the Freuds and psychoanalytic “movement”

p. 293 PP always revient to itself, haunted by tout autre, retour never “acquits” speculation of PP

——PP cannot be contradicted (contredit); Freud confirms PP in its absolute sovereignty

pp. 293-94 [re: Freud’s “speculative” writing] démarche of this writing, advancing w/out advancing, time of a detour, pas de thèse repeats itself: PP will not let anything be done w/out it, except repetition itself

——Wiederholungszwang (repetition compulsion) put in communication w/ death drive

p. 302 “[PP, the spool, ça, SA, Ernst, Freud] fait semblant deloigner le PP pour le ramener sans cesse, pour constater quil se ramène lui-même” [hetero-tautology? bringing it all back home]

——fort/da and Freud’s speculative game: same application

p. 305 how can [Freud’s] autobiography give a worldwide (mondiale) institution its birth? what is autobiography if everything that follows from it is possible?

——speculator can survive legatee of an autobiographical speculation, institution of movement w/out limit: mutism/death of legatee, one of the possibilities that dictates/causes legatee to write

——one gives oneself one’s own movement, one inherits from oneself all the time

——sufficient provisions so ghost can always step up to the cashier (passer à la caisse); all that’s necessary is to pronounce a name guaranteeing a signature, one thinks

p. 313 because speculator is a motivated observer, completion could never be declared by him > also, there’s a structure of incompletion in scene of writing: unconscious binds (lie) one to other [scene described & description], telecommunicated acc. same teleology

pp. 313-14 for Freud, in game of fort/da, the greatest pleasure is the re-turn (re-venir), Wiederkommen: yet, again becoming revenant, [spool] must be thrown away again > [Freud, the game] speculates on the return (retour): au départ de ce qui se doit de revenir

p. 316 analysand-locomotive (speculator/analyst the 1st analysand): for whom law of listening substituted for law of looking

pp. 316-17 curtains, veils, “skirt” of bed, hymen of fort:da, edge of bed (lit) [of reading?], va-et-vient, there would’ve been a hymen even w/out curtains > veil of this “skirt” is interest of bed (lit) and fort:da of all these generations

——[Derrida clearly explains the difference btwn fort/da and fort:da] “skirt” of bed, which hides the bars, forms inner chamber of fort/da, double screen which divides w/in itself—but dividing only by reassembling it w/ itself, sticking (piquant) to itself doubly, fort:da

——all the Orphism of a speculation [?]

p. 317 mastery of PP [grand (-père) spéculateur], mastery in general, Herrschaft distanced from PP only to reappropriate itself: tauto-teleology makes other return in domestic specter

p. 322 speculator describes what he’s doing w/out doing so explicitly [Rousseau from OG], does w/out auto-analytic calculation, w/out calculation itself analyzing itself > thus the interest and necessity of the thing [for Freud? for Derrida?]

***p. 332 classically [?]: art preserves proper name, science forgets proper name > what then is psychoanalysis?

——payer la science de son proper nom, science of his [Freud’s] proper name (propre nom) inseparable from nom propre: speculation, pay in advance the charges for a return to sender: reste à savoir (it remains to be had/seen/known)

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

p. 339 je le suppose relu [re: Freud’s Beyond…]—gagner le temps (or essential form of that which interests the speculation)

p. 370 [fort:da is a narrative] no thesis, only hypothesis, origin is speculative because the object cannot be the object of a thesis

p. 376 to speculate: not only going beyond a given oppositional limit but the very notion of limit as front btwn two opposed terms—eg. the identifiable terms where every term terminates: life/death [Derrida’s eschatology?]

——is Freud’s discourse’s restance statutory?

pp. 378-79 Freud’s “to let develop” [re: Aristophanes’ speech] mortgages irresponsibility, no engagement, epokhē of judgment, speaks from no-place [Lacan takes Beyond… too seriously?]

p. 379 speculation as advocatus diaboli, devil revient

p. 380 no one demands to know what devil thinks dans son for intérieur, Freud can think the devil w/out putting himself on the devil’s side (no written promise/contract w/ devil)

——speculation not intuitive (intellectual impartiality) but idiomatic, referential

p. 381 scientific intuition requires minimum of speculation in language’s irreducible metaphoricity

pp. 381-82 speculation as provisional floating, distances from intuition, impartiality, science, psychology of depths

pp. 380-83 [Freud divided] Freud translating translation into scientific theory: 1) “trans-” inhabit origin on (dès) its very threshold 2) perception as prior to its translation

——garde-fou has disappeared en chemin, all speculative transferences are of the party (partie); transference: as transpose, translate, network of correspondences, traffic, postal, railway, sorting

p. 384 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] passage btwn transference & speculation > speculative transference orients, destines, calculates most original & most passive “first step” on very threshold of perception: desire for concept of perception belongs to destiny of this calculation

——w/out borrowing, nothing begins, il ny a pas de fonds propre, there’s no transference of fund, lemprunt rapporte, produces surplus value, is the prime mover of every investment > on commence ainsi par spéculer, en pariant sur une valeur à produire comme à partir de rien: all these “metaphors” confirm, as metaphors, the necessity of what they state

p. 385 desire & throw of the dice beyond PP is Freud’s pleasure

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

——death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

p. 391 the démarche (procedure) of Beyond… is one of its objects, effects trans- and speculation

pp. 400-01 PP (the master) is not master > pleasure, the great speculator, calculates w/ effects of aphrodisiac stricture (Socrates wanted nothing to do with proper name of Aphrodite)

——quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

SPECTER

GOD p. 124n via Kierkegaard, general ethics is bloodless specter of faith; teleological suspension of ethics determined by Abraham’s silence; aesthetics cultivates secret, ethics punishes it

p. 134 filiation of impossible filiations: Kafka & Abraham, their spectral fathers, in scene of forgiveness, literature & secrecy

FK p. 62 technology & religion: “ether of religion has always been hospitable to a certain spectral virtuality” [return of virtual from OOG]

p. 83 machine-like & faith as one and the same possibility, machine-like & sacrosancity (heilig, holy, safe, unscathed, free, “swollen”) of the phallic effect: phallus as phainesthai, phenomenon (day of phallus) & also phantasm, fetish, specter, its double: colossal automaticity [phallic in bold 2x]

pp. 86-87 spectral fantasy of dead, principal of life and sur-vival; life must be worth more than life, only has value in labour of infinite mourning > indemnified spectrality w/out limit

p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

——these dimensions of self-sacrificial supplementarity, the auto-co-immunity, com-mon auto-immunity, keep community alive, open to something other, more than itself (a spectralizing messiancity beyond all messianism)

——Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

FL p. 259 how is the thought of the name articulated with haunting and the logic of the specter

p. 277 for Benjamin, text & signature are specters which exhibits & archive their implosion, in ruins, [Derrida now affirms this “stance”] such is status of deconstructive text: cannot escape law it enunciates, ruins & contaminates itself [at once founding/preserving], becomes specter of itself

MONL p. 22 threatening & threatened promise, monolingualism & tautology, impossibility of metalanguage, but there are effects of metalanguage: at the horizon, spectral, infinitely desirable, allows the mirage of another language to tremble

p. 73 let all my specters loose, a desire w/out horizon

AF p. 36 to know what archive means, we will only know in time to come: question of the future itself, of a response, promise, a responsibility for tomorrow (spectral messianicity at work in archive)

p. 84 the structure of the archive is spectral [see p. 68]

——spectral motif of archive stages disseminating fission, from which the archontic principle and concept of archive suffers

pp. 85-87 Freud both accounted for ghosts, and tried to conjure them like Marx: [re: Gradiva’s ghost] Freud speaks of “real ghost,” and of a part of truth, the truth of delusion, haunted by specter of truth, truth is spectral as part of truth irreducible by explanation

p. 100 singularity haunted by its own iterability, immanent divisibility, from the origin

——faithful memory of singularity is given over to the specter

SPOM pp. xvi-221 [see GHOST]

p. 3 specter as a foreign guest

pp. 4-5 as soon as one no longer distinguishes spirit from specter, the former assumes a body, incarnates itself, as spirit, in specter > specter an instant of flesh and phenomenality, apparition

——flesh disappears in the apparition, dans la venue même du revenant ou le retour du spectre

——when spirit becomes specter, an instant of flesh and phenomenality, an apparition

p. 6 asymmetry, we see the ghost of king resembles the king, but can’t see what looks at us, this visor effect linked to everything we will say about specter in general > such is the difference btwn le spectre ou le revenant de lesprit, fut-ce de lesprit au sense de fantôme en general > supernatural, paradoxical phenomenology, ungraspable visibility of the invisible, the non-sensuous sensuous of Capital, intangibility of a proper body w/out flesh [see p. 156 are specter/ghost different?]

——specter takes on the form of someone other (quelqu’un d’autre), that is, a self, subject, person, consciousness, spirit; thus specter is not icon, not ideal, not image of image (Plato’s phantasma), nor simple simulacrum (thought it is so close to this)

——feel ourselves being looked at by specter acc. absolute anteriority, outside of synchrony

——spectrality interrupts all specularity, de-synchronizes, calls us to anachrony

p. 7 specter in armor, a technical prosthesis, a “blazon of his nobility”

p. 10 question of the event as question of the ghost: first time (but also last time) & repetition, tout autre > hauntology, logic of haunting: more powerful than ontology, harbors eschatology/teleology as effects, mise en scène pour une fin de lhistoire

——what is a ghost? what is effectivity/presence of a specter? > virtuality, ineffectivity, simulacrum? is there a there btwn thing itself & its simulacrum?

——après la fin de lhistoire, lesprit vient en revenant, il figure à la fois un mort qui revient et un fantôme dont le retour attendu se répète, encore et encore

follow a ghost, be followed by it, persecuted by very chase we are leading?

p. 11 question of repetition, specter is always a revenant, can’t control its comings and goings > commence par revenir

p. 13 Marcellus anticipated la venue dun autre scholar, had to wait several centuries [for Derrida], one who can think possibility of specter, specter as possibility, who can address spirits, who knows that such is the condition of address, mad enough to unlock such a possibility

p. 24 “one never inherits without coming to terms with [sexpliquer avec (battling with)] some specter, and therefore with more than one specter, with the fault and the injunction of plus dun

***p. 48 [time scrambling] threat of specter, no reassuring order of presents, no linear succession of “real time” & “deferred time”

p. 55 betrayal, perjury, abjuration, lie, simulacrum: never very far from the specter

p. 56 via Marx, Schein-gold, money (Geld) as origin of spirit (Geist) and avarice (Geiz), transfiguring idealization of commodities: spectropoetic

p. 57 exchange-value a properly spectral apparition if this figure did not prevent the proper

——speculation (the hoarder) is always fascinated, bewitched by the specter, devoted in his alchemy to haunting or return of revenants

p. 63 frontier btwn public & private constantly being displaced because the spacing of the public (techno-tele-discursvity, -iconcity) is neither living nor dead: it spectralizes > less and less assured identity of political

p. 109 “we” will not please Marxists, insisting on the spirt of Marxism as spirits in the plural and in the sense of specter, allowing untimely specters to come back

p. 125 there is no Dasein of the specter

——specter, frequency of the visibility of the invisible, visibility is not seen > epekeina tes ousias

pp. 135-36 [re: Eighteenth Brumaire: “conjure up spirits of past”] convoking (beschwören) spirits as specters, le geste dune conjuration positive, celle qui jure pour appeler et non pour refouler

welcoming, hospitable conjuration still full of anxiety: la conjurationappelle la mort pour inventer le vif et faire vivre le nouveau, make come what’s not there, revolutionary

——specter weighs (pèse), thinks (pense), nothing more juste than this phantasmagoria, répondre du mort, répondre au mort > obssessive haunting, the more life, the graver the specter

p. 140 the great specter of classical tradition (Rome) is convoked (positive conjuration) to allow one to rise to height of historic tragedy

pp. 145-47 [Marx on “red specter”]

***p. 146 via Marx, players in history as inverted Schleimihls, shadows w/out body, the specter, the red specter is disincarnated > this impossibility [disincarnation of specter] isn’t it possibility itself: virtuality? mustn’t one reckon w/ this to understand history, the event-ness of the event?

——impossibility to discern specter from specter of specter > not night where all cows are black, but grey on grey because red on red

p. 156-57 specter is of the spirit, il en participe, il en relève alors même quil le suit comme son double fantomal > the difference btwn the 2 tends to disappear in the ghost effect, a shadowy articulation plays btwn spirit and specter, entre lesprit dune part, le fantôme ou le revenant dautre part [see p. 6 are specter/ghost different?], Marx plays w/ double meaning of Geist

pp. 160-61 spectral effect, for Marx, a dialectical position (Setzung) of the ghostly body as body proper > where Stirner sees 1st moment as spectral and 2nd as successful, interiorization, subjectivation (plus de vie) Marx sees a hyperbolic surplus of spectrality (plus de mort)

p. 167 when Marx says all phenomenology is a phenomenology of spirit, Derrida translates: a phenomenology of specter

p. 169 phenomenological ego is a specter, phanesthai is the possibility of the specter, brings death, gives death, works at mourning [see pp. 237-38n Husserl’s noeme, irréellité]

p. 180 if every specter is distinguished from spirit by a quasi-incarnation, an incorporation, then Christ is most spectral of specters > greatest and most “incomprehensible of ghosts (unbegreiflichste Gespenst)”: no concept of incarnation w/out Jesus [Gespenst: Man-God (der Gottmensch)]

——Christic moment, eucharistic instance, hyperbole of acharnement itself?

p. 184 Marx & Saint Max, heirs to Platonic tradition, associate image w/ specter, idol w/ phantasm, phantasma, eidola (Phaedo, Timaeus): living-dead, figures of dead souls > survival and return of living-dead as essence of the idol

***p. 185 character of the specter cannot be derived from a psychoanalysis of the imaginary

p. 190 specter is social, otherwise no desire, no love, no peace, no socius, no war

p. 195 secret of commodity form is substitution (quid pro quo), but one w/ ruse, perverse intervention of souffleur, parole soufflée > abnormal play of mirrors [men no longer recognize in the substitution made by commodity the social character of their own labor], commodity turns men into specters, vampires > can’t see their reflection, “but who is not so deprived?” Derrida adds

p. 205 is the ghost just the effect of the market economy? as Marx says, a finite delirium, a madness that will come to an end? same for spectrality in general?

A p. 61 for Derrida, in contrast to Heidegger [Freud & Levinas too?], mourning, revenance, spectrality, living-on, surviving: non-derivable categories or non-reducible derivations

S p. 29 Heidegger’s doubling of “spirit” by use of quotation marks affects it w/ obsessive specter, he doesn’t shelter “spirit,” a hospitality w/ reservations, quotations call for another word unless they re-call the other under the same

p. 31 beautiful description of the guard-like theatrical nature of quotation marks, and when they are relieved from “Geist” has spirit itself or spirit’s ghost (spectre) come on stage?

pp. 62-3 for Heidegger, that which causes destitution of spirit is of spirit, is its double, its spectral duplicity; yet, this is not Descartes’ Evil Genius (böse Geist), the destitution, the demonic, comes from cogitos substantializaton, accepts lies, destruction, doesn’t question (Schellingian)

OH p. 85 if public opinion wasn’t ephemeral, if it could take place, it would enable transparent discussion

p. 87 public opinion > ubiquity of a specter

POOF pp. 73-4n specters in Blake, Marx, Stirner

p. 83 when Nietzsche spectralizes the enemy, no longer reassurance of an identifiable enemy (of a figure at least): not a new ear of peace, human fraternity, but unprecedented violence

p. 94 friendship can never elude rhetoric of epitáphios, transfixed celebration of spectrality, at once fervent & caught in petrified cold of its inscription (funeral speech, testamentary fervor of heir)

pp. 116-17 Schmitt’s obsessive use of ‘concrete,’ always haunted by the spectral (gespenstisch), which, for Schmitt, is a synonym of ‘abstract’ or ‘empty’ > his book formed amidst these tensions

pp. 128-29 Derrida links logic of Schmitt’s decisionism to Nietzsche’s teleiopoetic, quasi-messianic perhaps: its actual/effective unveiling need only be possible for it to occur > thus, decisionism is haunted by law of spectrality

pp. 266-67 Hugo [re: humanist vision], like Marx, would like to swear (jurer) & abjure á la fois, on le voit à la fois accueillir et chasser, convoquer et conjurer le spectre, he would like to ‘let the dead bury the dead’ > Hugo: extinguishing of a people evaporating into fraternity

pp. 288-89 there are specters on both sides of us (past & future), the phantom friends we lost, the arrival of the Superman > ‘it is necessary to love’ = specters, they are to be loved

——disjunction of spectral distance marks past/future w/ non-reappropriable alterity [p. 307n cf. Düttmann, “What is Called love in…”]

——Nietzsche: higher still than love of man is love of causes and of specters (Sachen und Gespenstern)

p. 292 the 2 names: 1) very structure of testimonial survival stance, a certain spectrality, name survives a priori beyond presence 2) this general structure is enframed (arraisonné) in certain history, chance of filiation, inherited name, that of renown (again, woman excluded)

SH pp. 19-20 anniversary ring—seal > date: spectral return of that which will never return

p. 19 conventional forms of dating (charts, coded signs, spatiotemporal plottings, clocks, calendar) assign, consign, absolute singularity, must mark themselves off from themselves, a fatally equivocal power that enunciates the possibility of recurrence > not absolute recurrence (i.e. of the one time of circumcision/birth) but spectral recurrence of that which never will return

p. 22 readability effaces the date, the very thing which it offers for reading, date must conceal w/in itself stigma of singularity if it is to last longer (lasting is the poem), only chance of spectral return, commemoration of date’s annihilation, kind of nothing or ash > ash awaits us

——annulment in the annulation of return belongs to movement of dating

p. 58 poetry, literature, art, experience of the mask, an intense familiarity w/ ineluctable originarity of specter = ineluctable loss of origin > spectral errancy of words not an accident

FWT p. 81 Hamlet also machine of repression in politics, spectrality governs problematic of mourning & technics, media, virtual reality > general logic of spectrality

p. 131 literature a recent invention, threatened by death, repeats its birth beginning from its end, from a finitude that is its resource & essential specter

p. 159 agrees/disagrees w/ Foucault’s claim death is less visible > spectral logic invades everything: work of mourning, technē of image; visibility is deferred, perhaps, transformation of visible field > never have things been as “visible” in global space as they are today

ATIA p. 74 for Descartes, the specter/ghost “conjured” by judgment is simulacrum of “real man,” spectral man as animal-machine, this animal-machine we’re trying to “flush out”

GSP p. 157-58 Husserl refuses to believe #s/math fall from heaven, pure Platonic idealism, but also refuses, when subjectifying math, to explain #s via “psychologism”: 1) distinguishes # from concept, psychological artifact 2) math irreducible to psychological temporality 3) designates an intentional dimension of objectivity, which no psychological genesis could institute [Frege would call this possibility a bloodless specter (blutloses Gespenst)?]

***O p. 33 dissemination written on back, tain of mirror, not on its inverted specter

***WAP p. 23 “public opinion” demands immediate intelligibility: specter of a readership projected or constituted before appealing to it

DPi p. 24 daimon for Greeks: divine & inferior to divinity of God (theos), revenant, soul of dead, fate—kind of election, singular destiny; in Christianity, daimon is bad spirit, demonic, evil genius

——daimon (for Socrates) silent before law: philosophy finds its place in this silence of the daimon at moment of condemnation

***pp. 153-54 unheimlich concept of belief: the believer (Glaübiger) who affects to believe is divided in belief, fiction of this simulacrum belongs to belief: skepsis, ēpokhē as believing itself > all economy traffics in act of faith: believing w/out believing, belief haunted by non-belief > quasi-hypnotic, quasi-hallucinatory, spectral, unconscious

——believing (like cruelty) has no contrary, thus is its own contrary

p. 199 red (on flag) as specter of the dead

REST pp. 373-74 the unpairing of the shoes, as soon as they’re no longer going anywhere [Derrida gives a spectrum of possible specterings]

p. 380 [spectrality of stricture]: il sest rendu dans/avec/à /( ) ses chaussures

meanings knot/unknot in lace/snare of syntax (tous les sens se nouent et se dénouent dans le lacet de cette syntax)

HLP p. 28 fabulous, phantasma, return of some specter: apparition of specter, vision of phantom, phenomenon of the revenant

——fable & phantasm do not belong to true or false

——irreducible species of simulacrum, penumbral light of a virtuality, neither being nor nothingness (which no ontology/mimetology could account for, subdue w/ reason)

TR p. 160 that “sooner or later” de Man’s text will answer for him: spectral machine

PJP p. 171 quasi “presence” of [de Man’s] spectral vigilance, gaze, we’re being observed internally by him > does not limit our freedom, sharpens our responsibility

EL pp. 213-14 for Scholem, Sprache ist Namen, being of language resides in name, not in substantive but nominal, in power of naming (verbs were once names) > Derrida (via an internal reading) adds: must be a spectral haunting, there is a specter because there’s language, language can haunt because names haunt (neither present/absent) our sentences, language summons (convoque)—category of spectral revenant (not a flower of rhetoric) figures a beyond oppositional ontologic or dialectic of presence/absence

AD p. 35 spectral “possibility” of pervertibility [of Levinas’ face-to-face] not liminal pervertibility but impossibility of determining a limit btwn perversion & pervertibility

pp. 111-12 spectral aura of face, figure of Geist, ghost, urgent before “real” qualities > recognize other w/out waiting: exceeds, deconstructs ontological positions

——no hospitality w/out chance of spectrality; God uncontaminated by Being: rigorous definition of the Face, le tout autre > as spectral as it is spiritual? gives orders, gives pardon

CF p. 14 Benjamin’s police w/out borders—faceless, formless specter of its ghostly apparition extends endlessly

SPEC p. 295 Freud his own grandson? put PP in question—Freud makes hypothesis of beyond [the PP] come back (revenir) only to dismiss (congédier) it again, that which comes back (revient) hasn’t truly come back (revenu) > only passed by in specter of its presence

p. 317 mastery of PP [grand (-père) spéculateur], mastery in general, Herrschaft distanced from PP only to reappropriate itself: tauto-teleology makes other return in domestic specter

(living) SPEECH

LOBL p. 78 it is impossible for living speech to speak on living [sur vivre?], unless it’s impossible only w/ living speech: aporia even more paralyzing

POO p. 143n to speak of something w/out speaking of something [literature] valid for every trace, dissociation doesn’t need to be marked by words, doesn’t require la parole, can be mute deictic, gesture of animal [trace beyond human]

OOG p. 149 for Husserl, absolute is passage (historicity as passage of Speech, primordial Logos toward polar Telos)

——every return to the origin, an audacious move toward the origin (circulation, anticipation)

——Husserl’s method: bring [passage] to consciousness, Selbstbesinnung, Verantwortung, avoid risk of inauthenticity, loss of Speech, light

——for Husserl, speech is historical because it is always already a response, responsibility means shouldering a word one hears spoken > look after the advance of sense

SPOM p. 125 spectacularizing speculation, theatricalization of speech, no shut-eye > so intent to watch the return (à guetter la retour) [on imaginary screen]

HERP p. 182 philein—to accord oneself to logos (Sprache, legein, which is already engaged, opened), co-respond, correspondence (not first w/ some subject)

MPM pp. 96-7 de Man “parodies” Die Sprache spricht w/ Die Sprache versprichtlanguage promises (itself), no originary Sprechen modalized into promise [would Heidegger protest?] [see S p. 93-4]

EM p. 132n (159n) Derrida on privilege of spoken language in Heidegger [I’ll study it elsewhere?] leads back to Being as presence, Anwesenheit > but, is also erased when Heidegger announces a Wesen that wouldn’t be Anwesen (see OS [?])

SEC pp. 317-18 isn’t iterability of writing also in speech and in all experience? > never permits unity of self-identity

PP p. 72 problem of writing linked to problem of “knowing by heart” [speech] > need pharmakon, biblia, if one has not learned speech by heart

p. 77 in speech, son & father remain together

——writing: absence of father (orphan)

p. 87 in Ancient Egypt, power of speech is one with power of creation: “the egg of the great cackler”

p. 152 (175) pharmakon is liquid (opposites pass more easily btwn each other), water [see Laws on protecting water], everything in sperm which overflows wastefully (se dépense sans réserve) [living speech: non-diverted seminal potency]

p. 154 Plato makes living speech a psychic graphē, a writing of alētheia

VM p. 100 for Levinas, face is original unity of glance and speech, thought is speech > immediately face

p. 102 Blanchot: preeminence of oral discourse, tranquil humanist, nearness to speaker, socratic speech

——for Levinas, writing must be secondary to living, original speech, w/out it there could be grammar/lexicon w/out language > cybernetics, electronics

pp. 102-03 speech of God distinguishes Levinas from Socrates in Phaedrus

p. 103 for Levinas, can only, must only, speak to Other; must use the vocative (never accusative which would objectify Other), bursting forth, very raising up of speech

p. 116 [by following Levinas closely] isn’t speech by its essence rooted in space?

VP p. 9 living speech (spirituality of breath as phonē) preserves ideality and presence [in face of language’s game of presence/absence]

p. 13 the voice simulates the “keeping watch (la garde)” over presence, and that the history of spoken language as archive of this simulation prevents us from considering [its contradiction], prevents us from describing this simulation, the infinite complexity of its structure as phantasm

pp. 13-4 necessary privilege of phonē, originative affinity w/ voice not logos in general > phenomenological voice: breath, transcendental flesh, transforms body of word into flesh, Körper into Leib, a geistige Leiblichkeit [see p. 70]> the “grip (prise)” phenomenology preserves itself w/in

pp. 27-8 for Husserl, ex-pression moves outside (an absolutely original outside, neither nature, world, nor exterior to consciousness), toward an ideal ob-ject, but remains w/in “solitary life,” w/in noetico-noematic sphere of consciousness, remains in the “phenomenological” voice

pp. 59-60 [now] phenomenological [absolute] “silence” of self-relation must exclude not only the other (indication) but also expressive language itself > agency of voice btwn these 2 exclusions

p. 63 le sens du verbeêtreentretient avec le mot, cest-à dire avec lunité de la phonè et du sense, un rapport tout à fait singulier

pp. 64-5 the complicity of idealization and the voice are unfailing: brings monstration [?] to completion; unity of phonē and technē, voice as technical mastery of the object, via objectivity of object > the ideal object can be repeated, to infinity, while remaining the same

pp. 65-6 voice is ideal because it hears itself, because subject does not have to pass outside himself; it appears to have no spatial relation (unlike writing) > it is this “appearance,” the transcendent dignity of phenomenological voice that we must examine, cannot deconstruct sans s'enfoncer, en tâtonnant à travers les concepts hérités, vers l'innommable [plunge towards the unnamable]

p. 66 voice’s immediate erasure, its diaphaneity, makes phoneme most ideal of signs

p. 67 phoneme gives itself as mastered ideality of the phenomenon

——presence to itself of animating act, this intimacy of life to itself is why we say speech is alive, we hear our voice, thus the deaf are dumb

pp. 67-8 in contrast to speech, reflection and touch exteriorize

p. 68 pure auto-affection as universality, absolute reduction of space, unity of sound and voice, unites or escapes distinction btwn intramundanity and transcendentality

——voice is consciousness, hearing-oneself-speak

p. 69 voice as signifier has absolute proximity to the signified

p. 70 Husserl tormented by possibility that writing inhabits inside of speech, itself at work in intimacy of thought

***pp. 70-1 [commentary > interpretation] auto-affection as voice assumes a pure difference dividing self-presence, makes reduction of world, space, impossible; yet, must pass through reduction “in order to recapture difference in closest proximity to itself”: in closest proximity to movement of differance

——movement of differance produces transcendental subject

——Husserl ties concept of pure auto-affection to time

***p. 88 once presence in absolute infinity (unity of concept, logos, and consciousness in a voice w/out differance) appears to itself as its own death, this history is closed

——une voix sans différance, une voix sans écriture est à la fois absolument vive et absolument morte

p. 89 phoneme is the phenomenon of the labyrinth, soaring up to the sun of presence, it is the path of Icarus

S p. 83 Heidegger’s Gespräch w/ Trakl: language speaks in speech, speaks about itself, refers to itself by deferring itself

TC p. 240 speech’s rational transparency purloins the body, glossopoeia (not yet discourse, not a shout); for Artaud, word is cadaver of psychic speech, wants to renew spellbinding unseparatedness of language/speech’s power > hieroglyphics

PPHS pp. 72-3 theory of sign on basis of being-present, authority of lêtre-en-vue: telos of reappropriation [see POOF p. 65], coordination of sign & light of parousia, speaking logos as close as possible to itself in concept & consciousness

p. 75 in Peri Hermeneias [Aristotle spells out logo-phonocentrism]: spoken words (ta en tēi phōnēi) are symbols of mental experiences, written words are symbols of spoken words, mental experiences are the same for all

p. 88 authority of voice: coordinated w/ entire Hegelian system: its archeology, teleology, eschatology, its will to parousia > process of sign is an Aufhebung, negativity

——for Derrida, contents of semiology cannot be exhausted by the metaphysical theory which regulates bedeuten (meaning) by the telos of speech

p. 89 for Hegel, signifying substance is sound, “substance of expression” [glossematicians], most proper to be produced as time itself, sound relève from naturalness, linked to spirit’s relation to itself, the voice

——vocal note (Ton) is both intelligence, spirit, and natural (anthropological), growing out of its own naturalness, idea manifests in erfüllte Äusserung (full, adequate utterance)

——voice is the hinge btwn psychology & anthropology

p. 90 speech does not abandon the inside on the outside like writing, it confers presence

pp. 92-3 acc. Hegel, hearing more ideal than sight, double negation, i.e. sound (Ton)> inner vibration (inneren Erzitterns) of body, breath [trembling (of sound) prioritized by Hegel?]

pp. 93-4 teleological concept of sound [in Hegel]: logocentrism

p. 98 Hegel: human voice sounds w/out external impulse, out of one’s own feelings, spirit

p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

pp. 107-08 [Hegel on calculation and machine] a “living,” “thinking,” “speaking” protest against repetition

T p. xvi Being [one reading of it] assures permeable/transparent continuity, logos posits/negates itself en laissant sourdre sa propre voix

***F p. xlviii [Derrida’s speech]: feel on tongue angular cut of shattered word, et je sens alors, de ma langue, langle coupant dun mot brisé

WM pp. 232-33 for Aristotle, no tragedy w/out difference btwn dianoia (thought) and lexis (tone, diction, speech): this still maintains an original naturality of the figure of meaning

——he exists/acts w/in tragedy on condition that he speaks

pp. 236-37 for Aristotle, brutes and humans both make sounds, but only humans make sounds that can become intelligible, meaningful, sounds that become letters

——for Aristotle, the letter, the stoikheion, has no meaning in itself, but is capable of entering formation/composition of a phōnē sēmantikē, it is the atom of the voice (phōnē adiairetos)

——Aristotle’s definition of noun, the element of metaphor, is a theory of the name, articulated w/ ontology > value of metaphor systematically chained to values of discourse, voice, meaning, resemblance, or to logos, phōnē sēmantikē, sēmainein, onoma, mimēsis, homoiosis

p. 238 Aristotle: human voice is organ most apt to imitate

DS p. 188 specularity of eidos > logos—speech < mirroring [repetition ordered by resemblance (homoiōsis), doubling as duplication]

pp. 234-35 supplement in Mallarmé (not unilateral movement, like in Rousseau, which loses warmth of spoken word): cest lexcès dun signifiant qui, en son dedans, supplée lespace et répète louverture

p. 264n le son OR, le SON or (by way of lateral unconscious pressure)

POS p. 5 juridically decisive for Derrida to pose question of privilege of voice in Western metaphysics, represented in its most critical, vigilant form: Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology

p. 22 voice is consciousness itself when phonē is signifying substance > signifier and signified unite, signifier erases itself, exteriority of signifier reduced by spontaneous proximity

pp. 34-5 grammatology must liberate mathematization of language (which phonocentrism has always critiqued, for limiting that which links logos to phonē), but must be wary of Leibniz’s type of unifying, simple, mathematical language, which appeals to divine logos

ATIA p. 127 Lacan distinguishes btwn animal sexual pretense (feinte) and the deception (tromperie) of speech

FS p. 4 the possibility of speech & of being always already w/in it [historicity?], la répétition enfin avouée, extended to the dimensions of world culture—[of] a surprise incomparable to any other, a surprise responsible for Western thought

pp. 8-10, 303n consciousness takes on meaning by way of consciousness of nothing, thus is speech brought forth > car la pensée de la chose comme ce qu'elle est se confond déjà avec l'expérience de la pure parole; et celle-ci avec l'expérience elle-même

——doesn’t pure speech require inscription, isn’t it a privileged representation of inscription? just like Leibniz’s essence requires existence (pushes out toward world), power > act?

——God of Leibniz does not know the anguish of choice, only one book distributed through all books, God’s Will always chooses the “best”

——writing, not a determined pathos, an empirical state of writer, but responsibility of angustia: [Derrida is privileging a power of equivocality over creativity of classical God, anguish connoting a narrowing, a loss of breath, a restriction, constraint, and thus the anguish of choice]

——absence & haunting of divine sign (Jewish God) [cf. GOD], anguish of Hebraic ruah (pneuma), regulates modern books/criticism/aesthetics

p. 13 Heidegger on pure speech: can’t be perceived in the rigor of its essence on the basis of its “character-as-sign (Zeichencharakter)”

CHM CHM p. 59 for Descartes, thinking and saying what is clear & distinct is same thing—Derrida adds that, for St. Anselm, the insipiens, the insane man, couldn’t think because he couldn’t think what he said > madness as voluble silence that couldn’t think its own words

pp. 60–1 speech, confined to temporal rhythm of crisis & reawakening [re: Cogito as madness, then against madness] opens discourse by making a mockery, humiliating madman w/in us: movement of temporalization, historicity in general, reign of finite thought must stay close to this violence to liberate and live as speech > madman as fool of logos, of father, king, master

Gii Gii p. 42 Heidegger: only when man speaks does he think, not the other way around, as metaphysics still believes

p. 45 in seminar on Parmenides, Heidegger translates pragma as Handlung, so pragmata present themselves as Zuhandenes, Vorhandenes, w/in reach of hand > only a man w/ speech & thus hands can pray, murder, greet, give thanks, make oaths, signal (Wink)

pp. 46-7 writing is hand-writing in its essence, makes word manifest, monstre; co-belonging of hand & speech: ability to produce monstres that disclose concealment [still a phono-logocentrism, but one where handwriting is immediately bound to speech]

p. 49 hand speaks by way of “necessity,” chreon, usage, Brauch [?] > if the chreōn allows one to think the present in its presence, if der Brauch is “the gathering”—then, before all technology, surgery, le main ny est pas pour rien

***REST ***REST pp. 325-26 if police there is (and isn’t there always?) > Derrida polices too [?], “close reading,” counterpolices [?] oldest, most dogmatic, sinisterly authoritarian programs, massive meidatizing machines: pre-text of perception, of bare hands (mains nue), of real history, of living speech (vous enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte)

DST DST p. 230 caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

D p. 333 expropriation is operation w/in voice

LI p. 46 Searle explains [to Derrida] that from standpoint of iterability no difference btwn speech & writing > Derrida responds: it is so “clear,” I am so “aware,” idea was indispensable to SEC

TN pp. 113-14 interruption of auto-affection of mouth imparts speech [?]

E p. 17 Kant analogizes division of Fine-Arts w/ the mode of expression man possess in Sprechen (not w/out slight embarrassment) [this serves a teleological function]

p. 18 for Kant, poetry’s privilege is not just in the interiorizing structure of (mouth to ear) hearing oneself speak, but in sincerity, faithful adequation [its truth]; these values are not immediately moral > morality itself derives its value from full presence/full speech

BSi pp. 34-5 fable, for, fari, to speak, to say, fabula, something said > make so as to know: 1) bring knowledge to the other 2) give impression, effect, of knowledge, of knowing, simulacrum of knowing: a savoir-faire to “faire savoir where there is no knowing worthy of the name

p. 190 Valéry: “IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE FABLE [speech], it will always be

OG OG p. 3 (12) history of metaphysics as history of truth, as the truth of truth, the debasement of writing, its repression outside (hors) of “full (pleine)” speech

p. 10 (20-21) cybernetics & mathematics extend possibility of “message,” its no longer the written translation of a language, the transporting of a signified whose integrity remains

p. 11 Aristotle’s phono-logocentrism: voice, spoken symbols, immediately proximate to the universal language of mental experience (pathēmata tes psychēs), closest to the thing, the signified

p. 12 Hegel privileges sound (speech, voice), because it is a hearing of an interior vibration

——voice, phonè, sentendre-parler, saffecte lui-même (hearing-oneself-speak, affecting oneself), ideality

——phonocentrism se confond (merges) w/ onto-theology, produces these subdeterminations of presence: sight as eidos, substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as point (stigmè) of now (nun), consciousness, cogito, subjectivity, co-presence of other & self…

p. 29 (45) unity of phonè, glossa, logos, lunité articulée du son et du sens dans la phonie > this presupposition prior to all oppositions > re: this unity, writing always derivative: “sign of sign” says Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel

p. 35 (52) one must exorcise (that is, conjurer) writing (mask, perversion, disguise, debauchery) w/ the good word (bonne parole)

p. 50 (73) for Plato (Phaedrus 277e), play, childishness, paidia of writing opposed to adult gravity (spoudè) of speech

p. 57 (84) unity of sound and meaning: reassuring closing of play

p. 69 (101-02) the horizontality of spacing, hollow of differance, discontinuity and discreteness (does not oppose it(self) like surface to depth), a hinge (brisure) marking impossibility of full speech

p. 97 (145) Rousseau: voice answers hearing

p. 335n Vico was rare believer in contemporaneity of origin of writing/speech

p. 139 (201-02) ethics of speech: delusion of presence mastered

——lure of ethics of speech resembles a hunter’s stratagem, term of falconry > to recognize writing in speech is to begin to think the lure (leurre)

p. 166 (236) speech (voix): produces signifier that doesn’t fall (tomber) into world/space [subject can idealize him or herself by suppressing differance as such, myth of consciousness]

p. 168 (238-39) acc. Heidegger’s history of metaphysics, liberty/truth became condition of presence: freedom of speech borrows no signifiers from exterior world—cannot be dispossessed

p. 235-36 (335) via Rousseau, speech excites attention, the visible exacts it (la parole excite lattention, le visible lexige)—is that because the ear, always open, is more passive than sight?

——one can more naturally shut one’s eyes (child at breast [?]) than close one’s ears > the demanding attention of speech

p. 238 (339) Rousseau’s first allusion to writing (movement of magic wand [baguette], hieroglyph) holds itself out of reach of all distinction (all difference of need from passion)

——lorigine métaphorique de la parole ouvre un oeil au centre de la langue—visibility inscribed in the birth of voice is not purely perceptive, it signifies: writing is the eve of speech

——writing had to appear before a question of speech [?]: need before need

p. 240 (341-42) the violent penetration of speech, passivity, reception obliged, interiorization, “sentendre-parler”—passion: Rousseau suspects speech’s violence, the complicity of voice & heart

——dérobement of thing in speech > conceals what vision places before us: 1) interiorize thing in depth of heart 2) speech installs a fiction, a lie, we touch the simulacrum more than truth

p. 277 (392) for Rousseau, though poet lacks objective truth of object, he comes closer to authenticity/literalness than rhetor/writer > poet speaks from origin of his passionate speech

p. 308 (434) for Rousseau, le plein air—voice, nature, franc parler, absence of detour

ATAP ATAP p. 81 Derrida implicated [in Western eschatological program]: to tell le fin du fin (distinguish closure from end) > eschatology is a tone, the voice itself, isn’t the voice always that of the last man?

——Nietzsche: my beloved voice deludes my solitude, obliges me to speak as if I were 2

CIR CIR p. 288 before speech, among Jews alone, there’s circumcision

FV FV pp. 456n, 458n Lacan on experiencing Freud’s “full speech” in its authenticity > Freud as the master of truth vs. Bonaparte and her (bad) 2nd hand writing (master vs. cook)

pp. 464-65 [phonematic limitation of letter, phonē spared divisibility] voice: spontaneous self-presence one can retain (garder) w/out paper, w/out envelope, always available (disponible) > Lacan’s not attentive to writing w/in the voice, before the letter

——sheltered (à labri) from disseminating threat/power in OG, agency of Lacan’s letter is the relève of writing in system of speech

***p. 468 Lacan’s insistence on opposition truth/reality as orthodox as can be [p. 468n full speech]

p. 469 for Lacan, analyst links truth to power of speech: power of communication as a contract btwn 2 present things

p. 470n Lacan’s “True Speech”: “subject is founded in this act as being the other”

p. 470 Lacan thinks beyond the truthful, beyond lying: adequation/unveiling in present speech don’t await exterior verification, they guarantee each other intrinsically: adequation of full speech to itself [see p. 471n]

p. 472 Lacan’s authentic: “appel propre du vide

——for Lacan, ideal process of analysis: “realization” of full speech as assumption of desire (of castration)

pp. 472-73 [vis-à-vis Lacan] present speech, anamnesis, irreplaceable properness, inalienable singularity > disqualification of recording or repetition in the name of the act of living (present speech): a well known program

pp. 474-75 full speech, contracts only w/ itself, system of truth > Lacan not proposing crude readjustment [i.e. American psychology] but rarity à la Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit

p. 475 acc. Lacan, the [full] speech which constitutes/forms the subject is forbidden to him > it speaks everywhere it can be read in his Being [this antinomy is very antinomy of the meaning Freud gave to unconscious]: true speech always operates through mediation of another subject, it is open to chain w/out end re: speeches in which dialectic of recognition is concretely realized in human community [?]

p. 476n Lacan advocates reconciliation (Versohnung), re: reintegration [of letter?]

p. 477n Lacan: when patient can speak to you (analyst) about himself [sic]—analysis is over

p. 478n Lacan integrates Freudian phallocentrism w/ phonocentric Saussurian semio-linguistics

pp. 478-79 voice guards against the phallus becoming divisible, being reduced to part object, voice as ideal guardianship of partial/divisible object: mors disséminable (ce qui tombe)

p. 479 systemic & historical link btwn idealization, relève (Aufhebung), and the voice > Lacan’s elevation of signifier

SPEECH ACT THEORY

R p. 71 for Austin, only a sentence, not a word, has meaning

MONL p. 24 master thinks his “speech act” works

***FK p. 80 “without the performative experience of this elementary act of faith, there would neither be ‘social bond’ nor address of the other, nor performativity in general”

FL pp. 255-56 all constatives presuppose a performative: “I promise to make a sentence for you” > presuppose an act of justice, w/ irreducible thoughtlessness and unconsciousness in such urgency

——Derrida relates this to Levinas’ “la vérité suppose la justice (truth supposes justice),” “la justice, il ny a que ça de vrai” (dangerously parodying French idiom), and Saint Augustine’s idea that truth must be “made” [cf. AF p. 59 Augustine makes truth again, & again cf. POO p. 26]

p. 270 “felicitous performative speech act” as successful revolution

***LOBL p. ~90 performativity dissociated with the notion of presence [see p. 146]

p. 96 “there is no speech act not already the iteration of another”

MC p. 349 [Nietzsche’s etymologizing in On Genealogy] méchance (mean, bad, low): bad luck; malchance: Austin’s “infelicity,” parasite (breach of contract) [the clinic, those who fell (ill)]

p. 364 the great rendezvous (return to you) would be the performative of literature

p. 372 each explanatory context gives a performative of convention and a contract that guarantees new performatives

AF p. 58 mention rather than use [see POO p. 143n distinction still pragmatic], that the difference btwn mention & use must not be thematized is the secret

SPOM p. 23 Austin: a dictionary of words never give a definition, it only gives examples

pp. 62-3 privilege figure of conjuration (Verschwörung, Beschwörung) for another reason [not just fear]: swearing, taking an oath, committing oneself in performative, secret fashion

——“an interpretation that transforms what it interprets” contradicts speech act theory and 11th Thesis on Feuerbach

p. 116 “one makes oneself accountable by an engagement that selects, interprets, and orients, in a practical and performative manner, and by a decision that begins by getting caught up, like a responsibility, in the snares of an injunction that is already multiple, heterogeneous, contradictory, divided—therefore an inheritance that will always keep its secret, and the secret of a crime

p. 128 Marx uses performative, not constative, to announce future of communism

POOF pp. 213-14 Derrida ties the chiasmus btwn the vocative & pronominal dative omega ω to the chiasmus btwn the constative & performative in general (‘speech act’ theory reduced to its rudiments): the call, the address, always overruns neutral observation, a minimum consensus (of friendship, of consent) is presupposed in the utterance [?]

POO p. 3 the uncertain boundary btwn actor & analyst

p. 24 “let us (deconstructionists?) testify (témoignons) to a secret that is without content, without a content separable from its performative experience, from its performative tracing”

BL p. 216 literature as subversive juridicity

——literature makes law, power of performativity—sidestep existing laws which condition its emergence (jouer la loi [play, deceive the law])

MPM p. 24 performative function in de Man: once gathering of Being & totalizing of memory are impossible > fatality of tropological substitution (non-totalization)

p. 24 in terms of speech acts, law takes form of the performative

p. 95 no act before speech, no speech before act > there is this not natural “fact,” faktum, to which we’re recalled: already there, past never present, historicity itself, “ancientness” w/out history

p. 98 for de Man, “allegory of unreadability”: when performative cannot be distinguished from constative, all the while remaining irreducible

p. 111 indispensability of speech act theory for deconstruction

p. 113 Austin’s cunning naïveté as he discusses promises and excuses

pp. 115-16 what Derrida likes in Austin > doesn’t leave a properly philosophical thesis in place

p. 120-21 de Man confirms opposition btwn performative & constative, extends it beyond its original field > then undermines it and makes it sterile in its very principle [?]

p. 134 a new thinking of the act theorists of speech acts never thought: “promises” necessary and mad [via Nietzsche, de Man]

pp. 134-5 Nietzsche anticipated difference btwn constative/performative (destruction of episteme does not fall totally into doxa—not relativistic)

p. 145 for de Man, text defined by considering a statement at the same time performative & constative > this same time never is, will never have been, will never be present

p. 145 de Man “as soon as a text knows what it states, in can only act deceptively…if it doesn’t act, it can’t state what it knows.” tension btwn text as narrative and text as theory

SEC p. 321 the performative (I am, for the moment, placing myself in this hypothesis) > communicates a force by impetus of a mark

——speech act operates (no classical referent, such is interest of Austin’s finding)

p. 322 Austin freed analysis of performative from value of truth, opposition true/false, substituting for it the value of force, difference of force (nothing less than Nietzschean, who always had affinity for vein of English thought)

p. 322 Austin doesn’t account for graphematic structure of speech act in general

——intentional: conscious purpose of speech act

——no remainder

pp. 323-24 Austin proposes a full meaning that is master of itself, infelicity is an essential risk but always accidental (he avoids thought of endless alteration of essence and accident)

——Austin doesn’t think everything covered under problematic heading “arbitrariness of the sign” [see OG for deconstruction of “arbitrary”]

p. 325 general possibility of “parasite”: 1) trap (piège), failure (échec), abyss outside/in front of language, ditch (fossé), place of external perdition, which language can avoid, sheltered by (à labri de) its essence or telos? 2) or is this risk, internal and positive condition of its possibility, this outside its inside?

——Austin makes us accept as ordinary a teleological and ethical determination > univocality of statement, self presence of total context, transparency of intentions, presence of meaning—absolute singular oneness of speech act

pp. 325-26 Austin excludes determined modification of a general citationality, general iterability [cf. GLAS, general fetishism] w/out which no “successful” performative?

p. 326 Austin doesn’t deny iterability, “constructs a differential typology of forms of iteration” [?]

p. 327 what Derrida likes about Austin: critique of code of linguisticism

P (I) p. 14 beyond the divide between performative and constative, dans ces parages where border line trembles

FSW p. 229 Freud performed for us the scene of writing > le discours de Freud y est pris

SH pp. 6-7 how could we differentiate what Celan says [theorizes? is it theory in a poem?] about the date and how he dates? to differentiate would be to longer read him

p. 51-52 shibboleth: the indecipherability btwn constative & performative, the untrue truth of truth, ashes in truth

***FWT p. 173 [re: psychoanalysis’ method, teaching?] debt of all theoretical (juridical, ethical & political) positing to a performative power structured by a fiction, by figural invention: “the convention that guarantees every performative inscribes within itself the credit that is conferred upon a fiction”

ATIA p. 67 “I am he who will be”: a promise that breaches the purity of nothingness w/ a performative

WAP pp. 32-3 natural right claims to found its prescription on observation > a performative, a “must,” turns into an “is,” a description: limit btwn essence, possibility, having-to-be, btwn natural/positive law is surreptitiously crossed

——[natural law legitimates itself by denying its performativity]

p. 39 declaration of a right hides performative under constative > “convention” always assumes a philosophy: community never given but constituted by the right

DPi p. 100 Hugo (on French Revolution): once there’s peace, no more DP > Hugo: “inviolability of human life” > [Hugo aware of rhetoric of address, of apostrophe]

pp. 152-53 fiction, invented performance: which in the end we don’t believe, we pretend to believe, we make believe > no one could ever believe that homicide (crime) = DP (punishment)

TB p. 113 untranslatability less to do w/ adequation than unique occurrence of a performative of force

PIO pp. 10-1 fable, logos, performative demonstration of thing it’s saying, says the saying: [in the beginning was the word] incipit, dispatch (envoi), evangelical message

——Ponge’s “Fable”: poetic performative, describes/carries out, on same line, its own generation; telling & told are undecidable, its constative is its performative (not content w/ announcing, it’s located ironically in evangelical tradition, reveals/perverts structure of envoi)

pp. 11-2 Derrida explains how Ponge’s single line is divided into “use” and “mention”

——inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

p. 12 constative (discovering, unveiling, pointing out [manifester], dire ce qui est); performative (producing, instituting, transforming) > “Fable” is co-implication of these 2 values; “Fable” is exemplary > invents by means of enunciation (performs/describes, operates/states)

p. 13 [re: “Fable”] no metalanguage: essential instability, rapid oscillation btwn performative/constative (fiction/nonfiction), constitutes event > disturbs norms, rules, statues

——event (also loeuvre) calls for new statutes/conventions that could record, account for, such events (neither speech act theory nor literary theory [formalist or hermeneutic variety] can account for such event)

pp. 13-4 fabulous economy in “Fable,” of a very simple sentence [par le mot par commence donc ce texte], spontaneously deconstructs opposition constative/performative w/out disabling this logic totally, since it needs it in order to detonate speech event (pour provoquer ce singulier événement [?])

pp. 15-6 specularization paralyzes “Fable” (seems to freeze text)—undecidability of whether fabulous discourse makes it out of itself or is the very misfortune (malheurs) of the [possibility of the] mirror, infelicity of constative/performative (way they parasite each other)

p. 17 for Austin, “I” has the privilege of the performative; parabasis (parekbasis)

p. 414n de Man: Nietzsche anticipates speech act theory

PF p. xxxiii passivity marks all unconditional pure events (gift, forgiveness, hospitality, death), marks and thus doubly limits most active, productive performativity

——performative mastery: neutralizes & annuls event

p. xxxiv performativity exceeded by event (exposed to passivity)

HLP p. 51 performative can produce a truth, makes the truth, as Augustine says, whose power sometimes imposes itself forever

TR p. 74 for Austin, a machine could never achieve a performative, intervenes in performative event as a parasite, as extrinsic, accidental

pp. 118-19 for de Man: performative (language of power, beyond knowledge) discontinues, irreversible, and yet can always be “recuperated” by the cognitive

p. 128 Austin printed word performative, no matter how problematic, on the ribbon

p. 146 “I beseech you” not to “annihilate” [re: Confessions]: performative eve, arche-peformative before performative, younger & older, support & archive of confession, its subjectile

pp. 146-47 paradoxical antinomy of performative & event, the former neutralizes event in “I can” of mastery: vulnerability/finitude of body & corpus is limit of performative power

PJP p. 169 Miller: lie is performative & constative

PSSS p. 248 promise as threat—intolerable ambiguity for Speech Act Theory [promise en souffrance]

p. 258 mastery, sovereignty (Herrschaft, Bemächtigung), linked to a drive for power, possession, an “I can,” a performative power (Bemächtigungstrieb), via sworn faith (organizes Lacan’s symbolic), indissociable from Bewältigung (exercise of power, movement of appropriation)

p. 276 “I can,” “I may,” mastery of performative, dominates/neutralizes (in order of “symbolic,” symbolically) the event it produces

p. 277 constative: theoretical knowledge, neutral description, account of what is in fact, science

——performative: power, possibility of “I may,” “I can,” or obligation, promise, law, sworn faith, the symbolic, all institutionality

p. 278 btwn performative institution and constative knowledge an absolute hiatus, absolute cut, structure of indirectness, hiatus like a mouth that speaks or wound that bleeds [cruor]

——this discontinuity calls for a leap, what Classical humanist philosophers call freedom, this interruption gives a chance

***p. 278 wherever there is law & performative, event has been neutralized, reappropriated by performative force or symbolic order

PPT p. 3 Cezanne’s “I owe you the truth in painting”: a performative demanding another—performative supplementarity open to infinity

TN p. 224 event, la venue de larrivant, routs (met en déroute) and exceeds any performative power

UWC p. 233 mise en oeuvre (the putting to work), at least to the performative putting to work of “as if”

p. 235 force of event always stronger than performative

EU p. 95 university as a child of metaphysics & tehnē > once this offspring exceeds places assigned to it, becomes invasive margin: university “idea” reigns everywhere

——parasite everywhere there’s language, public, publishing > to wish to control/exclude parasites is a misunderstanding of speech acts

pp. 97-8 to ensure philosophy’s power-to-think-and-judge, Kant draws linear/indivisible border in language (language: that which opens passage to all parasites/simulacrum): [the professor utters only constative], university has no executive power, professor speaks w/out action, does not speak publicly > Kant makes information technology [that which escapes university] philosophy’s most faithful representative—but only as a reserved, intra-university, quasi-private language [before the law of this apparent paradox ultimate responsibility should be taken today]

p. 100 performativity (where knowledge & power are no longer distinguished) produces/transforms situation in which it speaks [i.e. the founding of a graduate school] > the performative does not exist

——[re: performativity of university] dream of studying every intersecting, dia- and synchronic code in class evaluations, jury reports > concept of university legible in every sentence

SPEC pp. 273-74 performance of psychoanalytic theory: “in the theory of psychoanalysis…” [compare to Rousseau’s Confessions: singular performance] > Freud gave his coup denvoi, his singular certification: Freud seems to contract only w/ himself

p. 274 the contractual institution that permits one to say “je-nous” > Freud’s signature engageant et représentant tous les tenants de la théorie: ça marche et fait marcher comme ça [is Derrida speaking about himself too?]

p. 322 inscription of a subject in his [Freud’s] text is also condition of the performance/pertinence of a text, beyond empirical subjectivity, supposing that could exist as soon as one writes, substitutes, supplements: notion of truth incapable of accounting for this performance

p. 372 variation-of-the-trait-in-relation-to-the-object, not only the theme of Symposium but its performance, its condition

WBH p. 199 gift determines, produces identity of giver & receiver, gives itself the right to determine, always a strike of force, irruption

p. 200 receiver as determining factor of gift, one who responds, performativity of text produces receiver w/out pre-existing [him/her/it]

——Declaration of Independence signed by God, signs American people into existence, they didn’t exist before it

——it is by the gift that Law is produced, the signature engenders sender, receiver, signer

p. 201 promise in every speech act, promise not simply performative

——if signature, or all that amounts to it, can’t rely on ready determination (is performative), then you can’t rely on sexual opposition

SPEECH ACT THEORY from LIMITED INC.

LI p. 33 use vs. mention (signature vs. say one’s name)

p. 39 metaphysical premises (fundamentally moralistic) of performative, speech act, discursive events underlie hermeneutics of Ricoeur, archaeology of Foucault

pp. 42-3 illocutionary/perlocutionary force (Nietzsche)

p. 58 value of act: used so generally, analyzed so little in speech act theory

——[quoted from SEC] doesn’t a performative have to be identifiable as a “citation?”

p. 59 [from SEC] by no means does Derrida deny the effects of speech, it is just that these effects don’t exclude what is generally opposed to them

p. 71 argument of principle concerns a structural limit, argument is of the same kind as the set-argument [re: speech act theory’s own differentiation of itself from other theories, & thus its reliance on the metaphorical: ruined analogical value btwn speech act theory and other theories]

——the way oppositions impose non-neutral hierarchies (classical logic) > eg. speech act theory’s demand for the “serious, literal, strict”

——speech act theory should (to escape traditional logic) assert right of its own speech acts to be non-serious

pp. 74-5 acc. speech act theory, a promise is defective if it is a threat or warning > threat vs. promise (do to vs. do for)

p. 77 in what way does speech act theory, philosophy, derive from fiction?

pp. 77-8 Sarl incorporates the parasite—retains the object w/in itself as something excluded > psychoanalytic incorporation delegitimizes Sarl’s claim of foreign body, impossible to assimilate, must be rejected

p. 81 Sarl’s anger at confusion btwn use/mention, his appeal to good & evil, due to fact that use/mention are always susceptible to confusion

p. 84 where is dividing-line btwn use/mention?

p. 85 Austin’s strategy of exclusion fraught w/ metaphysical presuppositions [re: nonserious, parasite]

p. 87 [from SEC] Austin excludes etiolations of language

pp. 86-9 possibility (can occur) vs. eventuality (the fact that such events do occur); for Austin, “can be quoted” is a possibility of a speech event, but one he excludes from his sense of purified eventuality > this exclusion/purification as a theoretical fiction; for Derrida, possibility as “standard [propre?]” demands no exclusion of eventuality: a promise must be iterable

pp. 90-1 in speech act theory, the parasite is secondary, it is “logically dependent” on a nonparasitical onto-logical order; this logic enables its exclusion

p. 93 speech act theory’s hierarchical axiology: set up value oppositions & subordinate these values to each other (normal/abnormal, parasite/nonparasite, fulfilled/void, serious/nonserious, literal/nonliteral, briefly: positive/negative, ideal/nonideal)

———Plato, Rousseau, Descartes, Husserl: good before evil, simple before complex, positive before negative, pure before impure, essential before accidental, imitated before imitation (not one metaphysical gesture among others—the metaphysical exigency)

p. 94 to have a general theory of speech act theory: masterpiece of metaphysical-oedipal rhetoric

p. 95 to avoid the pretended speech act in the general theory is not rigorous

p. 97 speech act theory seeks the founding categories of all ethical-political statements: relation of intentionality to conventionality or to rules (in the best Kantian tradition)

p. 99 [from SEC] acc. Austin, relative purity (specificity) of each performative does not emerge in opposition to iteration or citationality but to other kinds of iteration constituted by general iterability > such iterations violate rigorous purity of every speech act (event of discourse)

SPERM (SEED) [fixerup]

PP p. 149 Plato prefers one writing over the other, a good writing over bad, a fertile trace (endgenders w/in) over a sterile one (une semence dépensée au-dehors en pure perte, risk of dissemination)

p. 150 good-writing is serious (spoudē), pharmakon, ephemeral produce is a game (paidia)

p. 152 (175) pharmakon is liquid (opposites pass more easily btwn each other), water [see Laws on protecting water], everything in sperm which overflows wastefully (se dépense sans réserve) [living speech: non-diverted seminal potency]

p. 154 seed must submit to logos, do violence to itself, since sperm is opposed to law of logos > when Plato turns live speech into psychic graphē he does so w/ a problematic of truth: lécriture en tè psuchè nest pas une écriture de frayage, mais seulement denseignement, de transmission, écriture daletheia

PAS PAS p. (104) ces mots le blanchâtre près de l'eau (j'y entends le déplacement silencieux, dissimulé d'un cachalot, sperm-whale

***p. (105) double band is structure of name said to be proper, anonymity is the effect, whether by monumentalization (sauf, the unscathed) or effacement (seeds, dispersion); gift of name is corrupted in advance dans le pas-de-nom [plus-de-nom] > what takes place in and beyond language: leaves the fold of this folding back

FSW p. 230 unerasable trace, not a trace, full-presence, son of God, sign of parousia, not a seed, not a mortal germ

WM pp. 244-45 acc. Aristotle (onomatism, doctrine of simple names), metaphor, like mimēsis, must come back (revient) to physis, to its truth and its presence: nature finds itself, its proper analogy, nature gives itself in metaphor, thus metaphor is a natural gift, a characteristic of genius > geniuses have more nature, more generosity, more seed; Derrida asks whether everything can be taken from me except the power to replace? can physis sow itself?

DS pp. 179-80 suspended lustre of title: title provides a first fold, highlights womb-like matrix of page, a germinal or seminal blank, “the perpetual suspense of a tear that can never be entirely formed nor fall (still the lustre) scintillates in a thousand glances

pp. 273, 276n elle, aile, L: m/f; voile, milky way [sperm, milk] (voie lactée), m/f [see P p. 146] [see ATIA p. 36 feminine ejaculation as fantasy of penis, milk become thread, filament]

p. 266 hymen will have always disseminated: SPERM, burning lava, milk, spume, dribble of seminal liquor

p. 269 dissemination, fold of hymen, somber white of cave or womb, au noir sur blanc du ventre, lieu de son émission éparse et de ses hasards sans retours [scattered emissions, chances, w/out return]

p. 271 dissemination in the folds of the hymen

p. 285 désertant toute profondeur, chacune de ses faces est aussi, après coup, tout le dé

in a hymen depending on verse, blank once more, composed of chance & necessity, writing prepares to receive the seminal spurt of a throw of dice

POS POS pp. 45-6 dissemination, seminal differance, explodes semantic horizon, not polysemia (which reassembles w/in totalizing, teleological dialectics), play on seme and semen: simulated common parentage, accident produces semantic mirage, deviance of meaning sets something off

P P p. 95 what is beautiful is dissemination, pure cut w/out negativity; negativity is significant; adherence always connotes division, lack, negativity; beauty is not a signifier; the signifier: accounts for everything except beauty > a non-sterilized cut from fecundation: la semence serre

FS FS p. 23 logos spermatikos: adult in miniature, encasement, anthropomorphic concept, preformationsim, biological idea, totality of hereditary characteristics enveloped in germ

O O pp. 44-5(n) acc. X (chiasmus) (thematic diagram of dissemination), semen [preface] just as likely to get lost as seminal differance as it is to be reappropriated by sublimity of father

——preface as father assuring/assisting his work, his son, idealizing, mastering his seed, auto-, homo-, re-insemination, btwn father & son alone > narcissism as law, on par w/ law, figure of Platonic boētheia (coming to aid of speech, helping logos): even better if just father, preface useless

p. 44 acc. X (chiasmus) (thematic diagram of dissemination), semen just as likely to get lost as seminal differance as it is to be reappropriated by sublimity of father

p. 45 MOP as effacement or sublimation of seminal differance, restance of outwork gets internalized, domesticated into ontotheology of great book

p. 48 concept > engenderer & consumer (jouissant) of itself, relève its preface, plunges (senfonce) into itself > conception of concept an autoinsemination

——return of theological seed to itself, dispersion working for profit of Idea, exclusion as inclusion [not Hegel’s Jew?] > la vérité qui se parle dans le cercle logocentrique, cest le discours de ce qui revient au père

p. 50(n) logos spermatikos, philosophy of the seed, romanticism, myth of semantic depth, genetic pro-gram [quoting from OG]

——seminal differance: not only the seed, but the egg

p. 52 [in field of dissemination] formalism no longer fails (néchoue) before empirical richness [like in Hegel?] but before une queue, dont le se-mordre [self-bite] nest ni spéculaire ni symbolique

BL BL p. 209 hymen of the law, its entry (Eintritt): ante portes (place of premature ejaculation), place & non-place: the adjournment ’til death of child is either premature ejaculation or non-ejaculation: no ejaculate w/out relation to the law [Lacan] > tabernacle empty, dissemination fatal

SW SW p. 327 tallith as intimate secretion [see SERICULTURE], opened, given birth by divine word preceding it, & also separate, dissociated, dissolves bond, holds to secret

p. 353 silkworm’s sex impossible to discern, the spitting outside oneself, secretion, of what will never leave it: female ejaculate, milk, sperm, fantasy of penis (neither veil, nor web)

——milk become thread, this filament

TB TB pp. 113-14 one can think maturation of seed as a geneticist/vitalist metaphor, this would support genealogical/parental code > or, one can invert/overturn order, “metaphorical catastrophe”: only understand “family,” “life” by way of language & its sur-vival, [this reversal is operated expressly by Benjamin?]

——Benjamin utilizes metaphor of family seed [cf. p. 112], Hegelian-like spirit returning to itself

DPi DPi p. 188 for Hugo, seed of abolition (germe always goes together w/ teleology), abolition will happen, a magnificent advance, advance is credit: make civilization a loan in advance > promise

——spirit of revolution makes an advance to spirit of civilization

EJQB EJQB p. 72 Breton: “the name must germinate, otherwise it is false”

AFR AFR p. 35 Condillac denounces Aristotle’s philosophy as unconscious empiricism: Aristotle takes derived generalities as premises, products for seeds or origins (germes)

pp. 44-7 for Condillac, sensation is unmodifiable, first material, immediate presence, but also a germ for analogic sign > degrees of intensity, good analogy, “identical proportions”

——sensationalist metaphysics, via analogic, develops into semiotism: sign unfolds (développe) germ

p. 84 Locke, acc. Condillac, missed the sign as principle of unfolding [sensible] germ, did not radically analyze germ/seed

D D p. 304 “primitive” mythical unity always reconstituted retrospectively dans laprès-coupure > the decision, le coup (shot, throw, blow) parts the seed as it projects it (partage la semence en la projetant)

——numerical multiplicity not death threat sneaking up on unified germ, it pathbreaks (fraye la voie) for “the” seed (semence), which advances/produces (itself) in plural: singular plural

——dissemination, germination, no first insemination, “primal” insemination is dissemination: a trace, graft, whose traces have been lost

——each germ is its own term—finds its term w/in itself as its own internal limit, faisant angle avec sa proper mort [tracing, grafting, semen already swarming (essaimée)]

atomistic theories, theories of germ

p. 322 fertility of mother-site (androgynous), M (male, mère), m/f, milk, milky way, mère, énumère

pp. 324-25 le discurs dassistance, pluperfect, deconstructs “illusion” of present, unites presence & auxiliary, supports [Plato’s boetheia] ekgonos (dispossessed son), a seed exposed to all violence of writing: you

——“I” as ghost, as germ, term, that disseminates, a germ that carries w/in itself its own term, se faisant fort de sa mort > le sperme: ferme

p. 347 air as seeds

p. 351 semantic order entangled in seminal, that which was never itself, never comes back to itself; semantic, as a moment of desire, signifies reappropriation of seed w/in presence > the seminal’s dream of death: seed wanting to keep itself

C C pp. 203-04 disseminal spurt (projet) of semen [120 Days] does not emerge (débouche) into the other’s mouth (bouche) before the turd has been incorporated by the mouth, his own: embouchure of the remainder, vomit in economimesis

CIN CIN p. 53 the cinder like burning semen (semence brûlante), lava destined nowhere, when you take word into your mouth, to breathe

p. 55 and you can also receive semen through the ear

OG OG pp. 216-17 (310-11) Rousseau would like absolute origin of language to be absolute south > instead, he describes (against his wishes) a turning of language, language is sown (semées), a structure, a system of oppositions

——axis of reference [North or South] traces inside of each language

ATAP ATAP p. 65 lever/relever all senses (meanings) pressing around Hebrew gala, in front of columns/colossi of Greece, in front of the galactic, the milky ways that fascinate me

EU EU p. 57 Kant’s bio-architectural idea of the university, a living organism: architectonics as organic scientificity, bio-technological > this harmony (btwn State power & Faculty of Philosophy), as regulative idea, inspires Kant’s politics of university

pp. 57-8 Kant’s architectonics (of Reason) as internal principle, organic whole or organic purposiveness (finalité), one sets out from a purpose (on part de la fin), as in every organic totality > organic “metaphor” in Critique of Pure Reason presages the 3rd Critique

——if one does not set out from architectonic principle, one only achieves “technical” unity, “know-how”

p. 59 [re: Kant’s University] monogram, un germe (Keim), an elliptic, enveloped signature—completes itself, pre-destined form

SPIRIT

GOD pp. 99-100 heart as light, photology, because it is spiritual, not earthly, it cannot hide, cannot be encrypted, an omnipresence more radical & effective than a spy satellite

GT p. 44 spirit as gift

p. 97 a “true” corpus is still, perhaps, counterfeit money, may be ghost or spirit, spirit of body & of capital (title, heading, is capital), no problem of canon if this institution were natural

p. 114 in Mauss, ghost & spirit linked in same time, same scene

FL p. 280 spirit as police hauntings, spirit as dictatorship

SPOM p. xx commitment of justice, to whom? to life (natural life, life of spirit) of living being > that this is irrefutable carries justice beyond present life, non pas vers la mort mais vers une sur-vie, where life & death are traces of traces

——alors il y a de l’esprit, des esprits, et il faut compter avec eux > le plus d’un

pp. 4-5 when spirit becomes specter, an instant of flesh and phenomenality, an apparition

pp. 8-9 three things which decompose the single thing (spirit, specter, king): 1) mourning, localize, identify the dead, know who and where [ontology, hermeneutics, philosophy] 2) language, voice, “scull had a tongue in it” 3) work, “spirit of the spirit” is work, spirit works

p. 61 pluralize spirit, send a welcome to specters

pp. 61-2 “to be present” not un mot desprit, but le mot de lesprit > the first verbal body

p. 134 semantics of Gespenst haunt semantics of Geist

p. 135 [re: Eighteenth Brumaire: “conjure up spirits of past”] convoking (beschwören) spirits as specters, le geste dune conjuration positive, celle qui jure pour appeler et non pour refouler

p. 109 “we” will not please Marxists, insisting on the spirt of Marxism as spirits in the plural and in the sense of specter, allowing untimely specters to come back

p. 141 btwn spirit & specter, tragedy & comedy, difference of time btwn 2 masks

p. 143 spirit of past [not ghost?] convoked to anesthetize itself (sich betäuben), protects against its “own content,” protects against itself, makes you forget why and that you’re violent

p. 154 acc. Marx, to call forth spirit and dismiss ghosts is to phantomalize, bewitch oneself w/ spirit

p. 157 acc. Marx, the ghost effect not only spiritualization, autonomization of spirit, idea, or thought (Hegelian idealism), but also supplementary moment after autonomization, one more simulacrum is added: a body, flesh (Leib)

pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

***——that’s not all: specificity of process can still capitalize spectralization > the first ghost effect (autonomized spirit) can be incorporated, negated, integrated as one’s own human body

***p. 167 via Marx, all phenomenology is phenomenology of spirit, cannot hide its Christian vocation

pp. 170-71 difference btwn specter and spirit is differance, specter is > carnal apparition of spirit, its phenomenal, fallen, guilty body, impatient, nostalgic waiting for redemption, for spirit

——ghost would be deferred spirit, promise or calculation of an expiation > this differance must be reckoned w/: it upsets all calculations, interests, capital > a transition btwn 2 moments of spirit, the ghost just passing through [see Hamacher, “Lingua Amissa,” Futures: Of Jacq.., p. 165]

——passage of “spirits,” “offspring of spirit” > spectrality of everything (Gespensterhaftigkeit Aller)

p. 180 if every specter is distinguished from spirit by a quasi-incarnation, an incorporation, then Christ is most spectral of specters

p. 193 there is always more than one commodity, more than one spirit, # belongs to the movement of the commodity

A p. 60 pass from hostage to host/guest from host/guest to ghost in series: hostage, host, guest, ghost, holy ghost, Geist

pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

VP p. 9 living speech (spirituality of breath as phonē) preserves ideality and presence [in face of language’s game of presence/absence]

p. 29 the “as such”: totality of body, of mundane, totality of the spatial, the visible > not worked over (ne sont pas travaillés) by Geist, which transforms Körper into Leib

p. 70 Geistigkeit needs no signifier to be present to itself; writing is an incarnation that needs spirit, speech, thought to be animated

OH p. 34 Heidegger’s Entmachtung of spirit > destitution of Europe

pp. 68-9 ideality in capitalization: that which exceeds borders of sensible, opens onto infinite, gives rise to universal, “maxim of maximization,” nothing other than spirit itself (analogic)

p. 123n spirit as exemplary example, example par excellence, of value (source of value)

p. 124n Valéry makes analogy btwn spirit, value & capital [refers to Nietzsche]

p. 125n via Valéry, originary & transcategorical character of spirit, original spiritualism a logocentrism born in Mediterranean

pp. 125-26n Valéry: the word “spirit” > first commerce of the world [logocentrism]

PPHS p. 76 Aufhebung facilitates spirit’s elevation beyond that within which it was submerged, sublimates nature into itself > presenting itself to itself as such

p. 85 Egyptian immortality of soul—close to Hegel’s freedom of spirit

p. 86 despite symbol’s identity, sign’s arbitrariness is closer to independence, freedom of spirt than external, natural symbol [Saussure concurs in footnotes]

p. 87n Hegel: creative memory, mnēmosynē, freely bestows on sign a value that only has value conferred on it by spirit > [because sign is arbitrary, unlike symbol, it resonates w/ spirit, solely]

p. 89 for Hegel, signifying substance is sound, “substance of expression” [glossematicians], most proper to be produced as time itself, sound relève from naturalness, linked to spirit’s relation to itself, the voice

p. 90 acc. Hegel, when ideality appears in nature: spirit hides itself outside itself in sensory matter

p. 94n classical take on writing as “practical exterior activity,” as that which “comes to the aid” condemns all mnemotechniques, all langue machines, all supplementary repetitions > life of spirit is thusly forced to emerge from its interior

p. 98 Hegel: human voice sounds w/out external impulse, out of one’s own feelings, spirit

p. 105 acc. Hegel, silence of writing, space of calculation, interrupts movement of Aufhebung, interiorization of past (Erinnerung), history of spirit

p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

WM p. 253 via Du Marsais, the philosophical metaphor light of the spirit is a detour w/in (in sight of) reappropriation, presence, etc. (from Platonic eidos to Hegelian Idea), a trope, a borrowed dwelling (house) > here, light is one metaphor among metaphors, and borrowed dwelling, expropriation, becomes metaphor of metaphor

P p. 26 art forms only one of the circles in the great circle of Geist, revenant (circle of art, circle of religion, circle of philosophy)

FS pp. 9-10 absence & haunting of divine sign (Jewish God) [cf. GOD], anguish of Hebraic ruah (pneuma), regulates modern books/criticism/aesthetics

——writing, not a determined pathos, an empirical state of writer, but responsibility of angustia: [Derrida is privileging a power of equivocality over creativity of classical God, anguish connoting a narrowing, a loss of breath, a restriction, constraint, and thus the anguish of choice]

O p. 24 Hegel: spirit is a trinity, but cannot be counted (counting is a bad procedure)

p. 48n for Hegel, life is essential philosophical determination of concept & spirit (vegetal, biological traits), organicity of encyclopedic logic [inborn germ of death]

Gii p. 30 Geschlecht, in Fichte, is/inhabits living language of inspirited breath vs. dead language torn from its root

——acc. Fichte, children learn language as if signs for sensible things were arbitrary (willkürlich) > must reconstitute past development of national language

p. 60 Heidegger employs idiomatic untranslatability of opposition btwn geistig/geistlich to withdraw Gedicht (“site”) of Trakl from Platonic tradition, w/ its opposition aisthēton/noeton (“sensible” material/“intelligible” spirituality), and from Christian opposition spiritual/temporal

——Heidegger’s Geist (gheis): lifted, transported out of oneself, like a flame

TR pp. 89-90 Rousseau abjures Protestantism (freer, more intentionalist, more spiritual), he converts mechanically to more mechanical, ritualistic Catholicism

IW p. 261 acc. Cohen, Kant: holy of holies, innermost sanctum (die innerste Verwandschaft) of German spirit & Kant represents most intimate affinity w/ Judaism

——this kinship (Kant, German, Jew) is sealed in most intimate depth, most essential interiority, is sacredness itself, historical sacredness of spirit

p. 262 for Cohen, Reformation placed German spirit at center of world history (in den Mittelpunkt der Weltgeshichte)

——faithful heir of Platonic hypotheticism: cult of doubt, suspicion of dogma, culture of interpretation, free interpretation (free from institutional authority)

——slogan (Schlagwort) of Reformation: to give account (logon didonai) & justify

p. 263 it’s as if Cohen tells Jews/Catholics: recognize the Protestant spirit that already inhabits you: a demand for hypothesis, truth, science, beyond instituted dogma [Jewish & German]

p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——truth of nationality is German idealism; the German spirit is the spirit of humanity

p. 286 music as highest, most ideal art, its structure is pure breath, spiritus and psyche

EL pp. 204-05 Scholem protests against Christianizing Messianism, interiorizing & spiritualizing, a flight seeking to escape verification of Messianic, apocalyptic claim

p. 220 Germans (Kant) think French combine Geist and Witz in Esprit

C p. 218 bananas [re: Titus-Carmel’s The Great Cultu] would be copies of copies w/out example, phantasmata, if force of ductus did not carry the remainder beyond any phantasy, beyond the signature, proper name, nameable [cf. pp. 220-21 also beyond hierarchy]

——ductus’ [?] contingency accounts for ideality of model, which always rises, fermentation of spirt (Geist), above an organic decomposition

TN p. 247 for Aquinas, spiritual touching, pure act, no intervallic medium (transcends value of affect), not temporal but eternal: like pure act or Prime Mover, a touch foreign to sensibility: (ordinary/extraordinary) history of Christian language

p. 248 Christian body as post-sin, post-Incarnation historical body

——divine spirit as flame, sets itself on fire, figure of love & desire which spiritualizes hapto-onto-theo-teleology of Christian flesh > highest possibility

——the becoming-love of Aristotelian desire (orxeis) [?], spontaneity of a causa sui

p. 261 spacing & “distance” are thought by Chrétian [by Christian theology of flesh], reduced to phenomenology of finitude, que le toucher spirituel (infini, immédiat, etc.) aura commencé par élever et relever [differance serving to close closure]

p. 367n Pascal: true sacrifice must be spiritual—the flesh that doesn’t perish [circumcision of heart]

——letter (touchable), spirit (untouchable), Jews/Christians—who touches more? Hegel’s hardness of Jews

AD pp. 111-12 spectral aura of face, figure of Geist, ghost, urgent before “real” qualities > recognize other w/out waiting: exceeds, deconstructs ontological positions

——no hospitality w/out chance of spectrality; God uncontaminated by Being: rigorous definition of the Face, le tout autre > as spectral as it is spiritual? gives orders, gives pardon

CF p. 34 for Hegel, all is forgivable except crime against spirit, against reconciling power of forgiveness

CIN p. 55 cinder & smoke (fumée): smoke gets lost w/out perceptible remainder, spirited away, sublimates; cinder falls (tombe), lets go, heavy, more material because it fritters away its word: it is very divisible

OG pp. 17-8 (29-30) natural writing (breath) pneumatological not grammatological

——interior holy voice of faith; natural law, native unity of voice & writing is prescriptive, commandment > good writing comprehended as that which had to be comprehended

p. 26 (41) non-phonetic hieroglyph (Leibniz, Chinese) menaces history/life of spirit because menaces substantiality, breaks the noun (nom) apart > describes relations not appellations

SPIRIT from

S p. 1 Heidegger warns we should, he should, vermeiden (avoid, flee) the word “spirit”

p. 3 theme of spirit has been disinherited (forclos dheritage) from Heidegger’s oeuvre

pp. 3, 115-16n from spirit—to fire; history of title De lesprit

Rousseau was penning a condemnation of Helvétius’ De lesprit when he discovered the author was being prosecuted, he threw his text into the fire

p. 4 pneuma, spiritus, Geist (quarrel btwn languages, Übersetzung)

p. 5 what remains unquestioned for Heidegger, Geist is force itself in the most out-of-the-ordinary manifestation, acquires extraordinary authority in German, and, not appearing at forefront of scene, it w/draws from any destruction or deconstruction, as if it did not “belong to the history of ontology” [Derrida on his modest itinerary toward exposure]

p. 6 geistig and geistlich are modalities of Geist that bring privilege to the political

pp. 8-9 Heidegger’s spirituality would be a nodal resistance in its most economical torsion, a truth of truth, the tautology of which does not need to be discovered/invented: spirit as another word for the One and Versammlung [Derrida is presenting this politely as an hypothesis, but he knows it’s true]

p. 10 is Geist the name (beyond any other name) Heidegger gives to the unquestioned possibility of the question?

p. 10 Heidegger tries to save purity of a non-Christian Gestigkeit of Geist, a purity internal to spirit, though he recognizes evil (das Böse) is spiritual (geistlich)

p. 14 Heidegger does not make of spirit a limitation (Beschränkung) of Being; Heidegger’s use of spirit is most often axiological, axiomatic, axio-poetic > spirit doesn’t belong to onto-theology[?]

p. 15 spirit designates resource of any deconstruction, possibility of any evaluation

p. 16 spirit is what in no way allows itself to be thingified (substantialized, subjectum, hypokeimenon); w/out ontological clarification, thingification of spirit is dogmatic [Descartes, Husserl]

pp. 21-2 Derrida proposes that analytic of Dasein could also be analytic of Gemüt (not Geist but still translated as esprit in one of the French translations)

p. 23 putting “spirit” in quotation marks preserves and withdraws something of Latin-Cartesian meaning [Heidegger hopes quotation marks free spirit from vulgar, uneigentlich]

p. 24 acc. Heidegger, one must not say that the body alone has spatiality, this would be naive opinion (naïve Meinung) where spiritual being is transposed after the fact (nachträglich) into space

p. 25 Heidegger rephrases Hegel’s “history of spirit unfolding in time” as “the development of history falls into time”

p. 26 acc. Heidegger, Hegelian spirit ruled by epoch of Cartesian cogito, thus calls for deconstruction; Hegel called Descartes the Christopher Columbus of philosophical modernity

p. 28 Heidegger: “spirit” is originary temporalization

p. 31 beautiful description of the guard-like theatrical nature of quotation marks, and when they are relieved from “Geist” has spirit itself or spirit’s ghost (spectre) come on stage?

p. 32 die Selbstbehauptung (self-affirmation) could not be what it is w/out spirit, and there is even a logic of spiritual guidance in Heidegger’s “terrifying” Rectorship Address [see pp. 34, 36-37]

——for Heidegger, Geist not pneuma, not spiritus, but flame, and he says this can only be thought in German

p. 34 the imprint (Gepräge) marking destiny of Germans is onto-typological [Lacoue-Labarthe], is the imprint of spirit’s force

pp. 36-7 Heidegger: spirit not Witz, not Reason of world, it is the being-resolved to the essence of Being, gives “rhythm to the march our people has begun toward its future history”

p. 38 spirit writes hyphen btwn authorities and history, world, people, will to essence, to know

***pp. 39-40 price of the strategy of “spirit,” always turns back on “subject,” even when used to displace subject from racism, biologism, naturalism, the opposition requires a “unilaterality of subjectity,” an oppositional determination > whether “human rights” or democracy, freedom of spirit demarcates a metaphysics of subjectity that is blind to the irreducibility of complicity, contamination (even if, and there are, degrees)

p. 40 Geist is always haunted by its Geist, a ghost is always the other’s ventriloquist; metaphysics always returns in the sense of a revenant, Geist is the most fatal figure of revenance: the double which can never be separated from the single

——Heidegger’s Rectorship Address is diabolical because it capitalizes on the worst, both evils at once: sanctions nazism and a metaphysical gesture [spirit w/out quotations]

p. 43 spiritual duction as possibility of question, Vor-fragen, freedom of spirit comes before, in front, anticipates

——Vor-fragen of Führung, spirit, freedom of spirit, an Ursprung, leap, allows question to not solely reflect back on itself: why? why? why? > spirit = already questioning conduction

pp. 43-4 what seems in service of determinate politics [nazism] in Rectorship Address, w/ spirit awakening from Vor-fragen of Führung, could be a following of the will-to-know

p. 47 acc. Heidegger, animality is not de lesprit

p. 51 no world w/out spirit

pp. 59-60 [Heidegger appeals to depth (Tiefe) positively, sees destitution (Entmachtung) of spirit/world as a flattening, where dimension has become extension & number]

p. 62 that a spirit is force and is not force, has and does not have force, is a relation to double, a relation to haunting; Entmachtung (destitution) is inevitable (fatale), since ghost of spirit is never perceived

pp. 62-3 for Heidegger, that which causes destitution of spirit is of spirit, is its double, its spectral duplicity; yet, this is not Descartes’ Evil Genius (böse Geist), the destitution, the demonic, comes from cogitos substantializaton, accepts lies, destruction, doesn’t question (Schellingian)

p. 64 for Heidegger, Marxism’s falsification of spirit occurs w/ transformation of spirit into superstructural, powerless intellect, and, symmetrically, organization of people as living mass

p. 65 Heidegger: spirit is “eine ursprünglich einigende, verpflichtende geistige Macht (a spiritual power which originally unites and engages, assigns, obliges)”

——[when is spirit not used as propaganda?]

pp. 66-7 Derrida stresses theater of Heidegger’s removal (w/out remarking) of quotation marks from “spirit”

p. 121n Husserl shows signs of the worst w/ his racism against Eskimos, Papuans, Indians [spirit not an accidental ornament for Husserl’s thought]

p. 122n question of spirit: where is the worse?

——Valéry: says farewell to ghosts, world doesn’t need you [this exorcism equates spirit w/ death] [if you exorcise a ghost, you exorcise the spirit which produces the ghost]

pp. 122-23n acc. Valéry, spirit is negative dialectics, “always says no,” and to itself, spirit opposed to life/nature [Nietzsche-like]

p. 71 acc. Heidegger (via Schelling), Geist never Spiritus, but it is pneuma, but really it is flame; only German can name spirit, not even Greek

——to name spirit is to offer for thinking, German only language in which spirit comes to name itself

pp. 125-27n Derrida reminds of Matthew Arnold, his Babelian phrase Get Geist, his claim that Geist is untranslatable > in Get Geist spirit apostrophizes itself, a beginning—no beginning (pas de commencement): in the beginning there will have been (ghost of future perfect)

p. 127n Meister Eckhart: Augustine says Gemüt is like a receptacle (sloz) of spiritual images

p. 77 Schelling: spirit is breath of love, but love is the Most High [i.e. higher than spirit]

p. 78 spirit as a revenant, founds history as breath of something it cannot name, return to what is to-come in Hölderlin, the poet must preserve this experience in his Gemüt

p. 80 via Heidegger’s course on Schelling, spirit is only proper if it is close to itself, desire for gathering, a nostalgia, a Sehnsucht, where Sucht, etymologically, isn’t research but evil, evil inscribed in desire > evil as the desire to go out of oneself in order to return to oneself (motif, movement, trajectory of fire, not circle, of return)

——Heidegger: “in spirit there reigns the nostalgia for its own essence”

p. 81 in Der Ister, Hölderlin calls to the fire, Jetzt komme, Feuer!, fire as what comes, call for to-come > acc. Heidegger, Hölderlin, the Beseeler, has been struck by God of light, gift of spirit as incineration, cremation, almost becoming ash [MOP & annihilation of trace]

pp. 95-6 Heidegger on Trakl’s avoidance (vermeiden) of word “geistig”: is contrary opposed to material, names abyss (abîme, Kluft) btwn suprasensible (noeton) & sensible (aistheton) > Heidegger is condemning the degradation of “spiritual” into the “rational,” “intellectual,” “ideological”

p. 97 acc. Heidegger, spirit in-flames has evil in it already, thus an evil that is not Platonico-Christian, not of the body, evil is spiritual

p. 98 Heidegger: what is proper to spirit is its auto-affective [voice in VP] spontaneity; Geist from gheis, to be thrown (aufgebracht), to transport, transpose, deport (entsetzt)

p. 136n [references to Hegel’s fire and spirit in Glas]

p. 138n Luther: fire, tongues, sacred breath

pp. 137-38n St. Paul distinguishes “psychic man (psychikos anthropos)” from “spiritual man” (pneumatikos), only the latter accepts spirit of God

p. 104 fire-writing, flame writes, writes itself, right in the flame (à même la flamme) > a Riss, frayage of this trait, a mark that leads spirit on the way to soul, pursues soul in way opened by its fire, trait de conflagration, lesprit en-flammetrace la route, il fraye la voie

pp. 104-06 from masculine spirit (that chases and hunts) to feminine soul (that guards and nourishes), the trait, re-trait (Riss from fire-writing), engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, soul bears the sadness

p. 106 double mark, doubly remarkable trait [engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, affinity w/ Schlag]: it is the spirit in which it inscribes itself, traces itself, belongs to flame it divides

pp. 106-07 acc. Heidegger, difference or duality inscribed by the trait (Riss) is not division, it is the gathering (Versammlung) of the place (Ort), the de-cease (Abgeschiedenheit), in the one (Ein), the soul Gemüt, Ein Geschlecht, none other than Geist [path-breaking (frayage) of trait]

SPONGE

PIO p. 413n sponge-towel (serviette-éponge), emblematic story of my name as story of the other, blazon (mise en abyme) of “impossible subject,” fable, another way to make history

SPUR

SP p. 39 style advances as spur: 1) prow of sailing vessel, rostrum, cleaving hostile surface of sea 2) rocky point, also éperon, on which waves break at harbor’s entrance

——déjà, nom de ce qui sefface ou davance se soustrait, laissant néanmoins une marque, une signature soustraite dans cela même don il se retire > style uses spur to protect against this subtraction

——[it is impossible, and the English translation, I believe, fails to convey this, to tell whether the spur protects against presence or the threat to presence]

pp. 39-41 spur, sporo, spor, to spurn [in Mallarmé], word, trace, wake, indication, mark

p. 41 style-spur (le style éperonnant) as oblong object w/ its tissues, webs, sails, veils, thus its apotropaic power > also an umbrella

——what impresses mark of stylate spur in question of woman? this doesn’t concern la figure de la femme: question of figure open and closed by “woman” > concerns instead her abduction (senlever)

p. 43 Derrida reads éperons, the cliffs (feet), in Nietzsche’s “here I stand in the midst des Brandes der Brandung (of the surging of the breakers)”

***p. 107 question of style, spurring-operation, more powerful than thesis, meaning: stylate spur rips through veil, to show the veil, to undo opposition veil/unveiled (sailed/unsailed) [voilé/dévoilé]

p. 129 umbrella’s symbolic figure: hermaphroditic spur of a phallus (modestly folded dans ses voiles) > aggressive/apotropaic à la fois threatening/threatened

p. 139 plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

REST pp. 321-22 I meant “escape (évasion)” by overflowing pictorial limit, framed representation, visible immediacy (if any such thing exists, in the picture) w/ collar flared (au col évasé), half-inside out > isn’t this overflowing the discursive operation, from its very first word? or is its internal reason in pictorial structure? > question of structure of this limit, of being-in or being-out, question of supplement of parergon—once “escape” takes off (prendre son appel sur) from impoverished descriptive trait: no longer concerns a painting

***CHOR p. 96 some can’t see beyond end of phallic forms in SP (bisexual complication of style, spur, umbrella): those people do not read the syntax and punctuation of a given sentence, arresting the text in a position, settling on a thesis, meaning or truth

STATE

SPOM p. 117 re-elaboration of concept of State requires vigilant reference to Marx (re: illusions of its legal autonomy, and its withering or reinscription elsewhere)

POOF p. viii a friendship/politics ‘beyond the principle of fraternity’? > the political rarely announces itself w/out State enforcing schematic of filiation (stock, genus, species, sex, blood)

pp. 92, 109n via Schmitt, stasis implies state of rest, arrest (status) & also revolt [in this sense stasis could name auto-immunity], stásis as a category of political nosography, misfortune, fatal disorder, bad luck

pp. 119-20 for Schmitt, State presupposes the political, yet (à la Hegel) the State serves as teleological pole for political > State as static, stance, status, and stásis [auto-immunity]

p. 135n for Freud, State forbids injustice so it can monopolize injustice

FL p. 271 [re: Benjamin’s 2 general strikes] the two temptations of deconstruction: 1) replace order of one state w/ another (general political strike) 2) abolish the state (proletarian strike)

VM p. 97 Levinas’ critique of state’s alienation neither Marxist, nor Hegelian, nor anarchist, since his is a philosophy of “principle as commandment”

pp. 109-10 for Levinas, homogenization of Same and Ego, homogenized w/ concept, and finite totality, permits him to condemn state, totality, not in the name of but against subjectivity

OH p. 37 “capillarities” (new media, techno-scientific powers): centralizing pulsions don’t always go through states anymore

FWT p. 37 future has in store things not yet registered by civil state—but already known by unconscious

p. 93 nationalism always state-nationalism today: a zealous, jealous, vindictive vindication of nation as a sovereign state

p. 144 DP: alliance btwn sovereignty of State & religious message (but is State ever not deeply in alliance w/ the religious?)

OTO p. 33 Nietzsche exposes “academic freedom,” autonomous university, as ruse of State, a constraint more ferocious for disguising itself as laisser-faire [Hegel is accused here, too]

pp. 33-4 Nietzsche’s critique of journalism always linked to critique of cultural machinery of State and educational apparatus [Derrida reads this as striking re: media today] > Nietzsche’s critique would make “ideology” critique appear as symptomatic, degenerative, as new subjection to Hegelian State (but, there are many Marxist views of State, and one would also…)

pp. 34-5 your ears grow into ass-ears (inverted cripple) when you think you are free, autonomous, w/ respect to the State > all ears for the phonograph dog, you’re a high-fidelity receiver

pp. 35-6 the umbilicus has you by the ear, the ear is “taking notes,” the master a mouth (ear, mouth: both invaginated, involuted orifices) > the umbilical cord of State (dead father, cold monster) education, like a leash, commands us to write—that’s uncanny

WAP p. 107 always difficult to pinpoint where the state is

p. 122 natural truth is also national: Descartes is France

p. 125 onto-encylopedic universitas inseparable from a certain concept of the State; Cousin: “University is the State,” “public power brought to bear on the instruction of the young”

——Cousin: to teach is not a natural right, the professor of philosophy is a functionary of the moral order

p. 149 philosophy threatens to either change or destroy State, acc. to the State

DPi p. 3 stage lighting of DP, light of fire, never is sovereign more visible than when it makes itself voyante et voyeuse of execution > sovereign witnesses crime, witnesses itself, eye witness

p. 15(n) for Rousseau, the state gives you life: life is a conditional gift of the state

——for my life to be safe/assured, must promise to lose it

p. 21 DP as origin of social contract, state, any community

p. 48 w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

p. 68 sovereign exception & DP > is state, third party, witness already there in singular, savage, secret crime, when murderer claims to do ones own or to do oneself justice? where does murder begin?

——both abolitionists and proponents of DP allow logic of exception

p. 87 Schmitt, significantly, says his theory is not a theory of state but a theory of the political, the founding of the constitution (Verfassungslehre) (theory of state presupposes theory of the political)

p. 165 Baudelaire & Nietzsche (less narrowly) confine interest to zoo-psychobiology (conscious or unconscious motivations of the individual) > “we must” think interest in relation to that of the (global) state’s interest in maintaining/suspending DP

HLP p. 47 can a state stop lying about crimes it committed against humanity? can it confess? [p. 50 new performative, tribunal], state dissociated from what characterized it: good conscience

p. 52 new problematic of truth of state (figures of revisionism, negationism) requires infinite task: no state, no law of state, can take its measure > work of memory, demonstration of archive

p. 63 for Koyré, any secret threatens res publica: politeia as absolute phenomenality, thus required transparency/illumination of public space

——lead to totalitarianism w/ democratic face: [everything must be illuminated]

IW p. 275 re: Cohen’s Judeo-Kantian spirit, at deepest foundation of all morality, God’s law founds right and state, makes possible juridical feeling > analogy made to Kant’s feeling of respect: Kant states new Verbindungslinie btwn ethics & religion (gathers together soul & spirit)

HST p. 364 border btwn ethical/political no longer insured: the 3rd (le tiers) gives birth to justice & finally state, 3rd announces himself in duel of the face-to-face, & the face: the beyond the state (condition of ethics) had to produce itself in the state

——this is a topological invagination: “outside produce[s] an enclave in the inside of the inside”

AD p. 34 state, politics, ontology all betray/exceed ethics in opening it [?]: quasi-transcendental, originary, pre-originary perjury > possibility of radical perversion, haunting of its possibility, also condition of Good, Justice, Love, Faith, perfectibility

pp. 73-4 for Levinas, state of Caesar, pure essence of state, “refuge of idolatry,” place of corruption par excellence; state of David—messianic, beyond “politics”

p. 75 acc. Levinas, Christianity’s “political indifference” is why it has “so often become a State religion” > this indifference elicits a taste for power for the sake of power, at whatever cost

——Derrida finds this hypothesis appealing but precipitous, asks: what about Islamic lands?

pp. 94-5 for Levinas, paternal “fecundity” (not feminine alterity anymore) opens infinite discontinuous time: protest against egoist protestation of subjectivity (that of Kierkegaard, Rosenzweig) > true anarchy, paternal: only effective protestation against “tyranny of the State”

***p. 97 via Levinas, the State left “to itself” only judges the dead or absent, no face present [Aristole’s Politics]

p. 98 the 2 ways State dissimulates the face: 1) bringing to light makes face’s invisibility invisible 2) effaces its unicity in generality > both of these are the same

CF pp. 51-2 sovereignty of human metaphysically aligned w/ sovereignty of Nation, though often appeal to human rights aspires to limit powers of Nation-States

——States remain jealous of their own sovereignty in limiting that of others [re: Gulf war]; for Arendt, sovereignty only imposed where it’s ‘possible,’ imposed on the weak by the strong

p. 57 all Nation-States founded in violence, all culture a type of colonialism > foundation scripted into State order to hide itself, sublimation/celebration of beginning as amnesia

BSi p. 26 political sovereignty as the fable of a monstrous animal is prosthetic, prostatic, prosthstatic: supplement that supplements nature by adding an artificial organ, here the state

p. 28 Hobbes: “Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul” > soul as principle of life, vitality, vivacity

——state, a robot, an animal monster, giant prosthesis designed to amplify

——animal-machine, living-machine, machine of death: serving the living > prosthstate, and yet vitalist in that it mimics the body > civil war [like Schmitt?] death of the State

p. 29 prosthstatic sovereignty presupposes right of man over beasts

pp. 42-3 obey what protects (double meaning of obliger) > when state says, “I protect you,” it institutes a fear that obliges you, subjects you [Donald Trump]

p. 44 Schmitt: protego ergo obligo is cogito ergo sum of State

pp. 45-6 [vis-à-vis Schmitt] 3 assertions of political anthropology: 1) prosthstatic sovereignty proper to man 2) absolute indivisibility of sovereignty 3) excludes beast & God

EU p. 52 Kant rationalizes necessity of censorship, constructs a schema of pure a priori rationality to justify a state of fact (fact of the State [like Hegel?])

pp. 76-7 Kant’s (not unconditional) liberalism would caution against crossing certain limits, so as to avoid total absolutization of State

——for Schelling, State is philosophy/action > standpoint of Ur-wissen

SPEC p. 365 State, multicellular society, socius, guarding life beyond death of any given subject, serves to reproduce & rejuvenate other cells

STEAL [fixerup]

SPOM p. 159 Marx loves word “Eskamotage,” the theft of merchandise which makes the perceptible body disappear, “the escamoteur knows how to make inapparent,” height of his trick is to make disappear while producing “apparitions” [re: Stirner’s incorporation]

***HST p. 388 the 3rd intrudes when 2 absolutes exchange place; the 3rd, question of justice, immediately betrays other’s finite-infinite singularity > thus: congenital perjury of justice

TR pp. 125-26 violence of “I”: irreducibly singular, yet nothing more universal, anonymous

——w/ reference to unjust justice [phrase Derrida admits having stolen from de Man], where the law suspends reference right as it requires it, where chacun, “each one,” is appropriated (always theft/deceit) in utterance “I” > all justice begins in perjury

p. 128 Rousseau’s “I was as if,” the theft of the “I”: one cannot steal a “what” w/out stealing, even raping, a “who,” a woman, child, man

C pp. 191-92 [re: 127 coffin drawings in drawers] glossary tire, tirer, tiroir, tirage [draw, to draw, drawer, drawing (attracting)] (also à la tire of the pickpocket), leads to that of idiomatic trait, to duction or even “ductus” > one recognizes a draftsman even before he signs his name

——seduction/attraction of a drawer, seduce the haunting of a cenotaph

p. 231 coffin’s mutism: always a box in a box, some supplementary cartridge, a parergon > hors la boîte, fors la boîte: necessity to steal coffin (each time, differently) inscribed right on the “thing,” right on the cartouche [congenital perjury of justice]

——inimitable ductus of pickpocket [idiom], repeating (transgression must be repeated to begin) > worst, most fatal of villainies: robbery/violation of tombs

pp. 231-32 who signs the theft? Cartouche as great robber: this is my cartouche, I stole it, I am it, this is the body of my name > Cartouche left an institution: commonizing of proper name

——what if the name itself were what is at stake in the theft?

LI pp. 30-1 if Searle had spoken the obviously true, why the copyright? > the copyright engenders suspicion, divides the seal: Searle’s seal is stolen in advance

BSi p. 144 Deleuze accuses psychoanalysis (Freud) of dispossessing (brutalizing w/ machines of war) the Wolf Man (much like Artaud’s complaint about theft of his proper name)

ST. PAUL

SW p. 312 grand masters of discourse about resurrection: Saint Paul, Saint Augustine

p. 325 as though fate of humanity depends again on who holds power over women about the veil (St. Paul, abusive interpretation of Koran) [sin, fall or Verfallen, therefore the veil]

——“what I admire most in Nietzsche is his lucidity about Paul”

p. 344 St. Paul thought he knew the literality of the letter, thought he was distinguishing for the first time, & he prided himself on it, wrongly, the circumcision of the heart (breath, spirit) from that of the flesh (body, “acc. the letter”)

p. 345 St. Paul: Man is the glory of God / Woman is the glory of man

p. 346 “this very mild, this terrible Paul” > whose monstrous progeniture are our history/culture, he points to nature & tells us to judge for ourselves [re: woman wearing veils]

pp. 346-47 St. Paul wanted to veil heads of women & unveil those of men, he denounced children of Israel for not knowing how to lift the veil (over face of God, covenant, on heart) > he wonders how service of breath/spirit/life (not death) wouldn’t be more luminous, unveiling

HLP p. 29 St. Paul, the privileged adversary of Nietzsche’s ferocity

p. 291n St. Paul: “I have been all things to all men…” “…everything in order to win them all over” > “Did Paul lie?” on the subject of circumcision

IW p. 272 St. Paul on Jewish law

NOY p. 233 St. Paul: “in Him there has been only Yes (nai)” > de Certeau: this “yes” pierces field of distinctions/separations practiced by Hebraic epistemology

CF pp. 19-20 St. Paul ‘politicized’ primary injunctions of Abrahamic religions: “no longer foreigners nor metic in a foreign land, but fellow-citizens w/ God’s people, members of God’s household” (Ephesians II. 19-20) > cosmopolitanism

STRATEGY [fixerup]

HERP pp. 211-12 when Heidegger places strategy of a decision outside the calculus of the formalizable, is this still a war economy?

POOF p. 284 if we find in Nietzsche a play of the Gospels against Aristotelian virtue, while Aristotelian heritage is reimplemented: enough to discourage a reassuring historical scansion, must think up different ways of doing history, that which defies tranquility of historian is a strategy of friendship, a war for friendship: lamitié, voilà lenjeu de ces stratagèmes sans fin

p. 286 Nietzsche’s gift must also belong to a finite world > how to think dissymmetry of gift w/out exchange, infinite disproportion, from vantage point of terrestrial finitude? under its horizon w/out horizon [see p. 263] > infinitization itself is suspected of being an economic ruse, perverse seduction, stratagem, of loving one’s neighbor

EM p. 134-35 (162) [re: deconstructive method] strategic bet (le pari stratégique), radical trembling coming from outside, trembling played out in violent relationship of West to its other [its other?], whether that other is “linguistic,” economic, ethnological, political, military > military/economic violence have structural solidarity w/ “linguistic” violence

p. 135 two strategies of deconstruction interwoven: 1) exit from within terrain 2) change terrain, discontinue > 1) risks sinking into autism of closure 2) risks inhabiting more naively the inside one claims to have deserted

POS p. 71 the strategy of paleonomy, of using old name, refers to play of stratagem not hierarchical organization of means & ends: 1) extract predicative trait held in reserve 2) extend, graft, extracted trait, as a lever of intervention, transforming previous organization [writing]

p. 104n complicity [in MOP] of concepts “history,” “constitution,” “production,” Derrida uses them for strategic purposes

O pp. 3-4 paleonymy (keep old word for determined time?): question goes beyond signifier’s simple exteriority to its concept, beyond a fore-knowledge of paleonymic strategy: escape or destroy word in question (i.e. “literature,” “philosophical discourse”) [?]

p. 7 preface announces what will already have been written > Derrida claims preface presages a general practice of deconstruction, strange strategy w/out finality, cette défaillance organisatrice of telos or eschaton, which reinscribes restricted economy in general economy——[is this because the preface is an essential and ludicrous operation attempting to cancel out all displacement?]

p. 25 the 3 is no longer ideality of speculative solution, but the “effect” of a strategic re-mark > referring name of 1 of the 2 terms [in dual opposition] to absolute outside of opposition (marked once again in exposé of differance)

FS pp. 19-20 Derrida explains that by opposing force to structure he’s not envisioning an economy of pure, shapeless force > he opposes one series to the other to make apparent the noncritical privilege granted to one of the terms (structure, site, spatiality): a strategy which uses strength of field to turn its own stratagems against it > dislocate, fissure the system: le dé-limitant de part en part [delimit as describe, mark, and delimit as un-limit]

***WAP p. 13 institution & philosophy: “here less than ever is thinking opposed to science, technique, calculation, and strategy”

p. 103 there are only singular, idiomatic, heterogenous styles, strategies of deconstruction unique to each situation > essential to account for this irreducible heterogenity

p. 145 GREPH deconstructs the age of Hegel, even as it enlists its services strategically

CHM p. 36 unsurpassable, unique, imperial grandeur of order of reason (Hegelian law) leaves us only recourse to strategies and strategies

——archaeology against reason can’t be written: concept of “history” has always been a rational one > writing that exceeds, by questioning them, values of “origin,” “reason,” “history” couldn’t be contained w/in metaphysical closure of an archaeology

RGE pp. 263-64 Bataille’s sliding occurs at point, place in pattern, where old word, because of placement, slides—making entire discourse slide > violent, strategic twisting (imprinted upon language), inflects old corpus: relates its syntax to a major silence, to the privileged moment of the sovereign operation > “even if it took place only once”

p. 272 this stratagem, the sovereign operation, play w/ syntax, does not subordinate itself to an anticipated discourse

***p. 276 reactionary movement & revolutionary movement: too full of meaning (via Aufhebung), these contradictions lack pertinence, at a very determined point [Bataille’s sovereign point?]

——one understands nothing about strategy if one renounces any regulation of ascertaining nonpertinence (if one puts it in the hands of the left or the right)

TR p. 71 mēkhanē: theatrical/war machine, something both mechanical & strategic

pp. 85-6 for Rousseau, work of evil, “wickedness of men,” must be trade secret of God, can’t accuse mēkhanē (strategy, machine) of men (but can’t accuse God—so must put blind trust in him)

PSSS p. 271 it is necessary to cultivate (it is necessary for an “it is necessary” to take shape: ethical/juridical/political obligation) an economy of detour & difference: strategy, path, pathbreaking, road, even a method > “indirect” way of combatting cruelty drive

LI p. 93 Derrida cannot accept distinction btwn strategical decision & metaphysical presupposition: every strategy has a decision concerning metaphysics > the more confident, implicit, the more its order and calm reigns over methodological technicity

p. 104 “strategic” exclusions: invoke authority of one-way movement

TN pp. 92-3 the invincible stratagems of Levinas’ caress: a paternal, virile, fraternal, phallocentric filiation > an avowedly shameful confession (movements as irreproachable as they are guilty)

p. 219 idiomatic singularity of a gesture is never pure or purely reappropriable and it can’t be separated from a scene, strategy, discursive tactics [where’s the bridge, the passage?]

CF p. 50 must forgiveness saturate the abyss (suture, reconcile)? but who could object to imperative of reconciliation? amnesties, work of mourning—political strategy, psycho-therapeutic economy

pp. 50-1 strategies ruses can hide abusively behind “rhetoric” or “comedy” of forgiveness

BSi p. 35 “storytelling,” convention of some historical as if, fabular > a moral lesson, a political strategy, pedagogical artifice to credit a fable: to make known (political logic, rhetoric)

pp. 35-6 fabular dimension of political not just sayings or writings but actions > death & suffering inscribed in affabulatory score (on Television): put living beings on stage to accredit interpretation of narrative, to faire savoir, like Augustine’s making truth, veritatem faciare

pp. 212, 215 erected marionettes, Sovereign in its Majesty, Most High—not merely a trope, [it’s sublimity is even practical]: surveillance (economic/military) strategy

OG p. 24 (38-9) the hesitation of Heidegger & Nietzsche is not “incoherence,” it is the trembling of deconstruction: deconstruction does not destroy structures from the inside, must inhabit, inhabits most when one doesn’t suspect it > borrow all subversive strategies from old structure

p. 93 (142) unnameable movement of différence-même, I’ve strategically nicknamed (surnommé) trace, reserve, differance > could be called writing only w/in historical closure, w/in limits of science & philosophy

EU p. 63 [vis-à-vis Kant] metaphysics as the teacher’s mistress (maîtresse du maître), as censor > for a teacher, a finite being, no lifting of censorship, only strategic calculation: censorship against censorship, debate of the best censorship [the idea of philosopher’s legislation found everywhere in man’s reason], censorship of reason: [Derrida asks vis-à-vis Schelling] is this strategy an art?

pp. 117-18 [Derrida’s move] from phenomenology to a language that couldn’t be submitted to the epochē (to the epoch) [list of interests: wills, testaments, archives, etc.]

——not a system, but strategic device opening onto its own abyss, non clôturable, not wholly formalizable rules of reading, interpretation, writing

p. 119 strategic/rhetorical scope (portée) of these gestures never ceased to engage me in subsequent texts, grouped together under the title: graphics of differance, deconstruction, trace, supplement…

p. 128 Derrida admits to abusing word strategy, always stratégie sans finalité, au risque de me couper lherbe sous les pieds > car jy tiens et elle me tient > aleatory strategy: someone who admits he doesn’t know where he’s going > also comme la précipitation sans détour vers la fin, joyous contradiction of self: very old and cunning (rusée), something that’s just been born, delights in being w/out defense

p. 221 destination not thesis/theme or category > what happens to question “what is?” when it’s measured against destination? > strategic force of this question, “lever,” even polemological: new military-industrial complex strategies should be included/welcomed by CIPH

SPEC p. 269 death impels (pousse) the pas décriture: but de la vie, but sans but, stratégie sans finalité du vivant > Nietzsche’s no conservation, and life a rare genus of that which is dead

pp. 275-78 strategy [Freud’s speculation] whose finality’s not clear, no known genre, it overflows, thus the hypothesis, the athesis of athesis > asking questions in the dark: Freud’s phosphorescent antennae

WBH p. 192 [re: teaching women’s studies] is it only a question of strategy, isn’t strategy the real risk?

pp. 194-95 to say woman is on side of undecidability has only meaning of strategical phase, the side of woman becomes the side from which you begin to dismantle structure > but, as soon as you reach first stage of deconstruction, opposition man/woman no longer pertinent

STRICTURE (INTERLACE)

GT pp. 9-10 relation of gift to “present,” essential knot in interlace of this discourse [GT], in knot of Geflecht of which Heidegger says the circle is perhaps only one figure/particular case

pp. 36-37 is madness the movement of the circle or its excess? besieges reason at its 2 borders (inside & outside)

——linked to double bind (stricture, ligature, obligation) > absolve, forget absolutely & forgive by giving (lier et délier absolument)

p. 47 madness linked to double bind as the bind & the non-bind or débandade: folie de la garde ou de la capitalisation hypermnésique, et folie de la dépense oublieuse; eats away at language, burns up word or meaning of “gift,” spreads its ashes w/out return; that which does not return to the father

p. 97 Montaigne: our soul moves only on credit and faith, bound & constrained, under the authority of their teaching

LOBL pp. ~171-72 economy: stricture not coupure [pre-capitalist machine?], always external constraint that arrests a text in general, i.e. anything, for example life death

——think exteriority from angle of economy of the arrêt: greatest “bound” energy, bandée, tightly gathered around its own limit (Hemmung, Haltung) > immediately disseminated, sand, empty, unloaded, spontaneously: in trance of trans, ghosts, transes, folies du jour (cf. Glas on trépas, trans/partition [Derrida’s referring to Genet crossing national borderlines])

PP p. 84 (91) plus tard, dans le même tissu, dans les mêmes textes, nous tirerons dautres fils, et de nouveau les même pour voir sy ourdir ou dénouer dautres desseins

SH p. 23 w/in stricture of cipher # 13 [re: Celan’s February 13th] chance & necessity are bound together, fatality & chance

POOF pp. 16-7 hexis, contretemporal habitus: yoke-effect (leffet de joug), binds 2x in same time: duration & omnitemporality, marks/hides in masking—another name for psukhé > hexis insufficient for friendship, remains a simulacrum

——analogy btwn spirit (nous) & animal body inscribes in living body habitus of this contretemps

p. 78 Lysis [on friendship] ties proper name to common one (lysis): emancipation, unbinding, untangling, absolution, even solitude > knot undone & what it means to be solitary

pp. 99-100 identification qua fraternization, bond btwn 2 necessities (ties): embedding of an ‘it is necessary’ in the filiation of what is, obligation to the natural [p. 102 isonomy from isogony]

P p. 31 leaving (laisser), lacing (lacer), interlacing (Geflecht) can cause a lace to disappear once in a while (effigy & fiction) [re: truth in painting, Van Gogh]

p. 103 sublime as striction and counter-striction [surges up indirectly unlike pleasure of beauty]

p. 128 re: sublime, arrest of outpouring (épanchement) at floodgate (vanne), pressed on limit, pleasure gushes after arrest, inhibition, suspension (Hemmung), an arresting that makes flow > for a blink of an eye passage is closed, stricture absolute, then barrage, linondation

ROP pp. 29-30 deconstruction announces status w/out status of nonfinite # of names/quasi-concepts: the thinking of writing called for this, but it’s better thematized and formalized in theory of double bind, stricture of double band, and especially non-ontological remaining

p. 33 Glas and The Post Card, books on bind (Band), nexum, desmos, stricture, “unsolvable-postal effect”

p. 36 double bind (preferable to double contrainte), is the call to analysis: one can never fully analyze it, one can only unbind one of its knots by making the other tighter: movement I call stricture

p. 120n stricture can take figure of sacrifice, everything btwn sacrifice and nonsacrifice, unless suspended btwn sacrifice that knots (noue) & sacrifice that cuts (tranche), the 2 great experiences of Abraham & Isaac > idiom of resistance, resistance of idiom, in distant word “sacrifice”

ATIA p. 10 proximity to the animal, being-huddled-together (être-serré), pressu, près, après, acc. stronger/weaker stricture, which always remains pressing

DIF DIF p. 3 differance neither a word nor a concept, à la lettre > impossible (for essential reasons) to gather (rassembler) all usages of differance in a sheaf (en faisceau)

——Derrida uses sheaf because it marks fact that the assemblage has structure of a weaving, interlacing (dun intrication, dun tissage, dun croisement), which permits threads (lines of force/meaning) to go off again, always ready to tie (nouer) itself up w/ others

O p. 3 I will not feign, acc. to code, either premeditation or improvisation

pp. 21-2 Derrida explains many traps Hegel tries to avoid, i.e. rejecting formalism in name of inspiration (Begeisterung)

REST p. 261 interlacing of interruption points, a purely faked multiplicity [Derrida confessing about the multiple voices, the dialogue occurring in essay?], periods remain w/out destination, but they have authority in common [cf. ATM how do interruptions interlace?]

pp. 298-99 via Shapiro, Heidegger’s 3 modes (work-of-art-thing, being-thing, product-thing) articulate each other, turn each other inside/out: law of stricture, strophe of the lace

***pp. 303-04 [though word “stricture” not used] a detailed analysis of how Heidegger’s 3 modes of thing interlace w/ the interlacing lines of the painted shoes themselves, all these cutting outs, the shoes, the laces, the frame itself, going btwn outside & inside, limits have to be thought as lace

——[compare to RGE p. 277 where Bataille traces his eye]

——the hors-doeuvre in the oeuvre (lace pierces the canvas & leather simultaneously: how can we distinguish these 2 textures of invisibility?)

how can we distinguish 2 textures of invisibility from each other, piercing (trouant) all this [the frame’s hole in the canvas, the painted shoes’ eyelets] w/ a single pointure?

p. 313 when Shapiro says, “they are clearly pictures of the artist’s own shoes,” the copula (they are) couples the painted shoes to the painter’s feet, laces drawn out of picture, presupposes hole in canvas

pp. 313-14 the 3 dogmas of Shapiro: 1) painted shoes belong to real subjects w/ names 2) shoes are shoes, painted or “real” 3) feet belong to a proper body, can’t be severed

——these 3 distinct articulations in the interest of one and the same continuum: reattach detachables according to an absolute stricture

p. 321 ask question of frame by way of figure/trajectory of lace: a stricture by alternate and reversible passage from inside to outside, under and over

pp. 336-37 [re: Heidegger’s stance that a picture is useless to apprehend the useful] this reason doubles up (se dédouble): un mouvement dentrelacement du lacet: 1) the interlacing of lace w/ itself 2) incompletely laced (entre-lacé), entrouvert (half-open) 3) figurer of lace interlaced with what is figured

——Heidegger’s argument hangs (tient) on 2 reasons that double each other, remarkable mode of interlacing: one reason marked in the other or in itself

p. 339 for Heidegger, the picture is doubly useless, depicts, “shows,” being-products that’re out-of-service, w/out use-value > multiple edge(s) (bordures) detach being-product from subjective scope (portée subjective), simultaneously baiting (inducing/luring) reattachment of subjective scope

——edge (bordure) less simple when turned inside out [invaginated?], not simple at all w/ the lace & the hemmed holes (trous bordés), the eyelets comme lieu de passage [figure of decapitation here too]

***p. 340 logic of detachment as cut (opposition, leads to suturing-sublation, maintains problematic of castration truth) vs. logic of detachment as stricture (is tout autre, interlacing of differance of [or as] stricture, no suture, haunting, neither empty nor full, largument-de-la-gaine, can’t accommodate the couple, ces coupes oppositionelles, the ghost leases, le, la, les double(s) band-)

——[Derrida describes this logic of stricture as a double bind suspendu/tendu à la fois, but will not attach it strictly to another discourse on double bind] > any stricture is à la fois stricturation & destricturation

pp. 341-42 [re: interlacing correspondence] detachment of one mark marks, re-marks, overmarks that of the other—in itself interlacing it > use mark (march, margin) to avoid/deconstruct “show,” “represent,” “paint,” “say” [interlace doesn’t bring together 2 detachable identities]

pp. 342-43 there’s a reattachment always, already, in process of retightening the unstrictured > les souliers font marquer (font marcher, font marché-de), shoes make move, make a market, are bigger than the frame

the detached must also be understood as “representative mission to be reattached to its origin of emission” [father-son]

p. 343 lace traits form the “frame” of the picture which appeared to frame them [i.e. the traits of the shoes draw out “this is a picture”] > we, the shoes, are bigger than the frame & incorporated signature

——law of parergon comprehends everything w/out comprehending (perverts all links btwn part & whole) vs. the obviousness of a framed painting detached in course of reattachment, in process of (un-re-)stricturation [law of parergon vs. that of (un-re-)stricture?]

pp. 344-45 [re: the interlaced correspondence]: interminable overflowing of whole, la surenchère en plus-value de la correspondance débordante (subordante), occurs btwn general element (discourse, writing, painting) & particular determinate element > element worth more than whole, and whole plays the part [metonymy/synechdoche no longer what they are]

——what’s essential for Heidegger is making the overflowing appear by “earth,” “shoes,” “world” > il faudrait les ressaisir à linstant où le hors-dusage détaché (relativement déstricturé) donne lieu, a sort of abyssal surplus value, une surenchère sans fond > we can speak of conditions of fetishization of product/work, surplus value forms a truth-effect, useless gives way to speculative exploitation, more than useful (plus quutile): useful for grasping usefulness of useful—call for adherence [cf. pp. 339-41 double/triple uselessness (work, product, useless for grasping usefulness)]

——when the detached calls for reattachment: a discourse is sketched, maneuver to call for adherence

p. 346 for Heidegger, putting to work of truth, appears in the hors-dusage, unlacing, destricturation, uselesness overloaded w/ value, augments it w/ surplus value in attaching it symbolically to its belonging > a capital difference, concerns head of subject (not proprietor subject but: the earth and the world, trait and attraction, [ontological difference?])

p. 348 traits delimiting object & frame disqualify a priori by stricture/interlacing the question re: whether painting is required for a further step in thought

p. 356 Heidegger’s Geborgenheit associates hidden, crypted secret w/ being-in-safety: what one must hold in reserve, conceal, to live > tightening of originary ring > effect of Verlässlichkeit

p. 357 fort/da: every “step” implies this double movement (peasant woman now in, now out, of the picture), Heidegger’s whole discourse is supported by it [by abyss of fort/da?]

fort/da not a relation of opposition, each notion offers an eyelet to be traversed by the other, to the figure or the pointure of the other (Heidegger’s playing w/ the bobbin)

——fort: da, double eyelet [i.e. colon instead of slash]: how it must be “reknotted/taken up (renouer)” again in writing

p. 376 betting on the pair, plus/pas de pari, trap always works in interlace (la piège marche toujours dans lentrelacs): soit quil fasse marcher, laisse marcher ou quil paralyse [p. 373 only the pair can go]

p. 380 [spectrality of stricture]: il sest rendu dans/avec/à /( ) ses chaussures

meanings knot/unknot in lace/snare of syntax (tous les sens se nouent et se dénouent dans le lacet de cette syntax)

PIO p. 414n racism is an invention of the other, one that excludes it, tightening circle of same

RM p. 60 Geflecht, interlacing, in Der Weg zur Sprache, interlaces Sprache and Weg: a binding-unbinding interlacing (entrelacement liant-déliant) (entbindende Binde)

——a circle that is not a vicious circle, yet still interlaced in advance > Sprache and Weg are “already in advance of us (uns stets schon voraus)”

WAP pp. 45-6 for Kant, right is only strict, attains its proper stricture, in contrainte réciproque universelle, a link btwn universal and “freedom,” right has no internal depths, objects must be shown in actions, domain of visibility, theatricality w/out fold

——[tautological] consciousness of stricture: being-right of right is its right to be right

pp. 106-07 ingenuity of human sciences (precritical) offers privileged ground for ideological reinvestments > double bind, the nodosité (knottiness) of the knot structure: precriticalness is often of a philosophical nature—and where is the State in all this?

PPT p. 10 when one unlaces (or considers the lacing), one looks for revenue (return or investment) or revenant that comes back

C p. 218 stricture of coffins, holds dead man rigid, knotted w/in & w/out, pulls dans tous les sens (in all directions), seira, cord, chain, knotted cord

p. 221 [re: out-of-series] dynamic instability or even double bind (holds coffin btwn its laces): both colossal/radiating/magnificent & diminished/abandoned (délaissé), delacée

p. 240 hiatus of series scores out (rature), in serial interlacing, reference to the other (I have called this seriature [cf. ATM]), to the other’s other > simulacrum of reference, supplementary folds

p. 242 cords, laces, Medusa’s snakes

p. 243 in vain I’d try to typify the discourses I’m getting caught up in, and have been elsewhere (3 at least):

1. a discourse on stricture: elles sont tendues pour (faire) bander le mors (bind the bit, get a hard-on), set a trap w/key and lock (serrure) > get up the ghost of a double bind, same lacing in other series, w/in, around two bodies skewered in mirror-image

2. a discourse on lacs (snare): lacing as stricture, interlacing

3. a discourse on series: series as emblem of a seriature, serial interlace, supplementarity of interlacing allowing no respite to the typos > supplement transforms and detaches

LI p. 83 differance of stricture > the writing of God renders possible/impossible, serious/non-serious, strict/non-strict oppositions like “normal” & parasitic

ATM pp. 143-45, 150 “he will have obligated (il aura obligé),” a phrase knotted up (se noue) in a certain way of tying (lier), a serial structure of a singular type > edges of the sentence in fog, belong to the night

p. 165 since interruption is not a cut but logic of ab-solute de-stricturation, since it is reappropriable: to insist on the hiatus, the series is necessary > series has no single knot, but knots a multiplicity of retied knots (noeuds re-noués)

——opening of interruption is never pure

p. 166 Levinas’ linking of interruptions: a stricture of moments of rupture

pp. 166-67 [Derrida wonders about the risk of Levinas’ obligated negotiation, what he calls an inevitable “concession”: to stricture interruptions, contaminate, interrupt them]

p. 167 for Levinas, in search of God uncontaminated by Being, contact is a priori contamination > graver yet: risk of contamination that surfaces before contact, in necessity of tying interruptions together (insistence of ruptures)

——contamination is no longer a risk but a fate that must be assumed [from risk to fate]

pp. 167-68 [re: Levinas] no edges in this interruptive series, in this incomparable stricture, but tapering points (establishing continuity at a distance [?]) > binding & unbinding, the lace (lacet) of obligation is in place (not a trap): an ob-ligation that un-binds, opens up religion in this very unbinding

p. 168 “lace of obligation holds language…prevents it from falling apart in passing through eyelets of a texture [reappropriation?]: alternatively inside and outside, below and above, before and beyond”

p. 178 Levinas’ intr(el)aced saying [dire entr(el)acé]

BSi pp. 300-02 liberty & sovereignty (its limitless “I can”) are indissociable, double bind in 2 senses: 1) double injunction 2) duplicity in very concept of binding, obligation, bind, bond: stricture rather than structure, stricture that limits liberty along w/ sovereignty or sovereignty along w/ liberty

——double bind [#1 above]: deconstruct ontotheology of sovereignty w/out questioning liberty in name of which we put this deconstruction to work: think liberty differently, w/in distribution of a divisible sovereignty > think unconditional w/out indivisible sovereignty

OG pp. 36-7 (54-5) to think writing first, a perversion, dangerous promiscuity, origin ungraspable, the violence of forgetting, auxiliary meaning not living (not spontaneous); representation mingles (senlace) w/ what it represents; infinite reference (renvoi): le double dédouble ce quil redouble

ATAP p. 69 tone, tonos, strap, cable, braided rope—privileged figure of everything subject to stricture (that which norms both theme & instrument or cord of Glas)

FV pp. 440-42 circular itinerary [re: Lacan’s Poe], Dupin & analyst find letter where they expect it: Queen wants letter-fetish brought back to her, exchanges one fetish for another w/out spending—because there’s equivalence here (assurance of return): circle of restricted economy, stricture of the ring

——castration-truth is that which contracts itself (stricture of the ring): brings signifier, fetish, phallus, letter back into their oikos, familiar dwelling, proper place

STRICTURE (INTERLACE) in SPEC

SPEC pp. 259-60(n) instead of “logic”—issue is to rebind (relier), by means of analysis, notions of lien, stricture, desmos, question of life death to that of position (Setzung, thesis, theme) [this functions as a supplementary “judas” from Glas, re: an incision tattooed btwn pages 270/272]

pp. 260-61(n) Indra–Varuna (Abraham–Isaac-like) interlace their names w/out revenir sur eux-mêmes (not a ring) > cannot close, so enclose each other > always a [double signature]

——when Manu is absolved of Varuna’s double bind by Indra, will Manu escape bind of profit (bénéfice) from Indra’s grace, will he only love Indra?

p. 285 from whichever end (bout) [i.e. pleasure or reality], it is death, inscribed but non-inscribable in structure, in process of structure—stricture: death already (déjà) life death

p. 286 if “sexual drives” are beyond reality principle [et RP =PP], are they beyond pleasure principle too? does the sexual resist binding? stricture? the proper? economy?

p. 323 under what headings (titres) can one say re: Ernst, Freud’s recalling himself? under several interlaced, serial headings (titres)

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

pp. 343-44 déclencheur (trigger-effect) of the déchaînement, unbinding, destricturation > repetition compulsion & death drive unbind from all contracture

p. 348 PP loses mastery w/ flooding (Überschwemmung), no longer seeks pleasure, just binding

p. 349 Vorbilder (models), necessity of metaphoric detour whenever Freud doesn’t know what he’s talking about re: interminable band, contra-band, quantity of binding—so he uses rhetoric of code, message, envoi, postal network

p. 350 [re: trauma dreams] exception to law that dream fulfills a wish, exception precedes law, doesn’t contradict it, something older than law w/in law: band over contra-band, or contra-band over a-band, disband, over absolute astricture

p. 351 tendency to stricturing (binding, mastering) foreshadows PP w/out being it, everything en différance de stricture > repetition itself > but there never is repetition itself > allure of this more or less tightened lace

p. 389 bindinal economy, economy of tie (lien) or bond (liason) (bind, band, double bind, contra-band); PP as principle of binding, can’t be finished

pp. 390-91 resolution, solution [of Freud’s argument?]: band closer, mount tension until released [these are Freud’s schemas] > relating what Freud says to what he does (writing’s démarche, its performance), interlacings can no longer be undone, can’t be closed or opened—trait divided [see p. 391n double chiasmatic invagination of borders]: there can be no accounting, reckoning

pp. 393-95 function of binding (not machinelike regularity [?]), function of stricture as original as the X about which we can only know once banded, once represented by representatives

——to bind is to supplement/substitute, thus represent, Ersatz in place of what stricture inhibits/forbids, to bind is also to detach, detaches a representative, sends it on a mission, a missive liberated to fulfill destiny of what it represents: a post effect, de facteur préposé à lacheminement

the secondary (supplementary stricture) transforms freely mobile into immobile cathectic energy: posits, posts—here’s a thesis: immobilized cathexis is more tonic, tonicity related to effects of binding (elasticity & tension), thus binden as bander (erection): “bander: poster, liason: postale

p. 395 Bindung inaugurates, assures, overflows PP (mastery), as seat of its condition

——no relève of PP—not Hegelian [since PP always master?] > in fact, function of PP, (postal) binding, determines interpretation of Aufhebung

p. 396 the 2 modes of pre- PP (laps, sas): 1) interested in PP, prefigures PP: teleological, function of binding in service of PP 2) indifferent to PP, a tendency in service (Dienst) of more general function > tendance toward combing back (revenir), every preliminary binding se tende toward pleasure of discharge, final relaxation

p. 396tn tendance, bander as tendre, erection, double bande (both noun & verb)

p. 397 irresolution of scene of writing—a Bindung, tends itself (se tend), ceaseless posting, no final orgasm, beyond of pleasure remaining the end of pleasure > pleasure at its proper moment? still don’t know what it is: secousses orgasmiques, joussiance, deferred as soon as obtained

pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

p. 399 pleasure—ungraspable limit btwn 2 limits, un en-deçà et un au-delà qui réduisent un pas à rien

producing itself, regenerating: only pleasure, pleasure as counter-pleasure, band contra band, tout se passe alors dans des différences de bandage—not general economy (absolute expenditure) but strictural economy (to the point of its inevitable collapse)

pp. 400-01 [fire-like] unleashed intensity of PP would destroy itself if it didn’t submit to moderating stricture, if it didn’t measure itself

——reality nothing outside law of differance > stricture produces pleasure by binding it, plays btwn 2 infinities, betting/speculating on surplus value restriction will bring it

——PP (the master) is not master > pleasure, the great speculator, calculates w/ effects of aphrodisiac stricture (Socrates wanted nothing to do with proper name of Aphrodite)

——quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

p. 401 irresolution—impossible logic btwn solution (non-liaison, absolute untightening: absolution itself) & non-solution (absolute tightening, paralyzing bandage)

——where Causa is lAutre Choseno more opposition btwn pleasure & unpleasure, w/in & beyond, life & death: graphics of strictural supplement not oppositional, knowns no negation, no lack > in this graphics, desire is sanssans,” is of a “sans sans sans”

p. 402 “set (ensemble)” of stricture, a unity that’s not subject/consciousness, begins by binding itself (se-lier) in differential relation w/ itself—it destines itself (se destine), which doesn’t mean: il arrive

pp. 402-03 s’il faut se rendre à ce quil faut echaîner strictement [if it’s necessary to submit to what must follow strictly] re: le mot de maîtrise, going beyond oppositional logic—is there mastery?

p. 407 death drive doesn’t work in silence (like in French translation), but goes unnoticed (unauffällig), has to do w/ time (link to Kant, Aristotle)—thus rhythm: do feelings of tension exist to distinguish btwn bound/unbound energy or do they exist in relation to absolute magnitude?

STRUCTURALISM

GT p. 76 one must render account of law that dissolves the gift in an Aufklarung of relational logic, that privileges, like Lévi-Strauss, the logic of exchange

p. 77 the mapped-out signified of structuralism, a complementarity w/out supplement that conditions “exercise of symbolic thinking” > this is the rationality of the principle of reason

FWT pp. 6-7 despite its “subversion,” Derrida also sees price structuralism had to pay, its somnambulism, naiveté, the sterilizing, precipitous, dogmatic elements of its program

——structuralism in danger of neutralizing force, misrecognizing/denying rupture in history

p. 7 Derrida respects idiom or singularity of signature [re: Foucault, Lacan, Lévi-Strauss] while looking to deconstruct what’s hegemonic, the “dogmatic moment,” the residue of credulity

——“I never said anything against structuralism”

POS pp. 27-8 differance incompatible w/ static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in concept of structure because of generativity (via transformation) of a of differance; production of differance not astructural (produces regulated, systematic transformations, even structural science), differance even develops most legitimate exigencies of “structuralism”

GSP p. 157 structuralist demand: descriptions of totality w/ internal legality (each element has meaning in its solidarity of correlation/opposition with every other); genetic demand: origin, foundation of structure > Husserl ceaselessly tried to reconcile the 2

p. 159 “a certain structuralism has always been philosophy’s most spontaneous gesture”

p. 323n Koffka, disciple of Husserl, argues that “psychology of form” escapes critique of psychologism by means of its structuralism

FS p. 3 to think sign (structuralism) is only a sign of the times is a dream of violence [contra “linguistic turn”]

pp. 3-4 Derrida links structuralist obsession w/ an anxiety (inquiétude) about (sur) language, an anxiety of (du) language and in (dans) language itself

——structuralist attitude, et notre posture aujourdhui devant ou dans le langage, not only moments in history: étonnement, plutôt, par le langage comme origine de lhistoire > par l'historicité elle-même

p. 4 structuralism will never be able to contribute to a “future history of imagination and affectivity” [Jean-Pierre Richard’s hope]

pp. 4-5 structuralism & literary criticism (structuralist in essence/destiny), lapse of attention paid to force (the tension of force itself) > even take revenge on force by declaring separation the condition of the work

——form fascinates when one no longer has force to understand force w/in itself [decadence?]

p. 5 like melancholy for Gide, structural criticism only possible after defeat of force: a reflection of the constituted, constructed: historical, eschatological, crepuscular

——w/in structure there’s not only form, relation & configuration > there’s an interdependency & totality that is always concrete

——panoramagram (image of structuralist instrument): obtain on flat surface, depth of objects on horizon > one can glance at field divested of its forces

——in structuralism, content (living energy of meaning) is neutralized by form > they’ll say this is the author’s responsibility before the critic’s

——a city no longer inhabited, reduced to its skeleton, haunted by meaning & culture > cette hantise is the mode (absent/present) of thing itself in pure language (housed in pure literature)

pp. 5-6 structural consciousness a catastrophic one, simultaneously destroyed & destructive (destructuring) > decadence, period proper to all movement of consciousness [Nietzsche]

p. 14 structuralism risks Platonism when protecting “internal truth and meaning of work itself,” risks missing texts’ historicity, the impossibility of text ever being present

p. 15 structure becomes the object itself, literary thing itself, no longer a method of reading or heuristic instruction

——structure as literary thing is finally structure taken literally: as space, form, sites, geometry

pp. 15-16 structure now as architecture (pyramid, tomb)

p. 16 as long as one doesn’t focus on metaphorical sense of notion structure > focus paid on figure itself (geometrical & rhetorical sense)—not on metaphorical play

——Leibniz critiqued Descartes for having explained everything in nature w/ figures & movements, of ignoring force by confusing it w/ quantity of movement [Derrida extending this critique to structuralism, Rousset, the best literary formalism]

***p. 17 “metaphor is never innocent” > orients research, fixes results: when spatial model is hit upon, critical reflection can rest w/in it

p. 18 Derrida shows how structuralism can rely on dimension of height, where values mount scalewise & Good is most high, to think quality (inner intensity) w/ out giving up on structure

p. 19 [but structuralism also Leibnizian] structuralism traces everything w/ line, and can find a math equation for everything

p. 21 in structuralism, structure as one w/ geometrism: preformationsim, teleologism, reduction of force, value & duration

p. 24 Claudel, Proust (structuralists): neutralize surprises of nonsimultaneity, thus time becomes eternal, atemporal

——structuralist reading > presupposes/appeals to theological simultaneity of the book

pp. 25, 306n structuralist demand for flat/horizontal, letter of the Law, can’t bear volume, lability

p. 26 structuralism tries to avoid all finalism, telos, tries not to refuse every accident as an aberration, but it lives w/in, on, its promise & practice: how can there be an organized totality w/out end, or intentionality w/out consciousness?

——structuralist totality promises infidelity to telos, but: structures must permit totality to open, overflow itself, totality thus takes on meaning by anticipating telos > an opening which liberates genesis and time but risks stifling force under futural becoming of teleological form

p. 27 like structuralism, no concept of force in Husserl (brings phenomenology back to Platonism despite professed anti-Platonism); for Husserl, truth requires forgetting [of genesis, force, failure, crises]

***p. 28 not abandon ourselves to structural formalism: must attempt emancipation, but only as a dream, emancipation is impossible unless we forget our history [contra Nietzsche?]

——Apollonian ecstasy cannot embrace force, movement which displaces lines, nor force as desire for itself, nor writing > fallen Dionysianism, melancholy, nostalgia

p. 305n for Rousset, infinity is the center, toward which literary act ascends: irreducible specificity of “movement” and also its qualitative specificity

O pp. 23-4 for Hegel, taxonomies, structures, formalisms offer dead limbs—et autres tableaux that pin down the living to death (épinglant le vif à mort)

CHM p. 44 legitimate renunciation of certain style of causality must still ask etiological questions [re: “act of force”] > can a strict structuralism even write a history?

——what is Descartes’ affinity w/ his historicized period?

OG p. 99 (148) “structuralism” stuck in logocentrism, thinks it’s not

p. 120 Lévi-Strauss appeals to an “epigenetist” leap from speech to writing: born suddenly

p. 337n structuralism needs the logic of “born by chance” to maintain structure

STRUCTURE

KH p. 94 structural law: inevitability of tropology & anachronism, [desire for] totalizing apprehension of interpretations of khōra [re: translating, thinking khōra]

***p. 119 btwn text & theme, structure w/out an indivisible origin > theater of irony, w/out end, w/out bottom [abyss]; to isolate a theme, “philosophy-of-Plato,” would be to violently misrecognize, deny textual scene, questions of topology in general

GT pp. 122-23 the foreseeable, programmed, conditioned, expected, counted on, necessary cannot be a gift or event

——event, gift, must be structured by aleatory, remain unforeseeable w/out being kept so

R p. 86 structure of a promise: the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now

AF p. 84 the structure of the archive is spectral [see p. 68]

A p. 42 via Heidegger, there is no culture of death itself of properly dying, question arises of limit btwn universal (non-natural) structure and differential (non-natural but cultural) structure

EM p. 133 (161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

——this trembling can only come from a certain outside—already requisite within the very structure that it solicits

p. 134 (161-62) Derrida’s attention to system and structure, la réduction du sens, neither restores classical motifs nor erases them > rather, determining possibility du sens on basis of “formal” organization which in itself has no sens: a critique [sic] of phenomenologies (Husserl, Hegel), which aspire for une réduction au sens

MC p. 349 unforeseeability conditions the structure of the event

PP p. 159 Plato uses letter, alphabet, for pedagogical ends > never thematizes law of difference made apparent, the irreducibility of structure & relation, of proportionality, w/in analogy

p. 161 la khōra est grosse de tout ce qui se dissémine ici, inscription produces the son and at the same time the constitution of structurality

VM p. 113 langage, fils de la terre et du soleil: écriture > one could never come across a language w/out rupture of space, no aerial or aquatic language, in which alterity would be more lost than ever > structure of inside-outside/day-night has no meaning in pure space [proscribed words], inhabits conceptuality itself

——structure [inside-outside] has no meaning w/out included origin, inscribed eastern horizon which is neither w/in nor w/out space

OH p. 78 democracy to-come not a Kantian regulative idea, not a certain future, but democracy that has structure of promise > memory of that which carries the to-come here and now

PAS PAS p. (34) pas does not find itself in (dans) a labyrinth [topos], it carries itself along like a labyrinth, has the structure of a labyrinth

p. (79) “from an earlier time (autrefois)” not a date, not past of an event, it’s the structure of a relation to it, the word, the moment

***p. (105) double band is structure of name said to be proper, anonymity is the effect, whether by monumentalization (sauf, the unscathed) or effacement (seeds, dispersion); gift of name is corrupted in advance dans le pas-de-nom [plus-de-nom] > what takes place in and beyond language: leaves the fold of this folding back

VP p. 75 structure of supplement: “a possibility produces by delay that to which it is said to be added”

p. 82 “my death is structurally necessary to pronouncing the ‘I,’” it is an active structure, and it must function against all falsehood, meaning “I am dead” must function as Bedeutung outside of intuition (fact of my death)

***FWT p. 193 there is a universal “structure” of heteronomic election: this election of each gives to all responsibility worthy of the name

POOF p. 79 the structural law of the event is absolute urgency

p. 235 “O my friends…” a call, a promise, a prayer (eukhé) [neither true nor false, Aristotle] > can’t give friendship, were friendship not still to come [Heideggerian ek-stasis] > in the name of friendship, “no friend” respectfully declares the perfect sovereign friendship impossible

——vous-mes-amis-soyez-mes-amis-et-bien-que-vous-ne-le-soyez-pas-encore-vous-lêtes-déjà-puisque-je-vous-appelle-ainsi: “O my friends…” has structure & temporality of messianic teleiopoesis

p. 292 the 2 names: 1) very structure of testimonial survival stance, a certain spectrality, name survives a priori beyond presence 2) this general structure is enframed (arraisonné) in certain history, chance of filiation, inherited name, that of renown (again, woman excluded)

DS p. 234 to write that such a movement [practice of spacing, antre ouvert, insertion] plays along a structure of supplementarity, surplus, vicariousness, is, literally, to quote

p. 261 hymen is the structure of and/or, btwn and and or

POS pp. 27-8 differance incompatible w/ static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in concept of structure because of generativity (via transformation) of a of differance; production of differance not astructural (produces regulated, systematic transformations, even structural science), differance even develops most legitimate exigencies of “structuralism”

***p. 33 couple outside/inside, language as “expression,” are structural lures (what Kant would’ve called a transcendental illusion)

p. 40 gathering Derrida’s work into a “sheaf,” historic/systematic crossroads, is structural impossibility of limiting network of differance, not a master-word, always finds itself in others

***p. 68 writing structurally carries w/in itself (counts-discounts) its own erasure, while marking what remains of this erasure

ROP pp. 101-02 for Foucault, psychoanalysis oscillates on both sides of dividing line, in two places, two times, at same time (but he does not think these two times w/ structural possibility of event)

SP p. 127 does one assume one’s own signature? formulation of such question disqualified by structure of the signature: (la signature/tombe)

p. 137 were the key to the secret of a text “btwn me and myself,” I will still die > relation to event of text as structurally posthumous necessity > text remains open, offered, undecipherable

GSP p. 155 is Husserl respectful of that which remains open w/in structure, even when one thinks the opening of structure as structural? [faithful comprehension meets no choice]

p. 157 structuralist demand: descriptions of totality w/ internal legality (each element has meaning in its solidarity of correlation/opposition with every other); genetic demand: origin, foundation of structure > Husserl ceaselessly tried to reconcile the 2

p. 159 neither structure (which isolates objective significations in their static originality) nor genesis (which effects abusive transitions from one region to the other) clarifies Husserl’s problem: foundation of objectivity

PS p. 186 acc. Artaud, membering is dismembering; structure always structure of expropriation; “every organ is a parasite” of the body; Heart: “dirtiest means a being could have invented to pump life inside me”

——fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish: must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference

FS p. 5 w/in structure there’s not only form, relation & configuration > there’s an interdependency & totality that is always concrete

——structure is the formal unity of form & meaning

p. 6 to see structure more clearly, solicit it, threaten its supports: concentrate on its [structuralism’s] keystone (la clef de voûte) (possibility & fragility of its existence) > the secret place where structure is neither construction nor ruin but lability

p. 18 Derrida shows how structuralism can rely on dimension of height, where values mount scalewise & Good is most high, to think quality (inner intensity) w/ out giving up on structure

p. 21 in structuralism, structure as one w/ geometrism: preformationsim, teleologism, reduction of force, value & duration

p. 23 logos spermatikos: adult in miniature, encasement, anthropomorphic concept, preformationsim, biological idea, totality of hereditary characteristics enveloped in germ

p. 28 difference btwn Dionysus & Apollo, ardor & structure, cannot be erased in history, because not in history > it’s an original structure, the opening of history, historicity itself

DIF DIF p. 7 strategically differance seemed most proper one [?] to think/master, though maintained w/in structural limits of mastery

O p. 4 structure of double mark (caught [pris], both seized [emprunté] & entangled [enfermé], in binary opposition)

——one of the terms retains old name to destroy opposition to which it no longer quite belongs

——repetition w/out identity, one mark inside, the other outside deconstructed system: double reading, double writing, double science: structure itself is worked in turn

——no concept, no name, no signifier can escape this structure

p. 5 “transcendental signified” arrests writing [in structure of double mark this arrest can no longer occur, writing as possibility of living on, arrêt de mort]; can’t master a structure w/out mastery

p. 21 neither formalism nor thematism can master irremediable structure of gap btwn empty form/full meaning: will miss it in attempt to master it

p. 41 structure of feint > always an extra turn (un tour de plus)

p. 54n the point is to work to set up or dismantle a scaffold, a scaffolding (un échafaudage), we need one to substitute, the time of a lapse, Mallarmé’s lustre for Plato’s sun

TB p. 104 Babel as metaphor of metaphor, narrative of narrative, translation of translation: not only structure hollowing itself out like that, but does so in its own way > its idiom would have to be saved

p. 116 does a work require translation? answer is apodictic, injunction even w/out translator there, the requirement of the other as translator: structure of original, relation of life to survival > a priori, even if forgotten > its apodictic essence: it is unforgettable, so forgetting is accidental, death would not change it at all

CHM p. 35 [Derrida asks question about Foucault’s responsibility, the manner in which Foucault seems to return to innocence, end all complicity] doesn’t suffice to imprison the delegate, the psychiatrist, and in doing so the whole adventure of Western reason (acc. Foucault, capture & objectification of madness): wouldn’t Foucault’s proceedings, verdict, reiterate the crime?

——if the Order is as powerful as Foucault says it is: infinite, universal complicity of those who understand “this language”

p. 36 “no Trojan horse unconquerable by reason,” the best spokesman of the mad are those who betray them best

pp. 61-2 from heights of “to-attempt-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole”: absolute opening, uneconomic expenditure, thought announces itself, frightens itself, reassures itself against annihilation by madness/death > always re-embraced by economy > relation btwn reason, madness, death is an economy: structure of deferral whose originality must be respected

——vouloir-dire-lhyperbole condition of silence, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

RM p. 56 Derrida’s “disconcerting (déroutante) tactic” to use usure doubly, not wily, manipulative or triumphant perversity: “corresponds to intractable structure in which we are limited & carried away in advance”

p. 75 via Ereignis, re- of retrait no accident, no accident occurring to trait, does not appear, no proper, structurally in withdrawal: gap, trace, border, traction, effraction, differentiality

PJP p. 173 structural signification of oath, Law itself, origin of Law: commit to not be affected by time

——but the perjurer can always plead the discontinuity of time

p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

D pp. 336-37 obsessive desire to escape due to structure of the text, obsession always textual

——textuality is obsidional: undecidable process of opening/closing—no letup (sans cesse)

+R pp. 151-52 acc. Benjamin [theory of revolution], never stock up on apparatus w/out transforming its very structure, twisting it, betraying, attracting it out of its element

C p. 189 remainder itself, in its structure as remainder, will have been w/out (w/out example, w/out precedent)

LI pp. 47-8 absence of receiver from sender is possible not necessary, but this possibility is a must, is a structural necessity > possibility of an absence always inscribed, necessarily inscribed as possibility

pp. 48-9 structural & essential, iterability is at work in all facts, each mark divided or multiplied in advance > a more powerful “logic”—graphics of iterability undercuts classical opposition of fact & principle (le droit), factual & possible (virtual), necessity & possibility

——iterability disrupts presence, unity of ego in sender, du maintenant-écrivain (grasping w/ 1 hand his ballpoint pen) > stigmè of every mark already split

***p. 57 structural possibilities: what makes it happen even before it happens

p. 59 [from SEC] structural unconsciousness, absence of intending actual utterance, prohibits any saturation of context (total presence)

p. 62 [vis-à-vis iterability altering, contaminating] no choice but to mean to say something other than what we mean to say: accident is never an accident

p. 103 parasitic structure: writing, graft, mark, marche, margin, differance, undecidable, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, parergon

——as though an auxiliary/parasite could not supplant, as if “parasite” is a simple addition

p. 148 when Derrida uses the term infrastructural (not meant as substratum beneath Marxist superstructure), but: recalls concept of text, not book, not discourse, not idealogical sphere: all structures called “real,” “economic,” “historical,” socio-institutional > all possible referents

——every referent, all reality, has structure of a differential trace, can only refer to “real” in an interpretive experience

***BSi p. 81 inventive, passionate, compulsive hallucination of fantastical beasts (zoopoetic fictions): essential structure of political sovereignty, codified rhetoric, law of genre [?]

pp. 300-02 liberty & sovereignty (its limitless “I can”) are indissociable, double bind in 2 senses: 1) double injunction 2) duplicity in very concept of binding, obligation, bind, bond: stricture rather than structure, stricture that limits liberty along w/ sovereignty or sovereignty along w/ liberty

——double bind [#1 above]: deconstruct ontotheology of sovereignty w/out questioning liberty in name of which we put this deconstruction to work: think liberty differently, w/in distribution of a divisible sovereignty > think unconditional w/out indivisible sovereignty

OG p. 30 (46) Saussure’s (Aristotle’s) phonocentrism: voixstate of soul; writing—symbols of voix

——one should call this a model, and not a structure, of a certain kind of writing: it does not function perfectly, but there’s an ideal directing a function ([thus] never completely phonetic)

p. 167 (238) originary differance is supplementarity as structure: irreducible complexity of shifting play of absence/presence: metaphysics produced by it, doesn’t think it: writing is a representation of trace, trace itself does not exist > place of decision now hidden, but still indicated

p. 254 (359-60) structural analysis can cycle back to point zero w/ concept of catastrophic event: structuralism does not follow linear genesis

EU p. 19 translating structure begins as soon as a reading of “original” text is instituted, offers up language to be read in its very erasure: erased traces of a path (odos), chemin deffacement, translation passing over/beyond the path of language [beyond Heidegger], passant son chemin

p. 83 response: initial form & minimal requirement of responsibility > structure of call to responsibility so anterior to any positive response—nonresponse a priori assumes responsibility

SPEC p. 321 an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (dun après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

FV p. 419 literature that puts truth on stage, can it be read by psychoanalysis? abyssal structure, this space overflowed by powers of simulacrum

p. 485n coincidence in Poe; point is to show that due to structure of effects of framing—no totalization of bordering can occur: frame always enframed, parts w/out a whole

STUPIDITY (

GT p. 33 Baudelaire: “most irreparable of vices: to do evil out of stupidity.”

p. 166n Baudelaire affirms the diabolical evil or “bêtise”, satanic cruelty, Kant refuses to acknowledge (excess zeal of a bottomless perversity)

——for Baudelaire, the worst evil is the one that doesn’t know it’s evil

pp. 168-169 The stupidity of the friend in Counterfeit Money not feeling remorse. (Not worthy of the absolute originary gift nature gave man: authentic money, presence.)

SPOM p. 187 imbeciles: think they see what they see

HERP p. 189 Heidegger called his belated confiding about his indulgence in Nazism: eine grosse Dummheit

VP p. 67 presence to itself of animating act, this intimacy of life to itself is why we say speech is alive, we hear our voice, thus the deaf are dumb

TC p. 248 Artaud: spirit of beginnings, which is the Christian spirit, has not ceased to make me commit idiocies

OS p. 39 w/out rigorous critical/deconstruction of MOP, the very necessary attention to differences, coupures, mutations, leaps becomes ensnarled (sencombre) in slogans, dogmatic stupidities, empiricist precipitation > and discourse “put in question” [takes you from behind]

ATIA p. 30 the utter stupidity, plus bête que les bêtes, of arguing for genetic continuism btwn man & animal > there is an abyss btwn man/animal

p. 31 given the heterogeneity at the edge of “the human,” the multiplicity of organizations of relations btwn life/death, relations so abyssal/intertwined no exteriority of one term to other, to say animal, in the singular, is to utter a bêtise > confirms animality disavowed & complicit in war of the species

p. 32 lanimal que donc je suis speaks, and no less asinine (bête) for it

p. 41 the right to speak blithely of the animal, one of the most symptomatic asinanities of the human, bêtise (of which animals are exempt by definition)

p. 64 most stereotypical anthropomorphism to speak of the bêtise of the animal

pp. 63-4 je rêve, donc, au fond dun terrier introuvable et à venir: the schizis of a contradictory injunction > translate an inhuman language w/out the usual bêtise re: animal

SW p. 317 wait w/out horizon & someone else one knows too well, “even me why not,” an other yet to be born, who strikes dumb order of knowledge > too well-known, stranger head to foot

BSi pp. 137-38 talk of the bottom (fond), the profound, believing in depth [of “who” or “what”] will never be free from bêtise (stupidity) > sovereign & beast as bottomless bottom, abyss, vertigo

pp. 138-39 if bêtise is proper to man, autopositing the proper is stupidity itself

p. 147 “how is a synthetic a priori possible?” and Deleuze’s “how is bêtise (and not error) possible?”: transcendental questions of possibility > but, Deleuze’s question removes possibility from epistemological economy, from determination of Being, from objectivity of object

p. 148 if bêtise not an error (bad judgment) but hebetated (dulled) judgment, aptitude for wrong judgment, it could be there in absolute knowledge [stupidity of encyclopedic knowledge]

pp. 148-49 for Descartes, bêtise would occur btwn infinite will & finite understanding; the excess, disproportion of will (freedom) over understanding leaves abyssal/vertiginous possibility of bêtise

if bêtise is not an error [Deleuze’s stance], no pragamatic use of bêtise does not refer (if obscurely) to abyss of jus (justice, justness, judge) [not faulty judgment but judgment of judge, judgment from which one expects some justness]

p. 150 for Deleuze, bêtise [ethical, quasi-juridical fault] at heart of philosophy > makes modest

p. 151 transcategorial—“qui transcendit omne genus”: does not belong to series or table > is bêtise a transcategorial category, a quasi-transcendental?

pp. 152-53 for Deleuze [?], bêtise is thoughtful, a thinking, a matter of thought, a thinking and thoughtful freedom (i.e. proper to man) > Deleuze’s bêtise has a relation to ground (also Ungrund) influenced by Schelling’s discourse on human freedom

——for Schelling, only man w/ his freedom can relate to a groundless ground

p. 155 Blödsinn, Avital Ronell’s Stupidity; groundless ground of bêtise links it to sovereignty, cruelty, thought

pp. 156-57 acc. Deleuze, “best” literature, not pseudo-literature, not philosophy, lets itself be haunted by bêtise

p. 158 bêtise can always be mine, turns around like “category of accusation,” betraying my fault > contagion, being-with of bêtise

p. 159 only a becoming-bête > no bêtise in itself [not Deleuze’s becoming-animal]

——[vis-à-vis Flaubert] bêtise of hunting bêtise, seeing only bêtise; absolute knowledge as very element of becoming-bête, as sovereignly bête

pp. 160-61 bêtise as becoming “what” of “who”—monument, stone, becoming-thing of proper name

——bêtise as madness of definition, “S is P,” definite articles le or la, bêtise is defining as much as defined > the category is a signature of bêtise

——for Flaubert, stupidity is wanting only noon and midnight

pp. 162-63 Kleinigkeit, Geringfügigkeit, Belanglosigkeit, Nichtigkeit, Dummheit, Torheit, Unsinn, Blödigkeit, blunder, silliness, foolishness, triviality

——only in French is bêtise related to animal bête [see p. 170 stupidity is related to animal in Spanish, Italian, Greek?]

——groundlessness, no fundamental meaning of bêtise

——abyss of translation [w/in language, btwn species] makes so-called human/animal opposition a bêtise > the privilege of bêtise

p. 164 can you swear an oath that you know what you mean to say w/ word bête???

p. 165 one is never bête all on one’s own: class-structure in accusation of stupidity [re: Flaubert, Valéry]

p. 166 use of bêtise always a stratagem, act of war, violence that intends to wound

——if I swear that I know what I mean when I injure someone [w/ bêtise], I perjure myself > bêtise always perspectival

p. 167 accusation of bête deprives the accused, like animal, of all that is proper to man (language, reason, logos, sense of death, technique, history, convention, culture, laughter, tears, work)

p. 168 from apophantics to apophatics: trying to describe bêtise [vertigo]

pp. 168-70 bêtise not exactly stupidity, foolishness, imbecility, idiotic, Dummheit, Kleinigkeit, etc. [example of nonsynonymous synonym]

——still, difference btwn these words can only be marked in context, which doesn’t imply an absolute relativity of context: bêtise can’t mean anything at all, not an idealized, objective, “free” ideality > translation problems occur in same language, same cultural code

pp. 168-69 inane (sot), ass, knows knowing—not bêtise

p. 169 bêtise as ambiguous hetero- or self-accusation: I’m too good, too bête

p. 170 Avital calls stupidity a quasi-concept: so unstable, subject to variability, plasticity—not secure

p. 171 apaideusia, uncultivated, aphronesis, lack judgment, anaisthetos, insensitive, agroikos, uncouth

——Heidegger [re: commitment to Nazism in 1933-34]: “I did a Dummheit

p. 173 sovereign decision, mad and bête

pp. 173-74 Ronell: philosophy & stupidity, nothing more stupid than Hegel’s absolute knowledge

p. 176 nonknowledge of bête, spirit of seminar; the living in life itself outplays opposition btwn bêtise and its supposed contrary > Nietzsche one of most eloquent witnesses of this theme: both man & animal, both idiotic & cunning—no decidable limit

pp. 178-79 if very meaning of lexicon of bêtise, being-bête, is not absolutely translatable (abyss of translation), one cannot reserve bêtise for man as sovereign & free > if meaning is linked to relation of forces, distinction btwn reaction/response loses its rigor and decidability [must revise everything]

***pp. 180-81 “I do not wish to homogenize things and erase differences,” but no criteria to conclude that man alone is exposed to bêtise, no criteria to exclude the animal

p. 182 abyssal depths, pretension, of Monsieur Teste’s “la bêtise nest pas mon fort

p. 183 force-differential (unconscious mechanisms) btwn which tension/contradiction bound to localize > bêtise on both sides: side of sovereign (who), side of beast, the stupid, the other (what)

——pitiless lucidity of cogito, triumph of conscious self-positing self, the thesis of self always reflects itself as bêtise, bêtise always triumphs > Triumph of Life in bêtise

bêtise always on side of victor > bêtise must not find itself bête: that would be suicidal

p. 184 truth of bêtise: upping ante, denying it (hyperbolically), always adds a supplement of bêtise

p. 191 I kill bêtise first, I kill the marionette in me, the animal-machine (so as not be killed by it)

pp. 191-92 [têtu, entêté] essence itself as headstrong stubbornness in being, bêtise, pigheadedness (entêtement)? the marionette (other) in me I wish to condemn to death? > bêtise hits you over the head (tête), acephalic manner > bêtise not proper to man, but to all those capital beings w/ heads?

p. 193 [vis-à-vis Valéry] bêtise, particularity rather than generality, when the “I” takes itself for the whole > thus, to be rich in spirit, in opposition to bêtise, would be to know how small you are

pp. 224-25 for Derrida, hypothesis that bêtise always threatens imperturbable ithyphallus is the essential ithyphallic bêtise > ithyphallus’ hyperbolical desire is nil/empty of thought, this void pushes, pulses, compulses, makes one think of a drive that is absolutely bête, never gives up anything, absolute stranger to all thought

p. 254 [“you’re stupid”: Cartesian, apocalyptic verdict, final judgment]

pp. 305-07 for Heidegger, Den Eigensinnigen ist Leben nur Leben, for the stubborn, for those with one thing in mind, life is only, merely, life > stubborn bêtise that doesn’t ask any questions

pp. 306-07 bêtise as self-positing, positivism, positivity itself, across all 3 modes (question, affirmation, negation) > but affirmation, the “yes,’”is not to be reduced to positivity [?]

p. 307 bêtise as stubborn opinion of life & death, one proper meaning for each

pp. 307-08 Heidegger’s stubborn stupidity: only man has a relation to dying (sterben) as such

IF p. 301 [vis-à-vis Flaubert] philosophy as vast circulation, unending procession of received ideas > insofar as encyclopedia generates/preserves ideas, it carries w/in itself its own necrosis: idea always becoming-matter (from 1st instant) > hence stupidity of philosophy (easy to stereotype), hence impertinence of materialism & spiritualism

p. 303 for Flaubert, stupidity of philosophy is its desire to conclude

p. 305 Bouvard and Pécuchet possess pitiable faculty of discerning stupidity & finding intolerable

p. 306 Flaubert has become Bouvard and Pécuchet > their stupidity

p. 308 for Flaubert, stupidity is always monumental

STYLE

MPM p. 139 each deconstructive thinking constitutes a text which bears its rhetorical singularity (style of promise, figure of signature)

EM p. 135 Nietzsche: if there is style it must be plural [perhaps we need a change of “style”]

T p. xix logic of event, structures of expropriation: timbre (tympanum), style and signature > same obliterating division of the proper, make every event possible, necessary, unfindable

DS pp. 202-03 graft/graph (both from graphion, writing implement, stylus) — bridge graft; capital title as scion/graft (can’t tell whether its present or absent anymore)

P p. 33 to go against feast [re: hermeneutic circle of philosophy & art] do not mix genres but extend metaphors (you can always try: question of style) > i.e. feast top to toe, circling step

SP p. 37 “question of style” always concerned w/ weight (le pesant) of pointy object (stiletto, stylus, rapier, quill), which attacks matter/matrix, leaving a mark

——also the protection against this threat, se pliant alors ou repliant, en fuite, derrière des voiles

pp. 37-9 question of style, des voiles, laissons lélytre flotter entre masculin et féminin > our tongue [the French one] assures la jouissance [re: double gender of des voiles]

***p. 39 style advances as spur: 1) prow of sailing vessel, rostrum, cleaving hostile surface of sea 2) rocky point, also éperon, on which waves break at harbor’s entrance

——protects against what stubbornly (avec entêtement) se donne à voir [thrusts itself into view]

p. 41 style-spur (le style éperonnant) as oblong object w/ its tissues, webs, sails, veils, thus its apotropaic power > also an umbrella

——what impresses mark of stylate spur in question of woman? this doesn’t concern la figure de la femme: question of figure open and closed by “woman” > concerns instead her abduction (senlever)

p. 57 Nietzsche’s writing as inscription of truth, elevated (se lève) in quotation marks (machination, cri, vol et pinces dune grue), cet écart de la vérité qui senlève delle-même > the feminine “operation”

——if style were a man (like Freud says penis is prototype of fetishes), writing would be a woman

pp. 63-5 for Nietzsche, since man alone believes in woman-truth, women feminists are men too, lay claim to truth > perd le style (gone the style)

p. 83 pratique stylet, pratique stylée, de quel genre? can’t be written w/out conjoined fabulation of woman/truth, entre la femme, in spite of the profundity that is modesty

pp. 99-101 Nietzsche’s style not an impregnable, infinite mastery, doesn't impeccably manipulate the snare (piège), doesn’t calculate the undecidable like Leibniz’ God (a falling back into the trap), nor does he use parody/simulacrum as a weapon, which would lead to a Nietzsche cult (interprêtrise of parody) > rhythmic blindness of hymen/margin “inscribes castration’s effect w/in itself” > dans le toile du texte, Nietzsche is lost, a spider, or spiders, unequal to the web spun

***p. 107 question of style, spurring-operation, more powerful than thesis, meaning: stylate spur rips through veil, to show the veil, to undo opposition veil/unveiled (sailed/unsailed) [voilé/dévoilé]

p. 139 never has been the style, the woman, the simulacrum, the sexual difference [un gai savoir]

——plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

DST DST p. 203 thus Lacoue-Labarthe’s “style,” ethos, multiplying parentheses, rhythm of warnings, which don’t protect anyone > warning stands watch so no one will fail to expose oneself

EJQB p. 71 fragment: neither determined style nor failure, it’s the form of that which is written

LI p. 131 “I” w/ quotation marks marks tendencies, styles, types, situations rather than a person

TN p. 131 “my impertinence will be my tact”: baroque composition, flaunted taste for delirious profusion > response to aporias of text

ATM p. 166 [Levinas’ negotiation w/ interruption and reappropriation] is a style, an idiom that marks the negotiation w/ a singular and irreplaceable seal

SUBJECTILE

KH p. 95 khōra never reached, broached [entamer?], touched, exhausted: not subject, not subjectile

——a virginity rebellious against anthropomorphism, not order of eidos or mimemes

AF pp. 26-7 can one imagine an archive w/out foundation, w/out substance, w/out subjectile?

pp. 97-9 the archaic impression Freud seeks almost no longer an archive, confuses itself w/ a footstep that leaves its still living mark on surface, place of origin, when step still one w/ subjectile

MSUB J p. 157 subjectile: not an object of knowing

——btwn sub and tile [the “-ject”]: persecuting evils, haunting the supports, substrata, substances > Artaud never stopped exorcising, conjuring the fiends (suppôts), succubi, sorcerers

p. 158 subjectile is everything distinct from form, from sense & representation, skin w/holes for pores [Irigaray] > “its presumed depth can only be seen like surface,” a flat succubi

——the 2 classes of subjectile: 1) porous like wood, paper, permits itself to be traversed 2) metals, alloys, permits no passage

p. 159 subjectile’s secret should only be shared w/ the translator: that it is untranslatable.

——subjectile embodies the paradox of excess (does it or does it not belong to language?)

p. 164 a mime would say we have to be done w/ subjectile, and he wouldn’t be wrong, it’s a judgment of God, we are spectators of it, “having done with it, interminably”

——subjectile is consistency of btwn itself

p. 165 subjectile: “we won’t ever speak of it if to speak of means to speak of objects or subjects”

p. 167 to meet back up with innate nature (in-né), must force the subjectile, rendering it mad from birth, desiring birth

——subjectile interposes itself as the hymen btwn inside & outside, finally becoming the jetée (the spurt, a spurt like a fallen stone, dead) > objective, subjective, projectile, introjection, objection, dejection, abjection

p. 168 subjectile, btwn 2 places, the subject become a gisant, spread out, stretched out, inert, neutral (ci-gît) [see C p. 234 ci-gît, “here lies”]

——subjectile is the forceful throwing, casting and also what has to be traversed, pierced, the membrane, the paper > “the trajectory of what’s thrown upon it” dynamizes the skin in perforating it, passing to other side: “after having exploded the wall of the problem” [hymen]

p. 169 neither/nor of subjectile (neither subservient nor dominating) situates place of a double constraint (both screen & projectile) > becomes unrepresentable

——everything played out btwn transitivity of throwing and intransitivity of being-thrown

p. 170 motion of motif, w/out totalization, subjectilian wall: “of this dissociation in the body of which there will always be marked the singularity of the event made work”

——to speak of the subjectile, we must speak by insertion and precipitation, acceleration of rhythmical projection [see MPM p. 62] and inscription of projectile, beyond “words and images”

TR pp. 121-22 band, ribbon, silk, double bind en soie, ringhband, phantasmatic body on which limited ink (finite reserve) is made to flow; ink remains modest but capitalizes, virtually lets flow

——ribbon: subjectile on which one writes & piece of machine thanks to which one will never have done w/ inscribing [all this deconstructs de Man’s claim the “ribbon” is a “free signifier’]

p. 146 “I beseech you” not to “annihilate” [re: Confessions]: performative eve, arche-peformative before performative, younger & older, support & archive of confession

——its subjectile, very body of event, archival and auto-deictic body

——revelation of truth nothing w/out saving body of inscriptions

p. 159 due to unforeseeable, inappropriable exteriority, event is traumatic (a fearsome generality of “trauma”—there’s trauma of “happy” experience) > makes precarious distinction btwn point of view of subject & that which is produced independently of desire: event injures desire

***CIR p. 134 to those idiots who think computers are harmful to writing, I’ve nicknamed mine subjectile

(transcendental) SUBJECTIVITY

GOD p. 22 repression & incorporation: either 2 economies, or one economy w/ 2 systems in move from mysterium to secretum (possibility of keeping the secret)

——[secretum as history of truth, as cryptology, as a subjectification, separation from community of fusion]

p. 78 formula tout autre est tout autre disturbs while reinforcing Kierkegaard’s discourse, it means that Abraham’s God is found everywhere something is wholly other; and since each of us [?] is infinitely other in absolute singularity [Abraham’s election is universalized?]

GT p. 24 subject and object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of the gift; subject as such never gives or receives a gift

pp. 101-02 subject as such: bordered, posed, identified, always calculates, reappropriates surplus-value, circular return, a certain capitalization

——despite labor of subject, production of surplus-value, gift takes place where there’s trace, dissemination, in excessive forgetting, forgetful excess of the gift

***p. 170 secret of literature has no depth, no interiority, spread on the surface of the page, non-psychological structure, not subjective though responsible for most radical effects of subjectivity, a post card, a bank note, a “letter of credit” [see LOBL p. ~101, &

SUBJECTILE

]

***R p. 55 the unconscious remains the most vital reserve of the self-destructive conservation of the “subject” or of egological ipseity; without autoimmunity, no sadism, masochism, consciousness, death drive

SPOM p. 112 exappropriation is the radical contradiction of all “capital,” property and appropriation, as well as ideas that depend on it: i.e. free subjectivity: “servitude binds (itself) to appropriation” > lexappropriation ne justifie aucune chaîne

p. 235n the supplement of an internal-external fold, in abyssal fashion, marks the closure or principle of ruin of a philosophy of life, and of subjectivity: si on intégrait à la vie de cette subjectivité vivante le travail de la négativité ou de lobjectivité, les phénomènes ou plutôt les non-phénomènes de la mort, etc., pourquoi sobstiner encore à appeler cela vie?

OOG p. 88 for [later] Husserl, w/ respect to writing, subjectless transcendental field is one of the “conditions “ of transcendental subjectivity

p. 143 for Husserl, subjectivity “normed” in the Present, “fastened” to a “higher subjectivity,” higher sense investigation

p. 147 Logos (always has form of a Telos) is not the real transcendence but the ideal Pole for bringing about transcendental subjectivity itself

*** p. 152 “access to Being and Being’s arrival must always already be contracted [stricture] or drawn together when phenomenology begins by claiming the right to speak (droit à parole)” > prescribing historicity for Being avoids simple misfortune of delay: phenomenology alone can open absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History, as auto-temporalization of Living Present

BL p. 188 subject summoned before law requires axioms, conventions: a system

HERP p. 195 for Heidegger, anthropology & psychology depend on metaphysics of subjectivity, interpretation of man as subject; thus, psychology did not exist for Greeks, and Christianity (w/ its new relation to philein) is 1st stage in formation of passions for subject/psychology

MPM p. 21 the being “in us” of other in bereaved memory, not resurrection of other himself, can’t be included in narcissistic fantasy of subjectivity closed in on itself > other so marks narcissistic structure that being “in us” becomes coming of the other

POOF p. 17 via Aristotle, must submit oneself to time in time like cattle, to have the habit form > history of subject as history of time

p. 68 Schmittian decisionism implies the instance of the subject > a classic, free, willful subject to whom nothing can happen, not even an exceptional event [?]

——theory of the subject (in its identity in itself & its calculable permanence) incapable of accounting for the slightest decision

p. 243 hard to follow Heidegger’s epochal scansion of philía, yes, anachronistic to find subject/object in Aristotle, but how can he say there's no anthropological or psychological vantage point?

——acc. Heidegger, Christianity is an education of passions, even a psychology, a psychological subjectivity—all post-Aristotelian friendships are Christian, same goes for ‘politics’

p. 244 is the voice of the friend in Heidegger, that which rings out withdrawn from metaphysical subjectivity, a minimal ‘community,’ friendship prior to friendship & enmity?

pp. 250-51 agency called ‘proper name’ can’t be reduced to registered name, to patronymic or social reference (its determining manifestation) > would Heidegger’s pre-Socratic phília be capable of doing w/out proper name, insofar as it is older than subjectivity?

MSUB J pp. 154-57 treason (can a subjectile betray?): not come when called [Artaud levels accusation of treason at God] > “subjective,” the treason close up of “subjectile”

EM p. 129n (155n) Heidegger: metaphysics, thought of subject, treats man on basis of animalitas, essence of man is not heeded

VM p. 100 other not signaled by face, he is the face, “absolutely present, in his face, the Other—w/out any metaphor—faces me”; face > does not incarnate anything other than subjectivity (self)

pp. 109-10 for Levinas, homogenization of Same and Ego, homogenized w/ concept, and finite totality, permits him to condemn state, totality, not in the name of but against subjectivity

p. 132 for Husserl (transcendental phenomenology), “subjective a priori” only way to check totalitarianism of the neutral, impersonal “absolute Logic”: eschatology w/out dialogue [re: why finitude?] [revelation through faulty teletype]

p. 135 eidos as noema in understanding or logos of the infinite subject (God) > how does transcendental idealism escape horizon of infinite subjectivity?

——Husserl would say that Plato’s eidos realized outside noema, outside being thought

PP p. 97 the “drug” side of pharmakon creates surprises for those who try to manipulate it as master/subject

VP p. 10 no language is equal to the task that opposes, doubles, a transcendental ego to a mundane self, Husserl’s verweltlichende Selbstapperzeption “mundanizing self-apperception”; the soul, the transcendental subject is Selbstobjektivierung, the One, the monadic ego

***pp. 70-1 [commentary > interpretation] auto-affection as voice assumes a pure difference dividing self-presence, makes reduction of world, space, impossible; yet, must pass through reduction “in order to recapture difference in closest proximity to itself”: in closest proximity to movement of differance

——movement of differance produces transcendental subject

p. 72n for Husserl, that which is unnammeable is “absolute subjectivity,” a being of presence as substance, ousia, hypokeimenon > can name its attribute not its “absolute properties,” i.e. its substance [classical metaphysical scheme]

——for Husserl, object is relative, subject is absolute

***S pp. 39-40 price of the strategy of “spirit,” always turns back on “subject,” even when used to displace subject from racism, biologism, naturalism, the opposition requires a “unilaterality of subjectity,” an oppositional determination > whether “human rights” or democracy, freedom of spirit demarcates a metaphysics of subjectity that is blind to the irreducibility of complicity, contamination (even if, and there are, degrees)

——only choice is btwn the terrifying contaminations it assigns [re: subjectity of spirit]

p. 73 Heidegger saves Nietzsche’s text (from accusation of biologism, zoologism, racism [?]) by damning it: still metaphysics of absolute subjectity like Hegel: Nietzsche’s absolute subjectity that of body, impulsions, affects; Hegel’s that of the willing that knows itself

FSW p. 229 concept of subject requires concept of substance (thus presence)

PPHS pp. 91-2 Hegel: light is original ideality—nature becoming subjective

p. 101 philosophy began in West because China grounded itself to a halt w/out opposition btwn substance and subjective freedom, could not reflect

FWT p. 65 great respect for foundation of human rights, via post-Cartesian subjectivity, though must be analyzed, developed, enriched

——rights for animals confirms logic of subjectivity responsible for greatest violence against them > human rights for animals a disastrous contradiction

p. 74 Kant: (finite) subject of law—subject of duty > save God, who has no duty, and slave, who has duties but no rights [see ATIA pp. 99-100]

p. 99 singularity resists, remains, sometimes it even resists being assigned to “subjectivity”

p. 178 Europe exports: 1) norms, advancements, language [re: consolidation of rights, laws, to sovereignty of subject] 2) its auto-hetero-deconstructive capacity or auto-immunity

p. 179 “subject” instituted only out of “fear” of unconscious, interrupts energy; one ethical/political “system,” one “idea” of Good/Right > constructions produced to resist a threat

POS p. 23 communication: transmission of identity of signified object from one subject (presupposes subject) to another: A communicates B to C

OS pp. 52-3 transition from parousia to absolute subjectivity does not disrupt Aristotelianism: prime mover, presence, desire, eros, “desire is desire of presence,” absolute subjectivity, circle, return to self, parousia as self-presence > prime mover, noēsis noēseōs, as subject

P p. 47 affect of the pleasing-oneself-in (se-plaire-à) [re: Kant’s disinterested pleasure, critique of judgment] remains subjective through & through, an auto-affection that goes outside its inside

p. 144 double trait of cise, limits and unlimits at the same time, divided line upon which colossus comes to cise itself—and incises itself w/out cise > the sublime

——Kant calls this “subjective,” this psychic ideality, “not in nature,” the psyche as kolossos, superelevated, beyond height

ROP p. 75 Lacan returns to an unsurpassability of Descartes, brings Descartes close to Freud > [is this part of Foucault’ critique of psychoanalysis? re: subject (of science)]

SP p. 139 this death [in text] not that of tragedy nor subject, not “I am mortal, therefore…” > the scene of text’s cryptic nature makes possible anticipation of death: tragedy, parody & birth

ATIA p. 31 anthropo-centric subjectivity speaks only from one edge of Man/Animal limit, gives autobiography, history of its life, that it therefore calls History

p. 90 Descartes never calls “I think there I am” subjectivity, but it lays the foundation of the subject (Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, Levinas)

p. 92 for Kant, the power to have the “I” is the erection of man, infinitely above: the subject

p. 94 animal is capable of auto-affection, of [quasi] “I,” not capable of pointing toward itself and saying “this is I,” of autodeictic, autoreferential self-distancing, thus not capable of understanding, reason, response, responsibility

p. 95 can we not find auto-deixis in animal sexual acts (follow me), or genetic chains, and isn’t the human’s “I” not infused w/ alterity too abyssal to ensure pure/rigorous autonomy?

p. 96 finitude of “I think” (anthropologism) is denied the animal by Heidegger & Kant

***PS p. 183 metaphysical determination of madness as disease of alienation had to be contemporary w/ proprius [Latin era] > proper subject, absolutely close to himself

DIF DIF p. 16 consciousness, self-presence—subject cannot be thought w/out reference to presence as hupokeimenon or ousia > subject of consciousness has always manifested itself as self-presence

RGE p. 269 Hegel 1st to have demonstrated onotological unity of method & historicity, so sovereignty exceeds not only subject but history, not as ahistorical, but as superhistorical—takes its responsibilities from completion/closure of history

REST p. 261 restitution: reestablishes in rights or property by placing subject upright again, “the erect body”

pp. 265-66 when shoes no longer have strict relation avec un sujet porteur ou porté—they’re the lightened, anonymous, voided support (but so much the heavier abandoned à son inertie opaque) “of an absent subject whose name haunts the open form”

——never completely open, the shoe maintains a form, that of the foot > describes external surface or envelope of what is called a “form” [Derrida quotes from Littré, where “form” is wood in shape (figure) of foot, then he links figure to face—Shapiro sees Van Gogh’s in “his” shoes]

p. 266 restitution: who’s the proper subject?

p. 273 temptation to stand shoes upright again, to return them to authentic subject: la structure de la chose et du procès oblige, alors, toujours, à en rajouter (to keep adding to it) > to put back becomes a supplementary retortion, delirious dramaturgy > these shoes are hallucinogenic

p. 283 whose shoes (whose feet) (the subject of reattachment): the capital subject of this contract [btwn Shapiro & Heidegger], they each have one piece of symbolon, share common interest

p. 284 the pas de contact (pas de sujet) of Van Gogh’s shoes, a detachment whose reattachment is sought in its fundamental surface, the sole, or the fundamental subjectivity of the ground

——pas de contact, rhythmically, makes marche, pas is not present nor absent

pas works (marche) badly w/out a pair

p. 285 Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art intends to lead beyond, or to, eve of constitution of the subjectum, a Schritt zurück (backward step) on road of thought [?]

***pp. 287-88 Heidegger: from hypokeimenon to subjectum, Roman thought takes over (übernimmt) Greek words w/out corresponding co-originary experience, absence-of-ground (Bodenlosigkeit) of Western thought opens w/ this translation > a transfer, über, over and beyond Greek experience

——these words become ghostly (fantômatiques) doubles of themselves, leur simulacre légers, walk above/in the void, bodenlos

pp. 291-92 gift, abyss, offering, there is abyss > essence of Van Gogh’s painting, via Heidegger’s Origin, opens onto an abyss (not attributive certainty, secure ground of [Cartesian-Hegelian] subjectivity)

p. 339 for Heidegger, the picture is doubly useless, depicts, “shows,” being-products that’re out-of-service, w/out use-value > multiple edge(s) (bordures) detach being-product from subjective scope (portée subjective), simultaneously baiting (inducing/luring) reattachment of subjective scope

——edge (bordure) less simple when turned inside out [invaginated?], not simple at all w/ the lace & the hemmed holes (trous bordés), the eyelets comme lieu de passage [figure of decapitation here too]

p. 365 real wearer-holder-proprietor-signatory [subject] of shoes > so much augmented capital: these meanings are added onto, not confused w/, one another

DST DST p. 200 désistance—impossibility of consisting, [de]-constitution of subject

p. 210 Derrida wary of every “return of the subject,” even in least dogmatic of returns, like that found in late Foucault (all “returns” omit rigorous reading of Heidegger)

***pp. 212-13, 318-19n w/ both Lacoue-Labarthe & Heidegger, Derrida wonders about unity of unthought—couldn’t the unthought be désistance, & doesn’t désistance enforce an irreducible dispersion that disidentifies even a concept of a subject that exceeds the metaphysical one?

pp. 319-20n delay as inevitable, delay re: one’s “own” birth, experience of “abortion” > a subject that cannot identify itself because ineluctably delayed [Lacan’s human born prematurely]

——condition of possibility of identification is its impossibility (both ineluctable) > subject identifies itself because it can never be identified

TR p. 157 force of nondesire in desire? force of desubjectivation in/as subject itself?

p. 159 de Man: dispossession in writing due to arbitrary power of signifier, from point of view of subject, this can only be experienced as beheading, dismemberment, castration

PJP p. 163 le parjure forgot to remember the duty of memory (infinite at every instant), memory must be an ethical obligation [I did not think that I had to not forget]

PSSS p. 245 psychoanalysis will be left behind if it doesn’t analyze mutation of subject of the subject, citizen subject

D pp. 298-99 illusion of truth facing me, sans cesse par soi régénérée de mon visage, will have only been scene-effect of “dispositif”; cet appareil differentiated enough to include autarchic illusion of sovereign subject in its structure

HST p. 409 substitution resists ontology, question of hypokeimenon, that which places itself “below,” underneath, the very proximate words substance/subjectivity

+R pp. 178-79 Benjamin theorizes that portrait of face is last “ritual religious art” before “technical reproducibility” > disappearance of the subject as art of the cenotaph [?]

TN p. 37 “subject”: Kant’s word not Descartes’

p. 152 hierarchy/teleology [au sommet]: willing subject, quasi-sense that is touch (ultrasense), the hand [the whole hand, not just tip of an extremely pointy fingernail (ongle extrêmement aigu)]

p. 160 Husserl offers hand as an example of free, spontaneous, immediate movement of ego-subject

NOY p. 236 for Heidegger, the metaphysics of will: interpretation of Being as unconditional will of subjectivity—this hegemony marks all modernity (from Descartes to Hegel, to Nietzsche?)

EW p. 259 give up reconstructing the subject, it’s already been deconstructed, deconstructed itself

——Derrida’s “subject”: a place or non-place in a text, an instance (w/out stance) for some “who,” a “who” besieged by problematic of trace and differance, of the je[c]t as destinerring of missive

pp. 262-63 not necessary that singularity be translated by “who” or remain privilege of “who”

——Heidegger and Nietzsche, in spite of their distrust for substantialist or subjectivist metaphysics, endorsed the “who,” subtracted “who” from deconstruction of subject

p. 263 even in the most marked transcendental idealism (Husserl’s), alter-ego leads back to a pre-egological and pre-subjectivist zone (transcendental passive genesis of time and other)

p. 270 subject assumes presence, that is to say sub-stance, stasis, stance

p. 271 Da of Dasein singularizes itself w/out being reducible to any categories of human subjectivity (self, rational being, consciousness, person), because it is presupposed by all of these

p. 272 subject is also a principle of calculability, for the political, for the current concept of democracy

p. 273 subject and Dasein (still tied to a relation to self, reserved for man alone) constitute identity in name of a particular kinds of rights, a certain juridico-political calculation; deconstruction calls for different rights, more exacting articulation of rights, more responsibility

***p. 274 all subjects subjected to the following predicates (all ordered around étant-present): presence to self, identity to self, positionality, property, personality, ego, consciousness, will, intentionality, freedom, humanity, etc.

pp. 280-81 full rights given to other (women, vegetarians [?]) has only occurred recently, at very moment when subject began to be deconstructed

p. 283 Derrida links denegation of murder, in the putting to death of the animal, to the violent institution of the “who” as subject

p. 286 unconditional affirmation that motivates deconstruction can always upset an instituted rhythm of every pause (subject is a pause, stabilizing arrest, the thesis we will always need [?])

OG p. 68 (100) writing can never be thought under the category of the subject

p. 69 (100) spacing as writing is the becoming-absent, becoming-unconscious of the subject

p. 108 (158-59) graphein as originary effacement of proper name, there is “subject” the moment obliteration of proper is produced (dawn of language) > universal a priori

p. 132 beyond Lévi-Strauss, who thinks literacy is an enslaving violence, Derrida sees writing as constitution of free subject in violent movement of its own effacement and bondage (enchaînement)[Derrida’s phrasing describes non-classical enslavement to a universal law?]

***p. 165-66 (236) auto-affection, universal structure of experience, being capable of being affected by other, capable of symbolizing, another name for “life,” the as-for-itself or for-itself: subjectivity—gains in its mastery of the other to the extent that its power of repetition idealizes itself (s’idéalise) > the external, the signifier, becomes my spontaneity, and escapes me less and less

p. 184 (261-62) image is death, it cannot represent & add representer to represented, thus presence of re-presented folded back on itself in the world, presence announces its dispossession w/in its own representer/death > subject: merely this movement of expropriation

CIR pp. 296-97 avowal, even for crime not committed, secretes meaning, order, an intelligibility that arrests > subject constituted by category of this accepted accusation (confines asubjective & endless culpability of chaos)

EU p. 90 formal law: pure legitimation, reason as court of final appeal > pure ethico-juridical instance, tautology, pure practical reason, decision of pure egological subject

p. 91 Derrida discusses how one can dissolve value of responsibility by relativizing/secondarizing subjectivity, consciousness, or intentionality > in such cases, one doesn’t question link btwn responsibility & freedom of subject—one keeps axiomatics in tact [Lacan, psychoanalysis?]

——more interesting, perhaps impossible, think responsibility as linterpellation requiring response, beyond juridico-egological form, encore à venir, plusjeune” (younger, still to come)

FV p. 461 Bonaparte falls back onto dogmatic imprudence (appeal to author’s unconscious), Lacan falls back, w/ incomparable philosophical vigilance, onto Truth > [both Bonaparte & Lacan] castration of mother as ultimate meaning & proper site of letter: “real intersubjectivity,” “solution in broad daylight”—proper as relation to lack itself, in proper place/body

***p. 489 even when letter arrives, its capacity not to arrive torments it, affects “subject,” “character,” “position” [w/ divisibility]

WBH p. 193 to say woman is not a “subject,” 2 consequences: 1) radically revolutionary or deconstructive 2) dangerously reactive

——to say women are subjects keeps whole framework on which traditional university is built

CHOR p. 92 specular reversal of masculine “subjectivity” (even in its most self-critical form, when most jealous of itself and its “proper” objects) represents only one phase of feminism?

SUBLIME

BL pp. 193-94 the height of the human, 2 legs, is what creates repression; turning away is an upward movement, purification, turns away from that which stinks: the history of the law

MPM p. 62 [see p. 88n at what speed ought one to read?] motif of precipitousness in de Man, acceleration to win time, win time over, non-dialectical—not a particular rhythm—a rhythm w/out rhythm (incommensurable acceleration, infinite and null, touches the sublime)

P p. 103 sublime as striction and counter-striction [surges up indirectly unlike pleasure of beauty]

pp. 122-23 sublime (Erhaben), superelevation (what in Glas is called the élève), absolutely high, not measurable in height

pp. 127-28 beauty & sublime: please by themselves, independent of judgment of senses & determinate judgments, pretension to universal validity on side of pleasure (not knowledge), both reflexive judgments > beautiful (finite) requires parergon, presence of limit gives form to beautiful, this bordered edging not only externally limited but called in by hollowing of lacunary quality w/in the work (ergon) > colossal/sublime excludes parergon, not ergon, usually nature, “w/out limit”

p. 128 re: sublime, arrest of outpouring (épanchement) at floodgate (vanne), pressed on limit, pleasure gushes after arrest, inhibition, suspension (Hemmung), an arresting that makes flow > for a blink of an eye passage is closed, stricture absolute, then barrage, linondation

p. 129 “negative pleasure” of sublime, respect, admiration, is different from “positive pleasure” of beautiful, and unique from beauty’s negativity (the work of of mourning in beauty), which was already singular, a negativity w/out negativity, sans sans sans, sans of pure cut, sans fin of finality

——sublime does violence to our imagination, all the more sublime for that, shock, double bind (attraction, repulsion), violent incommensurability

——abyss, the privileged presentation of sublime (the ocean)

p. 130 beauty: w/out interest; sublime: counter-interest

pp. 130-31 “pleasing-oneself-in” of sublime suspends play, elevates to seriousness, nur negativ, relates to moral law, both presuppose violence done to senses, w/ sublime violence done by imagination, not reason > imagination mutilates itself, conceals itself, binds, robs itself: sacrificial violence gains by losing > organizes expropriation w/in calculation > imagination organizes theft of its own freedom, feels sacrifice/theft at same time as the Ursache to which it submits [see GOD]

pp. 131-32 no object of sublime, presentation of inadequation of unpresentable, principle of sublime must be in ourselves, in Reason (moral seriousness w/out play), reason of the colossal

——unlike beauty, sublime must be found w/in ourselves

p. 132 though Kant’s examples of the sublime are nature, it is only found w/in ourselves, so all comments on sublime are an appendix to aesthetics of natural finality

pp. 132-33 Hegel reproaches Kant for starting from cise and not from w/out cise: i.e. the sublime, for Hegel, goes beyond symbol, expresses itself only by marking annihilation of expression, in sublime, content (infinity itself, the one, substance) sublates form > Kant is wrong to think subjectivity, finitude, could signify it, but Kant would respond in principle: one can only think w/out cise, the colossal, by way of figure [signified infinity vs. signifying finitude]

p. 134 for Kant & Hegel, pas crossing line finite/infinite interrupts symbolic beauty > Judaism as historical figure of sublime irruption: ban on representation (Kant), Hebraic poetry (Hegel)

pp. 135-36 acc. Kant, sublime is absolutely large, w/out dimension, an unequal equal only to itself > why is there still reference to a cise in space? if absolutely large why not absolutely small? Kant’s preference of largeness is tautological: more is more (preference itself thinks more)

p. 137 why is quantum” for sublime, which is unmeasurable, always considered large? this logic must be similar to St. Anselm’s

p. 138 w/ sublime, everything that is compared to it is small > here, Kant throws a bridge, the bridge like the symbol throws itself [by way of reason?], btwn unpresentable and presentation > the whole world can be made small in relation to sublime magnitude

p. 140 small/big (problem of sublime) measured against, w/in, living body of man > starting from it, the erection of the largest is preferred

——imagination (btwn sensibility & understanding) has 2 operations, is the cise because it has 2 cises: 1) has the cise of what it delimits 2) and cise of what it de-limits, i.e. that which is liberated in it of its limits [apprehension lets go in comprehension what it gains in apprehension]

pp. 140-41 human body as topos of experience of sublime because it is a median btwn sensibility & mathematical indefinite

p. 142 distance required by the sublime opens up perception to space of narrative? divergence btwn apprehension/comprehension? doesn’t it call itself, w/ narrative voice: the colossal?

p. 144 double trait of cise, limits and unlimits at the same time, divided line upon which colossus comes to cise itself—and incises itself w/out cise > the sublime

——Kant calls this “subjective,” this psychic ideality, “not in nature,” the psyche as kolossos, superelevated, beyond height

p. 146 glas et galactique du colossos, the bridge [tree?] over the abyss which threatens to swallow everything, interval btwn dynamic/mathematical sublime, on edge of which analytic of sublime is broached (sentame): whirlpool heaves/tears tree into la dissemence laiteuse (the question is the cipher writing on the surface of nature)

TB pp. 119-20 classic circle always begins to turn once one asks about origin of languages/society > Benjamin interested in an original kinship, affinity (Verwandschaft), alliance btwn languages, contract of translation beyond blood ties, empirical symbioses > Derrida compares this affinity to Kant’s sublime: rendering present an affinity that’s never present in this presentation

IW p. 288 Cohen’s discourse about nationalism a discourse on sublime, sublimity of spiritual forms hand in hand w/ mathematization of rhythm: sources of feeling, originality of German music

D p. 363 innumerable as force, blows up (or out of) all frames, & it works through it (taken into account) from the inside [Kant’s mathematical sublime?]

+R p. 161 fishing picture, record of a hunt: 2 death drives cross in an X (double diagonal): 1) pushes, attracts, holds down—descending column 2) the other, just as sublime, raises up, asphyxia of the phallus—ascending column

TN p. 105 for Nancy, sublime: imagination feeling its powerlessness as it touches the limit (limit conceived as height, absolute height)

pp. 105-06 cela se touche: “it itself touches itself,” “one touches it, it lets itself be touched” > imagination: possibility auto-affecting its essence of a nonessence: it is touched, in a movement de retrait ou de re-pli, becomes at moment it touches untouchable [re: imagination “touching” sublime]

p. 109 Nancy: sublime occurs on edge of art

E p. 21 Kant: sublime occurs due to a momentary checking (Hemmung, an arrest), and its pleasure (admiration or respect) is a negative pleasure

pp. 21-2 though sublimity works against our senses, the sacrifice (Aufopferung) of the sublime keeps a power in view, sublime can dawn in art: attains a power greater than what was sacrificed

——economic calculation allows sublime to be swallowed

***pp. 21-2 Derrida compares the work of mourning to the sublime, both allow negative pleasures to be reappropriated by economic calculation

BSi pp. 212, 215 erected marionettes, Sovereign in its Majesty, Most High—not merely a trope, [it’s sublimity is even practical]: surveillance (economic/military) strategy

SUBSTITUTION [fixerup]

SPOM p. 195 secret of commodity form is substitution (quid pro quo), but one w/ ruse, perverse intervention of souffleur, parole soufflée > abnormal play of mirrors [men no longer recognize in the substitution made by commodity the social character of their own labor], commodity turns men into specters, vampires > can’t see their reflection, “but who is not so deprived?” Derrida adds

POOF p. 5 apostrophic pledge (gage apostrophique et sa citation): could apostrophe (uttered on edge of life, i.e. death) ever offer a pledge w/out substitution?

pp. 55-6 Nietzsche’s silence (among friends), imperative/enigma of sense of decency (pudeur) [Why I am a Destiny]: an erasure w/out erasure, everything is possible in this silence > silence as interruption that substitutes testimony for know-how, faith for the test, the perhaps for certainty, other for same, friendship for calculation: different way of thinking among

A p. 22 if death names irreplaceability of absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in place of the other) then all examples in world can illustrate this singularity, death of all those who say “my death” is irreplaceable [universal?] > tout autre est tout autre

——that anybody can appropriate expression “my death” > exemplary complication of exemplarity: nothing more nor less substitutable than syntagm “my death,” hapax legomenon

VM p. 94 for Levinas, classical dissymmetry of same and other feigns overturning while remaining the same, impassive beneath an algebraic substitution

PP pp. 92-3 Thoth supplants and supplements (en le suppléant) its other (father, sun, life, speech, origin or orient); at same time Thoth takes shape from very thing it resists and substitutes for

——Thoth opposes itself, passes into its other > messenger-god is truly god of absolute passage btwn opposites: god of non-identity (if he had identity: coincidentia oppositorum)

DIF DIF pp. 26-7 [Derrida argues for new relation to unnameable, different from Heidegger’s] “no name” for differance is not ineffable Being which no name could approach (i.e. God), it is play which makes possible nominal effects, the chains of substitutions of names

PF p. 282n old, inexhaustible question of “I”: how can a universal substitute lodge itself in unicity resisting all substitution? > most universal in most singular of alibis w/out alibi

HLP p. 292n “live” broadcast replaces “thing-itself” [power of “propaganda image”: mutation that affects substitutive status of substitute] [think Trump]

p. 293n lying w/ images, “facts” structured by simulacrum/virtual, “live television,” by means of selective/interpretive performativity, destroys even reference to the alterity of what it replaces: produces indubitable “truth effect” > absolute lie can survive w/out anyone knowing [evil genius]

TR p. 96 logic of à propos—logic of substitution [cf. p. 149]

p. 115 in every scene of inheritance, there’s laws of substitution (law period): responsibility, debt, duty—thus guilt & forgiveness

p. 117 de Man: “ribbon substituting for a desire which is itself a desire for substitution” [re: Rousseau’s Confessions]

p. 134 deceit/theft of singular I by universal I, just injustice, ineluctable subterfuge/substitution

D p. 305 proliferation, substitution of the unit that adds & effaces itself, counts itself out (se décomptant) at moment of déclenchement; Sollers: “participating in the calculation that effaced us and replaced us”

pp. 324-25 le discurs dassistance, pluperfect, deconstructs “illusion” of present, unites presence & auxiliary, supports [Plato’s boetheia] ekgonos (dispossessed son), a seed exposed to all violence of writing: you

——“I” that attends its own incessant, violent reinscription, a pure passageway for operations of substitution, a mere function or ghost

p. 326 “I”: passing passageway for permutation, repercussive percussion, full force of writing > dun coup, triggers (déclenche) tale & keeps (maintient) it in progress

——simulacrum [of “I”] as a force, le simulacre de lassistance: chambre obscure: feigns to transform the imperfect into present: impossible > et vous entraîne dans un nouveau vertige

p. 328 authority & property still remain, but as pretensions of attending discourse, dead surface effects

p. 364 each angle of square belongs to totality of surface, but multiplies it by folding back on itself, fractures it [the surface]—leaving room for supplementary attending (dassistance) surface

——same w/ supernumerary (surnombre) (column of words): is part of the numeral and belongs (appartient) to very milieu it exceeds

HST pp. 364-65 Levinas’ change of accent, scenery (paysage) (from Totality & Inf to Otherw): from peaceful welcome to violent hostage > no apparent inconsistency

——the same logic: the one welcoming comes 2nd, thus hostage > inseparability of concept of substitution & concept of subjectivity as hostage: hostage, responsible for all, therefore substitutable, precisely where he is absolutely irreplaceable

p. 376 Huysmans: Jesus as first example of mystical substitution, the substitution (suppléance) of him who owes nothing for him who owes everything

p. 376 hostage: “we offer ourselves as a pledge,” captivity, spiritual residence [re: Massignon’s Badaliya, Arabic name for substitution, a spiritual community he founded in Egypt]

p. 377 hostage, substitution or suppléance

p. 379 [re: Massignon’s, Kahil’s Badaliya] St. Paul: “while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his son” > a sacred deposit, mystical substitution, hostage as disappropriation

p. 385 for forgiveness to be possible, what there is to forgive must remain unforgivable: otherwise exchange, excuse [see p. 380] > logical aporia (not just formal logic) but tragedy of compassion: intersubjectivity as destiny of hostage, madness of substitution

p. 386 must welcome the infinite (for Levinas, that’s 1st hospitality), forgive beyond me, what is not mine to forgive [forgiving in my name but only in the name of the other]: must think substitution from limit-experiences (decision, gift, forgiveness), from possible-impossible, the impossible of the possible

p. 387 limit (of forgiveness) cannot be crossed (infranchissable)—and is crossed insofar as it can’t be [hymen] > ultimate compassion, very test of substitution (impossible), to be hostage and hôte of the other

p. 388 substitution of hostage as un être-sous, être-dessous, not the beneath of subjectum, substantia, hypokeimenon but submitted (soumis), assujetti, to the height of the Most High (law above)

p. 389 love, mystical love, gives itself w/out giving anything but itself > abandons itself while asking forgiveness at the height of the other

p. 397 X, great 3rd, God accords/grants forgiveness, renders substitution possible

p. 400 last vertigo/breath: forgiving in the name of the other: is this only forgiving the other in one’s/his place (à sa place) in substitution, or forgiving the other one’s/his name, i.e. what survives of him, pardonner au nom de lautre as (to) his first fault?

p. 402 Levinas: substitution frees the subject from boredom

pp. 408-09 substitution, cloning, series; where does human begin? abortion: subject hôte-hostage, clone w/out father?

p. 409 substitution resists ontology, question of hypokeimenon, that which places itself “below,” underneath, the very proximate words substance/subjectivity

pp. 409-10 an example is always a substitutable substitute > “you, for example” often violent address of one who has power/authority to take hostage: inscribes possible replaceability in address to other

——no authentic filiation: every child a substituted substitute [apparently Derrida though of example of swapping babies before finding it was the first example in Littré]

——everything comes in the place of, examples of substitution: sign, money, prothesis, representing

***p. 410 exemplary substitution, child substitution (steal a child & replace w/ another), irreplaceable substitution > if so: every substitution recalls child substitution (the child is the first substitute)

p. 411 Rousseau: mother’s love can’t be substituted

p. 411 grave substitution (one worthy of name), life for another, or life for something (contaminate logic of who w/ what, ethics w/ arithmetic, arithméthique) > (fetishism is only a figure of this)

——one for the other: 1) prosthetic sense: in place of 2) dative sense: sacrifice for the other 3) ontophenomenological sense: being, appearing “for the other” > all 3 inter-cross

——Celan: “no one is a witness for the witness”

p. 412 legal substitutes, agents, Kafka, animals

p. 413 autosubstitution, quasi-genetics, genalogy? natural? cloning? or apostles?

——estate law, suppléant, substitute as inheritor, ensures surviving, inheritors have family resemblance but are not clones

——at heart of logic of substitution/supplement there’s apparently a crossing of natural reproduction & technological reproducibility, natural series & institutional deviation, natural filiation & adoption as legal fiction > unless this logic threatens/ruins opposition nature/institution

***p. 414 thoughts of hospitality at once ethics of substitution & ethics of holy/sacred hospitality

——word substitution can substitute more than once concept of substitute/substitution

pp. 414-15 mourning as both interiorized incorporation & presentation of external dead body > substitueries [“substitution” w/ “killings”]

p. 416 “in/at the place of (à la place de, au lieu de, en lieu et place de),” “for (pour)” indicating substitution & gift: entering economy of gift/sacrifice to exceed it > [lieu-tenants]

pp. 416-17 Derrida using logic of substitution to complicate “what,” thing, “who,” person > “one +”—its substitute can always be what one calls a “what”

p. 417 Abrahamic substitution not a homogenous, identical (cloning) replacement but that of exception, election > implicates (engage) each singularity in responsibility to give, to sacrifice themselves as pledge (comme gage) > still, not a free, voluntary act: there’s grace, a certain passivity

pp. 419-20 simple, homogenous, calculation of cloning—but every unit is irreplaceable in its factual existence (Kant)—so to be ethical, must be conscious, must be auto-affected by this uniqueness? > for Derrida, displaced certainty btwn opposition arithmetic/ethical substitution]

+R p. 155 trait for trait—each stands for all the others: by this fact, never chance left for equivalence

LI p. 37 we are nothing more than prête-noms, “borrowed names,” “fronts” (Woody Allen): masks, substitutes for a clandestine subject

TN p. 19 death introduces drive of expropriation, but is still more tolerable than prosthesis, metonymic substitute, technical survival [lintrus] (complicates incarnation even more)

p. 221 “a lieu et tient lieu: a lieu tout en tenant lieu, a lieu pour tenir lieu…” [this goes on, Derrida then compares taking the place of to translation, where it is a considerable event in thinking; 356n TN. “thank you”]

pp. 223-24 mechanical technique (esp. machines) as a simulacrum of “sensible”—does not feel itself feel, does not hierarchize the “5 senses”: opens place for metonymic substitution

ATM p. 148 gift of other, debt w/out contract, demands: at the same time, indefinitely equivalent substitution (anonymity) and singularity (rather, absolute uniqueness of proper name)

p. 151 Levinas: psyche as a seed of folly, a psychosis, not an ego (Moi), but me (moi) under assignation—arrachement-à-soi-pour-un-autre (torn-up-from-oneself-for-another)

p. 153 Levinas’ substitution: astriction to giving and extradition of subjectivity to the other

p. 168 Levinas: proximity as responsibility for the Other, and responsibility for the Other as substitution

p. 170 Levinas: the substitution of the hostage discovers the trace

E pp. 23-5 what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of identification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

AD p. 7 Levinas: “responsibility for the other,” “responsibility of the hostage,” an experience of substitution & sacrifice

p. 136n law of substitution, from substitution as law: the 3rd interrupts (distances) w/out interrupting (distancing)

p. 57 hostage: 1) a hôte given/received as a substitute pledge (gage) in places of power, at disposal of sovereign, hospitality w/out property, “accusation by everyone” 2) obsidium, obsidatus—condition of being captive/hostage, a state of siege, “persecuting obsession,” “responsibility for everyone” > acc. both lineages there’s a token of proof (gage) of substitution

pp. 65-6 “Torah before Sinai,” law before event, recognition of Torah by those for whom event of Sinai means nothing? a recognition by some 3rd, that would replace unique w/ unique? > a universal message in election of Israel (humanitarian hospitality uprooted from singularity of event, which becomes empirical, allegorical, “political” in restricted sense)

p. 70 election not restricted to particular place/identity, inseparable from what seems to contest it: substitution

——iterability: replaceability of unique in experience of unicity [see p. 72]

p. 145n acc. Levinas, substitution, the-one-for-the-other (lun-pour-lautre) (inscribed in human fraternity), would be unintelligible for Plato—links this response to his parricide of Parmenides

p. 146n Badaliyasubstitution “as hostages”—Massignon’s persecution resonates, up to a point, w/ Levinas’

p. 83 for Levinas, “substitution,” absolute passivity, “possibility of the impossible” that’s not Heidegger’s death, but the condition of the hostage, responsibility before/beyond death— impossibility of “slipping away (se dérober)”

p. 110 first affection of subject in ipseity: singular as replaceable > substitution announces destiny, subjection (as hôte and hostage), of subjectivity

——unicity (absolute, irrecusable singularity) of face is plural a priori via substitution

pp. 150-51n though Levinas calls substitution of being-host (being-hostage) a sacrificial experience (approach as sacrifice), Derrida wonders if substitution comes “before” sacrifice

CF p. 44 only dead man can forgive—survivor not ready to substitute him/herself (immense, painful experience of survivor)

BSi pp. 50-2 Hobbes’ rage against the liars who appeal (to God) above the sovereign: 1) the lie of immediacy 2) partisans, civil disobedients: place a law above law 3) like the Jews, don’t accept sovereign as lieu-tenant of God > p. 53 [but!] acc. Hobbes, the sovereign mimics God, Christian incarnation; p. 54 lieutenant as suppléant for other along metonymic chain

OG pp. 328-29n Horus, god of writing, has a substitute eye [?], god of death

pp. 339-40n [re: certain interpretation of Rousseau] Derrida wonders if the singularity of each substitution [for Rousseau’s mother] loses significance, each cleavage blurred, when a totalitarian psychoanalysis of existentialist or phenomenological nature claims diffuse, total, sexuality

p. 157 (225-26) Rousseau looks for a supplement to take complete possession of his heart (remplit mon coeur) > a substitute for mother (another girl)

——this sequence of supplements announces necessity of an infinite chain of substitutes: immediacy is derived > that’s what’s inconceivable to reason

p. 215 Rousseau links effacement w/ substitution

p. 314 (443) [beyond good & evil] no more evil (mal) in substitution once one sees it’s a substitution of a substitute

SPEC p. 274 the contractual institution that permits one to say “je-nous” > Freud’s signature engageant et représentant tous les tenants de la théorie: ça marche et fait marcher comme ça [is Derrida speaking about himself too?]

p. 321 an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (dun après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

p. 345 capital front [bobine (Ernst’s spool) as face, cap as head], where PP might be placed out of action > to rout a mastery, so one doesn’t just end up w/ one’s couriers, offspring, lieutenants

SUFFERING

SPOM p. 101 suffering that suffers still more when it no longer recognizes itself in old word [“unemployment”] and scene that word named for so long

SUICIDE

R p. 33 since concept of democracy has always been suicidal, if there is to be a democracy to come must think life otherwise, life and the force of life [contra to Aristotle’s actuality as life?]

***——[re: Algeria] immunize against suicide of democracy by committing the suicide (value of this strategy can neither be confirmed nor refuted)

p. 35 autoimmunity: a murder that becomes suicide, a suicide that becomes murder

p. 45 autoimmunity is suicidal while robbing suicide itself of its meaning and supposed integrity

FWT p. 178 Europe is the most beautiful example of auto-immunity, and allegory, because w/ Europe we see auto-immunity as survival, invincibility as auto-immunity: immense tragedy of a beautiful suicide

DS p. 201 perfect crime (mimed doubly), orgasm, heights of jouissance > leave no trace, (Bataille's laughing at dying, dying of laughter), “supreme spasm” [Wolf Man] > hymen

——masturbatory suicide

SW p. 325 letting other live: absolute suicide, no trace, not even the seal of a break

——not even leave them my ashes

——no longer be oneself or have oneself (sêtre ou savoir) > truth w/out truth looking for me at end of world

——blessing of one who leaves w/out leaving an address

DPi p. 117 Blanchot’s right to death: right to give it, giving it to oneself (en se la donnant), inflicting DP; right to accede to death (not natural) by exceeding natural life > both the right that gives birth to literature and the law that gives birth to the law itself: literature thinks this right of/to right

pp. 218-19 condemned to death: know the date, quasi-suicidal mastery of death, criminals who do everything to give themselves this death (se donner cette mort) > phantasm of omnipotence over their own death

p. 238 coinciding w/ deconstruction of DP, the possibility of a suicide that is neither self-murder nor self-inflicted

pp. 238-39 alleged mastery over limit btwn life/death organizes every calculation btwn dead & living, presupposes ability of giving death, mastering instant of death; calculable credit we grant to “death” indexed to set of presuppositions in which “capital punishment” finds a place of inscription where it’s indissociable from murder & suicide; if we can’t master instant of death, one could neither talk of murder, suicide, DP…

p. 247 can’t share death, must die one by one, if it were possible for 2 people to seek DP together this would be more sacred than marriage

***p. 249 what if no DP would frustrate society’s promise to kill you, to let you kill yourself > a diabolical proposition & formidable

p. 250 to run toward DP, to run toward suicide, to want to have done w/ the other > out of excess hatred/love

REST p. 380 “to suicide” someone —make him come back (le faire revenir) as a ghost (fantôme) or make him stay (le faire rester) as a ghost, où il est, en somme assez bien enterré, ne disposant plus que de ses pas? > pas de revenant, pas de nom [don’t let the dead bury the dead]

PSSS p. 279 btwn killing/suicide: difference infinite & null [cf. DPi p. 249]

C p. 229 feu (sur) le paradigme [TN. fire on the paradigm, late paradigm], fuit, il-fût > suicide paradigm, retrac(t)ing by blowing itself up

TN p. 292 Novalis: only authentic philosophical act is suicide > first kiss and suicide [?]

CIR pp. 284-85 writing w/out believing in one’s survival, in the inheritance of the last will, writing for the present, a made present, like SA wants to make truth: I don’t take my life, je me donne ici la mort

EU p. 19 in 1644, Courcelle’s Latin translation of Discourse of Method doesn’t include Descartes’ “I am speaking French” > when “original” speaks its language by speaking of its language, it prepares a suicide by translation, suicide by fire: almost w/out remainder [tells us about idiomaticity in general]

SPEC p. 356 [Freud’s death drive] autoteleguiding, suicide deferred, wishes to sound its own glas, wishes the impossible > most driven drive is drive of the proper, reappropriate oneself

SUN

GOD p. 93 when Platonism, light or son of Good (invisible source of intelligible visibility) becomes Christian faith (a gaze)

PP p. 82 Plato: sensible sun as offspring of Good

p. 84 one must turn away from the blinding sun toward logos

pp. 97-8 (111) acc. to king, sun, Thoth is a flimflam artist

p. 167 disappearance, retrait of father’s face (good-sun-capital) is movement of differance, which opens to writing, which writing opens for itself, threatens hierarchical interiority of pharmacy

VP p. 89 phoneme is the phenomenon of the labyrinth, soaring up to the sun of presence, it is the path of Icarus

WM pp. 218-19 Saussure: even the sun does not have a fixed value as a signifier; in Mallarmé, we find “fantasmagoric settings of the sun” [due to syntax]

p. 224 “optic metaphor opens up every theoretical point of view under the sun”

pp. 242-43 sun in Plato’s Republic (VI-VII); strangely, Aristotle discusses the power of metaphors when a missing term must be invented > i.e. sun cast forth flame,“sowing around a god-created flame”; Derrida wonders if this is more an “enigma,” secret narrative, asyndeton, than a metaphor

——if, acc. Aristotle, every metaphor is an elliptical comparison or analogy, then the metaphor comparing sun’s flames to sowing seed is metaphor par excellence, an ellipsis of ellipsis

——for Aristotle, proper name is nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, father of all figures > everything turns around it, towards it

——sun’s referent has originality of always being original, unique, irreplaceable

***p. 250 sun turns in metaphor, philosophical metaphor turns toward the sun, flower of rhetoric, un tournesol, heliotrope

——since sensory sun can never be known all metaphors will be im-proper to it

pp. 250-51 sun is the paradigm of sensory and of metaphor: it turns and hides; first because aisthēton, sensory, can always not present itself [sun set], and second because it is exactly w/ metaphor that sensory absents itself: thus all metaphor attempts to describe turning of the sun

——metaphor means heliotrope: turned toward the sun, turning movement of the sun

——if best metaphor is never absolutely good, wouldn’t bad metaphor be the best example?

p. 251[exemplary nature of sun in relation to metaphor] if sun is always metaphorical, it has lustre [Mallarmé], is an artificial construction, always other than itself, emerging from itself (father, eye, seed, fire, egg)

***p. 266 when syntax is subordinated to semantics in concept of metaphor, what else will be found than a return to the same, the sun, the light, same circle, the dominant metaphor of the group, heightened by its power of dissimulation, escaping mastery: God or Sun?

——dominant metaphor, major signified of ontotheleogy: circle of the heliotrope

pp. 268-69 the East is where the sensible sun rises, the sun sets, is interiorized, in heart (eye) of the West

DS p. 208 for Mallarmé, ideality of idea, metaphysical name, is necessary to mark non-being, nonpresent, marks w/out breaking glass, alludes to epekeina tēs ousias: a hymen (closeness & veil) btwn Plato’s sun & Mallarmé’s lustre

BSi p. 291 scene, theater, visibility of autopsy [sovereign]: violence of light > enargeia of seeing, knowing; enargeia: fulguration of sun, can’t look at directly

O p. 54n the point is to work to set up or dismantle a scaffold, a scaffolding (un échafaudage), we need one to substitute, the time of a lapse, Mallarmé’s lustre for Plato’s sun

LG p. 252 lépreuve of a récit brought to light the madness of genre—spinning (faire tourner) Peterson’s genre-disc, comme un soleil fou > dividing borders btwn literature and its others

OG p. 91 heliocentric concept of speech, analogical system: king, father, sun, logos > [ethnocentrism of this concept: all other languages delayed logocentrism]

FV p. 458 psychoanalysis [Freud, Bonaparte] justifies crushing monotony of monosemic truth under heading Wiederholungszwang [i.e. Freud declaring sun another sublimated symbol of father]

SUPPLEMENT

***GOD p. 79 [we are all Abraham in every instant] responsibility and relation of gift of death of each instant

——via tout autre est tout autre & Kierkegaard, supplementary complication upon ethical generality: everyone else asks at every moment to behave as knights of faith

GT p. 77 the mapped-out signified of structuralism, a complementarity w/out supplement that conditions “exercise of symbolic thinking” > this is the rationality of the principle of reason

***p. 80 language elle vole, elle nous souffle, withdraws (soustrait) responsibility it seems to inaugurate, this originary supplementarity extends far beyond language in strict sense to all textuality

p. 98 “another border already divided itself in indefinite abyssal supplements”

FK p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

——these dimensions of self-sacrificial supplementarity, the auto-co-immunity, com-mon auto-immunity, keep community alive, open to something other, more than itself (a spectralizing messiancity beyond all messianism)

p. 100 no alliance of 2 [faith & religion], plus dun at once more than 2: iterability, division at source > supplement introduces incalculable in heart of calculable; pure faith = pure madness

——n + 1 incalculably engenders all supplements: crypt

***LOBL p. 107 Blanchot: survivre, not living maintaining oneself, lifeless, in a state of pure supplement, movement of supplementing life, but stopping (arrêter) the dying, a stopping that doesn’t stop > speak on the arrête (ridge, cutting edge, backbone, fish bone, arris)

p. 108 sur, “on”, the entire enigma of “supplementary logic” [cf. GLAS p. 81r “sur” vs. “dans”]

——survival & revenance, living on & returning from the dead: goes beyond life and death, supplementing each w/ sudden surge, a reprieve

p. 122 reaffirmation, triumph over (sur, hyper), living-on, a supplement of life that is better than life and better than death, better than truth > la Chose par excellence: sur-vérité [see pp. 137-38 la sur-vérité du survivre][Blanchot calls la Chose the event]

p. 139 living on establishes the supplement [is supplement 2nd?], in truth beyond truth (la sur-vérité), supplement of truth w/out truth

POO POO pp. 10-1 responsibility not in ones own name but arises in structure of supplementarity: in my name as the name of the other > singularity quakes in exemplary equivocality of this “as”

SPOM SPOM p. 157 acc. Marx, the ghost effect not only spiritualization, autonomization of spirit, idea, or thought (Hegelian idealism), but also supplementary moment after autonomization, one more simulacrum is added: a body, flesh (Leib)

p. 173 Marx feigns to count ghosts, they are innumberable, and there is but one ghost (already too many, i.e. supplements), it is # itself, the arch-specter as father as capital or Plato’s good

p. 235n the supplement of an internal-external fold, in abyssal fashion, marks the closure or principle of ruin of a philosophy of life, and of subjectivity: si on intégrait à la vie de cette subjectivité vivante le travail de la négativité ou de lobjectivité, les phénomènes ou plutôt les non-phénomènes de la mort, etc., pourquoi sobstiner encore à appeler cela vie?

POOF POOF p. 276 is there a worse jealousy than jealousy of self? is there any other? jealous of one’s very own brother: qui est le plus d’un, le supplément de l’un en trop? [the friend, says Nietzsche’s hermit]

HASD HASD p. 62 sil y avait une expérience purement pure de la prière would one need a supplement? would a theology, a theiology, be possible w/out supplement?

MPM MPM p. 24 fatality (of tropological dislocation) is the law, non-totalization [impossibility of coming into being], the law of the law, that the law takes turns w/, as if it were, its own supplement

SEC SEC p. 313 though representation supplements presence, the general assumption [Condillac] is that writing repairs > a continuous, homogenous modification of presence in representation

PP PP p. 64 “not serious” and “serious” can both add nothing to a text, instead: reading or writing supplement rigorously prescribed > a play, il faut accorder le système de tous ses pouvoirs

p. 73 writing, pharmakon, supplement

p. 83 supplement introduces possibility of the equivocal, dissimulation, deception, lies

p. 89 pure play of traces, supplements w/out transcendental signified, no absolutely external reference, on and on infinitely, is not w/out its own violence

*** pp. 92-3 Thoth supplants and supplements (en le suppléant) its other (father, sun, life, speech, origin or orient); at same time Thoth takes shape from very thing it resists and substitutes for

——Thoth opposes itself, passes into its other > messenger-god is truly god of absolute passage btwn opposites: god of non-identity (if he had identity: coincidentia oppositorum)

p. 102 how can supplementary parasite be excluded by maintaining boundary or triangle?

p. 109 (124) supplement is dangerous because it doesn’t exist (not a simple non-being, its sliding slips it out of alternative presence/absence)

——(125) once there’s a supplement, there’s a supplement of a supplement (this is its structure); Plato fears this fatal entrainment, though it’s linked to eidos as possibility of repetition of same

p. 167 absolute invisibility of origin of visibility, father (good-sun-capital), epekeina tēs ousias, a structure where all presences are supplements substituted for absolute origin

p. 168 no repetition possible w/out graphics of supplementarity, supplies for lack of full unity, being enough the same and enough the other to replace by addition (en ajoutant)

VP VP pp. 74-5 originary supplement of the lack, an originary non-self-presence, supplementarity is differance

p. 75 w/ supplement the for-itself of presence becomes “in the place of (für etwas)” itself; structure of supplement: “a possibility produces by delay that to which it is said to be added”

FSW FSW pp. 211-12 Freud’s supplementarity: unconscious not a code book, nachträglich

——supplement [from Littré]: add what is missing, supply necessary surplus [add plentitude to plenitude]

p. 214 supplementary delay, pathbreaking, subterranean toil, mole-like

DS DS p. 191 internal division w/in mimēsis, double of itself, destined to mime or mask itself, everything played in paradox of supplementary double

p. 226 surprise in writing, supplement, baffling economy of seduction: entre un silence

p. 234 to write that such a movement [practice of spacing, antre ouvert, insertion] plays along a structure of supplementarity, surplus, vicariousness, is, literally, to quote

pp. 234-35 supplement in Mallarmé (not unilateral movement, like in Rousseau, which loses warmth of spoken word): cest lexcès dun signifiant qui, en son dedans, supplée lespace et répète louverture

p. 238 supplementary double will always defy & baffle criticism, always one extra rejoinder, one recess or representation too many, and thus too few

——replication of tissue and a re-folding

p. 248n Aufhebung—most “relevant” way of (re)covering (up) graphics of supplementarity or hymen, le recouvrement le plus séduisant, because most similar > thus, must critique Aufhebung as decisive target, that which obfuscates specificity of “writing operation”

p. 252 in all rigor, supplementary mark is neither metaphor nor metonymy

p. 262 supplementary addition [addiction] enriches itself w/ zeros > racing toward infinity: “more” and “less” are separated/united by next-to-nothing of the hymen

O O p. 52 dissemination also explains itself, “the apparatus explains itself,” constitutes itself into a program (heterogeneity, absolute exteriority of seed), but one that is not formalizable, infinity of its code, sa rupture, not saturated w/ self-presence: “it is attached (tient), so to speak, to the incessant falling of a supplement to the code

p. 53 sense of fulfillment by way of copula (is) means nature is incomplete, needs a book to complete itself: closure of library articulates itself and turns on this hinge (gond): logic, rather graphics, of supplement

REST REST p. 273 temptation to stand shoes upright again, to return them to authentic subject: la structure de la chose et du procès oblige, alors, toujours, à en rajouter (to keep adding to it) > to put back becomes a supplementary retortion, delirious dramaturgy > these shoes are hallucinogenic

p. 302 if clothing for Kant is parergonal what do we make of these unlaced shoes? a “pure” supplement?

p. 368 identification, like attribution, has supplementary/parergonal structure > because demand for reattachment is insatiable, unsatisfied, always making a higher bid, always starts out again

PIO PIO p. 44 supplementarity introduces (into structure of psyche) the fabulous repetition, a crossing of chance & necessity, bending performative rules while respecting them: allows other to come, or announce’s its coming, in dehiscence’s opening > deconstruction

AFR AFR pp. 91-2 after Condillac admits he had to take great detours, Derrida explains that the sign is the name of this detour, experience itself as detour, generation of suppléance to be retraced

p. 99 acc. Condillac, theoretical is only a supplying remark (remarque suppléante) of the practical

pp. 101-02 operation of suppléance (supplementation or supplying) produces overabundance & frivolous futility

p. 132 for Condillac, repetition and absence of perceptual present to itself: gap or deviation of time > opens representative vection [desire] w/in sign & idea: suppléance as representation

HST HST p. 413 at heart of logic of substitution/supplement there’s apparently a crossing of natural reproduction & technological reproducibility, natural series & institutional deviation, natural filiation & adoption as legal fiction > unless this logic threatens/ruins opposition nature/institution

C C p. 224 supplement of consequence contains everything, including abyss

LI LI pp. 99-100 another parasitic/fictional structure can always be added, “supplément de code” > everything becomes possible against the language-police

——never be able to de-limit object-fiction/object-parasite except by another counter-fiction

p. 100 or, or rather, even parentheses, i.e. “citation (iterability)” > not genus/species, not identity, classical logic fractured in its code, parasitic contamination entame all these relations, which is why words have to be qualified, supplemented by others

p. 103 inner purity & exterior supplement—this is myth itself (mythology of a logos)

TN TN p. 223 one should take the technical supplement into account

pp. 234-37 leibhaftig as incarnate? does Leib have flesh? > what about machine-bodies, technical supplements, which are both Körper and Leib [p. 361n Derrida points to his early work on Husserl]

BSi BSi p. 184 truth of bêtise: upping ante, denying it (hyperbolically), always adds a supplement of bêtise

OG OG p. 314 (443) impossibility of designating supplement escapes metaphysics by a hairsbreadth (par une pointe), “elle doit pour le reste puiser ses ressources dans la logique quelle déconstruit

EU EU p. 80 for Schelling, man is tasked w/ supplementing, complementing, the world’s manifestation (eine Ergänzung der Welterscheinung) > develop God’s revelation, which is lacking: this is called translation, it is the destination of the university

SPEC SPEC p. 322 inscription of a subject in his [Freud’s] text is also condition of the performance/pertinence of a text, beyond empirical subjectivity, supposing that could exist as soon as one writes, substitutes, supplements: notion of truth incapable of accounting for this performance

FV FV pp. 490-92 [re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

SUPPLEMENT (ROUSSEAU

OG pp. 144-46 (207-10) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] writing as supplement, sajouter, suppléant, mediocre makeshift (pis-aller) [translated elsewhere as stopgap], surplus, plenitude added to plenitude, stranger, evil, fills a void

——supplement as adjunct, subaltern instance that tient-lieu, becomes dangerous when representation claims to be presence/sign of thing itself

——Nature doesn’t supplement herself, self-sufficient, no substitute for a mother’s love

——Rousseau: dividing of the mother’s right (nursing another woman’s child rather than one’s own is evil), [writing as substitute for mother], forcing her to see her child love another, every evil follows from this, whole moral order is disturbed

——yet, Rousseau advocates a kind of natural supplement w/ culture, a suppléance > habit, pedagogy, both necessary & insufficient to reconstitute wholeness of mother nature

——childhood first call for suppléance, first manifestation of deficiency, pedagogy crudely shows the paradox of supplement

p. 147 (211) the scandal: sign becomes force, supplement as acting through hands of other, sign now moves the world

***pp. 148-49 (212-14) society as a furnace, man rummages the entrails (fouille les entrailles) of the earth, blindness to plants, nature, mother, moving from blindness to the supplement is the law, we can’t make supplement emerge from its shadow > we speak its reserve (nous en disons la réserve)

p. 149 (214) reason can’t think (and thus constituted by) this double infringement: there’s a lack in Nature and because of that very fact something is added to it, the supplement as image & representation of nature, image neither in nor out [Aristotle’s “neither for nor against”]

p. 150 (215) Derrida not looking for a truth signified in Rousseau but an engagement and appurtenance “qui enserrent dans le même tissu, le même texte, lexistence et lécriture”—same [text, tissue] is here called supplement, another name for differance

——Rousseau: “suppléer en gagnant de vitesse sur lexperience,” dangerous habit of supplementing by out-distancing experience

p. 151 (216) [Rousseau] masturbation pleasure irremediable loss of vital substance > exposure to madness & death

——for Rousseau, danger of image, imaginary seduction, in writing & masturbation, “fatal advantage (funeste avantage)” > the supplement that “trompe (cheats) la nature

p. 151 (216-17) slow place of pedagogy, Nature takes her time, outpaced by immediacy of dangerous supplement which burns the halting points (brûle les étapes), consumes lénergie sans retour

p. 152 (217) Rousseau: all evil caused because mothers shirk their duty as mothers

——Rousseau: I only felt strength of attachment to my mother, when I no longer saw her

p. 152 (219) dangerous supplement inconceivable to reason: no longer diverting total enjoyment toward a substitute, but experiencing it or miming it directly and in its totality [not kissing the bed to get close to Mamma, but conjuring the presence of Mamma]

p. 153 (221) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] masturbation, contingent evil, model of perversion: summon absent beauties, one corrupts oneself by oneself (on s’altère soi-même)

pp. 153-54 (221) restitution of presence by language: symbolic/immediate, se passe de passer par le monde: touching is touched, jouissance not deferred: auto-affection se donne pour autarcie pure, it does not wait (nattend pas) > but, auto-affection pure speculation, present delivered is chimera, the no longer deferred is absolutely deferred: acc. Rousseau, sign/image/representation sont des illusions qui donnent le change (sidetrack us) [differance w/out delay]

p. 154 (221-22) Rousseau’s pernicious habit of donner la change [satisfying his wants, sidetracking, giving money]

——supplement is maddening, it breaches/broaches (entame) our pleasure and our virginity [hymen]

pp. 154-55 supplement not only procures an absent presence, it distances, masters, protects: supplement transgresses and à la fois respects interdict (acc. to play/difference of forces)

p. 155 (223) for Rousseau, as dangerous as the supplement is, cohabitation w/ women is even more dangerous, “jouir!” another name for death

pp. 155-56 for Rousseau, auto-eroticism (preference for sign) as protection from mortal expenditure; use of dangerous supplement morally redeemable > hurts only me

p. 157 (225-26) Rousseau looks for a supplement to take complete possession of his heart (remplit mon coeur) > a substitute for mother (another girl)

——this sequence of supplements announces necessity of an infinite chain of substitutes: immediacy is derived > that’s what’s inconceivable to reason

p. 157 (226) Rousseau: no intermediary btwn everything & nothing, must substitute

p. 163 supplement as chain itself, theory of textuality, en abyme, structural necessity of abyss, desire of presence born in abyss

——supplement itself is exorbitant, in every sense of the word

——deconstruction: relate founding categories of metaphysics to the supplement

pp. 163-64 (234) concept of supplement as blind spot (tache aveugle) in Rousseau: the not seen that opens & limits visibility

——that we know this now a priori: not a knowledge at all

p. 165 (235-36) supplement/onanism: contournent un danger et réservent une dépense > in spite & thanks to them, we’re authorized to see the sun, the light that keeps us on surface of mine [see pp. 148-49 furnace, blindness]

——w/ 2 supplements (writing, onanism), auto-affection manifests by leaving a trace of itself in the world, exteriority of space, touchant-touché admits the world as 3rd party, here jouissance and se-donner-une-présence welcome the other in small difference separating lagir du pâtir (doing from suffering)

p. 166 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] writing: 1) effort to symbolically reappropriate presence 2) consecrates dispossession that had already dislocated parole

p. 167 (237-38) masturbation & writing totally indistinguishable inasmuch as each puts into play (met en jeu) the presence of the present, the life of the living

——logocentrism demands their difference

——exclusion of the supplement, of addition, can only function if one deems it pure [i.e. simple exteriority, pure addition] > for logocentric MOP addition is nothing, can’t add to full presence (being, essence, eidos, ousia)

p. 167 (238) origin/nature as myth of addition, supplementarity annulled by being purely additive > myth of the effacement of the trace

——originary differance is supplementarity as structure: irreducible complexity of shifting play of absence/presence: metaphysics produced by it, doesn’t think it: writing is a representation of trace, trace itself does not exist > place of decision now hidden, but still indicated

pp. 168-70 (239-42) acc. Rousseau & Duclos [via Lévi-Strauss’ tribe w/out writing], degradation of politics/community caused by degradation of language—bad pronunciation, shortened words, caused by capital, aristocracy: speech of the assembly dispossessed from the people by written law (from Rome & Greece to empires of great distance)

pp. 173-74 (247-48) Rousseau contra Hobbes: pity/compassion is a natural law (beasts have it too), mother’s law, law of the (soft) voice, pity “takes the place of” instituted law, supplements law [though it works the other way around too]; mother’s law, written in our hearts by God > natural writing, writing of heart—not reason, before reason: writing (of reason) is w/out pity, transgresses law of voice, a perverse passion

pp. 174-75 (248-49) for Rousseau, first there is self-love (lamour de soi) [not unnatural lamour-propre], and then love of the (m)other > pity is a suppléant, which can be supplanted by law/society

——pity protects man, vir, homo against love of woman, against the becoming (child becoming-man, mother becoming-woman) that is the great substitution > pity saves virility

p. 175 (250) for Rousseau, amorous passion perversion of natural pity—limits our attachment to a single person

pp. 175-76 (250) jealousy, a creation of culture, an arresting of nature by woman, stratagem of femininity > invention of culture denatures pity [which should reach out to every living thing]

——jealousy marks the gap btwn pity/love

pp. 176-77 (251-52) Rousseau: woman’s commands are caresses, her threats are tears, she manages the commander

——women turn men into women, but the contest (partie) is not equal, perhaps most profound signification du jeu de la supplémentaire

pp. 178-79 perverse substitution as historicity itself or as degradation w/in history? doesn’t the former imply the latter? doesn’t concept supplement permit both interpretations?

p. 179 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] history also protects/resists abyss of evil > “moral love” (which is immoral, acc. Rousseau) becomes modesty (true morality of women)

p. 180 acc. Rousseau, God gave man reason and woman modesty to supplement (a lack = an excess), restrain, guide natural inclinations, & God gave a bonus (praemium) too, a recompense, reward [for correct usage of supplement], a supplement to the supplement [Christianity]

p. 181 acc. Rousseau, “moral love” not biology but power of imagination > all depravity of culture related to possession of women (movement of preference/difference)

p. 182 imagination, for Rousseau, is more proper to man than reason > pity is born of imagination

p. 183 (260) imagination inaugurates perfectibility & liberty [whereas animal sensibility is passive, fixed] > activates pity

——the dangerous differance, the master name of this supplementary series: death > metonymic substitution horizon & source, abyss from which each threat announces itself

p. 184 (261) imagination belongs to same chain of signification as anticipation of death, is le rapport à la mort > both imagination & death are representative and supplementary (dispossession)

——for Rousseau, proper of man is fear of death

p. 186 (264-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] cet être-dans-la-nature a donc le mode dêtre étrange du supplément: lêtre-dans makes classical logic tremble

p. 187 (266) metaphysics rethinks/conceals supplementarity as accomplishment of dynamis/virtuality, substituting pure history for pure play > supplement permits & escapes this thought

pp. 199-200 for Rousseau, origin as beginning of end, inaugural decadence, separation btwn song & speech: growth of music parallels writing as “dangerous supplement” > gradual forgetting (of voice of nature) usurps, separates, deprives: re-placement as effacement by forgetting

p. 201 (287) Rousseau: philosophy ensured separation of speech & music > Rousseau tries to efface the toujours-déjà of spacing by calling it a catastrophic event: the birth of philosophy out of Greek tragedy (the perfection of grammar of song)

p. 201-02 all Rousseau’s figures of evil occur in move from Greece to Rome (articulation over accentuation, no small city, consonant over vowel, northern over southern, capital over province)

pp. 202-03 [re: Rousseau] strange unrepresentable infinite movement of circles of degradation: each brings us back to a more secret nature (new loss w/ new defense): neither horizon nor abyss, one cannot represent this infinity > the relation of representation (spacing) to original presence

p. 203 w/ song, the living arts, outside imitates the inside, “paints” passions, is expressive; w/ inanimate arts, reproduction of the outside on the outside [painting?] > both externalize

pp. 203-04 for Rousseau, art and mimesis are disastrous (supplement) & emergence from inanimate, expression of passion

p. 204 (291) for Rousseau, child can’t relate to separated signifier, child will spontaneously donner la change, doesn’t treat largent pour largent > no relation to sign for itself, no fetish

——perverse use of signifier permitted & tolerated by imitation

p. 208 [if art is moralism prior to sensation, by way of sign], attention to signifier degrades art by separating signifier’s effectiveness from the signified it signifies; supplement signifies nothing

p. 211 for Rousseau, the rational privileging of harmonics over melody is a fault of the heart not reason [i.e. the heart moves toward reason]

pp. 213-14 corruptive principle linked to spacing [writing]; Rousseau includes originarity of lack that necessitates supplement (i.e. harmony supplements melody, color supplements design) w/out making it explicit > “work of contraband”

p. 216 (309) orientation is a disorientation, the structure of language; Rousseau’s geography of language: oriented toward its origin comme à son orient > occident as la fin, la chute, la cadence, léchéance, la mort, la nuit

pp. 216-17 (310-11) Rousseau would like absolute origin of language to be absolute south > instead, he describes (against his wishes) a turning of language, language is sown (semées), a structure, a system of oppositions

——axis of reference [North or South] traces inside of each language

p. 218 (312) Rousseau’s morphological classification of language: typology linked to topology (place of origin) [North/South: need/passion]

p. 219 supplement even in savage man: dédommagé (indemnified) by faculties as a supplement for what he lacks [culture?]

p. 221 (315) Rousseau’s 3 needs of man: 1) conservation 2) bien-être: sexual appetites 3) public opinion

p. 223 for Rousseau, only Europe can be itself & everything else at same time [re: language/society], pedagogical success & ethnological humanism have good fortune to appear in Europe

——Derrida says Rousseau simply wrong for not using this universal opening en fait

Rousseau introduces a btwn (entre), a median btwn north & south to think difference? or to access nondifference? [North/South: 2 poles of language: North: aidez-moi; South aimez-moi]

——pedagogical success & ethnological humanism appear in Europe

p. 224 absolute North is death, need usually isolates men—in North it begins society: what was needed was not énergie but clarity, work replaces passion, represses desire

p. 225 force of need/work turns song into articulation: Northerner fights against force of death w/ another force of death [economy of death]; liberated passion impossible in North

p. 226 (321-22) writing in North, cold, reasoning, turned toward death, tour de force, detour of force qui sefforce à garder la vie > history effaces vowel accent, extends power of writing

——Rousseau: to judge Orientals from books, to paint a portrait of corpse > oriental corpse is in the book, ours is already in our speech

——for Rousseau, to cancel (biffer) accent in speech produces a supplement (articulation)

pp. 226-27 (322) via Rousseau, a written accent, “il ny a là quun fard (makeup) dissimulant le cadavre de laccent,” writing hides language, masks the already decomposed corpse of language

p. 227 (323) Rousseau fascinated by the copyist, produces sign of signs, always tempted to add supplementary signs to improve restitution of original—the good copyist must resist [baby daddy]

——punctuation best example of nonphonetic mark in the interior of writing > its impotence re: accent isolates proper misery of writing

p. 229 (326) Rousseau declares what he wishes to say: writing/articulation are post-originary malady; he describes what he does not wish to say: articulation (space of writing) at origin of language

——what he describes takes place for better or worse, annuls eschatology & teleology just as differance (originary articulation) annuls archeology

pp. 231-32 Rousseau struggling to determine which invented which: langue ou société

p. 232 (330-31) Rousseau’s 2 ways (moyens) pour agir sur les sens de lautre (to act on the senses of others): le mouvement et la voix

——movement is immediate by touch or mediated by gesture

pp. 233-34 (332-33) mute sign is sign of liberty when it is immediate, no detour, no anonymity (the expresser and expressed are properly present), mute sign is sign of slavery when re-presentative mediacy invades system (abyss of circulation sans fin, no one there for anyone, not even himself) > presuming speech opened this abyss, Rousseau tempted to return to archeological moment of sign w/out speech

p. 234 (333) for Rousseau, the wand (la baguette) that traces w/ so much pleasure does not fall outside the body (ne tombe pas hors du corps)

pp. 234-35 (334) le mouvement de la baguette este riche de tous les discours possible mais aucun discours ne peut le reproduire sans lappauvrir et le déformer—movement of the wand is a substitute (supplée) for all discourse that, at a greater distance, would substitute itself for it [how, for Rousseau, writing will correct speech if it doesn’t precede it]

——graphic supplementarity is origin which separates gesture & parole in the city

p. 237 (337) Rousseau [sometimes] places hieroglyphic, passionate langue before speech, a writing that is proximate and present, he praises this savage writing—traces like the wand (baguette), un dessin dans lespace (writing)

pp. 237-38 [review of Rousseau] voice immediacy, hieroglyphic immediacy, in and out of nature: [double bind of] need & passion, Rousseau describes une différance supplémentaire [writing/pity]

p. 238 (339) Rousseau’s first allusion to writing (movement of magic wand [baguette], hieroglyph) holds itself out of reach of all distinction (all difference of need from passion)

——lorigine métaphorique de la parole ouvre un oeil au centre de la langue—visibility inscribed in the birth of voice is not purely perceptive, it signifies: writing is the eve of speech

——writing had to appear before a question of speech [?]: need before need

p. 239 [here] Rousseau privileges writing [?]: speech draws its energy from oral picto-hieroglyphics, from the visible (which has been compared to death)

——Rousseau: feigned misfortunes touch more than real ones, we cry at theater but not at other’s sufferings

p. 239 (340) Rousseau cannot declare unity of the advantage of writing (l’intérêt d’écrire), can only describe it in contraband: writing–need, speech–passion

p. 242 (345) for Rousseau, convention pulls language beyond/out of the cry (arrache la langue au cri) w/ consonants, tenses (i.e. articulation): language born out of its own degeneration

pp. 242-43 (345) complexity of zero degree, origin, nothing but a point in the system of supplementarity? [despite what he declares, nothing Rousseau writes authorizes simple origin]

——history of language as history du supplément dorigine

p. 244 (346) Rousseau tries to describe a language not yet corrupted by articulation, supplementarity, convention > time of that language: mythic limit btwn déjà and pas-encore

***pp. 244-45 (347-48) supplementarity is nothing, not absence, presence, not essence/substance of man: it’s the opening of play (jeu) btwn presence/absence, dislocation of proper of man, the impossibility and thus the desire for proximity to self (pure presence)

——supplement extends beyond man: man calls himself man by drawing limits (excluding other): purity of nature, madness, divinity, childhood

——approach to limits (madness, divinity, childhood, animality, etc.) feared as threat of death & desired as life w/out differance: truth-value of these limit concepts only has meaning w/in closure of game (clôture du jeu), they belong to an epoch of supplementarity

p. 245 (348) must be death via grapheme before phoneme: word & thing are referential limits produced/marked by supplementarity

pp. 245-46 (349) [excluded 3rd defied by supplement] incompatibles brought together [Freud’s dream interpretation] [double bind]: Rousseau affirms both that which constructs via articulation (passion, language, society, man) & that which is canceled by it (accent, life, energy, passion) [passion both prior to supplement & supplemental] > Rousseau dissociates these contradictions while allowing an intact purity (une pureté inentameé) to both negative & positive

——Rousseau says what he doesn’t wish to say: graphics of supplementarity is not comprised in any dialectic (a concept governed by horizon of presence, eschatological parousia, parole pleine)

p. 247 (350-51) Rousseau looks for a limit “being born (naissante)”: childhood, God, pure language w/out supplement—alibi, in illo tempore

pp. 247-49 (351-53) [Artaud-like fantasy in Rousseau?] breath (of God), neume, superhumanity, not on the way to humanity (like child), body w/out organs, w/out spacing, pure presence w/ jouissance, inarticulate enough for jouissance de soi to remain uncorrupted by alterity

——for Rousseau, the child has no language because he/she has only one (one organ) > child sometimes on side of humanity, sometimes on side of animality

pp. 249-50 (354) heart as organ of pure presence is not an organ, not inscribed w/in system of differences

p. 250 (354-55) jouissance—pure presence to self-auto-affection accorded to God; interior, homogenous, no relation w/ object, welcomes no mortal difference

pp. 250-51 (355) acc. Rousseau, God distributes dédommagements man receives—il est la dispense du supplément (God is the exemption from, dispensation of, the supplement) (presence: utopia)

p. 251 (356) Rousseau declares point-zero, but describes…

p. 252 (357) Rousseau knows all factual illustrations of primitive presence are fictive [?], could care less about the facts

p. 253 (358) Rousseau of Essay describes the presque society, subtle passage from origin to genesis; in Discourse he lays out a radical virgin origin > these 2 “origins” complement each other

p. 255 (360) impossible to describe continuity, passage, from inarticulate to articulate, pure nature to culture, plenitude to play of supplementarity > Rousseau attempts to reconcile (concilier) the 2 times after describing the birth, the being-born, of supplement

p. 255 (361) Rousseau’s “catastrophic” birth of supplement prescribed by chain of concepts

p. 256 (362) causality of rupture, both exterior & natural [Rousseau beautifully describes the bridge]

p. 256 (363) [in Rousseau’s archeo-teleology] origin & end are inertia

***pp. 258-59 for Rousseau, only philosophy can think catastrophic factum, which history (historians) can’t; passage can’t be explained structurally; chance, the “surprising,” not part of system, a free & mythic invention

p. 259 (366) passage from nature to society can’t be described by alternative genesis/structure; advent of supplementarity as natural catastrophe neither in nor out of nature [Aristotle]: nonrational origin of reason

pp. 259-60 (367) for Rousseau, what never should have arrived, did [i.e. the supplement]; for Plato, for all onto-theology, meaning put out of play (le sens est mis hors jeu) in condemnation of art > Rousseau does not affirm (play/game of) writing but resigns himself to it

——society born by accident to repair the accidental catastrophe (Fall) [birth of supplement] of nature

p. 260 for Rousseau, man’s work, the “hand,” can hold back degradation of nature [by supplementary operation]

p. 261 (369) [summary of Rousseau’s North/South oppositions]

p. 262 (371) Rousseau: cradle of nations, first fires of love born at water wells; p. 267 “well of oath” in Genesis XXI

pp. 262-63 (371-72) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] no opposition applied to passage btwn state of nature & state of society, to becoming-present of presence (a lasting passage like the present in Reveries): a supplementarity, festival (fête), w/out jeu; moment of festival: pure continuity > society formed morrow of festival (indifference of pleasure & desire): de la danse à la loi

p. 269 writing threatens song, poem, epic—w/ death

p. 270 (381) obsessive pressure of writing from where it’s held in check, such is the history of metaphysics > obstinate effort to cancel writing : threatens presence, proper, parole

—becoming-language of cry > loss of paroles plenitude (hollows out in articulating itself)

p. 271 for Rousseau, language’s mother is passion, originarily metaphorical, thus need [contra passion] (light, clarity) operates after origin, pro-regresses by mastering, effacing the figure

p. 273 Rousseau: need–gestures, passion–words [?]

p. 274 need as dispersion, as law of spacing, natural effect of needs separated man > culture the effect of an attempted reconciliation [need closer to nature, passion is purer language?]

——need explains eve of society and explains society’s extension, how it distributes/differentiates itself in space

pp. 275-76 (390-91) [vis-à-vis Rousseau’s distinction btwn literal/metaphor] if speech doesn’t pass through reference to object, instead producing sign via literalization of passion, literal expression remains a metaphor preceded by nothing, opening an exchange to the outside: no literal meaning precedes it, no rhetor watches over (surveille) it

p. 277 (392) for Rousseau, though poet lacks objective truth of object, he comes closer to authenticity/literalness than rhetor/writer > poet speaks from origin of his passionate speech

pp. 277-78 (392-93) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] absolute fear as original encounter w/ other as other, 1st passion, la face derreur de la pitié

p. 278 (393-94) for Rousseau, fear induces magnification that makes man speak [cf. 351n Vico]; [repetition of instrumental fear: aidez-moi (Northern need)] anguish & repetition

p. 279 (396) proper noun (name) & infinite present as origin > degradation in their separation

pp. 279-80 (396-97) neume, epoch of natural languages: fête autour du point deau, temps de lIsle de Saint-Pierre [?]: limage fixant ce qui ne fut quun point de pur passagela limite toujours déjà franchie, rèpere absolu

——“to supplant/compensate for (suppléer)” defines writing, adds itself to presence, defers it in indestructible desire to rejoin it

p. 280 (397) for Rousseau, present is always the presence of a jouissance, jouissance always the welcoming of presence > language (anxious research of learning): the spacing btwn 2 jouissances

pp. 282-83 theory of sensible origin of ideas (attention > imagination > pictogram), Cartesian critique of Leibnizian rationalism: no intact theological, metaphysical base

——sensible origin coincides w/ concept of sign as original sin > if experience is relation w/ plenitude, sign always a sign of the fall [Husserl, Hegel, ontotheology]

——model of Fall (Platonic or Judeo-Christian) can only be stated w/in common closure

p. 284 (402-03) [re: certain historical interpretation of writing, Condillac, Warburton] linear progress of writing (quantitative condensation) > from one unique sign for each thing (not even signification but presence) to less ornamental, more economical, more attention to signified

p. 285 (404) history of knowledge as desacralizaiton of signifier: history only conceivable btwn absolute pictograph & graphic expense reduced to presque rien

p. 291 (411) Rousseau broke w/ linear genesis

p. 292 (412) via Rousseau, from pure painting to allegorical painting: on transporte la chose dans son double (dans une idéalité) > representation always other

——original possibility of the image is the supplement

p. 292 (413) writing as painting is evil and remedy, pharmakon, zoographeme betrays being & speech, freezes (fige) them > writing as representation (painting) of la bête chassée: capture et meurtre magiques

——that writing carries death, Rousseau would agree w/out reservation

p. 293 (414) [Rousseau’s system summarized]

pp. 294-95 (416) [necessity of writing] to think writing as accidental, as chance, is to ignore lappel de suppléance and to think evil as exterior, therefore effaceable addition

p. 295 (416) should (devrait) is the mode and tense (temps) of the teleological/eschatological anticipation that surveils Rousseau’s discourse

p. 295 (416-17) for Rousseau, in writing the worst is simultaneously the best: total alienation is total reappropriation of presence to itself > Rousseau: “plus de force pour conserver ce quon a

p. 296 (417-18) representation dispossesses, re-presents, wrenches presence from itself

——naiveté of MOP: to see representation as restorative

p. 298 (421) “labîme, cest le creux qui peut rester ouvert entre la défaillance de la nature et le retard du supplément” [abyss as delay, hollow, open]; pure law restores (gives back to people) liberty, gives back to presence its sovereignty [sutures abyss], pure law a supplement of supplement

pp. 298-99 (421-22) though Rousseau doesn’t make “travail de la mort,” play of difference, & operation of negativity serve in dialectical accomplishment of Hegel’s truth w/in horizon of parousia > still, a horizon of infinite restitution of presence [in Rousseau]

p. 300 (424-25) money/phonetic writing both substitute an anonymous supplement for the thing

——both open an aggression against the life they make circulate

pp. 300-01 (425-26) Rousseau’s 2 poles [of original mute writings]: pure pictograph, pure phonograph (presence to thing, presence to voice) [p. (428) “excès qui se touchent”] > signifier effaces itself for signified in both cases

pp. 303-04 (428-29) acc. Rousseau, Leibniz’s pure algebra, universal writing of science, total break from langue parlée, would be absolute evil, alienation > Rousseau: “la lettre tue

***——supplement has no presence, does not precede from itself, alway the supplement of a supplement

p. 304 (430) for Rousseau, theater worked by profound evil of representation (Darstellung—put there before), luxury, fine clothes, adornment (parure), dissipation

p. 307 (433) for Rousseau, fête w/out object, sans masques, sans dépense, sans sacrifice: no play if play is exchange of presence/absence, chance & absolute risk > fête represses relation to death

p. 309 (436) for Rousseau, imagination irritates/ravages desire, representation (North, winter, death) as danger of supplement—whose efficiency is of the imagination

***p. 313 (442) originary supplement can’t be thought classically—no ontology can think it

SURFACE (SUPERFICIAL) [fixerup]

GT p. 94 reader is not deceived [like narrator], experiences a secret w/out depth, a secret w/out secret

pp. 148-49 not probing soul of literary character, merely analyzing semantic and intentional possibility of utterances, such as they are readable on surface itself

p. 152 [no depth beyond literary phenomenon] inviolability of secret depends on essential superficiality, bare device of being-two-to-speak (lêtre-deux-à-parler), a secret beyond reserve of technique, thing, being, thing thought (same could be said for money)

***p. 170 secret of literature has no depth, no interiority, spread on the surface of the page, non-psychological structure, not subjective though responsible for most radical effects of subjectivity, a post card, a bank note, a “letter of credit” [see LOBL p. ~101, &

SUBJECTILE

]

OOG pp. 99-100 “the equivocity of expression is the chosen field for sedimentary deposits,” sedimentations obliterate sense only insofar as there are surfaces available for this [?]

MPM p. 87n when de Man quotes Mallarmé’s “this shallow calumniated stream called death” from “Tomb of Verlaine” (signatory of epitaph always writes on his own tomb), Derrida tells us genealogy of genitives cannot be broken by cenotaph or cremation: the tomb of Verlaine of Mallarmé of Paul de Man

MSUB J p. 158 subjectile is everything distinct from form, from sense & representation, skin w/holes for pores [Irigaray] > “its presumed depth can only be seen like surface,” a flat succubi

VM p. 90 [Derrida on Levinas’ method] uses philosophy’s own light to reveal that philosophy’s surface is severely cracked (lézardes), that its solidity is its rigidity > progresses along cracks, negates negations, neither/nor, poetic force of metaphor a trace of this wounding of language

PP p. 119 (136) Socratic irony doesn’t bring pharmakon in contact with transparent logos, but reverses its powers, retourne la surface, reveals impropriety of pharmakon, that it can always turn against itself

***pp. 127-28 pharmakon, forever in reserve, no fundamental profundity or locality; it infinitely promises itself and vanishes into a labyrinth

PAS PAS pp. (50-1) Blanchot unleashes what Witz contains or denies, a transparent, neutral, impassive surface of language of writing, beyond/before les lignes de rupture ou de front (psychoanalysis, literature, philosophy, political practice/thought)

p. (85) sans remarks same X w/out annuling; a springless spring, re-trait, leaves everything in tact, safe, unharmed, on the surface, at the same time it has abducted, erased

FSW p. 212 for Freud, consciousness—surface exposed to external world

p. 224 Mystic Pad depth w/out bottom, stratification of surfaces, whose interior is a similarly exposed surface, perfectly superficial exteriority open to incision of scratch

p. 226 writing unthinkable w/out repression > Freud uses metaphor of censorship, writing as vigilance [neither permanent contact] & failure [nor permanent break] of censorship

pp. 227-28 Freud’s Writing Pad (machine) can’t run of itself (like living memory of Plato), a dead complexity w/out depth, multiplicity of layered surfaces

——“life as depth belongs only to the wax of psychical memory,” Plato’s mnemic writing

F p. xxxv “conservative” repression installs in the unconscious what the Self treats as an exquisite corpse, a “surrealism” of folded sentences loses its creases, the paper flattens out, and there is a spot (lieu) of pleasure disguised as pain, which the therapist must exhume

p. xlii [re: Wolf Man’s cryptonomic translations] phonetic contaminations, nonsemantic associations, neither rhetorical figures nor metonymic displacements > but angular: contact (semantic or formal) w/ surface of its allosemes acc. most economical line/surface; angles make itinerary unreadable, makes cryptonomic the once inflexible logic of castration

DS p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

***p. 281n opposition btwn metaphor & metonymy is purely semantic—deconstructed by superficial, profound, that is abyssal operation of versification (vers, verssensvers, versus, verre), morcelante et reconstituante (hiver, pervers, envers, travers, vertige, rêve)

p. 285 désertant toute profondeur, chacune de ses faces est aussi, après coup, tout le dé [each surface, once die is cast, is the whole of it]

OS pp. 41-2 space becomes concrete by retaining/restoring negative w/in itself, by negating itself

——1st negative determination of space is the POINT (the place that does not take place), it then negates itself in relation the LINE > als sich aufhebend, point is the line, the Being-spatial of point > then comes the PLANE (surface) > each next stage only made of the negated prior stage, i.e. line made of negated points

ROP ROP p. 74 “one must” begin by listening to the canon, speaking the language of the patient, necessity of finding surface of manifest meaning > avant de et pour déstabiliser

SP SP pp. 57-9 via Nietzsche, woman believes in superficiality of existence, disguising pudendum, nothing more than affair of modesty, decency > “truth” nothing but a surface, becomes desirable by way of veil; suspend the veil, or let it fall differently, no longer truth, only “truth”

***pp. 115-19 Heidegger’s abyssal structure of the proper, at once superficial & bottomless (since not fundamental), the proper founders, passes into the other

ATIA ATIA pp. 38-9 [from S] the animal-machine that gnaws at the surface of a text, the crossing-out of Being, of traces, a figure of evil, the virus in Derrida’s own writings

FS FS p. 5 panoramagram (image of structuralist instrument): obtain on flat surface, depth of objects on horizon > one can glance at field divested of its forces

RGE RGE p. 259 w/ Hegel, negative is reassuring other surface of the positive

REST REST p. 264 point does not bring foot in contact w/ a surface, doesn’t spread out on a surface (the soles, the ground)—surface is lower than the foot, goes lowest (Derrida’s never examined this)

pp. 265-66 when shoes no longer have strict relation avec un sujet porteur ou porté—they’re the lightened, anonymous, voided support (but so much the heavier abandoned à son inertie opaque) “of an absent subject whose name haunts the open form”

——never completely open, the shoe maintains a form, that of the foot > describes external surface or envelope of what is called a “form” [Derrida quotes from Littré, where “form” is wood in shape (figure) of foot, then he links figure to face—Shapiro sees Van Gogh’s in “his” shoes]

p. 284 the pas de contact (pas de sujet) of Van Gogh’s shoes, a detachment whose reattachment is sought in its fundamental surface, the sole, or the fundamental subjectivity of the ground

——pas de contact, rhythmically, makes marche, pas is not present nor absent

pas works (marche) badly w/out a pair

D D p. 290 Soller’s Numbers is exemplary re: the reader, cette fois enfin, the text shows (montrée) that a reader cannot choose his/her place in a text > does so by composing surfaces retournées & par une mise en scène matérielle exacte

p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, only 1/ 4 surfaces donnant lieu to moment of visibility, de la présence en vis-à-vis (face-to-face), counting out the phenomenon > surface is mounted (montée)

p. 295 passage toward other, se resserrer (fitting itself) into the angles btwn the surfaces, dans l’entre-surface [inter(sur)face] > articulation of one surface sur l’autre (d’un temps sur l’autre)

——Derrida’s text: re-marks passage [in Soller’s], repeats square by closing angle, opens another surface of writing to-come: play w/ cardo, hinge, cardinal points; remarque d’angle: all lines broken

p. 299 by a folding-back (reploiement) or internal angle of surface: face (frons scaenae) contemplates itself as unconditioned opening of appearance, but explains itself as surface-effect, as conditioned [by square apparatus]

p. 307 opening of presence, “dead surface,” 4th surface, plunged by its “history” into limitless time that is neither “present” nor a “history”

p. 312 Soller’s open square: open side, air, mirror, veil

p. 313 Soller: single sheet gives sensation of depth, representation, reflection

p. 314 mercury, tain of this ink: a screen: visible projection surface for images, & prevents one from seeing other side

p. 316 each part of mirror larger than whole (mirror smaller than itself): 4th surface paradigm of this relation

——the inside of text will always have been outside it; reciprocal contamination of body proper, violent expatriation, poison affirmed—mercury in its tain is a poison

p. 327 “I” as surface vacant of itself: foments (prepares a poison) cruel dispossession > reaches simulacrum point: où il peut à la fois teindre le tissu (stains the tissue) et feindre to tell you truth about it

——a summons, provocation, face-to-face [w/ what?]

p. 328 authority & property still remain, but as pretensions of attending discourse, dead surface effects

p. 331 one’s undifferentiated proximity to oneself: another name for death > the space of property: “dead surface”

p. 336 opening paradoxically wrought as a thing that closes (squares of cubes)

p. 339 already plunged by imperfect into already opened thickness of another text

p. 350 moment of present meaning: their “content” only surface effect into which you tombez sans cesse, fascinés by appearance

p. 351 transformations of meaning hinge on certain squaring of text, obligatory passage through open surface, detour through empty square, around the column of fire

——semantic order entangled in seminal, that which was never itself, never comes back to itself; semantic, as a moment of desire, signifies reappropriation of seed w/in presence > the seminal’s dream of death: seed wanting to keep itself

pp. 351-52 column is not, passage of dissemination, “phallic” significance of column is a semic effect, reflection on 4th surface (described center, represented mastery of dissemination); “is”—procures calm, consciousness of ideal mastery > operation of 4th surface

——column has no being, belongs to no one

***p. 357 thickness (lépaisseur) of text opens upon beyond of a whole, nothing or absolute outside: its depth (sa profondeur) at once null & infinite—each layer (couche) harbors (en abrite) another

***p. 358 au bord (du vertige), alert to the border itself, infinite depths were also bottomless, perfectly superficial, cube w/out depth

p. 364 each angle of square belongs to totality of surface, but multiplies it by folding back on itself, fractures it [the surface]—leaving room for supplementary attending (dassistance) surface

——same w/ supernumerary (surnombre) (column of words): is part of the numeral and belongs (appartient) to very milieu it exceeds

EL p. 201 for Scholem, secularized = pulling out language’s apocalyptic thorn; but secularization does not take place, a surface effect, language still sacred in its abyssal interior

pp. 201-02 secular is a epiphenomenon, surface (rhetorical) effect, a façon de parler

——secular is surface effect, produces the surface on which we sleepwalk, we believe in the surface, but there is only abyss > speak sacred language even in denying it (avoid speaking it)

+R p. 159 plus dair, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature

C p. 215 work of the angle (RECTIFIES in all senses) resounds on more than one surface: kills, repairs, restores, recaptures, then once more (inexhaustible debt until the échéance of a dice throw)

TN TN p. 6 can only touch on a surface, peau, pellicule

——limit, deprived of body, does not touch itself, does not let itself be touched

p. 12 Nancy’s partes extra partes, everything outside another outside; p. 14 fold of becoming-inside of the first outside, nothing but surfaces & outsides w/out insides: superficies of surfaces are limits, exposed to a touch that can only leave them intact, untouchable > irreducible disseminal divisibility

p. 103 for Nancy, touching the limit > moment of decision

——philosophy, literally, has never touched anything > inversely, all one ever does is touch a limit (destiny of this figurality) [hymen]; to touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a border, an outline

pp. 103-04 touch untouchable-touchable surface/border/limit on exposing edge of an abyss

——philosophy will have “touched” something 2x: limit & unfoundable abyss beneath/beyond it

——there can only be a figure of touch, one only touches by way of figure > the object, the touchable thing, the "thing itself,” is the untouchable (gives itself, opens only in history of figure)

p. 131 always writing a story, tangent touches line/surface w/out intersection, a tangent touches one point, point is nothing, a limit w/out depth or surface, untouchable even as a figure

pp. 177-78 Husserl struggles to describe the self-touch of the heart, w/out appealing to double apprehension of hand > heart sensation beneath the surface when you push on your chest [?]

***pp. 181-82 how the hand led us to the other surface, the other of sense, while trying to demonstrate auto-affection

p. 222 Nancy: “created body” is a tautology [what else but body is created?], body is the coming into presence as being this screen [no depth]

pp. 229-30 differance btwn 2 surfaces: condition of contact & originarily spaced opening that calls for technical prosthetics (makes it possible w/out delay)

E E p. 2 once inserted into another network, the “same” philosopheme is no longer the same > inversely, “unique and original (inédits)” philosophemes, if there are any, once they enter network of inherited philosophemes, they’re affected over their whole surface and under every angle > the very project of rigorous criteria for judging philosophical specificity, which we are nowhere near disposing of, belongs to a set of conditions (un ensemble)—that remains to be thought

OG OG p. 69 (101-02) the horizontality of spacing, hollow of differance, discontinuity and discreteness (does not oppose it(self) like surface to depth), a hinge (brisure) marking impossibility of full speech

p. 165 (235) exposed surface of body signifies, marks forever, the division working auto-affection

SPEC SPEC p. 283 Freud repeats his arrest, pas de marche: speculative possibility of tout autre (than PP), inscribed in advance w/in it, “louvre dune scription de lautre à meme (overlaps) le principe

——la surface même du à même (overlap)” does not belong to itself—writing affects the very surface of its support > non-belonging unleashes speculation

SURPLUS VALUE (REVENUE)

GT pp. 101-02 subject as such: bordered, posed, identified, always calculates, reappropriates surplus-value, circular return, a certain capitalization

——despite labor of subject, production of surplus-value, gift takes place where there’s trace, dissemination, in excessive forgetting, forgetful excess of the gift

p. 106 “Purloined Letter” & “Counterfeit Money” proceed from surplus-value of remnant or a superfluity of revenue (income or inheritance)

pp. 122-23 condition common to gift & event: unconditionality > chance, tukhē, in an instant, disorder, surprise, irruptive, unmotivated, freedom of dice throw, coup de don, obey nothing but disorder, principles w/out principles, not necessary, gratuitous, déchirer la trame

p. 137 sacrifice (always distinguished from pure gift) expects a surplus-value or at least an amortization, a protection

SPOM p. 173 one cannot count ghosts because ghost is # itself, numerous, innumerable as number, cannot count its supplements or surplus values

MPM p. 13 deconstruction grows strong by accumulating forces that try to repress it, w/out being able to totalize them, “like those surplus values from which a victim of aggression always profits” > here, totalization is what an account, story and narrative are denied

PP p. 82 Plato’s Republic (555e): “one of the drawbacks of democracy” is way it lets capital foster drone and pauper element in state, harvesting interest from any remainder

——son as interest on capital investment, as return, revenue, son as physical sun, analogon of intelligible sun (the Good, capital, origin of all onta); father as noooumena, son as horōmena

meaning of patēr sometimes exclusively financial capital

WM p. 210 metaphor of (the) usure (of metaphor): the ruining of figure; usure as erasure, rubbing out, and usure as increasing return in the form of revenue, surplus value, supplementary capital

——la figure sensible qui sabrite et qui suse, jusquà paraître inaperçue, dans chaque concept métaphysique

P p. 71 no deconstruction of labor w/out theory of frame, any market presupposes a process of framing to liberate surplus value > in classical language, lack as product/production of frame

p. 75 frame overflowed on 2 borders by what it overflows: it travaille [labors, gives, plays, see TN.] indeed; Kant is undoing the labor of the frame; the structurally bordered origin of surplus value creaks and cracks like wood, never fully exposed

OTO p. 7 masks return a constant yield of protection, a surplus value as the ruse of life, ruse incurs losses once surplus value “does not return again to the living, but to and in the name of names, the community of masks” ——[cf. above]: “nothing ever comes back to the living”

DPi p. 140 the Latin interest: 1) finding oneself being btwn space larger than oneself 2) fiduciary calculation, surplus value, search for profit/capitalization, monetary or psychological economy

p. 261 damnum, via Benveniste, money given w/out return, given for nothing > excess of compelled expenditure pays more than is due, marks double law of homogeneity/proportionality btwn damage/punishment & their incalculable heterogeneity: the condemned/damned pays what he owes and does something tout autre, infinitely more than acquit himself of calculable debt: there is economy/aneconomy > “unless it is a matter of reimbursement (indemnification) and interest as the incalculable surplus value of capital”

p. 270 “cost of life,” what’s worth more than life? surplus value of life—“sur-viving” that would be ultra-life (more than life in life) [re: DP as theater of life, theater of sur-vival]

RGE p. 337n via Bataille, consumption of [general economy’s?] excess of energy by a determined class is not the destructive consuming of meaning, it’s the significative reappropriation of surplus value w/in restricted economy > if sovereignty is absolutely revolutionary, revolution w/in restricted economy (reorganization of world of work, redistribution of values w/in space of meaning) is still a necessary phase w/in strategy of general economy

REST pp. 258-59 what revenue, what surplus value is unleashed, what ghost step (pas de revenant) still comes to haunt the shoe’s in their painting truth (the annulment of their use-value, their out-of-service dereliction)? [revenue & revenant]

——are they (the shoes) haunted by some ghost or la revenance itself

p. 260 the pair (of shoes) might not come back to anyone: disappoint desire to reattribute surplus value > might have been made to “remain” there, defying the tribute

——desire for attribution is a desire for appropriation (in matters of art, & everywhere else)

p. 265 shoes: what are they worth? what does their surplus (or minus-) value signal toward? en quel sens (qui? quoi?) font-elles marcher?

pp. 344-45 [re: the interlaced correspondence]: interminable overflowing of whole, la surenchère en plus-value de la correspondance débordante (subordante), occurs btwn general element (discourse, writing, painting) & particular determinate element > element worth more than whole, and whole plays the part [metonymy/synechdoche no longer what they are]

——what’s essential for Heidegger is making the overflowing appear by “earth,” “shoes,” “world” > il faudrait les ressaisir à linstant où le hors-dusage détaché (relativement déstricturé) donne lieu, a sort of abyssal surplus value, une surenchère sans fond > we can speak of conditions of fetishization of product/work, surplus value forms a truth-effect, useless gives way to speculative exploitation, more than useful (plus quutile): useful for grasping usefulness of useful—call for adherence [cf. pp. 339-41 double/triple uselessness (work, product, useless for grasping usefulness)]

——when the detached calls for reattachment: a discourse is sketched, maneuver to call for adherence

p. 346 for Heidegger, putting to work of truth, appears in the hors-dusage, unlacing, destricturation, uselesness overloaded w/ value, augments it w/ surplus value in attaching it symbolically to its belonging > a capital difference, concerns head of subject (not proprietor subject but: the earth and the world, trait and attraction, [ontological difference?])

p. 365 real wearer-holder-proprietor-signatory [subject] of shoes > so much augmented capital: these meanings are added onto, not confused w/, one another

WAP pp. 128-29 [re: Hegel] are children insured against death of their father (capital, revenue) still children? or, haven't they always been? [same for widow who can count on revenues]

PIO p. 418n if there’s still no invention w/out genius, or brilliant flash of Witz, the generosity must no longer respond to principle of savings (dépargne), to a restricted economy of differance

RM p. 56 usure as “wear and tear” and usure as usury, the production of a surplus value acc. to laws other than a continuous & linearly accumulative capitalization (must deconstruct what’s accredited in psychoanalytic, Nietzschean genealogical, and economico-political regions)

AFR pp. 100-01 Condillac’s theory of analogy (operation of remarking): supply a language’s defects > remarks anteriority in the fact, an anteriority (of the fact) that becomes lacking in itself > supply what is necessary, is missing (il faut), but [remark] also presents itself as surplus value, a superabundance, frivolous futility > makes all commerce possible (as value & sign)

pp. 101-02 operation of suppléance (supplementation or supplying) produces overabundance & frivolous futility

D p. 364 no (trade) mark ever gets registered (se dépose) w/out certain lacking of names and #s, this lack provokes over-production, surplus value [then registering of mark?]

PPT p. 10 when one unlaces (or considers the lacing), one looks for revenue (return or investment) or revenant that comes back

C pp. 196-97 Derrida tries to preserve what he invests in word paradigm, a word that’s too much used, worn down (usé), on all sides—thus irreplaceable > what he invests in the word is assaulted by investments of other, from capital (interest & usury): its measure accumulates in surplus value

p. 215 retrace one’s steps, narrative (récit), series, funeral procession/palindrome, revenir: le revenu de lusure, le revenant, lhôte, ghost, guest [both in English] > le coffin comme hôtel de passe (whore-hotel)

TN p. 52 Nancy: philosophy as work of mourning, work of representation, incorporation, profits from death (jouir de la mort), philosophy doesn’t know true mourning (w/out limits: ashes & tears)

***E p. 15 [re: disinterested pleasure] a moral revenue drawn from a natural production w/out interest to us; one takes wealth w/out interest, the singular moral surplus value of sansstill, the trace (Spur) of a purpose in nature is what makes our stock in moral value rise

CIN pp. 57-59 Derrida’s not accumulating surplus value, speculating on some cinder capital, but making a withdrawal (retrait), to try his luck on a gift w/out the least memory of itself, un retrait (retreat, retracing) w/ no relation to what he just did, what he’s about to tell you

SPEC p. 295 Freud his own grandson? put PP in question—Freud makes hypothesis of beyond [the PP] come back (revenir) only to dismiss (congédier) it again, that which comes back (revient) hasn’t truly come back (revenu) > only passed by in specter of its presence

p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

——document is ciphered, will remain secret if author dies before “his own (les siens),” all “his own” will be those who believe they can decipher the will (testament) of this code

FV p. 487 [profiting from remnant] by means of a remnant of paternal inheritance, one the debtors left out of account, Dupin draws revenue, surplus-value of a capital that works by itself, calculating (rigorous economy) > Dupin can pay for a sole luxury [Dupin’s desire to read]: cuts across restricted economy like gift w/out return

SURPRISE

GT p. 119 no gift w/out advent of an event, no event w/out surprise of the gift

p. 147 violence of gift: takes by surprise in such a way as to trap, indebt the receiver, place, hold in a process of circulation, but this violence irreducible whether it repeats or interrupts the circle

——or: a surprise surprising enough to be forgotten w/out delay, beyond Being, epekeina tes ousia: secret about which one cannot speak, but can no longer remain silent

FK p. 56 absolute surprise of messianicity, event

H p. 129 Klossowski: surprise in the instant

***VM p. 153 Greek logos not accidental for any thought; Greek miracle is impossibility for any thought to treat its sages as “sages of the outside” > by proferring epekeina tes ousias, by welcoming alterity into heart of logos, it has protected itself against every surprising convocation

PAS PAS p. (51) Blanchot on event: he’s always outside it, lightning, can only perpetuate its approach, take its indecision by surprise

p. (54) Blanchot: “more slowly than any slowness, more suddenly than any surprise”

T pp. xiii-xiv exteriority & alterity (by themselves) do not surprise philosophy > the overflow is [philosophy’s] object

FWT pp. 52-3 event falls upon me vertically from so high (not most high)—does not come upon me horizontally, also event surprises from behind, or I never see it, I feel or hear it/him (barely)

——event worthy of the name absolutely surprises me, so I can’t not respond, exposed beyond all mastery, dare I say, happily vulnerable

DS p. 226 surprise in writing, supplement, baffling economy of seduction: entre un silence

P p. 89 death’s essential relation to the cut, the hiatus of the abyss, where beauty takes us by surprise

p. 129 sublime does violence to our imagination, all the more sublime for that, shock, double bind (attraction, repulsion), violent incommensurability

ATIA pp. 17-8 time before time has always made “me” dizzy: God’s exposure to surprise, when God does not know what will become, what will happen when the poet names living things; Derrida feels the same way, depuis le temps, before his cat: will it/God address me?

FS p. 4 the possibility of speech & of being always already w/in it [historicity?], la répétition enfin avouée, extended to the dimensions of world culture—[of] a surprise incomparable to any other, a surprise responsible for Western thought

p. 24 Claudel, Proust (structuralists): neutralize surprises of nonsimultaneity, thus time becomes eternal, atemporal

O p. 40n if “assumption” of castration is same as denial of it: “apotropaics would always have one more surprise up its sleeve (plus dune suprise)”

***SW pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

PIO pp. 23-5 double, indivisible movement of invention: gives place (donne lieu) to an event and produces a machine by introducing a gap (écart) in habit; novelty must surprise: no status ready/waiting to reduce it to the same

p. 39 the government’s aleatory margin (for invention) remains homogenous w/ calculation (programmed invention) > w/in order of the calculable: no absolute surprise, order of the same

——but Derrida will not oppose deconstruction (not passivity), the invention of the other, to government’s program: because opposition belongs to regimen of the same

PF p. 283n mustn’t a response respond beside the point, mustn’t it surprise? > justement et juste à côté de la question: not by program but by aporia

AFR pp. 108-09 to introduce (not saturate, not intrude [sintroduire]): seduce the text (not the reader), surprise it close to its content > a rigorous “abyss”

——follow lines, grafts, borders, ribs: analyze its machine of oppositions, its program, and what breaches the program, defeats its teleology, undecides its circle: suspend text on one of its nervures après-coupées (cut-after-the-fact-ribs)

HST p. 361 hospitality: to be ready to not be ready > surprised, violated, expropriation: unprepared in mode that is not even “not yet”

pp. 380-81 forgiveness granted to other—supreme gift of hospitality > host too must ask forgiveness, welcoming must be infinite, one can never give enough to surprise of visitor, messianic surprise: host, always lacking, at fault, unprepared

CF p. 39 the excessive, mad, hyperbolic forgiveness, surprises like a revolution: to forgive not only the guilty one but the fault itself, where both are evil, irreversibly, repeatably

——this mad forgiveness heterogenous to politics, ordinary juridical practice > otherwise, calculated transaction, negotiations, hypothetical imperatives

OG p. 92 (139) writing as eclipse that surprises/obscures glory of word [cf. GLAS, faulty tele-type], dislocates founding categories of language & grammar of epistémè

pp. 157-60 doubling commentary: writing that’s a reading, read where writer is surprised [re: surprising resources of Rousseau’s supplement], can’t command his own language > no transcendental signified: il ny a pas de hors-texte

***pp. 258-59 for Rousseau, only philosophy can think catastrophic factum, which history (historians) can’t; passage can’t be explained structurally; chance, the “surprising,” not part of system, a free & mythic invention

EU p. 206 [CIPH] interference of knowledge or “interscience” [Einstein]: prepare or let oneself be surprised > new information & communicative technology, new objects arising on transversal paths

——privilege accorded to inter-ferences [see p. 207]: transference in every sense of the word

SURVIVE (SUR-VIE)

GT p. 102 death: the fact that the gift does not return to the donor; death not a natural accident, can only be thought setting out from (à partir du) the gift > neither death nor immortal life can give anything, only a singular surviving can give, “life” in an “economy of death”

R p. 4 Derrida speaking from the bottom of his heart: the excessive gift goes straight to his heart, to what he holds dear, to what holds him to life > any words of welcome (hospitality) too modest

***p. 89 [quoted in POOF] deconstruction guides us endlessly, orders us to engage, enjoins us to inherit a stance of survival coming through tired features (is this done in name of democracy?)

FK pp. 83-4 phallus, the marionette, virtuality of virtuality, distinct from penis: parade fetish, the healthy, the automatic sur-viving, faith in most living as dead

pp. 86-87 spectral fantasy of dead, principal of life and sur-vival; life must be worth more than life, only has value in labour of infinite mourning > indemnified spectrality w/out limit

p. 87 in view of invisible, spectral sur-vival, an excess beyond living, life worth more than life, space of death opens—linked to automaton (exemplarily “phallic”), to technics, machine, prosthesis

——these dimensions of self-sacrificial supplementarity, the auto-co-immunity, com-mon auto-immunity, keep community alive, open to something other, more than itself (a spectralizing messiancity beyond all messianism)

——Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

LOBL p. 77 living on: reprieve, afterlife, “life after life,” life after death, more life or more than live > you’ll never have done w/ that suspension

p. 78 it is impossible for living speech to speak on living [sur vivre?], unless it’s impossible only w/ living speech: aporia even more paralyzing

p. 88 Derrida relates little “sur” to surjet (overcasting) in La Dissémination

p. 104 [extensive description] yes of event, yes of iteration, quotes, cites, in accordance w/ strange ring outside of presence, sur-vives

——ring is sealed by arrêt de mort (syntax, almost untranslatable, is sealed in this French expression)

p. 107 Blanchot: survivre, not living maintaining oneself, lifeless, in a state of pure supplement, movement of supplementing life, but stopping (arrêter) the dying, a stopping that doesn’t stop > speak on the arrête (ridge, cutting edge, backbone, fish bone, arris)

***p. 108 sur, “on”, the entire enigma of “supplementary logic” [cf. GLAS p. 81r “sur” vs. “dans”]

——survival & revenance, living on & returning from the dead: goes beyond life and death, supplementing each w/ sudden surge, a reprieve

p. 109 life being drawn through by sharp dividing line, edge where it is impossible to settle: arrête, angle of instability impossible to settle (sarrêter)

p. 122 reaffirmation, triumph over (sur, hyper), living-on, a supplement of life that is better than life and better than death, better than truth > la Chose par excellence: sur-vérité [see pp. 137-38 la sur-vérité du survivre][Blanchot calls la Chose the event]

p. 123 the minute of living-on has the syntax of a revolution

p. 126 btwn the call & the resurrection, there’s no time > absolute event, not effect of a cause, the cause, causa, la Chose, first name itself

p. 134 more-than-life (sur-vie) marks a reprieve, excess triumphs over life, worth more than eternity of life but presents itself before the arrêt de mort

p. 135 living on is neither opposite nor identical to living, difference is undecided, évasé like a bevelled edge (bord)

p. 136 differance: arrêt de mort or triumph of life

pp. 136-37 survivre delays at once life & death, line of least sure sur-, no clear-cut opposition, living on like differance, beyond identity & difference > tele-phone, tele-gram only 2 modes of this teleography in which trace, grapheme, does come secondarily but marks telic structure a priori

——narrator is always away (at a distance, tele-)

pp. ~136-37 sur-vient, the event, Nietzsche’s Doppelgänger, ghosts, consists in nothing but coming about, being gone

p. 138 living on as phantom revenance (one who lives on is always a ghost), this is re-markable

p. 139 living on establishes the supplement [is supplement 2nd?], in truth beyond truth (la sur-vérité), supplement of truth w/out truth

p. ~176 to speak of writing, triumph, as living on, is to denounce [Freud’s] manic fantasy (not w/out repeating it)

SPOM SPOM p. xx commitment of justice, to whom? to life (natural life, life of spirit) of living being > that this is irrefutable carries justice beyond present life, non pas vers la mort mais vers une sur-vie, where life & death are traces of traces

——alors il y a de l’esprit, des esprits, et il faut compter avec eux > le plus d’un

p. 143 Marx’s revolutionary injunction “let the dead bury the dead”, the imperative of an “active forgetting,” as Nietzsche would put it

——neither the dead nor the living (the “only living,” the immortal living, the gods) have buried anyone (Marx knows this) > il faudra toujours que des mortels encore vivants enterrent des vivants déjà morts

pp. 184-85 survival and return of living dead belong to essence of idol, idol only appears against “background of death”

——“lineage of patrimony [from Plato to Marx] [nominalism, conceptualism, realism, rhetoric, logic, proper meaning…] is wrought, but never interrupted” by the question of the idea, question of the concept, concept of the concept, the question of life-death, opening onto a dimension of irreducible sur-vival or surviving (survivance)

***AF ***AF p. 60 return of the repressed as triumph of life [re: Lou Andreas-Salomé’s reading in Moses], surviving of an excess of life which resists annihilation

POOF POOF p. 3 via Cicero, the friend as exemplary, illuminates, brings hope beyond death, elle la promet à la revenance testamentaire d'un plus-dé vie, d'un survivre qui restera ici l'un de nos thèmes

***p. 4 Cicero combines the meanings of exemplum (copy, reproduction, duplicate) and exemplar (portrait, single original) to describe the hope friendship provides beyond death: Cicero stresses sameness, ideal double, as condition of survival

p. 13 friendship can’t survive its act but can survive its object, it can love the inanimate, it lives, becomes psychic, from w/in resource of survival: the beloved might be dead > re: Aristotle on mother, not needing to be known also means not needing to know if what you love is there

——philía begins w/ the possibility of survival

——the irreducible dissymmetry btwn hypothesis of shared friendship & idea that love can (must) survive the friend’s death—a doubling fold: friend bears our proper death, expropriates it, he bears my death & inherits it as the last survivor

pp. 13-4 one cannot survive w/out mourning, not even God can escape this tautology

pp. 14-5 time of surviving (btwn mourning & its possibility) gives itself in withdrawal, self-delivers, self-effaces 2x—constancy & beginning again: indefinite repetition of inaugural moment, keeps memory & anticipates > contre-jour of this contretemps, condition/possibility of friendship

pp. 186-87 Augustine’s abyssal calculation, after death of his friend [Confessions IV], his close reading of Aristotle’s friends are ‘one soul in bodies twain’: survivre, ou non, au nom de lautre?

survive for yourself or person you’re mourning? question of gift, donner au nom de lautre, a narcissism that only occurs in name of other

pp. 228-29 one always takes a stand re: friendship > Derrida utters “O my friend…” in my own name > power of the name to survive bearer of the name: il y va donc du nom porté [borne], du port [bearing] ou du support [basis] du nom et du rapport [relation] au nom, la portée [range] du nom

p. 291 though Montaigne infinitizes friendship, he ensures mediation of solder (soudure) in the name of the brother (and the exclusion of woman) > via Montaigne, name ensures ‘fraternal solder’: owing to name, friendship begins prior to friendship, friendship survives friendship—friendship always begins by surviving

p. 292 the 2 names: 1) very structure of testimonial survival stance, a certain spectrality, name survives a priori beyond presence 2) this general structure is enframed (arraisonné) in certain history, chance of filiation, inherited name, that of renown (again, woman excluded)

MPM MPM p. 49 defect, default of name is its immense power: name already survives him, does not wait for death

pp. 58-9 if a past does not exist, no more does death—only mourning, figures of death, we inscribe in every trace (otherwise called “survivals”)—because they outlast us, trying their luck, in advance, “in memory of” [see p. 87n inexistence of past/death not futility/illusion]

***p. 66 promise of the other (for the future, trace of the future) made to the other as an absolute past, the other’s sur-vival exceeds the “we” of a common present: brings together two friends, “incredible scene of memory,” written in absolute past; dictates madness of amnesic fidelity, forgetful hypermnesia, gravest and lightest

A A pp. 52-3 [via Heidegger’s performative incision, decision, “here”] figure of border, line between here & beyond (len-deça et lau-delà) re: death, survival, immortality, beyond

p. 55 for Heidegger, all interest, belief in immortality, man’s irreducible torsion of retrospective anticipation (survival structure) in every instant (introduces untimely moment and posthumous in most alive of present living thing), stems from man’s mortality—is secondary [to being-toward-death] > only a “being-to-death” can think, desire, project, live immortality as such

p. 61 for Derrida, in contrast to Heidegger [Freud & Levinas too?], mourning, revenance, spectrality, living-on, surviving: non-derivable categories or non-reducible derivations

PP PP p. 93 Thoth, god of resurrection, interested in death as a repetition of life, life as a rehearsal for death

FSW FSW p. 224 writing as trace survives scratch’s present, punctuality, stigmē

SH SH p. 39 survivors (readers, guardians, interpreters) of poem

FWT FWT p. 42 mustn’t crush dimensions of living being [biology, cultural] into each other, all life (animal & human) survives by knowing how to discern (btwn forms of life, btwn “living” and “dead”)

ROP ROP pp. 117-8 was not Freud looking for, in “death drive,” in “repetition compulsion,” the principle before the principle (of pleasure/reality), l’esprit de cette spirale, voilà qui tient en haleine [holds one in suspense], ou si vous aimez mieux: en vie

OTO OTO p. 16 [via Nietzsche] mother, who is living on, outlive me long enough to bury me, living on is the name of the mother, “this survival is my life whose shores she overflows”

pp. 17-8 the living on of an ageless virgin mother (living long enough to bury her child), & the already dead father > logic of glas, and obsequence [one finds this in Christ’s family]

p. 38 mother is the faceless figure of a figurant, an extra, gives rise to all figures by becoming anonymous, everything addresses/destines itself to her, she survives, as long she’s at bottom

ATIA ATIA p. 20 every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

SW SW p. 318 just where you finish it—it will survive you > shroud: sums up essence of veil

TB TB pp. 113-14 one can think maturation of seed as a geneticist/vitalist metaphor, this would support genealogical/parental code > or, one can invert/overturn order, “metaphorical catastrophe”: only understand “family,” “life” by way of language & its sur-vival, [this reversal is operated expressly by Benjamin?]

p. 114 Überleben and Übersetzen (survival & translation)

——for Benjamin, translator as survivor, agent of sur-vival, heir [man], the sur-vival of translation can make original text not only live longer but more & better

p. 116 does a work require translation? answer is apodictic, injunction even w/out translator there, the requirement of the other as translator: structure of original, relation of life to survival > a priori, even if forgotten > its apodictic essence: it is unforgettable, so forgetting is accidental, death would not change it at all

p. 117 vis-à-vis Benjamin, if structure of work is “sur-vival,” a strange debt that doesn’t bind anyone to anyone: debt not engaged w/ subject-author but to formal law in immanence of original text

DPi DPi p. 40 to think forgiveness, set out from unforgivable, irreversible, we spoke of some surviving (du sur-vivre) that leaves one defenseless before a death/injury that already occurred, where victims can no longer testify > not only speaking of death, but judgment of injury/wrong

p. 256 it belongs to life not to be immortal, but also to have a future where instant of death is not calculable

——to be against DP is to be against calculation, calculable decidability of you will die on such and such a day, at such and such an hour > no future w/ anticipation of calculable instant > “my life” must keep a relation to the coming of the other as coming of the to-come (venue de là-venir)

——DP ends finitude of “my life” > w/ calendar

——it is because my life is finite, “ended,” that I keep this relation to incalculability and undecidability as to the instant of my death

p. 270 “cost of life,” what’s worth more than life? surplus value of life—“sur-viving” that would be ultra-life (more than life in life) [re: DP as theater of life, theater of sur-vival]

p. 271 CI (and thus DP) is priceless, w/out interest, so Beccaria’s utilitarianism is not the law, is pathological; for Kant, justice can’t be evaluated, transcendent to calculation, to price of life, priceless > transcendence (maybe) of the “sur,” surviving beyond life (drive)

p. 274 can one desire, what is really called desire, an anesthetic?—pure intelligibility (sur-viving beyond life), death as absolute anesthetic

p. 275 Montaigne: fairest death is the most willed death, pulled like a thread > Derrida imagines [via fil of life, filet of blood] a tireless trapeze artist who is caught by net of belief, his opinion, dies on day net breaks, a willed/beautiful death > he decides to put an end to his belief

pp. 278-79 for Montaigne, there’s always something worth more than life, exceeding life, force of an opining (to say yes), belief, a force of force, a force of act of faith that says yes > this, acc. Montaigne, is the essence of religion: acceptance of sacrificial death & DP in shadow of a sur-viving supposedly worth more than life > religion grants the surviving of survival

PIO PIO p. 25 the invention must create the statutory conditions not only to be recognized, legitimized, institutionalized, but also to occur, to come about (survenir)

——how can we sort out the conditions that made an invention possible if the invention modifies structure of context itself?

HLP p. 293n lying w/ images, “facts” structured by simulacrum/virtual, “live television,” by means of selective/interpretive performativity, destroys even reference to the alterity of what it replaces: produces indubitable “truth effect” > absolute lie can survive w/out anyone knowing

p. 70 one cannot think the lie itself w/out taking into account its survival to infinity, its radical perversion, and its technical mutations in simulacrum or iconic substitutes

TR p. 75 “loeuvre has a virtual future only by surviving or cutting itself off from its presumed responsible signatory” [logic of machine in loeuvre]

p. 86 “sooner or later,” patience of virtual that stretches time beyond death: promises survival of work, and also survival by the work as self-justification

——passion of [Rousseau’s] faith seals virtual time of work, une oeuvre that will operate by itself, beyond its signatory (w/out [Rousseau’s] living assistance [machine])

pp. 133-34 surviving: excess over present life, being destined to this sur-vival > cut of oeuvre sometimes assures survival

EJQB p. 71 if nature refuses the leap (saut), Scripture will never be nature: proceeds by leaps alone

——to write: courage to lose one’s life, to die away from nature

p. 78 books are always books of life, or of afterlife > written questions addressed to literature are forgotten, drained, by literature (mortifications, ruses of life, life negating itself in literature to survive): writing would die of pure vigilance to question (and also simple erasure of question)

PSSS p. 261 survival, like some cruelty to oneself, always consists in enduring more than one death (and already during one’s lifetime)

p. 264 to think institution of auto-nomy (egalitarian, democratic) as autoconvoked and not hetero-convoked is an abdication, political failing

——an auto-nomy institutes itself on basis of a hetero-nomy that survives what survives it, on basis of the law of other, coming of the sur-viving other

——Derrida would like to ask “What is to be done?”—beyond all possible cruelty & sovereignty, w/out alibi, this question is not foreign to paregicide

***p. 276 originary affirmation, which advances itself in advance, lends [?] rather than gives itself?

——beyond the beyond, not a sovereignty, a principle

——originary affirmation is attached to a life, but an im-possible life, a sur-vival, not symbolizable, but the only one worthy of being lived, w/out alibi, the one from which to depart

——one cannot justify pacifism, right to life, setting out from an economy of life, can only be done on basis of a sur-vival that owes nothing to alibi of some mytho-theological beyond

EL p. 215 living dead language is sur-viving, “hyperliving” > sacred language [?]

HST pp. 382-83 survival guilt, reproach oneself before everything for which Auschwitz remains proper name/metonymy > asking forgiveness for being-there (être-là); (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas) debt prior to any borrowing: unacquittable fact of being-there, a being there originarily guilty

p. 383 asking for forgiveness occurs in the unforgivable; guilt of survivor (not only concentration camp survivor), anyone who is mourning; work of mourning is always “I survive”

——Levinas: ultimate proximity—to survive as a guilty one

pp. 391-92 for Levinas, threshold of solitude constitutes request for forgiveness, constitutes being-myself—a kind of ego cogito as an asking forgiveness from the other (a leap), as the very temporalizing of “I” [morality/psychology as ontology: the being in “being forgiven”]

——surviving, resurrection, as miracle of each instant (having to be forgiven—as survivor)

——for Levinas, resurrection/survival becomes miracle of each instant, where an “I” calls out for forgiveness (salvation, redemption, Messiah), every instant

p. 397 the definition of (a) today, sursis de vie, reconciliation in the impossible > great forgiveness as test/ordeal of unforgivable [re: 2 enemy Jews comically forgiving each other]

pp. 407-08 impossible grammar of “I love you”: tragic/comic desire to want to die first and to want to survive you to console you at the time of my death (guard in me your mourning of me)

p. 413 estate law, suppléant, substitute as inheritor, ensures surviving, inheritors have family resemblance but are not clones

+R p. 160 survival movement, arrêt de mort, final trance, sursaut cambré tenu au mors: says “I” (am dead) or hoc est corpus meum > dominant fish, one that bites best, takes from sea a body of scaly writing, homogenous w/ signatory’s initials

——death dance in fish’s tail (queue) > rhythmos: cadence of writing, undulation of waves

LI p. 52 phenomenon of repeatability is condition of possibility of survival of text [not vice versa]

TN pp. 3-4 pray that you’ll outlive me, survivor guilt > the only reconciliation w/ death: not to see those I love die

p. 49 Psyche as Mary, beautiful for being neither dead nor alive: surviving

AD p. 6 for Levinas, death is experience for the survivor of “without-response” > not, first of all, annihilation, non-being, nothingness: survivor’s guilt as guilt w/out fault/debt, as entrusted responsibility

——it is the murderer who identifies death w/ nothingness (Cain)

CF p. 44 only dead man can forgive—survivor not ready to substitute him/herself (immense, painful experience of survivor)

p. 48 the 3rd as survivor in general (institution, sociality, transgenerational heritage)

CIR p. 191 intense relation to survival that writing is (no desire that something remain after me), to enjoy this light I’m producing through experimentation of my possible survival, i.e. of absolute death (truth of the world w/out me) [?]

p. 218 fear that kills me in face of death, not fear of dying (how simple that would be), but fear of replacing one more dead one before being able to die myself [so dead don’t bury the dead]

SPEC p. 334 does Freud want survival of psychoanalysis in his name? does its structure require it?

p. 367 for Freud, the “cause,” must be one w/ cause of science—best chance of survival, rings, alliance

SYMBOL

FSW p. 197 logo-phonocentrism is necessary and necessarily finite > history of the possibility of symbolism

***p. 208 Freud: dream-interpreters were versed in symbolic riddling, a ground of interpretation giving the strongest credit to their Art

PPHS p. 84 Hegel: sign vs. symbol “symbol has identity w/ what it mimics, sign is foreign”

——symbols (triangle, lion fox) possess the Bedeutung they’re expressing

p. 86 despite symbol’s identity, sign’s arbitrariness is closer to independence, freedom of spirt than external, natural symbol [Saussure concurs in footnotes]

p. 106 sign is essence of symbol, the symbol past, both in turn relevé by living concept, language w/out language, language become thing itself, voice murmuring in greatest proximity to spirit, identity of the name, of Being

F p. xxix Freud: symbol always symbol of an earlier symbolized, and Torok and Abraham examine symbol’s operative genesis, as a hieroglyph, so it never becomes a “dead symbol,” a substance

p. xxix Abraham: symbol to semantic might just be symbol to symbol; what we most seek is to place symbol back into dynamism of intersubjective functioning

p. xlviii cryptonomy: crack (la ligne de brisure) of a symbol, upright column of name (colonne érigée dun nom), blank voice of a scruple [see p. xiii], always extends beyond the self

p. xlv Wolf Man calls himself by unspeakable name Thing (tieret), gives himself no name > entire body of a proper name always shattered (morcelé) by the topoi, la Chose est un morceau de symbole

WM p. 216 Marx on gold serving as symbol of itself, and that “nothing can serve as symbol of itself”

P p. 36 Kant looking for a bridge from sensible to supersensible (an analogy), a symbol—that crosses/closes abyss

——bridge (Brücke) not an analogy, concept/effect of analogy makes the bridge itself

——analogy of abyss & bridge over abyss require 3rd term, that which heals the gap, a symbol, bridge is symbol, symbol bridge > abyss calls for analogy (active resource of Critique), mais lanalogie sabîme sans fin dès lors quil faut bien un certain art pour décrire analogiquement le jeu de lanalogie

p. 138 w/ sublime, everything that is compared to it is small > here, Kant throws a bridge, the bridge like the symbol throws itself [by way of reason?], btwn unpresentable and presentation > the whole world can be made small in relation to sublime magnitude

REST pp. 282-83 whose shoes (whose feet) (the subject of reattachment): the capital subject of this contract [btwn Shapiro & Heidegger], they each have one piece of symbolon, share common interest, coded commitment

C pp. 234-35 breakable, limping hyphen: not only an emblem, a coat of arms, but the symbol > acc. symballein, brings together pieces of a body divided in contract, pact, alliance [symballistic]

SYMPTOM

MC pp. 350, 352 symptōma in Greek, first meant sinking, depression, then meant coincidence, event, finally meant sign, illness [finitude]

p. 355 turn contingency into symptom

HASD p. 7 [in absolutely singular logic] “God” names that without which one could not account for any negativity: grammatical or logical negation, illness, evil and neurosis

——instead of reducing religion to symptom [in this logic], the symptom would be a negative manifestation of God

——deconstruction: a “symptom” of modern/postmodern nihilism or last testimony of faith, martyrdom, in the present fin de siècle?

MPM p. 31 de Manian criticism/deconstruction always analysis of “resistances” and symptoms they produce [i.e. “resistance to theory” in literary studies]

PP p. 110 King-Ra says writing only cures the symptom, writing belongs to the exteriority of the symptom

S p. 100 Heidegger’s avoidance of Geist as symptomatic foreclosure

FSW p. 331n against Freud?: a rigorous determination of the anomaly [symptom?] is impossible

F pp. xlii-xliii 2 routes (both angular) (double density) the Thing follows at dividing line (the Thing marked by same dividing line as symbol broken by crypt): 1) crosses unconscious directly (tableau, symptom) 2) crosses intrasymbolic crack (alloseme)

FWT p. 45 symptoms of “secret” always return: not necessarily [re: letter always arrives]

pp. 122-23 can you prosecute someone who is only showing symptoms of racism? can one judge a symptom?

p. 188 [re: murder of the father] Freud’s “historical” vs. “material” truth: one based on facts in real archive, the other discernible in symptoms [Yerushalmi neglects the latter]

POOF p. 82 [even if Nietzsche announces, calls for, texts by Bataille, Nancy, Blanchot, reading these texts as symptom-effects remains crude] reading not simply limited by reading in the language that the symptom-effect speaks [follow other traces] > otherwise, “reality” and “history” one distinguishes would remain undetermined & imaginary: i.e. the discourse of those ‘realistic’ champions of historical referent & actuality (effectivité)

POS pp. 6-7 to “deconstruct” faithful/violent to philosophy, a certain textual work that produces great pleasure, a writing interested in itself that enables us to read philosophemes as symptoms (a word Derrida suspects), the symptom of thinking Being as presence [via Heidegger]

——to read this symptom is not ingenious discovery of single person, is due to total transformation that can’t be called “historical,” or “worldwide” anymore)

ROP pp. 21-2 Freud’s 5 resistances in “Inhibition, Symptom, Anxiety”, one of which is the ego benefiting from the illness, Derrida wonders by what concept of illness this could be an interesting singularity

ATIA p. 4 symptom means “fall,” case, coincidence, what falls due (échéance), mishap

p. 41 the right to speak blithely of the animal, one of the most symptomatic asinanities of the human, bêtise (of which animals are exempt by definition)

***p. 44-5 comparing Genesis w/ Greek myths [re: fault, nakedness] as two symptomatic translations, whose internal necessities partially overlap re: the proper of man [default in propriety]: technics, sociality, emergence out of nature, knowledge, historicity [?], subjectivity, subjugating superiority over animal

p. 113 Derrida points out that a certain profound humanism [that of the Old Testament?] privileged the question of the animal as that of the infinitely other

——this silent appeal that calls from the outside, whose trace can only be disavowed w/ so many wounds, symptoms

p. 115 exclamation marks, acc. Rousseau, marks of irony, allegorical incredulity [for Derrida, reading Levinas, they are marks of disavowal]

WAP p. 10 the erection of institution betrays fragility of foundation: institution instituted against deconstructibility (reveals/deceives ground like a symptom would)

Gii p. 40 the way scientists or thinkers talks about animality constitutes a decisive symptom of discourse’s essential axiomatics

HLP p. 57 to lie to oneself is not “bad faith” > must account for mediatic techno-performativity and logic of phantasma (spectral), or symptomatology of unconscious

p. 68 Derrida doesn’t believe that the effect of the lie, of betrayed veracity, remains indestructible as symptom [either way, logic of symptom can’t be contained w/in opposition good/bad faith]

p. 69 Freud treats lie as revealing symptom, avowal of another truth

IW pp. 255-56 if German-Jewish relation is a delirium, cannot be made into object (such object being an “artificial” reflection), then Cohen’s discourse on it could very well be symptom of madness it describes, but a true symptom: a truth it speaks that’s not of order of positive objectivity

——channeling Cohen, logos is the région where symptom can be true, logos speaks of itself; to speak of logic, of objective knowledge, in opposition to logos, is to speak of nothing but its “logical” manifestation: perhaps there is a “meta-logic,” but not a meta-logos

HST p. 382 if avowal goes through symptom rather than declaration > changes nothing of the truth [re: 2 Jewish enemies comically forgiving each other] [Rousseau in OG]

p. 396 laughter that says the truth of lying: logic of symptom always stronger than an ethics of truthfulness (véracité)

TN pp. 127-29 intuitionistic-continuistic logic of immediacy as irrepressible as desire itself, as intractable as language constraints, grammatical violence > this law has to happen, symptoms will crop up [does Nancy really avoid this logic?]

——who could finish w/ this tempting postulation? [i.e. “smooth” desire]

SYNTAX

GT p. 49 Derrida thinking gift by way of idiomatic expressions: give a class, donner une facilité, donner le change [hunting expression], etc.

LOBL p. 104 [extensive description] yes of event, yes of iteration, quotes, cites, in accordance w/ strange ring outside of presence, sur-vives

——ring is sealed by arrêt de mort (syntax, almost untranslatable, is sealed in this French expression)

p. 115 like death, arrêt remains undecidable, one arrêt marks delay, the other haste [2 syntaxes]

——suspensive arrêt already [déjà] undecided because it suspends, decisive arrêt undecided

p. 123 the minute of living-on has the syntax of a revolution

POOF p. 66 instant of perhaps friendship: causes no ripple in calm waters of semantics

pp. 189-90 on difference btwn omega ω [w/out iota & spirit] in “O my friends…” and ᾠ [w/ both] [which, inconceivably, English translation failed to mark], vocative interjection or pronomial dative? > philological haunting, ω [w/out] as crypt w/ twin ghosts, the added spirit (aspiration) in memory or omission > do the friends remain motionless/indifferent in either case?

p. 301 Blanchot [on Foucault’s death]: “the intellectual friendship that his death, so painful to me, today allows me to declare to him, as (tandis que) I recall the words attributed by Diogenes Laertes to Aristotle: ‘Oh my friends, there is no friend’” > incredible audacity of this tandis que, and the singular use of the colon, an act of punctuation that unfurls a veil of mourning—will one have ever punctuated w/ more rigor?

POO p. 13 in syntax of “X: A Critical Reader,” who’s reading whom, who’s the subject?

p. 26 the secret is the possibility of homonymy, and mimesis

SEC p. 320 Husserl’s interest is in purely logical grammar not pure grammar > “the green is or,” unacceptable in context determined by a will to know, still signifies an example of agrammaticality

——in French “le vert est ou” can become “le vert est où” or “le verre est où

VM p. 112 “syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

OH pp. 9-10 what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself, culture of oneself as culture of other, gathered and divided at the heart, home: [violent syntax] différence (d) avec soi

PAS PAS p. (97) if I write slowly you can hear si jétais là (if/yes I was there) in three ways

PPHS pp. 107-08 for Hegel, machine works as a negation w/out relève, thus Hegel could never think a machine that could work! that which doesn’t work in service of meaning: pure loss

——but Derrida sees machine working by itself, outside > Hegel’s logic, syntax, concepts, engaged in system of this unpower [of course, not enough to “essentialize” technology]

SH pp. 24-5 in shibboleth (river), there’s suspension of meaning, almost opposite of phenomenological “epokhe,” which preserves meaning > those who couldn’t pronounce “shi” marked themselves as unable to remark a mark thus coded

F p. xiii method & element of The Magic Word: new cryptology, anasemic retranscription of all concepts, “antisemantics”

WM p. 233 for Aristotle, onoma can be both verbs & nouns, anything that has phōnē sēmantikē, anything that has intelligible meaning outside syntax, not a syncategorem

p. 234n Leibniz seeking to find hidden concept or name beneath all syntactical relations

p. 236 Fontanier: prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs not tied to substantive idea, just ways of seeing

——Aristotle: noun as element of metaphor, first semantic unity, smallest signifying element, composite phōnē sēmantikē, each of its elements are insignificant (asēmos) w/out meaning; noun is different from verb only in atemporality

pp. 264-65(n) for Bachelard, the hidden (fire) is what demands metaphors, Derrida explains how this conceptualization, despite fact that Bachelard appeals to syntax, “a poetic mind is a syntax of metaphors,” still amounts to metaphor of the same > here, all metaphors have a semantic focal point, the hidden fire as life, nature

p. 266 most invariable characteristic of concept of metaphor: unity/continuity of meaning dominates play of syntax, subordination of syntax

p. 268 because metaphoric is plural from the start, it cannot escape syntax, it organizes its division w/in syntax, cannot be what it is except in erasing itself, indefinitely constructing its destruction

DS p. 180 Mallarmé’s coils, shells, motifs, lustre of title > Mallarmé’s only use [?] of word syntaxier (syntaxer): “never would the sovereign bow fall”

pp. 193-94 double mark, mark erases mark, undecidable stroke > this syntax escapes pertinence of truth, inscribes truth w/in its play [“Mallarmé exemplifies this”—suspect such a claim]

p. 211 displacement w/out reversal of Platonic heritage, always an effect of syntax, writing, language—not simply dialectical overturning of concept (signified)

——dialectic is beginning and end of philosophy, Mallarmé marks it w/ his syntax at the point of its sterility [MOP] > a point that will be called, analogically, provisionally, undecidable

p. 220 Derrida not using hymen like Hegel used Aufhebung, Urteil (contradictory layers of signification, depth); what counts for hymen is form or syntactical praxis that (de)composes it

***——the word hymen could be lost, and its function would remain: we’ve been making believe everything can be traced to this name [see GOD p. 116], simply possesses a certain economic condensation, accumulation

pp. 220-21 [explanation on how syntax counts for “undecidability,” not lexical richness] hymen in text (crime, incest, suicide, simulacrum) inscribed at very tip (à la pointe) of indecision

p. 221 hymen in relation to inter-, “btwn,” a syncategorem, syntactical plug, even Husserl calls this an incomplete signification, its syntactical (de)composition can never be mastered

——like Freud’s unconscious (syntax of “hymen” tolerates, remains insensitive, to contradiction)

p. 222(n) “btwn” re-marks its semantic void, becomes quasi-categorem, marks opening btwn syntax/semantics > its meaning: possibility of syntax, spacing [Spinoza, “btwns” in Hebrew]

p. 224 [example from Mallarmé of undecidability of syntax]

p. 229 in the morgue you’ve been able to read the folding (vous aurez pu lire que la pliure)

p. 231 syntax of hymen’s fold makes it impossible to arrest its play of indecision [i.e. to stop it on “mental,” or “imaginary”]

p. 242 syntax of point and pas

pp. 262-64n [re: Mallarmé’s use of Or] Or (substantive noun/adverb of time), gold turned to nothing; Igitur, adverb-name (also means “therefore”), has affinities w/ Or, or marks the hour (today) > temps dor, “Il Signor,” “qui signore,” “signe or,” in the golden antre of a glottis (glossa, gold ingot, lingot, lingua) > throw of linguistic dice

p. 276n infinite unfolding of aviary, of fan > ailes, elle, l, illi (lit)

POS p. 70 discourses of reduction and misconstrual: thematism, sociologism, historicism, psychologism (can be avoided by formal/syntactic work)

ROP pp. 41-2 Lacan speaks of the insuccèsDerrida transforms it: “linsuccès qui échoue à arriver” > playing w/ syntax of to: 1) I do not arrive 2) I fail to arrive because I arrive

DIF DIF pp. 4-5 that pyramidal silence btwn “e” and “a” can only function in phonetic writing reminds us there’s no pure phonetic writing (functions by admitting nonphonetic “signs”: punctuation, spacing)

***D p. 328 sil ny a pas de hors-texte [outside the text, extratext], it’s because le graphique généralisé a toujours déjà commencé: il ny a rien avant le texte, always implanted in “prior” writing [no pretext that’s not already text]

O p. 43 dissemination: doesn’t simply place plural in effervescence > il sagite de la contradiction sans fin, marked by undecidable syntax of plus

RGE p. 272 this stratagem, the sovereign operation, play w/ syntax, does not subordinate itself to an anticipated discourse

REST p. 264 DS turns around points of ballerina, “la syntaxe du point et du pas” > each pair referring to some other, signifying too the operation of signifying

pp. 267-68 Derrida’s reading of Freud’s shoe fetish: shoe replaces that which is lacking not because of its form but because of its directional situation > syntax of a movement upwards

p. 268 “according to the circumstances,” [Freud’s bisexuality of most dream-symbols] also occurs acc. syntax irreducible to semantic or “symbolic” substantiality

——“to tell the truth”: necessary to hold in reserve excess of interpretation, supplement of reading—for the idiom of a syntactic variation > absolute idiom is name of a lure, but absolute “pas didiome” [see p. 381] does not authorize contentment w/ symbolic equivalences, “w/ off-the-peg universals (duniversaux de confection)”

p. 273 restitution, remise des chaussures, snares (ret) of these shoes formed by re- prefixes, revenir

pp. 325-26 Derrida’s “close reading,” a policing, “if police there is (and isn’t there always),” played out via the size (pointure) of a comma, that which separates “pair” (of shoes) from “the product” > not a temporal interval but a syntactic fact

p. 380 [spectrality of stricture]: il sest rendu dans/avec/à /( ) ses chaussures

meanings knot/unknot in lace/snare of syntax (tous les sens se nouent et se dénouent dans le lacet de cette syntax)

DST DST p. 199 ne pas ne pas: redoubles movement of negation through syntactical formation

——not do something that consists in not doing: ineluctable, unavoidable > sur-négation

——neither work of dialectic nor unconscious denegation [neither Hegel nor Freud]

PIO p. 12 inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

RM p. 58 Derrida has regularly questioned (w/ insistence that might be judged tiresome) the “privilege of the name,” opposing its primacy w/ attention to syntactic motif

TR p. 105 de Man: w/in certain perspective, no use of language that’s not radically formal, mechanical, even when concealed by aesthetic, formalistic delusions

pp. 132-33 Derrida plays on syntactical error, etymology, unconscious narration: in early proof of OG, Rousseau’s “I was as if I had committed incest” came back as “…committed insect”

EJQB p. 78 to write: to confuse ontology & grammar; grammar: in which are inscribed all dislocations of dead syntax, all aggressions perpetrated by speech against language, every questioning of the letter

——all these tortures are forgotten in literature, as mortifications, as ruses of life

PSSS p. 240 psychoanalysis as another name for “w/out alibi”: questions radical evil or an even worse evil > only psychoanalytic revolution up to task of taking account of grammatical syntax, reflexivity: [“I you we made I you we suffer”]

D p. 339 [re: Numbers] paragrammatical effects, cut w/in graphic substance retains/distorts traces of all sorts, small differences in repetition, imbedding

C p. 187 potencies of syllable “tu” [you, silent, killed]

LI p. 55 Derrida extracts certain predicates that can be extended to every mark [thus, emphasis on graphematic predicate is not “genuine,” Sarl is right: there’s nothing especially graphematic about separation of sign from signified]

p. 83 [re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

——the rest of the trace, its remains (restance), neither present nor absent

p. 100 or, or rather, even parentheses, i.e. “citation (iterability)” > not genus/species, not identity, classical logic fractured in its code, parasitic contamination entame all these relations, which is why words have to be qualified, supplemented by others

——[re: citationality (iterability)] parentheses do not mark synonyms/identification > iterability marks citationality in its possibility, its “graphematic root”

ATM p. 154 the grammatical utterance [“here I am”?] is there, but put out of joint (disloqué), making room (that is not a home) for an agrammaticality of the gift assigned from the other (depuis lautre)

——incorporating what it can’t assimilate, quoting the uncitable consists in accusing language [appearing as witness & accused], (sur)rendered (offerre) to a gift, as a gift which language can’t open up to on its own

NOY pp. 231-32 when thought and the word (la parole) given in writing merge (se confond) at the heart of the same time (au coeur du même temps); chance encounter in singularity of “graph,” coincidence of the cut (la coupure) and the opening (louverture)

OG p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

——becoming-space of time & becoming-time of space mark dead time w/in presence of living present > dead time is at work, les blancs take on importance > limit of phenomenology

p. 227 (323) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] punctuation best example of nonphonetic mark in the interior of writing > its impotence re: accent isolates proper misery of writing

***CIR p. 119 nongrammatical syntax that remains to be invented to speak name of God

SPEC pp. 283-84 Derrida corrupts (détourne) “properly Freudian” usage of speculation [i.e. a mode proper mode of research]: as production of surplus value, overflows, the given of the gift, oblique object of Freud’s discourse > Freud’s bias of procedure interests Derrida, the scene of what makes Freud write: faire faire, laisser faire, faire écrire, laisser écrire: the syntax of these operations not given [in Freud]

——detour, Umweg, breaks open the path (frayage) > Freud does not interrogate the graphics of the différant detour for itself (can it ever be for itself?)

p. 340 all the interlacings of fort:da, tout ce qui senvoi in graphics of repetition that dislocates summary “triangle” > le trait oedipien nest quune rection pour le fil conducteur de la bobine [Oedipus most narrowly restricted effects of above repetition’s graphics]

p. 363 index of original normality [at this point of Beyond…] is the “primitive,” not child: primitives don’t face death [?], anxiety about death has no proper content

——death is the analogon of castration > castration not incompatible w/ thesis of death drive if one refers to syntaxic articulation of athesis: Derrida’s pointing to “it” at this moment

p. 401 w/ Causa, lAutre Choseno opposition btwn pleasure & unpleasure, w/in & beyond, life & death: graphics of strictural supplement not oppositional, knowns no negation, no lack; in graphics, desire is sanssans,” is of a “sans sans sans”

***CHOR p. 96 some can’t see beyond end of phallic forms in SP (bisexual complication of style, spur, umbrella): those people do not read the syntax and punctuation of a given sentence, arresting the text in a position, settling on a thesis, meaning or truth

p. 97 how can one breathe w/out punctuation, w/out multiplicities of rhythm, steps, how can one dance?

SYSTEM

MC p. 345 competition btwn randomness & code disturbs systematicity of system, while regulating it in its instability

EM p. 135 (162) efficiency of system turns transgressions into “false exits”

T pp. xix-xxii two types of mastery (phallocentrism, logocentrism): 1) hierarchy [Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger] 2) envelopment [Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel] (whole in each part), system, encyclopedia, circle, homogeny

p. xxii(n) margin, march, demarcation pass btwn denegation (plurality of modes) and deconstruction (systematic unity of a spiral)

PPHS p. 88 authority of voice: coordinated w/ entire Hegelian system: its archeology, teleology, eschatology, its will to parousia > process of sign is an Aufhebung, negativity

F pp. xlvi-xlvii desire for idiom/idiom of desire wrenched open w/in system > never purely idiomatic (absolutely undecipherable) nor simply commonplace (conventional & transparent)

p. xxvii no-place proper to “original” event, “hypothetical zero hour,” creates cryptomythical system

WM p. 254 though Hegel’s system is irreducible to Plato’s, the word Idea bears a traditional burden that continues Plato’s system in Hegel’s

DS p. 202 a system that is closed-in on itself would be checked by a safety-catch (un cran darrêt)——wrong to interpret Mallarmé’s Mimique as oriented toward its abysses, its false bottoms, as if they were pretextual referents > a writing that refers back only to itself is some other writing

POS p. 3 displacement forms a system, undecidable resource sets system in motion: necessity of “blank spaces”

p. 55 WM systematizes critique of etymologism in philosophy and rhetoric

p. 102n taking seriously the systematic formation of our “culture” gives deconstruction its systematic character, avoids empiricism, improvisation, false discoveries

***pp. 68-9 if one does not develop a systematic strategy of deconstruction, textual irruptions risk falling into excess, into empirical experiments, or into classical metaphysics > but certain risks must be run [re: problematic first re: his own writing on “history of philosophy”]

OS p. 39 “there is no chance that within the thematic of metaphysics anything might have budged” w/ respect to concept of time, from Aristotle to Hegel > founding concepts, entire system, substance, cause, etc. sufficed > one cannot interrupt, transgress, exceed “metaphysics” w/out acknowledging this powerful systematic truth

pp. 49-50 if Aristotle conceived time in a way not dominated by presence, did Heidegger arrest this possibility in Sein und Zeit, did Kant just make explicit the evaded question [section title] in Physics IV? such making explicit keeps to (se tient) the system de l’éludé

D p. 295 open system: repetition of ruptures

O p. 6 to remain content w/ reversal is to operate w/in immanence of system to be destroyed

p. 11 Hegel: philosophy’s systematic exposition of itself as science, inner necessity of knowing [cf. Derrida’s double science]

TB p. 104 multiplicity of idioms limits “true” translation & is a structural order, a coherence of construct: internal limit to formalization, incompleteness of constructure > up to a certain point justified to see there translation of a system in deconstruction

RGE p. 334n Bataille: Hegel’s memory takes him back to perceived abyss in order to annihilate it, the system is annihilation (Hegel touched the extreme, he knew supplication)

p. 253 Bataille took Hegel seriously: understood internal rigor of system—couldn’t pull one part out

***p. 275 Aufhebung: system of work of signification from one infinite determination to the next, each one conserved in the other, transitions produced by anxiety of infinity—never suspends totality of discourse, never exceeds its closure > restricted economy, circulation of prohibitions

WAP p. 74 system of philosophical discourse (enormous organization: social, economic, impulsive, fantasmatic) is an “object” of deconstruction, but also deconstruction is an “effect” of this system

IW p. 249 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig, Cohen] system cannot be given, forbids or reappropriates the gift in advance (in a circular manner) > most generous gift: give to think beyond system

PPT pp. 7-8 essential parasitizing opens every system to its outside, divides unity of the line (trait) purported to mark the system’s edges

——trait acts as a passe-partout: multiplies dealings and transactions (contraband, graft and parasitizing among them); still, passe-partout must formally answer to finite system of constraints

LI p. 44 SEC concerned w/ system of values associated w/ truth: repeating and altering that system

TN p. 223 Nancy’s technē deconstructs system of ends: always “technē of the next one (du prochain)”

AD p. 39 systematic totality, architechtonics [?]: habitability of habitation, interiority of an economy

CF p. 46 transcendental principle of system [re: monarch, right of grace, divine right of pardon] doesn’t belong to it > as foreign as an exception

***OG pp. 7-8 (17) privilege of phonè necessary moment of economy (of “life,” of “history,” of “être comme rapport à soi”), not historical contingency: not a choice that could have been avoided

——system of “hearing (understanding) -oneself-speak,” of the so-called noncontingent signifier, organizes: difference btwn worldy/non-worldly, outside/inside, ideality/nonideality, universal/nonuniversal, transcendental/empirical, etc. > dominated history of world during entire epoch

p. 93 [vis-à-vis Heidegger] thought of trace, perfectly neutral name, never has weight in system, blank part of text: what we already know we haven’t done

p. 101 (149) metaphysics: exemplary system of defense against violence of writing > what is violence if something in it is equivalent to operation of the trace?

EU pp. 3-4 [re: Descartes’ Discourse on Method] to separate langue from discours (parole), to hypothesize language as method, formation of universal language, appeal to programmability of method, to a philosophical grammar (all systematic discourses: Leibniz, Bergson, Hegel, Marx)

——all philosophies of method, systematic discourses on concept of method, would thus exploit philosophemes already caught in language of philosophy, no invention then [?]

TABERNACLE

SW pp. 315-16(n) [re: Exodus 26:31] there are 2 veils/curtains btwn [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle & [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle of tabernacles [of holies/of sanctuaries] > 1st embroidered by artist, 2nd merely the work of a carpenter

p. 316 God as name of what gives the order to give the veil (btwn holy & holy of holies), veil as gift (that it is) ordered to give, gives to think separation from le tout autre (faith itself) > did this come to an end w/ death of Christ? can it be comprehended in veiled folds of Greek alētheia?

p. 317 absolute knowledge will not accept that there will be nothing behind the curtain (in the veiled place of le tout autre: nothing that is in the present)

p. 322 verdict neither torn nor lifted cloth > if veil is neither torn nor lifted is it still not hung btwn holy & holy of holies? > who knows? we must dare the “perhaps”: “the fulgurating nearness of this day depends/tends” toward who or what I know not yet

TACT/ABSTINENCE

GOD pp.132-33 the phrase [“pardon for not meaning (to say)…”] is “up in the air”: an appearance that comes from who knows where, contingency (touch, tact, contact), & pertinent (touching, tact, contact) > dwells suspended in air, even when it touches, meteoric, suspended like Abraham’s knife over Isaac’s head [re: scene of literature, secrecy, forgiveness]

TN p. 47 acc. Aristotle, touch: co-extensive w/ animal life, the genus of senses

——animals die w/ too much touch: an originary prohibition, reserve of touch holds life on the brink (au bord) of exaggeration, touching a question of life & death

——in the beginning there’s abstinence: et le toucher parjure sans retard, unforgivably

pp. 66-8 law of law > law of tact: must touch w/out touching, ne pas toucher [touch/tamper] à la chose même, & 1st of all—the law itself, the untouchable > kept at a distance by the gaze (regard), respect law rather than person, respect law as the cause of respect

***——tact: knowing how to touch w/out touching

——il y a la (là) du tact > given as given as much as ordered (do touch but avoid contact)

p. 67 untouchable before vow of abstinence [cf. OG p. 109 spacing prior to prohibition of names]? a vow of abstinence requires promise of touch > touch haunting abstinence itself, intensifying transgression: unforgivable perjury at heart of interdict

——touching remains limitrophe > an inhibition constitutes its appetite: it eats w/out eating what it comes to cultivate, elevate, educate, dresser (train), trephein

pp. 68, 328n do but do not touch > this is not a formula, contact sans contact is madness! somnambulist reproduction of paradoxical formulas is always possible [Heidegger, Intro…] > tact discredits every opposition (esp. nature/culture) because if law is a commandment that interrupts continuity w/ “nature,” it already occurs with touch, well before man, before distinction btwn beings/living [touch as animal life itself—Aristotle]

pp. 75-6 caress, to take or give pleasure?; the order/command “Tiens!” [TN. there, here, hold on to this, take it] is not the same order as tact (the trembling, relinquishment [dessaisissement] at heart of seizing [saisie]) [beyond Lacan’s: “never give up on your desire”?]

p. 91 death threatens the promise (promise of death), giving to see the mortuary mask in the face beyond face; less the “already-ethical” of caress/profanation than a remainder of shame (reste de honte), of profanation/treachery/perjury in the ethical

——“loi du tact: tout commence, et la fidélité même, et le serment, par un impardonnable parjure”

p. 329n vow of abstinence: anything but a contact phobia

p. 330n touchable-untouchable, untouchable right on/at (reste à même) the touchable, could only be announced if before any religion, cult, prohibition

pp. 94-5 w/out playing on words, never: il faudrait donc entendre et tendre tendrement ces motstender, tend, extend > “Tiens!”: “Take (Prends)!” (tender it, à tendre on sous-entend) is not “I give you (je te donne)” (obscene phrase: assumed certainty, expected recognition)

——“Tiens!”: that the other grasp or seize, keep what one extends to him, giving to “touch”

p. 107 Derrida poking fun at himself, how he’s abstaining from touching Nancy, claiming touch is impossible–prohibited, and we love to call this loving—abstaining, like the Messiah

——Derrida jokingly scolds himself for scolding Nancy: stop using this incredible vocabulary > abstain from ‘touching,’ ce concept sans répondant assuré: figures w/out figure, therefore w/out credit

p. 131 “my impertinence will be my tact”: baroque composition, flaunted taste for delirious profusion > response to aporias of text

p. 283 for there to be a good heart: possibility of bad heart must remain forever open, i.e. tout autre > good heart must be ready for the other, for treachery, for perjury (inevitable-impossible vow of abstinence, tactile’s fate); is this how we can translate Kant’s “evil heart”?

p. 292 quasi-hyper-transcendental-ontologization of tact (and not of touch) must remain paradoxical [Derrida has replaced touch w/ tact]

p. 293 to touch as tact, thanks to you, because of you, is to break (rompre) w/ immediacy wrongly associated w/ touch (in ontology, self-presence, transcendental idealism, body proper, etc.)

***p. 296 touche à (touches on, tampers w/) la limite, there untouchable is tangible, presents itself as inaccessible to the tactile, in tact (i.e. impossible) > vow of abstinence avows (before one keeps or betrays it) transgression, perjury, unforgivable profanation in fidelity

——tact (touch w/out contact) > avowal of impossible confession: confession is perjurious, confession is inexpiable, is the fault > le vertige of comedy that absorbs (aspire) every confession, tragedy of lies in good faith, lies w/ hand on heart

p. 298 pudeur: elle déploie ses voiles à l'infini > must must not, because can can’t (confess/betray)

——la loi marque ainsi le sans dan le sens ou dans lexistence

a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

p. 303 strange couple of 2 tactilities: appropriate necessity (pertinent), singulier aléatoire (contingent)

p. 310 “consentement exaspéré,” un salut exespéré (ex-hoped for salvation), un salut juste à venir (a just salut to come, a salut just on its way…), un salut sans salvation, worthy of the name

TALLITH

SW p. 326 textile, tactile, tallith: tear my tallith away from any story of the eye, from the theft of absolute usure [tallith beyond history of the veil?]

——tallith, your fringe (not a veil), a possession which doesn’t belong, recalls you to the law > something different than “seeing”: Derrida likes to kiss his every night w/out opening his eyes

——when one cannot read original language, one is lost in translations (veils, fringes or clothing, panels, wings, corners)

p. 327 tallith as intimate secretion [see SERICULTURE], opened, given birth by divine word preceding it, & also separate, dissociated, dissolves bond, holds to secret

——when Derrida is traveling his tallith waits for him like an animal, hidden in its hiding place

pp. 327-28 Derrida’s completely white then yellow tallith; Derrida ought to have pretended to dictate this decision (to have been chosen for choice of white tallith), but verdict is aways of the other: “it is forbidden to be old” [only your fringes are old?]

p. 328 culture of tallith, of shawl (not culture of veil): blessing and death

——what color would be a tallith of someone who said: “I am the truth and the life, I have come, they saw me not, I am the coming, etc., so long after another had said, first: here I am?”

——daughters, women, sisters have no tallith

p. 338 tallith recalls me to the “only once” of mortal wound [circumcision?] (it could speak but it never does, we both know that)

——unlike the veil, the tallith depends on One of the unique, singular event whose repetition repeats only, and that’s history, the “only once” of the Law given

p. 341 tallith: 4 corners of living skin

——fur (wool) & skin (leather): tallith must be something living taken from something living worn by something living > a burying of the dead that once had possibility of auto-affection

——homogeneity of textile, heterogeneity of the sewing of corners: another book

p. 342 unlike veil, tallith must be made of living animal, mortal wraps up in it as a sacrifice

p. 342n tallith can become a shroud [shroud is essence of veil, so, in relation to time of verdict, is tallith no longer/not yet tallith as shroud? (see pp. 312, 318)]

pp. 342-43 tallith as trace of date, event of singularity, not lifting, unfolding of veil—“even if one translates this gift of the Law as Revelation, the figure of the veil,” the taking-place of the event counts more than the “intuition & movement of vision”

p. 343 when prayer replaces bloody sacrifice, tallith commemorates both privileged animal of sacrifice & (leaping w/ wing-beat to eschatological term of story) the sacrifice of sacrifice

——tallith hangs on body like a memory of circumcision

pp. 343-44 bookmark the fringes, they served once to accomplish a commandment, may another be accomplished w/ them [Kitsour…] > that’s what I’m doing, à contretemps, et signe et livre et date

***p. 344 unlike veil, tallith is the difference of the event, irreducible reference to the One, the One + n > cannot be or become (like every veil) a figure, symbol, because of the uniqueness of its reference, the untranslatable carry of this ference (which one cannot/must not get rid of)

***p. 350 [BEAUTIFUL PASSAGE, as if they all aren’t] could a “theory of fetishism” ever measure up to infinite tenderness of “my own tallith” (as if such phrase preceded ipseity, “I”)? stranger to all maudlin, effusion, pathos—to all “Passion” > yet, compassion w/out limit: absolute delay of verdict that is/was/will make itself arrive w/out luminous vision (glory) > belongs to the night, my white tallith, absolute night

——tallith not incommensurable w/ fetish, but a generalized not restricted fetishism (Glas); theory of fetish no longer merely a theory at moment of verdict

——tallith is proper to man (not woman), like circumcision

pp. 350, 352 gentleness, softness (childhood, tallith)

TAIN

POOF pp. 194-95 the disproportion of sovereign friendship, the bond, trust [credit], faith marks rupture of knowing & loving, reason & affect > if the knowledge we have of each other is equally shared, it’s shared in glass of a mirror, autonomous on both sides, ce bris du miroir est bien le signe quà l'autre mon amitié se tend et se tient > passion & heteronomy [still Aristotelian topos?]

***O p. 33 dissemination written on back, tain of mirror, not its inverted specter

PIO p. 19 tain prohibits transparency & authorizes invention of mirror, is a trace of language

——tain (btwn 2 lines) is language itself [“word”] (associates/dissociates forever: Eros/Psyche) [tain like hymen?]: an unbearable violence, a perversion that obeys law of language

pp. 43-4 invention, invenire (advent of future-to-come) comes back to the same as soon as it receives a status legitimized by an institution: what is being invented are institutions > for this to happen invention must be possible: this statutory economy of public invention does not break the psyché, does not go beyond the mirror

p. 45 it is another “we” given over to inventiveness when mirror broken & tain crossed [re: “Fable”], a “we” that doesn’t find itself anywhere—not “we” of a community of human subjects

——the other is always another origin of the world, and we are to be invented > beyond being

——to invent the other is impossible, thus it’s the only invention: the invention that invents us

D p. 313 lécriT, lécrAn, lécrIN (wriTing, encAsIng, screeNing): TAIN

p. 314 not enough to make air itself appear (call presence to mind), “air” is not a simple medium: opening carved out of it is a closed opening, false exit: a mirror—not any mirror, the tain of…

——mercury, tain of this ink: a screen: visible projection surface for images, & prevents one from seeing other side

p. 316 each part of mirror larger than whole (mirror smaller than itself): 4th surface paradigm of this relation

——the inside of text will always have been outside it; reciprocal contamination of body proper, violent expatriation, poison affirmed—mercury in its tain is a poison

TAUTOLOGY [fixerup]

***GOD p. 83 the speculative requires a heterotautological position (Hegel, revealed religion that is precisely Christian) [G], always risks meaning nothing, speculates on every secret [re: tout autre est tout autre]

GT pp. 11-12 credit, good faith, we lend each other in conversation; credit/faith as precomprehension that condition “tautology” of gift, and make gift impossible: “one” has to give some “thing” to someone other

MONL p. 22 threatening & threatened promise, monolingualism & tautology, impossibility of metalanguage, but there are effects of metalanguage: at the horizon, spectral, infinitely desirable, allows the mirage of another language to tremble

R p. 17 democratic sovereignty replaces theogonic politics with something just as phallocentric, phallo-paterno-filio-fraterno-ipsocentric (ipsocratic, though tautological, because ipseity already implies force)

FL p. 267 all law wants to monopolize violence, tautology of the violence of the law, protect itself [autoimmunity]; performative tautology or a priori synthesis structures any founding of law, so one can “credit” the validity of each performative, guarantee

HERP p. 209 [re: Heidegger] what assures homology of to auton, the reversible tautology btwn polemos and philein, what gathers tautology w/ itself, is logos > “philology,” tautology is otology

——how is Heidegger’s monology, this belonging-to-one-another of Speech [shiz produced by polemos must gather, join up, ally, couple] different from speculative proposition [Hegel]? both synthesize an autoheterology, a heterotautology—too big of a question? [see p. 214 reconciliation in Heidegger btwn friend & enemy]

POOF p. 9 for Aristotle, it’s impossible to love w/out knowing it, science, self-consciounsess, loving cannot remain a secret, la force obscure mais invincible dune tautologie [tautology & necessity]

pp. 13-4 one cannot survive w/out mourning, not even God can escape this tautology

p. 118 [re: Schmitt] structural disavowal that informs/constructs political discourse [that theory of politics must be performed, sides must be taken], principle of affirmation & ruin at heart of most coherent gestures > figure of tautology we were calling teleiopoetic [?]

OOG p. 52 return inquiry [tautology]: geometry’s development is a history only because it is a history> ground of unity is the world (not finite totality of sentient beings), but infinite totality of possible experiences in space

EM pp. 125-26 (150-51) for Heidegger, exemplary being is “phenomenological,” governed by principle of principles, i.e. presence and presence in self-presence, manifested in being we are, such proximity determines factum

PP pp. 135-36 writing stripped of its path-breaking force, pure repetition, dead repetition, tautological, hollow, repetition of death > writing is not living repetition of the living

pp. 168-69 two tautologies, repetitions: 1) life coming back to itself: eidos, logos, mnēmē, phōnē, requires dialectics, didactics 2) life going out of itself beyond return, unreserved spending, irreducible excess, play of supplement [can’t think these apart from one another]

VM p. 94 for Levinas, concrete (nonformal) tautology or false (finite) heterology [compare to “false infinite”], along w/ the negative (work, history, etc.), never has a relation w/ other > no negativity in metaphysical transcendence

pp. 135-36 acc. Levinas, Being has impoverished logic of “truism,” [?] valid for every existent except “the Other,” subordinates ethics to ontology,

——if “truism” = analytic affirmation (poverty of tautology) > wouldn’t Being escape form of (banal) truism, where subject is repeated in predicate?

p. 153 Hegel’s speculative logic: living logic which reconciles formal tautology and empirical heterology [after having thought prophetic discourse in preface to Phenom…]

VP p. 6 “founding value of presence” is a pleonastic expression

p. 30 “they [facial expressions] do not want to say (vouloir-dire) anything because they do not want (vouloir-dire) to say anything.”

S pp. 8-9 Heidegger’s spirituality would be a nodal resistance in its most economical torsion, a truth of truth, the tautology of which does not need to be discovered/invented: spirit as another word for the One and Versammlung [Derrida is presenting this politely as an hypothesis, but he knows it’s true]

p. 18 how else but by confirming it a priori and circularly can Heidegger question Daseins privilege (Vorrang) re: the question?

p. 70 that one can only think in German is a half-asleep tautology (confirmed by ideas of untranslatability of Sein, Denken, Geist)

pp. 125-27n Derrida reminds of Matthew Arnold, his Babelian phrase Get Geist, his claim that Geist is untranslatable > in Get Geist spirit apostrophizes itself, a beginning—no beginning (pas de commencement): in the beginning there will have been (ghost of future perfect)

T p. ix Hegel: need for philosophy begins w/ itself

P p. 22 asking what art means, the vouloir-dire of art, tautology w/out reserve, logocentrism of question “What is art?”—teleology & hierarchy prescribed in envelope of this question

p. 26 Hegel’s ternary rhythm—what he calls a “ring”—encircles, links to other rings: in science of beautiful, mind presupposes, anticipates itself > philosophy of art: circle in circle of circles

pp. 135-36 acc. Kant, sublime is absolutely large, w/out dimension, an unequal equal only to itself > why is there still reference to a cise in space? if absolutely large why not absolutely small? Kant’s preference of largeness is tautological: more is more (preference itself thinks more)

OTO pp. 3-4 strict adherence to classical pedagogy (whose imperatives one can never break from once and for all) would reduce you to silence, tedium, tautology

ATIA pp. 92-3 Kant’s fundamental anthropocentrism, man possesses representation “I”: tautological, egological, autographical

——power of “I”: “I can I,” a divine injunction that empowers man (not simply speak I, but think I, be present as self, as I)

FS p. 27 Hegel demonstrated that explication of a phenomenon by a force is tautology; yet, one must consider this w/in language’s inability to emerge from itself, not solely w/in thought of force

——force is the other of language [by articulating it, becomes a phenomenon]

***O p. 29 scriptural apparatus of Hegel’s opening w/ sense-certainty

p. 31 tautology & heterology coupled together in speculative proposition > analytic/synthetic procedure mutually envelop each other: no more anteriority, belatedness of form, exteriority of content > concept enriches itself

SW pp. 318-19 verdict: end of the end of history, everything is going to start again—is there a heritage looming at this instant/point of verdict? > I am no longer in question re: this unknown verdict, one that, if it came, would be so tortuous, so against the rhythm, that it would mime quasi-resurrection of new year by sealing forever the “so late, too late, sero” > “late” (always tautology) means “so late,” “too late, absolutely”

DPi p. 256 must go from quasi-tautological opposition of life to death to a more specific opposition: opposition of life to DP

Gi p. 20 [Heidegger’s tautology?] relation to birth/death speaks w/, supports itself through, dispersion, unbinding (Zerstruung, Unzusammenhang)

——Daseins btwn death/life not possible w/out dispersion

PIO p. 12 inventive event as both quotation & narrative [re: “Fable”], allegory & tautegory > event of an utterance, its vis inventiva, inseparable from syntactic play, also an art of disposition

***p. 22 there can be no problematics of deconstruction [this after wondering whether deconstruction can be inventive in itself]

RM p. 77 Heidegger’s nontautological fashion (like Sprache, Ereignis): trait treats or treats itself, traces the trait, retraces or re-treats the withdrawal > a strange contract that doesn’t precede, for once, its own signature (sa propre signature), and therefore carries it off (et donc l’emporte)

WAP p. 46 [tautological] consciousness of stricture: being-right of right is its right to be right

p. 55 invitation (Aufforderung) to tribunal of reason would be a repetition of old task (Nancy on Critique: philosopher pronounces law on law)

pp. 147-48 Derrida now wonders whether Hegel’s philosophy itself demands that no texts [i.e. his “Report”] be minor [preface? not even a text?] > passage from minor to major is tautological, reproduces heterotautology of speculative proposition

——Hegel’s system an immense school: auto-encylopedia of absolute spirit in absolute knowledge > never leave this school, mandatory instruction

——Universitas: onto-, auto-encyclopedic circle of the State

AFR pp. 80-1 Condillac: if there is fundamentally only one machine, there is fundamentally only one property > unique property assures possibility of “identical propositions,” this self-evident identity (nontautological) is discovered by way of Reason, is “the only sign of evidence” > all modifications are those of first property modifying itself: sensibility

——Condillac’s non-Cartesian indubitability: first property which knows itself (sensibility)

p. 134 need or desire? 1) frivolity comes to need through desire, desire opens direction of object, produces supplying (suppléante) sign, is thin, slight, inconstant 2) need is frivolous, need w/out desire is blind, no object, identical to itself, tautological, autistic: in such a case, desire would moralize need, subject it to law

IW p. 292 exemplarism (center of our reflection on nationality): our Beispiel (example) must be followed as a model (Vorbild) to recognize our Vormacht (hegemony, preeminence): if Beispiel is exemplary, not indifferent case in series, then this statement is a tautology

——exemplary as a pre-model, a pre-formative model, an ideal

EL p. 216 tautological & contradictory logic (speaks of the event of an impossible, makes of impossible the condition of possibility): secularization allows us to speak of a secularization that doesn’t take place

TN p. 222 Nancy: “created body” is a tautology [what else but body is created?], body is the coming into presence as being this screen [no depth]

p. 258 [heterotautology?] transitivism: flesh wants a hand, God’s hand, must go beyond hand of man, then come back to Incarnation, to flesh, to receive hand of man from God

pp. 260-61 how to go from unfigurable to figurable (God to man’s hand) > question of passage, figural transfer—but one answer: passage, like Incarnation, Passion, Transubstantiation, mediation btwn infinite immediate & finite medium, btwn infinite & singular finite—is logos fashioned into flesh, the Son, the Hand of the Merciful Father [heterotautology]

p. 274 will is will to touch, strange tautology, bends oneself back into passive affect of activity—desire

E p. 21 logo-phonocentric system doesn’t exclude a negative, negative is its business, it’s work, it excludes what can’t be digested, represented, eaten, irreducible heterogeneity: vomit

——tautologically, vomit never lets itself be swallowed thus causes itself to be vomited

p. 23 to say that the other of the system of taste is distaste (disgust) is tautological, yes > Derrida wonders whether the tautological structure (that of logos as self-same-identity) is the very form of what the exclusion (of disgust) serves to construct

EW p. 280 link the question of “who” to the question of “sacrifice,” phallogocentrism as a schema of carnivorous virility

——carno-phallogocentrism: a heterotautology as a priori synthesis, i.e. “speculative idealism,” “becoming-subject of substance,” “absolute knowledge,” “speculative Good Friday” > idealizing interiorization of phallus and its necessity of its passage through the mouth

BSi pp. 78-9 “reason of strongest always best” is violently tautological [Derrida’s “gonna show” this tautology, but never does, thus (as the professor, as the strongest in the room) he does show it (a performative demonstration)]

EU p. 85 for Kant, that scholars alone can judge other scholars, a tautology: essence of knowledge as knowledge of knowledge

p. 90 formal law: pure legitimation, reason as court of final appeal > pure ethico-juridical instance, tautology, pure practical reason, decision of pure egological subject

SPEC p. 301 [re: fort/da]: selbstgeschaffene (self-invented) game, spontaneity, auto-production, self-engendering of repetition itself, hetero-tautology (definition of Hegelian speculative): gives time, there is time

p. 302 “[PP, the spool, ça, SA, Ernst, Freud] fait semblant deloigner le PP pour le ramener sans cesse, pour constater quil se ramène lui-même” [hetero-tautology? bringing it all back home]

p. 312 [grandson & son want each other to understand] but we know what a tautology can bring back by gushing over (peut faire revenir en dégorgeant)

p. 317 mastery of PP [grand (-père) spéculateur], mastery in general, Herrschaft distanced from PP only to reappropriate itself: tauto-teleology makes other return in domestic specter

p. 403 Bemächtigungstrieb, drive not reduced to other drives, takes place in others, quasi-transcendental privilege, donner, prendre, envoyer, destiner, transcendental tautology

——drive to dominate: drivenness of drive

TEACHING

WAP p. 36 “right to teaching assumes the knowledge and teaching of right”

——“right to” as right of access, right to right, to read, interpret—instruct

Gii p. 37 learning for Heidegger, “work of hand or pen,” passes through entrsprechen, Entsprechung, zusprechen, Zuspruch > relate what we are doing to correspondence in us w/ what is essential

for Heidegger, thinking as work of cabinetmaker (Schreiner), a joiner, attune to hidden plenitude of wood’s essence as it enters inhabited site, Handwerk

no craft w/out correspondence btwn essence of wood & man’s essential inhabiting > thinking, teaching, teaching thinking is such a noble craft

TEACHING BODY

WAP p. 89 pose questions, pose or posit that which does not pose or posit itself, not-thetic? this alleged neutrality constructs teaching body > no question not constrained by a program

pp. 89-90 [speaking of teaching body] hear I am, the teaching body, in what way is this a glorious body? all light on me > it is also glorious because no longer a body: sublimated, at once part/whole of general teaching body, representative of philosophical/sociopolitical corpus

p. 90 teaching body fascinates when it’s more than a center: its excentricity permits synoptic surveillance covering field of (indistinguishable) body taught & permits withdrawal, reserve, of body that does not surrender, offering itself from only one side [visor effect?]

pp. 90-1 body becomes teaching and exercises mastery by a stratified erasure in front of/behind the corpus taught

——my body > cadaverization of my body, capturing by erasure, fascinating neutralization > my body only fascinates while playing dead, when erected in rigidity of cadaver (delegation of life)

——cadaverizing seduction: the simulacrum of erasure > negativity of death, removal (enlèvement) of writing, erosion of text/surface/textual marks

——philosophy occurs in the place of this erosion, which is effect of refoulement, of a reactive bustle (dun affairement réactive), and du même coup, this erasure is sublime annihilation of all characteristics of the face (facies) > effects that make one believe body has nothing to do w/ it (all is vocable/audible)

p. 167 struggle for philosophy cuts through entire teaching body (teachers, students)

EU p. 62 double bind that knots around sublime body of “teacher of philosophizing” [i.e. philosophy eludes teaching, philosophizing requires it]: teacher haunts the scene, doesn’t dominate, or dominates like a ghost > one might say he fascinates/seduces if these connotations weren’t too closely tied to imagination/sensibility: for reason should break the charm [of sensibility?] [chaire vacant]

TECHNOLOGY /

GOD pp. 36-37 acc. Patočka, allows demonic to return in orgiastic irresponsibility, heightening of orgiastic, individualism as role not person

R p. 53 technique, “technical measure of equality” is not a mishap, chance for incommensurable, technique before calculating technique [?] [POOF]

pp. 75-6 both Plato & Aristotle maintain political turn toward or salutation of One God, where arkhē has at his disposal tekhnē, for Plato not utopia, prayer, but very difficult

FK p. 62 technology & religion: “ether of religion has always been hospitable to a certain spectral virtuality” [return of virtual from OOG]

pp. 65-66 technoscience: bears, supports, and supposes religion

pp. 79-80 religion & technoscience (fatal logic of the auto-immunity of the unscathed)

p. 80 the “lights” and Enlightenment of tele-technoscientific critique and reason suppose trustworthiness

p. 82 machine (technē) & sacrosanct: one and same possibility

p. 90 knowledge & faith, technoscience & religion, alliance of calculable and incalculable

p. 91 the 2 types of auto-immune supplementarity imposed by religious reactivity to technology: 1) violent sundering (Entwürzelung) from all roots, all sacred: identity, proper name, culture, memory 2) counter-fetishism, animism of technology as evil [See H p. 53 & SPOM p. 64]

p. 93 “contemporary” movements (ecologists, humanists…) search for salvation in new alliance btwn tele-technoscientific & two sources of religion: 1) heilig, unscathed 2) faith, belief

H p. 45 to-and-fro btwn urgency of end-of-millenium and tradition from which we receive axioms, vocabulary, concepts: techno-political-scientific mutation obliges deconstruction

p. 137 technological prostheses, whose refinements are unlimited in principle > still give fantasy of auto-nomy, auto-affection: is there hospitality w/out this, w/out auto-affection, the privileged figure of hearing oneself speak?

***p. 139 urgent contemporary matters [new technologies] not only bring classical structures into present, they seem to deconstruct these inheritances of themselves

p. anne 64 hospitality threatens a world founded on transparency and quantification?

AF p. 15 does the psyche transform w/ technological advancements or does it find itself better represented?

***pp. 16-7 the prosthetic, hypomnesic techniques of archive not only place for storing, but also determine structure of the archivable content in its very coming into existence, in its relationship to the future

SPOM p. 66 Marx rare thinker of past to think originary indissociability of technics and language, tele-technics

p. 67 techno-mediatic power that conditions and endangers any democracy

p. 98 techno-tele-media apparatuses don’t affect only the facts but concept of “facts”

p. 177 figures of death: differance of technical apparatus, iterability, non-uniqueness, prosthesis, synthetic image, simulacrum, all of which begins in language, before language

p. 212 technology separates present from representation more severely than ever

pp. 212-13 the event we are prowling around (autour duquel nous rôdon) hesitates btwn singular “who” of ghost and general “what” of simulacrum; in dis-locaton, in virtual space of tele-technosciences, le messianique tremble au bord de cet événement même

POR p. 12 (142) vis-à-vis Heidegger, one can longer distinguish btwn technology, science, theory and rationality, principle of reason cannot be separated from idea of technology [techno-science]

——(143) never before has science been tied so closely to military aims, military technology [Derrida refers to finalisation of research]

***HERP p. 212 Verfall into optics, spectacle, noise > poets, thinkers not tolerated

MPM pp. 106-07 to distinguish Gedächtnis (thinking memory) from Erinnerung (interiorizing memory) de Man marks irreducible link btwn memory & technical dimension of memory (art of writing, hypomnesic, exteriority of Mnemon, archivation, data banks, artificial memory) > no deconstruction w/out calling into question dissociation of thought and technology, no longer able to subscribe to Heidegger’s Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht (science does not think)

p. 109 for Heidegger, thinking of essence of technology is not technology, is free of technicity, same for science [and he would say the same of rhetoric]

p. 139 deconstruction is no longer Heideggerian where he tries to reclaim hierarchy, limit purity by claiming “essence of technology is nothing technology” [or thinking of rhetoricity is not rhetorical]

p. 140 Heidegger protects agains abyssal risk of parasitic contamination, of an an-oppositional differance, thus risk and gravity of saying, “essence of technology is not foreign to technology”

A pp. 59-60 from kidnapping to hostage war (different modes of technology)

EM p. 128 (154) for Heidegger, what is threatened in extension of metaphysics & technology is the essence of man, devastation of languages threat to essence of humanity

OH p. 45 following program—application of know-how > ethics & politics become a technology, no longer order of practical reason or decision, begins to be irresponsible

VP pp. 64-5 the complicity of idealization and the voice are unfailing: brings monstration [?] to completion; unity of phonē and technē, voice as technical mastery of the object, via objectivity of object > the ideal object can be repeated, to infinity, while remaining the same

S p. 10 acc. Heidegger, essence of technology is not technological; Derrida: what if it is? what is this desire for rigorous non-contamination? > envisage fatal necessity of a contamination

——“contamination by technology of the thinkable essence of technology”

FSW p. 228 Freud augured a beyond and beneath of “Platonic” closure > by opening to theme of writing, writing as technē, as relation btwn life & death, btwn psychical and nonpsychical

——perhaps we need a new name for technology to remove from traditional problematic

FWT p. 97 technology [telephone, Internet, stock market] dissociates political field from territorial & national field > new concept of political is being forged

POOF pp. 135-36n, for Heidegger & Schmitt, technics depoliticizes & neutralizes > for Schmitt, though, there is know being-toward-death, only life against life: life confronted w/ the machine qua death is no longer life

pp. 141-42 in history of partisan Schmitt details, there’s a move away from autochthony (1st partisans were nationalists), & a study of tele-technology (new speeds, new relations to space)

——tele-technical prosthetic automotion breaks w/ autochthony, cuts telluric roots of 1st guerilla wars

pp. 142-43 [per usual] Derrida will not accept Schmitt’s periodization of the partisan: “telluric autochthony is already a reactive response to a delocalization and to a form of tele-technology” > what Schmitt said of the partisan could have been said of most classical combatant

——not simply a problem of periodization: at stake are relations btwn history of the political & the structure of theoretical concepts which one claims to articulate upon it

p. 144 re: cybercrime, ‘Clipper’ chip, etc., despite the technological mutation which produces structural effects, there’s fundamentally nothing new here > certainly, but novelty of structural effects mustn’t be neglected: the entirety of the ‘concrete’ in politics

pp. 197-98 for Aristotle, one can not be friends w/ a tool (órganon), friendship irreducible to technologization: requires philía, puskhé, ánthrōpos, díkaion, nómos, sunthékē (convention, contract), koinōnía (communal sharing) > it is thus, out of a relation of proportion, a tendential law, that friendship finds its destiny in democracy

pp. 248-49 Schmitt & Heidegger give credit to oppositional logic (one Nietzsche smiles at) > Heidegger on technological deployment of modern ‘world wars,’ abandonment of Being, man as ‘most important raw material,’ lets his will be unconditionally equated w/ the process

p. 270n Heidegger: in accomplishment of metaphysics, metaphysics becomes ‘psychology,’ psychology & anthropology are last word of metaphysics—psychology & technics go hand in hand

pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

P pp. 20-1 for Hegel, art has a single meaning, une vérité une et nue, an etymon, that can be unveiled through history > wouldn’t this mean art is outside of history? but philosophers have always been too quick to deem art historical via opposition tekhnē/physis translated as art/nature

***SW p. 331 “immobile archaism of the fantasy [Oedipus as eye-surgeon?] can outplay w/ its infinite anachronism all the lasers in the world”: (the unconscious) resists translation “in an age of technoscience,” never disarms, nor should we ever > more powerful than technical all-powerfulness

RGE pp. 262, 265 servility/work as desire for meaning, techne as unfolding of truth > how writing of lordship (which seeks to maintain trace) becomes writing of servility (for Bataille)

Gii p. 36 hand is monstrosité (monstrasity), proper characteristic of man as the being of monstration

——“can’t talk about hand w/out talking about technology” [Derrida has just recalled photographs of Heidegger’s hands, way the hands seem deliberately staged, overflow the frame]

——acc. Heidegger, sciences belong to essence of technology, not to technology—to its essence; technology remains plunged in a fog (noyée dans un brouillard) > we still do not think (science, no one, is responsible for this) > the most thought-provoking (das Bedenklichste): we still do not think

p. 39 Heidegger’s Hand-werk, an artisanal protest against hand’s defacement in industrial automation of modern mechanization

p. 46 Derrida proposes “manuscripture" to Heidegger’s handwriting (Handschrift), given that typewriting, which Heidegger will indict, is also a handwriting

——Heidegger: typewriter “tears (entreisst) writing from the essential realm of the hand” [MOP]

——“typed” word only a copy (Abschrift)

——machine “degrades” word into means of commerce, offers the advantage, for those who enjoy degradation, of dissimulation > Heidegger: “typewriter makes everyone look the same”

p. 47 typewriter becomes signless, a-signifying (zeichenlos), it dissimulates, a movement of withdrawal, subtraction (entziehen) [loses the hand]

p. 49 [for Heidegger, all technology of hand is surgery?]

PIO p. 10 grasp unity of 2 measures of invention: 1) fabula/fictio: art 2) tekhnē, epistemē, istoria, methodos, art, know-how, procedure, knowledge, research

pp. 24-5 coming about (survenue) of the new always due to operation of human subject, invention always belongs to man as inventing subject, techno-epistemo-anthropocentric > invention’s value inscribed in structures that bind technical order w/ metaphysical humanism (differentially)

——Derrida links tekhnē/fabula and historia/epistemē > man defined by human subject’s aptitude for invention: 1) narrative fiction, historical fabulation 2) technical or technnoepistemic innovation

p. 32 the 2nd notion of invention [dispositif] haunts & thus magnetizes the 1st [unveil what’s there] > this haunting at heart of question re: modern tekhnē

RM p. 62 for Heidegger, Metasprache and Sputnik are the same, monstrous project of father, of metaphysics (mastery of form for form’s sake)

HLP p. 52 tele-techno-mediatic modernity: colossal amplification

TR p. 133 machine structurally resembles causa sui, figure of God, question of technical as question of theological: Bergson’s “machine for making gods”

WAP pp. 105-06 double bind of techno-science (formalization)/philosophy (mother/natural tongue): 1) formalization of techno-science resists monolingual hegemony of philosophy as onto-encylopedia—science of sciences 2) philosophy can still point to dogmatic philosophemes in science

***PSSS p. 249 death & technics > nonderivable, nonsecondary technics

D p. 292 technicity as metaphor that transports life into death, a non-accidental extra, which, in its act of falling (en y tombant): la branche (plugs it in) et la déclenche (and triggers it off): “force vivante

TN p. 19 death introduces drive of expropriation, but is still more tolerable than prosthesis, metonymic substitute, technical survival [lintrus] (complicates incarnation even more)

pp. 128-29 Nancy moves dialecticized Judeo-Christian-Islamic “fellow” (residing in particular and universal) into technē > the true “creation” and “art” of our world

pp. 170-71 for Husserl, where sight requires the technical [to see itself] (in sense of mediation and in sense of “intruder”), touch’s self-relation is immediate, spontaneous, direct, intuitive and acts w/out empathy or analogical appresentation

p. 177 Husserl analyzes solipsism w/ figure of manual touching and Herzgefühl, “heart sensation”

——but could I feel my heart w/out technē or grammar (grammar, like rhetoric, a form of technē)?

p. 223 Nancy’s technē deconstructs system of ends: always “technē of the next one (du prochain)”

——one should take the technical supplement into account

——to proclaim “essential originarity” of technical [as Nancy does] translates this “law” into a classical language that meets its limit here

pp. 223-24 mechanical technique (esp. machines) as a simulacrum of “sensible”—does not feel itself feel, does not hierarchize the “5 senses”: opens place for metonymic substitution

p. 224 Nancy links a dissemination of haptics w/ body’s technical character

p. 287 via Nancy, there is no “the” technical is an exemplary example, plus quun exemple, gives privileged access to all “there is no ‘the’…”’s > le vertige quasi transcendantal

——it’s because there’s some technical (which there is not) that one can infinitely repeat examples that deconstruct very properness/unity itself of all essences, “beings”

p. 301 “facts of the day” [i.e. computer, cybersex], artefactual haunts and works through technics & desire (and work in general)—same labor, same pleasure, same torture, tripalium

BSi p. 31 for Freud, thanks to technology, mastery over nature, man has become a “prosthetic God”

p. 251 [via Celan via Büchner’s Dantons Death] art as species of marionette > marionette: an allegorical personification of technē, technical who and what

pp. 296-98 curiosus: avid knowledge and care (cura), Heidegger’s unwholesome curiosity (Neugier, Neugierde) > curious in the beast, in the madman (zoo, asylum): caring and locking up, installing limits, an art and technique, perhaps tekhnē itself

p. 323 Heidegger against science: the face nature turns toward man’s technical mastery might simply conceal her essence

OG p. 8 (18) writing & technique se confound (merge) > technique doesn’t clarify thought of writing

p. 9 (19-20) if cybernetics ousts metaphysical concepts soul, life, value, choice & memory, it must conserve notion of writing, trace, grammè, graphemeuntil its own historico-metaphysical character is exposed [cybernetic program will be the field of writing]

——grammè (or grapheme), not human or nonhuman, not simple, can’t be defined w/in oppositions of metaphysics

p. 10 (20-21) cybernetics & mathematics extend possibility of “message,” its no longer the written translation of a language, the transporting of a signified whose integrity remains

pp. 84-5 how to think possibility of techné, of machine, w/out becoming technicist, teleological? it’s impossible [?] > recapture unity of body & language, tool & thought, w/out thinking they’re unity in a system where they’re opposed, w/out succumbing to confusionism; Leroi-Gourhan’s pluri-dimensional “mythogram”—beyond linearity & simultaneity (simultaneity still linear because it brings two absolute points of presence together)

p. 209 (297) trait permits imitation, donner lieu to art as mimesis, possibility of iteration, this life & death of art > technique & imitation: opens space of calculation (grammaticality, scientific intervals)

pp. 285-86 (404) science, philosophy, epistémè, movement of idealization, privilege of logos is that of phonetic writing, of a more algebraic, economical writing (by reason of certain condition of knowledge): mondial effacement of signifier > one believes one is exalting parole, when in fact, one is fascinated by a figure of technè

TELEIOPOESIS

MC p. 346 I address you w/out knowing you, something arrives [Nietzsche’s future philosophers]

***p. 374 [artist as pervert?] art (particularly literature) can isolate performatively its own context for its own event > the “oeuvre”

POR p. 19 (154) reflect on reflection, seize inaudible in sort of poetic telephony, “hear” hearing > this time of reflection is heterogeneous to what it reflects, gives time, chance of event

POOF pp. 31-2 Nietzsche: “Alas! if only you knew how soon, how very soon, things will be –different! –” > “what a sentence! is it a sentence?” the sentence precipitates/precedes itself, a knowledge of a non-knowledge, an instantaneous teaching, a circle that is future-producing, instantaneous teledromatics, race finished in advance: “vibration of a shaft of writing” that promises/calls for a reading: withdraws from space by penetrating it [hymen], arrow whose flight returns to bow, as what happens in every instant—the end begins > elle se gagne de vitesse

——for economic purposes, let’s call the event of such sentences: teleiopoetic

——teleiopoiós: that which renders absolute, perfect, complete, brings to an end; tele: distance, far-removed, spanning of space > rendering, making, transforming, producing, creating—this is what counts! > occurs in auto-tele-affection of sentence, always auto-teleipoetics, but auto is the splitting effect not simple origin [see auto-affection in VP]

pp. 32-3 that there can only be friends w/ enemies, that when one desires enemies, we can only count friends—madness looms (in every teleiopoetic event), plus de sens, empty resembles overflow

p. 34 telephone call

p. 37 Nietzsche’s teleiopoesis, a messianic structure, we establish ourselves as heralds & precursors [of ‘community of those w/out community’?], Nietzsche sometimes says “I” and sometimes “we”: singular responsibility is always double [contretemps], doubled, disseminated: double as infinitely divided responsibility

——Nietzsche’s new philosophers: something like the Messiah

——[ethics of EROS?] double infinite responsibility: “an intertwining of temporal ekstases; a friendship to come of time w/ itself where we meet again the interlacing of the same and the tout autre (‘Grundlich-Anderes’)”

p. 41 Derrida countersigns Nietzsche [re: arrivant thinkers, new philosophers], extends the duty to countersign again, to us, to me, to you, teleiopoetically: friendship w/out friendship of friends of solitude

pp. 42-3 already of perhaps paradoxical force of teleiopoetic propulsion: makes arrivant come by withdrawing, produces an event > teleiopoesis also defines a structure of political allocution, a politics of friendship, a ‘great politics’

p. 77 Nietzsche’s unbelievable teleiopoesis: mad “I”, suspended “we”

p. 118 [re: Schmitt] structural disavowal that informs/constructs political discourse [that theory of politics must be performed, sides must be taken], principle of affirmation & ruin at heart of most coherent gestures > figure of tautology we were calling teleiopoetic [?]

pp. 128-29 Derrida links logic of Schmitt’s decisionism to Nietzsche’s teleiopoetic, quasi-messianic perhaps: its actual/effective unveiling need only be possible for it to occur > thus, decisionism is haunted by law of spectrality

pp. 172-73 difference btwn talking to them [o my friends/enemies] & speaking of them [there are no friends/enemies]: world of difference, fort/da, record their absence after having called

the contretemps [appealing to other presupposes his presence, allows him to come, while distancing/retarding his arrival] dictates, as insane as it is inevitable, the teleiopoetic sentence > expectation of Messiah as unbearable terror: hatred of what is thus awaited?

p. 174 teleiopoesis carries w/in it an irresistible disavowal, fearing all the chance & threat of the perhaps?: the called converted to the repressed, friend into enemy

——to renounce desire, must command the other to be free, to address the other qua other, command him to be capable of not answering, double bind [eg. don’t answer my phone call]

p. 235 “O my friends…” a call, a promise, a prayer (eukhé) [neither true nor false, Aristotle] > can’t give friendship, were friendship not still to come [Heideggerian ek-stasis] > in the name of friendship, “no friend” respectfully declares the perfect sovereign friendship impossible

——vous-mes-amis-soyez-mes-amis-et-bien-que-vous-ne-le-soyez-pas-encore-vous-lêtes-déjà-puisque-je-vous-appelle-ainsi: “O my friends…” has structure & temporality of messianic teleiopoesis

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

p. 285 via Nietzsche, friendship is a thing of distance, a thing of the future: friends ready to hear will be ready when they have heard the teleiopetic word

——Nietzsche’s teleipoetic word accomplishes Gospel word in perverting it: promises spiritual fraternity, beyond milk & blood (owing to another blood, another eucharistic body [?])

p. 287 Nietzsche’s Superman: awaited because he is origin/cause of man, Ursache, this friend promised via messianico-teleiopeotic perhaps, immemorially past > this friendship to come would still be too human, still deserves name ‘friendship’ [anthropological, humanist character of friendship is situated/delimited here, friendship of proximity/presence]

p. 296 Zarathustra always called us, supposing it teleiopoetically, under neutral, non-dialecticizable law of pas and ‘X w/out X’

p. 306 when will we be ready for an experience of freedom & equality that’s capable of respectfully experiencing the friendship that would at last be just, just beyond law, measured against its measurelessness? > “O my democratic friends…”

SW p. 349 I do not foresee the future thus promised, I foretell it

——the gage of my foretelling destines: calls to make come, beyond any truth of ontological revelation

——it destines itself to those men & women who will know how to read, of course—knowing how to read (voilà, the circle) only on basis of gage given > reading finally what you have to read

SPEC p. 319 [see also SPEC in (AUTO)BIOGRAPHY] greatest pleasure, play w/ the dummy (le mort), [Ernst, Freud] speaks to himself telephonically, make himself re-, acc. law of PP: signing, contracting w/ himself

p. 321 [Freud’s speculation on Ernst] needs no witness, no counter-testimony has weight before this teleological auto-institution

——net (filet) is in place, one pulls on a string (fil), getting a hand, foot, caught: cest un lasso ou un lacet > Freud caught himself in advance; rapporté différé (deferred overlapping) > describing in advance scene of its own description——an abyss of more than one generation [Freud & Ernst] (also said about computers), an a priori of an aftereffect (dun après-coup) [Derrida doing this too?] > formal structure se donne à lire once objects can substitute for each other (laying bare substitutive structure itself)

p. 332 classically [?]: art preserves proper name, science forgets proper name > what then is psychoanalysis?

——payer la science de son proper nom, science of his [Freud’s] proper name (propre nom) inseparable from nom propre: speculation, pay in advance the charges for a return to sender: reste à savoir (it remains to be had/seen/known)

p. 339 “il senvoieet la poste fait suivre, elle ne donne ni ne demande jamais dacquit définitif pour le solde du mandat” [sends himself w/out acquittance to meet the balance]

p. 341 demon, revenance which repeats its entrance, revient w/out having been called by PP > like Socrates’ demon, which made everyone write, this automaton produces effects of ventriloquism, w/out origin, emission, addressee, tele w/out telos

p. 342 demonic in scene of writing/inheritance: en se précédant de son annonce auprès de qui tient lieu prêt pour sa revenue [announcement for those who will hold its place when it comes back] > hope that message will become archival, or indestructible monument of interrupted en-voie

p. 344 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] speculating, “author” already no longer there, no longer responsible, leaves document in your hands > “literary”: make of it what you will, it’s up to you—you’re more than ever on board

p. 345 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] you carry (vous portez) his name, until the end of time you will formulate theory carrying his name > ruse infinie (more tricky than itself)

——capital front [bobine (Ernst’s spool) as face, cap as head], where PP might be placed out of action > to rout a mastery, so one doesn’t just end up w/ one’s couriers, offspring, lieutenants

pp. 347-48 Freud’s metaphor of the “vesicle,” protoplasmic bulb, amortizes excitations from outside world [and inside], protects, can be transferred to every corpus [i.e. text]: transference from one legatee to the other, like the simulacrum of secret

p. 349 Vorbilder (models), necessity of metaphoric detour whenever Freud doesn’t know what he’s talking about re: interminable band, contra-band, quantity of binding—so he uses rhetoric of code, message, envoi, postal network

p. 353 demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

FV p. 457 dead king, Freud, only one to contract w/ himself, awaits restitution > restoration: carrying off last plume w/ his 1st hand [in dying, mobilizes many]: theory of the facteurs

TELEPHONE

POOF pp. 222-23 Aristotle believes friendship requires proximity, that it fails if distance prevents ability to speak, Derrida wonders what he would have made of the telephone

——aprosēgoría (non-address, silence, non-allocution) undoes many friendship

OH pp. 42-3 anti-democratic to shut off telephone, telephone blurs lines between public and private, the prefiguration and imperious prescription of the ruin of totalitarianism; the telephone inaugurates the formation of public opinion [and soon the videophone]

LOBL pp. 136-37 survivre delays at once life & death, line of least sure sur-, no clear-cut opposition, living on like differance, beyond identity & difference > tele-phone, tele-gram only 2 modes of this teleography in which trace, grapheme, does come secondarily but marks telic structure a priori

——narrator is always away (at a distance, tele-)

pp. 169-72 in Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, 2 women, 2 voices w/out voice, tele-phone each other: “come” > how do we read this unreadable hymen? it takes place as unreadable, from bottom of crypt in which it remains > it will have taken place where it remains: that’s the proof

DPi p. 49 always telephone today linking, like an umbilical cord of life or death, place of execution to executive power of sovereign

pp. 138-39 “one must” come as close, in body, to those on death row, to thinking “absolute imminence of execution,” or interminable, infinitely brief, suspension of imminence, instant of execution, no more beyond, or beyond where beyond remains beyond, or beyond where salvation might come > telephone line [appeal of love] [see p. 213 where Hugo says “we all dream” of the Last Day of a Condemned Man; Derrida’s imperative is Hugo’s universalism?]

——telephone as suspension/link to beyond, moment of grace or verdict from beyond, who calls from theologico-political apparatus of DP?

p. 145 telephone: technics of transcendence, technics of teleferic relation to sovereignty of absent other, absent God

p. 146 vis-à-vis Nietzsche, sovereignty of music: Sprache des Willens—telephone exchanged w/ God: priest as musician

——if ascesis rejects body, telephonic language rises above, bringing the distant close to itself, the mediate immediate > the priest, mouthpiece for the in-itself of things speaks in language of metaphysics (er redete Metaphysik)

——still there is enjoyment on the “metaphysical line,” aesthetic renunciation renounces nothing

——telephony is metaphysics: religious, sacrificial, asceticism itself, priesthood itself

***pp. 168-69 impossible, unstable, contagious, endemic question of cruelty reinscribed in hollow (creux) of another question: belief (croyance) > believing and not-believing “resonat[e] spectrally in the shell or the hollow of the other’s ear,” every belief “ventriloquized telephonically” by skepsis or epokhē of an “incredible” that is not belief’s contrary, but always a belief w/out belief, cruelty w/out cruelty [?]; cruelty and belief are hollowed into each other, the credited (cru) and the cruel

***SW pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

TN pp. 112-13 phone sex: phantasm of ecstatic pleasure promises pleasure (through phainesthai)

p. 310 caress (bad or good) hits like a phone call to the heart

ATAP p. 86 write and send, voice comes from behind John Patmos: transmits a message already transmitted, testifies to a testimony > so many on telephone line

TELOS (END)

KH p. 100 speculative dialectics inscribes mythic thought in a teleological perspective

pp. 100-01 mytheme, acc. Hegel, will have been a prephilosopheme promised to a dialectical Aufhebung > teleological future anterior resembles narrative while marking end of narrative fiction

p. 113 khōra as myth w/in myth, inscribed for a moment, while having a bearing on the place of inscription, oneiric, bastard reading, heterogenous to philosopho-mytheme which orders myth to its philosophical telos

***R p. 83 regulative Idea of Kant, a last resort, an alibi, w/ a certain dignity, can’t deny I might one day give in to it > infinite deferral or teleological vs. im-possible

BL p. 190 Kant: typology, symbolic presentation of moral good (beauty, a symbol of morality), respect for law which only appears in law > “as if” in maxim: reconciles practical reason w/ historical teleology (narrative), w/ possibility of unlimited progress

LOBL pp. ~104-05 [literary] title is not its own telos, not self-mirroring, writing prevents reflecting representation from folding back on itself

OOG p. 50 Husserl’s Rückfrage (return inquiry, question en retour) has a postal reference, return inquiry asked on basis of a first posting, already readable document offering possibility to ask about final intention, which is mediacy itself, openness to a general telecommunication

p. 74 the way an outdated proposition remains unified & animated by intention of truth, authenticity, clarity (synonyms for Husserl) > absurd intention, “nonsense,” “countersense” continually points toward telos, owns up to telos in order to disown it (Stranger of Sophist)

p. 115 Europe is the good example of historicity, incarnating in its purity the Telos of all historicity: universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditonality

pp. 142-43 “the Absolute of the Idea as the Telos of an infinite determinability is the Absolute of intentional historicity”

——this “of” is neither objective nor subjective genitive > it concerns the Absolute of genitivity, the pure possibility of genetic relations, primoridal interdependence of subject/object

p. 147 Logos (always has form of a Telos) is not the real transcendence but the ideal Pole for bringing about transcendental subjectivity itself

p. 149 for Husserl, there’s nothing outside pure historicity of passage of Speech, “Logos and the Telos are nothing outside the interplay (Wechselspiel) of their reciprocal inspiration” > Absoulte is Passage

SPOM p. 45 messianic extremity, eskhaton, exceeds, at each moment, final term of a phusis, such as work, production, and telos of any history

p. 96 “world is going badly (le monde va mal),” il est usé mais son usure ne compte plus, vieillesse ou jeunesse [see SW pp. 322-23]—on ne compte plus avec elle, on ne sen rend plus compte comme dun seau âge dans le progrès dune histoire > ce qui arrive arrive à lâge même > messes w/ “teleological order of history”

POOF p. 199 friendship is political if political comes down to creating the most friendships (Eudemian Ethics 1234b 22-3, Book III of Aristotle’s Politics), the good life as philía, as télos of pólis

pp. 221-24 via Aristotle’s prótē philía as teleía philía, telos of friendship as that which can’t be reached, inconceivable, self-contradictory, would be the desire for a perfect friend, for a friendship w/ God [Derrida offers 3 reasons why this is impossible]

——if man has friends, it’s because he thinks the other, thought of the other as thought of the mortal, and thus there is only thought in friendship > “O my friends…” the declaration of God, who knows only divine friendship

p. 288 for Zarathustra, humanity in default of an end also defaults itself (manque la fin se manque aussi elle-même) —is itself en manque dhumanité

A p. 7 pas [belongs to French?] involves the line that terminates all determination, peras (end, limit) not telos, puts us on path beyond, on other side, peraō eis khoran (penetrate into place, country)

pp. 26-7 Heidegger distinguishes death of Dasein from its end (Ende), from its maturation or ripeness (Reife), Dasein don’t need to mature when death occurs, not a final maturity, not an limit end, a telos, terma, a border > Dasein is very transgression of this borderline

p. 30 abyssal inquiry re: Heidegger’s delimitation of death, modes of ending, more than one limit, ends of man an indestructable subject > death of Dasein not end of man, btwn the 2 there’s a divisible limit, perhaps, of ending, place where ending ends [?]

p. 34 absolute arrivant, no more commands than commanded by memory of originary event where archaic is bound to final extremity (telos, eskhaton)

p. 74 double sense of de-termination [re: determined closure]: logic of termination (terma, peras, finis) and resolute decision or resolution [Being in Time great discourse on Entschlossenheit]

EM p. 121 (144) “la relève ou la relevance de lhomme est son télos ou son eskhaton” (p. (147) 2 ends)

——truth of man, metaphysics, always has an ends of man

——is there an ends of man w/out teleology of nous?

pp. 121-22n (144-45n) Kant’s pure end of moral law—not anthropological

p. 122 (145) thinking of appearance (phainesthai) linked to thinking of telos

p. 122n (145-46n) man’s specificity, as rational animal, announces itself to itself, as an infinite end

p. 134 (161) prescription of the end of man, prescribed since always, has done nothing but “modulate equivocality of the end, in the play of telos and death”

——dans la lecture de ce jeu: le fin de lhomme est la pensée de lêtre, lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre, la fin de lhomme est la fin de la pensée de lêtre > lhomme est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-a-dire la fin de son propre > lêtre est depuis toujours sa propre fin, cest-à-dire la fin de son propre

SEC p. 325 general possibility of “parasite”: 1) trap (piège), failure (échec), abyss outside/in front of language, ditch (fossé), place of external perdition, which language can avoid, sheltered by (à labri de) its essence or telos? 2) or is this risk, internal and positive condition of its possibility, this outside its inside?

——Austin makes us accept as ordinary a teleological and ethical determination > univocality of statement, self presence of total context, transparency of intentions, presence of meaning—absolute singular oneness of speech act

OH pp. 13-4 “cap” (caput, capitis), the head, extremity of the extreme, last legs, final moment (eschaton > telos); captain (not a woman); eschatology and teleology—that is man

pp. 27-8 in the dated nature of dating, of currentness, lies a disquieting wrinkle, stigmata of anachrony marking all our days > traditional discourse of modernity, discourse of anamnesis w/ its goût de fin, if not for death

——horizon (ancient Greek) = limit; to see itself (Europe) on the horizon, is to see itself from its end, discourse of anamnesis—taste for finality (goût de fin), for death

VP p. 7 Husserl determines logos on basis of logic, giving logicity the normalcy of logos telos, the telos of being as presence; this requires distinction btwn pure logic or “pure logical grammar” and pure grammar [logic before language]

p. 8 dignity of a telos, purity of a norm, essence of a destination

——every time presence is threatened Husserl appeals to a telos, Idea in the Kantian sense, infinity of prescribed progress, permitted repetition

pp. 83-4 knowledge as norm, intuition adequate to its object, already opened by promise, telos, in truth, the pro-visional [difference btwn intuition/intention] as essence of meaning (vouloir-dire), discourse adheres to discursive essence when false, attains its entelechy when true

——“pure logical grammar” > le sens nattend pas la vérité insofar as it expects it (en tant quil lattend)

S p. 50 Aristotle’s dynamis (potentiality) is a virtuality oriented by a telos

PPHS p. 88 for Derrida, contents of semiology cannot be exhausted by the metaphysical theory which regulates bedeuten (meaning) by the telos of speech

p. 91 sensory matter hierarchized acc. power of ideality; physical ideality as teleological anticipation, or inversely, concept and value of ideality a “metaphor” > the “history” of metaphysics; sensualist reduction & idealist teleology follow same line [circle]: “metaphor”

WM pp. 247-48 via Aristotle, univocity (one meaning per noun) is telos (essence) of language, there is only finite polysemia: a nonmasterable dissemination (an irreducible polysemia) is not even a polysemia, it belongs to what is outside language, and thus outside humanity

OS p. 54 for Aristotle, potentiality & act are not symmetrical: governed by teleology of presence, act (energeia) as presence (ousia, parousia)

P p. 25 for Hegel, telos of beauty is found in art not nature; for Hegel, there’s almost no natural beauty, and it is inferior to beauty produced by mind

p. 68 finalité sans fin

pp. 85-7 but en blanc [cf. C p. 229 can(n)on] (gun as finality w/out end in sight) [goal as white page] Kant’s finality w/out end: free beauty, wild tulip

p. 95 free beauty, tulip, cut off from fecundation but not sterile: sterility is determined from the end (as end of end)

pp. 100-01 adherent/vague beauty cannot relate—is there a frame btwn them? suspending relation, puts them in relation > which is the example of which?

——pure telos of beauty (as non-telos), telos of 2 beauties would be sans, nonpresentation of telos

p. 104 conceptual determination of end limits free play (of imagination): sans opens play w/in beauty

——one must choose btwn not seeing beauty & seeing the end

p. 105 the strange fact that the median propositions (those on free beauty) in Kant’s Critique remain suspended, lack immediate justification—though magnetized by their end

p. 106 perfection [teleological end, purpose] often confused w/ beauty, Kant breaks from this tradition > judgment of taste does not bear on perfection of object, its internal possibility of existence—those examples (man, horse, buildings) which only have adherent beauty always have relation to man [Kant’s beauty as anti-anthropological in its anti-perfection] [the subjective finality or finality w/out end (beauty) vs. objective finality]

p. 108 the horse is so much a part of man’s telos, it can never achieve errant, free beauty, unable to disregard its objective finality which can only be external

p. 117 acc. Kant, though we cannot determine empirical laws of nature, we must act as if an understanding (not our own) gave them unity [regulative idea?]

pp. 117-18 in Kant, art of man analogized with art of creator (unity of empirical laws), man has goal before operating, this effaces a priori the sans, the pure cut of free beauty

——connection btwn anthropo-theologism & analogism: course being steered [Spinoza says something quite tangential in Ethics], analogy w/ practical finality is its medium

——analogism saturates hiatus by repetition: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse, reconstitutes economy of mimesis (economimesis), lanalogisme recapitule ou recapite

p. 125 an object is “prodigious,” monstrous (not colossal), when, by size, it annihilates & reduces to nothing the end which constitutes its concept, exceeds the final limit, overflows end & concept

ATIA p. 100-01 for Kant [via Adorno], animals have no teleology (so always a means), they have no dignity (Würde), that is, no priceless internal value, so always a price, always belong to sensible world that must be sacrificed; Adorno sees in this a hatred towards animals, a Kant avec Sade

p. 102 Kant’s providential-machine (Maschinenwesen der Vorsehung), which teleologizes in advance all war machines, would prosecute war w/out mercy against animal in form pax humana

GSP p. 157 how “untamed genesis” demanded of Husserl a metaphysics of history and a solid structure of telos, moving phenomenology beyond descriptive space, beyond phenomenology?

p. 165 genetic description of ego prescribes task of a universal genetic phenomenology (a eidos of historicity) for Husserl, this is not a series of ruptures, revolutions, that tear open a previous finitude to lay bear a hidden infinity, giving voice to dynamis of silence > the ruptures are always already indicated [Telos] [Derrida wonders if this a metaphysical affirmation in a phenemonology]

p. 167 Telos/Vorhaben > infinite theoretical anticipation & infinite practical task: Kantian Idea as project of phenom.? makes it possible by overflowing its system (as its end?) > doesn’t enclose genesis of Being & meaning—is structurally genesis itself: origin/becoming, birth of history

FS pp. 22-3 Proust’s aesthetic/critical method not outside the work, but heart of its creation > the end of the book engenders its beginning (Derrida compares Proust to Hegel)

p. 23 logos spermatikos: adult in miniature, encasement, anthropomorphic concept, preformationsim, biological idea, totality of hereditary characteristics enveloped in germ

p. 26 structuralism tries to avoid all finalism, telos, tries not to refuse every accident as an aberration, but it lives w/in, on, its promise & practice: how can there be an organized totality w/out end, or intentionality w/out consciousness?

——structuralist totality promises infidelity to telos, but: structures must permit totality to open, overflow itself, totality thus takes on meaning by anticipating telos > an opening which liberates genesis and time but risks stifling force under futural becoming of teleological form

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

p. 36 the 2 fictions: 1) when fiction is in service of meaning, truth is (truth of) fiction, it is low on a hierarchy, accessory to concept 2) fiction outside mimetologism affirms itself as simulacrum, disorganizes all oppositions to which teleology of book sought to violently subordinate it

DPi p. 188 for Hugo, seed of abolition (germe always goes together w/ teleology), abolition will happen, a magnificent advance, advance is credit: make civilization a loan in advance > promise

——spirit of revolution makes an advance to spirit of civilization

p. 258 an end will never put an end to finitude because: finality of this end will produce phantasm of this end of finitude, the other side of an infinitization (experience constitutive of finitude)

Gii p. 30 for Fichte, “we” of Geschlecht, question of humanity (Menschlichkeit) (versus animality) > teleological essence of humanity announced par excellence in Deutschheit

PIO pp. 34-6 both Descartes & Leibniz demonstrate 2 meanings of word “invention” in phrase “invention of truth”—when pursuing a universal language: both speak of a universal characteristic, both think about a new machinery to be forged and found

——Leibniz, however, believes the invention of this language does not depend on human perfection of “true philosophy,” the language itself can lead us towards such perfection, the invention thus preceding knowledge/science, until, at last: to reason = to calculate

p. 36 Leibniz’s version of universal language confers productive facilitation, even if inaugural adventure is kept under teleological surveillance by fundamental analyticism

AFR p. 110 Condillac’s move from perception to imagination (and from one sign to another): on the march toward freedom, spontaneity of auto-affection > teleology: the complete sign, the true sign, is the instituted sign [after rupture, process magnetized toward greatest mastery possible]

p. 128 frivolity originates from deviation or gap of signifier, also from its folding back on itself in closed, nonrepresentative identity

——we escape frivolity only at semantic risk of nonidentity; Condillac names nonidentity metaphor, makes it the primordial structure of language to begin its analogical/teleological reappropriation

p. 135 via Condillac, desire no longer a direction, but an end w/out end > moment stone (statue) comes to life, works to reduce gap, (not) become dead again—contrary to frivolous distraction, to headstrong identity of signs: fear of Medusa [fear of frivolous?], legitimacy itself

EL pp. 203-04 secularize (desacralize): remove point, sting (Stachel), apocalyptic thorn of language > sting, this teleological aim (visée), institutes sacredness of language > this sacred language (Hebrew) would be nothing w/out magnetized pointer of apocalypse (cette pointe aimantée dapocalypse)

LI p. 56 Derrida does not impose a clean break w/ intention but calls into question its telos, its fulfillment, its actualization in a plenitude that would be present to & identical w/ itself

——intention is differing/deferring in its inception

p. 121 telos of “fulfillment” (in this I believe Husserl was right) is not accidental, separable from concept of intentionality—conditions it [cf. p. 56 is there disingenuousness here?]

——this telos, a “longing for metaphysical plenitude,” can be lived/described w/out romantic, even mystical pathos sometimes associated w/ these words

p. 122 for Searle, “realization” signifies “actualization” or “fulfillment”: “serious/literal” are exemplary qualities of idealized realization of intention, what language ought to do

p. 129 plenitude is telos, but structure of this telos is such that attainment = death/paralysis > thus, telos divided/split, this non-end not an extraneous vestige but most intimate and irreducible other in intentionality; plenitude orients and endangers intention [“dispossessed of long-for presence…”]

——non-end lasts wherever there’s life, language, intention, mark, finite infinite of differance

p. 130 iterability not merely a law of intentionality, though it introduces the structural limit of its telos > Derrida distrusts figure of intention, which grows increasingly obscure [Derrida not in “conflict” w/ intentionality, just observes limit to its telos > intentionality no more telos than arché]

TN p. 4 aporias, never through with them (those worthy their name), can’t see or touch their end

pp. 13-4 tôt (soon): davance dévoré par cet autre du temps, consumed, burned, tostus refers to instant, au temps sans temps dune flamme > on the verge, it’s the end: no time for motion, trop tard

pp. 41-2 for Kant, only man has hand (telos): allows us to explore form, whereas coldness, heat, softness are just “vital”

p. 121 desire is intuitionistic—as soon as it’s weaned (sevré) of intuition > lethal contradiction, sign of its end, its telos (telos is haptico-intuitionistic)

p. 139 self-relation, “sefforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force sarrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

p. 223 Nancy’s technē deconstructs system of ends: always “technē of the next one (du prochain)”

E p. 14 for Kant, the purpose-lessness (le sans-fin) of the experience of beauty leads us inside ourselves, there’s an interiorizing suppléance, a slurping (suçotement), by which we find our moral destination w/in, consume w/in what we can’t consume outside; this inside purpose, teleology, is moral and analogously relates to natural harmony

WOG p. 37 closure is not end of metaphysics, which doesn’t have a self-identity

BSi pp. 345-46 for Aristotle, autarkeia (self-sufficiency), sovereign, has an end in himself, is best > the end of everything

OG p. 25 (40) Aufhebung is the concept of history & teleology

p. 40 (59-60) for Saussure & Husserl, teleology of phonetic writing makes the crisis of nonphonetic writing psychological errors, these nonintutionisms exile from sense; for Husserl, unlike Saussure, empty formalism part of his teleology > dialectical use of negativity should force us to rethink crisis (crisis not a mere accident)

p. 82 “logocentric teleology” is a pleonasm

pp. 114-15 (168) confessions of anthropologist [does an anthropologist write anything else?], 18th century, humility before a goodness European society has lost: a “zero degree,” native soil, an eschatology/teleology of full, immediate closing of history

p. 197 (282) via Rousseau, exceed nature, then return to it, imitate it, but keep a minimal (almost nil) difference > nature as ailleurs, archeo-teleologic, alibi (elsewhere in space), in illo tempore (elsewhere in time)

p. 198 (283) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] in an archeoteleological concept of nature [eg. identification of word & song, avant et afin]: modification becomes one w/ substance it modifies: (nature & its other, archeology & eschatology, substance & mode, origin & genesis) > this logic wreaks havoc on juridical/methodological point of view, annuls difference btwn structural/genetic point of view

p. 233 (332) natural immediacy is à la fois origine et fin, in the double sense of birth & death, unfinished sketch and finished perfection (esquisse inachevée et perfection finie) [how Rousseau’s contradiction is only apparent, how his law of concept of nature constrains natural law]

p. 256 (363) [in Rousseau’s archeo-teleology] origin & end are inertia

pp. 256-58 (363-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] teleology as external—passage from state of nature to state of language (from one structure to another) explained by catastrophic archaeology (catastrophe of dangerous supplementarity)

ATAP p. 95 [apocalypse w/out apocalypse] X w/out X, sans marks internal/external catastrophe of apocalypse, catastrophe of sans doesn’t merge w/ announced end, is its pli: a closure w/out end, end w/out end > outside of apocalypse w/in apocalypse

——“do not seal”: i.e. do not close, do not sign

UWC p. 209 “as if the end of work were at the origin of the world”: begin at once at end & at beginning > begin w/ end as if it were the beginning [event or telos?]

SPEC p. 313 because speculator is a motivated observer, completion could never be declared by him > also, there’s a structure of incompletion in scene of writing: unconscious binds (lie) one to other [scene described & description], telecommunicated acc. same teleology

pp. 317-18 what binds (lie) game to itself is re- of return, the returned or the returning (le revenu ou le revenant), revenance orders entire teleology, can be handed over to PP

——mastery of PP [grand (-père) spéculateur] as mastery in general, Herrschaft distanced from PP only to reappropriate itself: tauto-teleology makes other return in its domestic specter

p. 369 Nirvana—death drive, teleology organizes return of old, oldest, furthest away

CHOR p. 91 once feminism movements reappropriate stifled past, feminism will perhaps have to renounce all too easy progressivism

——“dogmatics” of feminism as telos, sinister mystification, will flounder in same homogenized, sterilized river of history of mankind [w/ its age-old dream of reappropriation]

TEST/ORDEAL/TRIAL (

GOD p. 122 re: test God imposed on Abraham, where, all the way to hyperbole, “not meaning to say (de ne pas vouloir dire)” (keeping a secret) = not being able to mean (to say) (ne pas pouvoir vouloir dire)

SPOM p. 94 lépreuve de lindécidabilitié & “it is necessary” of emancipatory desire > condition of re-politicization, perhaps another concept of political

HERP p. 214 an originary enmity in Heidegger, Feindschaft, gives a reconciliation btwn friendship & enmity, a reconciliation carried in the same ordeal (épreuve), in non-identical-sameness

F p. xv forums are politico-juridical instances, require a third, a witness (like a duel), tribunal instruisant un procès, mettant en cause

p. xxi any judicial thought of the Thing [chose, causa (also, “thing” in Old English means “assembly”)] also thinks that the trial (procès) should not have taken place, did not have place > not an acquittal, but that the space of acquittal should never have been constituted > trauma and “contradictory” incorporation should never have taken place

FWT p. 108 Derrida’s wares are more perverse, contraband, than his father’s (sees his father as exemplary figure of the victim, of “sacrifice,” voûté); perhaps Derrida is avenging his father by introducing disorder into “commerce,” whose trial he would be organizing

POOF p. 16 hexis binds 2x in same time, such contretemporality another name for psukhé, accounts for, registers, lépreuve du temps, withholds (en garder) its trace in the body [by way of inscription] > the yoke effect

p. 295 event of death reveals/effaces ‘truth’ of friendship, oblivion is necessary, faut loubli > friendship w/out memory, by gentleness & rigor of fidelity, friendship for the solitary > Nietzsche already demanded “community w/out community”: la mort est lépreuve suprême de cette déliaison

***ROP p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

p. 113 Foucault pulls back from (admits impasses of) epistēmē > mais seul ceux qui travaillent, seuls ceux qui prennent des risques en travaillant rencontrent des difficultés > responsibility dans lépreuve de laporie

SW p. 325 infinite finite trial (implacable suspicion) that you impose on yourself to not want what you know you want (the due date of such a verdict)?

RGE p. 254 Lordship’s putting at stake of life (mettre en jeu, Daransetzen des Lebens) has meaning, it’s a moment in constitution of meaning, presentation of essence, truth

——for history (that is, meaning) to form a continuous chain, to be woven (se trame), master must experience his truth (éprouve sa vérité) (must stay alive once raised above life)

REST p. 273 temptation to stand shoes upright again, to return them to authentic subject: la structure de la chose et du procès oblige, alors, toujours, à en rajouter (to keep adding to it) > to put back becomes a supplementary retortion, delirious dramaturgy > these shoes are hallucinogenic

pp. 275-76 everything on trial (tout chose en procès), publicized [re: Shapiro], the proximate cause is a trap: a double that doesn’t make a pair, makes a trap, can’t put one’s feet in them, Christic shade of bait [sole? proper subject? Van Gogh’s surrender?], Christ’s flesh is bait for the Devil (Muscipula Diaboli)

p. 276 all the steps of trial are traps [Heidegger assigning sole of shoe, Shapiro sending letter], as if figured in advance: to whom is the trap due (à qui revient le piège)? des chausse-trapes, des lacets, des pièges à lacets (laces of the shoes)

p. 331 comes down to a decision about the frame, a border (bordure) which is double in its trait: joins together what it splits (partage): “at stake are (il y va) all the interests caught up in the trial (procès) of this split (partage),” what separates external from internal > a police inquiry, inquiry into the police: police always more & other than what one might want to limit under this name

DST p. 203 [re: Lacoue-Labarthe’s désistance] exemplary, superior probity that, w/out ceding to dogmatic moralism, submits ethical demand to trial (lépreuve) of thought

p. 320n Lacoue-Labarthe’s subject proves and undergoes (fait la preuve et lépreuve) the contrary > identifies itself by way of désistance that makes absolute identification impossible

HST p. 382 Jew of any time, especially this century, undergoes lépreuve (test, ordeal, trial) of impossibility of forgiveness

p. 385 impossibility of forgiveness must be thought onto la racine la plus radicale of its paradox—it does not resist the impossibility of what wants to be conceived in it > concept of concept undergoes lépreuve of its essential precariousness, its finitude, its deconstructability

p. 386 forgiveness merges (se confondre) w/ lépreuve of aporia: possibility of impossible, impossible of the possible

p. 387 limit (of forgiveness) cannot be crossed (infranchissable)—and is crossed insofar as it can’t be [hymen] > ultimate compassion, very test of substitution (impossible), to be hostage and hôte of the other

p. 397 the definition of (a) today, sursis de vie, reconciliation in the impossible > great forgiveness as test/ordeal of unforgivable [re: 2 enemy Jews comically forgiving each other]

LI p. 101 Derrida imagines himself on trial for quoting all of Sarl’s Reply

p. 105 always police & tribunal there when a rule is invoked [re: context, event, signature], because conventions can be violated (in themselves and by fictionality that constitutes them)

TN pp. 93-4 let’s not play w/ words ever: le tendre ne séprouve quà tendre (the proof of the tender is only in the tending, extending)

p. 221 cet espacement fait lépreuve du non-contact comme la condition ou lexpérience même du contact, lexpérience même du même à jamais ouverte (forever open)et par lautre espacée” [hiatus of noncontact at heart of contact]

p. 291 w/out lépreuve of impossibility of auto-affection—no love

——il faut saimer [French grammar: puts transitivity in reflexivity] says every “I love you” > this (impossible) auto-affection of love makes love possible

p. 299 compassion, if there is any: lépreuve of impossible compatibility

AD p. 106 questions of eschatological hospitality not posed (posent) in repose of place, they put one to the test (mettent à lépreuve) of an interrogation that endures sans repos

LG p. 227 “avant den venir à lépreuve dun certain exemple, je tenterai de formuler [formulate before the ordeal, test, proof of an example, i.e. Blanchot]

p. 252 lépreuve of a récit brought to light the madness of genre—spinning (faire tourner) Peterson’s genre-disc, comme un soleil fou > dividing borders btwn literature and its others

CIN p. 26 (ici séprouve la force implacable du sens, of mediation, of the negative) all-burning must pass into its contrary, guard itself: as soon as fire shows itself: il reste, il se retient, it loses itself as fire

TESTIMONY

FK p. 66 religion & reason develop in tandem, their common resource: testimonial pledge of every performative; same source divides itself, possibility of two, n +1

p. 96 testimonial, sacredness in Heidegger, Bezeugung (attestation) [see A p. 30 testify to death]

p. 98 truth beyond proof

——testimonial pledge of the other unites presence with sanctification of the law of the other [2 sources, experiences, of religion]

p. 99 socius as the secret of testimonial experience, a certain faith, address/relation to tout autre, that is, socius as non-relationship of absolute interruption: Levinas, Blanchot

***MONL p. 1 cannot challenge indisputable monolingualism in me, except by testifying to its omnipresence in me

p. 20 one can testify only to the unbelievable: that which can only be believed > even false testimony presupposes this unbelievable testimony

LOBL pp. 169-72 in Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, 2 women, 2 voices w/out voice, tele-phone each other: “come” > how do we read this unreadable hymen? it takes place as unreadable, from bottom of crypt in which it remains > it will have taken place where it remains: that’s the proof

AF p. 99 Freud dreams irreplaceable place, the very ash, condition of singularity, idiom, secret, testimony, trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate > absolutely safe location

POO p. 23 of what does verification consist, when nothing happens w/out some sacrifice? would this be a testimony neither witness, attestation, nor testament could exhaust?

——testimony never reducible to proof, verification, demonstration > knowledge [cf. F p. xxvii]

p. 24 “let us (deconstructionists?) testify (témoignons) to a secret that is without content, without a content separable from its performative experience, from its performative tracing”

SPOM p. 129 “who” testifies to “what”? one never precedes the other

HASD p. 7 deconstruction: a “symptom” of modern/postmodern nihilism or last testimony of faith, martyrdom, in the present fin de siècle?

A pp. 6-7 insofar as a sentence speaks, it testifies to its belonging to a language, an inclusion different from any other mode of inclusion (social class, soil, blood, citizenship, geo-graphic, etc.)

p. 51 “lived experience” is a ridiculous translation of Erlebnis (the measure of phenomenology) > how does it relate to Bezeugung (testimony)? Dasein never has the Erleben of its own demise (Ableben) but can testify to it, acc. Heidegger

pp. 53-4 Heidegger places analytic of Dasein re: death here, on this side, before all ontical speculation operating beyond (ultra, meta, trans), by way of an uncontested, irrecusable decision (a performative incision) on the undecidable question of “here”: a testimony w/out proof

p. 56 Heidegger’ rigorous methodological decision to start on “this side,” w/ pre-archic originarity of the proper, eigentlich, who can testify against it?

p. 64 irreducible prescriptivity in mode of phenomenological attestation (Bezeugung) > one can and must testify to it

pp. 78-9 death is figure of the aporia in which “death” and death can replace (metonymy that carries name beyond name, beyond name of name) all that is possible as impossible: love, gift, other, testimony

p. 79 [consider existential analysis as a witness] belonging w/out belonging condition of testimony, and of its language first of all

PP p. 76 king, father, does not need to write, testifies to his sovereign independence

OH p. 73 whether hospitable or xenophobic, self-affirmation of identity always claims to be responding to call of universality, an inscription of universal in singular, unique testimony to human essence and to what’s proper to man

POOF p. 24 find friend w/in oneself (Echo before Narcissus), the other in oneself, would ruin in advance what it makes possible: narcissism & self-exemplarity [however, wouldn’t change testamentary structure Derrida is discussing]

——une archi-amitié sinscrirait à même le sceau du testament [not Ciceronian exemplar]

pp. 26-7 “O my friends, there is no friend” as eloquent sigh (btwn established fact & the judgment of the sentence) > testament reaches us through unindicated channels, w/ meaning still to be deciphered

pp. 27-8 Nietzsche’s upheaval (soulèvement), interruption of Aristotle’s “O my friends…”, a seismic wave, a revolution of the political (more discreet than revolutions known under the name): refuses “accepted propriety of its [“O my friends…”] paradox,” counter-testimony

p. 32 testament: natural miracle in that the sentence will outlive each author, you & me > the arrow will have never left its bow, and yet it will have reached us [?] (never in any presence)

p. 51 Aristotle’s ‘O my friends, no friends’: a last will & testament, spoken from place of death, does not address enemies (unlike Nietzsche's living fool) > dying person turns toward friendship, living person towards enmity

p. 55 how can you be together to bear witness to secrecy, singularity, separation? > testify where testimony remains impossible (Blanchot)

***p. 93 logic of testimony, becoming-proof of a testimony that should never be equivalent to proof: its privileged place—kinship > in Menexenus, we survivors are witnesses that we belong to the same race, fervor of heir at funeral oration, supplementary proof: “we say so, and that is enough”

p. 94 friendship can never elude rhetoric of epitáphios, transfixed celebration of spectrality, at once fervent & caught in petrified cold of its inscription (funeral speech, testamentary fervor of heir)

p. 100 as long as brothers remain faithful to memory of their fathers (specters of their fathers of noble birth), they are bound by testamentary tie (recalls their truth, truth qua political truth), a monumental memory that inaugurates truth as much as it recalls it

p. 177 no testament (diathékē) w/out possibility of philological sidetracking (dun mauvais aiguillage) > testament is read, offers itself (se donne) to readings, but also ordains (ordonne) readership: testament is Bible of hermeneutics

pp. 201-02 men & women can have a virtuous friendship, but it’s unstable, child becomes the indispensable link of the bond: the difference from animal procreation is the testament

pp. 252-56 via Kant, responsibility (response, speaking, time) of friendship linked to respect (distance, gaze, space) > Kant links highest friendship to ‘moral law,’ to distance, repulsion, links love to attraction—if it’s a duty to intend toward dignity of ‘sympathy’ & ‘communication (Mitteilung),’ ‘ardour’, excess, of love can break equality while maintaining reciprocity > there must be outward signs, (external) testaments of friendship [?]

pp. 289-90 returning ghost [of Zarathustra?] who promises is a testament, a ‘this is my body’ offered again to brothers > no mourning but mourning of brother?

p. 290 great canonical meditations on friendship (Cicero, Montaigne, Blanchot) all belong to experience of mourning > through the irreplaceable of the named, they always advance in testimonial order to confide/refuse death of unique to a universalizable discourse > simultaneously found/destabilize all oppositions, opens to abyss, se fracture

p. 292 the 2 names: 1) very structure of testimonial survival stance, a certain spectrality, name survives a priori beyond presence 2) this general structure is enframed (arraisonné) in certain history, chance of filiation, inherited name, that of renown (again, woman excluded)

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, Aristotle overtook to ruin the capital letters of Platonism, the eídos of friendship, by calling the witness to the stand, an “actual” friend > Derrida will take sign of this ruin & no longer answer call to witness stand

pp. 305-06 the question “what is meant when one says ‘brother’?”, and the infinite price of friendship, supposes an affirmation, a pledge of a testimony irreducible to proof or certitude > this pledge retranslated into hypothesis/question: is it possible to think/implement democracy, keeping old name ‘democracy,’ & faithful memory of democratic reason (& reason tout court), while uprooting it from all these figures that prescribe fraternal friendship

——“O my democratic friends…”

F p. xix le tiers incorporé est gardé pour être supprimé [held in to be crossed out]: assembly of witnesses around Wolf Man’s crypt (forum): whole strategy of testifying > on sy coupe tout le temps, witnesses testify by interrupting, wounded by angular edges of forum

***pp. xliii-xliv “Cause” is designified in the crypt of anasemia, a trace w/ no present in its wake > Thing does not speak, is not a thing, its testamentary structure organizes funeral pomp of crypt

p. xlv et cest dans la mesure où la crypte fermait mal quune chance restait encore: le preuve > but the proof came for Wolf Man too late

FWT p. 44 there is no absolute archive, and the trace is not a proof [re: authentic “parent”]

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

testify to what we can neither forget nor recall, a testimony w/out force of verdict or death sentence, to not write risks worst betrayal

ATIA pp. 56-7 institutional sanction of “autobiography,” or pure autobiography, discharges onus of proof, authorizes, offers witness, to “naked and raw” “I”

p. 77 every testimony presents itself as autobiographical truth

pp. 77-8 Descartes approved use of témoigner to translate: testatur (attestation), arguunt (demonstrative argument), and probant (mode of proof)

——some animal will cock its ears when someone [Descartes] invokes infinity of experiences that “witness to,” w/out feeling need to “review” [animal Derrida? animal Nietzsche?]

——testimony knows no limit in the field of discourse

O p. 14n Hegel: proof of science/logic solely in necessity of emergency (Hervorbringung), a räsonierende (ratiocinative, discursive) manner produces historical knowledge

HLP p. 34 impossible to prove someone lied (did it on purpose): “I didn’t mean to deceive, I didn’t mean to say that”

p. 38 I will not tell you the whole truth about a history of the lie, not even what I think it’s necessary to say, I will not say the whole truth of what I think: a lacunary testimony

p. 52 how to prove by bearing witness, if testimony is irreducibly heterogenous to proof?

p. 61 opposition veracity/lie homogenous w/ testimonial problematic, not w/ epistemological one of true/false or of proof

TR p. 83 confession (a veracity of testimony) never makes concessions to lies of literature

IW pp. 324-25n exemplarity (rather than paradigm): when “nation” declares itself, by virtue of its singularity, to be charged w/ exemplary testimony, universal message [e.g. Germans, Jews]

PJP pp. 182-83 tragedy of testimonial narration > encrypt while unveiling

p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

C p. 214 leaving an “act” (act of discursive writing)—in the sense of archive or testamentary document

LI p. 62 etymology has no value as proof: if Sanskrit itara does not mean alterity, etymology’s mistake confirms law of iterability

p. 83 why did Descartes have to prove the existence of God twice? ][3rd and 5th Meditations?]

what does it mean to multiply/cite demonstrations/proofs of that beyond all substitution? God, exemplary case: unique, irreplaceable, both absolutely repeatable and unrepeatable

——[re: SEC] Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing > name of God drawn into graphematic drift (dérive): does name of God refer to God or name of God? “perhaps” of “that it perhaps does not exist” marks fact that “possibility” of graphematics places writing (remainder) outside ontology > [God should exist but in relation to name/reference that “perhaps” does not]

TN p. 272 via Nancy’s finite thinking, infinitism of Christian flesh finds itself contesté at heart of lattestation itself > we have no access to it but to refer touch to the limit

LG p. 248 law demands a testimony oriented by a sense [genre] of history, ordonné par la raison and unity of “I think (je pense)”: originally synthetic apperception accompanying all representations

——that “I” does not always accompany itself > radically persecutes the law

ATAP p. 86 write and send, voice comes from behind John Patmos: transmits a message already transmitted, testifies to a testimony > so many on telephone line

p. 92 general narrator at moment of signature calls itself the witness (martyrōn, testimonium)

TEXT

KH p. 120 the text: ensemble w/out limit

***p. 119 btwn text & theme, structure w/out an indivisible origin > theater of irony, w/out end, w/out bottom [abyss]; to isolate a theme, “philosophy-of-Plato,” would be to violently misrecognize, deny textual scene, questions of topology in general

p. 120 “Platonism” a necessary effect of Plato’s texts has dominated (in name of philosophy) by way of arbitrary violence (making the law) other motifs at work in the text

——turns back against the text, w/ a violent reversion that’s always interested & interesting [says same thing about Nietzsche]

pp. 120-21 “Platonism” not only neutralizes Plato’s texts, inhibiting forces that continue to maintain a certain disorder (parasitism, ventriloquism, clandestinity, tone of denial), “Platonism” command whole history of this neutralization, a philosophy would always be “Platonic”

***GT p. 80 language elle vole, elle nous souffle, withdraws (soustrait) responsibility it seems to inaugurate, this originary supplementarity extends beyond language in strict sense to all textuality

p. 96 text [“Counterfeit Money”]: a machine for provoking events

p. 100 et nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement que partir des textes, et des textes en tant qu’ils partent (quils se séparent, deux-mêmes et de leur origine, de nous) dès le départ [even if we wished to]

OOG p. 88 text depends on writer or reader (haunted by a virtual intentionality), otherwise it would have no transcendental function [for Husserl?]

FL p. 277 for Benjamin, text & signature are specters which exhibits & archive their implosion, in ruins, [Derrida now affirms this “stance”] such is status of deconstructive text: cannot escape law it enunciates, ruins & contaminates itself [at once founding/preserving], becomes specter of itself

BL p. 204n ci falt (thus ends, fails, is lacking, is necessary (faut) a text)

LOBL p. 83 to approach a text it must have an edge [arêtes: edge, stop]

p. 84 text as differential network

——text overruns all the limits assigned to it, but I’m not trying to transform the world into a library by doing away w/ all boundaries, framework, all sharp edges (all arêtes)

p. ~102 text lives on only if it lives on (sur-vit), it lives on only if it is at once (hama) translatable and untranslatable

p. ~137 no paradigmatic text, only cryptic haunting from mark to mark, no piece, metonymy, integral corpus, thus no fetishism

p. ~146-47 translation as transference, transference is love, one text loves the other in translation

*** p. 161 how do we let a text live? letting someone read is like letting them live [re: Derrida pointing us toward Blanchot]

AF p. 57 deformations of text: murder

MPM p. 80 all figures are ghostly figures, speak like phantoms and phantomize the text > never define trace or phantom w/out ironically/allegorically appealing from one to the other

p. 123 de Man: no need to deconstruct Rousseau, already done so himself > texts deconstruct themselves by themselves [Derrida agrees w/ stipulation on use of “itself (se)]

p. 145 for de Man, text defined by considering a statement at the same time performative & constative > this same time never is, will never have been, will never be present

——disjunction of memory & promise is the law, the text of law, the law of text

EM p. 125 (149) for Heidegger, exemplary interrogated (Befragte) being [man] constitutes privileged text for a reading of meaning of Being

pp. 125-26 (151) Dasein serves as exemplary text to read Being, lhomme reste le lien ou le fil conducteur paléonymique that ties analytic of Dasein to totality of metaphysical tradition

——“on voit donc que le Dasein, sil nest pas lhomme, nest pourtant pas autre chose que lhomme

p. 132n (158n) Heidegger destroys privilege of present-now (Gegenwart) by way of a presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit) which 3 modes of present (present-present, past-present, future-present) can’t exhaust > provides playing space (lespace de jeu) on basis of the fourfold (On Time and Being), “an alternative always suspended over its ‘own proper’ abysm”: it is the text of dissemination

PP p. 63 text is forever imperceptible, its laws and rules [legibility?] are not “harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret,” but can never be booked (se livrent) in the present

text “run[s] the risk of being definitively lost, who will ever know of such disappearances?”

——text as web (toile), can dissimulate itself for centuries, regenerate its own tissue behind cutting trace

p. 96 Plato cannot see the links (les liasons), les laisser dans lombre ou les y interrompre > they go on working, outside his text? thanks to him? in his text? outside his text?

p. 98 (111) textuality is absolutely heterogenous, constantly “composing with the forces that tend to annihilate (annuler) it”

F pp. xxviii [re: Abraham’s psychoanalysis] joy of breaking wall btwn rational & irrational, condition necessary for “scientific truth and poetic truth” to belong to “same essence”

——this poetic truth not gratuitous literary estheticism, nor unveiling presence > truth is “poetic” in that it writes a text on and in a text, hieroglyph on hieroglyph

p. xxix ultimate object still remains, even as “proper” name or body—a text to be deciphered

p. xxxvi encrypted, coded text written on crypt is not written on a pre-existing partition, the partition is the material of the text

DS p. 202 relation of one text to another, open & closed, at the same time > necessary that each organism only refer to itself as determinate

p. 238 “re-presentation” [Derrida via Mallarmé]: less concerned with setting forth things, the image of things, than setting up a machine > repetition-toward-itself of text as re-folding

p. 240 paragraph woven like textile, copious veil, fabric being spread out before & stitched down, histological operation pierces/joins w/ point, nothing but text, cut through, gathered up

p. 253 “themes” run aground (échoue) at edge lesser & greater than theme, where “there is” a text is made a possibility, a readability w/out signified (fright’s reflex declares: unreadable)

p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text, yet desire for reappropriation, structural site of theological trap, is produced, nourished, in very act of separating from it > le pli (se) plie: son sens sespace dune double marque, au creux de laquelle un blanc se plie

pp. 261-62 hymen not even a signifier or sign [an event?], thus everything that comes from propagation-structure of hymen, i.e. text, is never truly made up of “signs” or “signifiers”

p. 270 si le texte à la lettre nexiste pas, there is (il y a), perhaps, a text, en marche, avec lequel il faut frayer

if fold had a limit somewhere, if mark, margin, or marche (limit, threshold, border) was fold’s other > there would be no text

POS pp. 26-7 gram as differance neutralizes phonologistic propensity of “sign,” liberates “graphic substance” > gram not an element, interwoven w/ traces of other elements of chain/system

——this interweaving, this textile, is the text > produced only in transformation of another text

pp. 33-4 from perspective of expressivism, text is nonsignifying, from perspective of differance, text produces all signification, “only nonexpressivity can signify,” “interiority” of meaning already worked over by its own exteriority

pp. 59-60 there’s a general text, an overflow, everywhere a discourse and its order (essence, meaning, ideality, consciousness) is put back into position of mark in a chain that this authorizing discourse believes it governs (and it does [?])

—— (writing of text has exterior limit of a certain re-mark [?]) general text not limited to writing on page, that’s only a determined type, like “literature,” of this re-mark

p. 65 “text” not reducible to sensible or visible presence of graphic or the “literal”

pp. 90-1 cannot expect “efficacity” of theory/praxis of deconstruction to be immediate, deferred acc. complex networks > regional “effects” of this trembling have a nonregional opening [to the, in the, “general text” (which is neither a reflection nor an effect)] > no pretention to mastery

SP pp. 135-37 possible forgetting [?] of their code makes all texts open, undecipherable, and structurally posthumous (the author will die w/ the key inside, will forget it even)

p. 137 were the key to the secret of a text “btwn me and myself,” I will still die > relation to event of text as structurally posthumous necessity > text remains open, offered, undecipherable

pp. 161-63n la signature et le texte tombent lun hors de lautre, se sécrètent, se séparent, et sexcrètent, se forment de la coupure même qui les décapite, les échafaude en tronc sans tête, dès linstant de leur itérabilité > expropriative commencement marks everything erected w/ structure of etron [fecal matter]

DIF DIF p. 26n w/out displaced reinscription of ontological chain the relation btwn ontology and whatever it masters will not be transformed rigorously and irreversibly > this reinscription will not be found in philosophical discourse, only on scene of text in general

O p. 33 this new text, cest aussi le débord infini de sa représentation classique, a breakthrough (effraction), lining fringe [?], de-limitation, would be called a posteriority or an empiricism [by Hegel]

***p. 35 avancer quil ny a pas de hors-texte absolu, ce nest pas postuler une immanence idéale > not an idealist/theological operation, le texte affirme le dehors, deconstructs & reduces predicates of speculative operation (appropriation of outside) to “effects”

pp. 36-7 if nothing outside text, text not snug airtight (calfeutré) inside of an interiority or an identity-to-itself (dune identité à soi) > though “dehors à tout prix” can play a reassuring role, un certain dedans peut être terrible

p. 43 only extra text, unceasing preface

p. 57 text (lau-delà du tout) resists ontology > not primum movens > il imprime pourtant au tout, depuis le dedansdu système où il marque ses effets de colonne vide et inscrite, un mouvement de fiction

TB p. 117 vis-à-vis Benjamin, if structure of work is “sur-vival,” a strange debt that doesn’t bind anyone to anyone: debt not engaged w/ subject-author but to formal law in immanence of original text

p. 133 sacred text is transferability making its translation untranslatable

——sacred text (absolute text): pas de sens (not poverty of meaning, but no meaning that would be itself) > sacred text surrenders itself to translation; commands right away the translation it refuses

***REST pp. 325-26 if police there is (and isn’t there always?) > Derrida polices too [?], “close reading,” counterpolices [?] oldest, most dogmatic, sinisterly authoritarian programs, massive meidatizing machines: pre-text of perception, of bare hands (mains nue), of real history, of living speech (vous enferme en tout hâte dans un prétendu hors-texte)

p. 327 border between the text as a book and general textuality (w/ no absolute edge) comes away (sy enlève)—comes away in the sense of Gestalt and effacement

TR p. 80 textual event: calls to question internal/external border

p. 118 when it’s a matter of structure of text, concept of historicity not regulated by teleological process but by the event, by singularity of “one time only”

pp. 124-25 no text conceivable w/out grammar (machine), no machine w/out “suspension of referential meaning”

p. 149 de Man: text is generative, open-ended, non-referential grammatical system & a figural system closed off by a transcendental signification that subverts code to which it owes its existence

p. 156 de Man: text as body (always retraceable to metaphor) displaced [deconstructed] by text as machine, in this process suffers loss of illusion of meaning [dis-figuration, de-metaphorization]

EJQB p. 67 text as weed (mauvaise herbe) and outlaw (hors la Loi)

D p. 290 Soller’s Numbers is exemplary re: the reader, cette fois enfin, the text shows (montrée) that a reader cannot choose his/her place in a text > does so by composing surfaces retournées & par une mise en scène matérielle exacte

p. 294 [let’s mark in hollow, mute, invisible angle] statistical accumulation of “quotations,” [like constraints of that angle] accumulation as feigning to present the text > “this” text & all that touches it—still “that” text; generalized simulacrum: intertext of 2 fictions (btwn primary text & commentary) [Derrida will call D “this” text w/ a certain irony]

p. 316 the inside of text will always have been outside it; reciprocal contamination of body proper, violent expatriation, poison affirmed—mercury in its tain

p. 323 through mirror-effect (germinates/deforms), each sequence of text comprehends another > each part smaller than themselves & greater than the whole they reflect

——figure of quadrangle complicated by strange mirror [imparfait de double fond], mirror as echo that precedes origin it seems to answer > “echo” is an “incision” (X nétant constitués quen retour)

***p. 328 sil ny a pas de hors-texte [outside the text, extratext], it’s because le graphique généralisé a toujours déjà commencé: il ny a rien avant le texte, always implanted in “prior” writing [no pretext that’s not already text]

pp. 328-29 [parentheses: no outside text]

pp. 336-37 obsessive desire to escape due to structure of the text, obsession always textual

——textuality is obsidional: undecidable process of opening/closing—no letup (sans cesse)

p. 339 already plunged by imperfect into already opened thickness of another text

p. 341 text occupies place before “me,” announces me to myself—une tour de guet (watchtower) planted inside me > like a “transparent column,” pure outside: driven into that which tries to close in on itself > imagine you swallowed a cylindrical mirror, tower of Babel, bottomless plurality, not negative…also phallic [p. 342 in Zohar: “great, ungraspable columns of air”]

p. 350 one must choose btwn the text & the theme

p. 355 to write means to graft (same word), each grafted text radiates toward the site of its removal, sy régénèrent dans la répétition, à la bordure dun surjet (overcast seam)

——discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

***p. 357 thickness (lépaisseur) of text opens upon beyond of a whole, nothing or absolute outside: its depth (sa profondeur) at once null & infinite—each layer (couche) harbors (en abrite) another

+R p. 162 [quoting Glas] Genet’s text is not exhausted by the pocket Derrida cuts, sews, and binds: it was the text [Genet’s] which pierced a hole in the pocket first

p. 163 Adami shows what is forbidden to Glas, out of range of its signatory, signs the absolute reverse of a text: monstration, exhibition, exposes the exposition

LI p. 52 phenomenon of repeatability is condition of possibility of survival of text [not vice versa]

pp. 136-37 nothing outside text = nothing outside context [less shocking, more to think about?]

——I’ve said 1000 times, still not heard: text is not the book confined to the library > does not suspend reference to history, reality, being, (and especially) the other

p. 148 when Derrida uses the term infrastructural (not meant as substratum beneath Marxist superstructure), but: recalls concept of text, not book, not discourse, not idealogical sphere: all structures called “real,” “economic,” “historical,” socio-institutional > all possible referents

——every referent, all reality, has structure of a differential trace, can only refer to “real” in an interpretive experience

ATM p. 172 [Levinas’ work] a fabrication of quotation marks crocheting a text w/out edge: seriality irreducibly knots a text to a language

AD p. 118 hiatus ensures that analysis encounters dissociation in structure of arguments, heterogeneity: text knows how to interrupt itself

LG p. 229 all texts left open, eternally remarkable—possibility of becoming literature

p. 230 effect of code: in marking itself generically, text unmarks itself (se démarque) > because of trait, text participates in one or several genres

OG p. 18 (30-1) book as idea of totality, encyclopedia, requires external signified, is against writing and its aphoristic energy

——violence on both sides: logocentrism (book), deconstruction (text)

p. 329n Derrida is not concerned w/ Sausurre’s intentions, nor the very thought itself, instead interested in a text which has influenced readings, borrowings, etc.

p. 150 (215) Derrida not looking for a truth signified in Rousseau but an engagement and appurtenance “qui enserrent dans le même tissu, le même texte, lexistence et lécriture”—same [text, tissue] is here called supplement, another name for differance

***pp. 157-60 doubling commentary: writing that’s a reading, read where writer is surprised [re: surprising resources of Rousseau’s supplement], can’t command his own language > no transcendental signified: il ny a pas de hors-texte

EU p. 16 single text, doesn’t mean homogenous & continuous text

pp. 100-01 interpretation of poem, philosopheme, theologeme always proposes an institutional model, consolidating an existing one or constituting a new one: calls for politics of community of interpreters > every text/element of corpus bequeathes/reproduces several injunctions

——every text opens/closes, double bind, undecidability, an overdetermination that can’t be mastered

FV pp. 442-43 letter found “in” the text which escapes, from 4th side, eyes of Dupin/analyst [letter not found in sealed interior of Poe’s tale, not assignable lack, definable hole]

——the text The Purloined Letter: the open, the very open, letter that is fiction

p. 443 at moment Dupin/Lacan finds letter [by drawing triangles/circles], moment it returns to its proper course, acc. desire of Queen, they no longer see the map itself: la carte that the “text” is, deviation of the four (lécart du quatre) w/ no promise of topos or truth

pp. 486n The Purloined Letter, title of the text, not only its object; everyone drops (laisser tomber) [the text] like they do the preface

p. 493 mise en abyme of title [The Purloined…]: the text is the object

WBH p. 192 as members of a university, we are all guardians of Law, and also naive in front of text, in front of Law [like both characters in Kafka’s “Before the Law”]; p. 193 Law in Kafka’s story neither male nor female

THEATER OF CRUELTY

TC p. 232 theater of cruelty, an affirmation, not a new form of negativity, an affirmation that has “net yet begun to exist”

p. 233 Western theater dispossessed of its life, removed from affirmative essence, from the origin on, [such dispossession] the very movement of origin, of birth as death > offspring of this movement: man

——theater of cruelty born by separating death from birth and erasing the name of man

——Artaud: theater never supposed to describe man and what he’s done [anti-Euripidean, like Nietzsche]

——decline of Western theater has necessary affirmation of theater of cruelty on its Eastern horizon, this necessity always there, at work, measures our distance from it > cruelty always at work > opening of distance in which stage of cruelty rears its enigma

p. 234 theater of cruelty measures limit of representation: man is a representation of life, humanism > instead, life is cruelty, the nonrepresentable origin of representation

——decline of theater occurs in dissociation of technical from theatrological [?]

pp. 234-35 to change, revolutionize theater > to change Western “codes” [transvaluation]

p. 237 the kind of representation theater of cruelty is: not one which refers back to logos/God, presence, but one that spaces, in a time that does not refer back to phonic-linearity

——cruel representation must permeate me

p. 238 theater of cruelty would be the closure of classical representation, but still would produce closed space of original representation (produced from w/in itself w/out master-speech) w/out alibi or invisible utopia > autopresentation of pure visibility/sensibility [see p. 332n]

——Western “illness,” incapable of wanting, victim of formal habit

——Artaud’s cruelty as necessity and rigor

p. 239 for Artaud, play read can never = play performed

——theater of cruelty: parricide of master text [God, abusive wielder of logos]

p. 240 speech’s rational transparency purloins the body in direction of meaning; glossopoeia (not yet discourse, not a shout); for Artaud, word is cadaver of psychic speech, wants to renew spellbinding unseparatedness of language/speech’s power > hieroglyphics

——language of life itself, “speech before words,” eve of the origin of languages

p. 242 theater of cruelty, a theater of cruel dreams

pp. 242-43 Artaud rejects psychoanalytic theater for its secret interiority > theater of cruelty a theater of dreams, of calculated dreams, cruelty as consciousness, exposed lucidity

——Artaud: consciousness gives to every act of life it’s blood-red color, its cruel nuance, life is always someone else’s death

p. 243 via hieroglyph, theater of cruelty will restore the sacred, which man-God representative system destroyed > man has been separated from life by God

p. 244 a rigorous, sober machinery would be more loyal to Artaud’s theater than improvised agitation

pp. 244-45 Artaud is against Verfremdungseffekt (alienation effect) which reaffirms Western ideal of art, nonparticipation of specterar > festival must be political act, act of revolution is theatrical

p. 245 in The Social Contract and Letter to M. dAlembert, Rousseau suspects the “representer” when proposing that theatrical representations be replaced by public festivals

p. 247 theater/festival of cruelty could only take place one time, w/out reserve, return, economy, history, must be forgotten, à la Nietzsche’s active forgetting (aktive Vergesslichkeit)

p. 248 [Derrida’s interpretation?] “grammar” of theater of cruelty will always remain inaccessible limit of a re-presentation that is not repetition, that is full presence, doesn’t carry it’s double w/in itself as death, a present outside time, a nonpresent > [instead?] present harbors its “intestine difference” in the interior fold of its original repetition, in representation, in dialectics

p. 249 idea of impossible theater of cruelty [Master Morality], w/out representation, which begins in repetition, doesn’t help regulate theatrical practice but helps conceive of its origin, limit, horizon of its death > Western theater encompassed w/in its own possibility, but repetition steals its center

pp. 332-33n Nietzsche: Dionysian excitement has no listener, if he did, would be torn to pieces by Maenads [theater of cruelty: speech w/out listeners, spectacle w/out spectators]

PS p. 176 Artaud wanted to soufflé the machinery of the souffleur (prompter) in theater > destroy (in same blow) economy of classical art, linspiration (poetic), & metaphysics, religion, aesthetics supporting them, faire voler en éclats la structure du vol

p. 327n Nietzsche & Artaud: dance as theater

p. 187 for Artaud, theater not one genre among others, summons totality of existence

p. 188 Artaud advocates the stigmata, the wound, not the tattoo (still too much liberated letter)

DPi p. 58 theater of cruelty, scopic drive, fascinatio, enchantment that chains spectator to spectacle (fascio, to tense, tie, attach, fasciola is a bandage wrapping [bandelette]) > what links voyeur-spectator to fascinum, charm, enchantment, virile sex

——to executioner: “so, you got a hard-on! (tu bandes!)” (link to erection at moment of decapitation)

p. 114 Blanchot’s “literature as right to death” is not against DP, literature as last act, last judgment, theater of cruelty, both eschatological & apocalyptic

p. 158 mechanism of cruelty: take (infinite) pleasure in doing evil for evil’s sake > “genealogy of morals”: theater of cruelty, history of cruelty, prehistory of history as cruelty

PSSS p. 256 Derrida, advancing to a new theater of cruelty, wants to avoid alibis, will be very slow: prefers incorrigibly long [therapy] sessions

OG p. 307 (434) Derrida describes method where Rousseau’s fête is near to Artaud’s theater of cruelty or Bataille’s sovereignty > though Rousseau transforms dépense into presence

THE BRIDGE (EVENT, PLEDGE, PROGRAM)

FL p. 245 “I cannot speak the language of the other except to the extent that I appropriate

it and assimilate it according to the law (loi) of an implicit third…inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of the idioms”

MPM p. 19 de Man’s affirmation of memory, an alliance or ring more ancient, secret, resistant than familial or strategic alliances it makes possible, but is never reduced to

p. 25 de Man: we always re-enter a system of tropes

***pp. 137-38 promise’s relation to calculation: “the staging (mise) of the promise is a committed positing (position)”; deconstruction must let itself be contaminated, without a more original “third term” deconstruction will always be figurable

A p. 35 absolute arrivant makes possible everything (starting w/ humanity of man) it cannot be reduced to

PP p. 161 khōra, inscription produces the son and at the same time the constitution of structurality

PAS PAS p. (58) repetition of yes, yes, allies one yes to other, refolds the other, gives sens to a singularity that should have none

p. (62) pas de don has to recall itself in order to come about: knot (pas) of truth, truth of knot (pas) > begins to be ensnared in trap of law

p. (67) X that is loubli tout autre is also the same X of philosophy, science

p. (87) immensity cannot be measured, but dominant effects occur whether you want them to or not, and you must give an account of/for it

VP p. 11 no language, nothing, no bridge between Husserl’s transcendental subject and the mundane (psychological) self, a parallelism, a coincidence, which Husserl refuses to substantialize

p. 51n for Husserl, perception and symbolic representation, the phenomenological difference, is unbridgeable

POOF p. 38 perhaps will never be abolished [?] > perhaps makes possible all determining orders that depend on questioning (research, knowledge, science, philosophy, logic, law, politics, language) > perhaps ‘before’ Zusage (acquiescence) that engages, comes ‘before,’ the question

***pp. 219-20 how this madness [undecidable, beyond dialectics] can negotiate w/ what it isn’t, translated & protected in good sense of ‘things,’ proofs, guarantees, symbols, concepts—in a politics: this is the whole of history

pp. 250-52 a grammar beyond grammar of response, friendship a privileged locus for this reflection: 1) on répond de soi [for self]: subject, agency of ‘proper name’ 2) on répond d'abord à lautre [to]: more originary than other two, ‘insistence’ of Other, dissymmetrical anteriority that marks time as structure of responsibility 3) répondre devant [before]: marks, right on idiom, passage to institutional agency of alterity, no longer singular but universal, before the law, agency authorized

pp. 259 a few oddities that don’t surprise Kant: 1) no secrets in nature, secrets only there where there’s engagement, promise—and no one has the infinite intelligence to know for certain what the secret is 2) the impossible & necessary arithmetic returns: friendship as n + 1, plus dun, there’s always one more than the 2 friends, a 3rd, so how can the secret be kept? 3) merely moral friendship is not just ideal, the event of friendship happens, the black swan

pp. 262-63 Kant’s fraternity–friendship [but everyone else’s too], desire for one family, where the brother occupies the unique place, place of irreplaceable: a ‘pure practical reason’ welded to a pragmatic anthropology > the brother as khóra, place of irreplaceable, place of possible substitution, can never be confused w/ what occupies it: then Derrida says that from the place of this very place, we gaze over the horizon looking for a black swan [a friend] > yet, a place can never be situated anywhere but under a horizon, from out of a limit which opens & closes, thus we look over the horizon for a friend under the horizon determined by political phallogecentrism qua cosmo-phratrocentrism [khóra overdetermined as brother, limiting horizon of political translation]

pp. 276-77 are the 2 models of friendship antagonistic to each other? do they imply one another as supplementary ruses?: 1) absolute singularity of other, double singularity of dual, narcissism, secret-private-invisible-illegible-apolitical 2) universality, the 3rd friend, forever keeps question of secrecy from closing, law that interrupts singularity, manifest-public-testimonial-political > the hegemonic schema or familial symbol btwn these 2 models is fraternal, excludes the feminine or heterosexuality

p. 291 though Montaigne infinitizes friendship, he ensures mediation of solder (soudure) in the name of the brother (and the exclusion of woman) > via Montaigne, name ensures ‘fraternal solder’: owing to name, friendship begins prior to friendship, friendship survives friendship—friendship always begins by surviving

p. 292 the 2 names: 1) very structure of testimonial survival stance, a certain spectrality, name survives a priori beyond presence 2) this general structure is enframed (arraisonné) in certain history, chance of filiation, inherited name, that of renown (again, woman excluded)

pp. 298-99 desire in lovence (friendship or love) engages me w/ a particular him or her, a singular ‘who,’ desire of the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance (nécessairement infranchissable), where a politics of lovence would no longer imply motifs of community, which always risks bringing a brother back > risk must still be assumed to keep question of ‘who’ from being politically enframed (arraisonner) by schema of l'être-commun

OH p. 18 keep the heading (garder le cap) > because absolutely new might bring ghost of the worst

FSW p. 197 repression of writing, the writing interior to speech contained outside it, repression of that which threatens presence > mastering of absence

PPHS p. 71 when Being is presence, sign can only be a transition, lieu de passage, (provisional) bridge btwn 2 moments of full presence, the bridge can be relevé

SH p. 20 [Derrida comes very close here to a dialectic of program/event?]

p. 31 Babel w/in a single language, shibboleth marks multiplicity in language, insignificant difference as condition of meaning

——shibboleth takes on meaning in relation to a place (border, house, threshold) > formation of alliances, codes, contracts

pp. 32-3 tragic inversion of shibboleth, corruption of its differential value, from condition of alliance to discriminating limit, policing, normalization, methodical subjugation

p. 52 a date “may give rise to calculations,” but it ceases to be calculable

p. 67 circumcision is a determination, defines & decides, but to ask for circumcision is not to ask for meaning or object > circumcision always binds body to language

F p. xxxiv-xxxv when introjection is thwarted, contradiction sets in, and a opposition of forces constructs crypt and props up marketplace, rates, laws, forum or for

pp. xlvi-xlvii desire for idiom/idiom of desire wrenched open w/in system > never purely idiomatic (absolutely undecipherable) nor simply commonplace (conventional & transparent)

FWT p. 40 differance is at once: the same (living being, but deferred, supplemented by technology, prosthesis) and the other (absolutely heterogenous, wholly other, death, irreducible, untranslatable); ——differance can both interrupt laws and introduce economy of new configuration into living being, it can both be reinscribed in economy of the same and opened to excess of tout autre

pp. 52-3 no “free subject,” but certain space of freedom opened by event, spacing liberated, dis-engaged, before & for the pledge (le gage); “with the determinism you spoke of”—no future

p. 92 indispensable dissociation btwn unconditionality (justice w/out power) & sovereignty (right, power, or potency)—that’s deconstruction: on the side of unconditionality, even when it seems impossible > but, sometimes (anti-)sovereigntist, examine each situation

p. 96 there’s necessity for secondary effects of program (programmatic economy & strategy), but in the first/last instance, what is to be done is invented/inaugurated, must come w/out program

pp. 123-24 [the bridge] unconditionality comes, il faut imposes itself on us, unconditionally, announces future, then I try to think thought, the experience of the condition, the exposure to a limit (however unstable) btwn conditional and unconditional

p. 179 “subject” instituted only out of “fear” of unconscious, interrupts energy; one ethical/political “system,” one “idea” of Good/Right > constructions produced to resist a threat

DS p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text, yet desire for reappropriation, structural site of theological trap, is produced, nourished, in very act of separating from it

p. 277 difference is the necessary interval, suspense btwn 2 outcomes, “lapse of time” btwn 2 shots, rolls, chances > a game of chance forever new, a play of fire forever young > fire & games (via Nietzsche, Heraclitus), play of luck w/ necessity: a hymen btwn chance & rule

POS pp. 27-8 differance incompatible w/ static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistoric motifs in concept of structure because of generativity (via transformation) of a of differance; production of differance not astructural (produces regulated, systematic transformations, even structural science), differance even develops most legitimate exigencies of “structuralism”

P p. 36 Kant looking for a bridge from sensible to supersensible (an analogy), a symbol—that crosses/closes abyss

——bridge (Brücke) not an analogy, concept/effect of analogy makes the bridge itself

——analogy of abyss & bridge over abyss require 3rd term, that which heals the gap, a symbol, bridge is symbol, symbol bridge > abyss calls for analogy (active resource of Critique), mais lanalogie sabîme sans fin dès lors quil faut bien un certain art pour décrire analogiquement le jeu de lanalogie

p. 37 abyssal operation (formalize rules, multiply patches, constrain logic): work toward rèleve & reproduces collapse

***pp. 80-1 le se-protéger-de-oeuvre (ergon), énergie captée, bordée, condition for mastery of PP, self-protection of energeia > energeia not as pure, total presence (prime mover), but as (par)ergon against what’s lacking in it, lack not as a substantial emptiness, but as impossibility of arresting differance in its contour, in a pose, of localizing lack, like metaphysics does, in its proper place: castration as truth > whether parergon borders (works against) free energy or essential lack, the 2 determinations sont le même (métaphysique)

pp. 117-8 art of man is analogized with art of creator (unity of empirical laws), man has goal before operating, this effaces a priori the sans, pure cut of free beauty

——connection btwn anthropo-theologism & analogism: course being steered [Spinoza says something quite tangential in Ethics]

——analogism saturates hiatus: mise en abyme resists the abyss of collapse

p. 138 w/ sublime, everything that is compared to it is small > here, Kant throws a bridge, the bridge like the symbol throws itself [by way of reason?], btwn unpresentable and presentation > the whole world can be made small in relation to sublime magnitude

ROP p. 12 how can the cut be the tie itself? how can the link be the interruption?

p. 72 Foucault’s pathbreaking (frayage) History of Madness, like all frayage, does so at a price, bolting shut (verrouillant) other passages, ligaturing, suturing, comprimant, réprimant dautres veines

PS pp. 189-90 se laisser ainsi souffler la parole, cest, comme lécrire lui-même, larchi-phénomène de la réserve: abandon de soi au furtif, discrétion, séparation et en même temps accumulation, capitalisation, mise en sécurité aussi dans la décision déléguée ou différée > laisser la parole au furtif, cest se rassurer [tranquilize? give courage? reassure] dans la différance, cest-à-dire dans léconomie

DIF DIF p. 19 Derrida well aware of evidential calculations that will dismiss illogicality of differance, their necessity, function, is part of differance > rigorous, “scientific” relating of restricted economy (takes no part in expenditure w/out reserve) & general economy (keeps nonreserve in reserve)

——this “scientific” relating: a relationship btwn a differance that makes a profit on its investment, and a differance that misses its profit, la mise de la présence pure et sans perte se confondant avec celle de la perte absolue, de la mort [pure presence and pure loss merge w/ each other]

***DPi pp. 258-59 phantasm of infinitization at heart of finitude [dream of a verdict, the putting an end to finitude], theologico-political, an infinitization of survival assured by calculation itself, by cutting decision of DP, phantasm is one w/ God, belief in God

CHM pp. 61-2 from heights of “to-attempt-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole”: absolute opening, uneconomic expenditure, thought announces itself, frightens itself, reassures itself against annihilation by madness/death > always re-embraced by economy > relation btwn reason, madness, death is an economy: structure of deferral whose originality must be respected

——vouloir-dire-lhyperbole condition of silence, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

RGE p. 257 Aufhebung amortizes absolute expenditure (la dépense absolue), works the “putting at stake” into an investment (à élaborer la mise en jeu en investissement) > it’s laughable

REST p. 312 Shapiro treats shoes as reproduction of real shoes, misses that, for Heidegger, shoes don’t relate to given subjectum, or given world, he won’t be able to avoid the bridge, doesn’t know shoes’re already prosthetic—précipitée dans labîme, la sphinge, dès linstant où lenflure (turgidity)

——that the shoes can always be someone else’s: “to be in someone’s shoes [in English]”

PIO p. 418n aleatory event of tout autre, beyond the incalculable as a still possible calculus [p. 45], et ne peut advenir que pour un être fini [only happens to a finite being]: la chance même de la finitude > what happens thus (échoit ainsi) is how finitude invents and appears to itself [more like passage?]

pp. 43-4 invention, invenire (advent of future-to-come) comes back to the same as soon as it receives a status legitimized by an institution: what is being invented are institutions > for this to happen invention must be possible: this statutory economy of public invention does not break the psyché, does not go beyond the mirror

TN pp. 135-36 shouldn’t sense of touch touch us, for something to come about at last (pour que quelque chose arrive enfin), an event, as some say, fatiguing us a little, a singular event (!!) [: )]?

——as if idea of simultaneity/continuity born in contact w/ contact btwn 2 points of contact

p. 219 idiomatic singularity of a gesture is never pure or purely reappropriable and it can’t be separated from a scene, strategy, discursive tactics [where’s the bridge, the passage?]

pp. 260-61 how to go from unfigurable to figurable (God to man’s hand) > question of passage, figural transfer—but one answer: passage, like Incarnation, Passion, Transubstantiation, mediation btwn infinite immediate & finite medium, btwn infinite & singular finite—is logos fashioned into flesh, the Son, the Hand of the Merciful Father [heterotautology]

CIN [question of the bridge asked 3x] 1) how from this consuming destruction w/out limit can something remain that primes dialectical process and opens history? 2) how could the purest of the pure, the worst of the worst, lincendie panique du brûle-tout, put forth some monument, i.e. pyramis 3) if all-burning destroys its letter, its body, how can it guard the trace of itself and breach/broach (entamer) a history where it preserves (se conserve) itself in losing itself? [see CIN pp. 24-30 in FIRE for fuller explanation]

OG p. 108 (158-59) graphein as originary effacement of proper name, there is “subject” the moment obliteration of proper is produced (dawn of language) > universal a priori

how one moves from this a priori to empirical facts can’t be answered, no general answer to a question of this form [no explanation of bridge, passage]

p. 255 (360) impossible to describe continuity, passage, from inarticulate to articulate, pure nature to culture, plenitude to play of supplementarity > Rousseau attempts to reconcile (concilier) the 2 times after describing the birth, the being-born, of supplement

p. 256 (362) causality of rupture, both exterior & natural [Rousseau beautifully describes the bridge]

pp. 256-58 (363-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] teleology as external—passage from state of nature to state of language (from one structure to another) explained by catastrophic archaeology (catastrophe of dangerous supplementarity)

***pp. 258-59 for Rousseau, only philosophy can think catastrophic factum, which history (historians) can’t; passage can’t be explained structurally; chance, the “surprising,” not part of system, a free & mythic invention

p. 259 (366) passage from nature to society can’t be described by alternative genesis/structure; advent of supplementarity as natural catastrophe neither in nor out of nature [Aristotle]: nonrational origin of reason

pp. 259-60 (367) for Rousseau, what never should have arrived, did [i.e. the supplement]; for Plato, for all onto-theology, meaning put out of play (le sens est mis hors jeu) in condemnation of art > Rousseau does not affirm (play/game of) writing but resigns himself to it

——society born by accident to repair the accidental catastrophe (Fall) [birth of supplement] of nature

pp. 262-63 (371-72) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] no opposition applied to passage btwn state of nature & state of society, to becoming-present of presence (a lasting passage like the present in Reveries): a supplementarity, festival (fête), w/out jeu; moment of festival: pure continuity > society formed morrow of festival (indifference of pleasure & desire): de la danse à la loi

p. 267 for Rousseau, birth of society not a passage but a pure, fictive, unstable point > post-originary degradation analogous to pre-originary repetition

ATAP p. 94 “Come” doesn’t try to lead, can always be appropriated: “I am in the act of seducing you” can always increase seduction > “Come” can always lead back higher than itself toward conductive violence, toward authoritarian “duction”

THE EAST

VM p. 113 structure [inside-outside] has no meaning w/out included origin, inscribed eastern horizon which is neither w/in nor w/out space

S p. 107 most matutinal in Frühe, of promise, an other birth, other essence, hétérogène à lorigine, foreign to Christianity w/out being opposed to it, even more radically foreign to Platonic metaphysics

WM pp. 268-69 the East is where the sensible sun rises, the sun sets, is interiorized, in heart (eye) of the West

FS p. 8 “pure book turns toward Eastern edge of this absence [Blanchot’s pure absence]…is its first and proper content”

Gii pp. 61-2 savage second blow of sexual difference, its Verwesung, vs. originary, tender sexual difference > Heidegger claims this schema is not Christian/Platonic, but it has no other content and even no other language than Platonism/Christianity > its archi-matinal origin, ultra-Western horizon, constituted by hollow of a repetition, same for Verfall, Ruf, Sorge in structure of Dasein

TN p. 281 reflexivity of se toucher toi of 2 borders (bords) does not submit to logic of mirror, speculum

——eyes touch btwn 2 orients: invisible eye (touchable), seeing eye (untouchable)

OG p. 25 (40-1) acc. Hegel, writing (an Umweg) betrays life/breath > finitude/paralysis, sterilizes spirit, principle of difference/death in becoming of being (is to speech, what China is to Europe)

p. 216 (309) orientation is a disorientation, the structure of language; Rousseau’s geography of language: oriented toward its origin comme à son orient > occident as la fin, la chute, la cadence, léchéance, la mort, la nuit

p. 226 (322) Rousseau: to judge Orientals from books, to paint a portrait of corpse > oriental corpse is in the book, ours is already in our speech

CHOR p. 106 questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

THE END

BL p. 204n ci falt (thus ends, fails, is lacking, is necessary (faut) a text)

THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL

FWT p. 93 is Bataille’s sovereignty still theologico-political like Hegel’s mastery? > both are sacrificial

POOF p. 233 once again referring to the ‘infinite’ Christianization of Greek fraternity, while reminding us that Greek phília carries w/in it the injunction of its infinitization, Derrida will privilege Christianiziation for the role it played in the theological-political graft that constructed political discourse of modern Europe

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, is literature [linked to democracy, which has no unconditional virtue] the very thing which remains intolerable to the geopolitical process of a becoming-worldwide (mondialité)? > absolute theologization qua absolute politicization

***DPi pp. 4-5 Socrates’ death: katēgoria (accusation), a theological one: he introduced new demons (hetera de daimonia kaina), daimonia sometimes gods but also lesser ones, revenants

p. 23 to think DP, must think history/horizon of sovereignty as hyphen in theologico-political

pp. 88-9n one must be a theologian to understand Schmitt’s sovereign exception > decision = miracle (a decision outside norms that invents its own law is a miracle)

pp. 138-39 telephone as suspension/link to beyond, moment of grace or verdict from beyond, who calls from theologico-political apparatus of DP?

***p. 262 zone btwn capital of capital punishment (de-cap-itation) & capital of capitalism (capitalization) causes vertigo, relations murky, when calculating drive, interest of capital, is no longer calculable and becomes virtually infinite, when death w/out return is part of market there where it can’t be, where it ought to remain incalculable > theologico-political: phantasm of infinitization in heart of finitude

EU pp. 48-9 acc Kant, censorship: a critique that has force (Gewalt) at its disposal > since 17th century, censorship was always matter of church, theological-political power: grant/refuse imprimatur, decide on professional qualifications, seize/prohibit books

THE RIGHT (CONSERVATISM)

SPOM p. 105 Derrida admits that the right’s stance on the hypocrisy of what’s called humanitarian should be saluted, while remaining vigilantly on guard for its manipulations

p. 145 those who inspire fear frighten themselves

FWT p. 27 denunciation of “political correctness” in U.S. is organized/manipulated by conservatives

p. 28 general ethics of vigilance re: signals of phallocentrism, racism seems necessary, its caricature is in the minority, in those cases conservatives have a right to complain

WAP pp. 30-1 a certain conservatism to improve chances of philosophy [?]

DPi p. 116 Blanchot repeats core argument of right-wing philosopheme found in Kant, Hegel: man’s dignity is to risk life in law > right as right of literature & right of death as right of DP

p. 121 paradox of right to lifers, in name of Christ, in name of human > usually for DP

LI p. 141 Derrida’s “conservatism”: I am for safeguards, memory, jealous conservation of #s of traditions (in university & in scientific, philosophical, literary theory) > I am actively committed to safeguards: at same time (in same text), I call into question foundation of these traditions

——in deconstructive practice, opposition conservative/revolutionary no longer pertinent

p. 147 those conservatives who are most paralyzed/paralyzing > because deconstruction is on the move in “the things themselves”: the play of differance making “guardrails” possible

AD pp. 100-01 Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden (toward perpetual peace): wants neither cemetery w/ which rulers of State, hawks of every epoch, threaten us nor “sweet dream” of the pacifist philosopher

WBH p. 202 deconstruction, occupies both places [re: women’s studies], thus it’s conservative and not conservative

THE WORST

R p. 104 [Derrida on 9/11]: not as unforeseeable as everyone claimed; the trauma that occurred, not what actually happened, but apprehension of a worse threat still to come

FL p. 257 madness of justice: the incalcuable and giving idea of justice is close to the bad, the worst, can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation > assurance against the worst will only suture the opening

FK p. 83 no to-come w/out iterability, w/out heritage & possibility of repeating, w/out messianic memory and promise, messiancity more originary than all messianism, opens the worst

——technical, automatic, machine-like [the possibility of faith, its very chance], a chance that entails risk of radical evil, otherwise it would simply be pure know-how, pure knowledge, annulment of future, programme, proof, predictability, providence

p. 100 the worst violence: alliance of two in pure madness of faith; or One + n, all its supplements, makes violence of itself, does violence to itself, keeps itself from the other: “religion” indemnifies itself w/out assignable end

SPOM pp. 108-09 w/out some fidelity to Marxist spirit, the worst, worse than bad, might occur: a fatalist idealism [nihilism, accelerationism] or abstract and dogmatic eschatology in face of world’s evils [orthodox Marxism?]

p. 34 everything Derrida affirms, the “out of joint,” is the possibility of evil, no doubt

——mais sans louverture de cette possibilité, il ne reste, peut-être, au-delà du bien et du mal, que la nécessité du pire, une nécessité qui ne serait (même) pas une fatalité

p. 220 the impossible (“to let the dead bury their dead”) is possible, absolute evil (fully present life which doesn’t want to hear/know death), takes place (peut avoir lieu) > on basis of this terrible possibility, justice is desirable (through but also beyond law, right) [cf. HST p. 399]

POR p. 19 (153) “thinking” requires both principle of reason and what’s beyond it, both archē and an-archy > decision [of thought] always risks the worst, to claim to erase the risk by institutional program is to create a barricade against a future

POO p. 13 “what returns to your name, to the secret of your name, is the ability to disappear in your name,” that is, not to return to itself, which is the condition of the gift (i.e. the name) of all expansion of self, of all auctoritas

MPM p. xix [death, real death: the worst?]

VM pp. 106-07 for Levinas, asymmetry, non-light, commandment are violence and injustice only in relation to finite things, Levinas’ infinite God avoids a world of pure/worst violence, of immorality itself, by being infinite, does not rage war of single, naked finite man

***p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

p. 130 least violence is the avowal of violence (against nihilism); worst violence: nothingness, unimaginable night

p. 148 only in its silent origin before Being would language be nonviolent; the worst violence then silently cohabits the horizon of peace

p. 152 worst violence (what some call Judaic experience of infinitely other), when one silently delivers oneself into hands of other in the night

S p. 40 Heidegger’s Rectorship Address is diabolical because it capitalizes on the worst, both evils at once: sanctions nazism and a metaphysical gesture [spirit w/out quotations]

p. 121n Husserl shows signs of the worst w/ his racism against Eskimos, Papuans, Indians [spirit not an accidental ornament for Husserl’s thought]

p. 122n question of spirit: where is the worse?

PAS PAS p. (60) mastery, getting by too well, je men tirais trop bien, does not allow chance of event, must be disabled, wrecked, for something other to happen finally: the best & worst > la dérive guards against security, anchorage, property and against, perhaps, ce qui arrive, le pire ou le meilleur, venant den face ou de labîme [?]

***POOF p. 38 for Nietzsche, mediocre (lookalike) caricatures [i.e. those w/ “democratic sensibilities”], the worst enemy of what they resemble, usurpers of the name

pp. 63-4 Derrida reads Nietzsche [re: GS 61] as advocating acceptance of gift & dependency, elevating logic of gift above self-sufficiency of a subject [Greek philosopher who refuses King’s donation], a logic that reorients friendship, calling friendship back to irreducibility of other—but perhaps this installs an irresponsible freedom, madness (friend–enemy), the worst? [as new possessions, Hegel’s terror of freedom]?

p. 219 w/out possibility (which must be neither living nor dead) of perjury, radical evil, absolute crime—no responsibility, freedom, decision > “I love you” (promise, prayer) can’t hope to prove anything at all, must remain unilateral/dissymmetrical, no mutuality/agreement can reduce the disproportion, the very condition of sharing (partage)

OH p. 18 keep the heading (garder le cap) > because absolutely new might bring ghost of the worst

SH p. 57 no worse loss than death of name (still, a date remains) > mourning, interiorization of other in Erinnerung, the preserving of other in sepulcher/epitaph, is denied us; words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts > incinerated beyond of date, words lost w/out sepulcher

FWT p. 55 do not give in to reactive all or nothing in political imaginary of the worst, monolithic

p. 114 those who internalize, who think they can assimilate, appropriate, habituate, subjectivize the worst [in a work of mourning], immunize, sacralize, and idealize it

p. 116 the worst thing [re: making use of Holocaust]: appropriation and instrumentalization of historical memory

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

testify to what we can neither forget nor recall, a testimony w/out force of verdict or death sentence, to not write risks worst betrayal

p. 175 we must always reaffirm something of the past to avoid relapse into something worse

SW p. 349 signature (operation of poetic writing) must not be absolutely invulnerable: an “I” signs in the place of the wound (the other operates on us w/out knowing)—so virtual that it remains > bears bereaved memory of an unrefusable lesion > seems older than self: you may have forgotten it, but it carries on dictating all the blows of fate (as if we desired even the worst of them)

DST DST p. 204 Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger never avoided anything? > how does one dare write such a sentence?

——it is possible not to avoid anything: 1) never pass up a question, a possibility, a truth, never miss a fold, a twist 2) mistakes, weaknesses, misapprehensions, inhibitions, even the worst

TR pp. 145-46 archive is as precarious as it is artificial, it’s threatened in advance > “sooner or later” the worst can happen to it

PSSS p. 239 psychoanalysis allows to think: the suffering for the pleasure of it (just to, just for), the worst cruelty, suffer to suffer, making/letting oneself suffer

p. 266 all the worst cruelties and terrors coincide w/ invention of human rights: Paris Commune, French Revolution, Shoah…

HST p. 385 unforgivable as worst of the worst: resists any historical reconciliation

C p. 231 inimitable ductus of pickpocket [idiom], repeating (transgression must be repeated to begin) > worst, most fatal of villainies: robbery/violation of tombs

TN p. 2 bénédiction au bord du pire, comme toujours > only beneficence if perversion is possible

p. 283 for there to be a good heart: possibility of bad heart must remain forever open, i.e. tout autre > good heart must be ready for the other, for treachery, for perjury (inevitable-impossible vow of abstinence, tactile’s fate); is this how we can translate Kant’s “evil heart”?

EW p. 266 on the democracy to come, on its safeguarding against the worst: don’t expect a formula from Derrida—but a long, slow trajectory

AD p. 35 the possibility of offering hospitality to the worst is necessary so good hospitality has a chance: yes of the other, yes to the other > impossibility of programming a limit btwn pervertibility/perversion is necessary

BSi pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

OG p. 295 (416-17) for Rousseau, in writing the worst is simultaneously the best: total alienation is total reappropriation of presence to itself > Rousseau: “plus de force pour conserver ce quon a

***CIR pp. 215-16 those who don’t admit their violence, lack of respect for evil, demand Derrida to “own up!” > to Derrida, this is the shameless forgetting of the fault: economy of the worst

THEMATISM

KH pp. 101-02 acc. Hegel, Plato uses myth because he’s impotent, a ludico-mythological drift (dérive), Aristotle Hegel’s guarantor of seriousness

——even if Plato is a master for using myth, myth remains subordinate to philosophical theme

***p. 119 btwn text & theme, structure w/out an indivisible origin > theater of irony, w/out end, w/out bottom [abyss]; to isolate a theme, “philosophy-of-Plato,” would be to violently misrecognize, deny textual scene, questions of topology in general

GOD p. 28 when Patoçka refers to the inadequate thematization of Christian mysterium tremendum, he does so appealing to ultimate adequacy of thematization

SEC p. 313 for convenience [re: Condillac], Derrida opposes operative concept to thematic one

OS p. 39 “there is no chance that within the thematic of metaphysics anything might have budged” w/ respect to concept of time, from Aristotle to Hegel > founding concepts sufficed

POS pp. 46-7 thematic reading as insufficient as a purely formalist one (both ignore genetic, “historical” element)

O p. 21 neither formalism nor thematism can master irremediable structure of gap btwn empty form/full meaning: will miss it in attempt to master it

REST p. 306 what is thematic attention? both Shapiro & Heidegger pay no attention to the sex of reattachment, graft of sex onto the shoes

WAP p. 201n the fold of such supplement of objectification marks a differential limit which could as well apply to thematization (cf. DS)

D p. 350 one must choose btwn the text & the theme

C p. 195 a paradigm that is posed as if always there (theme, then, thesis)

TN p. 231 Derrida obeys thematic focus [for a bit?]

AD p. 21 neither face nor hospitality can be thematized (what they have in common)

SPEC p. 372 variation-of-the-trait-in-relation-to-the-object, not only the theme of Symposium but its performance, its condition

THESES [fixerup]

GT p. 17 of the Instant

p. 77 GENERAL

p. 100 GENERAL (text and trace concern gift not metaphysics of Presence

MC p. 345 play w/in system

MSUB J

A

***SEC

***PP

S

ROP pp. 26-31 [MOTHERLOAD] a comprehensive recap of deconstruction: synonyms, double binds, history, affirmation…

***SP p. 107 question of style, spurring-operation, more powerful than thesis, meaning, stylate spur rips through veil, to show the veil, to undo opposition veil/unveiled

***SW pp. 348-49 this irreducible reality of an event (outside discourse but not text)—is so unlike you? > but, it’s the signature, a hem, on the edge, forever heterogenous, a tear, overlap, remaining caught in poetic stitches—thus the effects of anticipated iterability

THESIS (THEME)

KH pp. 119-20 Platonism, which still can be referred to, would refer to the misprision, the thesis torn out by artifice from written fiction of “Plato,” and, under the name of philosophy, a certain force of thetic abstraction in his texts recommends one to do so

GOD p. 157 properly phenomenological virtue of literature: puts thesis or arrest in quotations (parentheses) > literature’s relation to non-literary, religious remainder (Abrahamic moment), betrays in double sense of word: unfaithful to its history at moment it uncovers that history’s secret, reveals its “truth” (i.e. its [literature’s] own filiation) > literature must ask forgiveness for this double betrayal

POO p. 6 the theses, the positive or negative evaluations, are most often infinitely overdetermined

p. 11 thetic way, direct, frontal, projective [shield, problem child] [see p. 14 oblique way as warding off the geometric but still too much in common w/ diagonal]

——when Derrida says one should not approach experience of responsibility in a thetic way, to argue that this “do not do it” has a shortcoming, that it should appear before moral tribunal, misses its demonstrative rigor [“do not be present” is not the moral injunction of “be present”] > strict rigor sheltered from all questioning [cf. GLAS pp. 50-1]

——“nothing would seem more violent or naïve than to call for more frontality, more thesis or more thematization, to suppose one can find a standard there”

——ellipse is different from a-thematicity (some people can’t see the difference)

MSUB J p. 166 “the property of a theme is what an expropriation has deprived us, and it is as if we had been deprived of our own memory, distanced from our own birth”

S p. 12 acc. Heidegger, animals can’t question (no technē or spirit) > Heidegger always presenting his stance on animals as “theses,” which he avoids, for essential reasons, almost everywhere else

DS pp. 248(n) “reflection” so loaded, reduces text to signified theme > thematicism as eudemonistic or hedonistic

——Freud’s inconsistency re: psychoanalysis of work of art: 1) going beyond formal limits toward theme (Stoff) in service of Lustprinzip 2) says, frustrated, the formal artist is given over to Lustprinzip

p. 250 diacriticity of language, its inexhaustibility, prevents a theme from being a theme

pp. 254-55 thematism leaves out formal, phonic, graphic “affinities,” ignores play that takes word apart > thematism gathers semes linked by meaning (or signified concept)

p. 251 sum can’t be totalized, nor is this non-totalizing exceeded by infinite richness of content of meaning or intention > define the limit otherwise: fold w/ no possibility of folding text back on itself (angle & intersection of re-mark), no reduction of its spacing > blank, fold: impossibility of (imaginary) theme beyond textual instance > these textual effects rich w/ kind of poverty, singular/regular monotony, disappear: one can’t see this because one thinks one is seeing themes

p. 253 “themes” run aground (échoue) at edge lesser & greater than theme, where “there is” a text is made a possibility, a readability w/out signified (fright’s reflex declares: unreadable)

p. 262 if no thematic unity, hermeneutic concept of polysemy must be replaced by dissemination

p. 277 Mallarmé’s play (on “plume,” on “winds [brise]”) anathema to thematization, to deciphering meaning > coin-entre

POS p. 70 discourses of reduction and misconstrual: thematism, sociologism, historicism, psychologism (can be avoided by formal/syntactic work)

ATIA pp. 153-5 Heidegger’s rare use of “thesis” to describe his theses of animal, human, stone

C p. 195 a paradigm that is posed as if always there (theme, then, thesis)

BSi p. 42 political contract, a prosthesis, nomos as thesis (opposed to physis), convention, positing

——thus provisional, historical, always deconstructible > declared immortal because not

p. 67 master-self, sovereignty (positionality of self: thesis), ipsissimus (the absolutely himself)

DST DST p. 215 Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger draws stehen and stellen together by identifying stal of stellein (to equip, to send word for) w/ sta of stele (column), he also links thesis via dhe to Setzung, Stellung, Lage—more philological Witz than true etymologism

ATM p. 187 Levinas contaminates when he thematizes the nonthematizable, Derrida contaminates this irrepressible thematization in his turn (not structurally, but w/ a fault of his own)

SPEC pp. 275-78 strategy [Freud’s speculation] whose finality’s not clear, no known genre, it overflows, thus the hypothesis, the athesis of athesis > asking questions in the dark: Freud’s phosphorescent antennae

p. 345 no theses in science or literature (athetic), every thesis is philosophical

p. 394 the secondary (supplementary stricture) transforms freely mobile into immobile cathectic energy: posits, posts—here’s a thesis: immobilized cathexis is more tonic, tonicity related to effects of binding (elasticity & tension), thus binden as bander (erection): “bander: poster, liason: postale

***CHOR p. 96 some can’t see beyond end of phallic forms in SP (bisexual complication of style, spur, umbrella): those people do not read the syntax and punctuation of a given sentence, arresting the text in a position, settling on a thesis, meaning or truth

THIS (SENSE-CERTAINTY)

A p. 20 we can never say these are the conditions of inexhaustible singularity of event, must speak in negative form (w/out X no Y) [Derrida against present or presentation of “this is that”]

OH p. 81 every time Europe, politics, responsibility, decision is reduced to what they must exceed (order of the present, of presentation [knowledge, certainty, judgment in the form “this is that”]), we have the very presentable face of good conscience

P p. 94 envy, jealousy, mortification at work w/in our affect > the beautiful this does w/out everything, w/out you, w/out its class [re: Kant’s free beauty]

ROP p. 28 immanence of presupposition (Voraussetzung) constantly required in Hegelian dialectic

***O p. 29 scriptural apparatus of Hegel’s opening w/ sense-certainty

p. 40n to understand this network [Derrida has just proliferated footnote w/ gratings, columns, squares, stones and poisons from Maldoror] by way of “this is that,” one would lose about everything in the expectation (pour attendre)

REST p. 260 desire for attribution is a desire for appropriation (in matters of art, & everywhere else)

p. 313 dogmatic, precritical language: “real,” “proper,” “this is that,” evidently, clearly, his own > talk so loudly, price to pay to have the shoes, Shapiro believes he is no stranger to the other

D p. 347 all these grafts, this is (est) that, this means that [forever]

TN p. 61 “this” and “here” of body (its sublimating idealization) makes it inaccessible to touch > an anesthesia of anesthesia, euthanasia contract

pp. 61-2 don’t have to wait until Hegel’s Pheno… before suffering wounds of sense-certainty

p. 62 waking from anesthesia, sense certainty becomes madness > Rimbaud: senses in disarray

p. 186 Merleau-Ponty’s originary here, origin of world, an “I can”

p. 308 Nancy: epopteia, sight accomplished, consummation of Mystery of Sense Certainty, phallic & cephalic

ATM p. 173 Levinas has not only withdrawn dissymmetrical responsibility from circle (of pact, debt, synchronic reciprocity, recognition) but also from annular alliance, from the rounds (tour), whatever makes the rounds of a finger, of a sex or sexual organ [?]

BSi pp. 151-52 katēgoreuō (decry, accuse in legal proceedings) also means to attribute, to say something about something: “S is P”

p. 161 bêtise as madness of definition, “S is P,” definite articles le or la, bêtise is defining as much as defined > the category is a signature of bêtise

***OG p. 336n Lévi-Strauss: proper names are a quanta of signification below which all people do is point > this zero degree of language, pointing, “sensible-certitude”: a myth effaced by play of difference

SH p. 43 ellipsis, discontinuity, caesura, discretion cannot be sublated (aufgehoben) > no dialectic of sense-certainty can reassure the matter of archive’s safekeeping

THIRD PARTY

GOD p. 122 “Here I am” (no third party) [See H]

p. 154 secret is an absolute relation w/out third party, “Here I am” (holy but not sacred)

p. 155 covenant remains absolutely singular in its election, if there’s no 3rd party, no hypothetical imperative, no generality of ethical, political, juridical

GT pp. 11-12 credit, good faith, we lend each other in conversation; credit/faith as precomprehension that condition “tautology” of gift, and make gift impossible: “one” has to give some “thing” to someone other

p. 145 poor man is third party (allows men to exchange, competition, capitalism) vs. woman [Irigaray]

pp. 150-51 [re: “Counterfeit Money”] only a liar could know whether friend gave real money, that is, a connoisseur of counterfeit money; so narrator believes, credits his friend

——literature as place of non-place of frame, triptych w/ dislocated frame, 3 + or – excluded 4th, all positions exchangeable to infinite, an ex-propriation that forbids a return to self, most powerful or interesting speculation

——readers are at once debtors & creditors, like the narrator, we are the beggar, the 3rd party excluded from the secret of the dual scene

p. 152 [no depth beyond literary phenomenon] inviolability of secret depends on essential superficiality, bare device of being-two-to-speak (lêtre-deux-à-parler), a secret beyond reserve of technique, thing, being, thing thought (same could be said for money)

FK pp. 64, 65 God as third party, witness.

FL p. 245 “I cannot speak the language of the other except to the extent that I appropriate

it and assimilate it according to the law (loi) of an implicit third…inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of the idioms”

H p. 5 third person, justice, foreigner, Levinas’ “birth of the question”

p. anne 78 “Here I am” of the guest is traumatizing

AF p. 40 Yerushalmi doesn’t treat Freud as a witness in the 3rd person (terstis), but as a 2nd person called to witness (incompatible w/ classical scientific discourse, history, philology)

SPOM SPOM p. 5 Horatio, third party, witness for Hamlet’s father’s ghost

p. 158 self-manifestation of the manifesto, the “here I am” in the announcement of communism (Marx, Engels’ Manifesto)

POOF POOF pp. 204, 206 via Aristotle, the just wage (gage), a fee, salary, 3rd party & common measure—war ensues wherever common measure & straight and narrow path recoils (se dérobe) [translator also translates the Chapter Title, Replis,” as recoils] > in these grievances, where calculation becomes incalculable, where I can’t count on you, there is no friend

pp. 214-15 that either address [re: omega ω] is addressed to someone will always expose utterance to undecidability because address to ‘someone’ presupposes the impossible: 1) neutral gender 2) ‘only one’ someone > for one person to receive a mark once, the mark must multiply, its iterability affirms plus dun (which allows & limits calculability), the 3rd party is there > there is never one, one is always more than one (w/ or w/out consent)

pp. 259 a few oddities that don’t surprise Kant: 1) no secrets in nature, secrets only there where there’s engagement, promise—and no one has the infinite intelligence to know for certain what the secret is 2) the impossible & necessary arithmetic returns: friendship as n + 1, plus dun, there’s always one more than the 2 friends, a 3rd, so how can the secret be kept? 3) merely moral friendship is not just ideal, the event of friendship happens, the black swan

pp. 259-60 for Kant, the black swan of moral friendship is a brother [for Juvenal, p. 258, black swan was a woman]: bond btwn 2 men w/ necessary supplementary complication of a 3rd man

pp. 276-77 the 3rd witnesses a law that interrupts vertigo of singularity (a dual narcissism), 3rd opens up & keeps from closing the question of secrecy > Nietzsche: for the hermit, the friend is always 3rd person (keeps the other 2 [w/in oneself] from sinking to the depths)

POO POO p. 10 innocent witness (testis), third (terstis), actor-participant, problematic (used as shield, supplement, “cover”) child, assume responsibility for another, passing oneself off as another [passion of Ulysses the oblique, Philoctetus]

p. 31 cannot trust any definite witness

HASD HASD p. 34 Plato’s use of “third species” as analogical mediation, concerns Being, epekeina tes ousias, and khora > khora also constitutes a third species (triton genos), isn't intelligible paradigm

SEC SEC p. 315 no code of writing is structurally secret, can always be iterable for a 3rd party

VM VM p. 96 for Levinas, when 3rd term [party] is light of Being (which is not being nor non-being while same and other are) > theoretical relation is ontology

PAS PAS p. (52) what i would like to give you: Viens w/out language overhang (sans aucun langage de surplomb), w/out anything that could name it, designate it from a third place

F p. xv forums are politico-juridical instances: require a third; le for du dedans (not intérieur) is not le tribunal de la conscience (“jury box” of consciousness)

pp. xviii-xix crypt must always incorporate more than one, plus dun: cryptophore’s secret must be shared (partagé) w/ a “third,” that’s what makes a secret a secret

——le tiers incorporé est gardé pour être supprimé [held in to be crossed out]: assembly of witnesses around Wolf Man’s crypt (forum): whole strategy of testifying > on sy coupe tout le temps, witnesses testify by interrupting, wounded by angular edges of forum

POS p. 43 Derrida’s undecidables, unities of simulacrum, “false” verbal properties that can’t be included in philosophical binary, but still inhabit it, resisting, disorganizing, w/out ever constituting a 3rd term, a solution: hymen, gram, incision, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, margin

P p. 32 for Hegel, art as 3rd term gives reciprocity to artist & artwork, art is thus 1st term

p. 34 third party (ein Drittes) regulates encirclement, art can play this role, a medium, can touch both edges > ambiguity of participation can’t exhaust it [what if this 3rd doesn’t rèleve?]

ROP p. 71 can there be a witness to madness, a third that provides reason w/out objectifying? w/out examining (arraisonner)? [Nietzsche’s no accusation, GS 276]

ATIA p. 64 suis of Qui/Que suis-je? (both être and suivre) the little third party as copula, comes btwn subject and itself, worries it (sacharne), hounds it, to hunt itself in the mirror

p. 112 why did Levinas never imagine the animal occupying place of the 3rd party, thus the 1st appeal to justice? > never an other other than the other human

p. 131 Levinas’ 3rd party, an other of the other, in contrast to Lacan’s “there is no Other of the Other” > but, for both of them, what about the animal-other?

FS p. 11 God imprints secondarity on every navigation of the human: 1) passage of deferred reciprocity btwn reading & writing? 2) absolute witness who’s already read what you will write: third party as transparency of meaning? [circular logos]

SW p. 316 “for they shall make a sanctuary, I shall dwell in their bosom” > veil, curtain, drape is dwelling of God, his ethos, this Who (that dwells) is also a What, a 3rd party, the Law, text of law

DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

p. 68 sovereign exception & DP > is state, third party, witness already there in singular, savage, secret crime, when murderer claims to do ones own or to do oneself justice? where does murder begin?

***pp. 221-22 DP speaks in 3rd person present (can’t say: “I am no more”), copula signifies instantaneous passage from being to nothingness (“he is no more”): stigmē, Most High, Last Judgment, God’s verdict (always instant of death of a 3rd party, never me, you, us)

HST p. 364 border btwn ethical/political no longer insured: the 3rd (le tiers) gives birth to justice & finally state, 3rd announces himself in duel of the face-to-face, & the face: the beyond the state (condition of ethics) had to produce itself in the state

——this is a topological invagination: “outside produce[s] an enclave in the inside of the inside”

***p. 388 the 3rd intrudes when 2 absolutes exchange place; the 3rd, question of justice, immediately betrays other’s finite-infinite singularity > thus: congenital perjury of justice

p. 397 X, great 3rd, God accords/grants forgiveness, renders substitution possible

LI p. 116 undecidability as third [?] remains heterogenous to dialectic/calculable, opens field of decision, decidability

TN p. 90 Levinas: lovers, dual solitude, excludes the third [triple solitude: each partner is solitary and so is the witness], the contrary of social relation > nothing attained, touched w/ caress

AD pp. 29-30 the 3rd, illeity of 3rd (not the 3rd man), begins justice, comes w/out waiting [w/out delay of differance?], affects face to face, but doesn’t interrupt the “welcome of the face”

p. 31 ineluctability (this is necessary) of the 3rd is law of question > question of a question, addressed to the other, from the other: the other of the other > a question that is certainly not first (comes after the yes of/to the other), though nothing precedes it

——the “without question” at the birth of “first question” (the question is the 3rd): passage (w/out transition) from ethical responsibility to political, juridical, philosophical responsibility (the move out of immediacy)

pp. 33-4 violence of pure face to face (hospitable welcome, narcissistic closing [renfermement]): in double bind w/ the 3rd (protects against vertigo of ethical violence while violating its purity)

——pure face to face as oath (serment) before the letter, debt before every contract or loan (emprunt), must perjure itself in bind w/ 3rd: in operation of justice can no longer distinguish btwn fidelity of oath & perjury of false witness

——justice as law begins w/ perjury > violates; sigh of just man: “Quai-je à faire avec la justice?”

p. 136n law of substitution, from substitution as law: the 3rd interrupts (distances) w/out interrupting (distancing)

p. 138n il, illeity, 3rd, “unrectitude”: certain rectitude would reduce its transcendence

p. 59 Levinas compares his illeity to unimpeachable witness in Descartes’ 3rd Meditation

p. 60 “illeity,” sometimes designates interruption of face to face, sometimes very transcendence of the face in the face-to-face (a certain experience of “feminine alterity”): He (Il) in the depth of you

pp. 65-6 “Torah before Sinai,” law before event, recognition of Torah by those for whom event of Sinai means nothing? a recognition by some 3rd, that would replace unique w/ unique? > a universal message in election of Israel (humanitarian hospitality uprooted from singularity of event, which becomes empirical, allegorical, “political” in restricted sense) [see p. 72]

p. 144n for Kant & Levinas, brothers, irruption of equality, thus of the 3rd

p. 149n [Levinas on the 3rd and the face]

BSi pp. 166-67 Kant’s distinction btwn conflict (Streit) & war (Krieg): an institution (3rd party) must know exactly what the accusation means [re: bêtise] for it to achieve rational status of conflict

CF p. 42 forgiveness must engage 2 singularities: the guilty (perpetrator) & victim

——amnesty, reconciliation, reparation when 3rd intervenes (no longer pure forgiveness)

p. 48 the 3rd as survivor in general (institution, sociality, transgenerational heritage)

OG pp. 165-66 (235-36) w/ 2 supplements (writing, onanism), auto-affection manifests by leaving a trace of itself in the world, exteriority of space, touchant-touché admits the world as 3rd party, here jouissance and se-donner-une-présence welcome the other in small difference separating lagir du pâtir (doing from suffering)

SPEC p. 285 each time one of [3] “terms” [2 principles +/– differance] goes to the end (va au-bout) of itself, of its other, w/out 3rd party, it is death (lentorse mortelle qui met fin au retors du calcul)

THOUGHT

KH p. 93 leave khōra untranslated, thinking & translation here traverse the same experience/experiment (expérience): “place,” “location,” “region,” “country” & its figures, “mother,” “nurse,” “receptacle,” “imprint-bearer” [see p. 126, these figures not even true figures]

GT p. 22 can one ask these questions (i.e. what is a gift?) w/out anticipating a thought?

R p. 15 Aristotle’s Prime Mover, the first desirable, gives a life that exceeds the life of a human, continuous, unending—for us, impossible

——energeia of this pure activity is “pleasure (hēdonē), circle of taking pleasure in oneself (jouissance de soi); a specular auto-affection that accords w/ thinking of thought

MONL p. 95 for Heidegger, Zusage primary to question, the most irreducible in thought

H p. anne 28 “thought is in essence a force of mastery…breaking up the unknown to possess it, shed light on it, name it”

pp. anne 54-6 step beyond border, threshold, because inability to mark a stable territory provokes thought

p. anne 152 a place of haunting has no ghosts, ghosts come where they are exclude, death haunts us by remaining unthought

OOG p. 153 phenomenology never had to learn that Thought would always be to come

SPOM p. 136 no pure identity if that which is most living have specters inside, weighed down by specters, which think

p. 207 jurer ou conjurer: the chance of thinking and its limit? the gift of its finitude? [nous gageons ici que la pensée ne vient jamais à bout de la pulsion conjuratoire]

p. 214 via Marx, practical events, where thought becomes act (se fait agir); thought as Handeln in Heidegger

POOF pp. 221-24 via Aristotle’s prótē philía as teleía philía, telos of friendship as that which can’t be reached, inconceivable, self-contradictory, would be the desire for a perfect friend, for a friendship w/ God [Derrida offers 3 reasons why this is impossible]

——if man has friends, it’s because he thinks the other, thought of the other as thought of the mortal, and thus there is only thought in friendship > “O my friends…” the declaration of God, who knows only divine friendship

POR p. 16 (148) reason only one species of thought

p. 19 (153) “thinking” requires both principle of reason and what’s beyond it, both archē and an-archy > decision [of thought] always risks the worst, to claim to erase the risk by institutional program is to create a barricade against a future

MPM p. 71 thinking, not bereaved interiorization, thinks at boundaries, thinks the boundary, the limit of interiority

p. 92 Heidegger: is memory a container for thought [Gedachtes]? or does thinking rest in memory [Gedächtnis]?

pp. 92-3 Heidegger rethinks “thought (Gedanke)” w/ Gedanc, bottom of the heart, gathering together of all that concerns us, more original than Pascal’s thinking of heart? [Dank]

VM p. 103 for face to present other w/out metaphor, speech must not only translate thought, thought must already be speech

p. 104 dissociation of thought and language, subordination of latter to former, is proper to philosophy of finitude [Cartesian Cogito of 3rd Meditation]

p. 115 classical infinitism of Cartesian type, thought goes much further much faster than language [thought vs. body (language)?], would handle questions re: Levinas’ other by neutralizing space to liberate positive infinity

***p. 153 Greek logos not accidental for any thought; Greek miracle is impossibility for any thought to treat its sages as “sages of the outside” > by proferring epekeina tes ousias, by welcoming alterity into heart of logos, it has protected itself against every surprising convocation

VP p. 70 Husserl tormented by possibility that writing inhabits inside of speech, itself at work in intimacy of thought

PAS PAS pp. (48-9) event (de-distance of near) (Eriegnis, Entfernung, Enteignis) “before” which philosophy and its pas au déla (thought) are trying to close themselves

S p. 13 Heidegger: the more original the thought, the richer its unthought, the unthought is the highest gift a thought can give

p. 71 to name spirit is to offer for thinking, German only language in which spirit comes to name itself

p. 94 promise as the promise of the day before the day before; acc. Heidegger, there’s a “must” a “we must think” of the promise, thought as fidelity to promise > must hear & obey

PPHS p. 87 Hegel: German language bestowed direct kinship btwn Gedächtnis and Gedanke

p. 94n Hegel: “we think in names” [magic?] ex: “lion” [Hegel contradicts privilege of sign?]

p. 106 Hegel: number is pure thought of thought’s externalization, in number sense is brought closest to thought > thoughtlessness, indifference, number remains sensuous

SH p. 3 the resistance thought of “once” gives one to think, let’s let ourselves be approached by this offering

p. 48 philosophy finds itself in vicinity of poetic, of literature, the blurred border (no place, utopia) btwn empirical (contingency of the outer) and necessary (necessity of inner) > indecision of this limit most provokes thought [Derrida attacks the idea that philosophy loses itself there]

FWT pp. 56-7 safe and sound—beautiful freedom of human thought [juxtaposed to physiologistic determinism] [Scientology, Going Clear] [moral image of thought]

POS p. 49 Derrida’s suspicion of “thought,” that it means nothing, that it is logocentric > substantified void of highly derivative ideality [Deleuze’s moral image of thought]

OS p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

the impossibility of the otherwise produces a trembling, a question of tout autre, think the tie btwn truth/presence, in a thought that doesn’t need to be true/present [no skeptical moment]

pp. 52-3 transition from parousia to absolute subjectivity does not disrupt Aristotelianism: prime mover, presence, desire, eros, “desire is desire of presence,” absolute subjectivity, circle, return to self, parousia as self-presence > prime mover, noēsis noēseōs, as subject

ROP p. 70 thought conditioned (exercent) by fidelity, fidelity honed (aiguisent) by thought

ATIA p. 29 to think the war we find ourselves waging [against animals] is not only a duty, no one can escape it: thinking, perhaps, begins when animal looks at us and we are naked before it

pp. 86-7 properly phenomenological logic of “I am” means there is only “I think” > breath, life are secondary: “I breathe, therefore I am” concludes nothing > indubitability of existence depends on thought (not being-in-life)

FS p. 304n for Leibniz, man is finite in act, infinite in thought; in God act/thought coexist

***WAP p. 42 “thinking,” which entitles only this “no” of no pure instance, must, in the name of a democracy to come, “unremittingly interrogate” (that is deconstruct) the de facto democracy, its determinations > event/promise whose singularity doesn’t signify (self-) presence

CHM p. 47 madness rejected form very interiority of thought itself [Foucault on Descartes]

——Montaigne haunted by thought of going mad in very action of thought itself

p. 59 for Descartes, thinking and saying what is clear & distinct is same thing—Derrida adds that, for St. Anselm, the insipiens, the insane man, couldn’t think because he couldn’t think what he said > madness as voluble silence that couldn’t think its own words

Gii p. 27 Heidegger: thinking is genuine activity, lend a hand to the essence

p. 35 thinking of the hand, hand of thinking > thinking of human Geschlecht (not a humanism? or not a metaphysical, classical humanism?)

p. 36 acc. Heidegger, sciences belong to essence of technology, not to technology—to its essence; technology remains plunged in a fog (noyée dans un brouillard) > we still do not think (science, no one, is responsible for this) > the most thought-provoking (das Bedenklichste): we still do not think

for Heidegger, thinking as work of cabinetmaker (Schreiner), a joiner, attune to hidden plenitude of wood’s essence as it enters inhabited site, Handwerk

p. 38 Heidegger: the hand is constantly in danger, writing of poetry too

——to think is a handiwork [w/out any perhaps] > elsewhere in Heidegger, thought is linked to Lichtung, to eye, or to hearing/voice—now to hand

——thinking is neither cerebral nor disincarnate

p. 39 for Heidegger, hand thinks before being thought > it is thought, a thought, thinking

p. 42 Heidegger: only when man speaks does he think, not the other way around, as metaphysics still believes

p. 43 Heidegger: work of hand, thought, man’s hardest & simplest work

——hand gives & gives itself: animal rationale can only take, grasp [anti-Hegel, whose concept is the graspable] [Derrida refers to GT, where giving & taking are problematized]

p. 48 acc. Heidegger, Socrates is purest thinker of West, wrote nothing, placed himself in the draft—withdrawing movement, in Zug (pull) of withdrawal (des Entziehens)

pp. 48-9 logo-phonocentrism in Heidegger: writing declines thought, escapes draft when it enters literature [Derrida briefly directs us to Heidegger’s meditation on chreōn, Brauch, necessity, logos]

p. 56 for Heidegger, philosophy & science never attain the parallelism, the cutting/breaching (into one another), of thinking/philosophy (Denken) & poetry (Dichten)

REST p. 377 dress wounds (panser) [see P p. 88]

DST p. 200 thinking of translation, experience of thinking itself, its most essential & risky passage, where experience of thinking is also poetic experience: privileged examples (in Lacoue-Labarthe): Gestell, mimesis, rhuthmos

p. 203 [re: Lacoue-Labarthe’s désistance] exemplary, superior probity that, w/out ceding to dogmatic moralism, submits ethical demand to trial (lépreuve) of thought

p. 205 Derrida has his doubts when Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger’s unthought (impensé) gathers in unity of single site, as if there were only one unthought for each “great” thought—as its secret law

pp. 318-19n Derrida wonders if Heidegger’s insistence on Ort, Erörterung, a unique site of gathering, leaves un-thought désistance or dislocation, which might be thought itself [this torments Derrida’s respect for Heidegger, along w/ Derrida’s insufficient concern re: authentic thought]

RM pp. 71-2 neighborhood (voisinage, Nachbarschaft) of Dichten and Denken: vicus, veicus, which perhaps refers to oikos and Sanskrit veca

p. 74 entamées, les deux parallèles se coupent à linfini, se recoupent, sentaillent: each one [Denken and Dichten] signs in some way in the body of the other, the one in the place (au lieu) of the other: sign there the contract w/out contract of their neighborhood

PF p. xxxiii only know what thought means by way of what resists/remains to be thought, thought remains to be thought

HLP p. 70 trying to think, by answering for its memory [re: history of the lie]

TR p. 72 event & calculable program (machine) together > no future w/out this thought

p. 73 event-machine: change very name of what we call “thought” (now a homonym, paleonym)

IW p. 245 Rosenzweig sees Cohen as a philosopher-teacher who reminds us of the abyssal risk of thought or existence

PJP p. 166 “re-mind”: already a mnemotechnics at heart of & not outside the thinking of thought [cf. Nietzsche’s On the Genea]

D p. 292 no one can enter Soller’s Numbers who thinks literature/thought ought to exorcise the machine (that the 2 have nothing to do w/ each other)

LI p. 117 thought, relation to other, “experience” of differance

TN p. 24 the move from body extension to extension of psyche/thinking is incommensurable > a place (lieu) neither of objective space nor extension: place (lieu) as spacing before space

p. 25 Nancy: “the incommensurable extension of thinking is the opening of the mouth” > mouth as union of soul/body; Nancy accords decisive authority to “quasi” in Descartes’ “quasi permixtio

p. 71 Nancy moves from Psyche is extended to body weighs (i.e. thinks) [penser, peser]

p. 74 Nancy: “la pensée pèse exactement le poids du sens” (Derrida points out transitive/intransitive double meaning of pèse)

p. 341n Diderot, in tradition of Anaxagoras: “man thinks because he has hands”

p. 266 insistence that comes down to thinking, no longer a simple rhetorical movement

p. 299 malgré la pensée, thought thinks only in spite of itself, never begins by itself [Nancy’s peser]

NOY p. 231 when thought and the word (la parole) given in writing merge (se confond) at the heart of the same time (au coeur du même temps)

OG p. 93 [vis-à-vis Heidegger] thought of trace, perfectly neutral name, never has weight in system, blank part of text: what we already know we haven’t done

p. 93 (142) thinking (what we already know we haven’t begun), “mesuré à la taille de lécriture, s’entame seulement dans l’epistémè” > in a certain manner, thought gives you nothing to say

ATAP p. 81 for Heidegger, thought (not philosophy) essentially eschatological

EU pp. 66-7 for Schelling, thinking as Einbildungskraft, as post-Kantian originary unity > all differences translations of same > post-critical, critique of critique

pp. 75-6 most post-Kantians (incl. Nietzsche [?]) claim to have already reached the inaccessible: to think finitude, you have already thought the infinite (this becomes definition of thinking)

——post-Kantians accuse Kant of founding “criticism” in denegation, more responsible to found thought in inaccessible

pp. 202-03 [CIPH] no preinterpretation, “thinking” as what questions philosophy > indeterminate opening (experimental incursions in unexplored areas)

CHOR p. 98 [cf. WBH p. 198] could femininity, however irreducible it may be, remain derived from or subordinated to question of destination or thought of gift?

——Derrida uses word “thought,” which is also excessive, instead of philosophy, theory, logic, structure, scene

TIME (TEMPORALITY)

GT p. 6 time gives nothing to see, is the element of invisibility

p. 9 could only be a gift the instant the paradoxical instant tears time apart (what Kierkegaard means when he says decision is madness)

p. 14 temporalization of time (memory, anticipation, pro, re- tention) destroys the gift

p. 19 for Heidegger, importance of rethinking time, privileged horizon for reelaboration of Being

p. 22 the es gibt plays (spielt), play of 4’s as play of gift, manifests the unity of time’s 3 dimensions, la donne de ce jeu [relance], & la doña, la femme qui nous a requis depuis lexergue [Derrida then mentions a fine book, Finas’ Donne, which interlaces all these themes]

p. 28 most serious stake of political economy: certain social classes have more time than others; but time cannot be given, it is certainly not time that they possess

p. 40 demand for term & temporization, very structure of the thing, demand for limit, boundary, margin, a demand which dawns in gift-counter-gift

p. 103 time of woman: woman’s absence [in “Counterfeit Money”] organizing the scene like a clock [?]

p. 171 a gift is not signed, does not calculate w/ a time that would do it justice

R p. 17 by killing father Cronos (infinite order of time), Zeus wills out over time, touches the finitude of time, sovereignty as the instant of a decision, end to time and language

p. 109 annulment of time announced in date, revolution, volt of the ring (anneau), il faut le temps, default, failure, collapse [autos needing other, event, time, heteronomy]

SPOM p. 20 “time is out of joint” : both out of order and mad

——not a negative, broken time, but a time w/out a certain conjunction

p. 23 “[Hamlet] curses his mission: to do justice to a de-mission of time, he swears against a destiny that leads him to do justice for a fault, a fault of time and the times, by rectifying an address, a movement of correction, reparation, restitution, vengeance, revenge, punishment”

***p. 48 [time scrambling] threat of specter, no reassuring order of presents, no linear succession of “real time” & “deferred time”

p. 85 Fukuyama “responds on demand” [the timely]

p. 96 “world is going badly (le monde va mal),” il est usé mais son usure ne compte plus, vieillesse ou jeunesse [see SW pp. 322-23]—on ne compte plus avec elle, on ne sen rend plus compte comme dun seau âge dans le progrès dune histoire > ce qui arrive arrive à lâge même > messes w/ “teleological order of history”

p. 175 le longtemps, cest le temps de cette chasse à l’éloignement (hunt for distance, a hunt w/ distance > pray & lure): distance hunt can only hallucinate, desire, defer proximity: lure & prey

p. 193 socius binds men through the interest of time, apprehension of time related to commodity-specters, time comes from difference

BL p. 202 time: resolution of non-resolution—brings story into being and sustains it, only appears after law of delay, advance of law, anachrony of relation

MPM p. 61 time, memory: nothing other than figure of the marks that efface anteriority of past, “memory of the present” marks itself > only memory can recognize differential “stamp,” mark, signature, that relates a present to presence itself

POOF pp. 14-5 faith, credence, credit of engagement: open experience of time

p. 16 Aristotle’s bébaios [re: friendship] (temporal, becoming-intemporal, omnitemporal), stable & reliable, marks, covers over in marking, passage (through time) btwn 2 heterogenous orders: 1) assured calculable reliability 2) act of faith (reliability of oath)

pp. 16-7 whole story of eidos, incl. Husserlian interp. of production of ideal objects (idealization), intemporality qua omnitemporality > [but] “takes time to do w/out time”

p. 17 via Aristotle, must submit oneself to time in time like cattle, to have the habit form > history of subject as history of time

p. 235 “O my friends…” a call, a promise, a prayer (eukhé) [neither true nor false, Aristotle] > can’t give friendship, were friendship not still to come [Heideggerian ek-stasis] > in the name of friendship, “no friend” respectfully declares the perfect sovereign friendship impossible

——vous-mes-amis-soyez-mes-amis-et-bien-que-vous-ne-le-soyez-pas-encore-vous-lêtes-déjà-puisque-je-vous-appelle-ainsi: “O my friends…” has structure & temporality of messianic teleiopoesis

A p. 3 Diderot: mediocrity attributed as much to lack of time as lack of talent

pp. 3-4 via Seneca & Diderot, one would guard jealously one’s time above all else; to “master” “my life” > know difference btwn giving one’s time & wasting one’s time

——time, we have a right to be miserly about

p. 14 Heidegger thinks beyond “vulgar concept of time that privileges now,” Derrida asks: “is there anything other than vulgar time & vulgar death” [see OS]

VM p. 91 acc. Levinas, no time, no history, w/out absolute alterity of each instant

p. 133 “living present” : originally and forever violent, freeing of absolute alterity in absolute same > if other can only be respected/dissimulated by the same, then time is violence, living present originally marked by death > “presence as violence is the meaning of finitude, meaning of meaning as history”

p. 134 present as absolute form of experience: pre-comprehending anticipation of Being as time, the ens of praes-ens > if Being has always been determined by philosophy as presence, the question of Being posed on basis of transcendental horizon of time > first tremor of philosophical security, of self-confident presence

p. 145 for Heidegger, every epoch is erring (Irren), irreducible if Being is time and history

PAS PAS p. (36) Blanchot: she guarded the hope of escape through the perspective of time

p. (37) Blanchot: during the night she decided to become the time of men

VP p. 6 just like in POOF w/ Aristotle’s friend, non-presence is found in Husserl where temporalization and intersubjectivity are connected

pp. 52-3 Heidegger claims that Husserl, in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, breaks from Aristotelian concept of time as “point,” “now,” stigmē; Derrida clarifies that Husserl admits that lived-experience, spread out in “now’s,” never have a punctual phase, while always referring them back to a “source-point,” like a comet’s tail

p. 71 “source-point,” “originary impression” which produces temporalization, is auto-affection

pp. 71-2 for Husserl, intuition of time is a reception that receives nothing, an originary impression that engenders itself, a pure spontaneity, which creates nothing

——Husserl ties concept of pure auto-affection to time

p. 72 only by means of metaphor can we describe movement from one “now” to next, borrowing its concepts from order of objects of experience temporalization makes possible

p. 73 acc. Husserl, as soon as we insert a determinate being into description of auto-affection [in time] we are speaking in metaphor,

——time itself is a metaphor that indicates and dissimulates auto-affection, at same time

——“trace is relation of intimacy of the living present to its outside,” to exteriority, to the non-proper, temporalization of sense is from its very beginning “spacing”

S p. 27 for Heidegger, time forms transcendental horizon of existential analysis

pp. 91-2 Derrida uses revenant to describe a Heideggerian passage on Trakl in spite of the metaphysical negativity Heidegger might reject in it: re-venir as the idea of an end before a beginning, originary essence of time kept under veil, guarded in its archi-origin > we are still prisoners of Aristotelian representation of time

FSW p. 225 Kant’s 3 modes of times, 3 analogies of experience: permanence, succession, simultaneity

——very structure of Freud’s Mystic Pad is the time of writing

p. 230 for Freud, erasure of trace, as movement of pure auto-affection, temporalization, makes repression “itself” possible

PPHS p. 79 movement of transcendental imagination is movement of temporalization (productive of signs and time)

p. 89 acc. Hegel, relève of space is time, time is truer than space: what space will have meant is time [future anterior], sensory intuition of sign relevé in passage of time

——signifying substance is sound, “substance of expression” [glossematicians], most proper to be produced as time itself, sound relève from naturalness, linked to spirit’s relation to itself, the voice

FWT p. 80 why figure of Hamlet?: relation of ghost and time

DS p. 210 temporal dislocation in hymen baffles decidability of different terms: is there even time, tenses, temporal differences, when there’s no central present/referent?

——rhythm as hymen (Dream?), “center of vibratory suspense”: soir, noir, noire, miroir, ivoire

p. 230 intermission or interim of hymen does not establish time [Setareh] > non-mastery, no present in truth presents itself there

ATIA p. 2 since time, so long ago (depuis le temps)

p. 17 come after the animal, named after him, this after is not in time: it’s the genesis of time

pp. 17-8 time before time has always made “me” dizzy: God’s exposure to surprise, when God does not know what will become, what will happen when the poet names living things; Derrida feels the same way, depuis le temps, before his cat: will it/God address me?

GSP pp. 163-64 unlike noema, hylē is real but not intentional, sensate material of affect before intentional form, pure passivity, w/out which consciousness could not receive anything but itself, an essential opening > as temporal matter, wouldn’t it be possibility of genesis itself? irreducible complicity of time/other call “principle of principle” into question

p. 323n TN. auto-affection is concerned w/ time, self-generating series of present moments, leads to Derrida’s analysis of speech [Heidegger’s analysis of Kant in Kant and…]

FS p. 24 Claudel, Proust (structuralists): neutralize surprises of nonsimultaneity, thus time becomes eternal, atemporal

DPi p. 18 “two centuries is an infinity of eternities, and it is a fraction of a second in the history of humanity, all and nothing”

p. 136 span of 50 years: eternity for the dead, a fraction of 1/1000 of a second in the history of humanity

p. 220 w/ DP, the third party, the State, its legal system are presumed to know, calculate, operate “time of death”: alignment of objective time w/ subjective time of subject condemned to death

p. 226 in absolute knowledge time is Tilgen not Aufheben (not merely sublated but suppressed)

Gii p. 302n Heidegger: 2 hands clutch in haste, utilitarian violence (want #, quantity), don’t have patience of 1—the essential is not #, it’s the right time (die rechte Zeit)

TR p. 87 machine kills time & redeems fault by the work of the work at work

p. 118 when it’s a matter of structure of text, concept of historicity not regulated by teleological process but by the event, by singularity of “one time only”

——via de Man, time is not enough to make history, not the essential predicate of concept of history

AFR p. 95 for Condillac, time secures moment when object goes missing from perception, moment perception is absent from itself > moment space of signs opens, w/ function of imagination [time as that which absents perception?]

p. 131 for Condillac, there is no difference in general, only of degrees > this proposition comes to unfold (déplier) all concepts of rupture/repetition, this unfolding is time’s

p. 132 for Condillac, repetition and absence of perceptual present to itself: gap or deviation of time > opens representative vection [desire] w/in sign & idea: suppléance as representation

HST p. 394 Levinas: “I” does not endow itself w/ this [temporal] alterity: impossibility of dialectical time is impossibility of saving oneself by oneself (alone)

——classical thesis of time (monad, event of negation) lacked thought of forgiveness (until Bergson & Heidegger)

LI p. 62 vices [turns] that interest me: time & place of the other time, the other time in (stead of) the first time, at once

TN p. 46 for Kant, time is a priori formal condition of all appearances > question of pure auto-affection in movement of temporalization

AD p. 52 alterity as movement of temporalization

BSi p. 234 for Celan, letting the other speak what in the other is most other: let time speak

OG p. 60 (88) arche-writing at work in graphic and nongraphic expression, pattern uniting form & substance, all content & expression > opens temporalization, relationship w/ other & language

p. 68 (99) becoming-space of time, time of space, marks dead time w/in presence of living present > dead time is at work, les blancs take on importance > limit of phenomenology

p. 72 (105) linearism, what Heidegger calls “vulgar concept of time,” inseparable form phonologism

p. 86 “line” only a particular model, vulgar, [acc. Heidegger] mundane concept of time in ontology from Aristotle to Hegel > meditation on writing & the deconstruction of the philosophy of history are inseparable

UWC p. 228 figure of humanist: a response to the question of work, the theology of work secularizes time > the clock sometimes represents an attribute of the humanist [14th century]

SPEC p. 280 time, in Freud, must be thought in differential of pleasure–unpleasure, must be of the party (partie)

p. 301 [re: fort/da]: selbstgeschaffene (self-invented) game, spontaneity, auto-production, self-engendering of repetition itself, hetero-tautology (definition of Hegelian speculative): gives time, there is time

p. 339 je le suppose relu [re: Freud’s Beyond…]—gagner le temps (or essential form of that which interests the speculation)

p. 347n for Freud, unconscious is “zeitlos” (w/out time)

p. 359 Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

p. 407 death drive doesn’t work in silence (like in French translation), but goes unnoticed (unauffällig), has to do w/ time (link to Kant, Aristotle)—thus rhythm: do feelings of tension exist to distinguish btwn bound/unbound energy or do they exist in relation to absolute magnitude?

TIME (NOW) in OS

OS pp. 31-2(n) Heidegger’s question of Being seeks to destroy vulgar concept of time by repeating and interrogating it > that Being is ousia, parousia, Anwesenheit w/ regard to idea of time as Gegenwart (the present)

——vulgar time as gegenwärtigen Besitze (always present possession), the having (Habe) of Being, its permanent presence

pp. 33-8 [Heidegger’s footnote that links Hegel’s vulgar concept of time to Aristotle]

p. 35n is [Heidegger’s] authentic/inauthentic, proper/improper still Hegelian, still “vulgar” time

p. 36 Hegel: now [point] has tremendous right (ein ungeheures Recht), it is nothing as individual Now, as I pronounce it, the proudly exclusive now dissolves, flows away, falls into dust

——acc. Heidegger, [MOP] privilege of form of “now” and “point”

p. 39 Aristotle’s aporia [on time] is an exoteric: opened and closed on this dead end (cette voie sans issue): time is that which “is not” or “barely, and scarcely”

——“there is no chance that within the thematic of metaphysics anything might have budged” w/ respect to concept of time, from Aristotle to Hegel > founding concepts, entire system, substance, cause, etc. sufficed > one cannot interrupt, transgress, exceed “metaphysics” w/out acknowledging this powerful systematic truth

pp. 39-40 nun, often translated as instant, functions in Greek like “now (maintenant)” > nun is form in which time cannot not be given, yet nun is not, is both no longer (nest plus) & not yet (nest pas encore), a no-thing (ne-ant), doesn’t participate in presence

p. 40 1st stage of Aristotle’s aporia [re: time]: think time as divisibility, where none of its parts, no now, is in the present; 2nd stage: now is not a part, time is not composed of nun

pp. 41-2 space becomes concrete by retaining/restoring negative w/in itself, by negating itself

——1st negative determination of space is the POINT (the place that does not take place), it then negates itself in relation the LINE > als sich aufhebend, point is the line, the Being-spatial of point > then comes the PLANE (surface) > each next stage only made of the negated prior stage, i.e. line made of negated points

——“always too late to ask the question of time” re: spatialization

——each stage of Aufhebung is time

p. 43 point & time thought in circularity together (Aufhebung, speculative negativity, only possible by means of infinite correlation or reflection) > time is spacing, space is time > thus for Aristotle, stigmē, punctuality, determines nowness (nun, jetzt)

——Hegel: negativity posited for-itself is time

——acc. Hegel, negation of negation as punctuality is time, time relève space

pp. 44 Hegel credits Kant w/ discovering “non-sensuous sensuous” concept of time, “intuited becoming” in itself, w/out empirical sensory content [Copernican revolution]

pp. 44-5 Heidegger, like Hegel, equates I = I w/ time, in the form “I think” is time

p. 45 for Hegel, time is becoming/passing away, not simply that in which things pass away > Hegel critiques “fall” into time, intratemporality (Innerzeitigkeit) (but, Derrida adds, this “fall” shouldn’t be denied all dignity, see WM)

pp. 45-6 acc. Hegel, think present as eternity, eternity as another name of the presence of the present (eternal, Idea, Spirit, True, neither inside nor outside time)

p. 46n Hegel: immediate vanishing of differences [re: dimensions of time as becoming externality: past, future, present] into singularity is the present as Now (die Gegenwart als Jetzt) > vanishing of being into nothing & nothing into being: excludes/continues other moments

pp. 48-9 [Kant & Aristotle treat time as pure form of sensibility (nonsensuous sensuous), because time does not belong to beings]

p. 49(n) time compared by Aristotle to movement and chance, w/out being either one of them, time can only occur en tēi psukhēi > time’s analogy: what is traced (le tracé) as line, grammē

p. 49n time, for Kant, brings difference together: only in time can opposed predicates meet in same object

——for Kant, inner intuition of time gives us no shape, so we make up for this via analogy: time is a line progressing to infinity > but where parts of line are simultaneous, parts of time are successive

pp. 49-50 if Aristotle conceived time in a way not dominated by presence, did Heidegger arrest this possibility in Sein und Zeit, did Kant just make explicit the evaded question [section title] in Physics IV? such making explicit keeps to (se tient) the system de l’éludé

p. 50n Heidegger: Kant’s transcendental aesthetic can’t perceive something actually present (Anwesenden), to perceive something Gegenwärtigen, one couldn’t intuit a single now (Jetzt), since each now has essentially continuous extension in just passing and just coming (in sein Soeben und Sogleich)

pp. 50-1 Aristotle repeats aporia of Zeno’s argument re: time, says it clarifies nothing, but does not deconstruct it > time’s nonbeing pre-comprehended as nonpresence in relation to determination of being as present

——to say time is not present is to already have determined time as “now”

p. 51 question of meaning (sens) always posed w/in closure of metaphysics: sens (meaning, essence) governed by ousia as presence, as act, as end of movement, energeia (the sens of time thought on basis of present as nontime, as Being)

——[re: ousia as presence] Hegel makes Aristotle’s nonpresence of time explicit by calling it negativity

pp. 52-3n all anticipation of the meaning of time: onto-theo-teleology; time suppressed the moment one asks the question of its meaning, when one relates it to presence, truth, essence; Hegel: “time is that which erases time” > time, existence of circle, hides from itself its own totality

p. 53n for Aristotle, circle is model of movement for time and grammē

——for Hegel, time erases time, Tilgen (to erase) is also an Aufhebung: given that time is pure exterior self, parousia is end of time

p. 54 acc. Aristotle, time is continuous & divided according to the “now” [does Hegel simply affirm Aristotle’s exoteric aporia?]

p. 55 the now, presence in the act of the present: limpossibilité de coexister avec soi: avec soi, cest-à-dire, avec un autre soi, un autre maintenant, un autre même, un double

——this impossibility contradicts itself, time is name for possibility of impossible, this impossible possibility: alterity & identity of the now maintained in a differentiated element of a certain same

——the cum, or co- of coexsistence has meaning only on basis of its impossibility

——conversely, space of possible coexistence is space of impossible coexistence > simultaneity only via synthesis, temporal complicity [cumplicity]

p. 56 for Aristotle, being-together [of nun and stigmē] not a determination of Being but very production of Being > ama as the pivot (cheville) (clavis), the key opening & closing metaphysics > this complicity so self-effacing as to barely be noticed, the common origin of space & time

pp. 56-7 Aristotle’s 1st aporia, nun not part of ousia, because made of now’s (time’s parts), several nows can’t : 1) follow each other by immediately destroying each other 2) not destroy each other immediately 3) or remain in the same now > need temporal intemporal hama to conceive this aporia

p. 57 [quoting Aristotle, Derrida doesn’t concur w/ Bergson’s critique of Aristotelian time as cinematographic > Aristotle can’t identity time w/ gramme representing movement]

——Aristotle: [strange logic re: now as limit, whereas no determinate divisible thing has a unique limit]

p. 58 for Aristotle, time defines movement/change (not defined by them)

——analogy, correspondence: enigma of “at the same time” [re: relation of time to space, changes of place, movement]

p. 58n Bergson: traditionally, one studies space & transports conclusions to time: juxtaposition (space) replaced by succession (time), space & time treated symmetrically

p. 59 Aristotle differentiates numbering # [actual #] from that which can be numbered (horse, man, time), time thus not a mathematical being

pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

——this would be a gramme that erases its tracing in a circle, removes limit of point

——we go around in circles trying to erase this circle > [time, still, introduces the thought of trace, if even to excise it]

p. 61 like “point: line,” now as limit (peras) is only time’s accident, time not thought on basis of now, thus mathematization of time has limits (always accidents/potentialities) [taken in all senses]

p. 62 acc. Aristotle, being in act, energy, is not time but eternal presence: eternal beings (ta aei onta) are not in time

——must think play of submission & subtraction as formal rule to read history of metaphysics w/in opening of Heidegger’s breakthrough [re: categories such as desire, movement, time]

p. 63 still Platonism in Heidegger’s Verfallen (into time, Being)? > move from primordial to derivative (time) always metaphysical

TITLE

GT p. 60 pièce & “title” could give the title to any possible discourse on gift, any possible gift

p. 86 “Counterfeit Money”: title of all fiction

p. 92 title = proper name of narrative

p. 97 Baudelaire’s “Counterfeit Money,” its play w/ title, links literature to belief, credit, thus capital, economy, politics

——a “true” corpus is still, perhaps, counterfeit money, may be ghost or spirit, spirit of body & of capital (title, heading, is capital), no problem of canon if this institution were natural

LOBL p. 89 Blanchot’s Death Sentence, “title runs wild and drives the reader mad”

pp. ~104-05 [literary] title is not its own telos, not self-mirroring, writing prevents reflecting representation from folding back on itself

BL p. 189 “Before the Law” : the meta-structure of the title itself

pp. 189-190 title is part of literature but heterogeneous to text because of its legal authority

p. 212 from title to incipit [re: Vor dem Gesetz], 2 moments, repetition, the same > dividing of letter, “it [the repetition itself] splits the boundary by dividing its line”

HASD p. 16 every title has the import of a promise

MPM p. 119 title promises, pledges

PAS PAS p. (47) endless dissemination in Blanchot’s Le pas au-déla > just what, so some other thing, than what comes to the title as title

DS pp. 177-78 title—capital: carries its head too high, raises its voice, drowns out ensuing text

p. 178 what ruins the “pious capital letter,” the aplomb of the heading: the blanks, ordered return of white spaces, measure & order of dissemination, law of spacing, rhythmos, invisible fleuron

pp. 179-80 suspended lustre of title: title provides a first fold, highlights womb-like matrix of page, a germinal or seminal blank, “the perpetual suspense of a tear that can never be entirely formed nor fall (still the lustre) scintillates in a thousand glances

pp. 202-03 graft/graph (both from graphion, writing implement, stylus) — bridge graft; capital title as scion/graft (can’t tell whether its present or absent anymore)

WAP p. 1 privilege of title, capital, capital letter, folded up (repliée): capitalizes its meanings in its folds: able to dispense w/ sentence, w/ making itself explicit > we should begin by decapitalizing (employ/deploy significations)

——privilege from its unicity, its place > its privilege is legal & authorized

——keeps quiet while making us think it has a lot to say

pp. 4-5 institution of title/work can be incarnated by people, even single person: but this incarnation guaranteed by some institution > institution guards, guarantees title, thus already holds title; origin of power to entitle/accredit can never be phenomenalized; this not merely circle makes us rethink “repression,” “suppression,” “sacrifice”

p. 15 a community (being-with, being-together, meeting, gathering) always presupposed in word/concept “title”

pp. 15-16 title, titulus (inscription, certificates of genealogy), tiō, timaō (estimate, honor, valorize), timē (evaluation, estimate, price attached to someone, reward) or ci (connection)

p. 42 title only has meaning virtual sentences (phrases) could give it, it gets its authority (both silent and intarissable) by capitalizing (summoning/repressing) on these virtualities

p. 43 title: most artificial/deceitful place in language

p. 99 the definite article in title “The Crisis in the Teaching of Philosophy” would mean one can identify it, legitimacy of a topos [but crisis is a problem of limits, borders, etc.]

DPi pp. 40-1 w/out title, head (chef), capital: a text is an outlaw, decapitated (w/ neither head nor tail [PP p. 79])

PIO pp. 26-30 [section heading: Patents (Brevets): Inventions of the Title]

PJP pp. 177-79 the 3 meanings of Le Parjure, each haunts each other, raises the # of titles (3+n): 1) the novel itself [“Counterfeit Money”], narrator betrays truth confided in him 2) betrayal, unfulfilled promise of hero of novel 3) the legal perjury, le parjure committed by le parjure

C pp. 204-05 when there’s # in the title: corrupts the authority of the name, voice, phonetic writing

p. 219 cartouche: puts itself to work, forms part of the work by inscribing (itself) (as) the title, signature, autobiographical performative of the signatory

p. 236 that which is entitled Cartouches is itself a series of cartouches, the title describes place, structure, form of text: voici des cartouches, ceux que je suis [follow/am] [cf. “Counterfeit Money”]

p. 237 I am myself cartouche and cartouches(s) in the plural: “I” sign myself to death as soon as there’s the title, reduce myself to first heading, capital, shrunken head

ATAP p. 66 quoting title, a genre, genre making fun of a genre [re: Kant’s “Of an Overlordly Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy”]

EU p. 121 Derrida believes in indestructibility of ordered procedures of legitimation, titles, diplomas

SPEC p. 298 fort/da: argument of spool, not a story, not a myth > to give it a title is to accredit the deposit, the investiture

p. 323 under what headings (titres) can one say re: Ernst, Freud’s recalling himself? under several interlaced, serial headings (titres)

FV p. 493 mise en abyme of title [The Purloined…]: the text is the object

TO-COME (A-VENIR)

R pp. 4-5 fidelity to come, to the to-come, to the future, always trembling, risky, is held in friendship, friendship of thought: yes, there is friendship to (be) thought: oui, il y a de lamitié à penser > we are guests to this snaking oath (serment) [D.H. Lawrence], in name of democracy

p. 9 [re: Greek word democracy] heirs, legatees, the legacy & the allegation (play btwn legare & legere), “sending or putting off (renvoi) gestures toward the past of an inheritance only by remaining to come”

p. 86 structure of a promise: the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now

——to think democracy [Paulhan], to think “first to happen by (le premier venue),” at limit of “who” or “what,” living being, cadaver > “first to happen by” = “first to come”?

——to-come: democracy does not exist, never present, not because deferred but because aporetic in its structure (force without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality, commensurability and incommensurability, heteronomy and autonomy, indivisible sovereignty and divisible or shared sovereignty, a despairing messianicity)

p. 87 invention not of the event but through it

***p. 91 “to” of “to-come” wavers btwn: imperative injunction (call or performative) and patient perhaps of messiancity (nonperformative exposure)

——the two haunt each other, are each other’s alibis, withdrawing into the secret of irony, of which democracy gives the right: to fiction and literature

p. 104 [Derrida on 9/11]: not as unforeseeable as everyone claimed; the trauma that occurred, not what actually happened, but apprehension of a worse threat still to come

p. 108 urgency and imminence of to-come: the à of à-venir inflecting into injunction, and into messianic waiting the a of différance

p. 114 only a God w/out sovereignty can save us? nothing is less sure, that is why we are talking, and what we are talking about [also re: democracy]; “democracy to come—salut!”

***MONL p. 47 I always surrender myself to language: give credit to that which is to come (as opposed to the given)

pp. 67-8 appeal to come (appel à venir) gathers language together in advance, not in unity, identity, but in singularity of its difference to itself: in difference avec soi not davec soi

OOG p. 53 “unity is still to come on the basis of what is announced in its origin”

p. 153 phenomenology never had to learn that Thought would always be to come

FK p. 82 “the future tolerates neither foresight nor providence”

p. 83 no to-come w/out iterability, w/out heritage & possibility of repeating, w/out messianic memory and promise, messiancity more originary than all messianism

——no promise w/out promise of a confirmation of the yes [yes, yes]

FL p. 254 justice is infinite because irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other before any contract, parce quelle est venue (because it has come, because it is a coming)

p. 256 rigorously distinguish “to-come” from future, which loses openness, loses coming of other, w/out which there’s no justice, la justice reste à venir, elle a à venir, elle est à-venir

H p. 123 entering is crossing the threshold, not only approaching or coming

p. anne 76 future, the absolutely surprising of what comes from the other

AF p. 36 to know what archive means, we will only know in time to come: question of the future itself, of a response, promise, a responsibility for tomorrow (spectral messianicity at work in archive)

p. 68 affirmation of future to-come is affirmation itself, condition of all promises

p. 70 no history or archive of the future to come [respect the future to come of the future to come]

p. 74 affirmation of affirmation, yes, yes, “inaugural engagement of a promise or of an anticipation which wagers, a priori, the very future”

——is Jewishness the absolute uniqueness of this trait? to be open toward the future (à-venir), to be Jewish?: exemplary uniqueness of the trait dunion [btwn Jewishness & future]

p. 79 if repetition is in the heart of future to-come, so is total annihilation of death drive

p. 80 in the structure of future to to-come

SPOM p. 19 the proper of a proper name will always remain to come

p. 45 opening of the future is its memory (p.45)

p. 81 democracy to-come not a future of democracy

——undetermined messianic hope, ce rapport eschatologique à lavenir, at heart of democracy and communism, concept[s] or promise[s] that arise in a diastema (“out of joint”), a “to come” in future present, not a Kantian regulating idea that would retain future modality of the living present

pp. 91-2 injunction, pledge, “necessary” promise “il faut lavenir” marks any opening to the event and conditions interest (not indifference) to anything whatsoever, to all content, no desire w/out it

EM p. 136 (164) btwn 2 eves (veilles), 2 ends, of man: 1) the guard mounted around the house (la garde montée auprès de la maison) 2) awakening to the day that is coming (léveil au jour qui vient)

VM p. 79 philosophy’s wellspring (ressource) is its death, nonphilosophy, because of its death it has a future, the future has a future

OH p. 78 democracy to-come not a Kantian regulative idea, not a certain future, but democracy that has structure of promise > memory of that which carries the to-come here and now

S p. 78 spirit as revenant, founds history as breath of something it cannot name, return to what is to-come in Hölderlin, the poet must preserve this experience in his Gemüt

VP p. 88 differance thought prior to or from presence tells us to interrogate presence w/in closure of knowledge > it must also be thought otherwise: dans louverture dune question inouïe nouvrant ni sur un savoir ni sur un non-savoir comme savoir à venir, approaching that on basis of which sa clôture announces/decides itself: openness of this question doesn’t belong to system of vouloir-dire

PAS PAS pp. (48-9) event, going-to-come rather than a coming-and-going (aller-venir plutôt que va-et-vient)

POOF pp. 36-7 philosophers of the future (lavenir) will be both figure & responsibility of fundamentally other, because they already are philosophers capable of thinking the future, those capable of enduring the undecidable, terrifying (unlike metaphysicians allergic to perhaps), they are like the Messiah, we are their friends, their herald & precursors (ihre Herolde und Vorlaufer)

pp. 37-8 the to-come disjoins itself, disjoins the self that would yet join itself in this disjunction > to-come more ‘ancient,’ ‘older,’ than the present [see p. 28 excess of Nietzsche’s “all too”]

p. 50 ‘perhaps,’ announcement of 1st act, 1st scene: only chance granted to the future, chance of chance

p. 65 future is not just the new, but the work of the arch-ancient, repetition

p. 235 “O my friends…” a call, a promise, a prayer (eukhé) [neither true nor false, Aristotle] > can’t give friendship, were friendship not still to come [Heideggerian ek-stasis] > in the name of friendship, “no friend” respectfully declares the perfect sovereign friendship impossible

——vous-mes-amis-soyez-mes-amis-et-bien-que-vous-ne-le-soyez-pas-encore-vous-lêtes-déjà-puisque-je-vous-appelle-ainsi: “O my friends…” has structure & temporality of messianic teleiopoesis

p. 306 democracy remains to come, this is its essence, indefinitely perfectible, always insufficient & future > even when there is democracy, it never exists

SH p. 61 figure of absolute future: monstrosity—Elijah, guest, other [re: word to be opened like a door to “who” would come] like a wound? yes and no

FWT p. 52 what comes?: what calls upon & overwhelms my responsibility, responsibility before my freedom, freedom w/out autonomy

ATIA p. 24 we’ll have to move continuously along the coming & going btwn the oldest & what is coming > the “again (de nouveau)” and “anew (à nouveau)” of repetition

SW p. 349 I do not foresee the future thus promised, I foretell it

——the gage of my foretelling destines: calls to make come, beyond any truth of ontological revelation

——it destines itself to those men & women who will know how to read, of course—knowing how to read (voilà, the circle) only on basis of gage given > reading finally what you have to read

WAP p. 22 autos of self foundation, never present, but not nothing, it is not the future but structure of promise to come

DPi p. 256 to be against DP is to be against calculation, calculable decidability of you will die on such and such a day > no future w/ anticipation of calculable instant > “my life” must keep a relation to the coming of the other as coming of the to-come (venue de là-venir)

PIO p. 45 other as the uninvented, in invention, must let other come, not make the other: deconstructive invention as opening, uncloseting, destabilizing foreclusionary structures

p. 46 sole concern of invention of the other (the coming of invention): allow adventure or event of tout autre to come > future-to-come

PF p. xxxiii injunction “it is necessary” of future-to-come can receive indifferently names “event” and “other” > irreducible to calculation, program, project, subject, object, anticipation

AFR p. 126n Condillac: the science Aristotle called ζητουμéνη (desired, sought after) is the general knowledge of soul on which all sciences depend (what science of happiness is to the arts), this science opens future, providence—so wise man is not stuck in present

TN p. 310 “consentement exaspéré,” un salut exespéré (ex-hoped for salvation), un salut juste à venir (a just salut to come, a salut just on its way…), un salut sans salvation, worthy of the name

***CF p. 55 a politics that would respect the secret (that which exceeds the political or is no longer in juridical domain): democracy to come

OG pp. 4-5 (14) rigorous investigation beyond closure of knowledge, take positivity of science to its limits—monstrous, breaks absolutely w/ normality > faithful to lavenir (for which there is yet no exergue [chapter title: exergue])

p. 66-7 (97) that the “imprint” is irreducible means speech is passive in relation to an absolute past that can never be fully mastered, brought to presence > this passivity of speech is also a relation to the future, but not via anticipation [which would be a mastering of passivity]

UWC pp. 204-05 unconditional university, resistance to indivisible sovereignty, to nation-state, to economic, media, ideological, cultural, religious powers > all that limit democracy to-come

p. 231 Nietzsche’s promising animal (the figure of man) is still to-come

EU p. 91 perhaps impossible, think responsibility as linterpellation requiring response, beyond juridico-egological form, encore à venir, plusjeune” (younger, still to come)

TOMB

GT pp. 170-71 Icarus racing toward sun [via Baudelaire], sinking (sombre) not toward the bottom (fond) but toward abyss; unable to give his name, how could he ever claim he knows how to give? has no sepulture thus no proper name > the whole story? all of history?

H p. 85 law (is always) laid down, laid down against some nature, an instituted thesis > laws that command, impassive, oversees behind glass, tomb of glass

LOBL p. 125 “the initial [re: J.] keeps (garde) the secret like a grave—jealously”

p. 164 desire in a glass coffin [see SPOM p. 142 revolution shatters death masks in glass caskets]

AF p. 23 entire economy of archival law found in these 2 words: memorial & reminder

——arca: cupboard, coffin, prison cell

MPM p. 87n when de Man quotes Mallarmé’s “this shallow calumniated stream called death” from “Tomb of Verlaine” (signatory of epitaph always writes on his own tomb), Derrida tells us genealogy of genitives cannot be broken by cenotaph or cremation: the tomb of Verlaine of Mallarmé of Paul de Man

POOF p. 5 ridiculous fantasy/staging of death of friendship: friend signs your signature at your tomb > who never dreams such a scene?

A pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

EM p. 133 (161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

PAS PAS p. (83) Blanchot: looking at them (elles) as if they had risen from their graves (tombeaux), and, I remain in their fascination > cest la scène deau, la noyade et léventualité de viens

PPHS pp. 76-7 Vorstellung, remembered-interiorized intuition; Erinnerung, interiorized memory, places images in reserve, like water in unconscious pit, like vein at bottom of mine > passage to conceptuality

——possession of pit > gives forth its property, produces light

p. 77n Hegel reassembles the feminine law (singularity, sepulcher, night, the divine) around the pit and the pyramid (feminine law only effective in the underworld not on earth)

p. 82(n) signifying intention (bedeuten) over body (signifier, from Cratylus, sēma/sōma (tomb/body), sign as tomb, prison) > Husserl, Saussure, Hegel

pp. 82-3(n) Derrida, through Hegel, describes tomb, family crypt (caveau), oikēsis, as the sign of death that capitalizes (thésaurise) on life by marking that life continues elsewhere, il la tient donc aussi à labri de la mort; at the heart of this monument, this sign of death, soul keeps itself alive, needs this works of death > the sign, “the height conserving in its depths the hegemony of the soul,” is the pyramid [later, Derrida will live through this tomb not, like Hegel, by negating it]

SH p. 57 no worse loss than death of name (still, a date remains) > mourning, interiorization of other in Erinnerung, the preserving of other in sepulcher/epitaph, is denied us; words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts > incinerated beyond of date, words lost w/out sepulcher

F pp. xii-xiii je marrête ici, déjà (tombe en arrêt [vault to a stop]), setting on the “edge of the crypt” a voiceless word, a blank stone of a scruple [see p. xlviii], to engage others to it, of a crypt

p. xxxiii-xxxiv anasemia: 1) narrative (superposing of “account (récit)”), story, fable w/in concept 2) angle 3) sepulcher

p. xlviii paelontologist médusé devant larête dun mot-chose, like a tomb burning in the grass, double-edged stare of a 2-faced Medusa (le double tranchant dun biface)

DS p. 229 in the morgue you’ve been able to read the folding (vous aurez pu lire que la pliure)

p. 259 secret angle of fold > “miniscule tomb”

p. 281 glassed-in library, open tombs [Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Z…]

P pp. 81-2 everything will flower at the edge of a deconstructed tomb

p. 87 [Kant on stone utensils found in ancient tombs]

SP p. 127 does one assume one’s own signature? formulation of such question disqualified by structure of the signature: (la signature/tombe)

DIF DIF p. 4 the capital “a” of differance, a pyramid [A]; Hegel: body of sign is Egyptian pyramid > Derrida moves from pyramid to tomb, oikēsis > tomb of proper, familial residence, economy of death (this stone announces death of tyrant [cf. TN.]) [this tomb can’t even be made to resonate]

p. 24 trace: à la fois, monument & mirage, traced & erased, living & dead, living in its simulation of life’s preserved inscription: a pyramid, to be deciphered otherwise, text w/out voice

O p. 11 preface as excrement of philosophical essentiality? that which falls away (la tombée) > can we account for preface differently?

——graft w/out body, bias w/out front, skew w/out line

pp. 11-2 for Hegel, necessity of preface belongs to Bildung, external necessity of concept’s self-presentation, must take time into account as the existence (Dasein) of concept [legibility]

REST p. 380 “to suicide” someone —make him come back (le faire revenir) as a ghost (fantôme) or make him stay (le faire rester) as a ghost, où il est, en somme assez bien enterré, ne disposant plus que de ses pas? > pas de revenant, pas de nom [don’t let the dead bury the dead]

D p. 292 technicity as metaphor that transports life into death, a non-accidental extra, which, in its act of falling (en y tombant): la branche (plugs it in) et la déclenche (and triggers it off): “force vivante

p. 307 opening of presence, “dead surface,” 4th surface, plunged by its “history” into limitless time that is neither “present” nor a “history”

p. 308 presence as product, tombe déjà comme un effet, sous le coup (under the sway) dune structure machinée qui ne se livre (gives itself away) pas au présent

p. 350 moment of present meaning: their “content” only surface effect into which you tombez sans cesse, fascinés by appearance

+R p. 158 “the angle is always for me the edge of a tomb (un bord de tombe)”

p. 159 plus dair, plus r [+R]; each letter, especially gl: re-marks the slippery surface, angled word, edge of tomb, hooked (crochue) signature

pp. 178-79 Benjamin theorizes that portrait of face is last “ritual religious art” before “technical reproducibility” > disappearance of the subject as art of the cenotaph [?]

C p. 190 cenotaph: empty tomb (kenostaphos)

p. 231 inimitable ductus of pickpocket [idiom], repeating (transgression must be repeated to begin) > worst, most fatal of villainies: robbery/violation of tombs

p. 238 contingent can do w/out discourse, a masterpiece can’t do w/out a cartouche (on the market & in itself: if you insist on this distinction) > even when the cartouche remains, is defunct: pas de cartouche, plus de cartouche > what will have been able to do w/out it? never touched, aussi impassible et invulnérable quaux harcèlements du trait: cest peut-être quil était déjà dans la tombe, le cartouche

TN p. 11 Nancy stopped short one day (était un jour tombé en arrêt) before Freud’s “psyche is extended, knows nothing about it” > this is a beginning by freezing (par simmobiliser)

CIN p. 35 entrust words to a page: better to inflame you, eat yourself up immediately, not a tomb that offers patience of mourning, but a tomb of a tomb, deprived of patience of mourning

p. 55 cinder & smoke (fumée): smoke gets lost w/out perceptible remainder, spirited away, sublimates; cinder falls (tombe), lets go, heavy, more material because it fritters away its word: it is very divisible

OG p. 166 (236) speech (voix): produces signifier that doesn’t fall (tomber) into the world/space [subject can idealize him or herself by suppressing differance as such, myth of consciousness]

p. 234 (333) for Rousseau, the wand (la baguette) that traces w/ so much pleasure does not fall outside the body (ne tombe pas hors du corps)

FV pp. 478-79 voice guards against the phallus becoming divisible, being reduced to part object, voice as ideal guardianship of partial/divisible object: mors disséminable (ce qui tombe)

pp. 485-86n The Purloined Letter, title of the text, not only its object

——everyone drops (laisser tomber) [the text] like they do the preface

TONE

MONL p. 48 I try to impart a tone, rhythm

R p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature

POOF pp. 57-8 Heidegger’s Stimmung [tonality] changes everything, beyond the concept, suspends/terrifies oppositions, where truth & untruth are together equiprimordially (gleichursprunglich) > Unheimlichkeit, lodges enemy in heart of every friend

SH p. 43 gift of the poem, and of the date: no dialectic > condition [of poem] made up of distress, hope, shi[f]t of tones, “Weschsel der Töne [Hölderlin]

ATIA p. 63 Derrida will produce a key not to free animals, but to rethink their proper, will offer high notes to change the stave (portée) (also a flat, to tone it down, change the tune)

ATAP p. 66 relever of tone, dream of philosophy: make tonal difference inaudible, neutrality of tone, affect works (over) concept as contraband

p. 69 tone, tonos, strap, cable, braided rope—privileged figure of everything subject to stricture (that which norms both theme & instrument or cord of Glas)

——change of tone (Wechsel der Töne), one of most obsessive motifs of PC

p. 70 [vis-à-vis Kant] mystagogue believes himself to have grace, genius, intuition outside school; pretension is mimicry of a tone (not tone itself)

p. 81 Derrida implicated [in Western eschatological program]: to tell le fin du fin (distinguish closure from end) > eschatology is a tone, the voice itself, isn’t the voice always that of the last man?

p. 85 prostitution as confusion of tongues or tones [?] > Babel: mother of whores

CIR p. 176 I knew how to “zap” even before Television gave me that pleasure, always zapped in writing, Wescheln der Töne [switch tones, cf. EU p. 70 Schelling’s Wechsel der Formen] (leaves other rooted to the spot)

SPEC pp. 388-89 death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

——this double tonality of Freud’s writing: grave, affirmative, cavalier

p. 394 the secondary (supplementary stricture) transforms freely mobile into immobile cathectic energy: posits, posts—here’s a thesis: immobilized cathexis is more tonic, tonicity related to effects of binding (elasticity & tension), thus binden as bander (erection): “bander: poster, liason: postale

TOPOGRAPHY (PLACE, TOPOLOGY)

KH p. 147n Heidegger: khōra as that which withdraws, “makes place” for something else

p. 150n Egyptian priest in Timeaus assigns “places” to race of men for conservation of archives, writing, tradition > temperate zones [Rousseau in OG] which protect against hot/cold

p. 100 khōra beyond ontological, to give place w/out donor-subject giving something to someone [GT]

pp. 106-09 belonging of genos [true citizens, philosophers, politicians] to proper place guarantees truth of its logos & action, different to Sophists who have no place, wander

——Socrates speaks as true citizen while identifying w/ Sophist, feigns, simulacrum: tells you, you alone have place, gives you the floor > excludes himself by himself by giving back the word; no room for specialists of nonplace or simulacrum in the agora

p. 109 Socrates as khōra, 3rd genus, for he only resembles the genus of those w/ no place

——Heidegger: khōra prepares way for “Cartesian space”

p. 111 Socrates puts himself in place of khōra (place itself, irreplaceable and unplaceable place), thus makes them, makes us talk, implacably [no choice] [see pp. 121-22 Socrates seems to program discourse of his addressees, who will speak?]

——is Socrates someone, something, play of proper names more abyssal than ever, “who are you, Khōra?

p. 112 en abyme reflected w/out limit, feeling of dizziness, up against inside face of what wall: chaos, chasm, khōra

p. 116 [re: a logic of living memory in Timaeus] effacement (of secondary impressions) would be the figure for the middle (mil-lieu), both for space and time, would not affect originary impression (that of child), ineffaceable once engraved in virgin wax

GOD p. 92 secret of secrecy: we have no knowledge of it, and it is there for no one (et quil nest là pour personne), a secret doesn’t belong, never at home or in its place (chez soi)

——what’s the sense of saying “my” secret, if the secret can only be revealed au tout autre

pp. 96-98 Matthew’s “to be learned by heart,” what is the heart, should it return to its correct place?: lemplacement juste du coeur, cest le lieu du meilleur placement

heart’s where you save real treasure, a capital beyond the terrestrial, the visible, an incorruptible capital, most secure, infinite profit

GT p. 35 the alogos, madness, of rendering account (logos) of the atopos (the gift), desire to think the impossible, to desire, to desire to give the impossible: madness as given & desired forgetting

MONL p. 8 division, why one writes and how one dreams of writing: place of jealousy divided btwn vengeance and resentment.

FK p. 48 [historicity itself was an event] figure of Promised Land, essential bond btwn promise of place & historicity

H p. 111 mourning is not allowed without a fixed (arrêté) place, monument, determinable topos, stopping point (arrêt) > promised w/out taking place, only possible mourning is an impossible one

p. 123 master: prisoner of his place and power

LOBL p. 138 La Chose takes place w/out having place [Introduction to Meta… & OG sent to Olivia]

p. 155 essential irresponsibility of promise or response: crime of hymen > repeats itself endlessly, takes place w/out taking place [writing/reading]

p. 163 there’s an arrêt btwn 2 deaths [in Larrêt de mort], thus hypertopia [see p. 140]

AF p. 2 arkheion, house of commanders, guardians, of archons, whose documents speak the law

——archives take place in a house arrest

***p. 77 Derrida trembles when Yerushalmi declares “only in Israel” [is there future, is there past], logic of election, question of proper name, exemplarity > place of all violences

——if it is just to remember to guard and gather archive, it’s just as just to remember the others, tout autre est tout autre [invaginates]

p. 99 Freud dreams irreplaceable place, the very ash, condition of singularity, idiom, secret, testimony, trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate > absolutely safe location

SPOM pp. 102-03 archaism, not bad in itself, more outdated than ever in ontopology it supposes, by tele-technic dis-location > this unheard of acceleration no less arch-originary than the archaism it has dislodged (déloge)

——local differance donne place et donne lieu, spacing of a displacement gives movement its start, stability, sedentarization depends on it > all national rootedness is in the memory of displacement

——not only time is “out of joint,” but space in time, spacing

p. 168 madness, to become a ghost [?], atopic, haunt all places at once

POO p. 28 no passion w/out secret, no secret w/out passion > passion in place of secret

HERP p. 175 what is the topos of the friend? a figureless figurehead?

HASD p. 23 in topolitology of secret, figures or places of rhetoric are also political stratagems

p. 26 [re: Mystical Theology] difference btwn access to contemplation of God, and access to where God resides > God not even in his most holy places, il nest pas et il na pas lieu, ou plutôt il est et a lieu mais sans être et sans lieu, sans être sons lieu

——place of God—atopics, strange (atopos), mad, madness

p. 27 figuration and places (lieux-dits) of rhetoric, topos, constitute concern of apophatic procedures

p. 46 height & proximity are topological

p. 49 Jerusalem as place that takes place since event of promise, place thus revealed as place awaiting realization of the promise > then it will take place fully, fully be a place

p. 52 where does order to remain silent take place? the place is Being, Being reduced to a threshold, outer sanctuary (parvis) of temple, sacred place

p. 54 Heidegger says Plato’s khora fell short of thinking the place (Ort), preparing the way for Cartesian space [Derrida thinks this statement is problematic & reductive]

——but 17 years later, Heidegger says, “[hē khōra] heisst der Ort,” and refers to Plato’s khōrismos as the difference of place (die verschiedene Ortung) btwn Being and beings

p. 57 for Heidegger, gathering of Geviert takes place in an indivisible topos, simplicity of point [of sword]: “the place (Ort) gathers toward itself at the greatest height and extremity”

p. 59 [re: Eckhart] place that gives place w/out being essence of foundation: step, passage, threshold, parvis (vorbürge)—avoidance denies its place there

A pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

PAS PAS p. (34) pas does not find itself in (dans) a labyrinth [topos], it carries itself along like a labyrinth, has the structure of a labyrinth

p. (69) Blanchot’s figures, room, sea, staircase, etc. are going to be effaced, figures san figure; not places in space, but they have a certain horizontality (thus the attribution of spatial horizon)

p. (81) she/it has no place, only what comes before place, what places itself before the place of every proper name (the Thing, pronoun, prénom)

FSW p. 205 Freud persists in accounting for psyche in terms of spacing, topography of traces, map of breaches

pp. 212-13 an immobile topography [& not a dynamic one] would freeze energy in “a naïve metaphorics of place” > for Freud, must rethink topology/space of conscious writing

SH p. 31 insignificance of language, can only take on meaning in relation to a place (border, house, threshold, site) > formation of alliances, codes, contracts

F p. xix topography of forum fragmented by secret—its ‘lashing out’

p. xix self does identify, to resist introjection: but only in “imaginary, occult” way; the “endocryptic identification” designed to keep topography intact and the place safe (le lieu sauf) are cryptofantasmatic, but the inclusion, divisions and partitions are real

p. xix crypt, pocket of resistance, le for le plus intérieur (la crypte comme inconscience artificiel, comme artefact du Moi) devient le hormis (excepté, sauf, fors) > dizzying topology of inside/outside

p. xx topography [of crypt] “twice cleft”; dividing line runs through intrasymbolism of Self and Unconscious (the twice divided, or double division, is what creates an undecipherable symbol)

p. xxi any judicial thought of the Thing [chose, causa (also, “thing” in Old English means “assembly”)] also thinks that the trial (procès) should not have taken place, did not have place > not an acquittal, but that the space of acquittal should never have been constituted > trauma and “contradictory” incorporation should never have taken place

——la topique des fors (the topography of safes) donne à penser, along w/ thought of crypt, the beyond-place (hors-lieu) or no-place (non-lieu), il faut garder sauf (hormis, exception faite, fors) in no-place the other place

——topography of crypt follows fracture line from no-place/beyond-place to other place: where “pleasure’s death,” marks the singular pleasure: sauf

p. xxvii no-place proper to “original” event, “hypothetical zero hour,” creates cryptomythical system [see p. xxxiii “u-topian,” “u-chronological”]

mythic founding event is only possible in secrecy—so it can ‘take place’

p. xxxii via Abraham and Torok, no meaning can come into being w/out topography

——Abraham and Torok: topos & force attempt the impossible, to grasp through language source from which language emanates

p. xxxiv-xxxv when introjection is thwarted, contradiction sets in, and a opposition of forces constructs crypt and props up marketplace, rates, laws, forum (for)

p. xlv Wolf Man calls himself by unspeakable name Thing (tieret), gives himself no name > entire body of a proper name always shattered (morcelé) by the topoi, la Chose est un morceau de symbole

p. xlvii proper name: multiple economy of places, instances & safes (fors)

FWT p. 97 technology [telephone, Internet, stock market] dissociates political field from territorial & national field > new concept of political is being forged

DS p. 285 the crisis of literature takes place when nothing takes place (a lieu) but the place > instance where no one is there to know

ROP p. 37 sans ce double bind et sans l'épreuve de l'aporie qu'il détermine, w/out its thousands and thousands of knots of passion, all would be program, no event/decision/place would ever take place (double bind can be “pathological,” but no more than pathetic figures of death)

p. 77 where else but on border do questions of topology get asked, and why else than that the border is not indivisible? risky for historian to assign taking place of event to a borderline

DIF DIF p. 6 if differance is [Heidegger’s Durchstreichung of Being], it reserves itself, never offered to the present: exceeds order of truth, not a hole in topology of castration [p. 21 differance is not]

WAP p. 31 inevitable topos in every problematic of right

Gii p. 58 Gedicht: place toward which poems tend acc. to a “rhythm” > unspoken, unique Ort

REST p. 290 for Heidegger, metaphorical (?) ground, this is the originary and fundamental experience of the Greeks, more than hypokeimenon > the underneath of the underneath (le dessous du dessous): a thinking of the abyss not mis-en-abyme

——abyss: “un des lieux ou non-lieux prêts à tout porter de ce jeu

p. 291 how that which is under hypokeimenon opens an abyss (change of direction) > a completely different topic: “more” carries away, thing no longer has value/figure of “underneath”

——Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, lhymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

p. 381 can a ghost (fantôme) be attributed as “the ghost-of”? > no distributive justice for this tribute: shoes always open to unconscious of the other, never possessed, still less kept (garder)

——en location (rented out) selon une autre topique ou la topique dun autre

PIO p. 2 for Cicero, invention vs. disposition: invention finds or discovers, concerns ideas; disposition places, arranges, locates, concerns words & things > this is, acc. Derrida, traditional philosophical topos, (see de Man’s “Pascal’s Allegory of Persuasion”)

D p. 290 Soller’s Numbers is exemplary re: the reader, cette fois enfin, the text shows (montrée) that a reader cannot choose his/her place in a text > does so by composing surfaces retournées & par une mise en scène matérielle exacte

p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, only 1/ 4 surfaces donnant lieu to moment of visibility, de la présence en vis-à-vis (face-to-face), counting out the phenomenon > surface is mounted (montée)

p. 297 structural transcendental illusion, one surface of Soller’s square opens to “classical representative scene” > this is a necessity, no nonplace left out, so no pure origin can stand guard over stage as if derived from intactness of absolute opening: any attempt to return to lintimité indemne et propre played out in illusion > nothing takes place but place

p. 311 this [re: Numbers] reinscription (writing, a machination) takes place (a lieu), il y a sa violence

TN p. 17 nothing takes place but place (rien na lieu que du lieu), extensions tiennent lieu (taking place of) > every metonymy announces, remains a sign of mourning

p. 221 “a lieu et tient lieu: a lieu tout en tenant lieu, a lieu pour tenir lieu…” [this goes on, Derrida then compares taking the place of to translation, where it is a considerable event in thinking; 356n TN. “thank you”]

p. 357n for Franck, no localization in general w/out auto-affect, self-contact

ATM pp. 171-72 the taking place in another place of Levinas’s oeuvre is an extravagant topic, another thinking of the name, a thinking that is tout autre because open to the name of the other (u-topic only for those who believe they know ce qui a lieu et ce qui tient lieu)

AD p. 106 questions of eschatological hospitality not posed (posent) in repose of place, they put one to the test (mettent à lépreuve) of an interrogation that endures sans repos

WOG p. 36 khōra, non-event, a place or a taking place, an-ontological, an-anthropo-theological; epekeina tēs ousias, event > fragile limit btwn certain event & non-event

LG pp. 230-31 genre [i.e. “novel”], singular topos, gathers together the corpus and keeps it from identifying w/ itself > designation [“novel”] does not take part in the corpus

CIN p. 19 no cinder w/out fire, that is what is owed (se doit) to fire, [yet, if possible] w/out shadow of sacrifice, at noon, w/out debt, w/out Phoenix, au lieu daucun placement, place solely of incineration

——“lincinéré nest plus rien fors la cendre [innermost cinder furnace], un reste qui se doit de ne plus rester, ce lieu de rien qui soit, un lieu pur se chiffrât-il [marked out]” > there are cinders, what takes place in letting a place occur

***p. 21 nothing will have taken place but the place, there are cinders, there is place (il y a lieu) > this untranslatable, like a hidden proper name, carries everything away toward prescribed limit, recognition, debt, obligation > place (proper name) for giving, rendering, celebrating, loving, friendship, dissemination…

BSi pp. 50-2 Hobbes’ rage against the liars who appeal (to God) above the sovereign: 1) the lie of immediacy 2) partisans, civil disobedients: place a law above law 3) like the Jews, don’t accept sovereign as lieu-tenant of God > p. 53 [but!] acc. Hobbes, the sovereign mimics God, Christian incarnation; p. 54 lieutenant as suppléant for other along metonymic chain

OG p. 218 (312) Rousseau’s morphological classification of language: typology linked to topology (place of origin) [North/South: need/passion]

UWC p. 213 impossible attempt to link “as if” to thinking of event: what happens when “taking place” of le travail, when the place itself, becomes virtual, becomes subject to mode “as if”?

EU p. 21 il ny a pas lieu: a phrase that crosses juridical, technical, social/proprietal codes

pp. 212-13 ontological-encyclopedic hegemony/structure, univerticality, tends to immobilize all recognized borders > all-powerful & powerless (destiny of philosophy subjected to State power)

——CIPH will outline different topology: horizontal, transversal, heterogenous > experiment

SPEC p. 262 what is the child’s debt in a play w/out debt? on what w/out debt does play speculate in secret? what is the place of such a secret? [re: Freud’s debt to Nietzsche]

pp. 378-79 Freud’s “to let develop” [re: Aristophanes’ speech] mortgages irresponsibility, no engagement, epokhē of judgment, speaks from no-place [Lacan takes Beyond… too seriously?]

FV pp. 436-37, 39 “Seminar” insists on topos, single proper itinerary of letter, if meaning [in the general sense] is indifferent to letter, meaning of the letter is not, meaning of letter as truth itself

——not naive topology but still a topos, Heideggerian-like veiled/unveiled castration placed at the hole (trou) of the woman, letter comes back to Being, to the nothing that is the opening btwn woman’s legs (Queen)

CHOR pp. 93-4 to say ironically, “there is no one place for woman,” is neither anti-feminist nor feminist, is faithful to affirmative displacement: “dancing” of women

pp. 94-5 lack of place, madness of dance, can also serve as alibi for deserting organized, patient, laborious “feminist” struggle

TOTALITY

GOD p. 6 European history gets lost in details, doesn’t think abyss at heart of history that prevents totalization, misunderstands link btwn historicity & responsibility

R p. 12 turn, turn around the self, makes a totality

MPM p. 13 deconstruction grows strong by accumulating forces that try to repress it, w/out being able to totalize them, “like those surplus values from which a victim of aggression always profits” > here, totalization is what an account, story and narrative are denied

p. 17 one cannot and should not totalize meaning of ongoing structure [re: deconstruction] when its structure is one of transference

p. 24 fatality (of tropological dislocation) is the law, non-totalization [impossibility of coming into being], the law of the law, that the law takes turns w/, as if it were, its own supplement

A pp. 6-7 insofar as a sentence speaks, it testifies to its belonging to a language, an inclusion different from any other mode of inclusion (social class, soil, blood, citizenship, geo-graphic, etc.)

——once totalities are overdetermined, contaminated, by events of language (of mark), which they also imply, they are no longer identical to themselves

MSUB J p. 170 motion of motif, w/out totalization, subjectilian wall: “of this dissociation in the body of which there will always be marked the singularity of the event made work”

EM p. 116 (137) [re: Sartre’s Being and Nothing…] unity of Being means totality of beings

VM p. 94 for Levinas, resistance to work, by provoking it, remains a moment of the same, a finite moment that forms a system and totality w/ agent > history: laborious procession of same

p. 314n Kant had a # of thoughts, more than others, about totality and infinity

pp. 109-10 for Levinas, homogenization of Same and Ego, homogenized w/ concept, and finite totality, permits him to condemn state, totality, not in the name of but against subjectivity

p. 107 for Levinas, totality is always finite totality

p. 117 against Levinas, Derrida sees history as transcendence, as excess over totality, history not totality transcended by eschatology, metaphysics, speech > but these movements themselves

p. 119 if, as Levinas says, same is violent, finite totality, then it would be more other than the other (an other totality), it would not be the same, it could not be posed w/out becoming other than itself (this is war) (“war there is”)

p. 123 history would be meaningless, impossible w/out eschatology and transcendence, impossible as either finite totality or positive infinity

DS p. 251 sum can’t be totalized, nor is this non-totalizing exceeded by infinite richness of content of meaning or intention > define the limit otherwise: fold w/ no possibility of folding text back on itself (angle & intersection of re-mark), no reduction of its spacing > blank, fold: impossibility of (imaginary) theme beyond textual instance > these textual effects rich w/ kind of poverty, singular/regular monotony, disappear: one can’t see this because one thinks one is seeing themes

GSP p. 160 for Husserl, pure truth missed when accounted for in historical totality, finite totality, factual totality > truth must open to infinite idea (Kant), w/out any limits, absolute, universal

FS p. 5 w/in structure there’s not only form, relation & configuration > there’s an interdependency & totality that is always concrete

——structure is the formal unity of form & meaning

p. 26 structuralism tries to avoid all finalism, telos, tries not to refuse every accident as an aberration, but it lives w/in, on, its promise & practice: how can there be an organized totality w/out end, or intentionality w/out consciousness?

——structuralist totality promises infidelity to telos, but: structures must permit totality to open, overflow itself, totality thus takes on meaning by anticipating telos > an opening which liberates genesis and time but risks stifling force under futural becoming of teleological form

O p. 54 if we can question and think about formula of absolute knowledge, the “part” then is bigger than the whole, strange subtraction of a remark, dissemination would then constitute the whole as a totality-effect

CHM p. 56 (Foucault’s narration imbedded w/in impenetrable point of certainty, as are all projects of thinking totality by escaping it) > can only escape, w/in existence, in direction of infinity or nothingness, this margin of the possible: not human (as in anthropological factuality, but demonic/metaphysical), first awakens to itself in war w/ evil genius, resists him by reducing natural man w/in: nothing less reassuring than Cogito at its proper and inaugural moment

pp. 57-8 everything (in Descartes) can be reduced to determined historical totality except the hyperbolic project

TR p. 155 for de Man, deconstruction wherever metaphorical totality shifts to metonymical aggregate

IW p. 247 coming of an event initiates irruption (volcano), rupture and hence interruption of totalizing synthesis

C pp. 230-31 [la cartouche is a cartridge] dissemination of cartouches/cartridges (en tous sens, en tout genre) never exhausts a total > no total of meaning and genres (masculine/feminine)

AD p. 39 systematic totality, architechtonics [?]: habitability of habitation, interiority of an economy

p. 147n in the passage beyond totality (epekeina tēs ousias), we find Levinas’ strained and precarious filiation w/ Heidegger > unlike Levinas, Heidegger does not give in to “politism” of, nor fascination w/, a (supposedly Hegelian) totality

OG p. 6 (15) crisis also a symptom: inflation of language, of sign “language,” inflation of sign itself, inflation itself > language’s historico-metaphysical epoch must determine totality of its problematic horizon, exposing its finitude when no longer self-assured, guaranteed (bordé), by infinite signified (which seemed to exceed it)

p. 132 how can literacy be violent when reserved for elite minority & when law demands total literacy?: universality always monopolized as empirical force by a determined empirical force

FV p. 485n coincidence in Poe; point is to show that due to structure of effects of framing—no totalization of bordering can occur: frame always enframed, parts w/out a whole

TOUCH

GOD pp.132-33 the phrase [“pardon for not meaning (to say)…”] is “up in the air”: an appearance that comes from who knows where, contingency (touch, tact, contact), & pertinent (touching, tact, contact) > dwells suspended in air, even when it touches, meteoric, suspended like Abraham’s knife over Isaac’s head [re: scene of literature, secrecy, forgiveness]

PAS PAS p. (30) “quand il la tient, il touche cette force dapproche qui rassemble la proximité, et, dans cette proximité, tout le lointain et tout le dehors

p. (89) le désir de toucher au bord a eu lieu (has taken place), the touching has not, not arrived at its term, sa rive, sa marge ou son bord, sa berge (bank) (ce qui garde et met à labri, contre une chute ou une noyade)

VP pp. 67-8 in contrast to speech, reflection and touch exteriorize

O p. 26 “la dissémination traitesur lit (doctors, reads, on bed)le point où le mouvement de la signification viendrait régulièrement lier le jeu de la trace en produisant ainsi lhistoire

DPi pp. 34-5 time of bandages: moment before noli me tangere [p. 35n unique moment, since Jesus is generally a touching Jesus], moment where mourning can’t set to work, there’s no corpse > when Mary and Antigone weep over absence of burial

p. 148 Nietzsche accuses Kant’s categorical imperative of a hypocritical cruelty, gives itself airs of keeping its hands clean (de ny pas toucher)

SW p. 313 sighing (together) before the “veil,” wanting to finally touch the it > to touch “veil” is to touch everything, leaving nothing intact, safe & sound: get caught up in it, nothing will remain

p. 320 veil as “sa laisse (lead, leash, let)” > tears skin, touches, punctures, pulls, doesn’t just veil gaze; voilà, every word counts

——after Cixous’ laser surgery, she realizes eyes touch, eyes are hands/lips [lips associated w/ language in Hebrew]

p. 326 “I like to touch more than to see” [his tallith]

TB p. 124 Benjamin’s untouchable (unberührbar) reminds Derrida of the hymen, of the wedding gown more visibly

——untouchable: fascinates, orients work of translator

***——text will be even more virgin, intact, after passage of translation: hymen, sign of virginity, more jealous of itself after the other hymen, the contract signed, marriage consummated (untouchable remnant remains intact)

p. 126 if axiom “there is no translation of translation” were broken, one would touch, and one must not, the untouchable of the untouchable (that which guarantees originality to the original)

PIO pp. 18-9 via Eros/Psyche myth, impossibility of seeing & touching oneself at same time: mourning, mirror, specularization

AFR p. 106 Condillac: we learn externality from touch alone

p. 107n Condillac: “sensation becomes idea only by force of touch,” every touch representative of objects the hand holds; sensation of solidity: both idea and feeling, idea as feeling in soul that relates to something outside

C p. 186 not one (pas un seul) must be forgotten if one wants to see or touch something of the group

p. 188 Derrida means not to touch anything, leave the thing alone, alone w/ you, leave the thing to “the nameless crypt of its mutism” > it knows (how) to keep quiet

p. 200 contingent: an attribute, a ration of a series; contingent touches on touch as false-contact; effects of chance, epithet of uncalculable term (échéance), use of nonnecessary become fatal

p. 236 principle of order is never untouchable [re: contingent dates of a series]

pp. 237-38 seal of crypt: contingent, “that’s enough” > Derrida left the seal in tact, truly, didn’t touch it

LI pp. 41-42 Sarl understood SEC or was touched by it (found something pertinent)

ATM p. 167 for Levinas, in search of God uncontaminated by Being, contact is a priori contamination > graver yet: risk of contamination that surfaces before contact, in necessity of tying interruptions together (insistence of ruptures)

OG pp. 153-54 (221) restitution of presence by language: symbolic/immediate, se passe de passer par le monde: touching is touched, jouissance not deferred: auto-affection se donne pour autarcie pure, it does not wait (nattend pas) > but, auto-affection pure speculation, present delivered is chimera, the no longer deferred is absolutely deferred: acc. Rousseau, sign/image/representation sont des illusions qui donnent le change (sidetrack us) [differance w/out delay]

pp. 165-66 (235-36) w/ 2 supplements (writing, onanism), auto-affection manifests by leaving a trace of itself in the world, exteriority of space, touchant-touché admits the world as 3rd party, here jouissance and se-donner-une-présence welcome the other in small difference separating lagir du pâtir (doing from suffering)

pp. 300-01 (425-26) Rousseau’s 2 poles [of original mute writings]: pure pictograph, pure phonograph (presence to thing, presence to voice) [p. (428) “excès qui se touchent”] > signifier effaces itself for signified in both cases

TOUCH in

TN p. ix meanings of le toucher (the touch, touching him, etc…)

p. 2 do eyes touch like lips? what is contact if it intervenes? a sealed interruption, or the continual, negating upheaval (relevante) of the interval—the death of btwn?

——that which touches: sils se carressent ou sils se donnent un coup?

p. 3 I could touch your eyes by approaching (mapprochant) you, if I dared

p. 4 Aristotle on the aporia of touch, touch is adēlon: obscure, secret, nocturnal

——aporias, never through with them (those worthy their name), can’t see or touch their end

p. 6 Aristotle (Peri psuchēs): 1) touch is “inward,” internal 2) flesh is the “medium” 3) touch has for its object tangible & intangible (tou haptou kai anaptou) [a touchable un-touchable?]

——how to touch untouchable? > la hantise of thought of touch—ou la pensée comme hantise du toucher

——can only touch on a surface, peau, pellicule

——limit, deprived of body, does not touch itself, does not let itself be touched

p. 16 vertigo of these concepts together: extension, partes extra partes, touch, se toucher

no assurance when I touch a body, or touch myself, that extension is transcended

p. 18 penser le toucher en touchant à lintouchable > injunction of impossible

pp. 44-5 transcendental psychoanalytic aesthetic (Kant may be a precursor) > how to have an apriori form of external sense, an already extended sense [?], a touch w/out empirical contact, sensibility touching nothing

——transcendental ideality tied to empirical revision (one can thus understand & avoid Berkeley’s absolute idealism), pure intuition/sensibility maintains something of empiricism: extension (Ausdehnung) and figure (Gestalt), both of which are not sensation (impenetrability, color, hardness) [i.e. not animalistic]

p. 46 for Nancy, touch is never raw, preceded by “desire,” drive, or even “my body,” but insistence of touch as motif makes it a post-deconstructive, irredentist realism

p. 47 acc. Aristotle, touch: co-extensive w/ animal life, the genus of senses

——animals die w/ too much touch: an originary prohibition, reserve of touch holds life on the brink (au bord) of exaggeration, touching a question of life & death

——in the beginning there’s abstinence: et le toucher parjure sans retard, unforgivably

p. 53 for Nancy, our world is in touch: auto-affects, hetero-affects itself

p. 55 flesh (sarx), Nancy’s Corpus is sarcastic, having it out w/ flesh, flesh of Christ

——Christianity a religion of blood > beyond point where any religion begins w/ experience of blood

——as if “touch in itself” were touching blood [Nancy’s self-expulsion] > rapport entre le sang et le sens, entre lecoup de senset lecoup de sang’ [sens, sang, cent, sans]

pp. 60-3 Nancy’s 4 metaphorical displacements of touch: 1) not to “touch” 2) finishing “touch” of pure Idea 3) anesthesia/euthanasia “as soon as it is touched…” 4) longing for touch

——Nancy’s thought of touch as flailing, weighing, scales or scourge of God (all senses of French fléau), exapropriation of most proper, autoimmune desire of proper, expulsion: eating one’s heart out > “saisie dessaisie ou dessaisissante (a seizing put-upon or at grips with one’s grasp)”

p. 63 Nancy: writing touches the body

pp. 68-9 touch who, touch what, coup, caress, biting kiss

——the who of the touch not necessarily human or male

p. 70 caresser, frapper

p. 76 the 3 neutral touches: 1) theoretical touch, as epistemic, knowing an object 2) pre-drive touch 3) phenomenological neutralization, a “reduction,” leaving intact intentional modes

p. 95 touch gives nearness/proximity more than sight/hearing > proximity, proper, present

——one thinks first of all, and too much, of hands: take the gift (“Tiens!”), comprehension, prehension, captation, a plea (prière) > “tender extending” becomes violence itself: “Take that!”

p. 96 operation that inscribed some touching in all writing, surg-ical, Greek cheirourgia, cheir (hand), ergon (work) > even if machines/technology are indispensable

p. 103 for Nancy, touching the limit > moment of decision

——philosophy, literally, has never touched anything > inversely, all one ever does is touch a limit (destiny of this figurality) [hymen]; to touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a border, an outline

pp. 103-04 touch untouchable-touchable surface/border/limit on exposing edge of an abyss

——philosophy will have “touched” something 2x: limit & unfoundable abyss beneath/beyond it

——there can only be a figure of touch, one only touches by way of figure > the object, the touchable thing, the "thing itself,” is the untouchable (gives itself, opens only in history of figure)

p. 105 untouchable, the excess of inaccessible beyond, the origin of figural fiction: le toucher

p. 109 would figure of limit have to be tangible? isn’t the tangible the very contamination of the proper, of contamination itself, of contact/contagion/impurification?

——touch more proper (Berkeley, Aristotle, Husserl, Maine de Biran)

p. 111 touch another sex, touch one’s limit, se toucher le sexe

pp. 111-12 syncope, interruption in contact, a history of never touching touch

p. 115 for Nancy, touching is very experience of “origin” as “plural singularity” > being w/ (cum or co-), community as co-tact > se toucher soi-même, se toucher l’un l’autre ou les uns les autres [French grammar tolerates reflexive in singular & plural]

p. 135 touching upon the demande (plea) of touch: “comment toucher, sans y toucher, au sens du toucher?”

pp. 136-37 to be able to touch: birth of simul btwn us

p. 137 question of touch belongs to history of body, to “my body” (hoc est emin corpus meum), to history of Europe having it out w/ its “Christianity”

pp. 138-39 touch is finitude, period, stop at this point > lefforcement (forceful exertion) always signs a finitude

p. 139 self-relation, “sefforcer” > institutes/born to itself as exertion moment when limit insists, resists > efforcement as effort/limit, a finite force sarrête, and se replie toward itself depuis sa fin

p. 338n Plotinus’ pan to sōma: organ of touch the whole body

p. 142 for Maine de Biran, passive is to active as sensory is to motor

——touch as genus, touch as exceptional: mobile, motor activity as the essence of touch

pp. 146-49 acc. de Biran, touch as transcendental, “faculty of movement,” withdraws from order of sensibility: exemplary sense (comparing other “senses” to touch: more or less sense on both sides of analogy)

p. 147 de Biran: the mobility of the eye is why sight most closely related to touch [i.e. mobility]

pp. 149-50 faculty of movement: “willing subject,” twinning (jumeler) the stem (souche): ego w/out ego before ego—1) touch as motor will 2) touch as pure sensibility

pp. 155-56 touch as middle term > where interval of divisibility is indivisible, continuism

p. 159 the 3 values of exemplarism [re: hand/touch]: 1) léchantillon quelconque (random sample), indifferent 2) teleological value—best example 3) et surtout, un simulacre déchantillon dont le symptôme trahirait une autre téléologie cachée: symptom of a metonymy, because touch always has been figural, some figural substitute courant sans fin to its “proper” abyss

p. 168 handless animals can touch!

pp. 168-69 for Husserl, the incomparable unity of touch: its reflexive double sensation (touching, touched)

p. 170 for Husserl, “we,” (who is this we?) immediately note difference btwn sight and touch

pp. 187-90 Merleau-Ponty diverts from Husserl while claiming accuracy: more interested in sensible reflexivity, discourse on flesh & incarnation, becoming-touch, becoming-visible of touch

p. 194 Nancy: no art of touch, touch is sense as threshold

p. 354n via Vasseleu [“Touch, Digital Technology and the Ticklish”], Mcluhan's assertion that touch is the sense of electronic age coincides w/ Freudian fear of touching

p. 229 differance as condition of contact

p. 245 acc. Jean Louis Chrétian, toucher autre chosetoucher de lautre…if touching nothing, not touching

——Chrétian dissymmetrizes reflexivity of touching, places other exceeding the “I” at the carnal heart (coeur charnal) of ego [no thought more forceful in linking “flesh” to Christianity]

p. 247 for Aquinas, spiritual touching, pure act, no intervallic medium (transcends value of affect), not temporal but eternal: like pure act or Prime Mover, a touch foreign to sensibility: (ordinary/extraordinary) history of Christian language

——Chrétian’s carnal figure of a spiritual touch, conversion of body (becoming-flesh) marked by historical event of revelation (Christian body): Incarnation, the Eucharist, by the giving, announcing, promising, and memory of Hoc est meum corpus

p. 246 touch as consent (Rilke), transitivity

p. 250 for Chrétian, infinite touching announces itself already in the finite

——Derrida notes, isn’t touching unrepresentable presence the best description of touching?

——Chrétian’s divine touch: immediate transitivity, dissymmetry—and reciprocity; w/ Jew, w/ Levinas’s caress, dissymmetry is an excess over me: no reciprocity/mutuality in experience of divine [p. 252 both Chrétian & Levinas capitalize the Son—Il, Fil?]

p. 254 Chrétian admits to a veil in finite touch, a “phenomenological occultation” of the creature

——immediacy of touch [its illusion] may be most widespread philosophical naiveté

pp. 256-57 the 3 universals of touch: 1) common to all living beings 2) whole body, flesh 3) covers whole field of the sensible

p. 257 [via Chrétian] for Aristotle, hand is “organ of organs,” can become anything because it is nothing, like the soul, touch w/out organs > this feeds into a thinking of Christian flesh

p. 269 lexicon of touch risks being ruined by abusive spending (dépense absuive) > an eschatological, postwar inflation (desperate call for new “era,” “provenance”) > apocalyptic symptomatology of “deconstruction of Christianity”: all we speak is “touching”

p. 272 via Nancy’s finite thinking, infinitism of Christian flesh finds itself contesté at heart of lattestation itself > we have no access to it but to refer touch to the limit

p. 274 touch as self-touchingle toucher plus tout autre sens (dizzy rhetoric), very form of space & time & will (essence of will) (from Descartes to Kant or even to Nietzsche)

——to will is to will to touch, strange tautology, bends/folds oneself back into fold of passive-active auto-affection > this affect, that inflects/conjugates passive activity of will: desire

p. 275 copula in Nancy’s “le sens est le toucher” is suspended, cautiously, and also insistent, also it has a transitive, active movement: touch touching on touch itself: le sens (est), touches touch

pp. 275-76 touch is quasi-transcendental-ontologization, quasi because touchable of touch gives itself over as untouchable (se donne comme intouchable)—figuring, fictionalizing itself

p. 285 Nancy: “touch” as limit of sense, and the limit of senses is to be taken in all senses, each of which breaks into (fait effraction) the other

——Nancy knows better than to capitalize “the” sense of touch w/ any semantic capital > none of the senses are assured, even if it can be quoted in the stock market

p. 298 touch is finitude, period

——what one doesn’t touch is part of what we call touch, and a part greater than the whole it designates [set, series]

p. 300 die Härte (hardness): [classically] touch resists virtualization

p. 302 Derrida’s offering [the text] will touch Nancy in a way this is both necessary/contingent: pertinere [as necessary] doesn’t fail to touch, is cocky, arrogant, impertinent; contingency: finite being [Derrida] would like to touch a singularity [Nancy], hic et nunc, in its [his] body

TOUT AUTRE [fixerup]

GOD pp. 67-8 secrecy essential to sacrificial responsibility, absolute, infinite, duty in name of God as tout autre, who must remain transcendent, hidden, secret, jealous of love, commands he gives

——absolute duty denounces all duties, responsibilities of human law [i.e. general ethics]

p. 78 formula tout autre est tout autre disturbs while reinforcing Kierkegaard’s discourse, it means that Abraham’s God is found everywhere something is wholly other; and since each of us is infinitely other in absolute singularity [Abraham’s election is universalized?]

***p. 79 [we are all Abraham in every instant] responsibility and relation of gift of death of each instant

——via tout autre est tout autre & Kierkegaard, supplementary complication upon ethical generality: everyone else asks at every moment to behave as knights of faith

pp. 82-116 [Chapter title: tout autre est tout autre]

***pp. 82-3 Derrida introduces tout autre est tout autre, then compares it to the speculative which requires a heterotautological position (Hegel, revealed religion that is precisely Christian) [G], always risks meaning nothing, speculates on every secret

——“let us not play at turning this little sentence around in order to make it dazzle from every angle” [instead Derrida interested in the incompatible duplicity of meaning]

p. 88 sacrifice: price to pay for not injuring tout autre, violence of sacrifice in name of non-violence; w/ Kant, self-sacrifice sacrifices most proper in service of most proper

p. 92 secret of secrecy: we have no knowledge of it, and it is there for no one (et quil nest là pour personne), a secret doesn’t belong, never at home or in its place (chez soi)

——what’s the sense of saying “my” secret, if the secret can only be revealed au tout autre

GT p. 122 [re: 2 characters in “Counterfeit Money”] espacement: ils séloignent du même pas, mais dun pas qui aussi doit être tout autre

MONL p. 60 madness of a hypermnesia, a supplement of loyalty, commit to traces of writing: toward an anamnesis of the entirely other > this is the most difficult thing [Aristotle says same about virtue]

p. 65 entirely other prior-to-the-first language, zone outside law, degree zero-minus-one of writing, leaves a phantomatical map

p. 68 other is entirely other when knowledge and recognition does not suffice for it

R p. 60 pure ethics, if there is any, begins w/ respectable dignity of the other, absolutely unlike (neighbor, resemblance, ruins such an ethics)

FK p. 99 socius as the secret of testimonial experience, a certain faith, address/relation to tout autre, that is, socius as non-relationship of absolute interruption: Levinas, Blanchot

H p. 25 foreigner vs. barbarian (absolutely other does not have a name or family name)

***AF p. 77 Derrida trembles when Yerushalmi declares “only in Israel” [is there future, is there past], logic of election, question of proper name, exemplarity > place of all violences

——if it is just to remember to guard and gather archive, it’s just as just to remember the others, tout autre est tout autre [invaginates]

SPOM p. 10 question of the event as question of the ghost: first time (but also last time) & repetition, tout autre > hauntology, logic of haunting: more powerful than ontology, harbors eschatology/teleology as effects, mise en scène pour une fin de lhistoire

p. 217 “absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous (es spukt),” unnameable, neutral power > this, which we have said nothing determinable urgently returns, insists, gives one to think, irresistible anguish, like that of future and death, doesn’t stem from but produces automatism of repetition alongside principle of reason > tout autre est tout autre

——nous faisant régulièrement parler depuis le lieu où nous ne voulons rien dire, où nous savons clairement ce que nous ne voulons pas dire mais ne savons pas ce que nous voudrions dire, comme si cela n'était plus ni de l'ordre du savoir ni de l'ordre du vouloir ou du vouloir-dire

POOF p. 22 wound opens w/ necessity to count one’s friends, democracy’s 2 irreducible laws: 1) respect for irreducible singularity or alterity 2) calculation of majorities, representable subjects, all equal

——mais là où tout autre est également tout autre > political desire borne by this disjunction, bears chance of future of democracy, divided virtue, inadequate to itself, chaos opening in silence

——no virtue, w/out the tragedy of # w/out #, perhaps more unthinkable than tragedy

p. 36 philosophers of the future will be at once its [the fundamentally other] figure & responsibility

p. 37 double infinite responsibility: “an intertwining of temporal ekstases; a friendship to come of time w/ itself where we meet again the interlacing of the same and the tout autre (‘Grundlich-Anderes’)”

pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

HASD p. 39 khora, neither an event nor a giving, neither an order nor a promise, the wholly other (tout autre), neither transcendent, absolutely distanced, nor immanent and close

p. 44 God is the Good that transcends the Good, the Being that transcends Being, this “logic” is that of the “without (sans)” > transcendence nothing other, and tout autre, than what it transcends

pp. 53-4 strangeness of what is as le tout autre (das schlechthin Andere)—transcendence, which, acc. Heidegger, Plato properly expresses w/ epekeina tes ousias

MPM p. 137 there is no beyond-the-undecidable, remains to be thought, incalculable order of tout autre, there is no inside-the-undecidable, but an other (singular) memory calls us w/out leading us back to any anteriority > there never existed an older, more original “third term”

A p. 18 decision concerns choice btwn relation w/ a wholly non-opposable other (an other that’s not its other) and an other who is its other (can be opposed in a couple) > the former relation is that of aporia, not a crossing of border but a double concept of the border

p. 22 if death names irreplaceability of absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in place of the other) then all examples in world can illustrate this singularity, death of all those who say “my death” is irreplaceable [universal?] > tout autre est tout autre

pp. 64-6 triple transitivity of sattendre: 1) oneself 2) arrivant, the other 3) await each other, which is immediately consonant w/ reference to tout autre [cf. HST p. 360]

EM p. 113 (133) interest in universality of anthropos a sign of West’s attempt to interiorize, master what’s different from it, leffet de cette différence dun tout autre ordre, where philosophical colloquium has no meaning, this other space neither barren, nor desert-like

VM p. 94 for Levinas, w/out the irruption of tout-autre, internal consciousness could not se donner le temps nor [give itself] the absolute alterity of every instant

p. 95 acc. Levinas, concepts anticipate a horizon w/in which alterity is amortized as soon as it is announced—because foreseen, horizon always horizon of the same

——for Levinas, infinitely-other cannot be thought on basis of the same

p. 104 Levinas’ infinitism is pre-Kantian, Levinas’ reading of Descartes’ 3rd Meditation supports entirety of his thought: absolute irreducibility of other, infinitely Other can only be infinity

p. 111 Kierkegaard had a sense of relationship w/ irreducibility of tout-autre by way of Abraham

p. 114 think Levinas’ infinitely-other, to think unthinkable-impossible-unutterable beyond (tradition’s) Being and Logos

infinitely other not as a positive infinite, as God; acc. Levinas, can’t designate infinitely other via negation of (finite) spatial exteriority, must renounce all negativity, labor, thus language, thus first of all words “infinite,” “other

p. 129 infinitely other & infinitely same, if they have meaning for a finite being, is the same

p. 148 for Levinas, origin of concept must be the gift of the world to the other as tout autre, not the thought of Being

p. 152 nothing can so profoundly solicit Greek logos as irruption of tout-autre > Greek language offers hospitality to a thought which remains foreign to it [Jew/Christian in his home]

——worst violence (what some call Judaic experience of infinitely other), when one silently delivers oneself into hands of other in the night

OH p. 19 must be suspicious of repetitive memory and tout autre of absolutely new [cf. POOF p. 65], of anamnestic capitalization & amnesic exposure to what would no longer be identifiable

PAS PAS p. (31) to think “starting from (à partir de)” Blanchot departs from the reassuring line of thought of philosophy, thinks tout autre; inappropriate inclusion of tout autre in the same

pp. (43-4) each pas transgresses the pas [contamination of adverb/noun]; violence of this dislocation, sur une scène tout autre, occurs, increases, when it appears not to displace anything in discursivity, consciousness, in unscathed, assured normality of language [alters subterraneanly]

p. (67) science is a dissimulation of tout autre, philosophy also > Blanchot keeps “old name” to attempt to give an account of this

***p. (84) [list of Blanchot’s many sans constructions] X sans X forms the trace or the pas of the toute autre that acts on itself there (sy agit) > degree o (eau); il reste un reste sans reste de ce passage (il y apasrien, un texte, un récit, déjà)

p. (85) formulation of sans is impossible; sheltered (abrité) by paleonym w/out relation to it, invests paleonym w/ tout autre > sanstrace de pas

p. (86) sans is infinitely passive to tout autre that approaches it, sans auto-affects itself by tout autre

S pp. 111-13 performing as Heidegger, Derrida affirms [?] Heidegger’s rigorous repetition [not hollow], which crosses path of tout autre [re: attempt to move beyond Christianity]

T pp. xv-xvi luxating philosophical ear, set loxōs in logos to work, une tout autre forme dembuscade, lokhos, block correspondence muffling other hammer [speaks to him w/ third ear]

SH pp. 11-2 tout autre in Celan, ganz Anderen Sache, other does not contradict, enters into alliance w/, in expropriating, “inmost concern”

p. 48 privilege of code (clock, calendar) [in Celan], that which allows one to call off the hours, to class (calare) > calendar, clock, name return of tout autre in the same > hour writes, speaks

FWT p. 40 differance is at once: the same (living being, but deferred, supplemented by technology, prosthesis) and the other (absolutely heterogenous, wholly other, death, irreducible, untranslatable); ——differance can both interrupt laws and introduce economy of new configuration into living being, it can both be reinscribed in economy of the same and opened to excess of tout autre

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

——how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same

DS p. 193 closure of metaphysics: not as a border enclosing homogenous space but acc. noncircular, tout autre, figure (invariable reference to primary truth, reference itself)

OS p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

the impossibility of the otherwise produces a trembling, a question of tout autre, think the tie btwn truth/presence, in a thought that doesn’t need to be true/present [no skeptical moment]

P p. 47 “grosse Schwierigkeit” of critical judgment of beauty [un plaisir désintéressé], auto-affection must cathect w/ pure objectivity, universality w/out concept, pure pleasure w/out enjoyment > Wohlgefallen (I-please-myself-in), Je-me-plais-à-me-plaire-à > auto-affection immediately goes outside: is pure hetero-affection, tout autre cathects me, w/out which, there’d be no universality

ATIA pp. 11-2 animal as tout autre, tout autre est tout autre, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal, secret > what happens to brotherhood when animal comes on scene?

p. 113 Derrida points out that a certain profound humanism [that of the Old Testament?] privileged the question of the animal as that of the infinitely other

——this silent appeal that calls from the outside, whose trace can only be disavowed w/ so many wounds, symptoms

O p. 56 literature is beyond of everything: author would have to disappear along w/ literature

——literature is the exception in the whole and the exception to everything (lexception de tout) (subtraction w/out lack), part (pièce) which exists by itself [solitude], marks le tout autre

SW p. 316 God as name of what gives the order to give the veil (btwn holy & holy of holies), veil as gift (that it is) ordered to give, gives to think separation from le tout autre (faith itself) > did this come to an end w/ death of Christ? can it be comprehended in veiled folds of Greek alētheia?

p. 317 absolute knowledge will not accept that there will be nothing behind the curtain (in the veiled place of le tout autre: nothing that is in the present)

DPi p. 261 damnum, via Benveniste, money given w/out return, given for nothing > excess of compelled expenditure pays more than is due, marks double law of homogeneity/proportionality btwn damage/punishment & their incalculable heterogeneity: the condemned/damned pays what he owes and does something tout autre, infinitely more than acquit himself of calculable debt: there is economy/aneconomy > “unless it is a matter of reimbursement (indemnification) and interest as the incalculable surplus value of capital”

REST p. 340 logic of detachment as cut (opposition, leads to suturing-sublation, maintains problematic of castration truth) vs. logic of detachment as stricture (is tout autre, interlacing of differance of [or as] stricture, no suture, haunting, neither empty nor full, largument-de-la-gaine, can’t accommodate the couple, ces coupes oppositionelles, the ghost leases, le, la, les double(s) band-)

PIO p. 39 invention of tout autre beyond possible status, still invention because one prepares to let the other come > deconstruction is that which gets ready for the coming of the other (deconstructs this double genitive) > to invent: to “know” how to say “come” and answer “come” of other

p. 46 sole concern of invention of the other (the coming of invention): allow adventure or event of tout autre to come > future-to-come

——tout autre not any figures of ontotheological configuration (subject, consciousness, unconscious, self, man or woman)

PF p. xxi countersignature: confirmation of an agreement & a wholly other signature: counterforce [re: Peggy Kamuf’s collection, Derrida’s texts have returned to him transformed]

TR p. 126 since every “I” is an “I”——tout autre est tout autre as the same: (the) I can betray w/out least appearance becoming manifest > substitution “I” for “I”: root of perjury

D p. 366 limits of square/cube—indefinitely specular unfolding/refolding: not limits at all > opening of its own inscription—tout autre, la même, another geometry to come [EROS]

HST pp. 361-62 absolute hospitality: say “yes” to the coming of le tout autre, absolutely inanticipable stranger

madness of concept of hospitality: Messiah as hôte; visitation not invitation (not dialectical opposition) > invitation prepares for visitations

TN p. 283 for there to be a good heart: possibility of bad heart must remain forever open, i.e. tout autre > good heart must be ready for the other, for treachery, for perjury (inevitable-impossible vow of abstinence, tactile’s fate); is this how we can translate Kant’s “evil heart”?

p. 291 the “self” is as indispensable as you in se toucher toi, an “I” unable to touch itself couldn't se plier à ce qui le déplie absolument, au tout autre qui, comme tout autre, habite mon coeur en étranger > no anthropological limit here > “divine,” “animal,” & life all derivative of se toucher toi

ATM p. 150 how can Levinas inscribe le tout autre in language of being, of the present, w/in its syntax, lexicon, under its law? > or: cette langue nest pas d’elle-même déliée, opens to tout autre?

——doing so in a way, where the fault (la faute) [see p. 149 Derrida’s fault, failing], which consists in inscribing tout autre in empire of same, alters the same enough to absolve it of itself

pp. 171-72 the taking place in another place of Levinas’s oeuvre is an extravagant topic, another thinking of the name, a thinking that is tout autre because open to the name of the other (u-topic only for those who believe they know ce qui a lieu et ce qui tient lieu)

p. 172 infinite law of quotation marks suspends all reference, work enclosed in a borderless context it gives to itself (se donne à elle-même), while making absolute reference to command of tout autre

p. 180 Levinas appeals to a tout autre which is sexually unmarked, thus making sexual difference secondary, and yet, this unsexed alterity is referred to as HE (IL)

p. 184 by excluding the woman in alterity, does the woman become the tout autre of Levinas’ seriasure, weaving the text from its other side

AD p. 10 for Levinas, relate to tout autre by way of heteronymous curvature > relation to other— justice

pp. 111-12 no hospitality w/out chance of spectrality; God uncontaminated by Being: rigorous definition of the Face, le tout autre > as spectral as it is spiritual? gives orders, gives pardon

WOG p. 26 the remainder (of all ontology) and the contamination btwn tout autre and its regular reappropriation (economic redialectization) haunts all Derrida’s essays on the Greeks

——the tout autre of the Greek, the figure of a tout autre unfigurable by him

BSi pp. 270-72 Celan’s tout autre [ganz Andere] not alter-ego, not another living present, but inaccessible other

p. 271 Celan: poem speaks in the cause of the strange, “vielleicht in eines ganz Anderen Sache

p. 272 tout autre can’t resemble or be introjected, assimilated into mine: chance of encounter, event, takes one’s breath sway—turns it [is tout autre sovereign or sovereignty of no sovereignty?]

OG pp. 46-8 (68-70) Derrida calls instituted trace “unmotivated” (immotivée), asks that the word “institution” not be so quickly interpreted w/in classical oppositions; “unmotivated” deconstructs Saussure’s arbitrary, thinks its possibility en-deçà de (short of) lopposition dérivée btwn nature/convention, symbol/sign > becoming-unmotivated of trace requires synthesis where le tout autre sannonce comme tel: not more natural than cultural

p. 110 (162) death, violence, impossibility of pure point, “point vocative,” death of absolutely proper naming (the other as pure other) is death of pure idiom

SPEC p. 283 Freud repeats his arrest, pas de marche: speculative possibility of tout autre (than PP), inscribed in advance w/in it, “louvre dune scription de lautre à meme (overlaps) le principe

——la surface même du à même (overlap)” does not belong to itself—writing affects the very surface of its support > non-belonging unleashes speculation

PP always revient to itself, haunted by tout autre, retour never “acquits” speculation of PP

pp. 317-18 death drive, w/out contradicting PP, hollows it out, older, not an other mastery (Herrschaft), but other than master, tout autre (not dialectically opposed to PP as life, living, alive)

p. 359 Freud’s auto-affective structure of time, life as the auto-affection of death, differance lodged in desire (desire nothing but this) for this auto-tely: auto-delegates & arrives only by differing in tout autre [for Freud, life-death announced to serve the proper, an economy of death]

TRAGEDY

H p. 77-9 aporia as the collision of two laws, antinomy; tragedy of destiny that 2 terms of antinomy are asymmetrical [the law above law & laws proper in plural]

SPOM p. 24 essence of tragic: preorginary and properly spectral anteriority of the crime; Hamlet cursed to be the man of right, can only come after the crime, originarily late and therefore destined to inherit

p. 25 “time is out of joint” when inheritor can redress wrongs only by seeking revenge

pp. 28-9 Heidegger refuses to see nihilism in Ancient Greek thought of adikia, but a “trace” of the “tragic,” beyond esthetic-psychoanalytic, this trace calls us to thinking

p. 30 the tragedy of Hamlet cannot be understood if story is reduced to an economy of vengeance, all the hesitations to take revenge, the deliberations, the non-automaticity of the calculations: the neurosis, if you like

p. 140 the great specter of classical tradition (Rome) is convoked (positive conjuration) to allow one to rise to height of historic tragedy

VM p. 131 btwn original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, in which violence returned against violence, in which original finitude appears, in which other is respected w/in, by, the same

question of philosophy: why finitude? why must I think transcendental through ego, ipseity?

——for Levinas, tragedy of ego, riveted to its own being > even in transcendence toward, venturing toward, the Other

TC p. 248 following Artaud, Derrida describes a dialectic outside conventional Hegelianism > the indefinite movement of finitude, original repetition, origin of tragedy as absence of simple origin: dialectics as tragedy, only possible affirmation to be made against idea of pure origin

——what is tragic is not impossibility but necessity of repetition

p. 250 to think closure of representation is to think tragic: not as representation of fate, but the fate of representation, its necessity

SH pp. 32-3 tragic inversion of shibboleth, corruption of its differential value, from condition of alliance to discriminating limit, policing, normalization, methodical subjugation

pp. 39-40 via Celan, date/poem becoming no one’s, this possessive has 2 meanings that form a tragic alliance: 1) either date remains encrypted, finite survival, the survivors (readers, interpreters, guardians) of poem lose possession of it in spectral return 2) or nothing is encrypted, poem available to all, the other’s singularity is incinerated > there is no choice btwn this either/or, no contradiction, the madness, sense, chance of a poem

FWT p. 178 Europe is the most beautiful example of auto-immunity, and allegory, because w/ Europe we see auto-immunity as survival, invincibility as auto-immunity: immense tragedy of a beautiful suicide

POOF p. 22 wound opens w/ necessity to count one’s friends, democracy’s 2 irreducible laws: 1) respect for irreducible singularity or alterity 2) calculation of majorities, representable subjects, all equal

——mais là où tout autre est également tout autre > political desire borne by this disjunction, bears chance of future of democracy, divided virtue, inadequate to itself, chaos opening in silence

——no virtue, w/out the tragedy of # w/out #, perhaps more unthinkable than tragedy

p. 151 deadliest tragedy of fratricide: absolute enemy resembles absolute friend

WM pp. 232-33 for Aristotle, no tragedy w/out difference btwn dianoia (thought) and lexis (tone, diction, speech): this still maintains an original naturality of the figure of meaning

——he exists/acts w/in tragedy on condition that he speaks

ROP p. 21 inability to identify w/ oneself, unify oneself, gather oneself > alliance of destiny, namely tragedy, and chance as the possible or aleatory [no pertinence to dramatization]

SP p. 139 this death [in text] not that of tragedy nor subject, not “I am mortal, therefore…” > the scene of text’s cryptic nature makes possible anticipation of death: tragedy, parody & birth

PJP pp. 182-83 tragedy of testimonial narration > encrypt while unveiling

HST p. 385 for forgiveness to be possible, what there is to forgive must remain unforgivable: otherwise exchange, excuse [see p. 380] > logical aporia (not just formal logic) but tragedy of compassion: intersubjectivity as destiny of hostage, madness of substitution

p. 388 congenital perjury of justice: tragedy that calls for forgiveness > this “tragedy” qui désaccorde le coeur dans laccord même, at the heart of the heart—prayer of mercy (miséricorde) rises

TN p. 296 tact (touch w/out contact) > avowal of impossible confession: confession is perjurious, confession is inexpiable, is the fault > le vertige of comedy that absorbs (aspire) every confession, tragedy of lies in good faith, lies w/ hand on heart

OG p. 201 (287) Rousseau: philosophy ensured separation of speech & music > Rousseau tries to efface the toujours-déjà of spacing by calling it a catastrophic event: the birth of philosophy out of Greek tragedy (the perfection of grammar of song)

CHOR p. 108 if this merciless closure [of sexual duality, of the 2] would arrest desire at wall of opposition, tragedy would leave this strange sense, a contingent one, that we must affirm and learn to love instead of dreaming of innumerable: but doesn’t dream prove what is dreamt of

TRAINING/PEDAGOGY

MONL p. 33 “the loving and jealous vengeance of a new work of training [dressage], restore and reinvent language”

SPOM pp. xvi-xvii the address “I’m going to teach you to live,” from lips of master, father to son > hesitates btwn address as experience, as education, as taming or training (dressage)

POR p. 4 (130) via Aristotle, knowledge as knowing to learn and to teach

——sight is privileged sense re: knowledge, knowing for sake of knowing linked to sight as senseless sensation (sight privileged even when no praxis in view)

p. 4 (131) bees, Aristotle says they can’t learn because they can’t hear

p. 18 (152-53) for Aristotle, theoretician leader possessing logos knows how to teach, how to lead, how to command

HERP pp. 202-03 Heidegger [on Bildung]: community of struggle (Kampfgemeinschaft) a struggle that holds opposition open, permits resolute self-examination [only the “few”] [see p. 190]

HASD p. 44 [re: negative theology] a politics of initiation or teaching, multiplication of voices, veil dissimulates & renders attractive at same time [Augustine: God is powerful w/out power]

p. 61 agogic path [askesis] of a text [Dionysus to Timothy]: repetition or repeatability

PP p. 154 (178) [in your soul (en tēi psuchēi), like a mantra, an education]

——seed must submit to logos, do violence to itself, since sperm is opposed to law of logos > when Plato turns live speech into psychic graphē he does so w/ a problematic of truth: lécriture en tè psuchè nest pas une écriture de frayage, mais seulement denseignement, de transmission, écriture daletheia

p. 159 Plato uses letter, alphabet, for pedagogical ends > never thematizes law of difference made apparent, the irreducibility of structure & relation, of proportionality, w/in analogy

POOF pp. 94-5 the pledge (la parole donnée) before the living dead must recall the political principle: politeía forms men, it’s not a consequence of this aristocratic equalization > politics is that which forms men, regulates itself in its laws re: nature, eugenics, education

p. 243 acc. Heidegger, Christianity is an education of passions, even a psychology, a psychological subjectivity—all post-Aristotelian friendships are Christian, same goes for ‘politics’

FWT p. 55 training as a form of cloning

DS p. 234 Mallarmé’s book is a block composed of sheets of paper—its “cubic perfection” is open, impossibility of closure, dehiscence as “internal” theater, practice of spacing put in play

P p. 19 Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics: system of training for teaching and cycle of knowledge

p. 27 metaphor of circle of circles, of training (Bildung) as philosophical encyclopedia

ROP p. 18 Freud’s link to all disciplines that question analysis: teaching, teaching philosophy, and (w/ its concern for truth & avowal) confession

OTO pp. 3-4 strict adherence to classical pedagogy (whose imperatives one can never break from once and for all) would reduce you to silence, tedium, tautology

pp. 21-2 for Nietzsche, culture (Bildung) begins when we know how to treat the living as living; Derrida discusses a pact, alliance, contract, a hymen w/ living language, w/ mother (tongue), against death (father): even good master of history (science of the father) trains for the sake of mother tongue, must know when to suppress ‘historical interest’ for culture to begin

p. 24n Nietzsche: rights of genius have been democratized, so everyone is relieved of the labor to form oneself

pp. 26-7 phoenix motif [in Nietzsche]: one burns what is already dead, the appearance of life, so living feminine can be reborn in these ashes [cf. EN]

——Derrida compares phoenix motif to Nietzsche’s call to actively destroy/forget Zarathustra, & to training methods, a treatment of the body (via tongue, ear) > must destroy selectively, the degenerate, which offers itself to annihilation, Entartung as life principle hostile to life [cf. GM]

p. 28 Nietzsche: culture (Bildung) begins w/ obedience (Gehorsamkeit), subordination (Unterordnung), discipline (Zucht), not academic freedom

pp. 35-6 the umbilicus has you by the ear, the ear is “taking notes,” the master a mouth (ear, mouth: both invaginated, involuted orifices) > the umbilical cord of State (dead father, cold monster) education, like a leash, commands us to write—that’s uncanny

p. 38 no trace of woman in State education system, she is the great “cripple,” not even attached to the [State] umbilical cord > Derrida does not say this to seduce, a vulgar procedure, and a ubiquitous one, “gynegogy”

——except the mother, there’s a mother in this system (faceless figure, survives on bottom)

ATIA p. 1 one should try not to repeat oneself, it gives appearance of training (dressage), of following a program

pp. 16-7 man names the animals to dominate, domesticate, train them

p. 23 vous entraîner à ma suite “train you to follow me, drag you after me” in coordination w/ hunting him (Derrida) down through labyrinths

***p. 29 transgressal experience of limitrophy, trephō, trophē, trophos: to feed limit, train, nurse, make grow, thicken, fold, divide the line, multiply/increase limit’s figures [not efface the limit]

O p. 13n Hegel: “Bildung (culture) must leave room for the earnestness of life in its concrete richness; this leads the way to experience of the thing itself”

Gii pp. 32, 39 Heidegger’s question of technology presented as protest, barely disguised condemnation of professionalization of University studies during Nazi regime

***PIO pp. 5-6 no invention w/out advent, singular structure of event, makes come about what is new in a “first time ever,” [cf. première fois] inauguration of a possibility/power at disposal of everyone, thus conventions, belonging to a culture (heritage, pedagogical institution, discipline)

——invention begins by being susceptible to repetition, exploitation, reinscription

pp. 7, 411-12n Bach’s Inventions not merely didactic techniques

WAP (DB) pp. 169-70 Derrida’s argument against too young for philosophy

p. 170 Socratico-transferential: interminable training from same teacher one’s entire life

IW p. 245 Rosenzweig sees Cohen as a philosopher-teacher who reminds us of the abyssal risk of thought or existence

p. 254 via Cohen, need for pedagogy: awaken what is asleep in logocentered psyche

+R p. 151 resonances leading you astray, what if I like words in order to be-tray (pour trahir) > (pour traiter, triturer, traîner, tramer, tracer, traquer)

TN p. 67 untouchable before vow of abstinence [cf. OG p. 109 spacing prior to prohibition of names]? a vow of abstinence requires promise of touch > touch haunting abstinence itself, intensifying transgression: unforgivable perjury at heart of interdict

——touching remains limitrophe > an inhibition constitutes its appetite: it eats w/out eating what it comes to cultivate, elevate, educate, dresser (train), trephein

p. 154 for de Biran, the hand is irreplaceable/dominant (teleological) and it’s pregnant w/ every kind of metonymy (pedagogical): best ontoteleological figure, best rhetorical figure

——“transcendentalism” always guided by such surreptitious exemplarism

p. 346n Ravaisson: good habit as return to innocence through training

AD pp. 17-8 Levinas proposes a teaching via welcoming that gives/receives something else, not ruse of master who feigns effacement behind figure of midwife

——maieutics, stuck in the same, teaches me nothing, only what is already in myself: même, egomet ipse, medisme, pouvoir savoir, property, gathers in itself (rassemble en lui-même) capacity & knowing

p. 26 Levinas’ open door calls for the opening of an exteriority or of a transcendence of the idea of infinity > idea comes through the door: the door passed through is reason in teaching

p. 27 Levinas refers to Aristotle: agent intellect discovers knowledge coming in by the door > [Levinas sees reception in this transitivity, an absolute exteriority not found in maieutics]

p. 85 Levinas gives teaching magisterial height: teaching what “to welcome,” “to receive”

CIN p. 49 Woolf: “incarnadine the willows…for we have done with this ‘education’!”

BSi p. 35 “storytelling,” convention of some historical as if, fabular > a moral lesson, a political strategy, pedagogical artifice to credit a fable: to make known (political logic, rhetoric)

pp. 35-6 fabular dimension of political not just sayings or writings but actions > death & suffering inscribed in affabulatory score (on Television): put living beings on stage to accredit interpretation of narrative, to faire savoir, like Augustine’s making truth, veritatem faciare

p. 243 D.H. Lawerence: “I despised myself and the voices of my accursed human education”

p. 283 nomos of oikos: taming, training > oikonomia also general condition of ipseity of sovereign mastery

OG pp. 144-46 (207-10) Rousseau advocates a kind of natural supplement w/ culture, a suppléance, habit, pedagogy, as necessary and insufficient to reconstitute wholeness of mother nature

——childhood first call for suppléance, first manifestation of deficiency, pedagogy crudely shows the paradox of supplement

p. 151 (216-17) slow place of pedagogy, Nature takes her time, outpaced by immediacy of dangerous supplement which burns the halting points (brûle les étapes), consumes lénergie sans retour

pp. 204, 344n (292, 292n) teach by example or explanation? but will the child do it by heart or memory? is there virtue in imitating virtue? [Kant, Rousseau]

EU p. 71 for Schelling, philosopher develops negative condition: consciousness of inanity of all finite knowledge > ability to translate, re-translate, the real to the ideal can be acquired—can be cultivated in a Bildung and become untransformable habitus, unalterable organ

p. 179 acc. Kant, all pedagogy gives conclusions w/out principle: place of passage, access to results of a thought elaborated

——relation btwn critique & metaphysics [in Kant]: socio-pedagogic scenography, also determined thinking on right to philosophy

p. 181 for Kant, the 3 places of pedagogy: 1) return to principles, coming to consciousness of metaphysics 2) theoretical instruction, indicate relation btwn moral principles & anthropological consequences 3) moral education in field of moral anthropology, conditions of application

p. 182 for Kant, pedagogy, discipline of philosophy, not purely philosophical

p. 247 quaestio, disputatio of Scholastics (pedagogical practices)

FV p. 416 [re: Benveniste on Aristotle’s categories (see p. 416n), Freud referring to The Emperors New Clothes] example of illustrative jubilation, treats element of its “scientific” discourse as marvelous paradigm there to be found, happily available (disponible) for instructing discourse

TRANSFERENCE

GT p. 120 through a movement of transference, narrator has affected fabric of relation itself

AF p. 37 coup de foudre, love at first sight, love & transference, “what if” of the future in the instant

LOBL p. ~146-47 translation as transference, transference is love, one text loves the other in translation

MPM pp. 10-1 if memory maneuvers btwn law and Being, can one think the being and law of memory? these questions move through transference & translation, above abyss; require impossible passageways: “the fragile resistance of a span” [hymen?]

p. 17 one cannot and should not totalize meaning of ongoing structure [re: deconstruction] when its structure is one of transference

PP pp. 71-2 difficulty of translating pharmakon (“remedy,” “drug,” “recipe,” “philter”) w/in Greek itself > violent transference of a nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme is problem of very passage into philosophy

DS p. 182n the hystera is supposed to be “behind” the hymen, but it exposes itself only through mimicry, transference & simulacrum

ROP p. 67 transference (love) has never needed the clinic to claim its victims

ATIA p. 108 since, for Levinas, face is human, only through transference or metaphor are we sensitive to animal suffering

pp. 121-22 for Lacan, mirror (imaginary) is enough to bring an animal from solitary to gregarious form (which is not social); animal does not have unconscious, language, sometimes develops it through domestic transference [?]

TB p. 133 sacred text is transferability making its translation untranslatable

——sacred text (absolute text): pas de sens (not poverty of meaning, but no meaning that would be itself) > sacred text surrenders itself to translation; commands right away the translation it refuses

PIO p. 4 Cicero opens his text on invention w/ question of the son as a question de ratione dicendi > scene of traditio, tradition, transfer, an allegory of metaphor

PSSS p. 249 “mad”: invent destination, address, addressee of grievance

——“mad” as a movement w/ no target, no telos, where movement of (counter-)transference has not yet taking place, is seeking its place, its subjects [is this an analytic site?]

——threat of death, whose mourning/grievance would be born in advance, invades place left vacant for transferential destination

p. 261 psychoanalysis only “science” that intrinsically involves the proper name of its founder, a transferential filiation it claims to be able to analyze

BSi pp. 244-45 reconstitute sovereignty by 1) transferring it to the other, i.e. no longer my sovereignty 2) or should the idea itself be contested?

p. 289 narrative/representation structural to sovereignty, its force, its dynamis and its energeia (virtual & actual power) > sovereignty draws all its power from simulacrum-, fiction-, representation-effect > mystification of representation constituted by the simulacrum of a true transfer of sovereignty

p. 290 trap of sovereignty, trap of transfer of sovereignty > in all these fictions and simulacra blood flows, no less cruelly, irreversibly: beast & sovereign bleed, so do marionettes

——political revolution w/out poetic revolution of political > just a transfer of sovereignty

——Bemächtigungstrieb: beyond other drives, beyond death drive, think sovereignty through drive, transference, inheritance, transmission, sovereignty itself is nothing, is excess, beyond everything

EU p. 77 [re: use of word “translation” to refer to “transposition, transfer, transport” in a sense not strictly linguistic] for Schelling, language is a living phenomenon; Novalis, Goethe: nature an author to be translated w/ skill of a philologist

——Schelling: “nature is like some very ancient author whose message is written in hieroglyphics on colossal pages” [geologic?]

p. 206 [CIPH] interference of knowledge or “interscience” [Einstein]: prepare or let oneself be surprised > new information & communicative technology, new objects arising on transversal paths

——privilege accorded to inter-ferences [see p. 207]: transference in every sense of the word

p. 241 [re: CIPH] translation: transferential, diagonal, transversal, interscientific research

SPEC p. 339 “transference (Übertragung)” attempts to reduce “resistances” of patient, only displaces resistance, operates a resistance, as a resistance > no legacy (legs) w/out transference > inheritance of transference, legs, legation, delegation, differance of transference

p. 339 “transference neurosis” supplements previous neurosis

p. 353 demonic, archive of its own demon: undissolved transference, like unpaid debt of inheritance, one can begin an inheritance thus: laissée en sommeil, la menace ainsi enkystée [pocket]

pp. 380-83 [Freud divided] Freud translating translation into scientific theory: 1) “trans-” inhabit origin on (dès) its very threshold 2) perception as prior to its translation

——garde-fou has disappeared en chemin, all speculative transferences are of the party (partie); transference: as transpose, translate, network of correspondences, traffic, postal, railway, sorting

p. 384 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] passage btwn transference & speculation > speculative transference orients, destines, calculates most original & most passive “first step” on very threshold of perception: desire for concept of perception belongs to destiny of this calculation

——w/out borrowing, nothing begins, il ny a pas de fonds propre, there’s no transference of fund, lemprunt rapporte, produces surplus value, is the prime mover of every investment > on commence ainsi par spéculer, en pariant sur une valeur à produire comme à partir de rien: all these “metaphors” confirm, as metaphors, the necessity of what they state

p. 388 transference, ersatz, prosthesis, at the mouth, Freud’s surgeries, cigar: les pas de plus et les plus de pas [?]

FV pp. 460-61 analysand seeing his/her double: “uncontrollable anxiety” disrupts every verification of identity, obstacle for transference

TRANSGRESSION

GT p. 91 what is a border (bord) or an approach (aborder) once the indivisibility of the trait is no longer secure (assurée)? gift will always be w/out border

——gift overruns border & suspends its relation to border, is beyond transgression

EM p. 135 (162) efficiency of system turns transgressions into “false exits”

POS p. 12 deconstruction not a transgression, that would re-enclose us, give us a hold on closure of metaphysics > “one is never installed w/in transgression, one never lives elsewhere, transgression implies that the limit is always at work”

ATIA p. 29 transgressal experience of limitrophy, trephō, trophē, trophos: to feed limit, train, nurse, make grow, thicken, fold, divide the line, multiply/increase limit’s figures [not efface the limit]

PS p. 194 transgression of metaphysics always risks returning to it

RGE p. 274 sovereign operation, to affirm itself as transgression must conserve, confirm, what it exceeds

p. 275 Bataille designates (as never before) the transgressive relationship that links world of meaning to world of nonmeaning

***WAP p. 138 to neglect Hegel’s functional letter (“Report”) [as parergonal] a failure to move beyond prestatist problematics of education > a refusal to identify borders, exterior, a refusal to transform and transgress

C p. 231 inimitable ductus of pickpocket [idiom], repeating (transgression must be repeated to begin) > worst, most fatal of villainies: robbery/violation of tombs

TN p. 67 untouchable before vow of abstinence [cf. OG p. 109 spacing prior to prohibition of names]? a vow of abstinence requires promise of touch > touch haunting abstinence itself, intensifying transgression: unforgivable perjury at heart of interdict

p. 295 Nancy’s “transgression” close to Derrida’s “originary perjury as inevitable as it is unforgivable”

ATM p. 148 [re: giving to EL w/out restitution] excess that overflows language sets it into motion at moment of traversing it > this traversal is not transgression (passage of a sharply dividing limit) > metaphor of overflowing no longer fits—too linear [?]

OG pp. 22-3 (36-8) Heidegger transgresses and contained (y est comprise) at same time in presence of logocentrism > his crossing-out (rature, kreuzweise Durchstreichung) of Being effaces presence of transcendental signified while keeping it legible: this last writing is a first writing (of an epoch), inasmuch as it de-limits onto-theology, metaphysics of presence, logocentrism > Heidegger must restore (provisionally) “transcendence” to Being to renounce project/word ontology [given risk of transgression becoming regression here, Derrida insists we go by way of Heidegger’s rigor alone]

p. 112 (164-65) complex layering of 3 violences re: proper names: 1) expropriation, repetition, déjà dédoublée, arche-writing, to give name it’s forbidden to pronounce, to name what’s never present, the unique [fire in CIN, Glas] 2) secret, protective, reparatory, “moral,” conceal names 3) the scene of proper names, reassuring seal of self-identity, refers to #1 and #2, empirical consciousness, common concept of violence, revealing name by effraction: evil, war, rape (system of moral law & transgression) [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]

p. 266 language couples prohibition & transgression endlessly, point of nonreplacement doesn’t exist > that which is elusive in our indestructible & mortal desire

WBH p. 197 deconstruction not transgression of the Law, it is the Law: it is an affirmation, and affirmation is on side of Law: as soon as you affirm a desire, you perform something which is the Law, the Law says, “yes” (Law is not simply negative, that’s hard to understand)

——deconstruction is another way of writing Law, affirming new mode of Law, thus not a movement of transgression or liberation

TRACE

GOD p. 81 Gospels: God maintains trace of his suffering by “seeing in secret,” you forget suffering in his love, he forgets nothing

pp.132-33 the phrase [“pardon for not meaning (to say)…”] is “up in the air”: an appearance that comes from who knows where, contingency (touch, tact, contact), & pertinent (touching, tact, contact) > dwells suspended in air, even when it touches, meteoric, suspended like Abraham’s knife over Isaac’s head [re: scene of literature, secrecy, forgiveness]

p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

——w/ no witness, can only come down to us in the trace of an inheritance

p. 153 after the flood, God reminds himself of the promise of the covenant, in the meteoric [trace] of a rainbow, that is, not merely in spontaneous, living, autoaffective memory [Derrida here showing literature’s relation to Jewish God]

GT p. 100 no problematic of gift on basis of metaphysics of presence, or sign, signifier, signified, or value > only w/ problematic of trace of text

MONL p. 60 madness of a hypermnesia, a supplement of loyalty, commit to traces of writing: toward an anamnesis of the entirely other > this is the most difficult thing [Aristotle says same about virtue]

p. 61 translate memory of what was forbidden, did not take place, left a trace, mark, scar

——what is the avowal, error, or defect, from which one must write?

R p. 35 figure of renvoi (remission, sending off, deferral) is like differance, trace, it creates spacing, and brings autoimmune in line with aporia, double bind

***p. 39 every trace is a trace of democracy, of democracy there could only be a trace

FL p. 253 memory of undecidability must keep a living trace that forever marks a decision as such [is that possible? does that mark its death?]

——the undecidable remains caught, lodged, as a ghost, an essential ghost, in every decision, every event, the ghostliness deconstructs from within all assurance of presence

LOBL p. 97 possible from “first trace” on, which is why there is no first trace: the outside opens a pocket [cf. F p. xix crypt: pocket of resistance]

pp. 136-37 survivre delays at once life & death, line of least sure sur-, no clear-cut opposition, living on like differance, beyond identity & difference > tele-phone, tele-gram only 2 modes of this teleography in which trace, grapheme, does come secondarily but marks telic structure a priori

***p. 149 commitment only in the language of the other [see pp. 153-54], there is “language of the other” whenever there is a speech-event, this is what I mean by a “trace”

——[trace as commitment to the other, the forgotten remnant in translation]

AF p. 80 question of revelation (Offenbarung) or revealability (Offenbarkeit): does the event make the archivization possible? or vice versa? besides, the after-the-fact, the trace, Nachträglichkeit, disturbs the logic of the these two theses

MC p. 360 Derrida says mark, trace rather than signifier, letter, word, or the generality of stoikheion—to extend mark beyond verbal sign, beyond human language (and beyond atomism) > thus he does not affirm “arbitrariness of sign” like Hegel, Saussure

SPOM p. xx justice carries life beyond present life, not toward death but toward “living-on,” a trace where life and death are traces, of traces, a survival that dis-adjusts the identity of the living present, of effectivity

p. 202 “mystical character” of commodity is inscribed before being inscribed, traced before being written letter for letter, everything begins before it begins > but Marx wants to know the instant the ghost comes on stage—this is a manner of exorcism

POO p. 29 when all hypotheses are permitted, when there is no longer even any sense in making decisions about some secret behind the surface of a textual manifestation (text or trace), when it is the call of the secret, when our passion is aroused

p. 31 no responsiveness [in English], is that death [Levinas says so]? death dealt? I see no reason not to call that life, existence, trace [w/out being the contrary]

p. 143n trace = grace: something rather than nothing

——to speak of something w/out speaking of something [literature] valid for every trace, dissociation doesn’t need to be marked by words, doesn’t require la parole, can be mute deictic, gesture of animal [trace beyond human]

HASD p. 9 differance and trace don’t arise from Being, from presence, even less from [negative theology’s] hyperessentiality

p. 14 from the moment I open my mouth, I have already promised at least to say: it is necessary to be silent > speak of the promise w/in the promise, as necessary as it is impossible: inscribes us by its trace in language—before language

p. 18 garder pour soi, voilà le pouvoir le plus incroyable et qui donne le plus à penser > must there not be dissimulation, multiplicity & difference from oneself, trace, for there to be keeping?

pp. 28-29 [letter always arrives?] always possible to call on God, to call assumed origin of all speech by name of God, God always names trace of singular event rendering speech possible, all apophatic discourse opens w/ prayer

——always presupposed event, déjà-là, trace of phrase indispensable, irreducible, trace has taken place, even if contaminated by repetition which confers on it code & intelligibility, even if it occurs only to efface itself, effacement will have taken place, even if its place is only in ashes, il y a là cendre

——trace as possibility of finitude, finite & infinite cause of trace appears secondary, an effect of trace or differance (which is finite insofar as it is infinite)

p. 30 no responsibility w/out prior coming of trace, or if autonomy were first & absolute [?]

MPM p. 29 this finitude (finitude of friendship) does not take the form of a limit, but takes the form of the trace of the other in us, the other’s irreducible presence

p. 31 any trace always trace of the other

p. 35 il faut: one must follow the trace, remember that which did not exist, the law [Being and law], only there in the aporia of mourning and prosopopoeia: 1) success fails: other becomes part of us, bear him in us, like a future 2) failure succeeds: aborted interorization, respect for other as other, other remains alone, outside us, in his death > schema makes true mourning impossible

p. 37 parts, traces, hypomnemata of other are fragments that seem greater & older than us—pregnant w/ this other

——no choice but to let other speak, cannot make other speak w/out other having already spoken > in trace, part greater/less than whole

p. 38 Gedächtnis calls itself beyond interiorizing memory (Erinnerung), beyond inclusion of part in whole, thinks itself as a “part” which is greater than “whole” > trace beyond mournful memory

——other as other: “non-totalizable trace inadequate to itself and the same”

p. 58 where Derrida’s memory differentiates from Hegel’s: no link btwn Wesen & Gewesenheit, the present doesn’t pull from a past that was present, but a trace never present

——for de Man, memory of traces of a past never present, which always remain to come—from the future, this promise of resurrection of anterior past, is a formal element, place where fictions & figures are elaborated

pp. 58-9 if a past does not exist, no more does death—only mourning, figures of death, we inscribe in every trace (otherwise called “survivals”)—because they outlast us, trying their luck, in advance, “in memory of” [see p. 87n inexistence of past/death not futility/illusion]

p. 80 all figures are ghostly figures, speak like phantoms and phantomize the text > never define trace or phantom w/out ironically/allegorically appealing from one to the other

A p. 15 border as limit (oros, Grenze, re: nun or Jetzt [now-point] Heidegger underlines) or border as tracing (grammē, Linie)

***pp. 73-4 trace borders to mark and at same time erase these lines, which only succeed in erasing themselves (narrivent quà seffacer), trace to introduce their impossibility, principle of ruin, their chance, promises the line while compromising it in parasitage, grafting, divisibility

VM p. 95 “doubtless, this encounter of the unforeseeable itself is the only possible opening of time, the only pure future, the only pure expenditure beyond history as economy, but this future, this beyond, is not another time, a day after history > it is present at the heart of experience, present not as a total presence but as a trace: therefore, before all dogmas, all conversions, all articles of faith or philosophy, experience itself is eschatological at its origin and in each of its aspects”

p. 108 what if God is an effect of the trace?

p. 129 if other is called trace it can only be metaphorical, for it must be made to appear

POOF p. 16 hexis binds 2x in same time, such contretemporality another name for psukhé, accounts for, registers, lépreuve du temps, withholds (en garder) its trace in the body [by way of inscription] > the yoke effect

SEC p. 313 for Condillac, trace means “to express,” “to represent,” “to recall,” “to make present”

PP p. 89 pure play of traces, supplements w/out transcendental signified, no absolutely external reference, on and on infinitely, is not w/out its own violence

p. 105 (119) written traces don’t belong to phusis, not alive, or belong to Heraclitean phusis, in which truth takes shelter in its crypt (à sabriter en sa crypte) > “cryptogram” is a pleonasm

——acc. to king, pharmakon hypnotizes life of memory, taking it out of itself (la faisant sortir de soi) by monumentalizing it: médusée (medusad)

p. 149 Plato prefers one writing over the other, a good writing over bad, a fertile trace (endgenders w/in) over a sterile one (une semence dépensée au-dehors en pure perte, risk of dissemination)

pp. 155 (179) Plato moves dividing line btwn presence and trace (ikhnos) to dialectical trace and nondialectical trace: good play and bad play

***pp. 159-60 origin of the world as a trace, a receptacle, womb, matrix, w/out any form of presence or presence of form, because this would be an inscription w/in the mother

PAS PAS p. (85) formulation of sans is impossible; sheltered (abrité) by paleonym w/out relation to it, invests paleonym w/ tout autre > sanstrace de pas

VP p. 58 possibility of re-petition in its most general form, the trace in the most universal sense, inhabits pure actuality of now and constitutes now via differance

——able to use language of trace w/out contradicting and erasing it immediately?

p. 73 must think originary-being from trace, not trace from originary-being

——“trace is relation of intimacy of the living present to its outside,” to exteriority, to the non-proper, temporalization of sense is from its very beginning “spacing”

S p. 106 double mark: it is the spirit in which it inscribes itself, traces itself, belongs to the flame it divides

FSW p. 198 necessity of archi-trace and erasure of archia [see POOF pp. 24, 32], erasure signifies conceived relationship of belonging to history of metaphysics

***p. 203 “no doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, differance”—but there’s no life present at first, life is trace so we can say life is death

p. 213 distinction of force & meaning is derivative in relation to archi-trace

p. 224 writing as trace survives scratch’s present, punctuality, stigmē

p. 226 traces produce space of their inscription by acceding to period of their erasure, traces constituted by double force of repetition & erasure, of legibility & illegibility

p. 230 trace is constituted by its irremediable disappearance—disappearance of its disappearance, erasure of selfhood, of one’s own presence

——for Freud, erasure of trace, as movement of pure auto-affection, temporalization, makes repression “itself” possible, escapes binarism and makes binarism possible on basis of nothing > useful to deconstruct logocentrism and to exercise at different levels of writing in general

p. 230 erasure [of trace] is death itself

p. 230 unerasable trace, not a trace, full-presence, son of God, sign of parousia, not a seed, not a mortal germ

SH p. 42 given of date leaves its trace in the poem, the trace of the date is the poem

p. 43 trace or ash: these names stand for other names, a date’s destiny is that of every proper name: is there any other desire than dating, commemorating?

FWT p. 40 trace: not sign, not signifier, not anything present/absent

p. 44 there is no absolute archive, and the trace is not a proof [re: authentic “parent”]

p. 63 writing, trace, gramma or grapheme exceed opposition: human/nonhuman > extend field of living, or rather life/death relation

***pp. 159, 230-31n revenant different from specter/ghost (latter have horizons, are visible, come into light); revenant—think event & haunting together; revenant “almost” merges w/ trace itself

DS p. 194 if, in Mallarmé, mime mimics nothing, does the mime still mimic the “idea”? can Mimique be read as a neo-mimetologism? no, doesn’t even imitate, nothing prior to his gestures > no present has supervised the tracing of his writing

p. 240 Mallarmé: “passing butterfly leaves a bit of sharp ingenuous nothing” —about to break through hymen

p. 261 if hymen constitutes itself as textual trace, if it always leaves something behind, it’s because its undecidability cuts it off from depending on any signified

OS p. 34 Heidegger does not investigate hidden passageway (le passage dissimulé) that makes problem of presence communicate w/ the problem of the written trace

p. 49(n) time compared by Aristotle to movement and chance, w/out being either one of them, time can only occur en tēi psukhēi > time’s analogy: what is traced (le tracé) as line, grammē

pp. 59-60 for Aristotle, the point gives to length its continuity and limit, an end and a beginning (arkhē kai teleutē); but ‘now’ is not to time what point is to line, because successive arrests does not give time (ne donne pas le temps); instead, now is neither time’s origin, end or limit (to the extent that it belongs to time) > instead, must conceive of gramme [French] not as line (by way of its parts or points) but as a line in act, by way of its extremities (ta eskhata)

——this would be a gramme that erases its tracing in a circle, removes limit of point

——we go around in circles trying to erase this circle > [time, still, introduces the thought of trace, if even to excise it]

p. 65 trace is its own erasure, belongs to trace to erase itself, eludes what would maintain it in presence, neither perceptible nor imperceptible

——only presence is mastered, trace (is) that which eludes mastery

——trace in excess of presence-absence: leads to other text

pp. 65-6 difference btwn Being/beings, Heidegger’s discourse of trace > if difference (is) (itself) trace (neither presence nor absence): trace of trace has disappeared in the forgetting of the difference btwn Being/beings [forgetting of Being as annihilation of trace]

***pp. 66(n) presence, instead of being what sign signifies, is the trace of the trace (trace of the erasure of the trace)—Heidegger: distinction Being/beings left its trace as presence

——trace cannot be illuminated, cannot be named as such, as such evades us forever

P pp. 97-100 [Derrida makes his move] Kant assigns free beauty to framing-foliation, signifying nothing > having to be interrupted, sans-theme & sans-text relate to end as nonrelation, finality w/out end, but this sans must be marked, the trace [?] > parergon: place/structure of free beauty?

POS p. 8 what defers presence (its trace, its sign, its representation) is basis of its announcement or desire

p. 26 there are only every differences & traces of traces [re: text, gram, differance, weave]

p. 52 hasn’t Derrida demonstrated that trace is neither ground, foundation, origin, can’t provide for manifest/disguised ontotheology? [still, he receives such criticisms]

ROP p. 17 it is thus the trace that resists analysis

pp. 27-8 in prejudicative and prethetic sense, trace is an irreducible binding (Verbindung) that resists chemical analysis, there is no synthesis > does not bind presences or absences

p. 30 double bind at work on examples of all undecidable figures (hymen, pharmakon…), carry predicates incompatible btwn themselves, in their very btwn, interlacing, sumplukē, chiasmatic invagination > but each one, in its sumplukē, makes up a single trace [?]

p. 33 what rejects analysis: affirmation of gift as trace

***ATIA p. 33 the question of whether animals can respond also concerns whether they can erase (seffacer), can they lie, pretend, cover their own tracks

——that traces can be erased, does not mean someone (man or animal) can erase them

p. 55 the animal sniffing out traces (which are always of an other), seeking to escape/find, privilege of smell (what happens when man stands up/represses smell)

p. 104 mark, gramma, trace, differance refer differentially to all living things, all relations btwn living and nonliving

p. 135 Derrida substituted trace for signifier to ensure that erasure and inscription could be included in the same structure

***p. 136 no human, no animal, no God has mastery over erasure of trace, nor power to “judge” its erasure

DIF DIF p. 12 trace as way out of closure of classical cause & effect (but not sufficient outside its text)

p. 13 [differance’s relation to trace] differance makes signification possible by assuring each “present” element relates to something other than itself, a trace of the future or past element

p. 16 privilege granted to consciousness, to the “living present”: power to synthesize traces, to constantly reassemble them

p. 18 Spur and Bahnung in Freud: inseparable from differance, no breach w/out difference, no difference w/out trace: movement of trace, in Freud, a protection, deferring danger by constituting a reserve (Vorrat) > each of Freud’s concepts a detour in economy of differance

p. 21 Levinas’ trace, enigma of absolute alterity (a past never present), solicits domination of beings (w/in these limits, differance implies Levinas’ entire critique of classical ontology)

——cannot think trace (therefore differance) on basis of presence: refers to a past never present

pp. 22-3 differance would be play of trace which no longer belongs to horizon of Being

——a trace that can never appear in phenomenon: trace beyond link btwn ontology & phenomenology > trace erases itself, muffles itself in resonating, like the “a” inscribing its pyramid in differance

p. 23 the annunciating and reserved trace can be disclosed in metaphysical discourse when stating closure of ontology (Levinas, Freud, Nietzsche, and especially Heidegger)

——trace & difference cannot appear as such, sheltered (sabrite)/dissimulated in names (received in metaphysical text)

p. 24 because trace is a simulacrum of presence, erasure belongs to structure of the trace, it has no site > erasures on both sides of trace

***——inversion of metaphysical concepts: the present becomes trace of trace, sign of sign, mark of erasure > present is a trace & a trace of erasure of trace

——trace: à la fois, monument & mirage, traced & erased, living & dead, living in its simulation of life’s preserved inscription: a pyramid, to be deciphered otherwise, text w/out voice

——text of metaphysics is comprehended (compris) > encore lisible, and to be read: not surrounded but traversed by limit, marked in its interior by multiple furrow (sillon) of its margin

CHM p. 62 vouloir-dire-lhyperbole not antagonistic to silence but its condition, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

RGE p. 265 Bataille against servile writing (not irresponsible techne of Plato) that serves life, phantom of life, in presence, advocates a trace w/ possibility of effacement absolu > unerasable trace not a trace

PIO p. 7 reflexive structure that does not produce presence but follows a trace, “self-reflexivity” of de Man [Gasché’s interp. of Derrida?]

p. 19 tain prohibits transparency & authorizes invention of mirror, is a trace of language

——tain (btwn 2 lines) is language itself [“word”] (associates/dissociates forever: Eros/Psyche) [tain like hymen?]: an unbearable violence, a perversion that obeys law of language

p. 416n to call all invention that of mark/trace (rather than language), btwn culture & nature: man/animal opposition [cf. Bergson on p. 418n] no longer accredited, privileges the postal, movement of envoi, differance

PF p. xvii one trace always refers to another, secretes, cannot not produce alibi: ubiquity of alibi

——a trace w/out alibi resists thinking, paralyzes, also only chance to not give in to paralysis

p. xxvii can there be a trace (and thus alibi) elsewhere than scene of culpa-responsi-bility, scene of debt, duty (Schuld, Schuldigsein)? an originary alibi that precedes juridico-ethico-political, but isn’t ontological neutrality?

——is the injunction to answer (answer to, answer for) inscribed right on the trace?

——does law, morality, politics determine through & through the thinking of trace/alibi? no

TR p. 150 Rousseau gave such emphasis/privilege to his theft (at age 16), and de Man hounds him, sacharne sur lui, as if he where after him in this trace

***EJQB p. 69 poet or Jew: protects the desert that protects his speech (can speak only in desert), his writing (traced [sillonner] only in desert) > invents unfindable/unspecifiable pathway (un chemin introuvable et inassigné) > dont aucune résolution cartésienne ne peut nous assurer la droite ligne et lissue

***D p. 331 trace can only imprint itself by referring to another trace (the other), letting itself be upstaged (outrepasser)/forgotten: its force of production stands in relation to energy of its erasure

p. 364 tracing not simply mere other or outside of erasing: can only trace itself out in in the erasure of its own “presence”

C p. 224 écart, tracé

LI pp. 137-38 that trace de-limits what it limits is why the finiteness of a context has an indefinite opening—never secure, simple > in this openness of erasure: political responsibility (where irreducible violence communicates w/ an essential nonviolence) > only the irresponsible (to be polemical) will object, those for whom things are always calculable, clear, programmable, decipherable

p. 148 every referent, all reality, has structure of a differential trace, can only refer to “real” in an interpretive experience

ATM p. 152 otherwise (autrement), the adverb in Otherwise than Being which wins out immeasurably over a verb, the beyond of the symplokē [linking nouns & verbs, that of essence], leaving a chain of traces, another symplokē [beyond essence]

p. 154 passage beyond language requires language, or requires text as a place for the trace of a step (pas) that passes beyond language, not (present) elsewhere [not classical]

pp. 164-65 if the State leaves a trace of interruptions too, how does Levinas’ tracing of them differ? it ties together interruptions btwn threads [i.e. doesn’t tie threads], a series out of series (hors-série) > series: hiatus must insist

——Levinas obligates w/out constraint, by way of nonphenomenality, to read the trace as trace, interruption as interruption (i.e. acc. as such no longer reappropriable as phenomenon of essence)

p. 170 Levinas: the substitution of the hostage discovers the trace

pp. 176-77 if Levinas insists on superimposing the trace, leaving a trace, entracing, how can we dissociate this trace from a sign?

p. 178 Levinas’ intr(el)aced saying [dire entr(el)acé]

EW p. 269 via “logic” of trace or differance, re-appropriation produces the opposite of what it aims for, thus ex-appropriation is not what is proper to man

TINO N pp. 208-09 “cinder” [ashes] renders better what Derrida meant by trace, remaining w/out remaining, cinder is not!, testifies w/out testifying, destruction of memory itself, absolute radical forgetting: absolute non-memory communicates w/ gift—not seeking to be recognized or saved; incineration as elementary form of experience

AD p. 62 Levinas: to be “in the image of God” is not to be an icon of God, but to find oneself in his trace (Exodus 33)

p. 71 [sweet Derrida] miracle of trace allows us to read Levinas and having meaning for us today

CIN p. 25 best paradigm for trace not the trail of the hunt, le frayage, wake in sea, nor love of step (pas) for its imprint, but the cinder (what remains w/out remaining from holocaust, from the all-burning [du brûle-tout]) > no longer makes a trace, or traces only by losing trace quelle reste à peine

p. 39 if you no longer recall it, it’s because the incineration/consummation of cinder proceeds from cinder itself > trace destined like everything to disappear so as to lose its way or rekindle a memory

SPEC p. 357 all these silences by which a trace works on a text, not indivisible simplicity of limes or marginal trait (S is P, “this has [not] been thought”)—rather: the non-thematized, implicit, mode of foreclosure, disavowal

TRACE in OF GRAMMATOLOGY

OG p. 26 (41) absolute knowledge effaces writing in logos, it is the retrieval (résumption) of trace in parousia, the metaphysics of the proper, reappropriation of difference

——though [eschatological] Hegel reappropriates trace in absolute knowledge, he is also the thinker of irreducible difference, last writer of book, first of writing > reintroduced necessity of written trace in philosophy, rehabilitated thought as the memory productive of signs

***pp. 46-8 (68-70) Derrida calls instituted trace “unmotivated” (immotivée), asks that the word “institution” not be so quickly interpreted w/in classical oppositions; “unmotivated” deconstructs Saussure’s arbitrary, thinks its possibility en-deçà de (short of) lopposition dérivée btwn nature/convention, symbol/sign > becoming-unmotivated of trace requires synthesis where le tout autre sannonce comme tel: not more natural than cultural

——in the “unmotivatedness” of the sign, le tout autre sannonce comme tel, the trace: “non-living,” occultation (de soi), prior to theology, dissimulates itself, no identity, no simplicity, resemblance, continuity > mark of relation to other, immotivation of trace has always become > il ny a pas de symbole et de signe mais un devenir-signe du symbole

p. 61 (89-90) transcendental arche must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased, arche-trace must comply w/ this necessity & erasure (contradictory and not acceptable in logic of identity), it is the disappearance of origin, and also the origin of origin, so to wrench (arracher) trace from classical scheme that would demand it comes after originary nontrace (that would make of it an empirical mark), we must speak of originary trace or arche-trace > but if all begins w/ trace, there’s no originary trace

——Derrida discusses the importance of appealing to the transcendental, the necessity of a pathway, ce parcours doit laisser dans le texte un sillage > no transcendental pathway (glossematics) would be naive objectivism; ultra-transcendental would leave no sillage, be pre-critical > these 2 end up resembling each other [this leads to deconstructive logic of trace]

pp. 61-2 (91) transcendental reduction—refers to lebendige Gegenwart (The Living Present), reduces trace > commanded by theme of presence

pp. 62-3 (91-2) unity of arche-trace’s double passage through form and imprint (empreinte) [re: path from Saussure to Hjelmslev, from phonic substance to formalism]

——the (pure) trace is differance, is the condition of sensible plenitude, an originary synthesis not preceded by absolute simplicity > w/out originary trace retaining other in the same, meaning could not appear

——differance is formation of form & being-imprinted of imprint

——differance does not exist, the never being-present outside plenitude > no science of this nonorigin

pp. 64-5 (94-5) in Husserl’s changing premises of debate,” neither natural inside nor outside > must distinguish le son apparasissant from lapparaître du son > always divided w/in themselves btwn variance and invariability, an unheard difference, invisible > trace opens appearance

pp. 70-71 (102-04) one can only justify the choice of word trace w/in une topique, it’s an historical calculation & strategy: a # of givens belonging to our discourse have imposed this choice on Derrida > Levinas—trace as absolute past, Heidegger—undermining ontology as presence/full speech, Nietzsche & Freud—Spur, and use of [trace?] in biology > all make enigmatic: propre, proche, presence

——this opening of first exteriority, spacing, where all familiarity needs grammé refuses the reduction of trace

——logos as sublimation of trace is theological from Plato to infinitist metaphysics: logocentrism…parousia, life w/out differance (name of God as name of indifference)

p. 70 trace, arche-phenomenon of “memory,” prior to oppositions nature/culture, animal/humanity [Levinas, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud]

p. 75 (110-11) trace is nothing, exceeds question “what is?” > no longer sheltered in grammatological knowledge: no longer assurance of opposition fait/droit > no pure fait

pp. 92-3 no law w/out possibility of trace, what is lost in thought of trace (complicity of origins, arche-writing) is the myth of the simplicity of origin

p. 101 (149) metaphysics: exemplary system of defense against violence of writing > what is violence if something in it is equivalent to operation of the trace?

p. 167 (238) origin/nature as myth of addition, supplementarity annulled by being purely additive > myth of the effacement of the trace

——originary differance is supplementarity as structure: irreducible complexity of shifting play of absence/presence: metaphysics produced by it, doesn’t think it: writing is a representation of trace, trace itself does not exist > place of decision now hidden, but still indicated

pp. 234-35 (334) le mouvement de la baguette este riche de tous les discours possible mais aucun discours ne peut le reproduire sans lappauvrir et le déformer—movement of the wand is a substitute (supplée) for all discourse that, at a greater distance, would substitute itself for it [how, for Rousseau, writing will correct speech if it doesn’t precede it]

——graphic supplementarity is origin which separates gesture & parole in the city

p. 237 (337) Rousseau [sometimes] places hieroglyphic, passionate langue before speech, a writing that is proximate and present, he praises this savage writing—traces like the wand (baguette), un dessin dans lespace (writing)

TRANCE (HYPNOSIS)

GOD p. 131 reader of literature hypnotized, paralyzed before suspended perplexity, before secret path of secret, exposed and concealed, jealously guarded: who says what to whom? who asks forgiveness?

LOBL pp. ~171-72 think exteriority from angle of economy of the arrêt: greatest “bound” energy, bandée, tightly gathered around its own limit (Hemmung, Haltung) > immediately disseminated, sand, empty, unloaded, spontaneously: in trance of trans, ghosts, transes, folies du jour (cf. Glas on trépas, trans/partition [Derrida’s referring to Genet crossing national borderlines])

SPOM p. 191 fantastic silhouette, autonomy of Marx’s table, inauguration of exchange-value, goes into trances, levitates, relieved of body like all ghosts, little mad too

POOF p. 94 friendship can never elude rhetoric of epitáphios, transfixed celebration of spectrality, at once fervent & caught in petrified cold of its inscription (funeral speech, testamentary fervor of heir)

PP p. 105 (119) written traces don’t belong to phusis, not alive, or belong to Heraclitean phusis, in which truth takes shelter in its crypt (à sabriter en sa crypte) > “cryptogram” is a pleonasm

——acc. to king, pharmakon hypnotizes life of memory, taking it out of itself (la faisant sortir de soi) by monumentalizing it: médusée (medusad)

p. 124 eidos, truth, law, epistēmē, dialectics, philosophy: names of the pharmakon that must oppose to pharmakon of Sophists, the bewitching fear of death

——Socrates must listen to the Laws like they’re a phonic spell

DS pp. 172, 286 TRANCE PARTITION (1,2)

ROP p. 16 psychoanalysis is in principle nonhypnotic, affirms right to resistance to hypnosis (and said resistance’s insurmountability)

DPi pp. 18-20 the transition, the trance btwn when Jews have received commandments but have yet to hear the “judgments” > as if they know God’s about to invent DP after uttering “thou shalt not kill,” terrified by this divine word electing them > Moses says, “Do not tremble”

***pp. 153-54 unheimlich concept of belief: the believer (Glaübiger) who affects to believe is divided in belief, fiction of this simulacrum belongs to belief: skepsis, ēpokhē as believing itself > all economy traffics in act of faith: believing w/out believing, belief haunted by non-belief > quasi-hypnotic, quasi-hallucinatory, spectral, unconscious

——believing (like cruelty) has no contrary, thus is its own contrary

REST p. 305 for Heidegger, in Origin, the abyss (Abgrund) plays itself out like “veiled” destiny (fatum) which transfixes (transit) being

+R p. 160 survival movement, arrêt de mort, final trance, sursaut cambré tenu au mors: says “I” (am dead) or hoc est corpus meum > dominant fish, one that bites best, takes from sea a body of scaly writing, homogenous w/ signatory’s initials

CIR p. 200 trance, anguish, desire of [Derrida’s] reader: intermittent flame, don’t know when the explosion will come

p. 234 I don’t have a fantasy of eradication/expropriation but a virtual, mimicked trance, painful pleasure of obsessive ideo-motor drive

SPEC p. 335 exclusive possession: dance/trance

pp. 380-83 [Freud divided] Freud translating translation into scientific theory: 1) “trans-” inhabit origin on (dès) its very threshold 2) perception as prior to its translation

pp. 388-89 speculation [beyond PP], investment made by borrowing, no possibility of amortization, no reconciliation by coins, signs, and their telos—promise more than can provide [formula of love?], insolvent—infinite debt, unpayable, thus beyond debt, violates economy of equivalence (not economy in general)

——death drive & repetition compulsion suck Freud into abyss of PP, always adding a supplement of abyss beneath his steps (movement of trans-)

p. 391 the démarche (procedure) of Beyond… is one of its objects, effects trans- and speculation

CHOR pp. 94-5 lack of place, madness of dance, can also serve as alibi for deserting organized, patient, laborious “feminist” struggle

p. 97 how can one breathe w/out punctuation, w/out multiplicities of rhythm, steps, how can one dance?

TRANSCENDENTAL

GT pp. 51-53 transcendental signified or signifier as general equivalent, “transcendental” makes possible every categorial determination, all givens (to be/to have, thing/person)

——Lacan’s “symbolic order” guards gift against dissemination, against itself

FK p. 87 Kant’s dignity (Würdigkeit) of the end itself (of finite being), absolute value beyond market price > transcendence, spectrality, fetishism: religiosity of religion

LOBL p. 127 call (demand, order, desire), “come”-effect of “first name” transcends all categories, thus strictly can be called transcendental, quī transcendit omne genus

HASD p. 44 God is the Good that transcends the Good, the Being that transcends Being, this “logic” is that of the “without (sans)” > transcendence nothing other, and tout autre, than what it transcends

EM p. 131n (157n) Heidegger: Being is the transcendens pure and simple, léclaircie (Lichtung) elle-même

SEC p. 316 absence—death of addressee (inscribed in mark) > value or effect of transcendentality linked to possibility of writing, to this “death”

FWT p. 142 DP conceived of as heart of all criminal law, all moral law (Kant) > its condition or transcendental

DP either internal to criminal law, one punishment among others, or external, non-serial exemplarity, hyperbolic, foundation, condition, more/other than a penalty

pp. 164-65 forgive the unforgivable, the impossible: accomplish a gesture no longer measured by human immanence > origin of religion related to this possibility

——there is transcendence in idea of forgiveness

POS pp. 67, 106n in critique of interiority/subjectivity must be careful not to “objectify” reassuring outside, or to make heterogeneity of “matter” a new transcendental, whether it be that of the Law, or the (appeasing/cruel) Element of the mother (Freud on mother/matter relation)

SP pp. 85-9 the becoming-woman (becoming Christian) of the idea, the veiling of truth, is the beginning of history, the idea séloigne, devient transcendante, inaccessible, séduisante, the dream of death begins (Heidegger avoids this becoming-woman in his own analysis of History of an Error)

ATIA p. 132 divinanimality, quasi-transcendental referent, sacrificed/disavowed foundation of what it founds: justice, symbolic, human order [brings Levinas & Lacan close] > difficulty of uttering discourse of transcendence/mastery e: animal in the name of God/Law

p. 137 for Lacan, what is great about Descartes’ cogito is that the sum is transcendental, it’s beyond imaginary capture (the animal’s cogito, w/out sum, w/out “I”), the specular > [it is symbolic]

p. 152 for Heidegger, in Christianity, world (totality of created beings) is everything that’s not God, man’s “having” world, a standing-over-against world

GSP p. 156 Husserl’s “transcendental experience,” designates field of reflection > for Kant, this project would have derived from teratology [study of monsters/abnormalities]

DPi p. 26 in theological-political structure of DP in 4 examples above: the sanhedrin, the Greek priests, the church must be only guardian/guarantor of word of God > DP against another political theology: in the name of transcendence against transcendence [p. 28 sovereignty against sovereignty]

p. 145 telephone: technics of transcendence, technics of teleferic relation to sovereignty of absent other, absent God

D p. 297 structural transcendental illusion, one surface of Soller’s square opens to “classical representative scene” > this is a necessity, no nonplace left out, so no pure origin can stand guard over stage as if derived from intactness of absolute opening: any attempt to return to lintimité indemne et propre played out in illusion > nothing takes place but place

C p. 208 coffin, as the odd, as the remainder, remains entire, divisible only by itself [prime: 127], as long as you deduct one—the paradigm coffin: belongs w/out belonging to series it makes possible > inscribes itself in series, leaves on it mark of its own subtraction

——transcendental mors, fors, exceptional piece; (fait) band à part (has a hard-on, keeps aloof)

TN p. 154 for de Biran, the hand is irreplaceable/dominant (teleological) and it’s pregnant w/ every kind of metonymy (pedagogical): best ontoteleological figure, best rhetorical figure

——“transcendentalism” always guided by such surreptitious exemplarism

AD pp. 76, 80 Levinas’ “beyond-in (au-delà-dans)” of State of David [?], a sort of enclave inside and outside of itself, participates in politics while going beyond it > [deconstructive invagination]

——transcendence in immanence, the door as the bearing (porte que porte)

p. 85 beyond-in: non-dialectical enclosure of its [paix] own transcendence

BSi p. 147 “how is a synthetic a priori possible?” and Deleuze’s “how is bêtise (and not error) possible?”: transcendental questions of possibility > but, Deleuze’s question removes possibility from epistemological economy, from determination of Being, from objectivity of object

OG p. 61 (89-90) Derrida discusses the importance of appealing to the transcendental, the necessity of a pathway, ce parcours doit laisser dans le texte un sillage > no transcendental pathway (glossematics) would be naive objectivism; ultra-transcendental would leave no sillage, be pre-critical > these 2 end up resembling each other [this leads to deconstructive logic of trace]

TRANSLATION

KH p. 93 leave khōra untranslated, thinking & translation here traverse the same experience/experiment (expérience): “place,” “location,” “region,” “country” & its figures, “mother,” “nurse,” “receptacle,” “imprint-bearer” [see p. 126, these figures not even true figures]

MONL p. 10 law of translation: “We never speak one language, we only speak one.” Law itself as translation.

p. 56 relentless resistance to translation

***untranslatable: poetic ECONOMY of the idiom (singular event of the original). From the moment economic equivalence is renounced everything is translatable.

***p. 57 both at same time: 2 hyperboles, everything can and cannot be translated, “it is easy for me to hold firm between these two hyperboles”

p. 61 monolingual (promised one language, deprived of it) writes as an aphasic: absolute translation

FK p. 46 [re: names of God] untranslatability of proper name, but also iterability, thus technē [see p. 56 announce impossible translation]

***LOBL pp. ~77-8 translation as economy, write in a telegraphic style, telegraphics, telephonics, é-loignement, Ent-fernung

——Derrida’s “translator’s note” [bottom band] as a double blind [Hillis Miller], blindly jealous double, double cortège

pp. ~107-08 Derrida addresses his translators re: how any attempt at intertranslatability couldn’t fail to enter into translation

p. ~118 translation leaves behind an untranslated remnant, illegitimately, because it arrests the movement of the everyday possibility of literature and parasitism [see SPOM p. 135 translation causes ghost to drop into oblivion] [re: double syntax of arrêt de mort]

——dream of a translation w/out remnants: a metalanguage, a guarantee

pp. ~142-43 will they translate verre and vitre w/ glas? something else that escapes usage, use-value, the wearing away of what’s out of use, surplus-value and process of fetishization,“under-glass” quality of text in translation, of every mark, how can a translation be signed? [H p. 85 law of hospitality “under glass”]

p. ~144 fundamental irresponsibility for a translated text

p. ~146-47 translation as transference, transference is love, one text loves the other in translation

p. ~154 absolute crypt [heart] is unreadability—yet calls for infinite finite analysis, infinite-finite reada-translata-bility

pp. ~169-70 matter of economy (time, space, counting words, signs, marks) arrests translations

H p. 15 violence of translation, foreign language imposition, for hospitality to be possible

MC p. 346 activity of translation mobilizes the context & what exceeds it

AF p. 28 stakes of conceptual difference btwn Verdrängung and Unterdrückung not only nominal questions of translation, but they are accumulated there

p. 90 archive always holds a problem for translation, repeatable & idiomatic

SPOM p. 20 a genius [Shakespeare] operates, it always resists and defies à linstar dune chose spectral, “the animated work becomes that thing, the Thing that, like an elusive specter, engineers [singénier] a habitation without proper inhabiting, call it a haunting, of both memory and translation,” “a masterpiece always moves…in the manner of a ghost”

p. 21 [re: translation of “the time is out of joint”] lécart: irreducible inadequation to the other language, to stroke of genius of the event that makes the law, to all the virtualities of the original

——each translation aggravates, seals the inaccessibility to other language

p. 25 stroke of genius, signature of the Thing “Shakespeare”: authorizes each translation, makes them possible without ever being reducible to them [Derrida is playing w/ the out-of-jointness of each translation of “time is out of joint”]

p. 42 the disjunctions btwn Marx’s injunctions were untranslatable even to Marx

p. 101 suffering that suffers still more when it no longer recognizes itself in old word [“unemployment”] and scene that word named for so long

p. 185 translations efface central figure of an ideology [see p. 57 a French translation of Marx drops reference to ghosts]

POOF p. 196 if Montaigne’s disproportion of sovereign friendship is translated into the political, wouldn’t that endanger Aristotle’s principle of autarky, equality, mutuality [?] > but our question is always about political translation: is the political a universal translating machine?

pp. 230-31 read Aristotle’s discourse on philía as a discourse on language, difficulty of translation already w/in the Greek language: Freundschaft, amitié, friendship as frayage in thought of other/same

p. 232 prepare a ‘political’ translation of what ‘must be (il faut)’ [could never exaggerate the aporias here: to multiply anticipations & announce the heading (cap)] > distort opposition btwn heteronomy/autonomy, the phília allergic to the other (dissymmetry, infinite distance) called for it, and in this call demands a democracy to come: an alterity w/out hierarchical difference at root of democracy > this would require an equality removed from phallogocentric schema of fraternity

pp. 263-64 yes this book is French, but it’s not written only in French, that would claim for French exemplary privilege of translation for all other idioms [i.e. Montaigne, Hugo, etc. on fraternity & humanity] > instead, this books sets itself up to work and be worked relentlessly (s’acharne lui-même), au sens de la chasse, là où acharner revient à disposer un leurre de chair, close to the thing called France

HERP p. 215 translation risks separation, also a war & a sacrifice, several events of sacrifice

MSUB J p. 159 subjectile’s secret should only be shared w/ the translator: that it is untranslatable

BL p. 183 problematic translation sums up and formalizes “what is at stake” [re: “Before the Law”]

MPM p. xxii Übersetzung (set against, translate)

pp. 10-1 if memory maneuvers btwn law and Being, can one think the being and law of memory? these questions move through transference & translation, above abyss; require impossible passageways: “the fragile resistance of a span” [hymen?]

A p. 5 Cicero was one of the first conscientious translators

p. 9 shibboleth effect, untranslatability (essential incompleteness of translation), borders of untranslatability w/in original language itself

PP pp. 71-2 difficulty of translating pharmakon (“remedy,” “drug,” “recipe,” “philter”) w/in Greek itself > violent transference of a nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme is problem of very passage into philosophy

p. 98 (111) bad translation [of pharmakon] destroys the anagrammatical nature [different functions of same word] of Plato’s writing, neutralizes textuality of the text and the citational play

p. 99 (112) interpretative translation as violent as it is impotent, destroys pharmakon by forbidding access to it, leaving it untouched in its reserve

——all translations into languages that are heirs to Western metaphysics produce these violent effects of analysis

VM pp. 123-24 Husserl’s alter-ego, nonviolent respect of secret, of separation, we can only know the other through analogical appresentation > translates recognition of radical separation

***S p. 4 more sensitive to Germanness of esprit, Geist, if we hear it coming from a foreign language, if we put to the test its resistance to translation, submitting our own language to the same test

p. 4 Heidegger: “tell me what you think about translation and I will tell you who you are”

pp. 21-2 Derrida proposes that analytic of Dasein could also be analytic of Gemüt (not Geist but still translated as esprit in one of the French translations)

p. 70 that one can only think in German is a half-asleep tautology (confirmed by ideas of untranslatability of Sein, Denken, Geist)

FSW p. 207 [Freud on tradition of translating dreams]

p. 210 it is the materiality of signifier that is relinquished in translation > when materiality is reinstated, translation becomes poetry

——since materiality of signifier constitutes idiom of dream scene, dreams are untranslatable

pp. 213-14 “repetition”—death as power, lack of power—institutes translatability, makes possible “language,” transforms absolute idiom into a limit toujours déjà transgressed (pure idiom is not language, becomes so only through repetition), repetition divides point of departure of first time; however, to only look at effect of repetition, at translation, obvious distinction btwn force & meaning, effaces intensity of death drive

SH p. 17 date always bound up w/ a proper name > gives us to think an idiom, each time, barely translatable [Derrida is also referring to his French phrasing]

p. 69n every untranslatable space, pause, calls for and provokes translation > shibboleth merges completely w/ translation in its essential dimension

F p. xxvi Abraham and Torok translate by setting each language at an angle w/ itself: shattered (brisée) linearity

p. xxvii just because there is a necessary fictionalization of “original event” does not make verification gratuitous, one cannot reorder the story, nor the internal necessity of translations

p. xxxiii via Abraham, in deciphering poem, “translator” has written one: poetic translation or psychoanalytic interpretation [re: “ghost”] > clears path for other w/out unilateral privilege

pp. xliii-xliv Ichspaltung rethought when it is not Fetish vs. Thing (in-itself) but Fetish-Thing as cipher to be translated interminably

DS p. 196n Mallarmé: “direct simplifying instinct,” “poet translates silence”

POS p. 20 theme of transcendental signified took place w/in idea of pure, unequivocal translatability, where translation practices difference btwn signifier/signified; Derrida proposes, if difference btwn signifier/signified is never pure, calling translation transformation

——transcendental signified as idea of a virgin, untouched translation

OS pp. 32-3(n) chain of interdependent concepts (ousia, parousia, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart, gegenwärtigen, Vorhandenheit) deposited only at beginning/end of Sein un Zeit > who better than Heidegger to think of problem of translation re: these terms

SW p. 326 when one cannot read original language—quickly lose oneself in translations (clothing, fringes, veils)

p. 331 unconscious never disarms—more powerful than “technical all-powerfulness”: resists translation

***p. 331 “immobile archaism of the fantasy [Oedipus?] can outplay w/ its infinite anachronism all the lasers in the world”: (the unconscious) resists translation “in an age of technoscience,” never disarms, nor should we ever > more powerful than technical all-powerfulness

p. 332 braid of phonemes (verdict, voix, vouloir, le voir, la venue, etc.) is knotted out of sight, remains, like warp of text, untranslatable > language we inherit is never ours, which is why it can’t be translated: put it outside its self, no longer recognize its children/idiom [baby daddy]

Gi p. 12 Heidegger pursues irreplaceable pathways (frayages)—inaccessible to common translation

pp. 17-8 translation problems not accidental or secondary, thinking of Geschlecht same as translation: French dis- translates (by means of transfer/displacement) German zer- (dissociation, distraction, dissemination, division, dispersion, Zerstreuung, Zerstreutheit, Zerstörung, Zersplitterung, Zerspaltung)

——inner supplementary frontier splits lexicon again: both dis- and zer- have neutral, nonnegative sense

Gii p. 52 even the best translations need to be amended, not as evaluation but to wrestle w/ idiom (harass the word) > duty to defy conventional ideal of translation (one word for another)

p. 55 what happens when same word, Schlag, is translated 2 different ways: coup, frappe? erases what authorizes Heidegger to find affinity btwn Schlag and Geschlecht

REST pp. 287-88 Heidegger: from hypokeimenon to subjectum, Roman thought takes over (übernimmt) Greek words w/out corresponding co-originary experience, absence-of-ground (Bodenlosigkeit) of Western thought opens w/ this translation > a transfer, über, over and beyond Greek experience

——these words become ghostly (fantômatiques) doubles of themselves, leur simulacre légers, walk above/in the void, bodenlos

DST DST p. 200 great task of translator, his agony, aporias, madness: proceed from initial strangeness, the gap opened by idiom of original text [original text?????]

——thinking of translation, experience of thinking itself, its most essential & risky passage, where experience of thinking is also poetic experience: privileged examples (in Lacoue-Labarthe): Gestell, mimesis, rhuthmos

p. 215 Heidegger & Levinas so close, so heterogenous: passage for a thinking translation

RM pp. 61-3 different economies of metaphoric transfer (Übertragung): 1) translation in traditional (ideal) sense: transport of intact signified into another language 2) the more violent inveigling (captatrice), seductive, transformative capture by another language, fatherland, motherland—w/ such translation, proper mother tongue violated at moment of import/export

p. 63 Derrida’s use of retrait [re: withdrawal of Being] captures greatest quantity of energy/information in Heidegger’s text from w/in the context that is “here our own”

p. 67 a good translation must always abuse

pp. 77-8 always plus dune language in the language: the capture of the crossing (croisement) that allies Ziehen and Reissen, this capture (à la fois violent/faithful, laissant sauf) affects the captor, abduction (captation), translation, into other’s language [French retrait, English re-tracing] > all this already at work (à loeuvre) in the other’s languages, these dealings make for a work (fait oeuvre)

LI p. 33 can a proper name or a signature be translated?

p. 52 [re: restance translated as remainder] whether or not it’s an adequate translation, no single word out of context can by itself translate a word perfectly

p. 101 translation: case of parasitic feedback

TN p. 221 “a lieu et tient lieu: a lieu tout en tenant lieu, a lieu pour tenir lieu…” [this goes on, Derrida then compares taking the place of to translation, where it is a considerable event in thinking; 356n TN. “thank you”]

p. 238 [re: Franck’s translation of leibhaftig] risks of effacing when interpreting through such an active translation

***AD pp. 119-20 “face” as untranslatable proper name—by virtue of an event of translation

——[re: visages] an other translation, more than a very old name, a poem composing a new accord, an other thought of translation, language unheard of by other man, other of man, other than man [übermensch?]

——to say à-Dieu to the face: call the name by name

p. 123 [other translation] Levinas: “to seek a translation that the properly religious surplus of truth already presupposes

BSi p. 22 translators always most vigilant, formidable readers

pp. 168-70 bêtise not exactly stupidity, foolishness, imbecility, idiotic, Dummheit, Kleinigkeit, etc. [example of nonsynonymous synonym]

——still, difference btwn these words can only be marked in context, which doesn’t imply an absolute relativity of context: bêtise can’t mean anything at all, not an idealized, objective, “free” ideality > translation problems occur in same language, same cultural code

***pp. 338-39 the (mis)translation of logos brings w/ it the whole of culture; whole force of history at work to produce this translation [logos as Christ] > whole of history at play in motif of beast & sovereign and their relation to zoōn: “there are no limits, no frontiers that can contain these issues of translation”

p. 343 logocentrism: forced hegemony of logos as speech, a “European” operation, logocentrism of Abrahamic languages > everything organized based on forced translations

***OG p. 8 (17) writing as secondary, as technique: a translator of a full speech present to itself, its signified, its other [w/in system that privileges phonè]

ATAP p. 92 John Patmos’ double bind: “do not seal the words of the inspiration of this book” > must disobey in order to obey: problem of translation re: quotation marks (“I, Yéshoua”)

IF p. 310 messenger, translator, facteur (letter carrier)

EU p. 12 king: someone who makes you learn his language, in learning it, you countersign his force: power demonstrated through fact of translation > this is a paradigmatic event, not structural necessity of master-slave dialectic

——can only say “I want to speak my mother tongue” in language of the king

p. 19 in 1644, Courcelle’s Latin translation of Discourse of Method doesn’t include Descartes’ “I am speaking French” > when “original” speaks its language by speaking of its language, it prepares a suicide by translation, suicide by fire: almost w/out remainder [tells us about idiomaticity in general]

——this translating structure begins as soon as a reading of “original” text is instituted, offers up language to be read in its very erasure: erased traces of a path (odos), chemin deffacement, translation passing over/beyond the path of language [beyond Heidegger], passant son chemin

p. 20 had Descartes written in Latin, “I am writing in Latin”—same translation problem

p. 21 if an utterance is bound to a language that irreducibly forms signifying fabric of its presentation & its signified theme—translation would obliterate very heart of the “signified,” no longer simply altering ratio btwn signifier/signified

pp. 22-3 re: translating Descartes “back” into Latin: restitution, reconduire to original language, restoration to writing & law (droit)

——if original (French) already possesses translating structure, already refers to translation of original, it is because Latin is the ordering, lawful language

p. 64 natural languages fixed, rooted, re-rooted in event of Bible translation > Luther suffices as emblem

p. 65 challenge to translation of series Bild, bilden, Bildung (image, form, formation, culture); translation of Übersetzung loses positional dimension of setzen

pp. 66-7 for Schelling, thinking as Einbildungskraft, as post-Kantian originary unity > all differences translations of same > post-critical, critique of critique

p. 67 originary unity precedes opposition sensible/intelligible, math resembles philosophy, math belongs to world of reflected image > analogical translation btwn philosophy/math assured by symbol (Bild) > symbolicity developed in play of Abbildung, Einbildung

p. 68 for Schelling, reason & imagination one & same thing in Einbildungskraft (not Latinate Imagination, which is false fantasy) > one in the real [imagination, art], one in the ideal [reason would have to be ideal] > intertranslatability of rational & fantastic only amazing from standpoint of understanding [Hegel makes analogous move]

p. 69 In-Eins-Bildung (uni-formation) > paradox: concept of fundamental translatability linked poetically to a natural language [German] that resists translation

——university must also be thought in logic of uni-formation > poetics of translation

p. 70 acc. Schelling, every “new” philosophy makes a new “step (pas)” in form, poetic originality, a provocation/challenge to translation

——for Schelling, math is different from philosophy: the latter provokes/challenges translation, whereas math solves or annuls translation problems

pp. 75-6 for Schelling, ethics (raised to a point beyond determination) makes us similar to God, onto-theological translation w/out rupture > a risk of totalizing absolutization of State (which Kant would deem dangerous)

p. 77 Schelling’s unity of ideal & real in originary knowledge: speak w/out trope, no metaphor (also nothing but metaphor): a generalized rhetoric [generalized fetishism] or translatology

——[re: use of word “translation” to refer to “transposition, transfer, transport” in a sense not strictly linguistic] for Schelling, language is a living phenomenon; Novalis, Goethe: nature an author to be translated w/ skill of a philologist

——Schelling: “nature is like some very ancient author whose message is written in hieroglyphics on colossal pages” [geologic?]

p. 79 for Schelling, individuals, who are finite, must translate > if mind could simply be infinite, there’d be no need to translate > “originary knowledge” can become “real" in an individual, only in der Gattung (in the genus), i.e. in historical institutions > history: becoming-real of idea

p. 80 for Schelling, man is tasked w/ supplementing, complementing, the world’s manifestation (eine Ergänzung der Welterscheinung) > develop God’s revelation, which is lacking: this is called translation, it is the destination of the university

p. 241 [re: CIPH] translation: transferential, diagonal, transversal, interscientific research

SPEC p. 314 “car la chose est un véhicule en translation (for the thing is a vehicle in convoy)”

p. 339 translation of hervortreten [from Freud’s Beyond…] as “emerge” or “se manifester” loses the implication “to step forward”

pp. 380-83 [Freud divided] Freud translating translation into scientific theory: 1) “trans-” inhabit origin on (dès) its very threshold 2) perception as prior to its translation

TRANSLATION/BABEL in TB (BENJAMIN

TB p. 104 Babel, exemplary: myth of myth, translation of translation > tells need for figures, tropes, for translation inadequate to compensate for what multiplicity denies us

——metaphor of metaphor, narrative of narrative: not only structure hollowing itself out like that, but does so in its own way > its idiom would have to be saved

——multiplicity of idioms limits “true” translation & is a structural order, a coherence of construct: internal limit to formalization, incompleteness of constructure > up to a certain point justified to see there translation of a system in deconstruction

p. 106 Cicero’s translation tip in Libellus de Optimo Genera Oratorum: avoid verbum pro verbo

p. 108 Finnegans Wake, “and he war” > Babelian book

——how do we translate texts w/ multiple languages?

p. 109 translation: its necessity as impossibility

——proper name untranslatable: seems not to belong, for same reason as other words, to the system of language > but its call makes language possible [compare to SIGNATURE]

pp. 109-10 Babel like Pierre (homonym, translation w/in single language), when a translator includes both meanings: that’s commentary not translation > if translator translates proper name into its common meaning [i.e. Babel as Confusion], loses property of proper name

p. 110 Jakobson’s 3 translations: intralingual (rewording), interlingual, transmutation (intersemiotic)

p. 111 that “Babel” doesn’t properly belong to one tongue—undecidability at work in struggle for proper name in scene of genealogical indebtedness

——translatable-untranslatable name: a universal reason that limits its universality > impossible univocity: translation as law, duty/debt, insolvent debt > all marked in very name of Babel

p. 112 [re: Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”] translation as Aufgabe (task)—translator must acquit himself, is at fault, fallen, in error, perhaps a crime: task to render [think reddere rationem, Leibniz], and possible “reconciliation”: Wiedergabe, Sinnwiedergabe (restitution of meaning)

p. 114 Überleben and Übersetzen (survival & translation)

——for Benjamin, translator as survivor, agent of sur-vival, heir [man], the sur-vival of translation can make original text not only live longer but more & better

——Benjamin utilizes metaphor of family seed [cf. p. 112], Hegelian-like spirit returning to itself

p. 115 for Benjamin, essential mission of translation is to communicate “communicability” of text (privileging performative?) not simply its communication (content)

——translation neither image nor copy, not reproduction or representative

——[does Benjamin link life & sur-vival of text to movement of kinship?]

p. 116 for Benjamin, “translation is a form,” a literary work has very little content [says it communicates “very little”] > law of this form has its 1st place in original

——does a work require translation? answer is apodictic, injunction even w/out translator there, the requirement of the other as translator: structure of original, relation of life to survival > a priori, even if forgotten > its apodictic essence: it is unforgettable, so forgetting is accidental, death would not change it at all

——translation, desire for translation, unthinkable w/out correspondence w/ thought of God

p. 117 vis-à-vis Benjamin, original gives itself in modifying itself, gift is not an object given, it lives and lives on in mutation [Deleuze?]

——every translator is committed, committed by the other before having committed himself?

p. 118 if original text demands translation, the original is indebted to the translator, original is 1st debtor: God weeps over his untranslatable name > [his Law as law of translation]

——double bind is the law, in name of God: most originary, most sacred, must be translated, deciphered: translation not 2nd (secondary): constructor cannot make universal tongue, deconstructor constrained by appeal to translation

pp. 118-19 at edge of the language, from this edge to the other of proper name: debt contracts the trait (to-be-translated from one language to the other) of relation of living subject to his name

——to be able to translate as contract > transcendental possibility of all contracts (absolute contract): origin of languages before language

pp. 119-20 classic circle always begins to turn once one asks about origin of languages/society > Benjamin interested in an original kinship, affinity (Verwandschaft), alliance btwn languages, contract of translation beyond blood ties, empirical symbioses > Derrida compares this affinity to Kant’s sublime: rendering present an affinity that’s never present in this presentation

pp. 120-21 Benjamin: original element of translator is the word (acts as an arcade) not the sentence (acts as a wall)

p. 122 for Benjamin, fleeting (flüchtig), infinitely small point of contact where 2 bodies of text touch > movement of love: “pass into its own language the mode of intention of the original”

pp. 123-24 for Derrida, “translation contract” is hymen or marriage contract (a seminar) > w/ promise to produce a child whose seed will give rise to history/growth

——Benjamin says as much, that in translation the original will enlarge itself > Derrida adds: this child can speak on its own, something other than a product subjected to law of reproduction > sacred and being-to-be-translated produce each other at edge of same limit

***——promise of reconciliation (even if unfulfillable) is a rare & notable event: kingdom is never reached, is untouchable > but the commitment takes place, bequeaths its record

——Benjamin’s untouchable (unberührbar) reminds Derrida of the hymen, of the wedding gown more visibly

——untouchable: fascinates, orients work of translator

***——text will be even more virgin, intact, after passage of translation: hymen, sign of virginity, more jealous of itself after the other hymen, the contract signed, marriage consummated (untouchable remnant remains intact)

pp. 124-25 Benjamin’s metaphors of core (Kern)/shell, fruit/skin (Frucht/Schale) > core is btwn fruit/skin (tenor [Gehalt]/language [Sprache]) [very nuanced distinctions on all sides]

pp. 125-26 for Benjamin, best translation resembles a royal cape, clothes remain separate from body while also wedding it—not wedded to it

——folds of this cape, gown, protect king, it is like his scepter, visibility of law, but what counts (has power) is what’s under the cape (body of king) > don’t assume there’s a phallus underneath

——hermaphrodite: royal cape as wedding gown, king inseparable from royal couple, wedding King & Queen, around which translation quilts, sews, hems, embroiders, busies its tongue

p. 126 if axiom “there is no translation of translation” were broken, one would touch, and one must not, the untouchable of the untouchable (that which guarantees originality to the original)

p. 127 truth: pure language where letter and meaning no longer dissociate > if one can no longer discover this place: can’t distinguish original & translation

p. 130 translation promises a kingdom to the reconciliation of languages

——Rousseau, Husserl & Benjamin seek origin even while dismissing historical/natural one [?]

——Benjamin: “concept of origin (Abstammugsbegriff) remains indispensable” [re: affinity of languages]

p. 131 for Benjamin, languages intend (as Babelian event) toward being-language of language, this is “pure language,” not transcendent to each language, not Leibnizian universal language

——translation, as the accord of tongues, lets the being-language of language resonate, announcing it rather than presenting it

——translation makes nocturnal intimacy of core emerge [jealousy]

p. 132 less revelation than promise: “infinite rebirth (Aufleben) of languages”

——translation, as holy growth of languages, announces messianic end, but sign of end only “present” in “knowledge of that distance,” Entfernung, remoteness

——can know this remoteness, not overcome it: fort/da (experience is translation)

——sacred text is sacred in that it announces its transferability

pp. 132-33 rhythm, twists & turns from abyss to abyss, deconstructs the tower > madness on both sides (interior/exterior limit) > impossible task: the infinite guilt absolves you immediately

p. 133 sacred text is transferability making its translation untranslatable

——sacred text (absolute text): pas de sens (not poverty of meaning, but no meaning that would be itself) > sacred text surrenders itself to translation; commands right away the translation it refuses

——translation: task of pure limit, an infinite labor to rejoin (doesn’t exclude gradations, virtuality, interval & in-btwn) > can one quote a signature?

ATAP p. 85 prostitution as confusion of tongues or tones [?] > Babel: mother of whores

EU p. 32 “land of romance,” universal language, completed Babel > Aristotle, Plato: math as universal & common science w/out object

p. 34 Descartes: almost no more controversy if we could agree on meaning of words

TRAP

GT p. 147 violence of gift: takes by surprise in such a way as to trap, indebt the receiver, place, hold in a process of circulation, but this violence irreducible whether it repeats or interrupts the circle

——or: a surprise surprising enough to be forgotten w/out delay, beyond Being, epekeina tes ousia: secret about which one cannot speak, but can no longer remain silent

BL p. 207 law is not a woman, not a feminine figure—even if man wants to enter, penetrate it (that’s its trap [makes you think it’s feminine?])

MPM pp. 93-4 de Man’s texts on promise pervert tranquil assurance of what we call “performative” > too much of promise is irremediable disturbance/perversion, is also a trap, also renders promise possible (indestructible), and comical

p. 135 auto-deconstruction where auto-, self can’t be reflected/totalized/gathered/recollected only written and caught in trap of promise

PP p. 158 dictum pronounces itself against itself as soon as it finds its way into writing, “contradiction” as relation-to-self of diction chasing itself away by hunting its trap (scription); not a contingent contradiction [confirmed by Platonism in Rousseau, Saussure]

PAS PAS p. (62) pas de don has to recall itself in order to come about: knot (pas) of truth, truth of knot (pas) > begins to be ensnared in trap of law

p. (81) diabolism, double of sovereignty, its trap must take on all forms of sovereignty: méconnaissance and forgetting w/out remains; sovereign traps the devil, lui donnant ainsi raison, risks leaving him the last word

FWT p. 116 to say “I’m Jewish, I can’t be accused when disconcerted by Israel”—programmed death of slightest lucidity, responsibility, deadly trap must be avoided at all costs

DS p. 258 no total/proper meaning because blank folds over (se plie), dès que le blanc (est) blanc, (se) blanchit, as soon as there’s a mark, there’s a re-mark, no blank w/ capital B, no theology of Text, yet desire for reappropriation, structural site of theological trap, is produced, nourished, in very act of separating from it

SP pp. 99-101 Nietzsche’s style not an impregnable, infinite mastery, doesn't impeccably manipulate the snare (piège), doesn’t calculate the undecidable like Leibniz’ God (a falling back into the trap), nor does he use parody/simulacrum as a weapon, which would lead to a Nietzsche cult (interprêtrise of parody) > rhythmic blindness of hymen/margin “inscribes castration’s effect w/in itself” > dans le toile du texte, Nietzsche is lost, a spider, or spiders, unequal to the web spun

O p. 4 structure of double mark (caught [pris], both seized [emprunté] & entangled [enfermé], in binary opposition)

——one of the terms retains old name to destroy opposition to which it no longer quite belongs

p. 54 if one is captive to formulas and absolute knowledge, can’t think anything outside the whole, not even its mimetic double

ATIA pp. 43-4 God sets a trap for Cain, God as hunter, don’t fall prey to sin lurking there, a lure, a temptation [Derrida’s prowling and lurking]

REST p. 273 restitution, remise des chaussures, snares (ret) of these shoes formed by re- prefixes, revenir

pp. 275-76 everything on trial (tout chose en procès), publicized [re: Shapiro], the proximate cause is a trap: a double that doesn’t make a pair, makes a trap, can’t put one’s feet in them, Christic shade of bait [sole? proper subject? Van Gogh’s surrender?], Christ’s flesh is bait for the Devil (Muscipula Diaboli); in PAS, another type of trap > la paralyse

p. 276 all the steps of trial are traps [Heidegger assigning sole of shoe, Shapiro sending letter], as if figured in advance: to whom is the trap due (à qui revient le piège)? des chausse-trapes, des lacets, des pièges à lacets (laces of the shoes)

p. 277 Van Gogh left a trap, lacet (snare) [at bottom right corner of picture, cf. p. 258] > cette boucle étrange, une sorte de noeud esquissé, untied shoes, forms an open circle, pincers or key ring, a leash (laisse), as though taking the place of his signature [cf. DST 323n ring linked to deconstruction]

p. 278 logic of false parity (rather than false identity) constructs the trap?

pp. 279-80 the trap: in this lace a sort of check payable to bearer that everyone jumps to fill in, w/ his name or w/ the name of a SARL (Heidegger for the pastoral, Shapiro for the city nomad)

p. 339 for Heidegger, the picture is doubly useless, depicts, “shows,” being-products that’re out-of-service, w/out use-value > multiple edge(s) (bordures) detach being-product from subjective scope (portée subjective), simultaneously baiting (inducing/luring) reattachment of subjective scope

pp. 354-55 Verlässlichkeit laces and lets loose at same time, restitutes “profoundest” going-back behind the philosophemes of matter-form, subjectivity, law, etc., but also [restitutes] most naively archaic regression to trust, that which can let itself be had (se laisser prendre), can abandon itself to the primary/crudest trap, trap before all traps, to a lure constituted by mirror play of the world, its Spiegelspiel [Levinas-like critique? or affirmation of Duplicity?]

p. 376 betting on the pair, plus/pas de pari, trap always works in interlace (la piège marche toujours dans lentrelacs): soit quil fasse marcher, laisse marcher ou quil paralyse [p. 373 only the pair can go]

p. 381 trap is the inevitability of betting, logic of the disparate

p. 382 don’t have to render anything: just bet on the trap like others swear (jurent) on a Bible > il y aura eu à parier, ça donne à rendre, a remmettre [there will be something to bet, it gives…]

if faudrait rendreencore, donc, en se séparant, et même en laissant tomber [even in letting the matter drop, we’d render (something?)]

DST DST p. 203 question of obsession, of obsidionality, of exposure on all sides, arises w/ figure of a besieged (assiégée) power

——this figure is impregnable because it has no single site, single figure

——it harasses (harcèle) out of (depuis) sa désistance all the others in turn

traps everywhere, double bind and hyperbologic leave no way out (aucun issue)

——must know all this to begin to think

——double bind (as ending parentheses): can’t close one front w/out opening another on another side

PIO p. 17 mirror as predicament, necessary or fateful situation > caught in mirror’s fatal & fascinating trap

——Derrida’s fondness for word piège [a favorite theme in light-hearted, hopeless, elliptical discussions btwn he and de Man]

RM pp. 61-3 different economies of metaphoric transfer (Übertragung): 1) translation in traditional (ideal) sense: transport of intact signified into another language 2) the more violent inveigling (captatrice), seductive, transformative capture by another language, fatherland, motherland—w/ such translation, proper mother tongue violated at moment of import/export

pp. 77-8 always plus dune language in the language: the capture of the crossing (croisement) that allies Ziehen and Reissen, this capture (à la fois violent/faithful, laissant sauf) affects the captor, abduction (captation), translation, into other’s language [French retrait, English re-tracing] > all this already at work (à loeuvre) in the other’s languages, these dealings make for a work (fait oeuvre)

WAP p. 80 chaque pas est toujours piégé, defending philosophy, destroying philosophy, using fragmentary, aphoristic, elliptical language > each can serve most violent didacticism

AFR p. 117(n) reference to Rousseau’s objection to Condillac in 2nd Discourse: Rousseau denounces [turns of Condillac’s] circle only to step into it more quickly

D pp. 313-14 the opening, as presence, is not noticed as opening—we’re fascinated, glued to what presents itself: we’re unable to see presence as such, visibility of visible > never present themselves

+R p. 156 Derrida yielded to Adami (hooked like a fish [hostage]), as if his angular signature was waiting for me [Derrida], a stupefying advance > it became Derrida's business, made him speak

p. 163 into (over) the bargain (the market) (par-dessus le marché), not au-dessus (above) the market (the lure in which you would again let yourself be caught) > puts in play, or en abyme, the destructive simulacra of surplus value

C p. 189 Derrida prefers sacharner to harceler: [resonates w/] trap, hunt, bait, taste of flesh

p. 243 lacs (snare): lacing as stricture, interlacing

p. 245 order of narrative, whose trap has been situated by logic of cartouche

——unity of a period (of a detour) is indeterminable: each article presents perforated cards that transform the other > tombe, in the snare (dans le lacs)

LI p. 149 Derrida’s uneasiness about using words “force” and “power” [eg. Foucault’s micropowers]—he has 3 conditions for using them: 1) no power/force, only differences of power/force (like Nietzsche) 2) realize the greater force could be the “lesser” 3) account for fact that force/power quickly trapped in ruses of mastery

ATM p. 147 the trap of obeying Levinas in restituting nothing, one becomes deaf to his obligation, but it only feels like a trap when inclined toward mastery, when one pretends to escape from absolute dissymmetry

pp. 167-68 [re: Levinas] no edges in this interruptive series, in this incomparable stricture, but tapering points (establishing continuity at a distance [?]) > binding & unbinding, the lace (lacet) of obligation is in place (not a trap): an ob-ligation that un-binds, opens up religion in this very unbinding

BSi p. 89 for Machiavelli, fox is closest to truth of man and man’s fidelity: knows who to lie, commit perjury, has sense/culture of snare [for Machiavelli, lion is too bête]

p. 290 trap of sovereignty, trap of transfer of sovereignty > in all these fictions and simulacra blood flows, no less cruelly, irreversibly: beast & sovereign bleed, so do marionettes

——political revolution w/out poetic revolution of political > just a transfer of sovereignty

——Bemächtigungstrieb: beyond other drives, beyond death drive, think sovereignty through drive, transference, inheritance, transmission, sovereignty itself is nothing, is excess, beyond everything

OG pp. 36-8 (56-7) writing as “trap,” pathology (blind), idolatry; for Saussure, Leibniz’s fixed language would be like a hen hatching a duck’s egg > “la perversion de lartifice engendre des monstres

SPEC p. 321 [Freud’s speculation on Ernst] needs no witness, no counter-testimony has weight before this teleological auto-institution

——net (filet) is in place, one pulls on a string (fil), getting a hand, foot, caught: cest un lasso ou un lacet > Freud caught himself in advance; rapporté différé (deferred overlapping) > describing in advance scene of its own description

p. 336 that which entraps speculation: murderous, mournful, jealous, guilty identifications [re: Freud’s relation to death of his & Ernst’s younger brother] > rigorous stricture, legacy & jealousy of a repetition (already jealous of itself) pull its [fort:das] strings (tirent les fils) more or less strictly > scene of writing becomes auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic

p. 401 quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

FV p. 424 for Lacan, signifier’s materiality (not empirical) due to certain indivisibility and locality (found where it isn’t) > indivisibility & locality are indissociable—rivet us (nous river), make us arrive at that which properly links singular to signature: guarantee of unity of signifier

TREMBLING

GOD p. 8 [another secret] Christian mysterium tremendum, fear and trembling before sacrificial gift, person being paralyzed, in its singularity, by the gaze of God

p. 55-56 another secret, another seal (supplementary seal), comes to overlay (sceller) the unlivable experience, another concealment (cèlement) to the tremor > afraid of the fear, tremble in form of not knowing: a double secret [trembling as supplementary seal?]

tremble in fear of unpredictable, unforeseeable, the untouchability of the arrival (tremo, tromeō, tromos, tremendus), enigma of trembling and tears, what are they metaphors or figures for?

——we would need to make inroads into the thinking of the body w/out dissociating registers of discourse

MONL p. 22 threatening & threatened promise, monolingualism & tautology, impossibility of metalanguage, but there are effects of metalanguage: at the horizon, spectral, infinitely desirable, allows the mirage of another language to tremble

R pp. 4-5 fidelity to come, to the to-come, to the future, always trembling, risky, is held in friendship, friendship of thought: yes, there is friendship to (be) thought: oui, il y a de lamitié à penser > we are guests to this snaking oath (serment) [D.H. Lawrence], in name of democracy

AF p. 76 remember to remember the future, Yerushalmi: “only in Israel and nowhere else is the injunction to remember felt as a religious imperative to an entire people” [makes Derrida tremble]

POO p. 8 the duplicity before the rule makes one tremble, an other who will seek to hold you back or push you into void, save you or lose you, supposing there ever a choice?

pp. 10-1 responsibility not in ones own name but arises in structure of supplementarity: in my name as the name of the other > singularity quakes in exemplary equivocality of this “as”

SPOM p. 27 a trajectory without heading, assurance, a trajectory of a precipitation which trembles, vibrates, orients, disorients: the question here addressed to us under the name justice

pp. 212-13 the event we are prowling around (autour duquel nous rôdon) hesitates btwn singular “who” of ghost and general “what” of simulacrum; in dis-locaton, in virtual space of tele-technosciences, le messianique tremble au bord de cet événement même

POOF p. 28 the all too of Human All Too Human, a rolling wave, a trembling, enveloped violence of a welling up wave falling back on itself, “when the excess of the beyond itself folds back into immanence,” turning around, coming to perhaps

pp. 80-1 we tremble in time of Nietzsche’s mutation, we belong (w/out belonging) to this tremor, absolute dislocation, borderless disjoining; we emit warnings, like searchlights w/out coast, mad, impossible pleas: recurrent syntagms of “X without X” (harbor invisible in their very light) > are these watchmen [Bataille, Blanchot, Nancy] guiding us toward another destination [?]

EM p. 133 (161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

——this trembling can only come from a certain outside—already requisite within the very structure that it solicits

p. 134-35 (162) [re: deconstructive method] strategic bet (le pari stratégique), radical trembling coming from outside, trembling played out in violent relationship of West to its other [its other?], whether that other is “linguistic,” economic, ethnological, political, military > military/economic violence have structural solidarity w/ “linguistic” violence

PP p. 169 abyss of trembling w/in the pharmakon

VM p. 82 Levinas makes us tremble, from the heart of the desert, a thought which makes us dream of dispossession and dismantling

p. 100 for Hegel, hearing as ideal sense, immediate trembling of object, but also an ideal of contemplation, aesthetics [from trembling to idealism]

p. 134 if Being has always been determined by philosophy as presence, the question of Being posed on basis of transcendental horizon of time > first tremor (ébranlement) of philosophical security, of self-confident presence

p. 141 Being makes search for an archia tremble, its priority is not an archia

P p. 77 for Kant, pure sound & pure color as vibration of ether > purely formal, “universally compatible w/ certainty”—beautiful [what about color gold on frame?]

PAS PAS p. (91) faire trembler dabord (trembling, first approach): denial of fear, frightens more, a fascination, la moindre possibilité de sarriver, in trembling one renounces mastery, use, domination, one does not know how to sign its effects > pas dinsistance distances itself on first approach

S pp. 107-08 origin as hétérogène à lorigine: 1) originarily heterogenous 2) heterogenous to what is called the origin, other than the origin 3) heterogenous and or insofar as at the origin: because and although (bien que) at the same time—is logical form of tension that makes this thought vibrate

OH pp. 5-6 hope, fear, trembling, when a name might mask the absence of a face [re: “subject” of Europe”]

PPHS pp. 92-3 acc. Hegel, hearing more ideal than sight, double negation, i.e. sound (Ton)> inner vibration (inneren Erzitterns) of body, breath [trembling (of sound) prioritized by Hegel?]

FWT p. 151 quaking of borders, their permeability, their undecidability [re: DP/suicide]

POS pp. 90-1 cannot expect “efficacity” of theory/praxis of deconstruction to be immediate, deferred acc. complex networks > regional “effects” of this trembling have a nonregional opening [to the, in the, “general text” (which is neither a reflection nor an effect)] > no pretention to mastery

OS p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

the impossibility of the otherwise produces a trembling, a question of tout autre, think the tie btwn truth/presence, in a thought that doesn’t need to be true/present [no skeptical moment]

p. 63 “the extraordinary trembling to which classical ontology is subjected in Sein und Zeit still remains w/in the grammar & lexicon of metaphysics”

pp. 64-5 almost impossible to distinguish Heidegger’s Anwesenheit from Gegenwärtigkeit: sometimes it is a more original presence, other times it questions Greco-Western philosophical closure; perhaps we need to make thought tremble w/ a Wesen not yet Anwesen

ATIA pp. 17-8 time before time has always made “me” dizzy: God’s exposure to surprise, when God does not know what will become, what will happen when the poet names living things; Derrida feels the same way, depuis le temps, before his cat: will it/God address me?

p. 18 staring at his cat, Derrida wonders if this is the same abyss, same vertigo, as when God waited for Adam to name the animals, this awful tale of Genesis, who was born first, before the names? who has remained the despot?

p. 24 tremble at borderline btwn bios and zoē

p. 155 trembling, dizzy, uncanny, vertigo, “Schwindel ist unheimlich,” in Heidegger’s description of animal and world

FS p. 25 Mallarmé unrealized unity of Book by making conceptual categories securing it tremble

DIF DIF p. 4 the capital “a” of differance, a pyramid [A]; Hegel: body of sign is Egyptian pyramid > Derrida moves from pyramid to tomb, oikēsis > tomb of proper, familial residence, economy of death (this stone announces death of tyrant [cf. TN.]) [this tomb can’t even be made to resonate]

p. 9 differance, middle voice > -ance remains undecided btwn active & passive (i.e. resonance is not the act of resonating), neutralizes what infinitive denotes as active

p. 21 it’s domination of beings (Being as presence or beingness) that differance solicits, questions, makes tremble in entirety: question emerges where ontological difference is broached (souvre)

p. 22 a trace that can never appear in phenomenon: trace beyond link btwn ontology & phenomenology > trace erases itself, muffles itself in resonating, like the “a” inscribing its pyramid in differance

O p. 55 Mallarmé: lift a corner of the veil, fragment of total book—scintillate (the whole that’ll never be)

DPi pp. 18-20 the transition, the trance btwn when Jews have received commandments but have yet to hear the “judgments” > as if they know God’s about to invent DP after uttering “thou shalt not kill,” terrified by this divine word electing them > Moses says, “Do not tremble”

pp. 236-37 we’ve asked “what is an exception?” “what is cruelty?” “blood?” “man?” “proper to man?” “to humanitarian?” > neither rhetorical nor answerable, these questions showed “the vertigo or the abyss of their own impossibility” > nor did they simply recreate dizziness of hermeneutic circle (which they also did) which accumulates meaning, supposes pre-comprehension [link to imagining the phone call, imminence of verdict]

RGE p. 253 Bataille took Hegel seriously: understood internal rigor of system—couldn’t pull one part out

——rigorous effect of trembling to which Bataille submits Hegel’s concepts

p. 260 since Hegel’s [all] logic is an interpretation, is submitted to an interpretive decision, it can be interpreted against him > reinterpretation: simulated repetition of Hegelian discourse

——minute displacement disjoints articulations, trembling spreads out—old shell cracks

p. 268 inscription of relation btwn discourse & sovereign operation: “scientific” > a science made to tremble in absolute nonknowledge, “science” only in a transgressed closure—avec un non-savoir absolu sur le sans-fond duquel senlèvent la chance ou le pari de sens, de lhistoire et des horizons de savoir absolu

IW p. 246 Rosenzweig associates abyss w/ volcanic fire (eruption), convulsive tremor marking rhythm of flow of lava—tempo of discontinuous rhetoric

p. 264-65 deconstruction: a seism that happens to truth > from what external location can one deliver verdict on truth of truth?

PJP p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

p. 187 anacoluthon’s metonymy blurs/complicates all frontiers, instigates all substitutions

D p. 326 simulacrum [of “I”] as a force, le simulacre de lassistance: chambre obscure: feigns to transform the imperfect into present: impossible > et vous entraîne dans un nouveau vertige

p. 358 au bord (du vertige), alert to the border itself, infinite depths were also bottomless, perfectly superficial, cube w/out depth

TN p. 16 vertigo of these concepts together: extension, partes extra partes, touch, se toucher

p. 73 Nancy remains an exacting, rigorous, philosopher where limits tremble (impossible, undecidable), trembles w/out trembling, submits to trembling

p. 287 via Nancy, there is no “the” technical is an exemplary example, plus quun exemple, gives privileged access to all “there is no ‘the’…”’s > le vertige quasi transcendantal

——it’s because there’s some technical (which there is not) that one can infinitely repeat examples that deconstruct very properness/unity itself of all essences, “beings”

AD p. 74 very thrust (poussée) of Levinas’ thought: makes borderline (ligne de frontière), semantic identity of all the words he uses, tremble

OG p. 24 (38-9) the hesitation of Heidegger & Nietzsche is not “incoherence,” it is the trembling of deconstruction: deconstruction does not destroy structures from the inside, must inhabit, inhabits most when one doesn’t suspect it > borrow all subversive strategies from old structure

——that deconstruction falls prey (emportée) to its own work is what another person can’t help pointing out w/ zeal (we should be able to formalize this exercise)

p. 186 (264-65) [vis-à-vis Rousseau] cet être-dans-la-nature a donc le mode dêtre étrange du supplément: lêtre-dans makes classical logic tremble

TRIAL

H p. 39 put a city, an unconscious, on trial

TRUTH

KH p. 148n Heidegger: chaos, khaos, khaine, signifies the yawning, a split in two, close connection to aletheia, abyss which opens

——for Nietzsche, Chaos prevents a humanization (Vermenschung) of existence in its totality

pp. 125-26 backwards steps (retours en arrière), rhythm of Timaeus, go beyond, under philosophical logos, normal couple, to a third, a bastard, hybrid, orphan (khōra) > necessary but not true

***p. 126 because philosophy can’t speak truly of that which looks like the mother, it speaks only of father/son, as if father engendered son all its own

GOD pp.122-23 secret of secrecy, not a hiding something, as in not revealing the truth, but respecting absolute singularity, infinite separation of what binds me to the unique, to one as to the other, à lUn comme à lAutre)

FL pp. 255-56 all constatives presuppose a performative: “I promise to make a sentence for you” > presuppose an act of justice, w/ irreducible thoughtlessness and unconsciousness in such urgency

——Derrida relates this to Levinas’ “la vérité suppose la justice (truth supposes justice),” “la justice, il ny a que ça de vrai” (dangerously parodying French idiom), and Saint Augustine’s idea that truth must be “made” [cf. AF p. 59 Augustine makes truth again, & again cf. POO p. 26]

BL p. 206 via Heidegger’s “truth” as non-truth as truth of truth, truth w/out truth guards itself > truth and law would be the guarding itself (Wahrheit): look btwn guardian & man

LOBL p. 122 reaffirmation, triumph over (sur, hyper), living-on, a supplement of life that is better than life and better than death, better than truth > la Chose par excellence: sur-vérité [see pp. 137-38 la sur-vérité du survivre][Blanchot calls la Chose the event]

p. 139 living on establishes the supplement [is supplement 2nd?], in truth beyond truth (la sur-vérité), supplement of truth w/out truth

p. 145 MOP uses a logic of truth as presentation substituted for a logic of truth as representative equivalence [FL p. 282]

AF AF p. 59 question of the archive introduced by very stakes of vertiginous difference btwn [Freud’s] “material truth” & “historical truth” [Derrida also mentions Augustine’s “making truth”]

pp. 85-87 Freud both accounted for ghosts, and tried to conjure them like Marx: [re: Gradiva’s ghost] Freud speaks of “real ghost,” and of a part of truth, the truth of delusion, haunted by specter of truth, truth is spectral as part of truth irreducible by explanation

POR pp. 9-10 the poleros (politics, polemos, eros, seduction) of analysis, ends in an abyss, where resistance to psychoanalytic Lösung, in the name of truth, can only be a disavowal > to analyze, to say to other: prefer, take, love my solution, you will be in truth if you do not resist my solution

——Derrida proposes an other resistance, that of the remainder, thus a restanalysis

HERP HERP p. 172 Heidegger mentions positively tradition of Scheler which goes back to Augustine [St. Anselm?] & Pascal: we access truth/knowledge on basis of love/charity—not vice versa

HASD HASD pp. 46-7 via Eckhart, like adverb quasi (quasi stella matutina), we are beside the verb that is the truth; Eckhart: “may the Father, the Verbum…help us remain adverbs of this Verbum”

MPM MPM p. 31 if death teaches us anything it leaves no chance for any innocent desire for truth

p. 66 must keep in memory difference of Lethe from Mnemosyne, call this aletheia

POOF POOF pp. 57-8 Heidegger’s Stimmung changes everything, beyond the concept, suspends/terrifies oppositions, where truth & untruth are together equiprimordially (gleichursprunglich) > Unheimlichkeit, lodges enemy in heart of every friend

p. 274 Kant explains that empty gestures, those of politesse, lead to genuine dispositions of soul > Derrida extrapolates: history of becoming-true of an illusion, une histoire qui se fait comme histoire qu'on se raconte: elle se fait alors qu'on la raconte, on se la raconte pour la faire [history made while story being told] > a trial (procès) of verification

——a good philosophical computer could convert Kant’s history of truth qua history of error into Hegelian software, then Nietzschean—il le fait déjà [Derrida], n'est-ce pas [baby daddy]

p. 275 for Kant, crime against humanity would be to disdain currency, to take counterfeit money for counterfeit [skeptic betrays mankind] > for Kant, virtue obligates that we turn counterfeit (small change) into gold, becoming-truth of the simulacrum, its verification, authentication [pp. 257-58 rare friend keeps secret, renounces possible public profit, that of circulating secret]

A A pp. 1-2 as soon as truth is confined (determined to be finished) a border crossing does not seem impossible; there’s something else than truth, something better, truth is finite, cest fini

p. 67 Derrida notes that, for Heidegger, the certainty of death is heterogenous to any other form of certainty, that when one speaks of dying it occurs at limits of truth and untruth

***p. 70 Heidegger pays no attention to logical form of contradiction (most proper possibility as possibility of an impossibility) > treats it as a condition of truth, its very unveiling (truth no longer measured in logical form of judgment)

pp. 71-2 greater and greater orientation toward death, for Heidegger, the incalculable nonmeasure [of truth], signifies possibility of measureless impossibility of existence

VP VP pp. 46-7(n) “falseness” of phrase “I am immortal” is the truth of truth itself > movement from “I am” (confession of mortal) to res cogitans (immortality) secures itself beyond that which makes it possible—death

pp. 83-4 knowledge as norm, intuition adequate to its object, already opened by promise, telos, in truth, the pro-visional [difference btwn intuition/intention] as essence of meaning (vouloir-dire), discourse adheres to discursive essence when false, attains its entelechy when true

——“pure logical grammar,” le sens nattend pas la vérité insofar as it expects it (en tant quil lattend)

FSW p. 196 repression of writing since Plato constitutes philosophy as epistēmē: truth as unity of logos and phonē

PP p. 68-9 Socrates give[s] myths a send off (envoyer promener les mythes), les saluer, dismisses them, cette belle résolution du khairein [Phaedrus (230a) Socrates says goodbye to myths, because he does not even know himself], khairein in name of truth, self-knowledge, autoscopy, autognosis

——Derrida treats this send off, in a dialogue w/ 2 rigorously original myths [cicada, Theuth], as a welcoming of myths > both myths invented after question of writing

p. 105 memory and truth cannot be separated, movement of alētheia, a deployment of mnēmē as psychic life in its self-presentation to itself > powers of lēthē (writing, pharmakon) increase domains of death, nontruth, nonknowledge: fascinate, hypnotize, medusa [verb]

p. 112 (128) Plato imitates the imitator to restore the truth of what they imitate: that is, the truth itself [i.e. both Plato and sophists advise exercise of memory]

——for Plato, only truth as presence of the present is discriminative > discrimination become so subtle it separates nothing, the same from itself (this movement is only possible within structure of ambiguity and reversibility of pharmakon)

p. 120 Socrates must renounce knowledge as power, passion and pleasure, must consent to die, let his body die, to achieve alētheia, epistēmē, which are also powers

p. 123 dialectical inversion of pharmakon or dangerous supplement makes death à la fois acceptable and null > immortality of soul, acts like antibody, dissipates its terrifying fantasy, le pharmarkon inverti, qui met en fuite tous les épouvantails: origin of epistēmē, opening to truth as possibility of repetition, submission of “greed for life (epithumein zēn)” to law (king, father, chief, capital)

p. 124 eidos, truth, law, epistēmē, dialectics, philosophy: names of the pharmakon that must oppose to pharmakon of Sophists, the bewitching fear of death

——Socrates must listen to the Laws like they’re a phonic spell

p. 134 (154) writing is not a good tekhnē, not a productive art, not secure (saphes kai bebaion), like alētheia (nonsensible visibility, intelligible invisibility)

p. 154 seed must submit to logos, do violence to itself, since sperm is opposed to law of logos > when Plato turns live speech into psychic graphē he does so w/ a problematic of truth: lécriture en tè psuchè nest pas une écriture de frayage, mais seulement denseignement, de transmission, écriture daletheia

p. 166 if truth is presence to eidos, would it not be absolute blindness? death?

p. 168 differance at once condition of possibility and impossibility of truth, disappearance of any originary presence

PPHS p. 80 Hegel: reason makes truth out of imagination’s indifference

F pp. xxviii [re: Abraham’s psychoanalysis] joy of breaking wall btwn rational & irrational, condition necessary for “scientific truth and poetic truth” to belong to “same essence”

——this poetic truth not gratuitous literary estheticism, nor unveiling presence > truth is “poetic” in that it writes a text on and in a text, hieroglyph on hieroglyph

WM p. 237 for Aristotle, only man can mimic [cf. ATIA p. 35 (still prowling around)], mimēsis is tied to possibility of meaning/truth: “the power of truth, as the unveiling of nature (physis) by mimēsis, congenitally belongs to the physics of man, to anthropophysics”; physis includes its own exteriority, its double, says itself, gathers itself

p. 241 for Aristotle, if metaphor, risk and chance of mimēsis, can miss the true, it is because metaphor must count w/ a determined absence [moment of detour]

——axiology of truth alone can answer question of whether bad metaphors are metaphors, this axiology is not neutral, belongs to interior of rhetoric

p. 244 acc. Aristotle (onomatism, doctrine of simple names), metaphor, like mimēsis, must come back (revient) to physis, to its truth and its presence

DS p. 177 double session finds its corner (coin) BTWN (ENTRE) literature & truth (that by which question “what is?” wants answering): figure of folding back, angle ensured by fold

p. 184 concept of history has lived on possibility of meaning, on past/present/promised presence of meaning & truth > outside this system, concept of history reinscribed elsewhere, strategically

p. 185 when writing is regarded as mimesis, the most it can be valued is equal to truth it’s imitating

p. 191 internal division w/in mimēsis: 1) Plato often disqualifies mimēsis 2) Plato links anamnēsis to alētheia, and it is very hard to separate mnēmē from mimēsis

p. 192 via Heidegger, 2 orders of truth [Derrida’s not sticking to Heidegger’s sequence]: 1) unveiling of what’s concealed (alētheia), presenting itself 2) truth is agreement (homoiōsis or adaequatio) > both orders privilege the precedence (pré-séance) of imitated

p. 193 mimesis commanded by process of truth 1) mimēsis presents thing itself, the physis that produces itself, it is the movement of phusis (which prefers the crypt), is linked to mnēmē, which unveils, un-forgets 2) or mimēsis sets up homoiōsis or adaequatio btwn 2 terms, a face-to-face, imitator/imitated, faithful imitation will efface itself by restoring freedom of true presence

——closure of metaphysics: not as a border enclosing homogenous space but acc. noncircular, tout autre, figure (invariable reference to primary truth, reference itself)

pp. 193-94 double mark, mark erases mark, undecidable stroke > this syntax escapes pertinence of truth, inscribes truth w/in its play [“Mallarmé exemplifies this”—suspect such a claim]

pp. 205-06 one of most typical metaphysical reappropriations of writing: if mimesis mimics nothing then it is the act of unveiling itself, alētheia, a primordial union btwn alētheia and mimeisthai

p. 260 the rape has already taken place and will nevertheless never have been perpetrated > caught in folds of veil: where all truth comes undone

P p. 20 re: art, three ways of truth: 1) word (signifier) 2) concept (signified) 3) thing (referent)

pp. 20-1 for Hegel, art has a single meaning, une vérité une et nue, an etymon, that can be unveiled through history > wouldn’t this mean art is outside of history? but philosophers have always been too quick to deem art historical via opposition tekhnē/physis translated as art/nature

p. 34 art: domesticated in this history of truth, onto-encyclopedic economy, the machinery of the pose (Setzung/Entgegensetzung)

POS p. 105n forms of truth: homoiosis, adequatio, certitude of cogito, absolute knowledge, alētheia

——“we must have truth (il faut)”—deconstruction not a discourse against truth and science

——paraphrasing Freud, speaking of present/absent penis (the same thing), we must recognize truth as “normal prototype of the fetish”

OS p. 38 Heidegger designates milieu of self-evidence, outside which thought suffocates > has not entire philosophy been authorized on “extraordinary right” of present? for Heidegger, it’s not a question of thinking otherwise, it’s thinking that which could not have been, nor thought, otherwise

the impossibility of the otherwise produces a trembling, a question of tout autre, think the tie btwn truth/presence, in a thought that doesn’t need to be true/present [no skeptical moment]

SP pp. 57-9 via Nietzsche, woman believes in superficiality of existence, disguising pudendum, nothing more than affair of modesty, decency > “truth” nothing but a surface, becomes desirable by way of veil; suspend the veil, or let it fall differently, no longer truth, only “truth”

pp. 85-9 the becoming-woman (becoming Christian) of the idea, the veiling of truth, is the beginning of history, the idea séloigne, devient transcendante, inaccessible, séduisante, the dream of death begins (Heidegger avoids this becoming-woman in his own analysis of History of an Error)

pp. 95-7, p. 101 Nietzsche’s 3 “positions” on woman:

1. woman is figure of falsehood, man as phallus is truth ; man fears castrated woman

2. woman is the figure of truth, plays w/ truth as a fetish ; man fears castrating woman

3. woman as artist, Dionysiac, dissimulatrice, castration doesn’t take place; love affirming woman

pp. 103-05 no truth in itself of sexual difference in itself, homme/femme en soi > but, ontology w/ its verification of identity, w/ its arraisonnement, shelters (recèle) undecidability of sexual difference

p. 111 can no long ask “what is property?” > because propriation, a sexual operation, before which we didn’t know sexuality [?], is undecidable, more powerful than ti esti, than veil of truth, meaning of being, it organizes all ontological statements > lhistoire (de la) vérité (est) un procès de propriation

ATIA p. 21 why would we owe truth anything? the debt of autobiography: confession > after the fall, must already conceive lying as evil, as hiding truth

p. 69 to confess the narcissism of confession is to admit that guilt, the lie, perjury are lodged in heart of promise, in veracity itself, in naked/intransitive simplicity of “I am”

FS p. 7 for Kant, [productive] imagination was already art itself > originally, did not distinguish btwn beauty & truth

p. 27 when all value 1st constituted by theoretical subject, diaphanousness is supreme value, univocity [Deleuze?] > hence, difficulty in thinking genesis & mysterious failures called crises

——Husserl’s solution: forgetting is eidetically dictated, necessary, under rubric of “sedimentation” > for the development of truth

O p. 12 for Hegel, exteriority of negative still belongs to process of truth—must leave its trace upon it

p. 48 return of theological seed to itself, dispersion working for profit of Idea, exclusion as inclusion [not Hegel’s Jew?] > la vérité qui se parle dans le cercle logocentrique, cest le discours de ce qui revient au père

pp. 48-9n la logique (est) de ce qui revient au père (mortplus que jamais) comme à la loi et au logos: la relève elle même > elle est vraie et elle constitue la vérité du logocentrisme > signifier sublated in process of meaning > [Derrida links Freud’s “only one” libido (masculine) to the rightness of reason]

SW pp. 322-23 I am so fatigued from knowing truth, that history of the veil—that truth: too old for me, too old like me (however young I remain) > you don’t know the “fatigue” I’m talking about (dreaming of writing in Spanish, forgotten ancestral language)

——infinite weariness of tropes, what do you expect, I want to end it all (protest, attestation, testament, manifesto against the shroud) > no longer write around/in/under folds of truth

p. 324 epuisement recalls the water & the well (le puits) of truth, back to the pit, the hole (puteus)

TB p. 127 truth: pure language where letter and meaning no longer dissociate > if one can no longer discover this place: can’t distinguish original & translation

CHM p. 308n no history except of rationality/meaning: reappropriation of negativity—or forgets it (same thing) > history of truth, history of economy of negative: negativity not positive truth is the nonhistorical capital of history

REST p. 271 in “I owe you the truth in painting,” emphasis should be placed on the owe (doit), the debt, il doit, “he must/should/owes/ought”: vérité sans vérité de la vérité

——when something is entrusted to the purveyor of truth, it is a secret for no one

p. 274 by owing the truth, one restitutes it, identifying as assigning points or proper size (pointure)

pp. 291-92 Origin an essay on the gift (Schenkung), one of 3 senses in which truth is said to come to its installation, institution, investiture (Stiftung), there’s also the “founding (Gründen)” > this truth which is also nontruth also opens onto the “abyss”

p. 322 Heidegger is interested in the truth of the truth, this would be indispensable condition for knowing what reference means [re: whose shoes?]

p. 325 for Heidegger, truth of the being-product is not that of the example (the particular shoes)

p. 334 philosophico-psychoanalytic concept of fetishism, opposition between fetish & thing, castration as truth of truth, sexual decidability

p. 345 what’s essential for Heidegger is making the overflowing appear by “earth,” “shoes,” “world” > il faudrait les ressaisir à linstant où le hors-dusage détaché (relativement déstricturé) donne lieu, a sort of abyssal surplus value, une surenchère sans fond > we can speak of conditions of fetishization of product/work, surplus value forms a truth-effect, useless gives way to speculative exploitation, more than useful (plus quutile): useful for grasping usefulness of useful—call for adherence [cf. pp. 339-41 double/triple uselessness (work, product, useless for grasping usefulness)]

p. 346 for Heidegger, putting to work of truth, appears in the hors-dusage, unlacing, destricturation, uselesness overloaded w/ value, augments it w/ surplus value in attaching it symbolically to its belonging > a capital difference, concerns head of subject (not proprietor subject but: the earth and the world, trait and attraction, [ontological difference?])

DST DST p. 213 fold or abyssal redoubling: désistance is first of all the désistance of truth: truth never resembles itself, so it resembles mimesis

p. 214 truth never resembles itself, withdraws, masks itself, se désister (never ceases)

PIO p. 19 double blow, the same blow: fabulous invention becomes invention of truth

pp. 33-4 for Descartes, Lebiniz, in Logic of Port-Royal: truth we find is not nature of thing itself but nature of our relation to thing itself

——“inventors of truth” are producers of propositions not sources of revelation, no one has ever invented anything > only truth as a proposition (connection of subject to predicate)

RM p. 78 from “Origin of the Work of Art,” Zug zum Werk (attraction toward the work), work as sumballein, allegoreuein, nonwithdrawal of truth as truth, Un-verborgenheit > truth as originary combat (Urstreit) > a combat that’s an attraction of reciprocal belonging, a Grundriss

HLP pp. 28-9 Nietzsche’s “History of an Error,” a fabulation about the fabulation of truth (Nietzsche proceeds as if a true story could be told about fabrication [?]) > coup de théâtre

p. 31 the history an error that would contribute to process of truth

p. 51 performative can produce a truth, makes the truth, as Augustine says, whose power sometimes imposes itself forever

p. 293n lying w/ images, “facts” structured by simulacrum/virtual, “live television,” by means of selective/interpretive performativity, destroys even reference to the alterity of what it replaces: produces indubitable “truth effect” > absolute lie can survive w/out anyone knowing [evil genius]

TR p. 131 no true archive of man in his truth before the Confessions

WAP p. 122-23 Derrida applies Heidegger’s thought of epochality to the philosophical “age”: from Descartes to Hegel truth is certitude, reassuring foundation of subjectivity > but, Derrida also wonders how this will shed light on regional determinants (political, ideological), and whether this systematic perspective puts to the test or a takes distance from the situation

EJQB p. 65 Jew elects writing which elects the Jews > responsible for truth’s suffusion w/ historicity, and history’s assignment of itself (s’assigne) to its empiricity

IW p. 264-65 deconstruction: a seism that happens to truth > from what external location can one deliver verdict on truth of truth?

p. 267 [vis-à-vis Rosenzweig] Protestantism makes faith come alive to its authenticity, new relation of religion to truth, no longer as correspondence (like science, objective knowledge) but as truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit), authenticity, most intimate Gewissen: [the Church?] internalizes what contests it

***PJP p. 196 the “us” of the anacoluthon, not absolute knowledge, interrupts forever: no one says better, “we are not present to the truth of us” than the acolyte

——when we are present, truth’s not there; suivre/être [see ATIA]

HST p. 382 if avowal goes through symptom rather than declaration > changes nothing of the truth [re: 2 Jewish enemies comically forgiving each other] [Rousseau in OG]

PPT p. 4 [re: Cezanne] to promise the truth, render what’s due, un rendu (a due, a sum rendered)

pp. 5-7 the 4 ways to interpret “truth in painting” : 1) restitution: truth itself restored, in person, w/out mask or veil > truth of truth 2) representation: adequation (not unveiling)—relief of original’s effigy 3) truth solely as painting can show it 4) the truth of painting itself

p. 9 one dreams of a painting w/out debt, w/out truth, a painting that would still not give up painting

LI p. 44 SEC concerned w/ system of values associated w/ truth: repeating and altering that system

p. 136 context, if you like: entire “real-history-of-the-world” in which value of truth and objectivity have taken on meaning and imposed themselves

pp. 136-37 deconstruction does not denounce (neither can nor ought to do so) values dominant in discourse (i.e. truth)

TN p. 22 [Nancy’s] garder: points to truth’s verity (veritas, Wahrheit), and economy; is garder compatible w/ retrait (withdrawal), w/ retenue (holding back, retaining)?

pp. 120-21 Phaedo, Republic: touch truth, relinquish sense

p. 272 dissociate “sense” from truth (Husserl’s distinction btwn pure grammar and logical pure grammar [?])

E p. 18 for Kant, poetry’s privilege is not just in the interiorizing structure of (mouth to ear) hearing oneself speak, but in sincerity, faithful adequation [its truth]; these values are not immediately moral > morality itself derives its value from full presence/full speech

AD p. 96 for Levinas, forgetting the other would attest to its absolute truth

WOG pp. 29-32 Greeks definitely speak the truth, but at what cost, under what conditions?

OG p. 3 (12) history of metaphysics as history of truth, as the truth of truth, the debasement of writing, its repression outside (hors) of “full (pleine)” speech

pp. 10-1 exposure to break btwn phonè and logos [via writing] de-constructs (de-sediments) signification of truth & God’s infinite understanding (pre- & post- Hegelian)

p. 20 (34) effacement of signifier in voice is the condition of the idea of truth: ce leurre est lhistoire de la vérité, & the constituent closure: the word is lived (vécu) as elementary, indecomposable > transparent experience/expression of “être,” of word “être

p. 337n alētheia, privileged instance of a vision filled & satisfied by presence

p. 168 (238-39) acc. Heidegger’s history of metaphysics, liberty/truth became condition of presence: freedom of speech borrows no signifiers from exterior world—cannot be dispossessed

***pp. 244-45 (347-48) approach to limits (madness, divinity, childhood, animality, etc.) feared as threat of death & desired as life w/out differance: truth-value of these limit concepts only has meaning w/in closure of game (clôture du jeu), they belong to an epoch of supplementarity

pp. 286-87 (406) the epoch of truth, what Nietzsche calls abbreviation of signs [retreat of signifier?] [Derrida defends Nietzsche against reading that restores truth, fundamental ontology, in Nietzsche’s thought] [Heidegger’s reading?]

ATAP p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

UWC pp. 202-03 university professes the truth (its commitment to the truth) while discussing truth's status (truth as adequation, revelation, as object of theoretico-constative discourses or as poetico-performative events)

EU pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

——provocation to think brings together in same instant desire for memory & exposure to future

SPEC p. 322 inscription of a subject in his [Freud’s] text is also condition of the performance/pertinence of a text, beyond empirical subjectivity, supposing that could exist as soon as one writes, substitutes, supplements: notion of truth incapable of accounting for this performance

p. 360 Heidegger links notion of guarding to Wahrheit, to truth as un-truth

FV p. 415 exhibiting, undressing (déshabillage), unveiling (dévoilement): acrobatics of metaphor of truth, metaphor of metaphor, truth of truth > when Freud intends to denude original Stoff: text coordinated à sa vérité nue, mais aussi à la vérité comme nudité

pp. 415-16 for Freud, dreams of nakedness don’t exhibit penis or absence of penis but absence of phallus, absence of attribute supplementing a possible fault, absence of colossal double > following chain is indicated: truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame [Schreber]

p. 418 for Freud, dream recasts [Stoff] in Einkleidung (garment, disguising, falsifying), the emperor is the dreamer, the imposter is the dream

p. 418 hidden theme of Emperors… is the hidden theme, text as its theme, text as veil, movement of alētheia

p. 419 literature that puts truth on stage, can it be read by psychoanalysis? abyssal structure, this space overflowed by powers of simulacrum

p. 421 for Lacan, truth inhabits fiction [Derrida exposes limitation of this stance]

p. 426 when literary writing occupies illustrative position: text in service of truth, to read general law in example, the most classical practice > Lacan: truth makes fiction possible

p. 432 structure of fiction reduced when related to its condition of truth, poor formalism which guarantees semantic content, doesn’t account for 1) “scription-fiction” and “scription-fictor” 2) narrating narration & narrator > complicity btwn formalist withdrawal (repli) and hermeneutic semanticism (or psychoanalysis applied to literature) [neglect of the subject-author, which, in some situations, might constitute progress or a legitimate demand]

pp. 436-37, 39 “Seminar” insists on topos, single proper itinerary of letter, if meaning [in the general sense] is indifferent to letter, meaning of the letter is not, meaning of letter as truth itself

——not naive topology but still a topos, Heideggerian-like veiled/unveiled castration placed at the hole (trou) of the woman, letter comes back to Being, to the nothing that is the opening btwn woman’s legs (Queen)

p. 442 for Lacan, Femininity is the Truth (of) castration, best figure of castration, because in logic of signifier it (elle) has always already been castrated > Femininity “leaves” something in circulation (here the letter), detaches something she never had, brought back to itself

——this 1st castration (pre-castration) affects w/ castration/femininity whoever holds the letter

p. 444 dissemination threatens law of signifier & castration as contract of truth, dissemination entame unity of signifier, i.e. the phallus

pp. 456n, 458n Lacan on experiencing Freud’s “full speech” in its authenticity > Freud as the master of truth vs. Bonaparte and her (bad) 2nd hand writing (master vs. cook)

p. 457 dead king, Freud, only one to contract w/ himself, awaits restitution > restoration: carrying off last plume w/ his 1st hand [in dying, mobilizes many]: theory of the facteurs

pp. 463-64 the 2 truths lean on, support each other (sétaient): 1) adequation, circular return, garde et regarde, circuit of pact, control, guardianship (la garde) of the phallus as guardianship of the lack 2) veiling-unveiling as structure of lack, a proper place: les contours étant-la place du manque à être

p. 467 in Lacan, abyss effects are seriously controlled; fiction [only] manifests truth

pp. 467-68 Lacan’s highly classical interpretation of mimesis: Dichtung as detour toward truth, more truth in fiction, fiction manifests the truth [i.e. for Lacan, truth is not a fiction]

p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

***p. 468 Lacan’s insistence on opposition truth/reality as orthodox as can be [p. 468n full speech]

pp. 468-69 the 2 truths: adequation (original contract: acquitting of debt), unveiling (lack on basis of which contract contracts in order to reappropriate what’s been detached)

——w/out return, divisibility rebels against lack

p. 470 Lacan thinks beyond the truthful, beyond lying: adequation/unveiling in present speech don’t await exterior verification, they guarantee each other intrinsically: adequation of full speech to itself [see p. 471n]

pp. 474-75 full speech, contracts only w/ itself, system of truth > Lacan not proposing crude readjustment [i.e. American psychology] but rarity à la Heideggerian Eigentlichkeit

pp. 493n, 494 Dupin as the biggest dupe [not the master/analyst of truth, like Lacan believes], He-addresses-her-the-Queen-the-address-dupes-her (Il-ladresse-la-Reine-ladresse-la-dupe)

——Dupin, real dupe, duped by truth

WBH p. 203 “woman” as “truth,” as that which stops the drift, but what about truth as movement of the drift [?]

CHOR p. 89 [quoted from SP] that which will not be pinned down by truth, is, in truth, feminine, but this should not be mistaken for woman’s femininity, nor female sexuality, by dogmatic philosopher, impotent artist, or inexperienced seducer still hoping to capture

p. 96 “essentializing fetishes” (truth, femininity, essentiality of woman or feminine sexuality as fetishes)—but one must be precise about fetishism [i.e. general fetishism in Glas], and its context, if only to displace it

pp. 100-01 when sexual difference is determined by opposition, acc. Hegelian dialectics, destines sexual difference for truth—in order to erase/neutralize sexual difference [in masculine sex?]

TURN (trope)

GOD pp. 9-10 anabasis, or “conversion,” the turns in the history of secrecy, history of revolutions, history as revolution

R pp. 2 turning, dates, decades, return to Cerisy

pp. 6-8 turning around double question, every use of “time,” fois, vicis, vicem, vice, vice versa (“a vicious circle,” see SH) a turn, and torture (torqueo, tortum, torquere) on the wheel, returning and haunting, quartering

——turn as Prime Mover, causes and things around which Derrida’ll turn [in R]

p. 7 turning of the question, double question, question of question, like being locked in a circular machine that does not work or turn just right [Olivia]

p. 12 turn, turn around the self, makes a totality

p. 13 democracy as the turning, the wheel, the sovereignty that gives the force of law, circularity, sphericity > either identity btwn origin/conclusion or by turns, in turn, each in turn

——Derrida loves the image of the wheel (potter) [Heidegger’s Das Ding?]

pp. 14-15 how can we reconcile the turning unity, autos = ipse, the One, the homogeneity of democracy with its heterogeneity, dissymmetry, disseminating multiplicity

p. 24 freedom and equality are reconcilable, so to speak, only in a turning or alternating fashion, only in alternation, must assure a turning to come and a returning to origin: govern and governed, in turn

***p. 75 plus dun, divisibility of God, announces democracy

p. 109 annulment of time announced in date, revolution, volt of the ring (anneau), il faut le temps, default, failure, collapse [autos needing other, event, time, heteronomy]

SPOM pp. 178-83 in German Ideology, Marx’s 10 ghosts (revenants, Gespenst), ils se suppléent pour passer tour à tour lun dans lautre, chacun figurant un tour de lautre: 1) God 2) Das Wesen 3) vanity of world 4) die guten und bösen Wesen 5) das Wesen und sein Reich 6) beings 7) Man-God, Christ 8) man 9) spirit of the people (Volksgeist) 10) everything (“Alles in ein Spuk zu verwandeln), thus, we must stop counting

pp. 186-87 the secret (Geheimnis) of the fetishism of the commodity, the “germ” of the money-form, une table tournante, example of an apparition

p. 189 commodity turns, it changes place, il y a là un pas, its allure belongs to specter/mutant

HASD p. 48 by never turning away from God, turn toward others w/out changing direction

p. 56 Heidegger avoids using but not mentioning “Being” [in Zur Seinsfrage]; Heidegger’s kreuzweise Durchstreichung of Being not an erasure w/ avoidance as essential function—a different designation, Being reduced to its turns, turnings, historical tropes (Zuwendungen)

MPM p. 24 fatality (of tropological dislocation) is the law, non-totalization [impossibility of coming into being], the law of the law, that the law takes turns w/, as if it were, its own supplement

p. 25 de Man: we always re-enter a system of tropes

p. 68 “all the pious recitations or bits of revolutionary bravura which only revolve in place.”

p. 78 Derrida: each one (allegory, metaphor, trope, figure) in turn can be privileged, self reflexivity w/out end

pp. 152-53n when de Man equates absolute irony w/ consciousness of madness, end of consciousness, he protects irony from its German-Romantic determination [as mastery]

——via de Man’s “irony is unrelieved vertige,” never stop turning, madness because it has no reason to stop, because reason is tropic

A p. 55 for Heidegger, all interest, belief in immortality, man’s irreducible torsion of retrospective anticipation (survival structure) in every instant (introduces untimely moment and posthumous in most alive of present living thing), stems from man’s mortality—is secondary [to being-toward-death] > only a “being-to-death” can think, desire, project, live immortality as such

VM p. 81 difference btwn philosophy as power/adventure of question itself & philosophy as determined event/turning point (tournant) w/in this adventure [difference btwn Nietzsche & Heidegger?]

PP p. 84 one must turn away from the blinding sun toward logos

p. 119 (136) Socratic irony doesn’t bring pharmakon in contact with transparent logos, but reverses its powers, retourne la surface, reveals impropriety of pharmakon, that it can always turn against itself

PAS PAS p. (78) Blanchot: I turned around myself, given up to wander (errer)

POOF p. 28 the all too of Human All Too Human, a rolling wave, a trembling, enveloped violence of a welling up wave falling back on itself, “when the excess of the beyond itself folds back into immanence,” turning around, coming to perhaps

p. 250 temporal torsion [O my friend, no friend, contretemps], dissymmetry envelops theoretical knowledge in performativity of prayer it could never exhaust, we return to question of the response

SH pp. 3-4 circumcision only once, at the same time “first & last,” ring, seal of alliance, anniversary of archeology/eschatology > ring traces, carves the “unwiederholbar (unrepeatable)”

——“one time” in English, but “one turn,” “una vez,” “una volta,” in vicissitudes of latinity

p. 38 ideality carries forgetting in its memory, the memory of forgetting itself, the truth of forgetting > reference to singular event annulled in ring’s annulation, the date’s turning-about, una volta, volte-face, revolt, revolution

p. 40 Sichelschrift > cuts in coming around > another turning (not rounding), another trope, inscribes letters in cutting all around > circumcises words in silence?

p. 68 circumcision of word is not dated in history, has no age, but calls forth date, opens word to other, of all that calls itself (the name, blessing of name, yes & no) > it sets turning the ring

F p. xxxv self: cemetery guard (crypt is enclosed w/in self as excluded), self makes rounds (round & round) of crypt like he’s the proprietor, but he’s not, uses knowledge to keep visitors away

WM pp. 219-20 plus de métaphore: layer of primary philosophemes can’t dominate (itself), gets “carried away (semporte)” when one of its products (concept of metaphor) attempts to include under its own law the totality to which it belongs > there would always be an extra metaphor, the metaphor w/out which metaphor could not be constructed, a metaphor of metaphor, a metaphor less (en moins), le tour de plus devenant le tour de moins: tropic supplementarity

p. 224 trope and arkhē have their own metaphorical charge, resist every meta-metaphorics, values of concept, foundation, theory > fundamental desire for firm/ultimate ground (to build artifice)

pp. 228-29 oppositions (physis/tekhnē, physis/nomos, sensible/intelligible, space/time, etc.) are made possible by “tropic” movements which do not make up a “proper” language; these metaphors, tropologies, obey the law of supplementarity (btwn concept and field)

p. 235n Condillac (whose philosophy, more than, or like, every other, can be considered a treatise on analogy): all tropes are metaphors, transport from one meaning to another

p. 241 metaphor marks moment du tour ou détour, the wandering of the semantic, the carrying it elsewhere; for Aristotle, that would be w/in nonmeaning before language (which has meaning) and truth of language

p. 243 for Aristotle, proper name is nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor, father of all figures > everything turns around it, towards it > metaphor as substitution of proper names w/ fixed meaning & referent

***p. 250 sun turns in metaphor, philosophical metaphor turns toward the sun, flower of rhetoric, un tournesol, heliotrope

pp. 250-51 sun is the paradigm of sensory and of metaphor: it turns and hides; first because aisthēton, sensory, can always not present itself [sun set], and second because it is exactly w/ metaphor that sensory absents itself: thus all metaphor attempts to describe turning of the sun

——metaphor means heliotrope: turned toward the sun, turning movement of the sun

——if best metaphor is never absolutely good, wouldn’t bad metaphor be the best example?

DS p. 246 fold, crisscrossed groove (sillon croisé), turns whole into “too much,” “too little”

pp. 251-52 tropic twist of fan (éventail) (wings, plumes) inscribes very movement of structure of fan-as-text (surplus-mark, margin of meaning), spacing, fold, hymen btwn all meaning-effects > this supplementary valence/mark neither metaphor nor metonymy, no transcendental privilege

p. 258 tropological structure circulates infinitely, always w/ supplement of an extra turn: plus dmétaphor, plus de métonymie > if everything’s metaphorical, no more metaphor, if everything becomes metonymical, part always greater than whole, how could one arrest metonymy?

ATIA p. 155 trembling, dizzy, uncanny, vertigo, “Schwindel ist unheimlich,” in Heidegger’s description of animal and world

O p. 41 structure of feint > always an extra turn (un tour de plus)

p. 53 sense of fulfillment by way of copula (is) means nature is incomplete, needs a book to complete itself: closure of library articulates itself and turns on this hinge (gond): logic, rather graphics, of supplement

WAP p. 18 name “philosophy” submitted to a torsion that folds it back toward excessive, unbounded (débordant), inexhaustible place (lieu)

SW pp. 322-23 I am so fatigued from knowing truth, that history of the veil—that truth: too old for me, too old like me (however young I remain) > you don’t know the “fatigue” I’m talking about (dreaming of writing in Spanish, forgotten ancestral language)

——infinite weariness of tropes, what do you expect, I want to end it all (protest, attestation, testament, manifesto against the shroud) > no longer write around/in/under folds of truth

TB pp. 132-33 rhythm, twists & turns from abyss to abyss, deconstructs the tower > madness on both sides (interior/exterior limit) > impossible task: the infinite guilt absolves you immediately

DPi p. 243 vertigos, head spinning, head falling (one blow of guillotine), turn around neck of decollation [cf. GLAS, O], everything turns around what turns (not merely rhetorical turns), turns of phrase given to expression “condemned to death” or “condemned to die”: revolution, conversion, faith and DP, DP and belief > highs & lows we climb up/down to point of vertigo

REST p. 273 temptation to stand shoes upright again, to return them to authentic subject: la structure de la chose et du procès oblige, alors, toujours, à en rajouter (to keep adding to it) > to put back becomes a supplementary retortion, delirious dramaturgy > these shoes are hallucinogenic

p. 376 bet on pair to limit absolute wager [cf. pp. 301-02 Derrida doesn’t limit absolute wager?], which limits & tightens itself (se resserre) to point of self-strangulation, tying itself so as not to absolve itself > the cunning twist (le retors) of le pari absolu: must never exclude disparate or absolute unneveness (limpair)

RM pp. 64-5 metaphysics as series of guises, turns, modes, figures—vast structural process of epochē of Being withholding itself, holding itself in withdrawal > metaphysics as tropics, a singular metaphoric detour

PF p. xxvi aren’t all tropes alibis? aren’t alibis allegories? words from elsewhere, in place of others

PPT p. 13 [re: uses of passe-partout] there could always be one use that could be taken out of the series and surround the rest, play among the others, one more turn

LI p. 62 vices [turns] that interest me: time & place of the other time, the other time in (stead of) the first time, at once

ATM p. 173 Levinas has not only withdrawn dissymmetrical responsibility from circle (of pact, debt, synchronic reciprocity, recognition) but also from annular alliance, from the rounds (tour), whatever makes the rounds of a finger, of a sex or sexual organ [?]

AD p. 102 à of à-Dieu is turned (tourné): by Infinity toward infinity

LG p. 252 lépreuve of a récit brought to light the madness of genre—spinning (faire tourner) Peterson’s genre-disc, comme un soleil fou > dividing borders btwn literature and its others

BSi pp. 201-02 the World Trade Center as image of Valéry’s double capitalized phallic erection (jealous of themselves) > double turn makes one think of double tower (tour)

p. 218 Celan: poetry a turning of breath (Atemwende)

p. 232 turn as turning of breath—inspiration itself

p. 272 tout autre can’t resemble or be introjected, assimilated into mine: chance of encounter, event, takes one’s breath sway—turns it

OG pp. 23-4 (38) differance can only be thought by passing through the ontico-ontological difference, a determination that gets erased by differance: this trick of writing (tour décriture) is irreducible [historial question]

pp. 216-17 (310-11) Rousseau would like absolute origin of language to be absolute south > instead, he describes (against his wishes) a turning of language, language is sown (semées), a structure, a system of oppositions

——axis of reference [North or South] traces inside of each language

p. 226 (321-22) for Rousseau, writing in North, cold, reasoning, turned toward death, tour de force, detour of force qui sefforce à garder la vie > history effaces vowel accent, extends power of writing

CIR p. 76 secret I’m jealously seeking as last word of my jealousy, continually turning around it w/out knowing secret of my suffering

p. 89 “I shall wonder what, from my birth or thereabouts, to turn around has meant”

EU p. 124 my obstinacy is great, compulsive, forced me to take les voies les plus détournées

TYMPANUM

T p. xii “can one puncture the tympanum” of philosophy—its percussion (which amortizes impressions, typoi resonate)—a place of exteriority, alterity where one can still treat of philosophy?

——makes types (typoi) resonate by striking the typtein

——is there any ruse not belonging to reason which will prevent philosophy from borrowing its categories from logos of other, affecting itself w/out delay [see POOF p. 1]?

——philosophize w/ hammer, batter their ears, Dionysiansism, sound of tympani

p. xv [Derrida’s oblique ear—not perpendicular—to hear the margins] tympanum squints (louche) [so does the slave who loves secrets in On the Geneal…]

p. xvii if tympanum is a limit, unhinge concept of limit > no limit in general, every limus, the limes, short cut, the oblique

p. xviii(n) un autre tympan > tympanum, Dionysianism, labyrinth, the spiral walkways of a shell stretched out to sea, ramps don’t hold [play w/ limaçon and conque]

p. xix logic of event, structures of expropriation: timbre (tympanum), style and signature > same obliterating division of the proper, make every event possible, necessary, unfindable

p. xxv how to put one’s hands on tympanum so it can escape from hands of philosopher, so he can no longer recognize his phallogocentrism [play w/ mains, maintenant, maintain], no longer rediscover himself, no longer able to say: I will have anticipated it w/ absolute knowledge

pp. xv-xvi how to interpret (interpretation as neither a theory nor discursive practice of philosophy) the discourse that organizes economy of its [philosophy’s] representation, its weave, so nothing surprises: reasons from w/in vault (cave) of its autism

——interpretation as luxating philosophical ear, set loxōs in logos to work, une tout autre forme dembuscade, lokhos, block correspondence muffling other hammer [speaks to him w/ third ear]

p. xxi(n) this ecorchè (destroy the tympanum) (Dissemination too was to “skin the ear”), brain dissection, burnt head > pursues deconstruction of triangulocircular structure (Oedipus, Trinity, Speculative Dialectics)

——from Vitruvius’ wedge to Hegelian spiral [Vitruvius tympanum to Lafayes tympanum]

pp. leiris xxvi-xxvii [Leiris’ phonograph (purely sonorous idiom that cannot be expressed w/ words) “mirrors” literature on printing press tympanum]

p. xxvii khōra—as tympanum, watches over its margins as virgin, homogenous, negative space, leaving its outside outside, w/out mark, w/out opposition > ready to receive and repercuss type

pp. xxvii-xxviii the 4 bands of the tympanum, what can’t be read in its “luminous triangle” or oculus

p. xxviii tympanum punctures itself (se crève), grafts itself > resists concepts of machine or nature, de coupure ou de corps, resists metaphysics of castration

REST p. 255 [epigraph] “POINTURE (Latin punctura), synonym for prick, blade that fixes page to be printed on tympan, hole which it makes in the paper

EU EU p. 123 philosophy finds itself inscribed w/in space it can’t order, opens to an other not even its other > in a tympanum as little Hegelian as possible

UNCANNY

GOD p. 92 Unheimlichkeit of Geheimnis, both Freud & Heidegger [see SPOM pp. 218-19]: beyond an axiomatic of the self or the chez soi as ego cogito

FK p. 78 quasi-spontaneous automaticity: confused identity, auto-immunity, auto-indemnify > detaches & reattaches (to family, proper) at same time, mystical or secret mechanicity: unheimlich

H p. anne 136 deconstruction leads to uncanny at heart of the most familiar, where “all we had seen was fire”

S p.116n deinon as furchtbar and unheimlich

p. 50 doesn’t the having-of-world for man include an unheimliche privation of world (like the animal)

AF p. 46 uncontrollable undecidability in axiomatics of both Freud & Heidegger when they use the word unheimlich

SPOM p. 166 “I am” = “I am haunted,” Ego = ghost; Es Spukt (translation misses impersonal, quasi-anonymity of German), “it spooks,” “it ghosts,” it specters,” ego inhabited by its specter

——“es spukt” in Freud’s “Das Unheimliche,” production of figure the revenant (der Spuk)

p. 181 man, most unheimlich of all ghosts, if Christ (absolute specter) causes fear and pain, man causes even more—man makes himself fear (se fait peur), becomes fear he inspires > thus contradictions of all humanism

——unheimlich: word of irreducible haunting or obsession

p. 212 figure of absolute hospitality: strange, familiar, inhospitable > quasi-transcendental “messianism,” materialism w/out substance, materialism of the khōra for a despairing “messianism,” a curious taste of death, a foretaste (avant-goût), curious of what it conjures

pp. 217-18 if “es spukt” is strongest example of Unheimlichkeit, as Freud admits, can it be reduced to an example, is it not the Thing, cause of history or epistemē, exemplary force?

——Freud’s conjuring mechanism: even though “es spukt” strongest example of Unheimlichkeit, one can’t begin there because on se fait trop peur, heimliche-unheimliche becomes undecidable

A p. 67 Dasein takes shelter from standing before oneself [in anxiety of death] in gossip (Gerede), far from Unheimlichkeit, structural not accidental modes of Verfallen

POOF pp. 57-8 Heidegger’s Stimmung changes everything, beyond the concept, suspends/terrifies oppositions, where truth & untruth are together equiprimordially (gleichursprunglich) > Unheimlichkeit, lodges enemy in heart of every friend

p. 58 unheimlich enters into the most familiar, lodges enemy into heart of friend, a form of welcome that recalls the haunt as much as the home (lhabitat), hearth, oikeiótēs

pp. 177-78 if Aristotle says a friend is ‘one soul in two bodies,’ the friend has no home, no proper body, a visitor, traveller, guest, unheimlich (translated into Greek as atópos, mad?) > what would this say of the principle of convenance, which elsewhere defines political—in its bond to friendship [?]

DS p. 220n Derrida always returning to Freud’s Das Unheimliche (1919)—double, repetition, blurring of borders btwn “imagination” & “reality,” “symbol” & “thing it symbolizes”

p. 268n (to be continued) in The Uncanny, Freud is most attentive to undecidable ambivalence, play of double, though he separates fictional uncanny from the feeling itself

OTO p. 33 the ear is uncanny, can become double, large or small; Freud says the infant can’t close it

pp. 35-6 the umbilicus has you by the ear, the ear is “taking notes,” the master a mouth (ear, mouth: both invaginated, involuted orifices) > the umbilical cord of State (dead father, cold monster) education, like a leash, commands us to write—that’s uncanny

ATIA p. 155 trembling, dizzy, uncanny, vertigo, “Schwindel ist unheimlich,” in Heidegger’s description of animal and world

DPi pp. 153-54 unheimlich concept of belief: the believer (Glaübiger) who affects to believe is divided in belief, fiction of this simulacrum belongs to belief: skepsis, ēpokhē as believing itself > all economy traffics in act of faith: believing w/out believing, belief haunted by non-belief > quasi-hypnotic, quasi-hallucinatory, spectral, unconscious

——believing (like cruelty) has no contrary, thus is its own contrary

REST p. 373 once there is ghost (fantôme) or double as revenant, logic of identification is not easily appeased > ghost of Van Gogh: genitive translates the malaise, Unheimlichkeit, all by itself

pp. 378-39 certain thinking/experience of nothingness (nonexistent) is required to question being of existent, and the difference of being and existent

——for Heidegger, cette pensée du néant alien to science, which deals only w/ existents: belongs to philosophy/poetry > nonexistent, there w/out being there as being present, a kind of haunting: Unhemlichekeit is condition of question of being, pivot (cheville) of the essence (see OS)

RM pp. 69-70 when Heidegger says “House of Being,” it’s less so the house can determine Being, more so we can rethink the house

——this is an unheimlich maneuver, not pure inversion, outside the familial transport of colloquial metaphor (rethinks economic value & the proper, not a judicative statement: “S is P”)

EL p. 217 secularization as a sacrifice of language, destruction of sacred language as experience of sacred language (perhaps most unheimlich experience), but also sacrifice of sacrifice: self-destruction of sacrificial function/operation (which presupposes sacredness)

HST p. 408 unheimliche: absence as presence

BSi p. 205 Valéry [in Monsieur Teste] tries to neutralize/master Unheimlichkeit [see BSi pp. 200-01 in

CAP(ITAL)

]

pp. 260-61 via Celan, art as unheimlich, containing the inhuman: Medusa, monkey, automata, marionette

pp. 261-62 unheimlich: 1) worrying aspect of foreignness as intimacy of one’s own home 2) says the essential bearing of Celan’s “Meridian” 3) associated w/ the foreigner 4) Geheimnis (the intimate, the folded back on itself, what has withdrawn in withdrawal, hidden inside of house and home), secret of encounter at most intimate heart of present

p. 263 Unheimlichkeit just as important for Heidegger as for Freud (but scarcely pointed out)

p. 265 Heidegger translates Antigone’s deinon (usually translated as violent, terrible) as un-heimlich

acc. Heidegger, man is the most unheimlich—steps out of usual frontiers (Grenzen) of habit > man’s Grundzug (fundamental feature): being foreign to everything familiar

p. 266 Heidegger doesn’t say “there’s nothing proper to man,” but that the property of what is appropriated is strange, unfamiliar to interior of home

p. 266 man sovereignly excels in being unheimlich

SPEC p. 270 Beyond and Das Unheimliche: devil comes back neither as imaginary representation, nor as an apparition in person: devil comes back “in person” to double his double…a doubling doubling his double, devil overflows his double at moment he’s nothing but his double

——dialectics acquits itself [allays uneasiness] of double, opposes mask to original “in person”

——visitation of devil, apparition of “thing in itself,” over & above representative that’s supposed to supplement him, supplement of its “own supplement”: expands double-effects, upsets appeasing order of representation, duplicity w/out original > for Rousseau, diabolical brings fright to a climax

p. 343 “literary fiction” in fort:da, fait-oeuvre in abyss of these repetitions, fairies, demons, unheimlich repetitions, what is most gripping (saisissant) and ungraspable (insaisissable) about Beyond…, for Freud too, who believed he could affix the seal of the Freuds to it [Beyond…] while hearing voices

FV pp. 426-27 even Freud [thus not Lacan] indicates, in Das Unheimliche, literary fiction’s resistance to general law of psychoanalytic knowledge

pp. 459-61 Lacan forecloses the double w/out mercy, contains it in the imaginary > imaginary/symbolic duality controls Unheimlichkeit, the anguishing disarray (laffolement angoissant) (w/out hope of closure, reappropriation, or truth) provoked by references (renvois) from simulacrum to simulacrum, double to double

——analysand seeing his/her double: “uncontrollable anxiety” disrupts every verification of identity, obstacle for transference

pp. 490-92 [re: narrator identifying w/ Dupin in Purloined…] if dual relation btwn 2 doubles overflows & simulates symbolic: opposition imaginary/symbolic has little pertinence

——position of each character identifies itself w/ the other & divides itself: even the position du mort (dummy) and of a supplementary 4th [beyond triangle] [all characters occupy all positions]

——double, Unheimlichkeit, doesn’t belong to triad, triangle carried into a labyrinth of doubles, w/out original, fac-similes

UNCONDITIONAL

GT pp. 122-23 condition common to gift & event: unconditionality > chance, tukhē, in an instant, disorder, surprise, irruptive, unmotivated, freedom of dice throw, coup de don, obey nothing but disorder, principles w/out principles, not necessary, gratuitous, déchirer la trame

R pp. 48-9 democracy’s antinomy: equality introduces measure and calculation, freedom is unconditional, heterogeneous to calculation and measure > incalculable, incommensurable, unconditional equality [?]

p. 84 more impossible & yet necessary: separate autonomy & democracy, sovereignty & unconditionality, law & justice [Derrida reminds audience of UWC]

H p. 73 hospitality remains, like law, conditional, and thus conditioned on the unconditionality that is the basis of the law

p. 77 unconditional welcome of every other would include animals

***p. 81 categorical imperative (under erasure) of hospitality, unconditional; p. 83 unconditional w/out imperative, w/out duty, beyond economy and debt

p. 85 law (is always) laid down, laid down against some nature, an instituted thesis > laws that command, impassive, oversees behind glass, tomb of glass

HASD p. 16 there can only be denial of that which is undeniable

FWT p. 92 indispensable dissociation btwn unconditionality (justice w/out power) & sovereignty (right, power, or potency)—that’s deconstruction: on the side of unconditionality, even when it seems impossible > but, sometimes (anti-)sovereigntist, examine each situation

pp. 123-24 [the bridge] unconditionality comes, il faut imposes itself on us, unconditionally, announces future, then I try to think thought, the experience of the condition, the exposure to a limit (however unstable) btwn conditional and unconditional

ATIA p. 20 the 2 falls of man, Prometheus/Adam, narrate (infinite) superiority over the animal: man’s property is unconditional & sacrificial

WAP p. 185 affirmation, if there is any, non-negotiable, uncompromising, unconditional

PSSS p. 278 unconditional coming of other, its death or death itself, as irruption that routs performative/constative, perhaps beyond any cruelty

LI p. 152 unconditionality (Derrida intentionally recalling Kant’s CI) is independent of every determinate context, announces itself only in the opening of context

——unconditionality intervenes at very inception of determination

——unconditionality must be articulated w/ the determinate (Kant would say hypothetical) > rhetoric, strategy, ethics, politics

pp. 152-53 though nothing exists outside context, limit of frame/border of context always entails nonclosure: outside penetrates, thus determines, inside

——unconditionality independent of every determinate context, even determination of context as such > announces itself only in opening of context

——unconditionality defines injunction that prescribes deconstruction: let another language, other thoughts, make their way

——Derrida hesitates to characterize all this in Kantian terms (though unconditionality intentionally recalls Kant’s CI) because those philosophemes call for deconstructive questions: he experiences a new responsibility, which he respects enough never to compromise

CF pp. 22-3 improve law of hospitality, do so btwn unconditional and conditional: pure unconditional law in danger of piety, irresponsibility, no potency, no form > the unconditional can be perverted at any moment

——for Kant, perpetual peace depends on State sovereignty and the always public nature of the juridical [thus Derrida’s unconditionality w/out sovereignty]

p. 44 irreconcilable heterogeneity and indissociability of unconditional & order of conditions

pp. 59-60 Derrida’s mad, not so mad, dream of forgiveness w/out power: unconditional but w/out sovereignty

BSi pp. 300-02 liberty & sovereignty (its limitless “I can”) are indissociable, double bind in 2 senses: 1) double injunction 2) duplicity in very concept of binding, obligation, bind, bond: stricture rather than structure, stricture that limits liberty along w/ sovereignty or sovereignty along w/ liberty

——double bind [#1 above]: deconstruct ontotheology of sovereignty w/out questioning liberty in name of which we put this deconstruction to work: think liberty differently, w/in distribution of a divisible sovereignty > think unconditional w/out indivisible sovereignty

***UWC p. 235 necessary to dissociate unconditional independence (of thought, deconstruction, Humanities, justice) from any phantasm of indivisible sovereignty (mastery)

p. 236 sovereign mastery of interior > [indivisible] border of inside/outside vs. divisible limit, because divisible, it has a history > the divisible limit is the limit of the impossible, the perhaps

p. 237 [the event, the unconditional] matter of the sense of sense [meaning of meaning?] > up to you now, up to others—signatories are also addressees

UNCONSCIOUS

R p. 54 [re: democratic count] how many voices, how many votes for the unconscious?

p. 55 the unconscious remains the most vital reserve of the self-destructive conservation of the “subject” or of egological ipseity; without autoimmunity, no sadism, masochism, consciousness, death drive

pp. 109-10 autoimmunity takes account of what psychoanalysis once called the unconscious

LOBL p. 132 the must not or need not know yourself, the interdiction of each event, interposes an unconscious between the event and the experience of it, between living-on and presence

HERP p. 217n can we read an “unconscious” affinity btwn impending arrival of friend and imminence of death? [Heidegger would protest—isn’t analytic of Dasein regulated by norms of absolute intentional meaning?]

VP pp. 53-4(n) Husserl and Freud both view unconscious as “after-the-fact,” Freud’s Nachträglichkeit (après-coup), though Husserl utterly rejects its possibility

FSW p. 211 for Freud, wrong to think simple translation can occur from unconscious to conscious, presupposes immobile master text > unconscious consists of archives always already transcriptions

pp. 211-12 Freud’s supplementarity: unconscious not a code book

F p. xiii question of crypt (singular not general) precedes philosophical questions re: Thing, Thinking > false, “artificial” unconscious (new metaphorical terrain): graft in heart of the organ

pp. xxx-xxxi crypt (foreigner in self) & the ghost effect (heterocryptic ghost returning from Unconscious of the other) > radical otherness in self (not unconscious) > law of another generation

FWT p. 179 “subject” instituted only out of “fear” of unconscious, interrupts energy; one ethical/political “system,” one “idea” of Good/Right > constructions produced to resist a threat

POOF pp. 68-9 a passive decision, responsibility outside of knowledge, outside of subjective decisionism, occurs from the heartbeat of the other (blood arriving), which makes an exception for/of me > opens autonomy on to itself, matches decision to the gift, figure of the heartbeat: [passive decision doesn’t contradict sovereign decision, sovereign becomes guest, other?]

——in sum, a decision is unconscious

p. 72 friendship–enemy btwn logic of unconscious & logic of lie: these 2 logics can’t help but haunt each other, et de partager même le concept de cette hantise qui travaille le langage de notres temps

DS p. 221 hymen is like Freud’s unconscious (tolerates or remains insensitive to contradiction)

POS p. 101n “undecidable” not Hegelian contradiction, but, in rigorously Freudian sense, the unconscious of philosophical contradiction, which ignores contradiction, to extent that it belongs to speech, consciousness, discourse, presence, truth

DIF DIF pp. 20-1 via differance, unconscious not a virtual, hidden, potential self-presence but differs, and defers, itself

SW p. 331 unconscious never disarms—more powerful than “technical all-powerfulness”: resists translation

DPi p. 165 Baudelaire & Nietzsche (less narrowly) confine interest to zoo-psychobiology (conscious or unconscious motivations of the individual) > “we must” think interest in relation to that of the (global) state’s interest in maintaining/suspending DP

pp. 166-67 impossible to know if what we blithely call unconscious can calculate incalculable

REST p. 361 putting shoes on acc. to its own size (sa pointure)? unconscious of Shapiro/Heidegger puts something of his own (sien) in them? > no, à la pointure du fantôme (the ghost’s size), of the unconscious of the other, in the final account (tout compte fait)

DST DST p. 199 ne pas ne pas: redoubles movement of negation through syntactical formation

——not do something that consists in not doing: ineluctable, unavoidable

——neither work of dialectic or unconscious denegation [neither Freud nor Hegel]

LI p. 59 [from SEC] structural unconsciousness, absence of intending actual utterance, prohibits any saturation of context (total presence)

pp. 73-5 unconscious as giant/great Parasite > not as lateral, virtual potential of consciousness

p. 76 economics that accounts for iterability, which questions traditional philosophy of oikos, of proprecan’t be separate from economy of Unconscious, of graphematics of undecidables

AD pp. 23, 135-36n that decision & responsibility are always of the other, the making unconscious of the Schmittian sovereign decision (cf. POOF 68-9), not how Levinas would put it

BSi p. 183 force-differential (unconscious mechanisms) btwn which tension/contradiction bound to localize > bêtise on both sides: side of sovereign (who), side of beast, the stupid, the other (what)

OG p. 68 (99) passivity of speech can’t be distinguished from relation btwn unconsciousness of language and spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval) that constitutes origin of signification in general

p. 69 (100) spacing as writing is the becoming-absent, becoming-unconscious of the subject

CIR p. 233 G. and I are whispering, confess w/out anyone knowing, like a gift confession from the unconscious (know of no other definition of unconscious)

SPEC pp. 264-65 Nietzsche dared to link debt to the unconscious, a debt to that which one feels in advance acquitted, the debt of another that comes back to torment you

p. 347n for Freud, unconscious is “zeitlos” (w/out time)

WBH p. 198 if gift has assignable destination, is an exchange, it’s not a gift, if there is from man to woman (or woman to man) an assignable destination (re: object, discourse, jouissance, desire, subject), no longer a gift > gift must be absolutely unconscious & random to be given a chance

UNDECIDABLE

GOD p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

GT p. 54 “give time (day, life)” is to give nothing: one sees blurred lines btwn transcendental & conditioned, the fold of undecidability that permits all values to be inverted: to give life is to give death (i.e. strange crossing of idioms: “se donner le mort” means “to take one’s life [in English]”)

MONL p. 62 political decision in writing & reading: inscribe undecidable (chance, terror) in ipseity of host, avoid temptation to make prior-to-the-first-language a language of the master (new master)

R p. 25 undecidability, play, in the interpretation of the democratic

p. 36 because of undecidability linked to autoimmune logic, can never “prove” whether it’s more democratic to include/exclude immigrants, vote/not vote directly, both protect democracy through some exclusion, some renvoi

***p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature > this undecidability [“I continue to believe”] only radical possibility of letting/thinking what comes about by arriving of whoever arrives

OOG p. 53 Gödel discovered the rich possibility of “undecidable”

p. 53(n) [re: possible completeness of math, Derrida describes undecidable as incommensurable (“unique source of value vaster than the project of definiteness itself”), undecidable has negative value when taking its sense from decidability of geometrico-mathematical horizon]

——“undecidability has a revolutionary and disconcerting sense, it is itself only if it remains essentially and intrinsically haunted in its sense of origin by the telos of decidability—whose disruption it marks” [undecidable: sense retains a sedimentary reference to antecedent sense, (see p. 51)]

FL pp. 252-53 undecidable is not just oscillation between determinate rules that are equally imperative (equity and singularity) but the gauntlet every impossible decision delivers itself through

——memory of undecidability must keep a living trace that forever marks a decision as such [is that possible? does that mark its death?]

——the undecidable remains caught, lodged, as a ghost, an essential ghost, in every decision, every event. The ghostliness deconstructs from within all assurance of presence

p. 291 [re: Benjamin’s 2 violences] undecidable on each side: 1) divine: decision w/out decidable certainty 2) mythic: certainty of the undecidable w/out decision

LOBL p. 75 “in other words on living”: this “in other words” amasses powers of indecision & adds to utterance its capacity for skidding [see PAS]

p. 114 power of undecidability—another false name, rather than a pesudonym for difference, arrhythmic pulsation of the “word”

——arrêt de mort: decision on what can’t be decided—it also arrests death by suspending it: gives

“living on”

p. 115 like death, arrêt remains undecidable, one arrêt marks delay, the other haste [2 syntaxes]

——suspensive arrêt already [déjà] undecided because it suspends, decisive arrêt undecided because what it decides, death, la Chose, the neuter, is undecidability itself

AF p. 46 uncontrollable undecidability in axiomatics of both Freud & Heidegger when they use the word unheimlich

SPOM p. 25 is a day infinitely foreign to vengeance [w/out it], heterogeneous at its source, to come or more ancient than memory itself? impossible to decide, today: “the time is out of joint”

pp. 187-88 the commodity is blurred (embrouillé), tangled (embarrassant), aporetic, paralyzing, perhaps undecidable (ein sebr vertracktes Ding)

POOF p. 29 perhaps as arrivant, arrivant of perhaps: at last the thought of perhaps (will come) > prevails over impossible, possibilization of possible impossible: undecidable and therefore decisive

***MPM p. 135 undecidable is the condition of deconstruction (on and in [sur, dans?] this condition); in the sense of condition of possibility and, at the same time, condition as situation or destiny

——this limit, this finitude, makes one write; deconstruction makes a path of writing through the aporia (impossible); deconstruction thinks only on the level of the impossible

p. 137 there is no beyond-the-undecidable, remains to be thought, incalculable order of tout autre, there is no inside-the-undecidable, but an other (singular) memory calls us w/out leading us back to any anteriority > there never existed an older, more original “third term”

A p. 23 mobile slash btwn and/or, and/and, or/and, or/or: a singular border, simultaneously disjunctive, conjunctive, undecidable

pp. 54-7 the 3 reasons Heidegger’s authoritative decision on what must remain undecided seems so decisive: 1) superordinating of existential analytic 2) the originary, underivable character of death, of finitude, forces us to decide 3) prevalence of phenomenological tradition, pre-ferring, pre-férance [with an “a”], pre-archic originarity of proper, eigentlich

p. 56 decision to decide from “here” not simply methodological decision: decides that a method is pre-ferable to no-method, this absolute decision turns into non-decision since, as unconditional decision re: place/taking-place of decision, it relies on prevalence of what can’t be decided (i.e. death), leaving questions undecided, that would make one hesitate btwn decision/non-decision

——that which would make decision object of thematic knowledge must remain undecidable for there to be a decision

PP p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

p. 137-38 (158) in Republic, we need a pharmakon (antidote) for poets, pharmakon is in combat zone btwn philosophy and itself, undecidable

PAS PAS p. (65) [récit] btwn 2 affirmations, legendary suspense, in which the undecided lets itself be lured (se laisse attirer)

p. (65) Derrida questions himself about whether he hides a new economy, new mastery behind the undecidable > [responds] nothing that doesn’t expose itself & remove itself

p. (90) ne-pas, not negation brought to bear on a position or a negation, but on “singular undecidability of the approach of the other”—unable to go nearer or father: suffice to disable every dialectical schema

SH p. 48 philosophy finds itself in vicinity of poetic, of literature, the blurred border (no place, utopia) btwn empirical (contingency of the outer) and necessary (necessity of inner) > indecision of this limit most provokes thought [Derrida attacks the idea that philosophy loses itself there]

FWT p. 76 risk decision by enduring undecidable: 2 contradictory imperatives

p. 151 quaking of borders, their permeability, their undecidability [re: DP/suicide]

DS pp. 193-94 double mark, mark erases mark, undecidable stroke > this syntax escapes pertinence of truth, inscribes truth w/in its play [“Mallarmé exemplifies this”—suspect such a claim]

p. 211 dialectic is beginning and end of philosophy, Mallarmé marks it w/ his syntax at the point of its sterility [MOP] > a point that will be called, analogically, provisionally, undecidable

p. 219 perpetual allusion, which plays, performed in groundless entre—undecidable

——undecidable, acc. Gödel, a proposition that can’t be deduced from given system of axioms, but doesn’t contradict them either > tertium datur, w/out synthesis

pp. 220-21 [explanation on how syntax counts for “undecidability,” not lexical richness] hymen in text (crime, incest, suicide, simulacrum) inscribed at very tip (à la pointe) of indecision

p. 231 syntax of hymen’s fold makes it impossible to arrest its play of indecision [i.e. to stop it on “mental,” or “imaginary”]

p. 261 if hymen constitutes itself as textual trace, if it always leaves something behind, it’s because its undecidability cuts it off from depending on any signified

p. 268n (to be continued) in The Uncanny, Freud is most attentive to undecidable ambivalence, play of double, though he separates fictional uncanny from the feeling itself

POS p. 3 displacement forms a system, undecidable resource sets system in motion: necessity of “blank spaces”

p. 43 Derrida’s undecidables, unities of simulacrum, “false” verbal properties that can’t be included in philosophical binary, but still inhabit it, resisting, disorganizing, w/out ever constituting a 3rd term, a solution: hymen, gram, incision, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, margin

p. 101n “undecidable” not Hegelian contradiction, but, in rigorously Freudian sense, the unconscious of philosophical contradiction, which ignores contradiction, to extent that it belongs to speech, consciousness, discourse, presence, truth

ROP p. 30 double bind at work on examples of all undecidable figures (hymen, pharmakon…), carry predicates incompatible btwn themselves, in their very btwn, interlacing, sumplukē, chiasmatic invagination > but each one, in its sumplukē, makes up a single trace [?]

O p. 43 dissemination: doesn’t simply place plural in effervescence > il sagite de la contradiction sans fin, marked by undecidable syntax of plus

WAP p. 63 question has no critical status if its answer is undecidable (yes & no)

DPi p. 256 it is because my life is finite, “ended,” that I keep this relation to incalculability and undecidability as to the instant of my death

REST p. 291 thing hidden away, wrapped up underneath its investiture [abyss of ground]

——the hiding or veiling, figure of the veil, is drawn into undecidability by the hymen

DST DST p. 225 un autre indécidable, the gap/hiatus in an undecidable derived from dialectical calculation/contraction, arrhythmic caesura as respiration of rhythm (this necessity awaits us) [pas, heartbeat] [Derrida here wonders if double bind is too dialectical, thus the other undecidable]

PIO pp. 15-6 specularization paralyzes “Fable” (seems to freeze text)—undecidability of whether fabulous discourse makes it out of itself or is the very misfortune (malheurs) of the [possibility of the] mirror, infelicity of constative/performative (way they parasite each other)

TR p. 95 undecidability btwn excuse & accusation

PJP p. 168 “invention” hesitates undecidably btwn creative and revelatory invention > perhaps btwn fiction/truth, lying/veracity, perjury/fidelity

PSSS p. 241 Derrida evokes a beyond the death drive, beyond pleasure/reality principle, beyond drive for sovereign mastery, beyond cruelty—beyond the “mythology of drives” > the undecidable in psychoanalysis, the impossible other

D p. 365 invisible column—undecidable, unmasterable in its height, uncontrollable in extension > unique & innumerable like what is called (the) present

EL p. 218 responsibility on edge of double possibility, undecidability of das Geschlecht des Übergangs (generation of transition), entre-deux, “mi-lieu,” edge of abyss is same as above abyss [Derrida links to Heidegger’s anxiety, abyss, responsibility, Entschlossenheit (resoluteness)]

p. 222 question of decision & responsibility (that of our generation) returns (revient) to us out of (depuis) undecidable bottom, which is, au fond, undecidable

PPT p. 2 even if Derrida explained, narrated, what he wrote in The Truth In Painting, the indecision (the divided Prime Mover) he was trying to reduce would remain in the formalizing economy—each time overloaded (surchargée) w/ some supplement

LI p. 59 dehiscence, botanical, divided opening, makes plant grow > law of undecidable contamination (like iterability)

p. 75 wolves of undecidability (pharmakon, gift, supplement, hymen)

p. 76 economics that accounts for iterability, which questions traditional philosophy of oikos, of proprecan’t be separate from economy of Unconscious, of graphematics of undecidables

p. 116 undecidable calls for decision, for ethical-political responsibility beyond program, beyond calculable—even if it takes a second: experience and experiment of the undecidable > passage/trial of the undecidable

——pathos of undecidable cannot be symmetrically opposed to a pathos of “self-presence”

——no completeness possible for undecidablity: 1) resists binarity/triplicity 2) other defines limits of calculability 3) as third remains heterogenous to dialectic/calculable, opens field of decision, decidability

p. 148 undecidability (not “indeterminacy”) always a determinate oscillation btwn possibilities highly determined in strictly defined structures: difference of force in decision of writing (a word whose broad sense includes political action & experience in general) > no indecision or double bind w/out determination: occasionally, each side terribly necessary & irreplaceably singular

TN p. 72 Nancy thinks necessity of undecidables re: thought/weight > there will be identical/analogous necessity re: subject of touching

WOG p. 35 undecidability found a certain privilege in ‘Greek’ words, in philosophy, on [sur?] its borders, that is, beyond its confines [pharmakon, hymen, parergon]

——undecidability: condition and necessary passage for the decision

BSi p. 33 by its essence, every decision sovereign & exceptional, escapes order of the possible, the programmable, makes distinction btwn a deciding decision and an undecided one undecidable > supposed decision looks like indecision, nonintention, unconscious, irrational > sovereign looks like the beast

SPEC pp. 397-98 PP btwn 2 limits of the w/out pleasure: stricture & discharge, preparation & end, desire & final fulfillment: liminary place of passage (hymen indécis pris dans lanneau), le passage du pas: pleasure arrives only to erase itself

WBH pp. 194-95 to say woman is on side of undecidability has only meaning of strategical phase, the side of woman becomes the side from which you begin to dismantle structure > but, as soon as you reach first stage of deconstruction, opposition man/woman no longer pertinent

——“woman” no longer best trope to refer to these things, same goes for undecidability itself!

——there’re many undecidables, one undecidability acts as a program, programming or unprogramming a program

UNIVERSALITY

GOD p. 78 formula tout autre est tout autre disturbs while reinforcing Kierkegaard’s discourse, it means that Abraham’s God is found everywhere something is wholly other; and since each of us is infinitely other in absolute singularity [Abraham’s election is universalized?]

R p. 85 Kant’s as-if essential to regulative idea, imaginary approach tending towards universality; re: mondialisation, Kant’s word remains a regulative idea [Derrida on why he can’t take regulative idea seriously]

***p. 87 Democracy only system that permits Auto-immunity, thus only paradigm that is universalizable

p. 101 Schmitt is right, a pure sovereignty (decisionist exceptionality) is indivisible or not at all > incompatible w/ universality & internationality that always calls for it

MONL pp. 19-20 alone in a genre [particular] that becomes a universal example, exemplarity of host as hostage: “universal hostage”

p. 21 universal value of “I only have one language, it is not mine:” immanent structure of promise or desire, expectation w/out horizon

***p. 26 differance in relation to universal necessity (trauma, lesion)

p. 27 “universal destiny assigns us to a single language while prohibiting us from appropriating it”

p. 39 “sovereign establishment (mise en demeure souveraine) [sovereign summons]… disguised under alibis of ‘universal’ humanism”

p. 69 universal structure: messianic idiom

FK pp. 5-6n [in Anidjar’s introduction] Hegel on Islam, no nationalism like Judaism [?] (lacks particularity); Islam has a universalism, Judaism doesn’t > Christianity has both

pp. 85-86 holding-back, restraint (halte), inhibition, modesty: universal structure of religiosity

***p. 93 gap btwn opening of possibility [of a religion] (as a universal structure) irreducible to its determinate necessity

H p. 89 “language is also the experience of expropriation, of an irreducible exappropriation” makes us all wandering Jews, mother tongue is the tongue of the other [universalizes election], desert in all of us

FL p. 245 “I cannot speak the language of the other except to the extent that I appropriate

it and assimilate it according to the law (loi) of an implicit third…inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality or singularity of the idioms”

p. 248 justice addresses itself to the singularity of the other, despite or because it pretends toward universality [?]

p. 286 For Benjamin, universalization of law is its very possibility, but a sudden reference to God above reason and universality, references, according to Derrida, irreducible singularity of each situation

OOG p. 143 movement of primordial temporalization (protention, retention) was, as every dialectic wants, a dialectic in to nondialectical (the Living Present, universal form of all consciousness)

SPOM p. 210 messianic as universal structure, historical opening of future, experience itself and its language (Abrahamic messianism an exemplary prefiguration?)

***p. 211 “ascesis strips the messianic hope of all biblical forms…all determinable figures…denudes itself in view of responding to that which must be absolute hospitality, the ‘yes’ to the arrivant(e), the “come” to the future (lavenir) that cannot be anticipated”

——“we must practice recognizing (sexercer à reconnaître)” those too familiar ghosts

——open, waiting for event as justice, this hospitality is absolute only if it “keeps watch (veille)” over its own universality

POOF p. 3 familiarity (oikeiótēs, in Plato’s Lysis) (being-at-home, being-close-to oneself) links friendship w/ laws & logics of universalization, ethics, law, right, equality, equity, democracy

p. 44 via Nietzsche, universalization hides cunning of all dogmatisms: being-common or being-in-common, a dogmatic stratagem > la mise en commun ne fait jamais que raisonner pour arraisonner [frame, set]

p. 165 ‘all men are brothers’: a responsibility, that is always, of course, exemplary (claim to universalism) > reconciles double imperative: brother (face & mirror, original & copy, one & other) is always exemplary & that is why there’s war

p. 196 if Montaigne’s disproportion of sovereign friendship is translated into the political, wouldn’t that endanger Aristotle’s principle of autarky, equality, mutuality [?] > but our question is always about political translation: is the political a universal translating machine?

pp. 237-38 gravest of problems, not our intention to denounce fraternity: via Michelet, fraternity as ‘law beyond law,’ vision of universal/revolutionary fraternity [à la the Enlightenment], a hyperbole whose generosity can’t be opposed > [Derrida promising] a fraternity w/out fraternity (literal, strict, genealogical, masculine)

——what will be put into question re: fraternity is the exemplarist strategy (ethnocentrism, patriotism, nationalism), alleged universalism of nation, homeland: our homeland gives passage to homeland of all mankind

pp. 238-39 for Michelet, fraternity is another name for friendship, national singularity gives example of universal friendship, the boundless generosity (exemplary universalism) of Michelet’s andro-gallo-fraternocentrism

p. 264 via Hugo, fraternity is universal in first being French, ‘sublimated France’: ‘natural law,’ ‘generosity,’ the brother

p. 290 great canonical meditations on friendship (Cicero, Montaigne, Blanchot) all belong to experience of mourning > through the irreplaceable of the named, they always advance in testimonial order to confide/refuse death of unique to a universalizable discourse > simultaneously found/destabilize all oppositions, opens to abyss, se fracture

BL p. 187 singular relationship to the law must come in contact w/ “general or universal” essence of law, w/out being able to do so

p. 213 literature: when the singular crosses the universal [Hegelian?], when the categorical engages the idiomatic

***A p. 22 if death names irreplaceability of absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in place of the other) then all examples in world can illustrate this singularity, death of all those who say “my death” is irreplaceable [universal?] > tout autre est tout autre

——that anybody can appropriate expression “my death” > exemplary complication of exemplarity: nothing more nor less substitutable than syntagm “my death,” hapax legomenon

p. 42 via Heidegger, there is no culture [p. 59 nor politics] of death itself of properly dying, question arises of limit btwn universal (non-natural) structure and differential (non-natural but cultural) structure

p. 52 universality of existential analysis of death

p. 57 only way for existential analytic of Dasein to achieve universality, must be only discipline where death knows no borders

p. 59 Heidegger refuses to use word universal even though his existential analysis of death wants to be (universal too humanistic for Heidegger, too dependent on Aufklärung)

p. 74 death always the name of a secret, signs irreplaceable singularity, puts forth common name of the proper name w/out name, always a shibboleth > language about death long history of a secret society, hidden religion of the awaiting, a universal Marrano

EM pp. 111-12 possibility of international philosophical colloquium must take place in a medium > universality of philosophical discourse, linked to group of languages & “cultures”

p. 113 (133) interest in universality of anthropos a sign of West’s attempt to interiorize, master what’s different from it, leffet de cette différence dun tout autre ordre, where philosophical colloquium has no meaning, this other space neither barren, nor desert-like

VM pp. 96, 314n Kant and Levinas both have immediate respect for other, but Levinas does not pass through neutral element of universal, nor through respect for law

p. 319n doctrine of uniformity of Being (don Scotus, Heidegger) incompatible w/ Aristotelian-Thomist Being in which question of 1st/2nd [re: universal/singular] remains

VP p. 58 possibility of re-petition in its most general form, the trace in the most universal sense,

inhabits pure actuality of now and constitutes now via differance

OH p. 33 capital as cutting edge of progress (à la pointe du progrès), universalizing model, everyone joins at the head

pp. 47-8 nationalism always a philosopheme, justifies itself in name of a privilege in the memory of the universal, of the transcendental, of the ontological > no one is more universal than the one that is we; cosmopolitanism & nationalism have always gotten on together

pp. 48-9 Europe advances itself as heading for universal essence of man > to advance oneself: to name oneself, rush out ahead, in front, anticipate, launch, stick one’s neck out, to love or to violate, to love to violate, to colonize, colonize itself

p. 52 [summary of political responsibility today] denounce divergences btwn principle and the determined limits of their representation > task always urgent, infinite > always unequal to task of international rights (responsible for the universe)

p. 65 via Valéry, most interesting moment of rhetorical capitalization of “capital” (its hierarchization): regional capital always calls for always threatened universal capital

pp. 68-9 [threatened] ideality in capitalization: that which exceeds borders of sensible, opens onto infinite, gives rise to universal, “maxim of maximization,” nothing other than spirit itself

p. 70 via Valéry, people who read are responsible for, respond before, turn memory into “solid value,” create an absolute surplus value, increase of universal capital, “world’s wealth” increases

p. 72 value of universality capitalizes all antinomies, linked to value of exemplarity which inscribes universality in proper body of singularity (idiom or culture)

p. 73 whether hospitable or xenophobic, self-affirmation of identity always claims to be responding to call of universality, an inscription of universal in singular, unique testimony to human essence and to what’s proper to man

p. 75 for Husserl, the European philosopher committed to universal reason is functionary of mankind

p. 89 everydayness as a category of social rhythm is not natural (that is, universal)

SH p. 43 unreadable is readable as unreadable, shibboleth transmitted to a few during finite time of incineration, heart to heart, mouth to ear, hand to hand, still universal by right (legible, coded, troped) > madness of fire: consumes a date from w/in > renders ash from 1st moment

pp. 53-5 Jew as poet, as “he” w/ unpronounceable name, as witness to the universal through absolute singularity, by virtue of and in name of the other

p. 59 wound, very experience of reading, universal

FWT FWT p. 18 the universal of philosophy (neither relativism nor nationalism) not a given, an essence, but an infinite process of universalization > in the name of European filiation we are liberating ourselves from Eurocentrism/ethnocentrism

p. 20 [E.R.: how can we think universal difference w/out yielding to communitarianism or narcissistic cult of minor differences?]

p. 21 what is universalizable about differance: allows one to think differentiation beyond every kind of limit, there is differance wherever there’s living [not just human] trace, a relation of life/death, presence/absence > spacing, not an essence, not a (dialectical) opposition, inscription of same that’s not identical, not frozen/fixed [also a meditation on signifier/signified, Saussure]

p. 25 the nationalism of republican “universalism” protesting against “democratic” communitarianism almost always voiced by strongest community [Black Lives Matter]

p 229n Levinas justifies lex talionis > a “message of universalism,” not a reveling in revenge, seeks only justice

***p. 193 there is a universal “structure” of heteronomic election: I am the only one called to do this or that, irreplaceable in the place of decision, in obligation to respond “I am here,” this election of each gives to all responsibility worthy of the name, if there is any, its chance/condition > also, Derrida is very suspicious of “doctrine” of election, & binding this universal to Judaism

WM WM p. 213 white mythology [vis-à-vis Anatole France]: metaphysics, culture of West, erased w/in itself fabulous scene that produced it, this scene remains active—inscribed in white ink; white man takes his own mythology, his own logos, the mythos of his idiom, for universal Reason

P P p. 47 “grosse Schwierigkeit” of critical judgment of beauty [un plaisir désintéressé], auto-affection must cathect w/ pure objectivity, universality w/out concept, pure pleasure w/out enjoyment > Wohlgefallen (I-please-myself-in), Je-me-plais-à-me-plaire-à > auto-affection immediately goes outside: is pure hetero-affection, tout autre cathects me, w/out which, there’d be no universality

p. 77 for Kant, pure sound & pure color as vibration of ether > purely formal, “universally compatible w/ certainty”—beautiful [what about color gold on frame?]

p. 93 paradox of 3rd Critique: singularities must give rise to universalizable judgments > Kant’s free beauty: self-subsisting, always beautiful once

p. 110 in Kant, sans of free beauty compressed/oriented by regulatory idea of maximal consensus among men [universal?]

GSP GSP p. 160 for Husserl, pure truth missed when accounted for in historical totality, finite totality, factual totality > truth must open to infinite idea (Kant), w/out any limits, absolute, universal

PS PS p. 171 Blanchot: Artaud’s “unpower” as if “essential to thought”

p. 172 rush to essentiality, because there is nothing to say about the unique?

——Blanchot’s very Hegelian reading of Hölderlin > fate not his but poetry’s fate: dissolution of unique (say “poet” instead of Hölderlin) authorized by conception of unity, unicity, of unique

DPi DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

p. 110 Hugo: “law of laws” = universal conscience

CHM CHM pp. 53-4 all discourse, philosophy, must escape madness in fact/principle if it is to have intelligible meaning (discourse must carry normality w/in itself) > not a defect linked to determined historical structure but essential universal necessity > the meaning of meaning

Gii Gii p. 34 profound link btwn Europocentric universalism, humanism & nationalism

REST REST p. 268 “to tell the truth”: necessary to hold in reserve excess of interpretation, supplement of reading—for the idiom of a syntactic variation > absolute idiom is name of a lure, but absolute “pas didiome” [see p. 381] does not authorize contentment w/ symbolic equivalences, “w/ off-the-peg universals (duniversaux de confection)”

PIO PIO p. 3 btwn 17th-19th centuries, in the positive notion of rights, only form & composition display invention/originality—not content, “things,” thematics or meaning

***p. 36 universality (ideal objectivity, unlimited recurrence) in invention blurs signature of invention: name of individual (singular empirical entity) is associated w/ invention in inessential, extrinsic, accidental, aleatory way > this gives rise to enormous problem of property rights

EJQB EJQB p. 75 [re: Jabès] Jew reproached by rabbinical Jews for universalism, skeletal (décharnés) allegorism, for neutralizing event in realms of symbolic/imaginary [Jew as suffering allegory]

——Jew is split btwn 2 dimensions of letter: 1) allegory (no history, abstract universalism, cold skin of concept) 2) literality (empirical, actualized history, too warm flesh)

IW IW pp. 324-25n exemplarity (rather than paradigm): when “nation” declares itself, by virtue of its singularity, to be charged w/ exemplary testimony, universal message [e.g. Germans, Jews]

p. 296 soldier’s conscience: national development serves universal justice

HST HST p. 404 Levinas: memory of servitude in Egypt assembles humanity, ego is a hostage, ego ceaselessly missing itself, debt absorbed only by being increased; such is the pride of nonessence!

TN pp. 63-4 for Nancy, history of world/body is Christian? or is it a universal “history”? or the history of the production of every “universalism,” “mondialisation”—through the obligatory passage of a surreptitious, autoimmune, globalatinizing Christianization? couldn’t every culture have produced this idealizing anesthesia, this neutralization, this euthanasia of the body?

pp. 128-29 Nancy moves dialecticized Judeo-Christian-Islamic “fellow” (residing in particular and universal) into technē > the true “creation” and “art” of our world

pp. 193-94 [Derrida’s universality]: convey to “every man’s” ear that world of each person is untranslatable, that there’s never the “same world” > not incompatible premises, condition/call for one another [deconstruction Merleau-Ponty]

AD pp. 65-6 “Torah before Sinai,” law before event, recognition of Torah by those for whom event of Sinai means nothing? a recognition by some 3rd, that would replace unique w/ unique? > a universal message in election of Israel (humanitarian hospitality uprooted from singularity of event, which becomes empirical, allegorical, “political” in restricted sense) [see p. 72]

p. 68 Levinas’ transnational, universal hospitality, asylum (asile), inn (auberge) (“place offered to stranger”) not Kant’s cosmopolitical

***BSi p. 348 phonocentrism, authority of the vocal, is universal: hegemony of logocentrism is not

OG p. 108 (158-59) graphein as originary effacement of proper name, there is “subject” the moment obliteration of proper is produced (dawn of language) > universal a priori

how one moves from this a priori to empirical facts can’t be answered, no general answer to a question of this form [no explanation of bridge, passage]

p. 132 beyond Lévi-Strauss, who thinks literacy is an enslaving violence, Derrida sees writing as constitution of free subject in violent movement of its own effacement and bondage (enchaînement)[Derrida’s phrasing describes non-classical enslavement to a universal law?]

——how can literacy be violent when reserved for elite minority & when law demands total literacy?: universality always monopolized as empirical force by a determined empirical force

p. 223 for Rousseau, only Europe can be itself & everything else at same time [re: language/society], pedagogical success & ethnological humanism have good fortune to appear in Europe

——Derrida says Rousseau simply wrong for not using this universal opening en fait

EU p. 40 Descartes’ counter-proposal [to Hardy]: arcanum of “true science” > method, artificial intelligence, translating machine (could be taught in very little time): universality as principle of order, as path, passage, odos

UNIVERSITY WITHOUT CONDITIONS (see new Enlightenment)

POR p. 19 (153) protocols of vigilance for new Aufklärung: beware the abysses and gorges, but also the bridges & barriers, beware of opening university to bottomless outside or closing it in on itself so that it is available to any interest, or becomes useless > beware of ends, university w/out ends?

PF p. 283n sometimes “outside” more faithful to principle of university than “inside”

UWC p. 203 unconditional university via Humanities (not so as to enclose itself there) > find best access to new public space, techniques, archive

p. 204 university w/out conditions does not, in fact, exist > still, in principle, it remains ultimate place of critical resistance to dogmatism, unjust appropriation

——right to deconstruction as unconditional right to ask questions—even re: the authority of the question, the interrogative form

pp. 204-05 unconditional university, resistance to indivisible sovereignty, to nation-state, to economic, media, ideological, cultural, religious powers > all that limit democracy to-come

p. 206 university w/out condition: heterogenous to power > has no power of its own, “w/out condition” as in “w/out power,” “w/out defense” > can be held hostage (by science–capital)

p. 207 deconstruct unconditional sovereignty: even the people, the citizen, the subject

——must still conserve university’s particular sovereignty

——principle of unconditionality: right to say everything, not limited to Humanities, but presents itself, originally, there, place of safekeeping

pp. 207-08 deconstruction has privileged place in Humanities, place of irredentist resistance > principle of civil disobedience, dissidence in name of law above laws, justice of thought

p. 208 thought: that which commands resistance

——deconstruct all determined figures sovereignty has taken throughout history

——university w/out conditions as a promise, pledge, a profession of faith

pp. 209-10 “as,” “as if,” politics of the virtual (not a virtual politics) in cyberworld or cyberspace of worldwide-ization > delocalizing, virtualization of communication, publication, archivization

——where there’s trace there’s some virtualization (i.e. virtualization not absolutely novel)

p. 210 new technical “stage” of virtualization > the accelerated rhythm/extent/power of capitalization of such virtuality: digitalization, computerization, virtually immediate mondialisation of readability destabilize university habitat, topology of event no longer “campus”

p. 213 impossible attempt to link “as if” to thinking of event: what happens when “taking place” of le travail, when the place itself, becomes virtual, becomes subject to mode “as if”?

pp. 214-15 professor: profession of faith, who will profess in the future? “to make profession of”: promise, declare openly, pledge, engage > exceeds pure techno-scientific knowledge (constative)

——bear witness: neither practice nor theory; profession, performative, “as if,” fable [etymology of “to speak” fari/phanai]

pp. 216-17 work of a worker (travailleur) must be recognized as craft/trade/profession in market (a semantics rooted in socio-ideological history dating back to Christian Middle Ages) > when is there an oeuvre? professor’s authority not based on production of oeuvre

pp. 217-18 not every travail an event in itself, doesn’t always produce an oeuvre, not every performative (always authorized by an institutional “as if”) produces oeuvre

p. 218 act of professing a doctrine is performative, but doctrine is not

pp. 219-20 Kant sees philosophy (in university) neither as performative nor as producing oeuvre, but professor of philosophy has total freedom > speaks publicly, but only inside university

p. 220 transformation of cyberspace, beyond nation-state borders—renders inside of university even more unimaginable

——absolute immunity of academic type must be protected even if it risks dangerous auto-immunity, even if we must address ourselves to university’s outside > we must commit ourselves in act, in work, in what we make happen w/ events

p. 225 techno-scientific virtualization of work, the putting-into-common, any “community” [Aristotle’s city] > mutation of taking place of event, of oeuvrethat which arrives

p. 230 humanities to come will cross disciplinary borders (not “interdisciplinary” or “cultural studies”)

——humanities of tomorrow will have to study history of concepts that institute disciplines

p. 231 Nietzsche’s promising animal (the figure of man) is still to-come

p. 232 “literature,” its link to performative force of “as if,” to the right to say everything (or not to say everything), which founds both democracy & unconditional sovereignty claimed by Humanities

p. 233 end of certain figure of professor gives rise to other strategies of “as if,” singular oeuvres > Derrida believes in certain necessity of professoriat

——mise en oeuvre (the putting to work), at least to the performative putting to work of “as if”

***p. 235 necessary to dissociate unconditional independence (of thought, deconstruction, Humanities, justice) from any phantasm of indivisible sovereignty (mastery)

p. 236 sovereign mastery of interior > [indivisible] border of inside/outside vs. divisible limit, because divisible, it has a history > the divisible limit is the limit of the impossible, the perhaps

——university w/out conditions: “everywhere that it, perhaps, gives one (itself) to think”

p. 237 [the event, the unconditional] matter of the sense of sense [meaning of meaning?] > up to you now, up to others—signatories are also addressees

——take your time, but be quick: don’t know what awaits you

EU pp. 73-4 [vis-à-vis Schelling] art can never be limited/programmed by State, there is no State culture > philosophy, which demands unconditional freedom, should reside in Faculty of Arts

p. 74 bureaucratic organization doesn’t provide for philosophy, has ceased being a free association in view of the arts (poetic translation)

p. 287n though CIPH is Schellingian as a place reserved for problematic of translation, it has an anti-Schellingian angle: State can recover all its power if uni-formation is blindly trusted

pp. 93-4 for Kant, parasite could be contained to a margin of university > today, university is what has become its margin

p. 95 university as a child of metaphysics & tehnē > once this offspring exceeds places assigned to it, becomes invasive margin: university “idea” reigns everywhere

——parasite everywhere there’s language, public, publishing > to wish to control/exclude parasites is a misunderstanding of speech acts

UNREADABLE [fixerup]

GT pp. 152 readability of text structured by unreadability of secret, narrator in situation analogous to reader; crypt gives to be read, eternally unreadable

BL p. 211 unreadability of text: impossibility of acceding to its proper significance

LOBL p. 116 larrêt de mort, “ingenious” decision, one of those that are made (sarrêtent) only in a language, escape signature by any “I”, untranslatable, decision is unreadable > unreadability does not arrest reading in face of opaque surface, it starts reading, writing, translating again

——unreadable not opposite of readable but the ridge (arête) that sets in motion

p. ~154 absolute crypt [heart] is unreadability—yet calls for infinite finite analysis, infinite-finite reada-translata-bility

pp. 169-72 in Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, 2 women, 2 voices w/out voice, tele-phone each other: “come” > how do we read this unreadable hymen? it takes place as unreadable, from bottom of crypt in which it remains > it will have taken place where it remains: that’s the proof

MPM p. 34 we come to ourselves through memory of possible mourning, knowledge older than ourselves, de Man might say: unreadability of mourning

——mimetic interiorization not just fictive, is origin of fiction, takes place in a body, makes place for body, soul, “ours” > death constitutes and makes manifests limits of me, us, obliged to harbor something greater than us w/in us

p. 98 for de Man, “allegory of unreadability”: when performative cannot be distinguished from constative, all the while remaining irreducible

VM p. 112 “syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

OH p. 102 that which is not mass-produced is unreadable

T p. xviii(n) tympanum, Dionysianism, Ariadne’s Thread, labyrinth: the bloodiness of a disseminated writing violates embouchure of philosophy, contact w/ another code, a unique event, unreadable as such, inaudible, btwn earth & sea, w/out signature [Bataille]

SH p. 43 unreadable is readable as unreadable, shibboleth transmitted to a few during finite time of incineration, heart to heart, mouth to ear, hand to hand, still universal by right (legible, coded, troped) > madness of fire: consumes a date from w/in > renders ash from 1st moment

pp. 58-9 “Sie setzt / Wundgelesens über (it carries across / the wound-read)”: [circumcision in the reading] “reader-gatherer” > wound offers itself to be read—not readable, but a part of reading

DS DS p. 253 “themes” run aground (échoue) at edge lesser & greater than theme, where “there is” a text is made a possibility, a readability w/out signified (fright’s reflex declares: unreadable)

PS PS p. 184 Artaud: “I am writing for illiterates” > not to erase letter but to subordinate it to incidence of illegibility

p. 189 Artaud seeks a depth of illegibility

EJQB EJQB p. 77 born only by approaching book, die only by failing (échouant) in sight of book > toujours la rive impassible du livre est d’abord

——book as epoch of Being (epoch coming to and end, the glow of Being in agony, a multiplication of the end, “garrulous and tenacious hypermnesia of certain moribunds,” books about the dead book)

——Being radically outside book, its letter > Being reveals itself only in illegibility (illisibilité)

—— radical illisibilité belongs to the book, very possibility of it > such illegibility not an accomplice of lost (sought after) legibility, of a page not yet cut from divine encyclopedia

D D p. 362 X not an unknown but chiasmus, a text that is unreadable because only readable > Numbers undecipherable because you imposed encryption on them by trying to decipher them

ATM ATM p. 161 the Relation to the Other is not a phenomenal monstration, and is not readable w/in the uncertainty of rigorous limits of a lexicon, language, semiotics, logic, etc.

SPEC SPEC p. 304 the unanalyzed remainder of an unconscious remains [re: Freud’s autobiographical, writing], Derrida: “je parie” that it will be transmitted blindly by all who “return to Freud”: remainder that works the scene is illegible—i.e., restance, yet the only urgency of what reste à faire

p. 352 [re: repetition before PP or collaborates w/ PP] the 2 repetitions (2 logics) as constitutive duplicity, double bind

——if there’s any chance of reading illegible text as illegible: must take incalculable double bind (bande) of PP into account

UNSCATHED/SAFE/SACRED/GUARD/SECURITY/KEEP

KH p. 97 khōra must keep its impropriety, having nothing of its own, this is what we must keep for it

GOD pp. 15-17 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

p. 23 genealogy’s axiom: history never effaces what it buries (enfouit), keeps (garde) secret of what it encrypts, the secret of the secret, cest une histoire secrète du secret gardé; genealogy is also an economy

GT p. 14 temporalization of time (memory, present, anticipation, pro, re-tention, imminence of future, “ecstases”) destroys the gift via keeping (la garde), restitution, comprehending in advance

pp. 51-53 transcendental signified or signifier as general equivalent, “transcendental” makes possible every categorial determination, all givens (to be/to have, thing/person)

——Lacan’s “symbolic order” guards gift against dissemination, against itself

pp. 122-23 the foreseeable, programmed, conditioned, expected, counted on, necessary cannot be a gift or event

——event, gift, must be structured by aleatory, remaining unforeseeable w/out being kept so

p. 137 sacrifice (always distinguished from pure gift) expects a surplus-value or at least an amortization, a protection

R p. 112 Heidegger: “only a God can save us (Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten)”; Derrida observes communication in Heidegger btwn retten (to save), das Heilen (the Unscathed, the safe, the sound), and das Freie (free, also, save, preserve, immunity) > in tact, untouched, purify

OOG p. 131 Husserl saves the absolutely original sense or internal historicity within universal historicity

FK p. 48 all sacred/holy not necessarily religious

p. 54 Levinas attempts to distinguish the sacred (heilig) from holiness (sainteté) > former “pagan,” natural; latter, of (Jewish) law, before or under Roman religion [Derrida is critical]

p. 54n Heidegger on Hölderlin: sacred of poetic only opens time of apparition of the gods, is divine, does not dream a god

p. 60n Derrida thinks Justice in relation to a sundering (déliaison), an always-safe, always-to-be-saved possibility of secret of disassociation, rather than bringing-together (Versammlung) re: dikē

p. 61 unscathed—thing itself of religion?

p. 61fn [Derrida includes etymology of indemnity] purity, cleanliness, non-contaminated…

pp. 66-67 hyper-imperialist appropriation (Anglo-American remains Latin), in mondialatinization no semantic cell can remain alien, “heilig,” safe & sound > word “religion” calmly applied to all that which has always been foreign to it, same goes for “cult,” “faith,” “belief,” “sacred,” “saved”

p. 81 religion appropriates indemnification of all “proper,” all property: the letter, blood and soil, family, nation

p. 84 matrix of unlimited, general fetishization of Thing itself > read the unscathed as spontaneity of erection or pregnancy

p. 85 why have women been the victims of most lethal explosions of ethnico-religious violence in ordeal of unscathed?

pp. 86-87 spectral fantasy of dead, principal of life and sur-vival; life must be worth more than life, only has value in labour of infinite mourning > indemnified spectrality w/out limit

p. 88 religion as ellipsis of sacrifice, Heidegger sees ontotheology as free from sacrifice & prayer, but Derrida sees double bind, religion excluding & requiring sacrifice, indemnification of unscathed, auto-immunization & sacrifice of sacrifice

H p. 97 the sacred, that which cannot be spoken, the most impure, the secret that cannot be violated by speech, the motion of logos

p. 99 security, safety of a city: borne through transmission of the secret

p. 105 Oedipus is twice encrypted, 1st in dying, 2nd in hiding his death > by demanding he be kept dead, he announces a piece of blackmail

FL FL p. 272 foundation is a promise, ever positing pro-met even if promise is not kept, iterability inscribes the promise as guard in the most irruptive instant of foundation, inscribes the possibility of repetition at the heart of the originary, so there is no real distinction between preserving violence and founding, positing is always a call for preserving: differential contamination

LOBL LOBL p. 125 “the initial [re: J.] keeps (garde) the secret like a grave—jealously”

BL BL p. 206 via Heidegger’s “truth” as non-truth as truth of truth, truth w/out truth guards itself > truth and law would be the guarding itself (Wahrheit): look btwn guardian & man

p. 215 all watchmen (critics, academics, literary theorists, writers, and philosophers), who guard positive laws, value of signatures, & identity of corpora, receive same answer in their appeal to the law: differance > plus de loi et plus de littérature

AF AF p. 2 arkheion, house of commanders, guardians, of archons, whose documents speak the law

——archives take place in a house arrest

p. 7 every archive at once institutive & conservative [see FL], revolutionary & traditional, an eco-nomic archive: keeps, puts in reserve, saves, but in unnatural fashion (forcing obedience to law)

p. 26 press “save” on computer > ensure indemnity, salvation

p. 78 Lun se garde de lautre pour se faire violence [the One guards against/keeps some of the other], the One erasing/keeping injustice of what it is, the One makes itself violence

p. 99 impossible origin is ash, where singular imprint, like signature, barely distinguishes itself from impression, where trace no longer distinguishes itself from substrate, absolutely safe location

POO POO p. 21 [2nd type of nonresponse] silence, protection, “insolent weapon and most deadly irony,” absolutely elliptical, shelters one, makes safe from objection, undermines responsibility, very essence of socius

POR POR p. 10 (139) principle of reason (Satz vom Grund) tells us to protect [dominant] relation of ob-ject before a subject that says “I”, and is assured of presence

——Heidegger’s caricature of principle of reason: hard, unblinking eyes (dominating, raping)

p. 14 (146) for Heidegger, principle of reason depends on delivery (Zustellung) of atomic energy > all Stellen (Vorstellen, Nachstellen…) characterize information tactics of modern technology

——information most economic, clearest, fastest, instructs men about safeguarding (Sicherstellung) their needs, ta khreai > computers, data banks, constructed on basis of this calculable language: all this, via Heidegger, assures man’s mastery over earth [one demand, call, of reason]

p. 20 (154-55) chance of an instant, Augenblick, a wink, blink: desire for memory & exposure to future brought together in same instant > guardian faithful enough to keep chance of a future: the singular responsibility of what he does not have and of what is not yet

——(155) can one keep chance? can one keep both memory & chance? je suis plutôt tenté de penser que lune ne se garde pas sans lautre, sans garder lautre et sans garder de lautre [double guard of university]

——risquons encore un clin doeil étymologique: la vérité (truth), cest ce qui garde et se garde > Wahrheit, veritas

HASD HASD p. 18 garder pour soi, voilà le pouvoir le plus incroyable et qui donne le plus à penser > must there not be dissimulation, multiplicity & difference from oneself, trace, for there to be keeping?

——can one ever say for certain: the secret has been kept?

p. 23 in topolitology of secret, figures or places of rhetoric are also political stratagems, “shields” against the many

MPM MPM p. 147 for Heidegger, Heissen (“to call, ” “to command” > entrust, keep safely)

A A p. 1 disquieting phrases need to be sheltered behind paternity [re: “limits of truth” in quotes]

p. 19 to protect decision or responsibility by knowledge, theoretical assurance, is to transform this experience into deployment of program

EM EM p. 133 (161) isn’t security of near trembling today? that is, the co-belonging/co-propriety of the name of man and name of Being, as it inhabits and is inhabited by language of West, such as it is buried in its oikonomia [house, tomb see DIF p. 4n], such as it is forgotten, and such as it is awakened by destruction of ontotheology? [trembling: announcement of deconstruction]

p. 136 (164) btwn 2 eves (veilles), 2 ends, of man: 1) the guard mounted around the house (la garde montée auprès de la maison) 2) awakening to the day that is coming (léveil au jour qui vient)

SEC SEC p. 325 general possibility of “parasite”: 1) trap (piège), failure (échec), abyss outside/in front of language, ditch (fossé), place of external perdition, which language can avoid, sheltered by (à labri de) its essence or telos? 2) or is this risk, internal and positive condition of its possibility, this outside its inside?

——Austin makes us accept as ordinary a teleological and ethical determination > univocality of statement, self presence of total context, transparency of intentions, presence of meaning—absolute singular oneness of speech act

VM VM p. 82 we know we are consigned to the security of the Greek element

p. 134 if Being has always been determined by philosophy as presence, the question of Being posed on basis of transcendental horizon of time > first tremor (ébranlement) of philosophical security, of self-confident presence

PP PP p. 105 (119) written traces don’t belong to phusis, not alive, or belong to Heraclitean phusis, in which truth takes shelter in its crypt (à sabriter en sa crypte) > “cryptogram” is a pleonasm

——acc. to king, pharmakon hypnotizes life of memory, taking it out of itself (la faisant sortir de soi) by monumentalizing it: médusée (medusad)

p. 126 no way to keep pharmakon secure, its nonsubstance is always capable of changing

p. 134 (154) writing is not a good tekhnē, not a productive art, not secure (saphes kai bebaion), like alētheia (nonsensible visibility, intelligible invisibility)

POOF POOF p. 15 bébaios, security, stability of friendship, acc. Aristotle

p. 16 hexis binds 2x in same time, such contretemporality another name for psukhé, accounts for, registers, lépreuve du temps, withholds (en garder) its trace in the body [by way of inscription] > the yoke effect

pp. 29-30 the unstable (inconstant), at the crossroads of chance & necessity, as necessary as the stable (bébaios), and already indispensable to Plato or Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship

p. 43 stable reliability of opinion (dogma)

pp. 53-4 via Nietzsche, keep silent about “truth” of friendship to protect, guarantee, the truth of friendship, resisting the abyss, the vertigo of friendship’s bottomless ground, the friendship that can’t resist the truth of its illusion, an asceticism, kenosis, speech would ruin friendship, speak in an elliptical way to avow > as though silence could not be spoken about elsewhere than in friendship

p. 59 sage & fool: l'un est lautre, l'un garde et se garde de lautre, l'un se fait violence, encore la surenchère infinie > this raising of the stakes doesn’t need an author’s intention

p. 218 one must resist the temptation to keep (garder) its chance, never let it become program, never a grounding on virtue of perhaps

pp. 256-57 via Kant's suspicion of tenderness/gentleness in friendship, a catastrophic complication in natural law of attraction/repulsion, a rupture, love will tend toward the evil of reciprocal possession (fusion), love harbors hate w/in itself > friendship as sign/symptom of this possible perversion, and that which protects us from it: attraction must be against attraction, repulsion against repulsion

p. 263 jusquici [up until now], for several 1000 years, le temps d'un clin d'œil [the twinkling of an eye], tremors have been registered, archived, by the archons of the same family [phallogocentric fraternization]

PAS PAS p. (22) Blanchot’s récit as new thought of citation acc. EROS, repetition of yes that begins by doubling itself, récit unscathed, unique force of a viens that never reproduces itself: vienssauf

p. (31) what does one know of force of de-distancing? and if the custody (garde) of knowledge is distanced? word knowledge would be refolded, re-employed > Blanchot’s reploiement formidable

pp. (43-4) each pas transgresses the pas [contamination of adverb/noun]; violence of this dislocation, sur une scène tout autre, occurs, increases, when it appears not to displace anything in discursivity, consciousness, in unscathed, assured normality of language [alters subterraneanly]

p. (52) Blanchot crosses limit of negative and interdiction, while keeping them safe [?]

pp. (52-3) (transgressive, completely passive) pas enacts a crossing of border that leaves border unscathed (indemne): bord sans bord, w/out any dialectical reappropriation

p. (54) double pas provokes double instantaneous but interminable preterition, forms a singular limit btwn keeping and loss, remembering and forgetting

p. (60) mastery, getting by too well, je men tirais trop bien, does not allow chance of event, must be disabled, wrecked, for something other to happen finally: the best & worst > la dérive guards against security, anchorage, property and against, perhaps, ce qui arrive, le pire ou le meilleur, venant den face ou de labîme [?]

***p. (66) viens, at the same time unique and copy (exemplaire), exemplary citations, unique power is unscathed possibility of unique, remains in reserve form which “I can emerge”

p. (77) logic of double band arrests laughter and shamelessness (limpudeur) when they shield themselves (se défendent) against anguish and affirmation

——[Blanchot displaces logic of disavowal & denial] pas-de-dénégation doesn’t mean apotropaic can ever be suspended, it is a “double chute,il garde la chute contre elle-même > perverts up to the limit perversion and its other

——those who think denial is a simple gesture are more sheltered (plus abrités) than others

——to save those drowning, lui donnant plutôt la parole, le sauf

p. (79) what does sauf mean? save them from an outside not even proper to them? sauf: secret (dérobé), powerful word, language fascinates starting form it > like sans, pas: crumbles, precludes the set from understanding itself: “rien sauf le dehors” > sauvetage project part of writing project

p. (85) sans remarks same X w/out annulling it, springless spring (ce ressort sans ressort), this re-trait leaves everything intact (sauf, indemne) in appearance [absolute heterogenous neutrality w/out negation], at the same time it has abducted, erased, absolute rapidity of dispossession (dérapage)

p. (89) le désir de toucher au bord a eu lieu (has taken place), the touching has not, not arrived at its term, sa rive, sa marge ou son bord, sa berge (bank) (ce qui garde et met à labri, contre une chute ou une noyade)

p. (93) forgetting must guard itself (se guarder) to preserve the gift, so the gift can give, the bank (berge) and contamination poison the gift

p. (94) must be able to reject the gift, vomir ce qui tappelle à dire viens, forget in order to reject the poison, to not guard the gift

p. (97) the inner rhythm of sauf (contamination), always altered, always unscathed, “jai tout, sauf” > “sauf que je voudrais en être débarrassé

p. (98) “il faut: laisser indemne, ne pas laisser indemne, quoi? tout, saufle sauf quil faut laisser indemne, ne pas laisser indemne

pp. (104-05) if there was one [name], the signature, the anagrammatic, would lose name in infinite measure of its keeping [absolute guard], so > plus de nom (visible name might hide tout autre name)

***p. (105) double band is structure of name said to be proper, anonymity is the effect, whether by monumentalization (sauf, the unscathed) or effacement (seeds, dispersion); gift of name is corrupted in advance dans le pas-de-nom [plus-de-nom] > what takes place in and beyond language: leaves the fold of this folding back

***VP p. 6 the security of presence is founded on the non-empirical, the sign, the non-foundation, exposing this removes this security

p. 8 telos, Kant’s regulative idea, a guard against threat of losing presence > indefinite repetition of the same

p. 12 [re: not substantializing Husserlian “transcendental”] language never escapes analogy, is analogy through & through > classical war of language, casting metaphors against metaphors, takes place in difference > le langage garde la différence qui garde le langage

——Husserl re-secures possibility and rigor of philosophy by reading difference btwn “pure psychology of consciousness” and “transcendental phenomenology of consciousness” through parallelism [?] [compare to parallelism via concept of life in transcendental psychologism on p. 11]

p. 13 the voice simulates the “keeping watch (la garde)” over presence, and that the history of spoken language as archive of this simulation prevents us from considering [its contradiction], prevents us from describing this simulation, the infinite complexity of its structure as phantasm

p. 43 maintenance btwn reality and representation, presence and repetition, an obstinate desire to remain secured, assured, constituted in the face of repetition

p. 49n originary representation can only be designated w/in the closure that refuses to think it, Derrida attempts to produce securely insecurity in the closure, opening it to its outside, from w/in

p. 53 to enucleate consciousness from elsewhere than presence: eliminate all security and foundation

p. 76 the more the signifier is ideal, more it augments potency of repetition of presence, the more it protects, preserves, reserves and capitalizes on sense

S p. 9 is the guarding, the call, of the question still the question? the question remains protected from that which is not a question, the un-thought, non-negative, un-gedacht

p. 31 beautiful description of the guard-like theatrical nature of quotation marks, and when they are relieved from “Geist” has spirit itself or spirit’s ghost (spectre) come on stage?

p. 89 the becoming-crepuscular (Dämmerung) is not a decline (Untergang), it shields the year, the course of the sun [Jahr, march (ier, ienai, gehen), translates race or course of sun]

pp. 91-2 Derrida uses revenant to describe a Heideggerian passage on Trakl in spite of the metaphysical negativity Heidegger might reject in it: re-venir as the idea of an end before a beginning, originary essence of time kept under veil, guarded in its archi-origin > we are still prisoners of Aristotelian representation of time

OH p. 18 keep the heading (garder le cap) > because absolutely new might bring ghost of the worst

pp. 22-3 guardians of Europe: white, civilized man

pp. 52-3 word “avant-garde” [see pp. 25, 48-50]: capitalizes on figurehead, phallic point, advanced initiative of guarding, anticipating to conserve, thus “avant-garde position”

FSW p. 203 “no doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, differance”—but there’s no life present at first, life is trace so we can say life is death

p. 224 always protection in writing

p. 226 if there were only perception, pure permeability of breaching, there would be no breaches (frayages), no legible writing, but pure perception does not exist: nous ne sommes écrits quen écrivants, par linstance en nous qui toujours déjà surveille la perception, quelle soit interne ou externe

T p. xxv how to put one’s hands on tympanum so it can escape from hands of philosopher, so he can no longer recognize his phallogocentrism [play w/ mains, maintenant, maintain], no longer rediscover himself, no longer able to say: I will have anticipated it w/ absolute knowledge

PPHS pp. 82-3(n) Derrida, through Hegel, describes tomb, family crypt (caveau), oikēsis, as the sign of death that capitalizes (thésaurise) on life by marking that life continues elsewhere, il la tient donc aussi à labri de la mort; at the heart of this monument, this sign of death, soul keeps itself alive, needs this works of death > the sign, “the height conserving in its depths the hegemony of the soul,” is the pyramid [later, Derrida will live through this tomb not, like Hegel, by negating it]

SH p. 29 cipher can conceal secret, which it shelters in its readability, w/out the slightest hidden attention > there’s nothing it can do about it [why/who interpret(s) secret as a taunting gesture?]

F p. xxxv self: cemetery guard (crypt is enclosed w/in self as excluded), self makes rounds (round & round) of crypt like he’s the proprietor, but he’s not, uses knowledge to keep visitors away

p. xxxvi Wolf Man’s crypt not melancholic crypt, doesn’t shelter his own object, but illegitimate object of another [his sister] > if cemetery guard lacks ownership of the tombs, at least he’s entitled to position, Wolf Man is in position of guard as proxy [pp. 199-20n position as guard has been mortgaged, Derrida haunted by this word, this “death pledge”]

pp. xi-xlviii [see

FORS

]

FWT pp. 56-7 safe and sound—beautiful freedom of human thought [juxtaposed to physiologistic determinism] [Scientology, Going Clear] [moral image of thought]

pp. 75-6 ‘sanitized society’ [MOP]—dead, sterilized? > there is and will be cruelty, among living beings, among men

p. 114 those who internalize, who think they can assimilate, appropriate, habituate, subjectivize the worst [in a work of mourning], immunize, sacralize, and idealize it

p. 138 how to guard, watch over, what can’t be watched over, internalized > paradox of fidelity to tout autre > watch over tout autre w/out tout autre dissolving/identifying w/ same in the same

p. 144 Socrates, Christ, Joan of Arc, Al-Hallaj are paradigmatic cases, but religious authority, via accusation (profanation/violation of sacred), always decides on DP in exemplary way

p. 179 “subject” instituted only out of “fear” of unconscious, interrupts energy; one ethical/political “system,” one “idea” of Good/Right > constructions produced to resist a threat

WM p. 210 metaphor of (the) usure (of metaphor): the ruining of figure; usure as erasure, rubbing out, and usure as increasing return in the form of revenue, surplus value, supplementary capital

——la figure sensible qui sabrite et qui suse, jusquà paraître inaperçue, dans chaque concept métaphysique

***P pp. 80-1 le se-protéger-de-oeuvre (ergon), énergie captée, bordée, condition for mastery of PP, self-protection of energeia > energeia not as pure, total presence (prime mover), but as (par)ergon against what’s lacking in it, lack not as a substantial emptiness, but as impossibility of arresting differance in its contour, in a pose, of localizing lack, like metaphysics does, in its proper place: castration as truth (circular) > whether parergon borders (works against) free energy or essential lack, the 2 determinations sont le même (métaphysique)

ROP p. 11 Freud sutures the unfathomable navel, omphalos, mit dem Unerkannten (unknown, “unknowable”), navel not a provisional limit, but a night, ab-solute unknown, attaché au lieu dont il part et dont il garde la marque de naissance > not only the gap (la béance), as Lacan reads this navel

p. 44 ash, stepping beyond psychoanalysis, radical destruction of archive, destroys capitalizing reserve, the guarding of repression

SP p. 39 [it is impossible, and the English translation, I believe, fails to convey this, to tell whether the spur protects against presence or the threat to presence]

OTO p. 7 masks (any theory of simulacrum) propose/produce themselves by returning a constant yield of protection, a surplus value as the ruse of life, ruse incurs losses once surplus value “does not return again to the living, but to and in the name of names, the community of masks” ——[cf. above]: “nothing ever comes back to the living”

ATIA pp. 47-8 Bellerophon’s modesty, shame before the immodest women saves the city, this immunizing drive, Heidegger’s Verhaltenheit, restraint, is the origin of the religious, of the immune, sacred (heilig), holy, separate (kadosh) [it also can be perverted: auto-immunity; virtual, analogical relation btwn auto-biography & auto-immunity]

PS p. 176 we will follow Artaud’s intention (restore Danger by reawakening theater of cruelty, un monde où la structure du dérobement noffrît plus aucun abri) > with exception dun glissement calculé

p. 184 Derrida shows in Nietzsche & Hölderlin an equation btwn dancing, standing upright, and the work itself

——but, unlike Artaud, they treat erection metaphorically, it doesn’t exile itself into the work, expatriate itself to sovereignty of speech/writing, uprightness of letter, the tip of the pen

——does Nietzsche question relation of grammatical security & uprightness of letter?

——Heidegger foretells this relationship: Greeks interpret language visually, as grammata, in writing language comes to stand (paradoxically, this confirms disdain of writing in Phaedrus)

p. 194 fatal complicity Artaud reveals: all destructive discourses must inhabit structures they demolish, must shelter indestructible desire for full presence, nondifference: à la fois vie et mort

——not critiquing Artaud from standpoint of metaphysics, Derrida reveals complicity: Artaud must enclose himself in closure of presence to denounce naive implications w/in difference

DIF DIF p. 18 Spur and Bahnung in Freud: inseparable from differance, no breach w/out difference, no difference w/out trace: movement of trace, in Freud, a protection, deferring danger by constituting a reserve (Vorrat) > each of Freud’s concepts a detour in economy of differance

p. 25 trace & difference cannot appear as such, sheltered (sabrite)/dissimulated in names (received in metaphysical text)

SW p. 318 the remaining intact or tearing of the veil is the same: lune se garde de lautre > 2 liftings (deux relèves), you want to have finished w/ the veil: to have finished w/ oneself, that’s the veil

DPi p p. 31 Genet reveals/betrays a Christian perversity: sacred, religious element in DP

p. 154 Nietzsche’s debtor pledges himself to inspire trust in his promise > pledges to indemnify the creditor if he doesn’t pay (gives a possession: wife, body, life, freedom)

p. 240 deconstructing death a task for every kind of vigilance, a task of vigilance for the vigilant > when one loves keeping watch (la veille) and vigilance, when one loves period, one may sleep—but one dreams

***p. 254 1) being-unscathed (l’être-indemne): safe, sound, intact, virgin, heilig, unhurt, holy 2) becoming-indemnified (l’être-indeminsé): rendered unscathed again, reimbursed, redemption of debt

——indemnity signals toward interest, economy

pp. 259 terrifying solidarity btwn abolitionism/DP: what then is indemnity? what is condemnation?

pp. 260-61 dapnaō, to spend, dapanē, expenditure, dapanēria, prodigality, daptō, devour, consume, damnum (w/out p), injury sustained through forcible seizure, curtailment of resources

——curtailment of capital, head > capital punishment

——for Benveniste, damnare is “to compel to spend,” expense considered as “sacrifice of money” > give money for nothing

p. 261 damnum, via Benveniste, money given w/out return, given for nothing > excess of compelled expenditure pays more than is due, marks double law of homogeneity/proportionality btwn damage/punishment & their incalculable heterogeneity: the condemned/damned pays what he owes and does something tout autre, infinitely more than acquit himself of calculable debt: there is economy/aneconomy > “unless it is a matter of reimbursement (indemnification) and interest as the incalculable surplus value of capital”

p. 264 how printing press, secularization can spread the sacred law not just desacralize

CHM p. 55 language as break from madness, closer and closer language gets to it, still has Joyce’s “transparent sheet,” “elementary discretion of a nothing that neutralizes everything”

——thus, Foucault’s book a gesture of protection & internment

pp. 58-60 Descartes interns his own hyperbole by temporalizing Cogito, certifying it through God (temporalizes the sharpest point, the instant), a hurried repatriation > God protects Descartes against madness of Cogito

——philosophy as reassurance against anguish of madness at point of greatest proximity to it

RGE p. 252 slumber of reason, ruse of reason, slumber in the form of reason, vigilance of Hegelian logos (engenders monsters then puts them to sleep) > la raison veille sur un sommeil profond auquel elle est intéressée

Gii p. 33 le monstre > la monstre (montre) > what shows in order to warn or put on guard, a watch, prescribes the divisions of a line of verse [m/f]

p. 55 for Heidegger, Gedicht is silent source of written and spoken poems (Dichtungen)

——Ein Geschlecht shelters Grundton (fundamental note), from which Gedicht of poets keeps the secret (Geheimnis) silent (schweigt)

p. 57 Heidegger’s “security (Sicherheit)”: security of good polysemy of good poets > Derrida calls this dogmatic and Aristotelian (and contradictory to other Heideggerian motifs)

REST p. 356 Heidegger’s Geborgenheit associates hidden, crypted secret w/ being-in-safety: what one must hold in reserve, conceal, to live > tightening of originary ring > effect of Verlässlichkeit

DST DST pp. 203-04 Lacoue-Labarthe’s warning (la mise en garde) of désistance, of traps everywhere, not protective, stands watch (veille) so you don’t forget you’re exposed on this and that side > exposure does not miss you (ne vous manquera pas) or me

——presupposes a contract, alliance, fidelity to the ineluctable, this terrifying form, the already there before me, that which lends itself to all figures and schemas; could there be fidelity w/out the faith called for in this dissymmetry [Levinas]?

——fidelity to the very thing that you who besiege me (qui massiégez si nécessairement) couldn’t, did not, avoid (est-ce que cela revient au même?)

p. 320n does Lacoue-Labarthe define a subject from which Heidegger protects himself (and seeks relief [assistance])?

RM pp. 70-1 to state condition of metaphoricity nonliterally: withdrawal by which what is distanced (entfernt) in the non-near of proximity is withdrawn & sheltered

HLP p. 33 ethics of veracity always a sacral ethics of sacrifice [cf. p. 289n]

p. 39 for Rousseau, lie meaningless outside “sacred name of truth,” “holy truth”

p. 42 Arendt: modern lie doesn’t hide, it destroys Heiligkeit (sacrosanctity)

——for Kant, in Augustinian tradition, sacred duty, unconditional imperative not to lie; Schürmann: sacred, in Heidegger, keeps historical connotation, while awe and piety direct toward event, presencing (which is not at all historical)

p. 45 rational law of sacred veracity: condition of history, human sociality

p. 58 sacred veracity, the Heiligkeit of the safe, sound, healthy, saintly, lindemnealways links religious to ethical

WAP p. 133 those who think reading is immediately to do, and those who think reading is not to do, not even to write: both caught in oppositional conceptual guardrails (garde-fous)

AFR p. 119 for Condillac, bad metaphysics is frivolous, hollow signs, purely verbal; Condillac had to guard his discourse from frivolity as if from its infinitely alike double [doppelgänger]

IW p. 265 German-Jewish psyche, as a psyché always does, keeps watch over (garde) the spirit

PJP p. 194 rapport (analogies of this rapport)—obscure alchemy that precipitates an “us”—in the shelter of/from (à labri de) some sober & inevitable perjury: we guard ourselves form perjury we inhabit

pp. 198-99 [re: Henri Thomas’ novel] a couple men united as one, “a single idiot,” brothers before impassible, inaccessible woman (the other, only one who decides, only guardian, only survivor, keeps watch at end of night, “w/out saying a word”)

D p. 297 structural transcendental illusion, one surface of Soller’s square opens to “classical representative scene” > this is a necessity, no nonplace left out, so no pure origin can stand guard over stage as if derived from intactness of absolute opening: any attempt to return to lintimité indemne et propre played out in illusion > nothing takes place but place

EL p. 199 for Spinoza, sacred is neither in the name (word) nor the signified (thing) but in the intention that brings them together

p. 203 Scholem’s equivocal use of word apocalypse, fascination w/ abyss : indecision that he can’t, doesn’t want, to master > apocalypse should be guarded (saved), and we should guard against it

HST p. 364 if every concept shelters or lets itself be haunted by another concept (one that’s no longer its other), no concept remains in place [guard a ghost, a haunting, Derridean exorcism]

C p. 224 coffins simultaneously keep & destroy the keeping & destruction of what they keep & destroy [re: Titus-Carmel’s 127 coffins]

p. 240 there is the gift (es gibt) and there is what I couldn’t give: I want to keep it better than ever

TN p. 22 [Nancy’s] garder: points to truth’s verity (veritas, Wahrheit), and economy; is garder compatible w/ retrait (withdrawal), w/ retenue (holding back, retaining)?

p. 104 history of untouchable: immune, sound, safe, “saufle toucher

p. 180 there would be auto-affection “effects,” but their analysis can’t escape hetero-affection that makes them possible, keeps haunting them

——constitution of body proper would thus assume passage outside through “technē of bodies,” spacing, death, nonliving, other, mourning > everything the “solipsistic” tries to keep out (maintenir au-dehors)

p. 333n [re: Nancy’s distinction btwn gift & offering] how can you eschew economics w/ the value of “keeping (garde)”? [Nancy describes how the surprise of the gift is kept]

ATM p. 162 [re: Levinas’ sériature] cette reprise (this mending resumption) is the condition by which beyond essence keeps (garde) its chance [see p. 160] against the enveloping seam (couture enveloppante) of the dialectic or thematic

——the tear must be saved by playing seam against seam (couture)

pp. 187-88 “je donne, je joue lingratitude contre la jalousie,” if God is exempt from jealousy (no desire for possession) must he not guard this exemption jealously, and in so doing lose himself? > ellipse de jalousie: le sans-jalousie se garde jalousement, autrement dit se perd, se-garde-se-perd: plus de jalousie [seriasure always a jalousie, series of traits & retraits, beyond the face]

CIN p. 17 cinders: ce qui garde pour ne plus même garder, dooming (vouant) remnant (le reste) to dissolution

——“se donnant à elle-même, se donnant comme son propre nom, lart consumé du secret: de lexhibition savoir se garder [to give to itself, give to itself as its proper name, consummate art of secret: the exhibition of knowing how to guard oneself] [compare to God’s fiery consumption]

pp. 24-30 [see FIRE for what’s lost, what begins, in guarding]

BSi pp. 42-3 obey what protects (double meaning of obliger) > when state says, “I protect you,” it institutes a fear that obliges you, subjects you [Donald Trump]

OG p. 57 (84) unity of sound and meaning: reassuring closing of play

p. 59 (87) desire to restrict (lier) le jeu is irresistible

pp. 124-25 (182) [vis-à-vis Lévi-Strauss] birth of writing (in colloquial sense) most often linked to genealogical anxiety > genealogical relation & social classification as stitched steam (point de suture) [point de capiton?] of arche-writing: condition of (so-called oral) language and possibility of writing in colloquial sense

pp. 154-55 supplement not only procures an absent presence, it distances, masters, protects: supplement transgresses and à la fois respects interdict (acc. to play/difference of forces)

p. 226 (321-22) for Rousseau, writing in North, cold, reasoning, turned toward death, tour de force, detour of force qui sefforce à garder la vie > history effaces vowel accent, extends power of writing

pp. 275-76 (390-91) [vis-à-vis Rousseau’s distinction btwn literal/metaphor] if speech doesn’t pass through reference to object, instead producing sign via literalization of passion, literal expression remains a metaphor preceded by nothing, opening an exchange to the outside: no literal meaning precedes it, no rhetor watches over (surveille) it

EU pp. 154-55 double keeping of memory & chance (invagination of inside pocket); truth, Wahrheit, what keeps, calls upon [us] to watch faithfully, on coat of arms of American universities

——provocation to think brings together in same instant desire for memory & exposure to future

SPEC pp. 347-48 Freud’s metaphor of the “vesicle,” protoplasmic bulb, amortizes excitations from outside world [and inside], protects, can be transferred to every corpus [i.e. text]: transference from one legatee to the other, like the simulacrum of secret

pp. 360-61 notion of guarding (garde) is gathered, guarded (particularly in its strategico-military code), at moment Freud defines conservative drives: they are the guardians/sentinels of life (Lebenswachter), veillent sur la vie, la surveillent, gardent et regardent, montent la garde auprès delle > but they are also the satellites (Trabanten) or sentinels of death > Myrmidons, bodyguards, satelles, agents (generally armed), couriers, obeying revolution of a greater body (absolute power): le mort

Heidegger links notion of guarding to Wahrheit, to truth as un-truth

p. 361 to guard one’s fashion, one’s rhythm, what counts is less telos than rhythm of differance, speed of the step: Zauderrythmus (differential rhythm)

p. 365 State, multicellular society, socius, guarding life beyond death of any given subject, serves to reproduce & rejuvenate other cells

p. 383 garde-fou has disappeared en chemin, all speculative transferences are of the party (partie); transference: as transpose, translate, network of correspondences, traffic, postal, railway, sorting

FV pp. 463-64 the 2 truths lean on, support each other (sétaient): 1) adequation, circular return, garde et regarde, circuit of pact, control, guardianship (la garde) of the phallus as guardianship of the lack 2) veiling-unveiling as structure of lack, a proper place: les contours étant-la place du manque à être

p. 464 for signifier to be kept (pour que le signifiant se garde) in its letter—no partition (if divisible, always can be lost en route) > materiality—indivisibility—idealization—point de capiton (staples signifier to signified) [?]: Lacan determines letter (no matter what he says) at point of its meaning (ideality): letter escapes partition, movement [no wonder he calls this “materiality” “odd”]

pp. 464-65 [phonematic limitation of letter, phonē spared divisibility] voice: spontaneous self-presence one can retain (garder) w/out paper, w/out envelope, always available (disponible) > Lacan’s not attentive to writing w/in the voice, before the letter

——sheltered (à labri) from disseminating threat/power in OG, agency of Lacan’s letter is the relève of writing in system of speech

p. 477 point de capiton safeguards indivisible, living, non-fragmentary integrity of phallus

WBH p. 190 guardians of institution are guardians of Law > as women’s studies gains institutional legitimacy, it produces guardians of the Law; U.S. is a pioneer of women’s studies

UNTRANSLATABLE (Intraduisible)

***LOBL p. 77 untranslatability will not stop the procession, cortège, over the border of another language, into the language of another

p. ~102 text lives on only if it lives on (sur-vit), it lives on only if it is at once (hama) translatable and untranslatable, Übersetzung and “translation” overcome

pp. ~102-04 totally translatable disappears as body, writing, text, language; totally untranslatable dies immediately > thus, triumphant translation neither life nor death of text, only or already its living on, neither lives nor dies

——triumphant translation is a life after death, same goes for writing, trace, mark: neither lives nor dies, lives on, “starts” w/ living on (testament, iterability, restance, crypt, detachment that lifts the strictures of the “living” rectio or direction of “author” not drowned at edge of his text)

——relative synonymy Derrida seeks to produce btwn triumph of life & arrêt de mort

AF p. 78-9 (n) in response to Derrida’s statement that LUn se garde de lautre pour se faire violence can only be said/ thus archived so economically in French, Bennington wonders if Derrida committed violent election of the one: Derrida says he never spoke of absolute untranslatibility, and that his affirmation of idiomaticity is always one of deferral & impurity [both were ironic?]

POOF p. 166 assonance is untranslatable [re: Reim, Heimat]

A p. 9 shibboleth effect, untranslatability (essential incompleteness of translation), borders of untranslatability w/in original language itself

PAS PAS p. (34) Blanchot writes in a way where untranslatability closes off nothing (ne ferme rien), where Witz [see p. 50], slavish and commonplace, finds itself sovereignly thwarted (déjouée)

S p. 70 that one can only think in German is a half-asleep tautology (confirmed by ideas of untranslatability of Sein, Denken, Geist)

p. 76 Geschick, Schickliche, Schicksal, Geschichte, untranslatable because this chain is deployed in its own idiomatic mission of history

FSW p. 210 it is the materiality of signifier that is relinquished in translation > when materiality is reinstated, translation becomes poetry

——since materiality of signifier constitutes idiom of dream scene, dreams are untranslatable

p. 211 for Freud, wrong to think simple translation can occur from unconscious to conscious, presupposes immobile master text > unconscious consists of archives always already transcriptions

SH p. 31 untranslatability connected w/ difficult passage (no pasarán), aporia, that isolates one poetic language from another (& multiplicity w/in language) > also ce pas impossible

p. 32 shibboleth resists translation due to that w/in it that cuts nonsignifying difference in body, mark, written, oral

p. 69n every untranslatable space, pause, calls for and provokes translation > shibboleth merges completely w/ translation in its essential dimension

TB p. 113 untranslatability less to do w/ adequation than unique occurrence of a performative of force

p. 133 sacred text is transferability making its translation untranslatable

——sacred text (absolute text): pas de sens (not poverty of meaning, but no meaning that would be itself) > sacred text surrenders itself to translation; commands right away the translation it refuses

——translation: task of pure limit, an infinite labor to rejoin (doesn’t exclude gradations, virtuality, interval & in-btwn) > can one quote a signature?

Gii p. 60 Heidegger employs idiomatic untranslatability of opposition btwn geistig/geistlich to withdraw Gedicht (“site”) of Trakl from Platonic tradition, w/ its opposition aisthēton/noeton (“sensible” material/“intelligible” spirituality), and from Christian opposition spiritual/temporal

DST DST pp. 198-99 is it a law? Derrida’s choosing or compulsion to introduce a translation of an untranslatable [re: désistement]

p. 199 tie thinking of untranslatable idiom to logic of double constraint: one must avoid avoiding, one cannot avoid avoiding, il faut, il ne faut pas

PJP p. 179 untranslatable [re: Le Parjure] resists passage across frontiers of a nation

PSSS p. 280 is Derrida or the French language to blame for the untranslatable: avoir mal, faire mal, vouloir du mal, en vouloir à quelquun?

PPT p. 4 remainders (leipsomena), remains—untranslatable

p. 5 the “interest,” the revenue of the surplus value, remains untranslatable in idiom’s economic performance, in ellipses of its trait, the word by word or trait for trait in which it contracts

TN pp. 193-94 [Derrida’s universality]: convey to “every man’s” ear that world of each person is untranslatable, that there’s never the “same world” > not incompatible premises, condition/call for one another [deconstruction Merleau-Ponty]

***AD pp. 119-20 “face” as untranslatable proper name—by virtue of an event of translation

——[re: visages] an other translation, more than a very old name, a poem composing a new accord, an other thought of translation, language unheard of by other man, other of man, other than man [übermensch?]

——to say à-Dieu to the face: call the name by name

p. 123 [other translation] Levinas: “to seek a translation that the properly religious surplus of truth already presupposes”

WOG p. 34 impossibility to read/translate Greek means those works can’t close upon themselves, already marked by irruption of other [an experience already there for the “original” Greeks]

BSi p. 175 [re: bêtise as stupidity] the remainder/remnant is untranslated/untranslatable: totality of idiomatic network that coordinates values, quasi-synonymies, homonymies (i.e. bêtise and bête)

***——but also: point dintraduisibilité (point of untranslatability, no untranslatability [at all]): no pure translation or untranslation (I can spend a page explaining what can’t be translated)

pp. 336-37 the untranslatability of bêtise (no word in world can translate it), even untranslatable from French into French > those who speak French, those privileged by the idiom, are commanded by complicated programs, contexts, pragmatic situations > privilege to unique event of language, the “poetic,” is contaminated by reactive or reactional animality [animal-machine]

EU p. 65 challenge to translation of series Bild, bilden, Bildung (image, form, formation, culture); translation of Übersetzung loses positional dimension of setzen

pp. 92-3 locate untranslatable nodes in Kant’s The Conflict…, that which doesn’t reach us, remains outside usage of our era > but, rather than simply take inventory of what no longer is, or of certain contradictions—treat the un-translatable experience in excess of dialectical rationality: as a signal that university [since its origin] can’t comprehend [translate] itself in purity of its inside

CHOR p. 95 poker-like gamble w/ no insurance: “each man and each woman must commit his or her own singularity, the untranslatable factor of his or her life and death”

UNTOUCHABLE

KH p. 95 khōra never reached, broached [entamer?], touched, exhausted: not subject, not subjectile

——a virginity rebellious against anthropomorphism, not order of eidos or mimemes

GOD pp. 55-6 tremble in fear of unpredictable, unforeseeable, the untouchability of the arrival (tremo, tromeō, tromos, tremendus), enigma of trembling and tears, what are they metaphors or figures for?

TB p. 124 Benjamin’s untouchable (unberührbar) reminds Derrida of the hymen, of the wedding gown more visibly

——untouchable: fascinates, orients work of translator

***——text will be even more virgin, intact, after passage of translation: hymen, sign of virginity, more jealous of itself after the other hymen, the contract signed, marriage consummated (untouchable remnant remains intact)

p. 126 if axiom “there is no translation of translation” were broken, one would touch, and one must not, the untouchable of the untouchable (that which guarantees originality to the original)

TN p. 6 how to touch untouchable? > la hantise of thought of touch—ou la pensée comme hantise du toucher

p. 16 can one figure an untouchable extension? difficult except for intelligible extension w/out body (Descartes, Kant) or insensible sensible (Hegel, Marx)

——Psyche the untouchable, and not only for others

p. 18 penser le toucher en touchant à lintouchable > injunction of impossible

p. 42 for Nancy, always about touching the limit, the extreme, tip, point, that which can’t be touched

p. 53 living moment of life an interiorization or expulsion? becoming-tangible of untouchable or an idealization?

p. 61 “this” and “here” of body (its sublimating idealization) makes it inaccessible to touch > an anesthesia of anesthesia, euthanasia contract

pp. 66-7 law of law > law of tact: must touch w/out touching, ne pas toucher [touch/tamper] à la chose même, & 1st of all—the law itself, the untouchable > kept at a distance by the gaze (regard), respect law rather than person, respect law as the cause of respect

p. 330n touchable-untouchable, untouchable right on/at (reste à même) the touchable, could only be announced if before any religion, cult, prohibition

p. 104 history of untouchable: immune, sound, safe, “saufle toucher

p. 105 untouchable, the excess of inaccessible beyond, the origin of figural fiction: le toucher

p. 131 always writing a story, tangent touches line/surface w/out intersection, a tangent touches one point, point is nothing, a limit w/out depth or surface, untouchable even as a figure

pp. 275-76 touch is quasi-transcendental-ontologization, quasi because touchable of touch gives itself over as untouchable (se donne comme intouchable)—figuring, fictionalizing itself

p. 367n letter (touchable), spirit (untouchable), Jews/Christians—who touches more? Hegel’s hardness of Jews

p. 298 what one doesn’t touch is part of what we call touch, and a part greater than the whole it designates; intangible (pas-pouvoir-toucher) [capacity], untouchable (ne-pas-devoir-toucher) [ethics]

p. 299 logic of limit [hymen?]: what lets itself be touched does so on its edge (sur son bord), thus it doesn’t let itself be touched/reached (ne se laisse pas atteindre)—exposing untouchable itself, the other edge of the edge (lautre bord du bord)

——one would also have to integrate the rhetoric, plus quune rhétorique quand elle franchit à chaque figure the limits btwn sensible/intelligible—finding itself on both sides of the limit

CIN pp. 23-5 why the phrase “il y a là cendre” doesn’t belong to him [Derrida] > cinder lent, given, to so many others, cinder remains virginal (the only thing he loves), in tact (intacte), the sentence doesn’t even say the cinder

VAL

OH p. 64 Valéry: Mediterranean has been a veritable machine for making culture

pp. 116-117n Valéry predicts media war & says everything fiduciary requires conventions (relays, intermediary) that destroys rudimentary life

pp. 125-26n for Valéry, logos: calculation, reason, speech, discourse, knowledge > history

BSi p. 190 for Valéry, Poe higher than anyone/anything else

pp. 196-97 Derrida points out decreasing statistical series in Valéry: seen many…visited few…played my part

VALUE

GT pp. 12-3 circular ring of “giving back (rendre),” circulation of debt not just that of things but values or symbols that are involved there (qui sy engagent en-gage) [TN footnote on engager & its evocation of pledge]

p. 54 “give time (day, life)” is to give nothing: one sees blurred lines btwn transcendental & conditioned, the fold of undecidability that permits all values to be inverted: to give life is to give death (i.e. strange crossing of idioms: “se donner le mort” means “to take one’s life [in English]”)

POOF p. 81 via Nietzsche, no longer any homes here, darkness falling on value of value, hence on the very desire for an axiomatic (a consistent, granted, presupposed system of values)

OH p. 123n spirit as exemplary example, example par excellence, of value (source of value)

PAS PAS p. (32) Blanchot’s folding displaces typical opposition, hierarchy, value of value

WM pp. 217-19 for Saussure, value in language, which allows exchange btwn words, allows metaphor, requires 1) dissimilar exchange 2) similar comparison

——value, gold, eye, sun carried along in same tropic movement

SP p. 115 acc. Heidegger, Nietzsche belongs to metaphysics because his thought aimed to culminate it [Derrida asks whether belonging has one value, and, if so, would it carry belonging beyond itself]

p. 117 once there’s valuation (valorisation) of the proper, it can never be interrupted, a permanency that is valuation itself > its necessity must be interrogated sans cesse [re: Heidegger]

GSP p. 165 in late Husserl, [quasi-Hegelian teleological reason] movement of meaning can only be a norm/value not essence

PS p. 182 for Artaud, God is false value of initial worth of what is born: this false value becomes Value, for it doubled what never existed > the work (excrement) repeats this theft, steals another part of me [dispossessing my nonexistent ur-value prior to exiting the Orifice]

FS p. 18 beauty: value & force

p. 21 in structuralism, structure: preformationsim, teleologism, reduction of force, value & duration

p. 27 when all value 1st constituted by theoretical subject, diaphanousness is supreme value, univocity > hence, difficulty in thinking genesis & mysterious failures called crises

——Husserl’s solution: forgetting is eidetically dictated, necessary, under rubric of “sedimentation” > for the development of truth

WAP p. 18 philosophical determination of indestructible responsibility, concepts of its axiomatics (will, subject, “I” w/ free will, property, self-presence of intention), can always be deconstructed

DPi pp. 127-28 for Kant, CI, eye for an eye, talionic law, surpasses value of life and all price: no law will ever be founded on unconditional love of life (life for life’s sake)—on the absolute refusal of any sacrifice of life

p. 141 both abolitionists & Kant speak of price, value, dignity above Marketpries > for Kant, jus talionis is pure equivalence not revenge, impersonal principle of reparative justice

RGE p. 271 phenomenology of mind (phenomenology in general) correspond to restricted economy, restricted to commercial values, “science dealing w/ utilization of wealth”: circuit of reproductive consumption, limited to established value of objects and their circulation

——absolute production and destruction of value escapes phenomenology as restricted economy

Gii p. 41 everything Heidegger says about man takes on meaning and value w/in oppositional limit to animal (it is dogmatic and serious)

——man’s hand infinitely removed from prehensile organs through the abyss of its being “durch einen Abgrund des Wesens

——this abyss: speech & thought

EJQB p. 67 [cf. FS p. 30 Nietzsche’s new table] breaking of Tables: rupture w/in God as origin of history

LI p. 44 SEC concerned w/ system of values associated w/ truth: repeating and altering that system

p. 136 context, if you like: entire “real-history-of-the-world” in which value of truth and objectivity have taken on meaning and imposed themselves

pp. 136-37 nothing outside text = nothing outside context [less shocking, more to think about?]; deconstruction doesn’t denounce (neither can nor ought to do so) the “values” dominant in its socio-institutional situation, its language, historical inscription of its gestures (i.e. truth)

E p. 18 poetic speech, beyond finite commerce (out of circulation), yet of infinite value: the universal analogical equivalent, the value of values; through poetry, work of mourning turns hetero-affection into auto-affection, producing maximum of disinterested pleasure

OG p. 142 (205) [early who/what] sacrifice the I am present for what I am, what Im worth: renounce my present life to achieve myself in ideality/truth > writing is the phenomenon of this battle (replaces presence by value)

VEIL [fixerup]

GT p. 167 truth of gift would be (un)veiled by veil of tears rather than sight

HASD p. 24 since promise is also an order, allegorical veil becomes political shield, solid barrier of a social division, a shibboleth

p. 44 [re: negative theology] a politics of initiation or teaching, multiplication of voices, veil (predicate) dissimulates & renders attractive at same time

POOF pp. 56-7 what chance does a feminine friend have on a stage where truth must always be veiled, prudent, where even the perhaps’ indecency might still ask truth, woman, to remain in veils

——Nietzsche’s veiled truth of decency > do veil & decency signify absence of courage?

p. 301 Blanchot [on Foucault’s death]: “the intellectual friendship that his death, so painful to me, today allows me to declare to him, as (tandis que) I recall the words attributed by Diogenes Laertes to Aristotle: ‘Oh my friends, there is no friend’” > incredible audacity of this tandis que, and the singular use of the colon, an act of punctuation that unfurls a veil of mourning—will one have ever punctuated w/ more rigor?

MSUB J p. 166 “nature” conceals even the source of its interdiction > Artaud wants to tear apart veil of birth and reveal “naked nature”

WM p. 241 as moment of detour in which truth might still be lost, metaphor belongs to mimēsis, fold of physis, veiling, when nature has yet to re-find its proper nudity

DS p. 215 at the edge of being (au bord de lêtre): the entre of the hymen, masked gap, veil of virginity (where nothing’s taken place) & consummation, penetration of antre, release [one in the other] > mirror never passed through, ice never broke, at the edge of being

p. 239 Mallarmé: as of this date, a veil

***p. 249 dialectical structure can’t account for graphics of hymen, is itself comprehended and inscribed w/in latter, separated from it only by itself, a simple veil that constitutes the very thing that tries to reduce it to nothing: desire

p. 260 the rape has already taken place and will nevertheless never have been perpetrated > caught in folds of veil: where all truth comes undone

p. 261 if veil was lifted (blind us to death) by closing or bursting

SP pp. 47-9 [re: Nietzsche’s “—Distanz!”] hyphen & exclamation mark invite us, by way of pirouette & play of silhouette, to keep distance from veils [woman] that make us dream of death

pp. 49-51 Heidegger’s Entfernung, de-ferment, distantiation of distance, veiled enigma of proximation, distance itself constituted by destruction (Ent-)

pp. 57-9 via Nietzsche, woman believes in superficiality of existence, disguising pudendum, nothing more than affair of modesty, decency > “truth” nothing but a surface, becomes desirable by way of veil; suspend the veil, or let it fall differently, no longer truth, only “truth”

pp. 59-61 [re: truth-castration as man’s affair, and woman’s suspension of it] [English translation seems horrible] Derrida is asking that we take off the head (décapitonner) of Lacan’s discourse, w/ its truth speaking, castration & phallocentrism > by deploying metaphorics of veil

***p. 107 question of style, spurring-operation, more powerful than thesis, meaning: stylate spur rips through veil, to show the veil, to undo opposition veil/unveiled (sailed/unsailed) [voilé/dévoilé]

pp. 107-09 re: veil, to delimit, undo, come undone, would this not return again to unveiling? the destruction of the fetish? as much as it is a question, this question is interminable

p. 127 like woman, like writing: il se donne en se dérobant

O p. 55 Mallarmé: lift a corner of the veil, fragment of total book—scintillate (the whole that’ll never be)

Derrida places logic of veil alongside that of corner > prelude, en passant, improbably place of dissemination

SW p. 313 sighing (together) before the “veil,” wanting to finally touch the it > to touch “veil” is to touch everything, leaving nothing intact, safe & sound: get caught up in it, nothing will remain

p. 314 waiting for a quasi-resurrection, in view of a first/last time, that has nothing to do w/ unveiling (w/ truth)

——no chance of savoir (belonging to oneself) > you’ll end up in imminence > un-veiling still movement of veil: a disappearing, drawing aside, to let something be seen, let be, to let

pp. 315-16(n) [re: Exodus 26:31] there are 2 veils/curtains btwn [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle & [holy/sanctuary] tabernacle of tabernacles [of holies/of sanctuaries] > 1st embroidered by artist, 2nd merely the work of a carpenter

p. 316 God as name of what gives the order to give the veil (btwn holy & holy of holies), veil as gift (that it is) ordered to give, gives to think separation from le tout autre (faith itself) > did this come to an end w/ death of Christ? can it be comprehended in veiled folds of Greek alētheia?

——“for they shall make a sanctuary, I shall dwell in their bosom” > veil, curtain, drape is dwelling of God, his ethos, this Who (that dwells) is also a What, a 3rd party, the Law, text of law

p. 317 absolute knowledge will not accept that there will be nothing behind the curtain (in the veiled place of le tout autre: nothing that is in the present)

p. 318 the remaining intact or tearing of the veil is the same: lune se garde de lautre > 2 liftings (deux relèves), you want to have finished w/ the veil: to have finished w/ oneself, that’s the veil

——just where you finish it—it will survive you > shroud: sums up essence of veil

p. 320 veil as “sa laisse (lead, leash, let)” > tears skin, touches, punctures, pulls, doesn’t just veil gaze; voilà, every word counts

p. 320n Celan: scarcely has an image burst in then it remains suspended in the web: half image, half veil

p. 322 verdict neither torn nor lifted cloth > if veil is neither torn nor lifted is it still not hung btwn holy & holy of holies? > who knows? we must dare the “perhaps”: “the fulgurating nearness of this day depends/tends” toward who or what I know not yet

pp. 322-23 I am so fatigued from knowing truth, that history of the veil—that truth: too old for me, too old like me (however young I remain) > you don’t know the “fatigue” I’m talking about (dreaming of writing in Spanish, forgotten ancestral language)

——infinite weariness of tropes, what do you expect, I want to end it all (protest, attestation, testament, manifesto against the shroud) > no longer write around/in/under folds of truth

pp. 323-24n complaint (of exhaustion) & accusation lodged against matrix of discourse of veil

——complain about myself to myself: immodesty, impudence > but veil makes modest

——complaint: give up all modesty, most elementary politeness

——phantasm of thing itself an effect of the veil, veiled cause of nudity/modesty/shame/Verhaltenheit, of law, everything that hides & shows the sex

——Derrida’s written too much on the veil, his penelopean works [provides a list if you think he’s lying]

p. 324 where do I get the force/desire to precipitate the verdict w/out end, to the end of time, to precipitate imminence? > my texts have pocketed veils & sails of every sex and gender [French?] (which clothed my entire history): the whole history of our culture in a pocket

p. 324(n) Derrida knows too well how to do the history of veils > there’s the fault: “commencerà bien faire” (TN. “begin to do too well” or “it’s getting to be too much”); tiresome, tireless, tired out history I’m leaving behind me, running after me

——epuisement recalls the water & the well (le puits) of truth, back to the pit, the hole (puteus)

——has Derrida left no one the right to say the veil has something to hide? that it will suffice to have done w/ veil to access Thing itself (Cause safe & intact)?

p. 325 as though fate of humanity depends again on who holds power over women about the veil (St. Paul, abusive interpretation of Koran) [sin, fall or Verfallen, therefore the veil]

p. 326 when one cannot read original language, one is lost in translations (veils, fringes or clothing, panels, wings, corners)

p. 328 culture of tallith, of shawl (not culture of veil): blessing and death

p. 329 fault or election, veil is worn as a sign of mourning

——“I’d like to be done w/ mourning [for the veil]…perhaps [H.C.] already succeeded in that”

pp. 334-35 for Freud, women discovered one technique, weaving (veiling), but really they just copied nature (pubic hair) > unveiled the means of veiling

——if tekhnē never broke radically w/ physis—why reserve this animal naturality to woman? > woman weaves like a body secreting its own textile, like a worm, a worm w/out worm, a worm concerned to hide her non-being

pp. 335-36 what if the fantasy (the arm) and truth (the unveiled) are on same side, same rib (du côté de la même côte) (man woman) [deconstruction of sexual difference] > extricate before opposing absence to presence [Freud’s penis envy]: of the Thing (Phallus, Penis, Cause) behind Veil

p. 338 unlike the veil, the tallith depends on One of the unique, singular event whose repetition repeats only, and that’s history, the “only once” of the Law given

p. 342n tallith can become a shroud [shroud is essence of veil, so, in relation to time of verdict, is tallith no longer/not yet tallith as shroud? (see pp. 312, 318)]

pp. 342-43 tallith as trace of date, event of singularity, not lifting, unfolding of veil—“even if one translates this gift of the Law as Revelation, the figure of the veil,” the taking-place of the event counts more than the “intuition & movement of vision”

***p. 344 unlike veil, tallith is the difference of the event, irreducible reference to the One, the One + n > cannot be or become (like every veil) a figure, symbol, because of the uniqueness of its reference, the untranslatable carry of this ference (which one cannot/must not get rid of)

***p. 346 “not in a hurry”: I am against those who prescribe the veil, against those who forbid it (same w/ circumcision) > people don’t realize any longer that the scholarly, secular, democratic belong to cultures of tallith & veil: contamination is everywhere

pp. 346-47 St. Paul wanted to veil heads of women & unveil those of men, he denounced children of Israel for not knowing how to lift the veil (over face of God, covenant, on heart) > he wonders how service of breath/spirit/life (not death) wouldn’t be more luminous, unveiling

pp. 349-50 [to read the corpus that has known, from operation of other, how to undo itself from veiling/unveiling] you have to write, sign in turn, countersign in writing, something else, in another language, w/out betraying injection/call of first seal

——can’t prove it happened, only swear that it did: perjury must remain possible (a duty that must be respected)

pp. 350-51 culpable edging of phallus, edges of the cut, support the veil, hold it like a roof, canvas—this theoretical toilet of the phallus is the concept > phallus is the concept: can’t oppose it, nor a “sexual theory”: unless you do something different, the way you set the sail (Benjamin)

——thought of event (moment of verdict) w/out truth unveiled/revealed, w/out phallogocentrism of greco-judeo-paulino-islamo-freudo-heideggeriano-lacanian veil, w/out phallophoria, w/out (un)veiling of phallus

p. 353 silkworm’s sex impossible to discern, the spitting outside oneself, secretion, of what will never leave it: female ejaculate, milk, sperm, fantasy of penis (neither veil, nor web)

pp. 353-54 absolute knowledge not man’s thing but that of sericulture [?] > silkworm comes back to itself in its odyssey, wraps itself in its own shroud, kind of absolute knowledge: beyond any coupling, any sexual difference or rather duality of the sexes > [Derrida’s bestiary starting up]

REST pp. 284-85 hypokeimenon as underneath, what is the fundamental ground of subjectivity? [re: Van Gogh’s shoes]: the “sole,” the rhythmic pas de contact of a march/walk/step, the ground, what about veils, the stocking (le bas), as what’s underneath the text?

p. 291 thing hidden away, wrapped up underneath its investiture

——the hiding or veiling, figure of the veil, is drawn into undecidability by the hymen

——Derrida wonders if topos of abyss (a fortiori mis-en-abyme) might dampen (amortir) the angular necessity of this other topic, other pas: undecidables, la figure du voilement, du linge voilant, lhymen, la soquette ou le bas, entre pied et chaussure

***p. 305 for Heidegger, in Origin, the abyss (Abgrund) plays itself out like “veiled” destiny (fatum) which transfixes (transit) being

p. 318 Heidegger’s step backward from truth of adequation to truth of unveiling can leave one disarmed in face of precritical, dogmatic, in face of “preinvestment” (fantasmatic, ideological)

D p. 316 tout commence donc par la citation, dans les faux plis (creases) dun certain voile, of a certain mirror-like screen

TN p. 254 Chrétian admits to a veil in finite touch, a “phenomenological occultation” of the creature

——immediacy of touch [its illusion] may be most widespread philosophical naiveté

p. 298 pudeur: elle déploie ses voiles à l'infini > must must not, because can can’t (confess/betray)

——la loi marque ainsi le sans dan le sens ou dans lexistence

a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

ATAP p. 74 numerology, Plato’s amazement w/ geometric figures, illumination, Pythagorean mysticism, vision—all belong to apocalyptic world, crypto-politics, -poetics, [for Kant] perversion of philosophy > matter of veil & castration [that is, who will unveil? who speaks w/out mastery?]

p. 75 acc. Kant, mystagogues anticipate, approach, smell out, are men of imminence & the trace, new Platonists, abuse metaphors & figurative expressions (bildlichen Ausdrücken) > they bring into play the phantom & the veil

—— via Kant, apocalypse as dream of raising (aufheben) veil of Isis

SPEC pp. 308-09 curtain (rideau): canvases, veils, hymens, umbrellas > Derrida neither has time nor taste (goût) to show how they accord to same law (accomplished by itself or done w/out)

pp. 316-17 curtains, veils, “skirt” of bed, hymen of fort:da, edge of bed (lit) [of reading?], va-et-vient, there would’ve been a hymen even w/out curtains > veil of this “skirt” is interest of bed (lit) and fort:da of all these generations

——[Derrida clearly explains the difference btwn fort/da and fort:da] “skirt” of bed, which hides the bars, forms inner chamber of fort/da, double screen which divides w/in itself—but dividing only by reassembling it w/ itself, sticking (piquant) to itself doubly, fort:da

FV p. 415 Bouhours: metaphors are transparent veils, costumes, beneath which one recognizes the costumed person

pp. 417-18 for Freud, dream recasts [Stoff] in Einkleidung (garment, disguising, falsifying), the emperor is the dreamer, the imposter is the dream

——Freud pays no attention to a fold in the text [Emperors], literary narrative is a secondary elaboration, thus an Einkleidung > since Andersens’ text has the text as its theme, it puts Freud’s text [interpretation] onstage

p. 418 hidden theme of Emperors… is the hidden theme, text as its theme, text as veil, movement of alētheia

VERACITY

HLP p. 33 ethics of veracity always a sacral ethics of sacrifice [cf. p. 289n]

p. 37 prayer (doesn’t have a delimitable space w/in language), not in jurisdiction of the lie versus veracity, where performative depends on constative claims (reference to values of truth, reality)

p. 43 for Kant, opposite of lie is Wahrhaftigkeit (true-meaning-to-say), veracity, veridicity [not truth, not reality]

p. 44 Kant: veracity a formal duty (formale Pflicht)

——for Kant, veracity as a formal condition of right, social contract, not ethical but meta-juridical, not historical: “[a lie] necessarily does harm to humanity in general”

p. 45 Kant might say: “all language is structured by this promise of veracity,” “[when you lie] you cease speaking”; Derrida: difficult to refute unless one thinks specter of possible lie that haunts veracity

——rational law of sacred veracity: condition of history, human sociality

TR p. 83 confession (a veracity of testimony) never makes concessions to lies of literature

p. 190 veracity—light

PJP p. 172 faux témoignage, contrefaçon; perhaps I have already lied by promising veracity (veracity not truth) > Western social contract capitalizes this perhaps in the act of perjury

HST p. 396 laughter that says the truth of lying: logic of symptom always stronger than an ethics of truthfulness (véracité)

VERDICT

LOBL pp. ~112-15 acc. Freud, Verdikt (verdict, sentence, arrêt): “object no longer exists,” inspires ego to break tie (Bindung) to destroyed object, manic triumph of work of mourning [?]

p. ~115 arrêt de mort as verdict

FWT pp. 122-23 can you prosecute someone who is only showing symptoms of racism? can one judge a symptom?

pp. 150-51 Kant tries to eliminate revenge, all interest, from DP (from pure, immune law), but, for Derrida, this is impossible (at least acc. Kant’s logic); interiorizing lex talionis means I inflict this punishment on myself, guilty party executes the verdict himself

POOF p. 51 Aristotle’s ‘O my friends, no friends’: a last will & testament, spoken from place of death, does not address enemies (unlike Nietzsche's living fool) > dying person turns toward friendship, living person towards enmity

p. 165 Schmitt seems to echo Nietzsche & Aristotle (fool & sage), but as a man awaiting judgment: “woe to him who has no friend…woe to him how has no enemy…”

PS p. 183 for Artaud, soteriology will be the eschatology of one’s proper body: “state…of my body…will make the Last Judgment” [when body is upright w/out detritus, w/out the work]

SW p. 312 diminishing stitch, reduce (not undo), decrescendo, “diminution” consists in saying less, letting more be understood > stitch so as to let “rhetoric appropriate the truth of the verdict”

——all your new work is neither Testament nor Odyssey? the opposite, I call them to the witness-stand, knowing they’ll always be bigger than the tapestry I’m trying to sew them into (a crossing)

pp. 313-14 diminish the infinite, diminish ad infinitum: that’s the temptation/dream since ever: but you’re doing it w/out being sure of textile to come, as if caught in sails (voiles) & pushed toward unknown, at the point of this extremity, as if someone were awaiting new Messiah, i.e. a “happy event”—nicknamed the verdict > yes, but a verdict w/out truth, w/ a due date no longer caught up in revealing a truth, the fold or unfolding of a veil—writing from distant place of as if

pp. 318-19 verdict: end of the end of history, everything is going to start again—is there a heritage looming at this instant/point of verdict? > I am no longer in question re: this unknown verdict, one that, if it came, would be so tortuous, so against the rhythm, that it would mime quasi-resurrection of new year by sealing forever the “so late, too late, sero” > “late” (always tautology) means “so late,” “too late, absolutely”

p. 322 verdict neither torn nor lifted cloth > if veil is neither torn nor lifted is it still not hung btwn holy & holy of holies? > who knows? we must dare the “perhaps”: “the fulgurating nearness of this day depends/tends” toward who or what I know not yet

p. 324 where do I get the force/desire to precipitate the verdict w/out end, to the end of time, to precipitate imminence? > my texts have pocketed veils & sails of every sex and gender [French?] (which clothed my entire history): the whole history of our culture in a pocket

pp. 327-28 Derrida’s completely white then yellow tallith; Derrida ought to have pretended to dictate this decision (to have been chosen for choice of white tallith), but verdict is aways of the other: “it is forbidden to be old” [only your fringes are old?]

——I have decided to dictate nothing as to my death

p. 340 to pray too late or à contretemps: to pray alone (“I always pray alone”); don’t keep prayer waiting, & it comes before everything, never lets itself be waited for

——prayer: before question, before “this is,” before dialogue, reply, knowledge, “neither true nor false”—even a Greek knew that [Aristotle]

——this don’t be late to prayer is how Derrida tries to calculate time of verdict awaiting him > but its evening is so internal to it, its “so late,” its “too late,” “I despair of ever effacing it, sero te amavi” [Augustine’s “late have I loved you”]

p. 342n tallith can become a shroud [shroud is essence of veil, so, in relation to time of verdict, is tallith no longer/not yet tallith as shroud? (see pp. 312, 318)]

p. 350 tallith not incommensurable w/ fetish, but a generalized not restricted fetishism (Glas); theory of fetish no longer merely a theory at moment of verdict

——w/ whole history engaged in it (Freud, Exodus, St. Paul, the en abyme of un ver à soie), thought of the event w/out revealed/unveiled truth, w/out phallogocentrism, w/out greco-judeo-paulino-islamo-freud-heidggeriano-lacanian [no christiano!] veil, w/out (un)veiling of phallus

pp. 351-52 Derrida dreams of interruption of dream, a resurrection, at the ends of the verdict, that’s not a miracle but reality of the real, ordinary reality rendered beyond fantasy, hallucination > a verdict that never stopped suspending its moratorium, stretching out its imminence

——what luck, this verdict, feared chance, “enjoyment” here nicknamed resurrection, there will be for me worse than death > price to pay for extraordinarily ordinary life toward which I would like to turn w/out conversion > such enjoyment worth more than life itself [?]

***pp. 354-55 Derrida’s call, grain of a telephone ring: véraison (vary, change color, moment of ripening)—the moment the unforeseeable reappropriation of the silkworm took place > the surprise I had to expect never makes a mistake, took place only once, demands all time given to become what it was: the verdict, what a note, what news > as if nothing evil ever happened again, or only happen w/ death: “too late” > Derrida will never tell this tale, he promised

DPi p.1 DP: arrêtée par un arrêt de justice > an end decreed by the Other, a verdict > this is not the archetype of every decision [?], though it reminds us: sovereign decision always the Other’s

pp. 138-9 “one must” come as close, in body, to those on death row, to thinking “absolute imminence of execution,” or interminable, infinitely brief, suspension of imminence, instant of execution, no more beyond, or beyond where beyond remains beyond, or beyond where salvation might come < telephone line [appeal of love]

***pp. 221-22 DP speaks in 3rd person present (can’t say: “I am no more”), copula signifies instantaneous passage from being to nothingness (“he is no more”): stigmē, Most High, Last Judgment, God’s verdict (always instant of death of a 3rd party, never me, you, us)

***p. 248n scandal of DP, dares to calculate/measure beyond measure (démesuré), incorporate the infinite/incalculable into its calculation > excessiveness, penalty w/out proportion

p. 258 phantasm of end of finitude, the other side of an infinitization, is constitutive of finitude outside any real scene of verdict/DP [?] > DP thus an acting out or an effect of truth re: our own dreams of infinite survival assured by a calculated, decisive, interruption: in these dreams we play the role of judge, jury, executioner, assistants, the condemned > force of this phantasm so strong will probably guarantee forever the double survival of DP and abolitionist protest

TR p. 100 disturbing proximity btwn pardon & last judgment (which pardon is not, pardon does not judge, foreign to courtroom), as close as possible to verdict

——“I forgive you” has structure of last word, hence its apocalyptic & millenarian aura

p. 102 guilt in the act of writing, excuse doesn’t merely accuses: carries out the verdict

EL p. 204 apocalyptô: 1) decrypting what is hidden, revelation/unveiling 2) end time, last judgment 3) catastrophe, cataclysm

——Scholem: apocalypse, form of acute Messianism

p. 205 against cosmic/cosmopolitan background of apocalypses that ideas of last judgment, resurrection of dead, & paradise/hell have appeared

p. 224 every political revolution: a return to speaking essence of sacred language [?] > this return marks moment of judgment, instance of a court (Gericht, the last judgment [Das jüngste Gericht]) w/ apocalyptic value

CF p. 33 in 1964, French law described ‘imprescriptibility’ of crimes against humanity: this phrasing has an apocalyptic horizon of final judgment, law beyond law

p. 43 equivocality, heterogeneity, confusion btwn order of forgiveness & order of justice [juridical] > one can mimic scene of “immediacy,” quasi-automatic forgiveness, to escape justice

——forgiveness has nothing to do w/ [State] judgment or public/political sphere

p. 53 France’s 1964 definition of “imprescriptible” crimes signals toward an ahistorical Final Judgment: crime never effaced from judicial archive [Derrida uses this example to evince an appeal to transcendent order of unconditional in concrete history]

p. 59 Jankélévitch/Arendt: one only forgives where one can judge/punish > supposes power, force, sovereignty

BSi p. 254 [“you’re stupid”: Cartesian, apocalyptic verdict, final judgment]

ATAP p. 84 death, another apocalypse—whoever speaks apocalyptically: truth of truth, truth as end, Last Judgment, seduces w/ unbearable pure differential vibration (the 1st)

——this death sentence, cet arrêt de mort, can only judge us, those who don’t know this secret are already dead, so… let’s make a sect, sex, gender, race (Geschlecht) by ourselves [Babel scene] > we are the only ones in the world

SPEC pp. 261-62 Beyond… is a-thetic, no (final) judgment (instance), indefinite suspension re: life death > death drive appears/disappears while telling stories, making scenes: myths, fables (literary)

——Derrida will distinguish restance from instance (judgment)

pp. 384-85 to describe structural necessity of borrowing as provisional/external fatality is classical logic [Freud often does this]: suspense is provisional, notes/coins must be guaranteed in final judgment

VIENS/VENEZ (COME)

GT p. 81 question of the “come” of the “come back” will invaginate, efface, all borders, will redouble endlessly ambivalence of gift as good or bad, gift or poison (Gift-gift)

H p. 137 proper name in its pure possibility: it’s to you yourself, I say: “come,” “enter”

LOBL pp. 134-5 chose has always signified, in philosophy, that which doesn’t arrive > hupokeimenon or rēs, substance to which accidents happen, not only its accident

——its very not-happening happens to the “Come” in its pas de chose, procès, as arrêt de mort that can’t be decided, neither life nor death

pp. ~136-37 sur-vient, the event, Nietzsche’s Doppelgänger, ghosts, consists in nothing but coming about, being gone

——apocalypse, eschatology, the “last War,” the “context” of larrêt de mort > “come” is said to event that comes about, apocalyptic superimprinting of texts

p. 162 “come”: single word, yet intertwined in series, inscribes its own effacement in middle of and on invaginated boundaries of récit, of these crypts, death or bridal chambers, hymen brings alliance & separation [after theft of key]

p. 167 “and” as arrêt de mort, “and” of double bind, and I say “come,” “and immediately"-writing, annihilates time in ring of eternal return, yokes affirmation to itself in récit, the being-at-the-same-time of the other beyond time

pp. 169-72 in Blanchot’s Larrêt de mort, 2 women, 2 voices w/out voice, tele-phone each other: “come” > how do we read this unreadable hymen? it takes place as unreadable, from bottom of crypt in which it remains > it will have taken place where it remains: that’s the proof

PAS PAS p. (21) yes, yes: force of affirmative repetition, unique call of the to-come as the will to repeat itself, affirmation that cites itself, joyous EROS, immeasurable unhappiness, irreducible contamination, affirmation risks citation, le oui qui fait dans la langue un trou aussi étrange que viens, il approuve, affirme, contresigne tout cequi est arrivé

p. (22) who is there? what can respond to viens? dislocated unity of as such, an affirmation that says yes not to a being but to what/who is to come again, there is no incompatibility, contradiction, but no dialectic, no reconciliation

——Blanchot’s récit as new thought of citation acc. EROS, repetition of yes that begins by doubling itself, récit unscathed, unique force of a viens that never reproduces itself: vienssauf

——both affirmation and contaminated as a citation

p. (24) viens calls itself, calls the call, w/ no specular reflection, gives no order, receives no order from law of laws, exchanges nothing, not a prayer, desire, demand

——question of viens, question of tutoyer, questions everything [familiarity] w/out totalizing, je voudrais que tu tapproches lentement de ce dont il y va dans ce viens

p. (26) Venez: an authoritarian, an intimate word; violence kept at furthest distance, furthest distance is near

p. (28) “Viens” upsurges (surgit) from a groundless ground (fond sans fond) of an indefinite past

p. (29) Venez says the provocation of a pas

p. (33) Derrida proposes we hear Blanchot’s viens, a coming back w/out memory (le sous-venir sans mémoire), in Heidegger’s Ereignis

pp. (40-1) “Go (Va)” says the same thing as viens, moves away at same pas, towards a place w/out passage, toward a living (vivre) qui vautpeut-être même mourir

p. (52) to say “Viens” in quotation marks, leViens,” that which we cannot avoid is missed, mais on court la chance de répéter lalliance

what i would like to give you: Viens w/out language overhang (sans aucun langage de surplomb), w/out anything that could name it, designate it from a third place

p. (54) simulacrum of circle, EROS, the double pas, he/it that says viens inaugurates it by responding déjà

p. (58) viens calls la mort de lautre, venue de lautre, who calls and names itself

——repetition of yes, yes, allies one yes to other, refolds the other, gives sens to a singularity that should have none > viens never arrives because of this repetition

p. (60) affirm viens w/out possible return or as eternal return of the other

p. (65) it is not the meaning of viens but the pas de sens that thwarts the closure of language

p. (66) Viens, at the same time unique and copy (exemplaire), Blanchot’s récits as exemplary citations, their unique power is that the unscathed possibility of unique (le sauf) remains in reserve from which “I would emerge” to say, to one of them,“Viens

p. (68) viens doesn’t give place to any order, w/out law, w/out anything namable that may be desired, demanded from a lack

pp. (72-3) double pas, before, beyond all time, resounds in viens, stairway scene, un pas de marche, w/out figure that disappears in it, w/out representation

p. (73) the one who says “I” depends by his name, in his identity, on terrifyingly ancient event of another viens, le même pourtant > the drowned (noyé) as the one who says “I”

p. (74) the call of death precedes me, it is death and the word (mort/mot) that’re called in the viens > I call myself dead, marcher in my name > w/out name before viens

p. (80) to say viens to a unique word (parole), somewhat plural (un singulier sauf à être plurielle), to say “Come” to her, that word, is to sacrifice right to call (appeler) another and say you to him [?]

p. (81) Blanchot’s tutoieing (viens) breaks w/ indiscreet familiarity, not negative theology, but describes its law, its jurisdiction, its perversion > can say toi w/out tutoieing [& reverse]

p. (86) near depthless abyss in mise en scène of “Viens

p. (87) wanting (le vouloir) to break fascination always effect of fascination? why break it? I love and desire fascination, any desire w/out it? [tu me fascine, je taime]; viens, word of fascination, defers in difference what it cannot break with—dare that another dissimulation not come

p. (88) at the indistinct edge of sea, viens said just once between us

p. (94) must be able to reject the gift, vomir ce qui tappelle à dire viens, forget in order to reject the poison, to not guard the gift

p. (102) when I say viens, I scream (hurle) and hold back (retiens) a murmur no one can hear

p. (103) death, the other name of viens (both only reach the other)

——must forget the question of your self, of your uniqueness, and love viens, the unique, not a name, not an impersonal infinitive

S p. 81 Hölderlin: Jetzt komme, Feuer!

DPi p. 123 Jesus says to Lazarus: veni foras

PIO p. 39 invention of tout autre beyond possible status, still invention because one prepares to let the other come > deconstruction is that which gets ready for the coming of the other (deconstructs this double genitive) > to invent: to “know” how to say “come” and answer “come” of other

HST p. 408 hôte always passing through, iterability, come, come back

ATAP p. 91 Derrida didn’t know when he wrote Pas that “Viens” came from John Patmos

pp. 93-4 “Come” precedes & calls event, opens scene, no theme, supports no metalinguistic citation, not an order, not a prayer, not obscurantism—just beyond “What is?” > perhaps where Ereignis and Enteignis unfold movement of propriation

——“Come” doesn’t try to lead, can always be appropriated: “I am in the act of seducing you” can always increase seduction > “Come” can always lead back higher than itself toward conductive violence, toward authoritarian “duction”

——it is une dérive, absolutely derivable only from the other—not derivable from an appropriable identity, from what’s already derivable & arrivable—w/out “rive” (source, spring, rivus)

pp. 94-5 apocalypse w/out apocalypse, w/out Last Judgment, no eschatology beyond tone of “Come” itself > the apocalypse of apocalypse [our apocalypse now], beyond good & evil: no longer collection of evil & good in legein of alētheia, in Geschick of lenvoi, or of Schicken of co-destination

VIGILANT [fixerup]

GOD pp. 15-17 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

GT pp. 15-16 be careful, ethically vigilant re: gift w/out debt, there’s calculation & ruse (economy) even in the unconscious

POO p. 20 nonresponse as form of politeness, responsible form of vigilant exercise of responsibility > one cannot or one ought not to fail to respond (ought/can strangely co-implicated, perhaps)

SPOM p. 105 Derrida admits that the right’s stance on the hypocrisy of what’s called humanitarian should be saluted, while remaining vigilantly on guard for its manipulations

***p. 120 vigilance, therefore: the dead is perhaps not as dead as conjuration deludes us into believing

POR p. 19 (153) protocols of vigilance for new Aufklärung: beware the abysses and gorges, but also the bridges & barriers, beware of opening university to bottomless outside or closing it in on itself so that it is available to any interest, or becomes useless > beware of ends, university w/out ends?

A pp. 23-4 “my death,” a flashing light at every border, it’s awake, can always see a nightwatchman (du veilleur) or a nightlight (de la veilleuse)

EM p. 136 (164) btwn 2 eves (veilles), 2 ends, of man: 1) the guard mounted around the house (la garde montée auprès de la maison) 2) awakening to the day that is coming (léveil au jour qui vient)

VM p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

——an economy of violence (economy irreducible to Levinas’ definition) that tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity

PP p. 127 pharmakon is “ambivalent,” from out of its reserve, dans son ombre et sa veille indécises, opposites are opposed, carved out (découper), crosses borders of dualities, it is the movement, locus of play: (the production of) difference, differance of difference, before opposites, not the punctual simplicity of a coincidentia oppositorum [dialectics] fonds sans fond, exceeds, nothing in itself

***PAS p. (75) vigilance (jalousie) links (enchaînant) affirmation to its repetition, bond (lien) w/out pact, w/out debt

p. (106) mais la vigilance de lautre peut aussi rester: 1) lose your name 2) can’t/don’t want to throw it away

SH p. 33 from watch tower, sentinel of vigilance, one sees shibboleths value can, tragically, always be inverted

FWT p. 28 general ethics of vigilance re: signals of phallocentrism, racism seems necessary, its caricature is in the minority, in those cases conservatives have a right to complain

pp. 167-68 “friends of psychoanalysis”—affirm necessity of psychoanalysis’ future-to-come > consider whether psychoanalysis has yet to take place “up until now” > such a vigilant “friend” affirms, says “yes,” to its “secret” space, which calls for another ethics, law, rigor

WM pp. 228-29 oppositions (physis/tekhnē, physis/nomos, sensible/intelligible, space/time, etc.) are made possible by “tropic” movements which do not make up a “proper” language; these metaphors, tropologies, obey the law of supplementarity (btwn concept and field)

——to overlook this vigil of philosophy would be to posit thesis of an essence rigorously independent of what transports it, i.e. philosophy’s unique thesis

POS p. 5 juridically decisive for Derrida to pose question of privilege of voice in Western metaphysics, represented in its most critical, vigilant form: Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology

p. 36 grammatology vigilant practice of textual division (i.e. metaphysical presuppositions occurring w/ critical motifs, i.e. Hjelmslev’s glossematics)

P (P) p. xiv if the question corresponds to a demand from the other, elle se laisse déjà précéder par une étrange affirmation > pour veiller sur elle [to guard this affirmation], peut-être faut-il dabord se rendre à la veille de la question

ROP p. 115 history of a word is neither essentialist nor nominalist, it is a history of problematizations, to analyze all problematic intersections also calls for problematization of its own problematization > avec sa vigilance réflexive et le souci de se penser dans sa rigoureuse spécificité > which must itself question itself w/ same care that it methodically prescribes

DPi p. 240 deconstructing death a task for every kind of vigilance, a task of vigilance for the vigilant > when one loves keeping watch (la veille) and vigilance, when one loves period, one may sleep—but one dreams

RGE p. 252 slumber of reason, ruse of reason, slumber in the form of reason, vigilance of Hegelian logos (engenders monsters then puts them to sleep) > la raison veille sur un sommeil profond auquel elle est intéressée

***EJQB p. 75 book is never finite, tout devra habiter le livre (everything enters into, passes through, transpires in the book) [nothing outside the text], remains suffering and vigilant (veilleuse)

p. 78 books are always books of life, or of afterlife > written questions addressed to literature are forgotten, drained, by literature (mortifications, ruses of life, life negating itself in literature to survive): writing would die of pure vigilance to question (and also simple erasure of question)

——absolute interrogation (of God) will never belong to the book

PJP p. 171 quasi “presence” of [de Man’s] spectral vigilance, gaze, we’re being observed internally by him > does not limit our freedom, sharpens our responsibility

C p. 215 tracking an exhumed body, in the wake’s wake (sillage), exultation of a funeral vigil, blackmail (faire chanter) the dead, Finnegans Wake > faire vibrer le sarcophage: sous le charme

EW p. 274 vigil or beyond of question is anything but precritical, leads us to recognize processes of differance, trace, iterability, ex-appropriation at work everywhere, well beyond humanity

BSi p. 22 translators always most vigilant, formidable readers”

ATAP p. 85 vigil at moment of end, funeral Wake [re: apocalyptic tone]

VIOLENCE

***KH p. 119 btwn text & theme, structure w/out an indivisible origin > theater of irony, w/out end, w/out bottom [abyss]; to isolate a theme, “philosophy-of-Plato,” would be to violently misrecognize, deny textual scene, questions of topology in general

p. 120 “Platonism” a necessary effect of Plato’s texts has dominated (in name of philosophy) by way of arbitrary violence (making the law) other motifs at work in the text

——turns back against the text, w/ a violent reversion that’s always interested & interesting [says same thing about Nietzsche]

pp. 120-21 “Platonism” not only neutralizes Plato’s texts, inhibiting forces that continue to maintain a certain disorder (parasitism, ventriloquism, clandestinity, tone of denial), “Platonism” command whole history of this neutralization, a philosophy would always be “Platonic”

GOD p. 62 ethical must sometimes be refused in name of responsibility that doesn’t calculate, that keeps its secret, that tyrannically [Nietzsche], jealously refuses violence of accounts and justifications, declining autobiography that is auto-justification: egodicée

GT p. 147 violence of gift: takes by surprise in such a way as to trap, indebt the receiver, place, hold in a process of circulation, but this violence irreducible whether it repeats or interrupts the circle

——or: a surprise surprising enough to be forgotten w/out delay, beyond Being, epekeina tes ousia: secret about which one cannot speak, but can no longer remain silent

FK p. 7 archival violence: exergue, capitalize on ellipse, accumulates capital in advance, anticipates so to institute (Gewalt)

——archive at once institutive & conservative [see FL], revolutionary & traditional, an eco-nomic archive: keeps, puts in reserve, saves, but in unnatural fashion (forcing obedience to law)

***p. 77 Derrida trembles when Yerushalmi declares “only in Israel” [is there future, is there past], logic of election, question of proper name, exemplarity > place of all violences

——if it is just to remember to guard and gather archive, it’s just as just to remember the others, tout autre est tout autre [invaginates]

p. 85 why have women been the victims of most lethal explosions of ethnico-religious violence in ordeal of unscathed?

pp. 85-86 holding-back, restraint (halte), inhibition, modesty: universal structure of religiosity, mystical immunity of the secret > not w/out intuitive violence, to that which remains unscathed

p. 88 sacrifice: price to pay for not injuring tout autre, violence of sacrifice in name of non-violence; w/ Kant, self-sacrifice sacrifices most proper in service of most proper

——in our “war of religion” 2 violences: 1) hypersophistication of military tele-technology 2) “new archaic violence,” counters the first & everything it represents, revenge

p. 100 the worst violence: alliance of two in pure madness of faith; or One + n, all its supplements, makes violence of itself, does violence to itself, keeps itself from the other: “religion” indemnifies itself w/out assignable end

FL p. 134 how can the force behind law be just? Gewalt: violence and legitimating authority. No anterior legitimacy to the institution of law.

p. 260 founding vs. preserving violence

p. 267 all law wants to monopolize violence, tautology of the violence of the law, protect itself [autoimmunity]; performative tautology or a priori synthesis structures any founding of law, so one can “credit” the validity of each performative, guarantee

——criminal lays bare the violence of the juridical order itself

p. 271 Derrida hesitates to call the readability of violence Lacan’s symbolic order

p. 274 criminal & prophet

——acc. to Benjamin, antimilitary pacifists fail to recognize law-preserving violence

pp. 268-269 State fears founding violence, which could justify itself external to its laws, and this founding violence already belongs to the origin of the state’s law.

p. 273 symbols of peace recall the ceremony of war

p. 275 Kant’s categorical imperative—uncontestable but “allows for no critique of violence”

——Marxist-Hegelian critique of violence in name of liberty, in name of what Benjamin calls formless freedom (gestaltlose Freiheit), are impotent, remain alien to juridical essence of violence, to “order of the law”

pp. 278-79 for Benjamin, iterability precludes great founders, initiators, lawmakers (or “great” poets for Heidegger), preserves law, thus police become figure of this iterability

——police, index of ghostly violence, exemplary figure, figures w/out limit, w/out face or figure, not simply in uniform, a formless (gestaltlos) violence, all-pervasive specter

p. 281 via Benjamin, police violence of industrial democracies denies its own principle, democratic power would have no other name than police

p. 282 from instituting violence to preserving law/contract [modern democracies] > passage from presence to representation, acc to Benjamin a Verfall, forgetting of originary violence in this differance [Derrida doesn’t see this as accidental?]

——via Benjamin, politics of compromise: denegation of open violence [LOBL p. 145]

p. 288 for Benjamin, mythological violence of law sacrifices the living, whereas divine violence sacrifices life to save the living (destructive)

p. 290 founding violence is represented in preserving violence

p. 291 [re: Benjamin’s 2 violences] undecidable on each side: 1) divine: decision w/out decidable certainty 2) mythic: certainty of the undecidable w/out decision

p. 292 Benjamin: mythic law (juridical fiction) has bastardized “eternal forms of pure divine violence,” divine violence w/out law

p. 298 Benjamin’s divine, bloodless violence cannot avoid making us shudder w/ its eery affinity to the final solution (resembles too closely to point of specular fascination) > Benjamin still too Heideggerian, too messianico-Marxist or archeo-eschatological [for Derrida]

LOBL p. 118 infinite violence [of what’s strictly called] “double bind,” double invagination, double obligation, double demand > sans arrêt and arrêt de mort, no reconciliation

p. 152 the violence of leaving a text alone, “one should refrain from” as law of text, qui se donne à lire, matched by another violence, exerted against first law in an attempt to commit to it, to draw close > violent truth of “reading” [don’t touch, shred to pieces]

H p. 15 violence of translation, foreign language imposition, for hospitality to be possible

p. anne 88 “madness in the relationship to the mother,” the very possibility of madness; p. 92 “the essence of madness must be related to the essence of hospitality, in the area of this uncontrollable outburst toward the one who is closest,” mother tongue as metaphor for “being-at-home in the other”

p. anne 94 [from mother to violence] eruption of violence which borrows its madness from mother, substituted for proximity, from hospitality to hostility > terrorism, hostage wars

AF pp. 41-42 common(unal) violence—inscribe the other as spectral/patriarchic nursling

***p. 77 Derrida trembles when Yerushalmi declares “only in Israel” [is there future, is there past], logic of election, question of proper name, exemplarity > place of all violences

pp. 77-78 injustice of the justice of the one, the unique, violence of unity

p. 78 Lun se garde de lautre pour se faire violence [the One guards against/keeps some of the other], the One erasing/keeping injustice of what it is, the One makes itself violence

SPOM p. 73 Middle Eastern violence as unleashing of messianic eschatologies, infinite combinatory of holy alliances

p. 143 spirit of past [not ghost?] convoked to anesthetize itself (sich betäuben), protects against its “own content,” protects against itself, makes you forget why and that you’re violent

POOF pp. 231-32 caught up in a responsibility w/out freedom, silent deployment of strange violence at origin of justice/friendship, dissymmetrical curving of social space, perhaps the essence of the law [law before law] when one countersigns an affirmation ‘speaking in one’s own name’ > ineluctably responsible the moment we signify, freedom assigned to us from the other > tout autre est tout autre overflows (succeeds, survives) autonomy (where law one gives oneself & name one receives conspire)

HERP p. 212 for Heidgeger, phusis: instituting institution, originary upsurging of force, power, or violence, of the Gewalten des Waltenden

EM p. 134-35 (162) [re: deconstructive method] strategic bet (le pari stratégique), radical trembling coming from outside, trembling played out in violent relationship of West to its other [its other?], whether that other is “linguistic,” economic, ethnological, political, military > military/economic violence have structural solidarity w/ “linguistic” violence

VM p. 97 Levinas drags all classical concepts into agora, they’re summoned to justify themselves in ethico-political language they didn’t always seek, must confess their violent aims

p. 99 for Levinas, violence would be the solitude of a mute glance, a face w/out speech, the neutralization of desire (what makes sight excellent for Hegel)

p. 102 “limit btwn violence and nonviolence is perhaps not btwn speech and writing but w/in each of them”

pp. 106-07 for Levinas, asymmetry, non-light, commandment are violence and injustice only in relation to finite things, Levinas’ infinite God avoids a world of pure/worst violence, of immorality itself, by being infinite, does not rage war of single, naked finite man

p. 107 “war supposes and excludes God”

p. 110 acc. Levinas, Hegel and Kierkegaard: violent & pre-metaphysical egoisms

p. 116 distinction btwn discourse and violence impossible

***p. 117 avoid the worst by vigilance that takes finitude (history) seriously: that fights light w/ light: philosopher must speak and write w/in this war of light, in which he knows he’s already engaged; the worst is night, which precedes or represses discourse

——an economy of violence (economy irreducible to Levinas’ definition) that tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity

——for Levinas, silence as peace, as discourse being called outside itself, as its telos, as a future presence > finite silence is medium of violence

p. 119 if, as Levinas says, same is violent, finite totality, then it would be more other than the other (an other totality), it would not be the same, it could not be posed w/out becoming other than itself (this is war) (“war there is”)

p. 125 would return to intentional phenomenon acquiesce to violence of fact, is there thus an irreducible zone of factuality, an original, transcendental, preethical violence? > would it be tied to phenomenality itself & possibility of language? embedded in root of meaning & logos

pp. 128-29 preethical (if this can be said), transcendental violence institutes relationship btwn 2 finite ipseities, at the same time it’s nonviolence since it opens up relation to the other (an economy)

p. 129 that other as such only appears in relation to same is violence as origin of meaning and of discourse in reign of finitude

——for Hegel (against Levinas), difference btwn same and other has no meaning in infinite, except to speak of anxiety of infinite which determines & negates itself > violence in horizon of infinite is that where differance is no longer valid, where peace would no longer have meaning

——Hegel recognized negativity, anxiety or war in infinite absolute, as movement of absolute’s own history, whose horizon is a final pacification in which alterity would be absolutely encapsulated (résumée), if not lifted up (levée), in parousia

p. 314n acc. Levinas, reciprocity of Buber’s I-thou does violence to height

p. 316n connaturality of violence & discourse as very essence of history, ethnosociological (Lévi-Strauss) information would only confirm as factual example eidetic-transcendental evidence

p. 130 least violence is the avowal of violence (against nihilism); worst violence: nothingness, unimaginable night

——infinitist dogmatism in pre-Kantian style does not pose question of responsibility of finite philosopher, overlooks irreducibility of history (infinite passage through violence)

p. 131 btwn original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, in which violence returned against violence, in which original finitude appears, in which other is respected w/in, by, the same

question of philosophy: why finitude? why must I think transcendental through ego, ipseity?

p. 137 if Being is radically foreign to ethics it is not as a counterethics, nor, as Levinas argues, is it a subordination of ethics to neutral violent power

p. 138 Being conditions respect for the other, as what it is: other > w/out Being’s “laisser-être” (of ethical commandment, freedom) violence to such a degree it couldn’t appear or be named

p. 141 a politics of “philosophy” or “metaphysics” w/out Heidegger’s thought of Being stuck in economy of violence btwn archia and an-archy

p. 144 w/ “epochs,” being-history, Heidegger permits reemergence of thought of eschatology: “Being itself…is in itself eschatological”; eschatology different from messianic eschatology in that w/ former war is not an accident that overcomes Being, war not even negative, war is Being itself

p. 146 we do not say pure nonviolence, a contradictory concept like pure violence

p. 147 acc. Levinas, nonviolent language would not use “to be,” would not predicate, predication as 1st violence > only proper nouns: pure invocation, adoration [Derrida can’t see possibility of giving in Levinas’ vision, sees only slavery]

p. 148 only in its silent origin before Being would language be nonviolent; the worst violence then silently cohabits the horizon of peace

p. 149 for Heidegger, language’s dissimulation is the 1st violence, but also 1st defeat of nihilistic violence > 1st epiphany of Being

p. 152 worst violence (what some call Judaic experience of infinitely other), when one silently delivers oneself into hands of other in the night

PP PP p. 89 pure play of traces, supplements w/out transcendental signified, no absolutely external reference, on and on infinitely, is not w/out its own violence

p. 99 (112) interpretative translation as violent as it is impotent, destroys pharmakon by forbidding access to it, leaving it untouched in its reserve

——all translations into languages that are heirs to Western metaphysics produce these violent effects of analysis

p. 146 writing kills father, opens violence, dead father as ultimate resource

PAS PAS p. (26) Venez: an authoritarian, an intimate word; violence kept at furthest distance, furthest distance is near

pp. (43-4) each pas transgresses the pas [contamination of adverb/noun]; violence of this dislocation, sur une scène tout autre, occurs, increases, when it appears not to displace anything in discursivity, consciousness, in unscathed, assured normality of language [alters subterraneanly]

——violence occurs through the unscathed, assured normality of language—a subterranean, deconstructive impact

p. (45) Derrida wants to be violent to Blanchot, won’t just call him tu, must be more violent, more discreet than him, but in a different way

p. (57) from where the right to interrupt? unjustifiable violence of interruption, nothing more servile, indiscreet, unspeakable than generalizing, appropriating the unique, breaking the seal of an absolute singularity [re: citing from Friendship, on single friendship btwn Bataille & Blanchot]

p. (77) logic of double band arrests laughter and shamelessness (limpudeur) when they shield themselves (se défendent) against anguish and affirmation > contamination btwn laughs and violations is inevitable

p. (91) Blanchot’s example of how speaking negates the existent of which it speaks: ‘This woman!’ > Hölderlin, Mallarmé, all poets, felt act of naming is marvelous/disquieting

——Blanchot: ideal negation, deferred assassination that is language, my language does not kill anyone (woman can always die, her death announced, already present in my language)

FSW p. 214 when breaching, breaking of path, becomes route (via rupta) opened in nature, in wood (hyle) [see p. 229] > violent inscription of form opposed to writing, route acquires reversibility in time & space

T pp. xxv-xxvi [deconstruction:] limitrophic violence [p. xii] imprinted acc. new types, eat margin in luxating the tympanum (relation to itself of double membrane) > [i.e.:] think singular tympanum in ear, sewn up, domesticated march, alongside several tympan of printing machine [manual]

p. xviii(n) tympanum, Dionysianism, Ariadne’s Thread, labyrinth: the bloodiness of a disseminated writing violates embouchure of philosophy, contact w/ another code, a unique event, unreadable as such, inaudible, btwn earth & sea, w/out signature [Bataille]

SH p. 51 measureless violence of breaking up rhythm of poem (Derrida says he has to)

FWT p. 3 we do not choose our inheritance, it violently elects us

p. 31 scene of rape [never completely erased] informs lovers’ desires

p. 70 “no doubt it will always be necessary to kill animals, and probably humans too, even after the universal abolition of the death penalty”

p. 75 Derrida against culture/cult of bullfighting, still can like texts by Leiris

DS p. 260 the rape has already taken place and will nevertheless never have been perpetrated > caught in folds of veil: where all truth comes undone

P p. 67 what if Überfall had structure of parergon: violent superimposition that falls on thing, enslaves it, “insults” the thing? but what if…

ROP pp. 16-7 violence of psychoanalysis, actively counters forces of resistance

——violence of psychoanalysis: turn resister into “collaborator” (Freud’s words), or then deprive patient’s defenses of all value

GSP p. 154 to impose a debate, from w/in a philosophy [that of “genesis & structure”], begins w/ aggression, infidelity, even if it can set free meaning of latent process

PS p. 328n we could not avoid the violence of the example the moment we proscribed it, but perhaps we can better understand the necessity of this incoherence

FS pp. 3-4 Derrida links structuralist obsession w/ an anxiety (inquiétude) about (sur) language, an anxiety of (du) language and in (dans) language itself

——yet, to dream of reducing this link to a sign of the times is to dream of violence: the sign is more or less, something other than a sign of an epoch

O p. 36 the 2 fictions: 1) when fiction is in service of meaning, truth is (truth of) fiction, it is low on a hierarchy, accessory to concept 2) fiction outside mimetologism affirms itself as simulacrum, disorganizes all oppositions to which teleology of book sought to violently subordinate it

CHM p. 57 doubt & Cartesian Cogito punctuated by “unprecedented” excess, overflows totality (beings, factual history, determined meanings)

——to place w/in determined historical structure risks dulling point itself (doing violence)

——violence of rationalists: good sense never divides itself enough, always determined too quickly

——Foucault’s book totalitarian? puts unprecedented excess of Cartesian Cogito in straitjacket? makes hyperbole re-enter the world: reduction to intraworldliness very meaning of what is called violence, makes possible all straitjackets

——in deconstructing Foucault, Derrida is not evoking an other world, an alibi, or evasive transcendence—a violence often the accomplice of “totalitarian” “good sense”

pp. 60–1 speech, confined to temporal rhythm of crisis & reawakening [re: Cogito as madness, then against madness] opens discourse by making a mockery, humiliating madman w/in us: movement of temporalization, historicity in general, reign of finite thought must stay close to this violence to liberate and live as speech > madman as fool of logos, of father, king, master

p. 62 vouloir-dire-lhyperbole not antagonistic to silence but its condition, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

pp. 62-3 crisis: 1) acc. Husserl, menace to reason/meaning by way of objectivism, forgetting of origins 2) krinein, choice & division btwn 2 ways: meaning, non-meaning (Parmenides’ logos and non-way [labyrinth, the palintrope]), division in which logos (in necessary violence of its irruption) separates from itself as madness, forgets its origin [back to 1)]—finitude > possibility as crisis?

——identity btwn consciousness of crisis & forgetting of it > crisis of reason: access to reason and attack of reason > Foucault teaches us to think: crises of reason in strange complicity w/ crises of madness

RGE pp. 263-64 Bataille’s sliding occurs at point, place in pattern, where old word, because of placement, slides—making entire discourse slide > violent, strategic twisting (imprinted upon language), inflects old corpus: relates its syntax to a major silence, to the privileged moment of the sovereign operation > “even if it took place only once”

Gi pp. 10-1 justification of terminological choice Dasein—a predetermination only it can command > brutal, decisive declaration of name (Heidegger proceeds by decree)

p. 15 sexual difference as the 2, a negativity, even an asexuality > (is this interpretation, Derrida asks, too violent?)

p. 17 what if neutralization (which doesn’t happen by itself) were a violent operation?

Gii p. 302n Heidegger: 2 hands clutch in haste, utilitarian violence (want #, quantity), don’t have patience of 1—the essential is not #, it’s the right time (die rechte Zeit)

REST p. 308 to make fit, at all costs, forcing things, violence, sharpen to a point, give in

——[Derrida’s countermeasure] detachment & détaille (cutting into pieces, taking away the size [point], measure of something

PIO p. 19 tain prohibits transparency & authorizes invention of mirror, is a trace of language

——tain (btwn 2 lines) is language itself [“word”] (associates/dissociates forever: Eros/Psyche) [tain like hymen?]: an unbearable violence, a perversion that obeys law of language

RM pp. 61-3 different economies of metaphoric transfer (Übertragung): 1) translation in traditional (ideal) sense: transport of intact signified into another language 2) the more violent inveigling (captatrice), seductive, transformative capture by another language, fatherland, motherland—w/ such translation, proper mother tongue violated at moment of import/export

p. 67 withdrawal of Being donne lieu to metaphysics, ontotheology, producing concept of metaphor, producing/calling itself in a quasi-metaphorical manner

——not opposed to metaphor but will limitlessly extend/load (chargera) any metaphoric trait w/ supplementary surplus value; re-trait (at once +/–), double movement of being

——word re-trait designates quasi-catachrestic violence, abuse I impose on language, hopefully justified by necessity of good, economic formalization

p. 76 repetition of incision stated violently in Riss, Ent-Ziehung, Ent-fernung, and in the Enteignen (rectraction of propriety) that hollows out every Ereignis

pp. 77-8 always plus dune language in the language: the capture of the crossing (croisement) that allies Ziehen and Reissen, this capture (à la fois violent/faithful, laissant sauf) affects the captor, abduction (captation), translation, into other’s language [French retrait, English re-tracing] > all this already at work (à loeuvre) in the other’s languages, these dealings make for a work (fait oeuvre)

TR p. 117 violence of de Man cutting out “déjà vieux” from Rousseau’s text

pp. 125-26 violence of “I”: irreducibly singular, yet nothing more universal, anonymous

——w/ reference to unjust justice [phrase Derrida admits having stolen from de Man], where the law suspends reference right as it requires it, where chacun, “each one,” is appropriated (always theft/deceit) in utterance “I” > all justice begins in perjury

p. 151 resistance of letter (force of resistance w/out material substance) affects body: dissociative, dismembering, disseminating [materiality w/out matter, formality w/out form]

WAP p. 80 chaque pas est toujours piégé, defending philosophy, destroying philosophy, using fragmentary, aphoristic, elliptical language > each can serve most violent didacticism

EJQB p. 76 does not this anxiety [in the book], this war, rest on silence of nonquestion?

——is not the writing of the question, the first violence re: the question, a first response and repose, lerrance (wandering) as history, first crisis, first forgetting, the dissimulation of lerrance?

——nonquestion, act of faith, unpenetrated certainty that Being is a Grammar, world is in all its parts a cryptogram [this nonquestion not yet a dogma]

AFR p. 53 Condillac’s corpus vulnerable, open, to violent self-serving operations [e.g. de Biran], innocently called lapses in reading: dissolving alternative opposition [btwn genesis/calculus] because unable to find literal rule of its [system’s working] statement

IW pp. 255-56 via Cohen, re: delirium of German-Jewish psyche, Derrida evokes a true symptom, can’t be made into object by scientific rationalism (violent structure of interpretation/institution)

p. 264 [theatricalization of mondialisation via Cohen] greatest violence, logocentric psychosis [Derrida ends paragraph: “end of fable, or truth of truth”] [Nietzsche’s “History of an Error”]

p. 265 history’s harshest reality, its most murderous aspects—displacements of figures?

p. 293 via Renan, brutal unity of nation requires active, selective forgetting, one can’t tolerate something at origin of nation: act of originary violence, unavowable curse

PSSS p. 270 for Freud, force against force, deferred economy of force: makes right (passage from violence to law)

D pp. 300-01 violent, arbitrary cut, scission (la coupure) necessary because beginning se plie et se multiplie; coupe-papier (letter-opener), la lame (sharp blade) de la décision, tranchant (cutting edge); la répétition hasardeuse et nécessaire du déjà-là dun (autre) texte

p. 301 knife, obsessive, phallus that threatens & is threatened, la menace du coupe-papier dont saigna la tranche rouge ouvre ou érige (which the red edge bled opens or erects), thus broaching/breaching (entamant) in a stroke (dun trait) the decision: opens mouth > operation of reading/writing

p. 311 this [re: Numbers] reinscription (writing, a machination) takes place (a lieu), il y a sa violence

p. 316 the inside of text will always have been outside it; reciprocal contamination of body proper, violent expatriation, poison affirmed—mercury in its tain

p. 355 discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

HST pp. 409-10 an example is always a substitutable substitute > “you, for example” often violent address of one who has power/authority to take hostage: inscribes possible replaceability in address to other

+R pp. 173-74 this [chromatic] tr, which works inside & outside language, is not logocentrism, not a consecration of analogy, not a hypercratylean theory of language: what’s at stake is violence & the arbitrary > it breaches (fraye) an entirely different body

C p. 187 potencies of syllable “tu” [you, silent, killed]

p. 231 inimitable ductus of pickpocket [idiom], repeating (transgression must be repeated to begin) > worst, most fatal of villainies: robbery/violation of tombs

LI p. 90 parasite can never be excluded from body “proper” > “an owner” calls it parasite (jealously defending his oikos) > whatever violently “takes place” always something of a parasite, offered hospitality, a place, by host: never quite taking place is part of parasite’s success as an event

p. 111 Limited Inc: violence of discussions in “Academic World”

p. 112 to believe intellectual field is nonviolent, apolitical, is an artifice of untenable denial, scanty analysis & voracious interest

——[Derrida’s politics] analysis and most refined, ingenious account of conditions of violence: least violent gesture, perhaps nonviolent > contributes to transforming legal-ethical-political rules in university and outside

p. 137 to no longer oppose writing to erasure (accounting for supplementary paradox) is both terrible and yet nonviolent (perhaps nonviolence itself)

pp. 137-38 that trace de-limits what it limits is why the finiteness of a context has an indefinite opening—never secure, simple > in this openness of erasure: political responsibility (where irreducible violence communicates w/ an essential nonviolence) > only the irresponsible (to be polemical) will object, those for whom things are always calculable, clear, programmable, decipherable

p. 150 always repression in stabilizing determination of a context, repression at origin of meaning, an irreducible violence > can’t say it’s “bad”

TN p. 95 touch gives nearness/proximity more than sight/hearing > proximity, proper, present

——one thinks first of all, and too much, of hands: take the gift (“Tiens!”), comprehension, prehension, captation, a plea (prière) > “tender extending” becomes violence itself: “Take that!”

pp. 127-29 intuitionistic-continuistic logic of immediacy as irrepressible as desire itself, as intractable as language constraints, grammatical violence > this law has to happen, symptoms will crop up [does Nancy really avoid this logic?]

——who could finish w/ this tempting postulation? [i.e. “smooth” desire]

p. 220 [re: Nancy quote] violently excerpted: reread everything around it [few pages later: need to read on]

ATM pp. 169-70 acc. Levinas, humanity has to undergo a de-rangement of essence “so that it won’t find only violence repugnant”

pp. 185-86 Derrida’s fault/violence against Levinas’ work can only wound Him [i.e. not EL] in his body, He/Il that preseals everything that carries a name > Derrida compares his fault to that of erasing God’s name from a book (a fault that is buried, mourned [not annihilated])

p. 187 as a woman, by reversing dissymmetry [of tout autre in Levinas], Derrida has added rape [hostage to other, raped by other?]

AD pp. 15-6 violence of host, to dare to say bienvenue: appropriate a home one has to give

pp. 33-4 violence of pure face to face (hospitable welcome, narcissistic closing [renfermement]): in double bind w/ the 3rd (protects against vertigo of ethical violence while violating its purity)

——pure face to face as oath (serment) before the letter, debt before every contract or loan (emprunt), must perjure itself in bind w/ 3rd: in operation of justice can no longer distinguish btwn fidelity of oath & perjury of false witness

——justice as law begins w/ perjury > violates; sigh of just man: “Quai-je à faire avec la justice?”

CF pp. 29-30 we are all heir to crimes against humanity, i.e. the revolutions that made this concept [human rights] possible

p. 57 all Nation-States founded in violence, all culture a type of colonialism > foundation scripted into State order to hide itself, sublimation/celebration of beginning as amnesia

***pp. 58-9 absolute victimization—no speech, stripped of any possibility to forgive (not always murder)

BSi p. 20 analogy [re: beast and sovereign] announces (like a black cloud) the historical (actual & virtual) violences, disasters we won’t (already don’t) have a name for

p. 77 Schmitt argues [and Derrida doesn’t (entirely) disagree]: Left uses hugely murderous weapon of “humanitarian,” “humanistic”

p. 108 fraternalism frees us from all ethical obligation toward our non-fellow; worst human violence committed against humans considered non-fellows

p. 144 Deleuze accuses psychoanalysis (Freud) of dispossessing (brutalizing w/ machines of war) the Wolf Man (much like Artaud’s complaint about theft of his proper name)

p. 166 use of bêtise always a stratagem, act of war, violence that intends to wound

p. 217 power that makes the law, legitimation of arbitrary violence, passes via fable

p. 271 Celan: are we not all descended from such dates [January 20th]?

p. 300 culture of curiosity, treating, curing: violence of enclosing/objectifying

p. 319 logos or legein as gathering (more originary than logos as reason/logic) still deploys force/violence, a Durchwalten of physis > physis as Gewalt: deployment of sovereignty, of force [of logos] (no dissolving into void), in the highest acuity of its (sovereign) tension (Spannung)

p. 320 logos: exercise of force or violence (Gewalt)

OG p. 18 (30-1) book as idea of totality, encyclopedia, requires external signified, is against writing and its aphoristic energy

——violence on both sides: logocentrism (book), deconstruction (text)

p. 34 (52) dehors dans le dedans, archetypal violence, sin, interrupts natural rapport of soul w/ itself, writing, exterior, as body, as clothing

pp. 36-37 (54-55) to think writing first, a perversion, dangerous promiscuity, origin ungraspable, the violence of forgetting, auxiliary meaning not living (not spontaneous); representation mingles (senlace) w/ what it represents; infinite reference (renvoi): le double dédouble ce quil redouble

——deconstruction does not make writing innocent but shows why this violence does not befall (survient) an innocent language: violence is originary > wherever there’s the sense of a right side: mythological effect of return (retour)

p. 101 (149) metaphysics: exemplary system of defense against violence of writing > what is violence if something in it is equivalent to operation of the trace?

p. 106 for Derrida, writing as violence is originary, mustn’t be abstracted or isolated, not a fall/disease incurred by an innocent language

pp. 107-08 (158) writing as possibility of road? violent spacing of nature, silva is savage, via rupta is written, form imposed on hylè

p. 110 (162) death, violence, impossibility of pure point, “point vocative,” death of absolutely proper naming (the other as pure other) is death of pure idiom

p. 112 (164-65) complex layering of 3 violences re: proper names: 1) expropriation, repetition, déjà dédoublée, arche-writing, to give name it’s forbidden to pronounce, to name what’s never present, the unique [fire in CIN, Glas] 2) secret, protective, reparatory, “moral,” conceal names 3) the scene of proper names, reassuring seal of self-identity, refers to #1 and #2, empirical consciousness, common concept of violence, revealing name by effraction: evil, war, rape (system of moral law & transgression) [see TACT/ABSTINENCE]

pp. 127-28 (185-86) writing: opening of intersubjective violence

p. 132 beyond Lévi-Strauss, who thinks literacy is an enslaving violence, Derrida sees writing as constitution of free subject in violent movement of its own effacement and bondage (enchaînement)[Derrida’s phrasing describes non-classical enslavement to a universal law?]

——how can literacy be violent when reserved for elite minority & when law demands total literacy?: universality always monopolized as empirical force by a determined empirical force

p. 140 (202) arche-writing: nonethical (violent) opening of ethics, origin of morality & immorality; no ethics w/out other, detour, simulation, differance, absence, writing

p. 240 (341-42) the violent penetration of speech, passivity, reception obliged, interiorization, “sentendre-parler”—passion: Rousseau suspects speech’s violence, the complicity of voice & heart

——dérobement of thing in speech > conceals what vision places before us: 1) interiorize thing in depth of heart 2) speech installs a fiction, a lie, we touch the simulacrum more than truth

ATAP p. 94 “Come” doesn’t try to lead, can always be appropriated: “I am in the act of seducing you” can always increase seduction > “Come” can always lead back higher than itself toward conductive violence, toward authoritarian “duction”

CIR pp. 10-12 I always dream of a pen that would be a syringe, a suction point instead of a hard weapon to inscribe, choose, calculate > no risk of bad taste or violence, glorious appeasement

p. 135 foreskin & truth (detour/delay): question of knowing by whom by what the violence of circumcision was imposed

***pp. 215-16 those who don’t admit their violence, lack of respect for evil, demand Derrida to “own up!” > to Derrida, this is the shameless forgetting of the fault: economy of the worst

p. 272 they can’t stand that I say nothing refutable (nor tenable, nor valid), my capacity for silence & amnesia, not a strategy but “violence of the void through which God goes to earth to death in me”

EU p. 23 violence comes from both sides, each term of opposition marked by other side (not simply passage btwn 2 poles): law/nonlaw, writing/speech, death/life, paternal/maternal language): always 2 forces of frayage and resistance: each bearing life/death at once

CHOR pp. 107-08 certain dissymmetry is law of sexual difference & relation to other (Derrida says this in opposition to violence of “democratic” platitudes), dissymmetry as inordinate, excessive, goes beyond coded marks, beyond grammar & spelling of sexuality

VIRGINITY

KH p. 95 khōra never reached, broached [entamer?], touched, exhausted: not subject, not subjectile

——a virginity rebellious against anthropomorphism, not order of eidos or mimemes

p. 116 [re: a logic of living memory in Timaeus] effacement (of secondary impressions) would be the figure for the middle (mil-lieu), both for space and time, would not affect originary impression (that of child), ineffaceable once engraved in virgin wax

***——what about a virgin wax that is always virgin, always older, preceding any possible impression, and thus younger, achronic, anachronistic [cf. SW pp. 322-23]

p. 125 khōra so virginal it doesn’t even have the figure of a virgin anymore

R p. 112 Heidegger: “only a God can save us (Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten)”; Derrida observes communication in Heidegger btwn retten (to save), das Heilen (the Unscathed, the safe, the sound), and das Freie (free, also, save, preserve, immunity) > in tact, untouched, purify

FK p. 100 [bottom w/out bottom of always virgin impassibility] khōra of tomorrow in languages we no longer, don’t yet, speak: makes way w/out generosity, neither divine, nor human > dispersion of ashes not promised there, nor death given

PP p. 70 “through her games, Pharmacia has dragged down to death a virginal purity and an unpenetrated interior”

VP p. 56 for Husserl, non-presence does not dissimulate, surprise, presence, it allows the ever reborn virginity of presence

OH p. 19 tout autre as virginal, completely new

FSW pp. 200-01 Freud wants to maintain a permanence of trace and the virginity of the receiving substance [see pp. 204, 223] > such apparatus almost unimaginable

——Φ neurones (no trace of impression, perceptual), Ψ neurones (retain trace)

pp. 221-22 Freud’s interest in finding virginal writing surface, a slate that does not conserve imprints, erases traces

T p. xxiii margin not a secondary virginity (but an other text)—an inexhaustible reserve, stereographic activity of an entirely other ear

p. xxvii khōra—as tympanum, watches over its margins as virgin, homogenous, negative space, leaving its outside outside, w/out mark, w/out opposition > ready to receive and repercuss type

DS p. 195 mime inaugurates: breaks into white page

——“candid virginity” of white page

p. 215 at the edge of being (au bord de lêtre): the entre of the hymen, masked gap, veil of virginity (where nothing’s taken place) & consummation, penetration of antre, release [one in the other] > mirror never passed through, ice never broke, at the edge of being

——hymen, comme tissu, envelops, outwits (déjoue) philosphemes, ontologies, dialectics, les retourne et les inscrit, suspense in the antre of perpenetration

p. 216 play of hymen at once vicious & sacred; nothing more perverse than rending penetration that leaves virgin womb in tact

p. 257n virginity (newness, wholeness) always overlaid w/ opposite—virginity submits to operation of hymen of its own accord

p. 259 “the masculine is turned back on the feminine: whole adventure of sexual difference” > in same blow: fold ruptures virginity it marks as virginity, folding over its secret > nothing more virginal (and at same time) more purloined/penetrated than secret (loses smooth simplicity of its surface)

——secret differs before letter opener separates lips of the book, divided from/by itself, like hymen > after the fact, it remains what it was, virgin

POS p. 20 transcendental signified as idea of a virgin, untouched translation

OTO pp. 17-8 the living on of an ageless virgin mother (living long enough to bury her child), & the already dead father > logic of glas, and obsequence [one finds this in Christ’s family]

TB p. 124 Benjamin’s untouchable (unberührbar) reminds Derrida of the hymen, of the wedding gown more visibly

——untouchable: fascinates, orients work of translator

***——text will be even more virgin, intact, after passage of translation: hymen, sign of virginity, more jealous of itself after the other hymen, the contract signed, marriage consummated (untouchable remnant remains intact)

TR p. 88 [re: “to swear”] délire names extraordinary coincidence of irrationality of machine (beyond my control) & absolute sincerity (authentic innocence of my intentions)

——coincidence of infinite guilt & certainty in absolute, virgin, intact innocence> btwn infinite guilt & absence of guilty conscience

p. 158 play with marionettes, Marion of the ribbon [re: Rousseau’s Confessions] as the instant of fictive generations, like all those automatic virgins ambling about btwn Gospels & Kleist

D p. 302 pure present: la plénitude inentamée, la continuité vierge de la non-coupure (not yet having been written, à la veille du jeu)

TN p. 49 Mary: Christianity’s indeconstructible [?]

CN pp. 23-5 why the phrase “il y a là cendre” doesn’t belong to him [Derrida] > cinder lent, given, to so many others, cinder remains virginal (the only thing he loves), in tact (intacte), the sentence doesn’t even say the cinder

OG p. 154 (222) supplement is maddening, it breaches/broaches (entame) our pleasure and our virginity [hymen]

CIR p. 256 day of circumcision: a de-cision was taken in me w/out me > Jealousy & virginity, my two nipples

VIRTUAL

FK p. 59 khōra, secret, desert of the desert (last desert, before the first), neither a threshold nor a mourning, btwn event and possibility, or virtuality of the event, not the desert of revelation

——a khōra w/out faith or law, an utterly faceless other

p. 62 technology & religion: “ether of religion has always been hospitable to a certain spectral virtuality” [return of virtual from OOG]

pp. 83-4 phallus, the marionette, virtuality of virtuality, distinct from penis: parade fetish, the healthy, the automatic sur-viving, faith in most living as dead

AF p. 66 repression dissimulates or encrypts the archives, archive of the virtual > virtuality removed from its oppositional coupling to actuality, effectivity, reality [re: full & effective actuality of an archived event]

p. 67 archive of the virtual, “it’s time,” no distinction between act & power

pp. 71-2 “if it is at all knowable,” an epochal suspension as energy of virtuality (energeia of a dynamis) [Agamben, Aristotle?], vertiginous, gives only condition of a future which remains to-come, messianic, an archive w/ no record of presence of what is or will have been “actually present” (distinguished radically from all messianism)

SPOM p. 10 what is effective/present about a ghost is its virtuality, ineffectivity

p. 79 speed of virtual is real

***p. 146 via Marx, players in history as inverted Schleimihls, shadows w/out body, the specter, the red specter is disincarnated > this impossibility [disincarnation of specter] isn’t it possibility itself: virtuality? mustn’t one reckon w/ this to understand history, the event-ness of the event?

pp. 212-13 the event we are prowling around (autour duquel nous rôdon) hesitates btwn singular “who” of ghost and general “what” of simulacrum; in dis-locaton, in virtual space of tele-technosciences, le messianique tremble au bord de cet événement même

SH p. 51 virtually at the same date because the originary date, as coded mark, is already a kind of fiction, singularity spoken of in generalities and fable of conventions (iterable marks)

S p. 50 Aristotle’s dynamis (potentiality) is a virtuality oriented by a telos

POOF pp. 75-7 Nietzsche’s [?] virtual ‘perhaps,’ hypothesis w/out borders [cf. PP p. 89 pure play of traces]: in the process of exhausting the flesh of our events, uttermost live of our lives > no, not in the process of exhausting us, presence of such a process too reassuring, on verge of success: an absolute virtuality from which no event could escape, all becomes simply possible

——self-immunity, an “I” that could only be mad: in the contemporaneity of an unbelievable “we,” no friends, no enemies, absolutely w/out indifference

p. 229 who invites you to read a book? i.e. to invite the word of another into your home? how many of you are there? the rejoinder, the attention promised, remains virtual

OTO pp. 5-6 borderline btwn “work” & “life”: dynamis, virtual & mobile potency, neither active nor passive, outside nor inside, not a thin line, traverses 2 bodies (corpus & body) > not an indivisible trait lying btwn enclosure of philosophemes & life of author identifiable behind name

WAP p. 42 title only has meaning virtual sentences (phrases) could give it, it gets its authority (both silent and intarissable) by capitalizing (summoning/repressing) on these virtualities

SW p. 349 signature (operation of poetic writing) must not be absolutely invulnerable: an “I” signs in the place of the wound (the other operates on us w/out knowing)—so virtual that it remains > bears bereaved memory of an unrefusable lesion > seems older than self: you may have forgotten it, but it carries on dictating all the blows of fate (as if we desired even the worst of them)

DPi p. 59 all fascination: virtual involvement w/ perversity/perversion

p. 205 DP’s spectacle continues by becoming virtual [still visible?]

***PF p. 283n a work worthy of the name always opens a virtual university, appeals to a new universal knowledge capable of “reading” it, countersigning it, assuring its tradition

HLP p. 28 revenant, irreducible species of simulacrum, penumbral light of a virtuality, neither being nor nothingness (which no ontology/mimetology could account for, subdue w/ reason)

TR p. 75 “loeuvre has a virtual future only by surviving or cutting itself off from its presumed responsible signatory” [logic of machine in loeuvre]

p. 86 passion of [Rousseau’s] faith seals virtual time of work, une oeuvre that will operate by itself, beyond its signatory (w/out [Rousseau’s] living assistance [machine])

p. 100 destined to virtuality of “sooner or later,” archive produces the event no less than it records, consigns it [archive figures a place & an instance of power]

p. 135 [re: impossible conditions of possible] place of thought that ought to be devoted to virtualization of the event by the machine: exceeds classical determinations of possibility (dynamis, power, Möglichkeit), exceeds classical opposition possible/impossible

***PSSS p. 279 psychoanalysis only possible approach, w/out alibi, to all virtual translations btwn the cruelties of a suffering “for the pleasure of it” [?] [I you we cruel-suffer]

EL pp. 213-14 for Scholem, Sprache ist Namen, being of language resides in name, not in substantive but nominal, in power of naming (verbs were once names) > Derrida (via an internal reading) adds: must be a spectral haunting, there is a specter because there’s language, language can haunt because names haunt (neither present/absent) our sentences, language summons (convoque)—category of spectral revenant (not a flower of rhetoric) figures a beyond oppositional ontologic or dialectic of presence/absence

——a dynamis, enveloped virtuality, a power of language, quasi-autonomous [that of the name]

TN p. 300 die Härte (hardness): [classically] touch resists virtualization

BSi pp. 36-9 events of 9/11: know-how of archive, technical reproducibility part of event (political-economy/power of media) > knowing how to cause fear, making known: virtuality of the worst

——no capital w/out accredited fable > w/ real effects [logic of market part of logic of war]

OG p. 185 (263) for Rousseau, virtuality (innateness) of pity—imagination (which activates reserve of pity) perverts itself, is subject of perversion > imagination awakens pity & transgresses it

pp. 185-86 (263-64) nature as limit concept—impossible equilibrium btwn reserve & desire, imagination breaks equilibrium, desire must leave its reserve; acc. Rousseau, ethics: to come closest to this limit

pp. 256-58 (363-35) light movement, chiquenaude, le doigt qui incline un monde, most eloquent model of sign (divine action), la baguette > actualizes virtual faculties dormant in man [is this God’s touch? Derrida includes varying degrees: perhaps not, perhaps, probably, certainly]

UWC pp. 209-10 “as,” “as if,” politics of the virtual (not a virtual politics) in cyberworld or cyberspace of worldwide-ization > delocalizing, virtualization of communication, publication, archivization

——where there’s trace there’s some virtualization (i.e. virtualization not absolutely novel)

p. 210 new technical “stage” of virtualization > the accelerated rhythm/extent/power of capitalization of such virtuality: digitalization, computerization, virtually immediate mondialisation of readability destabilize university habitat, topology of event no longer “campus”

p. 213 impossible attempt to link “as if” to thinking of event: what happens when “taking place” of le travail, when the place itself, becomes virtual, becomes subject to mode “as if”?

***p. 234 [all the impossibles] gift, forgiveness, invention, justice, friendship, hospitality, etc. confirm thinking of impossible possible, possible as impossible, an impossible-possible that can’t be determined by metaphysical interpretation of possibility or virtuality

VISIBILITY

GOD pp. 15-17 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

pp. 88-91 the invisible (1: visible invisible 2: absolute invisible) vs. the secret

p. 93 when Platonism, light or son of Good (invisible source of intelligible visibility) becomes Christian faith (a gaze)

p. 98 Christianity, “seeing in secret,” God the Father restores economy interrupted by the dividing of heaven from earth

p. 108 God as the name of the possibility of keeping a secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior, a witness others cannot see, other than me, more intimate with me than myself, structure of invisible interiority, God calls me, I call myself God

GT p. 6 time gives nothing to see, is the element of invisibility

p. 167 truth of gift would be (un)veiled by veil of tears rather than sight

FK pp. 54-55 revealability (Offenbarkeit), revelation (Offenbarung), which is first? former prior to all religion, or revelation the origin of light, the very invisibility of visibility?

LOBL p. 90 scene of visibility: a primal scene > that which enables us to see should remain invisible, black, blinding [Plato]

pp. 127 seeing the terrible Chose, not as something, but as seeing itself

H p. 57 blessing of visibility and daylight also what police and politics demand

SPOM p. 125 specter, frequency of the visibility of the invisible, visibility is not seen > epekeina tes ousias

p. 187 is an ingenuous reading of Marx possible? when one must go beyond the first glance, when “one must see” what doesn’t let itself be seen > what sight first misses is the invisible

HERP p. 212 acc. Heidegger, when conflict stops, when one doesn’t hear the unheard, being is no longer kept, becomes an object, a spectacle, in the quelled visibility of objects facing us

——seeing a decay like that which occurs to hearing, suffers when polemos is quelled, sight degenerates into optics > creators (poets, thinkers, statesmen) are no longer tolerated [Nietzsche]

POR p. 4 (130) via Aristotle, sight is privileged sense re: knowledge, knowing for sake of knowing linked to sight as senseless sensation (sight privileged even when no praxis in view)

HASD p. 33 light produced by sun is son of the Good (neither visible, nor sight or vision), excess itself described by what it exceeds, even negative discourse retains ontology, does not interrupt analogical continuity [btwn perceptible/intelligible sun, the Good and that to which it gives birth, allusion to triton genos, i.e. khora]

MSUB J p. 170 through the subjectile, motion of motif “assures synergy of visible and invisible”

BL p. 191 the law itself is what is invisible in each law; silence, discontinuity, w/held site

PP p. 83 invisibility of father-good-capital-origin requires supplements

p. 134 (154) writing is not a good tekhnē, not a productive art, not secure (saphes kai bebaion), like alētheia (nonsensible visibility, intelligible invisibility)

p. 167 absolute invisibility of origin of visibility, father (good-sun-capital), epekeina tēs ousias, a structure where all presences are supplements substituted for absolute origin

VM p. 93 infinitely other is invisible, vision opens illusory and relative exteriority of theory and need

p. 99 for Hegel, sight is neutral, does not consume; for Levinas, sight is not neutral, desires, but, like Hegel, doesn’t consume

p. 103 forever discreet, interrupting all historical totalities through its freedom of speech, face not “of this world”

——être derrière le signe qui est dans le monde, cest ensuite demeurer invisible au monde dans lépiphanie

PAS PAS p. (82) elles, neither subjects nor things, a visibility that can’t see itself

TC p. 238 theater of cruelty would be the closure of classical representation, but still would produce closed space of original representation (produced from w/in itself w/out master-speech) w/out alibi or invisible utopia > autopresentation of pure visibility/sensibility

VP p. 89 there is no perception, the look (le regard) cannot remain (ne peut pas demeurer)

PPHS pp. 92(n) for Hegel, theory via vision, is death of desire, desire of death > no consummation of light (can’t be eaten); theoretical: “lets objects persist freely & independently”

FWT p. 12 in evolution of punishments, we don’t shift from visible to invisible, but from one visibility to another, a more virtual one

p. 136 anonymous [death] machines, purifying neutralization of DP, ensure nothing is visible, no blood > what is called for: history/economy of blood, of sacrificial theatricality it channels [Nietzsche]

p. 159 agrees/disagrees w/ Foucault’s claim death is less visible > spectral logic invades everything: work of mourning, technē of image; visibility is deferred, perhaps, transformation of visible field > never have things been as “visible” in global space as they are today

DS pp. 203-04 out of sight (a perte de vue): hymen & dissemination > une entaille y est marquée, qui ouvre encore sur un autre texte et pratique une autre lecture, lanalyse en serait infinie

DIF DIF p 5 an order neither of sensibility nor intelligibility, can not be seen nor heard > [to see (theōrein) as understanding, to hear (entendement) as understanding]

SW p. 329 fault or election, veil is a sign of mourning

——Cixous’ seeing in mourning of the unseen

——[re: laser] this radiance requires two parallel mirrors perpendicular to cutting rays (like in nature, double mirror w/ 2 voices)

p. 332 braid of phonemes (verdict, voix, vouloir, le voir, la venue, etc.) is knotted out of sight, remains, like warp of text, untranslatable > language we inherit is never ours, which is why it can’t be translated: put it outside its self, no longer recognize its children/idiom [baby daddy]

p. 349 I do not foresee the future thus promised, I foretell it

DPi p. 2 no invisibility of DP: polis must see condemned one die > as a way for sovereign to best see itself > its sovereignty: il se voit

p. 3 stage lighting of DP, light of fire, never is sovereign more visible than when it makes itself voyante et voyeuse of execution > sovereign witnesses crime, witnesses itself, eye witness

pp. 42-3 Foucault’s Discipline & Punish: duty to see punished (devoir de voir-punir)

p. 205 DP’s spectacle continues by becoming virtual [still visible?]

WAP pp. 64-5 working w/ Bourdieu’s idea of objectification, Derrida sees an infinite task: “objectifiable” is not objectifiable: always exceeds scene of visibility

IW pp. 259-61 for Cohen, Plato overprivileged vision, intuition, in determination of eidos > Cohen links German idealism to Plato’s neglected concept hypotheton: idea as hypothesis, that’s truly German, infinite task, rigorous science > idea (not as Being but as hypothesis)

——Cohen: this method of idea linked to Plato’s logon didonai (Rechenschaftsablegung)

D p. 291 in Soller’s Numbers, only 1/ 4 surfaces donnant lieu to moment of visibility, de la présence en vis-à-vis (face-to-face), counting out the phenomenon > surface is mounted (montée)

pp. 313-14 the opening, as presence, is not noticed as opening—we’re fascinated, glued to what presents itself: we’re unable to see presence as such, visibility of visible > never present themselves

TN pp. 2-3 eyes see visibility of nothing visible, the gaze (regard), the clairvoyance—our first night

p. 4 aporias, never through with them (those worthy their name), can’t see or touch their end

p. 201 Heidegger: from Parmenides to Husserl, sight privileged as unique access to beings & Being

pp. 206-07 Merleau-Ponty: visual experience is truer than tactical experience > yet, since M.-P. often uses “example of hand,” Derrida will follow a few of his lines (ses lignes) [i.e. lines of the hand] whose tracings brouille une statique des frontières that would stabilize “parallelism” or establish privilege

——Merleau-Ponty’s invisible w/ visible

p. 209 for Merleau-Ponty, is vision the infrastructure of “thought”? > Merleau-Ponty: a unique touch that accompanies us through all experiences

p. 308 Nancy: epopteia, sight accomplished, consummation of Mystery of Sense Certainty, phallic & cephalic

AD p. 98 the 2 ways State dissimulates the face: 1) bringing to light makes face’s invisibility invisible 2) effaces its unicity in generality > both of these are the same

BSi p. 279 knowledge no stranger to power, power no stranger to seeing, having, willing > autopsic/autoptic knowledge: take power over object of knowledge

p. 291 scene, theater, visibility of autopsy [sovereign]: violence of light > enargeia of seeing, knowing; enargeia: fulguration of sun, can’t look at directly

OG pp. 35-6 (53) for Saussure, true, natural bond is that of sound & signified (not visible image of writing)

p. 36 (54) (Saussure & Rousseau) bizarre to take image for model (object)

pp. 64-5 (94-5) in Husserl’s changing premises of debate,” neither natural inside nor outside > must distinguish le son apparasissant from lapparaître du son > always divided w/in themselves btwn variance and invariability, an unheard difference, invisible > trace opens appearance

pp. 328-29n Horus, god of writing, has a substitute eye [?], god of death

p. 337n alētheia, privileged instance of a vision filled & satisfied by presence

pp. 163-64 (234) concept of supplement as blind spot (tache aveugle) in Rousseau: the not seen that opens & limits visibility

——that we know this now a priori: not a knowledge at all

p. 235-36 (335) via Rousseau, speech excites attention, the visible exacts it (la parole excite lattention, le visible lexige)—is that because the ear, always open, is more passive than sight?

p. 238 (339) Rousseau’s first allusion to writing (movement of magic wand [baguette], hieroglyph) holds itself out of reach of all distinction (all difference of need from passion)

——lorigine métaphorique de la parole ouvre un oeil au centre de la langue—visibility inscribed in the birth of voice is not purely perceptive, it signifies: writing is the eve of speech

——writing had to appear before a question of speech: need before need

p. 239 [here] Rousseau privileges writing [?]: speech draws its energy from oral picto-hieroglyphics, from the visible (which has been compared to death)

p. 240 (341-42) dérobement of thing in speech > conceals what vision places before us: 1) interiorize thing in depth of heart 2) speech installs a fiction, a lie, we touch the simulacrum more than truth

p. 306 (432) Rousseau’s bonne fête > theater w/out representation, nothing to see since visibility entame la voix vivante; bonne fête: general will, sovereignty of social contract [signifier, la mort de la fête]

VISOR EFFECT

AF p. 61 ghost can see you, you can’t see ghost

SPOM p. 5 what spirit & specter have in common, one doesn’t know if it exists, doesn’t belong to knowledge, almost unnameable thing qui nous regarde

p. 6 visor effect linked to everything we will say about specter in general > such is the difference btwn le spectre ou le revenant de lesprit, fut-ce de lesprit au sense de fantôme en general > supernatural, paradoxical phenomenology, ungraspable visibility of the invisible, the non-sensuous sensuous of Capital, intangibility of a proper body w/out flesh [see p. 156 are specter/ghost different?]

——spectral interrupts all specularity, de-synchronizes, calls us to anachrony: we do not see who looks at us

p. 7 visor effect: “to feel ourselves seen by a look which it will always be impossible to cross” > the inheritance of law

p. 8 helmet effect (authority) needs visor effect

——both mask and helmet share the (supreme sign of) power: looking w/out being seen

p. 125 specter first of all sees us

p. 141 figures of the ghost first of all faces, matter of masks, helmet, visor

pp. 158-59 Marx’s theory of ideology: the “second” ghost > incorporation of autonomized spirit [“first” ghost?], ideological (fetish) lent a borrowed body [see DEBT], second incarnation “conferred on an initial idealization,” a non-natural body, a technical body or an institutional body (helmet of ideologem or fetish under armor)

BSi pp. 5-6 the wolf looms, fabulous animal, a fantasma in sense of revenant, wolf more terrifying when not there, a metonymic substitute come to announce/conceal, to manifest/mask

——a loup [party mask], feminine visor-effect: see w/out being seen

p. 293 visor-effect: king sees w/out [his gaze, origin of his seeing, his eyes] being seen

——[during spectacle of autopsy/sovereignty] an éclat > fragment of light touches everything

VOICE

HERP p. 175 the voice, acc. Heidegger, is essentially marked, like everything at opening of Dasein, by Stimmung and Befindlichkeit—tonality, modality that is affective (not Heidegger’s words)

p. 175 Heidegger’s voice is not an inner voice like in Husserl’s LI, but the voice of the other

p. 176 voice of the friend (if originary) does not have to be friendly

POS p. 22 voice is consciousness itself when phonē is signifying substance > signifier and signified unite, signifier erases itself, exteriority of signifier reduced by spontaneous proximity

VOLUNTARISM

VP p. 29 despite passive genesis, Husserl’s intentionality is still taken in tradition of metaphysical voluntarism

S p. 38 Heidegger’s Rectorship Address—massive voluntarism?

RGE p. 267 acc. Heidegger, Hegel & Nietzsche confused voluntarism w/ essence of metaphysics

VOMIT

PAS PAS p. (94) must be able to reject the gift, vomir ce qui tappelle à dire viens, forget in order to reject the poison, to not guard the gift

***F p. xxxviii introj. as idealization, incorp. refuses metaphor of substitutive supplement, refuses introj.; incorp. fantasy takes introj.'s oral metaphor literally: vomits into inside, into pocket of cyst

OTO p. 23n for Nietzsche, importance of vomit (Ekel), learning to vomit, so as to form one’s taste, one’s disgust; Derrida refers to Hamacher’s Pleroma, Hegel and Ekel

REST pp. 380-82 play w/ se rendre, render onto, give back, surrender, give oneself back, vomit

——don’t have to render anything: just bet on the trap like others swear (jurent) on a Bible > il y aura eu à parier, ça donne à rendre, a remmettre [there will be something to bet, it gives…]

if faudrait rendreencore, donc, en se séparant, et même en laissant tomber [even in letting the matter drop, we’d render (something?)]

C pp. 203-04 disseminal spurt (projet) of semen [120 Days] does not emerge (débouche) into the other’s mouth (bouche) before the turd has been incorporated by the mouth, his own: embouchure of the remainder, vomit in economimesis

E p. 16 Kant’s exemplorality, exemplary orality, the mouth—os as absolute of every analogon: mouth is the measure of taste, of good art, it’s also the measure of bad taste (consumptive taste): one expressive (emissive) the other vomitive (emitic) > 2 means of entering/leaving the mouth

——if pure taste demands non-consumption, wouldn’t disgust (rejection) be origin of pure taste?

p. 21 logo-phonocentric system doesn’t exclude a negative, negative is its business, it’s work, it excludes what can’t be digested, represented, eaten, irreducible heterogeneity: vomit

——tautologically, vomit never lets itself be swallowed > thus causes itself to be vomited

——since, for Kant, the sensibility of the mouth also produces its ideality, vomit, for Derrida, will work on both levels as well

——Derrida interested in vomit in relation to disgust, not vomiting (which can still be reappropriated as auto-affective)

p. 22 for Kant, that which is disgusting more unassimilable than evil, the ugly, the horrible (all of which can be made beautiful)

——the ultimately disgusting is unrepresentable, lexclu absolu, if one could name or represent it, it could enter auto-affective circle of master/reappropriation > must be insensible too (unnameable, un-intelligible), the absolute other of the system [Derrida compares this structure to that of the colossal]

——unrepresentable vomit violates our enjoyment, abolishes representative distance, prevents mourning, forces one to consume w/out chance of idealization

——unrepresentable vomit gives too much enjoyment, suspends the suspension of non-consummation (which accompanies pleasure bound up w/ representation): it burns up all work as mourning work

p. 23 if mourning always consists in biting off the bit (le mors), a remainder, a corpse, the disgusting can only be vomited

——to say that the other of the system of taste is distaste (disgust) is tautological, yes > Derrida wonders whether the tautological structure (that of logos as self-same-identity) is the very form of what the exclusion (of disgust) serves to construct

—— in the third passage of Zarathustra, Nietzsche ponders what can make one desire to vomit

p. 25 Kant: smell is, in a sense, taste at a distance, it is less sociable, more primed for disgust

——what is absolutely foreclosed from Kant’s system is not vomit but possibility of vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by anything else: something that would undo the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy—its power of identification > i.e. the “in the place of,” replacement that has no proper place, no return: [the] in place of prosthesis

w/in logocentric system (w/in the name), one simply can’t name what’s outside it, to say it would be to eat it—or, what is no longer absolutely different—to vomit it

——question “what is?”: offers a paregoric parergon, constructs framework to capture energy of unassimilable, it softens, remedies, w/ speech, consoles, exhorts w/ the word

——vomit, the word, arrests the vicariousness of disgust, and thus is still an elixir for philosophy

CIN p. 53 the cinder like burning semen (semence brûlante), lava destined nowhere, when you take word into your mouth, to breathe

WAGER (BOTH EQUALLY) (parier)

WAR [fixerup]

KH p. 149n in On the Social Contract, a form of fiction, war serves to throw light on limits of social contract [and Rousseau's’ fabulous text as well]

pp. 117-18 Socrates’ desire to animate representation of political, of ideal State, by seeing it at war, in relation to death, outside of its graphical hallucination (immobility) which is the only way poets, & Sophists can speak of politics [zoographic fiction, see p. 123]

ATIA pp. 97-8 for Kant, a deus ex machina, a Maschinenwesen der Vorsehung (providential machine) regularizes course of history > man’s war is purposeful, has Triebfeder, unlike animal “war”

ATM p. 170 Levinas: in the just war waged against war, trembling, relaxed virility w/out cowardice—passivity more passive than any passivity

BSi p. 75 Schmitt: war should speak its name: be honest, honorable (Ehre)

pp. 166-67 Kant’s distinction btwn conflict (Streit) & war (Krieg): an institution (3rd party) must know exactly what the accusation means [re: bêtise] for it to achieve rational status of conflict

EU p. 50 acc. Kant, conflict (regulated, foreseeable, codifiable) vs. war (savage, natural, no institutional access to arbitration, no recourse to law)

WE (

EM p. 116 (137) hégéliano-husserliano-heideggerienne anthropology (in France) concerned itself with the concept of history but not the history of a concept, especially concerned w/ we, nous-hommes, totality of human-reality

p. 121 (144) thinking of end of man prescribed in metaphysics, in thinking truth of man > difficulty today to think an end of man not organized by dialectics of truth & negativity, an end of man that’s not a teleology in first person plural

——nous: assures proximity to itself of central being for which circular reappropriation is produced; nous: unity of absolute knowledge and anthropology, God & man, of onto-theo-teleology and humanism

——“lêtreet la langue est le nom de ce qui assure ce passage par le nous entre la métaphysique et lhumanisme

p. 123 (147) nous, we, arises (sélève) [like ghost?] [out of the folds of the 2 ends of man: 1) transcendental end 2) finitude]

p. 124 if we give up we-men (nous-hommes) in relation to metaphysical determinations (i.e. zōon logon ekhon, etc.), the proper of man remains inseparable from the question or truth of Being (this makes Heidegger’s Kehre even less pertinent)

p. 125 (149) we (determined limit) is the means by which fact of Being is recognized

pp. 125-26 (150-51) for Heidegger, exemplary being is “phenomenological,” governed by principle of principles, i.e. presence and presence in self-presence, manifested in being we are, such proximity determines factum

nous, qui sommes, proches de nous-même, nous nous interrogeons sur le sens de lêtre

pp. 126-27 (151) Dasein serves as exemplary text to read Being [chapter title: “Nous Lisant” pp. 123-36]

S p. 17 the exemplarity of we, our we, is our Mitsein, discourse w/ ourselves and others, we who question/are questioned

OH p. 7 replace “I” w/ “we” > move from feeling to axiom

AF p. 47 [re: Yerushalmi] monolinguist who says “we,” promises secrecy for a virtual response [re: Freud’s unknown conviction that psychoanalysis was a Jewish science], does Freud’s ghost murmur the secret in private [to Yerushalmi]?

FSW p. 226 we must be several in order to write, even to “perceive”

DS p. 219n Hegel: curtain hanging before inner-world is drawn away, go behind it ourselves to see [curtain-raising of philosophical we, subject of absolute knowing]

POOF p. 77 Nietzsche’s unbelievable teleiopoesis: mad “I”, suspended “we”

p. 79 who will have better represented than Nietzsche what is happening to our world, what is happening to us w/ possibility by affecting even the possibility of saying we?

ROP pp. 42-3 to say “we” when all alone, after the death of the other, is a common phenomena of destinerrance, of the letter’s never returning, une dérive interne, to which we have to return

——“we” modality of with, with the other, as guest, host, or parasite, we is always said by a single person, taking advantage, the one signs for the other (at the home of; apud, avuec, avoc, apud hoc)

p. 109 untimeliness always disturbs the contemporary who reassures him/herself in a “we” > this “we,” our “we,” is not its own contemporary

DIF DIF p. 9 [which “we” is this?]

RGE pp. 275-76 [vis-à-vis Bataille’s paradigmatic displacement, never done before: Derrida’s simili-transcendental] “we” of absolute knowledge, vulgar & natural, naive consciousness: encloses itself in circle in order to know sense, where it comes from and where it is going to

Gii p. 29 Geschlecht as idiom, a “we” that can hear Fichte’s address (not necessarily the Germans)

——organic community in nonnatural, spiritual sense

——“we” announces itself to itself from infinity of a telos of freedom/spirituality > engages, allies, promises itself acc. to circle of this infinite will

p. 30 for Fichte, “we” of Geschlecht, question of humanity (Menschlichkeit) (versus animality) > teleological essence of humanity announced par excellence in Deutschheit

p. 36 acc. Heidegger, sciences belong to essence of technology, not to technology—to its essence; technology remains plunged in a fog (noyée dans un brouillard) > we still do not think (science, no one, is responsible for this) > the most thought-provoking (das Bedenklichste): we still do not think

PIO p. 45 it is another “we” given over to inventiveness when mirror broken & tain crossed [re: “Fable”], a “we” that doesn’t find itself anywhere—not “we” of a community of human subjects

——the other is always another origin of the world, and we are to be invented > beyond being

——to invent the other is impossible, thus it’s the only invention: the invention that invents us

TR p. 74 “us”: those of us who find ourselves inhabiting this uninhabitable machine-event monster, who refuse to subordinate one to the other

IW p. 283 Fichte’s great “discovery”: ego cogito is national, Self is social, in essence a national Self, cogito not formal [Kant] but in relation to other, a history, a language, substantially national

——“I” signs first in its spiritual language

p. 284 for Fichte, conversely, nation is an ego > relates to itself via egological subjectivity

——truth of nationality is German idealism; the German spirit is the spirit of humanity

——Cohen suspects a narcissistic infatuation in Fichte’s national ego, mirror of a certain psyché, but also room for any other self in this national self, cosmopolitan logic, national self as “We”

p. 290 “we” invoked as remaining to be constituted & presupposed as most originary

PJP p. 164 can “we” disavow, perjure, forget?

p. 166 more than 1 voice in 1 voice, dispersion, threatens concept of perjury, threatens identity, threatens concept “I”; Schlegel’s “permanent parabasis of irony”

p. 186 anacoluthon, generalized, causes all “subjects” to tremble (disturbance of identification), passes border btwn fiction/reality, btwn literature/testimony > even if erases border still a highly significant structural field: the duel of friendship, the question of “us”

p. 187 anacoluthon’s metonymy blurs/complicates all frontiers, instigates all substitutions

p. 194 rapport (analogies of this rapport)—obscure alchemy that precipitates an “us”—in the shelter of/from (à labri de) some sober & inevitable perjury: we guard ourselves form perjury we inhabit

p. 195 the knowing-oneself-dead of the father: “us”?

***p. 196 the “us” of the anacoluthon, not absolute knowledge, interrupts forever: no one says better, “we are not present to the truth of us” than the acolyte

——when we are present, truth’s not there; suivre/être [see ATIA]

p. 198 ultimate signature (last pages of book) says something of debt that remains unpaid > no scene of perjury w/out forgiveness

——forgive me, we say to us

D p. 311 “we,” nonpersonal, limitless, imperfect: I, you, he cut out of a “we” never presented full face (de face)

EL p. 219 “we” of covenant, not secularized “communal subject,” countersigns by responding to commitment already taken: autobiographicity of “we” assigned by call resonating from sacred language > in sacrificial instant, one hears imminence of God’s voice’s return

——Geschlecht and Schlag (stamp, imprint) > “we” that undergoes relation to itself out of (depuis) menacing interpellation of Geschlecht by apocalyptic speech (parole)

C p. 237 Cartouches, its singular performance (hapax, only once) simultaneously entitles & signs: I sign, therefore we sign cartouche(s) [m/f]

TN p. 115 for Nancy, touching is very experience of “origin” as “plural singularity” > being w/ (cum or co-), community as co-tact > se toucher soi-même, se toucher l’un l’autre ou les uns les autres [French grammar tolerates reflexive in singular & plural]

pp. 166-67 “principle of principles” gives us no choice [?]: commands us to begin w/ “us,” that is, w/ most proper, proximate Ego; this “man,” this “we” comes before most radical phenomenological reduction, the one that suspends the world

p. 170 for Husserl, “we,” (who is this we?) immediately note difference btwn sight and touch

pp. 198-99 Merleau-Ponty’s “it is a non-coincidence I coincide w/ here” can only be upset by thinking cum otherwise, w/ Nancy: “the other turns out to be the other of the w/

——law of parting/sharing at heart of con-tact: “inoperative community”

p. 200 Nancy: Heidegger and Husserl as 2 “styles of the essentiality of the with”

p. 210 [“we” feel/touch anthropology/humanism?]

EW p. 267 “we” of Dasein, we who are open to the question, to relation to self, to what is lacking in everything that’s not Dasein: this is analogous “logic” to what Heidegger sought to deconstruct

EU pp. 168-73 [structure of matrix of philosophical discipline] is a “nondialectizable” contradiction, divided law, double law, double bind, antinomy: the fights/debates we’re talking about always oppose different philosophies

——Husserl’s transcendental community of “we” in face of “crisis” & Heidegger’s call of Being comprises, pre-comprehends, us—so we begin w/ them & otherwise:

*1st commandment: 2 ends: the cheap end, the Kantian end

*2nd commandment: local, ubiquity

*3rd commandment: teach, not teach

*6th commandment: time requirements, and “single blow (tout à coup)”

*7th commandment: place, non-place

***p. 173 only livable community (for Derrida, this is a faith in spirit of philosophy w/out dogma, murder, idiotic polemic, hateful distortion) wouldn’t shun/deny double law [i.e. a teacher must initiate/train a student while effacing him/herself in name of autodidactic tradition]

SPEC p. 274 the contractual institution that permits one to say “je-nous” > Freud’s signature engageant et représentant tous les tenants de la théorie: ça marche et fait marcher comme ça [is Derrida speaking about himself too?]

WEAVE [fixerup]

PP p. 63 text as web (toile), can dissimulate itself for centuries, regenerate its own tissue behind cutting trace

p. 65(n) histos (1. standing up of a mast, beam of loom; 2. weave 4. spider web, honeycomb of bees) of metaphor, metaphor of histos

p. 67 hypothesis of a rigorous, sure, subtle form [re: Phaedrus] is more fertile, discovers new chords, surprises w/in more secret organization of themes, names, words, unties sumplokē patiently interlacing arguments > magisterial: affirms and effaces w/ suppleness, irony, discretion

p. 122 what species of protection (amuntērion) is the dialectic? counter-poison that’s not antidote [?] > acc. Plato’s Stranger, 2 forms of artificial (poiein, protection), of the 2nd form: 1) antidote either human or divine 2) problēmata (shield, fence), either armaments or fences, fences (clôtures, phragmata) can be screens (alexētēria) or protections, finally garments, art of weaving: problematic space of protection

——[anamnesic] dialectic as antidoteness of antidote, passage btwn human & divine, before their division, also dialectic as science of sumplokē [see p. 67], art of weaving (tissage), if there are 2 sorts of texture

p. 166 [stranger (from Sophist) as first grammatologist?] grammar and dialectics can only be distinguished when truth is fully present, fills logos > but parricide in Sophist (impossibility of presence) establishes condition of discourse as diacritical principle of sumplokē

necessity of logos as necessity of parricide > absolute pre-condition crossed out by parricide at point of its arche-being—prevents difference btwn grammar and ontology

VP p. 26 Derrida: although there is no discourse w/out expressive kernel, we could almost say la totalité du discours est prise dans une trame indicative

T pp. xvi Being, understood as [philosophy’s] proper, assures w/out let up (sans relâche) the relevant of reappropriation, the law of its proper weave (tissu), the economy of its representation

p. xxv like w/ Mystic Pad, question of writing machine should upset (devrait fair basculer) space of proper body dans lentraînement sans limite des machines de machines et donc de machines à main coupée

p. xxviii intro to differance, cites, repercusses its rhythm w/out measure, incision conduite par une main aveugle pour navoir jamais vu que le part-et-dautre dun tissu > to weave (tramer) doesn’t play le jeu denchaînement, il joue lenchaînement, trouer, traverser, works on both sides (le part-et-dautre), leaves ear canal open, sous le coup dun enchaînement simulé, non-echo

WM pp. 262-63(n) by placing metaphor en abyme, Nietzsche is responsible for the need to find a new distinction than that btwn metaphor and concept

——Nietzsche takes risk of continuity btwn metaphor & concept, describes metaphorical tissue of man as spider’s web, Derrida follows web, tissu, tisser, to weave, honey bees, Marx

DS p. 213 hymenoptera, filmy membrane, uphainō (to weave, spin spider web), huphos (textile), humnos (a weave, wedding song, song of mourning), suo, suere (to sew), a little stitch (syuman), tissue on which so many bodily metaphors are written

p. 215 hymen, comme tissu, envelops, outwits (déjoue) philosphemes, ontologies, dialectics, les retourne et les inscrit, suspense in the antre of perpenetration

p. 224 simple opposition btwn activity & passivity (btwn all -er/-ed concepts) becomes too formally weak to encompass graphics of hymen, its spider web, the play of its eyelids

p. 240 paragraph woven like textile, copious veil, fabric being spread out before & stitched down, histological operation pierces/joins w/ point, nothing but text, cut through, gathered up

POS pp. 26-7 gram as differance neutralizes phonologistic propensity of “sign,” liberates “graphic substance” > gram not an element, interwoven w/ traces of other elements of chain/system

——this interweaving, this textile, is the text > produced only in transformation of another text

p. 40 gathering Derrida’s work into a “sheaf,” historic/systematic crossroads, is structural impossibility of limiting network of differance, of putting an edge on its weave, not a master-word, always finds itself in others

P p. 37 economize on the abyss: 1) textual art of reprise, sépargner la chute en tissant et repliant à linfini le tissu, multiply patches (pièces) 2) abyssal operation (formalize rules, constrain logic, reappropriate): work toward rèleve & that in it which regularly reproduces collapse

p. 39 for Kant, system of pure philosophy (metaphysics) is not yet possible; only critique is possible, produces krinein, in-between > metaphysics sews everything up, includes critique w/in

p. 94 concepts stitch up (recoudre), furnish supplement of adherence [re: completes incomplete gadget]; still, there’s a chiasma, w/ free beauty, la coupure ny laisse aucune peau, aucun tissu dadhérence: law w/out concept, w/out debt, complete because incomplete

——une fleur belle est toujours en ce sens une fleur absolument coupable absolument absoute [sic], innocente

ROP p. 11 Freud sutures the unfathomable navel, omphalos, mit dem Unerkannten (unknown, “unknowable”), navel not a provisional limit, but a night, ab-solute unknown, attaché au lieu dont il part et dont il garde la marque de naissance > not only the gap (la béance), as Lacan reads this navel

——what forever exceeds the analysis of the dream: a knot that can’t be untied, un fil, qui, pour être coupé, comme un cordon ombilical, nen reste pas moins à jamais noué [knotted even when cut], à même le corps, a la place du nombril [name?] > la cicatrice est un noeud contre lequel lanalyse ne peut rien

pp. 14-5 in Freud, weaves, knots that can’t be untangled, Geflecht (Heidegger), challenges notion of analysis as unknotting; knowing how to pull on threads, Plato’s Statesman, diaresis, the royal art (technē) of the weaver; in Goethe, “fabrication of thought”—a thousand links in one stroke (Schlag)

pp. 18-9 royal weaver of Platonic dialectic (then Aristotle, Hegel, Kant), belongs to order of ideational consciousness, cannot intervene to remove resistance of any sort

p. 30 double bind at work on examples of all undecidable figures (hymen, pharmakon…), carry predicates incompatible btwn themselves, in their very btwn, interlacing, sumplukē, chiasmatic invagination > but each one, in its sumplukē, makes up a single trace [?]

pp. 37-8 Goethe’s Weber-Meisterstück

SP pp. 99-101 Nietzsche’s style not an impregnable, infinite mastery, doesn't impeccably manipulate the snare (piège), doesn’t calculate the undecidable like Leibniz’ God (a falling back into the trap), nor does he use parody/simulacrum as a weapon, which would lead to a Nietzsche cult (interprêtrise of parody) > rhythmic blindness of hymen/margin “inscribes castration’s effect w/in itself” > dans le toile du texte, Nietzsche is lost, a spider, or spiders, unequal to the web spun

ATIA p. 57 in SW, Derrida analyzed how pubic fleece led Freud into fatality of theoretical delirium

DIF DIF p. 3 differance neither a word nor a concept, à la lettre > impossible (for essential reasons) to gather (rassembler) all usages of differance in a sheaf (en faisceau)

——Derrida uses sheaf because it marks fact that the assemblage has structure of a weaving, interlacing (dun intrication, dun tissage, dun croisement), which permits threads (lines of force/meaning) to go off again, always ready to tie (nouer) itself up w/ others

O p. 42 [re: Maldorors 6th song, exit into the real] spider w/out web to spin, instant of awakening, instant of death

SW pp. 311-12 diminish the thread—neither pretense of totality (Penelope’s ruse—don’t lose lost threads [les fils perdus], preparing a shroud) nor totality (Royal Weaver)

p. 312 diminishing stitch, reduce (not undo), decrescendo, “diminution” consists in saying less, letting more be understood > stitch so as to let “rhetoric appropriate the truth of the verdict”

——all your new work is neither Testament nor Odyssey? the opposite, I call them to the witness-stand, knowing they’ll always be bigger than the tapestry I’m trying to sew them into (a crossing) pp. 313-14 diminish the infinite, diminish ad infinitum: that’s the temptation/dream since ever: but you’re doing it w/out being sure of textile to come, as if caught in sails (voiles) & pushed toward unknown, at the point of this extremity, as if someone were awaiting new Messiah, i.e. a “happy event”—nicknamed the verdict > yes, but a verdict w/out truth, w/ a due date no longer caught up in revealing a truth, the fold or unfolding of a veil—writing from distant place of as if

p. 320n Celan: scarcely has an image burst in then it remains suspended in the web: half image, half veil

p. 332 braid of phonemes (verdict, voix, vouloir, le voir, la venue, etc.) is knotted out of sight, remains, like warp of text, untranslatable > language we inherit is never ours, which is why it can’t be translated: put it outside its self, no longer recognize its children/idiom [baby daddy]

pp. 334-35 for Freud, women discovered one technique, weaving (veiling), but really they just copied nature (pubic hair) > unveiled the means of veiling

——if tekhnē never broke radically w/ physis—why reserve this animal naturality to woman? > woman weaves like a body secreting its own textile, like a worm, a worm w/out worm, a worm concerned to hide her non-being

p. 336 for Freud (the Freud of Penismangel and pseudo-discovery of weaving), mother = matter = materia = Madeira = Holz = hylē

p. 353 silkworm’s sex impossible to discern, the spitting outside oneself, secretion, of what will never leave it: female ejaculate, milk, sperm, fantasy of penis (neither veil, nor web)

RGE p. 254 Lordship’s putting at stake of life (mettre en jeu, Daransetzen des Lebens) has meaning, it’s a moment in constitution of meaning, presentation of essence, truth

——for history (that is, meaning) to form a continuous chain, to be woven (se trame), master must experience his truth (éprouve sa vérité) (must stay alive once raised above life)

***p. 277 a text [Bataille’s] that traces, in silence, structure of the eye [illumination] > in contriving/weaving (tramer) “labsolu déchirement,” absolutely rends (déchire) its own tissue—once more “solid” and servile de se donner encore à lire

REST p. 269 for Ferenczi, deviations (écarts) w/out essential norm [re: individual variants vs. universal symbols], supplements, overgarments, rain shoes, vaginas, sheath-effect

pp. 334-35 compare two shoes (not a pair) to gaine in Glas, sheath (garment) > bisexuality of the double in 2 shoes > displace sexual decidability, opposition btwn fetish & thing (castration as truth of truth)

pp. 335-36 shoes sheath (gainent), to what profit, what sex? an undone stricture of laces, the girdle too, perhaps allows (donnerait) to be seen [Derrida quotes Balzac describing a naked, living, female foot protruding from a canvas—visitors médusés]

PJP p. 194 Derrida is unable to reconstitute whole weave in which he cuts/selects—do not judge richness of Le Parjure from shreds extracted from it, in supplemental betrayal, for needs of current demonstration

D pp. 300-01 violent, arbitrary cut, scission (la coupure) necessary because beginning se plie et se multiplie; coupe-papier (letter-opener), la lame (sharp blade) de la décision, tranchant (cutting edge); la répétition hasardeuse et nécessaire du déjà-là dun (autre) texte

p. 323 through mirror-effect (germinates/deforms), each sequence of text comprehends another > each part smaller than themselves & greater than the whole they reflect

——figure of quadrangle complicated by strange mirror [imparfait de double fond], mirror as echo that precedes origin it seems to answer > “echo” is an “incision” (X nétant constitués quen retour)

p. 355 discrete violence of incision not apparent in thickness of text [cf. EJQB p. 78]

p. 357 in scratching (gratter) on this textual matter, your recognize description of a painting, reframed, broken into, placed in another quadrilateral, w/ one side fractured: you are painting, writing while reading: tout le tissu verbal y est pris, et vous avec

+R p. 151 resonances leading you astray, what if I like words in order to be-tray (pour trahir) > (pour traiter, triturer, traîner, tramer, tracer, traquer)

p. 162 Ich [the painting, but…] can’t be found in Glas; Ich captures/draws to itself a psicultural machination rhythmed by logic of double band (bind) or so-called sheath (gaine) argument

——[sheath as scales]

——[quoting Glas] Genet’s text is not exhausted by the pocket Derrida cuts, sews, and binds: it was the text [Genet’s] which pierced a hole in the pocket first

C p. 224 royal weaver of paradigm in Plato’s Statesman

ATM p. 152 otherwise (autrement), the adverb in Otherwise than Being which wins out immeasurably over a verb, the beyond of the symplokē [linking nouns & verbs, that of essence], leaving a chain of traces, another symplokē [beyond essence]

pp. 155-56 Levinas negotiates his negotiation w/ the unnegotiable in a way where he negotiates the negotiation (he reties the thread, weaves his interruptions of the same), to give the other a chance [Derrida refers to a double negation here], reprend dans sa toile lhistoire de toutes ses ruptures

——interruptive breakthrough occurs, ineluctable au moment même when Levinas’ philosophical récit claims to reappropriate the tear (déchirure) w/in the continuum of its (sa) texture

p. 157 Levinas’ “en ce moment même” [of reappropriation] obligated by the second “en ce moment même” [of interruption] > forms a text w/ its own tear (déchirure), this “series” does not enclose the Other but opens itself up from out of irreducible difference—before any present moment

p. 162 no tear (déchirure) possible in Levinas’ text w/out a certain notching (échancrure) of the 2nd moment, and certain contamination btwn the 2 > he likes the tear he detests contamination

p. 163 “metaphors” of seam and tear (couture et déchirure) obsess Levinas’ texts

p. 165 series (file, sequence, lineage…), seira (chord, chain, lasso…), sero (interlace, braid…), eirō ties interlacing of lace, the symplokē of discourse & the link

p. 172 how to cite when Levinas places the whole language (French & Western) btwn quotation marks? at same time “he” is in quotation marks: the nameless signatory w/out authorial signature, “he” who undersigns every work, met en oeuvre tout ouvrage

——[Levinas’ work] a fabrication of quotation marks crocheting a text w/out edge (bordure): seriality irreducibly knots a text to a language

——infinite law of quotation marks suspends all reference, work enclosed in a borderless context it gives to itself (se donne à elle-même), while making absolute reference to command of tout autre

LG p. 239 [all this due to Blanchot’s layering play w/ récit (recite, story, true account)] the other enunciates a decision: tears the toile (canvas, web) of a text as it envelops itself indefinitely in itself

WESTERN (THEATER)

TC p. 233 Western theater dispossessed of its life, removed from affirmative essence, from the origin on, [such dispossession] the very movement of origin, of birth as death > offspring of this movement: man

pp. 236-37 perversion of theater, not simply its absence or forgetting > authority of the text

p. 238 Western “illness,” incapable of wanting, victim of formal habit

p. 249 idea of impossible theater of cruelty [Master Morality], w/out representation, which begins in repetition, doesn’t help regulate theatrical practice but helps conceive of its origin, limit, horizon of its death > Western theater encompassed w/in its own possibility, but repetition steals its center

PPHS p. 101 philosophy began in West because China grounded itself to a halt w/out opposition btwn substance and subjective freedom, could not reflect

POS p. 19 “everyday language” neither innocent nor neutral, language of Western metaphysics, carries w/ it considerable presuppositions

PS p. 190 Western theater is decadent because it has broken away from Danger: Artaud, like Nietzsche, but via theater, wants to return us to Danger as Becoming

FS p. 4 the possibility of speech & of being always already w/in it [historicity?], la répétition enfin avouée, extended to the dimensions of world culture—[of] a surprise incomparable to any other, a surprise responsible for Western thought

DPi p. 270 “cost of life,” what’s worth more than life? surplus value of life—“sur-viving” that would be ultra-life (more than life in life) [re: DP as theater of life, theater of sur-vival]

RGE p. 271 negative theology: still reserved, perhaps, a “superessentiality,” an indestructible meaning? > touching on limits & greatest audacities of discourse in Western thought

OG p. 304 (430) for Rousseau, theater worked by profound evil of representation (Darstellung—put there before), luxury, fine clothes, adornment (parure), dissipation

p. 305 (430-31) acc. Rousseau, comédien (actor) vs. orateur/predicateur: former doesn’t signify anything, best case accepts role he incarnates, worst case despises role, a representer emptied of what he represents

p. 306 (432) Rousseau’s bonne fête > theater w/out representation, nothing to see since visibility entame la voix vivante; bonne fête: general will, sovereignty of social contract [signifier, la mort de la fête]

WHEEL

R p. 10 wheel as invention that returns one to oneself: auto-telic

p. 18 mondialisation, is it democracy or theogony? celestial vault itself used to be represented as turning wheel

p. 19 roué trickster deserves the wheel, respects nothing, sort of a voyou

WHO/WHAT

GOD p. 142 “who” can forgive, “what” can forgive? (who/what—impossible delimitation); Question of God: 1) can someone else forgive you? 2) can you forgive yourself?

R p. 86 to think democracy [Paulhan], to think “first to happen by (le premier venue),” at limit of “who” or “what,” living being, cadaver > “first to happen by” = “first to come”?

p. 87 singularity, a who beyond subjectivity

***p. 91 democracy opens public space by granting change of tone (Weschsel der Töne), irony as well as fiction, simulacrum, secret, literature > this undecidability [“I continue to believe”] only radical possibility of letting/thinking what comes about by arriving of whoever arrives [see p. 87]

SPOM p. 129 “who” testifies to “what”? one never precedes the other

p. 212 event hesitates btwn “who” of the ghost and general “what” of the simulacrum

BL p. 187 who judges & according to what criteria

pp. 203-04 to have rapport w/ law one must have no rapport w/ law, remain ignorant who/what it is

p. 207 knowing neither who nor what is the law: literature begins

H p. 131 we let ourselves be interrogated by certain figures of the foreigner, “what?” “who?”

——question of foreigner, question of response and responsibility

MPM p. 149 love, friendship, memory (moment two impossible promises are involved: “to what,” “to whom” are we destined) pledged beyond death, beyond what we call, without knowing what we speak, death; it involves, from the 1st moment, in reverse, the other is dead in us

A pp. 33-5 absolute arrivant: singularity of “who” arrives or neutrality of that which arrives

POOF p. 6 the question who or what is the friend? a protestation in name of the friend, in name of the name: resists reduction to dominant concept of political, ethical, ontophenomenological > a political allure that is not so political

——tís, who and what in Greek, why doesn’t this make Aristotle tremble?

p. 240 question “What is (tí estin) friendship?” & “Who is the friend (either sex)?” is nothing but the question “What is philosophy?”

pp. 298-99 desire in lovence (friendship or love) engages me w/ a particular him or her, a singular ‘who,’ desire of the call to bridge (à franchir) the distance (nécessairement infranchissable), where a politics of lovence would no longer imply motifs of community, which always risks bringing a brother back > risk must still be assumed to keep question of ‘who’ from being politically enframed (arraisonner) by schema of l'être-commun

OH p. 5 what/who (what concept/what real individual, singular entity)

PAS PAS p. (22) who is there? what can respond to viens? dislocated unity of as such, an affirmation that says yes not to a being but to what/who is to come again, there is no incompatibility, contradiction, but no dialectic, no reconciliation

SH p. 35 date is a witness, but one can bless date w/out knowing to “what” or for “whom” one bears witness, always possible there’ll no longer be a witness for this witness

FWT p. 60 absolute hospitality, risk, exposure to “who” comes, when love arrives > must maintain concept of this horizon w/out horizon, it can’t become a political/juridical concept

ATIA p. 64 suis of Qui/Que suis-je? (both être and suivre) the little third party as copula, comes btwn subject and itself, worries it (sacharne), hounds it, to hunt itself in the mirror

SW p. 316 “for they shall make a sanctuary, I shall dwell in their bosom” > veil, curtain, drape is dwelling of God, his ethos, this Who (that dwells) is also a What, a 3rd party, the Law, text of law

PF p. xxxii concept w/out concept of resistance, brought in line (after twists/turns) w/ desistance, especially restance (restance in Glas: being “nothing,” w/out substance, upsets ontological question “What is it?”—older than distinction btwn “who” and “what”)

TR p. 105 machine & event: btwn the “who” & “what”

p. 128 Rousseau’s “I was as if,” the theft of the “I”: one cannot steal a “what” w/out stealing, even raping, a “who,” a woman, child, man

PSSS p. 260 the who and the what of what arrives, the arrivant, the event, makes outdated in advance the question about it that always comes too late

HST p. 411 grave substitution (one worthy of name), life for another, or life for something (contaminate logic of who w/ what, ethics w/ arithmetic, arithméthique) > (fetishism is only a figure of this)

pp. 416-17 Derrida using logic of substitution to complicate “what,” thing, “who,” person > “one +”—its substitute can always be what one calls a “what”

TN pp. 68-9 touch who, touch what, coup, caress, biting kiss

——the who of the touch not necessarily human or male

p. 136 touching-power (pouvoir le toucher): 1) force of power, free, sovereign, potency 2) reserved virtuality, dunamis, capability

——touching has potential or power to touch personal pronoun “who” and definite article “what”

p. 293 Redlichkeit (probity), exact can be a virtue (who to whom), not just objective (what)

p. 309 greatest risk, try to know to “whom,” not about “what,” you’re talking

EW p. 260 Derrida’s “subject”: a place or non-place in a text, an instance (w/out stance) for some “who,” a “who” besieged by problematic of trace and differance, of the je[c]t as destinerring of missive

pp. 262-63 not necessary that singularity be translated by “who” or remain privilege of “who”

——Heidegger and Nietzsche, in spite of their distrust for substantialist or subjectivist metaphysics, endorsed the “who,” subtracted “who” from deconstruction of subject

p. 280 link the question of “who” to the question of “sacrifice,” phallogocentrism as a schema of carnivorous virility

p. 283 Derrida links denegation of murder, in the putting to death of the animal, to the violent institution of the “who” as subject

CF p. 38 “who,” “what,” do you forgive? from “whom,” for “what,” do you ask forgiveness?

BSi p. 137 “who” and “what” sink into indifference, into the abyss of who-becoming-what (death)—becoming what we will have always been

pp. 137-38 talk of the bottom (fond), the profound, believing in depth [of “who” or “what”] will never be free from bêtise (stupidity) > sovereign & beast as bottomless bottom, abyss, vertigo

pp. 160-61 bêtise as becoming “what” of “who”—monument, stone, becoming-thing of proper name

p. 183 force-differential (unconscious mechanisms) btwn which tension/contradiction bound to localize > bêtise on both sides: side of sovereign (who), side of beast, the stupid, the other (what)

p. 187 [feminine?] marionette: btwn who/what, sensible/insensible—tekhnē btwn art & technique, btwn life & politics

pp. 198-99 in Monsieur Teste, a Nietzschean kind of superman, infinitely cunning and infinitely bête solitary types: incalculable/hyperbolic arithmetic turns “who” into “what”

——quoi as coite from quietus (silence) [who > what: silencing]

p. 251 [via Celan via Büchner’s Dantons Death] art as species of marionette > marionette: an allegorical personification of technē, technical who and what

p. 264 for Heidegger, in the questioning essence of man, man comes to himself as “who” not “what” (ipseity [Selbst] before any “I,” individual, we or community)

p. 277 an autopsy [the seminar too?], the becoming-what of the who?

response to questions “so what, so who?” meant to enrich my science, knowledge, conscience through onto-logy, theatrical theorein (optical gaze) > sovereign autopsy

OG p. 142 (205) [early who/what] sacrifice the I am present for what I am, what Im worth: renounce my present life to achieve myself in ideality/truth > writing is the phenomenon of this battle (replaces presence by value)

CIR p. 135 foreskin & truth (detour/delay): question of knowing by whom by what the violence of circumcision was imposed

WILL TO POWER (NIETZSCHE-LIKE?)

GT p. 54 “give time (day, life)” is to give nothing: one sees blurred lines btwn transcendental & conditioned, the fold of undecidability that permits all values to be inverted: to give life is to give death (i.e. strange crossing of idioms: “se donner le mort” means “to take one’s life [in English]”)

MC p. 349 [Nietzsche’s etymologizing in On Genealogy] méchance (mean, bad, low): bad luck; malchance: Austin’s “infelicity,” parasite (breach of contract) [the clinic, those who fell (ill)]

FL p. 234 force used strategically in deconstruction, risks substantialism or irrationalism if its differential character is not stressed

p. 289 for Benjamin, what is sacred is the justice of life not mere life

HERP p. 207 the force forces itself (sefforce, sich erkämpft), Being comes, emerges, made apparent, her(aus)stellen, combines herausstellen, herstellen, ausstellen “produces some slaves, but others are free”

p. 210 polemos forms the unity, “in the conflict with the other the world comes about (In der Aus-einandersetzung wird Welt)”

MONL p. 47 someone in Derrida flatters himself to understand a domineering murmur beyond grammar, bow to a more hidden rule, last will of language entrusted only to me [see p. 49], last heir of French language: play the role of hero-martyr-pioneer-outlaw-legislator [Nietzsche]

***LOBL p. ~124-25 writing is triumph, manic life-after-life insurance, indiscreet, exhibitionistic, even if we read no “that’s me there” in it (this increase in discretion is more surplus-value of triumph), supplement of triumph, enough to make you sick

——Derrida says this against Nietzsche: triumph over oneself is also a pursuit of power (Gewalt)

POO p. 31 [Zarathustrian-like retraction of testimony]

——[Derrida’s passion?]: the absolute solitude of a passion without martyrdom

SPOM p. xix Derrida’s instant, spectral moment, furtive & untimely

p. 25 Hamlet complains that the law stems from vengeance before Nietzsche, before Heidegger, before Benjamin

p. 93 where determined concept of man finished > là lhumanité pure de lhomme, de lautre homme et de lhomme comme autre commence ou a enfin la chance de sannoncerde se promettre > in an inhuman or a-human fashion

p. 140 the great specter of classical tradition (Rome) is convoked (positive conjuration) to allow one to rise to height of historic tragedy

A pp. 34-5 [compare Derrida’s arrivant to Nietzsche’s master]

p. 81 Marranos that we are, whether we know it or not, incessantly older & younger, untimely histories, still waiting for the other in a last word infinitely finished

VM p. 107 Man is a God arrived too early, a God who knows himself forever late in relation to the already-there of Being (qui se sait à jamais en retard sur le déjà-là de lÊtre)

p. 130 [Nietzschean logic] Levinas’ eschatology would’ve had to have kept its promise already, even if no longer being able to occur w/in a discourse of eschatology

PP p. 120 (137) [re: Socrates renouncing pleasure for truth] one must be careful, in symptamotological manner of Nietzsche, to diagnose the economy, linvestissement et le bénéfice différé sous le signe du pur renoncement, sous la mise du sacrifice désintéressé

pp. 164-65 when the Stranger (in Sophist) thinks parricide, writing, this requires superhuman strength, risks madness

——Stranger insists he thinks to and fro (anō kai katō) and is not scatterbrained (manikos)

OH p. 72 any decision that does not endure antimony is a dangerous mystification, immorality plus good conscience, good conscience as immorality

VP p. xxviii must—refers to “force of law” [see end of Lacan’s Sinthome] [Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values in VP]

p. 88 what “begins” “beyond” absolute knowledge: unheard-of thoughts, sought across the memory of old signs [see “new demand” in On the Geneal…]

S pp. 122-23n acc. Valéry, spirit is negative dialectics, “always says no,” and to itself, spirit opposed to life/nature [Nietzsche-like]

TC pp. 232-50 [see

THEATER OF CRUELTY

]

p. 243 via hieroglyph, theater of cruelty will restore the sacred, which man-God representative system destroyed > man has been separated from life by God

p. 246 for Artaud, like Nietzsche, life beyond being, “the beyond of being,” Being as eternal repetition, ideal referral, victory of God/Death over life [cf. PS pp. 192-95]

p. 247 theater/festival of cruelty could only take place one time, w/out reserve, return, economy, history, must be forgotten, à la Nietzsche’s active forgetting (aktive Vergesslichkeit)

p. 249 idea of impossible theater of cruelty [Master Morality], w/out representation, which begins in repetition, doesn’t help regulate theatrical practice but helps conceive of its origin, limit, horizon of its death > Western theater encompassed w/in its own possibility, but repetition steals its center

T p. xv [Derrida’s oblique ear—not perpendicular—to hear the margins] tympanum squints (louche) [so does the slave who loves secrets in On the Geneal…]

pp. xv-xvi luxating philosophical ear, set loxōs in logos to work, une tout autre forme dembuscade, lokhos, block correspondence muffling other hammer [speaks to him w/ third ear]

p. xviii(n) un autre tympan > tympanum, Dionysianism, labyrinth, the spiral walkways of a shell stretched out to sea, ramps don’t hold [play w/ limaçon and conque]

SH p. 14 meridian binds (“das Verbindende,” both binds and connects), provokes, at noon, the encounter [shortest shadow], example of law > “a date would be the gnomon [nom, shadow, not mine] of these meridians”

FWT p. 128 beyond good and evil: only country of literature

p. 138 against Adorno’s “no poetry” > instead, a call for writing, just thought: to be faithful to an other one cannot internalize, categorize, justice to be invented [Nietzsche’s legislator]; “a voice of sheer silence,” [Laporte, Une voix de fin silence] enjoins us to begin again tout autre

p. 136 anonymous [death] machines, purifying neutralization of DP, ensure nothing is visible, no blood > what is called for: history/economy of blood, of sacrificial theatricality it channels [Nietzsche]

p. 151 DP as impossible evaluation of debt (Nietzsche says some strong things on subject)

pp. 172-73 Derrida follows Freud’s breaches & openings, a reaffirmation of reason “w/out alibi,” goes against a certain historical concept of reason, can even provoke thought beyond “power,” “drive for power,” drive for sovereignty

POOF p. 112 a hyperbolic build-up (surènchere) perhaps the origin of good & evil, both beyond being (Plato’s Good in Republic), a hyperbole common to both, makes them pass one into the other

DS p. 244 distinct trait of each genre finds itself commanding the work, employs discrepancy in its very structure [will to power], what remains is to find genres communicating

POS p. 5 juridically decisive for Derrida to pose question of privilege of voice in Western metaphysics, represented in its most critical, vigilant form: Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology

p. 14 risk meaning nothing, start to play (i.e. archi-trace, archi-writing, reserve, brisure, articulation, supplement, differance; there will be others) [Derrida as prophet of himself]

p. 26 “there are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces”

ROP pp. 27, 120n deconstruction as practice of critico-genealogical return (remontée), also counter-genaological, genealogy risks archeo-genetic motif

ATIA pp. 41-2 Bellerophon, figure of hunter, hunting/taming the Chimaera: Ecce animot, a chimera, neither species nor gender, living multiplicity of mortals, monstrous hybrid

FS pp. 5-6 structural consciousness a catastrophic one, simultaneously destroyed & destructive (destructuring) > decadence, period proper to all movement of consciousness [Nietzsche]

DIF DIF p. 17 Nietzsche: “difference of quantity is the essence of force, the relation of force to force”

RGE p. 335n laughter’s burst does not maintain itself (not negative), laughs at Aufhebung

p. 264 science of sovereignty (if not impossible) > independent like lordship, puts itself at stake—but does not want to maintain itself, does not govern itself nor anything [no subordination]

PJP p. 201 Christian marriage a machine of death: give oneself death as one pretends to be giving oneself life, to life, life to one’s children > ***Christianity marries everything

***PSSS p. 279 stranger [Derrida] speaks badly (mal) of evil, doesn’t believe in sovereign good or sovereign evil > he only suffers from it, but hopes to make it known

LI pp. 42-3 illocutionary/perlocutionary force (Nietzsche)

p. 149 Derrida’s uneasiness about using words “force” and “power” [eg. Foucault’s micropowers]—he has 3 conditions for using them: 1) no power/force, only differences of power/force (like Nietzsche) 2) realize the greater force could be the “lesser” 3) account for fact that force/power quickly trapped in ruses of mastery

TN p. 274 touch as self-touchingle toucher plus tout autre sens (dizzy rhetoric), very form of space & time & will (essence of will) (from Descartes to Kant or even to Nietzsche)

——to will is to will to touch, strange tautology, bends/folds oneself back into fold of passive-active auto-affection > this affect, that inflects/conjugates passive activity of will: desire

***AD pp. 119-20 “face” as untranslatable proper name—by virtue of an event of translation

——[re: visages] an other translation, more than a very old name, a poem composing a new accord, an other thought of translation, language unheard of by other man, other of man, other than man [übermensch?]

——to say à-Dieu to the face: call the name by name

WOG p. 33n Derrida explains why he prefers to speak of force (differential force) rather than power or will to power > anti-voluntarism, etc.

BSi p. 181 Derrida intentionally using “a Nietzschean-style language more acceptable to Deleuze”: force, differential, intensity (not Freudian unconscious)

p. 183 force-differential (unconscious mechanisms) btwn which tension/contradiction bound to localize > bêtise on both sides: side of sovereign (who), side of beast, the stupid, the other (what)

OG p. 323n (13n) theological prejudices even when atheist

pp. 154-55 supplement not only procures an absent presence, it distances, masters, protects: supplement transgresses and à la fois respects interdict (acc. to play/difference of forces)

***p. 288 (408) [extremely Nietzschean description of difference & hierarchy] [re: heterogeneous factors of space to which one and same “proper” body relates, re: boustrophedon]

p. 314 (443) [beyond good & evil] no more evil (mal) in substitution once one sees it’s a substitution of a substitute

ATAP pp. 94-5 apocalypse w/out apocalypse, w/out Last Judgment, no eschatology beyond tone of “Come” itself > the apocalypse of apocalypse [our apocalypse now], beyond good & evil: no longer collection of evil & good in legein of alētheia, in Geschick of lenvoi, or of Schicken of co-destination

EU p. 110 since founding responsibility occurs by acts/performance, interrogation of philosophy no longer simply belongs to philosophical setting, question inseparable from act of foundation > foundation of new university law is necessary: to say it’s necessary is to say one has to take [a new kind of] responsibility for it [Nietzsche] [what’s beyond philosophy in philosophy]

SPEC p. 365 [re: Freud’s Beyond…] malignant tumors also “narcissistic,” unleash themselves w/out concern for other cells, for the rights of authors or of succession

p. 399 pleasure—ungraspable limit btwn 2 limits, un en-deçà et un au-delà qui réduisent un pas à rien

producing itself, regenerating: only pleasure, pleasure as counter-pleasure, band contra band, tout se passe alors dans des différences de bandage—not general economy (absolute expenditure) but strictural economy (to the point of its inevitable collapse)

p. 402 “set (ensemble)” of stricture, a unity that’s not subject/consciousness, begins by binding itself (se-lier) in differential relation w/ itself—it destines itself (se destine), which doesn’t mean: il arrive

p. 405 power (posts) as transcendental predicate (not to be confused w/ death drive or repetition compulsion, gives us w/ what to describe them) > still, though borrowing descriptive traits from Bemächtigung, death drive & repetition compulsion overflow power > there is only differance of power, whence the posts, “will to power” [?]

pp. 408-09 for Nietzsche, pain is not in opposition to pleasure, will to suffer constitutes very aspiration of will to power [?] > would beyond the PP, for Nietzsche, be affirmation of life rather than return to inorganic [?]

——Nietzsche [Will To Power (699)]: one does not react to pain, it causes one to take a step

WITHDRAWAL (OF BEING) (

***GOD p. 32 contamination btwn: 1) renouncing oneself, denying the gift, as the generosity of the gift that must withdraw itself (se retirer), se cacher, sacrifice itself in order to give 2) repression that transforms gift into economy of sacrifice

——a heterogenous trembling that apprehends, gives oneself death in a new way

p.147 plea for forgiveness in inheritance of God’s retraction; God’s retraction, a double coming-back, covenant only sealed through repetition [Noah is twice forgiven], God goes back on himself; dissymmetrical contract of Covenant supposes double trait of this retreat (re-trait) (Entzug)

POOF p. 242 via Heidegger, philía as opening, accord, in essential relation w/ phúsis as covering up, dissimulation of self > phúsis qua philía: lune, comme lautre, garde ce rapport à la fois généreux et jaloux à elle-mêmeelle aime à se cacher, krúptesthai phileîn > le retrait de la pudeur [decency] donne ici le mouvement même: gives the gift (donne le don), accords phúsis and philía

PP p. 167 disappearance, retrait of father’s face (good-sun-capital) is movement of differance, which opens to writing, which writing opens for itself, threatens hierarchical interiority of pharmacy

S pp. 104-06 from masculine spirit (that chases and hunts) to feminine soul (that guards and nourishes), the trait, re-trait (Riss from fire-writing), engraves sadness in spirit’s relation to itself, soul bears the sadness

p. 111 wouldn’t Jews, Moslem, Christians respond to Heidegger’s retrait, flame and fire-writing in promise? [messianic echoes]

SH p. 17 date not there, w/ draws in order to appear, there are dates (just like there are ashes), even if they don’t exist

SP pp. 141-43 for Heidegger, forgetting of a being incommensurable w/ forgetting of Being: [Derrida quotes Heidegger: can’t understand forgetting as a human fact, as omission, Being not umbrella of distracted philosopher, forgetting attacks essence of Being, is the Destiny of the essence of Being]

RM p. 64 Verhüllung (veiling), Verborgenheit (being-hidden), Being withholds (se retient), withdraws (se retire) (sich entzieht), retrait

pp. 64-6 quasi-metaphor of Being, since it is nothing, since its as obliterates its as such

——metaphysics as tropics, corresponds to an essential withdrawal of Being > Being, the metaphor of metaphor (quasi-metaphor), overload of a supplementary trait, fold: re-trait

p. 66 metaphysics can only be exceeded, withdrawal of Being, if metaphor withdraws—insofar as metaphor is a metaphysical concept > finding no proper

p. 67 withdrawal of Being donne lieu to metaphysics, ontotheology, producing concept of metaphor, producing/calling itself in a quasi-metaphorical manner

——not opposed to metaphor but will limitlessly extend/load (chargera) any metaphoric trait w/ supplementary surplus value; re-trait (at once +/–), double movement of being

——word re-trait designates quasi-catachrestic violence, abuse I impose on language, hopefully justified by necessity of good, economic formalization

——re-trait as chiasmatic invagination of borders [?]

p. 68 unlike metaphors that give us access to the unknown, “withdrawal of Being” gives us to think less Being or metaphor than the Being or the metaphor of the withdrawal—gives us to think more about the the way, the vehicle, the making-way

p. 70 Being, which is nothing: makes possible metaphoricity & its withdrawal

——no proper term in this écart sans écart

pp. 70-1 to state condition of metaphoricity nonliterally: withdrawal by which what is distanced (entfernt) in the non-near of proximity is withdrawn & sheltered

p. 71 plus de métalanguage > toujours une métaphore de plus au moment où la métaphore se retire (in opening out [évasant] its limits)

p. 72 isn’t there a metaphor of withdrawal that authorizes one to speak of ontological difference and withdrawal of metaphor?

pp. 75-6 metaphysical unity of opposition determined only “starting from (à partir de)” the re-trait of the trait > the “starting from” sy abîme lui-même

——Being’s inscription narrive quà seffacer, cf. differance/trace

LI p. 35 the confrontation btwn Austin & Derrida confirmed and developed in Sarl’s process of withdrawing it

TN p. 22 [Nancy’s] garder: points to truth’s verity (veritas, Wahrheit), and economy; is garder compatible w/ retrait (withdrawal), w/ retenue (holding back, retaining)

p. 95 for Nancy, offering in the gift is the “withdrawal of the gift,” of its being-present

pp. 105-06 cela se touche: “it itself touches itself,” “one touches it, it lets itself be touched” > imagination: possibility auto-affecting its essence of a nonessence: it is touched, in a movement de retrait ou de re-pli, becomes at moment it touches untouchable [re: imagination “touching” sublime]

ATM p. 186 acc. Levinas, man, monotheistic man, has a unique relation to the ab-solute retrait of the revealed Name

AD p. 36 discretion: manifestation & withdrawal in the face [the woman?]

p. 62 trace of withdrawal, of face, visitation, unforeseeable, messianic visit, the “passing (passée)” of guest > dislocates temporal presence and representation, exceeds anamnestic representation

CIN p. 43 essence of cinder (its cinder itself): the insistent pharmakon of a plural body (doesn’t belong to itself) in which the retreat of fire disguises itself > if there is cinder, fire remains in retreat

pp. 57-59 Derrida’s not accumulating surplus value, speculating on some cinder capital, but making a withdrawal (retrait), to try his luck on a gift w/out the least memory of itself, un retrait (retreat, retracing) w/ no relation to what he just did, what he’s about to tell you

BSi pp. 261-62 unheimlich: 1) worrying aspect of foreignness as intimacy of one’s own home 2) says the essential bearing of Celan’s “Meridian” 3) associated w/ the foreigner 4) Geheimnis (the intimate, the folded back on itself, what has withdrawn in withdrawal, hidden inside of house and home), secret of encounter at most intimate heart of present

WITHOUT ALIBI

TC p. 238 theater of cruelty would be the closure of classical representation, but still would produce closed space of original representation (produced from w/in itself w/out master-speech) w/out alibi or invisible utopia > autopresentation of pure visibility/sensibility

FWT pp. 172-73 Derrida follows Freud’s breaches & openings, a reaffirmation of reason “w/out alibi,” goes against a certain historical concept of reason, can even provoke thought beyond “power,” “drive for power,” drive for sovereignty

p. 173 psychoanalytic aim > not to seek refuge in a theological/humanist alibi > Derrida seduced by psychoanalysis’ audacity of thought, its courage, signing theoretical “fictions” in name of a knowledge w/out alibi (thus, the most “positive” knowledge”)

PF p. xvi those who rush to confuse differance and alibi disavow that they are avoiding “thing itself,” which differance will never be; is differance a political alibi? an allegation destined to delay the deadline? no: w/out alibi is precisely a differance w/out alibi

p. xvii a trace w/out alibi resists thinking, paralyzes, also only chance to not give in to paralysis

——paralysis arrests: negative symptom of aporia > whereas aporia is possibility of impossible, of “play,” very condition of pas, experience of frayage, marche, via rupta [elsewhere Derrida deconstructs becoming route?], decision, event, coming of other: writing & desire

p. xxvii reaffirm the “it is necessary” of “w/out alibi”

pp. xxvii-xxviii “it is necessary” of w/out alibi: 1) not sovereign exception 2) not untouched pure presence of trace as referral 3) not invincible transcendental/ontological structure

——“it is necessary” of w/out alibi must proceed from an alterity exceeding circle of same/self, doesn’t take on duty to reclose economic circle of exchange [remains to be thought]

pp. xxx-xxxi w/out alibi might look like irresponsibility

——but to go from alibi to alibi, not knowing where one is going, to only have alibis, is to be w/out alibi: not proud, not innocent, a blatant offense, flagrante delicto, of irresponsibility

p. xxxii resistance: major alibi

***pp. xxxiv-xxxv not exonerated by decision of the other in me (passive decision): don’t give in to alibi of the other (ultimate creditor whose debt remains mine to discharge, God)

——impossibility of acquitting oneself, duty not to want to acquit oneself: attest to this w/out “mercy,” w/out alibi

p. 282n old, inexhaustible question of “I”: how can a universal substitute lodge itself in unicity resisting all substitution? > most universal in most singular of alibis w/out alibi

EJQB p. 65 the exchange btwn Jew & writing, exchange w/out prerogative, where original appeal is a convocation (Jabès’ persistent affirmation)

PSSS p. 240 “psychoanalysis” turned toward what is most proper to psychical cruelty, w/out alibi

——psychoanalysis as another name for “w/out alibi”: questions radical evil or an even worse evil > only psychoanalytic revolution up to task of taking account of grammatical syntax, reflexivity: [“I you we made I you we suffer”]

——confession of a “w/out alibi”—if that were possible

p. 256 Derrida, advancing to a new theater of cruelty, wants to avoid alibis, will be very slow: prefers incorrigibly long [therapy] sessions

p. 264 Derrida would like to ask “What is to be done?”—beyond all possible cruelty & sovereignty, w/out alibi, this question is not foreign to paregicide

pp. 275-76 [AT IT AGAIN] what I name, what I call for: w/out alibi, w/ or w/out bliss, beyond possible, beyond horizon, beyond the beyond, beyond economy, appropriable, possiblebeyond death drive wherever Freud reintegrated it in economy of possible, economic conditionality

p. 276 originary affirmation is attached to a life, but an im-possible life, a sur-vival, not symbolizable, but the only one worthy of being lived, w/out alibi, the one from which to depart

——one cannot justify pacifism, right to life, setting out from an economy of life, can only be done on basis of a sur-vival that owes nothing to alibi of some mytho-theological beyond

***p. 279 psychoanalysis only possible approach, w/out alibi, to all virtual translations btwn the cruelties of a suffering “for the pleasure of it” [?] [I you we cruel-suffer]

EU EU p. 11 decree re: move from Latin to French: no more alibi of ignorance to law, no more ambiguity or uncertainty before French laws written so clearly

WITNESS

GOD p. 108 God as the name of the possibility of keeping a secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior, a witness others cannot see, other than me, more intimate with me than myself, structure of invisible interiority, God calls me, I call myself God

p. 144 secret letter becomes literature [Kafka] when it risks publicity, destinerrance, an archive to be inherited, when abandoned to its undecidability (is it the signature of father or son?)

——w/ no witness, can only come down to us in the trace of an inheritance

GT pp. 130-31n Derrida not too convinced by those who defend anti-Semitism of Celine, Baudelaire; exterminate all the witnesses? there’s no anti-Semitism in that?

FK pp. 64-5 oath, sworn faith (foi jurée), pledge to God as witness: creates the unproducible, cannot not produce God as already there [déjà]

LOBL p. 129 witness, martyr, clue

AF p. 40 Yerushalmi doesn’t treat Freud as a witness in the 3rd person (terstis), but as a 2nd person called to witness (incompatible w/ classical scientific discourse, history, philology)

A A p. 79 Heidegger, Freud, Levinas remarkable witnesses to questioning induced by presuppositions of anthropo-thanatology

——[consider existential analysis as a witness] belonging w/out belonging condition of testimony, and of its language first of all

POOF POOF p. 55 how can you be together to bear witness to secrecy, singularity, separation: testify where testimony is impossible (Blanchot)

pp. 302-03 via Deguy, Aristotle overtook to ruin the capital letters of Platonism, the eídos of friendship, by calling the witness to the stand, an “actual” friend > Derrida will take sign of this ruin & no longer answer call to witness stand

TC TC pp. 332-33n Nietzsche: Dionysian excitement has no listener, if he did, would be torn to pieces by Maenads [theater of cruelty: speech w/out listeners, spectacle w/out spectators]

SH SH p. 18 witnessing codes, disguises of poem at once essential & inessential [re: Szondi as intimate witness of one of Celan’s poems, he knew Celan passed through Berlin at this date], poem would speak to us nonetheless, beyond its dated singularity

p. 35 poem—destined to remain alone > date is a witness, but one can bless date w/out knowing to “what” or for “whom” one bears witness, always possible there’ll no longer be a witness for this witness: affinity btwn date, name, ash

pp. 53-5 Jew as poet, as “he” w/ unpronounceable name, as witness to the universal through absolute singularity, by virtue of and in name of the other

F F p. xv forums are politico-juridical instances, require a third, a witness (like a duel), tribunal instruisant un procès, mettant en cause

p. xix le tiers incorporé est gardé pour être supprimé [held in to be crossed out]: assembly of witnesses around Wolf Man’s crypt (forum): whole strategy of testifying > on sy coupe tout le temps, witnesses testify by interrupting, wounded by angular edges of forum

DS DS p. 185 truth of the book is decidable, the book w/in the soul can be true, psychic writing must appear before tribunal of ontology & dialectics [re: Plato]

ROP ROP p. 71 can there be a witness to madness, a third that provides reason w/out objectifying? w/out examining (arraisonner)? [Nietzsche’s no accusation, GS 276] témoigner, est-ce voir? est-ce rendre raison?

ATIA ATIA p. 35 Derrida sometimes sees Nietzsche take the horse’s head in his hands, calls it as a witness to his compassion

p. 78 some animal will cock its ears when someone [Descartes] invokes infinity of experiences that “witness to,” w/out feeling need to “review” [animal Derrida? animal Nietzsche?]

pp. 117-18 Levinas’ Bobby dog is a witness for us, an other w/out alterity: recalls the subject to being subject > this is not sufficient deconstruction of Cartesian man/animal borderline

PS PS p. 170 to protect meaning of thought (value of work) against psychomedical reduction, criticism (aesthetic, literary, philosophical) must create an example, a case [from opposite path, produces same reduction it’s trying to avoid]

——the work, the example, becomes martyr, bearing witness to structure whose essential permanence is prime preoccupation of commentary > criticism reads essence into example

FS FS p. 11 God imprints secondarity on every navigation of the human: 1) passage of deferred reciprocity btwn reading & writing? 2) absolute witness who’s already read what you will write: third party as transparency of meaning? [circular logos]

DPi DPi p. 3 stage lighting of DP, light of fire, never is sovereign more visible than when it makes itself voyante et voyeuse of execution > sovereign witnesses crime, witnesses itself, eye witness

HLP HLP p. 31 history of lie, that of false witness, of perjury

PJP PJP p. 187 anacoluthic catastrophe finds one of its privileged places in fold where the guilty accuses the witness, makes him bear responsibility for the offense

HST HST p. 411 Celan: “no one is a witness for the witness”

ATM ATM p. 154 the grammatical utterance [“here I am”?] is there, but put out of joint (disloqué), making room (that is not a home) for an agrammaticality of the gift assigned from the other (depuis lautre)

——incorporating what it can’t assimilate, quoting the uncitable consists in accusing language [appearing as witness & accused], (sur)rendered (offerre) to a gift, as a gift which language can’t open up to on its own

AD AD p. 59 Levinas compares his illeity to unimpeachable witness in Descartes’ 3rd Meditation

BSi BSi pp. 293-94 [vis-à-vis Marin] autopsia: seeing w/ one’s own eyes, bear witness to authentic past event, narrator a “witness,” “martyr”

ATAP ATAP p. 92 general narrator at moment of signature calls itself the witness (martyrōn, testimonium)

CIR CIR pp. 197-98 intolerable foreclosure when I write: the already known, loved, that can’t be quoted; gather myself in circle of cum, circus of circum, before the constituting witness I’m always fleeing

pp. 314-15 hoping, sighing, demanding, invoking, promising that the witness will attest that you will never have had any witness, you alone, whose life will have been so short, you the crossing btwn 2 phantoms of witnesses who will never come down to the same

SPEC SPEC p. 321 [Freud’s speculation on Ernst] needs no witness, no counter-testimony has weight before this teleological auto-institution

p. 355 race to death, exhausts couriers, witnesses, relays, from post to post

WOMAN / FEMININITY

KH p. 97 risk of feminizing khōra, a female proper name?

——khōra must keep its impropriety, having nothing of its own, this is what we must keep for it

p. 98 khōra can’t receive the female gender she’s given

pp. 124-25 khōra is compared to mother & nurse, not part of oppositional couple, 3rd genus, does not belong to “race of women (genos gynaikōn), mother w/out engendering, not an origin, a before signifying no temporal anteriority [intelligible/sensible looks like father/son couple]

——relation of interval, or the spacing to what is lodged in it to be received

GOD p. 76 does system of sacrificial responsibility & double “gift of death” require exclusion (sacrifice) of woman? [re: absence of women in Isaac & Abraham story and “Bartleby the Scrivener”]

p. 145 woman spectacularly absent from scenes of forgiveness btwn father & son

GT p. 22 the es gibt plays (spielt), play of 4’s as play of gift, manifests the unity of time’s 3 dimensions, la donne de ce jeu [relance], & la doña, la femme qui nous a requis depuis lexergue [Derrida then mentions a fine book, Finas’ Donne, which interlaces all these themes]

p. 103 time of woman: woman’s absence [in “Counterfeit Money”] organizing the scene like a clock [?]

MONL p. 13 power this ‘alien’ [Oedipus] holds over ‘aliens’: innermost secret, sepulture, in exchange for salvation of city, which he refuses his daughters (refuses them a just ‘work of mourning’)

FK p. 85 why have women been the victims of most lethal explosions of ethnico-religious violence in ordeal of unscathed?

BL p. 207 law is not a woman, not a feminine figure—even if man wants to enter, penetrate it (that’s its trap [makes you think it’s feminine?])

LOBL pp. 169-72 Derrida’s mad hypothesis, nothing to do w/ intention of “author” that the hymen btwn the 2 women in Larrêt de mort (separated by uncrossable glass partition of 2 stories) is the absolute terror, that they love and approach each other w/out the narrator

SPOM pp. 210, 243-44n for Marx, there’s a phantomatic objectivity before commodity value [?] product of labor petrifies, erects, hardens (feminine character of commodity-chimera?)

POOF pp. 273-74 via Kant, the deception linked to modesty is moral & egalitarian, creates distance btwn sexes, saves other from degradation, becoming-technical, instrumentalization of jouissance

——modesty would get woman to participate in universal fraternity (i.e. humanity), equalizes sexes by moralizing them: modest woman is a brother for man

——woman doesn’t become any less desirable! modesty belongs to history qua fraternization

p. 281 the double exclusion of feminine related to tension btwn politicization & depoliticization of friendship (tension on the inside of the political itself)

——Nietzsche tells us 3x: “woman is not yet capable of friendship”

p. 282 Derrida deduces the political register of friendship in Nietzsche: to be able to honor enemy in friend, a sign of freedom, neither slaves nor tyrants know this freedom > woman is either slave or tyrant, knows only how to love, can’t respect enemy (honor what she doesn’t love); the political translation of Nietzsche’s axiom: friendship is freedom plus equality [the double bind]

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

pp. 292-93 [re: fraternal politics] women don’t have no chance, they have less > hegemony always relation of forces, laws of structure are tendential, impossibility of sheer (plus ou simple) exclusion, account for return of repressed, etc.

HASD pp. 35-6 khōra as metaphor—woman (1st strategy); khōra as negative theology (2nd strategy): Derrida favors 2nd strategy because it calls attention to possibility beyond metaphor

PAS PAS p. (66) she is the pronoun of a nameless one [see p. (70) here, figure is a he]

p. (91) Blanchot’s example of how speaking negates the existent of which it speaks: ‘This woman!’ > Hölderlin, Mallarmé, all poets, felt act of naming is marvelous/disquieting

——Blanchot: ideal negation, deferred assassination that is language, my language does not kill anyone (woman can always die, her death announced, already present in my language)

p. (92) cette femme, not yours, but the name for you, not a part of you, doesn’t possess you, addresses you > [she responds?] my name is unique, and you hide it, forget it

——Blanchot come is said so that elle can cry out its name

PPHS p. 77n Hegel reassembles the feminine law (singularity, sepulcher, night, the divine) around the pit and the pyramid (feminine law only effective in the underworld not on earth)

p. 83 Hegel: the intuition (of sign), an image which has received (in sich empfangen hat) [like a woman receives in conceiving] as is soul and independent mental representation

SH p. 50 uniqueness of every hour has its sister, its own, the same, its other revenant

WM p. 245 Diderot: women and poets reason mostly by comparisons

DS p. 242 hymen as the double show, as the difference between the sexes, play of penna (bird, wing, feather, quill, beak, etc.), and process of metaphorical reproduction constantly being relaunched by gap, setting-aside, of being

——Mallarmé: dancer is not a woman, but a metaphor, “veil of generality” “belonging to no woman in particular”

SP p. 41 what impresses mark of stylate spur in question of woman? this doesn’t concern la figure de la femme: question of figure open and closed by “woman” > concerns instead her abduction (senlever)

p. 43 all Nietzsche’s investigations, especially those of woman > coiled in labyrinth of ear

pp. 47-9 [re: Nietzsche’s “—Distanz!”] hyphen & exclamation mark invite us, by way of pirouette & play of silhouette, to keep distance from veils [woman] that make us dream of death

p. 49 not only keep your distance from woman, game of seduction, but woman as non-figure, non-identity, distance’s very chasm, interval’s cadence, distance itself [which can’t be said]

p. 51 woman but one name for untruth of truth, depthless depths that distorts identity, essence, property, brings philosophy to ruin

pp. 51-3 Nietzsche: modesty of life, veils: “Yes, life is a woman!” [see p. 59]

——if woman is truth, she knows there is none, that no one has a place for truth

p. 55 the feminine, that which cannot be pinned down by truth > this should not be mistaken for woman’s femininity, female sexuality, nor an essentializing fetish [for those inexperienced brobags (philosophers, artists) who believe they can capture]

p. 57 skepsis of truth as old as woman herself > skepticism, veiling dissimulation

pp. 57-9 via Nietzsche, woman believes in superficiality of existence, disguising pudendum, nothing more than affair of modesty, decency > “truth” nothing but a surface, becomes desirable by way of veil; suspend the veil, or let it fall differently, no longer truth, only “truth”

pp. 59-61 woman as suspension of truth & castration > truth-castration as laffaire de lhomme, his credulity, man is never sufficiently old (assez vieux), dissimulating, or skeptical

p. 61 woman plays w/ castration, does not believe in it, nor its opposite (much too clever for that), but she can’t seduce w/out it, needs castration’s effects, but as she plays w/ it, she anticipates her laughter (at man)

——were woman to believe in anti-castration, she would return plus sûrement to the same old machine, phallogocentrism’s attendant, disciple discipliné du maître > “we?” should learn from her

p. 67 Nietzsche: can woman really want enlightenment? is she simply looking for new adornment? nothing has been more alien to woman than truth, her great art is the lie

pp. 67-9 the double role of woman as truth’s recession, and as the nonbeliever in truth, she is like

the Jew in her “delight in dissimulation,” affirmative power

——does Nietzsche refer to Jew because of the way circumcision marks simulation & castration?

p. 71 one cannot find woman, her femininity, her sexuality, but it is impossible to resist looking for her

——“what is woman?” is suspended by fact that it is impossible to dissociate [woman, the question of woman] from problematic of truth, art, style

p. 77 Hegel on passivity of clittoral pleasure (de la jouissance clitoridienne)

p. 83 pratique stylet, pratique stylée, de quel genre? can’t be written w/out conjoined fabulation of woman/truth, entre la femme, in spite of the profundity that is modesty

pp. 85-9 the becoming-woman (becoming Christian) of the idea, the veiling of truth, is the beginning of history, the idea séloigne, devient transcendante, inaccessible, séduisante, the dream of death begins (Heidegger avoids this becoming-woman in his own analysis of History of an Error)

p. 89 the becoming-female, Christian, an epoch in parenthesis, a woman castrates and plays at her castration, feigns castration (at once suffered & inflicted) [see HYMEN]

pp. 95-7, p. 101 Nietzsche’s 3 “positions” on woman:

1. woman is figure of falsehood, man as phallus is truth ; man fears castrated woman

2. woman is the figure of truth, plays w/ truth as a fetish ; man fears castrating woman

3. woman as artist, Dionysiac, dissimulatrice, castration doesn’t take place; love affirming woman

p. 101 no such thing as woman, as truth in itself of woman in itself

pp. 119-21 (das Eigentum des Ab-grundes) the proper-ty of the abyss, the abyss of proper-ty, the reorganization of metaphysics around more powerful question of propriation, question of event (Ereignis) uprooted from ontology, where proper is proper to no one, to nothing: is this what Nietzsche’s woman is, style’s form: the no-where, gift as woman’s essential predicate, appears in undecidable oscillation btwn give/take, se donner/se donner-pour > price/value of pharmakon

just as there’s no essence of the woman or sexual difference, there’s no essence of es gibt Sein

p. 127 like woman, like writing: il se donne en se dérobant

p. 139 never has been the style, the woman, the simulacrum, the sexual difference [un gai savoir]

——plus dun spur, never been the woman > if there’s going to be style, pour que le simulacrum advienne, il faut écrire dans lécart entre plusieurs styles: anchor lost in abyss btwn—telle est léchéance

OTO p. 20(n) institutions of “yes,” have need of ears: Nietzsche doesn’t expect the ears and hands for his truths today—my small ears no small interest to ladies, makes me a monster, anti-ass, Anti-Christ

p. 38 no trace of woman in State education system, she is the great “cripple,” not even attached to the [State] umbilical cord > Derrida does not say this to seduce, a vulgar procedure, and a ubiquitous one, “gynegogy”

——except the mother, there’s a mother in this system (faceless figure, survives on bottom)

ATIA p. 57 “the animot is more naked than the human, who is more naked than the animot > this law governing nudity never resists placing woman/child on side of animal

——in SW, Derrida analyzed how pubic fleece led Freud into fatality of theoretical delirium

p. 103 [via Adorno] the idealist conjuration, the making totem/taboo, insulting materialism, hatred for the animal [the animal that therefore I am as self-hatred]: the Jew, the woman

FS p. 15 Delacroix: two lines give meaning; Freud: valley a common female dream symbol [column, hollowed margin]

O p. 49n dissemination reads “female sexuality,” if you look closely, as a sort of womb (théorique par-dessus le marché, pour voir)

DPi p. 48 DP requires a third party, arbitrating authority foreign/superior to parties of dispute, a reason of state, a rationality, logos w/ universal claims > beyond individual passion/affect

——w/ DP, rationality rises above heart (individual passion), alliance btwn reason & machine, universal claim of state right, frozen rigor, rigor mortis, “freezing insensitivity,” police-like, virile appearance > thus, many abolitionists appeal to feminine, heart, immediate feeling

pp. 61-2 coldness, cruelty, heartless machinism of guillotine, hard and cold like a machine (again juxtaposed to woman, who is apolitical, private, warm)

p. 112 Blanchot on putting to death by nomination, annihilating power of names: to say ‘this woman’ gives me the being deprived of being [Blanchot has replaced ‘flower’ w/ ‘woman’]

p. 184 Hugo: “shoot a woman?”

p. 194 guillotine made feminine to rhyme w/ machine

p. 215 though Hugo speaks well of women, we can hear “the classical connotations of this compassionate sympathy”

DST DST p. 221 Platonism denounces in mimesis (in désistance) madness, feminization, hysteria

HLP p. 62 “the earth, she, doesn’t lie” (earthly, feminine, naturalism)

C p. 230 rocket of a female orgasm (la fusée dune jouissance féminine) [?]

TN pp. 22-3 what embarrasses Derrida in word “generosity,” like “fraternity”: always refers to filiation, principle of “birth,” concerns “virility,” doesn’t include woman > if generosity is a capacity/force/power given at birth, can one still give?

pp. 83-89 Levinas’ feminine, profanation, the uncovering of the hidden still hidden, young animal, irresponsible animality, a not Good epekeina tēs ousias, uncovered virginity, mortuary mask

——Levinas: “equivocation constitutes the epiphany of the feminine”

pp. 336-37n pregnancy, only a woman can feel the heart of another in her; [Derrida to Nancy before surgery] “Don’t worry, I’ll wake up w/ you,” friend who keeps heart of other, this incredible survival > “heart” joins w/ thinking, w/ grace of gratitude, w/ love of friendship

p. 305 the selfsame (même) heart exappropriates instant touched by other, no possible reappropriation (absolute mourning)

——apparently, women respond better to heart grafts [?]

ATM pp. 183-84 while discussing Levinas’ and [a certain] psychoanalysis’ secondarization of the woman, Derrida hypothesizes [?] that this complicit gesture gathers around one fundamental design: their relation to me, to the other as woman

p. 185 “I am speaking from my place as woman”

p. 187 as a woman, by reversing dissymmetry [of tout autre in Levinas], Derrida has added rape [alongside other violences: hostage, persecution, etc.]

AD pp. 15-123 [see

LEVINAS

CARESS

]

p. 36 Levinas: woman, other whose presence is discretely an absence, hospitable welcome par excellence, condition for home, recollection, inhabitation

——Levinas: welcoming, “understanding w/out words,” “expression in secret,” “feminine alterity”

pp. 37-8 even if feminine alterity is “hospitable welcome par excellence,” even if she’s not a man, she remains human: woman w/out “height” of face, not most high: her familiarity accomplishes “the en-ergy of separation” [?]

BSi pp. 201-03 hardness of capital erection [CAP] turns woman into beast

p. 345 Aristotle: only under ruler are slaves and women distinguished

OG p. 155 (223) for Rousseau, as dangerous as the supplement is, cohabitation w/ women is even more dangerous, “jouir!” another name for death

pp. 175-76 (250) jealousy, a creation of culture, an arresting of nature by woman, stratagem of femininity > invention of culture denatures pity [which should reach out to every living thing]

——jealousy marks the gap btwn pity/love

pp. 176-77 (251-52) Rousseau: woman’s commands are caresses, her threats are tears, she manages the commander

——women turn men into women, but the contest (partie) is not equal, perhaps most profound signification du jeu de la supplémentaire

p. 178 (253) acc. Rousseau, women force men to love one theme, one representation, they turn men into women

——physical love urges sexes to union, moral love (which is immoral) fixes desire on particular object

——for Rousseau, “moral love” reflects history as denaturalization, this moral supplement is nothing, but still causes preference, forces force

p. 179 [vis-à-vis Rousseau] history also protects/resists abyss of evil > “moral love” (which is immoral, acc. Rousseau) becomes modesty (true morality of women)

p. 342n Nietzsche & Rousseau share same opinion of women (degradation of culture), and of genealogy of morals as servitude to slave—so how could Nietzsche have hated him so much?

p. 181 acc. Rousseau, “moral love” not biology but power of imagination > all depravity of culture related to possession of women (movement of preference/difference)

IF p. 310 for Flaubert, women always mix something useful or pleasant w/ beauty (thus don’t experience it)

——Flaubert desires male sentences, taut, muscular

EU p. 18 [vis-à-vis Descartes] link drawn btwn using vulgar language and “facility” for women

pp. 27-9 Descartes and feminism: intelligible order has no sexual marks [cogito is “desexed,” w/out body, sexually neutral or indifferent]

——which is feminist: learn Latin? or be talked down to in vulgar language?

p. 29 women guardians of vulgar language

SPEC p. 302 woman perpetuates race by risking the name: analytic “movement” as genealogy of son-in-law, Judaic law

FV pp. 415-16 Schreber: we all (women included) like naked women

——for Freud, dreams of nakedness don’t exhibit penis or absence of penis but absence of phallus, absence of attribute supplementing a possible fault, absence of colossal double > following chain is indicated: truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame [Schreber]

pp. 436-37, 39 “Seminar” insists on topos, single proper itinerary of letter, if meaning [in the general sense] is indifferent to letter, meaning of the letter is not, meaning of letter as truth itself

——not naive topology but still a topos, Heideggerian-like veiled/unveiled castration placed at the hole (trou) of the woman, letter comes back to Being, to the nothing that is the opening btwn woman’s legs (Queen)

pp. 437-38 Derrida on Lacan: circulation, acquitting of a debt, a proper place [not naive, empirical topology], detour from [woman’s] hole to itself permits signified to return to its origin—indivisible locality, signifier must never be lost, divided, fragmented

pp. 440-42 circular itinerary, Dupin, analyst, find letter where they expect it: Queen wants letter-fetish brought back to her, exchange one fetish for another w/out spending because there’s equivalence: restricted economy, circle, stricture

——castration, truth, signifier, fetish, bring phallus back into oikos ring

——the lack never lacks a place: indivisible circulation of proper

——lack does not have its place in dissemination

p. 442 for Lacan, Femininity is the Truth (of) castration, best figure of castration, because in logic of signifier it (elle) has always already been castrated > Femininity “leaves” something in circulation (here the letter), detaches something she never had, brought back to itself

——this 1st castration (pre-castration) affects w/ castration/femininity whoever holds the letter

p. 452 analyst has seen what no one else has: place of the thing btwn the legs

pp. 452-53 Dupin’s feminization: possess the letter [?] > letter has one place, occupied by all those who possess it

pp. 465-66 [in Purloined Letter] Queen wishes to play on 2 contracts [must be read elsewhere?]: Queen’s desire to retain (garder) or refind the letter doubles her pact w/ the King

p. 466 indestructibility of letter functions as pact binding 2 “singularities,” excludes all double simulacra: [in Lacan] subject is very divided, but phallus is not to be cut > at origin/end, there’s a word that doesn’t trick: the truth of the lure [p. 466n indivisibility in repetition compulsion]

pp. 480-82 all phallogocentrism articulated based on (individual, perceptual, cultural, historical) situation where phallus is mother’s desire (to the extent she doesn’t have it) > though phallus isn’t the organ, it mostly symbolizes the penis > thus, phallogocentrism as androcentrism & woman as absolute Other

***p. 481n [re: psychoanalysis] institution built on male child’s experience > at stage of genital organization, there’s only maleness (antithesis isn’t femaleness but being castrated): phallogocentrism is no accident/error, its old, enormous root must be accounted for [described] > but, its description is a “participant” when it induces a practice, ethics, institution, a politics that insures truth of a tradition

WBH p. 193 to say woman is not a “subject,” 2 consequences: 1) radically revolutionary or deconstructive 2) dangerously reactive

——to say women are subjects keeps whole framework on which traditional university is built

pp. 194-95 to say woman is on side of undecidability has only meaning of strategical phase, the side of woman becomes the side from which you begin to dismantle structure > but, as soon as you reach first stage of deconstruction, opposition man/woman no longer pertinent

——“woman” no longer best trope to refer to these things, same goes for undecidability itself!

——there’re many undecidables, one undecidability acts as a program, programming or unprogramming a program

p. 203 “woman” as “truth,” as that which stops the drift, but what about truth as movement of the drift [?]

CHOR p. 89 [quoted from SP] that which will not be pinned down by truth, is, in truth, feminine, but this should not be mistaken for woman’s femininity, nor female sexuality, by dogmatic philosopher, impotent artist, or inexperienced seducer still hoping to capture

pp. 93-4 to say ironically, “there is no one place for woman,” is neither anti-feminist nor feminist, is faithful to affirmative displacement: “dancing” of women

p. 96 “essentializing fetishes” (truth, femininity, essentiality of woman or feminine sexuality as fetishes)—but one must be precise about fetishism [i.e. general fetishism in Glas], and its context, if only to displace it

p. 98 [cf. WBH p. 198] could femininity, however irreducible it may be, remain derived from or subordinated to question of destination or thought of gift?

p. 100 new “concept” of woman? was there ever an old one? [deconstruct concept of concept]

***p. 105 “hymen,” “invagination,” part of Derrida’s attempt to re-sexualize philosophical/theoretical discourse, but these terms no longer simply designate figures of feminine body: what remains undecidable concerns [but not only] line of cleavage btwn 2 sexes

p. 106 hymen does not exist, anything constituting value of existence is foreign to “hymen,” so how could one then attribute existence of hymen properly to woman? (same goes for invagination)

pp. 106, 465n invagination is always taken w/in syntax of expression “double chiasmatic invagination of borders,” doubly folded, redoubled, inversed: can we still recognize “representation of woman” in this movement?

——questions of representation [of women] always too old & as yet to be born, overloaded w/ hieroglyphs & still as virgin as origin, like early morning in East

WOMB

GOD p. 13 Patoçka: Plato’s novel idea is will to leave womb of Earth Mother, follow path of “pure light,” subordinate (podřídit) orgiastic entirely to responsibility

FK p. 83 machine-like & faith as one and the same possibility, machine-like & sacrosancity (heilig, holy, safe, unscathed, free, “swollen”) of the phallic effect: phallus as phainesthai, phenomenon (day of phallus) & also phantasm, fetish, specter, its double: colossal automaticity [phallic in bold 2x]

p. 84 matrix of unlimited, general fetishization of Thing itself > read the unscathed as spontaneity of erection or pregnancy

p. 84n [via Benveniste, via etymology, Derrida links power, vitality to swelling, to womb]

DS p. 182n the hystera is supposed to be “behind” the hymen, but it exposes itself only through mimicry, transference & simulacrum

p. 269 dissemination, fold of hymen, somber white of cave or womb, au noir sur blanc du ventre, lieu de son émission éparse et de ses hasards sans retours [scattered emissions, chances, w/out return]

p. 271 dissemination in the folds of the hymen

O p. 49n dissemination reads “female sexuality,” if you look closely, as a sort of womb (théorique par-dessus le marché, pour voir)

C p. 187 casket engenders? father’s coffin w/ maternal belly? [il faudra que je renonce à ce type danalyse interminable]

p. 230 hearth (foyer) as crematorium

TN pp. 28-9 mouth before speaking, before orality, wouldn’t this be the mother’s lips, giving ex-

p. 49 Mary: Christianity’s indeconstructible [?]

CHOR p. 90 matrix: 1) situation or surrounding substance in which something originates, develops 2) metal plate used for casting typefaces

p. 103 via phallogocentrism, the “matrix” becomes the “patrix”

WONDER

HERP p. 184 thaumatzein

WORK OF MOURNING (

GOD pp. 15-17 Derrida starts w/ Phaedo, w/ meletē tou thanatou, w/ Socrates’ play on aïdēs (“one who doesn’t see”) & haidēs, references Levinas, Heidegger, then: care about dying as relation to self, mystery or secrecy in formation of psychē

——philosophy from the start, vigil (veille) over death that watches out for death and watches over death (qui veille à la mort et sur elle), as if over the very life of the soul, psychē as life, breath, pneuma, caring anticipation of dying, provisional mourning, vigil as veillée and wake [in English]

p. 66 instant of decision is madness; like gift & “gift of death,” instant irreducible to presence, act of giving death, sacrifice, suspends labor of negative, labor itself, perhaps even work of mourning

GT p. 36 is work of mourning still a desire to keep? gift vs. grief, gift as non-work [see FWT p. 78]

MONL p. 13 power this ‘alien’ [Oedipus] holds over ‘aliens’: innermost secret, sepulture, in exchange for salvation of city, which he refuses his daughters (refuses them a just ‘work of mourning’)

FK p. 59 khōra, secret, desert of the desert (last desert, before the first), neither a threshold nor a mourning, btwn event and possibility, or virtuality of the event, not the desert of revelation

pp. 86-87 spectral fantasy of dead, principal of life and sur-vival; life must be worth more than life, only has value in labour of infinite mourning > indemnified spectrality w/out limit

H p. 93 Oedipus gives the most poisoned gift, the deprivation of mourning, gives the mourning of mourning, no time of mourning, a respite of infinite time [for Freud, Oedipus’ gift is society]

p. 111 mourning is not allowed without a fixed (arrêté) place, monument, determinable topos, stopping point (arrêt) > promised w/out taking place, only possible mourning is an impossible one

LOBL p. 85 is the double affirmation triumphant or a paradoxical phase in work of mourning [re: Freud’s manic fantasy]? p. ~101 one never writes in one’s own language or in a foreign language > derive all consequences of this, from each element: hence the triumph (necessarily double & equivocal, because also a phase of mourning)

p. ~ 108 work of mourning is thematic in Glas, “Pas,” “Fors”

pp. ~ 108-15 for Freud, triumph over mourning occurs w/ manic type, from Überwindung of normal success to Triumphieren of manic, how is this dissimulation possible?

——acc. Freud, Verdikt (verdict, sentence, arrêt): “object no longer exists,” inspires ego to break tie (Bindung) to destroyed object, manic triumph of work of mourning [?]

——w/ Freud always un pas de plus et pas de thèse [re: speculation on death drive]

——Derrida, pointing to confusions in Freud, worries that the reduction of double affirmation to Freud’s meaning of triumph (a narcissistic breaking of tie to destroyed object) would stain it w/ negativity of mourning, economic resenting, and melancholia [manic closer to melancholic than mourner]

——Derrida refers to his deuil du deuil in “Ja ou le faux-bond and his half-mourning

p. ~176 to speak of writing, triumph, as living on, is to denounce [Freud’s] manic fantasy (not w/out repeating it)

POO p. 19 no vegetarian can avoid “sublimity of mystical cannibalism, cannibalism in mourning”

SPOM pp. 8-9 three things which decompose the single thing (spirit, specter, king): 1) mourning, localize, identify the dead, know who and where [ontology, hermeneutics, philosophy] 2) language, voice, “scull had a tongue in it” 3) work, “spirit of the spirit” is work, spirit works

——mourning ontologizes remains, make them present, name them, localizes the dead

p. 64 [re: dominant discourse on Marxism] the triumphal stage of work of mourning, maniac, jubilatory, animistic magic, rhythm of cadenced march [“Marx is dead,” long live capitalism]

p. 67 by mourning Marxism we inherit it

p. 120 conjuration, work of mourning: make sure dead will not come back

p. 145 reflexive return of conjuration: those who inspire fear conjure themselves, conjure very specter they represent (conjuration in mourning for itself, turns against itself)

p. 163 for Marx, “only this,” only practicality, work, production, techniques (see also p. 177) can get “the ghost”: “when one has destroyed a phantomatic body, the real body remains”

——[the “actual relations (wirkliche Verhältnisse)” must be dealt w/ once ghost has been exorcised]

p. 164 Marx opposes work [see pp. 161, 163] to Stirner's work of mourning, his hyper-phantomality, Marx determines differance or deferral as practical and as delay of reappropriation [he doesn’t eliminate death, expropriation, at heart of living—puts it to work?]

p. 169 phenomenological ego is a specter, phanesthai is the possibility of the specter, brings death, gives death, works at mourning [see pp. 237-38n Husserl’s noeme, irréellité]

pp. 224-25n Glas, “Fors” concern the problematic border btwn incorporation and introjection, effective but limited pertinence of this conceptual opposition, as well as the one [conceptual opposition] that separates failure from success in the work of mourning

HERP p. 190 to strive to recall—nostalgia; Aristotle, metaphysics: reactive nostalgia, a mourning for originary philein, semideafness that hears but not the originary gathering of logos

p. 201 moment of question as struggle, moment of Eros when philosophy becomes a question tensed/plunged into mourning, jealous/inquisitive about being?

POOF p. x “infinite abysses of imputability open on to mourning in the shadow of each and every event of death”

pp. 13-4 one cannot survive w/out mourning, not even God can escape this tautology

pp. 14-5 time of surviving (btwn mourning & its possibility) gives itself in withdrawal, self-delivers, self-effaces 2x—constancy & beginning again: indefinite repetition of inaugural moment, keeps memory & anticipates > contre-jour of this contretemps, condition/possibility of friendship

pp. 186-87 Augustine’s abyssal calculation, after death of his friend [Confessions IV], his close reading of Aristotle’s friends are ‘one soul in bodies twain’: survivre, ou non, au nom de lautre?

survive for yourself or person you’re mourning? question of gift, donner au nom de lautre, a narcissism that only occurs in name of other

pp. 283-84 for Nietzsche, if woman is not even part of humanity [via inability to befriend], man is not yet man either, men are equally late [Augustine], though woman lagging > be patient in the face of this ‘not yet’: mourned anticipation, a threshold naming—May we have it one day!

pp. 289-90 returning ghost [of Zarathustra?] who promises is a testament, a ‘this is my body’ offered again to brothers > no mourning but mourning of brother?

——deferred mourning as friendship, no possible introj./incorp. > no successful death w/out remainder, that would be the return of the father (what brothers don’t want!) > this is what brothers are conjuring: love of the father (a scene framed thus: w/out a woman)

p. 290 great canonical meditations on friendship (Cicero, Montaigne, Blanchot) all belong to experience of mourning > through the irreplaceable of the named, they always advance in testimonial order to confide/refuse death of unique to a universalizable discourse > simultaneously found/destabilize all oppositions, opens to abyss, se fracture

p. 301 Blanchot [on Foucault’s death]: “the intellectual friendship that his death, so painful to me, today allows me to declare to him, as (tandis que) I recall the words attributed by Diogenes Laertes to Aristotle: ‘Oh my friends, there is no friend’” > incredible audacity of this tandis que, and the singular use of the colon, an act of punctuation that unfurls a veil of mourning—will one have ever punctuated w/ more rigor?

MPM p. 6 two impossible mournings: 1) incorporate other as idol 2) refuse to incorporate: infinite remove

p. 21 the being “in us” of other in bereaved memory, not resurrection of other himself, can’t be included in narcissistic fantasy of subjectivity closed in on itself > other so marks narcissistic structure that being “in us” becomes coming of the other

pp. 28-9 summary of work of mourning:

——no true mourning

——no friendship w/out finitude

——all relation to others carries signature of memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave

——this finitude (finitude of friendship) does not take the form of a limit, but takes the form of the trace of the other in us, the other’s irreducible presence

——finitude of memory, formed by trace of other in us > approach or remembrance of future (memory of mourning, mourning of memory)

——self only appears in bereaved allegory (even before actual death of other) [see p. 33]

p. 20 Baudelaire links mourning and obsession

p. 31 can we mourn?: 1) are we capable of it? 2) do we have the right?

pp. 31-32 experience at heart of memory (Being & law), memorial, memoirs, mournful in essence, contracts itself together in impossible affirmation of mourning [affirmation is possible]

p. 32 impossible affirmation of mourning must be possible—impossible here is the Other, as he comes to us: as a mortal, to us mortals

p. 34 we come to ourselves through memory of possible mourning, knowledge older than ourselves, de Man might say: unreadability of mourning

——inconsolable [infinitely responsible] before finitude of memory: [want memory to be infinite?] possibility of impossible commands whole rhetoric of mourning, describes essence of memory > w/ dark light of this nothing (death of other) we learn other resists closure of our interiorizing memory [Freud’s “normal” “work of mourning” (ideally, quasi-literally devouring body/voice of other)]

——mimetic interiorization not just fictive, is origin of fiction, takes place in a body, makes place for body, soul, “ours” > death constitutes and makes manifests limits of me, us, obliged to harbor something greater than us w/in us

p. 35 il faut: one must follow the trace, remember that which did not exist, the law [Being and law], only there in the aporia of mourning and prosopopoeia: 1) success fails: other becomes part of us, bear him in us, like a future 2) failure succeeds: aborted interorization, respect for other as other, other remains alone, outside us, in his death > schema makes true mourning impossible

p. 37 uncontrollable necessity, nonsubjectivizable law of thought beyond interiorization, beyond un-mourning thought mourning > can we accept it? affirm it? can no longer become a question

p. 38 we think this (immeasurable grief & life of faithful friendship): sublimity of mourning w/out sublimation, w/out Freud’s triumph, w/out ‘paranoid fear’

p. 48 the essence of the proper name prevents “true mourning”

p. 56 inscription of memory effaces interiorizing recollection, not because of external limit or finite limitation of memory, but because of [allegorical] structure of relation to Other

p. 65 Gedächtnis [w/out Erinnerung], a thinking memory, engagement beyond negativity, a reaffirmation of engagement, a memory that has mourned the dialectic (which is mourning itself), memory w/out mourning, rigorous fidelity of an affirmation, barely “amnesic”

p. 71 thinking, not bereaved interiorization, thinks at boundaries, thinks the boundary, the limit of interiority

p. 148 always necessary to excuse oneself for appropriating to oneself this work of mourning

A p. 39 an originary mourning unthought by Heidegger, Levinas, Freud

pp. 43-4 “culture of death”—a tautology? each culture treats death differently, w/ different partitions, culture of death = history of death (cult of ancestors, rituals of mourning/sacrifice)

pp. 60-1 Heidegger not interested in revenant or mourning—just death itself, not its figures or experiences of demise (Ableben)

p. 61 for Derrida, in contrast to Heidegger [Freud & Levinas too?], mourning, revenance, spectrality, living-on, surviving: non-derivable categories or non-reducible derivations

pp. 61-2 all politics require time & space of mourning, a topolitology of sepulcher, anamnesic (thematic) relation to spirit as revenant, open hospitality to guest as ghost [in English] whom one holds, as he holds us, hostage

PAS p. (58) Blanchot: work of mourning is the inverse of dying

SH p. 39 mourning: reading itself > readability: tribute of lost singularity (“beauty” pays)

p. 56 in Celan’s “Die Schleuse” “Kaddish” is lost, “a word that was looking for me,” that which opens possibility of mourning what has been lost beyond a trace [loss of mourning]

p. 57 no worse loss than death of name (still, a date remains) > mourning, interiorization of other in Erinnerung, the preserving of other in sepulcher/epitaph, is denied us; words incinerated beyond sepulcher can return as ghosts > incinerated beyond of date, words lost w/out sepulcher

F pp. xvi- xvii incorporation (magic, secret, cryptic, instantaneous) seals loss of object, the dead, an exquisite corpse, loves the dead safe (save) inside me, as dead; introjection (slow, gradual, laborious, effective) dead save in me as living, enlarge the self (introj. as normal mourning)

FWT p. 78 work is always work of mourning, internalizes, appropriating idealization

p. 81 Hamlet also machine of repression in politics, spectrality governs problematic of mourning & technics, media, virtual reality > general logic of spectrality

p. 114 those who internalize, who think they can assimilate, appropriate, habituate, subjectivize the worst [in a work of mourning], immunize, sacralize, and idealize it

pp. 159-60 successful mourning is failed mourning, is unfaithful: denies alterity of dead other, of death as other, “narcissizes” the dead other > same goes for integration of immigrant/foreigner

——faithfulness prescribes impossibility of mourning at once [St. Augustine’s “I live on for my friend” in POOF]

P p. 79 Kant: examples are wheelchairs (Gängelwagen) [roulettes] of judgment, those who don’t have enough Mutterwitz, the sick, need these wheelchairs, prostheses that replace nothing

——Hegel: there is play in examples, they play, Beispielen

——Derrida, via Hegel, examples divert energy of ergon, introduce chance & abyss into necessity of Mutterwitz > this can make one lose one’s head, a Russian roulette (death drive and mourning of labor in experience of beautiful), to put into play pleasure w/out enjoyment

p. 129 “negative pleasure” of sublime, respect, admiration, is different from “positive pleasure” of beautiful, and unique from beauty’s negativity (the work of of mourning in beauty), which was already singular, a negativity w/out negativity, sans sans sans, sans of pure cut, sans fin of finality

ATIA pp. 18-20 in avowing his desire to avoid appropriative projection before animal’s gaze, to avoid tradition [Benjamin, Heidegger] that assigns deep sadness (Traurigkeit) to animal’s Benommenheit (inability to respond to name it’s given, inability to experience being “as such”)

——for Benjamin, animal/nature not sad because mute but mute because sad: not the sadness of passivity, of not being able to name, but of receiving ones name > a foreshadowing of mourning

——every case of naming announces a death to come in the surviving of a ghost, we feel mortal because name seeks to save us, assure survival, it is the feeling (promise) of dying > how could one refuse the animal this experience of death? deprive the animal of nomination?

SW p. 329 fault or election, veil is a sign of mourning

——Cixous’ seeing in mourning of the unseen

——“I’d like to be done w/ mourning [for the veil]…perhaps [H.C.] already succeeded in that”

DST DST p. 230 no rhythm w/out caesura > antirhythmic [Hölderlin], arrhythmic

——interrupts alternation, constraint of opposition, even double bind [cf. p. 225]

——Lacoue-Labarthe: caesura is empty moment, intrusion of prophetic word (Tiresias)

——caesura marks withdrawal of divine, plays at & undoes mourning > doubles work of mourning (the speculative, the dialectic, the opposition, the identification, the nostalgic interiorization, even the double bind of imitation), caesura takes one’s breath away (coupe le souffle), open mouth, pour donner, pour recevoir: quand elle a de la chance, gives one speech

DPi pp. 34-5 time of bandages: when body not found—when Jesus is not dead but not yet elevated, resuscitated > the lodging made ready for literature: ascension w/out ascension, elevation w/out elevation, immanence w/out immanence, imminent yet unaccomplished resurrection

——moment before noli me tangere [p. 35n unique moment, since Jesus is generally a touching Jesus], moment where mourning can’t set to work, there’s no corpse > when Mary and Antigone weep over absence of burial

PIO p. 9 death as moment of mourning when breaking the mirror is most necessary & most difficult > “Fable” tells story of this crossing over to the other, other side of mirror

——no matter how outstretched (tendus) we are toward the other, everything we say or do remains w/in us: part of us wounded, conversing w/ ourselves in work of mourning, of Erinnerung

——even if metonymy of other w/in ourselves already constituted our relation to living other, [actual?] death brings relation into a more abundant light (un plus de lumière) > makes the breaking of the mirror more necessary (difficult): at instant of death, limit of narcissistic reappropriation is terribly sharp > must no longer be concerned w/ other in ourselvesyet, that’s all we can be concerned w/ > narcissistic wound enlarges (saccroît) for want of being (ne plus pouvoir être) narcissistic, no longer appeased in that Erinnerung we call work of mourning

——beyond internalizing memory to Gedächtnis, another way to think

pp. 18-9 via Eros/Psyche myth, impossibility of seeing & touching oneself at same time: mourning, mirror, specularization [quantum physics?]

PSSS p. 249 “mad”: invent destination, address, addressee of grievance

——“mad” as a movement w/ no target, no telos, where movement of (counter-)transference has not yet taking place, is seeking its place, its subjects [is this an analytic site?]

——threat of death, whose mourning/grievance would be born in advance, invades place left vacant for transferential destination

HST p. 358 tears, work of mourning, as process of hospitality > also, the culture of smile, welcoming of a promise

p. 359 Tupinamba give tearful welcome: stranger hailed as revenant; hôte as ghost (spirit or revenant, holy spirit)

pp. 382-83 survival guilt, reproach oneself before everything for which Auschwitz remains proper name/metonymy > asking forgiveness for being-there (être-là); (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas) debt prior to any borrowing: unacquittable fact of being-there, a being there originarily guilty

——asking for forgiveness occurs in the unforgivable; guilt of survivor (not only concentration camp survivor), anyone who is mourning; work of mourning is always “I survive”

p. 384 for Levinas, when I mourn, I feel responsible, I murder: “my own,” those I believe I killed, I love > ineluctable empire of phantasm at origin of meaning [Blanchot also links thought of death to murder]

p. 407 all poetical declarations of love as sickness of the other? > an other always more ancient and more to come than me, as if I carry w/in me the mourning of me carried by the other

pp. 407-08 impossible grammar of “I love you”: tragic/comic desire to want to die first and to want to survive you to console you at the time of my death (guard in me your mourning of me)

pp. 414-15 mourning as both interiorized incorporation & presentation of external dead body > substitueries [“substitution” w/ “killings”]

***C p. 198 paradigm does not show a coffin, it shows itself in its coffin, Titus-Carmel does the paradigm down, to death > works at mourning w/out example: learns to go w/out (se passer)

p. 201 introjection of mors, morceau [Lacan’s objet a?] always lets drop a heterogenous remainder of incorporation > infinite analysis of mourning btwn introj./incorp.

p. 211 do the impossible: make mourning ones mourning (faire du deuil son deuil)

TN p. 17 nothing takes place but place (rien na lieu que du lieu), extensions tiennent lieu (taking place of) > every metonymy announces, remains a sign of mourning

p. 18 Psyche as life, breath: mourning life itself

p. 35 for Nancy, excès de la façon (fashioning) sur lessence, et que lune supplée lautre, at origin of feeling oneself touch oneself; spectral revenant, prosthesis at heart of (self-)feeling > revenant, btwn life/death, dictates impossible mourning, sans fin—life itself [re: spacing irreducible to extensio]; p. 321n shouldn’t this spacing (what I call differance/trace) be linked to Heidegger’s tension of distancing (Gespanntheit) rather than Descartes’ extensio or even Freud’s Ausdehnung

p. 50 absolute mourning of Psyche (life itself) > mourning mourning, mourning w/out work of mourning

pp. 51-2 for Psyche, for a psyche altogether exposed to outside & other, there’s no autobiography: mourning autobiography (not just any mourning)

p. 52 being unimaginable gives rise to phantasms, allegories, figures, metonymies: technics > no overcoming (surmonté) this mourning w/out mourning [of autobiography] by any "work of mourning”

p. 52 Nancy: philosophy as work of mourning, work of representation, incorporation, profits from death (jouir de la mort), philosophy doesn’t know true mourning (w/out limits: ashes & tears)

p. 192 pre-originary mourning (re: Husserl’s vigilant stance on alter-ego) tied to motif of exappropriation—interiorization, even introjection, never achieved

p. 290 “heart”: ultimate place of mourning, sanctuary of what one keeps when one can’t keep anything, name of what infinitely exceeds the inside

p. 305 the selfsame (même) heart exappropriates instant touched by other, no possible reappropriation (absolute mourning)

ATM pp. 185-86 to bury a text that erased the name of God [dysgraphy] is not to annihilate it (burn the whole thing): by inhuming the fault, one keeps it; a work of mourning which can either 1) be successful through spiritual interiorization, introjection 2) or else be paralyzed in melancholic pathology (incorporation)

E p. 18 poetic speech, beyond finite commerce (out of circulation), yet of infinite value: the universal analogical equivalent, the value of values; through poetry, work of mourning turns hetero-affection into auto-affection, producing maximum of disinterested pleasure

p. 20 [mourning presupposes sight?]

***pp. 21-2 Derrida compares the work of mourning to the sublime, both allow negative pleasures to be reappropriated by economic calculation

p. 22 vomit gives too much enjoyment, suspends the suspension of non-consummation (which accompanies pleasure bound up w/ representation): it burns up all work as mourning work

p. 23 if mourning always consists in biting off the bit (le mors), a remainder, a corpse, the disgusting can only be vomited

AD p. 2 “work of mourning”: confused and terrible expression

CF pp. 31-2 forgiveness not pure when aimed at reconciliation, determined finalities, at reestablishing normality by a work of mourning

p. 50 must forgiveness saturate the abyss (suture, reconcile)? but who could object to imperative of reconciliation? amnesties, work of mourning—political strategy, psycho-therapeutic economy

CIN p. 35 entrust words to a page: better to inflame you, eat yourself up immediately, not a tomb that offers patience of mourning, but a tomb of a tomb, deprived of patience of mourning

p. 37 incineration celebrates perhaps the nothing of the all, destruction w/out return, mad w/ its desire, desperate disseminal affirmation but also its opposite: “no” to the work mourning, “no” of fire > how to accept working for his Highness (monseigneur) mourning?

p. 41 you only have mass or volume when covered w/ cinders, like covering one’s head w/ ashes in sign of mourning

——rebellion against Phoenix, affirmation of fire w/out place or mourning

OG pp. 39-40 (58-9) the fact that there can be a usurpation of writing, the need to chase out writing as other (blindness, wandering, mourning)—a possibility that must be questioned

CIR p. 164 mourning capitalizes, saving loves me [proximity loves Derrida too]

***p. 166 where you hear me no longer, where you hear yourself no longer, I am content to turn around you: you do not even know that you are wearing mourning for me

p. 169 the satyr galatea that I am, half-mourning satyr > the splitting of the ego, in me, is no transcendental claptrap

SPEC p. 330 cremation: a form of Fortgehen, quite singular effects on work of mourning

pp. 334-35 several families (in French analytic movement) bear same name [Freud’s name?] w/out knowing it [via Marie Bonaparte; “au moment où on croit décacheter (unsealed) un testament”]

——condition of filiation, mid-mourning (demi-deuil) [see “Ja ou le faux-bond”]: introjection and/or incorporation: la barre entre et et/ou ou > structurally as necessary as it is necessarily impure

p. 340 exemplary narcissistic wound [for Freud]: jealousy over birth of new baby, proof of infidelity of object of child's affection, undoes (défait) the bind (lien) (Bindung) to parent of opposite sex

——demi-deuil: irreducible category, no gradations

WRITING

KH pp. 114-15 in Timaeus, Greeks who have no writing (unlike Egyptians), need myth (destined to perpetual childhood) > memory of city, its salvation, entrusted to the writing of the other [who is the master here?]

pp. 122-23 [kind of Plato/Socrates Envois motif] Egypt tells childish Athens that it lacks the writing which it possesses, but whose invention Athens played the role of model

GT p. 44 writing not as the external archive of the gift, but tied to the very act of gift, act in sense of archive & performative operation

MONL p. 8 division, why one writes and how one dreams of writing, place of jealousy, divided btwn vengeance and resentment.

——before any memory writing destines itself to anamnesia

p. 65 dreams of leaving marks that recall the entirely other prior-to-the-first language: degree zero-minus-one of memory. a desire for infinite salvation: scratch and graft, caress with claws, borrowed claws

p. 67 do I write in the promise of a sole poem, still unheard-of language? each time I speak or write, I promise

OOG pp. 87-8 for Husserl, writing assures absolute traditionalization of object, does through virtuality, an autonomous transcendental field from which every present subject can be absent

——[Derrida now seems to hint at his own thought on writing] if text is not haunted by virtual intentionality, does not announce its pure dependence from writer/reader there’s no possibility of it being intelligible for a transcendental subject > silence, death, illegibility of past arcana, entombment of lost intentions and guarded secrets make possible privilege of intentionality

pp. 88-9 the de jure purity of intentional animation, for Husserl, as linguistic or graphic body is a flesh, proper body (Leib) or a spiritual corporeality (geistige Leiblichkeit)

——writing no longer only mnemotechnical aid, possibility of being incarnated in a graphic sign is condition of Objectivity’s internal completion

p. 89 what Fink says about speech is true of writing, “in sensible embodiment occurs the ‘localization’ and the ‘temporalization’ of what is, by its being-sense, unlocated and untemporal”

p. 90 for Husserl, paradoxically, possibility of being written (possibilitié graphique) permits ultimate freeing of ideality

p. 94 for Husserl, all factual writings in which truth could be sedimented nothing but sensible “exemplars,” they could all be destroyed w/out overtaking the very sense of absolute ideality

p. 118 apriori structures of historicity could be questioned only by recourse to language, writing, the capacity of reactivation, and finally to method [this can be taken as Husserl’s method and as Derrida’s method]

***LOBL p. 84 what I still call “text” for strategic reasons, a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces, overruns its borders, all limits, everything set up in opposition to writing: speech, life, world, real, history, politics, economics

pp. ~104-05 [literary] title is not its own telos, not self-mirroring, writing prevents reflecting representation from folding back on itself

p. ~105 writing as triumph of life

***p. ~124-25 writing is triumph, manic life-after-life insurance, indiscreet, exhibitionistic, even if we read no “that’s me there” in it (this increase in discretion is more surplus-value of triumph), supplement of triumph, enough to make you sick

——Derrida says this against Nietzsche: triumph over oneself is also a pursuit of power (Gewalt)

p. ~139 vitrifying structure of writing & desire > hymen (as syllepsis) and pane of glass; p. ~141 Blanchot: glass doesn’t use up what I enjoy, reads book behind pane of glass

p. 167 “and” as arrêt de mort, “and” of double bind, and I say “come,” “and immediately"-writing, annihilates time in ring of eternal return, yokes affirmation to itself in récit, the being-at-the-same-time of the other beyond time

p. ~176 to speak of writing, triumph, as living on, is to denounce [Freud’s] manic fantasy (not w/out repeating it)

MPM p. 99 for De Man, we all write, like Rousseau, w/in the “misleading” of the Versprechen, which nevertheless “conveys the promise of its own truth”

——every reading engaged in a promise w/in scene of a signature/writing

——apparent contradiction btwn act of reading and unreadability in the act > versprechen, promise at origin of history

——every reading is writing (but we must demonstrate it, following structure of promise)

p. 100 you can only say and sign: yes, yes in memory of yes

——writing, as an event of signature, a signature which can only promise itself in the sense that its destination is barred, impasse of aporia

p. 123 we can only write what can be erased—otherwise no promise, no memory

***p. 135 undecidable is the condition of deconstruction (on and in [sur, dans?] this condition); in the sense of condition of possibility and, at the same time, condition as situation or destiny

——this limit, this finitude, makes one write; deconstruction makes a path of writing through the aporia (impossible); deconstruction thinks only on the level of the impossible

MSUB J p. 166 under the words (mots), hors sens, when you let attraction of words, motifs, motets [anthems] play under the meaning, you draw, sing, rather than speaking, you write the unwritable > this passage also convokes multiplicity of voices in a “motel,” rhythm, vibration

EM pp. 132-33n (159-60n) Heidegger: written form exerts wholesome pressure, present world crisis needs less philosophy, more thinking, less literature, we must liberate Dichtung from literature

SEC pp. 309-10, 314 Derrida will differentiate writing from a concept of communication which would treat the nonsemantic (gestures, tremors, shocks) as proper or primitive meaning

p. 311 writing in accepted sense (not innocent, primitive, or natural) > writing a means of communication which extends field of oral/gestural communication; Derrida asks if this presupposes a homogenous space of communication? [writing extends limits of speech further]

——Derrida wants to examine conditions of emergence & occultation of generic, classical interpretation of writing

——Condillac an example w/out counterexample of properly philosophical interpretation of writing

p. 312 we write to absent persons, general assumption of writing is that it is a vehicle that has no effect on the meaning it vehiculates (writing as picture)

——history of writing conform to law of mechanical economy: gain most space & time by means of most convenient abbreviation

p. 313 though representation supplements presence, the general assumption [Condillac] is that writing repairs > a continuous, homogenous modification of presence in representation

——idea/sign relation preserved through all forms of writing [in Condillac] (hieroglyph, ideograph, phonetic): economic, mechanical, homogenous reduction, community of analogical participation

——writing functions in absence of addressee, beyond his life itself

p. 314 for Condillac, for French “ideologues,” writing as species w/in genus of communication

***pp. 314-15 if all signs suppose absence, writing would no longer be a species of communication, and all other theories would be uncritical, ensuring authority and force of a certain historical discourse

——absence of addressee, différance, must be brought to an absolute degree (to make writing possible), not reduced to a presence that is distant [an absence that carries all the way to death]

——“supposing that writing exists”

p. 315 [writing must be structurally legible, iterable vs. Lacan’s the letter always arrives]

——no code of writing is structurally secret, can always be iterable for a 3rd party

p. 316 absence—death of addressee (inscribed in mark) > value or effect of transcendentality linked to possibility of writing, to this “death”

——to write is to produce a mark that is a kind of machine, legible in scribe’s absence (this drifting of absolute responsibility, this orphaned writing > what Plato condemns in Phaedrus)

***pp. 316-17 take classical notion of writing, make it generalizable to all order of signs, and extend it even to experience of Being

p. 317 a written sign can break with its context (set of presences which organize moment of inscription), still be legible, can always be lifted from interlocking chain, grafted into other chains ——no context, no code can enclose it > code: possibility/impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity)

pp. 317-18 isn’t iterability of writing also in speech and in all experience? > never permits unity of self-identity

p. 324 writing has always been treated as a parasite

p. 327 differance, “the irreducible absence of intention or assistance [due to iteration] from the performative statement, from the most ‘event-like’ statement possible” authorizes Derrida to posit general graphematic structure of every “communication”

VM VM pp. 112-13 inhabit metaphor’s ruins, shabiller des lambeaux de la tradition et des haillons du diable: by using tradition’s words, one can use [them] up (user), les frotter comme une vieille pièce de monnaie fruste et dévaluée, on peut dire que la vraie extériorité est la non-extérioritée sans être lintériorité, on peut écrire par ratures et ratures de ratures: crossing out writes, still writes in space

——“syntax of the Site whose archaic description is not legible on the metal of language cannot be erased: it is this metal itself, its too somber solidity and its too shining brilliance”

——langage, fils de la terre et du soleil: écriture > one could never come across a language w/out rupture of space, no aerial or aquatic language, in which alterity would be more lost than ever > structure of inside-outside/day-night has no meaning in pure space [proscribed words], inhabits conceptuality itself

PP PP pp. 63-4 cutting trace (la trace coupante): the decision of each reading, risk getting fingers caught, only chance, must not only look but touch the text

——reading is writing, a single gesture, but doubled, le est qui accouple la lecture à lécriture doit en découdre

p. 65 Plato: writing always signifies (sēmainei) the same, can only repeat (itself), it is a game (paidia)

p. 72 problem of writing linked to problem of “knowing by heart” [speech] > need pharmakon, biblia, if one has not learned speech by heart

p. 73 writing is open to empiricism & chance, is a drug, governed by ways of magic

p 74 Plato: questions of impropriety and propriety in writing

——writing as a question of morality, sophistry

——writing linked to myth, both contra knowledge (sought w/in oneself)

p. 75 writing as repeating w/out knowing (through a myth [?])

p. 76 king, father, does not need to write

pp. 91-2 god of writing must be god of death: breathless sign replaces living word

***p. 104 (118) excess, displacement of series, nest pas une simple sortie hors de la série (ce geste tombe sous une catégorie de la série), a folding back (repli), a re-mark, cannot name it with a single concept w/out being off the mark (sans le manquer): it is a real and necessary challenge that writes itself, and we must begin by reading it

p. 134 (154) writing is not a good tekhnē, not a productive art, not secure (saphes kai bebaion), like alētheia (nonsensible visibility, intelligible invisibility)

p. 135 (155) writing can only repeat its own hollowness, subject already knows signifieds, gives them to writing on consignment

pp. 135-36 writing stripped of its path-breaking force, pure repetition, dead repetition, tautological, hollow, repetition of death > writing is not living repetition of the living

pp. 136-37 writing paints living word, painting (zōgraphia, zōgraphēma sometimes shortened to gramma), both interrogated by living word > masks, figurines, simulacra denature what they claim to imitate, writing & painting should aim at resembling/faithfulness to their model

——from Phaedrus, writing is like painting, when you question it, responds w/ majestic silence > can’t answer for itself

p. 142 (163) writing: death, mask, festival, cosmetic, it others, destroys sameness

pp. 144-45 (166-67) democracy is like writing, Plato’s trial against democracy similar to that against pharmakon: excess, anarchy, orgy, flea market, fair, bazaar (pantopōlion); errant democratic man has no substance, not perverse in regular way, like signifier freed from logos

p. 149 soul-inscription, inscription of truth in soul, uses a metaphor [Plato admits it] that philosophy will never be able to do w/out, must borrow from simulacrum; metaphoricity is logic of contamination, contamination of logic

——good writing can only be described through metaphor of the bad

——Plato prefers one writing over the other, a good writing over bad, a fertile trace (endgenders w/in) over a sterile one (une semence dépensée au-dehors en pure perte, risk of dissemination)

p. 150 good-writing is serious (spoudē), pharmakon, ephemeral produce is a game (paidia)

p. 154 seed must submit to logos, do violence to itself, since sperm is opposed to law of logos > when Plato turns live speech into psychic graphē he does so w/ a problematic of truth: lécriture en tè psuchè nest pas une écriture de frayage, mais seulement denseignement, de transmission, écriture daletheia

pp. 156-57 no as such where writing or play are concerned, they cannot be classically affirmed (since they have no essence) w/out being negated, le jeu et la graphie vont sans cesse disparaissant

pp. 158-59 the 3 eras of “Platonism” (Plato, Saussure, and Rousseau), which put writing out of question while borrowing from it all its demonstrative/theoretical resources, must comes to term w/: 1) generalized sort of writing 2) a “contradiction”: written proposal of logocentrism 3) construction of “literary” work

p. 164 (189) writing is parricidal

p. 167 disappearance, retrait of father’s face (good-sun-capital) is movement of differance, which opens to writing, which writing opens for itself, threatens hierarchical interiority of pharmacy

p. 168 if disappearance of good-father-capital-sun is precondition of discourse, writing (is) epekeina tēs ousias

PAS PAS p. (66) “écriture comme trace dun mouvement sans origin, sans fin, sans langage, sans…”

p. (79) what does sauf mean? save them from an outside not even proper to them? sauf: secret (dérobé), powerful word, language fascinates starting form it > like sans, pas: crumbles, precludes the set from understanding itself: “rien sauf le dehors” > sauvetage project part of writing project

——assimilating interiority of mastery can also be terrible thus compulsion toward outside could be defense > sauf le dehors, tout sauf le dehors

p. (106) Blanchot: “friendship for the demand to write which excludes all friendship”

VP p. 69 for Husserl, writing, as usual, is an indication which needs to be reawakened, reawaken the word in the body of the letter, a letter that threatens emptiness

p. 70 Husserl tormented by possibility that writing inhabits inside of speech, itself at work in intimacy of thought

pp. 79-80 that pure grammar can work w/out object, w/out intuition, leads Derrida to the privilege of writing as the common name for all signification, must work after death

p. 80 writing inaugurates and completes idealization, neither real nor ideal, allows possibility to think idealization, death, repetition and signification in the same opennesses

p. 83 writing as “outspokenness”

S p. 111 wouldn’t Jews, Moslem, Christians respond to Heidegger’s retrait, flame and fire-writing in promise? [messianic echoes]

FSW p. 206 for Freud, metaphor of writing appropriates problems of psychic apparatus in structure & psychic text in fabric

p. 210 agreeing w/ Saussure that signifier/signified two sides of same paper, originary writing must still produce space & materiality of sheet itself

p. 211 to speak of writing, to betray Freud more than ever

p. 212 labor of writing erases transcendental distinction btwn origin of world and Being-in-the-world, erases it while producing it

p. 217 fundamental property of writing is spacing: diastem (interval, interruption) & time becoming space, unfolding (not linear time) [see Nancy’s Corpus on diastole]

p. 224 writing as trace survives scratch’s present, punctuality, stigmē

p. 226 writing unthinkable w/out repression > Freud uses metaphor of censorship, writing as vigilance [neither permanent contact] & failure [nor permanent break] of censorship

——if there were only perception, pure permeability of breaching, there would be no breaches (frayages), no legible writing, but pure perception does not exist: nous ne sommes écrits quen écrivants > subject of writing does not exist as sovereign solitude of author

p. 228 Freud augured a beyond and beneath of “Platonic” closure > by opening to theme of writing, writing as technē, as relation btwn life & death, btwn psychical and nonpsychical

——this opening never made explicit, but became urgent in relation to the [failure] of rhetorical device of metaphor [re: Mystic Pad]

——writing is stage of history & play of world

TC p. 247 Artaud wants to destroy all writing after reading it once; Artaud vs. Plato > both against writing: Artaud because it’s the erasure of body, Plato because it is body

PPHS p. 94n classical take on writing as “practical exterior activity,” as that which “comes to the aid” condemns all mnemotechniques, all langue machines, all supplementary repetitions > life of spirit is thusly forced to emerge from its interior

p. 103n [TN. Derrida often compares philosophical treatment of writing to Freud’s “kettle logic”]

SH p. 40 Sichelschrift > cuts in coming around > another turning (not rounding), another trope, inscribes letters in cutting all around > circumcises words in silence?

F pp. xxviii-xxix writing not essentially verbal or phonetic, body signs even before any “proper” name > no difference btwn verbal behavior of patient & paramecium faced w/ obstacle

FWT p. 63 writing, trace, gramma or grapheme exceed opposition: human/nonhuman > extend field of living, or rather life/death relation

DS p. 185 when writing is regarded as mimesis, the most it can be valued is equal to truth it’s imitating

p. 190 only metaphors of painting and writing are linked to psyche > in “reality,” literally, acc. Plato, writing & painting deal in copies, copies of copies, incapable of intuition of thing itself

p. 208 space of writing: “event”—hymen, crime, suicide, spasm (laughter/pleasure): everything describes structure of text & effectuates its possibility > a lustre which is nothing beyond its own fragmented light

p. 223 mime mimes a kind of writing, is himself written in a kind of writing, nothing of what is can lie beyond medium/speculum reading-writing > there is 1) writing w/out book, marking tip (la pointe du trait) proceeds w/out past upon virgin sheet 2) infinite number of booklets in other booklets > Mallarmé reads, writes while reading, while reading text written by Mime, who himself reads in order to write

p. 226 surprise in writing, supplement, baffling economy of seduction: entre un silence

p. 270 fold, multi-pli-cations (folders, foldouts, etc.)—ploys (all the figures) & the re-mark of the fold-upon-itself of writing (again)

POS pp. 13-4 no end of the book, no beginning of writing, writing puts archie in question

pp. 52-3 Derrida never identified writing w/ myth, what interested him was how philosophy excluded writing to keep myth exterior to scientific rationality > deconstruction attempts to break up opposition btwn logos and mythos

p. 53 how the “fall,” abasement (of writing) only functions via thought of origin

***p. 68 writing structurally carries w/in itself (counts-discounts) its own erasure, while marking what remains of this erasure

p. 71 the strategy of paleonomy, of using old name, refers to play of stratagem not hierarchical organization of means & ends: 1) extract predicative trait held in reserve 2) extend, graft, extracted trait, as a lever of intervention, transforming previous organization [writing]

p. 110n “I read while writing: slowly, taking pleasure in long prefaces to each term”

OS p. 67 differance as a difference older than Being itself, a still more unthought difference than difference of Being/beings > leads to a writing that exceeds all dialectics, w/out history, cause, absence, presence, archia, telos

ROP pp. 29-30 deconstruction announces status w/out status of nonfinite # of names/quasi-concepts: the thinking of writing called for this, but it’s better thematized and formalized in theory of double bind, stricture of double band, and especially non-ontological remaining

ATIA p. 52 what is terrible (deinon) about writing (painting), for Socrates, is its majestic silence, it does not respond [animals too?]

GSP p. 166 in writing, sign can always “empty” itself, may never be reactivated, risks remaining forever closed & mute

FS p. 8 for Blanchot, pure absence, the excess of everything—possibility of writing (absence of everything in which presence is announced) > makes one work

pp. 9-10, 303n doesn’t pure speech require inscription, isn’t it a privileged representation of inscription? just like Leibniz’s essence requires existence (pushes out toward world), power > act?

——God of Leibniz does not know the anguish of choice, only one book distributed through all books, God’s Will always chooses the “best”

——writing, not a determined pathos, an empirical state of writer, but responsibility of angustia: [Derrida is privileging a power of equivocality over creativity of classical God, anguish connoting a narrowing, a loss of breath, a restriction, constraint, and thus the anguish of choice]

——to write: 1) not only to conceive Leibnizian book as an impossible possibility (as Mallarmé names the limit) 2) ce n'est pas seulement savoir que le Livre n'existe pas et qu'à jamais il y a des livres où (se) brise, avant même d'avoir été un, le sens d'un monde impensé par un sujet absolu [the English translation of this sentence fails to capture the sense of the books themselves shattering] 3) nor is it to have lost the certainty of pages binding themselves into a “book of reason” 4) not only to know that the non-written can’t be relegated to having no basis by the obliging negativity of some dialectic 5) not only to know that through writing the best may not transpire 6) it is the impossibility of making meaning precede writing: it is to lower meaning while elevating inscription

——absence & haunting of divine sign (Jewish God) [cf. GOD], anguish of Hebraic ruah (pneuma), regulates modern books/criticism/aesthetics

p. 11 writing does not await prescription from some topos ouranios, or divine understanding

it’s because writing is inaugural that it is dangerous and anguishing, doesn’t know where it’s going, essential precipitation toward meaning that it constitutes—is its future [ex-stasis?]

——meaning must await being said/written in order to inhabit itself

——writing is only capricious through cowardice

——John Chrysostom: writing is second best course

——God imprints secondarity on every navigation of the human: 1) passage of deferred reciprocity btwn reading & writing? 2) absolute witness who’s already read what you will write: third party as transparency of meaning? [circular logos]

p. 12-13 through Rousset, a form of writing where true literary language, poetry, is access to free speech, pure historicity, beyond affectivity (finitude & empiricism), not a voluntarism, will to write actives the will itself, freedom, to write would be to forget difference, to forget writing

——attempt-to-write, moment of overflow (can’t be understand via voluntarism): when play of meaning overflows signification, which is always enveloped by limits of nature, life, soul

p. 29 Nietzsche against Flaubert for believing in the work over the man (sedentary life), we would have to choose btwn writing and dance: dance of the pen? but we must hunch to write

——writing: “excavation (creusement) w/in the other toward the other in which the same seeks its (sa) vein and the true gold of its phenomenon”

——l'écriture est l'issue comme descente hors de soi en soi du sens: métaphore-pour-autrui-en-vuc-d'autrui-ici-bas, métaphore comme possibilité d'autrui ici-bas, métaphore comme métaphysique où l'être doit se cacher si l'on veut que l'autre apparaisse

p. 30 writing, moment of depth as decay > original valley of the other w/in Being; incidence & insistence of inscription

DIF DIF p. 19 Aufhebung constrained into writing itself otherwise, or simply into writing itself, or taking into account its consumption of writing (sa consommation décriture) [re: general/restricted economy]

O p. 5 writing situates every signified as a differential trace

p. 49(n) re: writing, Hegel does not think exteriority, repetitive autonomy of remainder > writing becomes pro-gramme, pre-scription, pre-text, the simple empirical husk (déchet) of concept

——for Derrida, this husk is coextensive w/ whole life of discourse

WAP p. 122 double metaphoric of inscription (Plato, Cousin): bad writing (occults, perverts) is cryptic, artificial, secondary, voiceless > must be replaced by good writing

CHM p. 62 vouloir-dire-lhyperbole not antagonistic to silence but its condition, not voluntarism but a 1st passion, il garde en lui la trace dune violence, more written than said: differance of absolute excess (economy btwn that which exceeds and exceeded totality)

RGE p. 276 absurd for transgression of Book by writing to be legible only in a determined sense

REST p. 357 fort/da not a relation of opposition, each notion offers an eyelet to be traversed by the other, to the figure or the pointure of the other (Heidegger’s playing w/ the bobbin)

——fort: da, double eyelet [i.e. colon instead of slash]: how it must be “reknotted/taken up (renouer)” again in writing

DST DST p. 316n obsessionality, re: writing, no longer clinical category

——Bataille: what forces me to write is the fear of going mad

TR p. 103 not only accusation & judgment in confession, there’s the executioner (carrying out of the sentence): sentence endured in pleasure of writing, ambiguous enjoyment at heart of terrible, severe jubilation of inscription: one steps up to cashier right away to collect interest on a capital that will assume value only “sooner or later,” after my death, in my absence

EJQB p. 64 Judaism and the birth/passion of writing (origin of historicity)

p. 65 the exchange btwn Jew & writing, exchange w/out prerogative, where original appeal is a convocation (Jabès’ persistent affirmation)

pp. 67-8 writing (originally) as secondary, hermetic: displaced on broken line btwn lost & poisoned speech [re: God’s silence, repentance, broken Tables]

——separation of life & thought: infinite anchoritism (writing as moment of Desert, Judaic experience as reflection)

p. 70 to be a poet is to know how to have speech, let it speak alone, which it can do only in its written form

——to leave writing: be there only to provide its passageway (laisser le passage)

——only that which is written gives me existence by naming me (things come into existence & lose existence by being named) > sacrifice of existence to the word (Hegel), but also consecration of existence by word: one must write, not simply be written, in order to have a name

p. 71 Meister Eckhart: “God becomes God when creation says God” > this assistance given (secours porté) to God by man’s writing doesn’t contradict writing’s inability to “help itself (se porter secours)” (Phaedrus)

——isn’t the divine, la disparition de lhomme, announced in this distress of writing?

p. 71 if nature refuses the leap (saut), Scripture will never be nature: proceeds by leaps alone

——to write: courage to lose one’s life, to die away from nature

pp. 75-6 if writing isn’t a tearing of self toward other w/in a confession of infinite separation, if it takes pleasure for its own sake, it destroys itself—in plenitude, Identity, roundness of egg [cf. p. 66 Jabès renouncing verve, capriciousness]

p. 78 to write: to confuse ontology & grammar; grammar: in which are inscribed all dislocations of dead syntax, all aggressions perpetrated by speech against language, every questioning of the letter

——all these tortures are forgotten in literature, as mortifications, as ruses of life

AFR pp. 126-27 Condillac against frivolous obscurantism, erudition, against philosophers (inventors of prose) who did not “witness[ ]…impressions they caused” (unlike poets, orators), nor did they find rule of their discourse in “live interchange” > frivolous style is that of the written

D p. 357 in scratching (gratter) on this textual matter, your recognize description of a painting, reframed, broken into, placed in another quadrilateral, w/ one side fractured: you are painting, writing while reading: tout le tissu verbal y est pris, et vous avec

+R p. 152 [Derrida on 2 hands] > to write one must be several

LI p. 41 narrow, “strict” sense of writing

p. 83 Derrida replaces “of God” w/ “of writing,” where iterability of the proof (of God) produces writing; “the perhaps it does not exist” of writing; while, w/out opposition, “God…should certainly exist”

——the “perhaps” of perhaps it [writing] doesn’t exist, leaves existence of writing undecidable, escapes the jurisdiction of all ontotheological discourse: the rest of the trace, its remains (restance), neither present nor absent

p. 137 to no longer oppose writing to erasure (accounting for supplementary paradox) is both terrible and yet nonviolent (perhaps nonviolence itself)

p. 148 undecidability (not “indeterminacy”) always a determinate oscillation btwn possibilities highly determined in strictly defined structures: difference of force in decision of writing (a word whose broad sense includes political action & experience in general) > no indecision or double bind w/out determination: occasionally, each side terribly necessary & irreplaceably singular

p. 152 “double writing”: irreducible divisibility, “quasi-transcendental,” must partition itself along 2 sides of a limit and respect the rules (to certain extent) of what it deconstructs

TN p. 63 Nancy: writing touches the body

p. 276 Nancy: writing is violent exhaustion of the discourse in which “all sense” is altered in exscribed body

CIN p. 31 btwn black & white, color of writing resembles only “literality” of cinder that still inheres in a language

ATAP p. 87 John Patmos (1: 2–3) “the joys of the reader, of the hearer/of the words of the inspiration/for those who keep what is written/yes, the time approaches”: angelic structure, condition of all marks, time, experience, writing, trace > “apocalyptic” writings: exemplary revelation of this transcendental structure

——do not know to whom apocalyptic envoi returns, perhaps not even man is the terminal of this computer w/out end

CIR p. 191 intense relation to survival that writing is (no desire that something remain after me), to enjoy this light I’m producing through experimentation of my possible survival, i.e. of absolute death (truth of the world w/out me) [?]

pp. 272-73 never been able to contradict myself, still so young [cf. SW pp. 322-23], unforgettable power of my discourse—they grind even the mute ash, name of God in the ash > so I write, convenient for forgetting

SPEC p. 304 “the site of the legible, like the origin of writing, is carried away w/ itself (le site du lisible, comme lorigine de lécriture, sy emporter)”

p. 305 speculator can survive legatee of an autobiographical speculation, institution of movement w/out limit: mutism of legatee, one of the possibilities that dictates/causes legatee to write

p. 341 demon, revenance which repeats its entrance, revient w/out having been called by PP > like Socrates’ demon, which made everyone write, this automaton produces effects of ventriloquism, w/out origin, emission, addressee, tele w/out telos

p. 397 irresolution of scene of writing—a Bindung, tends itself (se tend), ceaseless posting, no final orgasm, beyond of pleasure remaining the end of pleasure > pleasure at its proper moment? still don’t know what it is: secousses orgasmiques, joussiance, deferred as soon as obtained

FV p. 483 certain psychoanalytic interpretations (invisible framing: frame w/in frame) vs. scene of writing w/ ruined (abîmé) limits

WRITING in OF GRAMMATOLOGY

OG p. 3 (12) history of metaphysics as history of truth, as the truth of truth, the debasement of writing, its repression outside (hors) of “full (pleine)” speech

p. 7 (16) writing as “signifier of the signifier” no longer means accidental doubling, fallen (déchue) secondarity, but overflows, goes beyond extension of language > comprehends language

——signified always already (toujours déjà) functions as signifier: effacing = overflowing

——secondarity of writing effects all signifieds

——advent of writing, advent of a play which effaces all those abris du hors-jeu (out-of-bounds shelters [transcendental signifieds]) that surveil field of language > destroying the concept sign

***p. 8 (17-8) writing as secondary, as technique: a translator of a full speech present to itself, its signified, its other [w/in system that privileges phonè]

——writing & technique se confound (merge) > technique doesn’t clarify thought of writing

——death of book announces death of full speech, announces exhaustion of language’s archon [speech], as if language now seen as a species of writing, as a (short) 3000 year adventure: announces new mutation in history of writing

p. 9 (19-20) if cybernetics ousts metaphysical concepts soul, life, value, choice & memory, it must conserve notion of writing, trace, grammè, graphemeuntil its own historico-metaphysical character is exposed [cybernetic program will be the field of writing]

p. 10 (20-21) cybernetics & mathematics extend possibility of “message,” its no longer the written translation of a language, the transporting of a signified whose integrity remains

pp. 14-5 (26-7) signified–immediate; signifier–mediate (exterior)

——writing as metaphoricity itself: a simulated immediacy; w/in logocentrism: bad writing is finite, artificial, sensible; good writing is infinite, soul-writing, Book of God (natural)

p. 17 (29) Rousseau: to “judge genius” from books is like “painting a man’s portrait from his corpse”; Derrida: writing in the common sense is the dead letter, exhausts life, carrier of death

pp. 17-8 (29-30) natural writing (breath) pneumatological not grammatological

——interior holy voice of faith; natural law, native unity of voice & writing is prescriptive, commandment > good writing comprehended as that which had to be comprehended

p. 17 (30) acc. Rousseau, perverse, artful writing exiled in exteriority of body

pp. 23-4 (38) differance can only be thought by passing through the ontico-ontological difference, a determination that gets erased by differance: this trick of writing (tour décriture) is irreducible [historial question]

p. 25 (40-1) acc. Hegel, writing (an Umweg) betrays life/breath > finitude/paralysis, sterilizes spirit, principle of difference/death in becoming of being (is to speech, what China is to Europe)

p. 29 (45) unity of phonè, glossa, logos, lunité articulée du son et du sens dans la phonie > this presupposition prior to all oppositions > re: this unity, writing always derivative: “sign of sign” says Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel

pp. 33-4 (50-1) if writing is mere “figuration” of language—it is exiled, cast outside, a double > unrelated to interior of the system: “internal system” is an epistemological exigency constituted by possibility of phonetic writing

——but this science [deconstructive grammatology?], where opening of “image” conditions “reality,” can’t maintain classical scientific grid: external/internal, image/reality, representation/presence > this science inaugurates the originality of its field

pp. 36-7 (54-5) to think writing first, a perversion, dangerous promiscuity, origin ungraspable, the violence of forgetting, auxiliary meaning not living (not spontaneous); representation mingles (senlace) w/ what it represents; infinite reference (renvoi): le double dédouble ce quil redouble

——deconstruction does not make writing innocent but shows why this violence does not befall (survient) an innocent language: violence is originary > wherever there’s the sense of a right side: mythological effect of return (retour)

pp. 36-8 (56-7) writing as “trap,” pathology (blind), idolatry; for Saussure, Leibniz’s fixed language would be like a hen hatching a duck’s egg > “la perversion de lartifice engendre des monstres

p. 325n (54n) Saussure: those who enforce correct pronunciation take the written image of sound for sound itself [another abuse of writing]

pp. 39-40 (58-9) the fact that there can be a usurpation of writing, the need to chase out writing as other (blindness, wandering, mourning)—a possibility that must be questioned

p. 40 (59-60) for Saussure & Husserl, teleology of phonetic writing makes the crisis of nonphonetic writing psychological errors, these nonintutionisms exile from sense; for Husserl, unlike Saussure, empty formalism part of his teleology > dialectical use of negativity should force us to rethink crisis (crisis not a mere accident)

pp. 41-2 (60-2) writing: absence of signatory/referent, a “fixité” different from speech’s, a monstrosity, écart naturel dans la nature > must contain it like a leper

p. 44 (65) Saussure’s arbitrary sign functions w/in interior natural sound

——[Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure] if “writing” signifies inscription & the durability of the sign, then the very idea of institution (hence the arbitrariness of the sign) is unthinkable outside writing, unthinkable outside horizon itself, outside world as space of inscription > opening to spatial distribution of signs (regulated play) [overturn opposition physis/nomos]

p. 54 (79) what is “after”? is the “after” always parasitic? what is a parasite? do we really learn to write and read “after” we learn to speak?

***pp. 56-7 (82-3) arche-writing can never be an object of science, it is that which cannot be reduced to a form of presence

——Derrida uses word writing in relation to the vulgar concept of writing, which, historically, would have been impossible w/out dissimulation of arche-writing

p. 60 (88) arche-writing at work in graphic and nongraphic expression, pattern uniting form & substance, all content & expression > opens temporalization, relationship w/ other & language

——arche-writing cannot be an object in a linguistic system or the “immanent” system itself [glossematics] > but, doesn’t have a real field elsewhere

p. 68 (100) writing can never be thought under the category of the subject

p. 69 (100) spacing as writing is the becoming-absent, becoming-unconscious of the subject

p. 73 (106-08) writing as death & resource of signatum [sa mort, sa ressource] > immediate signatum [in MOP] is not considered trace but full presence

pp. 328-29n Horus, god of writing, has a substitute eye [?], god of death

pp. 74-5 (110) question of origin at first merges w/ essence [re: what is writing?] > though writing is thoroughly historical, surprising [?] that scientific study of writing has always taken form of a history of writing

p. 332n writing’s instrumentalization, the suspension of being-upright (cf. FS, PS) > writing’s structural solidarity w/ capitalization [Rousseau, Engels, Court de Gebelin]

p. 86 “line” only a particular model, vulgar, [acc. Heidegger] mundane concept of time in ontology from Aristotle to Hegel > meditation on writing & the deconstruction of the philosophy of history are inseparable

***p. 92 (139) writing as eclipse that surprises/obscures glory of word [cf. GLAS, faulty tele-type], dislocates founding categories of language & grammar of epistémè

p. 93 (142) unnameable movement of différence-même, I’ve strategically nicknamed (surnommé) trace, reserve, differance > could be called writing only w/in historical closure, w/in limits of science & philosophy

p. 93 (142) thinking (what we already know we haven’t begun), “mesuré à la taille de lécriture, s’entame seulement dans l’epistémè” > in a certain manner, thought gives you nothing to say

p. 101 (149) metaphysics: exemplary system of defense against violence of writing > what is violence if something in it is equivalent to operation of the trace?

p. 106 for Derrida, writing as violence is originary, mustn’t be abstracted or isolated, not a fall/disease incurred by an innocent language

pp. 107-08 (158) writing as possibility of road? violent spacing of nature, silva is savage, via rupta is written, form imposed on hylè

p. 335n Vico was rare believer in contemporaneity of origin of writing/speech

p. 337n writing can’t be contained w/in a science—can’t have that ambition or modesty

p. 121 writing as criterion of historicity or cultural value

——still ethnocentric to think West is bad, that writing exploits

p. 338n writing and the sedentary

p. 123 (180-81) wen, Chinese for writing, also means marks on a tortoise’s back

pp. 124-25 (182) [vis-à-vis Lévi-Strauss] birth of writing (in colloquial sense) most often linked to genealogical anxiety > genealogical relation & social classification as stitched steam (point de suture) [point de capiton?] of arche-writing: condition of (so-called oral) language and possibility of writing in colloquial sense

pp. 127-28 (185-86) writing: opening of intersubjective violence

pp. 128-29 if Lévi-Strauss believes that writing doesn’t achieve “disinterest” of science, then he is not a scientist, a well-known pattern… [truth as theoretically infinite transmissibility has historical possibility only w/ writing]

p. 130 (189) [re: Lévi-Strauss’ assessment of when science began] if writing is “necessary condition” of science, argument se trouve frappée dun lourd indice dapproximation empirique

p. 133 (193-94) Derrida not denying certain roles of writing, but to attribute them to writing specifically and then to exempt speech: “il y a un abîme quon ne doit pas franchir aussi allègrement

pp. 134-35 (195-96) w/out writing no violence, no hierarchy, no deception [Derrida affirming Lévi-Strauss beyond his logocentrism]

p. 139 (201-02) the lure of the ethics of speech resembles a hunter’s stratagem, falconry > to recognize writing in speech is to begin to think the lure (leurre)

p. 140 (202) arche-writing: nonethical (violent) opening of ethics, origin of morality & immorality; no ethics w/out other, detour, simulation, differance, absence, writing

p. 142 (205) [early who/what] sacrifice the I am present for what I am, what Im worth: renounce my present life to achieve myself in ideality/truth > writing is the phenomenon of this battle (replaces presence by value)

pp. 144-46 (207-10) writing as supplement, sajouter, suppléant, mediocre makeshift (pis-aller) [translated elsewhere as stopgap], surplus, plenitude added to plenitude, stranger, evil, fills a void

p. 151 (216) for Rousseau, danger of image, imaginary seduction, in writing & masturbation, “fatal advantage (funeste avantage)” > the supplement that “trompe (cheats) la nature

p. 238 (339) Rousseau’s first allusion to writing (movement of magic wand [baguette], hieroglyph) holds itself out of reach of all distinction (all difference of need from passion)

——lorigine métaphorique de la parole ouvre un oeil au centre de la langue—visibility inscribed in the birth of voice is not purely perceptive, it signifies: writing is the eve of speech

——writing had to appear before a question of speech: need before need

p. 269 writing threatens song, poem, epic—w/ death

p. 270 (381) obsessive pressure of writing from where it’s held in check, such is the history of metaphysics > obstinate effort to cancel writing : threatens presence, proper, parole

—becoming-language of cry > loss of paroles plenitude (hollows out in articulating itself)

pp. 287-88 (407) writing in furrows (sillons), via rupta: if space were simply geometric, ideal, writing never would have broken from boustrophedon (turning of ox, left-right-right-left)

——space of geometric objectivity an ideal (object) produced/signified at moment of writing

pp. 288-89 surface of page distributes itself differently depending on whether one is reading or writing (writing sensible/ reading intelligible > but, opposition disqualified: it’s impossible to purely separate writing/reading), coordination of hand/eye > that phoné must see itself, handle itself, in temporal linearity, this is only one way of speech [i.e. ethnocentric universalism]

——[Derrida is questioning very space of page, its determination by movement of hand, linearity, wonders about abandonment of boustrophedon, turning of the ox, writing by furrows > linear, phonographic techniques homogenize space—age of transaction?] [baby daddy]

pp. 296-97 (418-20) acc. Rousseau, return to inalienable immediacy of self-possession (jouissance de soi), unrepresentable sovereignty—the end of written law > there is a social contract before writing, but always threatened by letter

——for Rousseau, writing is origin of inequality

p. 315 (443-44) writing is atonal > for Rousseau, words (voix) not sounds (sons) are written, i.e. writing consists of consonants & articulation > Rousseau describes w/out declaring, en contrebande, the originary exteriority of writing: alterity

——death (not present) travels w/in speech as trace, reserve, differance, supplement; not the simple exteriority of death to life, evil to good, signifier to signified [that would be MOP]

p. 316 (445) Rousseau: I give my dreams as dreams > la scène du rêve est toujours une scène décriture? [Westworld]

Xtreme

KH pp. 98-99 entire discourse on khōra, every yet-to-come history of interpretations, included in advance, this X receives all, teleologically programs history of hermeneutics[?], is that a history?

FL p. 243 deconstruction is possible as an experience of the impossible, wherever one can replace, translate, determine the X of justice, wherever there is (the undeconstructible)

LOBL p. ~165 X of Larrêt de mort, ichthus, (see +R), fish out of water, Christ-like figure of “who,” resurrection [see p. 168 raising an X, chi, chiasma over him]

***HASD p. 4 X (text, writing, trace, differance, hymen, supplement, pharmakon, parergon) : not subject to Aufhebung, dialectic, neither concept nor name > lends itself to a series of names, calls for another syntax, exceeds order and structure of predicative discourse [has induced accusation against Derrida of repeating procedures of negative theology]

POO pp. 12-3 X (a child, Pierre, a trace) does not need your, the father’s name, does not return your, the father’s name [Derrida’s thinly veiled reference to Pierre]

——Philoctetus: the child is the problem [shield], always, that is the truth

PAS p. (67) X that is loubli tout autre is also the same X of philosophy, science

POS p. 70 X as chiasm [btwn philosophy & literature?]: a fork (crossroads, quadrifurcum, grid, trellis, key) > more unequal at one point than other: figure of double gesture, intersection

——can be hastily thought of as thematic drawing of dissemination

ATIA p. 38 Chi-mère whose name decomposes in Glas

O p. 44 acc. X (chiasmus) (thematic diagram of dissemination), semen just as likely to get lost as seminal differance as it is to be reappropriated by sublimity of father

D p. 362 X not an unknown but chiasmus, a text that is unreadable because only readable > Numbers undecipherable because you imposed encryption on them by trying to decipher them

HST p. 397 X, great 3rd, God accords/grants forgiveness, renders substitution possible

+R p. 161 fishing picture, record of a hunt: 2 death drives cross in an X (double diagonal): 1) pushes, attracts, holds down—descending column 2) the other, just as sublime, raises up, asphyxia of the phallus—ascending column

p. 165 X as Chi, the other scene, Ich, Isch (man)—she, cri

p. 166 X signs: a crossing privileged by all texts sold under my name [bibliography of Derrida’s use of X]

——X (chiasmus), general intersection of Glas, its beginnings or ends en bandes tordues et écartées, also demiurgic operation in Timaeus [see quote: turn X into 2 circles, split Other from Same]

——quotation [Adami] cut out of Glas: outbidding speculating to infinity

SPEC p. 401 quasi-proper name is the X that speculates [re: Freud’s Beyond…] w/out identity: sets in place proper trap of its suspension, limits itself in order to increase itself—if it did not limit itself: absolute discharge, disbanding, nothingness of death

X WITHOUT X

GOD p. 31 gift as gift w/out essence, can’t be seen in light of day, must be the secret, secrecy is the last word of the gift which is the last word of the secret

GT p. 17 something must come about in an instant, an instant that doesn’t belong to economy of time, time w/out time, a forgetting that forgets, but a forgetting that’s not nothing

p. 159 khrema signals in direction of monetary sign; w/ “Counterfeit Money” we’re at heart of truth w/out truth, law w/out law, duty w/out duty concentrated & lost in enigma of khrē, khrema, khraomai: one must, need, lack, desire, be indigent poor, owe, ought, need, utility, interest, thing, event, fatality, prayer

p. 169 natural debt, debt w/out debt > infinite debt

BL pp. 198-99 quasi-event of the murder of father, event w/out event, resembles fiction, myth, fable > real, effective guilt; question of belief & historical referent—irremediably fissured

——dead father more powerful than living one

p. 206 truth w/out truth: Heidegger calls non-truth the truth of truth [I think elsewhere? Derrida doesn’t register Heidegger’s statement as equivalent to truth w/out truth]

p. 209 literary: story w/out story

p. 216 language w/out language

LOBL p. 131 mother as figure w/out figure

POO p. 31 [Derrida’s passion?]: the absolute solitude of a passion without martyrdom

SPOM pp. 232-33n the 2 experiences of the secret: I tell you that I cannot tell you > my 1st crime and 1st confession, a confession w/out confession

HASD pp. 8-9 negative & hyperaffirmative meaning of without (sans) in St. Augustine

——sans deconstructs grammatical anthropomorphism

p. 44 God is the Good that transcends the Good, the Being that transcends Being, this “logic” is that of the “without (sans)” > transcendence nothing other, and tout autre, than what it transcends [Augustine: God is powerful w/out power] [quoting w/out quoting]

p. 60 Heidegger w/ and w/out word “être” wrote a theology w/ and w/out God, left a trace no longer his own, mais qui reste quasiment la sienne > 3 adverbs: pas, sans, quasiment

MPM p. 62 precipitousness, acceleration to win time, win time over, non-dialectical—not a particular rhythm—a rhythm w/out rhythm (incommensurable acceleration, infinite and null)

p. 65 memory w/out memory (thinking memory); Gedächtnis w/out Erinnerung (symbolist introjection), not re-animated in the interiority of consciousness

——Gedächtnis [w/out Erinnerung], a thinking memory, engagement beyond negativity, a reaffirmation of engagement, a memory that has mourned the dialectic (which is mourning itself), memory w/out mourning, rigorous fidelity of an affirmation, barely “amnesic”

p. 95 no act before speech, no speech before act > there is this not natural“fact,” faktum, to which we’re recalled: already there, past never present, historicity itself, “ancientness” w/out history

A p. 16 responsible decision must obey an “it is necessary” that owes nothing, owes nothing in order to be a duty, duty w/out debt, thus w/out duty

p. 20 we can never say these are the conditions of inexhaustible singularity of event, must speak in negative form (w/out X no Y) [Derrida against present or presentation of “this is that”]

p. 79 existential analysis as witness, belonging w/out belonging of testimony, and first of all to language

P pp. 32-3 Derrida’s pas in Hegel/Heidegger’s circle, get across (franchir) circle w/out getting free (saffranchir), pas sans pas: circular closure as one that remains open

p. 68 finalité sans fin

pp. 75-6 for Kant, beauty is universality w/out concept—necessitates an analogy, occupation of nonconceptual field by the grid (quadrillage) of conceptual force: sans et avec [concept] en même temps (ama)

pp. 85-7 but en blanc [cf. C p. 229 can(n)on] (gun as finality w/out end in sight) [goal as white page] Kant’s finality w/out end: free beauty, wild tulip

p. 89 the w/out counts for beauty

——tulip is exemplary of the sans of the pure cut (sans of finality-sans-end)

——“on this sans, that is not a lack, science has nothing to say”

p. 90 beautiful object, tulip, not lacking in anything, tel point de vue, de but en blanc, plie la totalité à se manquer elle-même > le sans de la coupure pure est sans manque—but for me to experience its totality, my knowledge lacks something—its end (bout); not the absence of end but the trace of the without [end] is origin of beauty; ça donne-le-beau: beauty gives nothing to be seen, sans is not visible, et pourtant il y en a et cest beau

pp. 89-91 nonknowledge is point of view whose irreducibility gives rise to the beautiful (purity of the trace of the sans) > Kant: no science of the beautiful, only critique

p. 94 concepts stitch up (recoudre), furnish supplement of adherence [re: completes incomplete gadget]; still, there’s a chiasma, w/ free beauty, la coupure ny laisse aucune peau, aucun tissu dadhérence: law w/out concept, w/out debt, complete because incomplete

——concept: a saturating generality—drinks up or effaces sans of pure cut

p. 129 “negative pleasure” of sublime, respect, admiration, is different from “positive pleasure” of beautiful, and unique from beauty’s negativity (the work of of mourning in beauty), which was already singular, a negativity w/out negativity, sans sans sans, sans of pure cut, sans fin of finality [Blanchot’s awaiting oblivion vs. Levinas’ face-to-face?]

p. 144 pas-sans-de-lune-à-lautre

PAS PAS p. (31) for Blanchot, proximity as an inclusion w/out interiority

p. (32) Blanchot’s Heidegger-like fissure that holds together, separation w/out separation, maintenance (nowness) w/out maintenance (nowness), Blanchot’s syntactical use of sans keeps us under its attraction [pas too?]

p. (33) law w/out law of é-loignement: not essence, but impossible topic of essentiality

***p. (42) play (w/out play) of the w/out (sans) disarticulates every identity, every contradiction > ever since the “the name of death” or nonidentity of double in the name

pp. (52-3) (transgressive, completely passive) pas enacts a crossing of border that leaves border unscathed (indemne): bord sans bord, w/out any dialectical reappropriation

p. (66) “écriture comme trace dun mouvement sans origin, sans fin, sans langage, sans…”

***p. (84) [list of Blanchot’s many sans constructions] X sans X forms the trace or the pas of the toute autre that acts on itself there (sy agit) > degree o (eau); il reste un reste sans reste de ce passage (il y apasrien, un texte, un récit, déjà)

p. (85) formulation of sans is impossible; sheltered (abrité) by paleonym w/out relation to it, invests paleonym w/ tout autre > sanstrace de pas

——sans remarks same X w/out annulling it, springless spring (ce ressort sans ressort), this re-trait leaves everything intact (sauf, indemne) in appearance [absolute heterogenous neutrality w/out negation], at the same time it has abducted, erased, absolute rapidity of dispossession (dérapage)

p. (86) sans is infinitely passive to tout autre that approaches it, sans auto-affects itself by tout autre

p. (92) death as the impossibility of dying, à partir de laquelle sannonce la mort sans mort

POOF p. 41 Derrida countersigns Nietzsche [re: arrivant thinkers, new philosophers], extends the duty to countersign again, to us, to me, to you, teleiopoetically: friendship w/out friendship of friends of solitude

p. 42 language of madness, forced by most rigorous & profound necessity to say the insane, impossible, absurd, undecidable—to the disdain of philosophical good conscience (wants to hold out in shade of the Enlightenment): every “X without X” [i.e. “community w/out community”]

pp. 80-1 we tremble in time of Nietzsche’s mutation, we belong (w/out belonging) to this tremor, absolute dislocation, borderless disjoining; we emit warnings, like searchlights w/out coast, mad, impossible pleas: recurrent syntagms of “X without X” (harbor invisible in their very light) > are these watchmen [Bataille, Blanchot, Nancy] guiding us toward another destination [?]

p. 238 gravest of problems, not our intention to denounce fraternity: via Michelet, fraternity as ‘law beyond law,’ vision of universal/revolutionary fraternity [à la the Enlightenment], a hyperbole whose generosity can’t be opposed > [Derrida promising] a fraternity w/out fraternity (literal, strict, genealogical, masculine)

p. 296 Zarathustra always called us, supposing it teleiopoetically, under neutral, non-dialecticizable law of pas and ‘X w/out X’

p. 298 this friendship announced would have nothing to do w/ community: so that each X without X, unceasing neutralization of one predicate by another (relation w/out relation, community w/out community, partage sans partage), would call on significations altogether different from part shared or held in common

ROP p. 34 la restance disséminale, hyperbolythique, destined (vouée) to chance, to ash, à un oubli radical, trace w/out trace: secret w/out depth, lieu, nom, destination, lysis w/out measure/return/anagogy

ATIA p. 5 contretemps of 2 nudities w/out nudity: 1) animal in non-nudity because nude 2) man in nudity so no longer nude

O p. 42 [re: Maldorors 6th song, exit into the real] spider w/out web to spin, instant of awakening, instant of death

SW p. 322 expecting w/out knowing, thus w/out expecting [?]

p. 348 [read Cixous’ Savoir] only in a French to come, only happen in delayed form—inheriting w/out inheriting, reinventing mother & father [baby daddy]

DPi pp. 34-5 time of bandages: when body not found—when Jesus is not dead but not yet elevated, resuscitated > the lodging made ready for literature: ascension w/out ascension, elevation w/out elevation, immanence w/out immanence, imminent yet unaccomplished resurrection

p. 37 instant of bandages, Christ’s being-there w/out being-there: this Dasein that is not a Da-sein, this Fort/Da-sein of Christ who’s dead but not dead, mort vivant

p. 119 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] literature “expresses w/out expressing,” “this death w/out death” defines horizon w/out horizon of responsibility w/out responsibility of writer

REST p. 271 in “I owe you the truth in painting,” emphasis should be placed on the owe (doit), the debt, il doit, “he must/should/owes/ought”: vérité sans vérité de la vérité

DST DST p. 213 for Lacoue-Labarthe, mimesis is an essence w/out essence, is not, does not exist—desists (not negative)

AFR p. 135 via Condillac, desire no longer a direction, but an end w/out end > moment stone (statue) comes to life, works to reduce gap, (not) become dead again—contrary to frivolous distraction, to headstrong identity of signs: fear of Medusa [fear of frivolous?], legitimacy itself

C pp. 244-45 how can we delimit all the features (traits) [of artwork] when the absent one haunts, obsesses, besieges (assiège) [plus quun autre] > avec égale sans (trait dunion: with-out [in English])

EL p. 197 desert, verge of the abyss, place w/out place (lieu sans lieu), improbable border

——does Scholem want shibboleth to get out of abyss (the improbable border, the desert) or to rush into it & be engulfed by it (pour sy engouffrer)?

TN pp. 13-4 tôt (soon): davance dévoré par cet autre du temps, consumed, burned, tostus refers to instant, au temps sans temps dune flamme > on the verge, it’s the end: no time for motion, trop tard

p. 73 Nancy remains an exacting, rigorous, philosopher where limits tremble (impossible, undecidable), trembles w/out trembling, submits to trembling

p. 81 this equivocation [re: Levinas’ caress] of negation w/out negativity marked by recurrence of “as if” and “without” (x w/out x, “essence of this non-essence”)

p. 107 Derrida jokingly scolds himself for scolding Nancy: stop using this incredible vocabulary > abstain from ‘touching,’ ce concept sans répondant assuré: figures w/out figure, therefore w/out credit

pp. 149-50 de Biran, faculty of movement: “willing subject,” twinning (jumeler) the stem (souche): ego w/out ego before ego—1) touch as motor will 2) touch as pure sensibility > combines thinking of force w/ thinking of virtual [p. 136]

p. 298 pudeur: elle déploie ses voiles à l'infini > must must not, because can can’t (confess/betray)

——la loi marque ainsi le sans dan le sens ou dans lexistence

a “must (devoir)” worthy (digne) of the name must remain foreign to an economy of debt [w/out alibi]

***E p. 15 [re: disinterested pleasure] a moral revenue drawn from a natural production w/out interest to us; one takes wealth w/out interest, the singular moral surplus value of sansstill, the trace (Spur) of a purpose in nature is what makes our stock in moral value rise

——the without of pure detachment is a language nature speaks to us, “she who loves to encrypt herself and record her signature on things”

LG p. 230 trait (supplementary & distinctive), re-mark of belonging doesn’t belong, this sans > a blink of the eye, w/out which nothing would come to light

p. 231 genre-clause (clause de genre): clin doeil, écluse (floodgate), clôture qui sexclut de ce quelle inclut, déclasse ce quelle permet de classer > unfigurable figure of clusion, forme sans forme, neither sees day nor brings itself to light

ATAP pp. 94-5 apocalypse w/out apocalypse, w/out Last Judgment, no eschatology beyond tone of “Come” itself > the apocalypse of apocalypse [our apocalypse now], beyond good & evil: no longer collection of evil & good in legein of alētheia, in Geschick of lenvoi, or of Schicken of co-destination

p. 95 [apocalypse w/out apocalypse] X w/out X, sans marks internal/external catastrophe of apocalypse, catastrophe of sans doesn’t merge w/ announced end, is its pli: a closure w/out end, end w/out end > outside of apocalypse w/in apocalypse

——“do not seal”: i.e. do not close, do not sign

EU p. 128 Derrida admits to abusing word strategy, always stratégie sans finalité, au risque de me couper lherbe sous les pieds > car jy tiens et elle me tient > aleatory strategy: someone who admits he doesn’t know where he’s going > also comme la précipitation sans détour vers la fin, joyous contradiction of self: very old and cunning (rusée), something that’s just been born, delights in being w/out defense

SPEC p. 401 where Causa is lAutre Choseno more opposition btwn pleasure & unpleasure, w/in & beyond, life & death: graphics of strictural supplement not oppositional, knowns no negation, no lack > in this graphics, desire is sanssans,” is of a “sans sans sans”

YES, YES

GT p. 155 [Derrida includes a “yes, yes” w/out elaboration]

FK p. 55 “responsibility of repetition in the wager (gage) of decision or of affirmation (re-legere) which links up with itself to link with the other” [desert, messianic, khōra]

p. 100 yes, yes: answering machine & possibility of radical evil; yes, yes: testimonial affirmation & reactivity; yes, yes: order of faith, trust in address of the other & mechanical machine-like division

LOBL p. 85 is the double affirmation triumphant or a paradoxical phase in work of mourning [re: Freud’s manic fantasy]? p. ~101 one never writes in one’s own language or in a foreign language > derive all consequences of this, from each element: hence the triumph (necessarily double & equivocal, because also a phase of mourning)

p. 95 double affirmation: of death which triumphs over life, & triumph of life at edge of death

***p. 104 [extensive description] yes of event, yes of iteration, quotes, cites, in accordance w/ strange ring outside of presence, sur-vives

——ring is sealed by arrêt de mort (syntax, almost untranslatable, is sealed in this French expression)

p. 108 Blanchot’s come, come, Derrida’s yes, yes

pp. ~114-15 is double affirmation same as Freud’s triumph? wouldn’t this risk negativity of mourning, economic resentment, melancholia in “yes, yes”? can this be avoided?

p. 132 yes to yes w/out self-recollection, the must not or need not know yourself, the interdiction of each event, interposes an unconscious between the event and the experience of it, between living-on and presence

p. 150 madness of understanding “yes”

p. ~176 to speak of writing, triumph, as living on, is to denounce [Freud’s] manic fantasy (not w/out repeating it)

AF p. 74 1st yes is promise, 2nd yes is engage; affirmation of affirmation, inaugural engagement of a promise or of an anticipation which wagers, a priori, the very future

SPOM SPOM p. 33 irreducible possibility of Un-fug: resource & injunction of reaffirmed affirmation

p. 42 deconstruction links an affirmation to the experience of the impossible, radical experience of perhaps

***p. 211 “ascesis strips the messianic hope of all biblical forms…all determinable figures…denudes itself in view of responding to that which must be absolute hospitality, the ‘yes’ to the arrivant(e), the “come” to the future (lavenir) that cannot be anticipated”

——“we must practice recognizing (sexercer à reconnaître)” those too familiar ghosts

——open, waiting for event as justice, this hospitality is absolute only if it “keeps watch (veille)” over its own universality (messianic is always revolutionary, has to be)

POOF POOF p. 244 promise before friendships linked to ‘yes, yes’—beyond position > resituate the ‘concept of the political’

POO POO p. 16 affirmation of excess always spurs a counter-moralism

——affirmation beyond ethics, morality, politics, responsibility, or the subject

MPM MPM p. 19 de Man’s affirmation of memory, an alliance or ring more ancient, secret, resistant than familial or strategic alliances it makes possible, but is never reduced to

pp. 19-20 affirmation (yes, yes) that seals alliance, via de Man > alliance not secret because occult but because it commits before and beyond anything else

p. 20 ”yes” commits w/ no content must repeat itself: yes yes, must bind itself to memory for memory, if anything’s to come from future [alliance btwn memory and seal of yes, yes]

pp. 31-32 experience at heart of memory (Being & law), memorial, memoirs, mournful in essence, contracts itself together in impossible affirmation of mourning

——the coming of the impossible other, we love as such, affirming this to be good

p. 37 uncontrollable necessity, nonsubjectivizable law of thought beyond interiorization, beyond un-mourning thought mourning > can we accept it? affirm it? can no longer become a question

pp. 38-9 all figures receive possibility from these paradoxical structures: 1) inclusion in set of a part greater than set 2) that which regulates our relation w/ other as other [not mourning in current sense], that the other is capable of dying (which is our “own” mortality too) conditions rhetoric of faithful memory, serves to seal an alliance & call us to an affirmation of the other

p. 100 you can only say and sign: yes, yes in memory of yes

PAS PAS p. (21) yes, yes: force of affirmative repetition, unique call of the to-come as the will to repeat itself, affirmation that cites itself, joyous EROS, immeasurable unhappiness, irreducible contamination, affirmation risks citation, le oui qui fait dans la langue un trou aussi étrange que viens, il approuve, affirme, contresigne tout cequi est arrivé

p. (53) jaillissement de cette affirmation (wild affirmation “sauvage”)

p. (54) Pas est loubli, pas doubli doublement affirmé (oui, oui)

p. (56) affirmation of double pas, alliance w/out contract au tout autre (yes, yes), double band of a pact w/out pact

p. (58) repetition of yes, yes, allies one yes to other, refolds the other, gives sens to a singularity that should have none > viens never arrives because of this repetition

***p. (75) neutralization of sexual difference by calling her elle (anonymous, improper name), the de-distancing of viens instructs le pas de différence sexuelle; she is on the other side of the faux pas of the il that does not accompany me: neuter of affirmation, alliance, yes, yes, annulus of récit

***p. (75) vigilance (jalousie) links (enchaînant) affirmation to its repetition, bond (lien) w/out pact, w/out debt

S p. 94 promise (Versprechen) announces, salutes, what has already taken place “before” (this is the temporality of the coming of the event, Ereignis or Geschehen), it is the dissymmetry of a yes before opposition of yes and no, before question, language always revient à de la promesse

pp. 129-30n before the question, the question mark, language is already there, we have already said yes to it, given a pledge, acquiesced (Zusage,which also means promise, is for Heidegger a commitment of language toward language)

p. 130n before the word is the wordless word “yes,” a pre-originary pledge that precedes all engagements w/ language and action

OH p. 61 affirmation (faith) in language defies all metalanguage

TC pp. 232-33 a necessary affirmation can be born only by being reborn to itself [theater of cruelty still to be born]

pp. 246-47 [see NIETZSCHE & HEGEL on pure expenditure, death, repetition of affirmation, maintaining presence, consume pure difference w/ pleasure]

p. 249 affirmation must be penetrated in repeating itself > murder of father is endless, repeated indefinitely [murder of father: presence representing itself, i.e. a sign, a repetition]

SH p. 10 [pause as 1st affirmation, exclamation (speech) as 2nd]

FWT FWT p. 4 [re: contradictory reaffirmation] passive reception, decision to say “yes,” then selection, interpretation, thus transformation: not to leave safe the very thing one respects before all else > not to leave safe: to save it, perhaps, yet again, w/out illusion of final salvation

p. 175 we must always reaffirm something of the past to avoid something worse

ROP ROP p. 29 double bind drives deconstruction in rhythmic compulsion to track desire for origin, and to raise its stakes, la pousse à une surenchère > interminable drama of analysis, il fallait faire droit to the law deconstructed, w/ une affirmation donatrice unknown to yet driving analysis

p. 33 what rejects analysis: affirmation of gift as trace

OTO OTO p. 13 yes, yes, given to shadowless [?] gift of high noon, beneath that division whose borders are inundated by sunlight: this is how we can understand Nietzsche’s life

p. 14 it is life, as the living feminine, that must return eternally, selectively > life allied to herself by nuptial annulus, wedding ring

——btwn title & book to come, exergue situates place from which life will be recited: yes, yes, amen, amen, I sign, I am in debt to “high noon” [instant of signature, no place]

***pp. 19-20 good news of EROS is message, is a teaching, address/destination of doctrine, is untimely, differant, since news repeats an affirmation (yes, yes), must give rise to magisterial institution, institutions of the “yes,” which have need of ears

p. 20(n) institutions of “yes,” have need of ears: Nietzsche doesn’t expect the ears and hands for his truths today—my small ears no small interest to ladies, makes me a monster, anti-ass, Anti-Christ

DIF DIF pp. 26-7 that differance will never be a unique name, we must affirm this (w/out nostalgia), in the sense that Nietzsche puts affirmation into play, in a certain laughter & step of dance

WAP p. 185 affirmation, if there is any, non-negotiable, uncompromising, unconditional

DPi pp. 278-79 for Montaigne, there’s always something worth more than life, exceeding life, force of an opining (to say yes), belief, a force of force, a force of act of faith that says yes > this, acc. Montaigne, is the essence of religion: acceptance of sacrificial death & DP in shadow of a sur-viving supposedly worth more than life > religion grants the surviving of survival

——trapeze artist says “yes” (net saves him) until he doesn’t/dies

PF p. xxvii reaffirm the “it is necessary” of “w/out alibi”

***PSSS p. 276 originary affirmation, which advances itself in advance, lends [?] rather than gives itself?

——beyond the beyond, not a sovereignty, not a principle

——originary affirmation is attached to a life, but an im-possible life, a sur-vival, not symbolizable, but the only one worthy of being lived, w/out alibi, the one from which to depart

——one cannot justify pacifism, right to life, setting out from an economy of life, can only be done on basis of a sur-vival that owes nothing to alibi of some mytho-theological beyond

EL p. 219 “we” of covenant, not secularized “communal subject,” countersigns by responding to commitment already taken: autobiographicity of “we” assigned by call resonating from sacred language > in sacrificial instant, one hears imminence of God’s voice’s return

HST p. 361 one must (il faut) welcome w/out “one must” (sans il faut)

——absolute hospitality: say “yes” to the coming of le tout autre, absolutely inanticipable stranger

TN p. 279 for Chrétian, Christ is one, common body, not a plurality of bodies > Chrétian & Nancy deal w/ a different “yes,” or a different provenance of same “yes,” addressed to “you”

p. 286 Nancy’s “yes”: consent to touch a body to come

p. 289 [re: Nancy’s list of touchable bodies] finite series, symphonic “yes” of pleasure

NOY p. 232 yes no longer suffers any metalanguage, all subjects arise from the scene of the yes

yess essential, irreducible infinity: presupposed by negation, opposition, dialectics too

pp. 232-33 de Certeau: knowledge’s procedure is essentially a “no,” mystic postulate advances a limitless “yes”

——St. Paul: “in Him there has been only Yes (nai)” > de Certeau: this “yes” pierces field of distinctions/separations practiced by Hebraic epistemology

p. 233 de Certeau: “yes” (Ja) and the Separated (Ja, or Jahvé), yes brings together No-Name of Other and Yes of the Volition

——yes resounds (résonne) in question, always prior to, before, beyond any possible question

p. 234 quasi-transcendental or ontological structure of yes prescribes double destiny, a destiny of duplicity?

Nietzsche opposes Ja of innocent affirmation with Ja, Ja of the Christian ass

——Christian yes, a yes of finitude (repetition and memory); Derrida proposes a more ancient root to annul the alternative [limitless singular yes, finite ass yes]

pp. 234-35 observing separation in Christ’s ‘yes,’ Derrida wants to think a ‘yes’ neither Jewish nor Christian, but quasi, an originary eventness, fable inscribed in the yesorigin of speech (fari)

p. 235 Rosenzweig: Yea circumscribes as inner limit all that is non-Nought, “Amen” behind every word

——“yes” as “silent accompanist,” a little like Kant’s “I think” > Urwort

p. 236 yes belongs w/out belonging to whole it institutes and opens; it exceeds and punctures (troue) the language in which it remains immanent: first inhabitant of language, first to step out of its home (sortir de chez lui)

——the engagement, the promise to come to language

pp. 236-37 is the yes related to volo (will)? or to a more Heideggerian receptivity, the Zusage (pre-engagement) and its relation to Gelassenheit [Eckhart’s Gelâzenheit] (bespeaks non-vouloir)?

pp. 238-39 yes must be fictive, quasi, opens every event w/out being itself an event, never present

any ontology, transcendental statement, presupposes yes, can’t make it it’s theme, quasiment at the beginning

——quasi-analytic: yes never lets itself return to ultimate simplicity, it is the fatality of repetition, repetition as incisive opening (ouverture coupante)

——a first yes, given its structure, must be a response, dabord second, to the other (au prochain); yes, already there nonetheless remains to come (déjà là mais reste pourtant à venir)

p. 240 “second” yes a priori enveloped in “first”: doubled in advance, a repetition which opens and threatens w/ forgetting, simulacrum, contamination

——promise of memory, memory of promise, before all psychē, all morality

——the “second” yes, doit arriver comme un renouvellement absolu, the structural “forgetting” of fidelity

——“grâce à la menace de cet oubli [the cutting off, the becoming unique, the divisibility contre laquelle une signature se tend] la mémoire de la promesse, la promesse même peut franchir son premier pas, à savoir le second

yes, (already but always) faithful countersignature, can’t be counted: it always sends itself off in number (il senvoie toujours en nombre)

EW p. 268 in relation to “yes,” Zusage presupposed in every question, one must seek (post-deconstructive) responsibility of the subject

p. 286 unconditional affirmation that motivates deconstruction can always upset an instituted rhythm of every pause (subject is a pause, stabilizing arrest, the thesis we will always need [?])

AD p. 3 Levinas’ “unconditional yes” exceeds and precedes my freedom

pp. 22-3 hospitality, welcome of face, attention: this series of metonymies are all the same only where they withdraw, like the other, from theme—each welcomes (says “yes” to) the other

p. 23 yes, yes: the welcoming of the other (laccueil de lautre) (objective/subjective genitive)

——Levinas on cogito: “it is not I, it is the other that can say yes” > infinity welcomed in anarchy

p. 24 refer to “first” yes in quotes because there’s no first, call is only called from response, we are thrown, begin by responding > tragedy of unanswered call: as necessary as death, finitude

——call can only be heard in the promise of response

p. 31 ineluctability (this is necessary) of the 3rd is law of question > question of a question, addressed to the other, from the other: the other of the other > a question that is certainly not first (comes after the yes of/to the other), though nothing precedes it

p. 35 the possibility of offering hospitality to the worst is necessary so good hospitality has a chance: yes of the other, yes to the other > impossibility of programming a limit btwn pervertibility/perversion is necessary

pp. 54-6 aphoristic energy of déliasion in Levinas’ ethical affirmation: from subordination (no interiorization), to welcome of Most High (host), to unicity of possibility of substitution (hostage)

p. 69 absolute past: “word of God” —will have taken place before taking place, older than Sinai—truth of messianic exceeds national identity; p. 142n absolute “lateness”: older yes

p. 143n w/ Levinas, “yes” of faith not incompatible w/ atheism—or certain inexistence of God

> à-Dieu, unique, more than old, inaugural (& replaceable, exposed to inanities)

LG p. 243 Blanchot’s doubly affirmative neutrality: “(or…or)?”

p. 244 [Blanchot’s] immense double affirmation both to life & death, forming an alliance or marriage bond w/ itself (“hymen”)

p. 245 [vis-à-vis Blanchot] as long as I say “yes, yes,” I’m a woman and beautiful, man rendered other: secret and odd hymen > madness of sexual difference, mixing of genres

——transsexuality permits me, in a more than metaphorical & transferential way, to engender

p. 247 double affirmation not foreign to the genre, genius or spirit of law: no double affirmation w/out light of day and daylight becoming law > madness of the day

CIN p. 37 incineration celebrates perhaps the nothing of the all, destruction w/out return, mad w/ its desire, desperate disseminal affirmation but also its opposite: “no” to the work mourning, “no” of fire > how to accept working for his Highness (monseigneur) mourning?

BSi pp. 306-07 bêtise as self-positing, positivism, positivity itself, across all 3 modes (question, affirmation, negation) > but affirmation, the “yes,’”is not to be reduced to positivity [?]

WBH p. 197 deconstruction not transgression of the Law, it is the Law: it is an affirmation, and affirmation is on side of Law: as soon as you affirm a desire, you perform something which is the Law, the Law says, “yes” (Law is not simply negative, that’s hard to understand)

——deconstruction is another way of writing Law, affirming new mode of Law, thus not a movement of transgression or liberation

p. 203 to receive a gift, in Nietzschean sense, is to say, “I want to begin again,” not a reproduction: “yes” of gift must be repeatable from the start

ZERO

PAS PAS p. (84) [list of Blanchot’s many sans constructions] X sans X forms the trace or the pas of the toute autre that acts on itself there (sy agit) > degree o (eau); il reste un reste sans reste de ce passage (il y apasrien, un texte, un récit, déjà)

F p. xxvii no-place proper to “original” event, “hypothetical zero hour,” creates cryptomythical system

DS p. 262 supplementary addition [addiction] enriches itself w/ zeros > racing toward infinity: “more” and “less” are separated/united by next-to-nothing of the hymen

O p. 20 absolute knowledge present at 0 point of philosophical exposition: saturate text w/ meaning (sens), teleologically equate it [the text?] w/ its (sa) conceptual tenor

——point of ontotheological fusion reduces precipitation & after-affect (dehiscence btwn vouloir-dire & writing, anticipation & recapitulation) to sublatables [mouvement de tête]

CHM p. 56 hyperbolical (mad) audacity of Cartesian Cogito (critical experience of which we may be too self-assured to experience): return to original point, zero point, where determined meaning & nonmeaning come together in their common origin

D p. 296 re: Soller’s Numbers, a praxis that doesn’t just produce (not governed by motif of truth whose very horizon it frames), a certain textual zero

p. 330 two is no more an accident of one than one is a secondary surplus of zero (or vice versa): reconsider notion of accident, secondariness, surplus

OG pp. 114-15 (168) confessions of anthropologist [does an anthropologist write anything else?], 18th century, humility before a goodness European society has lost: a “zero degree,” native soil, an eschatology/teleology of full, immediate closing of history

pp. 242-43 (345) complexity of zero degree, origin, nothing but a point in the system of supplementarity? [despite what he declares, nothing Rousseau writes authorizes simple origin]

——history of language as history du supplément dorigine

ZOO

ATIA p. 12 bottomless gaze of other [Levinas], the animal [?], seeing not just seen eyes of other; abyssal limit of the human, ends of man, bordercrossing where man announces himself, ultimate and first event of the end, unveiling, verdict; instant of extreme passion, je suis the apocalypse itself > when all this passes I can speak calmly of beasts of Apocalypse, visit them at the zoo

BSi p. 283 zoos profitable to knowledge and economy [physiocratic theory of economy]

——nomos of oikos: taming, training, the domus of the dominus > oikonomia also general condition of ipseity as sovereign mastery over beast

p. 298 Derrida on how zoos hide limits, interiorize, hollowed-out (en creux) limits [ditch instead of bars] > repressive violence w/ liberal, idealist, spiritualist grimace

pp. 302-03 Persian paradeisos: an animal farm [a mystical zoo?]

p. 311 zoos, asylums: made people, all the mad animals, love the ecosystem of limits